### IN THE CO URT OF CR IMINAL APPEALS OF T ENN ESSEE AT NASHVILL E Feb ru ary 11 , 20 09 Ses si on

STATE OF TENNESS EE v . ABDIRI Z AK OMAR YUSSUF In re: RADAR BONDI NG COMPANY, INC.

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty No. 2005-C- 2589 J. Randall Wyatt, Jr ., Judge

No. M2008- 01161-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Novem ber 5, 2009

Appellant, Rader Bonding Company
, I nc., appea ls the judgme nt of the Davidson County Criminal Court order ing complete fo rf ei t u re of the bail bond in the case of Def endant, Addirizak Omar Yussuf. Appellant argues that the State’s ref usal to seek extradition of Def endant, who had fled to Sweden, constituted an extreme case under State v. Fr ankg os, 114 Tenn. 76, 8 5 S

. W. 79, 80-81 (Tenn. 1905) which re lieved Appe llant of its responsibilit y under the bond ag ree ment. Following

a re view of the rec ord and the parties’ briefs, w e af firm the judg ment of the trial c ourt.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed

T H O M A S T. W O O D A L L , J
., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D A V I D H. W E L L E S and J E R R Y L

. S M I T H , J J ., joined.

J oel H. Moseley , Sr., Nashville, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Abdirizak Omar Y ussuf.

Robert E. Cooper, J r., Attorney Gene ral and Reporter ; Clarenc e E. Lutz, Assistant Attorney Gene ral; Victor S. J ohnson, I I I
, District Attorney Gene ral; Amy Ei s en b eck, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral; and L isa Naylor, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for the appellee
, State of Tenne ssee.

OP INION

I. F actual Background

Def endant was indicted on Septem b er 2 0
, 2005, on one count of attempted second deg ree murder and one count of ag g ravated assault. Appellant was surety on th e b ai l b o n d i s sued for Def endant in the Davidson County Criminal Court in t he amount of $50,000. D efe ndant fa iled to
appea r befor e the court for a jury trial on May 22, 2006. A conditional forf eiture was taken ag ainst Def endant on that date, and a capias wa s issued for his ar rest. The trial court a lso issued a writ of

s ci re fa ci as notifying Appellant t hat t he amount of t he bond would be forfeited unless within 180 day s Def endant was produce d or Appellant showed cause why the bond should not be forf eited. OnMarc h 9, 2007, the trial court issued a final forf eiture in the amount of $50,000. Following a hear ing

on J une 8, 2007, the trial court reissued t h e wr i t o f scire fac ias, enter ed a conditional judgme nt ag ainst Appellant, and extended Appellant an additional 180 day s within which to produce Def endant.

A hear ing on the final forf eiture of Def

endant’ s bond was hear d on Fe bruar y 21, 2008. J err

y J ordan, the secr etar

y for Appellant, testified that he maintained the company ’s files for eac h person for whom the company had issued a bond. Def endant’s fi l e contained a repor t from J onathan Shorthouse, the investigator hired by Appellant to locate Def endant afte r he failed to appea r in court. Mr. J ordan stated that acc ording to Mr. Shorthouse’s investigation, it was believed that Def endant,

a Somalia national, was curr ently residing somewher e in Sweden with his g irlfriend, Shukri Ahmed. Ms. Ahmed was also a Somalian who had been g iven asylum by the Swedish g overnme nt under the United Nations Relocation Effor t. The information was provided primarily by Def endant’ s family members and members of the Somalian community in Davidson County

. Mr. J o rd an stated that Appellant had not y et incurre d the cos t s nece ssary to asce rtain Def endant’ s exact location within Sweden beca

use the State had i n d i ca t ed that it did not wish to seek extradition. Mr. J ordan said, howeve r, that Appellant stood rea dy to assume the expenses associate d with returning Def endant to the United States should the State choose to pursue extradition.

