The U.S. Army Campaigns of the Civil War

March – August 1862

Virginia Camp igns The
CMH Pub 75–5

Cover: Detail from The Charge of the Fifth Regulars at Gaines’ Mill, 27th of June, 1862 

by William Trego (U.S. Cavalry Museum, Fort Riley)
by

Christopher L. Kolakowski

Center of Military History

United States Army

Washington, D.C., 2016

Virginia 

Camp igns

The

March – 

August 1862

5

Introduction

Although over one hundred fifty years have passed since the 

start of the American Civil War, that titanic conflict continues to 

matter. The forces unleashed by that war were immensely destructive because of the significant issues involved: the existence of the 

Union, the end of slavery, and the very future of the nation. The 

war remains our most contentious, and our bloodiest, with over 

six hundred thousand killed in the course of the four-year struggle. 

Most civil wars do not spring up overnight, and the American 

Civil War was no exception. The seeds of the conflict were sown 

in the earliest days of the republic’s founding, primarily over the 

existence of slavery and the slave trade. Although no conflict can 

begin without the conscious decisions of those engaged in the 

debates at that moment, in the end, there was simply no way to 

paper over the division of the country into two camps: one that 

was dominated by slavery and the other that sought first to limit 

its spread and then to abolish it. Our nation was indeed “half slave 

and half free,” and that could not stand. 

Regardless of the factors tearing the nation asunder, the 

soldiers on each side of the struggle went to war for personal 

reasons: looking for adventure, being caught up in the passions 

and emotions of their peers, believing in the Union, favoring 

states’ rights, or even justifying the simple schoolyard dynamic 

of being convinced that they were “worth” three of the soldiers 

on the other side. Nor can we overlook the factor that some went 

to war to prove their manhood. This has been, and continues 

to be, a key dynamic in understanding combat and the profession of arms. Soldiers join for many reasons but often stay in the 

fight because of their comrades and because they do not want to 

seem like cowards. Sometimes issues of national impact shrink 

to nothing in the intensely personal world of cannon shell and 

minié ball.

Whatever the reasons, the struggle was long and costly and 

only culminated with the conquest of the rebellious Confederacy, 
6

the preservation of the Union, and the end of slavery. These 

campaign pamphlets on the American Civil War, prepared in 

commemoration of our national sacrifices, seek to remember 

that war and honor those in the United States Army who died to 

preserve the Union and free the slaves as well as to tell the story of 

those American soldiers who fought for the Confederacy despite 

the inherently flawed nature of their cause. The Civil War was our 

greatest struggle and continues to deserve our deep study and 

contemplation.

 CHARLES R. BOWERY JR.

 Executive Director
The Virginia Campaigns

March–August 1862

Since the Civil War began in April 1861 at Fort Sumter, South 

Carolina, both the United States government and the rebellious 

Confederate States of America had placed a premium on controlling 

the Commonwealth of Virginia. Home to the Confederate capital at 

Richmond, and adjacent to the Federal capital at Washington, D.C., 

Virginia’s strategic importance was undeniable. The Civil War’s 

first major engagement, the Battle of Bull Run, had taken place on 

Virginia soil near Manassas Junction on 21 July 1861. Elsewhere 

in 1861, Union forces had won victories in Missouri, Kentucky, 

and North Carolina, yet in Virginia the Confederacy had remained 

defiant, and it was on Virginia that all eyes focused. By year’s end 

the Federal government’s failure to capture Richmond had discouraged Northerners and buoyed the spirits of rebellious southerners. 

Anxious to end the bloodshed, President Abraham Lincoln hoped 

that 1862 would be the year in which Federal forces swept into 

Virginia, captured Richmond, and put an end to the insurrection. 

In this he was destined to be disappointed.

Strategic Setting

By January 1862, Federal authority in Virginia was confined 

to the state’s western mountains—essentially the area of the 

modern state of West Virginia, Fort Monroe at Hampton Roads, 

7
8 

and a sliver of ground around Alexandria opposite Washington, 

D.C. Otherwise the Potomac River separated the opponents. 

The Federals controlled the Maryland side of the river, while the 

Confederates encamped at Manassas and Centreville, Virginia, 

thirty miles west of Washington. Confederate pickets guarded 

the Virginia side of the river, while a battery at Aquia, Virginia, 

interdicted U.S. shipping downstream of Washington. Both sides 

had fortified their positions.

The Federal force guarding Washington was Maj. Gen. George 

B. McClellan’s Army of the Potomac. The energetic general was 

known as “the Young Napoleon.” 

A 35-year-old Pennsylvanian, 

McClellan was a distinguished 

graduate of the U.S. Military 

Academy at West Point and a 

veteran of the Mexican War. 

In 1856 he had served as an 

official U.S. Army observer of 

the Crimean War. In 1861 his 

success in restoring Federal 

control of the mountains of 

western Virginia had propelled 

him to command the Army of 

the Potomac in the wake of the 

Union defeat at First Bull Run. 

Later that fall President Lincoln 

had made him the commanding 

general of the entire U.S. Army. 

A superb organizer and motivator of men, McClellan was 

a vain man and tended to be 

a secretive and controlling manager. This made for sometimes 

frosty relations with his superiors in the War Department and 

with President Lincoln. Under McClellan the Union Army of the 

Potomac numbered over 105,000 men at the start of 1862, making it 

the largest American army ever fielded up to that time. 

Opposing McClellan at Centreville were the 45,000 men 

of General Joseph E. Johnston’s Army of the Potomac, oddly 

enough bearing the same name as McClellan’s army. The 

55-year-old Virginian was one of the Confederacy’s early heroes, 

as his timely rail movement to Manassas had contributed to 

General McClellan

(Library of Congress)
9

the Confederate victory at Bull Run. An 1829 graduate of the 

U.S. Military Academy, Johnston had spent several decades on 

the frontier in the artillery and cavalry, and had also fought in 

the Mexican War. At the time of Virginia’s secession from the 

Union he was a brigadier general and Quartermaster General 

of the U.S. Army. He had promptly resigned and followed his 

state into the Confederacy, and in the summer of 1861 he had 

become the fourth-ranking officer in the Confederate States 

Army. A formal man, Johnston enjoyed wide respect among 

his soldiers and the Southern populace. However, squabbles 

with the Confederate War Department over supplies and unit 

organization hurt his relations with Richmond. In the fall of 

1861 Johnston had fallen into a bitter dispute with Confederate 

President Jefferson Davis over rank, which irreparably soured 

relations between the two men.

The Union and Confederate armies were organized along 

similar lines. The three main combat branches were infantry, 

cavalry, and artillery. The majority of infantry and cavalry 

regiments had an authorized strength of approximately 1,000 

men, divided into ten companies. The main exceptions were 

the regulars of the 11th–19th Infantry, each of which had two 

battalions. In practice, most 

units on campaign numbered 

between 300 and 500 men due 

to illness, battlefield losses, 

and desertions. Two or more 

(usually three or four) regiments made up a brigade, 

and two or more brigades 

comprised a division. In 1862 

both sides introduced corpslevel commanders for the first 

time in American military 

history. The Union called 

these formations corps and 

numbered them, whereas the 

Confederacy referred to this 

level of command as wings. 

The Confederate army tended 

to have slightly larger divisions but in general matched 

General Johnston

(Library of Congress)
10 

its Union counterpart in terms of organization. One significant difference was that Confederate cavalry massed into one 

division, whereas Federal cavalry regiments were distributed in 

brigades among the several corps. Union artillery batteries (four 

or six guns each) were organized into regiments for administrative purposes but fought dispersed; Confederate batteries of 

four guns each were administratively independent organizations. Both armies attached batteries to individual brigades and 

divisions, while retaining a general reserve for massing of firepower. Federal equipment and ordnance were generally better 

and more uniform than those employed by the Confederates. 

It was not uncommon to find a Confederate infantry regiment 

with obsolete weapons or a battery containing three or four 

different types of cannon.

McClellan’s army had a small core of regulars, but most 

of the troops of both sides were volunteers and militia. Most 

Union troops enlisted for three years or the duration of the war, 

whichever came first. Confederates enlisted for one year in the 

spring of 1861 and elected their company-grade officers. Their 

one-year commitments meant that the Confederate armies 

stood ready to dissolve due to expiring enlistments just as 

the 1862 campaign got underway. The Confederate Congress 

responded by passing a conscription act, the first national draft 

in American history. The law held Confederate soldiers in the 

army for three additional years, and gave them a chance to 

reelect their officers. These changes took effect in April 1862, 

and stalled Confederate operations during that month.

The senior leaders of both armies were generally professionally trained officers. Most had studied at West Point and 

had served in the Mexican War or on the western frontier. 

Few officers, however, had experience handling large formations before the outbreak of the Civil War. Confederate general 

officers ranked as brigadier generals, major generals, or generals; 

their U.S. Army counterparts could rise no higher than major 

general. A considerable number of Confederate officers were 

graduates of the Virginia Military Institute and the Military 

College of South Carolina (The Citadel). Regimental and 

company officers tended to be appointed as much on political 

influence and recruiting prowess as on professional training; 

often they learned the drill and tactics alongside their men. 

No uniform basic training program existed for either army, 
11

although both sides used the same standard drill manuals from 

the 1850s. 

Compared to a modern staff structure, Civil War headquarters were considerably smaller. A commander’s staff in the 

1860s consisted of deputies for personnel, ordnance, medical, 

provost, and subsistence. Higher-level staffs also had an engineer 

section that covered mapmaking and other support. General 

officers were authorized aides, one for a brigade commander 

and up to four for an army commander, and these could be 

supplemented by “volunteer aides.” A Civil War commander 

was in effect his own operations officer and intelligence officer 

at the same time, which placed a strain on the senior leaders.

General McClellan’s plan to capture Richmond in the 

spring of 1862 was influenced by Virginia’s topography. The two 

capitals stood one hundred miles apart. The Virginia theater 

was further compressed by the Allegheny Mountains to the west 

and the Chesapeake Bay to the east. Several major rivers—the 

Rappahannock, Rapidan, Pamunkey, York, Chickahominy, and 

James—flowed eastward across any potential axis of advance 

toward Richmond from the north. A strong Union garrison held 

Fort Monroe at the mouth of the James and York Rivers. The 

United States Navy controlled the Chesapeake Bay and could 

thereby support land operations. To the west, the Shenandoah 

Valley ran from the southwest to the northeast, providing an 

abundant source of provisions and giving Confederate forces a 

route into central Maryland and Pennsylvania. 

A lack of good, all-weather, macadamized roads tied both 

armies to railroads, primarily for their supplies. The Richmond, 

Fredericksburg, and Potomac Railroad ran from Aquia Landing 

near Fredericksburg to the rebel capital. Another line, the Orange 

and Alexandria, went from Alexandria into central Virginia, while 

the Virginia Central connected Richmond with Staunton in the 

Shenandoah Valley. Several smaller lines fed into these three 

major railroads, extending their reach. Union armies could also be 

securely supplied by water using the Chesapeake Bay and Virginia’s 

eastern rivers.

As McClellan examined the map, he shrank from the hard 

fighting, heavy casualties, and logistical problems inherent in 

an overland campaign to Richmond. He also believed that his 

enemy outnumbered him. McClellan therefore proposed to 

move by sea to Urbanna, a tobacco port on the Rappahannock 
12 

River, where he could establish a base and advance toward 

Richmond. Lincoln favored an overland campaign but deferred 

to McClellan’s judgment. He approved McClellan’s Urbanna 

plan on 8 March with the proviso that the general keep sufficient 

forces around Washington to make the city “entirely secure.”

Before the first Union troop transports could sail, General 

Johnston upset the Federal plan. Wary of a possible flanking 

maneuver, he abandoned Centreville and Aquia in early March 

and retreated to Gordonsville on the Virginia Central Railroad. 

McClellan moved his army forward to Centreville on 10 March and 

discovered that the Confederate position was weaker than he had 

thought. Moreover, his troops found within the former Confederate 

defenses several “Quaker guns,” painted logs made to look like 

cannons. Embarrassed in the press, he returned to Washington 

and recast his campaign. The Union Army of the Potomac would 

now move by ship to Fort Monroe and advance on Richmond from 

the east. Lincoln approved this plan, and McClellan’s lead elements 

embarked on 17 March for Tidewater Virginia, where over the next 

four weeks the Army of the Potomac assembled.

During this time the Union high command underwent a 

major change. Frustrated by McClellan’s slow progress and uncooperative demeanor, on 11 March, Lincoln relieved “Little Mac” 

as general in chief of the U.S. Army but kept him as the Army 

of the Potomac’s commander, ostensibly so he could concentrate 

on his Richmond campaign. Lincoln and Edwin M. Stanton, 

his new secretary of war and former attorney general, assumed 

the overall direction of the war themselves. In the wake of this 

reshuffling, the spring campaigns in Virginia got underway.

Operations

The Shenandoah Valley Campaign

Events in the Shenandoah Valley cast a long shadow over 

the Richmond campaign. The Valley itself was of limited strategic value to the Union as an avenue of invasion, but it had to 

be secured to block a Confederate thrust into Maryland and 

threats to Washington from the west. Bounded by the Allegheny 

Mountains to the west and the Blue Ridge Mountains to the 

east, the Shenandoah Valley was split in half by Massanutten 

Mountain, which ran from Conrad’s Store to Strasburg. 
13

Massanutten Mountain could only be crossed in one place, via 

a gap east of New Market. The Valley’s rivers flowed from south 

to north; thus a march toward the Potomac River took armies 

“down the valley.” Staunton was situated at the Valley’s top, while 

Martinsburg and Harpers Ferry sat at the bottom. The macadamized Valley Pike connected the major localities in between. 

