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87–866 2015

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–103] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2015 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING 

ON

FISCAL YEAR 2015 NATIONAL DEFENSE 

AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST 

FOR NATIONAL SECURITY 

SPACE ACTIVITIES 

HEARING HELD 

APRIL 3, 2014 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

STEVE KITAY, Professional Staff Member 

LEONOR TOMERO, Counsel 

ERIC SMITH, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2014 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, April 3, 2014, Fiscal Year 2015 National Defense Authorization 

Budget Request for National Security Space Activities .................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, April 3, 2014 .......................................................................................... 21 

THURSDAY, APRIL 3, 2014 

FISCAL YEAR 2015 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET 

REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE ACTIVITIES 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces ............................................................................ 1 

Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Strategic Forces ............................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Klinger, Gil I., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space and Intelligence, Department of Defense .......................................................................... 2 

Loverro, Douglas L., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, 

Department of Defense ........................................................................................ 4 

Raymond, Lt Gen John W. ‘‘Jay,’’ USAF, Commander, Joint Functional Component Command for Space, United States Strategic Command ..................... 6 

Sapp, Betty J., Director, National Reconnaissance Office .................................... 5 

Shelton, Gen William L., USAF, Commander, U.S. Air Force Space Command, U.S. Air Force ........................................................................................... 2 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Klinger, Gil I. .................................................................................................... 44 

Loverro, Douglas L. .......................................................................................... 66 

Raymond, Lt Gen John W. ‘‘Jay’’ .................................................................... 91 

Rogers, Hon. Mike ............................................................................................ 25 

Sapp, Betty J. ................................................................................................... 81 

Shelton, Gen William L. ................................................................................... 27 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Attachment 1: JFCC SPACE Conjunction Assessment Customers .............. 107 

Attachment 2: JFCC SPACE Orbital Data Request Customers ................... 113 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Coffman ...................................................................................................... 121 

Mr. Cooper ........................................................................................................ 121 
Page

IV 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Cooper ........................................................................................................ 131 

Mr. Peters ......................................................................................................... 136 

Mr. Rogers ......................................................................................................... 125 

Ms. Sanchez ...................................................................................................... 132 
(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2015 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY 

SPACE ACTIVITIES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, 

Washington, DC, Thursday, April 3, 2014. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:59 p.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. ROGERS. This hearing of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces will come to order. I want to welcome all of our witnesses here and thank them for their time, not 

only for being here, but the time it took to prepare for this hearing. 

It is very helpful to us. 

We have with us today General William Shelton, Commander of 

Air Force Space Command; Mr. Gil Klinger, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Space and Intelligence Office; Mr. Doug Loverro, 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy; Ms. Betty 

Sapp, Director of the National Reconnaissance Office; and Lt. General John W. ‘‘Jay’’ Raymond, Commander, Joint Functional Component Command for Space. 

And what I am going to do is submit the rest of my opening 

statement for the record so we can get to the opening statements 

of the witnesses. And with that, I will yield to my ranking member, 

my friend and colleague from Tennessee, Mr. Cooper. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the Appendix on page 25.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

TENNESSEE, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to follow 

your fine example and do the same. And we welcome the witnesses. 

Thank you. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you very much. General Shelton, we will 

start with you. You are recognized for 5 minutes. 
2 

STATEMENT OF GEN WILLIAM L. SHELTON, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S. AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND, U.S. AIR FORCE 

General SHELTON. Mr. Chairman, Representative Cooper, and 

distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you once again as the commander of Air Force Space 

Command. It is also my privilege to appear with these colleagues 

from the national security space enterprise. 

Our nation’s advantage in space is no longer a given. The everevolving space environment is increasingly contested as potential 

adversary capabilities grow in number and sophistication. Providing budget stability and flexibility in this very dynamic strategic 

environment is necessary to maintain and bolster the viability of 

our nation’s space capabilities. 

Given this new normal in space, I believe it is—I believe we are 

at a strategic crossroad. It is a reality that requires us to address 

how we protect our space systems, challenge traditional acquisition 

practices, and consider alternative space architectures that are 

more resilient and affordable. 

I thank you for your support, and I look forward to working with 

Congress and this committee to keep you abreast of our efforts to 

provide relilient, capable, and affordable space capabilities for the 

joint force and for the nation. And I would also like to add that just 

this morning, we had a very successful defense meteorological satellite program launch out of Vandenberg Air Force Base on an 

Atlas V. Just bragging a little bit. 

Mr. ROGERS. Don’t blame you. Is that it? 

General SHELTON. That is it, sir. 

[The prepared statement of General Shelton can be found in the 

Appendix on page 27.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you very much. Mr. Klinger, you are recognized. 

STATEMENT OF GIL I. KLINGER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPACE AND INTELLIGENCE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. KLINGER. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, Congressman Cooper, and members of the committee. The space domain has changed 

significantly in 50 years. This environmental change has occurred 

concurrently with the steady recovery and improvement of our 

space acquisition programs and practices. Our progress affords us 

an opportunity to take stock of risks resulting from the significant 

increase in threats to our space capabilities as well as the potential 

opportunities associated with the growth of both U.S. and foreign 

commercial and allied space capabilities and services. 

This rapid evolution and expansion of threats may create a potential strategic imbalance, in which adversaries are increasingly 

able to use space to support military operations and also threaten 

our ability to sustain use of our space capabilities. Meanwhile, our 

abilities have lagged to protect our own use of space and also deny 

the advantages of space to an adversary. We must rectify this imbalance as a national priority. 

We must consider the impact resulting from the Budget Control 

Act and sequestration. The simple truth is that most space systems 

on which the U.S. Government depends are likely to remain highly 
3 

capital intensive, relatively costly investments. Moreover, many of 

the changes likely to be required to adapt to the changed threat require additional investments at precisely the same time as the Department is managing a significant drawdown in most other warfare areas. 

Perhaps no change has had more profound impact that the fundamental shift in the breadth, depth, and diversity of both the uses 

to which space capabilities are applied and the user population. In 

the past 25 years, a range of diverse space capabilities have become 

to defense and intelligence users what the dial tone on the telephone long ago became for all of us: a service whose presence we 

take for granted until the moment its availability is interrupted. 

Furthermore, our belated realization that space would become a 

contested battlespace leaves us with few planned or routinely exercised alternative means to meet our needs in the event of these 

interruptions. This change, when combined with the other shifts 

described here, confront the space acquisition community with a 

single major challenge, to maintain service continuity while simultaneously investing in technology innovation. 

We are at a strategic crossroads. We still utilize the advantages 

provided by capabilities brought about by past large-scale investments that often enjoyed a largely unfettered call on resources. 

Without wholesale sacrifices in other domains, we simply cannot 

afford that path in the future. 

The fiscal year 2015 President’s budget reflects the DOD’s [Department of Defense’s] commitment to measured, affordable, pragmatic progress as we plan our future space capabilities. The Space 

Based Infrared System, Advanced Extremely High Frequency 

[AEHF], and Global Positioning System [GPS] are utilizing Space 

Modernization Initiative investments to improve affordability and 

capability in order to remain effective in the changed strategic and 

fiscal environment. 

The Department adjusted the profile for the Evolved Expendable 

Launch Vehicle, EELV program, and implemented a dual track 

strategy to reduce cost and stabilize key elements of the space industrial base. This approach consists of executing a contract for 

launch services over 5 years with the only existing qualified provider, while implementing a new entrant certification process in 

partnership with NASA [National Aeronautics and Space Administration] and the NRO [National Reconnaissance Office] that enables new entrants to compete as soon as they are certified. We believe this strategy achieves the optimal balance between required 

mission assurance and affordability. 

While we continue to use the Russian RD–180 engine to support 

NSS [National Security Space] missions, the Department has been 

prepared for the possibility of a potential RD–180 supply disruption 

and has put in place several measures to mitigate the risk and impact. First, the nation has maintained an additional capability to 

launch national security payloads with the domestically produced 

Delta IV variant to the EELV. Second, as competition becomes a 

reality and domestic engine technology progresses, we become less 

susceptible to this foreign supply risk. Finally, our industry partner 

continues to maintain a supply of RD–180 engines in the United 
4 

States, thereby insulating the Department against any near term 

disruptions to the launch manifest. 

We are evaluating whether it is in the long term U.S. national 

security interest and that of significant elements of our space industrial base to develop a next generation U.S. designed and built 

engine. This approach is part of the Department’s reexamination of 

its strategy to ensure it is still capable of providing asssured access 

to space. 

I would like to thank you for your continued support and 

thoughtful engagement with us as we prepare for our future challenges. I would be pleased to take your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Klinger can be found in the Appendix on page 44.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Klinger. Mr. Loverro, you are recognized. 

STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS L. LOVERRO, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPACE POLICY, DEPARTMENT 

OF DEFENSE 

Mr. LOVERRO. Thank you. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member 

Cooper, and members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to join my 

colleagues to testify on the Department of Defense space programs 

and policies. 

I first testified in front of this subcommittee on these topics 

about 1 year ago, and I welcome the opportunity to continue that 

discussion today. As I stated last year, space remains, and will continue to remain, vital to our national security. It underpins DOD 

capabilities worldwide. It enables U.S. global operations to be executed with precision on a worldwide basis, with reduced resources, 

fewer deployed troops, lower casualties, and decreased collateral 

damage. 

Space empowers both our forces and those of our allies to win 

faster, and bring more of our warfighters home safely. It is a key 

to U.S. power projection, providing a strong deterrent to our potential adversaries and a source of confidence to our friends. But the 

evolving strategic environment increasingly challenges U.S. space 

advantages. 

Space is no longer the sole province of world powers. It is a frontier that is now open to all. In the last several decades, space has 

become more competitive, more congested, and contested. Those 

terms, the so-called three C’s, have been used extensively, and I believe it serves us well to put them into context. 

On the first, as an American, I welcome the competitive aspect 

of today’s space environment. I am highly confident that with the 

right policies, the United States is well positioned to remain ahead 

in that environment. The changes you authorized 2 years ago on 

export control reform, and the changes NASA and the Department 

of Defense have embraced on commercial launch, are just two of 

the many steps we are taking. I am not worried about the competitive nature of space. 

On the second ‘‘C,’’ congestion, I am not quite so welcoming, but 

I am optimistic. Congestion and debris in space is a real issue, and 

it threatens to put our use of space at risk. But the policies and 
5 

programs of the United States, programs like the Air Force’s Space 

Fence, are aimed at reducing that risk. 

Likewise, the work that we and the Department of State are 

doing internationally at the United Nations to set rules of the road 

for outer space, are aimed at bringing a similar focus on this issue 

to the community of spacefaring nations. So I am somewhat confident that we are on the right course in dealing with congestion. 

But what worries me the most, is the last ‘‘C,’’ the contested nature of space, which we now face. Over the last 15 years, other nations have watched us closely and have recognized that if they are 

to challenge the United States, they must challenge us in space. 

And they are endeavoring to do so. 

The United States has successfully addressed such challenges before in other domains, and now we must likewise respond in space. 

We don’t do so against the backdrop of a decreasing budget that 

challenges both the ability and speed with which we will act, but 

that in no way diminishes the importance of successfully sustaining 

the crucial advantages that space provides. 

Our strategic approach for these issues remains consistent with 

what we outlined in the 2011 National Security Space Strategy, 

and reaffirmed in DOD Space Policy in 2012. In the written testimony I submitted to the subcommittee, I have outlined the five key 

elements of this strategic approach: promoting the responsible and 

peaceful use of space, enhancing the resilience of DOD space architectures, partnering with like-minded nations in international organizations and commercial firms, and deterring aggression and defeating attacks while preparing to operate in a degraded environment. 

My testimony describes these in specific details. I look forward 

to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Loverro can be found in the Appendix on page 66.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. Ms. Sapp, you are recognized. 

STATEMENT OF BETTY J. SAPP, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL 

RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE 

Ms. SAPP. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and other 

distinguished members of the committee, I am pleased to appear 

before you today on behalf of the NRO. It is a real honor for me 

to appear today beside my DOD partners. I would like to begin 

with a few words about the state of the NRO today. 

Last year, our acquisition program successfully delivered and 

launched two new satellites into orbit. We are on track to continue 

our launch and acquisition success this year. We have one launch 

that we have done and three more to go. 

Our research and development program has done equally well, 

allowing us revolutionary increases in collection capability at risk 

levels compatible with successful acquisition programs. For the 

fifth year in a row, the NRO received a clean audit opinion on our 

financial statements, further proof of our commitment to excellence 

and conscientious stewardship of taxpayer dollars. 

Lastly, I would like to highlight the real bottom line for the 

NRO, our support to the warfighter. The NRO provides a wide 

array of focused capabilities to help solve specific critical ISR [intel-
6 

ligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] needs for the DOD. This 

past year, the NRO deployed a high-altitude system known as 

HALO to support three-dimensional, high-resolution mapping of 

geographically restricted areas in Afghanistan. HALO flew 65 missions between September and December, collecting over 72,000 

square kilometers of precision, wide-area mapping data, with an 

accuracy of 20 to 40 centimeters. 

HALO gave intel analysts potential insurgent routes and operational planners a precise terrain data necessary to develop force 

protection and interdiction missions. HALO is just one example of 

the NRO services, products, and tools directly contributing to the 

highest priority missions across the Department. And I am extremely proud of the critical contributions our systems and our personnel provide on a daily basis. 