The State called Assistant District Attorney Gene ral L isa Na y l o r as a witness. Gene ral Naylor stated t hat s he had participated i n the ex tradition from Me x i co of t hree Mexi can nationals char g ed with C l as s A felonies in Tenne ssee under the extradition treaty betwee n Mexi co and the United States. Gene ral Naylor stated that the extradition proce ss involved signific ant time, expense, and State resour ces. Gene ral Nay lor explained that in order t o o b t ai n an unlawful flig ht from
prosec ution war

rant throug h the United States Attorney ’s Offic e, the State was essentially require d
to submit its entire case -in-chie f supporting the char g es. Gene ral Nay lor stated that beca

use of the “rig orous proce ss” of obtaining extradition, the State pursued extradition only in those case s involving the most serious cr iminal charg es.

The trial court foun d t h at Ap pellant had assumed the risk that Def endant might flee the State’s jurisdiction at the time it ag ree d to se cure Def endant’ s appea

ranc e in c ourt. The trial court acknow ledg ed Appellant’s reluc tance to incur the expense nece ssary to locate Def endant’ s curr ent addre ss in Sweden in view of the State’s ref usal to seek extradition, but found that “but for Mr. Shorthouse’s repor

t based o n s ec o n d h and knowledg e, the wher eabouts of the Def endant would

rema in unknown.” Acc ording ly the trial court found “that t h e De fendant’s wher eabouts are unconfirme d and without specific ity .”

The trial c ourt found that:

despite the arguments and proof offe red by [App ell ant], that the circ umstances prese nt in the Def

endant’ s matter do not arise to an “extreme case ” as contemplated by the Court of Criminal Appea ls. T h e Court finds that the Def endant’ s flig ht to another county was a fore seea ble conting ency

when his bond wa s secur ed.

-2-Acc ording ly
, the tri al co u rt fo und that Appellant’s bond in the amount of $50,000 was

subject to final for feiture

.
II. Analysi s

On appea l, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in enter ing a final forf eiture judgme nt ag ainst Appellant beca use the State’s ref

us al t o seek Def

endant’ s extradition from Sweden, notwithstanding Appellant’s responsibili ty for the costs incurre d in the proce ss, rende red Appellant’s contra ctual obliga tion to produce Def

endant impossibl e. R el y i n g on I n re Sandford & Sons Ba il Bonds, Inc., 96 S.W .3d 199 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002), Appellant contends that
t h e S t at e’s ref

usal to seek extradition constitutes a brea ch of the State’s implied covena nt not to interfe re, throug h action or inaction, with the covena nt betwee n Appellant, as surety , and Def endant, as principa l.

The forf eiture of bail bonds is g overne d by Tenne ssee Code Annotated sections 40-11-201 throug h 40-11-215. Specifica lly
, Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 40-11-201( a) authorizes a trial
court to enter a conditional judgme nt of forf eit u re ag ainst a defe ndant and his sureties when a defe n d an t fa i l s to appea

r in court in acc ordanc e with a bail bond ag ree ment. Upon the entry of a conditional judgme nt, the trial court must additionally issue a writ of scire fac ias req u i ri ng the defe ndant and his sureties to show cause why the judgme nt should not become final. T.C.A. § 40- 11-202. To this end, the trial court must aff ord the defe ndant and his sureties a hear ing prior to final forf eiture. I ndemnity I ns. Co. of North Americ a v. Bla ckwe ll, 653 S.W .2d 262, 264 (Tenn. App. 1983). At this hear ing, a surety or bonding company may petition the court for relief from forf eiture. Howeve r, the surety bear s the burden of proving that its petition should be g rante d. I n re P au l ’s BondingCompany , I nc., 62 S.W.3d 187, 193 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001).

A surety may be exonerated from forf eiture by its surr ender of the defe ndant to the court at any time befor e pay

ment of the judgme nt of forf eiture. T.C.A. § 40-11-203. Otherw ise, the surety must seek relief pursuant to Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 40-11-204. That statutory provision provides that:

the judge s of the g ener al sessions, circ uit, criminal and supreme courts may rec eive, hear and deter

mine the pet i t i o n of any person who claims relief is merited on any

rec og nizances [or bail bonds] forf eited, and so lessen or a

bsolutely remit the same, less a cle rk’s c ommissi on . . ., and do all and every thing therein as they

shall deem j u s t and rig ht, and consistent with the welfa re of the state, as well as the perso n pray ing suc h relief

.

