IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE 

 AT NASHVILLE 

 October 10, 2023 Session 

BRANDON VANDENBURG v. STATE OF TENNESSEE 

Appeal from the Criminal Court of Davidson County 

No. 2015-C-1517 Monte Watkins, Judge 

 No. M2022-01548-CCA-R3-PC 

The Petitioner, Brandon Vandenburg, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s 

denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for four counts of 

aggravated rape, one count of attempted aggravated rape, two counts of aggravated sexual 

battery, and one count of unlawful photography of the victim. On appeal, the Petitioner 

contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his claims alleging that 

he received ineffective assistance of counsel by (1) lead counsel’s failure to have a witness 

qualified as an expert psychiatrist at trial, (2) lead counsel’s failure to introduce prior bad 

act evidence regarding the Petitioner’s codefendants at trial, and (3) lead counsel’s failure 

to have the Petitioner’s voicemail to Mr. Quinzio admitted as an exhibit at trial. The 

Petitioner also raises freestanding post-conviction claims, arguing that the trial court 

violated the Petitioner’s protection against double jeopardy by (1) allowing him to be 

retried on amended charges after jeopardy had attached and (2) allowing the State to 

proceed with a superseding indictment without disposing of the original indictment. 

Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed 

KYLE A. HIXSON, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which TIMOTHY L. EASTER and 

JOHN W. CAMPBELL, SR., JJ., joined. 

Manuel Benjamin Russ, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Brandon Vandenburg. 

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Andree Sophia Blumstein, Solicitor 

General; Alicia Gilbert, Office of the Solicitor General, Honors Fellow; Glenn R. Funk, 

District Attorney General; and Roger D. Moore and Jan Norman, Assistant District 

Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee. 

01/30/2024
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OPINION 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Trial Proceedings 

This case arises from the Petitioner’s participation in a number of sexual offenses 

perpetrated upon the victim in June 2013. In August 2013, a Davidson County grand jury 

indicted the Petitioner and his codefendants, Corey Batey, Jaborian McKenzie, and 

Brandon Banks, with five counts of aggravated rape, two counts of aggravated sexual 

battery, one count of tampering with evidence, and one count of unlawful photography. 

See State v. Vandenburg, No. M2017-01882-CCA-R3-CD, 2019 WL 3720892, at *1 

(Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 8, 2019), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 15, 2020). The Petitioner 

and codefendant Batey proceeded to trial in January 2015, and the jury convicted the 

Petitioner of four counts of aggravated rape, one count of attempted aggravated rape as a 

lesser included offense, two counts of aggravated sexual battery, one count of tampering 

with evidence, and one count of unlawful photography. Id. Months later, on June 23, 

2015, the trial court ordered a new trial after finding that the jury foreperson had failed to 

disclose during voir dire proceedings that he had been named a victim of statutory rape in 

a prior criminal case. Id. 

On July 7, 2015, a Davidson County grand jury returned a superseding indictment 

that charged the Petitioner and his codefendants with five counts of aggravated rape, two 

counts of aggravated sexual battery, and one count of unlawful photography. Id. As to the 

aggravated rape and aggravated sexual battery counts, the original indictment alleged that 

the Petitioner and his codefendants “were aided or abetted by one or more other persons” 

but did not specify whether “[f]orce or coercion [was] used to accomplish the act” or 

whether the Petitioner “kn[ew] or ha[d] reason to know that the victim [was] mentally 

defective, mentally incapacitated or physically helpless.” See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-

502(a)(3)(A), (B); -504(a)(3)(A), (B). As to these counts, the superseding indictment 

specified that the Petitioner and the codefendants “did aid or abet each other in the 

commission of the offense[s]” and that they “knew or had reason to know that [the victim] 

was mentally incapacitated or physically helpless” during the commission of the offenses. 

See id.; see also Vandenburg, 2019 WL 3720892, at *23. Additionally, the superseding 

indictment did not include the charge of tampering with evidence. 

Before the June 2016 trial, the Petitioner failed to timely file an expert witness 

disclosure regarding Dr. Sidney Alexander, whom the defense sought to testify regarding 

the Defendant’s mental condition and intoxication on the night of the offenses. See 
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Vandenburg, 2019 WL 3720892, at *28-29. The State filed a motion to exclude Dr. 

Alexander’s testimony, which the trial court granted on May 18, 2016, because lead trial 

counsel (“lead counsel”) failed to meet the “deadline for the defense to give notice of an 

expert and provide a report of that expert’s findings[.]” Id. at *29. On May 31, 2016, lead 

counsel filed a motion requesting the trial court to reconsider this ruling and attached Dr. 

Alexander’s report, which was dated May 27, 2016. Id. In his report,1 Dr. Alexander 

indicated that his opinions were based upon information provided by defense counsel, 

along with his training and experience as a psychiatrist. Dr. Alexander opined that that the 

Petitioner’s blood alcohol level would have been between 0.18 and 0.25% (mg/dl) fourteen 

hours after he began drinking. Dr. Alexander further opined that the Petitioner “would 

have been severely impaired in many facets of functioning” and that, even at the low end 

of his estimated blood alcohol level, the Petitioner “would have exhibited poor judgment, 

altered perception of his environment, greater susceptibility to the influence of others, poor 

impulse control, and overall diminished brain functioning.” Despite its previous ruling that 

the defense’s expert notice was untimely, the trial court held hearings at the outset of trial 

on June 10 and 13 to determine whether Dr. Alexander’s testimony was admissible. Id. at 

*29-30. 