The tremendous successes we have enjoyed in acquisition, 

launch, R&D [research and development], and in critical mission 

support activities are a testament to the quality of the NRO people. 

Ensuring we maintain that quality is fundamental to our future 

success. This year we are taking steps toward a more stable integral workforce to do just that. 

We will also continue to rely on the DOD and the Intelligence 

Community to provide us with rotational personnel who will bring 

the diversity of thinking also necessary for organizational success. 

Our goal is to ensure that we have the NRO workforce that can 

continue to provide the nation with premiere space reconnaissance 

capabilities for national security. 

I want to thank the committee for the support you have shown 

me, and the men and women of the NRO. Thank you again for the 

opportunity to be here today. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Sapp can be found in the Appendix on page 81.] 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank you. And General Raymond, you are recognized. 

STATEMENT OF LT GEN JOHN W. ‘‘JAY’’ RAYMOND, USAF, COMMANDER, JOINT FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT COMMAND FOR 

SPACE, UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND 

General RAYMOND. Chairman Rogers, Representative Cooper, 

and members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before 

you as the United States Strategic Command’s Commander of the 

Joint Functional Component Command for Space. This is my first 

opportunity to address the committee and I look forward to working with each of you to advance our nation’s space capabilities. 

I am proud to represent the 3,300 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and 

Marines, and civilians that make up the Joint Functional Component Command [JFCC]. These professionals, along with our exchange officers from Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, 

ensure our nation, our allies, and our joint warfighters have continued access to the space capabilities that enable the American way 

of life. 

To meet the demands of the dynamic space environment, my 

command is focused on three operational objectives: providing timely warning and assessment; supporting national users and joint 

and coalition forces; and three, protecting and defending our space 
7 

capabilities. JFCC Space is, and will continue to be, the world premier provider of space capabilities, even as it faces constantly 

evolving operating and threatened environment. 

I am confident that the men and women of JFCC Space are prepared to meet these challenges with a spirit of dedication innovation and devotion to duty, providing the warfighter assured access 

to the world’s premier space capabilities. I thank the committee for 

your continued support as we strive to preserve and enhance the 

space capabilities which are so vital to our nation. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of General Raymond can be found in 

the Appendix on page 91.] 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank you and thank all of you for those opening 

remarks. We will start with questions now. I recognize myself first. 

We all know the importance of the launch, and without an effective launch program we don’t have a space program. But unfortunately we have—but fortunately, we have an exceptional space 

launch program and as we just heard a little while ago, United 

Launch Alliance, their Delta and Atlas rocket lines are up to 168 

successful launches in a row. 

With that said, we currently use a rocket engine made by Russia, 

the RD–180, to launch many of our most important satellites into 

space. Do you think that developing a competitively acquired, next 

generation engine, available to all U.S. providers, that could effectively replace the RD–180 is important? Start with you, General 

Shelton, and we will go down the line. 

General SHELTON. Mr. Chairman, we are studying the problem 

of potential interruption of RD–180 supply right now. Those study 

results will be available in late May. 

And certainly one of the options we are thinking about is production of an indigenously produced engine. It certainly has it advantages, two that I can think of right off the top of my head. One is 

no longer relying on a foreign supplier. And secondly, an increase 

in the U.S. rocket engine industrial base. 

I think both of those would make a great contribution to the 

overall launch program, and I would be a strong supporter of that, 

if we can find the money to do it. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, and that is the point I want to remind all the 

witnesses. Money is our problem. Your job is to come up with strategy and how to execute what we need to get done and let us worry 

about the money. 

Mr. Klinger, I know you made reference to this in your opening 

remarks, but I would hear your thoughts in response to that direct 

question. 

Mr. KLINGER. Thank you, sir. Excuse me. I think General, I 

would echo General Shelton’s comments. I would just add a couple 

of things. 

I think in the long run it is in the interest in the United States 

Government to develop a next generation, U.S.-produced rocket engine. That said, in addition to the 45-day study to which General 

Shelton referred, we are going to have to find a way to reconcile 

three different kinds of objectives that are to some degree not intentioned, but they will probably compete for the same body of resources. 
8 

We, of course, are looking for a next generation—if we pursue a 

next generation engine, it would be based on liquid oxygen and kerosene. If you look—as you well know, the ballistic missile community relies on solid rocket motors and both the Navy and the Air 

Force are interested in pursuing upgrades and modernization to 

our solid rocket motor capability. 

At the same time, as we look to our partners in the civil space 

program, NASA, they rely on cryogenic engines. Because my personal belief is that this is a national level decision, in terms of a 

new engine, I think part of the work we have to do in the executive 

branch over time is to reconcile those needs with what will inevitably be scarce resources. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Loverro. 

Mr. LOVERRO. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Again, I think I can echo both 

General Shelton and Mr. Klinger, and I suspect you will get five 

echoes of the same answer as we move down the table here. 

There is no question in my mind. Our national space transportation policy and the policy of the U.S. encourage us to have U.S. 

domestic launch capability and that just doesn’t say half of or part 

of it. It says U.S. domestic launch capability. I don’t think you can 

meet that policy and not face the question of having domestically 

produced a engine in this nation. 

I think we need to find a way to do that. It is a critical space 

industrial based thing for the long term. Not just for the short 

term, but for the long term. And it is critical to make sure that we 

maintain a secure supply of equipment like this as we have seen 

in recent months. 

So, I very much support the notion that we need to do this. 

Clearly it is a balancing of resources. I think that there are many, 

many ways to address this issue from a funding perspective, some 

that you have mentioned. Other ways to do this industrially. There 

is not just one company who is reliant on Russian engines; there 

are many. 

And there are at least several agencies of the U.S. Government 

who are so interested. So we certainly believe that this is something we need to address. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. Ms. Sapp. 

Ms. SAPP. As Doug said, I am one of those agencies that is very 

interested. I obviously buy ULA [United Launch Alliance] boosters 

and I buy those through the Air Force. So we count on the Air 

Force to have those available for us. We have all recognized that 

the RD–180 is a vulnerability, a risk. We have known for quite 

some time. And certainly we would all feel better if that was produced in the United States. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Raymond, I won’t burden you with this one 

because you are a user. But I do appreciate those comments. And 

I did expect all of y’all to make that response. But it is important 

for us to put on the record that people in your positions acknowledge this is something that is important for us to do as a nation. 

Next, I want to talk about the acquisition strategy for the 

Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program. I understand that 

there are two elements of this strategy in the near term. There is 

a block buy contract with ULA as well as opportunities for competition with new entrants. 
9 

General Shelton, can you tell us why the program is currently 

structured the way it is, the current status, and the benefits to this 

approach? 

General SHELTON. Mr. Chairman, it is pretty simple. It is constructed this way because that was the most cost effective way to 

go at launch capability. We have got to have a way to get national 

security payloads into space. We want to make it more affordable. 

So the first phase of this program was intended to give United 

Launch Alliance the only certified provider, the only capability of 

getting the full suite of national security payloads into space. Giving them a launch—rather a business base that they could spread 

out over time gives them an economic order quantities with their 

second and third tier suppliers. It gives them the ability to plan for 

longer term. They don’t have to take as much corporate risk so 

they can give us a much better deal. 

The introduction of competition was also considered in this. We 

don’t have anybody certified yet. Obviously SpaceX is coming along, 

and we will have them certified, we are confident in the not too distant future, a lot of work to do before we get there, but we think 

we can get them to certification. Then they can compete for a subset of our national security payloads, because they don’t have lift 

capability yet that would lift all of it. But we will put them in competition and it will be a heads-up competition on mission assurance, price, and other factors. 

And then in the third phase—really, it is phase 1, phase 1A, and 

this phase 2, we will be full and open competition for what was 

originally intended to be 14 different missions. Because of the 

budget pressures we have come under, because the GPS constellation is doing much better, we were able to push some satellites out 

beyond the FYDP [Future Years Defense Program] and that gives 

us only seven, maybe an eighth, but for sure seven missions that 

we would be able to compete. 

I know some people are concerned about that. They think it is 

taking away competitive capability. That was budget based. It was 

not based on any reduction of our desire to have competition. In 

fact, we would like competition just as soon as possible. 

We think we will have at least one mission for competition next 

year and then we will see what the next few years bring along. But 

it will be at least seven missions. 

Mr. ROGERS. What do you think would be the impact of breaking 

up the currently structured block buy? 

General SHELTON. Yes, sir. I talked about cost effective being the 

first thing. There is no question that would add extra expense into 

the launch program. And I am talking about significant expense. 

Any option you would consider, if you said, okay, we are going to 

have to be able [to] compete all the rockets that we have got in 

play right now, it is definitely going to drive the prices up because, 

again, those economic order quantities wouldn’t be there. 

If we were restricted from using the RD–180 engine, that would 

drive us to Delta only. Delta is a little bit more expensive, in fact, 

significantly more expensive in some cases than the Atlas. So almost anything we did to the current strategy is going to drive 

costs. 
10 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. Thank you very much. The chair now recognizes Mr. Cooper. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Mr. Loverro, in your testimony, I was pleased to see that you would responded to some of 

our questions last year, and that AFRICOM [Africa Command] is 

shifting a lot of its satellite needs away from a Chinese satellite to 

commercially available. And you state in your testimony that process will be complete this May? 

Mr. LOVERRO. Yes, sir. We have been very aggressive about that. 

I made a commitment to this committee last year that we would 

push as hard as we could to go ahead and make that shift. And 

we have done that, working with AFRICOM, who has been a fantastic partner in doing so. 

In fact, I would say they have led the pack in doing so. They 

have managed to find alternatives for 75 percent of that communication capability. The last 25 percent they have not been able to 

get off yet, but they anticipate—we fully anticipate that by May we 

will be off that last 25 percent. If that changes, I will certainly let 

you know. But we are on the exact right path, and I really want 

to thank the commander of AFRICOM and his communicators for 

the work they have done to support that. 

Mr. COOPER. I also see in your testimony that you had plans to 

move a C-Band radar from Antigua to Western Australia. And that 

would have allowed us to look at low altitude things, but I presume 

not low enough to have seen that lost Malaysian airplane, right? 

Mr. LOVERRO. No, no sir. Probably not. It is not tuned for that. 

That radar right now is being disassembled in Antigua on its way 

to Australia. But even if it had been there, I don’t think it would 

have been much good for that. 

Mr. COOPER. Finally, on your testimony, you talk about the declassification of the geo-orbiting satellites that will allow us to 

monitor debris at that level. So that would be kind of the high 

version of the Space Fence? 

Mr. LOVERRO. Yes, sir. Not quite like the Space Fence. The Space 

Fence has a far greater ability to, excuse the vernacular, suck up 

a whole bunch of data and go ahead and sort through that. GSSAP 

[Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program] is—because of the nature of how the geosynchronous orbit works, it is a 

much slower process. But it allows us to see things we can’t see 

from the ground. And that is to identify pieces of debris or other 

hazards that may exist up in geosynchronous orbit. 

Mr. COOPER. I appreciate General Raymond being newly on duty 

here and I asked him earlier today what it was like to tell folks 

who had satellites in orbit that their satellite might be in danger 

from space debris. I couldn’t help but think, is it appropriate, possible, to even charge for those calls on a subscription basis? Because that is an incredibly valuable service we are offering to the 

world for free. I am not sure that they necessarily appreciate the 

time and effort it takes to warn them about their own assets. Is 

that even a conceivable thing for the community to do? Because 

these warnings aren’t free. 

General RAYMOND. Sir, thanks for highlighting the work that our 

airmen, sailors, and soldiers, and Marines do for the world. We actively track over 23,000 objects in space. About 1,100 of those are 
11 

active satellites and we provide warning of potential collision between either satellites or debris. 

It is in our best interest to do that as well. Because as we have 

seen in other cases where we have either had a breakup or a satellite break up into pieces, it impacts our ability to operate in the 

space domain, as well. So it is in our best interest as well for a safe 

and secure operating environment and we do that for the world, 

and for ourselves at the same time. 

Mr. COOPER. If you wouldn’t mind, if it wouldn’t be too much 

trouble to compile some simple list about who are the most frequent users of your services are, that would be a helpful thing for 

us to start understanding. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 121.] 

General RAYMOND. I will, sir. 

Mr. COOPER. General Shelton, this is apparently the third year 

that the Air Force has chosen not to support Operationally Responsive Space, ORS. So that’s presumably money the Air Force thinks 

we could save by zeroing out that item in the budget? 

General SHELTON. Yes, sir. This really is budget driven. And it 

is not that we don’t support the ORS concepts. In fact, what we 

would like to do is push ORS concepts into all space and missile 

centered system programs. So that should be the way we acquire 

satellites in the future, using those principles of acquisition and authorities, using the speed of acquisition, using some of those special 

techniques in terms of how we build satellites. 

So we are pushing that across the center. We are doing a good 

job of incorporating those lessons learned. What we were talking 

about was a specific program, separate and distinct, and so we 

have recently decided to go ahead with an ORS—I believe it is 

being called an ORS 5, which would be a trail blazer for the Space 

Based Space Surveillance follow-on satellite, and teach us some lessons as we go into the acquisition for that program. So I think we 

are using the principles to good effect. 

Mr. COOPER. But this might be a way that this committee—this 

Congress could save some money. 

General SHELTON. That was what we had proposed, sir. 

Mr. COOPER. Yes. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. The chair now recognizes Mr. Lamborn. Oh, Mr. 