A trial court’s discretion under Tenne ssee Code Annotated Section 40-11-204 is “broa d and
compre hensive, empower i n g trial courts to make deter minations ‘in acc ordanc e with [t heir]

conce ption of justice and rig ht.’” State v. Shredeh, 909 S.W .2d 833, 835 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (quoting Bla ck v. State, 154 Tenn. 88, 290 S.W

. 20, 21 (1927))

. “Ac cording ly
, in revie wing the trial court’s deter

minations in the instant case s, we apply an abuse- of-discr etion standard.” I n re Paul’s

-3-Bonding Co., 62 S.W .3d at 194 (citing State v. Wil liam Br et Robinson, No. E1999-00950-CCA-R3-

CD, 2000 WL 1211316, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxvi lle, Aug

. 28, 2000)). Under an abuse- ofdiscretion standard, this Court g rants the tria l court the be nefit of its de cision unless the trial court “applied a

n incorre ct leg al standar d, or re ache d a dec ision which is ag ainst logic or reasoning that

cause d an injusti ce to the party complaining .” State v. Shuck, 953 S.W .2d 662, 669 (Tenn. 1997);

see a lso St ate v. Shirley , 6 S.W .3d 243, 247 (Tenn. 1999)

.

I n I n re Paul’s B onding Co., we further stated:

Of course , in order to deter mine whether the trial court in t h es e cases applied an incorre ct leg al standard, we must define the corr ect leg al standard. I n this reg ard, our supreme court and this Court have narr owly ci rc u mscribed the circ umstances in which a trial court possesses the authority to g rant relief pursuant to Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 40-1 1 -204. We acknow ledg e the appar ent contra diction in limit ing a trial court’s “broa d and compre hensive” discretion to make deter minations i n acc ordanc e with its conce ption of justice and rig ht to a small n u m b er o f circ umstances. Nev er t h el ess, citing our supreme court’s decision in State v. Fr ankg os, 114 Tenn. 76, 85 S.W. 79, 80-81 (Tenn. 1905), w e have stated that

[t ]he authority to relieve sureties from liability may only be exercised in extreme case s, such as the d ea t h of the defe ndant or some other condition making it impossibl e for sureties to surre nder the defe ndant; the g ood faith eff ort made by the sureties or the amounts of their e x pense a

re not e x cuses.

Shredeh, 909 S.W .2d at 836; see also State v. L e Quire, 67 2 S

. W .2d 221, 222-223 (Tenn. Crim. App.1 984). Our supreme court in Fr ankg os, 85 S.W

. at 81, explained that “[t] o relieve sureties upon [l esser ] g rounds

. . . woul d encour ag e defe ndants to forf eit their bail, and bring about a very lax administration of the criminal laws of the state.”

I n re Paul’s B onding Co., 62 S.W.3d at 194.

A bail bond is “a c ontrac t betwee n the g overnme nt on one side and the criminal def endant and his surety on the other, wher eby the surety assumes custody of the defe ndant and g uara ntees to the State either the appea

ranc e of the defe ndant in court or the pay ment of the full amount of bail set by the court.” I n re Sanford & Sons Ba il Bonds, I nc., 96 S.W .3d at 202

. T y p i ca l l y , prior to or simult aneously

with the execution of a ba il bond,

[a profe ssional] bondsman and the defe ndant fo rm a co ntrac t in which the bail bondsman ag ree s, for a fee
, to act as the defe ndant’s surety

. I n addition to paying the fee
, the defe ndant ag ree s to appear i n co u rt for all schedule d appea ranc es. The bondsman only makes a profit when he is able to collect fee s from the defe ndant and

-4-avoid paying the amount of the bond to the court.... Hi s business depends on the

appea ranc e in cour

t of his clients.