At the hearing, Dr. Alexander testified that as a psychiatrist, he had experience with 

individuals suffering from the effects of alcohol. Id. at *30. He explained that he input the 

estimated number of alcoholic drinks the Petitioner had consumed the day of the incident 

into a formula and that the results indicated the Petitioner had an estimated blood alcohol 

level of 0.22. Id. Dr. Alexander testified that based on his experience and the results of 

the formula, the Petitioner would not have been able to form the requisite intent for the 

charged offenses. Id. Dr. Alexander testified that he was not a certified toxicologist and 

that after medical school, he had not received any specific training in toxicology. Id. at 

*31. Dr. Alexander said that he did not normally prepare reports such as the one he had 

prepared for the Petitioner. Id. Dr. Alexander also testified that in forming his opinion, he 

relied on an email questionnaire containing the Petitioner’s responses and did not interview 

the Petitioner. Id. Dr. Alexander testified that he did not have enough information to 

determine whether the Petitioner was malingering. Id. He also stated that he did not review 

video surveillance of the Petitioner’s actions on the night of the offenses prior to composing 

his report. Id. 

In a June 14, 2016 written order, the trial court stated its reasons for determining 

that Dr. Alexander’s testimony was not admissible: 

 

1

 We have taken judicial notice of the appellate record from the Petitioner’s direct appeal. See 

Tenn. R. App. P. 13(c). 
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[(1)] although each party has had ample time to conduct an evaluation of [the 

Petitioner] . . . , neither party has secured an evaluation of the [Petitioner]; 

(2) although Dr.[] Alexander testified regarding his psychiatric expertise, Dr. 

Alexander did not demonstrate any specialized expert opinion knowledge or 

training regarding toxicology; and (3) Dr. Alexander relied on information 

supplied via email by defense counsel and did not base any opinion on data, 

documentation or scientific evidence. Further, the [c]ourt finds that the 

underlying facts indicate a lack of trustworthiness of Dr. Alexander’s 

testimony. 

Id. at *29. 

At the June 2016 trial, the evidence showed that surveillance footage recorded the 

Petitioner and his codefendants carrying the unconscious victim into a Vanderbilt 

University dormitory. Id. at *1. At 2:37 a.m., the Petitioner, accompanied by the 

codefendants, carried the victim into his second-floor dorm room, which is where the 

offenses occurred. Id. at *2. At 3:09 a.m., the Petitioner left his dorm room and placed a 

towel over one of the dorm’s second-floor surveillance cameras to block the camera’s view. 

Id. 

Using his phone, the Petitioner took photographs and video recordings while the 

codefendants committed the offenses against the unconscious victim, and the video 

evidence showed the Petitioner and codefendants laughing and encouraging each other. Id. 

at *59. Regarding the first four counts of aggravated rape of the victim, the evidence 

showed that codefendant Banks penetrated the victim’s anus with an object, codefendant 

Batey digitally penetrated the victim’s vagina and anus, and codefendant Batey forced the 

victim to perform fellatio on him. Id. at *58. 

Pertaining to the attempted aggravated rape count, the evidence showed that the 

Petitioner photographed and recorded codefendant Batey’s attempting to penetrate the 

victim’s vagina with his penis. Id. at *59. The Petitioner’s video recordings depicted the 

Petitioner and codefendants laughing as codefendant Batey kneeled next to the unconscious 

victim with his pants and underwear pulled down. Id.

Regarding the Petitioner’s convictions for two counts of aggravated sexual battery, 

the evidence showed that codefendant Banks touched the victim’s genitals. Id. at *60. The 

evidence showed that codefendant Banks had taken a condom from the Petitioner and that 

Banks had deleted certain photographs from his phone. Id. Recovered photographs 

depicted codefendant Banks spreading open the victim’s labia to photograph her vagina. 
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Id. Close-up photographs of the victim’s genitals and anus were recovered from 

codefendant Banks’ phone. Id. The evidence also showed that codefendant Batey placed 

his buttocks with exposed genitals on the victim’s face. Id. Before this offense, 

codefendant Batey said that he “had never had his a[--] ate before.” Id. 

Regarding the Petitioner’s conviction for unlawful photography, the evidence 

showed that the Petitioner used his phone to take photographs and videos of the offenses 

and that they had been deleted after the offenses occurred. Id. at *60. A detective 

recovered nine images and three videos of the victim on the night of the offenses, all of 

which depicted her lying unconscious on the floor of the Petitioner’s dorm room and her 

clothing removed or moved to expose her body as the Petitioner and his codefendants 

committed the previously summarized offenses. Id. Moreover, the evidence also showed 

that during the offenses, the Petitioner watched pornographic videos and attempted to 

achieve an erection. Id. 

The Petitioner sought to admit a voicemail he left on Joseph Quinzio’s phone on the 

night of the offenses to show that he was too intoxicated to be criminally responsible for 

his codefendants’ conduct. Id. at *45. The voicemail contained the following message: 

“First of all, he was pissing on her p[---]y. He was pissing on her. Hold on, hold on. 

[muffled noise/unintelligible] Dude, you gotta call me back bro. I’m in deep s[--]t. You 

gotta call me back. [muffled noise/unintelligible].” However, the trial court excluded the 

voicemail on hearsay grounds. Id. 

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted the Petitioner as charged. Id. at 

*17. The trial court sentenced him to an effective seventeen-year sentence and denied the 

Petitioner’s motion for new trial. Id. 

The Petitioner filed a timely appeal from his convictions and raised multiple issues, 

including the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the superseding indictment on 

due process and double jeopardy grounds, the trial court’s exclusion of Dr. Alexander’s 

testimony, the trial court’s exclusion of the Petitioner’s voicemail on Mr. Quinzio’s cell 

phone, and the trial court’s exclusion of evidence of the codefendants’ prior bad acts. Id.

at *1. This court vacated the Petitioner’s conviction for one count of aggravated rape, 

modified the conviction to attempted aggravated rape, and remanded to the trial court for 

resentencing for this conviction. Id. This court otherwise affirmed the Petitioner’s 

convictions. Id. 
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B. Post-Conviction Proceedings 

Post-conviction counsel filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief and 

subsequently filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that the 

Petitioner received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that the trial court had 

committed error related to the superseding indictment and its exclusion of evidence 

pertaining to the codefendants’ prior bad acts. 

