U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare

Training and Education

2000–2010

by

Dr. Nicholas J. Schlosser

History Division

United States Marine Corps

Quantico, Virginia

2015
Other Volumes in the Marine Corps Base and

Training Center History Series

Quantico: Crossroads of the Marine Corps, 1978

U.S Marines at Twentynine Palms, California, 1989

U.S. Marine Corps Mountain Warefare Training Center, 1951–2001

Progress and Purpose: A Developmental History

of the United States Marine Corps, 1900–1970

ISBN 978-0-9911588-6-7

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Schlosser, Nicholas J.

 U.S. Marines and irregular warfare : training and education, 2000/2010 / by Dr. Nicholas J. Schlosser.

pages cm

1. United States. Marine Corps--Training. 2. United States. Marine Corps--History--21st century. 3.

Counterinsurgency--United States. 4. Irregular warfare--United States. I. Title.

 VE23.S335 2014

 359.9’64250715--dc23

2014033334
iii

Foreword ..........................................................................................v

Preface ............................................................................................ vii

Introduction .....................................................................................1

Chapter 1 ..........................................................................................7

 A Heritage of Fighting Small Wars:

The Marine Corps and Irregular Warfare, 1900–1990

Chapter 2 ........................................................................................ 25

Marine Corps Warfighting Concepts from 1991 to 2002

Chapter 3 ........................................................................................ 43

The Iraq War

Chapter 4 ........................................................................................ 63

The Marine Corps Rediscovers Counterinsurgency

Chapter 5 ........................................................................................ 81

 Adapting Marine Corps Combat Units to Counterinsurgency: 

Training in the United States and Adapting in the Field

Conclusion ..................................................................................... 97

Notes ............................................................................................ 101

Index ............................................................................................. 115

Contents

v

Foreword

From the development of amphibious warfare to the creation of the air-ground task force, the U.S. 

Marine Corps has a long history of innovation. Marines have also made a significant number of advances in the field of irregular warfare. During the early twentieth century, Marines fought small wars 

in Central America and the Caribbean and published one of the first detailed treatises on the subject, 

The Small Wars Manual, in 1940.

Over the course of the last decade, the Marine Corps rediscovered its small wars heritage and once 

again demonstrated its adaptable and innovative character as it fought insurgencies in Afghanistan and 

Iraq. Before the start of those wars, the Marine Corps’ principal focus was on conducting contingency 

operations of limited duration. While most planners believed that the most likely places Marines 

would conduct these operations were in the volatile and populated areas of Africa, Southwest Asia, and 

Central Asia, there was little attention paid to learning about the cultures and societies of these regions. 

Both the Iraq War and Afghanistan War forced Marines to conduct counterinsurgency operations in 

densely populated areas where knowledge of the local social geography was as critical to achieving success as defeating insurgent forces in open battle. Marines quickly adapted both in the field and at the 

Corps’ training installations and schools. This book recounts the remarkable story of how the Marine 

Corps instituted new programs and new courses of study to train and educate Marines in counterinsurgency and irregular warfare.

Nicholas J. Schlosser received his doctorate in history from the University of Maryland in 2008. 

He has been a historian at the Marine Corps History Division since 2009 and is the author of U.S. 

Marines in Battle: Al-Qaim, September 2005–March 2006 and the editor of U.S. Marines in Iraq 2004–

2008: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography. He is also coeditor of Counterinsurgency Leadership in 

Iraq, Afghanistan, and Beyond, a publication of the Marine Corps University Press. His research focuses 

on irregular warfare, the Cold War, and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer

Director of Marine Corps History

vii

Preface

This book recounts a period of considerable intellectual activity and change within the Marine Corps. 

The initial fighting during the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars convinced many Marine leaders that it needed to strengthen and enhance how it trained and educated Marines in counterinsurgency operations. 

The changes initiated by such Marines as General James N. Mattis, General James F. Amos, Colonel 

John A. Toolan Jr., and many others include transforming the Combined-Arms Exercise into Exercise 

Mojave Viper, revising the Marine Corps University Command and Staff College’s curriculum to better address cultural anthropology and foreign languages, and to create new organizations, such as the 

Center for Irregular Warfare and the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning.

However, it is important to note that many of these changes were initiated from the ground up, 

as Marines in Iraq and Afghanistan improvised counterinsurgency tactics in the field. They lived and 

operated in heavily populated areas and quickly learned that forging close relations with Iraqis and 

Afghans could lay the foundations for valuable and fruitful intelligence networks and ultimately isolate 

foreign fighters from organizations such as al-Qaeda. This book recounts these dual tracks of innovation, examining how Marines adapted in the field and at home at Quantico, Virginia, and Twentynine 

Palms, California.

This volume would not have been possible without the contributions of numerous individuals at 

the Marine Corps History Division, including chief historian Charles D. Melson, senior editor Angela 

J. Anderson, senior reference historian Annette D. Amerman, historian Paul D. Westermeyer, editors 

Wanda J. Renfrow and Andrea L. Connell, and designer Vincent J. Martinez. I am also thankful to 

Zayna N. Bizri, a History Division intern who worked as my research assistant in 2012 and 2013. 

I would also like to recognize Donald F. Bittner, professor at the Marine Corps University, whose

discussions with me about the history of the Command and Staff College were extremely helpful.

Dr. Nicholas J. Schlosser

Marine Corps History Division

Introduction

This is a brief history of how the Marine 

Corps trained and adapted to fight the 

Global War on Terrorism. It is not intended to be a comprehensive, definitive account, 

but instead aims to provide readers with a broad 

survey of the changes and innovations developed 

by the Marines to conduct counterinsurgency 

warfare in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Between 2001 and 2011, the U.S. military devised 

a number of measures to strengthen its ability to 

fight insurgencies in both those countries. In the 

Marine Corps, the changes occurred along two 

parallel courses. First, individual Marine Corps 

units in the field devised techniques to address 

the specific security problems and challenges in 

their particular areas of responsibility. Second, the 

constituent commands and units of the Marine 

Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) formulated new approaches to warfighting, revised the curriculum at the Marine Corps 

Command and Staff College, and wrote doctrine 

to strengthen Marine Corps training and proficiency in counterinsurgency (or irregular warfare). Often, MCCDC’s initiatives stemmed from 

lessons learned by Marine Corps units following 

their deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan.

Overthe past decade, especially following the 

outbreak of the insurgency against the American 

occupation of Iraq in 2003, there has been renewed interest both in the military and among 

scholars on the subject of counterinsurgency. 

Furthermore, much of this work has contributed to a general examination of how the U.S. 

military adapted and transformed itself, and has 

even described the transformation as “epic” and 

revolutionary in nature.1

 These works have largely focused on the United States Army, the largest of the U.S. Armed Services and, in terms of 

numbers of its personnel deployed over the past 

10 years, the Service that has borne the brunt of 

fighting the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. As the 

largest Service, the Army’s adaptation to fighting 

counterinsurgency has also required more striking change to its overall culture as an institution, 

with individual branches going through often 

dramatic reassessments of their primary functions 

and purpose as warfighters. Thus, it is unsurprising that most recent studies have focused primarily on the Army’s changes and adaptations.2

Many works written over the past decade on 

how the military adapted to fight counterinsurgency have utilized the Marine Corps as a means 

of comparison to draw conclusions about the 

Army.3

 However, little work has been done on 

how the Corps adapted in its own right. Its apPhoto by Cpl Matthew S. Richards

A Marine from Battalion Landing Team 1/4 on patrol in the 

Iraqi city of an-Najaf in 2004. The deployments to Iraq and 

Afghanistan prompted a renewed interest in irregular warfare 

throughout the Marine Corps during the 2000s.

1
2 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

proach to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, nevertheless, forms an important part of the broader 

story of the military’s transformation, especially 

in light of its significant contributions to both of 

those conflicts. While in terms of numbers, more 

soldiers than Marines have served in both wars, 

the Corps’ involvement has been significant and 

often decisive, especially in proportion to its size. 

Despite being the smallest of the United States’ 

Armed Services, the Marine Corps deployed most 

of its personnel to fight both wars. Throughout the 

Iraq insurgency, one forward-deployed Marine

expeditionary force operated in that country each 

year from 2004 to 2010. Sea-based Marine expeditionary units also served as United States Central Command’s operational reserve.4

 The Corps’ 

area of responsibility, al-Anbar Province, was the 

largest of Iraq’s provinces and also the stronghold of the Sunni insurgency. Furthermore, the 

tactics devised by Coalition forces to defeat the 

insurgency in that region, which focused on forging alliances with tribal federations and militias 

against the insurgent forces, played an important 

part in ending the insurgency in the province. 

The approach also influenced the overarching 

U.S. strategy in the country during the “surge” 

period beginning in 2007. Thus, an analysis of 

the Marine Corps’ contribution to the counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan is an 

important step toward gaining a full understanding of what the U.S. military as a whole did to 

fight those two conflicts.

The study is framed around a number of 

questions. First, what role did the Marine Corps’ 

past fighting small wars in Central America and 

Asia play in how it battled the two insurgencies? 

Second, what was the source of these adaptations? Was it propelled from below, or instituted 

from above? Was interservice rivalry a catalyst for 

innovation and change? Finally, did these adaptations lead to a fundamental transformation of 

the Marine Corps as a whole and its principal 

missions in particular?

Marine Corps Organizational

and Institutional Culture

Militaries, especially those raised and trained to 

defend a democratic state, change due to a confluence of political and cultural factors.5

 Culture 

is particularly pertinent to understanding how 

the Marine Corps changed and adapted to the 

Global War on Terrorism. The internal organizational and institutional culture of the Corps has 

been as significant an influence on shaping the 

Service as external factors have been.6

 In particular, the search for a mission has been a leitmotif 

throughout the Marine Corps’ history since its 

creation during the American War of Independence. The Corps has performed a wide range 

of missions throughout its existence, including 

serving as naval security forces, participating in 

landing parties, providing the military contributions to U.S. diplomatic interventions, and 

serving as the United States’ principal amphibious assault force.7

 Thus, the nation’s amphibious 

force-in-readiness has never had a clearly defined 

geographic area of responsibility. The Army fights 

on land, the Navy fights at sea, and the Air Force 

fights in the air. The Marine Corps fights in all 

three domains. This has helped make it into a 

highly versatile and adaptable military force capable of performing a wide variety of missions.

While this capability testifies to the Marine 

Corps’ versatility and adaptability, it has also 

been a source of vulnerability for the Service. On 

several occasions throughout its history, elements 

within the executive branch have attempted to 

either weaken or outright dissolve the Marine 

Corps as an independent Service. Detractors frequently noted that the Marine Corps duplicated 

many of the Army’s ground fighting duties and 

was thus redundant. The most serious of these 

efforts took place during the dramatic drawdown 

of American military forces following World War 

II, when supporters of defense unification sought 

to reduce the Fleet Marine Force from a multidivision, multiwing combat force into a small num-
Introduction 3

ber of regimental-size units attached to the Navy. 

The shock of the Korean War halted the drawdown of America’s postwar military strength. The 

performance of the Marine Corps during that 

conflict also attested to the Service’s skill on the 

battlefield and effectiveness as a combat force. 

Ultimately, congressional support preserved the 

Marine Corps as an independent Service within 

the Department of the Navy. By 1952, Congress 

also guaranteed Marine Corps representation on 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff.8

Despite successful efforts to preserve its existence, the Marine Corps remains an institution 

perennially on guard. This state of affairs has led 

to what scholar Terry Terriff has described as an 

“organizational paranoia.” Constantly fearful for 

its existence as an independent military Service, 

several notable Marine Corps leaders pressed 

the Service to innovate and adapt to potentially 

new missions.9

 Lieutenant Colonel Earl H. Ellis, Lieutenant General John A. Lejeune, Major 

General John H. Russell, Major General Merritt A. Edson, and Lieutenant General Victor 

H. Krulak stand as just a small number of officers who examined new potential missions and 

spurred the Marine Corps to innovate and adapt 

to new roles, whether it was amphibious warfare, 

small wars, or counterinsurgency.10 The Marine 

Corps has constantly been on the lookout for 

missions and specialties to which it can adapt itself in order to protect and strengthen its status 

among the other Armed Services.

As a result, no single mission has dominated 

the institution and overwhelmed planning for 

other potential missions. As Marines prepared 

doctrine for amphibious landings and the defense of forward bases during the 1930s, they 

also prepared manuals for small wars.11 During 

the 1960s, the Marines continued to focus on 

amphibious operations while also preparing to 

fight guerrillas and insurgencies.12 During the 

1980s, when maneuver warfare became the overriding doctrine for Marine planners, there was 

also interest in low-intensity conflict.

However, while the Marine Corps has 

planned for a variety of missions throughout 

its history, its leaders tended to emphasize certain missions over others. During the 1930s, the 

Corps’ leadership was much more concerned with 

building an amphibious assault force than it was 

in preparing Marines for small wars and colonial 

interventions.13 Similarly, while the Marines devised a number of innovative counterinsurgency 

programs during the Vietnam War, such as the 

Combined Action Program, the Service was eager to put guerrilla warfare behind it once the 

last Marines withdrew from Southeast Asia in the 

1970s. Renewing focus on amphibious warfare, 

Marine Corps planners shifted attention to planning for a large-scale conventional war against 

the Soviet Union and China.14 Although many 

argued at the time that Marines were more likely 

going to be fighting insurgencies in the Third 

Official Department of Defense photo

BGen Randolph C. Berkeley and his staff at Quantico in 

1931. Generals like Berkeley helped transform Quantico into 

the intellectual center of the Marine Corps during the 1920s 

and 1930s. The installation continues to fill this role.
4 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

World than the Soviet Army in Europe, on the 

whole, the Marine Corps focused on conventional warfare. The 1989 Warfighting, Fleet Marine 

Force Manual 1, which codified the principles 

of maneuver, mechanization, and speed, was the 

culminating point of nearly two decades of development within the Marine Corps as it trained to 

fight in a war with the Soviet Union.15

Although interest in certain types of warfare, 

such as counterinsurgency and small wars, has 

waxed and waned throughout its history, the U.S. 

Marine Corps has never forgotten its heritage 

fighting these types of campaigns nor neglected 

the possibility that it could very likely fight these 

types of wars in the future.16

Terminology: Small Wars, Irregular 

Warfare, and Counterinsurgency

Since the Iraq insurgency erupted in 2003, terms 

such as “small wars,” “irregular warfare,” “guerrilla 

warfare,” and “counterinsurgency” have been used 

somewhat interchangeably. Since these terms often 

carry specific meanings anchored to their historical context, it is important to assess their relative 

utility to describe the types of conflicts the Marine 

Corps fought in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The concept of an irregular, or partisan, component to warfare is not a new one. Carl von 

Clausewitz’s Vom Kriege devotes a chapter to the 

subject of “peoples’” or “popular” war (Volkskrieg).17 For Clausewitz, such warfare was a component of conventional war, with irregular fighters 

serving in a supporting role to the larger war. Thus, 

partisan warfare was not a distinct form of conflict 

unto itself. By the late nineteenth century, however, military thinkers began to cast a distinction 

between wars fought to subdue colonial populations in Europe’s overseas empires and wars fought 

between the major European nation-states.18 The 

British soldier C. E. Callwell, in one of the first 

comprehensive overviews of the subject, used the 

term small wars to describe these types of colonial 

conflicts, defining them simply as “operations of 

regular armies against irregular, or comparatively 

speaking irregular forces.”19 The term gained common currency throughout the early twentieth 

century, and was used by the Marine Corps to 

describe its interventions in Central America 

and China. The experiences from these conflicts 

(known as the “Banana Wars,” during which 

Marines battled bandits and other fighters) were 

codified in the 1930s in the Small Wars Manual, 

the first American doctrinal publication on the 

subject of irregular warfare.20 The Marine Corps’ 

definition of small wars was much more specific 

than Callwell’s, describing them as military and 

diplomatic operations conducted with the objective of altering the external and internal dynamics 

of an unstable state in order to create a situation 

amenable to the United States.21 Thus, small 

wars were a specific type of warfare defined by a 

unique combination of military and diplomatic 

characteristics.

By the 1960s, the term small wars had largely 

fallen out of use and had been replaced by the concepts of insurgency and counterinsurgency. In its 

broadest sense, insurgency has generally referred 

to any kind of organized effort to use armed force 

or subversion to cause a change in government. 

Counterinsurgency has been used to reference the 

military, political, and diplomatic efforts used to 

combat insurgencies.22 However, the terms gained 

popularity and importance during the 1960s due 

to their association with the Cold War and the 

Maoist wars of national liberation. In particular, 

the terms were used to describe the Communistled uprisings (and the struggles to defeat them) 

in Indochina. The John F. Kennedy administration’s prevailing concern with Soviet-led efforts 

to spread Communism into the Third World 

through wars of liberation forced military leaders to address the concept of counterinsurgency, 

and a number of military journals devoted entire 

issues to the subject. As with the concept of small 

wars, many military thinkers considered counterinsurgency to be a unique and specific type of war 

requiring different sets of skills, tactics, and strategies. The American experience in Vietnam forced 
Introduction 5

a reappraisal of counterinsurgency as a military 

theory, and by the 1970s the term had largely 

fallen out of use.23

During the two decades before the Global 

War on Terrorism, two new terms emerged to 

describe irregular warfare. Both continued the 

bifurcation of warfare into regular and irregular types. The first, prevalent during the 1980s, 

was “low-intensity conflict,” and was used by the 

Ronald W. Reagan administration to characterize 

the numerous Marxist insurgencies then waging 

throughout the Third World. The second, “military operations other than war,” (MOOTW) 

gained prominence during the 1990s as a way 

of describing the wide range of contingency operations short of the conventional combat that 

the military was expected to conduct.24 These 

included not only antiguerrilla warfare, but also 

humanitarian operations and advisory missions.

Thus, the concept of irregular warfare is an 

old one and a wide variety of terms have emerged 

over the course of history to describe it. These 

terms can be problematic. Implying a bifurcation 

in warfare exists has often led to the assumption 

that “irregular warfare” is radically different from 

“regular warfare.”25 Consequently, thinkers have 

qualified both as being more or less difficult to 

fight than the other. Terms such as military operations other than war and low-intensity conflict 

contradict the very intense, violent, and difficult 

nature of operations conducted to carry out counterinsurgencies and antiguerrilla wars. At the same 

time, analysts and military leaders have gone the 

other way in characterizing unconventional war 

as such a complex and difficult form of warfare 

that only a specific type of soldier is capable of 

even fighting it.26

Such a division is largely artificial however. 

Whether they are irregular wars or regular wars, 

both types require an understanding of strategy, 

the operational art, and tactics on the part of 

civilians and soldiers. Both also require soldiers 

to comprehend the intersection between politics 

and military action. In short, both conventional 

and unconventional warfare entail the use of violence by rivals to force one to bend to the other’s 

will. The distinction between the two lies in the 

nature of the combatants.

Consequently, this study uses the terms irregular, unconventional, and small to describe any 

war in which at least one of the combatant forces 

is not part of an organized military force attached 

to a nation-state or a coalition of nation-states. 

These forces can be guerrillas, insurgents, terrorists, or even criminal organizations, and their 

goal does not necessarily have to be overthrowing a government. Therefore, this volume treats 

insurgency as a specific type of irregular war in 

which the unorganized combatant force aims to 

change or depose an organized government utilizing military, political, and subversive tactics. 

Official Department of Defense photo

The Marine Corps has a long history of innovation and 

adaptation, clearly demonstrated in its development of 

amphibious landing and assault tactics and techniques during the 1920s and 1930s. Here, U.S. Marines conduct an 

amphibious landing exercise sometime during the pre-World 

War II years.
6 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

Furthermore, it defines the term small wars in a 

much broader manner than the Marine Corps’ 

Small Wars Manual does.

Methodology and Sources

Following the introduction, the study surveys 

the history of Marine Corps operations in small 

wars until the 11 September 2001 attacks, focusing on the breaks and continuities in how the 

Marine Corps has approached irregular warfare. 

The next four chapters explore in detail how the 

Marine Corps ultimately adapted to fighting the 

insurgency in Iraq. As will be seen, the Global 

War on Terrorism did not immediately spark a 

counterinsurgency renaissance within the Marine 

Corps. Between 2001 and 2003, the prevailing 

assumption was that the conflict would continue 

to be waged by small, networked units capable of 

drawing on significant firepower to overwhelm 

enemy forces. As chapter 3 shows, the Iraq War 

forced a rapid change in this viewpoint and led 

Marine Corps units in the field to both develop 

new means and resurrect old approaches to defeat the insurgency that quickly erupted in Iraq 

in 2003. Chapters 4 and 5 explore how the experiences of Marines in the field were adapted to 

Marine Corps training and ultimately created a 

rigorous and focused training program in counterinsurgency that nevertheless continued to ensure Marine Corps units remained versatile and 

adaptable to a multitude of missions and contingencies.

The principal sources for this study are the 

command chronologies of Marine Corps units 

currently stored at the Marine Corps Archives in 

Quantico, Virginia. These range from monthly to 

annual summaries of unit activities. The chronologies analyzed for this study include those of the 

Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 

the Training and Education Command, and the 

Education Command, as well as chronologies 

from combat units deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. The study also draws on substantial archival 

material from the Training and Education Command, which includes briefings and reports from 

the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory and 

other education commands. Another important 

source is the files of the Command and Staff College, which include course outlines and syllabi. 

Finally, this study draws on a number of interviews with Marines. Some of these were conducted by the author, though most were conducted by 

the Marine Corps History Division’s Field History Branch, often in the field, and the transcripts 

are currently housed at the Marine Corps History 

Division Oral History Collection in Quantico, 

Virginia.
Marines have fought in irregular 

wars since the Corps’ earliest days. 

Throughout the nineteenth century, 

as the Navy’s principal landing force, Marines 

participated in irregular conflicts throughout the 

world, including expeditions against the Barbary 

pirates in 1804, landings conducted to disrupt 

the slave trade in Africa in 1843, and landings in 

Korea in 1871.1

 The Marine Corps also fought 

alongside the Army in several Indian Wars, notably those against the Seminoles and Creeks during the 1830s.2

 However, it would be during the 

early twentieth century that small wars became an 

element of the Marine Corps that distinguished 

it from the missions of the other Services.

The Marines were not the only American 

Armed Service to fight irregular wars during 

the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as the Army’s experiences during the Indian 

Wars and Philippine War demonstrate.3

 However, whereas the Army’s participation in these 

conflicts emanated from its role as the primary 

Service responsible for continental and national 

defense (the Philippines being a formal U.S. colony following the Spanish-American War), what 

came to be known as the Banana Wars in Central

America and the Caribbean were the results of 

State Department efforts to protect American 

political and economic interests in independent 

states. As a landing force stationed onboard naval vessels, the Marines had long participated in 

brief actions to protect American citizens abroad. 

However, during the first decades of the twentieth century, Marine Corps’ landings took on 

the character of long-term interventions aimed at 

altering the foreign and domestic policies of foreign states and even transforming local governing 

and security institutions.4

Experiences in Central America and the Caribbean would prove to be the most significant 

for the Marine Corps’ doctrine and institutional 

identity. Three of the most important were interventions in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and 

Nicaragua. The interventions and subsequent occupations saw the Marine Corps become a major 

political and military presence in all three countries throughout the first decades of the twentieth 

century.5

 In all three, the Marines were deployed 

at the behest of the State Department to end civil 

Chapter 1

A Heritage of Fighting Small Wars: 

The Marine Corps and Irregular Warfare, 1900–1990

Official Department of Defense photo

Training and equipping native constabularies was a common practice of the U.S. interventions into such countries as 

Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua. This image 

from the early 1900s depicts riflemen of the Haitian Gendarmerie and their Marine officers.

7
8 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

strife, strengthen pro-American governments, 

and aid those governments against rebel forces. 

In all three, the Marine Corps established local 

constabularies officered and trained by Marines, 

such as the Gardia Nacional in Nicaragua and 

the Dominican Republic and the Haitian Gendarmerie.

6

 In some cases, notably in the Dominican Republic in 1916, U.S. forces established 

formal occupation authority over the country 

and ruled by decree, filling the cabinet portfolios with Marine and Navy personnel. More 

commonly though, the Marine Corps operated 

in support of the local governments, monitored 

elections, trained local forces, and constructed 

public works. The Marines also participated in a 

range of counterguerrilla operations against rebel 

groups opposed to the local government and the 

United States presence there, such as the cacos in 

Haiti, Augusto Sandino’s bandit forces in Nicaragua, and insurgents in the eastern provinces of 

the Dominican Republic. In all of the interventions, reported incidents of brutality and atrocities damaged the Marine Corps’ image in the eyes 

of both the American public and the populations 

of the countries in which they were serving.7

Marines were ready to put the experience of 

the Central American small wars behind them 

when the occupations came to an end in 1934. 

Duty in the Caribbean and Nicaragua was marked 

by boredom, disease, a hostile populace, and 

problems with discipline and unit cohesion. Major General Smedley D. Butler, who received one 

of his two Medals of Honor battling cacos in Haiti 

in 1915, denounced the operations, and declared 

Official Department of Defense photo

The level of involvement in local civil affairs varied widely from country to country during the interventions in the Caribbean. 

In some cases, such as the Dominican Republic, Marines and sailors led the government and filled their ministerial posts. This 

image depicts Gen Harry Lee (front row, far right) and his executive and military staffs in Santo Domingo.
A Heritage of Fighting Small Wars: The Marine Corps and Irregular Warfare, 1900–1990 9

that he had been nothing more than “a high-class 

muscle man for Big Business, for Wall Street, 

and for the bankers.”8

 Many Marines were also 

concerned that continued involvement in such 

conflicts threatened to marginalize the Corps as 

a Service. Thus, during the 1930s, many Marines 

began to devote their full attention to the creation 

of a Fleet Marine Force and the twin missions of 

amphibious assault and advance base defense.

Nevertheless, the small wars experience would 

have a number of short- and long-term consequences for the Marine Corps. In the short term, 

an entire generation of Marines had gained combat experience fighting with small units in jungle 

terrain. Many of these Marines, such as Alexander A. Vandegrift, Merritt A. Edson, and Lewis B. 

Puller, would go on to serve with distinction in the 

jungles of the Pacific Islands during World War II, 

drawing on their experiences fighting against the 

cacos and Sandinistas as they battled the Japanese. 

Of long-term significance to the Marine Corps 

was the wealth of experience and knowledge acquired about the strategies and tactics for fighting 

small wars. The involvement in the political and 

institutional development of foreign states set the 

Central American interventions apart from previous Marine Corps operations. Importantly, the 

interventions and Central American small wars 

exposed the Marines to a new type of warfare in 

which political considerations often took precedence over defeating enemy forces in the field. In 

short, the Banana Wars made irregular warfare a 

part of the Marine Corps’ institutional identity.

The Marine Corps had gone into the conflicts 

without any doctrinal guidance, and many of the 

tactics it employed were developed in the field as 

Marines experimented with different techniques. 

Marines such as Major Samuel M. Harrington 

and Major Harold H. Utley wrote and published 

articles on fighting small wars in Marine Corps 

Gazette.9 During the 1930s, a number of Marines, including Utley’s subordinate and fellow 

Nicaragua veteran, then-First Lieutenant Merritt 

A. Edson, collaborated on collecting these lessons 

and producing a manual for future small wars. 

The Small Wars Manual, published in its final 

form in 1940, synthesized the Marine Corps’ experiences in Central America and collected over 

three decades of lessons culled from these campaigns. Interestingly, its publication indicated 

the belief among many that the era of interventions was not yet over.

The Small Wars Manual was heavily influenced by Colonel C. E. Callwell’s Small Wars: 

Their Principles and Practice. A British officer 

who had served in various small wars throughout the British Empire at the turn of the century, Callwell was among the first to argue that 

a distinction existed between regular and irregular warfare. Irregular wars, or small wars as Callwell described them, were “operations of regular 

armies against irregular, or comparatively speaking irregular, forces.”10 Callwell’s work would go 

on to influence the conceptualization of small 

wars in a number of other ways. For example, the 

work recommended that forces fighting insurrections remain on the offensive, deploy small units, 

and understand the role cultural attitudes and 

beliefs played in shaping the nature and character of each particular conflict. Callwell’s influence 

over the writers of the Small Wars Manual was so 

great that they even borrowed, either consciously 

or unconsciously, specific passages from the former work. For example, with regard to the need 

to maintain the offensive, Callwell wrote, “It is 

most unfortunate when this occurs, because it 

puts the disciplined army in a thoroughly false 

position. The enemy gathers courage, many who 

have held aloof flock to join hostile standards, the 

longer the situation lasts, the more formidable 

will be the forces which must eventually be overthrown.”11 The Small Wars Manual made the 

same warning, cautioning leaders that “A guerrilla leader, if unmolested in his activities, creates 

the impression among the native population that 

the intervening forces are inferior to him; recruits 

flock to his standard, and the rapid pacification of 

the country will be jeopardized.”12
10 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

While Callwell’s work cast a shadow upon 

the architects of the Small Wars Manual, it was 

also different in a number of significant ways. For 

example, Callwell spoke of waging a war of annihilation aimed at delivering a critical blow to the 

enemy that would break its will to resist. “The records of small wars show unmistakably how great 

is the impression made upon semi-civilized races 

and upon savages by a bold and resolute procedure.”13 For Callwell, small wars were wars of annexation, retribution, and suppression aimed at 

ensuring loyalty to the British crown and empire. 

For the Marines, the interventions, while imperial 

in nature, were governed primarily by the need 

to bring about stability so that U.S. forces could 

withdraw. Thus, subjugation of the enemy was 

of less importance than creating a stable political 

settlement amenable to the Department of State.

The distinction is apparent in the Corps’ 

definition of small wars, which is quite different 

from how Callwell defined them:

As applied to the United States, small 

wars are operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force 

is combined with diplomatic pressure in 

the internal or external affairs of another 

state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as 

are determined by the foreign policy of 

our Nation.14

Whereas Callwell called for large-scale use 

of destructive force, the Small Wars Manual declared that “campaigns of conquest are contrary 

to the policy of the Government of the United 

States.”15 The manual’s writers also stressed the 

predominant role diplomatic and political factors 

played in the prosecution of campaigns against 

insurrections, writing that “Small wars situations 

are usually a phase of, or an operation taking 

place concurrently with, diplomatic effort. The 

political authorities do not relinquish active participation in the negotiations and they ordinarily 

continue to exert considerable influence on the 

military campaign.”16 The overall conception of 

small wars laid out by the manual’s writers was 

of a limited war dependent on political and diplomatic considerations. As the manual observed,

In [ordinary military duties, officers] 

simply strive to attain a method of producing the maximum physical effect with 

the force at their disposal. In small wars, 

caution must be exercised, and instead 

of striving to generate maximum power 

with forces available, the goal is to gain 

decisive results with the least application 

of force and the consequent minimum 

loss of life.17

Thus, the Marine Corps’ definition of small 

wars focused on the ultimate political and dipOfficial Marine Corps History Division photo

Civil activities were a common element of the Central 

American and Caribbean interventions. In this image from 

Nicaragua, a Marine places a voter’s finger in ink to ensure 

that the man cannot vote again.
A Heritage of Fighting Small Wars: The Marine Corps and Irregular Warfare, 1900–1990 11

lomatic goals specific to the conflict itself. The 

manual not only included chapters on small unit 

tactics, patrols, and aviation, but also chapters on 

training local constabularies and organizing elections.

Of particular interest was how the manual 

depicted the populace of the country in which a 

small war was taking place. More than 20 years 

before David Galula argued that the population 

was the focus of counterinsurgency, the Small 

Wars Manual made a similar argument:

In major warfare, hatred of the enemy is 

developed among troops to arouse courage. In small wars, tolerance, sympathy, 

and kindness should be the keynote of 

our relationship with the mass of the 

population. There is nothing in this principle which should make any officer or 

man hesitate to act with the necessary 

firmness within the limitation imposed 

by the principles which have been laid 

down, whenever there is contact with 

armed opposition.18

The manual also encouraged close contact 

between the occupying Marines and the local 

populace, concluding that “Whether a military 

commander be stationed at a headquarters in a 

metropolis or assigned to the smallest outpost, he 

must necessarily come into contact with the civilian population. By ‘contact’ in this case is implied 

intercourse in daily life. The transaction of daily 

routine involves the association with the civilian 

element, even in the most tranquil territory.”19

The manual stressed the need to understand local 

customs, culture, and psychology.

A great deal of the Small Wars Manual marks 

it as a product of the 1930s. Perhaps the most 

well-known anachronism is its extensive sections 

on pack mules and animal care. Words such as 

“The influence of racial psychology on the destiny 

of a people appears plainly in the history of those 

subject to perpetual revolutions” are also just 

one of a number of instances revealing the racist perspectives of some of the manual’s authors. 

The manual also assumed that “small wars represent the normal and frequent operations of the 

Marine Corps,” a postulation based on the fact 

that Marines had been engaged in some kind of 

small war almost every year between the SpanishAmerican War and the writing of the manual in 

the 1930s.20 The Marine Corps, as the manual’s 

authors conceived it, was an expeditionary arm of 

the Department of State and the Department of 

the Navy. Ironically, the word “amphibious” does 

not appear once in the entire document, despite 

the fact that Marines were devising an amphibious landing manual at the same time the Small 

Wars Manual was being written.

Yet, despite these elements and the work’s 

overall debt to Callwell, the Small Wars Manual 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo

The Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual was printed in its 

final form in 1940. Its authors assumed the Marine Corps 

would be involved in small wars and similar contingency 

operations for much of the foreseeable future.
12 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

looked forward in a number of significant ways. 

Its concept of a limited war in which annihilation 

of the enemy did not necessarily mean victory 

and its assertion that winning over the population was a critical means for achieving success 

(more than a decade before the phrase “winning 

hearts and minds” came into use) remain critical characteristics of current counterinsurgency 

doctrines. In sum, the Small Wars Manual stands 

as one of the most significant Marine Corps contributions to the theory and understanding of 

counterinsurgency warfare.

With the United States’ entry into World 

War II, the need to transform the Marine Corps 

into a Fleet Marine Force capable of executing 

amphibious assaults and seizing strategic islands 

across the Pacific took on a new importance. 

Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Peleliu, Iwo Jima, and 

Okinawa soon overshadowed the Banana Wars 

as testaments to the Corps’ skill, determination, 

and effectiveness as a military Service. As a result, 

small wars doctrine was largely overshadowed by 

the need to develop the tactics and strategy of 

amphibious warfare over the next two decades.

Counterinsurgency and the Vietnam War

The decade and a half following World War II 

presented a range of challenges to the Marine 

Corps. The Harry S. Truman administration’s 

proposals to unify the Armed Services threatened 

to render the Marine Corps irrelevant. Even when 

Congress passed a series of laws that guaranteed 

the Marine Corps’ size, mission, and right to representation on the Joint Chiefs of Staff between 

1947 and 1952, the Corps still faced a number 

of challenges that placed its existence in question. 

Statutory protection was pointless if the Corps 

was unable to make a meaningful contribution to 

national defense. However, nuclear weapons had 

thrown the possibility of future amphibious landings into doubt, as a single atomic bomb could 

wipe out the assembled sea and land forces necessary to stage a large-scale forced entry, the precise 

type of warfare to which the Marine Corps had 

dedicated itself.21 The Corps developed a number of innovations to confront the challenge of 

nuclear warfare, perhaps the most notable being 

vertical envelopment, in which Marines airlifted 

behind enemy lines by helicopter would seize inland defenses and prevent the enemy from using 

nuclear strikes to disrupt subsequent landings 

from the sea.22

The Marine Corps was not the only Service 

struggling to define its role and mission in the 

face of the Cold War rivalry. Both the Truman 

and Dwight D. Eisenhower administrations had 

embraced strategic bombers armed with nuclear weapons as the best means of deterring war 

against the Soviet Union. As a result, both presidents reduced the resources and budgets of the 

Army, Navy, and Marine Corps in favor of the 

Air Force. This led to two notable incidents in 

which Navy and Army leaders publicly declared 

their opposition to the White House. In 1948, 

“The Revolt of the Admirals” saw the resignation 

of several Navy commanders in response to the 

Defense Department’s decision to cut spending 

for carriers capable of launching nuclear-armed 

bombers.23 In 1959, in reaction to President 

Eisenhower’s “New Look” embracing massive retaliation as the primary means of defense, former 

Army Chief of Staff General Maxwell D. Taylor 

published The Uncertain Trumpet, a comprehensive critique of Eisenhower’s approach that 

introduced the concept of flexible response. An 

ill-defined term that proposed preparing the U.S. 

military for a wide range of different threats, not 

just nuclear ones, Taylor’s thesis was embraced 

by Massachusetts Senator Kennedy, who subsequently made it the foundation for his national 

security platform during his presidential run in 

1960.24

The election of Kennedy to the presidency 

spurred the emergence of a second major period of 

discussion and debate about small wars within the 

Marine Corps. Kennedy believed that the Soviets 

were directing their attention to wars of national 

liberation in the so-called Third World. Kennedy 
A Heritage of Fighting Small Wars: The Marine Corps and Irregular Warfare, 1900–1990 13

and his advisors saw this as the new battleground 

of the Cold War.25 Flexible response, with its stipulation that the U.S. military be prepared for a 

wide variety of threats and contingencies, seemed 

to present the best means for confronting this new 

Cold War challenge.

Kennedy believed that the best soldiers to 

battle Communist guerrillas were special forces.26

Nevertheless, the change in focus to the Third 

World and guerrilla warfare presented the Corps 

with the opportunity to reestablish a niche in the 

national security establishment that would allow 

it to maintain its expeditionary character without 

duplicating the Army’s role as America’s primary 

ground combat Service. Since the Korean War, a 

number of incidents had given the Marine Corps 

the occasion to demonstrate its value as a contingency force-in-readiness. In 1958, battalions 

from the 2d Marine Division occupied Lebanon 

in an effort to end civil strife in that nation.27

In 1958, a Marine aircraft wing was sent to reinforce the defense of Taiwan in response to aggressive maneuvers from the Peoples’ Republic of 

China. Thus, the Marines had already established 

that its historical ability to stand as a force-inreadiness was undiminished.

The Marine Corps’ response to Kennedy’s interest in counterinsurgency was ambivalent. On 

the one hand, a number of prominent Marines, 

such as General Victor H. Krulak, argued that the 

Marine Corps was ideally suited to counterinsurgency operations. On the other hand, many Marine leaders opposed any changes to the Corps’ 

training and doctrine that would limit its effectiveness as an amphibious assault force. General 

David M. Shoup, Commandant of the Marine 

Corps from 1960 to 1963, conveyed this position when he testified before the House Armed 

Services Committee:

Counterinsurgency is an attention-getting 

word these days and you may properly ask 

what the Marine Corps is doing in the 

field. We do not claim to be experts in the 

entire scope of actions required in counterinsurgency operations.

We do stand ready to carry out the military portions of such operations and to 

contribute to such other aspects of the 

counterinsurgency effort as may be appropriate.

The Marine Corps has long recognized 

that fighting guerrillas is an inherent part 

of landing force operations.

Counterguerrilla warfare is essentially 

one of small units and we have traditionally emphasized individual leadership and 

small unit operations.

Official Marine Corps History Division photo

The Kennedy administration sparked a period of considerable 

interest in counterinsurgency within the military. Kennedy’s 

special assistant for counterinsurgency and special activities, 

Victor Krulak (photographed here as a lieutenant general), 

strongly pushed the Marine Corps to pay greater attention to 

irregular warfare.
14 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

I am convinced that the training properly equips our tactical units to combat 

rabble, insurgents, guerrillas or an enemy 

equipped with modern conventional or 

nuclear weapons.28

Consequently, Marine Corps leaders during 

the 1960s aimed to ensure that the Marine Corps 

remained a flexible, general-purpose expeditionary force capable of fighting both counterinsurgencies and conventional wars. For Marines, the 

prevailing doctrinal guidance on counterinsurgency during this period was Operations Against 

Guerrilla Forces, Fleet Marine Force Manual 21,

issued in 1962. As the title indicates, it was not 

a manual describing how to carry out counterinsurgency operations, but on how to fight guerrillas. Rather than being a comprehensive doctrinal 

guide to counterinsurgency and small wars as a 

whole, the manual focused on one discreet part 

of those types of wars: fighting the insurgent 

forces. “It will be evidence in such a study that 

counterguerrilla activity is a prime element of a 

comprehensive counterinsurgency program. It 

complements companion efforts to improve the 

economic and educational position of a friendly 

country, and to assist its armed forces in developing their own strength in order to contribute to 

national stability.”29

Thus, whereas the Small Wars Manual expected Marines to be able to conduct the full 

gamut of small wars operations, from counterguerrilla operations to organizing and monitoring elections, Operations Against Guerrilla Forces 

placed an overwhelming emphasis on defeating 

guerrilla forces with purely military methods.30

While the manual’s foreword stated that the doctrine “takes its departure from the U.S. Marine 

Corps publication, Small Wars Manual, 1940,

and places emphasis on the planning and conduct of operations against guerrillas by Marine 

Corps forces,” there was little of the Small Wars 

Manual’s guidance on confronting the political and the socioeconomic grievances that often 

propelled insurgencies.31 Indeed, at this point in 

time there was comparatively low interest or even 

awareness of the Small Wars Manual within the 

Corps. 32 While Operations Against Guerrilla Forces argued that using purely military force could 

hinder ultimate success, the manual did not go 

into detail on what nonmilitary means Marines 

could draw on. The manual largely ignored topics such as civil-military relations, the diplomatic 

component of small wars, or the administrative 

duties that counterinsurgents were often forced 

to undertake to achieve success.

In short, Operations Against Guerrilla Forces

reflected General Shoup’s guidance with regard to counterinsurgency: the Marine Corps 

was primarily a force specializing in amphibious warfare. It had the capabilities to conduct 

counterguerrilla operations when necessary, but 

it would not radically alter its training in such 

a way that it could potentially hinder its ability 

to carry out its primary mission: amphibious assault operations. This general philosophy could 

be seen throughout a number of official documents and studies. A 1961 memo entitled U.S. 

Marines in Guerrilla and Anti-Guerrilla-Type Operations emphasized this overarching philosophy. 

The memorandum characterized guerrilla warfare as just one part of conventional operations, 

and consequently focused on the tactical dimensions of guerrilla wars.33 In an overview of counterguerrilla campaigns conducted by the Marine 

Corps, the memo listed actions in Guadalcanal, 

New Britain, and the Chosin Reservoir alongside the campaigns in Nicaragua and Haiti.34 In 

a Marine Corps Senior School research project 

on counterguerrilla operations written in 1964 

by Lieutenant Colonel Bruce F. Meyers, the author focused on the need to maintain the Marine 

Corps’ character as an amphibious assault force 

by analyzing the potential contributions Marine 

units could make to fighting in littoral areas and 

along rivers. Interestingly, the author made a 

point of differentiating between counterguerrilla 

and counterinsurgency operations. He wrote, 
A Heritage of Fighting Small Wars: The Marine Corps and Irregular Warfare, 1900–1990 15

“Although counterinsurgency includes within it 

counterguerrilla operations, the major element 

of Marine Corps endeavor is expected to be in 

the counterguerrilla area.”35 In the course of the 

project, the author also echoed General Shoup’s 

assertions, writing that “all [Fleet Marine Force] 

line units, with necessary specialized augmentation, are considered ready and capable of counterinsurgency and counterguerrilla operations.”36

But not all Marines were convinced that 

counterinsurgency and counterguerrilla warfare 

did not require any major change in Marine 

Corps training. Several also disagreed with the 

general premise that counterinsurgency was a 

form of warfare best left to others, namely special forces. In fact, many Marines argued that the 

Marine Corps stood as the U.S. Armed Service 

best suited for fighting such wars. The rise in interest could be seen in the pages of Marine Corps 

Gazette.37 In 1960, just 10 articles addressed the 

topic of “guerrillas” in some form or another. In 

1961, the number increased to 46. In 1962, the 

number of articles jumped to 92 before declining 

to 82 in 1963 and then averaging out to about 45 

articles a year between 1964 and 1966. In January of 1962, the journal devoted a whole issue 

to the subject. The issue included articles by Peter Paret, Walter W. Rostow, and Major Michael 

Spark, as well as a selection taken from Mao TseTung on guerrilla warfare.

