1

Africa Security Brief

Unfinished Business: A Framework for 

Peace in the Great Lakes

By Rigobert Minani Bihuzo

A Public ation of the Afric a C enter for Str ategic Studie s

◆ Conflict in Africa’s Great Lakes region persists because of a complex mixture of regional politics, 

financial incentives, ethnic polarization, and weak and illegitimate governance.

◆ Previous peace agreements have made important contributions to stability but have only been partly 

successful because they have not addressed some key conflict drivers.

◆ Given the regional nature of the instability, international actors, especially those in Europe and the 

United States that provide significant financial support to governments in the Great Lakes, are vital to 

achieving a comprehensive settlement.

Hig h lig h t s

No. 21 / July 2012

The provinces of North and South Kivu in the 

eastern DRC have been the epicenter of the fighting 

(see map). They are the largest source of recruits for a 

constantly shifting mix of militias. By one count, there 

are at least 19 nonstate militias comprising 7,000 to 

17,000 fighters in the Kivus.3

 Typical of the splintering seen in other extended conflicts, United Nations 

(UN) peacekeeping officials warn of a further “mushrooming of new groups.”4 Many of these groups are 

criminally oriented militias seeking to profit from trafficking the region’s natural resources. Some are led by 

local politicians and others are community self-defense 

forces. Alliances, goals, and leadership among these 

groups are often temporary, opportunistic, and at times 

contradictory. 

Conflict in the Kivus also has powerful external 

drivers. Militias opposed to the governments in Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda are based in the Kivus. 

In response, these countries have deployed troops and 

Landmark peace agreements signed in 2002 by 

11 African governments and various nonstate armed 

groups were meant to end 7 years of war that had 

ravaged Africa’s Great Lakes region. A decade later, 

instability, tightly intertwined with regional geopolitics, persists. Recurring conflict has killed tens of 

thousands, mostly civilians, and displaced millions 

of others. The extended instability has also led to a 

collapse of basic social services and economic activity in parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 

(DRC), resulting in manifold more deaths due to 

malnutrition, lack of access to basic healthcare, and 

scarce livelihood opportunities.1 Amid this breakdown, barbaric forms of violence have emerged. During one 4-day period in the summer of 2011, nearly 

400 women, men, and children were raped by militia 

fighters. Since 1996, there have reportedly been more 

than 200,000 rapes, which are mostly attributed to 

armed militias.2
2

sponsored militias in the eastern DRC, feeding the 

proliferation of armed groups. Nearly all of the illicit 

traffic in Congolese minerals that funds armed groups 

transits Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda.

Despite numerous initiatives and agreements, no 

comprehensive framework to end this complex conflict 

has been forged. Rather, international engagement 

has continued to be fragmented with an emphasis on 

symptoms. Costs to the international community in 

peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance alone total 

more than $2 billion annually. The persistent state of 

crisis, similarly, constrains economic investment in Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda. Instability in the Great 

Lakes, moreover, hinders other security challenges in 

the region, including statebuilding efforts in South Sudan and defeating the Lord’s Resistance Army militia. 

Entrenched Regional Conflict

As part of its effort to consolidate control over 

post-genocide Rwanda, the Rwandan Patriotic Front 

(RPF) launched an operation into the eastern Congo 

in 1996. The RPF aimed to neutralize the remnants 

of the former Rwandan regime’s military, the Forces 

Armées Rwandaises (FAR), and the Rwandan Interahamwe militia who were key actors in the Rwandan 

genocide. These fighters, who numbered in the tens of 

thousands, had fled to the Congo where they enjoyed 

free maneuver and launched raids into Rwanda. 