At the August 19, 2022 post-conviction hearing, Dr. Alexander testified that he was 

a physician who specialized in psychiatry. At the time of the post-conviction hearing, Dr. 

Alexander had testified as an expert in psychiatry in approximately twenty criminal cases 

and twenty civil cases. In 2016, a couple of months before the Petitioner’s second trial, 

lead counsel retained Dr. Alexander to help in preparation for trial. He explained that in 

this case, he was helping the defense establish that the Petitioner lacked the ability to form 

intent because of the Petitioner’s intoxication level. Lead counsel was Dr. Alexander’s 

primary contact on the defense team. Dr. Alexander spoke with lead counsel over the 

phone and in person regarding the Petitioner’s case. An invoice of Dr. Alexander’s 

services was entered as an exhibit. 

To prepare for the Petitioner’s trial, lead counsel informed Dr. Alexander about the 

number of drinks the Petitioner had consumed the day of the incident. Dr. Alexander said 

that he also interviewed the Petitioner and gathered information regarding his drinking that 

day. He testified that he had extensive conversations with the Petitioner regarding the 

incident, meeting with the Petitioner for three or four hours and speaking with the Petitioner 

on the phone one or two times. Dr. Alexander met with lead counsel and co-counsel, and 

he reviewed transcripts of the Petitioner’s police interviews and video recordings of what 

occurred at the dorm. Dr. Alexander estimated that the Petitioner had consumed twentyseven alcoholic drinks during an “all day drinking event.” While viewing one of the video 

recordings, Dr. Alexander observed the Petitioner “driving, parking, attempting to get [the 

victim] in the car, banging her head, unintentionally, but in a way an intoxicated individual 

might do when trying to get her out of the car, and he searched for help because he couldn’t 

manage her in her current state by himself.” Dr. Alexander explained that he would be 

able to observe a person without knowing their blood alcohol level and “be able to tell 

fairly consistently” the person’s level of intoxication. 

Dr. Alexander testified that he had “a lot” of knowledge about intoxication and how 

it affects people and that he used a toxicology formula to determine an individual’s blood 

alcohol level. Dr. Alexander said that the Petitioner’s intoxication level was important but 

that he did not have to know the exact intoxication level to render his opinion about the 
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Petitioner’s ability to form intent. Relying on the estimated number of alcoholic drinks the 

Petitioner had consumed, Dr. Alexander utilized the toxicology formula to determine the 

Petitioner’s blood alcohol level. He input into the formula the approximated number of 

alcoholic drinks the Petitioner consumed, and the results indicated the Petitioner’s blood 

alcohol level. Dr. Alexander explained that based on the formula results, the Petitioner had 

a high blood alcohol level, which would have caused the Petitioner to have had “poor 

impulse control,” “poor judgment,” and to be more susceptible to the influence of others. 

Based on his review of the evidence provided and the formula results, Dr. Alexander 

concluded that the Petitioner was “significantly impaired” on the day of the offenses. Dr. 

Alexander agreed that the Petitioner would have had “difficulty forming an intent to do 

any kind of particular thing[.]” 

Dr. Alexander said that he testified at a pretrial hearing on June 13, 2016, to 

determine whether he would be able to testify at the Petitioner’s trial. During the hearing, 

lead counsel asked him questions regarding the Petitioner’s case. Dr. Alexander recalled 

that before the hearing, lead counsel informed him that his testimony would be limited to 

how to use the formula to obtain an approximate blood alcohol level. Dr. Alexander said 

that he understood his testimony would not be related to intoxication because he thought 

there was a toxicologist who would testify regarding intoxication. Had he been able to 

testify at trial, Dr. Alexander explained that he would have said, based on the Petitioner’s 

blood alcohol level, the Petitioner would have had difficulty forming intent. 

On cross-examination, Dr. Alexander testified that he had never been qualified as 

an expert in toxicology. When asked if he had previously testified that he did not interview 

the Petitioner, Dr. Alexander responded that he did not believe that was correct and stated, 

“I had interviewed [the Petitioner]. I interviewed him the day after [lead counsel] had 

initially contacted me,” which was April 7, 2016. Dr. Alexander said that he “absolutely” 

interviewed the Petitioner in person for approximately three or four hours. 

Dr. Alexander’s previously admitted invoice for his work on the Petitioner’s case 

indicated that Dr. Alexander did not interview the Petitioner until June 7, 2016, which was 

approximately one week before the Petitioner’s second jury trial. Dr. Alexander said that 

his invoice was more accurate than his memory and that he did not interview the Petitioner 

immediately after speaking to lead counsel on April 7, 2016. The invoice also indicated 

that Dr. Alexander prepared his report that was dated May 27, 2016, before Dr. Alexander 

met with the Petitioner. The report contained Dr. Alexander’s calculations regarding the 

number of drinks the Petitioner consumed and what his blood alcohol level would have 

been. Dr. Alexander said that his recollection was that he spoke with the Petitioner to 

obtain details of his hourly drinking and then made conclusions. However, he “concede[d] 
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that [his] invoice would be more accurate than [his] memory” and that his invoice indicated 

that his memory of interviewing the Petitioner before his report was incorrect. Dr. 

Alexander agreed that he made a calculation regarding the Petitioner’s intoxication level 

before speaking with the Petitioner. 

On redirect examination, Dr. Alexander said that he initially believed he was being 

retained as a psychiatric expert, as opposed to a toxicology expert. As such, he initially 

thought that his testimony would involve the Petitioner’s behaviors he observed on the 

video recording and how those behaviors related to blood alcohol levels. Dr. Alexander 

said that it was lead counsel’s decision on which questions to ask Dr. Alexander during the 

pretrial hearing and that if Dr. Alexander did not testify about certain topics, then it was 

because lead counsel did not ask him questions related to those topics. 

The Petitioner testified that his trial defense team consisted of three attorneys and 

that lead counsel had the most contact with the Petitioner and his family. The Petitioner 

explained that he discussed defense strategy and the State’s evidence with lead counsel. 

