In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 20-2882 

MILDRED CHATMAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF 

THE CITY OF CHICAGO, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 1:18-cv-01328 — Marvin E. Aspen, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED MAY 11, 2021 — DECIDED JULY 20, 2021 

____________________ 

Before EASTERBROOK, RIPPLE, and KANNE, Circuit Judges. 

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Mildred Chatman worked in the Chicago Public Schools for over two decades. In 2009, she was 

laid off. She then filed a discrimination charge against the 

Board of Education of the City of Chicago. That matter later 

settled. As part of the settlement, Ms. Chatman secured the 

opportunity to interview for open positions within the Chicago Public Schools. She interviewed for positions at several 
2 No. 20-2882 

schools, four of which are relevant to this appeal, but received 

no job offer. She brought this action, alleging race and age discrimination, as well as retaliation based on her prior discrimination charge. The district court granted summary judgment 

for the Board. 

Ms. Chatman now contends that the district court erred in 

granting the Board’s motion. We hold that it did not. 

Ms. Chatman’s claims ultimately fail for a lack of proof. Even 

taking all reasonable inferences in her favor, the record cannot 

support her contention that the Board discriminated or retaliated against her. We therefore affirm the district court’s grant 

of summary judgment to the Board. 

I 

BACKGROUND 

Ms. Chatman, who is African American, was sixty-two 

years old when she commenced this action. From 1988 to 

1996, she worked as an instructor assistant in two of the 

Board’s schools. From 1997 through 2009, she worked as a 

school library assistant at a high school within the Chicago 

Public Schools. In August 2009, the Board laid off Ms. Chatman, informing her that it was eliminating her position. 

Ms. Chatman later learned that, despite the Board’s claim that 

the position had been eliminated, the Board had replaced 

Ms. Chatman with a younger, non-African American employee in the same role. 

Ms. Chatman filed a charge of discrimination with the Illinois Department of Human Rights and the EEOC, and then 

sued in Illinois state court. The Board settled with Ms. Chatman in February 2015. In addition to a monetary payment, the 

district would arrange for interviews for open positions for 
No. 20-2882 3

which Ms. Chatman was qualified. Specifically, from the date 

of the settlement through December 31, 2015, “[Ms.] Chatman 

shall identify to [designated Board Talent Office employees] 

Chicago Public Schools positions that are vacant on the 

Board’s ... job bulletin system for which she would like to interview, for which she is qualified and for which the Board is 

currently accepting applications.”1

 The Board would then arrange interviews. Ms. Chatman began identifying available 

positions shortly following the settlement agreement. All 

told, Ms. Chatman interviewed for positions at five different 

schools. 

Her first interview was for a library assistant position at 

Beasley Academic Center in June 2015. On September 9, 2015, 

Ms. Chatman learned that the Board had filled that position 

with another candidate. 

Ms. Chatman’s second interview was for a teacher’s assistant position at Earle Elementary. She stated in her deposition 

that she interviewed with the Earle principal on September 

10, 2015, although she could not remember many details 

about the interview and could not explain why she thought 

the interview took place on that date. Ms. Chatman also submitted for the summary judgment record an email from Linda 

Hogan, one of the Board’s Talent Office employees, to 

Ms. Chatman’s counsel, dated September 10, 2015 (the same 

day that Ms. Chatman claims to have interviewed for the 

Earle position), stating that the Earle principal would contact 

Ms. Chatman to set up an interview. The record contains no 

other communications about Earle. Later, when the EEOC 

sought information from the Board about the Earle position, 

1 R.70-5 at 6. 
4 No. 20-2882 

the Board denied that there was an open teacher’s assistant 

position at Earle during the time Ms. Chatman claims she interviewed. 

Ms. Chatman’s third interview was for a library assistant 

position at Mireles Academy. She interviewed for the position 

with Evelyn Randle-Robbins, the Mireles principal, in November 2015. During her deposition, Ms. Chatman claimed 

that Principal Randle-Robbins made some sort of reference to 

prior involvement in a lawsuit. Ms. Chatman could only 

vaguely describe Principal Randle-Robbins’s question, but 

took it to be in reference to her prior EEOC charge against the 

Board. In the same deposition, however, Ms. Chatman confirmed that Principal Randle-Robbins never discussed the 

specifics of her prior discrimination case or the settlement 

agreement she reached with the Board. Ms. Chatman was not 

hired for the position. In response to the EEOC’s inquiry, the 

Board claimed that the position for which Ms. Chatman interviewed at Mireles had been eliminated for budgetary reasons. 