Coffman. I am sorry. They are Coloradans, you know; they all look 

alike. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I think 

speaking to all of you, I think that Russia is certainly not an ally 

of the United States. They are not a reliable partner with the 

United States. And for us to be reliant upon them for our rocket 

engines is, I just think it is unwise and I think we need to move 

forward with finding a domestic supplier for that. 

General Shelton, the Air Force has proposed to purchase one 

GPS satellite this year instead of two, as originally planned. Over 

the program, how much money would be saved if we purchased in 
12 

a more economic manner as was originally planned, two satellites, 

this year? 

General SHELTON. Sir, I am going to have to take that one for 

the record. I can’t tell you that right off the top of my head. I know 

that again, one of those budget driven decisions. It is maybe not 

the most economic way to do it. But given the money we had available to us, this was the most efficient way to get it done, you know, 

with the constrained top line. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 121.] 

Mr. COFFMAN. Sure, okay. Mr. Klinger, did the Cost Assessment 

and Program Evaluation [CAPE] review this and offer an opinion 

on the most economical way to buy those satellites? 

Mr. KLINGER. I think the way I would answer your question is, 

sir, that the CAPE did an analysis when we incurred, as you are 

probably familiar, a Nunn-McCurdy breach with respect to the 

EELV program when we came out of sustainment. During that 

time, CAPE did conduct another independent cost estimate. 

We did vet both within the Air Force itself as well as in cooperation with the Office of the Secretary of Defense [OSD], very closely, 

the array of choices we had prior to coming to resolution of the contract that you are now familiar with, with regard to the 36-core 

block buys. So that was thoroughly vetted both within the Air 

Force and throughout the Department. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. General Shelton, I think we have one 

launch provider that is certified to carry the entire national security manifest. Is that correct? 

General SHELTON. Yes, sir. That is true. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. Do any potential new entrants currently 

possess the necessary facilities required to process and launch the 

full manifest? 

General SHELTON. Not yet, sir. SpaceX is obviously the Falcon IX 

version 1.1—— 

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. 

General SHELTON [continuing]. Can go up to a certain level. They 

have got plans to develop a heavy vehicle but that is not that far 

along yet. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. Would you agree that the new entrants be 

certified to support the full manifest before being allowed to bid? 

General SHELTON. No, sir. Not necessarily. We would allow them 

to bid and will allow them to bid without that full suite of capability, the full lift capability, for all of our payloads. So we are 

happy to compete one satellite at a time. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. Will new entrants be required to comply 

with the same auditing oversight and accounting rules that are 

currently applied to ULA? 

General SHELTON. I believe that is true, but that is an acquisition question that I would—— 

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. 

General SHELTON [continuing]. Ask Mr. Klinger if he wouldn’t 

mind commenting on that. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Sure. 

Mr. KLINGER. I think the terms of the specific contract for a new 

entrant, since that would be awarded competitively, the Air Force 
13 

would have to decide that. But certainly from a mission assurance 

perspective, there is no question in my mind that the Air Force will 

insist, as would the National Reconnaissance Office, I believe Ms. 

Sapp would agree, on the same level of mission assurance requirements associated with what we utilize now for the EELV systems 

that we currently have. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. General Shelton, Mr. Klinger, Ms. Sapp, 

what steps has the Department of Defense taken to improve the 

management of requirements in order to reduce program risk? 

General SHELTON. Are you talking about requirements just 

across the board? 

Mr. COFFMAN. Right. 

General SHELTON. Yes, sir. We are very judicious about our requirements to make sure that, one, we aren’t gold-plating things, 

but also that we don’t allow the requirements to creep up on us in 

the midst of the procurement. That is what really drives a lot of 

cost and technical risk as well. So we are very disciplined about 

how we maintain a hold on the requirements. 

Mr. KLINGER. Sir, I think both within OSD and across the services, we have a number of initiatives going on to improve our ability to respond and improve our acquisition system. But one example that I would highlight under my boss, Frank Kendall, the 

Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, one of 

the things that he is working hard on, with the services, and in 

particular the joint staff, is to pull the early phases of acquisition 

of any system closer to the requirements development process, 

thereby enabling an iterative process of exchange of information 

between the users who ultimately define the operational requirements for a given system, and the acquirers who have to then 

make that into a system implementation. 

The bottom-line goal of this is to ensure that we have a clear picture of what we are paying for in terms of performance, and where 

the bright points are where—so that we are not paying 20 or 30 

percent for the last 2 or 3 percent of performance of a given system. 

That is a work in progress. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. The chair now recognizes 

Mr. Carson. 

Mr. CARSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. For Lieutenant General 

Raymond, has STRATCOM [Strategic Command] evaluated disaggregation or provided any position on the issue, sir? And how does 

disaggregation contribute to deterrence? 

General RAYMOND. Sir, what STRATCOM does is talks about the 

importance about being able to protect and defend our capabilities, 

the how you go about doing it, the architectural part of that is 

more of a services organize, train, and equip. And I would offer 

General Shelton up to make a comment on that. 

Mr. CARSON. Yes, sir. 

General SHELTON. Yes, sir. There are a number of studies underway right now to determine whether or not disaggregation is the 

right approach. It seems like it is a good thing to pursue based on 

the need for additional resilience in our constellations given the 

new threats that are coming into the space environments. 
14 

So, hosted payloads is a possibility, disaggregation is a possibility, having more reliance on commercial sources, having international cooperation. There are a number of things that we are 

studying right now to determine the best way ahead to address the 

new threats in space and also to address the possibility of premature failure of our assets, making them more resilient is the 

overall goal. 

Mr. CARSON. Yes, sir. And General Shelton, to that point sir, as 

threats to space evolve and become more vulnerable to your earlier 

point, are we planning contingencies for that matter where we simply don’t rely on space at all? Is adequate training an ongoing issue 

in this regard? 

General SHELTON. Yes, sir. In my opinion, there is not an alternative that I see, near term or mid-term, an alternative to reliance 

on space capability. We don’t get to choose where we are going to 

fight. We don’t get to choose where disasters might occur. And our 

reliance on space is so heavy that there is just really no alternative 

out there. So, just like we haven’t decided to walk away from the 

airplane because it got tough to fight in the environment—— 

Mr. CARSON. Yes, sir. 

General SHELTON [continuing]. We need to figure out how we are 

going to be able to fight through this environment, as well. 

Mr. CARSON. That is good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield 

back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. The chair now recognizes 

the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Brooks, 5 minutes. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a question for 

Mr. Klinger and General Shelton. I am holding a piece of paper, 

a document that my staff informs me is being used by United 

Launch Alliance competitors to claim that ULA’s Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle, single launch costs have more than tripled. 

Mr. Klinger and General Shelton, do you agree with how this information is being used? And can you describe the vast requirements that United Launch Alliance must meet and how and why 

the block buy supported the reduction of costs? 

General SHELTON. Sir, I would tell you that information is not 

being used correctly. I would tell you that it is an extrapolation of 

2012 data up through 2030. It doesn’t give us any credit for the 

block buy approach. It doesn’t give us any credit for the introduction of competition. 

It doesn’t give us any credit for the remarkable success record 

that we have seen with this program. It just tries to paint a picture 

of one versus another and it is literally apples and oranges from 

my viewpoint. 

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Klinger, do you have anything to add? 

Mr. KLINGER. Yes, sir. In addition to echoing General Shelton’s 

comments, I would offer the following thoughts. 

One has to place the EELV program’s development against the 

backdrop of the environment in which we are operating. Put bluntly, when we started this program in the late 1990s, we made a series of assumptions, both mainly about the development of a large 

commercial demand that the U.S. Government was going to take 

advantage of, and therefore defray a lot of our costs. And that is 
15 

why the original costs for the EELV boosters was set at a level that 

was much lower than our current costs. 

But the reality is the following: virtually every assumption we 

made about the world that would come to be realized at the start 

of the program has not come to pass. Effectively the bottom fell out 

of the commercial space launch market with the collapse of the 

Internet boom, because a number of commercial ventures that 

would have placed a large number of satellites into orbit, and 

therefore required a large number of boosters, never happened. 

Therefore the larger burden associated with EELV costs was therefore transferred to the government. 

I don’t believe that the context in which that information is being 

used is accurate. I would offer the following point. As my colleagues 

have mentioned that we are all in favor of competition, here is one 

example had we had competition earlier that cost increase, though 

contextually inaccurate, probably would have been mitigated because there would have been a greater incentive first for Lockheed 

Martin, then Boeing, and subsequently United Launch Alliance to 

streamline their operations and find reasons to cut costs. In fact, 

I think we are reaping the benefits of the impending competition 

right now, when you look at the new contract that the Air Force 

has signed with the government, about the 36 cores. 

Mr. BROOKS. If I can have a follow-up question that is similar to 

the first one. And this one is for General Shelton, Mr. Klinger, and 

Mr. Loverro. The Air Force has signed a contract with the United 

Launch Alliance for a block buy for 36 rocket cores over 5 years. 

This was a new approach, rather than buying on an ad hoc, as 

needed basis. 

Can you tell how this approach came about and what the benefits are? How much money has the taxpayer saved as a result of 

the block buy? And what would be the risk of breaking the contract? 

General SHELTON. Let me go at these in reverse order. The risk 

would be significant, sir, because we would have to do a significant 

amount of work—engineering work, probably, to get payloads onto 

a different kind of booster. 

The other risk that would be significant would be cost. There 

would undoubtedly, undoubtedly be much, much greater cost per 

booster in the program, because, again, we don’t have economic 

order quantities assigned to that current provider, the only currently certified provider. 

It came about because all those things were in place. We had one 

certified provider. We needed to give the industrial base some certainty on the business base. So that is the approach that was taken 

and as I said earlier to the chairman, it was all about cost effectiveness. 

Mr. BROOKS. Do any of the other gentlemen have anything to 

add? 

Mr. KLINGER. I would offer, in addition to echoing General 

Shelton’s points, I think one measures costs not only in dollar 

value but in this case, from an acquisition perspective, in the adverse impact on the industrial base. I don’t think one can overstate 

the importance of the benefits that that block buy provides to a sec-
16 

tor of our space industrial base that was at best on unsteady footing. 

And I am not talking about the prime contractors here. As General Shelton mentioned, it is the second and third tier suppliers, 

who supply components and subsystems for ULA boosters, that are 

in a much better condition than they otherwise would have been, 

had we not had the block buy. 

I think the short answer to what would happen if we had to 

break that contract, we don’t know what it would ultimately cost. 

We know that it is at least in excess of $370 million dollars. We 

don’t know the exact figure. 

But what we do know is that, as General Shelton also mentioned, 

we would simply have to probably go back and negotiate on a mission-by-mission basis for launch services. And our experience, as 

you know, our experience with that from a cost standpoint has not 

been good. 

Mr. ROGERS. The chair now recognizes Mr. Lamborn for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you Mr. Chairman for having this hearing. 

General Shelton, good to see you again. And I know we have 

touched on some of these questions before, so this is maybe a little 

bit of recapping. 

But how many launches has the Air Force done as part of the 

Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program, how many of them 

were successful? And who was the provider of those various 

launches? 

General SHELTON. Yes, sir. We have done 68 national security 

launches under the EELV program. There have been 68 successes 

and United Launch Alliance is the provider. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay, thank you. Changing gears, and I don’t 

know who would be the best person to respond to this, but it has 

to do with space situational awareness and JMS [Joint Space Operations Center Mission System], and we have talked about this in 

previous hearings. And I know that there has been talk about establishing contracts with commercial providers for some of the capabilities of JMS. 

So can you update us on how that is working and how those relationships are developing, if so? And then I have maybe a follow-up 

on that. 

General SHELTON. Yes, sir. We have been very successful with 

the JMS program, introducing commercial software, what we call 

commercial-off-the-shelf software. Two companies are on contract 

right now, AI and AGI, and both of those are providing great services to us. 

So we have broken through some of the initial concerns about 

that and like I said, we have got at least a couple of providers on 

contract now. 

Mr. LAMBORN. What would you recommend, General, as far as a 

way forward that we can exploit the advantages that using a commercial partner, a private sector partner, to reduce risk of just having one supplier or maybe putting some of the cost risk upon the 

vendor instead of the taxpayer and the DOD assuming—what are 

some of the things you see going forward in that relationship? And 

what can we do as a committee to help out? 
17 

General SHELTON. Sir, I think the best thing the committee can 

do is to continue to support the program, because the overall architecture of the program absolutely was designed to be open and 

available for drop in and pull out kinds of software packages. So 

we have got this architecture that is now ready to plug things in, 

use it for a while. If we don’t like that, if there is another thing 

that comes along, we pull that old software out and plug in new. 

So it is absolutely ready for commercial sources. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay, thank you. And to finish up with some of 

the launches that have been postponed, and this may have been 

asked or described before I got in the room. I was a few minutes 

late getting here because of something else. But, what is the status 

of launches that have been postponed and when will they be taken 

up? 

General SHELTON. Yes, sir. I believe what you are referring to is 

there were 14—we contracted with ULA for 36 cores. There were 

14 missions that we thought that we were ready to compete. As we 

developed the fiscal year 2015 budget, because of affordability and 

because the GPS constellation was doing well, we were able to slip 

out some of those satellites outside the FYDP. So they will still be 

available for competition. Just not in this particular phase of the 

program. So, it is not like those requirements go away. It is just 

the timing of those. 