Soon after the initial operations the RPF broadened its goals to remove the regime of Mobutu Sese 

Seko, president of then Zaire, whom they saw as protecting their enemies. Several other countries, including Burundi and Uganda, eventually provided frontline troops and support to build a Congolese rebellion, 

ostensibly led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila, known as 

l’Alliance des Forces Démocratique pour la Libération 

du Congo-Zaire (AFDL).5

Kabila assumed power in Kinshasa in May 1997 

after Mobutu’s disorganized forces were quickly defeated during a 7-month war of “liberation.” However, 

lacking legitimacy, geopolitical vision, and governance 

experience, his regime was characterized by brutality 

and fecklessness. Concerned that this arrangement 

would reenergize the ex-FAR in the eastern DRC, 

Rwanda launched a second invasion, the so-called 

“war of occupation” from 1998 to 2003, and established another militia, Rassemblement Congolais pour 

la Démocratie (RCD). Kabila, meanwhile, urged the 

ex-FAR, his erstwhile enemies, to join his government 

Rigobert Minani Bihuzo S.J. is the Director of 

the Jesuit Africa Social Centers Network and was 

Director of the political section at the Center of Study 

for Social Action in Kinshasa. He has participated in 

several peace negotiations in the Great Lakes.

Mbandaka

Kisangani

Lubumbashi

Congo River

Atlantic

Ocean

100 km

ANGOLA

ZAMBIA

GABON

REP. OF

THE

CONGO

CAMEROON

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

UGANDA

UNITED

REP. OF 

TANZANIA

SOUTH

SUDAN

BURUNDI

RWANDA Bukavu

Goma DEMOCRATIC

REPUBLIC OF

THE CONGO

NORTH

KIVU

SOUTH

KIVU

Kinshasa

Mbuji-Mayi

Source: “The Role of the Exploitation of Natural Resources in Fuelling and Prolonging Crises in the Eastern DRC,” International 

Alert, January 2010, 79. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Both maps modified by author. 

Lake Victoria

KATANGA

ORIENTALE

NORTH

KIVU

SOUTH

KIVU

MANIEMA

Terminates at Port

of Dar es Salaam

Terminates at Port

of Mombasa

Bukavu

Dodoma

Kampala

Kigali

Bujumbura

Goma

Kigoma Tabora

Beni Kasese

Uvira

Isiro

Bunia

Gulu

Arua

Eldoret

Nakuru

Aru

Mwanza

Kisumu

TANZANIA

UGANDA

KENYA

BURUNDI

RWANDA

DEM. REP.

OF CONGO

Main road 

Railway

Secondary road 

National boundary 0 100

kilometres

200 

Province boundary
3

in fighting the RPF. In response to this second Rwandan gambit, seven other African armies deployed to 

the DRC either to counter or support the Rwandans. 

Kabila was assassinated in January 2001 by members 

of his presidential guard and was succeeded by his son 

Joseph, who led a government based on a transitional 

power-sharing arrangement negotiated in 2002. Most 

foreign armies subsequently withdrew in 2003. 

Rwanda’s 1996 invasion of the eastern Congo set 

a pattern of conflict that has since repeated itself and, 

in effect, wholly shifted Rwanda’s previous civil war 

onto Congolese soil. Its reliance on proxy militias in 

the DRC and periodic military operations to resolve 

complex political challenges prompted other governments to follow suit. This has led to the proliferation 

of armed nonstate groups and instigated a never-ending series of crises in the region.6

 In recent years, the 

key actors have been the Congrès National Pour la 

Défense du Peuple (CNDP), a militia supported by 

Rwanda, and the Forces Démocratiques de Libération 

du Rwanda (FDLR), which is composed of ex-FAR 

leaders and poses a security risk to Rwanda.

A lasting solution to the fighting in the Great 

Lakes will take more than the end of the FDLR and 

CNDP, however. Years of fighting have spawned other 

conflict drivers and peace spoilers. Among them are 

the eastern DRC’s easily accessible natural resources, 

particularly gold, tin, colombite-tantalite (coltan), and 

tungsten. Armed groups depend on revenues from the 

illicit trade in these resources. For some, it has become 

a primary objective. The same holds true for elements 

of the Forces Armées du République Démocratique du 

Congo (FARDC), the DRC’s national army, which 

have been implicated in mineral trafficking.7

The minerals trade also features prominently 

in decision-making in Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda. Most of the eastern DRC’s minerals must move 

through these and other East African countries, where 

they are levied with fees and re-exported, often by local businesses. This has become a significant source of 

economic activity and growth. For example, Rwanda’s 

domestic minerals production is small, but the mining sector was a “key growth engine” for Rwanda in 

2011 during a year of otherwise subdued regional economic activity, including a slump in Rwanda’s agricultural sector.8

 In March 2012, the firm Africa Primary 

Tungsten—one of Rwanda’s largest taxpayers—was 

censured by an international mining association after evidence emerged that it was misrepresenting the 

origin of its minerals.9 In short, powerful business and 

government interests profiting from the instability in 

the DRC have incentives to keep the conflict going. 