There is, of course , risk that the defe ndant will sign the contra ct with the bondsman,

secur e re lease and lea

ve the jurisdiction or re fuse to appear in court. To protec t his investment, the bonds man m ust be thorough not onl y in assessingthe risk of flig ht befor e writi n g t h e b o n d, but in keeping tabs on the defe ndant afte r the bond is written. The profit motive is presumed to insure diligent attention t o his custodial obligation.

I d. (citing Holly J

. J oiner, Note, Private Police: D e f e n d in g the Power of Professional Ba il Bondsman, 32 I nd. L . Rev. 1413, 1422 (1999))

.

The State’s ro le in a bail bond contra ct was revie wed extensively by this Court in I n re Sanford & Sons Bail B onds, I nc. We first observe d that the re strictive interpre tation of Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 40-11-204 “is g rounded in part in public policy considera tions, F rankg os, 85 S.W

. at 81, but also seeming ly stems from the rule articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Taylor v. Taintor, 16 Wall. 366, 83 U.S. 366, 369, 371 (1873), that a surety will be relieve d of its obligation under a bail bond only when perf ormanc e is rende red impossibl e by a superve ning act of God, act of the State that is the benef iciary of the bail bond, or act o f l aw t h at i s operative in the benef iciary State and obligatory in its eff ect upon her authorities.” I d. at 203. The Taylor rule ref lects the c ommon law of contra cts which re quires:

that if a party char g e hi m s el f wi th an obli g ation possible to be performe d, he mus t abide by it unless perf

ormanc e is rende red impossibl e by the act of God, the law, or the other p ar t y

. Unfore seen difficulties will not excuse perf ormanc e. Where the parties have made no provision for a dispensati o n , t h e t erms of the contra ct must preva il.

Columbus R y . Power & L ight Co. v. Columbus, 249 U.S. 399, 412, 39 S . Ct. 349 (1919).

As a party to the bail bond contra ct, “t]here is also an implied covena nt on t h e p ar t o f t he
g overnme nt, when the rec og nizance or bail is acc epted, that it will not in any way interfe re with th[ e]

covena nt be tween [t he principal and his sur eties], or impair its obliga tion, or take any proce eding s with the principal which will incre ase the risks of the sureties or aff ect their reme dy ag ainst him.” Reese v. United States, 9 Wall. 13, 76 U.S. 13, 21-22 (1869). That is, “a surety does not assume the risk that the State will interfe re with the surety ’s perf ormanc e of its obligation under the bail bond.” I n re Sandford & Sons Ba i l Bo n ds, I nc., 96 S.W .3d at 204 (citing Reese, 76 U.S. at 21-22). “A State’s m ater ial brea ch o f t h i s implied covena nt will relieve a surety of i ts obligation under a bail bond.” I n re Sandford & Sons Ba il Bonds, I nc., 96 S.W .3d at 204 (citi n g Reese, 76 U.S. at 22, United States v. Galve z-Uriarte , 709 F.2d 1323, 1324- 25 (9th Cir. 1983)).

-5-Appell an t ar gu es that the State materia lly brea ched its covena nt not to interfe re with Appe l l an t ’s contra ctual obligations by ref using to extradite Def

endant from Sweden. The case s relied upon by Appellant in its brief in suppor t of its a rg ument illust rate the various way s a State’s actions may

relieve a sure ty

of its responsibiliti es under the bond agr eeme nt. See Ga lvez-Uriar te, 709 F.2d at 1324-25 (finding that the S tate breac hed it s implied covena nt not to interfe re with the
contra ctual arr ang ement b et we en the surety and the defe ndant when the Assistant United States Attorney agr ee d with defe nse counsel that the defe ndant could return to Mexi co pending trial in violation of the terms of the bond ag ree ment); State v. L iakas, 86 N.W.2d 373, 377-380 (Ne b. 1957) (holding that the surety ’s obliga tion under a bail bon d agr eement was discharg ed when the State voluntarily waived jurisdiction over the defe ndant and extradited him to another state to stand trial for o ff en ses committed in that jurisdiction); Octavio Castanada d/b/a O. Castaneda ’s Ba il Bonds Company v. State, 138 S.W .3d 304 (Texas Crim. App. 2003) (addr essing the issue of the statutory proce dure a bonding company must pursue under Texas Code of Criminal Procedur e Article 17.16
to raise a defe nse of liabili ty on its bond when the principal is rele ased to the custody of another jurisdiction, in that case, the I NS).