The Board later disclosed that Principal Randle-Robbins had 

extended an offer to fill the position to another candidate, referred to in the record only by the initials K.D. K.D. accepted 

Principal Randle-Robbins’s offer around November 30, 2015. 

Yet, K.D. never actually started working in the library assistant position before Principal Randle-Robbins eliminated the 

position for budgetary reasons in February 2016. K.D. was under the age of forty. 

Ms. Chatman’s fourth interview was with Principal Daniel 

Perry of McDade Elementary on December 2, 2015, for two 

open special education classroom assistant positions. 

Ms. Chatman was not hired for the positions. Instead, the 

Board hired an African American man who was under forty 
No. 20-2882 5

years old and an African American woman who was over 

forty years old. In an affidavit, Principal Perry explained that 

the younger man hired for one of the positions was a McDade 

graduate who had volunteered at the school and worked with 

the specific special education student whom the special education classroom assistant would assist. 

Ms. Chatman’s final interview was on December 17, 2015, 

with Principal Megan Thole of Ray Elementary for three open 

special education classroom assistant positions. Ms. Chatman 

was not hired for these positions either. Instead, the Board 

hired two African American women over the age of forty and 

a non-African American woman under the age of forty. At the 

time of her interview, the non-African American woman under the age of forty did not possess the requisite paraprofessional license to fill the special education classroom assistant 

position. By the time she started in the position, however, she 

had obtained the license. 

When Ms. Chatman did not receive a job offer during the 

interview period provided by the settlement, she filed a new 

charge with the EEOC, and later initiated this action. In her 

complaint, she alleged violations of Title VII’s anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation provisions, as well as a violation of 

the anti-discrimination provision of the Age Discrimination 

in Employment Act (“ADEA”). After discovery closed, the 

Board moved for summary judgment. When Ms. Chatman responded to the Board’s summary judgment motion, the Board 

moved to strike several exhibits that Ms. Chatman had cited 

in her response. 

The district court granted the Board’s motion for summary 

judgment and its motion to strike. The court concluded that 

Ms. Chatman’s claims regarding the positions at Beasley and 
6 No. 20-2882 

Earle were barred by the statute of limitations. As for 

Ms. Chatman’s discrimination claims regarding the positions 

at Mireles, McDade, and Ray, the court concluded that 

Ms. Chatman could not establish that she was qualified for 

the positions, nor could she establish that the Board’s nondiscriminatory reasons for not offering her the positions were 

pretext for discrimination. With respect to the retaliation 

claim, the court concluded that Ms. Chatman could not establish that she was denied a job because of her prior protected 

activity. 

II 

DISCUSSION 

Ms. Chatman challenges the district court’s grant of both 

the Board’s summary judgment motion and its motion to 

strike several exhibits. For purposes of this appeal, we assume 

that the district court erred in granting the Board’s motion to 

strike. Even accounting for the stricken exhibits, summary 

judgment was still proper. 

We review a district court’s summary judgment decision 

de novo and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 

nonmoving party. Smith v. Chi. Transit Auth., 806 F.3d 900, 904 

(7th Cir. 2015). Ms. Chatman contends that the district court 

erred in granting summary judgment on her claims related to 

the positions at Earle, Mireles, McDade, and Ray; she concedes that her claim related to the Beasley position was untimely. We will first address the district court’s determination 

that Ms. Chatman’s Earle claim was untimely, then discuss 

her discrimination and retaliation claims regarding the positions at Mireles, McDade, and Ray. 
No. 20-2882 7

A. 

In a deferral state such as Illinois, a plaintiff who asserts 

Title VII and ADEA claims has 300 days from the alleged discriminatory or retaliatory act to file a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (Title VII 

statute of limitations); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1)(B) (ADEA statute 

of limitations). A defendant may invoke a plaintiff’s failure to 

timely file a charge with the EEOC as an affirmative defense. 

See Salas v. Wis. Dep’t of Corr., 493 F.3d 913, 921 (7th Cir. 2007). 