The invasions of the DRC have also catalyzed 

tensions at the community level. After the RPF’s military victory in Rwanda in 1994, nearly 2 million refugees from Rwanda’s Hutu community, including leaders of the Rwandan genocide, crossed into the eastern 

Congo, altering the region’s demographic composition. 

The RPF’s tactic of arming various Tutsi-dominated 

militias has likewise fostered mistrust of the DRC Tutsi 

community. In response to the heightened polarization 

and militarization of the region, communities—including the Nande, Nyanga, Tembo, Hunde, Shi, Rega, 

Bembe, and others—created armed militias, known 

locally as Mai-Mai, to defend themselves.

Decades of cross-border migration combined with 

ongoing conflict-related displacement of 1.4 million 

people in the Kivus have also turned the already 

thorny issue of land ownership into a major challenge. With each crisis, property belonging to locals 

was occupied by new arrivals. Any attempt to recover 

or return to this land became an intercommunal casus 

belli. The Kivus have among the highest population 

densities in the DRC, with nearly 70 inhabitants/km2

compared with a national average of 29 inhabitants/

km2. The resulting weakening of traditional authorities coupled with the government’s inability to enforce 

property laws have produced a state of permanent conflict over land ownership.

Conditions in the DRC’s neighbors also feed the 

proliferation of armed groups. In Burundi, the government has been accused of human rights violations, 

including extrajudicial executions by the army. In 

response, the previously demobilized Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL) rebel militia has regrouped 

and rearmed in South Kivu. A new rebellion, Fronatu 

“Rwanda’s 1996 invasion of the 

eastern Congo set a pattern of 

conflict that has since repeated 

itself”
4

Tabara, has also based itself in South Kivu. This has 

stoked fears that violence may return to Burundi in full 

force and engulf the eastern DRC.

In Rwanda, a minority elite is consolidating a monopoly of political and financial power and is intolerant of opposition voices. Arrests of activists and independent journalists are common. The post-genocide 

legal system has also been tainted by corruption and 

procedural irregularities,10 hindering the disarmament 

of the FDLR and the return of tens of thousands of 

refugees from the DRC. 

Meanwhile, hamstrung by weak legitimacy and 

capacity, the DRC government has had little success 

in extending its authority in the Kivus. Evidence that 

the November 2011 elections in the DRC were deeply 

flawed, including systematic intimidation and violence 

against voters by security forces, has fueled mistrust of 

the government and diminished its ability to mitigate 

the conflict. Frustrated citizens are turning to CNDP 

breakaways, the Mai-Mai, and other groups to protect 

their interests. 

Gai ns and Shortcomings of an 

Incomplete Peace Process

A dozen major peace agreements, negotiations, 

and reconciliation initiatives, often brokered with 

help from the international community, have been 

the primary vehicles employed to resolve conflict in 

the Great Lakes region.11 Most of these accords, however, have addressed only some of the causes and consequences of the conflict and, at times, neglected its 

principal drivers. 

ICGLR approach. The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) has to date 

been the largest peace initiative. Convened by UN 

Resolution 1291 in 2000 and held under the auspices 

of the African Union and UN with support from international donors, it brought 18 countries to the negotiating table, 11 of which were directly involved in 

the conflict. After 6 years of political negotiations, the 

conference gave rise to the Pact on Security, Stability, 

and Development in the Great Lakes Region, signed 

in December 2006 by heads of state from Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, the DRC, Kenya, 

the Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, 

Uganda, and Zambia. The pact entered into force in 

June 2008 after it was ratified by eight signatories. An 

ICGLR Secretariat was established in Bujumbura to 

implement the pact’s 10 protocols, including regional 

non-aggression and mutual defense, good governance, 

and reconstruction and development. Only limited 

progress toward these objectives have been realized to 

date, however.