The Petitioner communicated with all three attorneys on his defense team, but lead counsel 

was his primary contact. The Petitioner explained that at times, he received contradictory 

guidance from lead counsel and other members of his defense team but that he generally 

followed lead counsel’s advice. The Petitioner said that one member of his defense team 

wanted him to testify and wanted to call two witnesses to testify at trial, but lead counsel 

disagreed. 

The Petitioner said that lead counsel told him that Dr. Alexander would testify at 

trial about how the Petitioner’s alcohol intake affected his mental state. He explained that 

his primary trial defense strategy was that “[i]ntoxication impaired [his] judgment,” which 

was also his defense at the first trial. The Petitioner said that after his case was severed 

from codefendant Batey, it became apparent that he would need an expert to testify to aid 

his defense. The Petitioner recalled that lead counsel had retained Dr. Alexander and that 

Dr. Alexander was going to testify about the Petitioner’s impaired mental state. The 

Petitioner said that the State objected to a defense expert’s testifying at trial because lead 

counsel had failed to comply with pretrial scheduling deadlines. The Petitioner recalled 

that during a teleconference call with his defense team, lead counsel said that he had 

committed malpractice by his failing to notify the State about the expert witness. 

The Petitioner said that he eventually spoke with Dr. Alexander. Dr. Alexander 

interviewed the Petitioner in person, and they spoke for more than six hours. The Petitioner 

explained that Dr. Alexander reviewed surveillance footage of the Petitioner as well as 

photographs, including a photograph of the Petitioner’s drinking from a one-half gallon 
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vodka bottle. The Petitioner explained that he consumed a “significant” amount of alcohol 

on the day of the incident. He explained that over the course of that day, his memory 

became increasingly vague and that he consumed “more alcohol that day than [he] ever 

had in [his] entire life.” The Petitioner said that he eventually “black[ed] out.” The 

Petitioner said that he could not remember exactly the number of drinks he consumed but 

that he was able to piece together an estimate through different sources. For example, the 

Petitioner explained that a photograph depicted the Petitioner’s sitting in a car and his 

drinking from a one-half gallon bottle of vodka. He said that there were four other people 

in the car and everyone, except the driver, had shared approximately equal parts of the 

bottle of vodka. 

The Petitioner said that lead counsel attempted to have a recorded voicemail 

message the Petitioner left for Mr. Quinzio, which included the Petitioner’s “slurring” 

words and “incoherent” speech, admitted at trial. Lead counsel wanted to use the voicemail 

message as evidence of the Petitioner’s “severe” intoxication, but the trial court ruled 

against its admission at trial. 

The Petitioner testified that the trial court also excluded testimony regarding the 

Petitioner’s codefendants: Mr. McKenzie, Mr. Banks, and Mr. Batey. The testimony 

related to an incident on the evening before the underlying events of this case and alleged 

that the codefendants had “group sexual contact” with another victim in the dormitory. The 

Petitioner explained that his defense team wanted to call the other victim and an 

investigator, who had investigated this incident, as trial witnesses. The Petitioner said that 

his defense team explained this testimony would be used to rebut the State’s theory that 

the Petitioner was criminally responsible for his codefendants’ conduct. However, the trial 

court restricted the testimony. 

Regarding the Petitioner’s indictment, the Petitioner said that lead counsel was 

responsible for challenging the indictment on a double jeopardy basis. The Petitioner said 

that he did not understand the argument but that lead counsel told him the indictment would 

be dismissed if the argument succeeded. The Petitioner said that if there were 

disagreements among the attorneys on his defense team, lead counsel made the final 

decisions. 

On cross-examination, the Petitioner affirmed that “there was a multitude of 

evidence” of the Petitioner’s intoxication presented at trial. Witnesses testified about 

seeing the Petitioner the night of the incident and observing his apparent intoxication level. 

The Petitioner recalled that videos depicting his intoxication levels were entered as exhibits 

at trial. The Petitioner also agreed that text messages he sent to Chris Boyd and 
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surveillance video recordings were entered as exhibits at trial. The Petitioner agreed that 

a surveillance video recording showed the Petitioner’s placing a towel over the surveillance 

camera. The Petitioner said that he gave a statement to police based on information he had 

“piecemealed” together and that he did not have an “independent recollection” of the events 

from the night of the incident. 

The Petitioner explained that during the six-hour interview with Dr. Alexander, they 

discussed the Petitioner’s drinking on the day of the incident, a football-related concussion, 

and a car accident after which the Petitioner suffered “concussion-like symptoms.” The 

Petitioner said that the car crash occurred a few weeks before the incident and that Dr. 

Alexander told the Petitioner “brain trauma” could create an enhanced effect of alcohol on 

a person’s judgment. The Petitioner also told Dr. Alexander that before he attended 

college, he did not drink alcohol. The Petitioner said that he was not aware of any 

difficulties in scheduling a time to meet with Dr. Alexander and that he met with him when 

lead counsel arranged for him to do so. The Petitioner said that his understanding was that 

Dr. Alexander would testify about how differing levels of alcohol could affect a person’s 

judgment. 

Co-counsel testified that the Petitioner retained him and lead counsel after the 

Petitioner’s first trial had been overturned. Co-counsel said that lead counsel made the 

final decisions in the case. Co-counsel explained that the expert witness used in the 

Petitioner’s first trial was not available, so he and lead counsel discussed the need for a 

new expert. Lead counsel mentioned Dr. Alexander and told co-counsel he would take 

care of retaining him. Co-counsel said that he collected the trial evidence and gave it to 

Dr. Alexander. 

On cross-examination, co-counsel testified that it was his understanding that Dr. 