In the spring of 1862 about 6,000 Confederates of the Army 

of the Valley defended the Shenandoah Valley at Winchester. 

Their commander was Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson, nicknamed 

“Stonewall” for his heroic 

stand at the Battle of First Bull 

Run. Jackson was a West Point 

classmate of McClellan’s, a 

veteran of the Mexican War, 

and a professor at the Virginia 

Military Institute when war 

broke out. He answered to 

General Johnston on administrative and most operational 

matters, but also received 

orders directly from the 

Confederate War Department 

in Richmond. Opposing him 

in and around Harpers Ferry, 

were over 20,000 Federals of 

the V Corps, commanded 

by Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. 

Banks, a Massachusetts political appointee and former 

Speaker of the U.S. House of 

Representatives.

Banks received from McClellan a dual mission: secure the 

Shenandoah Valley and shield Washington. President Davis and 

his military adviser, General Robert E. Lee, ordered Jackson to 

tie down as many enemy forces in the Valley as possible to ease 

the pressure on Johnston’s army from McClellan’s massive host 

approaching Richmond.

In early March Banks’ troops pushed south from Harpers 

Ferry. Jackson accordingly withdrew his Confederates south from 

Winchester on 11 March, and the Federals occupied the town the 

next day. On 15 March the Federal War Department created a new 

General Jackson

(Library of Congress)
14 

Mountain Department in western Virginia under the command 

of Maj. Gen. John C. Frémont, a fiery abolitionist, explorer, and 

politician. Frémont’s mission was to organize Federal forces in 

western Virginia and campaign in southwest Virginia and eastern 

Tennessee. While Banks continued to report to McClellan, 

Frémont answered only to the War Department, a situation that 

created a divided command structure for the rest of the campaign 

in the Shenandoah Valley.

Jackson continued his 

retreat south to Mount Jackson 

to await developments. Banks 

pursued up the Valley to 

Strasburg but soon returned to 

Winchester on 20 March after 

having found no Confederates 

in his front. Believing the first 

part of his mission complete, 

he left only Brig. Gen. James 

Shields’ division of 10,000 

men around Winchester as a 

covering force, and sent Brig. 

Gen. Alpheus S. Williams’ 

division toward Manassas 

Junction to link up with 

McClellan’s army. Confederate 

intelligence agents discovered 

these moves, prompting General Johnston to write to Jackson on 

19 March: “It is important to keep that army in the Valley, that it 

should not reinforce McClellan. Do try to prevent it by getting and 

keeping as near as prudence will permit.” (See Map 1.)

Based on these orders, Jackson’s troops marched northward on 22 March toward Winchester, forty miles away. At 

this time Banks was en route to Washington for a conference 

with McClellan and the War Department, and Shields had 

his division deployed loosely around Winchester. He detailed 

a brigade under Col. Nathan Kimball to advance south along 

the Valley Pike at dawn on 23 March to meet Jackson’s advance 

at Kernstown, two miles south of Winchester. After initially 

driving back the Confederates on the Valley Pike, Kimball 

regrouped and called for reinforcements. Jackson tried to flank 

Kimball to the west, while the Federals stayed on the defensive. 

General Banks

(National Archives)
15

After his bluecoats repelled the Confederate attacks on their 

right, Kimball ordered a general advance that drove the Army 

of the Valley from the field in confusion. Darkness ended the 

pursuit as the Confederates streamed southward. Jackson’s 

army of 4,000 left 718 men on the field while inflicting 590 

Union casualties out of 6,000 engaged.

News of the clash at Kernstown alarmed Union officials 

in Washington. Even though Jackson had been defeated, with 

the Army of the Potomac in motion and Johnston’s army 

located on a direct route to Washington, the possibility of a 

general Confederate counteroffensive could not be overlooked. 

General Banks hurried to rejoin his command, while Williams’ 

division turned around and went back toward Winchester. 

General McClellan was still in Washington, and a concerned 

Lincoln asked him for a detailed tabulation of what troops 

would be left to defend the capital. McClellan replied on 1 

April, just as he boarded a steamer for Fort Monroe. His letter 

claimed that Washington’s garrison of untried artillerymen and 

local militia along with Banks’ troops was sufficient to meet 

Lincoln’s requirements. Secretary Stanton, however, concluded 

that “the President’s order has not been fully complied with,” 

after he looked into the number and distribution of the troops 

left to secure Washington. President Lincoln concurred, and 

Battle of Winchester [Kernstown], Decisive Charge Upon the Rebels at 

the Stone Wall, by Alfred Waud (Library of Congress)
Map 1

F R É M O N T

B A N K S

to RICHMOND

KERNSTOWN 23 Mar

WINCHESTER 24–25 May

NEWTOWN 24 May

FRONT ROYAL 23 May

30–31 May

WOODSTOCK 8 Apr

MOUNT JACKSON 17 Apr

HARRISONBURG 6 Jun

CROSS KEYS 8 Jun

PORT REPUBLIC 9 Jun

McDOWELL

8 May

STRASBURG 1 Jun

A L L E

G

H

E

N

Y

M

O

U

N

T

A I N

S

M

O

U

N

T

A I N

S

B L U

E

R I D

G E

Rocksh Ga p

Swift Run Ga p

S H E N A N D O A H V A L L E Y

Massanutten 

Mountain

Potomac R

Shenandoah R North Fork

South Fork

South Branch

North Branch

South R

North R

Middle R

Mechum’s River

Station

B altimore & Ohio RR

Cedarville

New Market

Mooreeld

Romney

Luray

Ora

Gordonsv

Staunton

West View

Franklin

Conrad’s Store

Cumberland

Charlottesville

VIRGINI A

MARYLAND
S H I E L D S S H I E L D S

to Emmitsburg

to Richmond

Potomac R

P o t o m a c R

Monacacy R

Rappahannock R

Bull Run

Rapidan R

North Anna R

B altimore & Ohio RR

Orange & Alexandria RR

Virginia Central RR

Richmond F redericksburg & P ot omac RR

Martinsburg Sharpsburg

Williamsport

Charles Town

Warrenton

Manassas

Junction

Aquia Landing

Centreville

Fairfax

Middleburg

Rockville

Culpeper

Port Royal 

ange Court House

ville

Harper’s Ferry

Frederick

Leesburg

Fredericksburg

Alexandria

WASHINGTON

BALTIMORE

VIRGINI A

MARYLAND 

MARYLAND

0 20

Miles

23 March–24 June 1862

J ACKSON’S VALLEY CAMPAIGN

Engagement

Confederate Movement, 23 Mar–23 May

Confederate Movement, 24 May–24 Jun

Union Movement
18 

canceled the movement of Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell’s 40,000 

troops to the Peninsula, instead posting it at Manassas and later 

Fredericksburg to help shield Washington.

Meanwhile, Banks concentrated at Winchester, and then 

set his command in motion after Jackson’s Confederates. On 26 

March Banks’ command moved south to Strasburg and Fisher’s 

Hill, effectively shielding the lower valley from Confederate 

incursion. Banks paused there to resupply, but his quartermasters 

proved unable to keep up with the change in direction back to the 

Valley, and for most of April the Federal supply line functioned 

poorly. Rain, muddy roads, and Confederate bridge demolitions 

exacerbated Banks’ logistical problems. Adding to the confusion, 

Stanton made General Banks’ force independent of McClellan, 

with Banks now reporting directly to Washington as commander 

of the new Department of the Shenandoah, an arrangement that 

further fragmented the Union command in Virginia.

Despite these logistical issues, the War Department in 

Washington ordered Banks to press up the Valley. Banks stripped 

his men of all tents and baggage except essential supplies and 

three days’ rations. On 1 April he pushed his troops southward. 

After a skirmish at Woodstock on 8 April, the Confederates fell 

back to Mount Jackson to defend the Valley Pike bridge over the 

north fork of the Shenandoah River. On 15 April Banks’ troops 

arrived at Mount Jackson, having covered only thirty miles in 

fourteen days.

Jackson again drew away but left a delaying force along the river. 

When his men reconnoitered the river, Brig. Gen. Nathan Kimball—

recently promoted in reward for Kernstown—recalled they found it 

“much swollen by rains, rendering it impossible to ford. There being 

one bridge, it now became the center of contest.” On the morning 

of 17 April the Confederates set fire to the bridge as Banks’ Federals 

advanced toward it. Suddenly, three companies of Ohio and Michigan 

cavalry thundered up the Valley Pike, crossed the bridge under fire, 

and extinguished the flames. Kimball’s infantry surged across and 

drove the Confederates farther south. After pausing to regroup, Banks’ 

troops reached Harrisonburg on 25 April. Despite their successes, the 

Federals were exhausted and still poorly supplied. 

Jackson’s Army of the Valley retreated eastward from 

Harrisonburg to Conrad’s Store and Swift Run Gap in the Blue 

Ridge Mountains, from which post Jackson could either move 

to Richmond or attack Banks if the Union forces moved south 
19

from Harrisonburg. Jackson 

regrouped and reorganized his 

men while he awaited Federal 

movements. Reinforcements 

from Richmond and central 

Virginia, chiefly an infantry 

division under Maj. Gen. 

Richard S. Ewell, increased his 

force to 12,000 men.

Up to this point Banks had 

accomplished his mission of 

driving Jackson up the Valley. 

Meanwhile, in the Mountain 

Department, General Frémont’s 

newly organized command 

included 19,000 troops available for duty. President Lincoln 

directed him to push southward from Wheeling into 

eastern Tennessee, a pro-Union area he was anxious to liberate. 

Frémont decided to take Brig. Gen. Louis Blenker’s reinforced 

infantry division through the Allegheny Mountains to Staunton, 

and then march southward into Tennessee along the railroad 

running between Staunton and Knoxville. Simultaneously, Brig. 

Gen. Jacob D. Cox would lead another Union force south from 

Charleston and meet Frémont along the way.

Execution of Frémont’s operation soon ran afoul of the 

region’s difficult mountain geography. Transportation and 

terrain delayed the arrival of Blenker’s division, and it took that 

unit five weeks by road and rail to transit west from Washington 

to Petersburg (West Virginia), from which Blenker planned to 

move southward immediately. When his troops arrived, they 

were in no condition for a major campaign; their appearance was 

so pitiful that Frémont’s chief of staff declared the men needed 

ten or twenty days rest before doing anything else. Frémont 

did get some of his forces in motion, and by early May a small 

brigade of 3,000 men under Brig. Gen. Robert H. Milroy was 

headed toward Staunton, by way of McDowell, a hamlet in the 

Allegheny Mountains of Highland County. This move threatened 

the Virginia Central Railroad, a vital part of the Confederate 

logistical network.

General Ewell

(Library of Congress)
20 

A second major Federal development in late April was 

Banks’ overconfident assessment of the strategic situation. 

Shortly after he arrived in Harrisonburg, Union scouts informed 

Banks that Jackson was moving over the Blue Ridge Mountains 

toward Gordonsville, thus leaving the Valley. Confederate prisoners confirmed this information. On 22 April Banks wired to 

Washington that “Jackson has abandoned the valley of Virginia 

permanently.” In response, on 3 May the War Department ordered 

Banks to set up a defensive position at Strasburg with Williams’ 

division and detach Shields’ large command to Fredericksburg 

for eventual movement to McClellan’s army. These orders pulled 

Banks’ force northward just as Frémont’s troops began moving 

toward Staunton on 12 May.

Meanwhile Jackson carefully watched these developments. 

President Davis and General Lee had reinforced Jackson with 

Ewell’s 8,000 soldiers, hoping he could further distract from 

McClellan’s advance toward the Confederate capital. In late April, 

Lee and Jackson corresponded about the best course of action—

hit Banks directly, go after Milroy at McDowell and then turn on 

Banks, or march on Strasburg and get in Banks’ rear. Lee left the 

decision to Jackson.

Jackson chose to attack Milroy’s column first “for if 

successful I would afterwards only have Banks to contend 

with,” Jackson later recalled. At this point Milroy and his 

brigade were at McDowell, twenty-two miles west of Staunton. 

These Federals were opposed by 3,600 infantry under Brig. 

Gen. Edward Johnson posted on the railroad at Westview, 

seven miles west of Staunton. To deceive Banks and Frémont, 

on 1 May the Army of the Valley set out on a march southeast 

over the Blue Ridge to Mechums River Station on the Virginia 

Central Railroad, where the troops entrained on 4 May. Ewell’s 

division stayed at Swift Run Gap to watch Banks’ Federals in the 

Valley, while Johnson’s scouts kept Jackson informed of Milroy’s 

dispositions. At Mechums River Station many soldiers assumed 

Richmond was their destination until the trains started west 

toward Staunton. The army then marched west from that town 

toward McDowell. Jackson’s vanguard arrived at McDowell on 

the morning of 8 May and reinforced Johnson’s small brigade 

atop Bull Pasture Mountain, three miles east of McDowell. 

Jackson then sent Johnson’s brigade to occupy Sitlington’s Hill, 

a spur of the mountain overlooking the town.
21

Milroy detected Jackson’s 

approach, and took up a defensive position at McDowell. 

