## NO. 12

- 15

- 00210

- CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

IN THE INTEREST OF

G.S. AND J. W.,

CHILDREN §
§
§ APPEAL FROM THE 321S T

JUDICI AL DISTRICT COURT
SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION J.N., proceeding pro se, appeals the termination of her parental rights to G.S. and J.W.
We affirm.

B ACKGROUND J.N. is the mother of two children, G.S., born on December 4, 2006, and J.W., born on June 2, 2014. On July 30, 2014, the Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department) filed an original petition for protection of G.S. and J.W., for conservatorship, and for termination of J.N.’s parental rights. That same day, the trial co urt signed an order for protection of a child in an emergency and appointed the Department as the temporary sole managing conservator of the children. On August 14, 2014, J.N. agreed to the trial court’s appointing the Department as the temporary sole man aging conservator of the children and appointing J.N. as their temporary possessory conservator. 1 On July 15, 2015, the trial court terminated J.N.’s parental rights pursuant to Section
161.001 , subsections ( b )(1)(K) and ( b )(2) of the family code. 2 This appeal followed.

1 G.S.1 is the father of G.S., and J.W.1 is the father of J.W. G.S.1 and J.W.1 we re appointed temporary possessory conservator for their respective child . Ultimately, their parental rights were terminated, and neither father is a party to this appeal.

2 S ubs ection s (b)(1)(K) and (b)(2) provide that a trial court may order termination of the parent

- child relationship if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has :2 I SSUE ON A PPEAL J.N. writes several statements in the portion of her brief denoted as “Issues Presented,” but none of them pose a direct challenge to the validity of the trial court’s order of termination. 3
After re view ing J.N.’s summary of the argument and argument sections, we construe her issue on appeal as a challenge to the voluntariness of her affidavit of relinquishment , which was the basis for the trial court’s termination order. The Reporter’s Record After the hearing on termina tion, J.N. filed a notice of appeal and a pauper’ s oath affidavit. The trial court set two hearings on J.N.’s oath of indigence, but J.N. did not appear at
either . The trial court denied J.N.’s request for a court appointed attorney, and J.N. did not

app eal the trial court’s ruling

. Correspondence from this court informed J.N. that the reporter’s record had not been filed because the reporter’s preparation fee had not been paid. We informed J.N. that the appeal
would be submitted on the clerk’s record a lone unless proof of full payment to the reporter was provided to us by a certain date. No court reporter’s record was filed, and J.N. did not respond to this court’s letter. Thus, we informed J.N. that her case would be submitted on the clerk’s record

a lone. Consequently, we can consider and decide only those issues that do not require a

e xecuted before or after the suit is filed an unrevoked or irrevocable affidavit of relinquishment of parental rights as provided by this chapter ;
[and]

that termination is in the best interest of the child.

T EX

. F AM

. C ODE A NN

. § 161.001( b)(1)(K), (b)(2) (West Supp. 2015).

3 J.N.’s issues presented are as follows:
Caseworker did not provide all documents to [J.N.] as required[.]
Mediator gave legal a dvice to [J.N.] and coerced her into signing relinquishment of her parental rights.
The affidavit of relinquishment was not subject to revocation. (Three exceptions)

- Evidence of fraud

- Misrepresentation

- Coercion
Two out of the three applies to myself [J. N.]. Yet I was not the one to attempt to revocate the affidavit.3

reporter’s record for a decision. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 37.3 (c) (providing that appellate court may determine issues not requiring reporter’s record if one has not been filed because appellant failed to pay or make arrangements to pay reporter’s preparation fee and appellant is not entitled to proceed without payment of costs). Effect of Failure to File Reporter’s Record When no reporter’s record is filed, we must presum e the missing evidence supports the trial court’s ruling. Bryant v. United Shortline Inc. Assurance Servs., N.A. , 972 S.W.2d 26, 31 (Tex. 1998); In re Marriage of Spiegel , 6 S.W.3d 643, 646 (Tex. App.

— Amarillo 1999, no pet.). We apply the presumption bec ause public policy favors the validity of judgments. Green v. Grocers Supply Co. Inc. , No. 14

- 14

- 00320

- CV , 2015 WL 3751529, at *2 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] June 16, 2015, no pet.) . Moreover, when a trial court ’ s judgment includes findings not suppl anted by separately filed findings, the findings in the judgment have probative
value. See In re C.A.B. , 289 S.W.3d 874, 880

– 81 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.); see also In re C.K.C.
, No. 12

- 10

- 00366

- CV , 2011 WL 7099714, at *2 (Tex. App.