In his contribution to the January 1962 issue 

of Gazette, Major Spark made his point with brevity and directness: “No force in the world today 

is better equipped and organized for counterguerrilla operations than the U.S. Marine Corps.”38

While Spark cited the Marine Corps’ experience 

in small wars in Central America, he focused on 

the Corps’ ability to deploy as a combined arms 

air-ground task force. This, combined with austere 

logistics, the capability to supply forces by air, and 

the ability of the Marine combat support element 

to protect itself from guerrilla threats, meant that 

the Service was the “nation’s ideal counterguerrilla 

force.”39 The issue proved popular and caught the 

attention of President Kennedy. The subsequent 

spike in requests for copies caused by Kennedy’s 

interest prompted the Marine Corps Gazette to 

compile the articles into a single volume titled The 

Guerrilla and How to Fight Him.40

During this same period, a number of Marines also questioned the principle that battling 

insurgents was no different than fighting conventional wars. In January 1963, the Marine Corps 

Gazette published the article “Counter-insurgency: Fighting the Abstract War,” jointly authored 

by Marine Corps Major General Victor H. Krulak, G. K. Tanham, and a veteran of France’s wars 

of decolonization, Colonel David Galula. Krulak, who at the time was a special assistant for 

counterinsurgency at the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

described counterinsurgency as a fundamentally 

different kind of war:

Never before, however, have we been 

dedicated to winning a global war where 

the battleground is not some identifiable 

geographic area but is found in the hearts 

Official Department of Defense photo

Civic action programs formed a critical component of Marine 

Corps operations in South Vietnam. In this image, 15 tons of 

goodwill supplies are turned over to the parish priest of Tra 

Hieu by 1stLt William H. Gibson and Lt Paul Toland, USN.
16 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

of thousands of small and simple people. 

Never before, moreover, has the capture 

or liberation of territory been completely 

subordinated, as a national goal, to winning the convictions of men, whose loyalty and good will are themselves the full 

measure of victory.41

Krulak’s assessment also stressed the political 

dimensions of counterinsurgency. “The winning 

of this battle involves not just the efforts of the 

soldier as he destroys the guerrilla, but the resources of the politician, of the propagandist, the 

economist, and the educator.”42

David Galula’s contributions to the article reflected the general principles outlined in his seminal work, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and 

Practice. Like Krulak, he argued that counterinsurgency was a different kind of war. Unlike conventional wars, it was difficult to ascertain when 

insurgencies began or even ended. Conflicts with 

insurgents were asymmetrical in nature, with both 

sides using radically different tactics. Galula also 

focused on the political dimensions of counterinsurgency, noting, “In counterinsurgency, military 

action cannot be separated from political action.”43

Civilian control of the counterinsurgency effort 

was critical, and Galula asserted that allowing the 

military to command the entire operation would 

“signal defeat.” Instead, “overall responsibility must 

be given at every level to the civilian who represents 

the political authority in a political war.”44

Photo by SSgt C. Durie

Marines worked closely with local South Vietnamese forces in their war against the Communist forces. This image depicts a Vietnamese police chief, an interpreter, and Marine 1stLt Paul R. Ek discussing a future assault on a suspected Viet Cong stronghold 

in September 1965.
A Heritage of Fighting Small Wars: The Marine Corps and Irregular Warfare, 1900–1990 17

Despite the large number of Gazette articles 

and General Krulak’s personal interest in the subject, counterinsurgency did not leave a significant mark on Marine Corps doctrine during the 

1960s. Ironically, whereas 92 articles referenced 

guerrillas in 1962, just 31 referenced the subject 

in 1968 during the height of the Vietnam War, 

when the Marine Corps was actually fighting 

an insurgency. However, although the Marine 

Corps may not have been writing new doctrine 

or writing much about the subject of small wars, 

the Vietnam War forced it to develop innovative 

methods to fight the counterinsurgency in South 

Vietnam.

The Vietnam War presented the United States 

with the dual challenge of fighting a conventional war with the North Vietnamese military 

and fighting an insurgency against the National 

Liberation Front. To confront the latter, General 

Krulak, now the commander of Fleet Marine 

Force Pacific, proposed a pacification strategy to 

strengthen local security forces and prevent Communist infiltration.45 The strategy was embraced 

by the Marine commander in South Vietnam, 

III Marine Amphibious Force’s (MAF)46 Major General Lewis W. Walt. General William C. 

Westmoreland, USA, commander of the overall 

American command in South Vietnam (the Military Assistance Command-Vietnam), was less enthusiastic about Krulak’s strategy, however, and 

pressed the Marines stationed in South Vietnam’s 

northern provinces to engage in search-anddestroy operations against National Liberation 

Front forces and North Vietnamese regulars. Instead, the Marines focused on developing South 

Vietnamese military forces to better protect the 

Vietnamese population and pacify the countryside. Among the most successful innovations for 

achieving this was the Combined Action Program (CAP), first devised by members of the 3d 

Battalion, 4th Marines, in Phu Bai Province in 

1965.47 The program, patterned on the Marine 

Corps’ experience in Haiti and Nicaragua and on 

the joint companies created by the British during the Malayan Emergency in the 1950s, called 

for the integration of a Marine rifle squad with a 

South Vietnamese Popular Forces (PF) platoon.48

Soon, CAP platoons and companies were operating throughout the I Corps area of responsibility 

and proved to be an effective means for acquiring 

intelligence and building close working relationships among the Marines, South Vietnamese soldiers, and the South Vietnamese population. By 

1966, 57 such units were operating in the area. 

The number increased to 79 in 1967.49

While CAP platoons and companies were 

successful, the Marine Corps was responsible for 

only one tactical zone in South Vietnam. Following the 1968 Tet Offensive and the subsequent 

election of Richard M. Nixon to the presidency, 

III MAF began a phased withdrawal from South 

Vietnam that ended in 1971. The experience in 

Vietnam had severely depleted the Marine Corps 

in terms of morale, materiel, and training. The 

end of the Corps’ involvement there thus presented the opportunity for the Marine Corps to 

redefine its mission and priorities. For another 

time in its history, the Marine Corps tried to 

forget unpleasant memories of jungle warfare by 

renewing its focus on amphibious war and conventional warfighting.

Maneuver Warfare

and Low-Intensity Conflict

Between the end of the Vietnam War and the 

beginning of the 2001 Afghanistan War, Marine 

Corps leaders were once again embroiled in a debate regarding the Corps’ future missions. Eager 

to avoid involvement in another irregular war in 

a jungle country, many Marines looked to Europe as a potential theater for future operations. 

The Marine Corps was not entirely new to the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defensive mission in Europe. Since the 1950s, at 

least one battalion landing team had served with 

the Navy’s Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and, 

beginning in 1966, Marine units began exercises 

around Norway.50 By the 1970s, however, Marine 
18 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

planners envisioned a more rigorous commitment 

to the defense of Europe.

Preparing for a war with the Soviet Union presented a range of challenges, however, as a lightly 

armed, amphibious air-ground task force seemed 

ill-suited to fighting a continental war with the 

Warsaw Pact’s armies. As constituted in the 1970s, 

a Marine division would likely be wiped out if it 

fought against massed Soviet armor and artillery 

in Central Europe.51 The Marine Corps would 

thus need to become heavier and more mechanized if it was to make a realistic case for participating in the defense of Western Europe. The 

introduction of more armored elements into the 

Corps posed potential problems to the Marines’ 

primary mission as an amphibious force. A heavy, 

mechanized Marine Corps would be incapable of 

conducting rapid, amphibious, and expeditionary 

missions, thus undermining its primary mission as 

America’s force-in-readiness. Furthermore, the introduction of large armored formations meant the 

Marine Corps had the potential to duplicate the 

capabilities of the Army, which would then make 

the Corps redundant.52

The Corps ultimately resolved this problem 

in two ways. First, it continued to focus its efforts 

on reinforcing NATO’s flanks in the Mediterranean and North Atlantic. Both the Army’s doctrinal concepts of active defense and AirLand Battle 

anticipated a massive holding action against the 

Warsaw Pact in the central plains of Germany in 

the event of war with the Soviet Union.53 In the 

event of such a war, NATO’s forces in Europe 

would be forced to rely on a massive resupply 

effort across the Atlantic from North America. 

To protect these supply lines and deny the Soviet 

Photo by Sgt Alicia D. Gruart

During the 1970s and 1980s, the Marine Corps moved away from training for irregular warfare and focused on preparing 

for a possible war with the Warsaw Pact. The development of light armored battalions equipped with LAV-25 light armored 

vehicles was one of the more prominent results of this shift to “maneuver warfare.”
A Heritage of Fighting Small Wars: The Marine Corps and Irregular Warfare, 1900–1990 19

Navy access to the North Atlantic, Marine Corps 

units were tasked with reinforcing NATO’s forces 

in Norway and Iceland.54

The second solution to the challenge of 

bringing the Marine Corps into the defense of 

Europe, and of greater significance for the future 

of the Corps, was the development of maneuver warfare. The concept provided the Marines 

with a balanced solution to its post-Vietnam War 

challenges by focusing on speed, maneuver, and 

mechanization over heavy armor and firepower. 

Spearheaded by such individuals as William S. 

Lind and Marine Captain Stephen W. Miller, the 

concept favored integrating fast, lightly armored 

vehicles into the Marine Corps to enhance, rather than undermine, its capabilities as a highly 

mobile force.55

During the 1980s, the Marine Corps embraced the maneuver warfare doctrine. In 1980, 

it procured the General Dynamics LAV-25, a Canadian-designed armored, wheeled vehicle, and 

activated new light armored infantry battalions. 

In 1989, it published Warfighting, Fleet Marine 

Force Manual 1. The manual was a succinct, focused summary of the central tenets of maneuver 

warfare. Its overriding theme was that wars would 

be short, Marines would likely be outnumbered, 

and casualties would need to be low to ensure 

continued domestic support for the war effort.

[The concept of warfighting] requires 

a concept with which we can succeed 

against a numerically superior foe, because we can no longer presume a numerical advantage. And, especially in 

expeditionary situations in which public 

support for military action may be tepid, and short-lived, it requires a concept 

with which we can win quickly against a 

larger foe on his home soil, with minimal 

casualties and limited external support.56

The primary goal of a campaign based on the 

principles of maneuver warfare was not annihilating the enemy, but shattering his morale and 

will to wage war. Even if the enemy continued 

to fight, the manual contended, maneuverability 

would counteract his ability to organize and impact the course of the war. Maneuver was given 

precedence over attrition as a means of crippling 

an enemy’s will to fight. The manual stated that

The aim is not an unfocused application 

of firepower for the purpose of incrementally reducing the enemy’s physical 

strength. Rather, it is the selective application of firepower in support of maneuver to contribute to the enemy’s shock 

and moral disruption. The greatest value 

of firepower is not physical destruction, 

the cumulative effects of which are felt 

only slowly, but the moral dislocation it 

causes.57

The overarching principle was speed and mobility. Critically, the manual was broad, flexible, 

and adaptable. It concluded that

Maneuver warfare is a way of thinking 

in and about war that should shape our 

every action. It is a state of mind born of 

a bold will, intellect, initiative, and ruthless opportunism. It is a state of mind 

bent on shattering the enemy morally 

and physically by paralyzing and confounding him, by avoiding his strength, 

by quickly and aggressively exploiting 

his vulnerabilities, and by striking him 

in the way that will hurt him most. In 

short, maneuver warfare is a philosophy 

for generating the greatest decisive effect against the enemy at the least possible cost to ourselves—a philosophy for 

“fighting smart.”58

As with the Army’s AirLand Battle,59 Warfighting was originally conceived as a doctrine for 

fighting the Soviet Union. Yet during the 1980s, 

the Cold War was still a conflict being fought 
20 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

primarily in Third World countries. The rise of 

leftist insurgencies in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and 

Guatemala during the 1980s prompted a new 

wave of interest in counterinsurgency and small 

wars within the American national security establishment, as well as within the Marine Corps.60

These insurgencies were placed under the broader 

and somewhat imprecise umbrella term “low-intensity conflict.” The National Security Strategy 

of 1987 summarized the challenge: “Conflict in 

the Third World can pose serious threats to U.S. 

security interests. Low-intensity conflicts, which 

take place at levels below conventional war but 

above the routine, peaceful competition between 

states, can be particularly troublesome.”61 To confront these types of conflicts, the administration 

proposed conducting a range of political, military, 

and economic efforts designed to undermine support for insurgencies in Central American states 

allied with the United States.62

As in the early 1960s, many Marines proposed 

ways that the Corps could adapt its mission to 

the Central American small wars and insurgencies. Once more, questions emerged concerning 

how to prepare for the next war: should the Corps 

plan for the war it was most likely going to fight 

(counterinsurgencies in the Third World), or for 

the one that was a potentially greater existential 

threat to the United States if it were to break out 

(a war with the Soviet Union)? In a Marine Corps 

Gazette article from 1986, Major T. X. Hammes 

came down firmly on the former side, remarking 

that “counterinsurgency remains the most probable form of conflict facing our Corps today.”63 A 

few months later, Major Paul Melshen addressed 

the issue, writing in the Marine Corps Gazette in 

January 1987 that “the threat of nuclear war has 

kept wars at lower intensities. And because of the 

continued threat of nuclear war, there is every reason to believe that wars in the future will remain 

on the lower end of the conflict spectrum.”64 In 

March 1988, the Gazette devoted an entire issue 

to the topic of low-intensity conflict, much as it 

had devoted a full issue to guerrilla warfare in 

1962. The Marine Corps leadership shared these 

concerns. In 1987, the Marine Corps reprinted 

the Small Wars Manual.65 In the September 1987 

issue of the Marine Corps Gazette, Marine Corps 

Commandant Alfred M. Gray Jr. wrote,

It is the Third World, the so-called lowintensity conflict arena, where we are 

most likely to be committed to this decade. . . . You had better break out the 

manuals and books about how to fight in 

this arena. . . . It is almost all in Sun Tzu, 

and I commend him to you. And there’s 

a lot of it in the book Rommel wrote as 

a young lieutenant, Infantry Attacks. Best 

of all, perhaps, is our own Small Wars 

Manual written in the 1930s and still 

available.66

Many contributors to the debate questioned 

what they perceived to be the arbitrary division 

of warfare into high-intensity combat and lowintensity combat, arguing that low-intensity 

conflict was a misnomer that undermined the 

severity of insurgent warfare. In 1989, Lieutenant Colonel Charles L. Armstrong, an advisor 

during the El Salvador counterinsurgency who 

had written extensively in the Gazette on his experiences, recommended abandoning the term 

entirely, writing, “What is the point of this arm 

wrestling over terminology? If we try to develop 

doctrine for, and participate in, low-intensity 

warfare we are starting from the wrong baseline. 

We are acting like the conflict will not really be 

a war.”67 He reinforced the assertion by pointing 

out that “low-intensity conflict is a contradiction 

in terms, like jumbo shrimp or sanitary sewers.”68

In an article entitled “Insurgency: The Forgotten Threat,” Major Hammes argued that “our 

current inability to deal with insurgencies represents the greatest threat to the strategic position 

of the United States.”69 Like Armstrong, Hammes 

found the terminology of low-intensity conflict 

problematic, writing that the Department of 
A Heritage of Fighting Small Wars: The Marine Corps and Irregular Warfare, 1900–1990 21

Defense’s definition was “so broad it is virtually 

useless.”70 In formulating his argument, Hammes 

drew attention to the fact that, since World War 

II, insurgencies—much more than conventional 

wars—had an impact on the strategic balance of 

power. Among the successful insurgencies listed 

by Hammes were the Chinese Civil War, the Israeli War of Independence, the Vietnam War, the 

Cuban Revolution, and the Algerian War. All of 

these conflicts, Hammes contended, had a dramatic and strategic impact. In contrast, Hammes 

argued that conventional wars in places like 

Korea, the Middle East, and the Falklands had 

maintained the status quo and had not radically 

upset the basic balance of power.71

Hammes’ examples were problematic in a 

number of ways. While the insurgency in South 

Vietnam was certainly a critical element of the 

war, the conventional war between the forces of 

the North and South Vietnamese armies was just 

as decisive, and even more so during that conflict’s final years. Also, while one could argue that 

the status quo was not dramatically altered by 

the Arab-Israeli Wars of 1956 and 1973, the seizure and occupation of the Sinai Peninsula, West 

Bank, and Golan Heights by Israeli forces during the Six-Day War would dramatically alter the 

strategic situation in the Middle East.

Nevertheless, Hammes’ overarching argument remained potent. The potential for insurgencies, such as Vietnam and Afghanistan, to 

dramatically alter the balance of power between 

the Soviet Union and United States was significant. To confront the challenge, Hammes recommended a “unified, multiagency response led by 

the Department of State.” The influences of both 

the Small Wars Manual and the writings of David 

Galula could be detected throughout Hammes’ 

recommendations, which included such maxims 

as “Political goals are paramount” and “All civil 

affairs must be conducted under the control of 

local civil authorities.”72

As with many of his predecessors in the Corps 

during the 1960s, Hammes argued that the Marine Corps should serve as the nation’s primary 

counterinsurgency force. As a rapid-reaction force 

backed by the Navy, the Marine Corps’ air-ground 

task force was “the logical choice” for such missions. Furthermore, the Corps was primarily an 

infantry force capable of drawing on substantial 

logistical and aviation assets, thus giving it an expeditionary and task-oriented capability suitable 

for future small wars. At the same time, naval support meant that Marine expeditionary assets could 

be based at sea, and consequently avoid “the political, social, and economic damage inflicted on 

a country by the presence of thousands of U.S. 

troops.”73

Photo by Sgt Jones

During his term as Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen 

Alfred M. Gray Jr., focused on adapting the Marine Corps 

to the principles of maneuver warfare. At the same time, 

however, he also stressed that Marines needed to be prepared 

to fight irregular wars.
22 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

Hammes was not alone in making these arguments. During the same period, analysts such 

as William S. Lind and Marines such as Lieutenant Colonel Gary I. Wilson and Captain John F. 

Schmitt contended that the very nature of war 

itself was changing. According to this view, first 

summarized in the Marine Corps Gazette article “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth 

Generation,” war evolved generationally. The first 

generation, marked by well-drilled line formations

designed to maximize the firepower of smoothbore 

muskets, gave way to a second generation defined 

by breech-loading, rifled firearms, machine guns, 

and indirect fire. In contrast, third-generation warfare focused on maneuver, mobility, and infiltration, rather than on attrition.74 Fourth-generation 

warfare was slowly emerging in the form of nonstate actors and insurgent forces. The authors wrote,

In broad terms, fourth-generation warfare seems likely to be widely dispersed 

and largely undefined; the distinction 

between war and peace will be blurred to 

the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, 

possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction 

between “civilian” and “military” may disappear.75

Whereas the Ronald Reagan administration 

and adherents of the concept of low-intensity 

conflict saw insurgencies and counterinsurgencies as subordinate operations to larger, conventional conflicts, writers such as Lind and 

Hammes saw these challenges as not only constituting a new kind of war, but also the norm

for future conflicts. Nonstate, transnational forces

Photo by Sgt Alicia D. Gruart

Col Thomas X. Hammes (pictured here in 2001) wrote a number of articles exhorting the Marines to strengthen its abilities in 

counterinsurgency. In 1986, he wrote: “ . . . counterinsurgency remains the most probable form of conflict facing our Corps today.”
A Heritage of Fighting Small Wars: The Marine Corps and Irregular Warfare, 1900–1990 23

using asymmetrical strategies and tactics to counteract American technological superiority were 

the critical threats to the United States and to 

nation-states throughout the world. The concept was further developed a year later by Martin 

van Crevald, who argued in The Transformation 

of War that the Clausewitzian focus on the state 

was an inadequate means for analyzing and understanding wars in the face of declining nationstate power.76 A decade later, Hammes would 

make another important contribution to the 

debate with The Sling and the Stone, once again 

emphasizing that irregular insurgent forces were 

the primary threat faced by U.S. forces.77 Despite 

this, the United States remained ill prepared to 

battle this most likely enemy.

The debates over low-intensity conflict reached 

a peak during the late 1980s before largely fading 

out by the beginning of the 1990s. In 1991, the 

Marine Corps participated in the largest engagement of American military forces since the Vietnam War during Operation Desert Storm. The 

Marines of I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) 

proved their capabilities against a Soviet-equipped 

Iraqi Army. The war seemed to vindicate those 

planners who prepared for a brief, clearly defined 

conflict with a decisive conclusion (although that 

conclusion was less decisive than it seemed at the 

time). Furthermore, it reinforced Marine Corps 

planners’ belief that a focus on maneuver warfare 

was the appropriate and best means for preparing 

the Corps for future wars. Even though Desert 

Storm did not entirely conform to the vision of 

a war of maneuver as described in the manual, it 

saw the first use of Marine light armored infantry 

formations in combat.

Once again though, events seemed to contradict these assumptions and reinforce the arguments being made by Hammes, Lind, and others 

that asserted insurgencies would be threats of 

the future. Throughout the George H. W. Bush 

and William J. Clinton administrations, Marines 

were involved in a variety of so-called low-intensity engagements, most notably in Somalia and 

in Haiti. These missions were a mix of military 

engagement and humanitarian aid. During this 

same period, Marine Corps squadrons participated in patrols of the no-fly zones over Iraq and 

flew combat missions over Bosnia-Herzogovina 

and Kosovo during the wars that erupted in the 

wake of Yugoslavia’s dissolution. Marine ground 

combat units also contributed to the defense of 

Kuwait throughout the 1990s.

Conclusion

Throughout its more than 200-year-long history, the Marine Corps has often struggled to define its primary purpose in relation to the other 

Armed Services. As a result, Marines have been 

involved in a wide variety of military missions, 

ranging from large-scale conventional wars to 

small wars and insurgencies. The Marine Corps’ 

history during much of the twentieth century was 

dominated by conventional warfare. The campaigns in Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Iwo Jima, and 

Inchon shaped the Marine Corps’ mission and 

legacy as the United States’ premier amphibious 

assault force. However, the Marine Corps’ naval 

heritage also meant that Marines fought in a significant number of irregular conflicts and small 

wars throughout the century as well, most prominently in Central America during the 1920s and 

in South Vietnam during the 1960s.

Consequently, the Marine Corps has a long 

history of fighting small wars, and such wars have 

rarely been considered outside of the Marine 

Corps’ mission profile. Nevertheless, most Marine 

leaders have been hesitant to embrace the small 

wars mission, feeling that the Marine Corps’ best 

contribution to the national defense was to prepare for a wide variety of threats with a specialization in amphibious warfare. This reticence with 

regard to small wars was most prominent during 

the 1930s and 1970s, decades that incidentally 

came after Marines had fought insurgencies in 

the Caribbean and South Vietnam, respectively. 

During the 1930s, Marines chose to devote their 

energies to preparing for an amphibious drive 
24 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

across the Pacific in anticipation of a war with Japan, a choice that proved prescient. Beginning in 

the 1970s, Marine planners focused on preparing 

the Corps for a war with the Soviet Union.

An important result of this new attention to a 

mission in Europe was the doctrine of maneuver 

warfare and the creation of Marine light armored 

infantry battalions. Both developments allowed 

the Marine Corps to fight alongside the Army 

without duplicating the Army’s role on the battlefield as the primary land fighting force. However, 

while maneuver warfare doctrine, codified in 

1989 in Warfighting, Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, 

had its origins in the Cold War, it was broad and 

flexible enough to provide Marines with a general 

guide for combat during the post-Cold War era. 

Furthermore, although the Marine Corps focused 

most of its attention on fighting a large war with 

the Soviets, many Marines served as advisors in 

counterinsurgencies, especially in Central America. For these Marines and many others, future 

wars would look much more like the ones they 

faced in the Third World and not like a conventional, big-unit fight (although China and North 

Korea remained potential conventional threats). 

As the Cold War quickly came to an end, many 

Marines and analysts outside the Corps began to 

speak of “fourth-generation warfare” and future 

conflicts against nonstate actors. Meanwhile, the 

Marine Corps as a whole began to adjust to the 

new realities of the post-Cold War era.
The decade before 11 September 2001 

seemed to confirm the assessment made 

in Warfighting, Fleet Marine Force Manual 1 that future U.S. military operations would be 

brief and intense engagements defined by maneuver, mobility, and use of precision fires.1

 Between 

the end of Operation Desert Storm and the fall 

of the Soviet Union in 1991, the U.S. military 

largely faced small-scale contingency operations 

that were relatively short in duration. The operations varied in terms of intensity and included 

the 1991–92 intervention in Somalia, the 1994–

95 intervention in Haiti, and the bombing campaigns and subsequent peacekeeping operations 

in the Balkans in 1995 and 1999. The decadelong patrols of the no-fly zones over Iraq were an 

exception in terms of duration. A 2002 Marine 

Corps combat assessment written following the 

first operations in Afghanistan summarized this 

state of affairs well, noting that “with the exception of Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 

since the end of the Cold War the threat environments encountered by forward deployed [Marine air-ground task forces] have generally been 

characterized as low-intensity conflicts, often 

operations under restrictive peacetime rules of 

engagement. They have been of relatively short 

duration, with limited operational objectives.”2

The end of the Cold War forced the United 

States to redefine the primary mission and purpose of its military, which had been designed and 

trained to fight the Soviet Union. Both the Marine Corps and Navy developed a range of new 

concepts and innovations that altered the focus 

of the United States’ naval services. The purpose 

of these changes was to shift from planning to 

fight enemy navies to planning for contingencies 

along the coastlines of potentially hostile or unstable states. These contingencies would require 

the U.S. naval services to perform a wide variety of missions ranging from raids, peacekeeping 

operations, humanitarian assistance, and evacuations. Both the Marine Corps and its Combat 

Development Command developed concepts 

to meet these new challenges, among them the 

three-block war and expeditionary maneuver 

warfare.3

Chapter 2

Marine Corps Warfighting Concepts from 1991 to 2002

Photo by Sgt B. E. Vancise

During his term, Marine Corps Commandant Gen Charles 

C. Krulak stressed the need for the Marine Corps to be versatile and readily adaptable to the wide variety of contingencies 

the United States would face in the post-Cold War era. He 

introduced the concept of a “three-block war” and the idea of 

the “strategic corporal.”

25
26 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

Thus, although the Marine Corps did not 

focus special attention on small wars or counterinsurgency, it did make plans to conduct unconventional operations. Planners aimed to create 

a flexible Corps capable of fighting a range of 

missions, including insurgencies. This aim could 

be discerned through the papers and concepts 

written and presented by Marine Corps leaders 

throughout the decade and in the course of instruction at the Marine Corps Command and 

Staff College. The 11 September 2001 attacks and 

the subsequent war in Afghanistan did not dramatically alter the objective of building the amphibious Service into an adaptable and effective 

expeditionary force-in-readiness.

Concepts for Building

a General-Purpose Contingency Force

One of the most enduring warfighting concepts to emerge during the 1990s was the idea 

of a three-block war. First presented by General 

Charles C. Krulak, Commandant of the Marine 

Corps from 1995 to 1999, the concept predicted 

that future wars would be akin to those that were 

fought in Haiti and Somalia.

In Bosnia, Haiti, and Somalia the unique 

challenges of military operations otherthan-war (MOOTW) were combined 

with the disparate challenges of midintensity conflict. The Corps has described such amorphous conflicts as—the 

three-block war—contingencies in which 

Marines may be confronted by the entire spectrum of tactical challenges in the 

span of a few hours and within the space 

of three contiguous city blocks.4

General Krulak’s assessment was notable for 

a number of reasons. First, the concept of the 

three-block war acknowledged the wide variety 

of missions Marines would be asked to undertake 

in the politically uncertain post-Cold War world. 

Second, Krulak’s argument that the “strategic corporal” would be a critical factor in how these operations other-than-war would be fought placed a 

new emphasis on the need for effective small-unit 

leaders who could devise and implement orders in 

an increasingly complex battlefield environment. 

“The inescapable lesson of Somalia and of other 

recent operations, whether humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, or traditional warfighting, is 

that their outcome may hinge on decisions made 

by small-unit leaders and by actions taken at the 

lowest level.”5

 Once again, the Marine Corps’ traditions of focusing on creating well-led small units 

capable of fighting a range of challenges seemed to 

provide a solution to emerging and unanticipated 

problems around the world.

Another influential Marine warfighting model to emerge in the post-Cold War world was expeditionary maneuver warfare. The concept drew 

together nearly 30 years of doctrinal innovation 

and development and laid the foundation for a 

general-purpose Marine Corps capable of conducting a wide variety of missions. The concept 

was initially circulated during General James L. 

Jones’ tenure as Commandant.6

 Expeditionary 

maneuver warfare collected and synthesized a diverse range of concepts, but two stood out most 

prominently: maneuver warfare and expeditionary operations. The concept placed a premium on 

the Marine Corps’ naval character and its ability 

to deploy quickly from sea-based positions. Importantly, expeditionary maneuver warfare sought 

to adapt and refine the maneuver warfare concept 

for a post-Cold War world. According to the 2001 

Marine Corps Concepts and Issues,

Built on the twin pillars of our philosophy of maneuver warfare and our expeditionary culture, [Expeditionary Maneuver 

Warfare] prepares the Marine Corps to 

meet the challenges and opportunities of 

a rapidly changing world. The concept 

describes the evolving characteristics and 

capabilities that the Marine Corps will 

employ to promote peace and stability 
Marine Corps Warfighting Concepts from 1991 to 2002 27

and to mitigate or resolve crises. More 

fundamentally, [Expeditionary Maneuver 

Warfare] provides an intellectual foundation that will influence how Marines, 

both individually and as an institution, 

analyze, understand, and formulate solutions across the spectrum of military operations.7

The concept was also the culmination of 

nearly a decade of renewed focus on the Marine 

Corps’ ability to project power from the sea. 

Concepts such as “operational maneuver from 

the sea” and “ship-to-shore objective” attested to 

the Navy and Marine Corps’ interest in planning 

for unconventional threats and contingencies.8

As the 1997 paper Operational Maneuver from 

the Sea noted, “In all other respects—goals, organizations, armament, and tactics—the warfare of 

the next 20 years will be distinguished by its great 

variety. For that reason, it is imperative that the 

Marine Corps resist the temptation to prepare for 

only one type of conflict.”9

 The paper envisioned 

an often chaotic, unpredictable threat environment concentrated along the potentially volatile 

coastal regions of the world. Here, Marines would 

likely not fight soldiers from conventional militaries, but irregular “fighters” struggling on behalf of an ethnic, religious, or tribal group rather 

than a nation-state. Consequently, a versatile amphibious force could play an important role in 

American national security. “To influence events 

overseas, America requires a credible, forwardly 

deployable, power projection capability. In the 

absence of an adjacent land base, a sustainable 

forcible entry capability that is independent of 

forward staging bases, friendly borders, overflight 

rights, and other politically dependent support 

can come only from the sea.”10

Photo by Sgt Craig J. Shell

For the most part, military operations during the 1990s were short-term contingencies, such as the NATO intervention in the 

Serbian province of Kosovo in 1999. In this image, a Marine from Company K, 3d Battalion, 8th Marines, mans an observation post in the city of Gnjilane, Kosovo, to help enforce the peace during Operation Joint Guardian.
28 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

The foundations for this expeditionary capability were the amphibious ready group, Marine 

air-ground task force, and maritime prepositioning force. The idea of the maritime prepositioning 

force had emerged during the 1970s and 1980s. 

At any given time, the equipment for at least 

three brigade-size air-ground task forces was afloat 

aboard three squadrons from the Military Sealift 

Command, with each squadron responsible for a 

specific geographic area. The force thus maximized 

the power projection capabilities of Marine Corps 

air-ground task forces throughout the globe. Utilizing the forward maritime prepositioning force 

for logistical support, Marine air-ground task forces were integrated with Navy amphibious squadrons to create amphibious ready groups. Typically, 

these ready groups were built around a big-deck 

amphibious assault ship (a Tarawa-class landing 

helicopter assault carrier or a Wasp-class landing 

helicopter dock carrier), supported by a landing 

ship dock and a landing ship transport dock.

Afloat with the ready group would be a Marine air-ground task force, in most cases a Marine 

expeditionary unit (MEU). Known within the 

Marine Corps by their acronym, MAGTF (pronounced “Magtaf”), these task forces comprised 

a command element, a ground combat element, 

an aviation combat element, and a combat support element, and ranged from 1,500 to 90,000 

Marines, depending on the threat situation and 

mission requirements.11 The MEU was the smallest of the MAGTFs. Commanded by a colonel, 

an MEU’s ground element consisted of a Marine 

rifle battalion reinforced with tanks, amphibious 

assault vehicles, antiarmor teams, and engineers, 

and was called a battalion landing team (BLT). 

The air combat element of an MEU was a composite squadron of fixed-wing and rotary-wing 

aircraft. These included Sikorsky CH-53E Sea 

Stallion heavy-lift helicopters, Boeing CH-46D 

Sea Knight medium-lift helicopters, Bell AH-1 

Super Cobra gunships, Bell UH-1 Iroquois light 

helicopters, and McDonnell Douglass AV-8B 

Harrier vertical takeoff and landing jump jets. A 

Marine expeditionary unit service support group 

also provided MEUs with logistical support to 

enable the force to operate independently for 15 

days. Their primary function was to provide joint 

commanders with a rapidly deployable force capable of performing stability, disaster relief, and 

peacekeeping operations.12

The largest MAGTF, the Marine expeditionary force (MEF), was commanded by a lieutenant 

general and made up of a Marine division, a Marine aircraft wing, and a Marine force service support group. Whereas Marine expeditionary units 

were designed primarily for rapid deployment to 

confront contingencies in a quick and decisive 

manner, the Marine expeditionary force’s major 

purpose was to conduct independent operations 

in a theater-size war. As a result, the MEF could 

sustain itself for about 60 days. Larger than an 

expeditionary unit but smaller than an expeditionary force was the Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB), a formation normally composed of 

a reinforced regiment, composite aircraft group, 

and a brigade combat service support group.13

Expeditionary brigades were frequently task organized, however, and did not always conform to 

this structure.14

In 2001, there were three standing Marine 

expeditionary forces15 (each with an attached expeditionary brigade that could serve as a forward 

echelon), and seven standing Marine expeditionary units. Two to three expeditionary units were 

forward deployed and afloat with an amphibious ready group at any given time, maximizing 

the Marine Corps’ crisis response capabilities. 

Before deploying, each MEU also underwent a 

six-month training period, which ended with a 

“special operations capable” certification.16 The 

expeditionary units afloat constituted the spearhead of the Marine’s rapid deployment and emergency response capability.

The operational maneuver from the sea and 

expeditionary maneuver warfare concepts brought 

together a number of doctrinal currents. The first, 

expeditionary operations, had in many ways been 
Marine Corps Warfighting Concepts from 1991 to 2002 29

a part of the Marine Corps since its very creation, 

a fact demonstrated by its long history as a seabased, rapidly deployable military force and by 

the hundreds of amphibious landings conducted 

by Marines since the late eighteenth century.17

The second current, maneuver warfare, was a 

more recent innovation, as seen in the previous 

chapter. Despite its Cold War origins, however, 

maneuver warfare was broad and flexible (some 

critics would argue vague) enough in design and 

conception that it could be applied to the types 

of operations Marines anticipated facing in the 

post-Cold War era without any major revisions.18

The 1997 revision of Warfighting, (renumbered 

as Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1) featured 

only limited changes, with more detailed descriptions about the nature of war and the styles of 

warfare.19 Its overall emphasis on mobility, speed, 

and on shattering the enemy’s will to fight without resorting to a war of attrition lent itself well 

to a force anticipating future short-term contingency operations defined by political and diplomatic goals over purely military ones.

Throughout the 1990s, Marine Corps leaders also made attempts to adapt the concepts 

of network-centric and effects-based warfare to 

the maneuver warfare doctrine. Both concepts 

had gained popularity since Operation Desert 

Storm. Although they differed from one another 

in a number of ways, both concepts shared a bePhoto by PH3 M. Dennis Timms, USN

Sea-based Marine expeditionary units formed the linchpin of expeditionary maneuver warfare. In this image of the USS 

Bataan (LHD 5) amphibious assault ship, one can see the wide variety of assets at the disposal of the Marines during the 

1990s and 2000s: (from left to right) CH-46 medium helicopters, UH-1 light helicopters, AH-1 helicopter gunships, CH-53 

heavy helicopters, and AV-8B jump jets.
30 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

lief that psychological and moral “effects” could 

have as great an impact as the large-scale physical destruction of the enemy’s infrastructure and 

warfighting capabilities. They both also placed 

a premium on the technological superiority of 

American military forces. Coupling the superior 

information- and intelligence-sharing capabilities of the U.S. military with highly precise munitions, the advocates for effects-based operations 

argued that future wars would require smaller 

and lighter U.S. forces.20

Many Marine leaders believed that maneuver 

warfare shared much in common with “effectsbased” warfare. A presentation given at the 1999 

Marine Corps General Officers Symposium integrated the concept of net-centric warfare with 

operational maneuver from the sea and maneuver warfare, declaring that “a Network-Centric 

structure complements the [Operational Maneuver from the Sea Concept] by allowing all U.S. 

forces within the theater, in addition to naval 

forces, to support the landing force via precision 

engagement, logistical offloading, and enhanced 

battlespace awareness.”21

The presentation cast a stark distinction between “attrition warfare” and “maneuver warfare,” 

and saw the latter as an extension of networkcentric war. Attrition warfare focused on physical 

impact and was defined by a “rigid, top-down, 

centralized planning and execution.”22 Attrition 

warfare featured only “limited interoperability” 

and “stove-piped battle systems.” In contrast, 

maneuver warfare “focused on reason and belief 

effects.” It was “network centric” and employed 

force “through movement in combination with 

firepower.” If attrition warfare’s main characteristics were firepower, rigidity, and physical effects, 

the presentation argued, then maneuver warfare 

was focused on speed, surprise, and psychological 

effects. The 2001 Marine Corps Concepts and Issues further stressed the link between expeditionary maneuver warfare and effects-based warfare, 

declaring, “Unlike traditional operations, [Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare] focuses on maximizing the effects of operations, rather than the 

mere destruction of an adversary’s military forces 

or the mitigation of a single aspect of a humanitarian disaster.”23

The election of George W. Bush to the presidency in 2000 brought new initiatives to how 

the military prepared and fought wars. Bush’s 

first secretary of defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld, 

was a forceful advocate of transformation, an 

ambitious policy that aimed to shift the military 

away from its supposed Cold War-era mind-set 

by making it more mobile and easier to deploy. 

One could discern the underlying principles of 

network-centric warfare and effects-based warfare within the Department of Defense’s plans. 

To achieve his goals, Rumsfeld hoped to draw on 

new technologies and innovations that would increase the lethality of the U.S. military while also 

decreasing its size and reliance on heavy forces.24

The transformation initiatives did not cause 

a considerable break in the general trends dominating Marine Corps planning that had begun as 

far back as the 1970s. The Marine Corps, planners argued, was “expeditionary by culture—

transformational by design.”25 Furthermore, as 

seen above, some of the major currents in Marine 

Corps planning reflected many of Rumsfeld’s 

transformation initiatives: smaller, lighter forces 

utilizing mobility and precision-guided munitions to break the enemy’s will to fight and ensure 

a brief and decisive campaign.26 Not all Marines 

were convinced that maneuver warfare was a perfect fit for “net-centric” and “effects-based” warfare, however, and a number criticized what they 

saw as an overemphasis on information warfare 

and technological innovation on the part of the 

Department of Defense. They also criticized the 

assumption that using both could overcome the 

unpredictability and friction of warfare.27

Of greater concern for Marines at this time 

was not that the Corps would have to significantly 

undergo transformation, but that its uniqueness 

would be diluted as the other Services changed 

and adapted. This predated Rumsfeld’s tenure, as 
Marine Corps Warfighting Concepts from 1991 to 2002 31

the Army had begun to stand up more light infantry divisions during the 1980s. The expansion 

of these units, such as the 6th and 7th Infantry 

Divisions, allowed the Army to take a greater role 

in contingency operations, operations that had 

traditionally been the provenance of the Marine 

Corps. Many Marines were quick to argue that 

the ability to rapidly deploy did not necessarily 

grant a unit a truly expeditionary capability.28

A Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory assessment of the United States Army’s Transformation 

War Game held in 2001 reflects this argument. 

The briefing, delivered to assess the implications 

to the Marine Corps of the Army’s approach to 

the Defense Department’s transformation initiatives, criticized the war gamers for failing to 

completely embrace the full capabilities of seabased Marine expeditionary units. The overall 

conclusions were intriguing. What concerned the 

Warfighting Laboratory was not that the Marine 

Corps would have to radically alter its mission 

and abilities in response to the Defense Department. Of greater concern was that, if the Army 

became lighter and more mobile, it would potentially duplicate the Marine Corps’ mission, inverting the decade-long tension between the two 

Services. “Army and Marine Corps core competencies are converging,”29 the briefing observed. 

“One of the pillars of the Marine Corps’ existence and survival as a separate service with a major warfighting role is that it not become, or be 

perceived, as a second land army. This has been a 

core sensitivity for the Marine Corps leadership 

since World War II. It would be ironic if the issue were again joined by the Army becoming ‘a 

second Marine Corps.’”30

Official Department of Defense photo

Upon assuming office as secretary of defense in 2001, Donald H. Rumsfeld sought to transform the military, using new technologies and innovations to increase the lethality of the U.S. military while also decreasing its size and reliance on heavy forces.
32 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

Operation Enduring Freedom:

A Proof of Concept for Expeditionary

Maneuver Warfare?

Donald H. Rumsfeld was secretary of defense for 

less than nine months when terrorists from Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda organization destroyed 

the World Trade Center in New York City and 

attacked the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, on 

11 September 2001. The United States immediately took action against Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, which had provided bin Laden with support 

and sustained his organization on its territory.

Although President George W. Bush declared 

that the war against the Taliban regime was a “different kind of war,”31 the military force deployed 

to fight it was one primarily designed to confront 

the limited contingency operations of the 1990s. 

The Marine Corps’ most significant involvement 

in the first year of the Global War on Terrorism, 

Task Force 58’s insertion and seizure of forward 

operating bases in Afghanistan, was an important 

demonstration of the Corps’ ability to quickly 

deploy from a sea base and conduct a rapid airlift 

inland to establish a tactical foothold in hostile 

territory. It thus demonstrated that the Marine 

Corps had embraced many of the philosophical 

and doctrinal tenets that had been shaping the 

Corps throughout the 1990s.

The Marine Corps’ contributions to the war 

in Afghanistan demonstrated the efficacy of 

speed and mobility as a means of defeating the 

enemy. Operation Enduring Freedom, U.S. Central Command’s code name for the campaign in 

Afghanistan, focused on two broad goals: overthrowing the Taliban regime and destroying the 

state’s ability to support al-Qaeda. To achieve 

these objectives, Central Command commander 

General Tommy R. Franks, USA, planned a largely ad hoc operation that combined special operations forces, anti-Taliban resistance forces, and 

conventional forces in a multiphased plan.32 The 

Marine Corps provided Central Command with 

a number of forces afloat, including two Marine 

expeditionary units, with two more preparing for 

deployment.33 Both units were deployed in the 

wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks.34 By November, U.S. Central Command drew up plans 

to utilize Marine Corps units in Afghanistan, and 

the commander of U.S. Naval Forces Central 

Command established Task Force 58 under the 

command of Brigadier General James N. Mattis. 