Brig. Gen. Robert C. Schenck’s 

brigade joined Milroy with 

3,000 troops from Franklin on 

8 May, after covering thirtyfour miles of mountain roads in 

twenty-three hours. Meanwhile 

Milroy’s infantry put up a 

bold front through aggressive skirmishing and artillery 

fire against Sitlington’s Hill. “I 

found Milroy,” Schenck later 

reported, “with his small force 

in the village at the foot of the 

mountain, defending himself 

against the enemy occupying 

the heights above, shut in, in 

fact, in a sort of amphitheater. 

The only easy way of escape 

from the position was down . . . the road by which I had arrived.”

The combined force of Federals numbered over 6,000 men, 

facing an equal number of Southerners. The Union commanders 

decided to make a spoiling attack on the afternoon of 8 May 

against the Confederate positions on Sitlington’s Hill. After a fourhour battle in rugged terrain, Milroy withdrew his regiments off 

the hill back to McDowell. His men had inflicted 499 casualties 

with a loss of 256 of their own men. In the early morning hours 

of 9 May Schenck withdrew both brigades northward toward 

Franklin, where Frémont met him with reinforcements on 13 

May. Jackson followed the bluecoats for two days, then broke off 

his pursuit and returned to Staunton. Having repelled Frémont’s 

advance in the Alleghenies, Jackson could now turn on Banks’ 

force in the Shenandoah.

Jackson’s men joined with Ewell’s division at Conrad’s 

Store and moved against Banks who had been forced to spread 

his weakened command across the Valley north of Massanutten 

Mountain. By 13 May Banks’ main force occupied Strasburg with 

5,000 men, while another 1,000 Federals under Col. John R. Kenly 

guarded the Union line of communications to the east at Front 

General Lee

(Library of Congress)
22 

Royal. General Shields’ division was already east of the Blue Ridge 

heading for Fredericksburg. With its 16,000 men, Jackson’s Army 

of the Valley could expect an advantage wherever it struck.

After a short rest at New Market, General Jackson set off 

down the Valley. Abandoning the Valley Pike, he turned his 

army east over Massanutten Mountain, and then headed north to 

Front Royal. On 23 May, over 4,000 Confederate troops surprised 

Kenly’s Federals and drove them through the town in disorder. 

The Northerners attempted to make a stand on Camp Hill and 

later at Guard Hill, but as they retreated north to Cedarville, two 

Confederate cavalry charges routed the entire Union force, and 

almost 900 Federals surrendered.

When Banks learned about the Front Royal defeat that 

night, he realized that his mission had changed from defending 

the Valley to saving his army. Believing the Confederate force to 

be small, he delayed packing his supplies until the morning of 24 

May. While on the road for Winchester he learned that the entire 

Army of the Valley was nearby and moving in his direction. “It was 

determined, therefore, to enter the lists with the enemy in a race or 

a battle, as he should choose,” Banks wrote later.

The Confederates caught up with Banks’ column at Newtown, 

eight miles south of Winchester on the Valley Pike. Jackson’s 

vanguard struck from the east, drove away the wagon guards, 

and captured fifty of Banks’ wagons full of supplies and arms. 

This haul, which the Confederates promptly put to use for their 

army, gave the Federal commander the unfortunate nickname of 

“Commissary Banks.” The two armies skirmished as Banks’ men 

retired northward to Winchester, reaching the town that night. 

On 25 May, Banks sent his remaining wagons north and made 

a stand outside Winchester to buy time. The Union troops held 

off Confederate attacks until their right flank was overrun, which 

caused the entire Union position to collapse. General Banks rallied 

his fleeing men as they hurried through the town, and managed 

to save most of his wagons from the Southern cavalry as the 

Federals headed for the Potomac at Williamsport. Still, Jackson’s 

army captured 1,750 Union prisoners in and beyond Winchester, 

including sick and wounded Union soldiers left in hospitals.

In Washington, President Lincoln and Secretary Stanton 

reacted quickly to this new Confederate surge. After ensuring 

Washington’s security, Lincoln ordered Frémont’s troops at 

Franklin to march to Harrisonburg, which would place them in 
23

the Confederate rear. Shields’ 

division had just arrived in 

Fredericksburg, but on 25 

May Lincoln turned it around 

and sent it back toward the 

Valley. McDowell’s large corps, 

preparing to march from 

Fredericksburg to Richmond 

to join McClellan’s army, also 

received orders to move to the 

Valley. Lincoln saw an opportunity to trap Jackson’s army 

around Winchester, and sought 

to place Shields, McDowell, 

and Frémont in positions to 

crush the Southern force. By 

the end of May, Union Brig. 

Gen. Rufus Saxton had 7,000 

men at Harpers Ferry, and 

Banks’ 7,000 men were still 

at Williamsport. Shields had 

11,000 men twenty miles east of Front Royal, and Brig. Gen. 

John W. Geary maintained a small Federal force of 2,000 men 

at Middleburg east of the Blue Ridge. The Confederates were 

near Harpers Ferry, dangerously exposed to the prospect of 

converging Federal forces. On 29 May Lincoln directed Shields’ 

division to Front Royal and Strasburg. Frémont’s army, on halfrations since the battle of McDowell, faced a road from Franklin 

to Harrisonburg that was stoutly defended by Confederate 

cavalry. Instead of proceeding to Harrisonburg, Frémont moved 

northeast to Moorefield on his own initiative, reaching there 

on 29 May with nearly fifteen thousand troops. His command 

was so badly strung out on the march that he paused for a day 

to rest his weary soldiers. As his men rested, Frémont received 

new orders from Lincoln to move to Strasburg and join Shields’ 

division. Lincoln now tried to create a pincer movement to block 

Jackson’s retreat, but both jaws of the pincer were independent 

of each other.

Effective reconnaissance by his cavalry kept “Stonewall” 

Jackson aware of the threat to his rear at Strasburg. His closest 

units stood thirteen miles away at Winchester, while others 

President Lincoln

(Library of Congress)
24 

near Harpers Ferry were over thirty miles from Strasburg. 

Jackson immediately set about escaping the trap, dispatching 

his cavalry to delay the Federals while his infantry marched up 

the Valley Pike.

When he received his new orders directing a push to 

Strasburg, Frémont stripped his army of all baggage and impedimenta except ammunition and a few days’ rations. On 31 May he 

marched east but ran afoul of poor roads and Ewell’s Confederates. 

Ignorant of the overall Federal plan, Frémont chose to deploy and 

skirmish, but his troops were held up again on 1 June, northwest 

of Strasburg.

Meanwhile Shields advanced his division on 30 May, and 

by dusk Kimball’s brigade had retaken Front Royal from the 

Confederates. Shields’ troops spent the night in Front Royal, 

and the next day found that the Confederates blocked their 

route westward. Kimball’s men skirmished with the enemy, 

while General Shields took no further action. He later disingenuously claimed he “would have occupied Strasburg, but 

dare[d] not interfere with what was designed for Frémont.” 

This command confusion delayed the Federals as much as any 

Confederate action.

The Federal pincers finally closed on 2 June when the 

vanguards of Frémont’s and Shields’ columns met near Strasburg. 

By then it was too late—Jackson’s force had escaped up the valley, 

while the Federals had to be content to nip at his rear guard. 

Frémont’s men chased the Confederates along the Valley Pike, 

while Shields’ division headed south on Massanutten’s east side, 

seeking to get in front of the Army of the Valley and trap it between 

the two Federal commands. General McDowell was left to the rear 

at Front Royal, while Banks was at Harpers Ferry.

Jackson’s army turned and fought a sharp engagement 

with Frémont’s troops at Harrisonburg on 6 June, then moved 

southeast to Port Republic on the South Fork of the Shenandoah 

River, where Jackson hoped to take a central position against the 

converging Federal columns. Frémont moved his troops southeast on the Port Republic Road from Harrisonburg on 8 June in 

pursuit of Jackson, but ran across Ewell’s Confederate division 

posted astride the road on a ridge near the hamlet of Cross 

Keys. Fighting raged most of the day, during which Frémont 

was repulsed. Ewell withdrew from the field that night to Port 

Republic, leaving only a brigade to watch the enemy. On the 
25

following day, Jackson’s united command defeated two brigades 

of Shields’ division north of Port Republic after heavy fighting. 

Frémont failed to reach the field in time to support Shields’ 

troops. In just over two hours, Jackson had won a convincing 

victory. Frémont withdrew his command to Harrisonburg, while 

Shields marched north along the Shenandoah River toward Front 

Royal, leaving the Confederate Army of the Valley to disengage 

south toward the Virginia Central Railroad. These movements 

brought the Shenandoah Valley campaign to a close.

On 9 June, the day of Jackson’s victory at Port Republic, 

Lincoln corrected his error of employing multiple, independent 

armies and reorganized the Union forces in the Shenandoah 

Valley into a unified command with a single mission. The president concluded in a message to his commanders that “Richmond 

is the principal point for our active operation.” Correctly deducing 

the Confederate goal of diverting Federal forces to the Valley, he 

wrote “we should stay on the defensive everywhere else, and direct 

as much force as possible to Richmond.” He severed the Mountain 

Department’s western section so Frémont could focus on operations in the Shenandoah. Banks’ troops moved to Front Royal, 

while McDowell’s corps returned to Manassas and Fredericksburg. 

These redeployments showed Lincoln’s belated maturation as a 

strategist; never again would he allow himself to be as distracted 

from the main objectives of a campaign as he was by Jackson in 

The Battle of Cross Keys, Sunday June 7th [sic]1862, by Edwin Forbes

 (Library of Congress)
26 

1862. Lincoln also began his search for a single commander to 

unite these forces into one army. 

The Campaign Against Richmond

While Union and Confederate forces maneuvered in the 

Shenandoah Valley, the Union Army of the Potomac attempted 

to claim the major prize—Richmond. McClellan had a powerful 

army to accomplish his task. Initially, McClellan organized his 

forces into four army corps—the I Corps under McDowell, the II 

Corps under Brig. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner, the III Corps of Brig. 

Gen. Samuel P. Heintzelman, and Brig. Gen. Erasmus D. Keyes’ IV 

Corps. In May, he created two additional corps, the V Corps under 

Brig. Gen. Fitz John Porter and the VI Corps under Brig. Gen. 

William B. Franklin. Moving in stages by water from Alexandria 

to Fort Monroe by 1 April 50,000 men had arrived there, with 

another 50,000 on the way. The army itself was confident that 

McClellan’s planned advance via Yorktown to Richmond would 

meet with success.

Opposing McClellan initially was a force of 10,000 

Confederates under Maj. Gen. John B. Magruder, who dug in 

across the peninsula between the York and the James east of 

Yorktown. His command, known as the Army of the Peninsula, 

had been in the area for nearly a year since the Battle at Big Bethel 

in June 1861. Magruder, known as “Prince John” for his flamboyant dress and manner, energetically prepared to defend against 

the Federal advance. Using impressed slaves to build fortifications 

across the peninsula from Yorktown to the James River, his men 

also dammed several waterways to increase the area’s considerable wetlands to channel a Union attack. Magruder also enhanced 

his position with deceptions that included marching his men in 

circles and dragging branches behind horses to stir dust and give 

the appearance of greater numbers to the enemy. In other places 

he used Quaker guns to produce a similar illusion. He also called 

for reinforcements, and Johnston’s army moved toward Yorktown 

from Gordonsville.

General McClellan’s state of mind negatively impacted his 

campaign against Richmond. His private letters at this time reveal 

a man who preferred maneuver over battle and seemed to doubt 

whether the Confederates would fight at all. McClellan came to 

detest Lincoln, Stanton, and the Washington bureaucracy, writing 

on 1 April, “Officially, I am glad to be away from that sink of 
27

iniquity.” The commanding general called Lincoln’s decision to 

cancel McDowell’s orders to join him in early April “the most 

infamous thing that history has recorded.” On 18 April he made 

an alarming admission: “The great trouble I have is a want of good 

staff officers. . . . Many of my aides are excellent but the trouble is in 

the Chiefs of Departments whose lack of experience I am obliged 

to supply by personal labor.” This attitude toward his staff—many 

of whom he had personally appointed—did not change, and 

several times during the campaign McClellan’s health suffered due 

to overwork.

McClellan’s infantry first probed the Yorktown lines on 5 

April, and found them more formidable than expected. Poor 

maps combined with rainy weather hampered Union operations, so McClellan decided to besiege the Confederate position. 

Meanwhile Johnston’s Confederate Army of Northern Virginia 

marched down the peninsula and reinforced the Yorktown 

defenses. On 12 April Magruder’s Army of the Peninsula was 

absorbed into General Johnston’s army, and on 17 April Johnston 

arrived on the scene. He had 62,000 men holding Yorktown and 

a secondary defensive line at Williamsburg.

McClellan’s intelligence organization detected Johnston’s 

arrival at Yorktown but misread the size of his army. At this time the 

Army of the Potomac used balloons for aerial reconnaissance and 

employed an intelligence organization headed by the renowned 

Allan W. Pinkerton, a former Chicago detective. Balloonists often 

could tell enemy positions but revealed little about his strength 

or intentions. Pinkerton demonstrated a penchant for telling his 

chief what he wanted to hear, which meant McClellan consistently 

overestimated the enemy strength, and was accordingly overcautious in his operations. (See Map 2.)

