PEACEW RKS

WOMEN’S ACCESS TO JUSTICE 

IN AFGHANISTAN

Tim Luccaro and Erica Gaston

[ [

individual versus community

barriers to justice
Cover photo: Afghan female judges at the end of a 

four-day conference in the capital, Kabul, Afghanistan, 

04 September 2013 (Photo by Fardin Waezi/UNAMA)

The views expressed in this report are those of the 

authors alone. They do not necessarily reflect the 

views of the United States Institute of Peace.

United States Institute of Peace

2301 Constitution Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20037

Phone: 202.457.1700

Fax: 202.429.6063

E-mail: usip_requests@usip.org

Web: www.usip.org

Peaceworks No. 98. First published 2014.

ISBN: 978-1-60127-228-7

© 2014 by the United States Institute of Peace

About the Report

This report maps how Afghan women seek justice when 

their rights are violated and the barriers women face in 

pursuing justice or receiving a fair outcome, whether in 

the formal system, in community-based mechanisms, or at 

home. Part of ongoing research and programming by the 

United States Institute of Peace (USIP) on how communitybased approaches can improve women’s access to justice, 

this report is based on a time-limited ethnographic study of 

women’s disputes in five provinces of Afghanistan between 

March 2011 and January 2012. This study was conducted 

in cooperation with the Women Activities and Social 

Services Association, the Organization for Human Welfare, 

and the Afghanistan Human Rights and Democracy Organization. It was funded by the U.S. Agency for International 

Development’s Office for Democracy and Governance and 

the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau for International 

Narcotics and Law Enforcement.

About the Authors

Tim Luccaro, USIP’s senior program officer in Afghanistan 

for three years, has worked on issues related to traditional dispute resolution, women’s access to justice, and 

nonviolent conflict resolution in Afghanistan since 2010. 

Previously, on behalf of USIP, he focused on traditional 

dispute resolution for USIP in Liberia and South Sudan. 

Erica Gaston is a human rights lawyer with seven years of 

experience in programming and research in Afghanistan 

on human rights and justice promotion. Her recent 

academic and policy publications include three books 

on the legal, ethical, and practical dilemmas emerging in 

modern conflict and crisis zones; studies mapping justice 

systems and outcomes in Afghanistan and Yemen; and 

thematic research and opinion pieces on rule of law issues 

in transitioning countries. Field research was conducted 

primarily by USIP staff Reyhaneh Hussaini and Farid Bayat. 

Nina Sudhakar contributed initial data analysis.
PEACEWORKS • JULY 2014 • NO. 98

CONTENTS

[Ongoing conflict, 

high maternal 

mortality and 

domestic violence 

rates, limited access 

to health care, 

and “near total 

lack of economic 

rights” combine to 

make Afghanistan 

the world’s most 

dangerous country 

in which to be born 

a woman.]

Introduction ... 5

Challenges Ahead ... 7

Methodology ... 9

Common Rights Violations and Causes of Dispute ... 12

Divorce and Child Custody ... 12

Forced Marriage ... 14

Domestic Abuse—Physical and Psychological ... 16

Running Away and Moral Crimes ... 19

Inheritance ... 20

Rape and Sexual Assault ... 21

Mechanisms and Barriers in Dispute Resolution for Women ... 23

Family Mechanisms ... 24

Barriers to Family Mechanisms ... 25

Community Mechanisms ... 27

Barriers to Community Mechanisms ... 29

State and External Mechanisms ... 34

Barriers to State and External Mechanisms ... 35

Conclusion: Strategizing for Long-Term, Sustainable Impact ... 45

Unpacking Assumptions ... 46

Breaking Down Barriers ... 48

Recommendations ... 52

Afghan Government ... 52

Donors and Program Implementers ... 53

USIP.ORG 3

WOMEN’S ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN AFGHANISTAN

Summary

■ Protecting women’s rights and expanding women’s access to justice has been a major priority 

for the international community, the Afghan government, and Afghan women’s advocates 

since the fall of the Taliban in 2002. 

■ Awareness of women’s rights, women’s participation in public life, and women’s access to 

education and healthcare have increased significantly. Meanwhile, government, legal aid, 

and psychosocial and shelter services for women have expanded dramatically. 

■ This level of progress in roughly a decade’s time is remarkable in a country where conservative cultural norms, ongoing violence and conflict, and a poor economic situation might 

have augured for much slower progress.

■ Despite these gains, protection of women’s rights and women’s access to justice remain 

extremely limited. Few Afghan women resort to state mechanisms or nongovernmental 

organization (NGO) services. Deeply ingrained social norms dissuade women from asserting their rights. Reporting abuses would trigger social stigmatization and the loss of social 

or economic safety nets. 

■ In some communities, social taboos against external intervention limit both men and 

women from seeking state or NGO help. These collective barriers continue to frustrate 

rights- or individual-based approaches to access to justice.

■ Women predominantly address their justice needs within their families or communities, 

but even there, a number of normative, consequential, and practical barriers prevent 

women from seeking or receiving justice. 

■ Understanding how these barriers affect women’s decision making is critical to expanding 

access to justice. Decisions that appear ill-advised because they forfeit rights are often based 

on a rational appraisal of the limited opportunities for justice and the likely consequences 

of seeking it.

■ Greater consideration for the community context and the barriers women face will be 

critical in the coming period given the expected reduction in support and reach for state 

and NGO services following international troop withdrawal in 2014.

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WOMEN’S ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN AFGHANISTAN

Introduction

Although the path to full exercise of women’s rights remains long and uncertain, the current status 

of those rights is measurably better than it was a decade ago.1 Before its fall in 2002, the Taliban 

enforced some of the most egregious limitations on women’s rights in modern statehood, preventing women from taking part in the most basic activities—from going to school to working outside 

the home to even walking in the street unaccompanied by a male relative. Women were forced to 

veil themselves head to toe when in public. They could not deal with male shopkeepers or doctors 

or speak to men outside their family. These restrictions severely limited women’s access to medical 

or other services. Exercise of political rights was near zero, with women denied the right to take 

part in public activities, much less serve in decision-making roles. Restrictions on women’s rights 

were enforced severely and often brutally, including consequences ranging from public stoning for 

accusations of adultery to chopping off women’s fingers if they were found wearing nail polish.

In the first few years after the ouster of the Taliban regime, the new Afghan government 

took significant steps to unwind the legal restrictions the Taliban had placed on women.2

In 2004, after a constitutional Loya Jirga was held, Kabul ratified a new constitution that 

guaranteed the equality of all Afghan citizens, including women, before the law. Earlier, in 

2003, Afghanistan acceded to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 

Women (CEDAW). In 2007, the Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MoWA) ratified the National 

Action Plan for Women, which called for a progressive mix of development, education, and 

legislation to ensure women’s full realization of equality in Afghanistan.3 In a 2009 executive 

decree, President Hamid Karzai enacted the Law on the Elimination of Violence Against 

Women (EVAW), which codified a new class of crime for acts of physical, economic, and 

emotional violence committed against women.4

Women have also taken an increased role in public life, particularly where government 

quotas have mandated it. In 2010, the United Nations’ Fund for Women (UNIFEM, since 

renamed UN WOMEN) estimated that 19 to 21 percent of government posts were filled by 

women, a far higher percentage than a decade earlier.5 The Wolesi Jirga, the lower council of 

Parliament, has sixty-nine female representatives, who occupy 28 percent of all seats, which 

is among the highest rates of female parliamentary representation in the world. In the upper 

council, or Meshrano Jirga, women hold twenty-eight senatorial posts. The posts are guaranteed by law through the constitution. Female representation in provincial councils was also initially guaranteed at 25 percent, but a recent amendment to the national electoral law lowered 

the quota to 20 percent.6 The National Solidarity Program (NSP) is an initiative by the government of Afghanistan to create democratically selected local institutions to manage development funds at a local level nationwide. It requires a level of female participation in community 

development councils (CDCs) and estimates that in CDCs “for which gender-segregated data 

is available” female members constitute 35 percent. However, within these CDCs, women hold 

only 3 percent of leadership roles, which are not subject to limitations and quotas.7

Significant efforts have also been made to improve women’s educational opportunities and 

health care. In 2001, according to some estimates, fewer than ten thousand girls were enrolled 

in schools nationwide. In 2011–12, according to the Afghan Ministry of Education, just under 

three million girls were enrolled in school.8 Numbers of female teachers have also dramatically 

increased. Meanwhile, maternal mortality rates have more than halved since 2000.9 See table 1 

for a numeric overview of the current status of Afghan women with respect to literacy, abuse, 

violence, and political presence.
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PEACEWORKS 98

Qualitative interviews conducted for this report suggest that improvements for women 

have occurred not just in terms of political representation and macro-level health and education indicators but also in the status of women at the grassroots level. The overall perception 

among most men and women interviewed was that women’s rights had improved slightly since 

2001, even if such improvements are against the extremely low benchmark under the Taliban. 

As comments from a woman from northern Jowzjan Province illustrate, these gains have been 

incremental: “The situation is better now. Men care more about women and listen to their 

words. But still the men do not consult with women about important issues.”10 According to 

another woman from Jowzjan, “Our condition is largely the same now as under the Taliban 

regime, although now we have a little more freedom [of movement].”11

Many of those interviewed remarked on lower levels of extreme domestic abuse, decreased 

honor killings, and, in some areas, greater respect for women’s education and employment opportunities and for a woman’s right to choose a marital partner. Throughout the areas surveyed, 

male and female respondents mentioned improvements in legal education and awareness. According to one woman from Daykundi Province: “The women have a better condition since 

Karzai came to Afghanistan. He gave justice, equality, and rights to women. The women themselves can decide about their life, and no one may interfere in their personal affairs.”12

This progress is due at least in part to the unprecedented level of investment in and engagement on women’s rights in Afghanistan since 2002. Supporting the advancement of women’s 

rights was a prominent promise of the international community following the U.S.-led invasion that toppled the Taliban regime in 2001 and has been a top priority for international 

donors. Supporting and promoting women’s rights in Afghanistan was eagerly taken up not 

only by donors but also by many domestic activists and members of the Afghan government.

Women’s rights advocates have focused not only on prevention of rights violations but 

also on improving women’s access to justice so that women may seek justice where and when 

their rights are violated. Access to justice strategies have focused on improving formal justice 

mechanisms, advancing progressive laws and policies, supporting legal awareness campaigns 

based on these legal provisions, and expanding legal aid services for women.

Table 1. Snapshot of Status of Women in Afghanistan

UNDP Gender Inequality Index 147 of 148 nationsa

Literacy rate of females fifteen and older 22 percentb

Provinces with female literacy rate under 

10 percent 11 of 36c

Representation in legislature Parliament: 69 of 249 members (27.7 percent)

Senate: 28 of 102 (27.5 percent)d

Female members in Community Development 

Councils (supported by Afghan government 

and foreign donors) 146,010 of 408,594 (36 percent)e 

Have experienced at least one form of domestic abuse 87 percentf

Have experienced multiple forms of violence 62 percentf

a. UNDP, The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World, Human Development Report, 2013

b. Lauryn Oates, “The Mother of All Problems,” The Guardian, June 21, 2013

c. Hayat Alvi, “Women in Afghanistan,” RAWA News, November 12, 2012

d. Inter-Parliamentary Union, “Women in National Parliaments,” 2014, www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm

e. Latifa Hamdi, Afghanistan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, e-mail, November 13, 2013

f. Diya Nijhowne and Lauryn Oates, “Living with Violence: A National Report on Domestic Abuse in Afghanistan” 

(Kabul: Global Rights, March 2008).

Women’s rights advocates 

have focused not only 

on prevention of rights 

violations but also on 

improving women’s access 

to justice so that women 

may seek justice where 

and when their rights 

are violated. 
USIP.ORG 7

WOMEN’S ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN AFGHANISTAN

In addition to supporting state mechanisms, funds aimed at improving women’s rights 

have supported a growing number of NGOs that have not only engaged in legal awareness 

and services but also provided critical health, psychosocial, and shelter support to women. This 

emerging cadre of external actors has begun playing an increasingly valuable role in helping 

women access justice. Women interviewed for this research offered powerful examples of how 

NGOs and other women’s rights supporters (within and outside the government) had helped 

them when no other options were available. 

Challenges Ahead 

Although significant gains have been made since the overthrow of the Taliban in 2002, Afghan 

women still face one of the most challenging environments in the world. A 2011 Thompson 

Reuters Foundation survey found that ongoing conflict, high maternal mortality and domestic 

violence rates, limited access to health care, and “near total lack of economic rights” combine 

to make Afghanistan the world’s most dangerous country in which to be born a woman.13

The female literacy rate in Afghanistan is still among the lowest in the region, despite percentile gains in the tens over the past decade.14 Women have little economic independence and 

few opportunities to work. Only 16 percent participate in the workforce, versus 80 percent of 

men—one of the world’s lowest rates.15 According to the 2013 Human Development Report 

issued by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), only one country—Yemen—

has greater gender inequality (see table 2).16

Conservative social norms continue to restrict basic freedoms, from whom to marry and 

divorce, to child custody, to freedom of movement. It is telling that the highest religious body 

in the country publicly decreed in 2012 that women were secondary to men.17 Despite marriage being illegal for women younger than sixteen, or fifteen with parental permission, it is 

still common in many communities for girls to marry below that age and to be betrothed while 

still young children or even at birth.18 Most parts of the country still practice systems of brideprice, in which a prospective husband’s family pays a male relative of the prospective bride for 

her marriage commitment. Honor killings—the murder of a family member, in this case often 

women, on the basis of perceived shame or dishonor brought by that individual’s actions or 

status—are still practiced despite being illegal, as are stoning and other capital punishments for 

women accused of adultery or other moral crimes.

Although women have equal rights under Afghan law, in practice these legal protections 

are under-enforced. According to a UN report on the EVAW law, of 2,299 cases reported to 

the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) that could be classified 

as a crime under the EVAW law, only 7 percent were followed through with indictments by 

prosecutors.19 The use of the law by state officials to protect women remains limited: Only 

seventeen of thirty-four provinces use it, and only two main urban areas regularly.20 Human 

rights advocates frequently note that the law is still fairly new— only enacted 2009—and that 

while there is still a long way to go, substantial progress is made each year. 

The pervasive inequality and suffering of women was strongly reflected in the interviews 

conducted for this report. None described a situation in which a woman was treated equally to 

a man or could fully exercise her rights. Many of the cases stemmed from violations of women’s 

most fundamental rights, including domestic abuse, rape or sexual assault, and punishment 

or imprisonment for running away from home. Many also signal continuing inequality of 

women with regard to economic rights and social rights. Women were repeatedly dispossessed 

of property or monetary assets and denied the right to work.
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Many women’s groups fear that even greater challenges are ahead after the 2014 international troop withdrawal. The international community has proved an important ally to domestic women’s rights groups, supporting their resistance to conservative legislation that might 

restrict women’s rights,21 as well as encouraging and supporting Afghan institutions in improving enforcement of these rights. If the trends toward more conservative politics continue as the 

international community’s influence recedes, some of the gains made so far may be at risk. If 

international troop withdrawals are followed by greater insecurity, women’s mobility is likely 

to decrease, which affects access to education, health, employment, and justice. Women and 

men interviewed for this report both noted that restrictions on women’s mobility were already 

increasing in areas that had become more unstable.22

In addition, the Afghan institutions and Afghan NGOs that have strongly contributed to 

advances in women’s rights and access to justice since 2002 depend heavily on external funding. 

Whatever levels of political and physical security are preserved following international troop 

withdrawals, donor funds are expected to decline from the high benchmark of the previous 

twelve years. To the extent that state and external mechanisms are already not capable of meeting all justice needs and not fully accessible to women, the lack of funding and any decline in 

security will likely result in their being less accessible in the near future. 

This is particularly troubling because this research suggests that an important remaining 

challenge is that the resources for women developed since 2002 are still beyond their reach. The 

vast majority of women do not or cannot access state mechanisms or NGOs (state or external 

actors). Most disputes involving violations of women’s rights do not go outside of her immediate family, and if they do they are far more likely to be resolved by community elders or forums 

than to be brought to state and external actors. This report unpacks at length some of the social norms, potential consequences, and practical barriers that have contributed to the limited 

use of external mechanisms. These normative, consequential, and practical barriers inform a 

woman’s decision about whether and how to pursue a violation of her rights and whether she 

is likely to receive a fair outcome whichever route she pursues. In addition, a woman’s ability 

a. Central Statistics Organization of Afghanistan and UNICEF, “Afghanistan Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey, 2010/11,” (Central Statistics Organization of 

Afghanistan, UNICEF, January 2013), http://cso.gov.af/Content/files/AMICS.pdf.

b. World Bank, “Maternal Mortality Ratio,” (World Health Organization, 2014), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.STA.MMRT

c. USAID, “Afghanistan: Property Rights and Resource Governance,” USAID Country Profile, (United States Agency for International Development, July 2010), 

8, http://usaidlandtenure.net/afghanistan.

Table 2. Afghanistan’s Performance and Current Status Relative to Strong Neighbors

Country

Female 

Literacy

Rate (%)

Maternal 

Mortality Ratio 

(per 100,000 

live births)

Female Life 

Expectancy 

(years)

Females 

and Males 

in Workforce (%)

Female 

Land 

Ownership (%)

Gender 

Inequality 

(of 148 

nations)

Afghanistan 22 (est.)a 400b 61b F: 16 – M: 80b 2c 147

India 66 220 68 F: 29 – M: 81 11 132

Iran 81 23 75 F: 16 – M: 73 — 107

Pakistan 45 190 67 F: 23 – M: 83 — 123

Tajikistan 100 44 71 F: 57 – M: 75 — 57

Uzbekistan 100 36 71 F: 48 – M: 75 — —
USIP.ORG 9

WOMEN’S ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN AFGHANISTAN

to seek assistance or intervention by a state or external actor depends not only on overcoming 

personal obstacles, fears, and challenges but also on the overall community’s relationship with 

forums for redress. Where communities are completely closed to outside intervention or help 

(as many are in Afghanistan), these collective barriers against going outside the community 

can restrict not only women but also men’s ability to reach state or external barriers.

These collective barriers have important bearings for designing programming that can push 

further against women’s access issues and may explain at least some of the limitations that 

still exist despite great efforts and strides in women’s rights. The findings suggest that a purely 

rights-based approach to improving women’s access to justice, without consideration for the 

collective barriers, may have little impact—and in some instances may further ossify the gaps 

between communities and state resources and principles of justice.

This is not to suggest that women’s access to justice efforts should abandon the strategies that—by all evidence—have had a significant impact since 2002. That those interviewed 

noted some gains is a signal that some of these rights-based strategies may be succeeding, 

albeit gradually. Although this report is based on a recognition that community forums are an 

important part of the justice landscape in Afghanistan—and may become increasingly so—it 

does not suggest that the women’s rights community should switch tracks entirely to a purely 

community-based justice approach (a strain of programming that has already provoked a significant schism in women’s rights groups because of the adamant opposition of some to this 

approach). Instead, a strategy combining both approaches will be necessary to maintain existing gains and to breach the obstacles that most women still face.

The primary focus of this report is to document women’s calculations and responses to their 

options via either family, community, or external mechanisms with a view to informing programming that might attempt to work with any or all of these mechanisms. Looking at how 

women negotiate their rights within the family and in community mechanisms, and at the limitations within them, is important to better understanding women’s choices, including those to 

navigate the formal justice system. Access to justice thus refers to the ability to obtain effective, 

responsive, and fair resolution of a conflict, dispute, or grievance. The phrase is often used to refer 

to access to formal justice mechanisms, but in this report it also refers to a broader definition that 

includes access to community mechanisms and respect for notional senses of justice.

