2017 UT App 45

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ROBBEN ANN OLDROYD,

Appellant and Cross-appellee,

v.

FARRELL LYNN OLDROYD,

Appellee and Cross-appellant.

Opinion

No. 20150451-CA

Filed March 16, 2017

Second District Court, Morgan Department

The Honorable Noel S. Hyde

No. 134500028

Brent D. Wride and Bryant McConkie, Attorneys for

Appellant and Cross-appellee

Brian E. Arnold and Lauren Schultz, Attorneys for

Appellee and Cross-appellant

JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN authored this Opinion, in 

which JUDGES STEPHEN L. ROTH and KATE A. TOOMEY concurred.

CHRISTIANSEN, Judge:

¶1 Robben Ann Oldroyd (Ann) and Farrell Lynn Oldroyd 

(Farrell) divorced in 2015.1 Both raise challenges to the district 

court’s division of their assets. The issue we now address is 

whether the district court appropriately determined that Farrell 

possessed a premarital interest in a house he helped build before 

the parties’ marriage on land owned solely by Ann. We conclude 

that the district court’s findings were inadequate to support its 

determination. Consequently, we vacate the ruling and remand 

 

1. We follow the naming conventions used in the parties’ 

briefing.
Oldroyd v. Oldroyd

20150451-CA 2 2017 UT App 45

the case for the district court to enter a ruling with more 

complete findings. We express no opinion as to what an 

appropriate division might be. Nor do we rule on the issues 

raised in Farrell’s cross-appeal, preferring instead to allow the 

district court to address them on remand if it so chooses.

¶2 We recite the basic facts as found by the district court.2

Before the parties’ marriage, Ann was the sole owner of an 

empty parcel of land. She decided to have a house built on the 

land, and when she and Farrell began dating, Farrell quit his job 

in Wyoming to assist in the construction. “The source of all 

funds for building the . . . home was from [Ann.]” However, 

“[Farrell] performed a lot more labor on the home than [Ann],” 

and “[Farrell] provided the vast majority of supervision and 

conceptual direction for the construction of the home.” The 

house was essentially completed before Ann and Farrell 

married. Ann retained title to the land and house in her name 

alone and never affirmatively transferred any interest to Farrell.

¶3 During construction, Ann paid several subcontractors 

who worked on the house. She also paid Farrell between $18,000 

and $19,000, apparently based upon an hourly rate. However, 

the district court found this money was “not tied to the value of 

[Farrell’s] contribution to the home,” but was instead intended to 

help Farrell “meet his ongoing financial obligations for a vehicle 

and payments related to his first marriage.” The district court 

continued, “Because the $18,000 to $19,000 amount was not a 

 

2. The written decision of the district court was prepared by 

counsel. The apparent orders of the court were included in the 

first section, titled “Findings of Fact,” while the second section, 

titled “Conclusions of Law,” was limited to a statement of 

jurisdiction and a finding of “irreconcilable differences.” We 

ignore the captions and treat those “findings of fact” that may 

reasonably be read as orders as such.
Oldroyd v. Oldroyd

20150451-CA 3 2017 UT App 45

payment for the value of services rendered, the Court finds it 

was a gift to [Farrell].”3

¶4 The court determined that “[t]he contributions of [Ann’s] 

premarital cash and [Farrell’s] supervision, labor, work, 

expertise, and conceptual direction are of roughly equal value” 

and that “[n]either of the parties could have accomplished the 

building of the home without the joint efforts of each other.” The 

court ultimately concluded that “[t]he contributions of [Ann] 

and [Farrell] to the value of the property occurred before the 

marriage relationship, and because of those efforts, both 

acquired a separate premarital interest in the improvements on 

the property.” (Emphasis added). The district court then ordered 

that the house be sold, that any remaining encumbrances be 

satisfied, that $110,000 of the sale proceeds be awarded to Ann

because she owned the land on which the house was built, and 

that the remaining proceeds be divided equally between the 

parties.

¶5 Ann appeals, arguing the district court erred or abused its 

discretion when it determined that Farrell had a premarital 

interest in the house built on her land. The district court has 

considerable discretion in determining the financial interests of 

divorcing parties. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Utah Ct. App. 

1993). The district court abuses that discretion when it fails to 

enter findings of fact adequate to support its financial 

determinations. Id. Findings of fact are adequate to support the 

district court’s financial determinations only when they are 

sufficiently detailed to disclose the steps by which the district 

court reached its ultimate conclusion on each issue. Id. We 

cannot affirm a district court’s ruling when the court has failed to 

enter adequate findings in support of its financial determinations. 

Id.; Taft v. Taft, 2016 UT App 135, ¶ 45, 379 P.3d 890.

 

3. The district court did not discuss whether Farrell’s 

contemporaneous labor on the house was a gift to Ann.
Oldroyd v. Oldroyd

20150451-CA 4 2017 UT App 45

¶6 In a divorce, each party “is presumed to be entitled to all 

of his or her separate property and fifty percent of the marital 

property.” Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1172 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

Accordingly, “the court should first properly categorize the 

parties’ property as part of the marital estate or as the separate 

property of one or the other.” Id.; accord Kelley v. Kelley, 2000 UT 

App 236, ¶ 24, 9 P.3d 171. “Generally, trial courts are . . . required 

to award premarital property, and appreciation on that property, 

to the spouse who brought the property into the marriage.” 