As ref lected in these case s and as emphasized by this Court in I n re Sandford & Sons Ba il Bonds, I nc., howeve r, it must be the action of the State which cause s “the surety ’s inability to satisfy its obliga tion under the bail bond.” I d. at 204 (citations omitted). In I n re Paul’s Bonding Company
, I nc., three Mexi can nationals wer e indicted on drug and extorti on char g es in Tenne s s ee

. I d., 62 S.W .3d at 189. After the Appellant ag ree d to secur e th e ap p ea ra n ce of eac h defe ndant, the defe ndants fled to Mexi co. I d. Appellant soug ht relief from the conditional judgme nts of forf eiture
arguing, a mong othe r issues, that it had enter ed into the bail bond contra ct with the under standing that an extradition treaty exis ted betwee n Mexi co and the United States. I d

. at 1 9 1. After the defe ndants failed to appea r for a schedule d court date, howeve r, Appellant lear ned from the Offic e of the District Attorney Gene ral “that, as a prac tical matter, the extradition treaty betwee n the United States and Mexi co is unenfor cea ble,” and t h e Di s t rict Attorney Gene ral declined to instit ute extradition proce eding s ag ainst the defe ndants. I d. Appellant ar gu ed t h at “the exis tence of an extradition treaty betwee n the United States and Mexi co war rants relief as the treaty l u l l ed the bonding c ompany

into a “fa lse sense of

secur ity .” I d. at 194.

This Court conclude d that “the lack of an enfor cea ble extradition treaty betwee n the United States and Mexico does not warr ant re lief.” I d. at 195 (e mphasis in origina l). We continued:

[i ]f the appellant did not know the difficulties inhere nt in rec apturing fug itives who have fled to Mexi co, it wa s t h e appellant’ s business to obtain the rele vant i n formation prior to enter ing into bail bond ag ree ments with Mexi can citizen s

. Nothing in the rec ord befor e this court sug g ests that the re l ev an t information was unavailable to the appellant at t he ti me of the ex ecution o f t he bail bonds at i ssue. I ndeed, [counsel for the bonding company] concede d at the September 8, 1999 hear ing that the appellant could have obtained the information throug h adeq uate investigation.

-6-I d. (see also Shredeh, 909 S.W .2d 836 (conc ludi n g that the lack of an extradition treaty betwee n

J ordan and the United States under the fac ts of that case did not war rant relief under Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 40-11-204)

.

We observe d in In re Sandord & Sons Ba il Bonds, I nc. that our previous holding in I n re Paul’s Bonding Company
, I nc. ref lects the principle that “a g round for relief asser ted by the surety will not constitute an ‘extreme case ’ for purposes of Tenn[essee] Code Ann[otated] [section] 40-11- 204 if it is a re alization of a risk assumed by the surety

in enteringinto the bail bond ag ree ment.” I n re Sandf

ord & Sons Bail B onds, I nc., 96 S.W.3d at 203.

I n I n re Sandford & Sons Ba il Bonds, I nc., th e d ef en dant, a Mexi can national, was

surre ndere d t o t h e I mmigration and Natura liz ation Service by the Hamblen County Sheriff’ s Depa rtment afte r the Appellant had enter ed into a bail bond contra ct with the defe ndant. I d. at 201. T h e trial court denied Appellant relief from the entry of a final judgme nt of forf eit u re wi t h o u t a hear ing, finding only that the defe ndant’s deportation to Mexi co di d not constitute a g round for relief

. We conclude d, howeve r, t hat the trial c ourt err ed in not conducting a hearing to deter mine if under the fac ts and circ umstances prese nted i n t h e ca s e, t he surety ’s failure to produce the defe ndant was cause d by the State’s conduct o r wh ether the defe ndant’s deportation was a fore seea ble risk assumed by

the surety

upon execution of a ba il bond contrac t.

