[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-10610

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

ROMULO PINTO, 

Petitioner,

versus

U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

Respondent.

____________________

Petition for Review of a Decision of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Agency No. A203-653-980

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-10610

Before WILSON, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Romulo Pinto seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’s (“BIA”) order affirming the Immigration Judge’s denial of 

his application for cancellation of removal pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 240A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). 

The government has moved to dismiss Pinto’s petition for lack of 

jurisdiction, asserting that (1) the Immigration Judge’s hardship determination is a “purely discretionary” decision that we lack jurisdiction to review, and (2) Pinto, in any event, failed to exhaust his 

administrative remedies. Pinto contendsthat we retain jurisdiction 

over mixed questions of law and fact, including the determination 

of one’s statutory eligibility for relief. As to the merits of his petition, he contends that the Immigration Judge mostly focused on 

his family’s medical issues and failed to weigh any other favorable 

or adverse factors, contravening BIA precedent as required by due 

process.

We review our own subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Lin

v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 881 F.3d 860, 866 (11th Cir. 2018). When the 

BIA affirms the IJ’s decision without opinion under 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1003.1(e)(4), we review the Immigration Judge’s decision as the 

final Agency determination. Yang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 418 F.3d 1198, 

1201 (11th Cir. 2005).

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21-10610 Opinion of the Court 3

Generally, we lack jurisdiction over “any judgment” regarding cancellation of removal under INA § 240A(b), 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1229b(b), including any statutory “eligibility determinations.” 

INA § 242(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i); Patel v. U.S. Att’y 

Gen., 971 F.3d 1258, 1279 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc), cert. granted,

Patel v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 2850 (2021). However, we retain jurisdiction over “constitutional claims or questions of law.” INA 

§ 242(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). In Patel, we rejected the 

government’s contention that this jurisdictional bar applies to “discretionary determinations,” as opposed to “non-discretionary determinations,” that underlie an alien’s removal order, and we overruled our precedent that distinguished between “discretionary” 

and “non-discretionary decisions” in this context. 971 F.3d at 1262, 

1276-79. We clarified that we lack jurisdiction over “factual challenges to denials of” cancellation of removal, but we retain jurisdiction over “constitutional and legal challenges to the denial of 

that relief, including review of mixed questions of law and fact.” 

Id. at 1275-77, 1279. However, we have jurisdiction only over colorable constitutional or legal claims, and “a party may not dress up 

a claim with legal or constitutional clothing to invoke our jurisdiction.” Id. at 1272.

While we retain jurisdiction over final orders of removal, we

“may review a final order of removal only if . . . the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of 

right.” INA § 242(d)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). The exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional and precludes review of a claimant’s 

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4 Opinion of the Court 21-10610

argument that was not presented to the BIA. Lin, 881 F.3d at 

867-68. We have applied the exhaustion requirement in cases 

where the BIA summarily affirmed the Immigration Judge without 

opinion. Alim v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 1239, 1242, 1253 (11th Cir. 

2006). Although not stringent, exhaustion requires that the petitioner “previously argued the core issue now on appeal before the 

BIA.” Indrawati v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 779 F.3d 1284, 1297 (11th Cir. 

2015) (quotation marks omitted). “Though exhaustion does not 

require a petitioner to use precise legal terminology or provide a 

well-developed argument” in support of his claims, “it does require 

that [he] provide information sufficient to enable the BIA to review 

and correct any errors below.” Id. (quotation marks omitted, first 

alteration adopted). Except for purely legal questions, “the BIA 

cannot review and correct errors without the petitioner first 

providing [his] argument’s relevant factual underpinnings.” Id. at 

1298. Further, merely identifying an issue to the BIA is insufficient 

to exhaust a petitioner’s claims, as the petitioner must also “set out 

any discrete arguments [that] he relies on in support of” those 

claims. Jeune v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 810 F.3d 792, 800 (11th Cir. 2016).

The Attorney General has discretion to grant cancellation of 

removal to a nonpermanent resident who shows, among other 

things, that “removal would result in exceptional and extremely 

unusual hardship to the alien’s . . . child, who is a citizen of the 

United States.” INA § 240A(b)(1)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). In 

deciding whether removal would result in such hardship, the BIA 

has held that Immigration Judges should consider various factors 

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21-10610 Opinion of the Court 5

“in the aggregate,” including “the ages, health, and circumstances 

of [the] qualifying [relative],” whether the alien has “a qualifying 

child with very serious health issues, or compelling special needs in 

school,” and whether the qualifying relative would experience “[a] 

lower standard of living or adverse country conditions in the country of return.” In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 63-64

(BIA 2001). Other factors include economic loss, inability to 

reestablish comparable economic stability in the new country, and 

the loss of a family support system. In re Gonzalez Recinas, 

23 I. & N. Dec. 467, 471 (BIA 2002).

As an initial matter, because the BIA affirmed the Immigration Judge without opinion, we review the Immigration Judge’s decision as the final Agency decision. Here, Pinto’s petition is subject 

to dismissal for failing to exhaust his administrative remedies. In 

his brief before us, Pinto makes specific, discrete arguments about 

the Immigration Judge that were not presented to the BIA in his 

notice of appeal (“NOA”), and Pinto failed to file a brief with the 

BIA. Merely identifying the issue of whether the Immigration 

Judge abused her discretion in denying his application, without any 

supporting argument, is insufficient to exhaust his claims. Accordingly, we grant the government’s motion, and we dismiss Pinto’s 

petition for lack of jurisdiction.

The government’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction 

is hereby GRANTED, and Pinto’s petition is DISMISSED.

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