Now, one satellite is frankly too heavy for the only, what appears 

to be the only additional new entrant to the game, here. And another one was reassigned to ULA to keep our 36-core commitment. 

So, the 14 boil down to 7 in this particular budget. There may 

be an eighth we can look at. We are looking at that right now as 

an opportunity to provide a competitive opportunity for that eighth 

satellite. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay, thank you. And Ms. Sapp, for the NRO and 

the important work that it does, is there anything more that our 

committee can do? I am just going to throw a general question out 

for you. Is there anything more that we can be doing to helping 

make sure that you have the resources and the assets you need to 

successfully do your job? 

Ms. SAPP. No. I appreciate the question. The NRO does quite a 

bit to support the DOD and we really appreciate this committee’s 

support of the NRO. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. And the chair now recognizes Mr. Langevin for his questions. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the 

panel for their testimony and for the great and important work 

they are doing on behalf of the country. I guess I would like to turn 

first to, well, to space launch if I may. 

EELV launch costs have steadily risen over the last decade. DOD 

and ULA have recently cited gains and efficiencies. Now if you 

have already covered this, you can let me know. I know I came in 

late, but my question is why weren’t these efficiencies and cost savings pursued and achieved before the new competitors, such as 

SpaceX, arrived in the marketplace? And how has the potential for 

competition affected price? 
18 

Mr. KLINGER. I think, Congressman, that we did cover a piece of 

this. But I will add to my earlier remarks. I think if you look at 

the start of the EELV program in terms of the initial program, we 

effectively had no choice. 

We were flying out the Titan IV. We had also incurred a series 

of five catastrophic launch failures over a very short period of time. 

Three of those were Titan IV failures. Two of those were Delta III 

failures. So we were in a position that we had to create, along with 

industry, a new launch capability for national security payloads. 

The costs have risen, as I mentioned earlier, in no small part because all of the assumptions, and the major assumptions that we 

made, that underpinned the original creation of the EELV program 

have simply not come to pass, or turned out to be wrong, most notably amongst them, the disappearance of what was anticipated to 

be a very significant increase in commercial demand for space 

launch capabilities. In fact, that is what the government was counting on to defray a large portion of the costs and the result of which 

would have been significantly decreased launch service costs by virtue of the volume of launches that would be provided beyond those 

that were needed by the government. 

In terms of competition, I think it is a situation in which we are 

now seeing the benefits of impending competition reflected in two 

ways. Number one, the most concrete way is the 36-core block buy, 

which I think 5 or 7 years ago would have been much harder to 

achieve, in no small measure because there was absolutely no—it 

would have been no incentive at that point for the United Launch 

Alliance to move down a path in which it was going to not only be 

willing to engage in that type of negotiation with the government, 

but in addition, ULA would not have really had any incentive to 

streamline its own internal operations because it was a monopoly 

provider, or the sole provider in effect at the time. So I think that 

the large change in the landscape in the last 3 or 4 years has not 

only been the impending, for them, specter of competition, on the 

landscape. 

The other thing is that, I think you are familiar with the Better 

Buying Power initiatives that OSD and the services have been implementing. And in some sense, those initiatives directed at lowering our costs are bearing fruit in terms of the contracts like the 

one we see in EELV. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. All right. Before my time expires, let me also 

switch to, and General perhaps this will be you or for Director 

Sapp. As we face increasing counter space threats, what are the 

benefits and challenges of disaggregation for the space architecture, 

and how will the Department decide whether to apply disaggregated architecture principles to future space system acquisitions? 

General SHELTON. Yes, sir. We are in the midst of those studies 

right now, trying to determine if that is the appropriate response 

to the threats we see in space. Disaggregation obviously spreads 

the capability over more platforms. It is distributed architecture as 

opposed to creating big satellites that would be potential targets. 

And even if you talk about a premature failure of a satellite, it 

would leave a large geographic hole in important constellations, 

such as Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellite, or the Space 
19 

Based Infrared System. Those systems that are very necessary in 

times of conflict to the United States. 

So I think those are existential capabilities. I think it is essential 

that we look at survivability and resilience in those constellations. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, General. I appreciate that. I know my 

time expired, so I thank the panel for being here. I will have some 

additional questions I would like to submit for the record. And I 

would appreciate a response on those. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman, and the chair recognizes Mr. 

Bridenstine, 5 minutes. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. We spend a 

lot of money on both military and commercial satellite communication systems. And I wanted to ask you how well these two enterprises, both the military and the commercial satellite communication systems are managed? And if there are benefits, and what 

those benefits might be to having a single manager? General Shelton? 

General SHELTON. When you say single manager, Congressman, 

are you talking about single manager inside the Department of Defense, or across the United States Government, or—— 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. So, my understanding is we purchase, you 

know, communications from commercial satellite providers, and we 

have our own military satellites as well. 

General SHELTON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. And between these two, are they managed by 

the same person? Are they managed separately? When you think 

about—I guess my overall question is, when you think about procurement, multi-year procurement of commercial satellite communication systems is something that I think could save money, and 

enable us to be more productive for the future. But I wanted to get 

your assessment on that. 

General SHELTON. Now I understand the question. We are in 

some pathfinder efforts right now to look at the way we acquire 

commercial services. We obviously have, as you said, we have dedicated military satellites for what we would call wideband communications. But that is not nearly enough bandwidth to even support 

the efforts in Afghanistan, previous efforts in Iraq, and really the 

efforts around the world. 

So, we also go out on what I would call the spot market and buy 

those commercial services. A very inefficient way to do business. So 

our pathfinder is looking at, what if we bought a transponder on 

a commercial satellite? How would that work out? What if we went 

increasingly all commercial and didn’t have dedicated military 

wideband satellites? 

So there is a range of options here, and we are looking at the 

full suite of those options, trying to determine what would be most 

cost effective. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. When you buy commercial, General, can you 

specify—when you buy commercial, are you buying with OCO 

[Overseas Contingency Operations] funds? Is there a procurement 

program for it? Can you talk about that? 

General SHELTON. There are—I think a lot of it is OCO funded. 

But through the Defense Information Services Agency, DISA, they 
20 

go out and procure those services. So some of it is, again, just 

bandwidth demand that is out there steady-state, they procure that 

with non-OCO funds. But the strictly wartime effort bandwidth 

that is required is obviously OCO funded. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. As far as a base level of necessary communications that STRATCOM can assess will be needed for the future, 

you know, there are challenges, right? We don’t know where the 

next conflict may be. We don’t know necessarily if we are going to 

have the communications capability in whatever region that may 

be. How do we mitigate some of these risks? 

General SHELTON. That has been the basis of providing the dedicated military satellite communications capability, at least a basis, 

a worldwide basis, that you can count on. And then you could surge 

from there with commercial capability. As we look to the Pacific, 

there is not as much bandwidth available to go after in some of 

those areas in the Pacific. So we will have to have a different strategy. Hence, these pathfinder efforts. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Okay. Mr. Klinger. 

Mr. KLINGER. Congressman, just a couple of things to add to the 

points General Shelton made. We have an ongoing analysis of alternatives that is underway in the Department, focused on protected satellite communications to include looking at non-space alternatives. And the focus of that effort is to identify alternatives 

beyond advanced AEHF vehicle six, which is the last vehicle in the 

existing program. 

We also are trying to assess the viability of acquisition options 

that will balance the need to save money with the need to maintain 

operational effectiveness. And that really requires on three things, 

the stability of the requirement, the stability of the funding, and 

whether in fact there are substantial savings to be had by procuring—using a different approach. 

You made reference earlier to multi-year procurement. I would 

just note the following: we and the committees continue to look at 

that. But there are some structural obstacles, and I would note 

scoring in particular, not to get into the arcane details of the budget process. But finding a way to preclude or mitigate the requirement that the Department would have to budget in a single year 

for a multi-year procurement of commercial services, is a major 

issue that we would need to work through with the Congress. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank the gentleman, and thank the witnesses. We 

are going to recess. Well, no, we are going to adjourn this open 

hearing. But before we do I want to remind you that we are going 

to leave the record open for 10 days for Members who have additional questions that we couldn’t get to in this hearing—submitting 

them—I would ask you to respond to those in a timely manner. 

And with that we will adjourn this hearing and come back after 

this series of votes, which we should be back in about 20–25 minutes, and go to the closed hearing. 

[Whereupon, at 2:59 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
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Attachment 1: JFCC SPACE Conjunction Assessment Customers 

Primary Owner/Operator Country 

Aalborg University, Denmark DEN 

ABAE—Agencia Bolivariano para Actividades Espaciales VENZ 

Al Yah Satellite Communications UAE 

Algerian Space Agency ALG 

Algerian Space Agency ALG 

Amateur Radio Research and Development Corporation (AMRAD) US 

AMSAT US 

AMSAT UK UK 

Arab Satellite Communication Organization (ArabSat) AB 

Asia Broadcast Satellite RP 

Astronautic Technology Sdn Bhd MALA 

Auburn University US 

Azerkosmos AZER 

Bigelow Aerospace US 

Boeing US 

Boeing/USAF/CCAR US 

Bolivian Space Agency BOL 

Boston University US 

Broadcasting Satellite System Corporation (B–SAT) JPN 

Budapest University of Technology and Economics HUN 

California Polytechnic University, San Luis Obispo US 

Canadian Department of National Defence (DND) CA 

Canadian Space Agency CA 

Carlo Gavazzi Space GER 

Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales (CNES) FR 

Cornell University US 

Darpa US 

Defence Science Organisation STCT 

Deimos Imaging SPN 

Delft University of Technology NETH 

DigitalGlobe US 

Echostar US 
108 

Attachment 1: JFCC SPACE Conjunction Assessment Customers—Continued 

Primary Owner/Operator Country 

Ecuadorian Civilian Space Agency (EXA) ECU 

Emirates Institution for Advanced Science and Technology (EIAST) UAE 

EOS Creative Technology Solutions AUS 

European Aeronautic Defense and Space (EADS) Company, Astrium FR 

European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites 

(EUMETSAT) 

EUME 

European Space Agency ESA 

Eutelsat EUTE 

FaCH (Chilean Air Force) Chile 

Federal Polytechnic School of Laussane (EPFL) SWTZ 

FH Aachen, University of Applied Sciences GER 

French Defence Force FR 

GE US 

Geo-Informatics and Space Technology Development Agency (GISTDA— 

Thai Ministry of Science and Technology’s Space Agency) 

THAI 

German Aerospace Center (GSOC) GER 

German Space Situational Awareness Centre (GSSAC) GER 

Gil Moore—Utah State University US 

Globalstar GLOB 

GOMSpace DEN 

Government of Japan JPN 

Hellas Sat GREC 

Hisdesat SPN 

Hispasat SPN 

H<gskolen i Narvik (HiN) NOR 

ImageSat International ISRA 

Indian Space Research Organisation IND 

Indosat INDO 

Inmarsat IM 

Institute for Radio Astronomy of the Pontificia Universidad Cato ́lica del 

Peru ́ (INRAS–PUCP) 

PER 

Institute of Space Technology, Pakistan PAKI 

INTA—National Institute for Aerospace Technology SPN 

Intelsat ITSO/US 

IPSTAR THAI 

Iridium US 

ISIS UK 

Isreal Ministry of Defense ISRA 
109 

Attachment 1: JFCC SPACE Conjunction Assessment Customers—Continued 

Primary Owner/Operator Country 

Istanbul Technical University TURK 

Italian Air Force IT 

Italian Space Agency IT 

Japan Civil Aviation Bureau JPN 

Japan Space Systems JPN 

Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) JPN 

Japanese Amateur Radio League JPN 

Kagawa University, School of Engineering JPN 

Kagoshima University JPN 

Kentucky Space LLC US 

King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology (KACST) SAUD 

Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology SKOR 

Korea Aerospace Research Institute SKOR 

KT SKOR 

Kyushu Institute of Technology (KIT) JPN 

Lawrence Livermore National Lab US 

Lithuanian Space Association LTU 

Los Alamos National Lab US 

MDA CA 

MEASAT (Malaysia East Asia Satellite) MALA 

Meggiorin Group IT 

Ministry of Science, Technology & Productive Innovation ARGN 

Missile Defence Agency US 

MIT Lincoln Laboratory US 

Montana State University US 

Morehead State University US 

nanosatisfi US 

Nanyang Technological University SING 

NASA US 

NASA AMES US 

NASA GSFC US 

National Academy of Sciences of Republic of Belarus BELA 

National Authority for Remote Sensing and Space Sciences EGYP 

National Institute for Space Research, Brazil BRAZ 

National Space Organization (NSPO) ROC 

Naval Postgraduate School US 

Naval Research Lab US 
110 

Attachment 1: JFCC SPACE Conjunction Assessment Customers—Continued 

Primary Owner/Operator Country 

NIGCOMSAT NIG 

Nihon University—Aerospace Structural Engineering Laboratory JPN 

Nilesat EGYP 

NOAA US 

Norwegian Space Centre NORWAY 

O3b O3B 

OHB System GER 

Optus AUS 

Orbcomm ORB 

Osaka Institute of Technology JPN 

Osaka Prefecture University (OPU) JPN 

PAKSAT PAKI 

Paradigm (EADS—European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company) NATO 

Planet Labs US 

Politecnico di Torino IT 

PRC PRC 

RapidEye GER 

Regional African Satellite Communication Organization (RASCOM) RASC 

Romanian Space Agency ROM 

Saint Louis University US 

Sandia National Laboratories US 

Sapienza, University of Rome IT 

SatMex MEX 

SES BERM 

Shinshu University JPN 

SingTel STCT 

Sky Perfect JSAT Corporation JPN 

SkyBox Imaging US 

SMDC/AFSC US 

South African National Space Agency (SANSA) SAFR 

Southern Stars US 

Space Research Centre of the Polish Academy of Sciences POL 

Space Science Laboratory—UC Berkeley US 

Spacecom ISRA 

SpaceQuest ARGN 

SRM University IND 

STADIKO GERM 
111 

Attachment 1: JFCC SPACE Conjunction Assessment Customers—Continued 

Primary Owner/Operator Country 

Star One BRAZ 

State Space Agency of Ukraine UKR 

Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd NIG 

Swedish Space Corporation SWED 

Tama Art University JPN 

Technical University of Berlin, Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics GER 

Technical University of Madrid SPN 

Technische Universita ̈t Dresden, Germany, Students’ Research Group for 

Spacecraft Engineering in Dresden (STARD). 