Methodology

The research on which this report is based was funded by the U.S. Agency for International 

Development’s Office for Democracy and Governance and the U.S. Department of State’s 

Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement. The fieldwork was conducted from 

March 2012 to January 2013 in five provinces. 

The target provinces were Daykundi, Herat, Jowzjan, Kabul, and Sar-e Pol (see figure 1). 

Within these provinces, researchers focused on seven districts: Nili District and Shahristan 

District in Daykundi Province, Herat District and Injil District in Herat Province, Aqcha 

District in Jowzjan Province, Paghman District in Kabul Province, and Sar-e Pol District and 

Sangcharak District in Sar-e Pol Province (see table 3).

Districts were chosen in consultation with local partner organizations, which also helped 

facilitate research. Participating provinces and districts were selected based on a number of factors, including security level, ethnic composition, and geographic location. The districts were 

also selected to include views from communities that are urban, rural, and peri-urban (that is, 

near urban areas but not themselves urban). Ease and security of access for field researchers 
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PEACEWORKS 98

were primary considerations; without them, meaningful qualitative research would not have 

been possible. Depth of access was favored over breadth of coverage.

Researchers identified five broad categories of target interviewees:

• government service providers or representatives, including provincial/district governors, police, court officials, and representatives from the Ministry of Justice’s Law 

Department charged with civil law matters, the Provincial Department of Women’s 

Affairs (DoWA), the AIHRC, and others

• community leaders and local service providers

• NGOs and civil society organizations (CSOs) operating in the target communities, 

particularly those engaged in women’s service delivery, training, and protection

• individual community members not direct parties to a dispute

• disputants to conflicts, particularly female disputants and litigants

Teams of two researchers spoke with or conducted formal interviews with 213 individuals. 

The teams consisted of one or two full-time USIP staff members and one local partner. Each 

province was assigned two teams, one all-female and one all-male. Generally, the female team 

conducted in-depth interviews with female respondents, and the male team talked with male 

representatives, community leaders, and government representatives. Researchers conducted 

107 in-depth, structured, individual interviews; twenty-three focus group discussions (either 

all-male or all-female groups);23 thirty-one case study interviews with individual disputants; 

and an additional fifty-three informal, semi-structured discussions and interviews.

Researchers used a mix of targeted and snowball sampling (in which interviewees recommended specific individuals for subsequent interview, usually those who were known to have 

Figure 1. Provinces Covered by the Research
USIP.ORG 11

WOMEN’S ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN AFGHANISTAN

Table 3. Profiles of Research Districts: Number Interviews, Characteristics, Ethnicity 

Sar-e Pol Province, Sar-e Pol City (includes surrounding peri-urban villages of Khaja Belan, Rulghani Kalan, and Pesh Kepa)

• Seven individual interviews 

• Provincial capital, estimated population 115,000a 

• Majority Uzbek, minorities of Pashtun, Tajik, and Hazara, a few smaller minority populations

Sar-e Pol Province, Sangcharak District

• One focus group discussion, six individual interviews

• Rural, estimated population 86,000,a increasingly unstable security situation, thirty minutes from provincial center, predominantly 

agricultural production, some weaving

• Majority Tajik, large Uzbek minority, smaller Hazara and Pashtun minorities 

Jowzjan Province, Aqcha District

• Three focus group discussions, nineteen individual interviews

• Rural, estimated population 50,000, thirty-one miles from provincial capital Sheberghan 

• Predominantly Turkmen, large Uzbek population, small Pashtun minority, Tabai village entirely Pashtun

Kabul Province, Paghman District

• Four focus group discussions, nineteen individual interviews 

• Rural to peri-urban, estimated population 120,000,b district center within thirty minutes of Kabul; economy based mostly on 

agriculture, some outward labor migration to Kabul City for work 

• Majority Pashtun, large Tajik minority, small Arab population

Daykundi Province, Shahristan District

• Five focus group discussions, eight individual interviews 

• Rural, estimated population 66,000, livelihood predominantly subsistence agriculture;c highly isolated and impoverished 

population, limited access to state services

• Majority Hazara, small Sayyid population 

Daykundi Province, Nili District 

• Two focus group discussions, fifteen individual interviews

• Small urban provincial capital, estimated population 30,000,d primary source of income almond production, relatively easy 

access to government offices, limited antigovernment threats 

• Hazara

Herat Province, Injil District

• Three focus group discussions, thirteen individual interviews

• Peri-urban, estimated population 236,000,e one main market town, relative access to government facilities in district center, 

more rural or remote villages more limited access to government facilities 

• Majority Tajik, large Pashtun minority, smaller Hazara and Turkmen populations,e mix of Shiite and Sunni

Herat Province, Herat City

• Two focus group discussions, seven individual interviews

• Urban, estimated population 436,000,f Jebrail area within city predominantly Hazara 

• Majority Tajik, large Pashtun, Hazara, and Turkmen populations, smaller Qazelbash, Baluch, and Uzbek communities

a. Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, “Summary of District Development Plan: Sar-e-pul Center, Sar-e-pul Province” (report, in collaboration with 

UNDP and MRRD, November 2007), 2, www.mrrd-nabdp.org/attachments/article/139/Saripul_Saripul%20Center_Summary_Finalized.pdf.

b. UNHCR, “Sub-Office Central Region District Profile” (Paghman, Kabul, July 31, 2002), 1, www.aims.org.af/afg/dist_profiles/unhcr_district_profiles/centra/

kabul/paghmani.pdf.

c. Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, “Summary of District Development Plan: Shahristan District, Daikundi Province” (report, in collaboration 

with UNDP and MRRD, November 2007), 2, http://nabdp.org/attachments/article/134/Daikundi_Shahristan_DDP%20Summary-Finalized.pdf

d. Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, “Summary of District Development Plan: Nili District, Daikundi Province” (report, in collaboration 

with UNDP and MRRD, November 2007), 2, http://www.nabdp.org/attachments/article/134/Daikundi_Nili%20_DDP%20Summary-Finlized.pdf

e. UNHCR, “Sub-Office District Profile” (Injil, Herat, August 26, 2002), 1,www.aims.org.af/afg/dist_profiles/unhcr_district_profiles/western/hirat/injil/injil.pdf. 

f. Central Statistics Office, Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “Settled Population of Herat Province by Civil Division, Urban, Rural and Sex—

2012-13” (Central Statistics Office, Kabul, 2012), http://cso.gov.af/Content/files/Herat%281%29.pdf.
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PEACEWORKS 98

been party to a dispute) to identify interview subjects in each of the target areas. Research in 

each field site typically began with targeted sampling of the first three categories of interviewees noted, using structured interview guidelines. 

The overall objective was to document individual decision-making processes and rationales 

in the course of resolving conflicts and to understand those decisions within a broader community or social framework. Given social restrictions and cultural prohibitions against discussing 

internal community or family disputes, identifying actual cases proved a massive challenge. The 

custom of hiding or diminishing the severity of disputes from external observation or scrutiny 

characterized many of the communities in which the researchers worked. In some instances, 

where communities or individuals were unwilling or unable to discuss actual cases, hypothetical 

scenarios were invoked to determine how people would resolve such a case. Whenever possible, 

however, researchers tried to track case processes and structure interviews using actual disputes.

It is important to emphasize that this research was qualitative; the sample was not developed 

in a way that would permit reliable quantitative interpretation. Where possible, the report references statistics derived from a tabulation of some of the interviews. These statistics, however, 

are offered purely to provide the reader a sense of the frequency with which an issue or opinion 

was expressed by interviewees. Only thirty-one of the 213 interviews were sufficiently detailed 

and specific to permit any form of statistical analysis. The report draws on the statistics of other 

organizations, researchers, and public reports to augment its findings where appropriate.

Common Rights Violations and Causes of Dispute

Although the districts and provinces studied have different ethnic, economic, geographic, and 

political compositions, many of the same issues emerged. Discussions began with questions 

about what issues most commonly arise with regard to women or for examples of disputes 

involving women. The vast majority of responses were not merely disputes involving women, 

but serious violations of women’s rights. Among the thirty-one cases documented, the most 

common issues were divorce (frequently involuntary), domestic abuse, child custody, disputes 

over women’s inheritance rights, rape, forced marriage, and running away. The greater number 

of divorce cases may have been because of the focus on seeking examples of cases that had gone 

to court. Other women’s groups working on a community mediation basis or on social work 

have found a greater proportion of other issues, such as inheritance disputes. 

Significantly, respondents generally perceived these not as isolated problems but as interconnected concerns that could produce a chain of legal and social troubles. For example, a forced 

marriage might lead to women running away or committing adultery or being subjected to 

domestic abuse or other violence, any of which in turn might lead to divorce. In addition, other 

factors related to the unequal social or economic status of women (such as economic disparities), 

as well as larger community problems (such as opium addiction, see box 1), often exacerbated 

these issues or were a secondary cause of the rights violation or of the dispute in question.

Divorce and Child Custody

“It is the worst thing that can happen for a woman.” —Diba, forty-three-year-old Tajik 

female

Under Afghan civil law, men may freely initiate a divorce without cause and may do so orally,24

but women may only request a divorce based on a set of prescribed reasons: when intercourse 

would be harmful, when the husband is infirm for a prolonged period or the infirmity makes 

intercourse harmful, prolonged absence of three years or more, and failure of the husband to 
USIP.ORG 13

WOMEN’S ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN AFGHANISTAN

provide support.25 In practice, prevailing conservative social norms limit a woman’s right to 

initiate a divorce to even more limited circumstances; for example, instances of extreme violence 

that are seen to violate local norms or local conceptions of Islamic law. As the Afghan government noted in its report to the CEDAW committee, “Although women have the right to ask for 

separation based on lawful reasons, most women are not aware of their right. The tendency for 

separation is not much either, because separation is deemed unfavorable in the Afghan culture.” 26

In many communities, it was virtually unheard of for women to initiate divorce until about ten 

years ago. Even today, the small but increasing number of women initiating divorces—at least 

formally—are predominantly found in urban areas, where there is greater awareness of women’s 

rights and greater means of economic independence and social support.27

Respondents reported that the negative stigma for women who sought divorce was so 

great that it was a last resort and acceptable only in extreme circumstances. In Daykundi, one 

young woman said that “the people speak behind my back if I go out because I am a divorced 

woman.” 28 A woman in Herat warned that women “destroy their lives” by divorcing.29

Although seeking a divorce was still a significant taboo, respondents cited it as one of the 

most common reasons why women seek out formal processes or other means of dispute resolution. Of the thirty-one individual cases documented, women sought divorce in one-third.30

Almost half of those women did so because of deteriorating economic conditions or persistent 

lack of financial support. For example, some husbands left the neighborhood seeking jobs and 

never returned; others were addicted to opium, which plunged their families into extreme 

poverty. In approximately one-quarter of the cases of divorce initiated by women that USIP 

encountered, the women said that they sought a divorce because of domestic abuse at the 

hands of their husbands and in-laws.

Despite suffering abuse, women may choose not to seek divorce out of concern for their children. One woman in Herat reported being thrown out of her home by her husband many times, 

but she kept asking him to allow her back because “I always thought about my children’s life and 

what happens to them if I leave my life, and who would support and protect me if I do it.” 31

Women who divorce risk losing custody of their children (who under Afghan law would 

remain in the custody of the husband’s family) or having their children viewed or treated withBox 1. Opium Addiction and Divorce

One emerging trend in the past decade is an increase in the rate of divorce due to opium 

addiction. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan produces nearly 90 percent of the world’s opiates. From 2005 to 2009, the rate of opiate use 

nearly doubled; the addiction rate in Afghanistan—at around 5.3 percent of the population, 

or 1.6 million users—is among the highest in the world.a

This problem was mentioned repeatedly in USIP interviews and was cited frequently by 

respondents in Daykundi, Jowzjan, and Herat Provinces. Husbands addicted to heroin or 

other opiates were often incapable of providing for their wives because they diverted limited 

financial resources to supporting their addiction, forcing some women to seek divorce or 

external support for maintenance. As one justice official in Herat noted, “The most important 

problem for women is their husband’s addiction, and it causes other problems in their lives. I 

dare say it is [involved in] about 95 percent of our cases.”b

________________

a. Azam Ahmed, “That Other Big Afghan Crisis, the Growing Army of Addicts,” New York Times, November 

2, 2013.

b. Thirty-seven-year-old Tajik male head of Huqoq office, interview, Injil District, Herat Province, December 

26, 2012.

Even today, the small 

but increasing number of 

women initiating divorces—

at least formally—are 

predominantly found in 

urban areas, where there 

is greater awareness 

of women’s rights and 

greater means of economic 

independence and social 

support.
14 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 98

in the community as illegitimate. Even if women do keep their children after divorce, they may 

have no way of supporting them unless they remarry. In one focus group discussion, women 

discussed the story of a married woman who was forced to tolerate an abusive relationship and 

ultimately withdrew her divorce request:

They threatened to take her children if she followed her divorce case. The woman’s family was poor, but the husband’s family was rich and influential. She returned to her home 

because she had small children. She went to the court for one year, but the court and the 

judge did not follow up on her case or provide her an opportunity to speak. The husband 

went just one time to the court, and he promised that he would stop beating his wife. But 

he continued to beat her when they went back home.32

In one case in Sar-e Pol, after an opium-addicted husband abused his wife and sold items 

from the home to fund his addiction, the wife’s father took him to a clinic to try to help him. 

When he continued using opium, the father asked the man to divorce his daughter and represented his daughter in the divorce. The man agreed to the divorce in return for all the items he 

had purchased for the woman, and the couple was able to obtain a decree.33

These examples illustrate that with family support a woman is able to obtain her right to 

divorce, but in many instances, women seeking divorce are discouraged from doing so by their 

family, their community, and government officials.

Forced Marriage

“I was innocent, but I had to get married to my husband because of my brother’s problem. I said 

that I did not want to get married to him, but no one listened to my voice.” —Nabila, nineteenyear-old Pashtun female

Forced marriages are prevalent in Afghanistan, particularly in conservative communities. Husbands are chosen for young women or girls in exchange for a sum of money—what is known 

as a bride-price. To avoid a bride-price, two families may agree to provide a daughter to a son of 

the respective family (a practice known as exchange, badal). Alternately, in the common custom 

known as baad, members of the family (typically girls, but they can also be boys) are given over 

to another family as compensation for murder or violence or even to settle small debts. This is 

considered a way to prevent blood feuds or to restore harmony between the two communities 

but is a gross violation of girls’ rights.

Forced marriage has been formally outlawed at least since the adoption of the current version of the Civil Code in 1977, though similar interpretations were also applicable in the Taliban period.34 Both Afghan law and Islamic legal traditions guarantee men and women equal 

authority in determining their marital partner.35 In addition, forced marriage was explicitly 

prohibited through the EVAW law in 2009. Despite this legal clarity that women must consent, in practice the old traditions remain. A Global Rights survey conducted in 2008 found 

that in Khost Province in the east of the country, 91.6 percent of women were forced into marriage.36 The lowest rates were found in Daykundi and Jowzjan Provinces, just over 20 percent.37

NGOs engaged in women’s rights protection or in dispute resolution services have suggested a decrease in baad in the past decade and a greater awareness of a woman’s right to 

choose her husband. Citing anecdotal evidence, those working with communities have suggested this may have been due to increased awareness about the harm caused by baad, ways 

that it contravenes Islamic law, or simply better overall economic prospect and so more alternatives for impoverished families. However, given the sensitivity of the issue, it is difficult to 

get an accurate picture of whether—and, if so, why—baad or other forced marriage practices 

have decreased. 

Even if women do keep 

their children after 

divorce, they may have no 

way of supporting them 

unless they remarry. 
USIP.ORG 15

WOMEN’S ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN AFGHANISTAN

Forced marriages often—but not always—take place when a girl is very young. Nishani 

refers to the practice of a father promising or engaging his daughter at a young age, sometimes 

as early as birth, to another family to strengthen social or economic ties between families. The 

legal marriage age for women under Afghan civil law is sixteen, or fifteen with parental permission. In 2010, the Ministry of Public Health in Afghanistan estimated that 21 percent of 

all women were married by age fifteen and another 53 percent by age eighteen; 38 some NGOs 

have estimated that the percentage before sixteen is much higher. According to the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 57 percent of marriages in Afghanistan involve girls under 

sixteen, many if not most of them arranged for the girl.39

Studies on the impact of forced marriage suggest severe and enduring consequences:

• 63.8 percent of women who were forced to marry reported experiencing physical 

violence versus 36.5 percent of those who married freely 

• 80.2 percent of women forced to marry reported psychological violence versus 65.7 

percent of those in free marriages 

• 21.6 percent of women in forced marriages reported sexual violence versus 10.6 percent of those in marriages freely entered into.40

Respondents in all five provinces cited forced marriage and its ongoing consequences as a 

major source of disputes within their communities. Respondents who discussed forced marriages 

were well aware of the negative impact over time of such marriages, in terms not only of the risks of 

physical and psychological abuse but also of the limits placed on women’s freedom and educational 

opportunities. Many girls are interested in continuing their education after marriage, but their 

husbands or their husbands’ families often prevent them from going to school.

Forced marriage was not only deeply entrenched in social norms but also often connected to 

issues of poverty, debt, and bride-price. In impoverished areas or families, forced marriage seemed 

especially resilient. In one community in Sar-e Pol, a father’s gambling left his family destitute. 

His thirteen-year-old daughter was then given in marriage to a sixty-year-old man because her 

family could not afford treatment for her eye condition. Her sister was also sold to a cousin’s son 

so that her father could secure more money for gambling.41 In general, respondents suggested 

that a high bride-price was an incentive for forced marriage in many communities. In Daykundi, 

a police officer noted that a high bride-price made fathers “just think about cash. They do not 

care [what] happens to their daughters in the future. They just want a lot of money.” 42 A justice 

official in Jowzjan similarly stated that “families do not send their girls to a husband’s home; they 

sell their girls here, which later causes many problems for the girl.” 43

Women and girls perceive themselves as powerless to avoid a forced marriage. “The family 

does everything and at the end they ask if the girl is happy or not, [when] all the people are 

enjoying the wedding party. The girl has to accept the marriage even if she is not satisfied,” a 

thirty-seven-year-old woman from Daykundi said.44 Women in each province also emphasized the role of fathers (or other male guardians) as the final arbiters of decisions about marriages. In one community in Daykundi, a woman reported that “everybody here got married 

through her father’s decision. No woman could decide about her marriage.” 45 In Sar-e Pol, 

one young girl said she had been asked her opinion about marriage but giving it was irrelevant 

because “it was my father’s decision.” 46

A twenty-five-year-old woman from Herat (see box 2) said that although she told her 

family that she did not want to get married to her cousin, she was told she “must follow the 

tradition of the community,” after which she felt so hopeless she attempted suicide before arriving in a protection shelter for abused women.47

According to UNICEF, 57 

percent of marriages in 

Afghanistan involve girls 

under sixteen, many if not 

most of them arranged for 

the girl.
16 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 98

Domestic Abuse—Physical and Psychological

“My father often beat my mother. It was normal. Then my father engaged me to a married man 

who had some mental [problems]. He got angry [so quickly that] I felt he [must be] a mad man. 

He usually breaks things or he screams and then he beats me. . . . It was not a life. I was living 

in hell.”—Karima, thirty-two-year-old Tajik female

Physical and psychological domestic abuse is a widespread problem across Afghanistan. A 2008 

survey conducted by Global Rights found that 87 percent of Afghan women suffer some form 

of physical, sexual, or psychological abuse.48 This is one of the most common reasons women 

seek help outside the home. For example, a local partner legal aid organization found that of 

1,508 family cases it handled from October 2009 to June 2013, 31 percent dealt with domestic abuse, according to records shared with the authors. Another women’s services NGO that 

shared data with the authors found that between 22 and 49 percent of the women who had 

sought its help each year from 2009 to 2012 did so because of domestic violence.