A key contribution of the ICGLR has been that 

it took into account the economic dimensions and 

motivations of the conflict in the eastern DRC. Specifically, it launched a Regional Initiative on Natural 

Resources to certify, formalize, and track the minerals 

trade so as to eliminate trafficking and the role of 

armed groups. Pilot schemes in Rwanda and South 

Kivu have shown some progress.12

 The ICGLR’s main shortcoming has been that it 

did not address the massive human rights violations 

committed by various state actors that intervened in 

the DRC—abuses that have now been well documented through UN reports.13 As a consequence, 

these actors have had little incentive to end their 

reliance on short-term military responses and proxy 

militias to meet their immediate security and economic interests.

The Tripartite Plus Commission. The Tripartite 

Plus Commission was a U.S. initiative launched in 

2004 dealing mainly with the FDLR presence in the 

DRC. This initiative culminated in a joint communiqué on November 9, 2007, committing the DRC 

and Rwandan governments to “a common approach 

to address the threat posed to their common security 

and stability by the ex-FAR/Interahamwe.” The Nairobi communiqué fulfilled a fundamental aim of the 

Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF) to more aggressively 

target the ex-FAR remnants that comprise the FDLR. 

The FARDC-RDF collaboration has been very 

unpopular in the eastern DRC, even though many 

in the region dread the FDLR. The joint operations 

“[various state] actors have 

had little incentive to end their 

reliance on short-term military 

responses and proxy militias to 

meet their immediate security and 

economic interests”
5

resulted in many civilian casualties and disarmed 

few FDLR, who have later conducted reprisal attacks against villages accused of aiding the FARDC 

and RDF. President Kabila is also paying a price for 

his expansion of military operations in the eastern 

DRC. In 2006, he received 95 percent of the vote 

in South Kivu and 78 percent in North Kivu, largely 

because he promised to bring an end to the Rwandan 

presence and restore peace. In the 2011 elections he 

garnered just 45 and 39 percent, respectively, in the 

same provinces. Given widespread electoral irregularities, his actual support may be even lower. His 

options and ability to manage the conflict will shrink 

further if he continues to lose support in the east.

The Tripartite Plus’s main achievement was to 

bring the two major antagonists—the Rwandan and 

Congolese leadership—to the table. Indeed, the U.S. 

Government extended much effort to force the two 

enemies to talk to one another, no doubt drawing 

from its extensive relations with and support to both 

governments. Donor support accounts for 40 percent 

of Rwanda’s annual government budget.14 Improving 

relations between Rwanda and the DRC is critical to 

consolidating peace throughout the entire subregion, 

and this approach showed that constructive communication is possible. 

This agreement errs in limiting responsibility for 

the instability to the FDLR. When the DRC government once suggested that illicit minerals trafficking 

be discussed within the Tripartite Plus arrangement, 

the Rwandan and Ugandan governments declined, 

indicating that this was not a regional issue.15 Moreover, the Tripartite Plus agreement stipulated that the 

DRC must offer the FDLR a choice between either 

voluntarily returning to Rwanda without security 

guarantees or being relocated and dispersed throughout the Congolese territory. If they accepted neither 

of these proposals, they faced military operations by 

the FARDC and RDF. 

This narrow approach ignores a UN assessment 

that at most 2,500 of the remaining 70,000 Rwandan 

refugees in the DRC are combatants.16 Beyond joint 

military operations, then, cooperation on refugee protection, repatriation, and resettlement could relieve 

local-level tensions and minimize a pool of potential 

FDLR recruits and supporters. Nor can the peace process in the DRC be separated from the broader context 

of democratization in the Great Lakes region. Refugees 

in the DRC from Burundi and Rwanda will continue 

to resist returning to a country where they face a restrictive political environment. The Tripartite Commission’s initiatives, thus, lacked the confidence-and 

trust-building elements essential for successful disarmament.

Goma conference. The Goma peace conference 

has been the only one initiated by the DRC government. From January 6–24, 2008, the conference 

brought together 1,500 delegates from all communities 

and social strata in North and South Kivu. Its general 

objective was to rally stakeholders and involve them 

in the restoration of peace in the area. Delegates ultimately signed an Acte d’engagement to cease hostilities.

