NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

JON DECANO, AKA Jon Darren 

Maglangit, AKA Jon Maglangit, 

Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 21-10099

 21-10100

D.C. Nos. 1:14-cr-00469-HG-1

 1:07-cr-00608-HG-1

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Hawaii

Helen W. Gillmor, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 12, 2021**

Before: TALLMAN, RAWLINSON, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges. 

In these consolidated appeals, Jon Decano appeals from the district court’s 

order denying his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

The district court concluded that, notwithstanding Decano’s asthma, he was 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

OCT 21 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 21-10099 & 21-10100

not entitled to compassionate release because he was 50 years old, he had already 

contracted and recovered from COVID-19, and he had been fully vaccinated 

against further infection. It further concluded that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors 

did not support relief because 57 months remained on Decano’s sentence and the 

nature and circumstances of his offense, as well as his history and characteristics, 

supported his 164-month sentence. The district court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying Decano’s motion. See United States v. Aruda, 993 F.3d 797, 799 (9th Cir. 

2021).

While we agree with Decano that the district court erroneously treated 

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 as binding, see Aruda, 993 F.3d at 802, we conclude that any 

error was harmless in light of the court’s conclusion that the § 3553(a) factors did 

not support his release. Contrary to Decano’s argument that § 3582(c)(1)(A) calls 

for a “holistic inquiry,” we have explained that compassionate release motions 

involve “a sequential step-by-step analysis” and a court denying relief may 

consider only one of the steps. See United States v. Keller, 2 F.4th 1278, 1284 (9th 

Cir. 2021). Here, though the court erred in step one of the analysis, it did not abuse 

its discretion at step two. Nor are we persuaded that the court’s consideration of 

dangerousness under § 1B1.13(2) “drove its assessment of § 3553(a)’s factors.” 

To the contrary, the court made clear that the § 3553(a) factors alone did not 

support relief because Decano’s “immediate release would not adequately reflect 
3 21-10099 & 21-10100

the seriousness of the offense, would not properly deter similar criminal conduct, 

and would not protect the public.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(C). The district 

court’s application of the § 3553(a) factors in this case was reasonable and 

consistent with the language of the statute. We need not decide whether the district 

court should have more fully considered Decano’s argument regarding changes to 

the applicable mandatory minimum under the First Step Act because it did not 

affect the court’s § 3553(a) conclusion. Finally, the record demonstrates that the 

district court considered Decano’s remaining arguments, including his argument 

that his sentence should be lowered, but was not persuaded that anything less than 

the current sentence was appropriate.

Decano’s motion for judicial notice is denied.

AFFIRMED.