Box 2. “I Ate Eighteen Sewing Needles on My Wedding Day”

“My father died before I was born. I was seven months in my mother’s womb when he died. 

Before his death my father had promised that he would give his child to his brother’s son if 

I was a girl. My father liked his brother so much and wanted to strengthen their relationship 

by giving me to his brother’s son as a bride. After my father died, my uncle and his family 

always repeated my father’s words. My relatives would tell me that I was the fiancé of my 

cousin Mirwais. At first I was indifferent . . . but I grew to hate him. I did not have a particular 

reason but I did not like him. I would go to see my mother [who remarried] in her new home. 

My mother’s husband had a son [Samie] from his previous wife. We were the same age and 

we fell in love. I imagined that he would be my husband in the future.

“When I was thirteen years old, my uncle’s family came, and they brought me a golden ring 

to perform our niqah ceremony. I was not willing to take the ring or be wed. My mother 

came to me, and she insisted that I marry Mirwais...I tried to commit suicide several times...

but unfortunately I did not die. I started eating sewing needles when the elders of the family 

were performing my marriage ceremony. I ate eighteen sewing needles on my wedding day, 

but I did not die. I was broken hearted.

“At the end of the [wedding] party, I called my fiancé’s mother and I told her that I did not 

want to be her daughter-in-law. I asked her to take back the presents to their home, but she 

refused. She advised me to accept that marriage and told me that I would fall in love with 

her son in time. Then she told my uncle and my uncle sent a message that he would kill me 

if I did not accept the marriage. I was afraid, but I loved Samie. At that time, my maternal 

uncle supported me a little. He knew that I did not like my cousin, but even he advised me 

to get married. I would have run away from home with Samie if somebody had helped me.

“It is a very bad tradition in Afghanistan that the people say the girl is gande [bad] if she 

does not want to get married, and they always blame her. No one cares about the future of 

the women’s lives here. . . . I told everybody that I did not want to get married to my cousin, 

but they all said I must follow the tradition of the [community].

“Then I got married to my husband. We lived together, but I was depressed. Two years after 

our marriage I got pregnant, but I always thought everybody had done an injustice to me. 

Then I gave birth to my son. He is nine years old, and I gave birth to my daughter six years 

ago, but I don’t even like my children.

“Forced marriage is the main problem. The families force girls to get married to old men 

when the girls are not happy. Also fathers give their daughters to married men. These girls 

have to be the second or even third wife.”

—Twenty-five-year-old Tajik female, interview, Injil health care clinic, Injil District, Herat Province, December 2012

A 2008 survey conducted 

by Global Rights found 

that 87 percent of Afghan 

women suffer some form 

of physical, sexual, or 

psychological abuse.
USIP.ORG 17

WOMEN’S ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN AFGHANISTAN

Many of those who work in women’s rights and women’s services argue that domestic abuse is severely underreported due to conservative social norms, societal acceptance of 

violence against women, and women’s limited access to reporting mechanisms, among other 

factors. Rights monitors estimate that only a fraction of incidents come to the attention of 

a legal aid organization or the formal justice sector. As one press statement from the United 

Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) evaluating violence against women 

noted, “Those incidents that reach law enforcement and judicial authorities or receive public 

attention due to their egregious nature represent the tip of the iceberg of incidents of violence 

against women throughout the country.”49 Underreporting of violence against women is so 

widespread that rights organizations interpret increases in reported violations each year as a 

sign of progress because the trend signals greater awareness and acceptance that these incidents are violations.50

Because of the stigma surrounding domestic abuse, even where domestic abuse is initially 

reported, women face continuous and significant pressure to drop their cases. For example, one 

legal aid provider noted that in one of the provinces where it works, Badakhshan, 75 percent of 

domestic abuse cases were abandoned, unresolved, or withdrawn by the victim.

This research unearthed similar patterns. Domestic violence was described as prevalent by 

male and female members of every community visited, although community definitions of 

what constituted abuse in the home varied considerably. Both male and female respondents 

said that a husband was entitled to use some level of violence to maintain order within the 

home but that the extremity of legitimate force was limited. However, no interviewee clearly 

articulated what levels of violence or acts would cross that line and be seen as illegitimate.51 A 

2008 study by the Women and Children Legal Research Foundation, an Afghan organization, 

found that 36.6 percent in a survey of 450 males and 900 females in five provinces responded 

that women should only file a complaint when “physical violence leads to broken bones.” 52

Only 40 percent believed a complaint should be filed in cases of rape.53

Respondents perceived domestic abuse as stemming from multiple causes, including poverty and unemployment. As one police officer put it, “Poverty brings violence.” 54 Respondents 

in all five provinces mentioned general unemployment and a lack of job opportunities in their 

communities. “When a person cannot support his family,” remarked an official in the district 

governor’s office in Jowzjan, “he feels shame and cannot control his emotions.” 55 Such violence 

is not limited to the husband or other male family members; one woman in Herat reported 

that her mother-in-law and other relatives abused her and that “their reason for beating me 

was my husband’s lack of a job.” 56

For many women, particularly those in forced marriages, abuse and violence came on top 

of an existing general unhappiness about their marriage. Such conditions had serious negative psychological consequences for many female respondents. As one woman in Herat said, 

“Those years living with my husband made me mentally sick” (see box 3).57 Many women 

expressed hopelessness about their situation and their inability to make the violence stop. This 

feeling of powerlessness led some women to take extreme actions, such as running away, selfmutilation, or attempted suicide. A woman in Herat said that she had decided to commit 

suicide more than ten times, but concern for what would happen to her children prevented her 

from following through.58 Police officers in Daykundi also noted that several women in the 

district had killed themselves because their husbands had abused them and that women had 

few alternatives to escape domestic violence.59

Both male and female 

respondents said that a 

husband was entitled to 

use some level of violence 

to maintain order within 

the home but that the 

extremity of legitimate 

force was limited. 

However, no interviewee 

clearly articulated what 

levels of violence or acts 

would cross that line and 

be seen as illegitimate.
18 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 98

From an interview with Belkis, a Hazara woman age forty, at AIHRC office, Herat, December 

2012.

A sixteen-year-old woman was forced to marry a seventy-year-old widower to pay off the 

debt of her father. In exchange for waving the bride-price, the father’s debt was forgiven. 

After moving from her native province to Helmand, the woman was forced to live in her 

husband’s adult son’s house.

After a short time, she became the victim of abuse from multiple members of her new family, 

“We had a normal life just for one month, but then my husband changed his behavior and 

he started mistreating me. My stepsons were very cruel, and they did not accept me as their 

father’s new wife. [Crying] Sometimes they beat me severely and I could not move my body. 

... Last year my stepsons threw me out of the warm room with my two sons, and we had to 

pass the winter in a cold room...I would lose my patience and argue with them, but they 

beat and threw me out of the house again.” Her hands had been broken and the scars and 

mis-set bones were still visible.

“I did not dare complain to somebody about my abuse. I just complained to my husband. 

My stepsons beat me if they figured out about me telling him.” She said that her husband 

told his sons to stop, but he was old and powerless within the home.

Her children also suffered frequent beatings and severe abuse from her stepsons and other 

extended family members, including potentially rape and sexual assault. “I remember once 

their cousin came to our home. He was an impolite sixteen-year-old boy. One day early in 

the morning, I saw my little eight-year-old son crying and changing his underwear. He refused to tell me what had happened, but I insisted. Then he told me that the boy was trying 

to rape him when my son was sleeping, but he figure[d] it out and threatened the boy that 

he would tell everybody if he did not leave him alone. I don’t know if that boy raped my son 

or not, but I went directly to my husband and told him what had happened. The boy and my 

stepsons denied the incident, but then they beat me and my son when my husband was out. 

I never talked with anyone outside of the home about it.”

Despite the abuse, she refused to leave, “I tolerated everything because of my children. 

They did not allow my sons to go to school, but I did not want my sons to be illiterate like 

me and my daughter so I sent them to school in secret.” Then her first child, a daughter, 

was forced to marry when she was twelve years old for a $10,000 bride-price. “My stepsons 

decided to [arrange] her marriage. They did not ask me and my daughter whether we were 

happy with the marriage.”

Eventually, the woman was able to get word to her brother about her abuse. “He went to 

my stepsons. He objected to how they were abusing me, and they told him that they cannot 

support me financially anymore and it would be better if my brother took me to his home. 

He took me to his home, and he promised me he would talk with them and that I would be 

able to go back to my home again. But three days later my stepsons came with a mullah, 

and they demanded a divorce on behalf of my husband. Then they took my sons to their 

home. They went to the mosque with my brother and a mullah, and then they came and told 

me they had finished the divorce. I went to my husband’s home when I heard about them 

taking my sons, but my stepsons did not let me enter.” After pleading with her husband, he 

said there was nothing he could do and said that it was best if she just leave.

The woman refused to give up her sons, though. After taking them back, she moved to a 

different province and sought work to support her sons. After a few months, the police came 

to her home and arrested her, explaining that her stepsons had filed a complaint against her 

and accused her of stealing a large sum of money from their home in Helmand. “The police 

investigated the case, and then the police figured out that my stepsons were lying and 

had filed a false complaint. They confessed that they had filed the charges in order to get 

my sons back. I told them I did not accept the initial divorce because my husband had not 

divorced me. They showed me a paper and said that they would not disturb me anymore 

and I could keep my sons if I signed the paper. I accepted and signed it. But later they said 

it was a divorce document and by signing I had accepted my divorce. They deceived me. A 

few days later they came and took my sons by force and left the area. I sought help from my 

brother, but he said it is not his business. I told my sister, but she ignored me too. They were 

afraid of my stepsons.”

The woman later learned that her children were being forced to work in her stepson’s store 

and being prevented from going to school. “I am concerned about my children’s future. 

Box 3. “I Tolerated Everything Because of My Children”
USIP.ORG 19

WOMEN’S ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN AFGHANISTAN

Running Away and Moral Crimes

“There were some women and girls in our community who ran away with strange men and their 

fathers or husbands killed them when they found out about it. I did not want my father to kill 

and bury me like those women.”—Hanifa, thirty-year-old female Jugi

Running away is not a crime under Afghan law, but it functions as one in practice. Women 

who flee their husbands or family are often arrested and prosecuted by law enforcement officials, typically charged either with zina (moral crimes), such as adultery or attempted adultery, 

or sometimes with running away or with moral crimes more generally. 60 In 2012, the Afghan 

Supreme Court issued an opinion that declared that running away was not a crime in Afghanistan; in response, prosecutors and judges in many jurisdictions began using attempted 

adultery as a new class of moral crime to detain women who ran away, although this is also not 

supported by Afghan law.61

In 2012, UNAMA and Human Rights Watch (HRW) noted that the arrest of girls or 

women for moral crimes is common and widespread, despite advances in legal protections 

and statements by high officials attempting to curtail the practice.62 Although noting that 

accurate national statistics are not available, an HRW study of these issues in Afghanistan 

found that in three of the main prisons where women are held, half of all adult female inmates 

and virtually all teenage girls were imprisoned for moral crimes.63 In 2013, HRW reported a 

50 percent increase over the previous eighteen months in incarcerated women and girls for 

moral crimes.64

The instances of running away that had the most severe consequences tended to involve 

girls or women who sought support from or became engaged to men who were not part of 

their families. This type of running away was often mentioned in the context of secret or illicit relationships, which frequently involved deceit on the part of male suitors. One woman 

in Sar-e Pol in a relationship with a man who promised to marry her but later refused do so 

was forced to run away because she feared violence from family members after they discovered 

her relationship.65 Another woman in Daykundi ran away after a young man told her he could 

make her happy and give her a better life. Later, he left her when she was pregnant, and she 

had no choice but to continue living with his family, who abused her.

In some communities, running away was linked not to false promises but instead to high 

bride-price and poverty.66 When a boy’s father was unable to pay a high bride-price, the couple 

had “no choice except to escape from home” if they wanted to be together.67 This phenomenon 

was cited as particularly prevalent in some Hazara communities in Daykundi, where, one man 

noted, “There are so many girls escaping from their houses—as far as I know it is at least five 

to six girls per year...and it is all happening because of poverty.” 68

Stigma and shame may prevent women who run away from returning to their communities 

or contacting their families. If a woman cannot return home and cannot stay with the man she 

They are too young. Every morning I went to the store in secret, when my stepsons were not 

there, so I could see my children. My stepsons found out, and they warned me that they would 

beat my children if I continued seeing them. Now just my youngest son is working there on Fridays, but still I am seeing him in secret. I had to spend my life in that home, so how is it my right 

to suffer? They destroyed my life, stole my children, and I now cannot support my life.”

This case had been investigated by the AIHRC, which corroborated her story.

Box 3. “I Tolerated Everything Because of My Children” cont.

Stigma and shame may 

prevent women who 

run away from returning 

to their communities 

or contacting their 

families....Women from 

more conservative 

communities that hold firm 

to traditional methods of 

punishment run the risk 

of death through honor 

killing for running away. 
20 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 98

ran away with, she may be left without any social or economic safety net. Women from more 

conservative communities that hold firm to traditional methods of punishment run the risk of 

death through honor killing for running away. As an elder woman in Paghman said, 

I have not seen honor killings happen in our community. But I think members of families must murder women or girls who run away from home because of doing a bad 

thing—for instance, running away with a strange boy. But if she runs away because of 

cruelty and injustice within family, it is not bad because they forced her to do it.69

Within this research, women who had decided to run away described it as their only option. In many instances, women who fled their marital home would return to their natal home 

or that of a trusted male relative, such as a brother, cousin, or uncle. In some instances, they 

sought the support of shelters or state representatives.

Inheritance

“My cousin today came to me and told me that the elders . . . are in my father’s home to divide the 

land, but no one informed me about it.”—Mahgul, twenty-five-year-old Hazara female 

Afghan and Islamic law entitles a woman to both property ownership and inheritance rights 

following the death of a husband or father. Under Islamic law, a woman is generally entitled to 

half the portion allotted to her male relatives within the same agnatic generation.70 However, 

across the researched provinces, whether women received their portion of an inheritance depended more on the family or community than on any legal or statutory framework. According 

to the Afghan government’s reporting to the CEDAW committee:

In most areas, men do not give women the inheritance right, and in some areas women 

do not even dare to ask for their inheritance rights. Request of inheritance by women can 

be deemed dishonor[able] and not acceptable among parts of society. Even if women dare 

to ask [for] their inheritance, the access to judicial organs barely exists and women’s issues 

are [weighted] less . . . in local councils and Jirgas.71

A study of popular attitudes toward women’s inheritance rights in ten provinces by the 

Women and Children’s Legal Research Foundation found that, among those surveyed, 89 

percent of men versus 37 percent of women had received an inheritance owed to them.72

Interviews for this report suggested a number of reasons for the stark difference. In some 

communities, women may not ask for their portion at all and instead simply cede it to their 

brothers as a rite of custom. In such instances, it is generally accepted that the brother then 

maintains a social obligation to look after his sister’s interests for the duration of her life. 

More commonly, women are left entirely out of the decision making. Often, women found 

out about the division of property after it had already been decided by male elders and relatives. A lack of understanding and education impedes women’s ability to assert their rights. 

One male head of a primary court in Jowzjan noted that “unfortunately, most people, even 

women themselves, think that women have no right to ask for their inheritance.”73 Thus, in 

some cases, whether women receive their portion may depend not only on their awareness of 

their rights but also on community and familial leaders’ acknowledgment of those rights. In 

some of the communities, respondents said that women who sought their legal inheritance 

were denied it.

The failure to respect a woman’s inheritance rights can have as critical an impact on a 

woman’s life as other physical violations of her rights. A woman’s inheritance may be the only 

economic asset she has to ensure the safety of her children after the death of her spouse. As 

will be discussed, lack of economic independence reinforces a woman’s dependence on her 
USIP.ORG 21

WOMEN’S ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN AFGHANISTAN

husband, family, or community and can make it even harder to overcome barriers to justice. In 

the absence of economic independence, a woman may be forced to forfeit her individual rights 

to protect her family’s or her children’s interests. One woman explained the rationale to marry 

her deceased husband’s brother:

My husband passed away a few years ago, but I had to get married with my brother-inlaw because of my husband’s inheritance. I wanted to keep my husband’s portion for my 

children. My husband and his brother had land, but I would lose the portion of my 

husband if I did not marry my brother-in-law. My brother-in-law does not take care of 

me and my children at all. I have two daughters and one son, but he does not buy any 

clothes or food items for me.74

Rape and Sexual Assault

“As much as I shouted, they beat me again and again and they were raping me again and again. 

They told me that this was a place that no one would hear my voice.” —Shakila, fifteen-yearold Herat female rape victim

International officials and rights activists insist that though reporting is low, the rates of rape 

and sexual assault in Afghanistan are high both in the home and in the few areas where women 

are active in the workplace. One survey found that 42.6 percent of women in Kandahar experience rape or sexual assault versus 17.2 percent nationally.75 Although these statistics offer some 

sense of how widespread the problem is, accurate statistics on the prevalence of sexual assault 

are difficult to come by. Instances of rape in Afghanistan are underreported because of social 

stigmatization, limited understanding of legal definitions and protections, and fear of being 

doubly victimized within the state justice system.

Under the EVAW law, rape and forced prostitution are explicitly criminalized.76 These 

protections, however, are often not enforced. UNAMA observed that the “majority” of rape, 

sexual violence, and forced prostitution cases were either never investigated or the prosecution 

and investigation were dropped without explanation. At the same time, it noted that increases 

in reporting each year are a strong victory for increasing awareness of women’s rights.77 Parts of 

the EVAW law are explicitly contradicted by other domestic law. For example, a strong interpretation by many in the women’s rights community was that the 2009 Shiite Personal Status 

Law effectively legalized partner rape for Shia women.78

Reports of government or law enforcement officials being tacit or complicit in perpetuating sexual abuse and assault are common. Women who have reported being raped have often 

found themselves being charged as accomplices to the rape and so guilty of a zina crime.79 One 

case shared during the course of this research was the rape of a sixteen-year-old girl by four 

police officers in Badghis Province. When rights advocates and supporters of the girl tried to 

have the case prosecuted, they were pressured by a local parliamentary representative, local 

influential elders, and members of the provincial council not to do so.

During the course of interviews for this report, women in various communities, particularly 

Daykundi, Sar-e Pol, and Herat, described rape and sexual assault as occurring but were often 

reluctant to share the details. Where it was reported, sexual assault appeared to take place at the 

hands of both family members and external parties. When rape was committed by someone 

other than a spouse, women feared that they might be killed by their family to restore its honor 

if the case were to become public. Women who had been raped by someone outside their family often resign themselves to the rapist marrying them (see box 4), in many cases because they 

see no other way to restore their and their family’s honor. 

Women who have 

reported being raped have 

often found themselves 

being charged as 

accomplices to the rape.
22 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 98

This case was introduced to the research team by the director of DoWA in Daykundi Province, who was acting as an advocate on behalf of a juvenile rape victim. The fourteen-yearold girl, referred to here as M, had been brought from a remote district to the provincial 

capital after being attacked as she walked home from school. Her family had not provided 

support, and in the absence of a qualified shelter in the province, the director was housing 

her in the directorate until a more permanent solution could be found. The interview was 

conducted in September 2012.

Q: Can you tell me what happened to you?

M: My classmates and I were going home [from school], but I stayed back because I was sick. 

I had a bad stomach ache. Then a young boy riding a bike came close to me. He asked me to 

sit behind him, but I refused. He stayed there and I walked faster because I was very scared. 