As noted by this Court, “in enter ing into bail bond ag ree ments involving aliens, sureties are

nece ssarily cog nizant of and assume the risk that, subsequently
, the defe ndant will eng ag e in conduct subjecting him to deportation p roce eding s.” I d. at 205. On t he other hand, “[ t] he surety does not assume the risk that the State will encoura g e the deportation of a defe ndant or otherwise refuse to cooper ate in a defe ndant’s o r s u rety ’s eff orts to stay deportation proce eding s pending trial.” I d. “Thus, to the extent the State’s action or inaction eff ects a defe ndant’s deportation a nd rende rs the surety ’s perf

ormanc e of its obligation under the bail bond impossibl e, a court may g rant re l i ef pursuant to” Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 40-11-204. I d.

I n the case sub judice, the bre ach of the bond ag ree ment at issue occur red when Def

endant voluntarily fled the United States, throug h no action or inaction on the part of the State. The risk of

a defe ndant’s flig ht is inhere nt in ever y bail bond ag ree ment. I n re Sandford & Sons Ba il Company
, I nc. 96 S.W .3d at 202. Thus, the bondsman must evaluate the risk of flig ht befor e writing the bond and be dilig ent “in kee ping tabs on the defendant after the bond is written.” I d., (quoting Holly J

. J oiner, supra, at 1422). “The exercise of due diligenc e by bail bond ag ents in proce ssing bail bonds is ex pecte d as a matter of due course .” In re Paul’s B onding Company , I nc., 62 S.W.3d at 194.

Mr. J ordan was not the ag ent who wrote Def endant’ s bond ag ree ment and, there fore
, had no persona l knowledg e as to what questions wer e asked when Def endant’ s bail bond contra ct was executed. Nonethele ss, we note that Appellant’s investigation of Def endan t (which occur

red approximately nineteen months afte r Def endant failed to make a schedule d cou rt appeara nce)

reve aled that Def

endant, a Somalian national, initially trave led to the United States with his adoptive mother’s “family

unit” to esca

pe the Somalian wa

rs, that Def

endant a nd the vi ctim of t he charg ed

-7-offe nses belong ed to differ ent war ring Somalian clans, that Def endant had impreg nated Ms. Ahmed
at some point while she was in the United States, that Def endant was ostracized by

his family

unit for impreg nating Ms. Ahmed out of wedlock and “for not adher i n g t o s ocial customs,” and that Def endant fled to Sweden afte r his adoptive family ’s ostracization. Appellant faxed a repor t of its i n v es t i gat ion to the United States Marsha ll’s Offic e but took no further steps to confirm the information g ained throug h the interview s or to deter mine Def endant’ s exact location.

Appellant, as surety , “knowing ly and absolutely ” contra cted that Def endant would be made available in court when schedule d. See Frankg os, 85 S.W

. at 81. The S tate’s policy decision not to pursue extradition after Def endant fled was not the conduct that cause d the breach of contra ct. See S tate v. Sey

bert, 745 P.2d 687, 689 (Mont. 1987) (concluding that the S t at e “d o es n ot have a duty to reme dy the surety ’s brea ch of contra ct” by seeking extradition of the defe ndant afte r the defe ndant voluntarily fled the state’s jurisdiction); State v. Ohay on, 467 N.E.2d 908, 911-12 (Ohio App. 1983) (concl u d i n g t h at a surety will not be relieve d of its obliga tions when it is unable to produce the defe ndant due to fore ign policy decisions as betwee n the United States and I srae l when the def endant voluntar ily

fled the c ountry

prior to his initi al cour

t appea ranc e).