Alexander was going to testify as a psychiatrist about the effects of intoxication on 

judgment. He explained that Dr. Alexander was not a forensic toxicologist. He said that 

lead counsel was responsible for meeting scheduling deadlines. Co-counsel said that he 

and lead counsel filed an interlocutory appeal after lead counsel failed to meet the 

scheduling deadline regarding Dr. Alexander’s testimony. He explained that lead counsel’s 

strategy was to have Dr. Alexander testify as a rebuttal witness to the State’s proof at trial. 

Co-counsel said that this was why Dr. Alexander’s testimony would have been limited. 

Co-counsel identified an email from lead counsel to co-counsel in which lead counsel said 

that if the trial court denied the Petitioner’s motion to reconsider, then lead counsel could 

argue he had committed ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to have Dr. Alexander 

qualified as an expert. The email was admitted as an exhibit. 
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Co-counsel testified that the general trial strategy was that the Petitioner’s 

intoxication level affected his ability to form his intent and that expert testimony regarding 

his intoxication was “very important.” After failing to have Dr. Alexander’s testimony 

admitted, the defense team relied on other evidence of intoxication in the record to obtain 

an intoxication jury instruction. Co-counsel said that expert testimony “certainly” would 

have “substantially aided” the defense. 

Following the post-conviction hearing, the post-conviction court denied the 

Petitioner relief. In a written order, the post-conviction court found that the Petitioner’s 

claim that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel by lead counsel’s failure 

to give timely notice regarding his intent to call Dr. Alexander as an expert witness was 

without merit. The post-conviction court also found that the Petitioner did not receive the 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel by Dr. Alexander’s not having the opportunity to 

testify regarding the effects of alcohol on the Petitioner’s ability to form intent. The postconviction court reasoned that Dr. Alexander was given the opportunity to express his 

opinions on the effects of alcohol at the pretrial hearing; however, Dr. Alexander did not 

do so. Moreover, the post-conviction court noted that the trial court excluded Dr. 

Alexander’s testimony not because lead counsel failed to provide proper notice but because 

“(1) [Dr. Alexander] did not demonstrate any specialized expert opinion, knowledge or 

training regarding toxicology; and (2) he relied on information supplied via email by 

defense counsel and did not base any opinion on data, documentation, or scientific 

evidence.” The post-conviction court also found that the underlying facts indicated a lack 

of trustworthiness of Dr. Alexander’s testimony. The post-conviction court concluded that 

the Petitioner failed to demonstrate the outcome of the trial would have been different had 

Dr. Alexander testified about the effects of alcohol on the Petitioner’s ability to form intent 

for the charged offenses. The post-conviction court also found that the Petitioner failed to 

show prejudice and denied relief regarding this issue. 

The post-conviction court found that the Petitioner’s allegation that lead counsel 

was ineffective by failing to successfully argue that prior bad act testimony regarding the 

Petitioner’s codefendants should be admitted was meritless because it had been decided on 

direct appeal. The post-conviction court noted that the trial court and a panel of this court 

had previously determined that the prior bad act evidence was not relevant and that even if 

admitted, it would not have affected the outcome of the trial. 

The post-conviction court determined that the Petitioner’s allegation that lead 

counsel was ineffective by failing to have the Petitioner’s voicemail to Mr. Quinzio 

admitted as an exhibit was without merit. The Petitioner argued that the voicemail would 

show that the Petitioner was “very intoxicated.” The post-conviction court reasoned that 
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Mr. Quinzio testified at trial that the Petitioner sounded intoxicated and that Mr. Quinzio 

had never seen the Petitioner that intoxicated. The post-conviction court found that even 

if the voicemail had been admitted as an exhibit, the result of the trial would not have 

changed. 

The post-conviction court ruled that the Petitioner’s allegation that his protection 

against double jeopardy was violated when he was “re-tried on amended charges after 

jeopardy attached” was meritless. The post-conviction court found that the trial court and 

a panel of this court had already ruled on the issue and determined that the issue was 

meritless. Moreover, the post-conviction court found that the Petitioner had failed to show 

that trial counsel’s performance was deficient or that the Petitioner was prejudiced by the 

alleged deficiencies. 

The Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal to this court from the post-conviction 

court’s denial of relief. The case is now before us for our review. 

II. ANALYSIS

Post-conviction relief is available when a “conviction or sentence is void or 

voidable because of the abridgment of any right guaranteed by the Constitution of 

Tennessee or the Constitution of the United States.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-103. The 

burden in a post-conviction proceeding is on the petitioner to prove allegations of fact by 

clear and convincing evidence. Id. § 40-30-110(f); see Dellinger v. State, 279 S.W.3d 282, 

293-94 (Tenn. 2009). “Questions concerning the credibility of witnesses, the weight and 

value to be given their testimony, and the factual issues raised by the evidence are to be 

resolved” by the post-conviction court. Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 456 (Tenn. 2001). 

On appeal, we are bound by the post-conviction court’s findings of fact unless we conclude 

that the evidence in the record preponderates against those findings. Id. Because they 

relate to mixed questions of law and fact, we review the post-conviction court’s 

conclusions as to whether counsel’s performance was deficient and whether that deficiency 

was prejudicial under a de novo standard with no presumption of correctness. Id. at 457. 

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

The Petitioner argues that the trial court erred by denying his claim for postconviction relief because he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The 

Petitioner argues that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel by (1) lead 

counsel’s failure to have Dr. Alexander qualified as an expert psychiatrist at trial; (2) lead 

counsel’s failure to introduce prior bad act evidence regarding the Petitioner’s 
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codefendants at trial; and (3) lead counsel’s failure to have the Petitioner’s voicemail to 

Mr. Quinzio admitted as an exhibit at trial. The State responds that the post-conviction 

court did not err. 