For the first time, a Marine commanded a naval 

task force. The force consisted of the 1st Marine 

Expeditionary Brigade (1st MEB), divided into 

two Marine expeditionary units, each attached to 

an amphibious ready group.35

On 25 November 2001, elements of the 15th 

Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations 

Capable) (15th MEU [SOC]) with supporting 

elements from the 26th Marine Expeditionary 

Unit (Special Operations Capable) (26th MEU 

[SOC]) took off from the amphibious assault 

carrier USS Peleliu (LHA 5) in six Sikorsky CH53E Super Stallions and seized a landing strip in 

southern Afghanistan designated Forward Operating Base Rhino. The helicopterborne assault

Official Marine Corps History Division map
Marine Corps Warfighting Concepts from 1991 to 2002 33

would take the Marine expeditionary unit 371.5 

nautical miles inland.36 On 14 December, elements of the 26th MEU (SOC) seized Kandahar 

Airfield.37 For the next two months, Task Force 

58 conducted operations throughout Afghanistan, maintaining Coalition supply lines, engaging enemy convoys, and helping to prevent Kandahar from being used as an escape route for the 

retreating Taliban forces.38

Task Force 58’s insertion into Afghanistan 

during the opening phases of Operation Enduring Freedom attested to the effectiveness of many 

principles shaping the Marine Corps at that 

time.39 Deputy Commandant, Installations and 

Logistics, Lieutenant General Gary S. Mc Kissock

wrote that the operation demonstrated the effectiveness of sea basing and was the culmination of nearly three decades of Marine and Navy 

planning and innovations.40 Lieutenant Colonel 

Frank G. Hoffman concurred, noting in United 

States Naval Institute Proceedings that Task Force 

58’s insertion demonstrated the effectiveness of 

ship-to-objective maneuver operations.41

However, while the operation demonstrated 

that the Marine Corps had successfully integrated many of the principles laid out in Warfighting, 

there was also concern that these principles were 

potentially unsuited for the Afghanistan War. 

The combat assessment team deployed to gather 

lessons from the operation reinforced this point 

when it observed, “The forward-deployed MEU 

(SOC) organization is geared to relatively shortduration operations.”42 Of particular concern 

to the assessment team were the challenges of 

conducting a long-term campaign to secure Afghanistan using a force designed for short-term 

contingency operations. The report’s writers observed, “Like other open-ended operational commitments since the end of the Cold War, OEF 

does not lend itself to a clear exit strategy, partly 

because of the absence of a measurable definition 

of victory itself.”43 The open-ended nature of the 

operation troubled observers, and the assessment 

team noted that “given current force levels, any 

increases in duration or frequency of these contingencies may jeopardize a delicate balance of 

Photo by LCpl Brian L. Wickliffe

In November 2001, using six CH-53 Super Stallions like the one pictured here, elements of the 1st MEB successfully travelled 

more than 350 nautical miles from amphibious assault ships in the Indian Ocean and seized a forward position deep within 

Afghanistan. The operation demonstrated the viability of sea-based operations and operational maneuver from the sea.
34 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

training readiness, personnel tempo, and strategic flexibility for the Corps as a force provider.”44

The operation up to that point also left many 

open-ended questions. While the operation demonstrated the ability of a Marine air-ground team 

to seize a forward position across considerable 

distance, the Marine air-ground task forces deployed to Afghanistan faced only minimal enemy 

resistance. As the official combat summary noted, 

Enduring Freedom provided only limited lessons 

with regard to expeditionary maneuver warfare:

Although the 15th and 26th MEU (SOC)s’ 

demonstration of operational reach over 350 

nautical miles inland during OEF is an impressive display of tactical flexibility, operational reach, and logistical adaptability, the 

threat environment never materialized that 

might have stressed the combat systems to 

their limits.45

Nevertheless, the same report remarked that 

“the Corps’ accomplishments during [Operation Enduring Freedom] confirmed the relevance 

of [Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare] and the 

soundness of the Marine Corps’ approach to the 

DoD’s transformation initiatives.”46

Thus, there was considerable uncertainty in 

the Marine Corps regarding whether or not the 

first several months of Operation Enduring Freedom would be the model for future operations 

against al-Qaeda and Islamist-backed terrorism. 

The question remained: was the operation in 

Afghanistan really a “different kind of war” or 

was it another short-term contingency operation 

akin to the operations in the Balkans? For a large 

number of observers affiliated with the Marine 

Corps, the war that began with the al-Qaeda attacks portended a break with the past decade of 

conflict. Critically, these analysts focused attention on the new challenges of fighting a nonstate 

actor like al-Qaeda. Within days of 11 September, William Lind, one of the intellectual architects of maneuver warfare and fourth-generation 

warfare theory, declared that the terrorist attacks 

were “Fourth-Generation Warfare’s First Blow.”47

Frank G. Hoffman forcefully argued in Marine 

Corps Gazette that the plans and assumptions of 

the 1990s needed to be discarded, asserting that 

in “its place, a sense of urgency must take hold, 

matched by a grim determination to refashion 

America’s security structures for an era where the 

forces of chaos and order exist side by side.”48

The Operation Enduring Freedom assessment team was also aware that Marines were

facing a decidedly unconventional threat, and 

characterized the enemies in Afghanistan as “simple, but not naïve,” and as “adept practitioners 

of the art of asymmetric warfare.”49 The team 

recognized al-Qaeda was an unconventional 

force that defied “the conventional assumptions 

around which most of the world’s militaries organize, train, and equip.”50 While recognizing 

that the enemies in the Global War on Terrorism 

would likely be unconventional, irregular forces, 

Marines were unsure about whether Operation

Enduring Freedom would be typical of future operations in the battle against Islamist radicalism:

The characteristic traits of [Operation 

Enduring Freedom] differ substantially 

from major wars of the 20th Century, 

which the majority of the world’s armed 

forces were designed to fight. In light of 

these distinguishing features, two questions arise that are vital to selection 

and application of appropriate lessons 

learned. First, how closely does the conflict experienced in [Operation Enduring 

Freedom] and the [Global War on Terror] foreshadow the nature of war in the 

future? Second, how well do[es] the Marine Corps’ concept meet the challenge 

presented by this type of warfare?51

Thus many Marines believed that the Global 

War on Terrorism and the conflict in Afghanistan constituted a break from the types of wars 
Marine Corps Warfighting Concepts from 1991 to 2002 35

the United States had been fighting over the past 

several decades. However, they drew a variety of 

different lessons from this conclusion.

For a number of observers, the lessons of 

the Afghanistan conflict were that future wars 

would be fought by small U.S. forces maintaining a light, unobtrusive footprint but nevertheless equipped to deploy intensive firepower when 

necessary. Major Lloyd D. Freeman, for example, 

argued that the heavy use of special operations 

forces in Operation Enduring Freedom was evidence that the Marine Corps needed to bolster its 

small units and create squads and platoons able 

to operate independently and to be capable of 

using technological advantages to deploy heavy 

firepower through the use of air strikes.52 The operations proposed in his article would have been 

air-intensive, with a heavy reliance on laser-guided and global positioning system-guided bombs. 

Captain Owen West made a similar argument, 

contending that the Marine Corps had been relegated to a supporting force in Afghanistan while 

special operations forces had taken the lead role. 

The future counterterrorism mission was becoming a fiefdom of the U.S. Special Operations 

Command. “The Marine Corps played the hare 

to the SOCOM tortoise,” he lamented.53 He further predicted that “the next Smedley Butler will 

come from SOCOM, not the Marine Corps.”54

The solution, West warned, was not to embrace 

Special Operations Command. The Marine expeditionary unit remained “the best positioned 

forces to tackle the Global War on Terrorism.”55

The Operation Enduring Freedom combat 

assessment team also noted U.S. forces’ heavy 

reliance on small, special operations units directing precision fires. The team acknowledged that 

“some observers suggested that [Operation Enduring Freedom] reversed the support roles between air and ground forces so that the primary 

Photo by Sgt Joseph R. Chenelly

Marines from the 15th MEU (SOC) on patrol in Afghanistan in heavily armed High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles 

and light armored vehicles in December 2001. During the initial phase of the Afghanistan War, a debate emerged amongst policy 

makers regarding whether conventional forces or special forces were better suited to conducting the Global War on Terrorism.
36 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

role of ground forces has become location and 

designation of targets for destruction by air.”56

Nevertheless, the report pointed out that several 

missions, such as airfield seizure, detainee operations, and the interdiction of isolated groups, 

could only be accomplished by forces on the 

ground.

The combat assessment team continued an 

important precedent for future Marine Corps 

operations. Their report constituted the first major assessment of Marine Corps operations in 

combat since the battle assessment team’s analysis 

of Operations Desert Sheild and Desert Storm, 

which had been assembled by Colonel Clifford L. 

Stanley.57 As the deputy commanding general of 

Marine Corps Combat Development Command 

in 2002, Stanley, now a major general, oversaw a 

second major assessment of combat operations. 

Both were products of the Marine Corps lessons 

learned system. In the final report, the Enduring 

Freedom Combat Assessment Team recommended a revision to the manner in which the Marine Corps acquired and disseminated “lessons 

learned” from its operations. The team proposed 

a Center for Marine Corps Lessons Learned that 

would be able to record, create, manage, and categorize lessons learned “in exercises, operations, 

and day-to-day experiences.”58 The combat assessment team would form the core of the future 

center, which would continue to acquire and organize lessons learned from further operations in 

Afghanistan and Iraq.

The vast distance and speed of the 1st MEB’s 

insertion into Afghanistan in 2001 demonstrated 

that the Marine Corps could execute operations 

based on the principles of expeditionary maneuver warfare. At the same time though, there were 

a range of unanswered questions regarding the 

future course of the Global War on Terrorism. 

Was Operation Enduring Freedom an extension 

of the contingency operations of the 1990s or 

an entirely new kind of war? Would special operations forces be the standard combatant force? 

Would effects-based surgical strikes and precision-guided attacks be the most effective means 

for defeating fundamentalist terrorist networks 

like al-Qaeda? If special operations forces were to 

take the lead in the future war against al-Qaeda 

and similar organizations, then what role would 

the Marine Corps play? The period between 

2001 and 2003 was thus marked by considerable 

uncertainty about what the Global War on Terrorism would look like. Consequently, many in 

the Marine Corps continued to train for contingency operations based on ship-to-shore maneuver warfare, as they had done in the years before 

11 September.

Preparing and Training the Marine Corps

for Contingency Operations

During the period after the 11 September 2001 

attacks, the curricula at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Amphibious Warfare 

School, and School for Advanced Warfighting 

continued to focus on the operational and tactical capabilities of the Marine air-ground task 

force. The stated focus of the Command and Staff 

College’s curriculum was “the development of an 

officer who understands the capabilities and poOfficial Department of Defense photo

U.S. Army Special Forces ride alongside Afghan Northern 

Alliance cavalry during Operation Enduring Freedom. With 

the assistance of only a small number of U.S. Special Forces 

coupled with extensive use of air power, the Northern Alliance 

was able to topple the Taliban regime during the fall of 2001.
Marine Corps Warfighting Concepts from 1991 to 2002 37

tential roles of the Marine air-ground task force 

(MAGTF) at the operational level of war and 

how to best task organize, deploy, and employ 

these forces in any tactical environment across the 

spectrum of conflict.”59 The first-year program 

included the courses The Theory and Nature of 

War, Strategy and Policy, The Operational Level 

of War, and a six-part course titled Warfighting 

from the Sea, which focused on teaching Marine 

officers the planning processes for offensive, defensive, expeditionary, and joint operations using a Marine air-ground task force.60 During the 

2003–4 academic year, the course block made up 

601.5 of the total 1,542 hours, more than a third 

of the course hours.61

The 2002–3 Command and Staff College

syllabus provides a good example of the basic 

focus and thrust of staff officer education in the 

Marine Corps at the turn of the century. The 

Warfighting from the Sea sequence of courses constituted 529.25 hours of the 1,516 course hours 

at the Command and Staff College, a little more 

than one-third. It was divided into six groupings. Joint and Marine Air-Ground Task Force 

(MAGTF) Organization (75 hours) provided 

students with lectures on the basic structures of 

the air-ground task force, the principles of maneuver warfare, effects-based operations, fourthgeneration warfare, and asymmetric war. Marine 

Corps Planning Process and Defensive Operations (77.75 hours) included classes on shaping 

operations, fighting battles, intelligence preparation, defensive operations, and force protection. 

Marine Corps Planning Process and Offensive 

Operations (50.50 hours) focused on offensive

operations and MEF fires. Marine Corps Planning 

Process and Expeditionary Operations (96.25 

hours) provided students with a comprehensive 

and detailed overview of the Marine air-ground 

task force’s primary mission as a force-in-readiness,

and included classes on amphibious warfare, 

the maritime prepositioning force, logistics in

expeditionary operations, and also included an 

expeditionary warfare practical application. Joint 

Operations and Military Operations Other Than 

War completed the sequence.62

The Command and Staff College’s course of 

study focused primarily on conventional warfare. 

Classes examining historic campaigns focused on 

large-scale amphibious landings such as Operation Cartwheel (the Solomons campaign, 1943), 

Operation Husky (invasion of Sicily, 1943), and 

Operation Chromite (Inchon, 1950). Students 

also gained knowledge and training in the operational conduct of World War I and World War II. 

Small wars and irregular warfare was not ignored 

entirely, however. The course Joint and Marine 

Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Organization 

included lectures on the asymmetric threat and 

fourth-generation warfare. Most importantly, the 

single largest class in the Warfighting from the 

Sea course was Military Operations Other Than 

War, which comprised 116.25 hours.

Military Operations Other Than War provided an extensive overview of the topic of irregular warfare, illustrated by case studies. The 

college acknowledged the immensely broad and 

varied nature of the class topic. The 1999–2000 

course syllabus was typical. Drawing on Joint 

Publication 3-07, Military Operations Other Than 

War, the course identified no less than 16 potential MOOTW missions. Along with counterinsurgency, the missions also included supporting 

insurgencies, arms control, counterterrorism, 

counterdrug operations, enforcing sanctions, supporting civilian authorities, peace operations, and 

strikes and raids.63 The syllabus acknowledged the 

course’s problematic title. In defining what counterdrug operations had to do with disaster relief 

and counterinsurgency, the syllabus read

The most simple response is that what 

these missions have in common is that 

they are not war. This is an intellectually 

and operationally unsatisfying answer. To 

say that Operation SILVER BAYONET 

in the Ia Drang valley, November 1965, 

was not war would come as a surprise to 
38 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

the members of the Army’s First Cavalry Division. Likewise, a Russian soldier 

might wonder, if the conflict in Chechnya was not a war, how was the city of 

Grozny flattened, and why are all of his 

friends dead?64

MOOTW missions, the course pointed out, often required the same level of force and combat 

just as intense as regular warfare missions.

The course concluded that the primary distinction between war and military operations 

other than war was the “overriding dominance 

of political factors in determining the nature of 

the crisis and the form and magnitude of the response.”65 The definition, again paraphrased from 

Joint Publication 3-07, Military Operations Other 

Than War, stressed that the overriding influence 

of political elements made MOOTW unique 

and distinct from regular warfare. “In MOOTW, 

politics is a factor from the White House to the 

foxhole.” Its emphasis on political factors was also 

an echo of older studies on irregular war, such as 

the Small Wars Manual and David Galula’s Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice.

The Military Operations Other Than War 

course had a number of goals. These ranged from 

defining the concept, assessing potential operations due to ethnic and religious conflicts, and 

considering the Marine Corps’ small wars heritage and whether it had an impact on future 

MOOTW operations. The course also explored 

the applicability of maneuver warfare doctrine 

and theory to irregular warfare.66 To examine 

these issues, the course focused on a number 

of cases studies, such as the Russians’ 1994–96 

Photo by SSgt Frank Date

In the years between the 11 September attacks in 2001 and the start of the Iraq War in 2003, the Marine Corps Command 

and Staff College’s curriculum focused primarily on instruction in large-scale, conventional amphibious assault operations. This 

scene from Operation Chromite (the 1950 landing at Inchon during the Korean War) was a subject of study.
Marine Corps Warfighting Concepts from 1991 to 2002 39

campaign in Chechnya, insurgency and counterinsurgency in Vietnam, British operations in 

Northern Ireland, and peacekeeping operations 

in the Balkans and in Haiti.67 Course readings 

were drawn from many of the classic works on 

small wars and counterinsurgencies. The 1999–

2000 syllabus included T. E. Lawrence’s Seven 

Pillars of Wisdom and Andrew Krepinevich’s The 

Army in Vietnam. Other readings included Gerard Chaliand’s edited volume Guerrilla Strategies, Low-Intensity Conflict: Old Threats in a New 

World, and an article by Marine Corps General 

Anthony C. Zinni, “Non-Traditional Military 

Missions: Their Nature, and the Need for Cultural Awareness and Flexible Thinking.”68

The class also contained a section entitled 

“Lieutenant General Zinni’s ‘Twenty Points for 

MOOTW.’” While Zinni’s observations addressed the challenges and requirements of irregular warfare as a whole, several anticipated 

the tactics and techniques utilized by the Marine 

Corps in Iraq between 2004 and 2008. For example, point 11 declared, “Don’t make enemies 

(But if you do, don’t treat them gently).”69 A 

variation of this recommendation would emerge 

from the 1st Marine Division in 2003 in Iraq 

as “No better friend, no worse enemy.” Other 

points included “Know the culture (who makes 

decisions? what is the social structure? where is 

the power and how is it applied?)”; “Start or restart a key institution ASAP. Normally, it is the 

police force, or other security force”; “Gain and 

maintain the initiative/momentum”; and “Create 

innovative, nontraditional methods.”70

The course saw counterinsurgency as just one 

of a number of different missions underneath the 

MOOTW umbrella. The class on Vietnam underlined the point and viewed counterinsurgency 

as a product of the 1960s:

For the military of the 1960s, Counterinsurgency was the MOOTW of the times. 

Counterinsurgency doctrine was formulated in response to the Wars of National 

Liberation doctrine of the Soviet Union, 

first formulated by Nikita Khrushchev, as 

a means of exploiting the decolonization 

movement of the 1950s and the 1960s 

to bring more countries into the socialist 

fold. It may also be seen as a product of 

the “trendiness” of the Kennedy Administration.71

Thus, Marines at the Command and Staff 

College were taught that counterinsurgency was 

anchored to the political and diplomatic world of 

the early 1960s and the Cold War. Nevertheless, 

the class did not argue that counterinsurgency 

was an irrelevant topic of study. Instead, it sought 

to argue that, while the term “counterinsurgency” 

was linked to the Kennedy administration, the 

actual type of warfare had been a part of the Marine Corps’ heritage for decades. “From 1915 to 

1934, the Marines were intermittently deployed 

to Haiti during the Banana Wars. Marine Corps 

legends like Smedley Butler (“Old Gimlet Eye”) 

and Lewis (“Chesty”) Puller commanded what 

today would be considered counterinsurgency 

and peace enforcement operations.”72

The 2000–1 MOOTW class syllabus focused 

more on studying counterinsurgency campaigns 

and included readings from the Small Wars Manual, C. E. Callwell’s Small Wars, Robert Thompson’s Defeating Communist Insurgency on Malaya, 

Roger Trinquier’s Modern Warfare on Algeria, and 

Francis “Bing” West’s The Village on Vietnam.73

The course dropped the case study of Chechnya 

and focused on the insurgencies in Malaya and 

Algeria, as well as counterinsurgency in Somalia, Colombia, and East Timor.74 Students also 

watched Gillo Pontecorvo’s film The Battle of Algiers. Notably, soldiers and scholars would closely 

examine both the Malayan insurgency and Algerian war as the U.S. military considered new strategies and tactics for defeating the Iraq insurgency.75

A common question addressed by the Military Operations Other Than War class was 

whether small wars and insurgencies were unique 
40 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

and distinct from conventional combat. In 

both 1999 and 2000, the syllabus devoted sessions to studying theorists of small wars and acknowledged that both Carl von Clausewitz’s and 

Antoine-Henri Jomini’s observations on warfare 

were relevant to understanding small wars and 

other military operations other than war. The 

2000–1 syllabus devoted a full class to comparing and analyzing Clausewitz, Jomini, and 

Callwell and their overall theories of irregular

warfare. The syllabus noted, “What is today 

termed ‘peacekeeping’ involves many of the 

same issues first raised in print by Clausewitz: 

the problems posed by ‘the people in arms’ and 

the inability of armed forces to bring about rapid 

results when faced with ‘wars in the interior.’” 76

Thus, while the course drew a distinction between conventional and unconventional warfare, 

it also aimed to avoid bifurcating war as a whole, 

stressing that theorists of regular warfare were 

just as relevant to understanding irregular wars, 

peacekeeping, and insurgencies.

The 11 September attacks did not spark any 

substantial changes to the MOOTW class. However, the 2001–2 syllabus stressed that the Global 

War on Terrorism made the lessons of military 

operations other than war even more relevant. 

“Since September 11th, 2001, however, the U.S. 

has had to think about how to employ its undoubted ‘superpower’ attributes against enemies 

both ruthless and determined.”77 The course outline also included cautionary words about the 

operations in Afghanistan: “By all indications, 

American high-tech weaponry has performed 

with great success, and American forces have enjoyed considerable if incomplete success against 

their foes. Their ultimate outcome, however, cannot be so easy. The evidence of those post-1945 

struggles studied in this course suggests that both 

resolution and perseverance will be sorely tried.”78

The 2003–4 class, taught while the Iraq insurgency was erupting, included similar words of 

caution as events seemed to confirm the concerns 

expressed two years earlier. “Operation Enduring Freedom, executed with astonishing speed in 

2001–2, now appeared to be an enduring mission of its own. The same situation had already 

developed in Iraq.”79 As with the previous years, 

the classes continued to study theories of small 

wars developed by Clausewitz, Jomini, Callwell, 

and the Small Wars Manual, and examine case 

studies of irregular warfare in Malaya, Algeria, 

Vietnam, Northern Ireland, and Somalia.80

Military Operations Other Than War was 

not the only class on unconventional warfare 

taught at the Command and Staff College. The 

college also offered a range of electives on the 

topic. In the 1999–2000 academic year, one of 

the electives focused on Latin American insurgencies. The course included sessions examining 

Castro’s rebellion in Cuba; the civil wars in El 

Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala; and the 

criminal insurgencies in Colombia.81 In 2001–2, 

the Operational Level of War course featured a 

class on Soviet counterinsurgency operations in 

Afghanistan.82 In 2002–3, the Command and 

Staff College’s electives included courses on Callwell and Victorian small wars as well as a course 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo

Capt Francis J. “Bing” West presents a copy of his History 

Division monograph, Small Unit Action in Vietnam: Summer 1966, to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen 

Wallace M. Greene Jr., in 1967. Books by West, such as The 

Village, were frequently required reading for students at the 

Command and Staff College and The Basic School.
Marine Corps Warfighting Concepts from 1991 to 2002 41

entitled The American Indian Wars: Neglected 

Part of the American Military Tradition?83 The 

latter course, taught by Donald Bittner, explored 

the long history of war between North America’s 

indigenous population and European settlers and 

their descendents. The class considered whether 

the wars between the United States and Indians 

constituted a part or an exception to the American military tradition.84 As with the course on 

MOOTW, the class sought to address whether 

small wars and irregular warfare as a whole was 

part of the “American Way of War.” The 2003–4 

academic year offered the same electives.

Whilethe subject went by a variety of names 

(a point highlighted by the fact that 16 missions 

were placed under the umbrella term military operations other than war), the Command and Staff 

College did not neglect the topic of small wars 

and irregular warfare. It was taught in electives 

and was a distinct section of the college’s Warfighting from the Sea sequence of classes offered 

during the first semester. However, although the 

MOOTW classes’ 120 hours accounted for the 

most credit hours of all the warfighting classes 

(about 20–22 percent), it accounted for just 

about 7–8 percent of the Command and Staff 

College’s total hours of instruction.85 The overall thrust and emphasis of the curriculum was on 

amphibious assaults along the scale of Operation 

Husky and Operation Chromite, expeditionary 

missions, Marine air-ground task force operations, and the operational level of war.

While the focus of the Command and Staff 

College’s syllabus during the beginning of the 

2000s was on mastering conventional operations, 

it nevertheless provided important instruction 

in irregular warfare. A number of themes would 

shape these courses throughout the decade. First, 

teaching students to treat the term counterinsurgency in a broad and flexible manner. Although 

the term was normally utilized to describe a range 

of specific conflicts, mostly anticolonial and MarxOfficial Department of Defense photo

U.S. Marines attack a possible enemy hideout in Haiti in 1918 or 1919. An important characteristic of Marine education 

in counterinsurgency was to emphasize that, although they were called “small” wars or “military operations other than war,” 

conflicts against irregular forces still required basic warfighting skills.
42 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

ist wars of liberations, the Command and Staff 

College’s instructors nevertheless taught students 

that the Banana Wars of the 1920s and the security and peacekeeping operations during the 

1990s were variants of counterinsurgencies. The 

definition of MOOTW as any kind of military 

operations in which political considerations overwhelmingly influenced the nature of the conflict 

and defined success or failure was also one that 

could be traced back to the Small Wars Manual 

definition of small wars and Roger Trinquier and 

David Galula’s definition of counterinsurgency. 

Perhaps the overriding and most persistent theme 

of small wars instruction for the Marine Corps was 

that it was nothing new. Small wars, counterinsurgencies, and irregular wars were an integral part of 

the Marine Corps heritage. Thus, while the college’s course of instruction focused on the Marine 

Corps’ role as an expeditionary and amphibious 

force-in-readiness, small wars were nevertheless a 

part of the Corps’ history and mission.

Conclusion

The Marine Corps that went to war in 2001 was 

very much the Marine Corps of the post-Cold 

War era. Throughout the 1990s, the Corps had 

joined the Navy in planning to fight potential 

short-term contingency operations. These plans, 

which envisioned crises emerging throughout 

the world’s unstable coastal regions, drew upon 

a range of concepts that had been developing 

within the Marine Corps since the Vietnam War: 

maneuver warfare, the maritime prepositioning force, sea-based operations, and operational 

maneuver from the sea. By the end of the 1990s, 

these ideas had been collected and synthesized as 

expeditionary maneuver warfare, a warfighting 

concept that emphasized the versatile capabilities 

of the Marine Corps’ air-ground task forces. Marine Corps leaders stressed the Corps’ ability to 

conduct humanitarian operations and fight both 

irregular and conventional threats.

Operation Enduring Freedom did little to 

change this mind-set within the Corps. The airlift 

of the 1st MEB from amphibious assault ships in 

the Arabian Sea more than three miles into Afghanistan in November 2001 demonstrated that 

Marine units could rapidly deploy over difficult 

terrain. The operation attested to the newfound 

influence maneuver warfare now had within the 

Marine Corps. At the same time, however, the 

opening months of Operation Enduring Freedom presented troubling portents for Marines 

who envisioned the Corps taking an active role in 

the Global War on Terrorism. As remarkable and 

dramatic as Task Force 58’s operations had been, 

U.S. Special Operations Forces teams attached 

to local Afghan rebel forces had been the principal cause for the collapse of the Taliban regime 

in Kabul. In the mind-set of many, the Marine 

Corps’ versatility made it ideal for the type of war 

emerging against al-Qaeda. Yet, the apparent success of special forces led some Marines to predict 

that this branch of the military would become 

the United States’ primary combatant force during the Global War on Terrorism.
The airlift of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade (1st MEB) into Afghanistan 

during the opening months of Operation 

Enduring Freedom in 2001 represented a confirmation of the concept of maneuver warfare for 

many Marines. The distance alone, more than 

300 nautical miles into a landlocked country, 

demonstrated that Marine Corps units could 

be staged at a sea-based position and operate far 

from the coast. The insertion confirmed that the 

Marine Corps was capable of fulfilling its mission 

of serving as an expeditionary force-in-readiness. 

However, some observers, notably those assigned 

to the Operation Enduring Freedom Combat Assessment Team, questioned whether the concept 

had been tested as fully as it could have been. 

While the 1st MEB had successfully executed 

its maneuver, it had faced little opposition on 

the battlefield, leading some to wonder how the 

brigade’s two Marine expeditionary units would 

have overcome the friction of combat. The prominent and ultimately decisive role played by special operations forces teams in overthrowing the 

Taliban also led some Marines to wonder what 

role they would play on a battlefield dominated 

by special forces units utilizing air-delivered, precision-guided munitions.

Less than two years after the fall of the Taliban 

regime, however, the Marine Corps would face 

a new threat in Iraq. This conflict, beginning in 

2003, would fully test the Marine Corps’ ability 

to serve as a flexible and adaptable combat force. 

As General Charles C. Krulak predicted, Marine 

Corps units would be tasked with concurrently 

conducting multiple types of operations, ranging 

from full-fledged conventional battle to humanitarian assistance. Most importantly, the Iraq War 

Chapter 3

The Iraq War

Photo by LCpl Andrew Z. Williams

LtGen James T. Conway speaks during a relief-in-place 

ceremony in Iraq in 2003. Conway’s I Marine Expeditionary 

Force was the principal Marine command during the first 

phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

43
44 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

would prompt a renewed and more focused interest on the subject of counterinsurgency as a 

specific type of warfare. Without abandoning its 

primary function as a general-purpose force, the 

Marine Corps would embrace the study of counterinsurgency throughout the decade.

Operation Iraqi Freedom I (2003):

Maneuver Warfare Is Once Again Put to the Test

The first three years of the Global War on Terrorism saw two significant events that demonstrated 

that the Marine Corps had fully embraced the 

principles of maneuver warfare. The first of these 

was the more than 300-mile airlift of the 15th 

MEU (SOC) into Afghanistan and the seizure 

of Forward Operating Base Rhino. The second 

was the dramatic, 300 mile-long drive from the 

Kuwaiti border to Baghdad in March 2003. In a 

matter of weeks, I MEF, commanded by Lieutenant General James T. Conway, was able to maintain the same speed of advance as the Army’s V 

Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General William S. Wallace. I MEF’s organic ground combat 

element, 1st Marine Division under the command of Major General James N. Mattis, would 

ultimately advance deeper than V Corps into 

Iraq, from the Kuwaiti border in the south to the 

city of Tikrit, more than 80 miles to the north 

of Baghdad.1

 In all, more than 20,000 Marines 

and 5,000 vehicles would cross the Iraqi desert, 

constituting one of the longest land campaigns in 

the history of the Corps.2

The operational plan, described as “the first 

major test of the maneuver warfare doctrine,”3

demonstrated that the mechanized, highly mobile Marine Corps envisioned by many during 

the 1970s had become a reality. The campaign 

also revealed how much the Army and Marine 

Corps had converged in terms of capabilities and 

their overall doctrines of maneuver.4

 The “march 

up”5

 from Kuwait to Baghdad was defined by 

speed. For the operation, I MEF was designed 

to travel as lightly and as rapidly as possible. The 

1st Marine Division would “fight lean,” utilizing 

only the barest minimum of logistical support. 

Vehicles were even equipped with external fuel 

tanks to increase range to optimum level.6

 All 

three of the 1st Marine Division’s regiments were 

reinforced with light armored reconnaissance 

battalions equipped with LAV-25 light armored 

vehicles. Two of these regiments, Regimental 

Combat Teams 5 and 7, also included a tank

battalion each.7

 The attached 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (Task Force Tarawa) was also 

reinforced with companies of light armored vehicles and tanks. The advance was demanding, with 

1st Marine Division’s subordinate commanders 

under constant pressure from its headquarters 

to maintain a constant forward advance.8

 On 4 

April 2003, for example, Major General Mattis 

relieved Colonel Joseph D. Dowdy of command 

of Regimental Combat Team 1 largely due to the 

sense that his regiment was slowing down the advance of the rest of the division.9

The initial invasion of Iraq bore the hallmarks of a large-scale conventional military 

operation against an organized national army. 

Yet, within a matter days, it became apparent 

that operations in Iraq would require a range of 

skills and tactics more in line with those entailed 

within military operations other-than-war. During the battle of an-Nasiriyah fought between 

23 March and 2 April 2003, Task Force Tarawa encountered fierce resistance from irregular 

militia forces known as fedayeen. These enemy 

forces utilized “hospitals, mosques, and schools 

as arms caches and defensive positions” as they 

battled Marines and sought to disrupt and hinder I MEF’s northward advance.10 The fedayeen’s 

tactics were largely inspired by those utilized in 

Somalia against U.S. forces in 1993, including 

blending in with the civilian population, utilizing rocket-propelled grenades, and using suicide 

attacks to slow down the U.S. advance and inflict 

the maximum number of casualties.11 As the U.S. 

forces advanced northward, regular Iraqi soldiers 

also began to melt into the population to give 

themselves an advantage.12 The fedayeen also had 
The Iraq War 45

a transnational element, with fighters coming to 

Iraq from across the Middle East to participate in 

martyrdom missions against American forces.13

All of these characteristics would define the insurgency launched against the U.S. occupation 

in the months after the fall of Saddam’s regime. 

However, while the tactics were similar, the fedayeen proved to be inconsequential to the ultimate outcome of the war.14 The end of the initial 

phase of the conflict occurred within a matter of 

weeks, as Marine Corps and Army units entered 

Baghdad beginning on 7 April 2003.

With the collapse of the Baath regime came 

a range of new challenges and tasks as the United 

States found itself increasingly responsible for the 

occupation and administration of the Iraqi state. 

During the days immediately following the collapse of the Baath regime, it did not appear that 

the coming months would be marked by further 

hostilities or violence, and both Marines and soldiers began to implement security and stability 

operations (also known as Phase IV operations). 

The Bush administration was reluctant to engage 

in nation building and initially hoped to implement a quick and rapid transfer of authority to 

the Iraqis.15 Consequently, there had been little 

planning for postwar operations, with one senior 

Marine declaring there was “absolutely no plan 

for Phase IV.”16

This was not entirely the case. In January 

2003, for example, the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory conducted a war game examining how Marines dealt with civilian populations, 

analyzing the Combined Action Program in 

Vietnam, operations in Somalia, and the recent 

operation in Afghanistan, with the intent of preparing Marines to deal with the population of a 

post-Saddam Iraq. Among the participants were 

former Combined Action Program Marines.17

Following the war game, the Marine Corps’ 

Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities 

produced a report detailing what commanders 

would need to consider as they developed tactics 

and training exercises for dealing with the Iraqi 

population.18 Anticipating postwar challenges, 

several I MEF staff members devised preliminary 

security and stability plans in the event of the 

Baath regime’s collapse, assuming the worst possible scenario.19 As the fall of Saddam Hussein’s 

government gave way to mass looting and general disorder in the streets of Iraq’s cities, it rapidly became apparent that Marines would need 

to conduct stability operations to reassert order 

in their areas of responsibility.

Even at this early stage in the Iraq War, the 

Marines of I MEF implemented a range of procedures that would become common practice 

during its operations throughout the insurgency 

phase of the war. The 11th Marines, the 1st Marine Division’s artillery regiment, was tasked with 

conducting foot patrols and operating the division’s Civil-Military Operations Center.20 During 

future deployments to Iraq, Marine artillery units 

would be given similar civil affairs and security 

missions, and often found themselves “leaving the 

tubes at home.”21 The Civil-Military Operations 

Center helped lay the groundwork for rebuilding 

Photo by GySgt Matthew M. Smith

Two of the more influential Marine commanders in Iraq 

in 2003 were 1st Marine Division commander Gen James 

N. Mattis (right) and 5th Marines commanding officer Col 

Joseph F. Dunford Jr.
46 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

basic infrastructure and services in Baghdad, including appointing an interim police chief, opening a police academy, and enlisting the help of 

electrical engineers to reestablish the power grid.22

For Brigadier General John F. Kelly, 1st Marine 

Division’s assistant division commander, the operations, which entailed providing basic security 

and humanitarian assistance, were akin to disaster 

relief.23

On 11 April, General Mattis placed Brigadier General Kelly in command of Task Force 

Tripoli, a task-organized force that combined I 

MEF’s three light armored reconnaissance battalions (1st, 2d, and 3d LAR Battalions) into a 

single mechanized unit, and sent it northwest 

from Baghdad to secure the city of Tikrit. Within 

days, the city was cleared of enemy forces, though 

looting and general lawlessness remained. Once 

again, Kelly saw the need to establish basic security and saw a solution to the problem when local 

tribal sheikhs approached the Marine checkpoint 

in order to establish a tribal leadership council.24

The tribes of Iraq, especially those in its western regions, would play a critical role in defeating 

the Iraq insurgency between 2006 and 2007. As 

a result, it is important to have an understanding of the role tribes have played in Iraq and its 

development as a state. Tribes have been a part 

of the Mesopotamian society for centuries. Along 

with the organization of much of the region’s 

rural population into tribes, clans, households, 

houses, and families, tribalism also left a legacy 

of concern for family, honor, and a loyalty to particular tribal groups that made cooperation beyond kinship groups difficult.25 The development 

of Iraq as a state was thus often shaped by the 

tensions between a centralizing government and 

a rival source of authority in the form of alliances 

built on kinship and tribal affiliation. During the 

Ottoman Empire, alliances between the central 

government and the tribal elites helped lay the 

foundation for governance in the provinces along 

the Tigris and Euphrates rivers.

Under the British Mandate (established in 

1920) and the subsequent Hashemite Kingdom 

(1932–58), the tribes were given considerable 

autonomy from the central Iraqi state.26 Following the overthrow of the Hashemites in 1958 and 

the establishment of the Iraqi Republic, tribal 

power in Iraq declined as the Baath party sought 

to centralize its authority and modernize the state 

by abolishing old traditional prerogatives and 

weakening rival sources of authority.27 Indeed, 

the Baath party often asserted that tribalism was 

a vestige of Iraq’s colonial past.28 Nevertheless, 

the Baath party often found itself forced to rely 

on the support of Iraq’s tribes, especially during 

the 1980s and 1990s when Saddam Hussein’s 

policies led to increasing threats to his regime 

from both outside (Iran, the U.S.-led Coalition 

in 1990–91) and within (the Shia uprising of 

1991).29 Of particular importance was the large 

Dulaimi Confederation of tribes located in Iraq’s 

vast western al-Anbar Province, a confederation 

that would play a crucial role in Marine Corps 

and Army counterinsurgency efforts over the 

course of Operation Iraqi Freedom. By the late 

1990s, Iraq’s tribes had become an integral part 

of the state’s security apparatus, a testament to 

the gradual decline of Iraq’s central government 

in the face of sanctions and constant military 

pressure.30 The tribes also took advantage of the 

economic disruption caused by the United Nations’ sanctions against Iraq, participating in a 

range of extra-legal activities such as smuggling, 

extortion, and hijacking.

General Kelly and Task Force Tripoli’s staff 

greeted the overtures from Tikrit’s sheikhs with 

some trepidation due to their history and place 

within Saddam Hussein’s governing apparatus. 

Not only had many of the sheikhs been involved 

in the Baath regime, but they also represented 

an antimodern, antidemocratic, and hereditary 

form of authority that conflicted with the goal 

of creating a stable, liberal, democratic state in 

Iraq.31 Nevertheless, faced with the need to reestablish order and security as quickly as possible, 
The Iraq War 47

Kelly agreed to the creation of an interim council 

managed by the sheikhs for the purpose of restoring basic services to the city.32

Throughout April, Task Force Tripoli confronted both the problems and benefits of

empowering Tikrit’s tribal groups. Vigilante organizations remained active, as did tensions between Arabs and Kurds. Nevertheless, General 

Kelly undertook considerable effort to build a 

working relationship with the sheikhs, in particular Fahran al-Sudaid, with whom Kelly traveled 

to the city of Bayji in order to assist him in establishing a governing council and police chief.33

Back in Tikrit, Task Force Tripoli continued to 

rebuild the region’s infrastructure, purifying water and working to rebuild power lines and grids. 

Its operations in the city were of relatively short 

duration, and between 19–21 April, the task 

force was relieved by elements of the U.S. Army’s 

4th Infantry Division under the command of 

Major General Raymond T. Odierno.

The transfer of authority over Tikrit from 

Task Force Tripoli to the 4th Infantry Division 

has sparked some debate, largely due to the contrast between the Marine Corps and Army approaches to security and stability operations in 

Iraq.34 The Marine Corps’ occasional paper, With 

the 1st Marine Division in Iraq, 2003, which 

draws on the division’s command chronologies, 

is critical of the 4th Infantry Division, writing 

that “the dichotomy between the two peacekeeping strategies was unsettling for the Marines.”35

The account also criticizes the Army division for 

failing to follow up on Task Force Tripoli’s efforts 

to forge a working relationship with tribal leaders and Tikrit’s citizens, and for preferring a more 

Photo by LCpl Nicholous Radloff

Marines of Task Force Tripoli in Tikrit, north of Baghdad, in April 2003. As they transferred authority over the city to the U.S. 

Army’s 4th Infantry Division that month, many Marines were struck by the differing approaches to security and stability operations of the two Services.
48 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

aggressive approach. The 4th Infantry Division’s 

failure to capitalize on these efforts helped to create an adversarial relationship between the Iraqi 

people and U.S. forces. Overall, the 4th Infantry 

Division has been criticized for its “heavy-handed tactics”36 and overreliance on artillery in operations throughout northern Iraq.

In the opinion of the 4th Infantry Division, 

however, the situation in Tikrit was not as stable 

as the Marines claimed. Lieutenant Colonel Gian 

P. Gentile, the executive officer of the 1st Brigade 

Combat Team of the 4th Infantry Division, noted, “The velvet glove applied by the Marines in 

Tikrit covered up some dangerous problems and 

conditions.”37 These conditions included continued mass looting and other forms of lawlessness. 

The dichotomy was likely a consequence of different perceptions regarding what type of mission 

needed to be performed. General Kelly’s outlook 

was that major combat operations had come to 

a close and postwar security operations were required. General Odierno and his division, in contrast, believed that such operations were premature. The region north of Baghdad around Tikrit, 

Samarra, and Baqubah had seen little combat 

during the initial phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Consequently, Baathist networks remained 

active and continued to attack American forces 

throughout the summer of 2003.38

Significant contrasts nevertheless remained 

between how the Marine Corps and Army related to the Iraqi population. While debate regarding which approach worked best will continue 

for some time, one important fact remains that 

is pertinent to this history: the rivalry between 

the Army and Marine Corps spurred innovation 

on the part of the Corps as it frequently devised 

counterinsurgency and stability operation tactics 

distinct from those utilized by the Army. The use 

of mounted and dismounted patrols is one example. On 17 April 2003, General Mattis remarked 

on the distinctions between the two services in 

his intentions message on the transfer of authority to the U.S. Army V Corps:

Photo by Sgt Kevin R. Reed

The 1st Marine Division’s advance into Iraq in 2003 was marked by high speed and mobility. In all, more than 20,000 Marines 

and 5,000 vehicles would cross the Iraqi desert, constituting one of the longest land campaigns in the history of the Corps.
The Iraq War 49

A critical lesson emerging in our handoff with V Corps is the mission essential 

requirement for dismounted infantry in 

civil-military ops. As we hand off our 

portion of Baghdad as well as the city 

of Tikrit, the lack of Army dismounts is 

creating a void in personal contact and 

public perception of our civil-military 

ops. Our forces need to project confidence in the security environment we 

have created. That is best exemplified in 

light, mobile force in armored vehicles. If 

we cannot engender friendship and confidence in the local security environment, 

we cannot set the conditions for good order integral to return civil control.39

The use of dismounted patrols would be a significant hallmark of the Marine Corps’ approach to 

security operations and counterinsurgency. Thus, 

the Marine Corps’ nature as a service built around 

dismounted riflemen became an asset in Iraq.40

As the 1st Marine Division transferred from 

Baghdad to occupation duties in southern Iraq 

during the summer of 2003, Mattis reinforced 

this point by ordering the division’s armored 

personnel carriers, tanks, and artillery to be sent 

back to Kuwait “to prevent his Marines from 

using heavy firepower that might unnecessarily 

arouse the locals.”41 The foot patrols also allowed 

the Iraqis to put a human face on the U.S. forces. 

As one Marine lieutenant recalled, “We did a lot 

of patrols . . . actually we did a lot of patrols, 

day and night, working the city.”42 Marines acknowledged that such patrols were dangerous. 