Under Def

endant’ s theory that a surety is absolved of responsibility if the State decide s not to pursue extradition of a missing d ef en d an t, a bonding company ’s obligations would be g reatly reduc ed. That is, if a bond is issued to a fore ign national who then voluntarily flee s the country , the surety would be relieve d of all obligation if the State decide s that pursuing extradition is not in the best interest o f t h e S t at e. I n other words, the State would serve as the “sure ty ’s surety ,” a relationship that is contra dictory to the policy considerations examined in Fr ankg os. I n Fr ang os, our supreme c ourt stated that:

[t he statutory provision g ranting relief from a surety ’s bail b o n d o b li g a ti ons] cer tainly

was not intended to authorize courts to relieve sureties upon bonds and r e cog nizances of parties c harg ed with cr ime, who had made defa ult a nd wer e still at larg e, mere ly beca use the sureties had, in g ood faith, and at much expense, made unavailing eff orts to rec apture them. These obligations are not mere idle forms, but are require d and made for the purposes expressed i n t h em

. Good faith is not involved. The sureties knowing ly and absolutely contra ct that their principal shall be prese nt at the time in the obligation stated, to answe r the state upon the char g e pref err ed ag ainst him; and, if they fail t o d o so, they must comply with the t erms of the bond or recog nizance. A wi s e and sound public policy require s a rig id enfor ceme nt of these bonds whe n brea ched.

Fr ankg os, 81 S.W . at 81.

Ba sed on our revie w, we conclude that the trial court did not err in enter ing a final judgme nt of forf eiture when Def

endant voluntarily fled the country and the surety was unable to produce him in court as c alled for

in the bail bond contra ct. Appellant is not entitled to relief on this iss ue.

-8-As a corollar y argument, Appellant d i re cts our attention to Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 40-11-201 which addre sses the situation in which a surety is unable to produce a defe ndant beca use she or he is imprisoned in a nother state. This section provides that the a ppear ance or bail bond rema ins in eff

ect until a detainer is filed ag ainst the detaining authority
, and the surety rema ins responsible for the expenses of returning the defe ndant to the State once he is rele ased by the other jurisdiction. T.C.A. § 40-11-201( c). Effe ctive J une 20, 2008, the leg islature amende d this statutory section to provide that if the detainer requ es t is ref used or the detaining authority rele ases the defe ndant notwithstanding the filing of the detainer
, “t h e s u rety may not be liable in the undertaking.” 2008 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 1131 ( emphasis adde d).

Def endant submits that the 2008 amendment “ shows a cle ar public pur pose that the sure ty and the State should both wor k toge ther” in returning a def endant to Te nnessee , and compar es the obtaining of an unlawful flig ht from prosec ution war rant with the issuance of a detainer

. Howeve r, extradition is an entirely differ ent proce dure than detainer. The I nterstate Compact on Detaine rs, codified at Tenne ssee Code Annotated sections 41-23-101 to-209, has as its primary purpose to provide cooper ative proce dures among the states for the ex p ed i tious and order ly dispositi on of char g es aga inst a prisoner. Dillon v. State, 844 S.W .2d 139 (Tenn. 1992). Ex t ra d i t i on, howeve r, is the proce ss by which a person who is not in custody may be lawfully ar re s ted and returne d to another state or ju ri s d i ct i o n for offe nses committed in that state. Ex traditions betwee n states are

cover ed by the Uniform Criminal Ex tradition Act, Tenne ssee Code Annotated sections 40-9-101 to -130. Ex traditions betwee n countries are handled throug h treaties. I t is presumed that the leg islature

was awa re of the exis ting sta t e o f t h e law conce rning extraditions and detainer s when it enac ted Chapter 1131 of the Tenne ssee Public Acts, and chose not to addr es s s cena rios involving extraditions. State v. Adams, 45 S.W .3d 46, 59 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) (citing Owens v. State, 908 S.W .2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995) ). Appe llant’s argument in this reg ard a ffor ds no relief

.

CONCLUSION

After a thoroug h revie w, we a ffirm the judg ment of the trial c ourt.

___________________________________ THOMAS T. WOODAL L , J UDGE

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