By giving all communities and most armed groups 

a voice, the Goma conference represented a significant 

step forward in understanding the conflict from local 

perspectives. And a high priority for these communities was to prevent those guilty of committing massacres, sexual violence, or inciting ethnic hatred from 

holding positions of responsibility, particularly in the 

security services.17 After the conference, the involvement of traditional village chiefs and other community 

leaders facilitated the disarmament or integration of 

22 armed groups into the national army—indicating 

a strong desire at the local level to end the fighting. 

The FDLR were excluded from the Goma conference, 

however. 

The Goma conference defused tensions in the 

Kivus, but months of heavy fighting began in August 

2008 between the CNDP and FARDC, jeopardizing 

the commitment of other signatories to disarm. By 

the end of the year, the CNDP was poised to capture 

Goma, the capital of North Kivu. Hundreds of civilians were killed and hundreds of thousands displaced. 

The fighting finally ebbed when, in a surprising 

turn of events, Laurent Nkunda, then leader of the 

“nor can the peace process 

in the DRC be separated 

from the broader context of 

democratization in the Great 

Lakes region”
6

CNDP, was arrested by authorities in Rwanda in January 2009. According to some accounts, Nkunda’s sponsors in Rwanda began to worry that he was growing 

unreliable and unresponsive, and therefore they moved 

to shuffle the leadership in the CNDP. Rwanda was 

also likely motivated by growing international criticism of its support to the CNDP. 

A Lasting Solution

To date, peace initiatives to end armed violence 

in the Great Lakes have addressed only some of the 

causes and consequences of the conflict. A multipronged framework drawing from lessons of previous agreements can rebalance future peace efforts to 

achieve sustainable solutions to the conflict. 

End support to proxy militias. Among the core 

group of states involved in the conflict, all have supported a proxy militia. This tactic is often intended to 

manage valid national security threats, but tends to be 

a counterproductive expedient that precipitates larger 

crises. In the end, most benefactors lose control over 

these proxies. These groups transform and develop 

their own agendas, sometimes threatening the very 

interests they were intended to protect. The AFDL, 

RCD, and CNDP all exemplify this pattern.

Rwanda, in particular, must end its support to 

these groups. Its actions in the DRC undermine the regional stability needed to attract further international 

investment. At stake, by extension, is its standing with 

international donors and investors. 

For its part, the government of the DRC must 

meet its obligations to disarm or integrate militias 

within the FARDC. Its failure to sustain its engagement following the consensus achieved during the 

Goma conference encouraged groups to pull out of 

the process and contributed to the 2008-2009 crisis in 

the Kivus. At times, it has also pursued temporary alliances with some militias, including the FDLR, to target others. It should rather prioritize security through 

community partnerships, achieving disarmament by 

demonstrating its trustworthiness, and the progressive 

isolation of recalcitrant combatants. A particular focus 

should be the senior leaders of the FDLR, both to address Rwanda’s legitimate concerns but also because 

the FDLR has been a severe threat to communities 

in the Kivus. Unfortunately, after years of seeing its 

numbers and maneuverability slowly shrink, the FDLR 

enjoyed a resurgence in 2012. Fighting in the Kivus 

between the FARDC and another Rwandan supported 

militia called M23 provided the FDLR some breathing 

space in which to recruit and conduct new attacks. 

International partners will need to apply more 

pressure on governments that undermine the peace 

process through their support of militias. The United 

States, the United Kingdom, and European Union 

provide substantial budgetary assistance to governments in the Great Lakes, and therefore should ensure 

that such support does not go to countries working at 

cross purposes. Likewise, international partners should 

provide support to uphold efforts to disarm, demobilize, 

or integrate combatants. 

International engagement should not stop there, 

however. Militia leaders and their state sponsors who 

persist in undermining stability in the DRC should 

face International Criminal Court (ICC) investigations on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity, including systematized murder, rape, torture, 

recruiting of child soldiers, and pillaging. Currently, 

General Bosco Ntaganda, formerly of the CNDP and 

now a head of M23, faces an ICC arrest warrant. Major 

General Sylvester Mudacumura of the FDLR is also 

under ICC investigation. General Laurent Nkunda, 

the former head of the CNDP under house arrest in 

Rwanda, and Colonel Sultani Makenga, an M23 commander, should likewise face ICC investigations for 

their involvement in unsolved massacres and recruiting child soldiers. Providing weapons and ammunition 