“You’re putting yourself out in the open—just 

walking down the middle of the street.” Nevertheless, it forced Marines and Iraqis to interact 

in a way that would have been impossible if the 

Marines relied only on armored vehicles. The sacrifice in security brought with it a less menacing and intimidating presence.43 The fact that all 

Marines were trained to be proficient marksman 

(“Every Marine a Rifleman”) also increased the 

numbers of Marines capable of participating in 

patrols and security operations. A lessons learned 

brief on Operation Iraqi Freedom emphasized 

this point, recommending that combat training 

should remain a requirement for all noninfantry 

Marines.44

During the summer of 2003, I MEF was 

tasked with the administration of nine provinces in Iraq’s south. The 1st Marine Division was 

responsible for seven of these.45 General Mattis’ 

approach to security operations was to balance 

a light footprint with persistent personal contact between Marines and Iraqis. Along with the 

division’s tanks and assault vehicles, Mattis also 

sent about 15,000 Marines home, leaving about 

8,000 in Iraq.46 Seven battalions remained (one 

for each province) along with two light armored 

reconnaissance battalions.47 The aviation component of I MEF, the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing 

(commanded by Major General James F. Amos) 

also returned to the United States, leaving behind two helicopter detachments.48 The region 

was densely populated, accounting for more than 

10 million individuals, roughly equating to one 

Marine for every 1,200 Iraqis.49 It was an exceptionally small number, especially considering the 

area of responsibility amounted to roughly half 

the country’s population. However, by maintaining a light footprint, Mattis hoped to prevent the 

impression of an oppressive occupation and ensure that people did not see a Marine everywhere 

they looked. Furthermore, he and others hoped 

to enlist the aid of Iraqis for security and administrative purposes.50

The battalion commanders were given responsibility for security, rebuilding infrastructure, and restarting basic services. They worked 

closely with the Iraqis, having tea with local 

leaders and building a rapport that gave them 

considerable knowledge and understanding of 

the culture and society of their area of responsibility.51 Total authority over the administration and security in each province rested entirely 

with the battalion commander, so much so that 
50 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

the Marines’ zone of responsibility was dubbed 

“The Blue Diamond Republic.”52 In the words 

of General Kelly, “They were, from commanders 

to squad leaders on patrol, in essence benevolent 

dictators with the wisdom of Solomon required 

to cut through the maze of competing agendas 

and emotions that dominate Iraqi society.”53 In 

al-Muthanna Province’s capital, as-Samawah, the 

2d Battalion, 5th Marines, under Lieutenant Colonel Daniel J. O’Donohue, successfully directed 

and supervised the recreation of a local city council with the cooperation of the city’s tribal leaders. In an-Najaf, the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, 

commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Christopher 

C. Conlin, arrested, removed, and replaced the 

city’s unpopular and corrupt mayor.54 In Karbala, 

the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines’ commander, Lieutenant Colonel Michael F. Belcher, helped organize city council elections and even participated 

in the selection of council members to particular posts.55 Creating a working police force that 

could provide security in a just and ethical manner was deemed a priority, and throughout the 

Marines’ zone of responsibility they opened new 

academies and patrolled alongside Iraqi policemen in order to put “an Iraqi face” on security.56

General Mattis ordered Marines to remove 

their sunglasses when speaking to Iraqis, so that 

they could look each other in the eye.57 Chaplains 

provided Marines with cultural sensitivity training, helping them to understand the importance 

of religion and religious institutions in Iraq.58 Understudy officers were also assigned by division 

headquarters to the battalions to provide commanders and staffs with information on “intelligence trends, local gossip, clerical proclamations 

(fatwah), and events on the street.”59 The approach 

was well summarized by General Kelly, who explained that in the absence of doctrine, the goal 

was to reestablish a working society by pointing 

out the parallels between Iraqi and American culture as a means of guidance. In Western countries, 

Kelly noted, individuals wanted to be left alone 

and were anxious around armed men in uniform, 

especially at holy sites. Iraq was no different.60

Mattis synthesized his guidance for the postwar 

administration into three basic goals: win hearts 

and minds, ensure that Marines would always win 

“the 10-second gunfight,” and “do no harm.” “If 

someone needs shooting, shoot him. If someone 

does not need shooting, protect him.”61

The Marine Corps was able to make the mental transition from combat to postwar operations 

with little difficulty, a fact commended later by 

I MEF commander General Conway.62 It did so 

without substantial preparation or planning beforehand, nor specific doctrinal guidance for security and stability operations. The sudden need to 

administer Iraq came as a surprise to many Marines 

in the field. General Kelly remarked that summer 

that he assumed nongovernment organizations 

would be putting the country back together and 

that United Nations forces would be providing security. “No one expected that we would have to 

put down the rifle and immediately turn around 

and start rebuilding a nation.”63 One platoon 

commander recalled about the operations, “It was 

kind of painful actually—because that’s not what 

we’re traditionally trained to do. But we started to 

make some progress with it.”64 The commander of 

the 5th Marines and later chief of staff of the 1st 

Marine Division, Colonel Joseph F. Dunford Jr., 

concurred, noting in August 2003 that he had not 

anticipated such heavy involvement in Phase IV 

operations on the part of the division.65 Deputy 

commanding general of I MEF, Major General 

Keith J. Stalder noted some surprise as well, but 

again acknowledged the Marines’ ability to adapt. 

“Our general prediction at the time was that the 

basic services for the Iraqi people would be the 

main effort in the campaign ahead, and we were 

absolutely right about that. I won’t say I was surprised, but it was pretty murky when you looked 

at it.”66 The 1st Marine Division’s operations officer, Lieutenant Colonel Norman L. Cooling, 

noted at the same time that much more time had 

been spent on security and stability operations 

than anticipated and that the plans for Phase IV 
The Iraq War 51

operations conducted before the invasion had 

been premised on incorrect assumptions about the 

state of Iraq following the war.67

Marines looked to a variety of precedents and 

historical examples as they set about conducting 

security operations. Colonel Dunford noted the 

importance of the Small Wars Manual, describing it as the “primary” doctrinal publication for 

the Marines in Iraq.68 Lieutenant Colonel Cooling agreed, though also noted that while the 

manual contained broad, universally applicable 

principles, it naturally lacked guidance regarding 

the specific cultural environment and circumstances for Iraq.69 Division staff members did 

consult with members of the British armed forces 

deployed in Iraq, in particular about their own 

experiences in Northern Ireland.70 Perhaps most 

important, however, was the tone set by General 

Mattis, who laid down a clear conception of how 

he wished to conduct security operations to his 

division commanders. A rigorous lessons learned 

program was also instituted, with Mattis meeting with his commanders every 10 days to review 

which tactics and procedures were working and 

which were not.71

While I MEF achieved a considerable number 

of successes during the summer of 2003, the period was also marked by setbacks and difficulties. 

Some were a consequence of deficiencies within 

the expeditionary force and division, most notably the lack of translators.72 Before Operation 

Iraqi Freedom began, I MEF estimated it would 

need 253 Arabic linguists. The Marine Corps 

could only provide 155 toward this requirement 

and of these only 45 were actually deployed to 

the theater.73 Thus, the expeditionary force had 

Photo by SSgt Bryan P. Reed

Marines from the 24th MEU establish a perimeter in Qalat Sukkar, Iraq, in 2003. Ensuring that Marines maintained close 

and visible contact with Iraqi civilians was a critical element of the 1st Marine Division’s security and stability operations during the summer of 2003. 
52 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

less than a quarter of the linguists required for 

its operations in Iraq. A Reserve Combat Assessment Team analyzing lessons learned from reserve 

forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom observed that 

“the MEF desperately needed translators during 

all phases of the conflict but especially during the 

Phase IV stabilization operations. The translators 

that the MEF did have were ‘worth their weight 

in gold,’ as one senior officer put it.”74 During the 

fall of 2003, Marine Corps Gazette would publish 

an article addressing the issue written by Arabic 

linguist Major Clint J. Nussberger, who concluded that “our national strategy of engagement 

requires that the Marine Corps retain a qualified 

pool of operational linguists.”75 Nussberger recommended a more rigorous process of identifying potential linguists within the Corps’ ranks as 

well as the continued use of Marine Expeditionary Force Command language programs.

Broader problems beyond the control of the 

Marine Corps units also existed, most notably the 

declining situation in Iraq within months of the 

fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime and the inability 

of the newly constituted Coalition Provisional Authority to support the reconstruction efforts being 

undertaken by U.S. forces in the field. The constant struggle to rebuild the nation’s power grid 

was one example, as the state’s infrastructure had 

been in a state of decline even before the war.76

Senior policemen were often corrupt, used to the 

practices of the Baath regime, and frequently unwilling to change their ways.77 When Lieutenant 

Colonel Conlin organized elections to replace the 

mayor of an-Najaf, it was initially supported by 

the Coalition Provisional Authority under L. Paul 

Bremer. However, shortly before the process was 

to begin, the authority ordered General Mattis to 

cancel the election out of fear that “an unfriendly 

Photo by LCpl Gordon A. Rouse

A Marine Corps High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle races to aid Marines fighting in an-Nasiriyah during the “march 

up” to Baghdad in April 2003. At an-Nasiriyah, Marines first encountered irregular fedayeen fighters who utilized many of the 

same tactics that insurgents would use during the subsequent insurgency.
The Iraq War 53

Islamic candidate would prevail.”78 Instead, Conlin was asked by the authority to select a group 

of Iraqis considered safe and allow them to select 

a new mayor. Bremer’s decision to disband the 

Iraqi Army also stalled reconstruction efforts, especially since General Mattis’ decision to redeploy 

the bulk of his division home had been predicated 

on the assumption that Iraqis would be able to 

participate in security operations. As Mattis recalled, “Two things then created major problems: 

disbanding the Iraqi Army and putting proud 

soldiers on the street unemployed. The other was 

shortstopping local elections.”79

A number of characteristics would emerge 

from the Marine Corps’ stability operations that 

would continue to shape its approach to combating the Iraq insurgency when Marines returned 

to Iraq in 2004. The first was an emphasis on dismounted patrolling and engaging the populace 

to put a human face on the American presence 

in Iraq. Related to this was the frequent utilization of all Marines for security duty. The concept 

that every Marine was a rifleman was confirmed 

by the frequent reliance on Marines from artillery battalions and logistics and combat service 

support units to perform security and civil affairs 

operations. The second was to seek out the sources of power and authority within local communities and forge cooperative arrangements with 

them. Thus, for example, although Task Force 

Tripoli expressed reluctance about empowering 

traditional tribal sheikhs, its members nevertheless understood that ignoring them and attempting to circumvent them would ultimately prove 

counterproductive. Third, the Marines focused 

on building police forces and trying to ensure 

that Iraqis, and not Marines, be responsible for 

security patrols.

Photo by Cpl Mace M. Gratz

Enemy prisoners of war and suspected fedayeen irregulars captured by Marines during fighting north of an-Nasiriyah in 2003.
54 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

The Marines would continue to utilize these 

basic approaches when they returned to Iraq in 

2004. However, as will be seen, the situation in 

that country quickly became more chaotic, lethal, 

and radicalized, necessitating new approaches 

and innovations. Thus, beginning in late 2003, 

Marine leaders would begin analyzing the events 

of the year and developing new approaches and 

strategies. What were once described as security 

and stability operations and military operations 

other than war were soon to be analyzed under the 

concepts of small wars and counterinsurgencies.

The Return to Iraq, 2004

When the commanding general of U.S. Central 

Command, John P. Abizaid, stated in a 13 July 

2003 press conference that U.S. forces in Iraq 

were facing a “classical guerrilla-type campaign 

against us,” he confirmed what many officials and 

troops in Iraq already knew.80 During the spring 

and summer of 2003, Iraq rapidly fell into the 

grips of an insurgency made up of a diverse collection of loosely organized groups with a variety 

of objectives. These ranged from former regime 

loyalists fighting for nationalist goals to foreign 

fundamentalist fighters whose primary aim was to 

build a new Islamist state. Whatever their background and goals, the U.S. forces in Iraq were 

their common enemy.81 As a consequence of the 

insurgency, the United States was forced to bolster 

its forces in Iraq. Almost as soon as the Marines of 

I MEF had returned to the United States, Commandant of the Marine Corps General Michael 

W. Hagee ordered Lieutenant General Conway to 

prepare three battalions for another deployment 

to Iraq.82 Within weeks, three battalions became 

two regimental combat teams, an air wing, and a 

force service support group, representing roughly 63 percent of the expeditionary force’s total 

strength.83

The deployment, scheduled for the spring of 

2004, would be markedly different from the one 

in 2003. Not only would the primary mission 

be security, reconstruction, and nation building, 

but the Marines would also be deployed to Iraq’s 

al-Anbar Province. Whereas in 2003 the Marine 

Corps was responsible for occupying Iraq’s Shiadominated south, now it would be responsible for 

a region defined by both Sunni Islam and tribal 

culture. While the population was considerably 

smaller (a little more than a million individuals, 

the majority of whom lived in towns and cities 

along the Euphrates River) than the population 

administered by the Marines in 2003, the total 

area was far greater: at 53,208 square miles, it was 

the largest of Iraq’s provinces, comprising about 

32 percent of Iraq’s total area.84 Thus, I MEF 

would be responsible for controlling the province’s nearly 500 mile-long international border 

with Jordan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. As a Sunni 

stronghold, al-Anbar was also a center of the insurgency, especially the city of al-Fallujah, which 

had been as hostile to the Baathist regime as it 

was to the Coalition Provisional Authority that 

replaced it.85 Lying along old trade and smuggling routes connecting Baghdad to the Middle 

Eastern states to Iraq’s west, the province was also 

the site of several “ratlines” as fighters from Saudi 

Arabia, Jordan, and Syria crossed into Iraq to 

participate in the insurgency.86

To confront the new challenges of operating 

in al-Anbar Province in what was now an irregular war, Generals Conway, Mattis, Amos, and the 

subordinate commanders of I MEF set to work 

devising a new plan for the return to Iraq that 

built upon their experiences the previous summer. Critically, the same commanders who led the 

Marine Corps against Saddam Hussein’s forces in 

March and April 2003 would command I MEF 

when it returned the following year. Along with 

General Conway, all of the major I MEF commanders would return, including General Mattis 

(1st Marine Division), General Amos (3d Marine 

Aircraft Wing), and Brigadier General Richard 

S. Kramlich (1st Force Service Support Group). 

General Conway’s deputy Marine expeditionary 

force commander, chief of staff, and the deputy 

chiefs of staff for manpower and personnel, intel-
The Iraq War 55

ligence, operations, civil affairs, and communications were all veterans of the 2003 deployment. 

Likewise, General Mattis’ deputy and former 

commander of Task Force Tripoli, General Kelly, 

would also return in his post as 1st Marine Division’s assistant division commander. Colonel 

Dunford, who had commanded Regimental 

Combat Team 5 during the march up in 2003, 

would return as General Mattis’ chief of staff. 

Colonel Toolan, who had served as both General 

Mattis’ chief of operations and a regimental commander, would also return as commanding officer 

of Regimental Combat Team 1. Colonel Stuart 

L. Knoll would return as commander of Marine 

Aircraft Group 16 and Colonel Ronnell R. McFarland would return as commander of Marine 

Air Control Group 38.87 Personnel continuity existed beyond the expeditionary force’s command 

structure, with many platoons and companies returning with little significant personnel change. 

First Lieutenant Anthony C. Johnston recalled 

on his platoon’s redeployment that “a lot of highend leadership remained intact” and that “we had 

enough key players in place that went through the 

first time, so when the new guys showed up, there 

was the experience there too.”88

Through I MEF, planners devised new means 

for confronting the challenges emerging in Iraq. 

The overall focus was on creating a plan of action 

distinct from that being used by Army units currently in theater. General Conway likened it more 

to the British Army’s approach in Basrah than 

to the Army’s.89 These efforts included renewed 

language and civil affairs training.90 The division 

contacted Arabists, such as Barak A. Salmoni at 

the Naval Postgraduate School, to provide Marines with briefings about Arab and Iraqi culture 

and society.91 “We didn’t even look at a mortar 

Photo by Cpl Annette Kyriades

Part of General Mattis’ plan for the 1st Marine Division’s second deployment to Iraq in 2004 was to introduce a version of the 

Vietnam War-era Combined Action Program in which Marines would train and fight alongside Iraqi security forces. In this 

image, members of the 11th MEU train Iraqi National Guard commandos at an-Najaf in 2004.
56 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

system pretty much the whole time we were there 

[training] and it worked out well,” noted Lieutenant Johnston about the cultural training he 

received before redeploying.92 First Lieutenant 

Donovan Campbell, who commanded a platoon 

of the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, recounted the 

challenges of training his command:

So, two weeks into January we shifted 

much of our time and effort away from 

proficiency in traditional missions and 

toward a new goal: learning how to avoid 

offending the Iraqis. My Marines, 50 

percent of whom probably could not 

have learned a major world religion, now 

learned the intricacies of the historical 

and doctrinal conflicts between Sunni 

and Shiite Islamic sects. We crammed 

Iraqi cultural nuances down their throats 

as fast as they could swallow them.93

Among other things, Marines were instructed 

not to stare at Iraqi women, not to touch Iraqis 

with the left hand, and to avoid showing Iraqis 

the bottom of their shoes.94

The 1st Marine Division also established a 

“rudimentary orientation” for its units using an 

abandoned housing site at March Air Reserve 

Base. The concept of creating a realistic training 

environment would lay the foundations for the 

creation of the Mojave Viper exercises at the Marine Air Ground Combat Center at Twentynine 

Palms (see below).95 During the exercise, role 

players were used to create an environment replicating that of an Iraqi town.96 Marines patrolled 

the mock-up, honing their skills at dismounted 

and mounted patrolling and establishing vehicle 

checkpoints. An elaborate range of scenarios 

was created to further enhance the realism of 

the training, with the role players given specific 

scripts and backgrounds. The steps in the presence patrol exercise began with the patrol leader 

gaining and maintaining situational awareness, 

drawing from intelligence and communications 

from higher headquarters and situation reports. 

The procedures for conducting the patrol emphasized conducting reconnaissance, developing necessary security measures, providing an 

overwatch (sniper, marksman) element, acquiring information on persons to be apprehended, 

and establishing casualty evacuation procedures. 

During the exercise, patrol leaders ensured that 

each Marine demonstrated an understanding of 

his mission and the rules of engagement.97

Dismounted patrolling would play an important part in the Marine Corps’ operational plans 

for Iraq. For example, Company G, 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, eliminated its weapons platoon 

and fielded a company made up of four rifle platoons, the rationale being that the use of mortars 

and rockets in densely populated areas could kill 

civilians and further alienate the population.98 A 

briefing from the command chronology of the 2d 

Battalion, 4th Marines, established a wide range 

of standards for effective patrolling, including 

the need to ensure all patrols possessed offensive 

capabilities, the importance of ensuring no unnecessary harm came to noncombatants, and the 

ability to effectively and rapidly deal with a variety 

of contingencies, including establishing a vehicle 

checkpoint, controlling a crowd, confronting civil 

disturbances, and apprehending suspects and arms 

caches.99

Once again, Marine leaders looked to the 

Small Wars Manual to be a useful basic guide for 

conducting operations, and General Mattis encouraged his Marines to read it before redeploying.100 Mattis also prepared a package of articles 

for his officers to read. These included works on 

current operations in Iraq as well as works on insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, such as T. E. 

Lawrence’s essay “Twenty-Seven Articles,” a collection of axioms and observations from his experience during the Arab Revolt of World War I 

as well as essays on Israel’s occupation of Lebanon.101 In preparing for the deployment, Mattis 

also studied French counterinsurgency operations 

in Algeria.102
The Iraq War 57

The principle enshrined in Lawrence’s 15th 

article—“Do not try to do too much with your 

own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than 

you do it perfectly”—underpinned much of the 

Marine Corps’ approach to its return to Iraq.103

To help build Iraqi security forces and put an 

Iraqi face on operations, the Marines planned to 

reintroduce the Vietnam-era Combined Action 

Program. The 1st Marine Division aimed to take 

one platoon from each battalion and transform it 

into an integrated CAP platoon that integrated 

Marines and Iraqi security forces. The Marines in 

this platoon would be given extra language and 

cultural training.104 As in Vietnam, the purpose 

of the CAP platoon was to strengthen local forces, better prepare them to fight what was ostensibly an Iraqi and not an American war, and also 

build closer relations between American forces 

and local security units.

As also in Vietnam, Marine Corps platoons 

would be partnered with and would train larger 

Iraqi units. The Marines tasked with participating in the program were given an intense 20-day 

language training course.105 While none of the 

Marines were expected to become fluent in less 

than three weeks, the training was nevertheless 

helpful. First Lieutenant Charles E. Anklam III 

noted that the biggest benefit of the language 

training was not so much that Marines could effectively communicate with the Iraqis, but that it 

allowed them to demonstrate to partnered indigenous units that they were attempting to broach 

the linguistic and cultural divide to form a closer, 

cooperative bond.106

The Marines tasked with working in the CAP 

program looked to the Marine Corps’ past experiences, in particular the use of the CAP in Vietnam, read Bing West’s The Village, examined case 

Photo by SSgt Jonathan C. Knaith

The performance of Iraqi forces attached to the 1st Marine Division in 2004 was mixed. However, in many cases, such as Operation al-Fajr, Iraqi units proved to be a critical factor and attested to the benefits of close, joint operations between the Coalition 

and Iraqis. In the image above, Iraqi soldiers train in preparation for the fight to clear Fallujah in November 2004.
58 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

studies, and also listened to lectures from former 

CAP Marines.107 In general, however, there was 

little guidance with regard to how the CAP units 

would be organized or what their actual mission 

would be. “There was no clearly defined mission 

statement,” recalled Lieutenant Anklam.108 “It 

was just a rough commander’s intent.”

Two notable examples were CAP Platoon 

Golf 3 and CAP India. The first was built around 

a platoon from Company G, 2d Battalion, 7th 

Marines, partnered with the 503d Iraqi National 

Guard Battalion.109 The second platoon, built 

around Marines from Weapons Company, 3d 

Battalion, 1st Marines, and Company I of the 

505th Battalion of the Iraqi National Guard, 

would participate in the Second Battle of Fallujah in November 2004 and would distinguish itself as the only Iraqi National Guard unit to fight 

alongside Marines on the frontlines of the battle.110 For many of the CAP Marines, the Combined Action Program was a considerable force 

multiplier. Lieutenant Anklam recalled, “When 

you look at it in the grander scheme of things, 

one platoon with a company of [Iraqi Civil Defense Corps Units] affected tremendously large 

amounts of space—entire towns and villages. To 

receive that same level of success and passive nature in the town would have required probably 

company-size elements to do the same thing.”111

The use of the CAP underscored a number of 

notable elements of I MEF’s plans for the 2004 

deployment. The goal was to defeat the insurgency, not the insurgents. The Marines hoped 

that building a close relationship with the Iraqis 

would discourage them from joining the insurgency. At the same time, the CAP platoons could 

possibly motivate Iraqis to take part in their own 

defense. As General Mattis recalled,

We identified three groups of enemy, or 

potential players on the battlefield. The 

tribes, there were criminals amongst 

them, and what we thought we needed 

for them was jobs and securing them, the 

locals. Then we had the former regime elements. These were the recalcitrant ones, 

the ones who chose to be irreconcilable. 

There were criminals amongst them, too. 

And then we had the foreign fighters, not 

many, when you ran into them, because 

you generally didn’t take prisoners. They 

fought to the death.112

Thus , al-Anbar presented the Marines with a 

range of different threats. To gain further understanding in ways to confront the challenges, Mattis and his staff consulted with the Los Angeles 

Police Department (LAPD) to gain their insights 

into riot control and techniques for reducing and 

controlling gang violence.113 Mattis and his staff 

took classes taught by LAPD officers on gang 

violence and security issues and observed how 

they policed the city. LAPD explosive experts 

also helped to train 55 infantry battalions on improvised explosive devices and also deployed with 

the Marines to Iraq.114

The overall counterinsurgency, populationcentric approach recalled David Galula’s own observations on the Algerian War. Yet, it was also 

one that stemmed from the Marine Corps’ own 

history. As one Marine lieutenant noted on the 

CAP, the “Marine Corps [has] actually been doing programs similar to that basically through 

its history. I mean, you look, and there’s a heavy 

resemblance to it in Nicaragua, Haiti, and the 

South American campaigns back in the early 20s 

and 30s. We didn’t have the moniker ‘CAP’ onto 

it, but the mission was very much the same.”115

How unique the Marine Corps’ plans for Iraq 

actually were is open to debate, however. While 

Marine leaders made a point of drawing distinctions between the Corps’ approach and the Army’s 

reliance on artillery and heavy firepower,116 it is important to remember that Army units in Iraq were 

also making changes to their tactical approach to 

the insurgency by 2004. Beginning in the summer 

of 2003, the commander of the Combined Joint 

Task Force 7 (the principal Coalition command in 
The Iraq War 59

Iraq from 2003–4), Lieutenant General Ricardo 

S. Sanchez, USA, acknowledged that the “ironfisted approach to the conduct of [operations] was 

beginning to alienate Iraqis.”117 He subsequently 

ordered units to scale down the size of their operations and focus on precision strikes on specific 

insurgent targets. His overall plan identified the 

support of the Iraqi population as its center of 

gravity, with lines of operation focusing on governance, information operations, essential services, 

and economic recovery.118

Individual unit commanders devised similar 

approaches, often on their own initiative. Major 

General David H. Petraeus, who commanded the 

United States Army’s 101st Airborne Division (Air 

Assault) during its 2003 operations in the northern Iraqi town of Mosul, focused on protecting the 

population and restoring local governance. At the 

same time that I MEF was preparing for its second 

campaign in Iraq, Major General Peter W. Chiarelli, commander of the U.S. Army’s 1st Cavalry 

Division, was conducting “full-spectrum” operations focused on separating the population from 

the insurgency. General Chiarelli also consulted 

with local leaders and sheikhs to gain a better cultural understanding of the Iraqi population and 

built a close working relationship with the United 

States Agency for International Development’s 

Iraq mission.119

Thus, Army units were already developing inthe-field tactics and operations similar to those being developed by Marine Corps planners. Perhaps 

the most innovative aspect of the Marine Corps’ 

plan, then, was its singular focus and new perspective. While Army commanders such as Chiarelli 

and Petraeus had already laid the groundwork for 

a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy in 

Iraq, not all Army units followed course. With 

each division granted wide latitude to conduct 

operations, there was a lack of organization and 

direction in the Army’s efforts in the country. This 

was compounded by the difficult conversion of 

the Army V Corps into the Coalition headquarters in Iraq, the Combined Joint Task Force 7. The 

task force never had the necessary staff with which 

to effectively conduct and coordinate operations 

throughout the country.120 Consequently, it was 

often difficult to build upon the efforts of single 

division, brigade, and battalion commanders.

Both Generals Conway and Mattis provided a 

coherent vision for what they expected of I MEF 

and the 1st Marine Division. This vision was tied 

to the Marine Corps’ history and culture. Each 

commander made a point to remind the Marines 

that the coming campaign was not a new, unfamiliar one. The Marine Corps had fought small wars 

Photo by LCpl Gabriela Garcia

Marine commanders were not alone in developing new counterinsurgency tactics for Iraq. As I MEF prepared to redeploy 

to Iraq, MajGen Peter W. Chiarelli, USA (pictured above as 

a lieutenant general in 2006), led the 1st Cavalry Division 

in full-spectrum operations designed to isolate the insurgency 

from the Iraqi populace.
60 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

and counterinsurgencies throughout its history. 

It had fought these wars not by following doctrinal dogma, but by using sound judgment, quick 

thinking, and ensuring that its actions did not 

alienate the population from the Americans. General Mattis’ letter to all hands written in March 

2004 synthesizes the basic Marine Corps approach 

to counterinsurgency in Iraq. “The enemy will try 

to manipulate you into hating all Iraqis. Do not allow the enemy that victory. With strong discipline, 

solid faith, unwavering alertness, and undiminished chivalry to the innocent, we will carry out 

this mission. Remember, I have added, ‘First, do 

no harm’ to our passwords of ‘No Better Friend, 

No Worse Enemy.’ Keep your honor clean as we 

gain information about the enemy from the Iraqi 

people.”121 Importantly, Mattis situated the current mission within the Marine Corps’ long history: “This is the right place for Marines in this fight, 

where we can carry on the legacy of ‘Chesty’ Puller 

in the Banana Wars in the same sort of complex 

environment that he knew in his early years.”122

He also noted, “This is our test—our Guadalcanal, 

our Chosin Reservoir, our Hue City. Fight with a 

happy heart and keep faith in your comrades and 

your unit.”123

By invoking the memory of Lewis B. Puller, 

Mattis reminded the Marines of the 1st Marine 

Division that the current struggle in Iraq would be 

similar to the Banana Wars and other small wars 

that had shaped the Marine Corps’ history during the early twentieth century. At the same time, 

though, by referencing major campaigns in World 

War II, Korea, and Vietnam, the general stressed 

that the current struggle would require just as great 

a skill and understanding of warfare, both regular 

and irregular, as the battles of those conflicts.

As noted earlier, the ability of Marine Corps 

commanders to offer a clear intent and purpose 

to their subordinates and the units under their 

command would constitute an important feature of Marine counterinsurgency and small wars 

campaigns. Colonel Julian D. Alford, who would 

command the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, in both 

Afghanistan and Iraq between 2004 and 2005, remarked on the importance of building a common 

understanding between commanders and subordinates in counterinsurgency warfare in order for 

those subordinates to carry out orders and conduct 

operations in accordance with their commander’s 

overall goals. “When I said ‘left,’ they knew exactly what ‘left’ meant.”124 Colonel David J. Furness, who commanded Battalion Landing Team 

1/1 in Iraq in 2005 also remarked on the critical 

role commander’s intent played, noting, “If you’re 

going to be successful in a decentralized fight, you 

have to operate on commander’s intent. . . . What 

I learned from watching General Mattis at the division level [is how he would] go down to the PFC 

level and just embed his ideas, his thought process, 

what was important to him down to the private. 

Official U.S. Marine Corps photo

In this image from the Nicaragua intervention, Lewis B. 

Puller (second from left) stands with two members of the 

Nicaraguan National Guard. As the 1st Marine Division 

deployed to Iraq, MajGen Mattis declared, “This is the right 

place for Marines in this fight, where we can carry on the 

legacy of ‘Chesty’ Puller in the Banana Wars in the same sort 

of complex environment that he knew in his early years.”
The Iraq War 61

I said, okay. That’s what I have to do when I get 

battalion command.”125

During March 2004, I MEF gradually relieved 

the 82d Airborne Division and took over responsibility for operations in al-Anbar Province (later 

designated Multi-National Force-West). Within 

weeks of the force’s arrival, four contractors from 

Blackwater International were ambushed and 

murdered in Fallujah. Both the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, L. Paul Bremer, and 

the Bush administration believed that allowing the 

murders to go unanswered would damage American authority and allow an increasingly unstable 

situation to spiral out of control. Faced with the 

prospect of conducting a large-scale assault on the 

city, the very kind of assault many had criticized 

the Army of conducting during 2003, both Generals Conway and Mattis recommended a more 

restrained response in which they hoped to locate 

and kill the actual perpetrators. Both commanders contended that such an aggressive assault was 

precisely what the insurgents hoped the response 

would be.126 Despite their opposition, however, 

higher headquarters ordered a general offensive 

against the city on 5 April 2004. Three Marine 

battalions attacked the city in what became Operation Vigilant Resolve, the First Battle of Fallujah. 

After three days of fighting, outrage among both 

Iraqis and the Iraqi Governing Council caused by 

the attack and civilian deaths was so great that the 

Marines were ordered to stand down.127 With the 

city still in insurgent hands, Generals Conway and 

Mattis met with a former Iraqi general and created the Fallujah Brigade in the hope that Iraqi 

forces would be able to secure the city. The brigade 

would ultimately prove a failure, however, and the 

city soon became an insurgent stronghold.128

The First Battle of Fallujah marked the beginning of a series of battles fought between I MEF 

and the Iraq insurgency throughout its deployPhoto by LCpl Joel A. Chaverri

While the 1st Marine Division planned to focus on pacification and security operations during its 2004 deployment to Iraq, the 

year was dominated by the struggle to clear and secure the city of Fallujah. In this image, Marines from the 1st Battalion, 8th 

Marines, set up a 60mm M224 mortar as the battalion advances into the city.
62 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

ment in 2004. These included fighting between 

insurgents and Marines and soldiers in al-Anbar’s 

capital, ar-Ramadi; the Battle of an-Najaf against 

Shia militants led by Muqtada Sadr in August 

2004; and Operation al-Fajr, a second offensive 

against Fallujah that cleared the city of insurgents. The latter, involving two regimental combat 

teams, an Army brigade combat team, supporting ground units, air support from the 3d Marine 

Aircraft Wing, as well as Iraqi Army units, would 

constitute one of the largest battles fought by the 

Marine Corps since the Battle of Hue City in Vietnam.129 The battle saw fierce street fighting at close 

quarters as the Marines and soldiers methodically 

cleared each city block of insurgent forces.

Thus, the summer and winter of 2004 were 

markedly different than the Marine Corps had 

planned. Lieutenant Anklam recalled,

The perceived mission statement that we 

were going to fall in on would be less an 

offensive nature at the time and more 

along the lines of supporting the Iraqi 

security forces, helping to redevelop the 

infrastructure in the towns and communities via providing a stable, war infraction-free environment . . . but obviously 

that took a backseat pretty quick, once 

we got into Iraq.130

Conclusion: The Marine Corps

and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2003–4

As in Afghanistan, the march up to Baghdad during the opening weeks of Operation Iraqi Freedom 

demonstrated the Marine Corps’ skill at conducting an operation based on maneuver principles. I 

MEF was able to cross overland at an operational 

pace equal to the Army’s V Corps, something that 

would have been unthinkable during the 1970s. 

However, the dramatically swift victory over Saddam Hussein’s forces led almost immediately into 

a new phase of the war marked by a general insurgency against both the U.S. occupation and the 

Iraqi government, which would gain sovereignty 

in 2004. Consequently, almost as soon as I MEF 

returned to the United States, it began to make 

preparations for a return to the country. In planning for the return, Marine Corps leaders looked 

to the service’s past as a counterinsurgency force, 

and even devised plans to implement a new version of the Vietnam-era Combined Action Program. The plan aimed to secure and protect the 

Iraqi population in order to cut off support for the 

insurgency. This entailed dismounted patrolling, a 

reticence to use extreme force, engagement with 

local Iraqi leaders, and training and equipping 

Iraqi security forces to partner alongside American 

forces. However, while I MEF did not abandon 

this plan when it arrived in Iraq, its efforts were 

nevertheless overshadowed by the fierce fighting in 

Fallujah, ar-Ramadi, and an-Najaf that ultimately 

fueled the insurgency even further and came to define the Iraq War for much of 2004.

At the end of 2004, I MEF’s primary focus 

was preparing for Iraq’s first national elections. In 

helping to organize and ensure the elections took 

place in a stable environment, the Marines were 

participating in a mission that it had performed 

on several occasions in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua during the 1920s. Nevertheless, the threat environment for the coming 

year remained uncertain. The year 2005 would see 

a range of operations along the Euphrates River as 

the Marines of both I and II MEF fought to contain the insurgency and disrupt its flow of supplies 

and personnel into central Iraq and Baghdad. Marines would continue to make efforts to engage the 

population and build local infrastructure. However, lack of adequate forces coupled with a general 

push from the Coalition headquarters to reduce 

the American footprint in Iraq hindered efforts to 

conduct a large-scale counterinsurgency program.
The Iraq insurgency and the deployment of 

I MEF to al-Anbar Province in the spring 

of 2004 spurred a renewed interest in the 

subject of counterinsurgency in the U.S. Marine 

Corps. To confront the challenges in Iraq, Marine 

Corps leaders, such as 1st Marine Division commander General Mattis, devised a comprehensive 

strategy that focused on dismounted patrolling, 

engaging the population and local leaders, separating the population from the insurgents, and 

resurrecting the Vietnam-era CAP program to 

help build the Iraqi military. While the Marines 

of I MEF sought to implement these tactics and 

achieve the goal of building a working relationship with the Iraqi population, pressure to conduct a general offensive against Fallujah at the 

beginning of April, followed by uprisings in arRamadi and an-Najaf, turned the Marine Corps’ 

focus from the Iraqi population to destroying the 

insurgency and interdicting its supply lines.

This change of focus in theater did not blunt 

an increased interest in counterinsurgency and irregular warfare within the Marine Corps. Many 

Marines began to discuss the topic in earnest, and 

Marine Corps Gazette saw a spike in articles on 

counterinsurgency, irregular warfare, and small 

wars. This new attention permeated the Marine 

Corps’ training commands, including the Marine 

Corps Combat Development Command, the Marine Air Ground Combat Center in Twentynine 

Palms, and the Marine Corps Command and Staff 

College. In all of these organizations, Marines and 

civilians worked to adapt education and training 

for the current conflict in Iraq. These efforts entailed exploring the Marine Corps’ past as a counterinsurgency force and then applying both those 

experiences and the recent experiences in Iraq 

to shape a predeployment training regimen that 

would prepare Marines for the specific cultural 

environment of Iraq and other states where they 

were likely to be deployed during the Global War 

on Terrorism.

As the first units of I MEF returned to the 

United States in the fall of 2004, many of its officers were given the opportunity to shape Marine 

Corps training and education. General Mattis, comChapter 4

The Marine Corps Rediscovers Counterinsurgency

Photo by LCpl Nathan A. Heusdens

Col John A. Toolan, commanding officer of Regimental 

Combat Team 1, talks to an Iraqi outside Fallujah in March 

2004. Later that year, Toolan would become the director 

of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College where he 

applied many of the lessons he learned in Iraq to a new course 

curriculum. 

63
64 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

mander of the 1st Marine Division from 2003 to 

2004, became the commanding general of Marine 

Corps Combat Development Command. One of 

his subordinates, 1st Marines commanding officer Colonel Toolan became head of the Marine 

Corps’ Command and Staff College. Other important directors at this time were Colonel Ronald 

L. Bailey of the Expeditionary Warfare School and 

Colonel Walter L. Niblock of the Marine Corps 

War College. While these officers did not seek to 

turn the Marine Corps away from its mission as an 

expeditionary force-in-readiness, they nevertheless sought to strengthen knowledge and understanding of counterinsurgency within the Corps 

through reforms to the combined-arms exercise, 

the syllabus of the Command and Staff College, 

and the creation of new centers of study on the 

subject.

Renewed Interest in Counterinsurgency: 

Marine Corps Gazette and Counterinsurgency

A survey of articles in Marine Corps Gazette from 

2004 to 2007 attests to the increased interest in 

counterinsurgency within the Marine Corps. In 

2004, just eight articles in Marine Corps Gazette 

referenced the subject of “counterinsurgency.” In 

2005, the number more than tripled to 29. In 

2006, there were 37 articles referencing “counterinsurgency” and in 2007 there were 72. Counterinsurgency became a topic of interest throughout 

the Marine Corps as Marines sought not only to 

devise new strategies for fighting the Iraq War, 

but also to prepare the Corps for future fronts in 

the Global War on Terrorism. The journal’s editors fostered discussion by publishing reviews of 

important works on counterinsurgency, printing 

a bibliography of major works on irregular warfare, and even reprinting its seminal article from 

1962 by David Galula, Victor Krulak, and G. K. 

Tanham on fighting insurgencies (see chapter 1).1

For some of the journal’s contributors, it seemed 

as if a new era had emerged and that Hammes 

and Van Creveld’s conception of a fourth generation of warfare was coming to pass. For others 

though, preparing for the future meant relearning basic tactics and techniques that had been a 

part of the Marine Corps’ warfighting philosophy for decades.

Most articles on counterinsurgency focused 

on proposing new ways that the Marine Corps 

could adapt to better fight insurgencies and irregular warfare. These ranged from revising old 

tactics to a large-scale restructuring of Marine 

Corps units. Captain David J. Danelo argued 

that knowledge of simple Arabic phrases and 

words could constitute a “tipping point” in the 

struggle to win the support of the Iraqi population.2

 A number of Marines argued for adapting the major doctrinal tenets of the past decade 

to the situation in Iraq. In 2004, Major Karl C. 

Rohr recommended melding pacification with 

expeditionary maneuver warfare. This entailed 

rebuilding a target nation’s infrastructure as soon 

as the assault objective had been captured and 

achieved. “As we see today in Iraq, such a policy 

of progressive occupation/reconstruction would 

have better served the pacification efforts by providing a military-governmental structure to the 

newly liberated countryside in the wake of the 

assaulting forces.”3

Major Adam T. Strickland made a similar 

defense of maneuver warfare principles in 2005, 

contending that the proposals for new counterinsurgency doctrine made at organizations such 

as U.S. Joint Forces Command and the Marine 

Corps Combat Development Command threatened to turn the Marine Corps away from maneuver warfare. “As the saying goes, ‘dance with 

the girl you brought,’ and for the Marine Corps, 

this means maneuver warfare.”4

 Major Strickland 

argued that both Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1: Warfighting and the Small Wars Manual 

provided Marines with all of the information they 

needed for planning and conducting effective 

counterinsurgency. “From cover to cover, [Marine 

Corps Doctrinal Publication 1: Warfighting] outlines operational considerations for conducting 

small wars, counterinsurgency operations, and in-
The Marine Corps Rediscovers Counterinsurgency 65

formation operations.”5 Maneuver warfare’s focus

on flexibility, speed, and developing solutions 

based on a full understanding of the battlefield 

was as relevant and effective in conventional 

warfare as irregular, counterinsurgency warfare. 

Strickland illustrated the point with a “how-tolist” for counterinsurgency drawn from maneuver 

warfare doctrine: establish appropriate expectations, remember the basics, determine security 

needs, continue professional military education, 

ask to what will the people respond, establish a 

lawful and legitimate security presence, create a 

local census, remain sensitive to the locals when 

engaging the enemy, and be aware that money 

does not solve every problem.6

 As Strickland concluded, “MCDP 1 gives us all the guidance we 

need and, therefore, makes many of the ongoing 

projects at places such as [U.S. Joint Forces Command] or [Marine Corps Combat Development 

Command] unnecessary, or at a minimum, in 

need of a serious rudder change.”7

Strickland’s article testified to the Warfighting

concept’s broad, flexible, and in many ways, nondoctrinaire approach to warfare. A year later, he 

provided further arguments for better organizing 

the Marine Corps for counterinsurgency operations, laying out a detailed proposal for restructuring the Marine infantry platoon.8

 Strickland’s 

plan involved a four-squad infantry platoon that 

included mechanized elements as well as Iraqi 

or Afghan soldiers in training. The overarching 

intent was to create an infantry platoon capable 

of deploying over a wider geographic area at a 

higher operational speed, thus “producing the 

appearance to locals of being anywhere and everywhere at all times further reinforcing the perception of security.”9

 As with many Marine units 

deployed to Iraq in 2004, Strickland suggested 

removing the platoon’s organic fire-support elements, such as its mortar sections. Strickland described the transformation of the Marine Corps, 

writing, “During this process we have returned to 

our past and rediscovered keys to the successful 

prosecution of the three-block war as found in 

the experiences of the Banana Wars and with the 

employment of the Combined Action Program 

in Vietnam.”10 His conclusions reflected the Marine Corps’ general approach to counterinsurgency: adaptation through a rediscovery of the past.

Other Marines were more critical of the ability of existing doctrine to confront insurgencies. 

In 2005, Captain David E. Cooper flatly wrote, 

“The organic assets of a Marine expeditionary force were not designed to effectively fight a 

counterinsurgency.”11 Arguing that military forces 

often serve supporting roles in a counterinsurgency, Captain Cooper proposed granting Marine expeditionary force commanders control of 

Photo by A1C Randy S. Mallard, USAF

Shortly after the first phase of the Iraq War ended and the 

anti-American insurgency began, retired Marine general and 

former Central Command commander Gen Anthony C. Zinni (pictured above as a lieutenant general in 1995) noted, “If 

we’re talking about the future, we need to talk about not how 

you win the peace as a separate part of the war, but you’ve 

got to look at this thing from start to finish. It’s not a phased 

conflict; there isn’t a fighting part and then another part. It is 

nine innings.” His comments would help define many of the 

changes to the Command and Staff College courses that began 

in 2004 and 2005.
66 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

interagency and nongovernmental organization 

assets. This would better maximize the resources 

at their disposal and allow the Marines to draw 

on their services, knowledge, and skills to rebuild 

infrastructure, acquire a better understanding of 

Iraqi culture, and undermine the legitimacy of insurgent forces.12 Colonel Mark F. Cancian, commenting on the utility of the Small Wars Manual 

in Iraq, noted that “the manual was published in 

1940, just as the Marine Corps was reorienting 

itself from small wars to amphibious operations. 