Criminal defendants are constitutionally guaranteed the right to effective assistance 

of counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Tenn. Const. art. I, § 9; see Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 

U.S. 335, 344 (1980); Dellinger, 279 S.W.3d at 293. When a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel is made under the Sixth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution, the burden is on the petitioner to show (1) that counsel’s performance was 

deficient and (2) that the deficiency was prejudicial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668, 687 (1984); see Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 368-72 (1993). “Because a 

petitioner must establish both prongs of the test, a failure to prove either deficiency or 

prejudice provides a sufficient basis to deny relief on the ineffective assistance 

claim.” Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 370 (Tenn. 1996). The Strickland standard has 

been applied to the right to counsel under article I, section 9 of the Tennessee 

Constitution. State v. Melson, 772 S.W.2d 417, 419 n.2 (Tenn. 1989). 

Deficient performance requires a showing that “counsel’s representation fell below 

an objective standard of reasonableness,” and reviewing courts “must indulge a strong 

presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 

assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89. When a court reviews a lawyer’s 

performance, it “must make every effort to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to 

reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from the 

perspective of counsel at that time.” Howell v. State, 185 S.W.3d 319, 326 (Tenn. 2006) 

(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). We will not deem counsel to have been ineffective 

merely because a different strategy or procedure might have produced a more favorable 

result. Rhoden v. State, 816 S.W.2d 56, 60 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). We recognize, 

however, that “deference to tactical choices only applies if the choices are informed ones 

based upon adequate preparation.” Cooper v. State, 847 S.W.2d 521, 528 (Tenn. Crim. 

App. 1992) (citing Hellard v. State, 629 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982)). 

As to the prejudice prong, the petitioner must establish “a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.” Vaughn v. State, 202 S.W.3d 106, 116 (Tenn. 2006) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 694). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 

the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “That is, the petitioner must establish that his 

counsel’s deficient performance was of such a degree that it deprived him of a fair trial and 

called into question the reliability of the outcome.” Pylant v. State, 263 S.W.3d 854, 869 

(Tenn. 2008) (citing State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 463 (Tenn. 1999)). 
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1. Expert Testimony 

The Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred by finding that Dr. 

Alexander had the opportunity to testify about the effects of intoxication on the Petitioner’s 

ability to form intent. The Petitioner argues that lead counsel failed to elicit such testimony 

from Dr. Alexander during the pretrial hearing in order to have Dr. Alexander qualified as 

an expert psychiatrist. 

The admission of expert testimony is governed by Tennessee Rules of Evidence 702 

and 703. State v. Copeland, 226 S.W.3d 287, 301 (Tenn. 2007) (citing Brown v. Crown 

Equip. Corp., 181 S.W.3d 268, 273 (Tenn. 2005)). Rule 702 provides, “If scientific, 

technical, or other specialized knowledge will substantially assist the trier of fact to 

understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 

knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion 

or otherwise.” Tenn. R. Evid. 702. 

The Petitioner argues that lead counsel’s performance was deficient. However, even 

if lead counsel’s performance was deficient by his not asking appropriate questions, the 

Petitioner has failed to show how he was prejudiced. The record shows that Dr. Alexander 

had an opportunity to testify at the pretrial June 2016 hearing. The post-conviction court 

noted that the trial court determined that Dr. Alexander was not qualified as an expert, 

finding that Dr. Alexander would not have been qualified as an expert to testify about the 

effects of the Petitioner’s intoxication level on his ability to form intent and finding that 

Dr. Alexander’s testimony lacked trustworthiness. See Tenn. R. Evid. 703; see also

McDaniel v. CSX Transp., Inc., 955 S.W.2d 257, 265 (Tenn. 1997) (“A Tennessee trial 

court may consider in determining reliability: (1) whether scientific evidence has been 

tested and the methodology with which it has been tested; (2) whether the evidence has 

been subjected to peer review or publication; (3) whether a potential rate of error is known; 

(4) whether, as formerly required by Frye, the evidence is generally accepted in the 

scientific community; and (5) whether the expert’s research in the field has been conducted 

independent of litigation.”) 

We also note that Dr. Alexander was psychiatrist and not a toxicologist. See 

Vandenburg, 2019 WL 3720892, at *31. At the pretrial June hearing, Dr. Alexander 

testified that, after medical school, he had received no training in toxicology and that he 

did not normally prepare reports similar to the one he had prepared for the Petitioner. Id. 

at *30. Dr. Alexander said that he based his report on an email questionnaire containing 

the Petitioner’s answers and that he did not interview the Petitioner. Id. At the post-
- 15 - 

conviction hearing, Dr. Alexander testified that he was not certified in toxicology. Dr. 

Alexander said that he interviewed the Petitioner but admitted that the interview did not 

happen until after he had prepared his report. The Petitioner has failed to show that Dr. 

Alexander would have been qualified to testify about the effects of alcohol on the 

Petitioner’s ability to form the requisite intent. 

Dr. Alexander’s testimony at both the pretrial hearing and the post-conviction 

hearing show that he was not a toxicologist and completed his report without first speaking 

to the Petitioner. In addition to not speaking with the Petitioner prior to writing his report, 

the proof from the pretrial hearing also demonstrates that Dr. Alexander did not review the 

surveillance footage of the Petitioner prior to such time. Id. at *31. Further, Dr. Alexander 

did not have enough information to determine whether the Petitioner was malingering. Id. 

In previously concluding that Dr. Alexander’s proposed testimony lacked indicia of 

reliability, this court noted that “Dr. Alexander relied on self-serving and uncorroborated 

statements from [the Petitioner] to calculate [the Petitioner’s] approximate BAC during the 

offenses.” Id. at 33. With these considerations in view, the post-conviction court correctly 

found that Dr. Alexander’s testimony was unreliable and would not have been admitted at 

the Petitioner’s trial. This would be the case even if lead counsel had tendered Dr. 

Alexander in a different manner at the pretrial hearing, thus defeating a showing of 

prejudice under the Strickland standard. 