There were no people around. He again came closer and ordered me to sit behind him. He 

grabbed my scarf, but I ran away and he could not catch me. I changed my path to my house, 

but suddenly another boy appeared before me and he grabbed me. He gave me to the first 

boy and then he ran to his home. The first boy raped me by force. He covered my mouth so I 

could not scream. Then suddenly I heard a voice. The voice was getting closer. Two boys were 

coming toward us. I screamed and they saw us. They got the boy and beat him, but the boy 

fled to his house. One of them raised me from the ground and put my scarf on my head and 

told me to inform my mother as soon as possible. They were my classmates. I had very bad 

pain in my body, but I could walk. [I started walking home] but my mother came to find me 

on the way. At home, my mother heard about the details and she was unconscious for three 

hours and she started crying when she woke up.

Q: What happened to the boy who did this? Did anyone press charges?

M: My mother and I went to the boy’s home that night. The boy’s father told us that you 

should forget this incident, and then I will come to your home after Eid [the holiday to celebrate the end of Ramadan] and take you for my son as his wife. But Eid passed and they did 

not come to our home. We sent a person to their home to perform the marriage, but they 

refused. My mother started crying and screaming and arguing with the boy’s father, but she is 

not confident at all. She could not defend me there. My mother then went to her brother and 

informed him about their refusal, because my father is dead. My uncle called the police and 

they came to our home.

Q: Why did you not call the police at first?

M: I told my mother to inform the police at the beginning, and they will go and arrest that 

boy. But my mother did not listen. She was afraid about people’s words. She was scared that 

people would talk behind our back. The police arrested the boy who gave me to the rapist, 

but the rapist ran away. Finally, his brother brought him to the police and they took him and 

sent them both to the jail.

Q: What happened to you while they were looking for the rapist? Was the issue 

resolved?

M: I lived with several female police officers in their home for three weeks in the Silbitu area in 

Sang Takht District, while the police were investigating the incident. Then they transferred me 

to Nili. The police sent me to the prosecutor’s office in Nili to investigate the incident more. ...

The police of Silbitu brought me to the prosecutor’s office in Nili. There, the prosecutor asked 

me about the incident and I described everything. Then the director of DoWA was told about 

my story by the prosecutor and allowed me to come stay with her rather than go to the jail. 

Now I am living with her and I am waiting to end my case. No one tells me what is happening 

to my case, but I am waiting.

Q: Who did you go to for help with resolving the dispute before calling the police?

M: I have no father, nor any uncle [brother of her father]. My father died six years ago. I have a 

poor mother. She tried to help me but she could not...My mother said to the boy’s father that 

we will file a complaint against them if they do not take me. His father said, “The police will 

arrest both my son and your daughter if you complain. Your daughter cannot tolerate being in 

jail, but my son can.” I heard that the boy got sick in the jail. The white beards [elders] of the 

qawm went to the boy’s father once to end the dispute, but the father refused to accept their 

decision. The white beards wanted to perform the marriage, but he would not accept their 

recommendation. He told them that his son is innocent and he did not do what I accused him 

of doing. But the doctor in the clinic checked me and she confirmed the rape. I went to the 

doctor with one of the female police officers.

Box 4. “The Boy Who Raped Me Must Take Me as His Wife”
USIP.ORG 23

WOMEN’S ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN AFGHANISTAN

Mechanisms and Barriers in Dispute Resolution for Women

As illustrated, women frequently lack protection of even their most basic rights. This section 

attempts to map how women go about addressing severe rights violations, as well as other disputes or grievances they may have. Understanding how women seek access to justice requires 

understanding not only the different mechanisms available but also the barriers confronting 

women who try to use them.

Those mechanisms exist on three levels: family, community, and external (that is, state 

mechanisms and other actors external to the community). Typically, women (like men) turn 

first to a family mechanism; if that fails, they turn to community mechanisms; if that fails, they 

may turn to an external mechanism. The largest number of disputes is resolved at the lowest 

level, the fewest at the highest (see figure 2). The same case may, in theory, be brought to any 

or all of the three levels.

Which mechanism a woman turns to often depends on the barriers to entry and the barriers to actually receiving justice within that mechanism by the woman’s estimate. Barriers are 

categorized in this report as normative, consequential, or practical. A normative or cultural barrier might be that women do not raise a dispute because they want, or feel obliged, to conform 

with social and cultural standards of appropriate behavior or because the deeply entrenched 

normative views of women legitimize some violations of their rights. These normative barriers 

often go hand in hand with lack of awareness about women’s rights. Consequential barriers 

refer to situations in which a woman is deterred from bringing a dispute by the risk of consequences for her action. Such risks include physical abuse, potentially fatal in extreme cases, 

to herself or her children; loss of any means to support herself or her family; and loss of face 

and honor for herself or her family (which may also lead to abuse, even death, or economic 

consequences). Finally, practical barriers refer to obstacles such as not having the money to pay 

fees associated with a court dispute, the difficulty of traveling long distances to where a court 

or other help might be found, or lack of appropriate documentation to establish a case in court.

Normative, consequential, and practical factors may act not only as barriers to entry to 

mechanisms but also to finding justice within dispute resolution mechanisms. Many of these 

barriers have a dual function: First, they impede a woman’s ability to access a forum; second, 

if she nonetheless accesses it, they prevent a resolution of her case or grievances in a way that 

respects her rights. During interviews, women expressed extreme dissatisfaction with all levels 

of the dispute pyramid in terms of giving them a fair hearing and enforcing their rights. They 

complained that men did not listen to them or respond fairly to their complaints in the family 

or community mechanisms. In the formal system, women said that their cases had been put on 

Q: Do you have any contact with your mother?

M: No, I do not. My mother has no information that I am here. Our house is too far away from 

the police station. It is one hour to the police by car. I cannot even call my mother. There is no 

signal there. No one has come here to see me.

Q: What do you think about your future?

M: That boy must take me as his wife. He should take me. It is not good if I sit at home with 

shame. The people will say very bad things behind my back. During those three days, I heard 

many bad things said about me when I was waiting for them to come and take me to their 

home. The people said to each other that I had an illegal relationship with that boy. I was so 

sad. I want to get married to him and end these words.

Box 4. “The Boy Who Raped Me Must Take Me as His Wife” cont.
24 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 98

the back burner and never resolved. Four out of five women interviewed were not pleased with 

the outcomes of their cases. Those women who were satisfied tended to present uncomplicated 

cases that could be resolved with minimal negotiation at the community level. Women’s overall 

skepticism that they would have their rights enforced, or even have a fair chance to explain 

their view, was itself a major deterrent and obstacle to justice. Thus, each section also includes 

a description of the reasons that these mechanisms offer poor prospects of justice for women.

It is important to understand that, from the individual’s perspective, the barriers may appear less as obstacles and more as preferences or choices, often based on a rational appraisal of 

the available options and the likely consequences. No single barrier explains why individuals 

choose or are forced to choose particular paths to resolve a conflict. Each woman’s experience 

with confronting these challenges is unique.

These barriers tend to be cumulative. The normative barriers that are present in the family level also exist at the community and state/external level, even if they present themselves 

slightly differently. Similarly, the consequential barriers in community mechanisms are also 

present—often to a more aggravated degree—in the state/external mechanisms.

Family Mechanisms

The majority of disputes are first addressed, resolved, or forfeited at the family level. This is true 

for both men and women but seems to be especially true with regard to violations of women’s 

rights because of notions of privacy and family honor. In small villages, a woman’s extended 

family may realistically extend through the entire village. This makes the distinction between 

family and community levels in small villages highly variable and mutable. As used in this 

report, family generally denotes a woman’s inner circle, usually her immediate family or close 

extended family.

Resolution of disputes at this level often falls to elder individuals, male or female. As a 

result, the family forum is the only place where women would frequently act as adjudicators 

or mediators, particularly in disputes involving women within the same household. Women 

interviewees repeatedly said that they like to solve their disputes or raise issues or concerns 

among other women in the family, often noting that men do not listen to them or give them a 

fair hearing. Many women expressed a preference for family-level mechanisms and explained 

that they did not want to air what they considered to be private matters outside the family.

Figure 2. Pyramid of Dispute Resolution Mechanisms

Government and 

External Mechanisms

Community Mechanisms

Family Mechanisms

Women’s overall 

skepticism that they would 

have their rights enforced, 

or even have a fair chance 

to explain their view, was 

itself a major deterrent 

and obstacle to justice. 
USIP.ORG 25

WOMEN’S ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN AFGHANISTAN

However, this was not purely a matter of privacy or preference. Many women said they had 

no option but to resolve disputes within the family because mechanisms outside their family 

structure were not open to them or because they would face extreme social, economic, or physical consequences for sharing family problems with outsiders. As one male community worker 

commented, “Suppose a woman tried to share her problem with those in her community [such 

as elders]; later she and her family would have to leave the community because it would be a 

big shame for the men of that family.”80

This research and other reports on dispute resolution trends among the broader population 

strongly suggest that the vast majority of cases involving women in Afghanistan never leave 

the family structure during the course of their resolution or abrogation.81 This situation makes 

documentation and tracking of disputes involving women particularly difficult. The majority of 

conflicts involving women are never reported at all or are obstructed from public view, sometimes even from the view of those within the same community.

Barriers to Family Mechanisms

Although family mechanisms are the most accessible level, women nonetheless face barriers 

at this level to raising a case and to being fairly heard. Many of these barriers relate to deeply 

entrenched social norms, such as expectations and definitions of a good woman and the legitimization and internalization of domestic violence. Not understanding the rights guaranteed 

under law may also prevent women from fully demanding or realizing those rights and protections even within the family level.

Normative Aspirations

“A good woman should tolerate difficulties and troubles within the family.”—Karima, thirtytwo-year-old Tajik female

Principles of tolerance, patience, and modesty are seen as important elements in distinguishing a woman’s character. Suffering, including that inflicted by one’s family, is often cited as a 

requisite or natural part of a woman’s life. A woman’s ability to tolerate and quietly persevere in 

the face of such suffering helps define being a good woman. Aspirations to meet these social 

standards deter women from making a complaint. At the same time, other family members—

male and female alike—are likely to reject a woman’s right to make a claim because, as a good 

woman, she is meant to bear suffering silently. These social norms are a barrier throughout all 

three levels of the pyramid but are encountered first within the home.

Women are counseled by other women from a young age to abide their suffering and not 

raise issues even within the home.82 Women are encouraged to burdabar, literally “to bear the 

burden.” As one woman in Paghman District, Kabul Province, said,

[Women] should tolerate [suffering or abuses] because it is not appropriate if they complain. For instance, when I came to my husband’s family’s home, all [my husband’s] sisters and my brothers-in-law were illiterate and jealous of me because I was educated. 

They forced me to do difficult things and made me stop teaching because I was a bride 

and should be tolerant and patient. I had never done such things in my family’s home 

before marriage, but I had to tolerate and did not say anything because it would have been 

bad if I said something.83

Women also evoked the idea of sabor, or patience, and sangin, or modesty, when describing 

expectations of women’s behavior.84 These expectations lead a large number of disputes to be 

abandoned within the home before they are ever brought to another person or forum for assistance. It is not uncommon for women to speak nonchalantly about serious issues such as doIt is not uncommon 

for women to speak 

nonchalantly about serious 

issues such as domestic 

violence, to say they had 

simply accepted that such 

abuse was part of their 

fate and that they would 

only suffer more if they 

were to raise their issues 

with others. 
26 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 98

mestic violence, to say they had simply accepted that such abuse was part of their fate and that 

they would only suffer more if they were to raise their issues with others. “Women have many 

problems, but there is no one who listens to them,” remarked one widow. “There are many difficulties and problems at home, but women have to be patient and cannot inform other people. 

... I tolerated everything in my life and never complained about violence or injustice.”85 An 

elder woman in Daykundi used the term tasha kadan to describe a woman’s ability to hide or 

obscure violence, abuse, or injustice.86

Showing contrition as a sign of respect or deference to others in the family—even when it 

is recognized that someone else is at fault—is a valued trait.87 This is reinforced by the subordinate status many women have in the family to their husbands, their fathers, their mothers-inlaw, or even other women who have married into the family earlier. As one woman explained, 

“It is better if the wife tries to settle the dispute and apologize even if she wasn’t guilty because 

the mother-in-law is old and respectable and the young should respect them.”88 Like the other 

principles, contrition is reinforced and taught from a young age. One woman recollected the 

advice she gave to a young bride: “Maybe it is your mother-in-law’s fault, but you have to tolerate and behave and respect her. Otherwise your life will be worse.” 89

Norms Legitimizing Violence

“Sometimes the women cause the husband [to] beat them. [In the past I fought] with my husband. 

I insulted my husband [so] he beat me.” —Masouma, thirty-two-year-old Tajik female

Violations of rights are also less likely to be raised because prevalent social norms tend to accept these as appropriate consequences for what is deemed bad behavior. Examples include a 

husband punishing a wife by not allowing her food, beating or verbally abusing her, or divorcing her without her consent. Acceptance of violence against women is widespread.

Many women and men interviewed for this report said that examples of such behavior are 

legitimate responses when the wife angers, disobeys, or otherwise displeases her husband. One 

woman from Paghman reflected this attitude: “I think men sometimes have to beat women 

[when women] are guilty. For instance, if a man comes back home and he is tired, but the 

woman starts disturbing and insulting him, so the man has to beat her in order to stop her.” 90

This acceptance of violence or punishment makes women less likely to seek justice even 

within the home because they see these punishments as legitimate rather than as violations of 

their rights. In addition, even if a woman does recognize the violation of her rights and wants 

to object to or resist punishment, it is difficult for women to rebut the common wisdom that 

she must have done something to provoke violence. A female police officer from Paghman 

District concurred: “Women are always guilty. A woman should not fight or make disputes; 

otherwise she is guilty and a bad woman.” 91 This barrier appears first within the family mechanisms but is a consideration at all levels of the pyramid.

Acceptance of punishment does not relate only to physical violence. Men and women 

interviewed said that for a man to divorce his wife over her behavior is an extreme form of 

punishment because the economic and social repercussions for the divorced woman and her 

children are so severe. Although considered extreme, this type of punishment is also frequently 

legitimated and viewed as the fault of the woman. “I think if a woman has good behavior, her 

husband will never divorce her,” argued one woman from Parachi Village. “[But] sometimes a 

woman makes a man so angry that he has to divorce her!” 92

This barrier appeared to deter or suppress many potential claims or complaints about 

treatment, but there were limits. Although no one was able to articulate what constituted an 
USIP.ORG 27

WOMEN’S ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN AFGHANISTAN

illegitimate use of violence against a woman within the home, both men and women declared 

that certain levels of abuse or other punishment were not legitimate and could not be tolerated. Community leaders said that the community would intercede when the violence toward 

a woman transcended unarticulated local norms of acceptable behavior.

Community Mechanisms

Although a woman’s first preference is generally for resolution through the family, when a case 

becomes too problematic or involves grave issues, she may resort to a community mechanism 

(also referred to in policy and academic texts as informal, traditional, or customary justice 

forums). Community, as used in this report, does not refer exclusively to a bound or contiguous geographic space. In some areas where research was conducted, the word was also 

used interchangeably with qawm, an extended kin group that is not necessarily geographically 

bound. Likewise, communities may not refer to family or kin relations but be based on physical 

location, though this is more common in urban areas. In more urban or heterogeneous areas, 

multiple communities may coexist or overlap within a particular geographic locale.

The majority of women interviewed privately and in all-female focus groups discussions said 

they preferred these community mechanisms for justice provision if they could not get an issue 

addressed or resolved among immediate family. Rights advocates frequently counter that this is 

because they lack other options, not because women would prefer these community forums if 

they had a choice. Nonetheless, an estimated 80 percent of disputes in Afghanistan are resolved by 

dispute resolution mechanisms outside the formal justice system.93 The percentage would likely be 

even higher if all the disputes resolved at the family level were factored into the calculation.

Both women and men said they preferred community mechanisms because they are quick, 

cost-effective, and knowledgeable about the situation in the community as a whole and about 

community values. Another attraction is that because community mechanisms are more connected to community norms and power structures, the decisions reached may be more likely 

to be respected and enforced than those of formal justice mechanisms and to mitigate any 

potential loss of face or reputation for the parties to a dispute.

Community mechanisms may offer women a better alternative than the home, especially 

when members of the family are the cause of a woman’s rights violations or concerns. If a 

woman’s husband, father, mother-in-law, or other family member is ignoring a woman’s wishes 

or abusing her rights, individuals within shura or jirga structures, as well as other influential 

community leaders, may help her seek justice in a way that respects her interests. However, 

where community mechanisms are closed to women (as is not uncommon in conservative 

areas) or where the elders or community leaders in decision-making roles are hostile to women 

who assert their rights, women may have no good options for redressing rights violations. Although community mechanisms seemed to exist in all the areas covered by this research, they 

were not always accessible to women. For example, in Aqcha District of Jowzjan Province, 

women were largely restricted from any forum outside the home, be it a formal state mechanism or an informal community forum.94 As one woman in the community scoffed, “Women 

cannot go out of their homes, so how can they go to the shura?” 95

Within the category of community mechanisms, the most common mediators of disputes 

are respected elders drawn from the local communities, including tribal elders, community 

leaders, mullahs or other religious leaders, local government officials acting outside their formal mandate, and other individuals who are respected within the community (sometimes but 

not often including respected women). In many Pashtun communities, the social structure is 
28 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 98

dominated by tribal networks, and the dispute resolution mechanisms tend to be tribal jirgas,

or ad hoc mediation councils run by particular tribal leaders or arbitrators.96 In non-Pashtun 

communities, tribal structure may be less central to dispute resolution patterns, although in 

some places family- or clan-based structures may play an equivalent role. However, there are 

similar structures of decision making by local respected elders and community leaders and 

collective decision making through shuras and jirgas.

Within the community level, women often try to seek the help of any individuals, male or 

female, reputed to defend women’s views and positions. For example, according to interviewees 

in the provincial capital of Sar-e Pol, strong female community leaders were able to intercede on 

behalf of women in the community and act as their advocates in both government and community forums. Sunni women in the Injil District, just outside Herat City, described one mullah as 

open-minded and supportive of women’s rights, and he was their preferred mediator when they 

had a dispute.

Aside from these local champions, women’s preferences over where to raise a dispute 

generally mirrored those of men in the same community. However, each research area differed somewhat, as table 4 illustrates.

Although community-level mechanisms are by no means new, specific actors and practices 

are constantly evolving. The situation has been particularly fluid since the fall of the Taliban 

and the surge in foreign investment at the local level. In the past dozen or so years, the Afghan 

government and foreign donors have transformed existing shura councils or formed new ones 

to create and expand subnational governance structures, the most prominent of which are 

the NSP shuras, as communities often refer to the shuras created under the auspices of the 

National Solidarity Program (described earlier).97 These semi-formal governmental bodies 

have become increasingly dominant in local dispute resolution.98

The presence of these externally driven shuras and their increasing prominence in community decision making and dispute resolution has had a mixed effect on women’s access 

to justice. On the one hand, many of these semigovernmental bodies are required to have 

a certain quota of female members or a certain level of female participation in decision 

making. In some of the participating research districts, all-female NSP shuras have been 

established. In districts where all female NSP shuras exist, or where women participate in 

NSP shuras, female interviewees tended to identify them as one of their first choices for 

dispute resolution outside the family. This is a positive development because it increases 

options for women to seek justice in their local communities and creates opportunities for 

women to be part of the process. On the other hand, government efforts to force communities to promote women to positions of authority by putting them on local NSP shuras has 

provoked a backlash in more conservative communities.