GER 

Technische Universitat Munchen—Institute of Astronautics GER 

Teikyou University JPN 

Telecomm MEX 

Telenor Group NOR 

Telepazio IT 

Telesat CA 

Telkom, Indonesia INDO 

Terma DEN 

Thaicom THAI 

Thomas Jefferson High School US 

Thuraya UAE 

Tohoku University—Space Robotics Lab JPN 

Tokyo Institute of Technology, Dept of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering JPN 

TU ̈ BI ̇TAK UZAY (Space Technologies Research Institute) TURK 

Turkish Air Force TURK 

TURKSAT TURK 

UKSpOC UK 

Universidad Alas Peruanas (UAP) PER 

University of Alabama Huntsville US 

University of Applied Sciences and Arts of Southern Switzerland (SUPSI) SWIT 

University of Colorado US 

University of Florida US 

University of Hawaii US 

University of Louisiana, Lafayette US 

University of Maryland US 

University of Michigan US 

University of New Mexico US 

University of Surrey Space Centre UK 
112 

Attachment 1: JFCC SPACE Conjunction Assessment Customers—Continued 

Primary Owner/Operator Country 

University of Tartu EST 

University of Tokyo JPN 

University of Toronto Institute for Aerospace Studies—Space Flight Laboratory ASRA 

University of Tsukuba JPN 

University of Vigo SPN 

University of Wuerzburg GER 

US Air Force Academy US 

US Military Academy US 

US Naval Academy US 

US Naval Academy/Drexel University US 

US Navy US 

USAF US 

USSOCOM US 

Utah State University US 

Vermont Technical College US 

Vietnam Academy of Science and Technology (VAST) VTMN 

Vietnam National Satellite Centre VTNM 

Vietnam Posts and Telecommunications Group (VNPT) VTNM 

Vimpel CIS 

Warsaw University of Technology POL 

Weather News Inc JPN 
113 

Attachment 2: JFCC SPACE Orbital Data Request Customers 

Organization Country 

CONAE (Argentinian Space Agency) Argentina 

DSTO Australia 

Inside Systems Pty Ltd Australia 

Von Karman Institute Belgium 

CSSS CA 

Canadian Surveillance of Space Office Canada 

CANSpOC Canada 

Defence Research & Development Canada (DR&DC) Canada 

DSTI–5 Canada 

FACh Chile 

EUMETSAT EUMETSAT 

Astrium Eads France 

CDAOA (French Air Force-Air Defense and Air Operations Command) France 

CNES France 

ESA Germany 

GSOC Germany 

GSSAC Germany 

ISRO India 

MediaCitra Indostar (MCI) Indonesia 

Italian MOD Italy 

Telespazio Italy 

Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center Japan 

JAXA Japan 

JSAT Japan 

SPTVJSAT Japan 

SES Luxembourg 

Satlist Netherlands 

WarfareSims.com Norway 

DEIMOS Spain 

OHB Sweden 

CalSky Switzerland 

Private Switzerland 

Yahsat UAE 

AMSAT–UK UK 

Fylingdales UK 

Surrey Space Centre, Univ of Surrey UK 

University of Southampton UK 
114 

Attachment 2: JFCC SPACE Orbital Data Request Customers—Continued 

Organization Country 

1 SOPS US 

10 SWS US 

14 AF/A5C US 

16 SPCS US 

16th Weather Squadron US 

17 ESPCS US 

20 SPCS US 

21 OSS US 

213 SWS US 

22 SOPS US 

25 SRS US 

3 SOPS US 

4 SOPS US 

4 SPCS US 

45 SW US 

46 TS US 

50 OG/Det 1 US 

53 TMG US 

595 SG/DMOC–S US 

6 SOPS US 

6 SWS US 

7 SOPS/Boeing US 

7 SWS US 

76 SPCS US 

Aerospace US 

AFIT US 

AFLCMC US 

AFRL US 

AFSPC US 

AFWA US 

AGI US 

AMSAT US 

ARSTRAT US 

Boeing US 

Brilligent US 

Cal Poly US 

COBRA DANE Program Office US 
115 

Attachment 2: JFCC SPACE Orbital Data Request Customers—Continued 

Organization Country 

DARPA TTO US 

Dept. of Astronautics US 

DIA US 

Digitalglobe US 

Energia Logistics Ltd. US 

Exelis, Inc US 

FAA US 

Global Broadcast Service Joint Program Office—Mitre contract US 

Global Imaging US 

Globalstar US 

HQ ACC/A5 US 

IDB Communications US 

ILS US 

Independent US 

Inmarsat US 

Institute for Defense Analysis US 

Intelligent Commercial Spaceflight, LLC US 

Intelsat US 

Iridium US 

JHUAPL US 

JMS CTF US 

LLNL US 

LMCO US 

MDA US 

Missile Defense Agency (MDSDC) US 

MIT/LL US 

Montana State University, Dept of Physics US 

MSSS US 

N2YO US 

NASA—Glenn Research Center US 

NASA/GSFC US 

NASA/JPL US 

NASA Langley Research Center US 

NASA/ODPO US 

NASA/CARA US 

NASA/JSC US 

NASA/KSC US 
116 

Attachment 2: JFCC SPACE Orbital Data Request Customers—Continued 

Organization Country 

NASA/WFF US 

NASIC US 

National Envir. Sat & Info Service/SPI US 

Naval Research Lab US 

Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) US 

NAVSOC US 

NGA US 

NGC US 

NOAA US 

Nocarum Tech US 

Northrupp-Grummun US 

NRO US 

NSWC Corona Division US 

O3b US 

Omitron US 

Operationally Responsive Space Office—SMC/SDDS US 

OrbitingEden.com US 

OSD US 

PARCS US 

Popular Science US 

Raytheon US 

Rincon Research US 

Riverside Research (Navy Contractor) US 

RTS Space Operations US 

Sandia National Laboratories US 

SAT Services US 

SATCOM US 

Scitor/OSD Net Assessment US 

SeaSpace Corporation US 

SERCO US 

Seti US 

SIDC/AFC US 

SkyBox Imaging US 

SMC US 

SMC/SY US 

Space Environment Technologies US 

Space Test Program SMC US 
117 

Attachment 2: JFCC SPACE Orbital Data Request Customers—Continued 

Organization Country 

Spaceflight Magazine US 

SpaceX US 

SPAWAR US 

SSC LANT US 

SSL US 

Terminal Eleven US 

ULA US 

University of Illinois US 

University of Miami US 

US ARMY PEO Missile and Space US 

US Army SMDC US 

USCG US 

USGS US 

USGS EROS Center US 

USSOCOM US 

WROCI US 

zarya.info US 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

APRIL 3, 2014 

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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER 

General RAYMOND. The submitted spreadsheets list all Joint Functional Component Command for Space Conjunction Assessment customers (Attachment 1), as 

well as the customers supported through the Space Situational Awareness Sharing/ 

Orbital Data Request program (Attachment 2). 

[The attachments referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 

107.] 

The Joint Functional Component Command for Space provides standard and 

emergency Conjunction Assessment products for all satellite owner/operators for 

whom we have contact information. We proactively work to maintain current contact information with all owner operators to provide the most comprehensive level 

of service to the international space community. 

The Joint Space Operations Center currently supports 204 distinct Conjunction 

Assessment customers from 68 countries to include 198 unique owner/operators and 

6 Department of Defense squadrons. Outside the United States government the customers with the largest number of assets are: Globalstar (82), Intelsat (79), Iridium 

(74), SES (54), Indian Space Research Organization (34), Eutelsat (30), Orbcomm 

(30), Telesat (23), and CNES (18). 

Orbital Data Requests are customer driven requests for services that are not provided as standard products on www.space-track.org. Requests come from Conjunction Assessment customers, launch agencies, United States government research organizations, etc. In the last two years, the Joint Space Operations Center has supported 609 Orbital Data Requests from 165 distinct customers, representing 22 

countries. [See page 11.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN 

General SHELTON. Lockheed Martin currently has eight vehicles on contract and 

is focused on establishing a cost-efficient production line that plans for the addition 

of a ninth GPS III space vehicle. Although we have not yet received a proposal from 

Lockheed Martin for SV09 which would provide details to calculate cost inefficiencies associated with the reduced buy in FY15 from 2 to 1 vehicle, we expect the pervehicle cost for SV09 to increase by approximately eighteen percent due to the inefficiencies in parts procurement, factory processing, and overhead. [See page 12.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

APRIL 3, 2014 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS 

Mr. ROGERS. The National Space Policy, signed by the President, states that ‘‘The 

United States will employ a variety of measures to help assure the use of space for 

all responsible parties, and, consistent with the inherent right of self-defense, deter 

others from interference and attack, defend our space systems and contribute to the 

defense of allied space systems, and, if deterrence fails, defeat efforts to attack 

them.’’ Can you provide your thoughts on the importance of an effective space defense? 

General SHELTON. Our nation’s reliance on space systems and services demands 

an effective space protection strategy. The increasing threats to our space systems, 

the risks posed by space debris, and the potential for premature failure of a given 

satellite, dictates a change to our traditional architectural approaches. We are working on both material and non-material solutions (e.g., OPSEC, Critical Asset Risk 

Management, Military Deception, Information Assurance) to affordably manage risk, 

increase resiliency and enhance overall mission effectiveness. 

Air Force Space Command, in concert with our partners in the National Security 

Space community, also is pursuing multiple solutions to dissuade and deter adversary actions against our space systems. 

Mr. ROGERS. How can we should change the current system to purchase commercial satellite communications services in a more cost effective and strategic manner? 

General SHELTON. Air Force Space Command is planning a set of pathfinders to 

work through many of the different aspects associated with the current purchase 

process, including investigations into the associated policy, business, requirements, 

circuit protection, and management risks. The first of these pathfinders is being executed by the Space and Missile Systems Center now and will award in 3Q FY14 

with a projected savings of ∼40% versus traditional bandwidth leasing practices. The 

results of these pathfinders will help inform the best balance of military satellite 

communications and commercial satellite communications (COMSATCOM) investment. This will, in turn, allow the Department to select a more affordable approach 

for future COMSATCOM procurement with substantial savings over the past methods for bandwidth leasing. 

Mr. ROGERS. What is the status of the Operationally Responsive Space office? 

General SHELTON. In compliance with FY13 National Defense Authorization Act 

(Public Law 112–239 § 914), the Department realigned the ORS Office reporting 

chain from the DOD Executive Agent for Space to the Commander, Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC). This change in reporting chain will facilitate direct 

interaction between the ORS Office with SMC’s other program offices. The transfer 

of knowledge and lessons learned will be the primary mechanism for fully integrating ORS principles into Air Force (AF) space acquisition programs. The AF is 

executing the transition using current funding in three phases: Phase 1 began in 

FY13 and includes the establishment of a Program Guidance Letter, a Concept of 

Operations (CONOPS), a Program Plan, the administrative transfer of personnel, 

and the financial transfer of personnel; Phase 2 includes the execution of current 

ORS Office projects and initiation of the most recent United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM)-validated urgent need; and Phase 3 completes the implementation of ORS tenets and authorities across the full range of space programs 

within SMC. 

The three-phase approach to transitioning the ORS program concepts allows for 

an orderly execution of programs and the ability to realize the Department of Defense goal to provide more resilient and cost-effective architectures. 

Mr. ROGERS. What are the current missions they are working on? 

General SHELTON. The ORS Office is continuing to respond to urgent need 

projects and to pursue enabler efforts to meet the congressional established cost 

goals of $60M per mission. The ORS Office will work with other SMC offices to ensure that current ORS projects are completed and the lessons learned and principles 

of ORS are transitioned into SMC programs. 

• ORS–1 Focus: Urgent Need. ORS–1 is delivering capability to the war fighter 

today and is the first dedicated system for United States Central Command 

(USCENTCOM). The program cost was $226M and fielded in under 32 months by 
126 

exercising streamlined acquisition, shortened decision-making chains, and novel engineering and technical solutions. 

Significance: ORS–1 built the enabling infrastructure with emphasis on ground 

systems architecture. ORS–1 achieved numerous ‘‘firsts’’ adding fundamentally new 

capabilities to tackle some of the nation’s hardest information gathering problems 

and a first-ever focused capability for USCENTCOM. ORS–1 provides superb collection capability and USCENTCOM, as well as other Combatant Commands, continues to rely on its capabilities as an integral component to their intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance architecture and collection plan. These architecture advancements will be utilized for future missions. 