The experience of World War II and then Korea, 

Vietnam, and the Cold War focused the Marine 

Corps as an institution on large-scale amphibious 

operations against conventional forces.”13 Colonel 

Cancian criticized the Marines’ overriding focus 

on force protection, claiming that the need to protect Marines from casualties at all costs threatened 

to alienate Iraqis, as civilians would inevitably be 

killed as Marines reacted to potential threats. A 

2005 essay by Captain Scott A. Cuomo criticized 

the Marine Corps’ lack of any kind of doctrinal 

publication specifically on irregular warfare for 

captains and junior officers to read and apply. “In 

the past few years we’ve heard much about the future being dominated by irregular warfare (IW), 

but little of our doctrine reflects this reality—and 

few of our field training exercises do either.”14 Captain Cuomo further argued that the United States 

was ill prepared for potential wars, lacking effective doctrine and organizations to battle insurgent 

forces. “We need a Scharnhorst—Pete Ellis—or 

David Galula-type individual to inspire a new [irregular warfare] doctrine and warfighting culture 

for success in the twenty-first century.”15 In an article on the “metrics” and means for evaluating 

Official Department of Defense photo

LtGen James N. Mattis (pictured here as commander I MEF) speaking at Camp Pendleton. During his term as commander of 

Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Mattis introduced a number of new initiatives designed to strengthen irregular 

warfare education in the Marine Corps.
The Marine Corps Rediscovers Counterinsurgency 67

success in counterinsurgency, Lieutenant Colonel 

H. Thomas Hayden wrote that the conventional structure and organization of the military led 

it to perceive all threats through a conventional 

war mind-set and subsequently assess success and 

victory through conventional means. As a result, 

counterinsurgency lacked effective metrics for determining success.16

Some Marines, both active duty and retired, 

expressed concern and encouraged caution as the 

military leaders pushed for greater innovation and 

adaptation in the face of the insurgent threats in 

Afghanistan and Iraq. Paying such close attention 

to counterinsurgency at the expense of other types 

of warfare threatened the versatile and generalpurpose character of the Marine Corps. Retired 

Marine Colonel Charles L. Armstrong warned 

that the surge in interest in counterinsurgency, 

while welcome and necessary, threatened to create 

an atmosphere of “groupthink” that could stifle 

innovative and imaginative thinking.17 Colonel 

Thomas L. Cariker warned of creating “one-trick 

ponies” and stated concerns about transforming 

the Marine Corps structures before major warfighting requirements had been identified and 

defined. Requirements of “fleeting political importance” were not a sufficient reason to restructure the Corps in Cariker’s estimation. Instead, 

he recommended identifying secondary missions 

and training Marines for those secondary roles.18

“Simply put, it is more expedient to train for a secondary mission than to eliminate and then have 

to reconstitute specialized or uniquely trained 

forces like artillery and tanks.”19 For example, 

Cariker cited instances in Grenada, Somalia, and 

Iraq where Marine Corps artillery battalions and 

batteries were deployed as provisional infantry, security forces, and civil affairs units.

Observing this sudden increase in focus on 

counterinsurgency, retired Lieutenant Colonel 

Frank G. Hoffman argued that Marines needed 

to focus more on “hybrid wars.” The term, first 

proposed by Hoffman and General Mattis in an 

article in Proceedings the previous year, described 

a type of war that “blended the lethality of state 

conflict with the fanatical and protracted fervor 

of irregular warfare.”20 Hoffman proposed that 

the Marine Corps’ general-purpose capabilities 

and versatile nature made it ideally suited for 

these types of conflicts. Hoffman pointed out that 

“we have historically worked at transition operations, transitioning from peace to crisis response, 

from ship to shore, and between the blocks of the 

three-block war.”21 The challenge was not to prepare for purely irregular or purely regular wars, 

but to train for “hybrid” conflicts, such as the 

one faced by Israel in Lebanon in 2006.

The debates within the Marine Corps reflected in the pages of Marine Corps Gazette

featured many of the same concerns and arguments that had shaped similar discussions about 

irregular warfare and conventional warfare that 

took place after the Banana Wars and in the wake 

of the Vietnam War. Once again, an overriding 

issue was the identity of the Marine Corps as a 

warfighting force. However, whereas in previous debates the issue had tended to resolve itself 

into a competition between whether or not the 

Marine Corps was a small wars force or a service 

dedicated to large-scale, amphibious landings, 

the debates during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars 

focused more on balancing and reconciling these 

two important traditions in the Marine Corps’ 

history. Few Marines called for change so radical that it would redefine the Corps as a service. 

Instead, they advocated new areas for training 

and a renewed focus on nonconventional threats 

within the overarching doctrinal concepts of expeditionary warfare.

Revisions at the Marine Corps

Command and Staff College

Before 2004, the primary aim of the Command 

and Staff College curriculum was to teach Marines 

the basic operational capabilities of the Marine 

air-ground task force. The curriculum included 

sections that addressed counterinsurgency, such 

as the Military Operations Other Than War class, 
68 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

as well as a number of electives on topics exploring insurgencies, irregular warfare, and small wars, 

but these only constituted a small segment of the 

Command and Staff College’s curriculum.

However, a number of veterans of both the 

Iraq and Afghanistan wars attending the college 

criticized the school’s lack of instruction on irregular warfare.22 Following their second tours to 

Iraq, General Mattis and one of his regimental 

commanders, Colonel Toolan, were appointed to 

billets in the Marine Corps education establishment. General Mattis was promoted to lieutenant general and became commanding general of 

Marine Corps Combat Development Command 

in the summer of 2004. In October 2004, Colonel Toolan became the director of the Marine 

Corps Command and Staff College.

Within months, Colonel Toolan’s influence 

over his new command could be felt. During the 

first half of 2005, the Command and Staff College began a significant restructuring of its curriculum to better address such issues as cultural 

awareness, interagency operations, and foreign 

language training.23 At the same time, a renewed 

interest in topics relating to small wars and irregular warfare could be felt, and the school invited 

experts to speak about irregular warfare and counterinsurgency and held lunchtime seminars on 

similar topics.24 The 2004–5 academic year began 

to reflect the new interest in cultural awareness 

and small wars. The Theory and Nature of War, 

Strategy and Policy, Operational Level of War, Art 

of Command, and Warfighting . . . from the Sea 

sequence of courses continued to be taught. However, the hours for the Operational Level of War 

was cut from 233.5 hours to 213.5 hours and the 

hours for Warfighting . . . From the Sea was cut 

from 601.5 hours to 470.25 hours. These were 

the most substantial of a number of cuts in credit 

hours designed to create room for a new sequence 

of classes titled Small Wars, lasting 117.75 hours.

A new series of classes was added to the

Warfighting . . . From the Sea course, titled Contemporary Warfare in a Joint/Multinational EnPhoto by Dr. Nicholas J. Schlosser

The Marine Corps University’s component schools all underwent curriculum changes to help prepare Marines for the wars in 

Iraq and Afghanistan.
The Marine Corps Rediscovers Counterinsurgency 69

vironment. The titles for the classes reflected the 

pressing concern with the Iraq War. Iraq’s Violent 

History in The Twentieth Century featured historian Phebe Marr as a speaker and examined the 

country’s history from the uprising against Britain in 1920 to the present.25 U.S. Interests, Policy, and Strategy vis-à-vis Iraq examined American 

foreign policy with regard to Iraq, particularly in 

the period immediately after the 11 September 

2001 terrorist attacks.26

Iraqi Culture aimed to provide students with 

a broad understanding of Iraq’s culture and history, with specific attention paid to religion, society, nationalism, the legacy of colonialism, and 

how Iraqis perceived both the United States and 

the West as a whole.27

The final campaign planning exercise for the 

Warfighting . . . From the Sea course, titled Nine 

Innings, stated that students needed to think 

about campaigns that included not only the 

fighting, but also the peace. The syllabus opened 

with a quotation from General Zinni about the 

Iraq War:

At the end of the third inning we declared victory and said the game’s over. 

It ain’t over. It isn’t going to be over in 

future wars. If we’re talking about the future, we need to talk about not how you 

win the peace as a separate part of the 

war, but you’ve got to look at this thing 

from start to finish. It’s not a phased conflict; there isn’t a fighting part and then 

another part. It is nine innings.28

General Zinni’s comments framed the course’s 

goal: to teach Marines to conceptualize campaigns 

that included the full gamut of operations, from 

warfighting to peace operations, and to be able to 

concurrently conduct all of these operations. As 

the course outline noted, “A clear lesson from the 

military campaign in Iraq is that the defeat of the 

enemy’s military forces may not always equate, or 

lead to, attaining the final end state of the overarching mission statement. It is imperative that 

essential nation-building planning takes place in 

close concert with other precampaign planning, 

long before the execution of operations begins.”29

The course stressed that knowledge of a nation’s 

interests, armed forces, politics, cultural conditions, and economic situation were as critical to 

achieving victory in stability operations as knowledge of the enemy’s order of battle. The syllabus 

stated that “we need to treat learning knowledge 

of culture and developing language skills as seriously as we treat learning combat skills: both are 

needed for success in achieving U.S. political and 

military objectives.”30 Using Iraq as a case study, 

students needed to account for the general motives of the insurgency; grasp the regional relationships in the Middle East; understand U.S. policy 

in the region; comprehend the tribal relationships 

among Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds; and have a firm 

knowledge of Iraqi culture and religion.

Along with the new Contemporary Conflict 

area of study added to the Warfighting . . . From 

the Sea course sequence, the 2004–5 syllabus also 

included a new sequence devoted entirely to the 

subject of small wars. The syllabus for the new 

course sequence, Small Wars and Operations 

Other Than War, began with a criticism of the 

term “low-intensity conflict,” thus immediately 

alerting students that this course would be a 

break with classes on irregular warfare taught in 

previous semesters.31 The syllabus also included 

the following quote from historian and soldier 

Harry G. Summers Jr., justifying the use of terms 

such as “small wars” over vague and bureaucratic 

descriptions such as “military operations otherthan-war”:

Unlike [Low-Intensity Conflict], small 

wars is blunt, and in being blunt it truthfully and explicitly alerts the American 

people to the dangers they face. Not the 

least of its advantages is that it forces policy makers and decision makers to . . . 

confront the messy military and political 
70 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

realities small wars entail and the military 

and political costs they exact.32

The course outline continued to highlight 

that “unfortunately, most military professionals 

in the United States are unaware of the theory 

and history of small wars, the nature of operational art in the context of small wars, and often 

seem supremely uninterested in the subject.”33

The writers of the syllabus acknowledged that 

this state of affairs was not surprising, due to the 

distinction drawn between conventional war and 

the so-called military operations other than war 

(MOOTW). The course described MOOTW as 

“an orphanage for doctrinal concepts that cannot 

find a permanent home elsewhere” and also noted that the popular term “stability operations” 

was an inadequate concept for fully addressing 

the challenges of insurgencies and other small 

wars. The writers of the syllabus concluded that 

“the point is that the traditional forms of diplomatic, economic, and military coercion that we 

studied in the Strategy and Policy course and find 

useful for dealing with states and regular armies 

are often not applicable when dealing with the 

nonstate actors that seem to populate the current 

geo-strategic landscape and account for much of 

the world’s misery.”34

The course’s primary objective was to 

strengthen students’ abilities to “think critically about small wars and operations other than 

war.”35 Lecture and seminar topics included small 

wars theory, the Philippine War, the Malayan 

emergency, the Vietnam War, and the conflict 

in Northern Ireland. Most of these were topics 

addressed in the Command and Staff College’s 

Military Operations Other than War course. 

However, a renewed sense of urgency underlay 

their instruction. Whereas before, the case studies were taught as a means of preparing Marine 

officers for theoretical counterinsurgencies, now 

they were taught to help them plan and fight a 

counterinsurgency that was taking place while 

they were actually in the classroom.

Among the theoretical works assigned in the 

class were studies by Callwell, Trinquier, and the 

Small Wars Manual; Bard E. O’Neill’s Insurgency 

and Terrorism; Wray R. Johnson’s Vietnam and 

American Doctrine for Small Wars; and Friedrich 

Freiherr von der Heydte’s Modern Irregular Warfare: In Defense Policy and as a Military Phenomenon. The syllabus described the last work, written 

by a former member of the Wehrmacht who commanded paratroopers during the Second World 

War, as “perhaps the best theoretical work on the 

nature of irregular warfare.”36 The class on the 

Philippines War included Robert Asprey’s War 

in the Shadows; John Morgan Gates’ Schoolbooks 

and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1898–1902; and Brian McAllister Linn’s 

The Philippine War, 1899–1902. Linn also delivered a guest lecture during the course. Assigned 

readings for the class on Malaya included Robert 

Thompson’s Defeating Communist Insurgency. The 

class on Vietnam featured readings by Trinquier; 

Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr.’s The Army in Vietnam; 

and Harry G. Summers Jr.’s On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context. In short, the course focused 

on the seminal, classic studies of the major counterinsurgency and small wars operations conducted during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The Command and Staff College’s revised 

curriculum went into effect during the 2005–6 

academic year. The new curriculum was summarized in the following way:

Mission: Informed by the study of history 

and culture, Command and Staff College 

educates and trains its joint, multinational, and interagency professionals in order 

to produce skilled warfighting leaders able 

to overcome diverse 21st century security 

challenges.37

Among the new areas of instruction introduced to the curriculum were a Culture and Interagency Operations course designed to improve 

students’ understanding of regional cultures and 
The Marine Corps Rediscovers Counterinsurgency 71

religions and strengthen their conception of 

small wars, peacekeeping and multinational operations, and strategy and policy. The class also 

aimed to examine the “complex relationships between social, political, ideological, and economic 

elements of war.”38 Case studies were, unsurprisingly, drawn from the Middle East and other 

parts of Asia. The language courses further underlined the new attention to culture. The classes 

focused on skills beyond simple communication, 

and entailed cultural understanding, local customs, and small group interaction.

The overall revision to courses of study emphasized cultural studies, anthropology, and a 

renewed interest in small wars and counterinsurgency. In 2005–6, the new curriculum went 

into effect, with a number of notable changes. 

Whereas before 2005–6, the curriculum allotted 

small wars and military operations other than 

war their own, independent sequence of classes, 

the new curriculum sought to integrate the topics associated with irregular warfare. In short, 

the curriculum aimed to end teaching warfare as 

either conventional or irregular war; the courses 

recognized that counterinsurgency was not an 

operation “other than war.”

The 2006–7 academic year reveals the new 

areas of interest and emphasis. The Warfighting 

. . . From the Sea and Operational Art course 

sequences remained the largest blocks of instruction at the college, comprising a little more than 

half of the total class hours.39 This was not substantially different from the 2002–3 academic 

year, when the two blocks also comprised about 

50 percent of the course hours.40 However, the 

actual classes within each sequence underwent 

considerable transformation. Warfighting . . .

From the Sea was expanded to include a new 

block on contemporary conflict, which addressed 

the Global War on Terrorism, security cooperaOfficial Department of Defense photo

Throughout the 2000s, Command and Staff College syllabi on small wars stressed that, despite the adjective, these types of wars 

remained just as difficult to fight as conventional wars. The Vietnam War was frequently examined as a case study. In this image, Marines advance on a Viet Cong position during Operation Harvest Moon.
72 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

tion, stability and support operations, and counterinsurgency.41 The 2006 Marine Corps University command chronology summarized the 

course, writing,

[Warfighting . . . From the Sea] is designed to deliver an understanding of 

planning and execution methodologies 

within the framework of joint and Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) 

doctrine; inculcate an ability to conceptualize, coordinate, and synchronize a 

broad spectrum of resources and yield 

productive effects across the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of warfare; 

and analyze contemporary issues and 

emerging challenges facing the military 

professional.42

The sequence also included a block on counterinsurgency planning. Planning exercises focused on instructing students in addressing 

conventional and irregular threats “while enhancing students’ ability to plan integrated [Marine 

air-ground task force] operations in a joint, interagency, and multinational environment.”43 A 

major new characteristic of the curriculum was 

its integration of the elective sequence into the 

different course sequence. The Warfighting sequence incorporated a range of electives such as 

Advising Indigenous Security Forces, Combating 

Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Postconflict 

Reconstruction and Economics. While a significant number of credit hours were now devoted 

to studying topics on irregular warfare, the Warfighting sequence nevertheless retained its focus 

on teaching Marines the skills needed to plan 

contingency and amphibious operations.44 The 

third and fourth blocks of instruction focused on 

a practical application exercise in which students 

were asked to plan the Marine Corps contributions 

to a hypothetical contingency operation defending Tunisia against an aggressive Libya. The exercise tested students’ skills at planning operations

for a Marine expeditionary brigade and a Marine 

expeditionary force and envisioned a conventional battle between Coalition and Libyan forces.45

The Art of Command sequence was replaced 

with a string of courses on leadership that not 

only included classes on command decisions at 

Gettysburg and Chancellorsville, but also case 

studies examining the My Lai massacre, the Abu 

Ghraib abuse scandal, and an exercise on negotiations. The Operational Level of War was replaced 

with the sequence Operational Art, which presented a range of courses on regular and irregular 

campaigns. Thus, while the sequence continued 

to examine large-scale amphibious operations in 

World War II and Korea, and other land-based 

conventional operations such as in World War 

I and Operation Desert Storm, it also included 

classes on French colonial theory, World War I 

in Africa, the Algerian revolution, the Malayan 

emergency, and the Soviet war in Afghanistan.

The Culture and Interagency Operations set 

of courses was perhaps the most significant addition to the Command and Staff College curriculum and the one that most symbolized the new 

interest in small wars and cultural studies. Course 

titles included The Ugly American, Anthropology and Sociology, Americans and the World, The 

Colonization of Africa, The Decolonization of 

Africa, World War I: War Termination, China’s 

Rise as a Global Power, The Philippine Insurrection, the Vietnam War, Arab Nationalism, the 

American Civil War, UN Peacekeeping, Iraq: 

Background and Dilemma, Planning World War 

II, and World War II: Occupation of Germany 

and Japan. The electives offered for the sequence 

included Counterinsurgency Warfare: A [Special 

Operations Forces] Perspective; Theory and Practices of Negotiation; The Middle East: A Cultural 

Analysis; and The Professional Military, Ethics, 

and Moral Decision Making.46 As with the sequence on Operational Art, the Culture and

Interagency Operations courses ranged from 

studies of regular warfare to irregular wars, as 

well as postwar stabilization operations.
The Marine Corps Rediscovers Counterinsurgency 73

Thus, students were not only taught about 

the operational and strategic planning for World 

War II, but also about postwar governance and 

occupation in Germany and Japan. Students 

learned about the events of World War I as well as 

how that war came to an end, and also explored 

the origins and development of Arab nationalism. The old bifurcated curriculum that established conventional warfare as the primary course 

of study and small wars and military operations 

other than war as an ancillary topic of interest 

had been replaced by a new curriculum that balanced conventional warfighting, small wars, and 

postwar occupation while also teaching students 

about the culture and history of the regions to 

which they would be deployed.

Another novel addition to the curriculum 

was 94 hours of instruction in French and Arabic.47 That sub-Saharan French was taught reveals 

Command and Staff College’s belief that Marines could possibly conduct contingency operations there in the near future. The focus of these 

classes was on “culturally astute oral communications.”48 Sample scenarios for instruction in Arabic included counting, knowing the days of the 

week and months of the year, describing people, 

meeting indigenous officers, meeting with tribal 

chiefs, visiting an Iraqi military hospital, and visiting an Iraqi petroleum minister. The designers 

of the course stated that language skills “are an 

operational necessity” and “an integral part” of 

the Command and Staff College’s curriculum. 

Role-playing exercises in which students were required to conduct mock negotiations were also 

added to the course of study.49 The overall aim 

was to train Marines to engage in “polite, icebreaking conversations” with government officials, citizens, and military officers. Thus, the aim 

of the class was not to make Marines fluent in 

Arabic or French, but to allow them the opporPhoto by LCpl William L. Dubose

Recognizing the influence of cultural sensibilities on the successful conduct of counterinsurgency, the Marine Corps University’s 

expanded curriculum included new language courses and instruction in cultural anthropology. In this photo, an Iraqi translator 

and a Marine speak with an Iraqi teacher in ar-Ramadi in 2006.
74 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

tunity to “shape a favorable tactical environment 

for negotiations through an interpreter.”50 Consequently, the course was consequently as much 

a class on etiquette, local customs, and cultural 

awareness as it was a class on communication 

and vocabulary. Notably, students were not just 

tested on their language skills, but also on their 

ability to work with an interpreter.51 During the 

2007–8 academic year, Chinese and Korean were 

also added to the list of languages taught.52

The revised Command and Staff College 

curriculum that came into effect in 2005–6 

and 2006–7 constituted an important change 

in the Marine Corps educational establishment. 

By integrating electives and placing courses on 

conventional and irregular warfare alongside 

each other, instructors and Marine Corps planners aimed to address the pressing need to train 

Marines for the conflict in Iraq by introducing 

a new emphasis on cultural awareness, history, 

and past small wars and irregular war campaigns. 

In short, Command and Staff College aimed 

to provide staff officers with the training necessary to conduct operations in a three-block war. 

Less than a decade since General Krulak had 

first written about the concept, Command and 

Staff College’s revised curriculum demonstrated 

a concerted effort to prepare staff officers to fight 

wars and conduct stability operations simultaneously. Thus, the overall aim was not to reorder 

the entire curriculum around fighting counterinsurgency, but to expand the definition of war itself. Cultural awareness, postwar reconstruction, 

and civil-military affairs were just as critical to 

planning and conducting campaigns as engaging 

and defeating regular military forces in the field. 

Importantly, though, the curriculum did not 

claim that these elements were more important 

than the skills required to conduct conventional 

campaigns. Consequently, the new curriculum 

aimed to reinforce and strengthen those elements 

of training that had long been a part of Marine 

Corps training: situational awareness, small-unit 

leadership, taking initiative, and expanding the 

base of knowledge and tools available to Marines 

as they confronted obstacles toward defeating the 

enemy in the field.

New Centers, Programs, and Doctrine

Beginning in 2004, the Marine Corps Combat 

Development Command initiated a range of new 

programs and organizations to strengthen counterinsurgency training within the Marine Corps. 

In doing so, though, it maintained its focus on 

the core principles and philosophy of maneuver 

warfare. Among the major programs initiated 

by commanding general Mattis and his successor, General Amos, would be the creation of the 

Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning, Marine Corps Center for Irregular Warfare, 

and a number of new warfighting publications, 

including the Small-Unit Leader’s Guide to Counterinsurgency. Other publications included Counterinsurgency, Army Field Manual 3-24/Marine 

Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5 produced

in collaboration with the U.S. Army, and the 

Multi-Service Concept for Irregular Warfare created with the U.S. Special Operations Command. 

The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory also 

conducted several war games analyzing urban 

combat and irregular warfare, while the Center 

for Emerging Threats and Opportunities commenced research projects on past insurgencies 

and counterinsurgencies.53

The overall goal behind the command’s projects was to strengthen the teaching and understanding of irregular warfare without causing a 

radical departure from the core principles entailed 

in Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1: Warfighting. At the same time, there was also a push to 

rethink and reassess conceptions from before the 

Global War on Terrorism, such as network-centric 

warfare. The unpredictability of the Iraq insurgency and the lack of success of high-value targeting 

to weaken the insurgency brought forth a new appreciation for the unpredictable character of warfare in general. Whereas, before the Iraq War, a 

number of Marine leaders sought to reconcile net-
The Marine Corps Rediscovers Counterinsurgency 75

work warfare with maneuver warfare (see chapter 

2), now planners brought into question whether 

the two were truly compatible. A briefing given at 

the October 2004 General Officer’s Symposium 

declared that

The global contest against terrorists and 

like-minded adversaries is going to be part 

of a continuing long-term conflict. This 

suggests a need to build upon the expeditionary skill set and Small Wars legacy to 

improve the capacity to counter irregular 

or blurring modes of warfare. The U.S.’s 

current capability overmatch in conventional operations will continue for some 

time, but now the Nation must achieve 

the same level of capability in more unconventional situations.54

The symposium reaffirmed the central principles of maneuver warfare, including the stress on 

speed, flexibility, and ability, with emphasis on the 

constantly changing nature of conflict. “Thus, the 

maneuver warfare approach encourages constant 

adaptation, improvisation, and agility at both an 

institutional level and operational level.”55

The symposium also addressed the emerging 

complementary concept of “distributed operations.” The concept entailed a style of warfighting in which operations would be decentralized 

and small units given wide autonomy to take initiatives in the field. The idea focused on increasing the effectiveness of Marine Corps small-unit 

commanders in the field by allowing them to 

operate with considerable leeway and independence. “Decentralized operations, facilitated by 

the commander’s intent, pushes decision making 

down to the lowest level, leveraging the superiority of Marine small-unit leadership and agility, 

and accelerates the speed and tempo of friendly 

operations.”56 The emphasis on expanding the 

small-unit leaders’ ability to act quickly on intelligence and seize the initiative in a combat 

situation was considered particularly effective in 

the counterinsurgency environment emerging in 

Iraq. Thus, even as Marine leaders recognized the 

need to strengthen training in irregular warfare, 

they still maintained a focus on the basic principles of maneuver warfare.

As in the curriculum at Command and Staff 

College, culture and cultural studies continued 

to shape Marine training in counterinsurgency 

warfare. Among the first and most visible new 

programs introduced by the Marine Corps Combat Development Command to address this need 

was the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning within the Marine Corps Training and Education Command. The center, also 

known by its acronym CAOCL, was established 

in May 2005 to enhance cultural studies within the Marine Corps, deliver language training, 

and provide Marines deploying overseas with a 

sound understanding of the culture, language, 

and customs of the region in which they would 

be operating.57 In the words of General Mattis, 

“Our Marines must be comfortable operating in 

Photo by SSgt D. Myles Cullen, USAF

During his term as commander of Marine Corps Combat 

Development Command, LtGen Mattis worked closely with 

Army LtGen David H. Petraeus (pictured here as a full 

general) to devise new doctrinal publications on counterinsurgency for both the Army and Marine Corps.
76 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

austere, very complex environments including 

those where firepower is not the primary means 

of victory, or may even be counterproductive.”58

The program had its origins in the fall of 2004 

with a Training and Education Command Training Symposium held on 17 November 2004, followed by the publication of a concept paper for 

an operational cultural studies center published 

in January 2005.59

Its creation marked an important transition 

in the Marine Corps with regard to how culture 

was taught to Marines before deploying. As the 

commander of I MEF (Forward) from 2006 to 

2007, Major General Richard C. Zilmer noted, 

“We recognize that dealing in a counterinsurgency in the Middle East, or in the Arab world, 

requires a fundamental understanding of culture, 

which gets back to some of the things we’re now 

doing as a Corps.”60 Previously, the weight of culture briefs during the deployments to Iraq and 

Afghanistan was focused on teaching Marines 

particular customs and rules of etiquette to prevent them from insulting and potentially alienating members of the local populace. It had usually 

been done quickly by the operating forces and 

Marines in the field and rarely had a single individual or organization to turn to with questions 

regarding Iraqi or Afghan culture.61

With the creation of CAOCL, the Corps began providing Marines in the field with a central 

clearinghouse for cultural questions and linguistic instruction.62 The center also sought to treat 

culture as a critical element toward accomplishing missions and to make it an embedded part of 

Photo by Sgt Steven King

Providing Marines with a stronger understanding of the cultures and languages in theaters of operation was a priority of organizations such as CAOCL. Here, Raja Bachra, a language instructor with USMC Forces, Special Operations Command Foreign 

Language Office, copies the lesson of the day in Arabic for the students in her class.
The Marine Corps Rediscovers Counterinsurgency 77

the planning process.63 With the focus on training Iraqi security forces, and the heavy reliance 

on Iraqis for intelligence, an understanding of local personalities, group dynamics, and the overall 

cultural landscape of an area of operations was 

considered a decisive means for defeating insurgent forces.64 Through a mixture of face-to-face 

and distance learning facilities, instructors from 

the center engaged each battalion deploying to 

Iraq, providing gradual, methodical, but nevertheless focused instruction in cultural and linguistic issues of relevance to the deploying force.65

InJanuary 2006, General Mattis added a Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning 

Center of Excellence. The center aimed to build 

a cadre of career Marines versed in the relevant 

culture and language of potential areas of operation. Thus, the center sought to avoid bringing 

too narrow a focus to its mission by focusing only 

on Iraq and Afghanistan, and aimed to identify 

and study other countries and regions to which 

Marines would be deployed.66 The members of 

the center would identify Marines with potential 

linguistic skills, coordinate and develop new curriculum with the president of the Marine Corps 

University (who also served as the commanding general of Education Command), and participate in the drafting of new doctrine with the 

Marine Corps Combat Development Command 

Doctrine Division. The director of the center was 

also responsible for serving as the Training and 

Education Command representative on all committees addressing issues regarding culture and 

language.

Another organization chartered by the Marine 

Corps Combat Development Command was the 

Center for Irregular Warfare, also known by the 

acronym CIW. Created in May 2007, the center 

aimed to strengthen understanding of irregular 

warfare in the Marine Corps. The organization’s 

charter acknowledged that Marines had engaged 

in small wars and irregular warfare throughout 

its history.67 Nevertheless, the charter’s author, 

Mattis’ successor General Amos, frankly noted, 

“However, these capabilities have not normally 

been among our strengths.” The basic challenge 

for the CIW and the Marine Corps as a whole 

was to enhance the Marines’ ability to apply “the 

widest spectrum of military capabilities, across 

the continuum of warfare, and in all phases of a 

campaign, against irregular threats in order to defeat foes that use nontraditional methods against 

us.”68 The center’s definition of irregular warfare 

included stability and reconstruction operations, 

civil-military operations, counterinsurgency, information operations, operational cultural knowledge, and foreign internal defense. The center 

comprised a cadre of experts with experience in 

irregular warfare as well as education in counterinsurgency, civil-military operations, and information operations.

Among the center’s tasks were coordinating 

irregular warfare doctrine; researching topics 

related to irregular warfare; advising the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the commanding 

general of Marine Corps Combat Development 

Command, and the commanding general of 

Training and Education Command; and coordinating and consulting on curriculum development at the Marine Corps University, the Marine 

Corps Training Command, and the Marine AirGround Task Force Training Command.69

Along with new centers for culture and irregular warfare, the Marine Corps Combat Development Command also developed a range of 

new doctrinal works to bring together recent lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan and provide 

Marines guidance for future deployments. Most 

of these were completed and published by the 

end of 2006, and included a number of works 

written in cooperation with Special Operations 

Command and the U.S. Army. In June 2006, the 

Marine Corps printed Small-Unit Leader’s Guide 

to Counterinsurgency. From the outset, the guide 

stressed it was not an unchangeable work of dogma, but a working document subject to change 

and alteration as new lessons were learned in the 

field (it remains Marine Corps Interim Publica-
78 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

tion 3-33.01). The opening page featured a note 

to readers requesting that they submit suggestions and changes.70 In the foreword, Lieutenant 

General Mattis also noted that “these [tactics, 

techniques, and procedures] provide methods for 

reference and are not prescriptive.”71

The manual characterized small wars and 

counterinsurgencies as conflicts waged primarily 

by small units. The actions of every soldier, from 

the company commander down to the private 

could have an impact on the overall counterinsurgency campaign. Consequently, it was critical 

that subordinates be able to operate with little 

supervision and allow the company commanders 

to better understand the nature and character of 

the insurgency throughout their area of responsibility and operations. As with other works on 

the subject going back to the Small Wars Manual, 

the handbook stressed the primacy of the political dimension of the counterinsurgency, and 

noted that the military played an ancillary role 

within the broader campaign. The handbook 

stated that commanders needed to plan operations while considering local languages, religion, 

social makeup, means of income, standard of living, and the civil infrastructure. To understand 

the enemy, leaders needed to learn how the insurgency was mobilized, who its key leaders were, 

and how it adapted and utilized networks to operate.72

The Small-Unit Leaders’ Guide to Counterinsurgency argued that the population was the center of gravity of a counterinsurgency campaign 

and devoted an entire chapter to the topic of 

mobilizing the populace.73 On the issue of “winning hearts and minds,” the manual concluded, 

“The ‘Hearts’ dimension seeks to persuade the 

populace that their interests are best served by 

the [counterinsurgency] force’s success. . . . The 

‘Minds’ dimension seeks to persuade the populace that the [counterinsurgency] force is going 

to succeed in its mission.”74 Consequently, the 

best way for the counterinsurgency force to mobilize the populace was to both demonstrate that 

defeating the insurgency was in its best interest 

and convince the populace that the counterinsurgents were committed to achieving victory and a 

sustainable solution.

To achieve this, counterinsurgent forces needed to rely on local intelligence, conduct constant 

patrols, and build relationships with key members of the population. The handbook provided 

Marines with a close and detailed outline on patrolling, presenting the different types of patrols 

(foot, motorized, helicopterborne), the types of 

missions that could be accomplished through 

patrolling (reconnaissance, combat), and how to 

plan each type. The manual advised Marines to 

provide clear, detailed planning and thorough reconnaissance for patrolling missions, and counOfficial Department of Defense photo

The product of a joint Marine and Army effort, Field

Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 

3-33.5: Counterinsurgency, was printed in 2006. Like 

the Small Wars Manual, it was as much a synthesis of 

past lessons learned as it was a guide for conducting future 

campaigns.
The Marine Corps Rediscovers Counterinsurgency 79

seled small unit leaders that “your unit’s success 

in [counterinsurgency] will be heavily influenced 

by how well it can patrol at the small unit level.”75

Patrols could never be routine, and their primary 

goal was to provide at least the impression to the 

populace that Marines could emerge anywhere 

and anytime.

Like many doctrinal treatises on counterinsurgency, such as those by Galula and Trinquier, 

the Small-Unit Leaders’ Guide to Counterinsurgency argued that the population was the center 

of gravity in an insurgency. The manual still contained many elements that characterized it as a 

Marine Corps document, however. For example, 

the handbook contained a list of five standards 

and rules of ethics that all units needed to adopt. 

Two of the axioms would have been familiar to 

Marine veterans of Operation Iraqi Freedom: 

“No better friend, no worse enemy” and “First, 

do no harm.”76 The manual’s stress on small-unit 

operations can also be seen throughout the older 

Small Wars Manual. The overtly flexible, provisional nature of the document was also a quality common to certain Marine Corps doctrinal 

publications. As with the seminal Warfighting,

the Small-Unit Leader’s Guide to Counterinsurgency aimed to provide Marines with a work that 

presented advice and guidance without instilling 

a strict framework that could potentially stifle 

initiative and imagination. As with other Marine 

Corps doctrinal works, it left the door open for 

the possibility that better approaches or tactics 

could be devised in the field.

One of the most publicized doctrinal publications on counterinsurgency from this period 

was compiled in collaboration with the U.S. 

Army Combined Arms Center in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps 

Warfighting Publication 3-33.5: Counterinsurgency. The manual was assembled by a Marine 

Corps–Army team with significant input from 

civilian scholars and experts on counterinsurgency warfare.77 Among the most notable of the Marine Corps team’s contributions was the manual’s 

fourth chapter, “Designing Counterinsurgency 

Campaigns and Operations.”78 The chapter noted 

that campaign design had the potential to be the 

most important element of a counterinsurgency 

campaign. It stressed the necessity of keeping 

campaign plans flexible, adaptive, and dynamic. 

The chapter featured a detailed vignette on the 

1st Marine Division’s planning process and operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom II. 

Drawn from an interview with General Mattis, 

the section presented the division’s plan to devise 

unique approaches for each major actor in the alAnbar insurgency: the tribes, the former regime 

elements, and the foreign fighters.79 The chapter 

also included a vignette on the French campaigns 

in Spain during the Peninsular War (1808–14), 

using that conflict as an example of how a large 

conventional army can lose a campaign by failing 

to assess and understand the culture and society 

of the environment in which it is operating.80

Counterinsurgency superseded the previous 

Marine Corps manual on counterinsurgency, 

Fleet Marine Force Manual 8-2: Counterinsurgency, and was released with considerable fanfare, including media appearances by some of 

its authors and a review in The New York Times 

by future ambassador of the United Nations, 

Samantha Power.81 Its reception among Marine 

veterans of counterinsurgencies was mixed. Lieutenant Colonel Charles L. Armstrong (Ret), an 

advisor of counterinsurgency campaigns in El 

Salvador, reviewed the manual in Marine Corps 

Gazette.

82 Colonel Armstrong noted a number of 

minor drawbacks, in particular the manual’s lack 

of stress on the need for U.S. forces to learn and 

function in the language of the region in which 

they are conducting counterinsurgency operations. The manual’s considerable length also led 

Armstrong to question how useful such a doctrinal work would be for the small-unit leader. 

Armstrong noted that “the manual is ‘directed 

primarily at leaders and planners at the battalion 

level and up.’ In every insurgency I attended, the 

tip of the spear was the battalion and down.”83
80 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

The document’s sheer length meant that it would 

be difficult for young Marines deploying for the 

first time to thoroughly read and adequately digest the manual’s guiding principles.

Former Marine and frequent chronicler of 

Marine Corps operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, Francis “Bing” West concurred with Armstrong, writing, “While the prime readership was 

intended to be battalion commanders, it was difficult to find more than a few who had read the 

entire document.”84 He also noted the reaction of 

a Marine battalion commander to the counterinsurgency theories being posited by commanders, 

stating that foot patrols remained the centerpiece 

of battling insurgencies.85 In 2009, Major General John F. Kelly, a veteran of Marine operations 

in Iraq as 1st Marine Division’s assistant commander in 2003–4 and the commander of I MEF

(Forward) in 2008–9, stated, “Well, I think the 

counterinsurgency manuals we had in the past 

were perfectly good, in my personal opinion. I 

think the counterinsurgency tactics, techniques, 

and procedures we learned from Vietnam and 

other counterinsurgencies were very valid.”86

As Armstrong noted, however, the manual 

was not intended to be a dogmatic, prescriptive 

outline perfectly applicable to all insurgencies 

no matter what the local conditions and circumstances actually were. Major Alfred B. Connable, an intelligence officer with both I and II 

MEF, commented that the manual effectively 

presented security as the primary issue in counterinsurgency and noted that it was “a kind of 

an accumulation of conventional wisdom on this 

subject, and it goes through, point by point, a list 

of things you have to do in order, and it says to 

establish security.”87 Thus, perhaps Counterinsurgency’s authors’ greatest accomplishment was not 

in creating a prescriptive instruction manual for 

devising a counterinsurgency campaign, but in 

assembling a comprehensive summary of relevant 

counterinsurgency tenets and principles distilled 

into a single doctrinal publication.88

Conclusion

The Iraq War, and in particular the al-Anbar insurgency, spurred a dramatic renewal of interest 

in counterinsurgency within the Marine Corps. 

This small-wars renaissance was spurred largely 

by Marine commanders in the field such as Generals Conway and Mattis as they confronted the 

challenge of fighting the insurgency in al-Anbar 

Province in 2004. In the United States, Marines 

and analysts also began a discussion of counterinsurgency in professional journals such as Marine 

Corps Gazette. The participants in these debates 

included both active duty Marines who had already fought in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as 

veterans of past counterinsurgencies in Vietnam 

and Central America.

Following the completion of his tour as the 

1st Marine Division commander, General Mattis would become commanding general of the 

Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Upon taking command, General Mattis 

strengthened the focus on counterinsurgency 

within the Marine Corps training establishment. 

He directed the creation of new centers devoted 

to providing Marines with training in cultural 

anthropology and foreign languages and also 

ordered the revision of Marine Corps doctrinal 

publications to better prepare small-unit leaders 

to fight insurgencies.

By stressing the Corps’ versatility and flexibility as a general-purpose contingency force, 

those supporting better counterinsurgency training focused on those elements of the Marine 

Corps that made it well suited to small wars. 

Thus, this renewed interest in counterinsurgency 

did not lead to a fundamental restructuring of 

either the Marine Corps or its central warfighting 

principles.
While the Command and Staff College revised its curriculum to better 

prepare Marine officers to plan irregular warfare campaigns, other elements of the 

Marine Corps Combat Development Command 

were tasked with quickly preparing the Service’s 

combat units—many deploying to Iraq in a matter of months—for fighting counterinsurgency. 

The Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center in 

Twentynine Palms, California, rapidly adapted the 

combined-arms exercise to the conditions of the 

war in Iraq, focusing its training regimen on operations in densely populated areas in which roads 

and buildings could all be booby-trapped and insurgents could masquerade as civilians. Within just 

a few years, the annual combined-arms exercise 

became Exercise Mojave Viper, an immersive livefire environment that focused on irregular warfare. 

Many of the lessons used to build the Mojave Viper exercise were acquired from combat unit experiences in the field. Thus, a symbiotic relationship 

existed between the Marine Corps’ training commands and the units deployed to the theaters of 

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Many of these 

lessons were passed on from battalion to battalion, 

a testament to the close-knit nature of the Corps.

This chapter first examines the transformation 

of the combined-arms exercise into Exercise Mojave Viper. It will then consider how Marine combat units learned and adapted in the field, focusing 

on two battalions deployed to al-Anbar in 2005 

and 2006, respectively.

Revising the Combined-Arms Exercise

The combined-arms exercises and training programs held at the Marine Corps Air Ground 

Combat Center in Twentynine Palms, California, had been a part of Marine training since the 

1970s.1

 By the 1980s, the combined-arms exercise 

had become one of the most important parts of 

Marine training, providing Marines with a livefire environment in which they could hone and 

Chapter 5

Adapting Marine Corps Combat Units 

to Counterinsurgency: Training in the United States

and Adapting in the Field

Official Department of Defense photo

Live-fire exercises have long been a staple of Marine Corps 

training. In this image from 1942, a Marine officer dashes 

through live machine-gun fire along the blitz course at 

Quantico.

81
82 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

practice combined-arms operations. Beginning in

2004, the Marine Corps began to revise the 

combined-arms exercise (more commonly called 

by its acronym CAX) to better prepare Marines 

for the second deployment to Iraq. This revised 

combined-arms exercise (RCAX), focused on allowing all ground combat units the opportunity to 

conduct live-fire training, convoy operations, firesupport exercises, and operations in urban areas.2

The training center also constructed a facility specifically dedicated to urban operations and created 

a Small Warfare Training Unit, which was deployed to support exercises at March Reserve Air 

Base in California.

Over the course of the next two years, the 

combined-arms exercise underwent further adaptations and ultimately became Exercise Mojave 

Viper. The primary objective of these changes was 

to transform Twentynine Palms into a “missioncentric” facility that trained Marines to prepare for 

shifting conditions and new threats.3

 Importantly, 

the revised exercises sought to focus on training 

both combat and support units.4

 The creation of 

two separate exercises testified to the new threat 

environment of the insurgency. No frontlines existed, and Marine Corps installations were often 

vulnerable to insurgent sniper and rocket attacks. 

Convoys were frequent targets and were vulnerable to improvised explosive devices (IED’s). Consequently, it was important to prepare combat 

service support Marines in combined-arms tactics 

and operations. The revisions to the exercises were 

the most recent iteration of one of the oldest Marine Corps principles: “Every Marine a rifleman.”

The RCAX lasted 11 days, and 12 revised 

exercises and provisional revised exercises were 

conducted between May and December 2004. 