At summary judgment, a defendant who asserts this affirmative defense must show that there is no genuine dispute of 

material fact as to whether the plaintiff timely filed with the 

EEOC. See Laouini v. CLM Freight Lines, Inc., 586 F.3d 473, 475 

(7th Cir. 2009). The defendant can establish its affirmative defense in two ways. One is by pointing to evidence that affirmatively shows that the plaintiff failed to timely file. The other 

is by pointing to the absence of evidence in the record to support the plaintiff’s timeliness. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986) (“[T]he burden 

on the moving party may be discharged by ‘showing’—that 

is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence 

of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.”). If the 

defendant meets its burden by pointing out the absence of evidence, the plaintiff must then “demonstrate that there is evidence” upon which a jury could determine that she timely 

filed with the EEOC. Modrowski v. Pigatto, 712 F.3d 1166, 1169 

(7th Cir. 2013). 

Ms. Chatman contends that the district court erred in concluding that her Earle discrimination and retaliation claims 

were barred by Title VII’s and the ADEA’s statutes of limitations. In her view, the Board presented no evidence that her 
8 No. 20-2882 

claims accrued outside the 300-day limitations period. She 

also submits that the district court erred by focusing its analysis on the date of her interview at Earle (September 10, 2015), 

rather than the date that she learned of the Board’s decision 

not to hire her. She contends that the record is unclear as to 

when the Board made its decision, and consequently, there is 

a disputed issue of material fact. The Board, on the other 

hand, contends that it met its burden of proof for the statute 

of limitations affirmative defense. It submits that there is no 

evidence in the record that shows any action by the Board related to Ms. Chatman’s Earle claims within the 300-day window. Indeed, the Board contends that the only evidence in the 

record regarding Ms. Chatman’s Earle claims is her deposition testimony that the interview happened in September 

2015 and a single email from Linda Hogan to her counsel stating that the Earle principal would reach out to schedule an 

interview. 

The district court correctly determined that Ms. Chatman’s discrimination and retaliation claims regarding Earle 

are barred by the relevant statute of limitations. All agree that 

the statutory deadline for Ms. Chatman’s claim was in November 2015. The Board has met its burden on the affirmative 

defense by pointing to the absence of anything in the record 

regarding Earle within the statute of limitations period. 

Ms. Chatman said in her deposition that she interviewed for 

the Earle position on September 10, 2015. She was uncertain 

of how she recalled that as the date of her interview and could 

not say definitively with whom she interviewed. She suggested that she may have emailed with someone about the 

Earle position after the interview, but no such email was uncovered during discovery. The Board, in its response to the 

EEOC’s inquiry, wrote that the Earle principal “believes that 
No. 20-2882 9

there was no vacant teacher assistant position at Earle School 

in September 2015.”2

 And the individual who Ms. Chatman 

initially identified in her complaint as the person hired for the 

teacher assistant position at Earle was actually hired for a position at Beasley. There is an email from Linda Hogan to 

Ms. Chatman’s counsel dated September 10, 2015, the date 

Ms. Chatman says she interviewed at Earle, stating: “The 

principal of Earle school will be contacting Ms. Chatman for 

an interview. Please let me know if she doesn’t hear from him 

for some reason.”3 But there is no evidence of any follow-up 

communication between the Earle principal to Ms. Chatman. 

Confronted with the Board’s asserted absence of evidence 

of timeliness regarding the Earle claims, Ms. Chatman has not 

shown that there is any evidence that she timely filed with the 

EEOC. The little evidence in the record regarding the Earle 

position all arose over a month before the statutory deadline. 

Indeed, it is not clear from the record that there actually was 

an Earle teacher assistant position available or that Ms. Chatman interviewed with the Earle principal. Notably, Ms. Chatman chose not to depose the Earle principal—or any other 

principal involved in this case—and that decision has contributed, noticeably, to the sparse record. The lack of any documentation regarding the Earle position is particularly noteworthy because Ms. Chatman’s settlement with the Board obligated her to identify open positions. That is why for other 

positions involved in this case she has been able to produce 

the position descriptions that the Board posted on its hiring 

2 R.86-1 at 45. 

3 Id. at 50. 
10 No. 20-2882 

website. Our case law makes clear that the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense and that if the “evidence [is] 

inconclusive at best, the tie must go to the plaintiff.” Salas, 493 

F.3d at 922. Here, the evidence that Ms. Chatman timely filed 

her Earle claim is not inconclusive; it is absent. We therefore 

must conclude that her Earle claim is barred by the statute of 

limitations. 