For the next four weeks both armies remained in their 

positions and traded artillery fire. An anxious Lincoln wrote to 

McClellan on 9 April, cautioning him that time was not on his side. 

“It is indispensable to you that you strike a blow. . . . The country 

will not fail to note—is now noting—the present hesitation to move 

upon an intrenched enemy, is but the story of Manassas repeated.” 

The letter closed with the imperative “you must act.” On 16 April 

a Vermont brigade from the IV Corps probed the Confederate 

line along the Warwick River at Dam Number 1; after finding a 

weakness it broke into the Confederate position but withdrew for 

lack of reinforcements. General Johnston later inspected the Dam 
Map 2

A. P. HILL

MAGRUDER

LONGSTREET

G . W. SMITH

HUGER

H E I NT Z E L M AN

(III)

K E Y E S (IV)

S U M N E R (II)

F RA N K L

( VI) I N

P O R T E ( V)

R

Malvern Hill

Harrison’s

Landing

Pamunkey R

Chickahominy R

J a m e s R

James R

Old Cold Harbor

New Cold Harbor

White

House

Fair Oaks Station

S avag e’s Station Seven Pines

New Market

Long Bridge

Richmond & York RR

Petersburg & Ci ty Point RR

Norfolk & Petersburg RR

Petersburg & Weldon RR Richmond & Petersburg RR

Virginia Central RR

Sur

Charles City

Court House

New Kent Court House

King and 

King William

Court House

Mechanicsville

Hanovertown

City Point

Port Walthall

RICHMOND

PETERSBURG
from

ALEXANDRIA

L O NGS T R E E T

G.W. SMITH

M A G R U D E R

J O H N S T O N

H E I N T Z E L M A N

(III)

K E Y E S

(IV)

S U M N E R (II)

Mattponi R

Yo r k R

R a p p a h a n n o c k R

Halfway House

Fort Monroe

Fort Magruder

Williamsburg

Yorktown

Hampton

Urbana

rry Court House

d Queen Court House

West Point

Gloucester

Court House

0 5 10

Miles

April–31 May 1862

PENINSULA CAMPAIGN

Confederate Position

Confederate Defenses

Confederate Movement

Confederate Retreat

Union Position

Union Movement
30 

Number 1 position and declared it so vulnerable that “no one but 

McClellan could have hesitated to attack.”

McClellan’s siege preparations continued, and he planned 

to start reducing the Confederate fortifications on 5 May. On the 

other side of the lines, Johnston worried about his own position 

at Yorktown. He doubted his army’s ability to hold out against the 

obviously superior Federal firepower being positioned against his 

lines. Moreover, the Confederate flanks by the York and James 

Rivers were vulnerable to Union Navy gunfire, and the possibility 

of an amphibious turning movement could not be overlooked. 

Federal shelling near Yorktown on 1 May amplified Johnston’s 

concerns. After a council of war that night, he directed that his 

army abandon its defensive works and withdraw toward Richmond 

starting the next day. Much of the rebel army’s heavy ordnance had 

to be left behind. On 2 May the supply trains and leading troops 

started west, while the rear guard left the following evening.

The Confederate withdrawal caught McClellan off guard. He 

ordered General Sumner to take the II Corps and III Corps in pursuit 

and sent for transports to embark a force to move up the York and 

block the Confederate line of retreat. Muddy roads slowed Johnston’s 

retrograde movement and forced him to pause at Williamsburg 

to defend a thin line of works 

outside the town. They consisted 

of fourteen small forts anchored 

by the imposing Fort Magruder in 

the center astride the major roads 

from Hampton and Yorktown. 

On 5 May, Federal cavalry and 

two infantry divisions attacked 

this line held by Maj. Gen. James 

Longstreet’s Confederate troops. 

Both sides were reinforced during 

the day, and after heavy fighting, 

the Confederates withdrew 

farther up the Peninsula during 

the night.

On 7 May General Franklin’s 

Union division arrived at Eltham’s 

Landing, near West Point on the 

York River, in an effort to envelop 

the Confederates’ north flank on 

General Longstreet

(Library of Congress)
31

the Peninsula. This maneuver also threatened the Southern army’s 

supply trains as they retreated west. Johnston had foreseen such an 

operation, and he detached two brigades from Maj. Gen. Gustavus W. 

Smith’s division to block Franklin’s threat. Strong attacks prevented 

Franklin from interfering with the Confederates’ withdrawal toward 

Richmond.

McClellan continued his plodding march toward Richmond 

despite Lincoln’s calls for a more aggressive pace. As the Army of 

the Potomac drew closer to the capital, both belligerents sensed the 

campaign was approaching its climax. McClellan remained convinced 

he was outnumbered and beseeched Washington for reinforcements. 

In response the War Department ordered McDowell’s I Corps to 

march overland from Fredericksburg to Richmond. Meanwhile 

Johnston deployed his army six miles east of Richmond to oppose 

McClellan’s advance, using the swampy Chickahominy River as a 

natural defense.

Logistical considerations now weighed on General McClellan. 

He had to decide which river—the York or the James—to use for 

his main line of supply. The York was completely in Federal hands 

and safe for Federal shipping, but control of the James remained 

uncertain. In the end, McClellan established his base at West Point 

on the York and used the railroad leading west toward Richmond 

to supply his army. This decision made geography a critical 

consideration. The Chickahominy River ran east of Richmond in 

a northwest-southeast direction and separated West Point from 

the Confederate capital. To shield his line of communications and 

threaten the city, McClellan chose to straddle the river with his 

army. It was a calculated risk, because one wing could be defeated 

without the prospect of quick reinforcement from the other, especially in times of high water levels. Most of the Union troops stayed 

north of the Chickahominy, but the III and IV Corps deployed 

south of it near Seven Pines and Fair Oaks Station. McClellan 

later defended this deployment scheme by stating that he expected 

McDowell’s force to arrive from the north, but on 25 May President 

Lincoln had ordered it back toward the Shenandoah Valley to face 

“Stonewall” Jackson’s threatening maneuvers.

Although Johnston’s retreat up the Peninsula alarmed Davis 

and Lee, Johnston also probed the Federal positions for an opportunity to attack. He decided to strike at the two Federal commands 

south of the Chickahominy, Keyes’ IV Corps and Heintzelman’s III 

Corps. On the rainy morning of 31 May he set 42,000 Confederates 
Map 3

A . P. H I L L

D . H . H I L L

W H I T I N G

M A G R U D E R

LO N G S T R E E T

F R A N K L I (VI)

N

S U M N E R

(II)

P O R T E R ( V)

KEYE S (IV)

HEINTZELMAN (III)

Deep Bottom

White Oak Swamp

Chan’s Blu

Malvern Hill

J a m e s R

James R

Chickahominy R to White House to Charles City Court House

Old Cold Harbor

New Cold Harbor

Gaines’ Mill

Fair Oaks Station

S avage’s Station

White’s Tavern

New Market

Frayser’s Farm

Shady Grove Churc h

Bethesda Churc h

St. Mary’s Churc h

Willis Churc h

Seven Pines

N EW M A RKET R O A D

D A R B YT OWN R O A D

C H A RLES CITY R O A D

N I N E M ILE R O A D

RIC H MO N D T U R N PIKE

LO N G B RI D G E R O A D

WILLI AM S B U R G R O A D

M EC H A N IS V ILLE T U R N PIKE

Richmond & York RR

Vi rginia Central RR Mechanicsville

Glendale

City Point Port Walthall

RICHMOND

Confederate Position

Richmond Defenses

Confederate Attack

Union Position

0 4

Miles

31 May 1862

B AT TLE OF FAIR O AKS

EVENING
33

in motion against Keyes’ position at Seven Pines and Fair Oaks 

Station (Map 3).

Several roads radiated eastward from Richmond toward the 

Federal lines. These were, from north to south, the Mechanicsville 

Turnpike, Nine Mile Road, Williamsburg Road, Charles City Road, 

Darbytown Road, and New Market Road. Johnston’s complex 

plan called for Longstreet’s reinforced division to march east on 

the Nine Mile Road and hit Keyes’ right while Maj. Gen. D. H. 

Hill’s division attacked along the Williamsburg Road and fixed 

the enemy in their front. Meanwhile, Maj. Gen. Benjamin Huger’s 

division would try to turn the Federal left south of Seven Pines. 

The operation soon went awry because of haphazard staff 

work and poor leadership. Longstreet took the wrong road and 

came up behind Hill. The coordinated attack scheduled for the 

morning turned into a series of fierce frontal assaults by Hill’s men 

against the Union lines. Beginning at 1300, they ultimately routed 

Brig. Gen. Silas F. Casey’s inexperienced Federal division of the IV 

Corps and pushed the IV Corps into the III Corps. Heintzelman 

called for help, and McClellan ordered General Sumner to 

rush reinforcements from his II Corps southward across the 

Chickahominy to assist beleaguered Union troops at Seven Pines. 

After a difficult march in deep mud, Sumner’s lead division under 

Brig. Gen. John Sedgwick arrived on the Federal right about 1630.

At Confederate army headquarters, poor reporting from 

the front made the situation appear confused. Johnston sought 

to regain control of the battle and personally led Maj. Gen. W. 

H. C. “Chase” Whiting’s division down the Nine Mile Road. 

Expecting to hit an open flank, the Confederates instead crashed 

into Sedgwick’s waiting troops. Renewed Southern attacks failed 

to crack Sedgwick’s line, and a Federal counterattack took 200 

Confederate prisoners. While watching the action, Johnston was 

seriously wounded and carried off the field. Darkness ended the 

fighting for the day, and both sides slept on the battlefield.

As the next senior officer, General Smith took command 

of the Confederate forces and renewed the attack against the IV 

Corps on 1 June at Fair Oaks Station. The reinforced Federal line 

north of the Richmond and York River Railroad held firm, and 

that afternoon the Confederates withdrew back to Richmond. The 

Army of the Potomac sustained 5,000 casualties of 34,000 engaged, 

while the Army of Northern Virginia lost 6,000 men, including 

the army’s commander, out of about 39,000 engaged. This debacle 
34 

represented the nadir of Confederate fortunes before Richmond 

in 1862.

General McClellan had been ill during Seven Pines and was 

unable to direct his army until 1 June. The next day he wrote to 

his wife, complaining of exhaustion and ill health, and also admitting, “I am tired of the sickening sight of the battlefield, with its 

mangled corpses and poor suffering wounded! Victory has no 

charms for me when purchased at such cost.” Meanwhile, late in 

the day General Lee assumed command of the Army of Northern 

Virginia by order of President Davis, who lacked confidence in 

Smith’s emotional state and command abilities.

The opposing lines now settled into a lull, and despite the 

urging of his engineer officers to advance toward Richmond and 

put the Chickahominy River behind him, McClellan held the Army 

of the Potomac astride the Chickahominy and ordered his men to 

dig in. McClellan begged Washington for more troops, claiming 

that the Confederate army contained nearly 200,000 men, rather 

than the 70,000 actually under Lee’s command.

In contrast to McClellan, who preferred to remain at his headquarters, Lee visited his new command and personally scouted 

the lines. The Confederate commander improved the Richmond 

fortifications but positioned his troops forward of those defenses 

to preserve the army’s opportunity to maneuver. Reacting to 

McClellan’s passivity, on 11 June Lee detached two infantry divisions to Jackon’s Army of the Valley for use against Frémont and 

Shields. Once those operations concluded, Lee expected Jackson 

to “move rapidly to Ashland by rail or otherwise . . . and sweep 

down between the Chickahominy and the Pamunkey cutting up 

the enemy’s communications” in concert with a general offensive 

by the Army of Northern Virginia. 

Also on 11 June Lee sent his cavalry commander, Brig. 

Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, to scout McClellan’s right flank north of the 

Chickahominy. While on this reconnaissance mission, Stuart 

ran into a Union cavalry brigade that blocked his return, so the 

Confederate horseman had his column ride entirely around the 

Army of the Potomac, raising havoc in the Union rear and embarrassing McClellan. Upon Stuart’s return to Confederate lines, Lee 

learned that the Federal north flank was “in the air” in the vicinity 

of Mechanicsville, and only Porter’s V Corps was positioned north 

of the Chickahominy, as the others had shifted to the south side of 

the river. Here was an opening for a counteroffensive.
35

General Lee took advantage of the Federal commander’s 

inactivity. The Army of the Valley (Jackson’s command retained 

this name until early August) started toward Richmond on 

18 June. Jackson proceeded to Richmond ahead of his men 

to confer with Lee, who had decided to concentrate his offensive against Porter’s 20,000 men north of the Chickahominy. 

Leaving Magruder and Huger with only 25,000 men south of the 

Chickahominy River, the remaining Confederate forces—60,000 

in all—would move against Porter’s position near the hamlet of 

Mechanicsville. Lee desired Jackson to get behind Porter’s troops 

and cut his supply lines. If all went according to Lee’s plan, the 

V Corps would be surrounded and crushed before it could be 

rescued. The attack was scheduled for 26 June to give Jackson 

time to get his troops in position (Map 4).

The Union V Corps contained three divisions under 

Brig. Gens. George W. Morell, George Sykes, and George A. 

McCall. Sykes’ division consisted almost entirely of U.S. Regular 

infantry and artillery. Porter’s troops held strong lines along the 

Chickahominy and Beaver Dam Creek, a swampy stream astride 

Old Cold Harbor Road and Old Church Road. They were dug in 

and had made good use of the creek’s steep banks and nearby hills 

to aid their defense.