Barriers to Community Mechanisms

Although the existence of community forums may provide women another option for resolving disputes, they are far from perfect vehicles of justice for women. First, some of the 

same normative barriers discussed earlier in the family section strongly deter or limit access 

to community mechanisms. A woman may also be deterred from raising a case before community mechanisms because she fears the consequences of going outside the home or does 

not believe that she will receive a fair hearing. 
USIP.ORG 29

WOMEN’S ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN AFGHANISTAN

Normative Barriers

“Sometimes women go to the qaryadar but not often. Most of the women solve their problems at 

home because it is not considered appropriate to let other people know about your problems.”—

Maryam, sixty-year-old Pashtun female

To the extent that notions of what it means to be a good woman or the internalization of violence deters women from making a complaint within the home, these norms can be even more 

formidable barriers against women raising a complaint or issue with those outside the home, at 

the community level. “[A woman] will go to hell if she takes the problem out of the home. A 

woman is shameless if she goes out of the home,” an older woman in Daykundi said. Another 

Province Men Women

Herat 

(Herat City, Injil District)

• Arbab or other elders

• Mullah

• Formal actors acting in an informal 

capacity

• Family members

• NSP and women’s shura

• Arbab, mullah, or other male 

community actors

• Formal actors or NGOs (DoWA, 

AIHRC, WASSA)

Jowzjan 

(Aqcha and Sheberghan Districts)

• NSP shuras

• Qaryadars or other elders

• Formal actors acting in an informal 

capacity

• Family members

• Female shura leaders

• Sar-e Pol women’s shelter

Sar-e Pol 

(Sar-e Pol City, Sangcharak District)

• NSP shuras

• Qaryadars or other elders

• Formal actors acting in an informal 

capacity

• Family members

• Female shura leaders

• Sar-e Pol women’s shelter

Daykundi 

(Shahristan and Nili Districts)

• Elders (individually or in shuras)

• Woleswali (district governor)

• Formal actors acting in an informal 

capacity, not formal mechanisms 

• Family members

• Elders or shuras (sometimes women’s 

shuras)

• Formal actors, often in informal 

capacity (DoWA, police) 

Kabul

(Paghman District)

• Elders (individually or in shuras)

• Local government actors acting in 

an informal capacity

• Formal mechanism as last resort

• Family members

• Elders or shuras (sometimes 

women’s shuras)

• Formal mechanisms, or external 

actors in Kabul as last resort

Terminology: A variety of terms describe local elders or community leaders. In addition to those noted in the text, Pashtun communities often refer to their elders 

as white beards (reesh-e-safed in Dari; spingheri in Pashtun), wakil-e-gozar (which tends to signify some level of official deputization), or malik(s). In non-Pashtun 

communities in the west of the country, the term arbab is commonly used to refer to influential community members. Khan is also used, particularly in Hazara 

areas. In the Turkmen areas where research was conducted (Sar-e Pol and Jawzjan Provinces) influential leaders are frequently called khojahen. Many western and 

northern provinces also frequently refer to community leaders as qaryadars or malik, although this term often implies some formal, governmental deputation to 

a community actor. In the north, particularly in recent years, the dominant community leaders have been those with some wealth in the community.

Table 4. Preferred Dispute Resolution Actors
30 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 98

woman from the same village noted, “I always thought it was a very bad action if I shared my 

domestic problem with the arbab, the mullah, or the white beards outside of the home.”99

Women interviewees said that they are uncomfortable at the prospect of sharing the intimate 

details of their lives with men who are not part of their family. Indeed, in communities where rigid 

gender segregation has been in place and women’s exposure to men has been restricted almost 

entirely to immediate relatives, the prospect of discussing personal matters with men unrelated to 

them is harrowing. As one elder explained “Women prefer not to say their problems to the men 

because they are not comfortable sharing those things with men in the shura.”

100

Just as in the family mechanisms, some norms may also predispose others within the community, such as elders, to reject a woman’s right to complain about abuse or to regard the 

complaint as spurious because the use of punishment or violence against women is deemed 

legitimate. In this way, these social norms are not only barriers to access but also may be barriers 

to receiving a fair outcome within community mechanisms.

Many disputants interviewed argued that women would have greater access to justice 

through these forums (and indeed family and external mechanisms as well) if they had greater 

access to education or if men in these community forums had more education. Although true, 

it is important to recognize that what is limiting recognition of women’s rights in these cases 

is not merely a lack of knowledge but the combination of that ignorance and these deeply entrenched normative barriers, which may take decades, if not generations, to change.

Consequential Barriers

“The women do not dare go to the woleswali for their problems. The family will cut their heads 

off if the women go there. Men do not like that.” —Fatima, thirty-seven-year-old Hazara 

female 

Taking a claim outside the family to community mechanisms, which in practice often means 

raising it with a male who is not a member of the woman’s family, can trigger very real consequences for women. These include social stigma or disapproval, physical violence, and loss of 

economic support or sustenance. Fear of these consequences can be a serious barrier against 

raising a claim with community mechanisms.

Women are so cognizant of these potential consequences that it was difficult to discern 

from women’s statements whether they were internalizing the stigma against sharing problems 

outside the home (a normative barrier) or simply afraid of being punished for transgressing 

these norms (a consequential barrier). In most cases, both are probably present. A thirty-twoyear-old Tajik woman in Yahya Village in Herat explained her decision not to raise an issue 

outside the home this way: “I had two reasons that I did not seek help. One is that I was afraid 

of my husband’s family and that they would abuse me. And two, I did not go anywhere in order 

to save my family’s honor.”

Women in all five provinces said that taking a case outside of the home, even to another community member, would dishonor them personally and harm their family’s reputation or honor. 

As one woman in Daykundi Province explained, “Women are embarrassed if the other neighbors know about their problems, so they do not destroy their honor and they do not go to the 

shura.” 101 The issue of social stigma or censure of both the individual and her family was raised 

by nearly every woman interviewed. A woman from Paghman said women did not raise issues 

with community elders because they feared what the rest of the community would think: “They 

[community] think she is not a good woman because she could not solve the problems within 

the family and complained against her family members, and they will call her a bad woman.” 102

In communities where rigid 

gender segregation has 

been in place and women’s 

exposure to men has been 

restricted almost entirely 

to immediate relatives, 

the prospect of discussing 

personal matters with 

men unrelated to them 

is harrowing. 
USIP.ORG 31

WOMEN’S ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN AFGHANISTAN

Because going outside the home damages not only a woman’s honor but also her family’s, 

women risk serious retaliation, physical or psychological, from others in the family when they 

take an issue to a community mechanism. A woman from Sar-e Pol Province who suffered 

domestic abuse from her husband said that both she and her family were threatened if they 

raised the issue further among the community: “[My husband] and his brother threatened me 

to murder my parents if I described the events [abuse] to the people. My [brother-in-law] beat 

my sister when she came to our home. He even threatened to beat my sister severely if she talks 

about it [to others].” 103 A woman in Jowzjan Province noted, “The men do not let women talk. 

They even may kill the women if they go to the people.” 104

Women also face severe consequences for their basic livelihood if raising a dispute outside 

the home leads their family to cut them off from existing economic support. This is one of the 

strongest potential consequences coloring the decision not to seek help with community members or mechanisms. As one forty-five-year-old woman from Herat Province said, “Sometimes 

I thought about getting my divorce, but always I thought about who would support and protect 

me if I do it. Many times my husband threw me out of home, but I cried and asked him to 

allow me back home.”

Women have few opportunities to earn a livelihood independently or to provide for their 

children outside their extended family. Women are frequently denied inheritance rights. Only 

an estimated 2 percent of women own land, most of them widows.105 Social stigmas against 

women working are high, and only 16 percent of the female population participates in the 

workforce.106 Aside from jobs serving women—women’s health providers or educators—most 

sectors of employment are de facto (but not legally) closed to women. Even women working in 

these more accepted fields are frequently harassed or threatened for working outside the home, 

particularly in more conservative areas. Because women’s independent economic means are so 

limited, when a woman defies social norms and takes a case outside the home, she puts her 

basic ability to provide for herself or her children in jeopardy.

Economic barriers are felt most acutely in many rural communities, in which women have 

less freedom of movement than women in cities and even more limited access to economic 

opportunities outside the home. As a woman in Paghman District explained, 

We are peasant women and jobless, so we have to tolerate things. Women in Kabul work 

and are independent, so they don’t have to tolerate everything. I am pretty certain that if 

rural women could get education and work, they would not be patient and even they could 

divorce their husbands [laughing], but now they do not have good economic conditions.107

Fear of economic consequences can be most pronounced when a woman turns to an external justice mechanism because the associated stigma is even larger and the likelihood of family 

members cutting her off is higher. Nonetheless, while a community mechanism may be more 

likely to broker a compromise that allows the woman to continue to be supported (because she 

too is part of the community), that compromise may be imposed on the woman and may deny 

her fundamental rights. Under Afghan law, a husband has an obligation to support his wife 

and children on divorce, but in practice these rights are under enforced at the community level 

as well as in the formal justice system. One woman interviewed in a focus group discussion 

in Herat Province said she wanted to get a divorce when her husband took a second wife, but 

because she was an orphan and had no other family, she did not have any place to go and she 

could not abandon her children.108

Because of the lack of economic independence and normative and cultural stigmas, women 

face few options if seeking help outside the home leads their family to cut them off. It is incredibly rare for a woman to set up a home on her own. Human rights and shelter advocates queried 

Women also face severe 

consequences for their 

basic livelihood if raising a 

dispute outside the home 

leads their family to cut 

them off from existing 

economic support. 
32 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 98

said they could only think of a “handful” of cases of women doing so and living independently. 

As one international women’s right advocate explained, 

For most women, living alone is inconceivable. So the only option if you want to leave 

home is a shelter, if you have one in your area. But there are often no options on the other 

side of a shelter: you can’t live alone and you’ve become a bad option for marriage. Do 

you want to spend the rest of your life there or endure the abuse? 109

Dim Prospects for Justice

“I do not think that the men allow the women to be very active. They try to silence the women’s 

voices.” —Masouma, thirty-five-year-old Hazara female

Many women are deterred from taking an issue to community mechanisms because they do 

not anticipate getting justice. Although most of the women interviewed said that they would 

raise a claim at a community forum before they would do so in Afghan courts, few seemed 

optimistic that they would get a fair hearing in community forums. Community mechanisms 

still mete out discriminatory and sometimes abusive punishments toward women; decisions 

are based on community compromise rather than rights enforcement, which is what some 

women want; and women are unable to represent themselves in many community forums, 

exacerbating existing inequalities.

Community Welfare over Individual Rights

Community mechanisms may not satisfy a woman’s demand for her rights to be enforced because their focus is not enforcement of rights but maintenance of community harmony and cohesion. Community forums seek a sustainable compromise that will strike a balance between 

the interests of the parties; their primary concern is not necessarily enforcing an individual’s 

legal rights, especially not the rights of women. This predisposition tends to reinforce rather 

than to rebut existing community norms, which do not embrace the notion of equal rights for 

women. Given women’s subordinate stature within a community due to deeply entrenched 

social norms, their views or interests often lose out in such deliberations.

The lack of respect for women’s rights or wishes can range from counseling a woman who 

wants a divorce to continue trying to live with her husband despite abuse, to not respecting 

a woman’s inheritance rights, to sanctioning punishments against her for behavior that does 

not comply with community social norms but is not illegal under Afghan law. Women’s rights 

groups have frequently criticized community mechanisms for perpetuating gender inequality 

and enforcing discriminatory practices. Community mechanisms sometimes sanction gross 

human rights abuses, including the practice of baad or, less commonly, stoning of women 

accused of adultery.110 It is worth noting that though discriminatory practices often manifest 

themselves at the community level, the unequal status of women is an equally challenging 

problem at both the family level and in government mechanisms.

Lack of Female Participation and Representation

Women may also be deterred from raising a case before community mechanisms because of the 

lack of female decision makers in those mechanisms and because most women lack the ability to 

represent and speak for themselves in community forums. Women are often skeptical that they 

will receive a fair hearing. “I myself do not believe in the shura,” explained a female lawyer, “because 

they are composed of mullahs, white beards, and other men in the community who have religious, 

[family]...or cultural biases. I think they never settle disputes in favor of women.”111
USIP.ORG 33

WOMEN’S ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN AFGHANISTAN

The level of women’s participation in community decision-making processes differs from 

community to community. In most communities, women reported being unable to approach 

shuras directly.112 Typically, a woman’s case is represented in a community forum by a male 

family member, such as a father, brother, husband, or uncle. This immediately puts a woman at 

a disadvantage if the perpetrator of rights violations is representing her or if she is lobbying for 

individual interests or rights not supported by her family. 

Although representation by a male family member is the norm, there are exceptions. In 

some areas, it may be tolerated for elders or well-respected women in the community to act on 

behalf of women, raising their issues with community leaders and serving as ad hoc advocates 

in community forums. In others, it is relatively acceptable for widows with no father, brother, 

or other male relative to bring a case directly to a community mechanism. 

Interviewees suggested that efforts since the ouster of the Taliban to expand women’s rights 

and access to justice have resulted in an increasing number of women both demanding and 

being permitted greater participation and direct representation in community mechanisms. 

This trend is most marked in urban or peri-urban areas, especially those with greater access 

to progressive influences. In some communities in Herat Province, and to a lesser extent in 

Jowzjan Province, women suggested that prohibitions against women’s participation in public 

forums were being relaxed, albeit slowly and incrementally. However, geographical proximity to 

progressive forces did not always result in greater openness to women’s self-representation. In 

Paghman District, for example, located less than thirty kilometers from Kabul, the most progressive city in the country with the most resources available for helping women, women cited 

continued community resistance to women directly addressing or participating in community 

mechanisms.

A related issue is the lack of women as decision makers in shuras or other community 

dispute resolution spaces. Despite instances of mixed shuras in some communities, and even 

entirely female shuras in others (primarily government or donor sponsored such as NSP shuras, 

which may have quotas for female participation), the majority of community forums to which 

disputes are referred consist entirely of local men.113 As a sixty-year-old woman in Jowzjan 

Province scoffed, “Women cannot participate or make decisions within the shuras at all. ...The 

men do not accept that.” 

Women often do not take decision-making roles at a community level because of both 

social norms and threats against them. Those women interviewed who had taken on a dispute 

resolution role in the community reported encountering resistance and threats. One female 

head of a NSP shura was threatened by the Taliban for participating in a Loya Jirga meeting, 

while another female shura head was warned to stop working for women. Despite such threats, 

these women leaders resolved to continue their work. As a female leader in Herat stated, “I 

received some letters with death threats, but I did not stop my job.”114

The lack of women in decision-making roles continues to deter women from seeking justice 

through community mechanisms available to them. Women interviewed suggested that men 

would not be as sympathetic or as likely to hear their side of the story as women would.

Although this is likely true in many cases, it is worth noting that where women were 

promoted to leadership positions—whether through the NSP shuras or, less commonly, in formal representation positions—they did not necessarily advance views any different from those 

voiced by men in the communities. For example, a prominent female prosecutor in Herat was 

known to take a more conservative or harsh stance toward women with regard to moral crimes 

than her male counterparts. In response to questions about what women should do when 

The majority of community 

forums to which disputes 

are referred consist 

entirely of local men....

Women often do not take 

decision-making roles at a 

community level because 

of both social norms and 

threats against them.
34 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 98

faced with domestic abuse, the head of a local women’s shura in Herat said that the solution 

lies in women not doing things to anger their husband. She said she had been teaching women 

how to behave with their husbands so as not to make them angry. One woman who received 

this counsel said that the advice was working, that although she had previously insulted her 

husband over conflicts with her mother-in-law, “Now I do not say bad things to him to cause 

conflict at home.”115

State and External Mechanisms

At the top of the dispute resolution pyramid, with the fewest cases, lie state and external 

mechanisms. This level includes not only formal state actors, such as judges, prosecutors, and 

law enforcement agents, but also women’s rights advocates, lawyers, and other private individuals working in NGOs, in shelters, for legal aid providers, and for other nonprofit organizations.

Although a women’s shelter is very different from a local prosecutor, they are both discussed as external mechanisms in this report because many of the barriers a woman faces when 

she decides to go to a women’s shelter are also present when she seeks the help of a prosecutor, the police, or another state actor. Furthermore, both the shelter and the prosecutor’s office 

clearly lie beyond the locally defined spheres of the home and the community. This report also 

seeks to make a clear distinction between family and community mechanisms and the state 

and external ones because most programming that has attempted to improve women’s access 

to justice since 2002 has focused on providing resources for or addressing problems at this state 

or external level.

State justice mechanisms have expanded in number and reach since 2002, as have the 

number of lawyers, paralegals, and legal counselors who support the formal justice system 

and women’s access to it. Formal reporting and complaints about rights abuses have steadily 

increased since 2002, signaling a greater understanding among women of what their rights 

are and perhaps some degree of greater acceptance that they may assert those rights through 

state mechanisms.

Women in all five provinces noted that if they were going to go to a state representative, they would go to the local Department of Women’s Affairs or the local representative of 

the AIHRC. The AIHRC is considered an independent body, though it is mandated in the 

constitution and commissioners are appointed by the executive branch. Although currently 

underutilized, these institutions are now established and accepted as a part of the social landscape, which is in itself a significant achievement. Barriers do exist, but if a woman faces dire 

circumstances and feels empowered to complain, there is at least a place she can seek help.

Outside of DoWA and AIHRC, positive experiences with formal justice actors or 

mechanisms was lacking among women interviewed in the study. Despite large investments, 

state and external mechanisms still have a limited reach, and state actors still have limited 

awareness of their roles and of citizens’ rights. But there were exceptions. One woman from 

Daykundi said that she had failed to receive a divorce from her abusive husband for more 

than ten years using family and community mechanisms but was finally successful when she 

turned to formal mechanisms. The judge who heard her case not only agreed that she should 

be granted a divorce but also ordered that she be paid alimony. “Neither my relatives nor the 

white beards supported me. They just vindicated my husband, but the judge supported me. 

The government and court is better. I should have just solved my problem before the government [to begin with],” she said.116
USIP.ORG 35

WOMEN’S ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN AFGHANISTAN

The growth in support from external, nonprofit actors has also been marked. Interviews attested to the increasing and important role that women’s rights groups and advocates can play 

within communities. For example, in the city of Herat, many women mentioned the efforts 

of women’s rights groups and other NGOs providing services for women such as the Women 

Activities and Social Services Association and Voice of Women Afghanistan, which have active legal aid and protection services in the provincial capital. In both Sar-e pol and Jowzjan, 

many women were aware of the women’s shelter in Sar-e Pol City run by Women for Afghan 

Women, and some had turned to it in extreme cases, such as when they had run away from 

home, faced domestic abuse, or were seeking a divorce. Although in many communities, shelters are controversial because the women taken in are perceived to violate social taboos, some 

shelters have been successful in winning local community support. Some shelters have also 

made headway developing positive partnerships with local authorities and police, which can 

improve the chances that women in extreme circumstances will be able to seek help without 

being doubly victimized, an issue discussed at greater length later in this report.

Yet though this NGO sector has expanded since 2002, the presence of such NGOs is still 

limited, particularly outside urban areas. In many of the non-urban communities researched 

for this report, there was little to no NGO presence. Reaching a shelter or a women’s group 

would itself have been a logistical and financial feat and an incredibly dangerous step for a 

woman to take. As a Human Rights Watch report on women jailed for moral crimes noted,

The number of women’s shelters in Afghanistan has increased from 14 in 2011 to 18 in 

2013. However, the capacity of the shelters is far too limited for the number of women 

who require assistance, and fewer than half of the country’s 34 provinces have even 

a single shelter. There are no shelters in the more conservative southern half of the 

country.117

Overall, the growing availability of state and external actors is a huge accomplishment and 

an important safety net for women facing often egregious violations of their rights. Yet though 

these mechanisms have expanded, they are still the least accessible and thus the least relied on 

options for women seeking justice or help. 

Table 5 presents the presence and reputations of state and external mechanisms in each of 

the districts visited, illustrating the varying roles these mechanims play in supporting women’s 

rights and access to justice in each community.