Throughout 2005, $65.5 million was expended 

on construction projects to create a pair of urban warfare ranges designed to resemble Iraqi 

towns and a live-fire convoy course.5

 By the 

end of 2006, when the revised exercise had become Mojave Viper, the mock-up village Wadi 

al-Sahara contained around 400 buildings, including government buildings, a village center, 

business areas, residences, and a mosque.6

 Role 

players replicated town activities in minute detail, and the mock-up village featured elected 

officials, unemployed individuals, businessmen, 

utility workers, civil servants, and both government and private security forces.7

 Role players 

were also expected to change and adapt their activities based on the actions of Marines. The role 

players who were treated with respect by Marines 

could choose to cooperate while those mistreated 

could chose to withhold intelligence or support 

insurgent forces, who were also represented by 

role players in the training village. The Marine 

Corps Air Ground Combat Center command 

chronology for 2005 concluded, “The large-scale, 

Combined-Arms [Military Operations in an Urban Terrain] complex will permit large units to 

truly ‘operate within’ an urban area and present 

unique opportunities for both air-ground integration and cross-boundary coordination.”8

Role players were one common element of 

all of the revisions to the combined-arms exercise. Actors performing as Iraqi civilians helped 

provide Marines with a sense of the threat environment. A variety of different roles were created 

for the civilian actors to replicate the potential 

variety of individuals, groups, political attitudes, 

and threats Marines would face in Iraq. The command chronology for 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, 

which deployed to Iraq with I MEF in 2004, laid 

out a range of role descriptions for a dismounted 

presence patrol. Some of the roles included

Script 1: You are a local cleric. Your town 

has been out of power for 24 hours. You 

are very upset with the lack of power and 

believe that Americans don’t care about 

Iraqis. You want to know why the power 

has not been fixed. You approach the Marine patrol with these complaints. When 

shots are fired you try to get out of the way.
Adapting Marine Corps Combat Units to Counterinsurgency 83

Script 9: You are a Former Regime Loyalist. You walk up behind a crowd talking 

to a Marine patrol. You are concealing a 

weapon and fire at the Marines. You then 

hand off the rifle to another FRL. You 

both run from the Marines.

Script 15: You are a local Iraqi going 

about your business. When shots are 

fired you stop to see what is going on. 9

Another scenario, meant to train Marines in 

operating a vehicle checkpoint, presented a wider 

range of roles, including Iraqi policemen assisting 

the Marines, arms dealers trying to get past the 

checkpoint, an injured Iraqi and his friend trying to get assistance from Marines, and four Iraqis 

conducting a drive-by shooting.10 A third scenario, 

which focused on conducting a mounted patrol, 

featured a similar mix of regular Iraqis and insurgents attacking Marines. The scenarios tested the 

Marines’ ability to conduct combat operations in 

an area densely populated with civilians, many 

of whom believed Americans were indifferent to 

their struggles. Of the 25 roles listed in the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines’ command chronology for dismounted patrolling, 8 depicted Iraqis disgruntled 

with the lack of power and the perception that the 

Americans did not care about the Iraqis. Three dePhoto by LCpl Jason S. Hughes

Marines prepare to fire an 81mm mortar from their LAV-M during a CAX conducted in 2000. During the subsequent decade, 

this exercise conducted at Twentynine Palms would place a greater focus on counterinsurgency operations and be transformed 

into Mojave Viper.
84 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

picted “former regime loyalists” and 14 depicted 

local Iraqis going about their business.

All three scenarios focused on basic operating procedures and assessed whether and how 

well Marines engaged with the population. The 

mounted patrol scenario included a step asking, 

“Did the Marines properly assess the situation 

and adhere to the rules of engagement when presenting their weapons at the particular target?”11

The scenario assessing vehicle checkpoints asked 

whether units complied with rules of engagement 

and whether the unit had a plan “for communication with locals, e.g. interpreter, hand and arm 

signals, etc.?”12 Thus, the predeployment training 

focused on preparing Marines to operate among 

civilians as much as it did on engaging insurgents. 

By 2006, the role-playing scenarios had evolved 

to feature a complex and diverse mock-up population that represented that of al-Anbar Province, 

with the majority of civilians depicted as Sunnis 

and the majority of Iraqi soldiers depicted as Shia.

In November 2006, the revised combinedarms exercise was redesignated Mojave Viper.13

The exercise was designed to be a “mission rehearsal” for Marine battalions going to Iraq. The 

exercise now lasted 30 days and featured not only 

combined-arms training, but also urban warfare 

exercises and nonmilitary training. The new Mojave Viper exercise consisted of two phases. The 

first focused on combined-arms training (as the 

Twentynine Palms exercises had always done), 

while the second trained Marines in urban warfare. The combined-arms training lasted 14 days, 

during which platoons and companies practiced 

infantry attacks and staffs refined fire-support 

skills. In order to prepare Marines for the insurgency/counterinsurgency environment, the 

exercise also included training in precise targeting and estimating collateral damage. Infantry 

Marines also took a combat patrol course. During this period, noninfantry and combat service 

support Marines conducted a convoy operations 

course requiring them to direct a logistical support convoy along a 20-kilometer route with

tactical scenarios integrating rotary- and fixedwing close air support and small-arms fire. Both 

the infantry and noninfantry courses prepared 

Marines to detect IEDs.

The urban warfare training course (the second phase of Mojave Viper) included scenarios 

designed to replicate conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Exercises within the course included 

tank and infantry integration, urban patrols, and 

IED training. Marines were further trained to 

conduct cordon-and-search operations and vehicle checkpoints. The course came to a close with 

a three-day, battalion-level final exercise meant to 

replicate a three-block war environment in which 

all of the course elements were addressed.14

To ensure that the exercise reflected lessons 

learned from the theaters in Iraq and Afghanistan, the members of the Tactical Training and 

Exercise Control Group (the command responsible for planning and conducting the exercise) 

maintained close contact with the Marine Corps 

Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning, the Joint [Improvised Explosive Device] Defeat Office, the Marine Corps Center for Lessons 

Learned, and Marine commanders in al-Anbar 

Province.15 These lessons provided Marines with 

a realistic training environment and aided in IED 

equipment training, Iraqi culture briefs, expanded medical instruction, integration of unmanned 

vehicles into operations, and a combined-arms 

breaching course.16

The Mojave Viper exercise symbolized the 

manner in which the Marine Corps adapted and 

transformed itself to fight the Iraq insurgency. 

The changes, while significant, did not radically 

change or alter the Marine Corps’ role as an expeditionary force. Instead, they focused on adapting 

Marine Corps tactics and operational procedures 

to the current threat environment in Iraq in order to force Marines to train in an urban environment populated by civilians whose knowledge of 

insurgent activity was a key toward defeating the 

insurgency. By providing a course for noninfantry Marines, the exercise also reflected Colonel 
Adapting Marine Corps Combat Units to Counterinsurgency 85

Thomas L. Cariker’s recommendation that training Marines for secondary missions and roles 

was preferable to fundamentally reorganizing the 

entire Corps’ structure and mission. A pamphlet 

printed and included within the Marine Corps 

Air Ground Combat Center command chronology for 2005 summarized the need to balance the 

Marine Corps’ primary mission as an expeditionary force-in-readiness with the challenges in Iraq:

Marines will preserve the uniquely fundamental tenets of Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare and combined arms 

air-ground task forces, but will enhance 

and expand on these capabilities through 

developing distributed operations and 

sea-basing techniques. This will impact 

training at Twentynine Palms. Similarly, 

an emphasis on providing Marines with 

enhanced training and education in tactical intelligence, cultural awareness, and 

urban operations will impact training at 

the Combat Center.17

Mojave Viper aimed to sharpen, hone, and 

enhance skills that had been considered part of 

Marine Corps training for decades. Its ambitious 

scope and close attention to detail also attested 

to the seriousness and energy the Marine Corps 

and Marine Corps Combat Development Command devoted to addressing the principal tactical 

challenges of battling the insurgency in al-Anbar 

Province.

Continuing Operations in Iraq:

Learning and Adapting in the Field

Following the elections for a constituent assembly 

at the end of January 2005, the Iraq War entered a 

new phase as the Coalition continued operations 

to prepare for the elections to ratify the constituPhoto by JO1 Craig P. Strawser, USN

One of the most significant changes to the CAX was the emphasis on training for operations in densely populated urban centers. 

Iraqi-Americans, such as those pictured above meeting with Secretary of the Navy Donald C. Winter in 2006, would act as

local nationals and play out scenarios to better prepare Marines for fighting an insurgency.
86 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

tion in October and then the first elections under 

that constitution in December 2005. Among the 

major goals of Multi-National Force-Iraq was to 

strengthen security and stability throughout the 

country and train, equip, and integrate the Iraqi 

Army into Coalition operations as a step toward 

transferring security missions to local forces and 

withdrawing U.S. forces. In light of this new 

mission, the Bush administration and U.S. commanders in Iraq envisioned a lighter footprint for 

U.S. forces and a reduced U.S. involvement in 

security and counterinsurgency operations in order to ensure that local forces would serve as the 

primary force for stability in the country.18

However, the persistence and virulence of the 

insurgency made such an approach difficult to 

implement, and 2005 saw American forces conducting a series of counterinsurgency operations 

designed to clear cities of insurgents, but often 

without the necessary number of forces required 

to hold and secure them. This was particularly 

the case in al-Anbar Province. Thus, the Marines 

of both I and II MEF (which relieved I MEF as 

Multi-National Force-West in March 2005) were 

confronted with the challenge of devising and 

implementing new tactics and techniques to confront the insurgency.19

The period between 2005 and the end of 

2006, when the Anbar Awakening began to take 

hold and the insurgency in al-Anbar began to 

collapse, was marked by experimentation and innovation as battalion and company commanders 

devised appropriate courses of action, often on 

their own initiative and without specific guidance from higher commanders.20 The lack of 

adequate numbers of Marines and soldiers often 

forced planners to favor vehicleborne patrols instead of dismounted patrols. A 7th Marines rePhoto by LCpl Chad J. Pulliam

Marines from 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, move from building to building during a Mojave Viper exercise in 2008. To better 

prepare Marines for fighting in urban environments, an entire village was built from scratch at Twentynine Palms to replicate 

urban areas in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Adapting Marine Corps Combat Units to Counterinsurgency 87

port on tactics, techniques, and procedures written after the regiment’s return to the United States 

in 2005 presented a frank assessment, noting that 

“dismounted saturation patrolling, by definition, 

is not achievable under current troop strength.”21

The report further recommended that such patrols

should not be conducted as a default but 

rather only when using them yields a 

specific advantage over the enemy. Doing 

otherwise gives the enemy a soft target 

and leads to repetitive mistakes. If you 

are using a dismounted patrol as a form 

of movement to contact you will loose 

[sic] and loose [sic] big in this environment, as the enemy will hit you with an 

[improvised explosive devise] from an 

undetectable position.22

The report concluded that “despite our exhaustive efforts to ‘win hearts and minds’ the local population resents our presence in their streets 

and sees presence patrolling as occupation of their 

homeland.” Such tactics, the memo argued, produced the opposite effect of that intended.

Other units and planners agreed, and much 

of 2005 was defined by mounted patrols and 

cordon-and-search operations designed to interdict and disrupt insurgent supply lines and 

their operations in the towns along the Euphrates River. These operations were part of a largerscale campaign designated Operation Sayaid. Its 

aim was to secure the Euphrates River in time 

for the October and December 2005 national 

elections.23 Due to the limited number of American forces available, Marine commanders in the 

region were forced to rely on maneuverability, 

speed, and concentration of force and firepower 

to break down the insurgent networks. However, 

while such operations as Operation Matador (in 

al-Qaim District) were initially successful, the 

limited number of Marines in theater meant that 

once U.S. forces withdrew, insurgent fighters 

would simply return. Colonel Stephen W. Davis, 

the regimental commander responsible for all of 

al-Anbar from the Iraqi town of Hit to the alQaim District on the Syrian border, described the 

primary challenges facing the Americans there: 

“This is a [Regimental Combat Team] with a division mission in a [Marine expeditionary force]-

plus battlespace.”24 He went on to note, “Because 

my force structure’s so small, I don’t have the 

ability to leave anybody in town who can make 

patrols . . . you’ve got to have people that stay 

there to give people security.”25

Faced with finding an immediate and lasting solution to the security problems in al-Anbar, 

Marine small- and medium-unit commanders 

developed new tactics and approaches in the 

field. The experience of two battalions serve as 

valuable case studies for how Marine units adapted in the field and then passed on their lessons 

and experiences to other units. In September 

2005, the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Julian D. Alford, deployed to the al-Qaim District. Located on the 

Syrian border, the al-Qaim District included the 

towns Husaybah, Karabilah, Sadah, and Ubaydi. 

Since 2004, Coalition forces had faced persistent 

insurgent violence there, and by the middle of 

2005, the district’s urban centers had fallen under insurgent control, mostly from forces aligned 

with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s al-Qaeda in Iraq 

Islamist organization. While Marine units conducted a number of clearing operations in the 

area, such as Operation Matador and Operation Spear, these failed to permanently dislodge 

the insurgent forces from the region, and they 

returned to the district once the operation task 

forces withdrew to another area in al-Anbar.

Throughout 2005, the cohesion of the alQaim insurgency had begun to crack. While insurgents were united in their opposition to the 

United States, differences in how they perceived 

the central Iraqi government and Islam’s role in 

everyday life caused fissures to emerge. While alQaeda in Iraq was a supranational Islamist force 

dedicated to dissolving the Iraqi government’s 
88 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

secular authority over al-Anbar and establishing 

a theocratic regime, al-Qaim’s tribes such as the 

Albu Mahal sought to maintain their local authority, their stake in the smuggling routes that 

ran through the district, and were largely parochial in their outlook. As a result, fighting erupted 

between organizations, such as the Albu Mahal 

militia Katab al-Hamsa and al-Qaeda in Iraq. The 

Albu Mahal frequently requested support from 

the Multi-National Force-Iraq, but Coalition 

forces failed to coordinate with the tribal sheikhs 

when conducting operations in al-Qaim.

The 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, had been 

through one deployment to Afghanistan the previous year. Each company had distinct experiences, with some involved in fierce urban battles and 

others involved in stability operations.26 The battalion’s Company I operated in Ghazni Province, 

conducting hundreds of patrols, building relationships with the local population, and locating 

and seizing rockets, mines, and munitions found 

in weapons caches throughout the region. Its 

Company K, reinforced with elements from the 

3d Battalion, 6th Marines’ Weapons Company, 

patrolled and secured bases near Pakistan’s border. Company L served as the security force for 

Bagram Airbase and as a quick reaction force for 

NATO. The company also supported the Afghan 

police forces, conducted humanitarian assistance 

programs, and provided security at polling stations during the October 2005 national elections.27 Thus, Colonel Alford and his battalion 

were not interested in whether the Marines were 

maintaining a light or a heavy footprint, but in 

using all of the unit’s available resources to provide a secure and stable environment.

Fortuitously, the majority of its personnel 

(including its principal company commanders 

and staff officers) would deploy with the battalion to Iraq the following year. Of the roughly 

950 Marines who deployed with the battalion 

to Afghanistan, 700 deployed to Iraq. Colonel 

Alford remained the commanding officer. The 

Headquarters and Service Company and Company I commanding officers remained as well (albeit switching billets). The battalion’s Weapons 

Company commander became the executive officer, and the commander of Company K became 

the battalion’s operations officer. When asked the 

reasons for 3d Battalion, 6th Marine’s success in 

Iraq, Alford responded that continuity of personnel and leadership between the two deployments 

was the most important factor. “When I said left, 

they knew exactly what left meant.”28

Colonel Alford was also a self-taught student of counterinsurgency, having digested major works by Galula and the Small Wars Manual

before he deployed with his battalion. Upon analyzing intelligence reports from al-Qaim, Alford 

noticed a strange phenomenon occurring in alQaim District. Insurgents, who were once aligned 

in common purpose against the American forces, 

seemed to be fighting each other. “When we’re 

there on our [predeployment site survey] in July 

of ’05, there was a lot of fighting going on up in 

the city and [3d Battalion, 2d Marines] was like, 

Official Marine Corps History Division photo

During its deployment to al-Qaim in the fall of 2005, LtCol 

Julian D. Alford’s 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, implemented a 

range of counterinsurgency tactics and techniques that helped 

to clear the city of insurgent activity.
Adapting Marine Corps Combat Units to Counterinsurgency 89

yeah that’s red on red.29 Just right there, I was like, 

well that’s got to mean something, if they’re fighting each other. I didn’t know what it meant, but I 

wanted to find out what it meant.”30

The 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, thus resolved 

to take a new path to counterinsurgency. Rather 

than remain in the forward operating bases built 

up outside major urban areas in al-Anbar, the 

battalion’s companies would patrol inside the alQaim District and live among the people there 

in platoon-sized battle positions. Doing so would 

achieve three objectives. First, the permanent presence of Marines would prevent insurgents from 

returning to the towns in the region. Second, their 

presence would help assure local residents that the 

Marines would not be withdrawing from the district. Third, operating inside the towns would allow the Marines to acquire better intelligence on 

the insurgency. The constant presence of Marines, 

Alford hoped, would encourage insurgent fighters 

to step forward with information. By living in the 

town, the Marines would also get a better sense of 

who the foreign fighters and who the locals were. It 

would also allow the Marines to better understand 

the social and cultural dynamics of the district and 

devise a means of action that would allow them to 

use that knowledge to help reduce the violence. 

To accomplish these objectives, 3d Battalion, 6th 

Marines, would also partner and work closely with 

Iraqi Army units.

Throughout its training for deployment to

Afghanistan and Iraq, the battalion focused on

the specific conditions it would face in that 

theater. Thus, in February 2004, the battalion 

transformed the final two weeks of its annual 

combined-arms exercise into a “foot-mobile”

operation that included advisors and even mules 

transferred to Twentynine Palms from the Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center in 

Bridgeport, California. In March, 100 Marines 

from the battalion underwent additional training at Bridgeport to create a specialized cadre 

of mountain warfare specialists within the unit. 

When 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, returned to the 

United States at the end of 2004, it immediately 

focused on strengthening its skills at small-unit 

tactics and preparing for deployment to Iraq. It 

drew on a number of lessons from its experience 

in Afghanistan, the most important being the 

need to live among the local population.31 Once 

again, the battalion conducted a CAX and also 

participated in the new RCAX at Twentynine 

Palms, which focused on warfare in densely populated urban areas.32 The battalion’s companies 

were restructured in a number of ways. An artillery and a truck company were attached to the 

Headquarters and Service Company, expanding it 

to more than 400 personnel. The Weapons Company’s combined antiarmor teams were also disbanded and transformed into three mobile action 

platoons.33 Predeployment briefs covered cultural 

awareness and the historical significance of Iraq to 

the United States.

Before the battalion could establish any 

kind of forward battle positions inside al-Qaim 

District however, it would need to clear the alQaeda in Iraq, forces from the district. Shortly after his battalion arrived in Iraq, Alford requested 

permission from Colonel Davis, his regimental

commander, to conduct a large-scale clearing 

operation of al-Qaim’s central towns. From 1 

October to 5 October 2005, 3d Battalion, 6th 

Marines, conducted Operation Iron Fist to clear 

Sadah and the eastern part of Karabilah.

Through the following month, the battalion 

deployed its companies throughout the cleared 

areas of the district, where they subsequently acquired intelligence on the insurgency in the region and a better understanding of the fighting 

between the foreign fighters and local militias 

aligned with al-Qaim’s tribes, most prominently 

the Albu Mahal. The success of Operation Iron 

Fist prompted the Marine commanders in alAnbar to plan a final clearing operation of alQaim’s remaining urban areas: Husaybah, Ubaydi,

and the western sections of Karabilah. To conduct the operation, 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, 

was joined by the ground combat element from 
90 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit, Battalion 

Landing Team 2/1. From 5 to 19 November 

2005, the two battalions swept through al-Qaim 

District in the largest Marine operation in Iraq 

since Operation al-Fajr. The force faced heavy 

opposition, especially on 16 November when an 

insurgent force ambushed a platoon from Battalion Landing Team 2/1, killing five Marines and 

wounding many more. By 19 November, however, Operation Steel Curtain had accomplished 

its primary objective. Al-Qaeda in Iraq’s presence 

in al-Qaim had largely been neutralized, and the 

Marines had successfully established an array of 

battle positions stretching across the district from 

the Syrian border to the town of Ubaydi.

Throughout its deployment to al-Qaim, 

3d Battalion, 6th Marines, focused on working 

closely with Iraqi forces. All battle positions were 

manned by a combined team of Marines and 

Iraqi soldiers. Since many in the largely Sunni 

district were wary of the Shia-dominated Iraqi 

Army, Multi-National Force-Iraq approved the 

creation of army units made up of locals and 

ensured that these new formations would not 

be deployed to other parts of Iraq. Among other 

important initiatives were the Desert Protector 

Force created by the Multi-National Force-Iraq 

and the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. The force included 200 initial recruits integrated into Iraqi 

Army units in al-Anbar. The intelligence and 

advice they provided to Coalition forces proved 

particularly valuable in al-Qaim during the fall 

of 2005.34

By the time the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, 

prepared to return to the United States in the 

winter of 2006, insurgent activity in al-Qaim 

District had largely been neutralized and contained. The basic elements that had shaped the 

campaign to secure the district would lay the 

groundwork for future Marine Corps operations 

in al-Anbar Province. They included coordinating with Iraqi forces, living among the populace, 

working with local tribal elites and organizations, 

maintaining a permanent and visible presence in 

the district’s urban areas, and ensuring operations 

were informed by a sound and accurate understanding of local culture, issues, and concerns.

Many al-Anbari sheikhs also cited the struggle between the region’s Albu Mahal tribe and 

al-Qaeda in Iraq as the start of what would become the Anbar Awakening. Kamis Ahmad Abban al-Alwani, the vice chairman of the Anbar 

Provincial Council, noted that “the first time [the 

Anbaris] started killing the terrorists was in the 

al-Qaim area, in the Albu Mahal and Karabla 

tribes.”35 The founder and director general of 

Iraqi Special Weapons and Tactics, Colonel Said 

Muhammed Muad al-Fahadawi, argued that “the 

Awakening started in al-Qaim, in the middle of 

2005. The Albu Mahal tribe revolted and started 

Photo by Cpl Neill A. Sevelius

A Marine from 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, fights alongside 

soldiers from the Iraqi Army during Operation Steel Curtain. 

Throughout the operation to clear al-Qaim, LtCol Alford 

ordered all Marine units under his command to work closely 

with partnered Iraqi units.
Adapting Marine Corps Combat Units to Counterinsurgency 91

to awaken.”36 Sheikh Ali Hatim Abd al-Razzaq 

Ali al-Sulayman al-Assafi, a tribal and political 

leader in al-Anbar, believed that the Albu Mahal 

tribe’s struggle with al-Qaeda in al-Qaim at the 

beginning of 2006 “was the first spark” that led 

to the eventual Awakening movement.37

Operations of the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, in al-Qaim mixed engaging the population with lethal force. The battalion’s command 

chronology stated, “Every Marine, regardless of 

[military occupational specialty] was a rifleman 

and operated under enemy fire.”38 To defeat the 

insurgents, the battalion relied on the full range 

of arms available to it, including AT-4 antitank 

rockets; M240, M2, and MK19 machine guns; 

60mm and 81mm mortars; M1A1 tanks; and 

bombs, rockets, and other air-launched ordnance 

from Marine Corps helicopters and fixed-wing 

aircraft.39 Battles were tough, house-to-house urban fights in which Marines focused on clearing 

each building of insurgent fighters. At the same 

time, the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, made a concerted effort to live with the populace. The approach provided them with valuable intelligence, 

as informants tipped Marines off to insurgent 

hideouts and the location of IEDs. Marines met 

with local elders and provided security for medical missions to local clinics.

The 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, serves as a 

case study for how the Marine Corps conducted 

effective counterinsurgency. Beyond the revised 

combined-arms exercise and cultural awareness 

briefs, there was no specific training geared toward counterinsurgency given to the battalion 

before it deployed. Overall, the keys to 3d Battalion, 6th Marines’ success were its aggressiveness, 

boldness, and sound understanding of the area 

of operations. Thus, while the battalion utilized 

its full combat power against the enemy forces, 

it did so while also ensuring that the population 

was both secure and had a stake in the outcome. 

The 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, was not the 

first Marine Corps battalion to achieve success 

against the insurgency in Iraq, nor was it the first 

to adapt to the specific conditions of the insurgency. However, its experience in both Afghanistan and Iraq as well as the fact that it deployed 

during a period when the Marine Corps training 

establishment was quickly designing and developing new exercises to prepare Marines to battle 

the insurgencies in both countries makes it a 

good example and case study of how the Marine 

Corps adapted to counterinsurgency. By assessing the situation in western Iraq and grasping 

the cultural and political dynamics of the region, 

the battalion was able to understand the impact 

of the insurgency on the western Euphrates Valley. The battalion subsequently drew on lessons 

it learned in Afghanistan to devise an approach 

that mixed the careful use of lethal force to clear 

the region of insurgents while also securing and 

separating the populace from the insurgency itself. In doing so, the battalion was able to draw 

on the intelligence resources of the Iraqis themselves, allowing them to better identify and target 

insurgents throughout the region.

This formula would be utilized by other 

battalions over the coming months as the Marines and soldiers of Multi-National Force-West 

worked to secure the still volatile city of arRamadi in 2006. The operations of 1st Battalion, 

6th Marines, is instructive in this regard. Months 

before deploying to al-Anbar in the summer 

of 2006, the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines’ commanding officer Lieutenant Colonel William M.

Jurney met with Colonel Alford to discuss his 

operations in Afghanistan and al-Qaim with the 

3d Battalion, 6th Marines.40 As Colonel Alford 

noted, the long personal history between many 

Marine officers played an important part in disseminating lessons learned in the field. “We’ve 

spent many, many hours over the last 20 years 

drinking beer together and on occasion sipping 

a glass of whiskey, talking about this stuff . . . 

we literally know what each other think(s). And 

that’s a unique thing about the Marine Corps 

that you need to understand.”41 Among the lessons Colonel Jurney drew from the experience of 
92 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

3d Battalion, 6th Marines, and other successful 

Marine Corps and Army units was the balance 

between maintaining a constant presence in the 

population centers while using lethal force to destroy the insurgents and their ability to operate.

The battalion operated under the 1st Brigade Combat Team of the 1st Armored Division, 

commanded by Colonel Sean B. MacFarland, 

USA, in al-Anbar’s capital and largest city, arRamadi.42 During the battalion’s tour, a critical 

shift among Iraq’s tribal groups in al-Anbar occurred that would ultimately lay the foundation 

for a dramatic decrease in violence throughout 

the province. Since the summer of 2006, I MEF 

(Forward) commander General Zilmer, Colonel 

MacFarland, and other commanders in MultiNational Force-West had been working to enlist 

the help of al-Anbari sheikhs to fight the insurgency in the province, now largely represented by 

al-Qaeda in Iraq. The tribes and sheikhs of the 

province had been largely unreceptive to U.S. initiatives to form an alliance during the years since 

2003. Many were even involved in the insurgency. However, as al-Qaeda in Iraq sought more 

radical goals—including banning women from 

walking alone in public; targeting, torturing, and 

murdering policemen and anyone else working 

with the Coalition; encouraging sectarian violence between Sunnis and Shia; and instituting 

a general reign of terror and intimidation against 

the local population43—and aimed to transform 

al-Anbar Province into a theocratic caliphate, 

many of the tribal leaders began to seek an alliance with the U.S. forces there. Al-Qaeda in Iraq 

Photo by Cpl Robert R. Attebury

LtCol William M. Jurney congratulates an Iraqi soldier for completing a training program. Jurney’s 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, 

would adopt many of the same tactics utilized by Marines in al-Qaim to help clear and secure al-Anbar’s capital, ar-Ramadi, 

in 2006.
Adapting Marine Corps Combat Units to Counterinsurgency 93

began to subvert and undermine the traditional 

authority of the tribes as well as usurp their involvement in smuggling operations throughout 

the province. Seeing U.S. public support for the 

Iraq War rapidly deteriorating, many al-Anbari 

tribal leaders also became apprehensive about the 

consequences of an American withdrawal. At the 

same time, American commanders had begun to 

question the efficacy of the Shia-dominated Iraqi 

Army to provide security in the Sunni-dominated 

province. Thus, by the summer of 2006, a variety 

of factors merged to lay the groundwork for an 

alliance between the United States and al-Anbari 

tribes.44

The Anbar Awakening not only marked a shift 

in allegiance among the tribes from the insurgency 

to the Americans, but also a shift in what kinds of 

Iraqi security forces were most useful in the counterinsurgency campaign. The emphasis on building 

the Iraqi Army had only achieved modest results 

in Sunni-dominated al-Anbar, in part, because it 

was dominated by Iraqi Shia. As General Zilmer 

noted in early 2007, “Nationally, [recruiting for 

the Iraqi army] is not a problem. The problem

is out here in Anbar Province, where 90 percent of 

your province is Sunni. . . . And trying to entice 

the Sunni young men to come out and join the 

army, that has proven problematic for us.”45

As a result of these difficulties, the Coalition 

forces in al-Anbar shifted priorities toward building local police forces made up of young Iraqis 

from the various tribes in the province. Police 

forces provided intelligence and trust that the 

Army could not. Made up of locals, its members 

were able to rely on their links with the community to gain intelligence as well as recognize 

outsiders from al-Qaeda in Iraq.46 Young alAnbari men sought work and the tribal sheikhs 

sought a means for providing it to them. Thus, 

the police forces presented an effective means for 

countering insurgent operations in the region. At 

the beginning of 2006, there were about 2,000 

members in the al-Anbar police force. By the following year, the number had reached 8,500.47

Engaging the Iraqi tribes was not a new strategy. As seen in the previous chapter, the Marines 

of Task Force Tripoli worked closely with tribes 

in the Tikrit area to help build a secure environment there in the spring of 2003. The situation 

was significantly different in 2006, however. A 

constellation of factors came together as Marine 

and Army leaders attempted to build a cooperative arrangement with al-Anbar’s tribes to secure 

the province. Perhaps most importantly, the violence in the region had reached a breaking point at 

which the tribal sheikhs realized that they would 

be better off siding with the Americans than with 

al-Qaeda in Iraq. “We realized that the people 

had had it with the situation,” recalled Sheikh 

Ahmad Bezia Fteikhan al-Rishawi, the brother of 

Photo by Sgt Curt Cashour, USA

Sheikh Abdul Sattar of the Abu Risha clan helped organize and lead al-Anbar’s Sunni tribes against al-Qaeda in 

Iraq in 2006–7 in what has become known as the “Anbar 

Awakening.” 
94 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha, the first leader of 

the Awakening.48 Sheikh Wissam Abd al-Ibrahim 

al-Hardan al-Aethawi summarized the situation: 

“There was a common interest between us and 

them, and that is security for all.”49

The key to securing al-Anbar was clearing the 

province’s capital, ar-Ramadi, of insurgents and 

reducing the violence there. Since April 2004, arRamadi had been a center of insurgent activity 

(see previous chapter). Basic services in the city 

had broken down, and members of al-Qaeda in 

Iraq had proclaimed it the capital of a new caliphate.50 As the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, arrived in 

August and September 2006 to take command, 

it faced considerable challenges. While the Anbar Awakening was rapidly emerging, its success 

was dependent on whether U.S. and Iraqi forces 

destroyed al-Qaeda in Iraq’s ability to conduct 

attacks. Such a task was made even more difficult by the organization’s effective use of highly 

visible attacks to break down public morale and 

create the perception that the city was in a state 

of chaos.51

Like other Marine battalions deploying to 

Iraq at this time, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, participated in a Mojave Viper exercise and conducted training at an urban warfare training facility. 

Colonel Jurney’s plan entailed training with the 

Iraqi police forces, building a constant presence 

in the city, and securing the populace from the 

insurgents. As with other Marine battalions deployed to Iraq, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, used 

its Headquarters and Service Company to provide 

security and used mobile assault platoons to increase operational speed and reach. The Weapons 

Company’s 81mm Mortar Platoon conducted 

logistics convoys between ar-Ramadi and Camp 

Blue Diamond in Fallujah. To provide the battalion with both light and heavy quick-reaction 

force capabilities, Weapons Company platoons 

were attached to tanks from U.S. Army armor 

battalions. These included a mobile assault platoon with tanks from Company C, 1st Battalion, 

77th Armor Regiment (U.S. Army), in October 

and a mobile assault platoon attached to tanks 

from Company A, 2d Battalion, 37th Armor 

Regiment (U.S. Army), in November.52 The provisional task forces also relied on close air support 

provided by fixed-wing assets to destroy insurgent 

forces and positions. Another instance of MarineArmy cooperation occurred with the creation of 

route-clearing task forces utilizing elements from 

an Army engineer battalion and an explosive ordnance unit led by the Weapons Company commanding officer.53

An overriding goal was to strengthen the authority of the central provincial administration 

by ensuring that the city would remain a stable 

and secure environment. Jurney deployed his 

companies to various observation posts throughout the city.54 His battalion conducted frequent 

foot patrols throughout the city, cleared IEDs, 

reduced rubble, and constructed new observation 

posts to facilitate security operations. The battalion immediately constructed a security station 

inside the city and commenced a series of operations against al-Qaeda. Through patrols, cordonand-search operations, and offensive operations, 

the battalion methodically cleared the city of insurgent fighters. It faced persistent opposition 

from insurgent forces, and the security outposts 

that were built throughout the city were under 

almost constant attack in the form of small-arms 

fire, IEDs, rocket-propelled grenades, mortars, 

and explosive-laden trucks driving at full speed 

toward Marine positions.55 The battalion responded with a number of operations. In November, Company A, Company C, and Weapons 

Company conducted Operation Makin Island 

III to clear the northern area of ar-Ramadi of 

insurgents. Other operations included Tinian, 

Midway Island, and Peleliu, and they were conducted by both Marines and Iraqi Army units. 

In December, the battalion was reinforced with 

elements of Battalion Landing Team 2/4 from 

the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit. Alongside 

Iraqi soldiers and police, the Marines focused on 

clearing insurgents from further areas of the city. 
Adapting Marine Corps Combat Units to Counterinsurgency 95

Originally planned as a three-day operation beginning 18 December 2006, it would last well 

into January due to the stubborn resistance of the 

al-Qaeda in Iraq forces.56 Nevertheless, the operations in December “yielded continued success 

in further integrating ISF (Iraqi Security Forces) 

into the task force’s Battalion combat operations.”57

Iraqi Army companies became permanently partnered with Marine units.58 Marines also 

worked closely with the police. The constant presence of Marines stationed in ar-Ramadi alongside 

Iraqis led to a significant shift in the operations 

against al-Qaeda in Iraq. As Colonel Jurney noted 

from ar-Ramadi in early 2005,

We have eight Marines who live in the 

police stations 24-7, which didn’t happen 

beforehand. When there’s time-sensitive 

information that comes into a police 

station, which it does, there is a fleeting 

target of opportunity. Typically a police force couldn’t move on that because 

they’d be afraid they’d get shot by Coalition forces, at night, moving around. . . . 

Now with Marines living there 24-7, you 

know they’re going to pick up.59

Most of the training given to Iraqi policemen 

was in the field during operations. As the battalion’s executive officer, Major Daniel R. Zappa, 

noted toward the end of the unit’s deployment, 

“When I say train, I don’t mean little academies 

where you’re teaching them to point their weapons in the right direction, they already know how 

to do that. I’m talking about partnership—living 

with them, operating with them, getting them 

operational.”60 The need to build close working 

Photo by LCpl Julian Billmair

MajGen Walter E. Gaskin (fourth from right), commanding general of II MEF(Fwd) and his deputy, MajGen John R. Allen 

(third from left), stand with a group of sheiks in ar-Ramadi in 2008. The Marine Corps campaign in al-Anbar depended on 

forging close alliances with local leaders as much as it did on firepower.
96 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

relationships between Marines and local forces 

was thus a paramount goal of defeating the insurgency in ar-Ramadi.

Alongside combat operations against insurgents and partnering with the Iraqi police, the 

Marines of 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, also conducted civil-military operations to strengthen basic services in the city. The battalion’s corpsmen 

provided medical services. In November 2006, 

the battalion and units of the Iraqi Army conducted Operation Berlin Airlift to provide basic 

provisions and food to the city. The operation entailed securing supply routes in order to deliver 

200 bags of rice, 200 bags of flour, 40 bags of 

beans, and 1,600 bottles of water and oil.61

The overall concept of operations entailed 

conducting clear, hold, and build operations

simultaneously.62 By the beginning of 2007, arRamadi saw a significant drop in insurgent activity as al-Qaeda in Iraq was driven out of the 

city. The 1st Battalion, 6th Marines’ operations 

in ar-Ramadi played a critical role in clearing the 

city of insurgents and securing the population. 

As with the operations of 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, in al-Qaim the previous year, the Marines 

of 1st Battalion, 6th Marines’ tactics combined 

aggressive combat operations, a focus on training and partnering with Iraqi security forces, and 

maintaining a constant presence on the streets of 

the city. It built observation and security posts 

within the city, thus disrupting al-Qaeda in Iraq’s 

freedom of maneuver. By remaining inside the 

city, it also helped to fortify the perception that 

its Marines were ready to put themselves at risk 

to protect the populace. The use of motorized 

mobile assault platoons also expanded the Marines’ operation range. The attachment of armored assets from U.S. Army armor battalions 

and use of close air support also greatly expanded 

the battalion’s firepower. Colonel Jurney’s counterinsurgency operations effectively utilized the 

full capabilities of the Marine infantry battalion. 

Similar operations took place throughout alAnbar Province, and the year saw a dramatic drop 

in the number of insurgent attacks throughout 

the region, after reaching a high point the previous year, from about 40 daily attacks the preceding fall to less than 10 by the end of the year. 

Thus, while 2007 would see some of the highest 

levels of violence in the war throughout the rest 

of Iraq, notably in the Baghdad area, the number 

of attacks would proceed on a downward trend 

throughout al-Anbar Province.63 Both I and 

II MEF would continue to serve as the MultiNational Force-West until the beginning of 2010, 

by which point the Marine Corps had changed 

its focus to the war in Afghanistan.

Conclusion

While the Command and Staff College and Marine Corps Combat Development Command 

buttressed the focus on counterinsurgency and 

cultural anthropology within the Marine Corps’ 

educational establishment, Marines in the field 

in Iraq and Afghanistan devised their own solutions to confronting the insurgencies there. These 

innovations were often devised and developed at 

the battalion level and down, as attested by the 

experiences and operations of units such as the 

3d Battalion, 6th Marines, in al-Qaim and the 1st 

Battalion, 6th Marines, in ar-Ramadi. Although 

both battalions underwent revised versions of 

the CAX, their success in Iraq stemmed as much 

from keen situational awareness and common 

sense coupled with a commitment to be aggressive and bold when necessary. Consequently, 

the focus on maintaining the flexible, generalpurpose character of Marine rifle battalions 

proved fortuitous. The focus helped prepare 

Marine units for a protean, often unpredictable 

environment that tested their full cognitive and 

combat skills. The versatility this training instilled 

within the units deploying to al-Anbar thus 

played an important role in laying the ground 

work for and fostering the creation of the Anbar 

Awakening and the ultimate neutralization of the 

al-Qaeda in Iraq insurgency in that province.
The Marine Corps did not undergo any 

kind of radical transformation as it trained 

and fought the Global War on Terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan. Instead, it adapted 

principles that had shaped and defined its warfighting mission throughout much of its history. 

On the eve of the Global War on Terrorism, the 

Marine Corps had focused its attention on refining and improving its ability to serve as the United 

States’ general-purpose contingency force. This 

post-Cold War Marine Corps sought to reconcile 

warfighting concepts, such as “maneuver warfare,” 

with a world whose strategic balance of power had 

radically changed following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Marine leaders subsequently focused 

on preparing for short-term operations along the 

coastal regions of failed or potentially hostile states. 

Planners improved and refined the Corps’ ability 

to rapidly deploy Marine air-ground task forces 

from amphibious ready groups and sustain those 

forces using the maritime prepositioning force.

Not only did this focus help provide the Marine Corps with a post-Cold War mission, but it 

also fit well with the Defense Department’s efforts 

to streamline the military by increasing the speed 

with which units could deploy and the lethality 

and precision of the firepower they could bring 

to bear. These changes also meant that smaller 

combat formations could be utilized. Also of 

importance was the general assumption on the 

part of both the Department of Defense and the 

Marine Corps (as enshrined in Fleet Marine Force 

Manual 1) that future wars and operations would 

be short and have clear, decisive conclusions.

Operation Enduring Freedom, at least in its 

opening months, seemed to stand as convincing 

evidence that U.S. planners had been correct in 

focusing on these transformation initiatives. In a 

matter of just a few months, U.S. Special Forces 

had successfully aligned themselves with resistance 

fighters and, with the assistance of precision-guided munitions from the air, successfully toppled 

the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. In the course 

of this operation, two Marine expeditionary units 

were successfully airlifted from a sea-based position and successfully seized a forward air base 300 

miles from the shore in central Afghanistan. The 

Conclusion

Marine Corps Institutional Culture and Training

for Irregular Warfare

Official Marine Corps History Division photo

Marines deployed to China during the Boxer Rebellion in 

1900. By the late nineteenth century, military theorists had 

largely accepted the idea that “small wars” or “irregular 

wars” were distinct from “big wars” or “regular wars.” It was 

during this time that Marines became the U.S. Service most 

commonly associated with fighting “small wars” overseas.

97
98 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

sudden collapse of the Taliban seemed to bring a 

quick and decisive end to the operation.

Thus, in the years immediately before the Iraq 

War, the Marine Corps’ leadership saw little reason to dramatically alter how it prepared to fight 

future wars. As they prepared to participate in 

Operation Iraqi Freedom, the planners at I MEF 

envisioned a war similar to that in Afghanistan 

during which U.S. forces would quickly depose 

Saddam Hussein’s Baathist regime and begin immediately withdrawing its forces. While Marines 

at the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory 

war-gamed postwar occupation operations, and 

while battalions from the 1st Marine Division 

participated in a range of stability operations 

during the months immediately after the fall of 

the Saddam regime, the bulk of I MEF returned 

to the United States in the summer and fall of 

2003.

The secretary of defense’s decision to deploy 

a Marine expeditionary force to western Iraq in 

2004 marked the true beginning of the counterinsurgency renaissance within the Marine 

Corps. In preparation for this deployment, the 

1st Marine Division commander, General Mattis, devised a range of counterinsurgency tactics 

and programs that he hoped to implement in 

Iraq’s al-Anbar Province. While General Mattis’ 

initial efforts were disrupted by the eruption of 

violence in Fallujah, Marine forces deploying 

in subsequent years made efforts to implement 

many of the 1st Marine Division’s plans. In such 

places as Iraq’s al-Anbar Province, Marine Corps 

units capably devised effective counterinsurgency 

tactics and strategies that helped reduce violence 

in what had been one of Iraq’s most volatile and 

unstable provinces.

This successful adaptation can be attributed 

to three factors organic to the Marine Corps as an 

institution. First, the Marine Corps was already 

well-suited to fighting so-called small wars and 

insurgencies. It had a history conducting these 

types of operations in such countries as Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. It had 

also developed doctrinal concepts for counterinsurgency, such as the Combined Action Program 

during the Vietnam War. The Corps’ nature as 

a general-purpose air-ground expeditionary force 

comprised of primarily light, mobile riflemen 

also made it an ideal service for conducting the 

wide range of missions included within counterinsurgency operations. When Marine battalions 

deployed to Iraq in 2003, they were able to conduct stability operations even though they had 

little preparation for these specific types of missions. As the Iraq insurgency erupted and Marines returned in 2004, Marine commanders in 

the field devised new measures to combat the insurgent forces, such as reintroducing the CAP. In 

al-Qaim and ar-Ramadi, Marine battalion commanders deployed their companies and platoons 

into the major urban areas to ensure that Marines 

both lived with the populace and could gather 

intelligence. They also worked alongside local 

Iraqis, most notably tribal sheikhs, and helped 

forge the alliance against the insurgency, known 

as the Anbar Awakening.