Elman v. Elman, 2002 UT App 83, ¶ 18, 45 P.3d 176.

¶7 Here, the district court determined that, while only Ann 

had a premarital interest in the land upon which the house was 

built, both Ann and Farrell “acquired a separate premarital 

interest in the improvements on the property,” i.e., the house. In 

other words, it ruled that both Ann and Farrell acquired 

ownership interests in the house before their marriage began. 

But the court had found that “the property[,] including land and 

all improvements, has always been titled in [Ann’s] name 

alone”; that “[t]here has never been a record transfer or title 

change in the property from [Ann] to [Farrell]”; and that “[t]he 

acquisition of the construction materials and payments of all outof-pocket costs for [the house] were paid by [Ann] from her 

separate premarital funds.”

¶8 The district court’s reasoning appears to be that an 

equitable interest in the house accrued to Farrell as a result of his 

construction-related labor and assistance.4 But the court did not 

explain what legal theory gave rise to that equitable interest, i.e., 

the court did not discuss whether unjust enrichment, promissory 

estoppel, quasi-contract, or some other theory applied. Nor does 

 

4. The court’s oral ruling as to this matter stated only that, “as a 

matter of equity[, Farrell] acquired an equitable interest in that 

property equal to one-half of its improved value at the time the 

home was completed.”
Oldroyd v. Oldroyd

20150451-CA 5 2017 UT App 45

our review of the proceedings below indicate that Farrell 

identified to the court a particular theory under which he was 

entitled to a premarital interest. It is therefore unclear what

theory the court applied and which facts it believed supported 

that theory.

¶9 Farrell asserts that the court distributed the house based 

on a determination of exceptional circumstances. See, e.g., 

Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, ¶ 15, 176 P.3d 476 

(noting that, in a divorce case, a district court “should consider 

whether there are exceptional circumstances that overcome the 

general presumption that marital property be divided equally 

between the parties”). But the district court did not rule that the 

house was marital property that should be divided unequally. 

Nor did it find that exceptional circumstances existed; in fact, 

neither the transcript nor the court’s written order even use that

term. Rather, the court determined that Farrell had “acquired a 

separate premarital interest” in the house. (Emphasis added.) 

Because the court did not divide the house as an item of marital 

property, let alone unequally, the exceptional-circumstances

doctrine does not apply.5

¶10 Farrell also asserts that the court’s determinations were 

based on an agreement made by the parties. But the court 

explicitly noted that “[t]here was no premarital agreement 

existing between the parties, nor was there any postnuptial 

 

5. Nor would the extraordinary-situation doctrine apply. See 

Elman v. Elman, 2002 UT App 83, ¶ 19, 45 P.3d 176 (recognizing 

that, in “extraordinary situations,” a court may invade one 

spouse’s separate property and award it to the other spouse to 

achieve equity); see also Kunzler v. Kunzler, 2008 UT App 263, 

¶ 35, 190 P.3d 497. The court did not mention the extraordinarysituation doctrine, did not find that the house was Ann’s 

separate property, and did not purport to award an interest in 

Ann’s separate property to Farrell to achieve an equitable result.
Oldroyd v. Oldroyd

20150451-CA 6 2017 UT App 45

agreement entered into by the parties.” The court’s written order 

made no mention of any other agreement, and we therefore

cannot presume that the property division was predicated on an 

agreement.

¶11 We are unable to trace with accuracy the steps by which 

the district court reached its ultimate conclusion that Farrell had 

obtained a premarital interest in the house. The findings of fact 

are thus inadequate to support the court’s financial 

determinations. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Utah Ct. App. 

1993). Consequently, we must vacate the district court’s ruling as 

to Ann’s and Farrell’s premarital interests in the house. Id.; Taft 

v. Taft, 2016 UT App 135, ¶ 45, 379 P.3d 890.

¶12 Farrell’s cross-appeal concerns two apparently 

unpreserved issues. An appellant’s brief must contain citations 

to the record showing that the issues presented on appeal were 

preserved in the district court or a statement of grounds for 

seeking review of unpreserved issues, see Utah R. App. P. 

24(a)(5), and this requirement applies equally to crossappellants’ briefs. Farrell provides no such citations or grounds, 

and we would normally consider these issues waived.6 See 

Wohnoutka v. Kelley, 2014 UT App 154, ¶ 3, 330 P.3d 762. 

However, because we vacate the district court’s ruling on other 

grounds and remand the case to that court without ruling on the 

cross-appeal issues, Farrell may yet attempt to raise these claims 

in the district court. See, e.g., Gildea v. Guardian Title Co., 2001 UT 

75, ¶ 9, 31 P.3d 543 (pursuant to the mandate rule, “issues 

resolved by this court on appeal bind the [district] court on 

remand”); Fish v. Fish, 2016 UT App 125, ¶ 10, 379 P.3d 882 

(noting that the mandate rule of the law-of-the-case doctrine 

 

6. We reject Farrell’s assertion, made at oral argument before this 

court, that the preservation requirement does not apply because 

he did not originally intend to appeal.
Oldroyd v. Oldroyd

20150451-CA 7 2017 UT App 45

prevents a district court from reconsidering an issue once it has 

been raised and actually resolved on appeal).

¶13 We vacate the district court’s ruling and remand the case

for further proceedings as appropriate.