Status: ORS–1 was officially transferred to Air Force Space Command in January 

2012. The system is operated by the 50th Space Wing, 1st Space Operations Squadron. • ORS–2 Focus: Enabler. ORS–2 is a modular, reconfigurable, multi-mission satellite bus developed using a Modular Open Systems Approach. The completed bus 

and its associated hardware (space common data link radio) along with the Gryphon 

cryptology unit (software-based encryption for satellite command and control) were 

delivered to the ORS Rapid Assembly, Integration and Test Facility. 

Significance: ORS–2’s Gryphon unit was first demonstrated on the ORS–3 enabler 

mission. ORS–2 will establish a baseline for future reconfigurable, scalable, and 

open systems. 

Status: The ORS office plans to transition the system to the AFPEO/SP. 

• ORS–3 Focus: Enabler. The ORS–3 mission demonstrated an integrated payload 

stack for a low-cost payload capability and decreased range costs through automated 

targeting and range safety processes. These enablers not only focus on the ability 

to execute a rapid call-up mission, they reduce engineering hours from months to 

days in both cases, resulting in decreased launch costs. 

Significance: ORS–3 demonstrated commercial launch practices and addressed 

complexity of integration of multiple payloads for efficiencies in future launches. 

Status: This launch occurred in November 2013 from the National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration Wallops launch facility. • ORS–4 Focus: Enabler. The ORS–4 mission will demonstrate a new, cost-effective, small launch capability that includes the development of three new solid rocket 

motors. This will demonstrate an alternative launch vehicle concept that reduces 

total mission cost through simple and repeatable processes. 

Significance: ORS–4 is the pathfinder launch to significantly drive down launch 

and range costs and allow more affordable access to space for a smaller-scale, modular space vehicle. The long-term benefit is to also scale the Modular Space Vehicle 

to house various payloads for rapid development and deployment of space assets. 

Status: This launch will occur 3rd quarter FY14. A strategy of transitioning the 

Super Strypi is being developed by the ORS Office and its mission partner, Sandia 

National Laboratories. This strategy should be completed by 3Q FY14. 

• ORS–5 Focus: Urgent Need. Commander USSTRATCOM tasked the ORS Office 

to provide a formal assessment and recommendation to support Joint Force Commanders’ urgent needs compiled by the USSTRATCOM/J8 staff. ORS–5 will apply 

the remaining FY13/FY14 ORS funding (approximately $60M) to address space situational awareness needs. 

Significance: ORS–5 will demonstrate the tenets of ORS and address the guiding 

principles outlined in congressional language. This mission should enable ORS to 

step down from the $200M missions toward the congressional cost goal of $60M. 

Other objectives include moving toward smaller and more cost-effective launch alternatives, use of commercial practices, and incorporation of commercially mass-manufactured components to lower cost, shorten delivery time and strengthen the industrial base. 

Status: On February 25, 2014, the ORS EXCOM approved a space situational 

awareness payload to meet USSTRATCOM-validated urgent needs, address rapidly 

evolving threats and serve as a pathfinder for the Space Based Space Surveillance 

system follow-on. ORS–5 is planned for launch in 2017. 

Mr. ROGERS. Will these missions provide value to the warfighter? 

General SHELTON. ORS–2 will establish a baseline for future reconfigurable, scalable, and open systems. ORS–4 will demonstrate an alternative launch vehicle concept that reduces total mission cost through simple and repeatable processes. ORS– 

5 will provide significant risk reduction to the Space Based Surveillance System follow-on and serve as an opportunity to continue driving down the cost and time to 

space by changing how we leverage commercial capabilities and incorporating ORS 

principles into programs of record. 

Mr. ROGERS. To what extent has DOD validated the assertion that disaggregated 

architectures offer to greater resiliency, operational efficiency, and/or cost savings? 
127 

What is the status of the CAPE studies on disaggregation? Are there any initial 

findings? 

General SHELTON. Disaggregation is one technique being examined to achieve resiliency of our satellite constellations. Our goal is not to validate merely one technique, but to find the best method or combination of methods that enable the ability 

to continue providing required space capability in the face of adverse actions or premature failure. Toward this end, the recently concluded Weather Satellite Followon analysis identified disaggregated alternatives that leverage civil, international 

and DOD capabilities in multiple orbits. We are also engaged in analyses of alternatives for the Space Based Infrared System Follow-on (SBIRS–FO) and Protected 

Satellite Communications Services (PSCS) capabilities that are evaluating 

disaggregated options within their tradespace of possible solutions. These analyses 

will inform the decision on the most resilient and cost effective solutions for followon programs. We have yet to validate any particular technique as the best approach; 

however, we are certain that business as usual is unsustainable in the face of a 

growing threat, stressed budgets and growing demand. 

Mr. ROGERS. There have been major advances in Overhead Persistent Infrared 

with the launch of the Space-Based Infrared System. Are we leveraging this capability to the fullest extent? 

General SHELTON. We have been exploiting additional capabilities since we operationally accepted two SBIRS Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO) satellites last 

year; however, we are still working to realize the full potential of the sensors on 

these satellites. The SBIRS GEO scanning sensors have been fully integrated into 

the Air Force Space Command OPIR constellation. They are providing excellent 

service and have already demonstrated capability superior to that of the legacy Defense Support Program sensors. We will not, however, achieve full capability on 

SBIRS GEO until the SBIRS ground segment is capable of processing data from the 

GEO staring sensor. This will occur with implementation of the SBIRS Block 10 

ground segment upgrade in Spring 2016. The staring sensor will allow SBIRS to 

begin meeting all program theater missile warning and technical intelligence mission requirements. We are already sharing un-tuned staring sensor data with the 

technical intelligence community so they can calibrate their systems. We will not 

know the staring sensor’s full capabilities until we have a chance to operate them 

following the Block 10 upgrade. 

Mr. ROGERS. The National Space Policy, signed by the President, states that ‘‘The 

United States will employ a variety of measures to help assure the use of space for 

all responsible parties, and, consistent with the inherent right of self-defense, deter 

others from interference and attack, defend our space systems and contribute to the 

defense of allied space systems, and, if deterrence fails, defeat efforts to attack 

them.’’ Can you provide your thoughts on the importance of an effective space defense? 

Mr. KLINGER. Our current national security space systems and those we are planning for in the near future trace their origins primarily in response to the Cold War 

stand-off with the Soviet Union. For the first thirty years of the Space Age our systems were designed principally to respond to the threat of nuclear war with the 

USSR. Since the end of the Cold War, the space domain has changed radically in 

fifty years. It has evolved from a relatively uncontested sanctuary to a likely theater 

of combat operations. Space has become equally pervasive in all aspects of our 

thinking about warfare and military operations—from major campaigns like Operation ENDURING FREEDOM to smaller scale relief operations in response to humanitarian crises, such as Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE to aid tsunami victims. Our asymmetrical advantage in space also creates asymmetrical vulnerabilities. Our adversaries recognize our dependence on space and continue to think of 

ways to respond to our space advantage. 

From an acquisition perspective, it’s evident that existing requirements validation, architecture development, and investment funding decisions do not account for 

the attrition, survivability, or resilience of our space capabilities in a contested domain. The rapidly changing environment, with new and evolving threats, in a difficult budget environment, requires a new approach to ensuring unfettered access 

to, and use of, space capabilities for the United States and its allies. Space domain 

mission assurance is essential for an effective space defense posture. In many programs the Department needs more analysis to implement optimal means of achieving that assurance. In order to implement an effective space defense, resilience 

should be a key performance parameter of our future space architecture, judging effectiveness relative to its contribution to resilience in addition to other requirements. 

In summary, we are undergoing a fundamental cultural shift in how we view the 

space domain. As we begin to fundamentally think about and approach the space 
128 

domain as a theater of combat operations, we will develop and implement the required degree of resilience as part of an effective space defense posture. 

Mr. ROGERS. How can we should change the current system to purchase commercial satellite communications services in a more cost effective and strategic manner? 

Mr. KLINGER. 

• Senate Report 113–44, dated June 20, 2013, included a section titled ‘‘Satellite 

communications strategy’’ in which the Secretary of Defense is requested to provide a 5-, 10-, and 25-year strategy for using an appropriate mix of Department 

of Defense (DOD) and commercial satellite communications (SATCOM) bandwidth. As part of the strategy, the Secretary was directed to consider the use of 

a capital working fund or other mechanisms for leasing or multi-year procurement 

of commercial bandwidth. 

• In addition, in response to FY14 NDAA Section 913, DASD C3CB briefed the 

HASC on March 26, 2014 on a strategy to enable multi-year procurement of 

COMSATCOM services. Key objectives included a budgeting approach for stable 

funding, acquisition pathfinders to reduce risk, determination of best value contract terms, and planning and operational management process improvements to 

create the framework necessary to devise long term needs and manage for affordability and savings. 

• In the strategy in response to Senate Report 113–44, DOD will address how commercial SATCOM is being used by DOD components, predict future demand, identify budgetary sources to fund the contracts, and instantiate an iterative process 

for managing the utilization of the purchased assets. This response is currently 

in final coordination within the Department and will be forwarded as soon as 

practicable. 

• DOD recognizes that long-term contracts place the burden of defining the contract 

requirements, budgeting for contract execution (and potential termination), and 

managing the efficient utilization of the procured bandwidth on the DOD, not the 

satellite service provider. Consequently, execution of this strategy will require a 

unique management concept of operations. 

• The strategy includes specific tasks and recommendations for pathfinder projects 

to test the results of the tasks against various multi-year contract methods. 

Mr. ROGERS. To what extent has DOD validated the assertion that disaggregated 

architectures offer to greater resiliency, operational efficiency, and/or cost savings? 

What is the status of the CAPE studies on disaggregation? Are there any initial 

findings? 

Mr. KLINGER. There is no current or planned CAPE study on disaggregation. 

Disaggregation is one option (as a subset of many resiliency options) that is being 

studied as part of AoA’s for follow-on systems for Protected Satellite Communications (SATCOM) and Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) capabilities. There are no 

preliminary findings at this time to report to the Committee. 

Mr. ROGERS. There have been major advances in Overhead Persistent Infrared 

with the launch of the Space-Based Infrared System. Are we leveraging this capability to the fullest extent? 

Mr. KLINGER. For the ground layer, data processing and exploitation of the SBIRS 

GEO and HEO scanner capabilities is being leveraged to the fullest extent possible 

and GEO starer data is already being leveraged prior to final calibration later this 

summer. The program accelerated delivery of calibrated starer data for the technical 

intelligence and battlespace awareness missions. All scanner and starer data is flowing to the National Air and Space Intelligence Center for data analysis and algorithm development. The program of record and Joint Overhead Persistent Infrared 

Ground (JOG) program are delivering the foundational communication capabilities 

to enable and enhance data dissemination and processing. The JOG program is also 

integrating starer data into the Space Awareness and Global Exploitation (SAGE) 

software tool which fuses/integrates multiple data sources and already contains a 

mature set of algorithms for battlespace awareness targets of interest. SBIRS Block 

10 will consolidate mission control into two ops centers (one primary and one backup) in 2016, and the remaining Block 20 ground development will fuse and automate starer data for the missile warning and missile defense missions in the 2018 

timeframe. 

In addition, SBIRS Space Modernization Investment (SMI) funds are already addressing how best to adapt the SBIRS architecture as part of the overall OPIR enterprise. We are looking at: investigation of evolving the current SBIRS design (e.g., 

simplified scanner); architecture studies to understand how best to adapt the SBIRS 

architecture beyond GEO 6 and HEO 4 as part of the overall OPIR Enterprise; wide 

field-of-view (WFOV) staring sensor technology for future satellite concepts and 

technology insertion; and associated sensor algorithm development. All of these 
129 

SBIRS SMI efforts have universal application regardless of the specific direction resulting from the OPIR AoA. 

Mr. ROGERS. The National Space Policy, signed by the President, states that ‘‘The 

United States will employ a variety of measures to help assure the use of space for 

all responsible parties, and, consistent with the inherent right of self-defense, deter 

others from interference and attack, defend our space systems and contribute to the 

defense of allied space systems, and, if deterrence fails, defeat efforts to attack 

them.’’ Can you provide your thoughts on the importance of an effective space defense? 

Mr. LOVERRO. The United States considers the use of space to be vital to its national interests from both an economic and security standpoint. Therefore, ensuring 

the ability to use space for the future is of utmost importance, especially in the contested space environment we envision. DOD Space Policy (DOD Directive 3100.10, 

‘‘Space Policy,’’ October 18, 2012) describes the Department’s overall strategy to 

deter threats to both U.S. and allied space systems by: (1) supporting the development of international norms of responsible behavior that promote the safety, stability, and security of the space domain; (2) building coalitions to enhance collective 

security capabilities; (3) mitigating the benefits to an adversary of attacking U.S. 

space systems by enhancing the resilience of our space enterprise and by ensuring 

that U.S. forces can operate effectively even when our space-derived capabilities 

have been degraded; and (4) possessing the capabilities, not limited to space, to respond to an attack on U.S. or allied space systems in an asymmetric manner by 

using any or all elements of national power. 

As we examine the specific question of space defense, it is in the context of these 

broad policy guidelines. Our preferred approach is deterrence—to persuade potential 

adversaries to refrain from conducting an attack or otherwise compromising the responsible use of space. We believe that this goal is best achieved by clearly denying 

the benefits of adversary attacks through substantial increases in the resilience of 

our space mission architectures. Architectural resilience ensures the continuity of 

space-derived services, maintains the effectiveness of U.S. conventional force projection capabilities, and, married to the stated intent of the United States to respond, 

significantly deters any likelihood of attack. It is my view that this is the most effective form of space defense. 