Barriers to State and External Mechanisms

Women faced the most significant barriers when they chose to seek the assistance of state or 

external actors, particularly state mechanisms. All the normative barriers present at the family 

and community level are also present when women try to access state and external mechanisms, but to a much greater degree. The fear of the consequences of going outside the home 

(community stigma or disapproval, physical retaliation from family members, loss of economic 

sustenance, and so on) is even more intense at this level than at the community level. In addition, much as women are skeptical of community mechanisms, women often doubt that 

they will find justice in state mechanisms due to the poor conduct of state actors or the overall 

perception of dysfunctional government service delivery. That social norms tend to bar opportunities for women to represent themselves also makes justice harder to secure.

Despite a deliberate search for women who were open to or had already sought state or 

external mechanisms, only one-third of women interviewed said that they were willing to go 

to the formal system. Most of those said they would go to state and external mechanisms only 

Only one-third of women 

interviewed said that they 

were willing to go to the 

formal system.
36 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 98

Table 5. Roles and Reputations of External Actors 

Province, District Name

• Relationship with or attitude toward government

• Presence of NGOs 

• Availability of advocates or resources for women

Sar-e Pol Province, Provincial Center 

• Limited trust in state officials, fears of corruption, high costs of engagement with government, and long processes; limited resort 

to the police or courts in the district, except in extreme cases

• Limited presence or role for most NGOs in the community; most serve as support agencies

• To some degree; women reported positive role of DoWA and the NGO Women for Afghan Women (WAW) as points of reference 

for disputes; DoWA has become de facto outlet for women in community for dispute resolution support

Sar-e Pol Province, Sangcharak District

• Low rates of referral to the government, limited service provision in the district

• No regular presence of NGOs; NGOs or other external actors provided support only if women came to offices in provincial center

• Neither state nor NGOs engaged in the community overall (much less women’s issues) due to insecure travel from provincial center

Jowzjan Province, Aqcha District

• Positive relationship between provincial governor’s office and community elders in some villages; tension between majority 

populations of Turkmen and Uzbeks, who dominate local governance institutions, and minority Pashtun population 

(in Tabai village)

• Some NGOs in Aqcha District center but focus on livelihoods and education and confined mostly to district center because of insecurity or antigovernment elements in some surrounding villages; past instances of kidnapping of aid workers in communities

• In Tabai, women had little knowledge of NGOs working in the district or of the role and responsibilities of government bodies 

dealing with women’s issues, including DoWA and AIHRC; severe distrust of government representatives among broader community

Kabul Province, Paghman District

• Lack of trust in district governor’s office (long process, high expenses, and corruption); little reference to the police or the 

primary court 

• No permanent NGO presence in Paghman District but located in Kabul Province, and highest saturation of NGOs and 

government services in Afghanistan in nearby Kabul City

• Despite proximity to Kabul, community does not allow outsiders, including law enforcement, to interfere in disputes, much less 

other women’s-related resources; some women mentioned MoWA as a potential resource but few had used it

Daykundi Province, Shahristan District

• Geographic isolation, poor infrastructure, and limited government presence; many people have no access to government services

• NGOs carry out intermittent projects in community, such as livelihood and peacebuilding programming

• Virtually no dedicated district activities focused on women’s support exist; nearest resources in provincial capital

Daykundi Province, Nili District 

• Good physical access to government entities, but many not keen to refer their cases to government because of perceived 

corruption and complicated processes

• Some NGOs provide training for livelihoods and improving economic issues, but few legal or women’s services; limited 

professional legal community and awareness of formal justice system

• DoWA provides some assistance to abused women, but no formal shelter

Herat Province, Injil District 

• Lack of trust in district governor’s office; fear of community censure for taking a case to government; fear of corruption 

and misconduct all deter engagement with state actors

• Some NGOs have provided services in the past, particularly WASSA, which regularly provides legal awareness and counseling 

for women

• WASSA helps many women in community; local women’s shura may refer cases to DoWA or AIHRC if shura cannot resolve issue 

on its own
USIP.ORG 37

WOMEN’S ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN AFGHANISTAN

after they had tried and failed to have the issue resolved in the home or in the community. 

Women resorted to the formal state actors only when faced with a serious issue, such as grave 

physical violence within the home.

Normative barriers can be much stronger vis-à-vis state or external actors, in particular 

collective barriers that deter the entire community (men and women) from going outside it for 

help. Women doubt that they will get a good outcome in state or external mechanisms. In discussing why this is so, the following section also spotlights a number of other practical or pragmatic barriers to accessing such mechanisms, such as lack of education and limited mobility. 

Although many of these barriers are present whether women seek the support of state mechanisms or of other external actors, some are relevant only with regard to state mechanisms.

Normative Barriers

“The women should say goodbye to their family if they go to the court because they have ignored 

the family’s reputation.” —Sakina, thirty-year-old Hazara female

The normative barriers that are present in the family and community levels—notions of what 

a good woman’s role would be, internalization of violence, the assumption that women have 

fewer rights than men, and association of shame and dishonor with exposing private matters 

to “strangers or outsiders” —also prevent or deter women from seeking justice through state or 

external actors, but to a much greater degree. By illustration, when prompted with the question, 

“Can women go to the police or the courts in the community? Why or why not?,” four female 

respondents from Paghman District, Kabul Province, answered as follows:

M: No, her family will not let her go.

Z: Everyone will tease her. If she goes to court, people will think she is a bad woman. 

Her husband will certainly tell her not come back home again.

P: Maybe her husband will beat her if she goes and he will not let her come back home.

D: Yes, women could go, but in practice no one does. It is not good for women to go to 

the police. People say everything behind her. Everyone tries to hide the disputes from 

outsiders and keep them within the family.

Such attitudes were common across all the communities visited. In Jowzjan, a girl tried to 

have her mother serve as a witness for her marriage after the girl had run away, but her uncle 

prevented her mother from going to support the girl. Her mother said, “We did not see my 

daughter because of the stigma she brought for us, and people’s words. We were scared to go 

out of the community and to the court [because it would also bring shame on us].” 118

These normative barriers may be even stronger when it comes to state or external mechanisms because doing so risks violating not only personal or family honor but also the entire 

community’s honor. As such, the normative barriers act as collective barriers for anyone in the 

community who contemplates going outside it and are often collectively reinforced.

Collective Barriers

A woman’s ability to access justice is defined not only by her relationship with her family or 

community (and expectations and attitudes of women within those spheres) but also by the 

relationship between the family or community and external services or authorities. Collective 

barriers stem from the same normative and cultural barriers discussed with regard to family and 

community mechanisms. One of the most significant collective barriers to raising cases with 

state and external actors is the taboo against taking problems outside the community. According 
38 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 98

to one young man whose sentiments echoed others in a focus group discussion, “In the village 

we are living like family and we are coming and going in each other’s houses. If we go to the 

police, it means that we don’t trust our elders. That seems very bad for all of us.” 119 As a member 

of the police force in Paghman District noted, “Here is a rural district, and people still think 

that going to the police or the court is a big sin, and they do not come here.” 120 Even when 

individuals do turn to an external mechanism for support, they often request that their use of 

the mechanism be kept quiet.

Distrust seemed to be greater with state mechanisms than with nongovernmental actors, 

though this depended highly on local community values and preferences. That it does may 

stem from the perception that the government’s methods do not reflect local norms and values. Some communities may have specific grievances against the government. For example, in 

the village of Tabai in Aqcha District, the minority Pashtun population deeply resented the 

predominantly Turkmen and Uzbek local government officials, who they claimed had discriminated against them for years.

The collective taboo limits access to state and external mechanisms generally but is undoubtedly a greater barrier for women. Going to the state or external actors demonstrates that 

a community and its leaders are incapable of resolving issues and protecting the population. It 

is frowned upon when men do it but women doing so provokes a yet fiercer condemnation. In 

the words of one young man, 

It is very shameful for women to go to the police. And it seems very shameful for all of 

her family for a woman to go to the police. But if they go to the police, then it shows our 

shura’s weakness, and it is shameful for all of us. And then the shura will lose its trust 

among the people.121

Because violating this taboo brings collective shame, it is strongly enforced by other members of the community. A young woman commented, 

The other members of a family would not let a woman in the family go to [the government]. But if she were to file a complaint against her family, all the people would say the 

members are cowards who let her do that and the woman is not respectable anymore.122

Women interviewees expressed the very real fear that violating a family’s or a community’s 

honor by raising an issue with external actors could have severe consequences, including being 

shunned or cut off from their family or community. A dissolution of all family and community 

relationships would strip a woman of economic and social protection.

Because of these collective barriers, a community’s willingness to engage with state and external mechanisms varied greatly from one district to another and strongly affected how much 

the women in that community were able to access them. No single model of openness to state 

and external actors fits all communities. Instead, communities fall along a spectrum—from 

those that are relatively open to external intervention or assistance to those that are closed 

and discourage all members from seeking outside help. Most communities in Afghanistan are 

situated toward the closed end of the spectrum, in part for historical reasons and in part as a 

response to generations of conflict. Greater openness is to be found in urban areas; however, 

even urban areas contain some relatively closed communities, as in the case of the Hazara community in the Jebrail area of Herat City.

Relatively open communities tend to make greater use of services offered by NGOs, formal government services and institutions, and actors (even informal actors) in other communities. For example, in Herat City and the immediately surrounding areas, both men and 

women were relatively free to approach external actors, though women still faced greater 

stigma for doing so. In such communities, strategies of ensuring that legal resources are avail-
USIP.ORG 39

WOMEN’S ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN AFGHANISTAN

able to women are likely to have an impact. Focusing on service provision, with the expectation that people will use the services provided, makes practical sense in such instances. This 

research suggests that expanded access to these resources in the past decade in areas such as 

Herat City has significantly improved popular perceptions of external justice services and 

enhanced women’s access to external forums for rights protection.

Consequential Barriers

These normative and collective barriers are often enforced by the consequences a woman faces 

for transgressing them, which, as discussed earlier in the community section, include shame, dishonor for herself or her family, loss of economic support for herself and her children, and physical 

abuse. In addition, a woman is often deterred by the potential consequence of poor or abusive 

conduct by the state or other external actors from whom she seeks help, as well as by the prospect 

of what her life would be like if she were to seek external help. Whereas these consequences may 

follow a woman’s decision to raise a violation at the community level, they are much more likely 

for a woman who goes one step further and seeks help from state or external actors. Also, just as 

the transgression of going to state or external actors is much greater, so are the consequences. The 

likelihood is far higher that a woman will face serious abuse or death, such as through an honor 

killing, or be completely cut off from her family when she goes outside the community.

Poor or Abusive Conduct

Women are afraid that going to formal justice actors will not only be of little help but will 

expose them to physical abuse or prosecution.

Women expressed fears about being physically assaulted or abused by state representatives—particularly members of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Female officers 

in Daykundi reported instances of abuse and rape within the ANSF, and a respondent in Herat 

described the rape of a sixteen-year-old girl by ANSF forces. The violence perpetrated against 

Afghan women who are members of the police force illustrates why many women say they are 

afraid to report sexual assault to authorities. An unpublished UN report leaked to the press 

found that 70 percent of Afghan policewomen interviewed in a nationwide survey had been 

sexually harassed or had experienced sexual assault in the workplace, typically by colleagues.123

Powerful local leaders or members of government have sometimes enabled such abuse, as illustrated in an example provided by an AIHRC representative in Herat:

There was a female police officer who has been [forced to] dance for other male police 

officers in the chief of police’s office in one of the districts. She was then misused and 

raped by the police officers. Then we tried to bring her to the shelter, but . . . a MP 

[Member of Parliament] . . . supported [the male police officers] and told us to send the 

woman back to the province. I told them no and that so long as I am alive, no one will 

take her back [there].124

In addition to the risk of physical violence, women who report crimes such as assault or 

domestic violence are frequently then prosecuted themselves, and often no action is brought 

against the perpetrator. For example, women who flee situations of domestic violence or other 

violations of their rights (for example, the right to choose a marital partner) are frequently 

charged with running away and sometimes with attempted adultery despite the fact that neither are crimes under the Afghan criminal code. Women who report sexual assaults or rape are 

also frequently charged with adultery or charged generally with moral crimes.125 As the head 

of a shelter in Herat commented, “Women are violated by men, then the women are brought 

to the court and found guilty.” 126

Women who report 

sexual assaults or rape

are also frequently 

charged with adultery 

or charged generally 

with moral crimes.
40 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 98

The interviewees included several women who had been arrested and prosecuted when 

they had attempted to flee violence or had sought government assistance with a dispute. 

In some cases, women may be arrested and jailed on very little evidence, and solely due 

to a family member’s complaint. One woman reported that her husband beat her severely, 

threatened to take another wife, and threw her out of the home. She was later arrested after her 

brother-in-law filed a complaint against her for allegedly having an illegal relationship with 

her cousin and running away from home.

No Return to a Normal Life

Another important consequential barrier is that women who turn for help to state actors or to 

NGOs, such as women’s groups or shelters, are likely to find it extremely difficult to return to 

their former lives. Women weigh the inability to reintegrate against the low likelihood of an 

outcome that protects their rights and interests.

This dilemma may be the most extreme for women who seek the support of a women’s 

shelter. The only option for many women who have run away from home, face extreme abuse 

and persecution, and have no other family support is to seek the assistance of a women’s shelter. 

But though shelters may provide immediate economic and physical protection, a frequent consequence may be that a woman is cut off from her long-term support. Women may not be able 

to see or live with their families again because of notions of shame or dishonor associated with 

time spent in a shelter. As one NGO worker in Herat noted, though the situation was better 

than in the past, it is “very difficult to convince parents to accept girls back from the shelter.” 127

Dim Prospects for Justice

“I am innocent. Those men raped me, but I am in the jail now.” —Fatima, thirty-five-yearold Hazara female

Just as women are deterred from going to community mechanisms because they do not think 

they will receive justice, they often do not seek justice through state or external mechanisms for 

the same reason. Reports of state misconduct, incompetence, and malfeasance are rife, ranging from pervasive corruption to officials’ lack of knowledge sufficient to perform their jobs 

competently, to predatory behavior against the population over whom state representatives 

have authority. Conservative views of women and discriminatory decisions and punishments 

are a major issue in state mechanisms, as they are at all levels.Legal aid workers and women’s 

rights activists have noted that even defense counsels may further deprive their female clients 

of their legal protections because they do not agree personally with a female client’s decisions 

or actions or have a poor understanding of her individual rights.128

Incompetency and Lack of Enforcement

The overall poor reputation of state actors, and of judicial actors in particular, also led women 

to believe they would not achieve justice through formal mechanisms. Interviewees frequently 

cited state officials’ inefficiency and incompetence, reflected in long delays and lengthy case 

resolution times, as a reason they would not go to the formal justice system. Both men and 

women interviewees expressed concerns about the transparency of judicial proceedings and the 

honesty of judicial actors. One man summarized the feelings of many when he said, “If you refer 

your case to the government, it means that you have made a big mistake because there will be 

Interviewees frequently 

cited state officials’ 

inefficiency and 

incompetence, reflected 

in long delays and lengthy 

case resolution times, 

as a reason they would 

not go to the formal 

justice system.
USIP.ORG 41

WOMEN’S ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN AFGHANISTAN

no justice. The winner would be the person who paid more bribes.” 129 This view, too, is consistent 

with other studies, which cite high levels of corruption or perceived corruption in the courts.130

Women worried that courts would not actually have the power or even the inclination to 

enforce women’s rights, a justifiable concern in light of available statistics. A December 2013 

report on the enforcement of the EVAW law found that although the preceding year had 

witnessed a 28 percent increase in official reports of violence against women to police and 

prosecutors, actual prosecutions increased by only 2 percent.131 Women said that they did not 

think courts would help them. A woman, Fatima, went to the court to get a divorce from her 

husband and to obtain her mahr (a woman’s financial rights guaranteed through her marriage 

contract), which would support her financially. Her husband threatened her that he would sign 

divorce papers only if she did not request the alimony at court, as was her right. Fatima said she 

did not think the court would or could force her husband to pay, so she ended up not only not 

asking for the alimony but not even going through with the divorce because she would have no 

way to support herself afterward.132

In many instances, the very normative values within the home and community that prevent 

women from accessing state or external forums for dispute resolution are reinforced by government actors, who either force women to refer cases back to the previous forums for resolution 

or punish them for transcending accepted social norms despite their legal right to seek protection (see box 5).

Lack of Female Participation and Representation

Some of the representation issues at the community level are also present at the government 

level and inform women’s belief that they will not get a full and impartial hearing of their 

grievances. First, opportunities for self-representation are limited. State authorities frequently 

demand that women be represented by men at all stages of a formal justice proceeding (and even 

in first making a complaint), despite the fact that Afghan law endows women with autonomy 

and the right to enter contracts, own land, and participate in legal processes.133

Box 5. “A Painful Story”

Women who seek to assert their rights typically need exceptional perseverance, as illustrated 

by this story shared by a defense lawyer in Nili.

“The woman [aged twenty-six] had a painful story. She had lived with her husband for 

twelve years, and then the man decided to divorce her when they had three children and 

she was pregnant again because he was in love with another girl. Her husband had thrown 

her out of their home with their children three times in order to get married to that girl. 

But every time the wife went back to the home and told him that she is not interested in a 

divorce. But the husband beat her, and finally the woman went to the shura to seek help 

[to obtain] a divorce. The shura decided to support her husband to divorce her without any 

alimony. She was a smart woman, though, and she wanted to get her alimony. She came 

to me. We did not want the case to go to the court because it certainly would have been a 

long process, so I sent her to the hoquq department [the local representative office of the 

Ministry of Justice, which is tasked with conciliation or mediation services]. The head of the 

hoquq department tried to get her alimony from her ex-husband. He sent several letters to 

the man to come to his office. The last I knew of the case, it seemed to be working. I hope 

she can solve her problem.”1

1

 Twenty-six-year-old Hazara female divorcee, interview, Nili District, Daykundi Province, September 2012
42 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 98

Family support may also be necessary because of either the cost of legal fees or the difficulty 

of traveling to and from court sessions (a woman traveling unescorted outside her community 

runs contrary to prevalent social taboos). For example, women in a focus group discussion in 

Herat suggested that even in the city of Herat, where women had greater autonomy and access 

to formal justice than women in any of the other research districts, women often could not 

obtain a divorce without a male family member advocating on her behalf.