Jackson’s troops were 

moving toward Porter’s position 

by 0300 on 26 June but soon 

met Federal skirmishers and 

roadblocks through the swampy 

terrain. The humid climate wore 

down and dehydrated Jackson’s 

weary men. For most of the 

Army of the Valley’s soldiers 26 

June 1862 was spent marching, 

then bivouacking at 1700 north 

of Mechanicsville near Shady 

Grove Church, without seeing 

the enemy or firing a shot. 

Along the Mechanicsville 

Turnpike, Lee waited in vain 

to hear Jackson’s guns, which 

would signal a general attack 

on the Union lines behind 

General Porter

(Library of Congress)
Map 4

L O N G S T R E E T

A . P. H I L L

H U G E R

D . H . H I L L

M AG R U D E R

J ACKSO N

P O R T E R ( V) FRANKLIN (VI)

KEYE S (IV)

HEINTZELMAN (III)

SUMNER (II)

Deep Bottom

White Oak Swamp

Chan’s Blu

Malvern Hill

James R

James R

Chickahominy R

to White House to Charles City Court House

Old Cold Harbor

New Cold Harbor

Gaines’ Mill

Fair Oaks Station

S avage’s Station

Seven Pines

White’s Tavern

New Market

Frayser’s Farm

Shady Grove Churc h

Bethesda Churc h

St. Mary’s Churc h

Willis Churc h

N EW M A RKET R O A D

D A R B YT OW N R O A D

C H A RLES CITY R O A D

WILLI AM S B U R G R O A D

RIC H MO N D T U R N PIKE

LO N G B RI D G E R O A D

N I N E MILE R O A D

Richmond & York RR

Virginia Central RR

Mechanicsville

Glendale

City Point Port Walthall

RICHMOND

Confederate Position

Richmond Defenses

Confederate Attack

Confederate Movement

Union Position

Union Movement

26 June 1862

B AT TLE OF MECHANICSVILLE

EARLY EVENING

0 4

Miles
37

Beaver Dam Creek. Three divisions under Generals Longstreet, 

A. P. Hill, and D. H. Hill stood poised to attack. Neither Lee nor 

Jackson sent couriers or staff officers to communicate with the 

other that day, so Lee was unaware of the Army of the Valley’s slow 

progress. Finally at 1500, without orders from Lee, A. P. Hill sent 

his men forward. McCall’s Federals were ready and, from their 

strong defenses, opened a fire that Porter later stated “strewed 

the road and hill-side with hundreds of dead and wounded, 

and drove the main body of the survivors back in rapid flight 

to and beyond Mechanicsville.” The Confederates re-formed and 

attacked again, but most of A. P. Hill’s men never made it across 

Beaver Dam Creek. Darkness ended the fighting; Porter counted 

only 350 casualties while inflicting 1,300 on the Confederates.

That night McClellan, who had been on the battlefield for most 

of the day, conferred with Porter. Upon hearing news of Jackson’s 

arrival near the battlefield after dark, McClellan ordered the V 

Corps to fall back eastward toward the Chickahominy. In the early 

morning hours of 27 June, Porter’s 20,000 men retired two miles to 

a ridge near Gaines’ Mill overlooking the vital crossroads at both 

Old Cold Harbor and New Cold Harbor. Porter’s flanks rested on 

the river, while the steep valley of Boatswain’s Creek covered part 

of his corps’ front. By 1000 the Federals were positioned in a one 

and a half mile arc and had fortified their line. Fearing an attack 

from Richmond against his lines south of the Chickahominy—in 

reality a bold front put up by General Magruder—McClellan chose 

to send only Brig. Gen. Henry W. Slocum’s VI Corps division of 

7,000 men to bolster Porter’s lines.

Lee and Jackson met on the morning of the 27 June and 

laid plans to attack Porter with their combined strength of about 

60,000 men. They sought to move quickly before McClellan recognized the Confederates’ weakened position south of the river and 

either attacked Richmond or reinforced Porter. While Lee’s divisions approached the V Corps from the north, the Army of the 

Valley would move to Old Cold Harbor and hit the Federals from 

the northeast (Map 5).

The Confederates began their attacks on the V Corps at 1400 

with the divisions of Longstreet and A. P. Hill, which advanced 

against the Union center under a murderous fire. General Porter 

had a panoramic view of the action, reporting that “brigade after 

brigade seemed almost to melt away before the concentrated fire 

of our artillery and infantry; yet others pressed on, followed by 
38 

supports as dashing and brave as their predecessors, despite their 

heavy losses.” D. H. Hill subsequently committed his division 

on Longstreet’s left, but it too failed to crack the Federal line. By 

1600 the Confederate attacks had all been repulsed with heavy 

casualties. 

Map 5

L O N G S T R E E T

A . P. H I L L

H U G E R

D . H . H I L L

M A

G R U D E R

J AC K S O N

P O R T E R ( V) FRANKLIN (VI)

KEYE S (IV)

HEINTZELMAN (III)

SUMNER (II)

Deep Bottom

White Oak Swamp

Chan’s Blu

Malvern Hill

James R

James R

Chickahominy R to White House

Old Cold Harbor

New Cold Harbor

Gaines’ Mill

Fair Oaks Station

S avage’s Station

Seven Pines

White’s Tavern

New Market

Shady Grove Churc h

Bethesda Churc h

St. Mary’s Churc h

Frayser’s Farm

Willis Churc h

N EW M A RKET R O A D

D A R B YT O W N R O A D

C H A RLES CITY R O A D

WILLI AM S B U R G R O A D

RIC H MO N D T U R N PIKE

LO N G B RI D G E R O A D

N I N E MILE R O A D

Richmond & York RR

V irginia Central RR Mechanicsville

Glendale

RICHMOND

Confederate Position

Richmond Defenses

Confederate Attack

Union Position

Union Movement

27 June 1862

B AT TLE OF GAINES ’ MILL

0 4

Miles
39

During the lull, Porter reinforced his lines with Slocum’s 

division, his only reserve troops. Wary of additional Confederate 

assaults, he asked McClellan for reinforcements. Meanwhile two of 

Jackson’s divisions, under Ewell and Brig. Gen. Charles S. Winder, 

finally got into position opposite Porter’s right after a confused 

and circuitous march. They attacked at 1700 against Sykes’ 

regulars, who held firm against determined assaults. After an hour 

of fighting, a lull descended on the battlefield, and by this time 

Porter’s exhausted command was running low on ammunition.

With the sun setting, Lee decided to launch his entire force 

simultaneously against the Federals and win the day by strength of 

numbers. By 1830 he had amassed 50,000 Confederates to assault 

Porter’s line, the largest single attack Lee’s army would make in 

the war. Spearheaded by Brig. Gen. John B. Hood’s brigade, the 

Confederates swarmed toward the Union position and broke into 

the V Corps’ lines all along the front, capturing much of Porter’s 

artillery. Increasing darkness and a desperate Union charge by 

Brig. Gen. Philip St. George Cooke’s cavalry brigade halted the 

The Charge of the Fifth Regulars at Gaines’ Mill, 27th of June, 1862, 

by William Trego

(U.S. Cavalry Museum, Fort Riley)
Map 6

LO N G S T R E E T

A . P. H I L L

H U G E R

M AG R U D E R

J ACKSO N

S U M N E (II)

R

F R A N K L I N (VI)

H E I N T Z E L M AN (III)

K E Y E S (IV)

P O R T E R

( V

De )ep Bottom

White Oak Swamp

Chan’s Blu

Malvern Hill

Harrison’s Landing

Jame s R

James R

Chickahominy R

Appomattox R

to White House to Charles City Court House

Old Cold Harbor

New Cold Harbor

Gaines’ Mill

Fair Oaks Station

S avage’s Station Seven Pines

White’s Tavern

New Market

St. Mary’s Churc h

Frayser’s Farm

Willis Churc h

N EW M A RKET R O A D

D A R B YT OWN R O A D

C H A RLES CITY R O A D

WILLI A MS B U R G R O A D

RIC H MO N D T U R N PIKE

LO N G B RI D G E R O A D

N I N E M ILE R O A D

Richmond & York RR

Petersburg & City Point RR

Richmond & Petersburg RR

Virginia Central RR Mechanicsville

Glendale

City Point Port Walthall

RICHMOND

PETERSBURG

Confederate Position

Richmond Defenses

Confederate Movement

Union Position

Union Movement

Supply Wagon Movement

29 June 1862

R E TREAT T O THE JAMES

LATE EVENING

0 4

Miles
41

Confederate advance, enabling the Federals to withdraw from the 

field and march toward the Chickahominy River bridges, which 

they destroyed after crossing.

The Battle of Gaines’ Mill was the largest and bloodiest of 

the Seven Days Battles, and it was an unquestioned defeat for 

McClellan’s army. Porter’s command suffered almost 7,000 casualties, including 2,800 prisoners, and had to leave the field. Lee’s 

army, however, suffered about 9,000 men killed, wounded, and 

missing. Strategically, Porter’s retreat exposed McClellan’s supply 

line to West Point and forced him to change his logistical base to 

the James River. The battle was important to the Confederates’ 

morale as General Lee’s first tactical victory as the army’s 

commander (Map 6).

Late on the night of 27 June, General Porter rode to army 

headquarters a mile south of the Chickahominy for a conference with General McClellan and the other corps commanders. 

McClellan—ill and exhausted—informed his subordinates that 

he would change the army’s base of supplies from the York to the 

James, and he directed that the army’s wagon trains start south 

via the road passing White Oak Swamp, Glendale, and Malvern 

Hill to Harrison’s Landing on the James River. The troops would 

follow in their wake. The commanding general remained a passive 

figure, showing little offensive initiative, waiting for Lee to dictate 

the events of the campaign. McClellan’s orders reflected this 

mindset—he ordered all his corps to begin the movement to the 

James the next day, 28 June, with Keyes’ corps in the lead, then 

Porter’s battered brigades, followed by the rest of the army. The 

huge supply base at the White House plantation near Eltham’s 

Landing was abandoned.

Both armies were in motion on 28 June. McClellan spent 

the day directing the movement of his supplies and trains from 

Savage’s Station southward, leaving his corps commanders to plan 

and execute their individual parts of the retreat. Lee remained 

north of the Chickahominy with his main body, probing to 

discover McClellan’s intentions. When late in the afternoon Lee 

discovered that McClellan was moving south, he determined to 

catch the Army of the Potomac north of White Oak Swamp and 

Glendale and defeat McClellan’s column in detail. He ordered 

the commands of Huger and Magruder to attack the next day at 

Savage’s Station, while Jackson’s troops harried the Union retreat 

from the north. A. P. Hill and Longstreet moved their divisions 
42 

across the Chickahominy to strike the Union flank to the south. 

Poor staff work hindered Lee’s understanding of the situation and 

hampered execution of his plans—themes that would recur over 

the next several days.

On 29 June the Army of the Potomac continued its march 

toward the James. Porter’s V Corps held Malvern Hill, while 

Keyes’ IV Corps extended the line north. The II, III, and VI 

Corps were at Savage’s Station on the Richmond and York River 

Railroad, covering the last withdrawal of the army’s stores. Per 

McClellan’s orders, all supplies that could not be moved were 

destroyed. McClellan also left behind in the army’s general 

hospital thousands of men who were too seriously ill or wounded 

to be moved.

During the morning Magruder advanced east along the 

Williamsburg Road to probe the Union line at Savage’s Station. Lee 

had ordered Magruder and his 14,000 men to attack and fix the 

Union rear guard in place while Jackson’s army hit their northern 

flank and Huger’s command clawed southward toward White Oak 

Swamp. Instead, Magruder halted his men when they encountered 

the first Federal outposts of Sumner’s II Corps. After wasting 

hours in a futile effort to concentrate more troops, Magruder 

finally attacked Savage’s Station in the late afternoon. After a short 

but sharp engagement, both sides disengaged. Sumner’s troops 

Ruins of the White House

(Library of Congress)
43

also delayed Huger’s advance, while Jackson’s command remained 

oddly idle all day north of the river repairing bridges and did not 

get into the fray.

The Confederates had missed a golden opportunity to hit 

McClellan’s retiring column on 29 June. Had Magruder attacked 

as ordered, he would have held a considerable part of the Federal 

army in place and opened the way for Huger to get in its rear. 

Instead, he had fought only mixed elements of the II and VI Corps, 

under the overall command of General Sumner as senior officer. 

Federal command confusion had opened up gaps in the line after 

Heintzelman had decided on his own initiative to withdraw the 

III Corps in the afternoon and McClellan had acceded to Slocum’s 

request to withdraw his division late in the day. Having escaped 

from a precarious position, the Federals spent the night retiring 

southward in a rainstorm.