The second factor was the Marine Corps’ 

small size. This made it a highly adaptive institution in which lessons were quickly transmitted 

among its officers and noncommissioned officers. 

Battalion commanders preparing their Marines 

for deployment could easily consult with comrades who had already led battalions and companies during earlier months. The Corps’ small 

size also meant training was easily centralized. 

All Marine battalions deploying to Iraq underwent some version of the CAX and later Exercise 

Mojave Viper at the Marine Corps Air Ground 

Combat Center at Twentynine Palms in California before their tours. Thus, the Marine Corps 

Combat Development Command could quickly adapt the exercises to conditions in Iraq and

Afghanistan, drawing on the experiences of Marine Corps units that had already deployed. The 

Corps’ small size also meant that it was easier for 

the expeditionary force and division commanders to transmit their aims and goals for each 
Conclusion 99

campaign and make it clear what they hoped to 

achieve and how they planned to achieve it.

Thethird factor was the Marine Corps’ education and training establishment’s ability to institute a number of important changes to its course 

of instruction and training exercises. These helped 

to strengthen the abilities of officers to fight insurgencies. As successful as Marine units were in 

the field, the Marine Corps’ training commands 

also realized that they could provide more concrete 

and detailed education and training in small wars 

and counterinsurgency. As the commander of the 

Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 

General Amos, acknowledged in 2007, “Marines 

have always engaged in activities and operations 

requiring nonkinetic military capabilities. However, these capabilities have not normally been 

among our strengths.”1

 It was one thing to stress 

that Marines needed to be able to fight a threeblock war, simultaneously conducting stability operations, humanitarian assistance, and combat operations in a single conflict. But such an approach 

required providing Marines with the appropriate 

tools for conducting such diverse operations.

This often meant shifting the focus of training and education away from the traditional emphasis on amphibious landings and introducing 

training in small wars, anthropology, culture, and 

language to Marine officers. The curriculum at 

the Command and Staff College was rebalanced 

to provide more course hours on counterinsurgency, small wars, cultural anthropology, languages, and the political and social history of 

the Middle East. Marine Corps Combat Development Command created new centers, such as 

the Center for Advanced Operational Culture 

Learning and the Center for Irregular Warfare, 

to ensure Marines received specialized training 

Official Department of Defense photo

MajGen Alexander A. Vandegrift (front row, fourth from left), commander of the 1st Marine Division, and his staff at Guadalcanal in 1942. This image is a testament to the close-knit nature of the Marine Corps and the strong influence this has played 

in its history. Of the 40 Marines pictured in this photo, 23 would become general officers and 3 (including Vandegrift) would 

become Commandant of the Marine Corps.
100 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

and to help build a cadre of experts who could 

advise and assist. Change did not just occur in 

the education of field grade officers, however. 

The Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center at Twentynine Palms adapted the annual 

combined-armed exercises into Mojave Viper to 

provide Marines preparing to deploy to Iraq and 

Afghanistan with a realistic training program designed to hone their skills operating in a densely 

populated, urban environment.

In 2009, a Marine air-ground task force deployed to Afghanistan. Constituting the most 

substantial Marine Corps deployment to Operation Enduring Freedom since Task Force 58’s 

insertion in 2001, Task Force Leatherneck was 

sent to the most troubled and hostile region of 

the country, southern Helmand Province. There, 

Marines drew on lessons learned in Iraq as they 

participated in NATO’s multinational assistance 

force’s overall counterinsurgency campaign.2

At the same time, the newly elected Barack 

H. Obama administration made a concerted effort to shift American strategic priorities to the 

Pacific. In 2010, the newly appointed Commandant, General Amos, reaffirmed this shift as he 

sought to reorient the Marine Corps toward amphibious operations in a region long considered 

the Marine Corps’ region of responsibility.3 General Amos also affirmed that the Corps’ principal 

mission was to continue serving as America’s expeditionary force-in-readiness. Thus, as the second decade of the twenty-first century began, the 

Marine Corps once again found itself in familiar 

territory as it prepared and trained to conduct a 

wide variety of missions and fight wars of differing type and character.
Notes

Introduction

1. Chad C. Serena, A Revolution in Military Adaptation: 

The U.S. Army in the Iraq War (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011); David Cloud and Greg Jaffe, 

The Fourth Star: Four Generals and the Epic Struggle for the 

Future of the United States Army (New York: Crown, 2009); 

Thomas E. Ricks, The Gamble: General David Petraeus and 

the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006–2008 (New 

York: Penguin, 2009); John Arquilla, Worst Enemy: The Reluctant Transformation of the American Military (Chicago: 

Ivan R. Dee, 2008); James D. Campbell, Making Riflemen 

from Mud: Restoring the Army’s Culture of Irregular Warfare (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007); and 

Frederick Kagan, Finding the Target: The Transformation 

of American Military Policy (New York: Encounter Books, 

2006).

2. This revolution and transformation should not be confused with the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs. 

That concept, dating to the Cold War, focused on how 

new technologies allowed for more precise use of fires, 

better acquisition of intelligence, and greater force protection. Adherents of this theory of military revolution posited that these innovations radically redefined how wars 

and battles were fought. Operation Desert Storm’s speed 

seemed to bear out this prediction, while the Afghanistan 

and Iraq wars seemed to stand as evidence that America’s 

enemies were already devising asymmetric means for countering its technological superiority. See Steven Metz and 

James Kievit, Strategy and the Revolution in Military Affairs: 

From Theory to Policy, Army War College Report, 27 June 

1995, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/stratrma.

pdf; John B. Alexander, Future War: Non-Lethal Weapons in Twenty-First Century Warfare (New York: Thomas 

Dunne, 1999); John Arquilla and David F. Ronfeldt, eds., 

In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information 

Age (Saint Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1997); and 

Donald Kagan and Frederick Kagan, While America Sleeps: 

Self-Delusion, Military Weakness and the Threat to Peace Today (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2000).

3. For an example, see Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin, 2006); 

and John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, foreword 

by Gen Peter J. Schoomaker (Chicago: The University of 

Chicago Press, 2002).

4. The primary theater combatant command for the Iraq 

and Afghanistan wars.

5. The question of how military organizations change and 

innovate has long been a subject of interest to scholars of 

the military. Political scientists, such as Samuel P. Huntington and Stephen P. Rosen, argue that doctrinal change is 

motivated from within military organizations. In contrast, 

such analysts as Barry R. Posen and Steven van Evera cast 

militaries as interdependent organizations linked to their 

civilian governments. While it also sees them as insular organizations, this school argues that militaries are reticent to 

change and only conceive new doctrine when pressured to 

do so by their civilian overseers. Meanwhile, scholars, such 

as Richard Duncan Downie and Elizabeth Kier, have contended that a complex range of different factors come together to effect change in military doctrine. Downie argues 

that change occurs when external conditions align with a 

military’s level of institutional learning and expertise. When 

these two conditions are met, a military will promulgate 

some form of doctrinal change. Consequently, military 

transformation proceeds from what societies in general 

and military institutions in particular perceive as potential 

threats. See Richard Duncan Downie, Learning from Conflict: The U.S. Military in Vietnam, El Salvador, and the Drug 

War (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998); Samuel Huntington, 

The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of CivilMilitary Relations (Cambridge: Belknap, 1957); Stephen P. 

Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern 

Military (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); Kimberly Marten Zisk, Engaging the Enemy: Organization Theory 

and Soviet Military Innovation, 1955–1991 (Princeton, NJ: 

Princeton University Press, 1993); Jack Snyder, The Ideology 

of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters 

of 1914 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984); Barry 

R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, 

and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 

University Press, 1984); and Steven van Evera, “The Cult 

of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War,” 

International Security 9, no. 1 (1984): 58–107.

6. Terry Terriff, “Innovate or Die: Organizational Culture and the Origins of Maneuver Warfare in the United 

States Marine Corps,” Journal of Strategic Studies 29, no. 3 

(2006): 475–503.

7. Col Thomas G. Roe, Maj Ernest H. Giusti, Maj John H. 

Johnstone, and Benis M. Frank, A History of Marine Corps 

101
102 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

Roles and Mission, 1775–1962 (Washington, DC: HistBr, 

G-3 Div, HQMC, 1962); Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: 

The History of the United States Marine Corps, rev. ed. (New 

York: The Free Press, 1991); and Jack Shulimson, The Marine Corps’ Search for a Mission, 1880–1898 (Lawrence: 

University of Kansas Press, 1993).

8. Gordon Keiser, The Marine Corps and Defense Unification, 1944–47 (Baltimore: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1996). See also Victor H. 

Krulak, First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine 

Corps (New York: Pocket Books, 1991), 17–79; and Millett, Semper Fidelis, 445–74.

9. Millett, Semper Fidelis; Jack Shulimson, The Marine 

Corps’ Search for a Mission; and Terry Terriff, “Innovate or 

Die.”

10. Krulak, First to Fight, 81–122; Keith B. Bickel, Mars 

Learning: The Marine Corps’ Development of Small Wars 

Doctrine, 1915–1940 (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2001); and 

Millett, Semper Fidelis.

11. Bickel, Mars Learning, 205; Millett, Semper Fidelis, 263.

12. Krulak, First to Fight.

13. Millett, Semper Fidelis, 263. As Millett notes, “By the 

time the last troops came home from Haiti and Nicaragua, 

the Marine Corps was glad to accept the verdict that it had 

more useful things to do.”

14. Terriff, “Innovate or Die.”

15. Warfighting, Fleet Marine Force Manual 1 of 1989, 

which codified the principles of maneuver, mechanization, and speed, was the culminating point of a nearly two 

decade-long development within the Marine Corps as it 

trained to participate in a conventional war with the Soviet 

Union. See U.S. Marine Corps, Warfighting, Fleet Marine 

Force Manual 1 (Washington, DC: Department of the 

Navy, 1989), hereafter Warfighting.

16. This waxing and waning of interest in irregular warfare was not unique to the Marine Corps and was shared 

by the rest of the U.S. military. Scholar Wray R. Johnson 

likens this ebb and flow of interest to a sine wave moving 

through American military history. See Wray R. Johnson, 

“Doctrine for Irregular Warfare: Déjà Vu All Over Again?,” 

Marine Corps University Journal 2, no. 1 (2011): 35–65.

17. Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege (Berlin: Dümmlers 

Verlag, 1832), book 7, chapter 26. See also John T. Sumida, Decoding Clausewitz: A New Approach to On War (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2011).

18. Douglas Porch, “The Dangerous Myths and Dubious 

Promise of COIN,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 22, no. 2 

(2011): 239–57.

19. C. E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice, 

rev. ed. (1896; repr., Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 

1996), 21.

20. U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual (Washington, 

DC: Government Printing Office, 1940); and Johnson, 

“Doctrine for Irregular Warfare,” 41.

21. Small Wars Manual, 1–1.

22. Current Joint doctrine defines insurgency as the “organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing

authority” and counterinsurgency as “comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and 

to address any core grievances.” See Joint Publication 1-02, 

Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 

Terms (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 

8 November 2010, as amended through 15 November 

2011), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/.

23. Johnson, “Doctrine for Irregular Warfare,” 45–48.

24. Ibid., 50–56.

25. Frank G. Hoffman, “Striking a Balance: Posturing the 

Future Force for COIN and Conventional Warfare,” Armed 

Forces Journal (July 2009), http://www.armedforcesjournal

.com/2009/07/4099782/.

26. See Mark Moyar, A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq (New Haven, CT: Yale 

University Press, 2009).

Chapter 1

1. For information on the Barbary Wars, see Glen Tucker, 

Dawn Like Thunder: The Barbary Wars and the Birth of the 

U.S. Navy (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963). For 

a good overview of Marine Corps landings before World 

War II, see Capt Harry Allanson Ellsworth, One Hundred 

Eighty Landings of the United States Marines, 1800–1934 

(Washington, DC: Hist&Mus Div, HQMC, 1974).

2. Millett, Semper Fidelis, 70–72.

3. Andrew J. Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and 

Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860–1941 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 

2003); and Brian McAllister Linn, The Philippine War, 

1899–1902 (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2002).

4. Millett, Semper Fidelis, 148–49.

5. Millett provides a good overview of the wars of intervention, or Banana Wars, in Semper Fidelis, 178–211 and 

236–63. For more on the era of interventions, see D. A. 

Graber, Crisis Diplomacy: A History of U.S. Intervention 

Policies and Practices (Washington, DC: Public Affairs 

Press, 1959); Bruce Calder, The Impact of Intervention: The 

Dominican Republic During the U.S. Occupation, 1916–
Notes 103

1924 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984); Lester D. 

Langley, The Banana Wars: An Inner History of American 

Empire, 1900–1934 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1983); Ivan Musicant, The Banana Wars: A History 

of United States Military Intervention in Latin America from 

the Spanish-American War to the Invasion of Panama (New 

York: Macmillan, 1990); Hans Schmidt, The United States 

Occupation of Haiti, 1915–1934 (New Brunswick, NJ: 

Rutgers University Press, 1971); and David Healy, Gunboat

Diplomacy in the Wilson Era: The U.S. Navy in Haiti, 1915–

1916 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976).

6. James H. McCrocklin, Garde D’Haiti, 1915–1934: 

Twenty Years of Organization and Training by the United 

States Marine Corps (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 

1956); and Marvin Goldwert, The Constabulary in the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua: Progeny and Legacy of U.S. 

Intervention (Gainsville: University of Florida Press, 1962).

7. Millett, Semper Fidelis, 211; and Schmidt, The United 

States Occupation of Haiti, 1915–1934, 105–21.

8. Smedley D. Butler, “America’s Armed Forces 2: ‘In Time 

of Peace’: The Army,” Common Sense, November 1935.

9. Maj Samuel M. Harrington, “The Strategy and Tactics 

of Small Wars,” Marine Corps Gazette 6, no. 4 (1921): 474–

91, and Marine Corps Gazette 7, no. 1, 84–93; Maj Harold 

H. Utley, “An Introduction to the Tactics and Techniques 

of Small Wars,” Marine Corps Gazette 15, no. 5 (1931): 

50–53; and Utley, “The Tactics and Techniques of Small 

Wars” Marine Corps Gazette 18, no. 3 (1933): 43–46.

10. Callwell, Small Wars, 21.

11. Ibid., 75.

12. U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual (1940), 6–4. 

Italicization is the author’s. In light of the various editions 

of the manual in print, all citations include chapter and 

paragraph to avoid confusion.

13. Callwell, Small Wars, 78.

14. U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual, 1–1.

15. Ibid., 1–2.

16. Ibid., 1–7.

17. Ibid., 1–16.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid., 1–31.

20. Ibid., 1–2.

21. Operation Chromite, the landing at Inchon conducted 

during the Korean War, would prove to be the exception to 

the rule, and was the last forced entry utilizing a corps-size 

assault force conducted by the United States. See Adrian 

Lewis, The American Culture of War: The History of U.S. 

Military Force from World War II to Operation Iraqi Freedom 

(New York: Taylor and Francis, 2007), 181.

22. Millett, Semper Fidelis, 454; and LtCol Eugene W. 

Rawlings, The Marines and Helicopters, 1946–1962 (Washington, DC: Hist&Mus Div, HQMC, 1976), 20–21.

23. Jeffrey G. Barlow, The Revolt of the Admirals: The Fight 

for Naval Aviation, 1945–1950 (Washington, DC: Naval 

Historical Center, 1994).

24. Ingo Trauschweizer, The Cold War U.S. Army: Building 

Deterrence for Limited War (Lawrence: University of Kansas 

Press, 2009), 120–22.

25. Lawrence Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars: Berlin, Cuba, 

Laos, and Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press, 

2000); Philip Nash, “Bear Any Burden? John F. Kennedy 

and Nuclear Weapons,” in The Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945, eds., John 

Lewis Gaddis et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 

1999), 120–40; and Michael Beschloss, The Crisis Years: 

Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960–1963 (New York: HarperCollins, 1991).

26. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, foreword by 

Gen Peter J. Schoomaker.

27. Jack Shulimson, Marines in Lebanon 1958 (Washington, DC: HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, 1966).

28. Testimony of Gen David. M. Shoup, House Armed 

Services Committee Hearings, “Defense Appropriations 

FY 1964,” quoted in Millett, Semper Fidelis, 548–49.

29. U.S. Marine Corps, Operations Against Guerrilla Forces, 

Fleet Marine Force Manual 21 (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1962), 25, hereafter Operations Against 

Guerrilla Forces. See also Johnson, “Doctrine on Irregular 

Warfare,” 1.

30. U.S. Marine Corps, Operations Against Guerrilla Forces,

46.

31. Ibid., foreword.

32. Introduction to the Sunflower Press edition of the 

United States Marine Corps Small Wars Manual (Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University Press, 1996), xii; Nagl, 

Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, 48; and Jon T. Hoffman, 

“Small Wars Manual,” The War of 1898 and U.S. Interventions: An Encyclopedia, ed., Benjamin R. Beede (New York: 

Taylor & Francis, 1994), 515.

33. U.S. Marines in Guerrilla and Anti-Guerrilla Type Operations, Marine Corps History Division Reference Branch 

Subject Files, Counterinsurgency and Guerrilla Warfare, 

Marine Corps Historical Center (MCHC), Quantico, VA.

34. Ibid.
104 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

35. LtCol Bruce F. Meyers, “Student Individual Research 

Project AY 1963–64,” Marine Corps History Division Reference Branch Subject Files, Counterinsurgency and Guerrilla Warfare, MCHC, Quantico, VA.

36. Ibid., 3.

37. Among the articles in the January 1962 issue were 

Peter Paret, “Guerrilla War and U.S. Military Policy: A 

Study”; W. W. Rostow, “Guerrilla Warfare in Underdeveloped Areas”; Michael Spark, “Guerrillas, Small Wars, and 

Marines”; and “Mao’s Primer on Guerrilla Warfare.” All 

in Marine Corps Gazette 46, no. 1 (1962). These articles 

and others were published in LtCol T. N. Greene, ed., The 

Guerrilla and How to Fight Him: Selections from the Marine 

Corps Gazette (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962).

38. Spark, “Guerrillas, Small Wars, and Marines,” 251.

39. Ibid., 259.

40. The story is related in a letter to Marine Corps Gazette 

written in 1988 by the journal’s editor in 1962, LtCol 

Thomas N. Greene. See “Critiquing Low-Intensity Conflict,” Marine Corps Gazette 72, no. 7 (1988): 30.

41. MajGen Victor H. Krulak, Col David Galula, and G. 

K. Tanham, “Counter-insurgency: Fighting the Abstract 

War,” Marine Corps Gazette 47, no. 1 (1963): 25.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid., 26.

44. Ibid., 27.

45. Ibid., 567; and Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, 

151–87.

46. III Marine Amphibious Force was the principal Marine 

headquarters in Vietnam from 1965 to 1971. Originally 

designated III MEF, the air-ground task force comprised 

two divisions, an aircraft wing, and supporting units. The 

term “expeditionary” was changed to “amphibious” due to 

the fact that the French colonial forces in Indochina had 

been called French Expeditionary Corps.

47. Jack Shulimson and Maj Charles M. Johnson, U.S. 

Marines in Vietnam: The Landing and the Build Up, 1965 

(Washington, DC: Hist&Mus Div, HQMC, 1978), 134.

48. Ibid., 133–34.

49. Millett, Semper Fidelis, 574–90.

50. Ibid., 552.

51. Terriff, “Innovate or Die,” 488.

52. The dilemma was summarized in a Brookings Institution report published in 1976. See Anthony Binkin and 

Jeffrey Record, Where Does the Marine Corps Go From Here? 

(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1976).

53. For an overview of Army doctrine for defending Europe against the Warsaw Pact during the 1970s and 1980s, 

see Trauschweizer, The Cold War U.S. Army, 195–229.

54. Millett, Semper Fidelis, 609.

55. Terriff, “Innovate or Die,” 495–96; Capt Stephen W. 

Miller, “It’s Time to Mechanize Amphibious Forces,” Marine

Corps Gazette 62, no. 7 (1978): 39–42; Capt Stephen W. 

Miller, “Winning Through Maneuver: Part I-Countering 

the Offense,” Marine Corps Gazette 63, no. 10 (1979): 28–

36; Capt Stephen W. Miller, “Winning Through Maneuver: Conclusion: Countering the Defense,” Marine Corps 

Gazette 63, no. 12 (1979): 57–63; William S. Lind, “Defining Maneuver Warfare for the Marine Corps,” Marine 

Corps Gazette 64, no. 3 (1980): 55–58; William S. Lind, 

“Proposing Some New Models for Marine Mechanized 

Units,” Marine Corps Gazette 62, no. 9 (1978): 34–38; and 

William S. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook (Boulder, 

CO: Westview Special Studies in Military Affairs, 1985).

56. Warfighting, 58.

57. Ibid., 60.

58. Ibid., 77.

59. John L. Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: 

The Development of Army Doctrine, 1973–1982 (Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 

Historical Office, 1984).

60. Steven Metz, Counterinsurgency: Strategy and the Phoenix of American Capability, 28 February 1995, U.S. Army 

War College Strategic Studies Institute Report, 11–12, 

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles

/pub333.pdf.

61. National Security Strategy of the United States, 1987, 

http://nssarchive.us/?page_id=48.

62. Ibid.

63. Maj T. X. Hammes, review of Armed Forces & Modern 

Counterinsurgency Today, in Marine Corps Gazette 70, no. 

9 (1986): 67.

64. Maj Paul Melshen, “Taking on Low-Intensity Conflicts,” Marine Corps Gazette 71, no. 1 (1987): 44–45.

65. Michael H. Decker, “The MAGTF and Low-Intensity 

Conflict,” Marine Corps Gazette 72, no. 3 (1988): 45–47.

66. Gen Alfred M. Gray, “29th Commandant Speaks to 

Corps,” Marine Corps Gazette 71, no. 9 (1987): 18.

67. LtCol Charles L. Armstrong, “The Decline of LowIntensity Conflict and the Rebirth of Small Wars,” Marine 

Corps Gazette 73, no. 4 (1989): 37–38.

68. Ibid., 38.

69. Major T. X. Hammes, “Insurgency: The Forgotten 

Threat,” Marine Corps Gazette 72, no. 3 (1988): 40–44.
Notes 105

70. Ibid., 40.

71. Ibid., 41.

72. Ibid., 43.

73. Ibid., 44.

74. William S. Lind, Col Keith Nightingale, USA, Capt 

John F. Schmitt, Col Joseph W. Sutton, USA, and LtCol

Gary I. Wilson, “The Changing Face of War: Into the 

Fourth Generation,” Marine Corps Gazette 73, no. 10 

(1989): 22–26.

75. Ibid., 23.

76. Martin van Crevald, The Transformation of War (New 

York: The Free Press, 1991).

77. Col T. X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in 

the 21st Century (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2004).

Chapter 2

1. Warfighting, 55–57.

2. U.S. Marine Corps Combat Assessment Team, Operation Enduring Freedom Summary Report, 2002, Files of 

Training and Education Command, Gray Research Center 

(GRC), Quantico, VA, 61, hereafter OEF Summary Report.

3. Gen Charles C. Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War,” Marines Magazine, January 

1999.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. U.S. Marine Corps, Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare

(Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Combat Development 

Command, 2001), in Marine Corps Combat Development 

Command (MCCDC) Command Chronology (ComdC) 

2001. All command chronologies (ComdC) cited in this 

work can be found at the Gray Research Center (GRC), 

Quantico, VA.

7. U.S. Marine Corps, Concepts and Issues 2001 (Washington, DC: HQMC, Programs and Resources Department, 

2001), 15.

8. Department of the Navy, From the Sea: Preparing the 

Naval Service for the 21st Century (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1992); Department of the Navy, 

Forward . . . From the Sea (Washington, DC: Government 

Printing Office, 1994); U.S. Marine Corps, Operational

Maneuver from the Sea: A Concept for the Projection of 

Naval Power Ashore (Washington, DC: HQMC, 1996); 

U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Command 

(MCCDC), Ship-To-Objective Maneuver, (Quantico, VA: 

MCCDC, 1997); U.S. Marine Corps, Sea-Based Logistics

(Quantico, VA: MCCDC, 1998); and U.S. Marine Corps, 

Marine Corps Strategy 21 (Washington, DC: Department 

of the Navy, 2000).

9. U.S. Marine Corps, Operational Maneuver from the Sea.

10. Ibid.

11. Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare, A-4.

12. U.S. Marine Corps, Concepts and Issues 2001, 200–3.

13. Ibid., 202.

14. During the first months of Operation Enduring Freedom, for example, the 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade 

was comprised of two Marine expeditionary units, the 

15th MEU(SOC) and the 26th MEU(SOC).

15. I MEF is based in California and Arizona, II MEF is 

based in North Carolina and South Carolina, and the forward-deployed III MEF is based in Okinawa and Hawaii.

16. U.S. Marine Corps, Concepts and Issues 2001, 203.

17. Ellsworth, One Hundred Eighty Landings of United 

States Marines, 1800–1934.

18. A recent article by William F. Owen presents a thorough analysis of the maneuver warfare doctrine and criticizes most of its basic assumptions. See William F. Owen, 

“The Manoeuvre Warfare Fraud,” Royal United Services Institute 153, no. 4 (2008): 62–67. Reprinted in Small Wars 

Journal and available at www.smallwarsjournal.com.

19. See Gen Charles C. Krulak’s foreword for a succinct 

overview of the revisions in Warfighting.

20. Williamson Murray, Air War in the Persian Gulf (Baltimore, MD: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1995); David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka, 

and Frederick P. Stein, Network Centric Warfare: Developing 

and Leveraging Information Superiority, 2d ed. (Washington, DC: Department of Defense CCRP Publication Series, 2000); and Edward R. Smith, Effects Based Operations: 

Applying Network Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis, and War

(Washington, DC: Department of Defense CCRP Publication Series, 2002).

21. “Network-Centric Warfare: Its Impact on the Marine 

Corps as We Move into the 21st Century” (General Officer’s Symposium, Quantico, VA, 28 September–2 October 

1999).

22. Ibid.

23. U.S. Marine Corps, Concepts and Issues 2001, 17. William F. Owen questions what he sees as the arbitrary division between “maneuver warfare” and “attrition warfare” 

writing, “The whole edifice of Manoeuvre Warfare rests on 

the idea that there are two competing forms of warfare, 

manoeuvre and attrition, one of which is skilled and the 

other which is clumsy. This construct is false; it makes no 

sense to favour one form over the other. To do so is to limit 

available options by slavish adherence to ways over ends. 
106 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

The idea that MW and Attrition are either separate styles 

or part of a spectrum does not stand analysis. While the 

selective use of examples by MW adherents has sought to 

prove them as opposing or differing styles, they are better 

explained as complimentary. They are in no way distinct 

or alternative forms of warfare. Success in battle is based 

on breaking the enemies’ will to resist. There are wellrecognised fundamentals to this activity on which most 

military doctrine is based. These fundamentals were clearly 

articulated by Henri Jomini, Carl von Clausewitz, Ardant 

Du Picq, and Ferdinand Foch, and great many others. 

Whether intentional or accidental, the advocacy of MW is 

based on the selective use of examples, altered definitions, 

and some deliberate misrepresentation.” See Owen, “The 

Manoeuvre Warfare Fraud,” www.smallwars.journal.

24. Michael R. Gordon and Gen Bernard E. Trainor, 

Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation 

of Iraq (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), 8–10; Bob 

Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 

2002), 22–24; James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: A History 

of Bush’s War Cabinet (New York: Penguin, 2004); and

David Jablonsky, “Army Transformation: A Tale of Two 

Doctrines,” Parameters 31, no. 3 (2001): 43–62.

25. Title for chapter 1 in Concepts and Issues, 2002.

26. Rumsfeld’s own phrase for this would come to define 

the nature of the initial Iraq campaign: “Shock and Awe.”

27. Maj Michael S. Chmielewski, “Maybe It’s Time to 

Reconsider Maneuver Warfare,” Marine Corps Gazette 86, 

no. 8 (2002): 65–67; Maj John F. Schmitt, USMCR, “A 

Critique of the HUNTER WARRIOR Concept,” Marine 

Corps Gazette 82, no. 6 (1998): 13–19; and LtGen Paul K. 

van Riper, “Information Superiority,” Marine Corps Gazette 

81, no. 6 (1997): 55–62.

28. Some of these units included the 6th Infantry Division, 7th Infantry Division, and 10th Mountain Division. 

John B. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of 

Divisions and Separate Brigades (Washington, DC: Center 

for Military History, 2001), 379–407; Maj Scott R. McMichael, A Historical Perspective on Light Infantry (CSI

Research Survey 6) (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies 

Institute, 1987); Thomas C. Linn, “Does America Really Need a Marine Corps?,” Marine Corps Gazette 73, no. 

10 (1989): 28–30; Richard A. Stewart, “A Light, Medium, and Heavy Approach to Marine Corps Operations,”

Marine Corps Gazette 65, no. 7 (1981): 30–35; and Mark 

E. Vinson, “Structuring the Army for Full-Spectrum Readiness,” Parameters 30, no. 2 (2000): 19–32.

29. Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, “A Marine Perspective on the Army Transformation War Game,” briefing, 22–27 April 2001, in MCCDC ComdC, 2001.

30. Ibid.

31. George W. Bush Radio Address, 29 September 2001, 

http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010929.html.

32. See Donald P. Wright, A Different Kind of War: The 

United States Army in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, 

October 2001–September 2005 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: 

Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010), 27–56, for OEF’s 

initial planning and objectives. See also Nathan S. Lowrey, U.S. Marines and the War in Afghanistan, 2001–2002: 

From the Sea (Washington, DC: HistDiv, U.S. Marine 

Corps, 2012).

33. OEF Summary Report, 48.

34. Ibid., 47–49.

35. Col Nicholas E. Reynolds, U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2003: 

Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond (Washington, DC: HistDiv, 

U.S. Marine Corps, 2007), 5.

36. Capt Jay M. Holtermann, “The 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit’s Seizure of Camp Rhino,” Marine Corps Gazette 86, no. 6, (2002): 41–43.

37. Reynolds, Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond, 2–6.

38. OEF Summary Report, 54–57; Gen James L. Jones, 

“Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare,” Marine Corps Gazette 

86, no. 2 (2002): A1–A10; and LtGen Michael W. Hagee, 

“The Timeless Realities of Human Conflict,” Marine Corps 

Gazette 85, no. 11 (2001): 35–38.

39. OEF Summary Report, 10; and Reynolds, Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond, 7.

40. LtGen Gary S. McKissock, “Seabasing: The Maritime 

Intermediate Support Base,” Marine Corps Gazette 86, no. 

6 (2002): 12–15. See also Col Vincent J. Goulding, “Marine Corps Warfighting Lab Looks at Seabasing,” Marine 

Corps Gazette 86, no. 9 (2002): 80–82.

41. LtCol Frank G. Hoffman, “Early Lessons from Enduring Freedom,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 128, no. 4 

(2002): 2.

42. OEF Summary Report, 66.

43. Ibid., 29.

44. Ibid., 66.

45. Ibid., 61.

46. Ibid., 29.

47. William S. Lind, “Fourth-Generation Warfare’s First 

Blow: A Quick Look,” Marine Corps Gazette 85, no. 11 

(2001): 72.

48. LtCol F. G. Hoffman, “Transforming for the Chaordic 

Age,” Marine Corps Gazette 86, no. 11 (2002): 44–55.

49. OEF Summary Report, 31.

50. Ibid., 30.
Notes 107

51. Ibid., 35.

52. Maj Lloyd D. Freeman, “Winning Future Battles: Why 

the Infantry Must Change,” Marine Corps Gazette 87, no. 

4 (2003): 54–58. See also F. J. West, “Let Squads Call Air 

Strikes,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 128, no. 7 (2002): 

38; and Norman Friedman, “Experiment Proves Value of 

Small Force with Heavy Firepower,” U.S. Naval Institute 

Proceedings 128, no. 7 (2002): 4.

53. Capt Owen O. West, “Who Will Be the First to Fight?” 

Marine Corps Gazette 87, no. 5 (2010): 54–56.

54. Ibid., 56.

55. Ibid.

56. OEF Combat Assessment Report, 25.

57. “Battle Assessment: What Did It All Mean?” Leatherneck 74, 1991, 15.

58. OEF Combat Assessment Report, 148.

59. Education Command (EdCom) ComdC, 2001.

60. Ibid.

61. EdCom ComdC, 2003, and EdCom ComdC, 2004.

62. EdCom ComdC, 2003.

63. Military Operations Other Than War (syllabus, Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA, 2000–1), 4. All 

syllabi cited in this work can be found at the Gray Research 

Center (GRC), Quantico, VA.

64. Ibid., 5.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid., 6.

67. Ibid.

68. Military Operations Other Than War (syllabus, Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA, 1999–2000).

69. Ibid., 11.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid., 107.

72. Ibid., 3.

73. Military Operations Other Than War, 2000–1.

74. Ibid., i.

75. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife; Walter C. 

Ladwig III, “Managing Counterinsurgency: Lessons from 

Malaya,” Military Review 87, no. 3 (2007): 56–66; Robert R. Tomes, “Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare,” 

Parameters 34, no. 1 (2004): 16–28; and Geoff Demarest, 

“Let’s Take the French Experience in Algeria Out of U.S. 

Counterinsurgency Doctrine,” Military Review 90, no. 4 

(2010): 19–24.

76. Military Operations Other Than War, 2000–1.

77. Military Operations Other Than War (syllabus, Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA, 2001–2), 7.

78. Ibid., 7–8.

79. Military Operations Other Than War (syllabus, Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA, 2003–4), 7.

80. Military Operations Other Than War, 2001–2.

81. Latin American Insurgencies: Past, Present, and Future 

(syllabus, Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA, 

1999–2000).

82. Operational Level of War: Afghan Insurgency (syllabus, 

Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA, 2001–2).

83. EdCom ComdC, 2003.

84. The American Indian Wars: Neglected Part of the American Military Tradition? (syllabus, Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA, 2002–3), 25.

85. During the 2002–3 academic year, the Command and 

Staff College offered 1,516 hours of instruction. Of this, 

529.25 hours was devoted to the Warfighting . . . From 

the Sea subcourse, of which 116.25 hours was spent on 

Military Operations Other Than War. During the 2003–4 

academic year, Command and Staff College offered 1,542.5 

hours of instruction. Of this, Warfighting . . . From the Sea 

entailed 601.50 hours and Military Operations Other Than 

War entailed 122.25 hours of instruction. Data in EdCom 

ComdC, 2003, and EdCom ComdC, 2004.

Chapter 3

1. Williamson Murray and MajGen Robert H. Scales Jr., 

USA, The Iraq War: A Military History (Cambridge, MA: 

Harvard University Press, 2003), 116.

2. Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 183.

3. Francis J. West, “Maneuver Warfare: It Worked in Iraq,” 

Proceedings 36, no. 2 (2004): 36–38.

4. Murray and Scales, The Iraq War, 243.

5. Francis J. West, The March Up: Taking Baghdad with the 

1st MarDiv (New York: Bantam Books, 2003).

6. LtCol Michael S. Groen, With the 1st Marine Division in 

Iraq, 2003: No Greater Friend, No Worse Enemy (Quantico, 

VA: HistDiv, U.S. Marine Corps, 2006), 3.

7. Reynolds, Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond, 171.

8. Col Rod Andrew Jr., U.S. Marines in Battle: An-Nasiriyah 

(Quantico, VA: HistDiv, U.S. Marine Corps, 2009), 7.

9. Reynolds, Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond, 88.

10. Andrew, An-Nasiriyah, 40.

11. Murray and Scales, The Iraq War, 102.

12. Ibid., 103.
108 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

13. Ahmed S. Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in 

Iraq (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), 12–13.

14. Ibid., 17.

15. Trainor and Gordon, Cobra II, 503–4.

16. Quoted in Reynolds, Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond, 37.

17. Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory ComdC, 2003.

18. Ibid.

19. Reynolds, Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond, 37. See as well 

BGen John F. Kelly, “Tikrit, South to Babylon,” in U.S. 

Marines in Iraq, 2003: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography, eds., Maj Christopher M. Kennedy, et al. (Washington, DC: HistDiv, U.S. Marine Corps, 2006), 221–37.

20. Groen, With the 1st Marine Division in Iraq, 327.

21. Col Thomas J. Connally and LtCol Lance A. McDaniel, “Leaving the Tubes at Home,” Marine Corps Gazette 89, 

no. 10 (2005): 31–34.

22. Kelly, “Tikrit, South to Babylon,” 224.

23. BGen John F. Kelly intvw with Col Jon T. Hoffman, 7 

August 2003, Marine Corps Historical Center (MCHC), 

Quantico, VA.

24. Groen, With the 1st Marine Division in Iraq, 358.

25. Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, 2d ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2004), 18–19.

26. Amal Vinogradov, “The 1920 Revolt in Iraq Reconsidered: The Role of Tribes in National Politics,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 3, no. 2 (1972):

123–39; Philip Khoury and Joseph Kostiner, eds., Tribes 

and State Formation in the Middle East (Berkley: University of California Press, 1990); and Austin G. Long, “The 

Anbar Awakening,” in U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2004–2008: 

Anthology and Annotated Bibliography, ed., Nicholas J. 

Schlosser (Washington, DC: HistDiv, U.S. Marine Corps, 

2010), 179–93.

27. Ibid., 180; and Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes 

and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq’s 

Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of its Communists, 

Baathists, and Free Officers (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978).

28. Long, “The Anbar Awakening,” 190.

29. Ibid., 182–83.

30. Ibid., and Kevin Woods et al., Iraqi Perspectives Project: A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam’s Senior Leadership (Norfolk, VA: Joint Center for Operational 

Analysis, 2005).

31. Groen, With the 1st Marine Division in Iraq, 2003, 359.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid., 368.

34. See, for example, Thomas E. Ricks’ account in Ricks, 

Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, 142–44. 

Ricks’ account cites from the draft text of Groen, With the 

1st Marine Division in Iraq, and erroneously describes it as 

an “official history.” While the work is actually a Marine 

Corps History Division occasional paper, and not an official, definitive history, its reliance on command chronologies provides important documentary evidence for the 1st 

MarDiv’s operations in Iraq in 2003. See also Gordon and 

Trainor, Cobra II, 447–48.

35. Ibid., 369.

36. Carter A. Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq: May 

2003–January 2007,” in U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2003–2008: 

Anthology and Annotated Bibliography, 16. See also Ricks, 

Fiasco, 170–71 and 232–34; and Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 453.

37. Quoted in Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 447.

38. Ibid.; and Donald P. Wright and Col Timothy R. Reese, On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, May 2003–January 2005 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute 

Press, 2008), 121.

39. Quoted in Groen, With the 1st Marine Division in Iraq, 

371.

40. Light infantry Army units also found that dismounted 

infantry could be a valuable asset in these types of environments. An example of this could be seen in the city of Mosul, within the area of responsibility of the 101st Airborne 

Division under the command of MajGen David H. Petraeus. See Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 17.

41. Mark Moyar, A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), 220–21.

42. 1stLt Anthony Johnston intvw with Maj John P. Piedmont, 9 May 2004, MCHC.

43. Ibid.

44. “OIF Lessons Learned Applicable to ELT” (Entry Level 

Training) (briefing, Training and Education Command, 

Quantico, VA, 30 September 2003). Briefing can be found 

at the Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA.

45. Reynolds, Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond, 132–33, 138.

46. Ibid., 137.

47. Kenneth W. Estes, U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2004–2005: 

Into the Fray (Washington, DC: HistDiv, U.S. Marine 

Corps, 2011), 1.

48. Ibid.
Notes 109

49. Both Reynolds and Kelly list the population of the

Marines’ area of responsibility at between 9 and 10 million. 

See Kelly, “Tikrit, South to Babylon, 228; and Reynolds, 

Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond, 132.

50. Ibid., 137.

51. Kelly intvw.

52. Groen, With the 1st Marine Division in Iraq, 384. The 

1st MarDiv’s World War II-era unit patch is a blue diamond, 

with a red one in the center framed by the southern cross.

53. Kelly, “Tikrit, South to Babylon,” 227.

54. Groen, With the 1st Marine Division in Iraq, 389; Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 490. While With the 1st Marine 

Division in Iraq implies that LtCol Christopher C. Conlon 

fired and arrested the mayor on his own initiative, Gordon 

and Trainor state it was done on orders from the Coalition 

Provisional Authority.

55. Groen, With the 1st Marine Division in Iraq, 387–89.

56. Col Joseph F. Dunford intvw with Col Jon T. Hoffman, 7 August 2003, MCHC.

57. Reynolds, Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond, 138.

58. Dunford intvw.

59. Kelly, “Tikrit, South to Babylon,” 228.

60. Kelly intvw.

61. Reynolds, Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond, 137.

62. Estes, Into the Fray, 11; see also Kelly intvw for a similar 

observation.

63. Kelly intvw.

64. Johnston intvw.

65. Dunford intvw.

66. Maj General Keith J. Stalder intvw with Col Jon T. 

Hoffman, 11 August 2003, MCHC.

67. LtCol Norman L. Cooling intvw with Col Jon T. Hoffman, 8 August 2003, MCHC.

68. Dunford intvw.

69. Cooling intvw.

70. Ibid.

71. Dunford intvw.

72. Ibid.

73. Results of the Foreign Language Integrated Product 

Team (IPT) meeting held on 29 May 2003 (After Action 

Report, Training and Education Command, Quantico VA), 

Training and Education Command Files, Box 9.

74. Marine Corps Reserve Forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom: 

Lessons Learned, Combat Assessment Team, MCCDC, 

January 2004, GRC.

75. Maj Clint J. Nussberger, “Engagement in the 21st 

Century and the Need for ‘Operational’ Marine Linguists,” 

Marine Corps Gazette 87, no. 10 (2003): 40.

76. Groen, With the 1st Marine Division in Iraq, 387.

77. Dunford intvw.

78. Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 490.

79. Quoted in Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 491. For the 

role the disbanding of the Iraqi Army played in fueling 

the anti-American insurgency, see Hashim, Insurgency and 

Counter-Insurgency, 92–99; Wright, On Point II, 92–104; 

and Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” 15–16.

80. U.S. Department of Defense, “DoD News Briefing: 

Lawrence Di Rita and General John P. Abizaid,” 16 July 

2003, http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx

?TranscriptID=2845.

81. Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency, provides 

one of the best scholarly assessments of the Iraq insurgency, 

its makeup, and its motivations.

82. Intvw with LtGen James T. Conway, 21 June 2005 and 

7 July 2005, in Al-Anbar Awakening: Volume I: American 

Perspectives, U.S. Marines and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 

2004–2009, ed. CWO-4 Timothy S. McWilliams and LtCol Kurtis P. Wheeler (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2009), 41.

83. Ibid., 42.

84. Estes, Into the Fray, 27.

85. Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency, 23–27.

86. Estes, Into the Fray, 32; Hashim, Insurgency and

Counter-Insurgency, 25–26, 134–50; and Wright and Reese, 

On Point II, 445–46.

87. See appendix A in U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2003: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography, 291–94 and appendix A in 

U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2004–2008: Anthology and Annotated 

Bibliography, 239–41.

88. Intvw with 1stLt Anthony Johnston, 9 May 2004, 

Marine Corps History Division Oral History Collection, 

MCHD, Quantico, VA. All oral history collection materials cited in this work can be found at the Marine Corps 

History Division (MCHD), Quantico, VA.

89. Conway intvw, 2005, 45.

90. Ibid., 42.

91. Intvw with Gen James N. Mattis, in McWilliams and 

Wheeler, Al-Anbar Awakening: Volume I, 23.

92. Johnston intvw.

93. Donovan Campbell, Joker One: A Marine Platoon’s 

Story of Courage, Leadership, and Brotherhood (New York: 

Random House, 2009), 48.
110 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

94. Ibid.

95. Mattis intvw, 2009, 23.

96. 2d Battalion, 4th Marines ComdC, January–April 2004.

97. Ibid.

98. Campbell, Joker One, 48.

99. 2d Battalion, 4th Marines ComdC, January–April 

2004.