Making architectures more resilient is a combination of adequate protection, increased numbers of satellites, service diversity through the use of commercial, allied, and wholly owned elements, distribution of service nodes, well-reasoned 

disaggregation, and operational ambiguity—all to create a service that can stand up 

to an adversary’s attack. These are the same force structure ideas we use in every 

other field of warfighting to help our systems survive in a hostile environment and 

to increase conventional force deterrence. Additionally, increases in resilience can be 

combined with other elements of space defense, such as active defensive operations, 

which can provide warning of or interruption to an adversary’s attack, and the ability to replenish lost or degraded capabilities. Taken as a whole, we are confident 

these measures can defend critical U.S. interests in space for the long term. 

Mr. ROGERS. How can we should change the current system to purchase commercial satellite communications services in a more cost effective and strategic manner? 

Mr. LOVERRO. Although there are short-term opportunities for improving the processes by which we purchase commercial satellite communications (SatCom) services 

(e.g., longer-term leases), full incorporation of commercial SatCom services into an 

operationally responsive, user-focused, and mission-reliant capability will require 

more than simple changes to buying or contracting practices. A recent DOD tiger 

team outlined a step-by-step approach to addressing some of these issues and proposed actions that could be taken in the short-term to reduce risks and uncertainties by establishing tools and completing ‘‘pathfinder’’ activities necessary to inform 

a future strategic approaches. 

The team’s study found that, based on historical lease data, and the recent Mix 

of Media study, the Department requires at least 3 GHz of commercial wideband 

SatCom bandwidth globally to satisfy its requirements through the Future Years 

Defense Program (FYDP). Further, as the Department begins to formulate its vision 

for a follow-on to the Wideband Global System, it must fully assess the operational, 

fiscal, and resilience implications of a more strategic relationship with commercial 

SatCom service solutions. 

Due diligence suggests that near-term risk mitigation strategies should be pursued immediately to gain crucial insights prior to the next series of SatCom investment decisions. Investment costs for the tiger team’s recommended pathfinder activities are almost negligible compared to expected lease expenditures, and several 

of these activities may reduce lease expenditure costs in the near term. 
130 

But the primary benefit related to utilizing commercial SatCom services would 

not merely be minor reductions in cost, but rather would include the array of benefits that may only be realized once commercial SatCom services are fully incorporated into DOD’s operational model. To do so, DOD must identify the right combination of prospective solutions, and current and future pathfinder activities are 

critical to that understanding. 

Mr. ROGERS. To what extent has DOD validated the assertion that disaggregated 

architectures offer to greater resiliency, operational efficiency, and/or cost savings? 

What is the status of the CAPE studies on disaggregation? Are there any initial 

findings? 

Mr. LOVERRO. The National Security Space Strategy and the DOD Space Policy 

(DOD Directive 3100.10, ‘‘Space Policy,’’ October 18, 2012) make clear that just as 

in all areas of warfighting, resilience must be a factor that is considered in developing and fielding future space architectures and systems. Although disaggregation 

has been viewed as a promising method to enable resilience, it is but one of several 

approaches we are examining to achieve overall space mission assurance. 

System-level studies, conducted by the Air Force, have indicated that for the two 

specific missions of Protected Communications (e.g., the Advanced Extremely High 

Frequency (AEHF) system), and Missile Warning (e.g., the Space-Based Infrared 

System (SBIRS)), disaggregation appears to be viable, although further analysis is 

needed. Those conclusions are still being examined in analyses of alternatives 

(AoAs) led by the Office of the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation 

(CAPE) and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD/AT&L). Alternative approaches to achieve necessary 

space mission assurance, such as defensive operations or reconstitution, could obviate the need to enhance the resilience of our space architecture through disaggregation, and other means, but these approaches also increase costs and are, themselves, 

untested. 

It is important to clarify, therefore, that the question is not whether disaggregation is needed to achieve resilience, but rather, whether resilience, through 

disaggregation, is more cost effective than other ways to achieve mission warfighting assurance, or whether the value of the mission itself warrants that investment 

in the first place. This is what we are examining in the relevant AoAs. 

Mr. ROGERS. The National Space Policy, signed by the President, states that ‘‘The 

United States will employ a variety of measures to help assure the use of space for 

all responsible parties, and, consistent with the inherent right of self-defense, deter 

others from interference and attack, defend our space systems and contribute to the 

defense of allied space systems, and, if deterrence fails, defeat efforts to attack 

them.’’ Can you provide your thoughts on the importance of an effective space defense? 

Ms. SAPP. The NRO places a high priority on space protection, though specific details regarding space protection are classified. Situational awareness and protection, 

including the monitoring of space, terrestrial, and cyber threats, is a key element 

of NRO’s survivability strategy. Continuous monitoring of these elements establishes both a baseline of normal activity and changes to the baseline associated with 

foreign counterspace actions. Such monitoring and awareness are critical for indicating when potential responses/actions may be warranted. Actions available to operators include various courses of action and concepts of operation that either minimize or mitigate counterspace threats. The NRO has key partnerships with the AF 

to ensure that we have the strongest team possible in addressing these critical 

threats. 

Timely and appropriate response to space situational awareness indications and 

warning is particularly important due to operational requirements. Because of this, 

the NRO places a high priority on monitoring, categorizing, and characterizing potential threats through all possible means, domains, and partnerships. The NRO 

continues to refine a process to better respond to satellite interference and/or attack, 

but these activities are largely classified. In addition, the NRO has established a 

process and timeline for senior interagency and congressional leadership notification 

in the event of suspect or confirmed satellite interference and/or attack. 

Mr. ROGERS. The National Space Policy, signed by the President, states that ‘‘The 

United States will employ a variety of measures to help assure the use of space for 

all responsible parties, and, consistent with the inherent right of self-defense, deter 

others from interference and attack, defend our space systems and contribute to the 

defense of allied space systems, and, if deterrence fails, defeat efforts to attack 

them.’’ Can you provide your thoughts on the importance of an effective space defense? 

General RAYMOND. An effective space defense is critical for national security and 

global economic stability. 
131 

Mr. ROGERS. Has STRATCOM evaluated disaggregation as a means to provide 

more resilience to current space constellations, or provided any position on the 

issue? 

General RAYMOND. U.S. Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) and U.S. Air Force 

Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) are leading the study of disaggregated 

space system planning. They’re studying SATCOM as their initial effort to better 

understand the concept. 

The space environment continues to evolve and there are attributes of disaggregation which may offer the possibility of attractive options; however, disaggregation 

requires more analysis to determine if this will be the best way ahead. Disaggregation is only one means by which we may create more resilient architectures to ensure continuity of space-derived services. 

Mr. ROGERS. How are the warfighter requirements for satellite communications 

projected in the future? Is there a base level of necessary communications that 

STRATCOM can assess will be needed for the next several years? 

General RAYMOND. Combatant Commands, Services, and Agencies submit satellite 

communications (SATCOM) requirements to the Joint Staff and USSTRATCOM for 

validation on a quarterly basis. These requirements are then leveraged by the DOD 

when planning for future Military SATCOM systems and by the Defense Information Systems Agency when contracting for Commercial SATCOM services. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER 

Mr. COOPER. How will the Department decide whether to apply disaggregated architecture principles to future space system acquisitions? What role is there for 

using additional hosted payload opportunities? What, if any, additional knowledge 

is needed to make an informed decision on whether to disaggregate DOD space systems? 

General SHELTON. DOD is conducting analyses of alternatives for the Space Based 

Infrared System Follow-on (SBIRS–FO) and Protected Satellite Communications 

Services (PSCS) capabilities. These studies are evaluating disaggregated options 

within their stable of possible solutions. Hosted payloads also are part of the solution set being examined in these studies. These analyses will inform the decision 

on the most resilient and cost effective solution for each satellite constellation. 

Mr. COOPER. To what extent have these potential benefits and limitations of 

disaggregation been proven out in pilots, demonstrations, or other tests, such as the 

Commercially Hosted Infrared Payload (CHIRP)? What knowledge or lessons have 

these provided? 

General SHELTON. CHIRP demonstrated the viability of commercially hosted overhead persistent infrared (OPIR) payloads and gave tremendous insights into the applicability of wide field-of-view (WFOV) staring technology to the missile warning, 

missile defense, technical intelligence, and battlespace awareness missions. The sensor’s ability to provide continuous coverage within the field-of-view proved to be particularly valuable in understanding short duration infrared events. Lessons learned 

from CHIRP will be applied to the Tactical WFOV Testbed and other ongoing OPIR 

Space Modernization Initiative (SMI) activities. These explore various space architectures, to include disaggregation, and develop/test lower-cost WFOV payloads to 

assess performance, cost and risk. CHIRP also provided many lessons on the benefits and constraints of a commercially hosted DOD payload. 

The Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) also conducted several over the air 

demonstrations in CY13 to explore MILSATCOM disaggregation. These demonstrations provided early risk reduction for the Protected Tactical Waveform (PTW) 

which will be utilized for future disaggregated protected tactical satellite communications. These demonstrations provided insight into the maturity of many of the 

major PTW functions and how they behaved over the Wideband Global Satellites 

and Intelsat. Successful demonstration of the government reference PTW over operational constellations proves the feasibility of a low-cost future Protected SATCOM 

architecture. 

Lastly, SMC has several ongoing efforts that will further develop our understanding of the benefits and limitations of disaggregation. In the OPIR mission area, 

the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) Follow-on Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) 

will assess a disaggregated system as one of alternatives to the current program of 

record. For MILSATCOM, the Protected SATCOM Services (PSCS) AoA is comparing the current program of record to a disaggregated satellite system or a new 

aggregated satellite system. And the Hosted Payload Office, established in 2011, is 

working to complete source selection for the Hosted Payload Solutions contract in 
132 

June 2014. This contract will enable demonstrations and pilots for commercial 

hosting opportunities. 

Mr. COOPER. How will the Department decide whether to apply disaggregated architecture principles to future space system acquisitions? What role is there for 

using additional hosted payload opportunities? What, if any, additional knowledge 

is needed to make an informed decision on whether to disaggregate DOD space systems? 

Mr. KLINGER. The Department is considering disaggregated solutions in several 

analyses of alternatives (AoA) studies, as we endeavor to create more resilient architectures. Disaggregation is only one solution; however, in the spectrum of solutions 

that can be implemented to address space architecture vulnerabilities in an effort 

to gain more resilience and more affordable capabilities. Similar effects may be 

achievable by diversification, proliferation, and distribution of the mission across 

commercial, USG or Allied satellites. 

Hosted payloads (assuming they are not hosted on USG satellites), have significant implications that must be assessed prior to an implementation decision. Alignment of commercial and USG development timelines, inability to command and control the vehicle, infrastructure requirements (user terminals, etc.), and counterspace and protection responsibilities of the USG are just a few of the concerns associated with the use of hosted payloads. 

Mr. COOPER. To what extent have these potential benefits and limitations of 

disaggregation been proven out in pilots, demonstrations, or other tests, such as the 

Commercially Hosted Infrared Payload (CHIRP)? What knowledge or lessons have 

these provided? 

Mr. KLINGER. CHIRP was an acknowledged technical success as it did provide 

some valuable lessons on the viability of utilizing commercial services for hosted 

payloads and demonstrated the utility of Wide Field of View (WFOV) sensors. However, the Department is still in the very early stages of analyzing the concept of 

disaggregation. The benefits and limitations of disaggregation are currently being 

studied through the on-going Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) processes for Protected 

Satellite Communications Services and Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR). The 

results of these efforts are not available for report at this time. We are also 

leveraging information across all of the AoAs to explicitly address findings related 

to new concepts of operation. Finally, disaggregation is but one tool in the resiliency 

taxonomy which the Department is exploring and we are focused on the resiliency 

of our capabilities, not just individual systems. 

Mr. COOPER. Has STRATCOM evaluated disaggregation, or provided any position 

on the issue? How does disaggregation contribute to deterrence? 

General RAYMOND. U.S. Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) and U.S. Air Force 

Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) are leading the study of disaggregated 

space system planning. They’re studying SATCOM as their initial effort to better 

understand the concept. 

Disaggregation may contribute to deterrence by influencing adversary calculations 

on the cost and benefits of attacking our space assets. Making our architectures 

more resilient—disaggregation is one means by which we may do so—enables our 

ability to deny an adversary the benefits of an attack. Other means to enhance the 

resilience of our architectures include adequate protection, increased numbers of 

satellites, service diversity through the use of commercial, allied, and wholly-owned 

elements, distribution of service nodes, and operational ambiguity. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ 

Ms. SANCHEZ. How does the Air Force plan to manage this competition to ensure 

a level playing field? How should ULA’s launch prices best be compared to those 

of SpaceX? 

General SHELTON. The Air Force is committed to pursuing the benefits of competition in the EELV program as soon as possible. We will compete portions of the 

launch manifest each year in 2015, 2016, and 2017 allowing all certified New Entrants to compete (the certification process includes successful completion of 

launches and reviews of manufacturing and launch processing methodologies, as 

spelled out in the New Entrant Certification Guide). 