The road to the James River headed south from Savage’s 

Station for five miles before crossing White Oak Swamp two miles 

north of the Glendale crossroads. All Federal troops and trains 

had to pass the intersection and travel south along the Willis 

Church Road. Congestion necessitated a pause at Glendale on 30 

June. McClellan set up a defense of two divisions under General 

Franklin covering the swamp, posting the rest of his available 

troops west of Glendale to defend the road network. He issued 

Commencement of the Battle of Savage’s Station, Sunday June 29,

by Alfred Waud

(Library of Congress)
Map 7

F R A N K L I N (VI)

S U M N E R (II)

H E I N T Z E L M A N (III)

KEYES (IV)

P O R T E R ( V)

JACKSON

L O N G S T R E E T

A . P. H I L L HUGER

HOLMES

MAGRUDER

Chan’s Blu

Malvern Hill

J a m e s R

James R

Chickahominy R

Appomattox R

White Oak

Swamp

to White House to Charles City Court House

Harrison’s Landing

Old Cold Harbor

New Cold Harbor

Gaines’ Mill

Fair Oaks Station

S avage’s Station

Seven Pines

White’s Tavern

New Market

Frayser’s Farm

St. Mary’s Churc h

Willis Churc h

N EW M A RKET R O A D

D A R B YT OWN R O A D

C H A RLES CITY R O A D

WILLI AMS B U R G R O A D

N I N E M ILE R O A D

RIC H MO N D T U R N PIKE

LO N G B RI D G E R O A D

Richmond & York RR

Petersburg & City Point RR

Richmond & Petersburg RR

Virginia Central RR Mechanicsville

Glendale

City Point Port Walthall

RICHMOND

PETERSBURG

Confederate Position

Richmond Defenses

Confederate Movement

Union Position

Supply Wagon Movement

0 4

Miles

30 June 1862

B AT TLE OF GLEND ALE

NOON
45

no further orders and rode south to the James. At 1600 McClellan 

boarded the gunboat Galena on the James River. By seniority, 

General Sumner took charge at Glendale (Map 7).

Hoping to capture the stalled Federal supply trains and cut 

off Franklin from the rest of the Army of the Potomac, Lee sent 

Magruder and the division of Maj. Gen. Theophilus H. Holmes 

southward toward Malvern Hill while A. P. Hill, Longstreet, Huger, 

and Jackson converged on the Glendale intersection. The plan 

miscarried. Cannon fire from Federal batteries on Malvern Hill 

and gunboats on the James handily repulsed Holmes’ inexperienced North Carolinians, while Magruder spent the day marching 

and countermarching in response to changing orders from General 

Lee. Huger found the Charles City Road blocked by trees felled by 

Federal pioneers, spent the day cutting a new path through thick 

forest, and took no part in the battle. Jackson likewise moved 

cautiously and his advance stalled at White Oak Swamp, about two 

miles north of the intersection. This left only the divisions of A. P. 

Hill and Longstreet advancing up the Darbytown and Long Bridge 

roads toward Glendale, where fierce and often hand-to-hand 

fighting erupted between the attackers and the Union divisions of 

Brig. Gens. Philip Kearny and Joseph Hooker, and General McCall. 

Thanks to Jackson’s passivity, General Sumner was eventually able 

to transfer General Sedgwick’s division from White Oak Swamp 

Battle at White Oak Swamp Bridge, by Alfred Waud

(Library of Congress)
46

to Glendale to reinforce the hard-pressed Federals. Heavy fighting 

continued until 2030, but when darkness fell, the intersection 

remained in Union hands. During the night Sumner withdrew 

three miles down the Willis Church Road to Malvern Hill.

After being dispersed for days in retreat, the Army of the 

Potomac was now fused into one compact mass. The Federal 

position on the northern end of Malvern Hill on 1 July was 

strong. McClellan created a U-shaped line, with Porter’s V Corps 

holding the left and center and Brig. Gen. Darius N. Couch’s IV 

Corps division and Sumner’s entire II Corps to the right and right 

rear. Open ground several hundred yards to their front gave the 

Union troops excellent fields of fire. After inspecting the line in the 

morning, McClellan retired to a Navy ship along the James River 

where he would remain for most of the day. He turned over control 

of the field to General Porter, despite the fact that General Sumner 

outranked Porter. 

Central to the Union defense was Brig. Gen. Henry J. Hunt’s 

reserve artillery, which combined with the various corps and divisional artillery batteries to stud the line with 107 cannon. Hunt set 

up an intricate fire plan that allowed him to concentrate thirty or 

more cannon onto one target. Most of the Federal gunners under 

Hunt’s control were highly trained regular artillerists from the 1st, 

2d, 3d, 4th, and 5th Artillery.

The Confederates approached Malvern Hill on 1 July from 

three directions. General Holmes’ division skirmished along the 

River Road, while Magruder’s command came onto the field from 

the northwest via Carter’s Mill Road. Jackson’s men marched via 

the Willis Church Road and deployed northeast of the Federal 

line. Lee planned a converging attack on the Federals and wanted 

to use his artillery first to soften up the position. The fire of Hunt’s 

cannon suppressed many of the Southern batteries, and infantry 

probes toward Malvern Hill met with bloody repulses. Confederate 

shelling, however, had a cumulative effect. Most of their cannon 

fire overshot the main Federal battle line, striking the army’s 

infantry reserves. The situation caused Sumner to pull his infantry 

back to a sheltered swale and to order Porter to follow suit. Porter 

refused to abide by Sumner’s command and instead shifted some 

of his troops along the line to take the place of Sumner’s departing 

regiments. (See Map 8.)

Lee witnessed these movements and interpreted them as a 

Federal retreat. Several of his subordinates also reported the same 
Map 8

J AC K S O N LONGSTREET

D. H. HILL

A. P. HILL

HUGER

HOLMES

MAGRUDER

PORTER

K E Y E S

Chan’s Blu

Malvern Hill

J a m e s R

James R

Chickahominy R

Appomattox R

White Oak

Swamp

to White House to Charles City Court House

Deep Bottom

Harrison’s Landing

Old Cold Harbor

New Cold Harbor

Gaines’ Mill

Fair Oaks Station

S avage’s Station

Seven Pines

White’s Tavern

New Market

Frayser’s Farm

Shady Grove Churc h

Bethesda Churc h

St. Mary’s Churc h

N EW M A RKET R O A D

D A R B YT OWN R O A D C H A RLES CITY R O A D

WILLI A MS B U R G R O A D

N I N E M ILE R O A D

RIC H M O N D T U R N PIKE

LO N G B RI D G E R O A D

Richmond & York RR

Petersburg & City Point RR

Richmond & Petersburg RR

Virginia Central RR Mechanicsville

Glendale

City Point

Port Walthall

RICHMOND

Confederate Position

Richmond Defenses

Confederate Attack

Union Position

Union Movement

1 July 1862

B AT TLE OF MAL VERN HILL

0 4

Miles
48 

information, prompting Lee to order an immediate attack. As 

General Porter recalled, “About 5:30 . . . the enemy opened upon 

[us] with artillery from nearly the whole of his front, and soon 

afterward pressed forward with his columns of infantry first on 

one [flank], then on the other, or both.”

Lee envisioned this charge as a grand coordinated assault, 

but it did not develop as expected. The Southern attacks were 

uncoordinated and piecemeal, and suffered high losses from the 

combined salvos of Hunt’s batteries. Salvos from Federal gunboats 

along the James River also tore into the Confederates, leading one 

southern officer to describe the scene as “not war, but murder.” 

Nonetheless, the steady Confederate pressure eroded Porter’s line 

to the point where his infantry wavered. Porter called up Hooker’s 

III Corps division and used it to launch a successful countercharge. 

By dark the battle lines had stabilized back in their starting positions, although firing continued into the night.

Just before 2100 a jubilant Porter reported to McClellan: “We 

have driven the enemy beyond the battlefield . . . we will hold 

our own and advance if you wish.” Instead McClellan, concerned 

about Stuart’s cavalry operating east of Malvern Hill and threatening communications between that point and the James, ordered 

a retreat to Harrison’s Landing, nine miles from Malvern Hill. The 

Federals withdrew during the night, and by dawn only a small 

Battle of Malvern Hills fought on Tuesday July 1st, by Alfred Waud

(Library of Congress)
49

rearguard force of cavalry and infantry held the hill. A New York 

soldier later summed up the army’s mood as it trudged through 

the rain to Harrison’s Landing: “The withdrawal of General 

McClellan’s army from Malvern Hill, a position that seemed to be 

impregnable, was a surprise to the men in the ranks, and for the 

first time in the campaign they became discouraged.” Confederate 

casualties at Malvern Hill were about 5,600, while the Union lost 

3,000 men.

Malvern Hill was the last of the Seven Days Battles. In the week 

of 25 June through 1 July 1862, 85,000 Confederates and 90,000 

Federals battled outside the Confederate capital; the fighting cost 

20,000 Confederate casualties against 16,000 losses for the Union. 

“I doubt whether more severe battles have ever been fought,” wrote 

McClellan on 1 July, although he personally witnessed little of the 

action. Lee’s troops followed the retreating Federals and reconnoitered McClellan’s position at Harrison’s Landing. A probe by 

Stuart’s cavalry demonstrated the strength of the Union defenses, 

and Lee opted not to attack. The Confederates pulled back to the 

vicinity of Malvern Hill, exhausted and bloodied but successful in 

their bid to protect Richmond. 

The Road Back to Bull Run

Union failures in the Shenandoah Valley and the Virginia 

Peninsula led the president to reevaluate both the war and the men 

leading it. Clearly the conflict was going to be longer and harder 

than everyone had hoped, and Lincoln concluded that if the Union 

was to prevail it would have to resort to more stringent measures. 

The War Department had stopped recruiting in May feeling confident that victory was near, but after realizing this mistake Lincoln 

called for an additional 300,000 volunteers in July. Meanwhile, 

Radical Republican politicians in Congress began pushing for 

tougher measures against the Confederate States. Some even 

suggested that McClellan’s timidity in the field and his orders to 

respect the property of rebellious civilians bordered on treason. 

On 8 July, President Lincoln visited the Army of the Potomac 

at Harrison’s Landing. He found the army in good spirits, with 

many officers and men preferring to renew the advance on 

Richmond. The army commander, however, was not as optimistic. 

Sensing the push for sterner measures, McClellan presented 

Lincoln with a letter in which he advocated that the government 

continue to adhere to “the highest principles known to Christian 
50 

Civilization” in waging the war. Although the government had to 

destroy the political and military forces of the Confederacy, the 

general argued that the conflict should not devolve into “a war 

upon [the] population.” Rather, the North should respect the 

rights and property of Southerners, to include the right to own 

slaves. Lincoln shared McClellan’s fear about allowing the war to 

degenerate into an internecine struggle, but he had come to the 

conclusion that the South needed to feel the burden of rebellion, 

and the North needed a cause that made its sacrifices worthwhile. 

He read and pocketed the letter without reply.

The following week Lincoln made two important decisions 

about the war’s conduct. On 11 July he appointed Maj. Gen. 

Henry W. Halleck as general in chief of the U.S. Army, rebuffing 

McClellan’s desire to be reinstated to that post. Halleck was a noted 

soldier-scholar who had directed several victorious campaigns in 

the Western Theater, although he was not what soldiers would 

call a “battlefield general.” He assumed his new duties on 22 July 

1862. On the same day, Lincoln unveiled a preliminary draft of the 

Emancipation Proclamation to his cabinet. He did so in the belief 

that freeing the slaves in the Confederacy “was a military necessity 

absolutely essential for the salvation of the Union.” The members 

of his cabinet counseled him to wait for a battlefield victory before 

making such a bold addition to the war’s aims, so that the move 

would not appear to be an act of desperation. 

The president agreed and shelved the measure for the time 

being. Convinced by the miscarried Shenandoah Campaign of 

the disadvantages of divided command, President Lincoln made 

another change in the summer of 1862, when he consolidated 

Union forces in the Shenandoah Valley and Northern Virginia 

into the Army of Virginia. To command the new army, Lincoln 

appointed Maj. Gen. John Pope, a Kentuckian with a reputation for 

aggressiveness and a solid combat record in the Western Theater. 

Pope assumed command on 26 June, the same day as the start of 

the Seven Days Battles but remained in Washington as Lincoln’s 

military adviser until Halleck arrived. In the meantime, he organized his command remotely via telegraph. He commanded three 

corps: the I Corps under Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel, who replaced 

Frémont; the II Corps under Banks; and the III Corps under 

McDowell. All three corps commanders were senior in rank to 

General Pope. Three cavalry brigades—one each attached to the 

three corps—and two reserve infantry divisions under General 
51

Cox and Brig. Gen. Samuel D. Sturgis rounded out the force. 

Using the Orange and Alexandria Railroad as a supply line, the 

Army of Virginia’s mission was to secure northern Virginia and 

the Shenandoah Valley, to threaten the Virginia Central Railroad, 

and to draw enemy forces away from Richmond and the Army 

of the Potomac.

Unlike McClellan, Pope believed in a hard-nosed type of 

warfare. He issued a series of general orders to his army that 

permitted confiscation of Confederate property and called for 

reprisals against civilians who harassed Union troops and sheltered guerrillas. He required oaths of allegiance among civilians 

in Northern Virginia and promised execution for all captured 

guerrillas. 

General Pope also penned a strongly worded address to his 

new command on 14 July: 

I have come to you from the West, where we have 

always seen the backs of our enemies . . . from an army 

whose business it has been to seek the adversary and 

to beat him when he was found; whose policy has been 

General Halleck

(Library of Congress)

General Pope

(Library of Congress)
52 

attack and not defense. . . . I presume that I have been 

called here to pursue the same system and to lead you 

against the enemy.

He then exhorted his men to “study the probable lines of retreat 

of our opponents, and leave our own to take care of themselves. 

Let us look before us, and not behind. Success and glory are in the 

advance, disaster and shame lurk in the rear.” 