100. Conway intvw, 43; Tony Perry, “Marines Returning 

to Iraq Consult Old Standby,” Los Angeles Times, 8 March 

2004; and Greg Jaffe, “For Guidance in Iraq, Marines Rediscover a 1940s Manual,” Wall Street Journal, 8 April 2004.

101. Ricks, Fiasco, 318.

102. Mattis intvw, 2009, 26.

103. T. E. Lawrence, “Twenty-Seven Articles,” The Arab 

Journal, 20 August 1917.

104. Mattis intvw, 2009, 29.

105. Intvw with 1stLt Charles E. Anklam III, 19 November 2004, MCHD.

106. Ibid.

107. Johnston intvw and Anklam intvw.

108. Anklam intvw.

109. 1stLt Jason R. Goodale and 1stLt Jonathan F. Webre, 

“The Combined Action Platoon in Iraq,” in U.S. Marines 

in Iraq, 2004–2008, 157–59.

110. 1stLt Zachary J. Iscol, “CAP India,” Marine Corps 

Gazette 90, no. 1 (2006): 55–61.

111. Anklam intvw.

112. Mattis intvw, 2009, 23–24.

113. Ibid., 25.

114. Ibid.

115. Anklam intvw.

116. Ricks, Fiasco, 315.

117. Sanchez quoted in Wright and Reese, On Point II, 122.

118. Ibid., 119.

119. Ibid., 31, 64, 124–25; and Cloud and Jaffe, The 

Fourth Star, 117–22. 

120. Wright and Reese, On Point II, 164–65.

121. MajGen James N. Mattis, “Letter to All Hands.” The 

complete letter is reprinted in Estes, Into the Fray, 22.

122. Ibid.

123. Ibid.

124. Col Julian D. Alford intvw with author, 19 October 

2010.

125. Comments by Col David J. Furness made at Marine 

Corps University Symposium on Counterinsurgency Leadership in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond, 23 September 

2009.

126. See Conway intvw, 2005, 50, and Mattis intvw, 2009, 

34.

127. For the First Battle of Fallujah, see Bing West, No True 

Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle for Fallujah (New 

York: Bantam, 2005); and Estes, Into the Fray, 31–52.

128. Estes, Into the Fray, 40–46.

129. For the fighting in ar-Ramadi in 2004, see Estes, Into 

the Fray, 40–44; and Campbell, Joker One. For a historical 

account of the Battle of an-Najaf, see Francis X. Kozlowski, 

U.S. Marines in Battle: An-Najaf, August 2004 (Washington, DC: HistDiv, U.S. Marine Corps, 2009). For the Second Battle of Fallujah, see West, No True Glory; Estes, Into 

the Fray, 53–78; and Dick Camp, Operation Phantom Fury: 

The Assault and Capture of Fallujah, Iraq (Minneapolis, 

MN: Zenith Press, 2009).

130. Anklam intvw.

Chapter 4

1. Col T. X. Hammes’ The Sling and the Stone was reviewed 

in Charles Armstrong, “Fourth-Generation Warfare Comes 

Alive,” Marine Corps Gazette 11, no. 91 (2004): 91; and 

in August 2005, T. X. Hammes reviewed David Galula’s 

Counterinsurgency Warfare, in Col T. X. Hammes, “What 

Goes Around Comes Around,” Marine Corps Gazette 89, 

no. 8 (2005): 58. A bibliography of significant works on 

counterinsurgency, Arab culture, and terrorism was printed 

in LtCol Arthur L. Clark, “Of Insurgency, Arab History, 

and Militant Islam,” Marine Corps Gazette 89, no. 1 (2005): 

41–43. “Fighting the Abstract War” was reprinted in October 2007, see MajGen Victor H. Krulak, Col David Galula, 

and G. K. Tanham, “Counterinsurgency Fighting the Abstract War,” Marine Corps Gazette 91, no. 10 (2007): 10–24.

2. Capt David J. Danelo, “The Linguistic Tipping Point,”

Marine Corps Gazette 89, no. 10 (2005): 30.

3. Maj Karl C. Rohr, “Progressive Reconstruction: Melding Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare With Nation Building and Stability Operations,” Marine Corps Gazette 88, 

no. 4 (2004): 48.

4. Maj Adam T. Strickland, “MCDP 1, Warfighting, Revisited,” Marine Corps Gazette 89, no. 8 (2005): 52.

5. Strickland, “MCDP 1,” 52.

6. Ibid., 54–56.

7. Ibid., 56.

8. Maj Adam T. Strickland, “Reorganization of Marine Infantry,” Marine Corps Gazette 90, no. 2 (2006): 36–37.
Notes 111

9. Ibid., 36.

10. Ibid.

11. Capt David E. Cooper, “An Organizational Model for 

Marines Fighting an Insurgency,” Marine Corps Gazette 91, 

no. 10 (2007): 49.

12. Ibid., 49–52.

13. Col Mark F. Cancian, “A Counterinsurgency Dilemma 

in Al Anbar,” Marine Corps Gazette 91, no. 10 (2007): 73.

14. Capt Scott A. Cuomo, “Will We Be Prepared for 

What’s Next?,” Marine Corps Gazette 91, no. 7 (2007): 9.

15. Ibid., 12.

16. LtCol H. Thomas Hayden, “Measuring Success in 

Counterinsurgency,” Marine Corps Gazette 89, no. 11 

(2005): 50–51.

17. LtCol Charles L. Armstrong (Ret), “Where’s Pete Ellis?,” Marine Corps Gazette 90, no. 11 (2006): 62–64.

18. Col Thomas L. Cariker, “No More ‘One-Trick Ponies’,”

Marine Corps Gazette 6, no. 89 (2005): 33–34.

19. Ibid., 34.

20. LtCol Frank G. Hoffman (Ret), “Preparing for Hybrid Wars,” Marine Corps Gazette 91, no. 3 (2007): 58. See 

also LtGen James N. Mattis and LtCol Frank G. Hoffman 

(Ret), “Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars,” Proceedings 131, no. 11 (2005): 18–19.

21. Ibid., 60.

22. Col John A. Toolan Jr. and Charles D. McKenna, “Educating for the Future,” Marine Corps Gazette 90, no. 2 

(2006): 12.

23. EdCom ComdC, 2005.

24. EdCom ComdC, 2006.

25. Warfighting . . . From the Sea: Nine Innings 2005

Playbook (syllabus, Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA, 2004–5).

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. Small Wars and Operations Other Than War (syllabus, 

Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA, 2004–5).

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. EdCom ComdC, 2007; and Warfighting . . . From the 

Sea lasted 564.50 hours, about 35 percent of total instruction hours. Operational Art included 267.25 hours of instruction, or 17 percent of the total hours.

40. EdCom ComdC, 2003. Warfighting . . . From the Sea 

included 529.25 hours, or about 35 percent of the Command and Staff College’s total hours of instruction. The 

Operational Level of War included 229.50 hours, or 15 

percent.

41. EdCom ComdC, 2007.

42. EdCom ComdC, 2006.

43. Ibid.

44. EdCom ComdC, 2007.

45. Warfighting . . . From the Sea: Block 3: MCPP Practical Application Syllabus, AY 2006–7 and Warfighting . . . 

From the Sea: Block 4: Exercise BABARY SWORD: Division, Wing, and MLG Planning (syllabi, Command and 

Staff College, Quantico, VA, 2006–7).

46. EdCom ComdC, 2007.

47. Ibid.

48. Command and Staff College Language Program, Arabic, 2006–7, Command and Staff College Files 2006–7, 

GRC, Quantico, VA, Box 13.

49. Toolan and McKenna, “Educating for the Future.”

50. EdCom ComdC, 2007.

51. EdCom ComdC, 2006.

52. EdCom ComdC, 2007.

53. Marine Corps Combat Development Command 

ComdC, 2005.

54. “Tomorrow’s Marine Corps: Speed, Flexibility, and 

Agility . . . Globally” (briefing, Marine Corps General Officer’s Symposium, October 2004), GRC, Quantico, VA.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

57. Marine Corps Center for Advanced Operational Culture 

Learning (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Combat Development Command, MCHC).

58. Matt Hilburn, “Bridging the Divide,” Seapower 48, no. 

12 (2005): 30.

59. Memorandum from LtGen James N. Mattis, Deputy 

Commandant for Combat Development and Integration/

commanding general, Marine Corps Combat Develop-
112 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

ment Command to director, Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning, “Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning Center of Excellence Charter (CAOCL 

COE),” 14 January 2006, Marine Corps Historical Center 

Reference Branch Files, hereafter Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning Center for Excellence Charter.

60. Intvw with MajGen Richard C. Zilmer, in McWilliams 

and Wheeler, Al-Anbar Awakening: Volume I, 147.

61. Barak A. Salmoni, “Advances in Predeployment Culture Training: The U.S. Marine Corps Approach,” Military 

Review 86, no. 6 (2006): 79–80.

62. Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning 

Center for Excellence Charter.

63. Isaac D. Pacheco, “The 7th Warfighting Skill,” Marine 

Corps Gazette 94, no. 4 (2010): 19–20.

64. Salmoni, “Advances in Predeployment Culture Training,” 79; and Hilburn, “Bridging the Divide,” 30.

65. Salmoni, “Advances in Predeployment Culture Training,” 87.

66. Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning 

Center for Excellence Charter.

67. Memorandum from deputy commandant for Combat 

Development and Integration LtGen James F. Amos to 

distribution, “Charter for the USMC Center for Irregular 

Warfare (CIW),” 11 May 2007, Marine Corps Historical 

Center Reference Branch Files, hereafter Center for Irregular 

Warfare Charter.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid.

70. U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Interim Publication 

3-33.01: Small-Unit Leaders’ Guide to Counterinsurgency

(Quantico, VA: U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development 

Command, 2006).

71. LtGen James N. Mattis, “Foreword,” Small Unit Leaders’ Guide to Counterinsurgency (MCIP 3-33.01).

72. U.S. Marine Corps, Small Unit Leaders’ Guide to Counterinsurgency (MCIP 3-33.01).

73. Ibid., “Chapter 4: Mobilizing the Populace,” 39–52.

74. Ibid., 41–42.

75. Ibid., 90.

76. Ibid., 28.

77. For accounts of the doctrine’s creation, see Cloud and 

Jaffe, The Fourth Star, 216–20; and Ricks, The Gamble, 24–31.

78. See the foreword to the University of Chicago Press version of LtCol John A. Nagl, “The Evolution and Importance 

of Army/Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency,” in Counterinsurgency Field Manual, U.S. Army and 

Marine Corps (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 

xiii–xx.

79. U.S. Marine Corps, Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps 

Warfighting Publication 3-33.5: Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 2006), 

4:7–4:8. See also Mattis intvw for an assessment of 1st 

MarDiv’s plans for Operation Iraqi Freedom II.

80. FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5: Counterinsurgency, 4:1–4:2.

81. Cloud and Jaffe, The Fourth Star, 220. For a review 

of the University of Chicago edition, see Samantha Power, 

“Our War on Terror,” New York Times, 29 July 2007.

82. LtCol Charles L. Armstrong (Ret), “Fresh Counterinsurgency Doctrine,” Marine Corps Gazette 91, no. 3 (2007): 

49–50.

83. Ibid., 49. Armstrong quotes page vii of FM 3-24/

MCWP 3-33.5: Counterinsurgency.

84. Bing West, The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the 

Endgame in Iraq (New York: Random House, 2008), 120.

85. Ibid., 122.

86. Intvw with MajGen John F. Kelly, in McWilliams and 

Wheeler, Al-Anbar Awakening: Volume I, 249.

87. Intvw with Maj Alfred B. Connable, in ibid., 123.

88. The U.S. Army addressed the issue of MCWP 3-33.5/

FM 3-24’s utility as a manual for operations in the field

by publishing a supplementary manual in 2009, Field 

Manual 3–24.2: Tactics in Counterinsurgency.

Chapter 5

1. Col Verle E. Ludwig, U.S. Marines at Twentynine Palms, 

California (Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Marine 

Corps, 1989).

2. Marine Air Ground Task Force Training Command, 

Marine Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, 

California, ComdC, 2004.

3. “MAGTF Futures Group” (brief, Training and Education Command, March 2004, GRC, Quantico, VA).

4. Twentynine Palms ComdC, 2004.

5. Twentynine Palms ComdC, 2005.

6. “Exercise Mojave Viper,” Marine Corps Gazette 90, no. 

12 (2006): 49.

7. Ibid., 50.

8. Twentynine Palms ComdC, 2005.

9. 2d Battalion, 4th Marines ComdC, January–April 2004.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.
Notes 113

12. Ibid.

13. Twentynine Palms ComdC, 2005.

14. Ibid. See also “Exercise Mojave Viper,” 48–52.

15. Ibid.

16. Twentynine Palms ComdC, 2005.

17. Ibid.

18. See Ricks, Fiasco and The Gamble; Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq”; Malkasian, “Will Iraqization 

Work?” in U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2004–2008, 161–78; and 

Cloud and Jaffe, The Fourth Star.

19. Estes, Into the Fray, provides an overview of II MEF’s 

operations throughout al-Anbar during 2005. See also the 

summary of action that accompanied II MEF’s Presidential 

Unit Citation Award Recommendation in U.S. Marines in 

Iraq, 2004–2008, 111–31.

20. Col Julian D. Alford intvw with author, 19 October 

2010.

21. LtCol Richard D. Hall, memo to CO, 7th Marines, 

“7th Marines’ Combat TTPs (Iraq),” 18 April 2005, GRC.

22. Ibid.

23. Estes, Into the Fray, 111–31.

24. Col Stephen W. Davis intvw with LtCol David A. 

Benhoff, 20 May 2005, Marine Corps Historical Center, 

Quantico, VA.

25. Ibid.

26. Alford intvw.

27. 3d Battalion, 6th Marines ComdC, January–December 

2004.

28. Alford intvw.

29. “Red on red” refers to enemy forces against enemy

forces. Enemy forces are usually designated in red on U.S. 

and NATO battle maps, whereas friendly forces are designated in blue.

30. Nicholas J. Schlosser, U.S. Marines in Battle: Al-Qaim, 

September 2005–March 2006 (Washington, DC: Marine 

Corps History Division, 2013), 15.

31. Alford intvw.

32. 3d Battalion, 6th Marines ComdC, January–June 2005.

33. Ibid.

34. Department of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: Report to Congress, February 2006, 35, http://

www.defense.gov/home/features/Iraq_Reports/Index.html.

35. Kamis Ahmad Abban al-Alwani intvw, in Al-Anbar 

Awakening: Volume II: Iraqi Perspectives, From Insurgency 

to Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004–2009, ed., Col Gary 

W. Montgomery and CWO-4 Timothy S. McWilliams 

(Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2009), 168.

36. Staff BGen (Pilot) Nuri al-Din Abd al-Karim Mukhif 

al-Fahadawi and Col Said Muhammed Muad al-Fahadawi 

intvw, in Montgomery and McWilliams, Al-Anbar Awakening: Volume II, 195.

37. Sheikh Ali Hatim Abd al-Razzaq Ali al-Sulayman alAssafi intvw, in ibid., 107.

38. 3d Battalion, 6th Marines ComdC, July–December 

2005.

39. Ibid.

40. Moyar, A Question of Command, 241.

41. Col Alford, comments at Marine Corps University 

Symposium, “Counterinsurgency Leadership in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Beyond,” National Press Club, Washington, 

DC, 23 September 2009.

42. Normally, one to two U.S. Army brigades served in 

the Multi-National Force-West area of operations of Iraq 

(the al-Anbar Province), under the authority of whichever 

particular Marine expeditionary force operated as the main 

command for the region. In 2006, it was the I MEF (Forward), which had relieved II MEF (Fwd) in March 2006.

43. See “Miriam” intvw (pseudonym for the head of an 

Iraqi women’s nongovernmental organization) in Al-Anbar 

Awakening: Volume II, 19–26; Long, “The Anbar Awakening,” 184; and Andrew Lubin, “Ramadi: From the Caliphate 

to Capitalism,” in U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2004–2008, 205.

44. For work on the Anbar Awakening, see Austin G. 

Long, “The Anbar Awakening,” in U.S. Marines in Iraq, 

2004–2008, 179–93; Maj Niel Smith, USA, and Col 

Sean B. MacFarland, USA, “Anbar Awakens: The Tipping 

Point,” in U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2004–2008, 195–203; Lubin, “Ramadi: From the Caliphate to Capitalism,” 205–9;

McWilliams and Wheeler, Al-Anbar Awakening: Volume I; 

and McWilliams and Montgomery, Al-Anbar Awakening: 

Volume II.

45. Zilmer intvw, 145.

46. Carter Malkasian, “A Thin Blue Line in the Sand,” Democracy 5 (2007): 48–58.

47. Zilmer intvw, 143.

48. Sheikh Ahmad Bezia Fteikhan al-Rishawi intvw, in 

Montgomery and McWilliams, Al-Anbar Awakening: Volume II, 46.

49. Sheikh Wissam Abd al-Ibrahim al-Hardan al-Aethawi 

intvw, in ibid., 57.

50. Lubin, “From the Caliphate to Capitalism,” 205.

51. LtCol William M. Jurney intvw, in McWilliams and 

Wheeler, Al-Anbar Awakening: Volume I, 194.
114 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

52. 1st Battalion, 6th Marines ComdC, July–December 

2006.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. Lubin, “Ramadi: From the Caliphate to Capitalism,” 

208.

59. Jurney intvw, 193.

60. Maj Daniel R. Zappa intvw, in McWilliams and 

Wheeler, Al-Anbar Awakening: Volume I, 205.

61. 1st Battalion, 6th Marines ComdC, July–December 

2006.

62. Lubin, “Ramadi: From the Caliphate to Capitalism,” 

206–7.

63. Michael E. O’Hanlon and Ian Livingston, Iraq Index: 

Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in PostSaddam Iraq (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 31 

January, 2011), 19, http://www.brookings.edu/saban/iraq

-index.aspx.

Conclusion

1. Center for Irregular Warfare Charter.

2. Col Norman Cooling, Col Dale Alford, Col Chip Bierman, and LtCol James Donnellan, “Retooling for Afghanistan,” Marine Corps Gazette, 93 (2009): 10–20; and MajGen

Robert B. Neller, “Lessons Learned: Some Thoughts on 

COIN,” Marine Corps Gazette, 94 (2010): 10–15.

3. Gen James F. Amos, 2012 Report to the Senate Armed

Services Committee on the Posture of the United States Marine

Corps, 15 March 2012, http://www.armed-services.senate

.gov/statemnt/2012/03%20March/Amos%2003-15

-12.pdf.
Index

A

Abdul Sattar Abu Risha, Sheikh, 93–94

Abizaid, John P., 54, 109fn80

Abu Risha Clan, 93

Afghanistan War, v, vii, 1–2, 17, 25–26, 32–35, 67–68,

76–77, 80, 84, 91, 96–98, 101fn2, 101fn4

See also Operation Enduring Freedom

Air Force, United States, 2, 12

AirLand Battle, 18–19, 104fn59

al-Anbar Province, Iraq, 2, 46, 54, 58, 61, 63, 80–81, 84–

90, 92–94, 96, 98, 113fn19, 113fn42

Albu Mahal Tribe, 88–91

Alford, Julian D. (Col, USMC), 60, 87–91, 110fn124,

113fn20, 113fn41

Algerian War, 21, 39, 58

Ali Hatim Abd al-Razzaq, Sheikh, 91, 113fn37

Allen, John R. (MajGen, USMC), 95

al-Qaeda, vii, 32, 34, 36, 42, 89, 91, 93–94

al-Qaeda in Iraq, 87–90, 92–96

al-Qaim, Marines in, 87–92, 96, 98

al-Sudaid, Fahran, 47

al-Zarqawi, Abu Musab, 87

Amos, James F. (MajGen, USMC), vii, 49, 54, 74, 77,

99–100, 112fn67, 114fn3

Amphibious Warfare School, 36

Anbar Awakening, 86, 90, 93–94, 96, 98, 108fn26,

108fn27

Anklam III, Charles E. (1stLt, USMC), 57–58, 62,

110fn105 

an-Najaf, Marines in, 1, 50, 55, 62–63, 110fn129

an-Nasiriyah, Marines in, 44, 52–53

Arab-Israeli Wars (1965, 1967, 1973), 21

Armstrong, Charles L. (LtCol, USMC), 20, 67, 79–80,

104fn67, 110fn1, 111fn17, 112fn82

Arab Revolt, 56

Army, United States

corps

 V Corps, 44, 48–49, 59, 62

divisions

 1st Armored Division, 92

 1st Cavalry Division, 59

 4th Infantry Division, 47–48

 1st Brigade Combat Team, 

4th Infantry Division, 48

 82d Airborne Division, 61

 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), 

59, 108fn40

companies

 Company A, 2d Battalion, 37th Armor, 

94

 Company C, 1st Battalion, 77th Armor, 

94

Army Combined Arms Center, 79

ar-Ramadi, Marines in, 62–63, 73, 91–92, 94–96, 98,

110fn129, 113fn43, 114fn58

Asprey, Robert, 70

See also War in the Shadows

As-Samawah, Marines in, 50

AT-4 antitank rocket, 91

B

Baath Party, 45–46, 48, 52, 54, 98, 108fn27

Bachra, Raja, 76

Baghdad, Marines in, 44–46, 48–49, 52, 54, 62, 96

Bailey, Ronald L. (Col, USMC), 64

Banana Wars, 4, 7, 9, 12, 39, 42, 60, 65, 67, 102fn5,

103fn5

Baqubah, Iraq, 48

Barbary Wars, 7, 102fn1

Basrah, Iraq, 55

Bataan (LHD 5), 29

Belcher, Michael F. (LtCol, USMC), 50

Bell AH-1 Super Cobra, 28–29

Bell UH-1 Iroquois, 28–29

Berkeley, Randolph C. (BGen, USMC), 3

Bin Laden, Osama, 32

Bittner, Donald F., vii, 41

Boeing CH-46 Sea Knight, 28–29

115
116 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

Bosnia-Herzogovina, 23, 26

Bremer, L. Paul, 52–53, 61

British Mandate (Iraq), 46

Bush, George H. W., 23, 45, 61, 86, 106fn24

Bush, George W., 30, 32, 106fn31

Butler, Smedley D. (MajGen, USMC), 8, 35, 39, 103fn8

C

Cacos, 8–9

Callwell, C. E. (Col, UK), 4, 9–11, 39–40, 70, 102fn19

See also Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice

Campbell, Donovan (1stLt, USMC), 56, 109fn93

Camp Blue Diamond, Iraq, 94

Cancian, Mark F. (Col, USMC), 66, 111fn13

Caribbean, Marines in the, v, 7–8, 10, 23

Cariker, Thomas L. (Col, USMC), 67, 85, 111fn18

Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning

 (CAOCL), Quantico, vii, 74–77, 84, 99, 111fn57,

112fn59

Center for Irregular Warfare, vii, 77, 99, 112fn67

Central America, Marines in, v, 2, 4, 7–10, 15, 20, 23–24,

80

Central Command, United States, 2, 32, 54, 65

Chaliand, Gerard, 39

and Guerrilla Strategies, Low-Intensity Conflict, 39

Chechnya, war in, 38–39

Chiarelli, Peter W. (MajGen, USA), 59

China, conventional war in, 3–4, 13, 24, 97

Chinese Civil War, 21

Chosin Reservoir, Battle of, 14, 60

Clausewitz, Carl von, 4, 23, 40, 102fn17, 106fn23

and Vom Kriege, 4

Clinton, William J., 23

Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), 52, 54, 61,

109fn54

Cold War, v, 4, 12–13, 19, 24–26, 29–30, 33, 39, 42, 66,

97, 101fn2, 103fn24

Colombia, 39–40

Combined Action Program (CAP), 3, 17, 45, 55, 57–58,

62–63, 65, 98, 110fn109, 110fn110

CAP platoon, 17, 57–58

Combined-arms exercise (CAX), vii, 64, 81–85, 89, 91,

96, 98

 See also Exercise Mojave Viper; revised combinedarms exercise (RCAX), Twentynine Palms

Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University,

 vii, 1, 6, 26, 36–42, 63–65, 67–68, 70–75, 81, 

96, 99, 107fn85, 111fn40

Concepts and Issues, 26, 30, 105fn7

Connable, Alfred B. (Maj, USMC), 80, 112fn87

Conway, James T. (LtGen, USMC), 43–44, 50, 54–55, 59,

61, 80, 109fn82

Cooling, Norman L. (LtCol, USMC), 50–51, 109fn67,

114fn2

Cooper, David E. (Capt, USMC), 65, 111fn11

Counterinsurgency, Army Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps 

 Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, 74, 78–79, 

112fn79, 112fn88

Counterinsurgency, Fleet Marine Force Manual 8-2, 79

Crevald, Martin van, 23, 105fn76

and The Transformation of War, 23

Cuban Revolution, 21

Cuomo, Scott A. (Capt, USMC), 66, 111fn14

D

Danelo, David J. (Capt, USMC), 64, 110fn2

Davis, Stephen W. (Col, USMC), 87, 89, 113fn24

Defense, Department of, 30, 97, 102fn22, 113fn34

Desert Protector Force, 90

Dominican Republic, Marines in, 7–8, 62, 98, 102fn5,

103fn6

Dowdy, Joseph D. (Col, USMC), 44

Dulaimi Confederation, 46

Dunford Jr., Joseph F. (Col, USMC), 45, 50–51, 55,

109fn56

E

East Timor, 39

Edson, Merritt A. (MajGen, USMC), 3, 9

Education Command, 6, 75–77

See also Marine Corps University

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 12

Ek, Paul R. (1stLt, USMC), 16

Ellis, Earl H. “Pete” (LtCol, USMC), 3, 66, 111fn17

El Salvador, 20, 40, 79, 101fn5

Euphrates River, 46, 54, 62, 87, 91

Exercise Mojave Viper, vii, 56, 81–86, 94, 98, 100, 112fn6

 See also combined-arms exercise; revised combined-arms exercise; Twentynine Palms

Expeditionary Warfare School, 64
Index 117

F

Falklands War, 21

Fallujah, First Battle of, 61, 110fn127

See also Operation Vigilant Resolve

Fallujah Brigade, 61

Fallujah, Second Battle of, 58, 62, 110fn129

 See also Operation Phantom Fury; Operation alFajr

Fedayeen, 44–45, 52–53

Fleet Marine Force, United States, 2, 9, 12, 15, 17

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 79

See also Army Combined Arms Center

Forward Operating Base Rhino, 32, 44, 106fn36 

Fourth-generation warfare, concept of, 22, 24, 34, 37, 64,

105fn74, 106fn47, 110fn1

Franks, Tommy R. (Gen, USA), 32

Freeman, Lloyd D. (Maj, USMC), 35, 107fn52

Furness, David J. (Col, USMC), 60, 110fn125

G

Galula, David (Col, USA), 11, 15–16, 21, 42, 58, 64, 66,

79, 88, 104fn41

 and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, 16, 38, 110fn1

Gardia Nacional (Dominican), 8

Gardia Nacional (Nicaragua), 8

Gaskin, Walter E. (MajGen, USMC), 95

Gates, John Morgan, 70

 and Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army 

in the Philippines, 1898–1902, 70

Gentile, Gian P. (LtCol, USA), 48

Germany, occupation of, 72–73

Global War on Terrorism, 2, 5–6, 32–36, 40, 42, 44, 63–

64, 71, 74, 97

Golan Heights, 21

Gray Jr., Alfred M. (Gen, USMC), 20–21, 104fn66

Greene Jr., Wallace M. (Gen, USMC), 40

Grenada, 67

Guadalcanal, Battle of, 12, 14, 23, 60, 99

Guatemala, 20, 40

Guerrilla and How to Fight Him, The, 15, 104fn37

H

Hagee, Michael W. (Gen, USMC), 54, 106fn38

Haiti, Marines in, 7–8, 14, 17, 23, 25–26, 39, 41, 58, 62,

98, 102fn13, 103fn5

Hammes, Thomas X. (Maj, USMC), 20–23, 64, 104fn63,

104fn69

and The Sling and the Stone, 23, 105fn77, 110fn1

Harrington, Samuel M. (Maj, USMC), 9, 103fn9

Hashemites, 46

Hayden, H. Thomas (LtCol, USMC), 67, 111fn16

Headquarters Marine Corps, United States

Combined Joint Task Force 7, 58–59

Multi-National Force–Iraq, 61, 86, 88, 90

 Multi-National Force–West, 61, 86, 91–92, 96, 

113fn42

Helmand Province, Afghanistan, 100

Heydte, Friedrich Freiherr von der, 70

 and Modern Irregular Warfare: In Defense Policy 

and as a Military Phenomenon, 70

History Division, Marine Corps University, 6

Hoffman, Frank G. (LtCol, USMC), 33–34, 67, 102fn25,

106fn41, 111fn20

House Armed Services Committee, 13, 103fn28

Hue City, Battle of, 60, 62

Husaybah, Iraq, 87, 89

I

Ia Drang Valley, Battle of, 37

Improvised explosive device (IED), 58, 82, 84, 87, 91, 94

Inchon, Battle of, 23, 37–38, 103fn21

Iran, 46

Iraqi Army, 23, 53, 62, 86, 89–90, 93–96, 109fn79

Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, 58

Iraqi Governing Council, 61

Iraqi National Guard, 55

503d Iraqi National Guard Battalion, 58

 Company I, 505th Iraqi National Guard Battalion, 58

Iraqi Security Forces, 55, 57, 62, 77, 93, 95–96

Iraq War, v, vii, 1–2, 4, 38, 43–62, 64–65, 68–69, 74,

79–81, 85, 93, 97–98 

See also Operation Iraqi Freedom

Iwo Jima, Battle of, 12, 23

J

Japan, occupation of, 24, 72–73

Johnson, Wray R., 70, 102fn16
118 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

 and Vietnam and American Doctrine for Small 

Wars, 70

Johnston, Anthony C. (1stLt, USMC), 55–56, 108fn42,

109fn88

Joint Chiefs of Staff, 3, 12, 15

Joint Publication 3-07, Military Operations Other Than War,

37–38

Jomini, Antoine-Henri, 40, 106fn23

Jones, James L. (Gen, USMC), 26, 106fn38

Jurney, William M. (LtCol, USMC), 91–96, 113fn51

K

Kabul, Taliban in, 42

Karabilah, Iraq, 87, 89

Karabla Tribe, 90

Katab al-Hamsa, 88

Kelly, John F. (BGen, USMC), 46–48, 50, 55, 80, 108fn19,

108fn23, 109fn49, 112fn86

Kennedy, John F., 4, 12–13, 15, 39, 103fn25

Khrushchev, Nikita, 39, 103fn25

Knoll, Stuart L. (Col, USMC), 55

Korean War, 3, 7, 13, 21, 38, 60, 66, 72, 103fn21

Kosovo, 23, 27

Kramlich, Richard S. (BGen, USMC), 54

Krepinevich Jr., Andrew F., 39, 70

and The Army in Vietnam, 39, 70

Krulak, Charles C. (Gen, USMC), 25–26, 43, 105fn3, 

105fn19

Krulak, Victor H. (MajGen, USMC), 3, 13, 15–17, 64,

74, 102fn8, 102fn10, 104fn41, 110fn1

Kuwait, Marines in, 23, 44, 49

L

Lawrence, Thomas E., 39, 56–57, 103fn103

and Seven Pillars of Wisdom, 39

Lee, Harry (Gen, USMC), 8

Lejeune, John A. (LtGen, USMC), 3

Light armored vehicle (LAV-25), 18–19, 44

Lind, William S., 19, 22–23, 34, 104fn55, 105fn74,

106fn47

Linn, Brian McAllister, 70

and The Philippine War, 1899–1902, 70, 102fn3

Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), 58

Low-intensity conflict (LIC), 3, 5, 17–23, 25, 39, 69,

104fn40, 104fn64, 104fn65, 104fn67

M

M1A1 Abrams tank, 91

MacFarland, Sean B. (Col, USA), 92, 113fn44

Machine gun

M2, 91

M240, 91

MK19, 91

Malayan Emergency, 17, 39, 70, 72

March Reserve Air Base, California, 82

Marine Air Ground Combat Center, 56, 63, 81–82, 85,

98, 100, 112fn2

See also Exercise Mojave Viper; Twentynine Palms

Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF), v, 21, 25, 28, 34,

 36–37, 41–42, 67, 72, 97, 100, 104fn46, 

104fn65, 112fn3

Marine Corps, United States

forces

 III Marine Amphibious Force (III 

MAF), 17, 104fn46

 I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF), 

23, 43–46, 49–51, 54–55, 58–59, 

61–63, 66, 76, 80, 82, 86, 92, 96, 98, 

105fn15, 113fn42

 II Marine Expeditionary Force (II 

MEF), 62, 80, 86, 95–96, 105fn15, 

113fn19, 113fn42

divisions/wings/FSSGs

 1st Force Service Support Group, 54

 1st Marine Division, 39, 44–51, 54–

55, 57, 59–61, 63–64, 79–80, 98–99, 

107fn6, 109fn54

 2d Marine Division, 13

 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, 49, 54, 62

independent brigades

 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade (1st 

MEB), 32–33, 36, 42–43, 105fn14

 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade, 44

 See also Task Force Tarawa

units/regiments

 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit 

(Special Operations Capable) (15th 

MEU[SOC]), 32, 34–35, 44, 94, 

105fn14, 106fn36 

 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit 

(Special Operations Capable) (26th 

MEU[SOC]), 32–34, 105fn14

 1st Marines, 64
Index 119

 See also Regimental Combat Team 1

 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, 58

 4th Marines

 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, 56, 82–

83, 110fn96

 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, 17, 56

 5th Marines

 See also Regimental Combat Team 5

 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, 50

 6th Marines

 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, 91–92, 

94, 96, 114fn52

 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, 60, 87–

92, 96, 113fn27

 7th Marines

 See also Regimental Combat Team 7

 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, 50

 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, 58, 86

 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, 50

 11th Marines, 45

 Regimental Combat Team 1, 44, 55, 63

 See also 1st Marines

 Regimental Combat Team 5, 44, 55

 See also 5th Marines

 Regimental Combat Team 7, 44

 See also 7th Marines

 independent battalions, battalion landing teams, 

companies, and platoons

 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, 46

 2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, 46

 3d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, 46

 Battalion Landing Team 1/1, 60

 Battalion Landing Team 2/1, 90

 Battalion Landing Team 2/4, 94

 CAP India, 58, 110fn110

 CAP Platoon Golf 3, 58

task forces

 Task Force Leatherneck, 100

 Task Force Tarawa, 44

 See also 2d Marine Expeditionary 

Brigade

 Task Force Tripoli, 46–47, 53, 55, 93

Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, 84

Marine Corps Combat Development Command

 (MCCDC), 1, 6, 36, 63–66, 68, 74–75, 77, 80–

81, 85, 96, 98–99, 111fn53

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1: Warfighting, 29, 64,

74, 79

Marine Corps Gazette, 9, 15, 17, 20, 22, 34, 52, 63–67,

79–80

Marine Corps General Officer’s Symposium, 30, 75–76

Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center,

Bridgeport, California, 89

Marine Corps Senior School, 14

See also Command and Staff College

Marine Corps University, 68, 72–73, 77

Marine Corps War College, 64

Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, 6, 31, 45, 74, 98,

106fn29

Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, 74, 78–79,

112fn79, 112fn83, 112fn88

Marine Expeditionary Force Command language program,

52

Marines in Guerrilla and Anti-Guerrilla Type Operations,

14, 103fn33

Mattis, James N. (MajGen, USMC), vii, 32, 44–46,

 48–56, 58–61, 63, 66–68, 74–75, 77–80, 98, 

109fn91, 110fn121, 111fn20, 111fn59, 112fn71

McDonnell Douglas AV-8B Harrier, 28–29

McFarland, Ronnell R. (Col, USMC), 55

McKissock, Gary S. (LtGen, USMC), 33, 106fn40

Melshen, Paul (Maj, USMC), 20, 104fn64

Meyers, Bruce F. (LtCol, USMC), 14, 103fn35

Military Assistance Command–Vietnam (MACV), 17

Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), 5, 26,

37–42, 44, 54, 67, 70–71, 73

Miller, Stephen W. (Capt, USMC), 19, 104fn55

Multi-Service Concept for Irregular Warfare, 74

N

National Liberation Front, 17

See also Viet Cong

Naval Postgraduate School, 55

Navy, Department of, 3, 7, 11–12, 27–28, 33, 42

Navy, United States

Sixth Fleet, 17

Task Force 58, 32–33, 42, 100

Niblock, Walter L. (Col, USMC), 64
120 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

Nicaragua, Marines in, 7–10, 14, 17, 20, 40, 58, 60, 62,

98, 102fn13, 103fn6

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 17–19, 27,

88, 100

Northern Ireland, 39–40, 51, 70

North Vietnam, 17

Nussberger, Clint J. (Maj, USMC), 52, 109fn75

O

Obama, Barack H., 100

Odierno, Raymond T. (MajGen, USA), 47–48

O’Donohue, Daniel J. (LtCol, USMC), 50

Okinawa, Battle of, 12

O’Neill, Bard E., 70

and Insurgency and Terrorism, 70

Operational Maneuver From the Sea, 27–28, 30, 33, 42,

105fn8

Operation Enduring Freedom Combat Assessment Team,

35–36, 43

Operations

al-Fajr, 57, 62, 90

Berlin Airlift, 96

Cartwheel, 37

Chromite, 37–38, 41, 103fn21

Desert Shield, 25

Desert Storm, 23, 25, 29, 36, 72, 101fn2

 Enduring Freedom, 32–36, 40, 42–43, 97, 100, 

105fn2, 105fn14, 106fn32, 106fn41

Husky, 37, 41

 Iraqi Freedom, 41, 44–54, 62, 79, 98, 108fn30, 

108fn38, 109fn74, 112fn79

Iron Fist, 89

Makin Island III, 94

Matador, 87

Midway Island, 94

Peleliu, 94

Phantom Fury, 110fn129

Sayaid, 87

Silver Bayonet, 37

Steel Curtain, 90

Tinian, 94

Vigilant Resolve, 61

See also First Battle of Fallujah

Operations Against Guerrilla Forces, Fleet Marine Force

Manual 21, 14, 103fn29

P

Pakistan, 88

Peleliu, Battle of, 12

Peleliu (LHA 5), 32

Petraeus, David H. (MajGen, USA), 59, 75, 101fn1,

108fn40

Philippines, 7

Philippine War, 70

Phu Bai Province, South Vietnam, 17

Pontecorvo, Gillo, 39

and The Battle of Algiers, 39

Puller, Lewis B. (LtGen, USMC), 9, 39, 60

Q

Quantico, Marine Corps Base, vii, 3, 6, 81

R

Reagan, Ronald W., 5, 22

Revised combined-arms exercise (RCAX), 82 84, 89, 91

Rohr, Karl C. (Maj, USMC), 64, 110fn3

Rommel, Erwin (German field marshall), 20

and Infantry Attacks, 20

Rostow, Walter W., 15, 104fn37

Rumsfeld, Donald H., 30–32, 106fn26

Russell, John H. (MajGen, USMC), 3

Russia, 38–39

S

Sadah, Iraq, 87, 89

Saddam Hussein, 45–46, 52, 54, 62, 98, 108fn30, 114fn63

Sadr, Muqtada, 62

Said Muhammed Muad al-Fahadawi (Col, Iraq), 90,

113fn36

Salmoni, Barak A., 55, 112fn61

Samarra, Iraq, 48

Sanchez, Ricardo S. (LtGen, USA), 59, 110fn117

Sandino, Augusto, 8

Schmitt, John F. (Capt, USMC), 22, 105fn74, 106fn27

School for Advanced Warfighting, 36

September 11, 2001 attacks, 40

Shoup, David M. (Gen, USMC), 13–15, 103fn28
Index 121

Sikorsky CH-53E Sea Stallion, 28, 32

Sinai Peninsula, 21

Small-Unit Leader’s Guide to Counterinsurgency, Marine

Corps Interim Publication 3-33.01, 73–74

Small Wars Manual, v, 4, 6, 9–12, 14, 20–21, 38–40, 42,

 51, 56, 64, 66, 70, 78–79, 88, 102fn20, 103fn12, 

103fn32

Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice, 74, 77–79,

112fn70, 112fn71

Somalia, Marines in, 23, 25–26, 39–40, 44–45, 67

South Vietnam, counterinsurgency in, 15–17, 21, 23

South Vietnamese Popular Forces, 17

Soviet Union, conventional war with, 3–4, 12, 18–21, 24–

25, 39, 102fn15

See also Khrushchev, Nikita

Spanish-American War, 7, 11, 103fn5

Special Operations Command (SOCOM), 35, 74, 76–77

Stalder, Keith J. (MajGen, USMC), 50, 109fn66

Stanley, Clifford L. (Col, USMC), 36

State, Department of, 10–11, 21

Strickland, Adam T. (Maj, USMC), 64–65, 110fn4,

110fn8

Summers Jr., Harry G. (Col, USA), 69–70

and On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context, 70

T

Taliban, 32–33, 36, 42–43, 97–98

Tanham, G. K., 15, 64, 104fn41, 110fn1

Tarawa, Battle of, 12, 23

Tarawa-class landing helicopter carrier, 28

Taylor, Maxwell D. (Gen, USA), 12

and The Uncertain Trumpet, 12

Tet Offensive, 17

Third World, warfare in, 4–5, 13, 20, 24

Thompson, Robert, 39, 70

and Defeating Communist Insurgency, 39, 70

Tikrit, Iraq, 44, 46–49, 93, 108fn19

Toolan Jr., John A. (Col, USMC), vii, 55, 63–64, 68,

11fn22

Training and Education Command, 6, 75–77

Trinquier, Roger, 39, 42, 70, 79

and Modern Warfare, 39

Truman, Harry S., 12

Twentynine Palms, California, 56, 63, 81–86, 89, 98, 100,

112fn1, 112fn2

 See also combined-arms exercise; revised combined-arms exercise; Exercise Mojave Viper; Marine Air Ground Combat Center

U

Ubaydi, Iraq, 87, 89–90

Utley, Harold H. (Maj, USMC), 9, 103fn9

V

Vandegrift, Alexander A. (MajGen, USMC), 9, 99

Viet Cong, 16, 71

Vietnam War, counterinsurgency in, 3, 12, 17, 19, 21, 23,

42, 67, 70–72, 98

Volkskrieg (Peoples’ War, Popular War), 4

W

Wallace, William S. (LtGen, USA), 44

Walt, Lewis W. (MajGen, USMC), 17

Warfare

amphibious, v, 3, 12, 14, 23, 37

attrition, 30, 105fn23

conventional, 4, 23, 37, 65, 67, 73, 102fn25

guerrilla, 3–4, 13–15, 20, 103fn33, 104fn37

 irregular, 1, 4–24, 37–41, 63–64, 66–72, 74–75, 

77, 81, 97–100, 101fn1, 102fn16, 102fn20

 maneuver, 3, 17–30, 32–38, 42–54, 64–65, 74–

75, 85, 97, 101fn6, 104fn55, 105fn6, 105fn18, 

105fn23, 106fn27, 106fn38, 107fn3, 119fn3

Warfighting, Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, 4, 19, 24–25,

29, 33, 64–65, 74, 79, 102fn15

Warsaw Pact, 18, 104fn53

Wasp-class landing helicopter dock carrier, 28

West, Francis J. “Bing,” 39–40, 57, 107fn3, 107fn5,

110fn127, 110fn129, 112fn84

 and The Village, 40, 80, 107fn3, 107fn5, 

110fn127, 110fn129, 112fn84

West, Owen (Capt, USMC), 35

Westmoreland, William C. (Gen, USA), 17

Wilson, Gary I. (LtCol, USMC), 22, 105fn74

World War I, 37, 56, 72–73

World War II, 2, 5, 9, 12, 21, 31, 37, 60, 66, 70, 72–73

Y

Yugoslavia, 23
122 U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare: Training and Education, 2000–2010

Z

Zappa, Daniel R. (Maj, USMC), 95, 114fn60

Zilmer, Richard C. (MajGen, USMC), 76, 92–93, 112fn60

Zinni, Anthony C. (LtGen, USMC), 39, 65, 69