— Ty ler 2011, no pet.) (“In the absence of a reporter’s record and separate findings of fact, we must presume that all findings made by the trial court in the judgment were supported by evidence at the trial.”).

A FFIDAVIT OF R ELINQUISHMENT J.N. contends that her parental rights should not be terminated because she was “coerced” into signing the affidavit of relinquishment of parental rights. The Department waived the filing
of a brief. Applicable Law Section 161.001(b)(1) (K) of the family code permits a tria l court to terminate the parent

child relationship if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has executed an unrevoked or irrevocable affidavit of relinquishment of parental rights. See T EX

. F AM

. C ODE A NN

. § 161.001( b)(1)(K) (West Supp. 2015 ). Section 161.103 requires that the affidavit be for voluntary relinquishment, and it is implicit in Section 161.001( b)(1) ( K) that the affidavit be voluntarily executed. See id. §§ 161.001(1)(K), 161.103 (West Supp. 2015) ; In re K.M.L. , 443
S.W.3d 101, 113 (Tex. 2014). An involuntarily executed affidavit of relinquishment is a complete defense to a termination suit based on Section 161.001 (b) (1)(K). Id.4

The Clerk’s Record According to the clerk’s record, this case was referred to mediation. On J uly 13, 2015, the parties attended mediation and reached an ag reement (MSA) providing , in pertinent part, that J.N. would execute an affidavit of relinquishment of her parental rights to G.S. and J.W. The
MSA also included terms and conditions regarding t he first option for placement and adoption of the children and a secondary option for placement. In the terms and conditions regarding J.N.’s relinquishment, the MSA provided that, upon signing and delivering the affidavit of relinquishment, the Departmen t would seek termination of J.N.’s parental rights based on the voluntary relinquishment, rather than termination on involuntary grounds.
The MSA contains J.N.’s signature, along with acknowledgements that she (1)
underst ood and agreed to every provisio n in the agreement ; (2) signed the agreement and any other documents in connection therewith “voluntarily and not as a result of any fraud, duress, or coercion by any person, specifically including the mediator ” ; (3) made her decision based on her
own inve stigation of the law and facts and not based on representations made by any other party, including the mediator ; (4) understood the agreement represents the entire agreement between the parties and that no other inducements, representations, or promises we re made in order to convince her to sign it, including by the mediator ; and (5) that the mediator did not serve as her attorney or give her any legal advice.
The clerk’s record also contains an affidavit of voluntary relinquishment of parental rights to G.S. and J.W. signed by J.N. The affidavit designates the Department as the managing
conservator of the children and consents to the ir adoption. The affidavit states that termination is in the children’s best interest and that J.N. “ freely, voluntarily, and permanently give [s] and relinquish [es] to the Department all my parental rights and duties[, and] I consent to the placement of the children for adoption or in substitute care by the Department or by a licensed
child

- placing agency.”
Discussion
J.N . contends that the acknowledgements contained in the MSA and affidavit of relinquishment are false, and that they were signed as a result of coercion. The record does not support these contentions, and instead supports the opposite. In its order of term ination, the trial court included a finding by clear and convincing evidence that J.N. “executed before or after the suit [wa]s filed an unrevoked or irrevocable affidavit of relinquishment of parental rights as5

provided by Chapter 161, Texas Family Code, pursuant to § 161.001(1)[(B)](K), Texas Family Code[.]” By finding the affidavit was executed pursuant to Section 161.001(1)(B)(K), the trial court implicitly found that it was voluntary. See In re K.M.L . 443 S.W.3d at 113.
The trial court made no subse quent findings regarding J.N.’s affidavit of relinquishment. Because there is no reporter’s record, and the trial court’s findings are probative, we must presume that J.N.’s affidavit was voluntary. See In re C.A.B. , 289 S.W.3d at 880

– 81; In re
C.K.C. , 2 011 WL 7099714, at *2. Accordingly, we overrule J.N.’s sole issue on appeal.

D ISPOSITION Having overruled J.N.’s sole issue on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

J AMES T. W ORTHEN Chief Justice

Opinion delivered December 16, 2015

. Pan el consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.

`

( PUBLISH )

## COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

JUDGMENT

DECEMBER 16 , 2015

NO. 12

- 15

- 00210

- CV

IN THE INTER E ST OF G.S. AND J. W., CHILDREN

Appeal from the 321st District Court of Smith County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 14

- 1915

- D) THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court th at there was no error in the judgment. It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the judgment
of the court below be in all things affirmed , and that this decision be certified to the court
below for observance.

James T. Worthen , Chief Justice

. Pan el consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.