Lincoln approved of Pope’s directives and his stated aggressiveness, reflecting as they did the evolution of his own thinking. 

Pope’s bombastic words also generated a favorable response 

among the army’s junior leadership. The reaction of some of 

the more senior officers was less enthusiastic. Along the James, 

McClellan and his commanders were horrified—Pope’s address 

and orders repudiated everything McClellan espoused in his 

Harrison’s Landing statement to Lincoln. General Porter spoke 

for many in the Army of the Potomac when he stated, “I regret to 

see that General Pope has not improved since his youth and has 

now written himself down as what the military world has long 

known, an ass.”

In Richmond, President Davis and General Lee viewed Pope’s 

appearance as a serious threat. Pope’s pronouncements infuriated 

Lee, who described the Northern general as a “miscreant,” and he 

wrote a stern letter to Halleck protesting Pope’s harsh treatment of 

civilians. Confederate leaders also feared a two-pronged attack on 

Richmond, with the Army of Virginia sweeping down from the 

north as the Army of the Potomac advanced against Richmond 

from Harrison’s Landing. Jackson shifted his army to Gordonsville 

to counter Pope’s threat in mid-July.

Meanwhile, General Halleck visited the Army of the Potomac 

in early August to confer with its commander. Since moving to the 

James, McClellan had been begging for reinforcements while his 

army suffered heavily from the heat and swampy climate. At least 

12,000 soldiers were sick and unavailable for duty at any one time. 

After inspecting the troops and meeting with McClellan, Halleck 

decided that a renewed campaign against Richmond was impractical. On 4 August he ordered McClellan’s army back to Fort Monroe 

for relocation to Aquia and Alexandria and a junction with Pope’s 

Army of Virginia near Culpeper. McClellan demonstrated toward 

Malvern Hill on 7 August, and then started a methodical march 

to Fort Monroe a week later. Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside’s IX 
53

Corps, consisting of troops freshly transferred from the Carolinas, 

moved to Aquia and Fredericksburg by water via Fort Monroe. On 

13 August Pope received orders to hold his position in northern 

Virginia and wait for the Army of the Potomac to arrive before 

taking the offensive. These decisions yielded the initiative in 

Virginia to the Confederates (Map 9).

General Pope concentrated his army around Culpeper, north 

of the Rapidan River. Meanwhile Lee sent A. P. Hill’s division to 

Jackson with orders to attack Pope if possible. Jackson’s column 

of 24,000 men was already on the move, and on 9 August it 

encountered Banks’ corps at Cedar Mountain, south of Culpeper. 

Banks attacked with 8,000 men and drove the Confederates back 

in disorder. As the Federal advance faltered, A. P. Hill’s division 

arrived on the field and counterattacked, regaining all of the lost 

ground. Reinforcements from Sigel’s corps stabilized the Federal 

line, and darkness ended the fighting. The Federals lost 2,400 

men, while the Confederates sustained 1,400 casualties. Jackson 

withdrew his men across the Rapidan.

Once Lee detected McClellan’s withdrawal from Harrison’s 

Landing, he sent the bulk of his army to Gordonsville to unite 

with Jackson’s forces. Lee arrived there on 15 August and promptly 

reorganized his 55,000-man Army of Northern Virginia into two 

corps-sized wings. Longstreet led the Right Wing, while Jackson’s 

Army of the Valley became the Left Wing. General Stuart’s cavalry 

division completed the force.

Lee knew he needed to move fast before the two Federal 

armies united and faced him with overwhelming odds somewhere north of Richmond. He wanted to cut off the Army of 

Virginia from Washington and destroy it if possible. Pope’s 

weak point was his divergent lines of communications, both of 

which needed protection; one ran northeast via the railroad to 

Alexandria, while the other led southeast along the roads from 

Culpeper and Warrenton to Aquia and Fredericksburg. Lee first 

planned to hit Pope’s left to sever his link with Fredericksburg 

and trap him between the Rappahannock and Rapidan Rivers, 

but he canceled the offensive after Pope’s cavalry captured the 

movement order in a raid. Seeing the danger in Lee’s plan, Pope 

withdrew the Army of Virginia north of the Rappahannock to the 

vicinity of Warrenton. There he was joined by two IX Corps divisions under Maj. Gen. Jesse L. Reno. Lead elements of the Army 

of the Potomac also began to arrive near Pope’s army, in the form 
Map 9

CEDAR

MOUNTAIN 9 Aug

CATLETT’S STATION 22 Aug

from RICHMOND

from

FORT

MONROE

J A C K S O N

L E E

P O R T E R

P O P E

P O P E

H E I N T Z E L M A N

BURNSIDE

POP E

to Richmond 

T horoughfar e G a p

B u l l R u n M o u n t a i n s

Potomac R

Shenandoah R

Po t o m a c R

Monacacy R

Rappahannock R

Rapidan R

North Anna R

Bull Run

Brandy Station

Bristoe Station

B alt imore & Ohio RR

Orange & Alexandria RR

Virginia Central RR

Richmond, F redericksbur g & P ot omac RR

Shepardstown

Charlestown

Berryville

Warrenton

Manassas Junction

Dumfries

Aquia

Landing

Centreville

Gainesville

Salem Groveton Fairfax

Rockville

Culpeper

Falmouth

Bowling Green

Port Royal

Chancellorsville

Orange Court House

Gordonsville

Harper’s Ferry

Leesburg

Fredericksburg

Alexandria

WASHINGTON

VIRGINIA

MARYLAND

MARYLAND

Engagement

Confederate Concentration

Confederate Movement

Union Concentration

Union Movement

4–28 August 1862

LEE’S MOVEMENT NORTH

AND UNION RESPONSE

0 20

Mile
55

of Heintzelman’s III Corps from Alexandria and Porter’s V Corps 

from Fredericksburg.

By this point Pope had effectively parried Lee’s thrusts, 

but all was not well on the Federal side. The addition of Reno’s, 

Heintzelman’s, and Porter’s corps brought Pope’s strength to 70,000 

men but also caused problems. The Army of Virginia’s administrative staff was weak and inexperienced, and consequently supplies 

often failed to materialize. The Army of the Potomac formations 

arrived with little transportation, ammunition, or rations, and their 

requirements added to the quartermasters’ burden. Union cavalry 

regiments effectively screened the front, but constant activity 

without adequate rest exhausted the Union troopers, reducing 

their effectiveness in providing information to Pope. In addition, 

Confederates in Tennessee had invaded Kentucky, preventing 

General Halleck in Washington from effectively managing the 

junction of Pope’s and McClellan’s armies.

Stuart’s Confederate cavalry rode around Pope’s right flank 

and raided the Orange and Alexandria at Catlett’s Station on 22 

August. Based on Stuart’s success, Lee decided to strike Pope’s rear 

in greater force. While Longstreet’s men kept up a front along the 

Rappahannock River, Jackson’s Left Wing would march around 

Pope’s right on 25 August, use the Bull Run Mountains to screen 

the march, and aim for the Army of Virginia’s supply base at 

Manassas Junction. Stuart would screen this movement with his 

cavalry, and Longstreet’s Right Wing would follow Jackson’s route 

a day later. It was a bold division of troops in the face of a superior 

enemy force.

Jackson’s men marched as planned on 25 August. The next 

day the Confederates moved eastward through the Bull Run 

Mountains at Thoroughfare Gap and that evening descended on 

Bristoe Station and then Manassas Junction, ripping up the rail 

line and availing themselves of the vast quantity of Pope’s supplies 

stored there. Ewell’s division pushed southward to block the 

railroad and defend against a Federal counterattack.

Federal cavalry detected the Confederate movements but 

could not keep up with them due to exhaustion and Stuart’s 

effective screening tactics. Pope believed Lee was headed to the 

Shenandoah Valley until his quartermasters reported interruptions along the rails at Bristoe Station and Manassas Junction. At 

2000 on 26 August the telegraph to Washington went dead—clear 

evidence that something was amiss. General McDowell recom-
56 

mended the army strike Jackson and try to defeat Lee’s divided 

army in detail. Pope agreed, and ordered the bulk of his army 

to march toward Manassas Junction the next day. Heintzelman’s 

newly arrived troops stood near Bristoe Station to fix Jackson’s 

force in place, while the other Federal units concentrated for battle. 

For the next four days Pope demonstrated an increasing fixation 

with finding and destroying Jackson’s Left Wing to the exclusion of 

all else—including the whereabouts of the rest of Lee’s army.

Pope’s grand plan ran afoul of his supply problems. The 

closest unit to Bristoe Station was General Hooker’s division of 

Heintzelman’s corps, which had little transportation and insufficient ammunition. Hooker’s Federals skirmished with Ewell’s 

division on 27 August but could do no more without support. 

Meanwhile, north of Manassas Junction, the Confederates 

destroyed the strategic rail bridge over Bull Run.

Pope ordered his entire army to Manassas Junction to “bag 

the whole crowd” of Confederates now in his rear. Early on 28 

August the Confederates left Manassas Junction, burning everything they could not move. Jackson’s troops marched north to 

the old Bull Run battlefield and an unfinished railroad bed to 

await the arrival of Longstreet’s wing, expected on 29 August. By 

early afternoon on 28 August Jackson’s Left Wing was in place 

along the railroad bed, which offered a superb fortification. The 

Confederates deployed in depth, with the division of Brig. Gen. 

William B. Taliaferro on the right, Ewell’s division in the center, 

and A. P. Hill’s division holding the left. Hill’s line stopped just 

short of Bull Run at Sudley Springs; Stuart’s cavalry guarded the 

far left along Bull Run itself.

Pope’s advance on Manassas Junction captured only 

Confederate stragglers. Learning that some of the enemy had 

moved to Centreville, on 28 August Pope directed his army 

there. Some of his exhausted units had to do considerable countermarching as a result of these orders. According to an Ohioan 

in Sigel’s corps, “The marching on the 28th was tiresome in the 

extreme. The weather was intensely hot, the roads were exceedingly dusty, and the supply of water for the troops, already worn 

by the demands of the campaign, was scanty.” On his own initiative General McDowell, near Gainesville and Thoroughfare Gap, 

sent an infantry division and his cavalry brigade to hold the gap, 

but Longstreet’s Right Wing forced its way through late in the 

day. Meanwhile Brig. Gen. Rufus King’s four-brigade division of 
57

McDowell’s corps marched east along the Warrenton Turnpike 

toward Centreville (Map 10).

King’s infantry unexpectedly found the Confederates about 

1730 at the Brawner Farm, two miles west of the intersection of 

the Warrenton Turnpike with the Sudley Road. As King’s troops 

marched along the pike, the Confederate Stonewall Brigade charged 

forward, striking Brig. Gen. John Gibbon’s brigade of Wisconsin 

and Indiana troops. Gibbon’s well-drilled soldiers turned and 

fought with Jackson’s men for ninety minutes, trading pointblank volleys only a few dozen yards apart. Jackson sent word to 

General Ewell for reinforcements. As his men went forward Ewell 

suffered a wound that cost him his leg. Brig. Gen. Alexander R. 

Lawton assumed command of Ewell’s division. Gibbon’s men held 

on, supported by two New York regiments from Brig. Gen. Abner 

Doubleday’s brigade. The confused fighting raged until after dark, 

and both sides disengaged about 2100.

The struggle at the Brawner Farm clearly established Jackson’s 

location for Union commanders and that night King reported the 

battle to McDowell and conferred with his brigade commanders. 

All of them decided to pull back rather than face an unknown 

number of Confederates the next day. At 0100 on 29 August King’s 

division withdrew to Manassas Junction. Pope now faced a critical 

decision. The road to Washington was open; to accomplish his 

mission, all he needed to do was march his forces to Centreville and 

defend behind Bull Run until the rest of McClellan’s army arrived. 

The Brawner Farm

(Library of Congress)
Map 10

POPE

J A

C

K S O N

L O N G S T R E E T

Mount Pone

C h i n n R i d g e

S t o n y R i d g e

Bull Run

Young’s Branch

Dawkin’s Branch

to Centreville 

to Manassas Junction 

to Gainesville

Manassas Gap RR

Unnished RR

W A R R E N T O N T U R N P I K E

S U D L E

Y R

O A D

Stone House

Stone Bridge

Matthews

Brawner

Carter

Henry

Chinn

Sudley Church

Cole

Groveton

Sudley Springs

New Market

Confederate Position

Confederate Attack

Union Position

AFTERNOON

30 August 1862

SEC OND BAT TLE OF BULL RUN

0 1

Mile
59

Instead Pope, possibly trapped by his earlier words, decided to 

attack Jackson’s troops. In a flurry of orders he sent Sigel’s corps 

toward the intersection of the Sudley Road and the Warrenton 

Turnpike to attack the Confederates, supported by Reno’s and 

Heintzelman’s corps. He ordered McDowell’s corps to attack from 

Groveton and Gainesville eastward, not realizing that this corps 

had moved south during the night. Pope ignored the movements 

of Longstreet’s wing or the necessity of holding Thoroughfare Gap, 

ensuring that Lee’s army could reunite. McDowell compromised 

Pope’s understanding of the situation by failing to forward information about Longstreet’s advance through Thoroughfare Gap.