B. 

For Ms. Chatman’s discrimination claims regarding Mireles, McDade, and Ray, the district court granted summary 

judgment on the merits. With respect to Mireles and McDade, 

Ms. Chatman raised only age discrimination claims. For Ray, 

Ms. Chatman raised a race discrimination claim and an age 

discrimination claim.

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire ... any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because 

of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 

origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Along the same lines, the 

ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to 

hire ... any individual with respect to his compensation, 

terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of 

such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623. At summary judgment, the critical question is whether the plaintiff has produced enough evidence to permit a reasonable factfinder to 

conclude that the plaintiff’s race or other proscribed factor 

caused the adverse employment action. See Purtue v. Wis. 

Dep’t of Corr., 963 F.3d 598, 602 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Johnson 

v. Advoc. Health & Hosps. Corp., 892 F.3d 887, 894 (7th Cir. 

2018)). To answer that question, we look at the evidence holistically. See David v. Bd. of Trs. of Cmty. Coll. Dist. No. 508, 846 
No. 20-2882 11

F.3d 216, 224 (7th Cir. 2017); see also Ortiz v. Werner Enters., 

Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 766 (7th Cir. 2016) (“[A]ll evidence belongs 

in a single pile and must be evaluated as a whole.”). 

Employing the familiar burden-shifting framework of 

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), is one 

way that a plaintiff can assist the court in sifting through the 

evidence to assess whether discrimination under Title VII and 

the ADEA is established. See O’Regan v. Arb. Fs., Inc., 246 F.3d 

975, 983 (7th Cir. 2001) (applying the same McDonnell Douglas 

framework to Title VII and ADEA discrimination claims). Under that approach, the plaintiff must first produce evidence 

establishing a four-part prima facie case: “(1) she was a member of a protected class; (2) she applied for and was qualified 

for the position sought; (3) she was rejected for the position; 

and (4) the employer [hired] someone outside the protected 

group who was not better qualified than the plaintiff.” Johnson 

v. Gen. Bd. of Pension & Health Benefits of United Methodist 

Church, 733 F.3d 722, 728–29 (7th Cir. 2013). 

If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden 

shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Id. at 728. 

For a failure-to-hire claim, one example of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason a defendant may offer is that “the individuals ultimately hired were better candidates” than the 

plaintiff. Skiba v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 884 F.3d 708, 724 (7th Cir. 

2018); see also Scruggs v. Garst Seed Co., 587 F.3d 832, 839–40 

(7th Cir. 2009) (explaining that, when hiring for a research assistant position, an employer had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason to select someone with experience as a research 

assistant for the company). 
12 No. 20-2882 

If the employer supplies a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 

reason, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to produce 

evidence that the defendant’s reason is pretext for discrimination. Johnson, 733 F.3d at 728. In this context, pretext “means a 

lie, specifically a phony reason for some action.” Russell v. 

Acme-Evans Co., 51 F.3d 64, 68 (7th Cir. 1995). We have also 

referred to pretext as an employer’s efforts to cover their 

tracks or hide their real reason for not hiring an applicant. 

Millbrook v. IBP, Inc., 280 F.3d 1169, 1175 (7th Cir. 2002). Yet, 

“a showing of pretext alone is not enough; the plaintiff must 

also show that the explanations are a pretext for the prohibited animus.” Hitchcock v. Angel Corps, Inc., 718 F.3d 733, 740 

(7th Cir. 2013). 

The district court concluded that Ms. Chatman had failed 

to establish a prima facie case; that the Board had supplied 

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for hiring other candidates; and that Ms. Chatman had failed to show that those 

reasons were pretext for discrimination. Because we conclude 

that Ms. Chatman cannot show that the Board’s reasons for 

not hiring her at Mireles, McDade, and Ray were pretext for 

discrimination, we limit our discussion to that issue. Accord

Lesch v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 282 F.3d 467, 473 (7th Cir. 2002) 

(“It is not always necessary to march through this entire process if a single issue proves to be dispositive. Here, as is often 

true, that issue is pretext or the lack thereof.”). 