All offerors will be required to submit proposals in accordance with the instructions in the Request for Proposal (RFP), and the Air Force will evaluate them in 

accordance with the criteria stated in the RFP. We will seek Industry’s inputs to 

the final instructions and criteria by providing a draft RFP for their review. The 

Defense Acquisition Executive will approve the final RFP. 
133 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Given the risk of future additional launch slips beyond the changes 

that reduced the opportunities for new competitors in FY15–17, how is the Air Force 

planning to ensure opportunities for competition? 

General SHELTON. The current launch procurement forecast is the result of programmatic decisions during the development of the FY15 budget request affecting 

launch planning in general, not just competitive opportunities, and was driven both 

by satellite operational needs and declining budgets. 

The Air Force is aggressively taking steps to support competition while ensuring 

our responsibility to deploy National Security Space payloads into their orbits safely 

and under acceptable levels of risk. We are working early with declared New Entrants to certify their systems as soon as possible. We have a Cooperative Research 

and Development Agreement with SpaceX and we have recently added more government team resources to accelerate review of certification products, data and other 

supporting information throughout the certification process. The AF awarded 

SpaceX early integration contracts in March and April 2014 to support timely GPS 

III and SBIRS–GEO integration requirements. NROL–79 is the remaining competitive mission in FY15. The AF delayed release of the RFP from January 2014 to June 

2014 to provide additional time for new entrants to prepare. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What is the requirement for maintaining the ELC line? Given the 

growing competitive environment in launch, should the government continue to pay 

for ULA’s annual launch infrastructure in the longer-term or should the government 

work toward buying launch vehicles like satellites—as fully cost burdened items? 

General SHELTON. We continue to fund EELV Launch Capability (ELC) to perform launch operations, maintain launch infrastructure (systems and expertise) and 

to provide the operational flexibility and cost predictability required to launch National Security Space (NSS) satellites. There is still only one launch provider in the 

U.S. who can lift the heavier satellites in the NSS manifest, such as Wideband 

Global SATCOM, AEHF, MUOS, and many classified payloads. Launch capability 

provides us the flexibility to meet mission requirements without continual requests 

for equitable adjustments (REAs) or schedule penalties driven by satellite vehicle 

(SV) acquisition/development issues, integration delays, range delays, and SV build 

delays. In short, the ELC portion of the launch business ensures we are continually 

prepared to launch national security payloads. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. EELV launch costs have steadily risen over the last decade. DOD 

and ULA have recently cited gains in efficiencies. How has the potential for competition affected prices? 

General SHELTON. The FY15 budget request includes $1.2B in Air Force savings 

between FY14 PB and FY15 PB in the EELV program, and reflects the final portion 

of $4.4B savings for the DOD since the FY12 PB high water mark for the program. 

This is a direct result of economic order quantity purchasing (36 cores over a 5 year 

period) while leveraging the benefit of competition with the incumbent. This FY15 

request demonstrates hard-fought gains in controlling launch costs. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What role do you see commercial industry having in satellite architectures of the future? 

General SHELTON. The commercial industry has a critical role in helping to define 

future satellite architectures through the introduction of business approaches, concepts for communication services, and internally developed technologies. That role 

continues in response to the ongoing conversations in support of future commercial 

satellite communications pathfinding risk mitigation. In partnership with commercial industry, the Department recognizes there are opportunities to develop and procure more affordable, resilient future satellite architectures. 

Unified S-Band (USB) and hosted payloads are two areas that the Space and Missile Systems Center is actively pursuing to take advantage of new developments in 

the commercial industry. Transitioning to USB will allow our satellites to take advantage of existing commercial satellite control networks and reduce the Air Force 

Satellite Control Network footprint. This will result in substantial cost savings, as 

well as development of dual band command capability, which will provide additional 

satellite control flexibility and resilience. And the Hosted Payload Office, established 

in 2011, is working to complete source selection for the Hosted Payload Solutions 

contract in June 2014. This contract will enable demonstrations and pilots for commercial hosting opportunities, the goal being to complement and supplement dedicated platforms while potentially providing significant cost savings and improved resilience across most mission architectures. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Are NNSA requirements for nuclear detection being met in terms 

of integrating this requirement on GPS III and what is the deadline for resolving 

what the nuclear detection payload on the next GPS III vehicles will be? What challenges remain? 
134 

General SHELTON. NNSA is coordinating closely with the Air Force to ensure successful integration of their Global Burst Detectors (GBDs) onto GPS III SVs 01–08. 

The GPS program office is currently working acquisition strategies for GPS III SV 

9 and beyond. 

Air Force Space Command is working with NNSA to firm up plans for the GPS 

III SV 9+ era. Interface definitions will be defined and coordinated over the next 

year. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Given the risk of future additional launch slips beyond the changes 

that reduced the opportunities for new competitors in FY15–17, how is the Air Force 

planning to ensure opportunities for competition? 

Mr. KLINGER. All launches over and above the 36 cores being sole-sourced from 

ULA will be available for competition to all certified providers. 

The Department will continue to work to ensure the maximum number of competitive opportunities are available to all certified providers. The Air Force is working with prospective new entrants to gain certification, without imposing potential 

design or cost impacts on existing new entrant launch vehicles, and by providing 

the launch infrastructure necessary to meet National Security Space (NSS) launch 

requirements. The Air Force is partnering with our civil space agencies, NASA and 

NOAA, to identify launch opportunities which will demonstrate capabilities equal to 

those needed for NSS. The funding for these opportunities has been provided by our 

civil space partners. 

The Air Force has also recognized that new entrants will have different approaches to meeting some requirements. The Air Force is updating these requirements to specify vertical integration, and maintaining the requirement for minimum 

20,000lb lift to Low Earth Orbit for new entrant providers, in order to maintain predictable requirements for new entrants. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. How does the Air Force plan to manage this competition to ensure 

a level playing field? How should ULA’s launch prices best be compared to those 

of SpaceX? 

Mr. KLINGER. The Department is working aggressively to ensure all future competitions will allow certified offerors the opportunity to compete on a full and open 

basis. For the Phase 1a competition the offers will be evaluated based on specific 

criteria developed for each mission. The Air Force will ensure a level playing field 

by having a readiness meeting with each contractor prior to RFP release. 

The new acquisition strategy, designed to introduce competition as soon as a new 

competitor is certified and in a manner to maintain mission assurance requirements, requires any competitor: to fly our most critical payloads to all required orbits; provide those capabilities from launch locations on both coasts; provide heavy 

lift launches; and meet the security and mission unique requirements of the National Security Space launch process for the EELV Phase II follow-on competition. 

Any price comparison between competitors must account for all of these requirements, as stipulated in the Acquisition Strategy. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What is the requirement for maintaining the ELC line? Given the 

growing competitive environment in launch, should the government continue to pay 

for ULA’s annual launch infrastructure in the longer-term or should the government 

work toward buying launch vehicles like satellites—as fully cost burdened items? 

Mr. KLINGER. ELC provides the government with the flexibility to meet all current national security space launch needs. The EELV Phase 1 Contract awarded to 

ULA on 18 December 2013 includes both a firm fixed price line item for the actual 

Atlas V and Delta IV launch vehicle, and a Cost Plus Incentive Fee line item for 

the majority of the Launch Capability support, i.e., the associated launch infrastructure readiness. This includes Systems Engineering and Program Management, Mission Integration, Base and Range Support, Maintenance Commodities and launch 

pad depreciation (the only Firm Fixed Price portion). This contract arrangement ensures that the government, in good faith, will make every reasonable attempt to lock 

in prices for the launch cores over the 5 year ordering period. 

The future acquisition strategy and contract structure that fully incorporates new 

entrants for future EELV procurements is still in development. The government will 

evaluate the competitive environment that exists when the future procurement occurs and determine the appropriate contracting approach. At this point the Department is evaluating plans that will take the costs currently funded in the ELC line 

and directly allocate them with individual launch service thus allowing the Department to phase out the ELC line on future EELV procurements. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. EELV launch costs have steadily risen over the last decade. DOD 

and ULA have recently cited gains in efficiencies. How has the potential for competition affected prices? 

Mr. KLINGER. The Department recognized the rising EELV launch costs and directed the AF to develop a new acquisition strategy that reintroduced competition 
135 

into the program with the hopes of realizing the benefits of competition in the form 

of reduced costs. The AF developed a dual track acquisition approach that encourages competition and also provides cost reduction by providing the incumbent contractor, United Launch Alliance (ULA), with a 5 year requirements contract that allows ULA to strike long term deals with their vendor base. This longer term contract has the added benefit of helping to stabilize an atrophying space industrial 

base. 

The combination of those two approaches has significantly reduced the cost of 

launch to the U.S. government, with program improvements that result in a 

$3Billion decrease in the new Acquisition Program Baseline, which includes extending the EELV program by 10 years (from 2020 to 2030) and increasing the launch 

service quantity by 60 from 92 to 152. It also takes advantage of a steady production 

rate to minimize costs adding stability and predictability for both Solid Rocket Motors and Liquid Rocket Engines. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What role do you see commercial industry having in satellite architectures of the future? 

Mr. KLINGER. The Department sees the commercial industry’s role becoming more 

prominent in the years to come. We are currently at a point in time where all of 

our major space capabilities are on the cusp of re-capitalization decisions and we 

have the opportunity to pursue a more significant role for commercial capabilities. 

The options to implement this include partnerships that add real value e.g. improved resilience, to our National Security Space architectures. A renewed focus on 

resilience offers an opportunity and a virtual requirement that considers these systems as a fundamental feature of our space architectures. Their consideration as 

elemental to our architecture should address not only their capacity contribution, 

but also their ability to bolster deterrence and complicate the decision calculus of 

our adversaries. Over the years we have demonstrated the value of commercial contributions in areas such as remote sensing for our warfighters, Coalition partners, 

disaster relief and many other civil applications. We now have the opportunity to 

expand use of commercial capability, as called for in the National Space Policy. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. EELV launch costs have steadily risen over the last decade. DOD 

and ULA have recently cited gains in efficiencies. How has the potential for competition affected prices? 

Mr. LOVERRO. It is my opinion that competitive forces have been an important element of DOD’s overall strategy to curb cost growth and, hopefully, eventually lower 

launch costs. 

More importantly, a well-managed, commercially competitive U.S. launch industry 

brings secondary benefits for DOD through competitively-inspired improvements in 

launch technology, range scheduling process, and a host of other areas, not to mention the overall national benefit of bringing commercial launch back to the United 

States. These are some of the primary reasons DOD is interested in facilitating new 

entrants into the space launch business and certifying those new entrants as quickly as possible. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Are NNSA requirements for nuclear detection being met in terms 

of integrating this requirement on GPS III and what is the deadline for resolving 

what the nuclear detection payload on the next GPS III vehicles will be? What challenges remain? 

Mr. LOVERRO. Yes, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is coordinating closely with the Nuclear Detection (NUDET) Detection System (NDS) 

and Global Positioning System (GPS) III Air Force teams to ensure successful integration of the Global Burst Detectors (GBDs) onto next-generation GPS III Satellite 

Vehicles (SV). There is no issue with SV 1–8, as NNSA will provide the payload on 

time to meet the integration schedule for these SVs as originally planned. If, as expected, the Air Force extends the contract and buys additional satellites, SV 9 & 

10 will not have GBDs, but these are not needed to have a healthy system. NNSA 

has begun research and development to develop a new/modified GBD to use on SV11 

and thereafter. 

According to the approved GPS Enterprise Schedule, the SV–11 Available For 

Launch date is in the second quarter of Fiscal Year 2022; therefore, the NDS payload would be required in the second quarter of Fiscal Year 2020. NNSA development is on schedule to meet these deadlines. NNSA, Department of Energy laboratories, and Air Force NDS and GPS Space Vehicle teams are working successfully 

together with the SV contractor to determine NDS payload space allocation on the 

next-generation GPS III SV. No other known challenges remain. 
136 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. PETERS 

Mr. PETERS. What progress has the Department made to establish its Space Acquisition Strategy for commercial satellite services as required in the final conference report of the fiscal year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)? 

A recent DISA report shows that military satellite communications bandwidth demand is increasing at a rate of 35% per year. It was surprising to learn that to meet 

2012 military bandwidth needs it takes 21 legacy satellites versus one modern commercial high capacity satellite. As the Department continues to develop its Space 

Acquisition Strategy, is the Department aware of the new technology that is available for high capacity satellites? How does the Department plan to incorporate the 

procurement of the best available commercial satellite services into the overall acquisition strategy that is being developed? 

General SHELTON. A Space Acquisition Strategy for commercial satellite services 

is currently in work to answer the requirement of the FY14 NDAA. 

The Department is actively engaged with commercial partners regarding new 

technology available for high capacity satellites. Beginning in FY11, the Space and 

Missile Systems Center (SMC) has conducted several Broad Agency Announcements 

(BAAs) with the goal of better understanding these technologies and integrating 

them into our plans for more affordable and resilient future satellite architectures. 

SMC is executing a pathfinder beginning later this year to procure transponders on 

a highly inclined commercial satellite to meet a validated warfighter need over 

USAFRICOM. This cost-efficient pathfinder will satisfy specific mission requirements and inform future commercial satellite communications procurement approaches. 

The pathfinder planned for later this year is the first of several additional pathfinders intended to incrementally build via a ‘‘crawl, walk, run’’ approach toward a 

more efficient commercial acquisition process and optimized balance between Military and Commercial SATCOM procurement. The ultimate goal of these efforts is 

to increase affordability, efficiency and resiliency. 

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