Moreover, at the post-conviction hearing, Dr. Alexander testified that it would have 

been difficult for the Petitioner to form the requisite intent. See State v. Hall, 958 S.W.2d 

679, 690 (Tenn. 1997) (holding a “lack of capacity to form the requisite culpable mental 

intent . . . is central to evaluating the admissibility of expert psychiatric testimony on [an] 

issue”). At the post-conviction hearing, Dr. Alexander did not testify that the Petitioner 

lacked the capacity to form the requisite intent. As such, Dr. Alexander’s testimony, as 

proffered at the post-conviction hearing, would have been inadmissible at trial under the 

Hall standard. See State v. Merritt, No. E2011-01348-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 1189092, 

at *27 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 22, 2013) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in excluding evidence that the defendant’s mental disease or defect impaired or 

reduced his ability to form the required mens rea, rather than stating that the defendant 

“completely lacked the capacity to commit premeditated first degree murder”); State v. 

Austin, No. W2005-01963-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 2624399, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 

10, 2007) (holding that although the trial court erred in ruling that an expert witness could 

not testify about the ultimate issue of the defendant’s mental state, the error was harmless 

because testimony that the defendant’s mental disease merely “impacted” his capacity to 

form the required mental state was inadmissible under Hall); State v. Idellfonso-Diaz, No. 

M2006-00203-CCA-R9-CD, 2006 WL 3093207, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 1, 2006) 
- 16 - 

(“The fact that the [defendant’s] mental disease impaired or reduced his capacity to form 

the requisite mental state does not satisfy the two-prong requirement in Hall and [State v. 

Faulkner, 154 S.W.3d 48 (Tenn. 2005)].”). 

In any event, as conceded by the Petitioner at the post-conviction hearing, the trial 

record is replete with proof of the Petitioner’s intoxication at the time of the offenses. As 

noted by co-counsel at the post-conviction hearing, lead counsel successfully obtained an 

intoxication jury instruction. This court previously noted on direct appeal that the proof of 

the Petitioner’s guilt was “overwhelming.” Vandenburg, 2019 WL 3720892, at *46. For 

the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Petitioner was not prejudiced by any alleged 

deficiency of lead counsel related to the admission of Dr. Alexander’s testimony. 

2. Exclusion of Prior Bad Act Testimony 

The Petitioner argues that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel by 

lead counsel’s failure to litigate the Petitioner’s motion to admit prior bad acts of his 

codefendants pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 24-7-125. The Petitioner 

argues that counsel should have utilized this code section, rather than Tennessee Rules of 

Evidence 404(b) and 608, to show the codefendants’ motive and intent in order to minimize 

the Petitioner’s role. The Petitioner argues that because codefendants Batey, Banks, and 

McKenzie were not tried jointly with the Petitioner, they could not have been prejudiced 

by the probative value of this evidence. He argues that lead counsel should have raised 

this issue and argued that analysis of the probative value alone was the proper 

consideration. The State counters that this evidence was irrelevant and that the Petitioner 

is merely restyling an unsuccessful argument raised on direct appeal as an ineffective 

assistance claim. 

“‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of 

any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 

probable than it would be without the evidence.” Tenn. R. Evid. 401. In general, relevant 

evidence is admissible, and irrelevant evidence is inadmissible. Tenn. R. Evid. 402. The 

court may, however, exclude relevant evidence if its “probative value is substantially 

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 

jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 

cumulative evidence.” Tenn. R. Evid. 403. 

 Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) generally provides that evidence of other bad 

acts is irrelevant and, therefore, inadmissible. Our supreme court has determined that Rule 

404(b) applies only to the accused. See State v. Stevens, 78 S.W.3d 817, 837 (Tenn. 2002). 
- 17 - 

In 2014, however, the General Assembly enacted Tennessee Code Annotated section 24-

7-125, the language of which is “essentially identical” to Rule 404(b) except that it applies 

to “any individual, including a deceased victim, the defendant, a witness, or any other third 

party[.]” See State v. Moon, 644 S.W.3d 72, 82 (Tenn. 2022) (noting that section 24-7-125 

“expanded Rule 404(b)’s protections to all witnesses in a criminal case”). 

 Section 24-7-125 provides that in a criminal case, “evidence of other crimes, 

wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of any individual, including a 

deceased victim, the defendant, a witness, or any other third party, in order to show action 

in conformity with the character trait. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes.” 

The conditions that must be satisfied before the evidence is admitted are: 

(1) The court upon request must hold a hearing outside the jury’s presence; 

(2) The court must determine that a material issue exists other than conduct 

conforming with a character trait and must upon request state on the record 

the material issue, the ruling, and the reasons for admitting the evidence; 

(3) The court must find proof of the other crime, wrong, or act to be clear and 

convincing; and 

(4) The court must exclude the evidence if its probative value is outweighed 

by the danger of unfair prejudice. 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-7-125. 

 Even if lead counsel was deficient by failing to argue for the admission of this 

evidence under Tennessee Code Annotated section 24-7-125, the Petitioner has failed to 

establish prejudice. Evidence that the Petitioner’s codefendants did not need the 

Petitioner’s encouragement or assistance to commit the offenses is not relevant to the 

Petitioner’s criminal responsibility. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-402(2) (stating that a 

person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by another if “[a]cting with intent 

to promote or assist the commission of the offense, or to benefit in the proceeds or results 

of the offense, the person solicits, directs, aids, or attempts to aid another person to commit 

the offense”). Importantly, as noted by the post-conviction court, a panel of this court 

found that the evidence was irrelevant. Vandenburg, 2019 WL 3720892, at *80; see State 

v. Jefferson, 31 S.W.3d 558, 560-61 (Tenn. 2000) (holding that pursuant to the law of the 

case doctrine, an appellate court’s decision on an issue of law is binding in later trials and 

appeals of the same case if the facts on the second trial or appeal are substantially the same 
- 18 - 

as the facts in the first trial or appeal). Because the evidence was irrelevant, it would have 

been inadmissible whether counsel had argued under Rule 404(b) or Code section 24-7-

125. The Petitioner has failed to show prejudice. Accordingly, he is not entitled to relief 

regarding this issue. 