For the library assistant opening at Mireles, the Board explained that it did not hire Ms. Chatman because it cut the 

position for budgetary reasons. See Jajeh v. Cnty. of Cook, 678 

F.3d 560, 573 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting that budget cuts can provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse 

employment action). Ms. Chatman contends that, although 
No. 20-2882 13

the Board provided a budgetary explanation, it also disclosed 

during discovery that Principal Randle-Robbins offered the 

job to K.D., who was under forty years old, before the position 

was later cut. That offer to K.D., Ms. Chatman submits, means 

that the Board’s initial legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 

for not hiring her was pretext. We cannot agree with 

Ms. Chatman’s view. If anything, the evidence about K.D. 

cuts against Ms. Chatman’s argument that the Board’s budgetary reason was pretext for discrimination. Notably, K.D. 

never started in the role because the position really was eliminated. The Board’s budgetary reason, therefore, is not a lie. 

See Russell, 51 F.3d at 68. Nor can Ms. Chatman persuasively 

assert that the Board’s decision to eliminate the position was 

driven by discriminatory animus. After all, K.D. was much 

younger than Ms. Chatman and had no protected activity, yet 

the Board still eliminated the position after K.D. accepted 

Principal Randle-Robbins’s job offer. 

As for McDade, it is obvious that the Board’s reason for 

selecting its chosen candidates was not pretext for discrimination against Ms. Chatman. Principal Perry hired an African 

American man who was under forty years old and an African 

American woman who was over forty years old to fill the two 

open special education classroom assistant positions. With respect to the younger hire, Principal Perry explained that the 

candidate was both a McDade graduate and had volunteered 

working with the specific special education student for whom 

the special education classroom assistant position was designed to assist. Ms. Chatman contends that she was more 

qualified than the younger hire and that the job posting said 

nothing about consideration of alumni status at the school. 

We see no basis to conclude that the Board’s reason was pretextual. The younger hire may have had less formal training 
14 No. 20-2882 

than Ms. Chatman, but he had spent time volunteering at 

McDade alongside the very same special education student 

covered by the special education classroom assistant position. 

That sort of valuable experience is a perfectly legitimate consideration during hiring. See Scruggs, 587 F.3d at 839–40 (holding that consideration of hands-on experience relevant to the 

position is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for hiring a 

candidate). And Ms. Chatman has offered nothing to suggest 

that Principal Perry’s consideration of the younger hire’s experience was phony or intended to cover up more nefarious 

motives. 

We reach the same result regarding the Ray positions. 

There, Principal Thole hired two African American women 

over the age of forty and a non-African American woman under the age of forty. Principal Thole explained that the 

younger, non-African American candidate was hired for one 

of the positions because she had volunteered at Ray and came 

highly recommended by the teacher in whose classroom she 

had worked. The principal’s reason is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for her selection. See id. Ms. Chatman contends that the Board’s explanation for why it hired the 

younger, non-African American candidate is pretext. She submits that among the Board’s prerequisites for the position was 

a state paraprofessional license. At the time of the interview, 

the candidate at issue did not possess the license. Thus, she 

argues that the Board subjected that candidate to less rigorous 

standards than it applied to her. Again, Ms. Chatman has 

failed to establish pretext. She is correct that the younger, 

non-African American candidate did not possess the 

paraprofessional license at the time of her interview. But by the 

time that candidate started in the special education classroom 

assistant position, she had obtained the license. Thus, the 
No. 20-2882 15

record reflects that possession of the license was an actual requirement of the job. Moreover, Ms. Chatman has done nothing to undercut Principal Thole’s explanation that she considered the candidate’s familiarity with the school and strong 

recommendation from one of Ray’s teachers. In short, there is 

no basis to conclude that the Board’s explanation for why it 

hired its chosen candidates was a lie. 