One woman went to the woleswali with her father to seek a divorce, [but] her husband 

refused to divorce her, so the woman’s father had to pay 2 lakh [200,000 Afghani, or 

approximately $3,500] to his son-in-law to get his daughter’s divorce. Her family supported her, otherwise she would not have been able to do that. She is living with her 

parents now.134

In addition, it is rare for women accessing the justice system or seeking other state support to be helped by a woman on the other side. Despite significant efforts to recruit women, 

female judges, prosecutors, lawyers, and police are few (see table 6). The interviews with women 

working in government or taking on other public roles suggest a long way to go in filling this 

gap. Nearly all of those interviewed reported confronting significant challenges to working, 

from negative perceptions or criticism to threats to outright attacks. Women police officers, for 

example, reported experiencing harassment. One woman noted that 

there is still a negative attitude toward women working as police officers. The people 

always say . . . that we are bad women. But it is not their fault. They do not know that a 

woman should check women and that a woman can share and talk with a woman police 

officer more easily.135

One woman working with a legal aid organization in Daykundi said that men would tell 

her that she was forcing their wives to get divorced and if she did not stop the process they 

would make trouble for her.136

As a result of the lack of women in these positions, the social taboos that prevent women 

from speaking to men outside the family can be a formidable barrier to accessing state mechanisms. This is less of an issue with most nongovernmental actors, which frequently have female 

Table 6. Women’s Representation in the Formal Justice Sector 

and Law Enforcement Services

Female judges 186 (of 1,800)a

Female defense lawyers 300 (of 1,700)b

Provinces with no practicing female attorneys 19 (of 34)c

Government employees who are female 21%d 

Women-friendly police stations (equipped with 

women’s toilets, changing rooms, etc.) 0

a. UNAMA, “Afghanistan’s Female Judges Discuss Challenges in Justice Delivery,” September 4, 2013, http://

unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=12254&ctl=Details&mid=15756&ItemID=37235&language=en-US

b. “More Defense Lawyers Needed for Afghanistan,” European Union Police Mission for Afghanistan (EUPOL). 

www.eupol-afg.eu/?q=node/314

c. AIHRC report, “Citizens Access to Justice,” (2012), 28, www.aihrc.org.af/media/files/AIHRC%20Report%20

on%20Decree%2045%20(English)-final.pdf. The report also notes that there are fewer than five active defense 

attorneys in fifteen provinces, and none at all in three of those provinces.

d. Central Statistics Office of Afghanistan, “2012 report on government employees by ministry and department: Number of Female Government Employees,” 20, http://cso.gov.af/Content/files/03%20Government%20Employees.pdf
USIP.ORG 43

WOMEN’S ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN AFGHANISTAN

staff. In most formal mechanisms, there is effectively no one to whom a woman would feel 

comfortable bringing her case. Many woman also said they would not bother trying because 

they did not believe that men, including those in government, would listen to women’s needs 

or treat them fairly.

Practical Barriers

“I could not find my way if I went out of the community. I do not know where the court is.”

—Gul Bibi, twenty-one-year-old Hazara female

Although most of the barriers discussed so far have been normative or consequential, when it 

comes to accessing state or external mechanisms, a number of practical or pragmatic barriers 

also come into play. Resolving a dispute within the home or the community is quick and relatively easy for women because no fees, distances, or formal legal arguments are involved. But 

taking a case to state or external mechanisms can mean surmounting a number of obstacles, 

including a lack of information about where to go, low levels of literacy, the need to travel great 

distances, and the cost of legal representation fees.

Limited Education and Awareness

Women’s ability to demand rights is impeded by a lack of understanding of basic rights and 

legal protections afforded under Afghan and Islamic law. This is a problem at every level of 

the dispute resolution pyramid, but it is most acute at the topmost level. Women are relatively 

more familiar with the “rules of the game” within the home and even in their community, 

but the rules of the state system are entirely foreign to many potential disputants.137 And, in 

the absence of a basic understanding of the legal principles and rationales being applied by 

state actors, many women find themselves forced to argue using terminology and a normative 

framework with which they are largely or entirely unfamiliar.

For many women, the first and most obvious barrier is lack of basic literacy. “The most 

important barrier,” observed one young woman, “is illiteracy within women. If all women were 

literate, they could easily access justice and find solutions for their problems and establish justice.” 138 When an illiterate woman does obtain counsel or support, she is immediately put in a 

continuing state of dependence on another party (such as a counselor or shelter worker) who 

can read official documents and inform her of her rights and issues of due process.

Most government services rely on some degree of written documentation and an ability to 

work through a complex and challenging bureaucracy. This can be a barrier for both men and 

women, given the high illiteracy rates across Afghanistan and the almost universal lack of legal 

understanding—even of the basic notion of rights—within some communities. However, as a 

rule, women have even higher rates of illiteracy than men and are often cut off from pathways 

of information, given social norms prohibiting them from speaking to men outside their family.

A general lack of understanding of the government’s functions and purpose also means 

that most of the women interviewed had a very limited understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the various state actors. In the absence of that information, most women must 

navigate the justice landscape blindly. “I am a victim of ignorance,” one woman in the Sar-e 

Pol shelter said.139 When asked where they would go if they had to get assistance from the government regarding a dispute, the majority of female respondents said they would seek out the 

DoWA. Women in many communities were unaware that DoWA does not have a mandate 

to provide services to people by law and would in most instances be unable to do more than 

provide ad hoc counseling or advisory services.

The rules of the state 

system are entirely 

foreign to many potential 

disputants...In the absence 

of a basic understanding 

of the legal principles and 

rationales being applied 

by state actors, many 

women find themselves 

forced to argue using 

terminology and a 

normative framework with 

which they are largely or 

entirely unfamiliar.
44 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 98

State mechanisms also present the added challenge of being conducted in an unfamiliar 

language. The majority of formal court proceedings, including all official documentation, are 

conducted in one of the two major national languages—Dari or Pashto—though at least seven 

other primary languages are spoken throughout the country. Poor Dari or Pashto skills are a 

practical challenge for both male and female non-native speakers, but women are often in a 

worse position due to limited opportunities for formal education and economic participation.

Bureaucratic and Administrative Barriers

Often neglected in rights awareness and legal aid campaigns is that women typically lack the 

legal documentation necessary to establish legal protections. Nearly all the married women 

interviewed said that they did not have an official marriage certificate from the state. All of 

them had urfi (customary) documents for their niqah (official marriage in Islam) from the religious leader who performed the wedding ceremony, but few had ever registered the document 

with the state.140 Some of the younger respondents and those with easier access to government 

offices had obtained a marriage certificate, but they were in the minority. Problems can arise 

for a woman without a certificate should she seek a divorce or try to secure mahr because state 

officials may claim that her lack of documentation prevents them from enforcing the payment 

of her mahr. Similarly, a lack of documentation can be troublesome during custody or maintenance claims for children or during inheritance disputes in the event of a spouse’s death.

Women also faced bureaucratic or administrative barriers to seeking assistance within state 

forums when they did not have a tazkera (an official government identification card). Many 

women did have voter registration cards, but few had a tazkera, which is often needed to formally register cases or obtain government assistance.

Limited Mobility

A woman’s ability to seek dispute resolution beyond her home depends heavily on her freedom 

of movement. State services are still primarily available only in urban or semi-urban areas in 

a country where 76 percent of the population still live in rural areas.141 Because of security 

concerns, poor roads and transportation, and limited resources, formal justice actors—such as 

court officials, state conciliators (hoquq), and attorneys— rarely stray outside provincial capitals, 

though some do travel to or operate in district centers. Among formal justice actors, the Afghan National Police had the greatest penetration into rural communities and beyond district 

centers. Even so, the nearest police station might be a two hour walk away, according to a 

number of respondents. Others reported that their district center—and the state representatives who work there—was five hours away.

Mobility and geographic access are thus a serious issue for many rural citizens, but particularly for women, given social norms limiting their movement outside the community, or sometimes even outside their home or compound, unchaperoned. To venture out unchaperoned 

might put a woman into the category of having run away, which in turn would likely lead her 

to be treated as a criminal. Research identified no instances in which women were permitted 

to visit a court, police station, or other external forum completely unhindered or unburdened 

by social prohibitions. In response to the question of why women do not bring cases to the 

formal system, one male community member in Aqcha District explained that they would 

have to be accompanied by a mahram or family member who would implicitly have to agree 

with her decision.142

Mobility and geographic 

access are thus a serious 

issue for many rural 

citizens, but particularly for 

women...To venture out 

unchaperoned might put a 

woman into the category of 

having run away, which in 

turn would likely lead her 

to be treated as a criminal.
USIP.ORG 45

WOMEN’S ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN AFGHANISTAN

In almost all the areas covered by the research (excepting highly conservative areas of Aqcha 

and Paghman Districts), women noted positive changes in women’s ability to move outside their 

homes and within their communities since the fall of the Taliban regime. However, a number of 

female and male respondents noted that the space for public movement had begun to contract 

again in the past few years as perceptions of insecurity in the country as a whole and in local 

communities had increased. If, as many observers expect, security deteriorates in the near future, 

it will likely further inhibit women’s freedom of movement in many areas.

Costs

The brunt of all costs associated with entering the government system must be borne by the 

parties to the conflict. Legal aid is still limited across Afghanistan. Real, and often prohibitive, 

costs include court fees, attorney costs, transportation to and from service providers, associated 

penalties and compensation costs after a decision is made, and bribes. As one young man in a 

focus group discussion remarked, “We don’t have extra money to spend in government offices 

for solving our problems. We can solve our entire problem within the community, so, therefore, 

there has been no need to go to the government to solve our problems.” 143 The costs incurred 

can be an even bigger barrier to women, given their lack of economic independence in most 

cases. Without her family’s financial support, a woman often cannot proceed with a legal case.

Conclusion: Strategizing for Long-Term, Sustainable Impact

Over the past decade, Afghan women have made gains in terms of increased public participation and the realization of some basic protection of their rights and interests. This progress is remarkable given the extent to which women’s rights were denied and ignored under the Taliban. 

Yet, despite the progress, interviews with both men and women indicate that women still face 

enormous obstacles in asserting and defending their rights and interests. Women said repeatedly that they had no choice, no option, or no means to access justice. At all levels of the dispute 

resolution pyramid, women are prevented from fully voicing concerns, raising a grievance, exercising their rights, ensuring their economic and physical protection, or otherwise seeking justice.

Many women’s rights advocates expect these challenges to increase in the near future, given 

the expected drawdown in international support and the potential for greater insecurity and 

violence in the coming years. Although interviewees seldom mentioned it, the possibility of 

the Taliban or other conservative elements gaining a stronger foothold in terms of geographic 

or government control is real and would put women’s rights under even greater strain. A full 

rollback of all rights, as under the previous Taliban regime, seems remote. But the pace of 

change may slow in the coming decade. Absent strong international pressure, many of the 

more progressive legislative victories for women may fall prey to conservative political pressures. The relative increase in women’s mobility may shrink in areas where security decreases or 

conservative actors assume more control.

Given these increased challenges, the need to support women’s access to justice is greater than 

ever. There are no easy solutions and likely no way to completely mitigate or reverse the coming 

restrictions on women’s rights and freedoms. However, it will be possible to preserve at least some 

of the hard-fought gains made since 2002. A long-term strategy of encouraging a shift in deeply 

entrenched normative beliefs and social practices may pay dividends, sowing the seeds for greater 

women’s equality in the future. Some of the assumptions that have underlain women’s access to 

justice strategies should be revisited based on the insights gained in this research.

At all levels of the 

dispute resolution 

pyramid, women are 

prevented from fully 

voicing concerns, raising 

a grievance, exercising 

their rights, ensuring their 

economic and physical 

protection, or otherwise 

seeking justice.
46 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 98

Unpacking Assumptions

Although the research indicates that the women’s rights strategies of the last decade have had 

some positive effect, it also suggests that slightly different approaches or understandings of 

women’s barriers might have increased the impact of these strategies. Women’s rights programming in Afghanistan was based on assumptions that increasing women’s (and men’s) knowledge 

about their rights and improving women’s proximity to resources would enable women to access justice. These assumptions and subsequent programming need to be revisited in light of 

the findings about barriers to justice for women. Lack of awareness and lack of resources are 

certainly significant hurdles to women’s access to justice, but they are only part of the problem. 

Even when women are aware of and physically close to the resources, they often are prevented 

from using these resources or choose not to use them because of the individual and collective 

barriers described.

Cost-Benefit Calculations and Awareness-Raising

Many efforts to improve women’s access to justice since 2002 have been based on an assumption that a lack of knowledge (both among men and women) about women’s rights was the 

main obstacle to women asserting their rights. As a result, most programming activities have 

focused on increasing the awareness of women’s rights, both among men and women.

These findings suggest that while awareness and knowledge—as well as the community 

norms informed by lack of knowledge—do play a role in limiting women’s access to justice, 

they are far from the only factors. The prevailing family and community norms and the consequences for contravening those norms may have more of a limiting role than a woman’s level 

of knowledge. Certain decisions a woman may make may seem to forfeit her individual rights 

or protections and thus may appear ill-advised and the product of coercion or ignorance. Yet 

often these decisions are based on a rational and realistic appraisal by a woman of the limited 

opportunities to pursue justice and of the very likely consequences of choosing to do so. Even 

women who are well aware of their rights may rationally decide not to pursue them.

An Afghan woman is more likely to weigh the potential consequences of her actions for 

her family and surrounding community members than a Western woman is. This results in actions different to those that an individual rights-based perspective might anticipate. Community-based concerns—including the protection of her personal or family honor, the guarantee 

of custodial rights, and the security of the social and economic safety net woven by family connections—may be judged more valuable to a woman than her individual rights. Or the certain 

consequences of contravening social norms may loom larger than the benefit preferred by a 

woman’s rights in theory given the dim prospects for actually having those rights enforced in 

the available forums, whether through family, community, or state mechanisms.

What this suggests is that though awareness-raising, education, and the gradual norm 

change that such activities ideally encourage are core components of improving women’s access 

to justice, they are not sufficient in themselves. They can contribute to change over the long term 

but they may not change a woman’s ability to access justice in the short or medium term because 

of the many other barriers that may take much longer to break down.

Resources and Proximity

The second assumption underpinning women’s rights strategies has been that the availability 

and proximity of resources are the primary determinants of access. Since 2002, legal aid clinics, 
USIP.ORG 47

WOMEN’S ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN AFGHANISTAN

formal justice mechanisms, women’s shelters, and other resources have been provided on a geographic basis wherever funds and infrastructure (human or physical) were available. Although 

no sector or type of gender programming was able to cover all geographic areas, many programs have assumed that the impact would gradually spread like an inkblot. According to this 

theory, making legal services or counseling more available in one area and raising awareness of 

individual rights could increase access and spread awareness to neighboring areas, even if the 

programs did not directly engage those areas.

This research suggests that the inkblot theory of programming impact is misguided: The 

nature of the community matters more than its geographic proximity to services, information, or resources. For example, despite Paghman District’s immediate proximity to the city 

of Kabul, which has the country’s largest concentration of women’s rights resources, very few 

women in Paghman District accessed resources outside the immediate family or community. 

Local community norms were extremely resistant to members of the community going to 

outsiders for help and largely blocked any positive spread of rights protection to women in 

the community.

In the future, the nature of the local community should affect the type of engagement strategy adopted. Evaluating the nature of the target communities should be the first step taken 

before any program is developed. One of the most important factors to assess is how strong the 

stigmas are within a given community against seeking outside help; in other words, one must 

determine where a community falls on the open or closed spectrum discussed earlier. In open 

communities, providing and expanding support via external mechanisms may help women 

because they will have some degree of freedom to access those resources.

However, if strong collective barriers are present, as they are in closed communities, strategies that target women as individuals but that ignore the wider community will have only 

limited impact, and in some cases minimal impact. For example, the minority Pashtun community within Aqcha District mistrusted all state actors (and also many nongovernmental 

actors who worked with the government) because the community perceived the government 

to be dominated by the local majority, non-Pashtun ethnic group and therefore to be biased 

against Pashtuns. Because of these community barriers, no individual—woman or man—in 

the Pashtun Aqcha community would consider resorting to outside actors (governmental or 

nongovernmental) to resolve a dispute or help address a problem. Women’s services might be 

available close by, and a woman might even know about them, but as a member of the Aqcha 

community, she would be unlikely to take advantage of them.

Even in relatively open communities, such as major urban areas, it is important to explore 

subcultures or smaller communities within the city where community barriers or social mores 

may limit access regardless of the openness of the surrounding urban community. If these barriers are not identified, then a large subsection of the population will struggle to obtain access 

to justice, even if resources are close at hand.

Many gender-based intervention strategies in such communities have failed because they 

have misdiagnosed a large part (if not the largest part) of the problem by ignoring or underestimating the scale of collective barriers. In most cases, the collective barriers are stronger 

than the individual ones. Although collective barriers may not be based on gender, women 

may find them even more of a hurdle because, given prevailing conservative norms, women 

are most vulnerable to physical retribution or social ostracism or least likely to test normative 

limits in conservative communities.

Where women’s rights programming seeks to work in closed communities, a narrow focus 

on women’s rights will be ineffective. Programming and awareness campaigns must broaden 
48 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 98

their focus and target the entire community, particularly men, to ensure improved access to or 

acceptance of external mechanisms by the community as a whole.

Breaking Down Barriers

These revisited assumptions suggest a need for a slightly different strategy in the future, 

one whose underlying theory of change is based on a more community-specific and end 

user–focused strategy of access to justice. First, to the extent possible, greater efforts should 

be made to engage with community-level forums. Second, many of the existing strategies 

of awareness-raising should continue but with an understanding that they are long-term 

strategies, which must be committed to on a sustainable basis for years to come. Third, to 

the extent that engagement with formal and external mechanisms continues and is possible 

(which may depend on the reach and openness of successive Afghan governments), efforts 

should be made to break down some of the practical barriers to reaching this top level of the 

dispute resolution pyramid.

Working with Community Mechanisms

Many of the findings support greater investment in community level engagement for two reasons. First, the research suggests that a strategy of focusing purely on government or external 

mechanisms will have little or no impact on the vast majority of women’s conflicts because 

most women cannot overcome the barriers to engaging these mechanisms. Going one level 

down and developing strategies targeted at the community level may improve the reach of 

existing programs and offer new opportunities to improve access to justice.

Second, working to improve women’s justice outcomes via these nonstate mechanisms 

may also be an increasingly necessary pragmatic response to potentially greater limitations 

on state and external mechanisms in the near future. In the coming years, political instability 

and increased physical insecurity may make external mechanisms even harder to access. Many 

expect the Afghan state to have a weaker presence and less control. If so, it will be less able to 

support formal justice mechanisms across the country effectively. In addition, in the past few 

years, conservative forces within the Afghan government have increasingly tried to roll back 

gains in women’s rights. Should these trends continue, threats to women’s protection may 

come from within the Afghan state. In addition, as foreign funds and influence contract, so 

may the geographic reach of NGOs and the services they provide.

Community forums are already the only realistic option for many women seeking justice 

resolution outside their homes. Ignoring community forums—particularly given the potential 

for contracting state and external resources in the near future—risks leaving the vast majority 

of women with little recourse to address rights violations or find help. It is better to work within the reality of what exists than to pretend that the existing system is effective and enforced.

Many women’s groups have been reluctant to engage with community forums because many 

of those forums continue to resist the full application of women’s rights as outlined in Afghan 

and international law. These are valid concerns, but some engagement with these actors may be 

necessary to shift changes in norms in the long term. Trying to shift norms without engaging 

community actors and forums as part of a rights-based strategy may slow the pace of long-term 

change by creating short-term resistance and blowback against what are perceived as outside or 

Western norms—resistance that is likely to strengthen—as the international presence in Afghanistan diminishes. Understanding community perceptions and norms before trying to shift 

them will help practitioners target diminishing resources more strategically.

Ignoring community 

forums—particularly given 

the potential for contracting 

state and external resources 

in the near future—risks 

leaving the vast majority 

of women with little 

recourse to address rights 

violations or find help.
USIP.ORG 49

WOMEN’S ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN AFGHANISTAN

Past approaches should not be abandoned, but an even greater emphasis should be placed 

on local coordination and partnerships and greater attention given to specific community 

needs and blockages than in the past. At the community level, programs may benefit from 

identifying and leveraging opportunities to support individual women who are leading the 

struggle for greater access to justice. Elder women, female members of NSP shuras, female 

teachers, and other respected women are finding opportunities and space to protect women’s 

rights within community forums. This research identified a number of examples of women 

who were active in counseling other women, advocating on their behalf in community forums, 

or providing direct mediation services. Similarly, in many of the communities where research 

was conducted, progressive mullahs and elders were vocal and effective supporters of women’s 

right to access justice.

Efforts to work with these individuals have been made in the past. Examples include empowering women leaders by appointing them or requiring their engagement in local decisionmaking bodies, supporting women leaders economically through microfinance grants or other 

gender-focused employment, and organizing training and education forums for women in a 

community (which have often also acted as de facto support groups and informal counseling 

forums). In addition, some women’s rights groups and legal aid organizations have recently 

invested more time and effort in engaging religious leaders and progressive mullahs, helping 

them to be advocates or to help in community rights outreach.144 All of these are examples of 

ways of leveraging existing opportunities within communities to promote rights. Other models or examples of programming might be developed if greater attention is given to starting 

women’s rights programming from a community-centric approach.