On the morning of 29 August Sigel’s corps probed Jackson’s 

position along the railroad bed. By early afternoon Heintzelman’s 

and Reno’s troops had arrived, and Pope decided to test the 

Confederate line. Beginning at 1400 and lasting until dusk, a series 

of brigade and division-sized attacks from Heintzelman’s, Reno’s, 

and Sigel’s corps pounded A. P. Hill’s division on Jackson’s left, 

cracking and bending the line at times. Poor Union coordination 

delayed reinforcements, while the Confederate defense in depth 

ensured that any breakthrough quickly received a counterattack. 

Despite this repeated and steady pressure over several hours, 

Jackson’s wing held firm. Meanwhile Longstreet’s wing arrived on 

the field at noon, taking up position on Jackson’s right.

South of the fighting, a different drama took place that 

afternoon as McDowell and Porter marched their troops up 

from Bristoe Station. Pope ordered them to advance toward 

Gainesville and to link up with the remainder of the Army of 

Virginia in front of Jackson. His order then went on to say, “as 

soon as communication is established between this force and 

your own, the whole command shall halt. . . . If any considerable 

advantages are to be gained by departing from this order it will 

not be strictly carried out.” Pope also said he expected Longstreet 

to arrive on the night of 30 August or the next day, discussed 

possible lines of retreat, and admitted, “It may be necessary to 

fall back behind Bull Run at Centreville to-night. I presume it 

will be so, on account of our supplies.”

Upon finding Longstreet’s wing deployed across their front, 

McDowell and Porter decided to hold position. As skirmish fire 

flared along his Right Wing’s front, Lee ordered an attack several 

times, but on each occasion Longstreet demurred. At 1800 instructions from Pope arrived for Porter to attack; Pope expected the 
60 

blow to land on Jackson’s right flank, but in reality, it meant the 

V Corps would attack Longstreet frontally. Porter chose not to 

move, as he was obviously outnumbered and his troops were not 

yet ready for offensive action. This decision eventually resulted in 

Porter’s court-martial and dismissal from service in 1863, as Pope 

and his sympathizers in Congress made him the scapegoat for the 

Union defeat.

During the night of 29–30 August, Pope conferred with his 

corps commanders at the Stone House, at the intersection of the 

Sudley Road and the Warrenton Turnpike. He deferred all decisions until morning and issued no orders. Early on 30 August, 

reports of Confederate troop movements convinced Pope that 

Lee was retreating, leading him to order a pursuit. The Army of 

Virginia quickly realized its commander’s error when it discovered 

Jackson’s men still in place. Pope stubbornly refused to believe he 

faced any more Confederates than Jackson’s Left Wing. He called 

up Porter’s V Corps and committed it to an all-out attack against 

Jackson’s right flank, hoping to envelop the Confederate position. 

Porter would be supported by McDowell’s corps, which meant 

that virtually all of the forces on Pope’s left were committed to the 

offensive. These preparations consumed the rest of the morning 

and part of the afternoon of 30 August.

At 1500 on 30 August, Porter attacked toward the railroad 

bed with two divisions under Generals Morell and Sykes. Their 

objective was a low-lying area called the Deep Cut, defended by 

Taliaferro’s Confederate division and part of Lawton’s division. 

General Longstreet observed the assault from a nearby hill: “It was 

a grand display of a well-organized attack, thoroughly concentrated 

and operating cleverly.” Morell’s division led the assault, followed 

by Sykes’ regulars in support. As Morell’s infantry advanced, 

Confederate artillery flayed the Union flank so effectively that 

Porter held back Sykes’ division for fear of adding to the slaughter. 

Morell’s Federals, plus part of McDowell’s corps, swept up to the 

cut and opened a fierce firefight with the Confederates. When one 

of Taliaferro’s rebel units ran low on ammunition, the order came 

down the line: “Boys, give them rocks!”

Jackson committed his reserves and called for reinforcements from Longstreet, who instead responded by increasing his 

corps’ artillery fire on the Federals in front of Jackson’s lines and 

by preparing his own wing to attack. The combined weight of the 

Confederate reserves and the shelling forced the Federals back in 
61

disorder. General McDowell stripped the Federal far left of troops 

to cover Morell’s retreat. Pope’s grand gambit had failed.

Lee and Longstreet both saw the opportunity to crush Pope’s 

left flank and moved to exploit it. Longstreet’s men were in motion 

even before Lee’s attack order was delivered. Five divisions in a line 

stretching a mile and a half jumped off at 1600. They aimed for 

Henry Hill, two miles east of their position. It was the key to the 

Sudley Road and the Warrenton Turnpike intersection and Pope’s 

retreat route to Centreville and Washington. 

The 5th and 10th Regiments of New York state volunteers 

of Col. Gouverneur K. Warren’s small infantry brigade guarded 

the Federal left. Longstreet’s sweep caught them by surprise. “The 

attack was so sudden that the deployed companies of the Tenth had 

barely time to discharge their pieces once before the Confederates 

were upon them,” noted an officer in the 10th New York. Attacked 

from three sides, the two regiments were quickly overwhelmed. 

Longstreet’s advance continued, forcing Pope to pull back his right 

and center while he hurriedly stripped his line of units to stop 

the Confederate onslaught. Several Union brigades marched into 

Longstreet’s path and were crushed, but not before slowing the 

Confederate momentum. The Federals pulled together a line along 

Chinn Ridge, a half mile west of Henry Hill, in an effort to delay 

the Confederates. Three brigades with artillery formed facing west 

along the ridge, but they had scarcely gotten into position when 

Hood’s Confederates attacked. “Hood’s Texas brigade . . . came 

forward with tremendous dash and force,” recalled an officer in the 

55th Ohio, “but they failed to break the stern front of the Buckeye 

troops, and fell back in disorder.” Other Confederate units swept 

in from the south, and soon the Federals were flanked out of their 

position. Jackson’s wing moved forward against the retreating 

Union formations to his front at 1800, too late to effectively disrupt 

the Federal withdrawal. Nonetheless, Longstreet’s momentum put 

the Confederates on the cusp of victory.

Like the Battle of Bull Run in July 1861, the Second Battle 

of Bull Run climaxed at Henry Hill, where Sykes’ regular division 

deployed, joined by elements of McDowell’s and Sigel’s corps. 

Longstreet concentrated his men and hammered the Federal line 

with successive massed attacks against the western and southern 

slopes of Henry Hill. Sykes’ left flank bent back and nearly 

collapsed, but in the dying light of the afternoon, the Confederates 

failed to exploit the opportunity for victory. Reno brought some 
62 

of his troops from the right and added weight to the defense. The 

Union center held by General Milroy’s troops cracked, but Federal 

artillery fire and a hasty counterattack by one of Reno’s brigades 

prevented a breakthrough. Darkness ended the fighting with the 

Federals still holding Henry Hill.

That night Pope chose to retreat. His defeated army slipped 

across Bull Run in the darkness, destroying the Stone Bridge 

over Bull Run behind them. At Centreville on 31 August, Pope 

met Franklin’s and Sumner’s corps of McClellan’s army. General 

McClellan had been slow in sending them to the battlefield, preferring, as he had proposed to Lincoln on 29 August, to “leave Pope 

to get out of his scrape & at once use all our means to make the 

Capital perfectly safe.” Pope’s forces spent a rainy day camped at 

Centreville.

Lee decided to try one more time to cut off Pope from 

Washington with a maneuver around the Union right flank. 

On 31 August he sent Jackson’s wing northward to the Little 

River Turnpike, which led directly to Pope’s rear at Chantilly. 

Federal pickets detected this movement on 1 September, and 

Pope immediately directed his men to head for the Washington 

defenses, thirty miles away. In the afternoon, Jackson’s wing 

made contact with Union forces posted at Chantilly, which 

resulted in a sharp battle in a severe thunderstorm as two of 

Jackson’s divisions attacked Brig. Gen. Isaac I. Stevens’ IX Corps 

The Battle of Groveton or Second Bull Run, by Edwin Forbes

(Library of Congress)
63

division. After some initial Confederate successes, Stevens led a 

counterattack in which he was killed at the head of his troops. 

The arrival of Maj. Gen. Philip Kearny’s division on the field 

dissuaded the Confederates from renewing their offensive, and 

the fighting sputtered on until dark. Late in the day Kearny 

mistakenly rode into Confederate lines and was killed while 

trying to escape capture.

The sacrifice of Kearny and Stevens enabled Pope to complete 

his withdrawal into the Washington defenses on 2 September. His 

army had sustained over 14,000 casualties out of 70,000 engaged 

at Second Bull Run and Chantilly, while Lee’s army had faced 

him with 55,000 men and lost 9,000. These two battles capped a 

dynamic seventy-day period in which the Confederates had driven 

Union forces back to the same lines they had held in March 1862. 

Lee’s army regrouped on 3 September at Centreville, and within 

days marched north across the Potomac into Maryland beginning a 

raid that ultimately led to the Battle of Antietam on 17 September. 

Meanwhile in Washington, Lincoln relieved General Pope and 

disbanded his army. McClellan absorbed the Army of Virginia’s units 

into the Army of the Potomac and followed Lee into Maryland on 7 

September. For a brief period, the fighting in Virginia had subsided.

Analysis

During the spring and summer of 1862, the Union Army 

fought some of its largest battles to date in Virginia. The Union 

soldiers often fought well, but erratic senior leadership hobbled 

their operations and led to defeat. Poor coordination and communication hampered Federal efforts in the Shenandoah Valley, while 

McClellan’s unsteady direction of the Richmond campaign had 

created opportunities for Confederate victory. “We are at a loss to 

imagine whether this is strategy or defeat,” mused a Massachusetts 

sergeant after the Seven Days Battles. Nevertheless, the Army of the 

Potomac generally remained confident in McClellan. In contrast, 

Pope received near-universal condemnation after his failure at Bull 

Run. “All the fatigues of the campaign were endured by the men . . . 

without confidence in the leading generals,” stated a Massachusetts 

officer. Pope’s strong pronouncements upon his ascension to 

command had made him look foolish. Perhaps the best that can be 

said for his performance is that the Army of Virginia had reached 

Washington despite several Confederate attempts to destroy it.
64 

Lincoln’s tenure as commander in chief from 11 March to 22 

July stands as one of the few times in American history when a 

president has exercised direct operational control over U.S. forces. 

It proved to be a failure, as Jackson skillfully eluded the Federal 

net and distracted the War Department during a critical phase of 

McClellan’s advance on Richmond, with negative effects on the 

Army of the Potomac’s operations and McClellan’s state of mind. 

To his credit, Lincoln realized his limitations and, in July, found a 

new general in chief of the U.S. Army, General Halleck.

Politically, the Virginia defeats demoralized the United 

States. “For the first time,” stated the New York Tribune’s 

Washington bureau chief on 1 September, “I believe it possible that 

Washington may be taken.” The seventy-day period from 26 June 

to 2 September, in which the Confederates wiped out all Federal 

gains in Virginia since March, stunned the nation. News of Second 

Bull Run provoked serious debate in London and Paris about 

whether the time was right for Britain and France to recognize the 

Confederacy’s independence and mediate an end to the war. By 

late summer the country’s spirits had sunk to a low point.

The Virginia campaigns in 1862 also showed that victory 

over the Confederacy would not be quick or easy, and that 

tougher measures would be required. Although not officially 

announced until the fall, President Lincoln had come to accept 

the need for more radical policies—to include the emancipation 

of slaves in Confederate territory—largely because of the battles 

that had occurred in Virginia in the summer of 1862. The nature 

of the conflict was beginning to evolve from the gentleman’s war 

of McClellan to the hard war of Pope that ultimately found its 

most determined practitioners in Ulysses S. Grant and William 

T. Sherman. The Virginia 1862 campaigns thus represent a key 

military and political turning point in the Civil War.
65

The Author

Christopher L. Kolakowski was born and raised in 

Fredericksburg, Virginia. He received his B.A. in history and mass 

communications from Emory & Henry College, and his M.A. in 

public history from the State University of New York at Albany.

He has spent his career interpreting and preserving American 

military history with the National Park Service, New York State 

government, the Rensselaer County (New York) Historical 

Society, the Civil War Preservation Trust, Kentucky State Parks, 

and the U.S. Army. He has written and spoken on various aspects 

of military history covering the period of 1775 to the present. 

He has published two books with the History Press: The Civil 

War at Perryville: Battling For the Bluegrass and The Stones River 

and Tullahoma Campaign: This Army Does Not Retreat. He is a 

contributor to the Emerging Civil War blog, and his study of the 

1941–1942 Philippine Campaign titled Last Stand on Bataan was 

released by McFarland in 2016.

He served as director of the General George Patton Museum 

and Center of Leadership in Fort Knox, Kentucky, from 2009 to 

2013, and became the MacArthur Memorial director in September 

2013.
66

Further Readings

Cozzens, Peter. Shenandoah 1862: Stonewall Jackson’s Valley 

Campaign. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 

2008.

Gallagher, Gary W., ed. The Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1862. 

Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003.

Hennessey, John J. Return to Bull Run: The Campaign and Battle of 

Second Manassas. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992.

Sears, Stephen W. To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula 

Campaign. New York: Ticknow and Fields, 1992.

Tanner, Robert G. Stonewall in the Valley. New York: Doubleday, 

1976.

For more information on the U.S. Army in the Civil War, please 

read other titles in the U.S. Army Campaigns of the Civil War 

series published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History 

(www.history.army.mil).

PIN : 200154–000

The

Civil

War Sesquicentennial