to the FDLR, M23, and for other military activities in 

the DRC, moreover, contravenes a United Nations 

Security Council arms embargo. Accordingly, other 

FDLR figures in the Diaspora could face charges and 

investigations, such as Ignace Murwanashyaka, an 

FDLR political leader and fundraiser on trial for war 

crimes in Germany. Likewise, top Rwandan officials, 

including Minister of Defense James Kabarebe, have 

been identified by the UN as having provided troops, 

ammunition, and weapons to M23.18

Develop political space as alternative to militancy. Ever since the 2007 Nairobi communiqué, military 

responses to the conflict have been prioritized at the 

expense of other approaches. The results have been 

very mixed. Groups targeted in sweeps often relocate 
7

until operations end, then return and attack civilians 

whom they accuse of helping state authorities. Military operations against nonstate armed groups may be 

necessary, but they should be combined with initiatives that offer an alternative and a future to certain 

members of these groups, especially those not guilty 

of war crimes. 

There is reason to believe that combatants can 

be persuaded to stand down. The Goma conference 

kindled some confidence among militia groups on a 

way forward. Likewise, during previous negotiations, 

the FDLR agreed to renounce the use of force, condemn genocide ideology, cooperate with the international tribunal on the genocide, and transform itself 

into a political party in Rwanda.19 Offering members 

of militias reasonable and secure opportunities in their 

home countries should be a key aspect in peace efforts. 

Fostering protection of political rights and civil liberties, moreover, will undermine the claims of exclusion 

and persecution that militias such as the FDLR use to 

recruit among exile communities. 

Ensure local community representation. Local communities in the Kivus are most exposed to 

the ongoing conflict in the region. Many members of 

these communities work in the artisanal mines that 

fuel much of the fighting and some, lacking suitable 

alternatives, make a living as professional militants. As 

a result of the lengthy conflict, land disputes, ethnic 

tensions, and other intercommunal challenges have 

worsened. Accordingly, the local communities of the 

Kivus need to be integrated into any framework for 

peace in the DRC. 

As the Goma conference demonstrated, including local community representation in the peace 

process can build consensus, reduce militia activity, 

and support disarmament. Future follow-on initiatives should be pursued, but with critical adjustments. 

Leadership from the Congolese state is essential to 

reduce the multiple parallel administrative systems 

that currently contribute to weak governance in the 

Kivus. Given the intercommunal tensions that have 

developed during years of conflict, regular meetings 

and accessible mechanisms through which community 

representatives can channel concerns to responsive 

government officials will be critical to breaking the reliance on militias and violence. Land tenure as well as 

displacement and relocation matters should be priorities. Finally, given the overriding regional political and 

ethnic dimensions to the instability, strong external 

engagement and pressure will be crucial to ensure that 

the Congolese state meets its obligations and earns the 

confidence of communities and combatants. 

Regulate the minerals sector. Illicit mineral 

trafficking is currently a key driver of conflict in the 

eastern DRC. However, it can also be a means of cooperation and collaboration. The mining sector has 

numerous stakeholders, from artisanal miners in the 

Kivus to influential politicians and businessmen in the 

capitals of the DRC, Rwanda, and elsewhere. None 

can afford to see it shrink and most would like to see 

it expand. Enhancing the transparency and regulation 

of this trade will help it grow, thereby benefiting all. 

It would increase tax, customs, and other earnings for 

the DRC as well as in Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda, 

which will remain the most viable export routes for 

these goods. A more properly regulated sector would 

attract more investment, creating new opportunities 

for communities in the Kivus. 

States in the subregion should continue to 

expand the progress achieved in establishing mineral supply chain verification systems under the ICGLR process. Particular attention should be paid 

to improving the transparency of gold mining, as 

illicit trafficking of gold remains widespread and a 

key source of funding for armed groups. New U.S. 

laws that require companies to ensure that minerals sourced from the Great Lakes are “conflict free” 

have also fostered new impetus to improve the security situation. Several consumers of the region’s minerals have already begun to seek alternative sources. 

If countries in the region wish to maintain, let alone 

expand, the customer base for the region’s resources, 

they must collaborate to reduce the size and number 

of militias in the Kivus. 