 Also, regarding this bad act evidence, the Petitioner argues that the trial court 

violated his due process rights by limiting his right to present a defense and that lead 

counsel should have argued for admission under due process principles pursuant to both 

the Tennessee and United States Constitutions. However, this matter has already been 

decided on direct appeal from the Petitioner’s convictions. See Vandenburg, 2019 WL 

3720892, at *80 (determining that the Petitioner’s “right to present a defense was not 

violated by the trial court’s exclusion of the evidence” pertaining to the codefendants’ prior 

bad acts). Post-conviction relief is not available for claims that have been previously 

determined. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-106(f). Furthermore, “[a] ground for relief is 

previously determined if a court of competent jurisdiction has ruled on the merits after a 

full and fair hearing[,]” and “[a] full and fair hearing has occurred where the petitioner is 

afforded the opportunity to call witnesses and otherwise present evidence, regardless of 

whether the petitioner actually introduced any evidence.” Id. at § 40-30-106(h). The 

Petitioner’s “right to a defense” claim on this issue was previously determined on direct 

appeal. The Petitioner is not entitled to post-conviction review of this same issue. 

3. Exclusion of Voicemail 

The Petitioner argues that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel by 

lead counsel’s failure to argue that his voicemail to Mr. Quinzio should have been admitted 

as a “disserving” rather than self-serving statement. The Petitioner also argues that lead 

counsel should have argued that the statements in the voicemail were non-hearsay, in that 

they were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. The Petitioner asserts that had 

counsel made this argument, the evidence likely would have been admitted. 

The Petitioner’s claim must fail because lead counsel in fact advanced the same 

arguments at trial that the Petitioner now proposes on post-conviction. At trial, lead 

counsel argued that the voicemail was not self-serving in that it was “actually an admission 

that [the Petitioner] was present.” See Vandenburg, 2019 WL 3720892, at *44. Lead 

counsel argued that the purpose of admitting the voicemail was to demonstrate that the 

Petitioner was “very intoxicated” and to form “a foundation for Mr. Quinzio’s opinion that 

[the Petitioner] was drunk[,]” both non-hearsay justifications for the admission of the 

voicemail recording. Id. While lead counsel’s arguments were unsuccessful in the trial 

court, this court later accepted the arguments advanced by lead counsel, holding that “the 
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trial court erred in excluding the voicemail as hearsay because the statements in the 

voicemail were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted.” Id. at *46. The record 

shows that lead counsel did not act deficiently on this issue. 

Even if lead counsel had performed deficiently, the Petitioner is unable to 

demonstrate prejudice. Despite ruling that the trial court erred in excluding the voicemail 

recording, this court held on direct appeal that, based on the “overwhelming evidence” of 

the Petitioner’s guilt, “the exclusion of the voicemail was harmless error.” Id. We agree 

with this assessment as it relates to the prejudice prong of Strickland. As noted, there was 

a plethora of evidence at trial indicating the Petitioner’s high level of intoxication during 

the offenses. The admission of this voicemail recording would have done little to advance 

what was already an obvious fact. On the other hand, the admission of the Petitioner’s 

statements in the voicemail would have likely prejudiced him in front of the jury. The 

voicemail places the Petitioner at the scene of the offenses when they occurred. Most 

damning, the voicemail contains the Petitioner’s admission that one of his codefendants 

was “pissing on her p---y” and the Petitioner’s acknowledgment that he was in “deep 

s---.” Id. The Petitioner is not entitled to relief. 

B. Superseding Indictment 

 

 The Petitioner argues that the trial court erred by denying his petition for postconviction relief because the Petitioner’s rights against double jeopardy under the Fifth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Tennessee Constitution, article 1, 

section 10, were violated. The Petitioner argues that the trial court erred by permitting the 

Petitioner to be tried “on amended charges after jeopardy had attached.” The Petitioner 

also argues that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by allowing the State to 

proceed with the superseding indictment without disposing of the original indictment, 

citing to State v. Harris, 33 S.W.3d 767, 771 (Tenn. 2000) (“Where there has been no 

jeopardy on the first indictment, a grand jury may return a new indictment against an 

accused even though another indictment is pending.”). The State responds that the 

Petitioner’s double jeopardy challenges were previously determined by a panel of this court 

and the Petitioner’s reliance on Harris is misplaced. Moreover, the State argues that the 

Petitioner waived review of his Harris issue by failing to raise it on direct appeal. 

1. Retrial on Amended Charges 

 The Petitioner argues that his rights against double jeopardy were violated because 

he was held to trial “on amended charges after jeopardy had attached.” However, the 

Petitioner unsuccessfully raised this same issue on direct appeal. See Vandenburg, 2019 
- 20 - 

WL 3720892, at *21. This issue was previously determined, and the Petitioner is not 

entitled to post-conviction relief. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-106(f), (h). 

2. Harris Issue 

 The Petitioner argues that because the State did not dismiss the original indictment 

against the Petitioner, the trial court violated his constitutional rights by allowing the State 

to proceed with the superseding indictment, effectively “having two indictments lodged 

against him simultaneously.” The Petitioner argues that according to Harris, the State was 

required to elect which set of offenses they wanted to pursue at trial, which did not happen 

in the Petitioner’s case. However, in Harris, our supreme court held that “the State may 

obtain a superseding indictment at any time prior to trial without dismissing the pending 

indictment and may then select the indictment under which to proceed at trial.” 33 S.W.3d 

at 771 (emphasis added). Moreover, the Petitioner failed to raise this issue on direct appeal 

from his convictions. Accordingly, it is waived. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-106(g) (“A 

ground for relief is waived if the petitioner personally or through an attorney failed to 

present it for determination in any proceeding before a court of competent jurisdiction in 

which the ground could have been presented”). The Petitioner is not entitled to relief 

regarding this issue. 

III. CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing and the record as a whole, we affirm the judgment of the 

post-conviction court. 

 

 KYLE A. HIXSON, JUDGE