Ms. Chatman’s claims with respect to Mireles, McDade, 

and Ray fare no better when the evidence is analyzed without 

the assistance of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting 

framework. When we put the evidence in “a single pile” and 

evaluate it “as a whole” we cannot say that a reasonable jury 

could find that Ms. Chatman’s age or race led to the Board’s 

hiring decisions. Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 766. Where the Board hired 

other candidates, it provided clear, legitimate, and documented reasons why it chose other candidates. When the 

Board relied upon a budgetary reason, there is no evidence in 

the record to suggest that reason was a lie or a subterfuge for 

discrimination or retaliation. Put simply, Ms. Chatman’s Title 

VII and ADEA claims regarding Mireles, McDade, and Ray 

fail for a lack of proof. 

C. 

Ms. Chatman’s final claim is under Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision. She submits that the Board’s decision not to 

hire her at Mireles, McDade, and Ray was in retaliation for 

her prior discrimination charge against the Board. The district 

court granted summary judgment for the Board on Ms. Chatman’s retaliation claim. We agree with the district court’s assessment. 
16 No. 20-2882 

To succeed on her retaliation claim, Ms. Chatman had to 

produce evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that: (1) she had engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) the Board refused to hire her; and (3) there was a 

causal connection between her activity and the Board’s action. 

See Burton v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 851 F.3d 690, 

695 (7th Cir. 2017). All agree that the first two prongs are met 

here; only the causation prong is contested. Causation for Title VII retaliation claims requires a plaintiff to show “but-for” 

causation. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 

338, 360 (2013). The plaintiff must show that “the unlawful 

retaliation would not have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer.” Id.

For the Mireles position, Ms. Chatman contends that a reasonable jury could infer retaliation because Principal 

Randle-Robbins asked Ms. Chatman during the interview 

whether she had been involved in a prior lawsuit. Ms. Chatman submits that the reference was to her prior discrimination lawsuit against the Board, and that there was no reason 

why the lawsuit should have come up during the interview 

for the library assistant position. When the Board later offered 

the position to K.D., Ms. Chatman contends that the Board’s 

decision was retaliatory because K.D. was less qualified and 

had not engaged in protected activity. 

The Board responds that Ms. Chatman’s description of 

Principal Randle-Robbins’s reference to a lawsuit is far too 

ambiguous to support her retaliation claim. The Board points 

to how Ms. Chatman described the interview in her deposition: “[The principal] asked ... I think questions had I ever 

had—did I know anything about lawsuits or suing or something to that nature, I can’t specify exactly how she put it to 
No. 20-2882 17

me, that made me think that, you know, she knew something 

about my case.”4

 Thus, the Board contends that, even with a 

generous interpretation of Ms. Chatman’s memory, the purported question is completely vague. That vague recollection, 

the Board submits, is not enough to establish but-for causation. 

We agree with the Board’s assessment of the evidence. 

Even when we draw all reasonable inferences in Ms. Chatman’s favor, we still see no way for a reasonable factfinder to 

conclude that Ms. Chatman’s protected activity was the 

but-for cause of her not being hired at Mireles. Ms. Chatman 

has marshalled no evidence that the Board’s decision to eliminate the Mireles position for budgetary reasons was based on 

retaliatory motives. In any event, as we have noted earlier, 

K.D. engaged in no protected activity, yet the Board still cut 

the position for budget reasons. Ms. Chatman, therefore, cannot possibly establish that she would have been hired absent 

her prior protected activity. 

The failure of Ms. Chatman’s retaliation claims regarding 

the McDade and Ray positions is even more clear-cut. In each 

case, the principals wrote in their affidavits that they did not 

know Ms. Chatman had prior protected activity. Ms. Chatman claims that because Principal Randle-Robbins at Mireles 

knew about her lawsuit, every principal with whom she interviewed must have known also. We cannot credit such speculation. It is far from clear that Principal Randle-Robbins 

knew of Ms. Chatman’s prior lawsuit. But more important, 

there is simply no evidence anywhere in the record that the 

principals at McDade and Ray had any knowledge of 

4 R.70-2 at 34. 
18 No. 20-2882 

Ms. Chatman’s prior EEOC charge. Absent such evidence, no 

reasonable factfinder could conclude that those principals’ 

decisions not to hire Ms. Chatman were retaliatory. 

Conclusion 

Because Ms. Chatman’s claim regarding Earle is barred by 

the statute of limitations and her claims regarding Mireles, 

McDade, and Ray fail for a lack of proof, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

AFFIRMED