Conclusion

The prospects for peace in the DRC will fundamentally depend on the development of an inclusive 

approach that combines the security and economic 

interests of the various local and regional actors in the 

Great Lakes. A fire cannot be extinguished without 

bothering to identify the arsonist, understand his in-
8

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ISSN 2164-4047

tentions, ascertain his plan and his methods, or institute measures to ensure he does not repeat his crime.

Moreover, none of this work can succeed without 

a sustained effort to rebuild a functioning, legitimate 

state in the DRC.20 At the end of the day, it is up to 

the Congolese to assume leadership over their territory 

so as to ensure security in the Great Lakes.

NOTES

1 Benjamin Coghlan et al., “Mortality in the Democratic 

Republic of Congo: An Ongoing Crisis,” The International 

Rescue Committee and the Burnet Institute, 2007.

2 Report of the Panel on Remedies and Reparations for Victims 

of Sexual Violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Geneva: 

Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, March 

2011). 

3 Jason Stearns, “List of Armed Groups in the Kivus,” 

Congo Siasa, June 9, 2010, available at <http://congosiasa.

blogspot.com/2010/06/list-of-armed-groups-in-kivus.html>.

4 Jason Stearns, “New Armed Groups Appear in South 

Kivu,” Congo Siasa, September 15, 2011, available at <http://

congosiasa.blogspot.com/2011/09/new-armed-groups-appear-insouth-kivu.html>.

5 Report of the Mapping Exercise Documenting the Most 

Serious Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian 

Law Committed within the Territory of the Democratic Republic of the 

Congo between March 1993 and June 2003 (Geneva: Office of the 

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, August 2010), 70.

6 Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic 

Republic of the Congo (UN Security Council: S/2008/773, 

December 2008).

7 Ruben de Koning, Conflict Minerals in the Democratic 

Republic of the Congo: Aligning Trade and Security Inverventions, 

SIPRI Policy Paper No. 27 (Stockholm: Stockholm International 

Peace Research Institute, June 2011), 17-18.

8 Resilience in the Face of Economic Adversity: Policies for 

Growth with a Focus on Household Enterprises, Rwanda Economic 

Update 2nd Edition, (Washington, DC: World Bank, November 

2011), 3.

9 Ivan R. Mugisha, “Firms Blacklisted for Illegal Mineral 

Tagging,” New Times (Kigali), March 7, 2012.

10 Justice Compromised: The Legacy of Rwanda’s CommunityBased Gacaca Courts (New York: Human Rights Watch, May 

2011).

11 Jean Migabo Kalere, Textes fondamentaux sur le processus de paix en RDC (Leuven: CPRS, 2008). Rigobert Minani 

Bihuzo, S.J., Du pacte de stabilité de Nairobi à l’Acte d’engagement 

de Goma : Enjeux et défis des processus de paix en RDC (Kinshasa : 

Cepas/Rodhecic, 2008). 

12 Shawn Blore, “Project Review: Implementing Certified 

Trading Chains (CTC) in Rwanda,” German Federal Institute 

for Geosciences and Natural Resources, March 2011.

13 See notes 2, 5, 6, and 19. 

14 World Bank.

15 Morten Bøås, Randi Lotsberg, and Jean-Luc Ndizeye, 

“The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region 

(ICGLR) – Review of Norwegian Support to the ICGLR 

Secretariat,” Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, 

June 2009.

16 “Over 1800 FDLR Armed Rebels in DR Congo 

Surrender to UN Peacekeepers in 2010,” UN Stabilization 

Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, February 3, 

2011. UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database.

17 Laura Davis, Justice-Sensitive Security Sector System 

Reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Brussels: Initiative 

for Peacebuilding, 2009), 11.

18 Addendum to the Interim Report of the Group of Experts 

on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (UN Security Council: 

S/2012/348, June 2012). “Rwanda Should Stop Aiding War 

Crimes Suspect,” Human Rights Watch, June 4, 2012.

19 FDLR Declaration (Sant’Edigio peace talks between the 

FDLR and the Government of the DRC, Rome, Italy, March 31, 

2005).

20 Rigobert Minani Bihuzo, 1990–2007, 17 ans de transition 

politique et perspective démocratique en RDC (Kinshasa : Cepas/

Rodhecic, 2008).