NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PAUL M. SANDERS,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v. LEGACY EMANUEL MEDICAL CENTER, an Oregon corporation; et al.,

Defendants

- Appellees. No. 14

- 35977 D.C. No. 3:14

- cv - 00690

- PK

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Michael W. Mosman, Chief Judge, Presiding Submitted January 18, 2017 **
Before: T ROTT , TASHIMA , and CALLAHAN , Circuit Judges. Paul M. Sanders appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging violations of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (“EMTALA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd. We have jurisdiction under 28

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

JAN 26 2017 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 14

- 35977

U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6 ). Arrington v. Wong , 237 F.3d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 2001 ). We reverse and remand.

The district court erred by concluding that Sanders had n ot stated an EMTALA claim against defendant Legacy Emanuel Medical Center. L iberally construed, Sanders alleged facts showing that he had received a different

examination than would have been offered to other patients presenting similar symptoms. Sanders also allege d that as a result of the disparate screening, the hospital failed to identify an emergency medical condition and he therefore

suffered harm. Assuming these allegations are true, the allegations in the First Amended Complaint w ere suffi cient to survive a motion to dismiss

. See Jackson v. East Bay Hosp. , 246 F.3d 1248, 1255

- 56 (9th Cir. 2001) ( under EMTALA “the touchstone is whether . . . the procedure is designed to identify an emergency

medical condition , that is manifested by acute an d severe symptoms[,]” which is determined by whether an examination is comparable to that “offered to other patients presenting similar symptoms . . . .” (citation and int ernal quotation marks omitted)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (providing that “ if a ny individual

. . . comes to the emergency department and a request is made on the individual’s3 14

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behalf for examination or treatment for a medical condition, the hospital must provide for an appropriate medical screening examination

. . . to determine wheth er or not an emergency medical condition . . . exists.”); id. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A) ( “ Any individual who suffers personal harm as a direct res ult of a participating hospital’ s violation of a requirement of this section may . . . obtain those damages available for personal injury . . . .”); id. § 1395dd (e)(1) (defining “emergency medical condition”); Hebbe v. Pliler , 627 F.3d 338, 3 42 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting obligation to construe pro se pleadings liberally ). Accordingly, we reverse an d remand for further proceedings consistent with this disposition. We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright , 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

REVERSED and REMANDED.