Beyond supporting individual leaders, there may be other ways to work within community traditions and norms to advance women’s protection and resources. For example, certain 

Pashtun communities have a tradition of community protection schemes for women, such 

as community-based safe houses where women can find temporary sanctuary when they are 

victims of a clear breach of community-accepted norms of abuse or domestic violence. Because 

women’s rights groups have tended to reject partnering with community elders, particularly 

within the tribal system, little attention has been given to the possibility of using these traditions to launch community-based and socially acceptable shelters that could reach a substantial 

proportion of the female population in need.

The Afghan state should also try harder to engage with these community mechanisms. 

Some state institutions have tended to oppose engagement with informal mechanisms for dispute resolution. Rearticulating internal ministry procedures to emphasize the need to protect 

vulnerable populations may help state actors at the district level have more positive engagement with informal actors.

Encouraging Long-Term Normative Change

Many of the barriers women face can be reduced or removed only through long-term normative change. For example, the normative barriers related to definitions of a good woman and 

the acceptance of domestic violence that are widespread among both men and women will take 

decades to change as will the consequences women face when they transgress these norms—

including physical, economic, and emotional retaliation. Education may be the only way to 

change discriminatory norms in the long term.

That some progress has already been achieved in the past decade is encouraging. Male and 

female interviewees agreed that there is greater respect for women’s rights today than a dozen 
50 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 98

years ago and that the most extreme abuses of women within the home have decreased over 

the same period. Greater knowledge of rights and greater awareness of the importance of 

protecting those rights seems to have been one important contributing factor. So, too, however, was media programming that portrays strong female characters and explores options 

and pathways for seeking justice. This research suggests that in areas such as the city of Herat, 

where media access was strong and this type of programming was prevalent, it had already begun to change women’s (particularly young women’s) attitudes, broadening their conceptions 

of the rights they have or should have. As one woman in a focus group in Herat said, “The violence against women has reduced since the media broadcast their programs and propaganda, 

which are beneficial for women’s rights. It has caused a very positive impact on the people’s 

understanding about women’s rights.” 145

If the woman in Herat is right, then investment in women’s rights awareness should continue, with donors continuing to fund both short-term, rights-focused programming and 

long-term policies to change educational priorities. If the next Afghan government agrees 

with this approach, then investing in early childhood education and incorporating civic and 

equal rights into the curricula of all state-funded and state-certified schools may be a more 

effective way to anchor awareness-raising about women’s rights than the ad hoc and often 

uncoordinated programming that has taken place in the past. Continued support in the media 

sector may be particularly important given the role it has already played in shaping community 

views on women’s roles and rights. This will require continuing donor funding, as the current 

level and genre of media programming is not sustainable absent external support.

Improving Prospects for Justice

Several of the barriers identified in this report stem from deficits within the mechanisms available to women. At each of the three levels, women were worried that even if they took the risks 

associated with raising an issue, they would still not get justice. Improving the fairness of these 

mechanisms depends in part on fostering long-term normative change and legal awareness. 

Some immediate barriers within community and state mechanisms might also be addressed, 

however.

In both community and state mechanisms, the lack of female representation is a problem. 

Efforts since 2002 to ensure that women take part in public life and play decision-making 

roles—at a community level within bodies such as the NSP shuras and at a government level 

by recruiting more female police and government officials—have had a positive effect. However, this has been one of the most controversial steps taken since 2002 and may be a major target 

for conservatives in the coming difficult period. It is important to try to continue to promote 

women’s autonomy within communities and to boost their participation in the government, 

but greater attention must be given to the risks women face when they assume a public role. 

The government of Afghanistan, international donors, and nongovernmental actors should 

work together to create stronger safeguards for the women who have made the choice to take 

part in public life, particularly female security service personnel. Protecting these women—

especially from physical danger—will not only allow them to perform their roles effectively but 

also encourage others to follow their lead and may over the long term result in mechanisms 

more attuned to women’s needs.

Finally, much more can and should be done to improve the likelihood that women will 

receive a just hearing within state mechanisms. Women will turn to the formal system only 

if they perceive state institutions as effective protectors of their rights. It is critical, therefore, 

It is important to try to 

continue to promote 

women’s autonomy within 

communities and to boost 

their participation in the 

government, but greater 

attention must be given to 

the risks women face when 

they assume a public role.
USIP.ORG 51

WOMEN’S ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN AFGHANISTAN

that efforts to improve respect for women’s rights are sustained. Laws, such as the EVAW 

law, and Afghanistan’s accession to international treaties protective of women’s rights are good 

first steps in state recognition of full rights for women. But there must be greater oversight of 

the implementation of those laws and direct punishments for individuals who break them or 

fail to uphold them. Some important progress has been made in this regard in the last several 

years, but more is needed. Monitoring and enforcement mechanisms for formal justice providers should be improved to ensure that Afghan laws protecting women’s rights are applied in 

practice. Broad judicial discretion tends to reinforce existing patriarchal social norms that deny 

women adequate rights protection within state forums.

Tackling Practical Barriers

Many women face pragmatic barriers to accessing justice. These barriers are most relevant 

when women try to access state and external mechanisms and range from basic mobility and 

transportation issues to fees involved with legal representation to the lack of bureaucratic and 

administrative options.

Continuing investment in legal aid, which is something to which many donors have committed in the coming period, is an important step to responding to these pragmatic needs. 

However, legal aid organizations and service providers must do more to develop models of legal assistance and counseling that are more accessible for women. Some innovative approaches 

are currently being piloted on a small scale: for example, basic legal counseling services being 

provided through health clinics or women’s groups, advice being offered by mobile legal clinics, 

and paralegals from within communities handling a wider range of issues. Given the mobility 

issues women face, the more that services can be brought to women, rather than women going 

to the services, the better women’s access will be.

Women must also be provided the basic tools necessary to access their rights. This research 

suggests that a lack of basic documentation and paperwork is a significant hurdle for many 

women. Women must be able to easily acquire tazkeras, marriage certificates, and other documentary proof of their citizenship, personal status, and economic entitlements. Such documentation is particularly valuable in cases involving inheritance, marriage rights, custody, and lack 

of child support by fathers in cases of divorce or separation.146

Finally, women already know of and make use of some services that offer advice on women’s options for accessing justice and on surmounting some of the pragmatic, consequential, 

and normative barriers that stand in women’s way. In many of the communities where research 

was conducted, DoWA and the AIHRC were the first entities that women approached when 

they wanted to engage with—or at least seek more information about engaging with—the 

formal justice sector. The government of Afghanistan should develop a strategy to empower 

these entities and expand their ability to serve as de facto entry points into the formal justice 

system. Such a strategy might include offering training programs for provincial and district 

representatives on practical skills, such as intake counseling, managing case referral systems, 

providing mediation services, and case tracking. Donors and NGOs should reinforce a positive 

relationship between state entities and nonstate providers of women’s services by developing 

programming that includes outreach or cooperation (including referral where relevant) with 

local branches of DoWA or the AIHRC.

However, while empowering AIHRC and DoWA to deliver some services would be a 

positive step, those entities should not be treated as the sole providers of women’s services, 

nor should all nongovernmental as well as other governmental services for women (such as 
52 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 98

shelters) be placed under their control, as has been suggested in some recent policy debates.147

Women must have the flexibility to go to nongovernmental actors, as well as to government 

bodies, when in need of shelter, counseling, and legal guidance.

The Afghan state also has a responsibility to work with communities in ensuring that 

resources and protection are available for women. Social safety nets for vulnerable groups—a 

category to which most women in Afghanistan belong—must be wide and strong enough to 

catch all who need them. The state, with the support of the international community, should 

make every effort to ensure that all women have access to the financial and support services 

they need if they are to take their disputes to the formal justice sector without fear of being 

ostracized and cast into poverty as a consequence.

Recommendations

Action from both the Afghan government and external donors and programmers is needed. 

These efforts combined will be critical in ensuring women’s long-term and effective access to 

justice.

Afghan Government

• Expand procedural guidelines for line ministries (some exist with some ministries 

already) regarding engagement with nonstate and community-based forums, with an 

emphasis on gender sensitivity and protection of vulnerable populations.

• Improve monitoring and enforcement mechanisms for formal justice providers to 

ensure that Afghan laws protecting women’s rights are applied in practice and that 

those who infringe upon those rights are punished. This will entail greater judicial 

review and oversight of decisions made through lower courts or of charges brought by 

prosecutors that punish women for being victims of particular crimes, such as rape, 

running away, or attempted adultery.

• Make greater efforts to ensure that women are easily able to gain access to tazkeras, 

marriage certificates, and other documentation of their citizenship, personal status, 

and economic rights. Such an identification and registration program may be modeled on voter registration strategies, which have had at least some success in registering large sections of the population in remote areas of the country and providing 

them with documentation. Current efforts to provide electronic tazkeras should have 

a gender-sensitive approach and make a concerted effort to reach the female population who may not have the freedom to come to central registration locations.

• Support the expanded ability of MoWA and DoWA to deliver services for vulnerable 

or at-risk women or victims of violence, such as in-take counseling, victims’ support 

or case tracking, or simply expanded referral services. The targeted training and 

financial support for MoWA and DoWA should support de facto practices of service 

provision that already exist in many provinces and provide technical capacity development, such as case documentation and tracking, counseling, and outreach services, as 

well as basic legal awareness.

• Any such support services should not replace or subsume existing responsibilities of 

state security services or judicial personnel, nor should it be seen as a viable replacement for NGO services. In no way should such support curb the invaluable work 

NGOs do to provide emergency safety nets and shelters. 
USIP.ORG 53

WOMEN’S ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN AFGHANISTAN

• Develop stronger protection mechanisms for women in public service positions and 

encourage greater female representation in the security sector, courts, and criminal 

defense professions.

Donors and Program Implementers

• Commit to long-term support for services for women, including multiyear funding 

for shelters, psychosocial services, the AIHRC, the Commission for the Prevention 

of Violence Against Women, and legal defense funds that support women. Given the 

slow pace of change in this area, continued support to these areas for a number of 

years is essential to preserve and expand on existing gains, especially if the posttransition results in increased pressure on women’s rights.

• Develop programming that includes outreach and cooperation (including referral 

where relevant) with local branches of DoWA and the AIHRC.

• Develop programs to encourage greater women’s participation and representation in 

community forums and through community mechanisms. This may include training 

respected female or male community members to act as paralegals and help women 

represent their interests within community forums.

• Before designing a programming intervention, conduct a context-based needs assessment of the target communities, paying attention not only to the supply side of justice 

services for women but also to gender-based and community barriers to accessing 

justice.

• Clearly define whether program modalities and objectives will primarily target genderbased, individual barriers or nongender-specific community barriers, which also affect 

women’s ability to access justice in the target communities.

• Establish an iterative process of discussion with community leaders and individuals 

about women’s rights protections and disputes to help identify points of intervention 

in particular communities. 

• Continue long-term support for education campaigns for both men and women about 

women’s rights. The results will emerge slowly and will be hard or impossible to 

measure in a single project cycle; donors should therefore be patient and base project 

metrics on longer time frames for normative and attitudinal changes associated with 

knowledge change.

• In relatively closed communities, emphasize gradually changing norms in the community and increasing overall community access to and trust in external 

mechanisms.

• Identify and leverage opportunities for supporting individual women within communities, particularly those women who have relative freedom of movement and the 

capacity to enter negotiations with community actors or to act as local advocates 

within community forums on behalf of women. Look to build on examples of local 

solutions to existing problems regarding women’s participation, representation, and 

access to justice.

• Support the provision of continued, and even expanded, social safety nets and economic opportunities for women. Such programs can help eliminate a key consequential 

barrier affecting many women’s decision of whether to pursue or abdicate their rights.
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PEACEWORKS 98

• Support public programming, such as media programming and women-to-women 

networking programs that model effective ways to make informed choices about 

accessing justice mechanisms, or provide Afghan role models who have successfully 

pursued and obtained their rights or legal protection.

• Do not assume that the inkblot theory works in practice. The only way of being sure 

that a district or community is exposed to a program is to implement that program in 

that community or district. This may mean making tough choices in terms of where 

limited funds are allocated, but it will be a more accurate way of estimating a program’s impact and preparing adequate outreach than assuming that geographic 

proximity is equal to coverage.

Notes

1. Women’s rights, as used in this report, refers to the standards set out under international human rights law 

and Afghan law.

2. For a full review of the efforts to codify women’s rights protections in Afghan law, see the report submitted 

by the Afghan government to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 

Women, December 21, 2011, www.bayefsky.com/reports/afghanistan_cedaw_c_afg_1_2_2011.pdf 

3. Ministry of Women’s Affairs Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “National Action Plan 

for Women: 2008–2018” (MOWA, 2008), http://mowa.gov.af/en/page/6686.

4. But see UNAMA, “Still a Long Way to Go” (Kabul, Afghanistan: UNAMA, December 2012).

5. United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), “Fact Sheet 2010,” http://gender.care2share.

wikispaces.net/file/view/AFGHANISTAN%20CASE%20STUDY.pdf. See also Central Statistics Office 

of Afghanistan, “Government Employees by Ministry and Department,” http://cso.gov.af/Content/files/

03%20Government%20Employees.pdf.

6. Atia Abawi, “Afghan Women Suffer Setback as Parliament Lowers Quota for Female Lawmakers” (NBC 

News, July 18, 2013), http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/07/18/19534549-afghan-women-suffersetback-as-parliament-lowers-quota-for-female-lawmakers.

7. Latifa Hamdi, Head of the Gender Mainstreaming Office at the National Solidarity Program, Afghanistan 

Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, e-mail to the authors, November 13, 2013. 

8. The Ministry of Education website includes a report summarizing the total number of students for the year 

1390 (2011–12) as 2,930,471 girls out of 7,681,927 total students. See “Total Students and Schools,” at the 

Afghan Ministry of Education website, Reports: Total Students and schools, available at http://moe.gov.af/

Content/files/EMIS-Total%20Student%20and%20schools%201390.xls; see also Ashley Jackson, “High 

Stakes: Girls’ Education in Afghanistan” (OXFAM, February 2011); Sean Carberry and Sultan Faizy, “Are 

Afghanistan’s Schools Doing As Well As Touted?” (NPR, October, 24, 2013), www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2013/10/24/240482395/are-afghanistans-schools-doing-as-well-as-touted.

9. Ministry of Public Health, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “Afghanistan Maternal Mortality Survey 

2010.” Despite these declines, Afghanistan still has one of the highest maternal mortality rates in the world. 

10. Twenty-five-year-old Pashtun female, focus group discussion, Tabai Village, Aqcha District, Jowzjan 

Province, June 24, 2012.

11. Sixty-year-old Pashtun mother of community leader, focus group discussion, Tabai Village, Aqcha District, 

Jowzjan Province, June 24, 2012. 

12. Seventeen-year-old Hazara girl, interview, Faizabad Village, Shahristan District, Daykundi Province, 

September 18, 2012.

13. Owen Bowcott, “Afghanistan Worst Place in the World for Women, but India in Top Five,” The Guardian, June 

14, 2011, www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/15/worst-place-women-afghanistan-india. 

14. UNICEF, Afghanistan Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2010/11 Central Statistics Organization of 

Afghanistan, “Afghanistan Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2010/11” (UNICEF, January 2013), http://

cso.gov.af/Content/files/AMICS.pdf. By contrast, the estimated literacy rate for women several years ago 

was 12 percent. See http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/lop/researchpublications/prb0734-e.pdf. 

15. It is one of the six lowest, along with Syria, Algeria, Jordan, Palestine, and Iraq. Neighboring Iran has a 

slightly higher level of female participation in the workforce, at 16.4 percent. See United Nations Development 

Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report 2013: The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse 

World, http://hdr.undp.org/en/2013-report.

16. See UNDP, Rise of the South, 156.
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WOMEN’S ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN AFGHANISTAN

17. In the same declaration, the Ulema council also decreed women’s support for the right to property, inheritance, 

marriage rights and alimony, choice of spouse, and prohibitions against badal (the sale or barter of women), and 

other acts of abuse against women. On some levels, the declaration was a positive endorsement from the religious 

community of many progressive values that the legal community had been pushing for since 2001. But the 

failure to recognize the inherent equality of both sexes potentially undermines the more progressive components. See the English translation of the Ulema Council’s declaration about women, March 2, 2012, at D. 

http://afghanistananalysis.wordpress.com/2012/03/04/english-translation-of-ulema-councils-declarationabout-women/. Original Dari version available http://president.gov.af/fa/news/7489, March 2, 2012. See 

also, http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?ctl=Details&tabid=12254&mid=15756&ItemID=33591. 

18. Afghan Civil Code, articles 70–71, www.asianlii.org/af/legis/laws/clotroacogn353p1977010513551015a650/.

19. UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human 

Rights (OHCHR), “A Long Way to Go: Implementation of the Elimination of Violence against Women 

Law in Afghanistan” (Kabul, Afghanistan: UNAMA, November 2011), 1, www.ohchr.org/Documents/

Countries/AF/UNAMA_Nov2011.pdf. 

20. A disproportionate amount of all indictments and successful prosecutions took place in only in two urban 

areas: Kabul Province, through the Attorney General’s Violence against Women Special Prosecution Unit, 

and in Herat Province. Together, they accounted for nearly 65 percent of all the violence-against-women 

cases in the country during 2012. See UNAMA, “Still a Long Way to Go.” 

21. See, for example, Anastasiya Hozyainova, “Sharia and Women’s Rights in Afghanistan,” Special Report no. 

347 (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, May 2014).

22. Empirical evidence of such trends has not yet been researched or become available publicly, however.

23. Mixed focus group discussions were conducted only in Daykundi at the request of the local community 

leadership.

24. Article 139 of the Afghan Civil Code, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 1976. The 

civil code does not stipulate that the husband has to have cause for a divorce, so long as he is sane (not 

“mentally confused”) and an adult. Article 137 of the Civil Code, www.law.yale.edu/rcw/rcw/jurisdictions/

assc/afghanistan/Afghan_Civil_Code_1976.pdf.

25. Under Article 131 of the Civil Code, tafreeq, or separation, can be initiated by a wife based on specifically 

enumerated causes, such as Article 176 (infirmity, when the husband is a victim of a disease that cannot be 

cured or requires a long time to recover from, and when intercourse with him is completely harmful), Article 

183 (when intercourse is harmful), Article 191 (when the husband refuses alimony or support), and Article 

194 (when the husband has been absent for three years or more). A different means of divorce is available, 

but only for men, under Article 131 of the Civil Code, which does not enumerate these specific cause limitations. See Afghan report to CEDAW, para. 359.

26. Ibid., para. 372. 

27. Fawzia Fakhri, “Till Death Do Us Part,” Afghanistan Today, Herat, October 1, 2010, www.afghanistantoday.org/article/?id=83.

28. Twenty-four-year-old Hazara female divorcee, interview, Nili District, Daykundi Province, September 

2012. 

29. Thirty-two-year-old Tajik female, focus group discussion, Haji Yahya Village, Injil District, Herat Province, 

December 19, 2012. 

30. There are no reliable statistics on the number of divorces in Afghanistan, much less the total number initiated 

by women as opposed to men. As stated by the Afghanistan government’s report to the CEDAW committee: 

“There is not any exact figure of marriages in the country, however, based on the figures given by Supreme 

Court of Afghanistan, from 2006 to 2009 (1385‒1388) 1049 divorce cases have been registered.” See Afghan 

report to CEDAW, para. 356. 

31. Forty-five-year-old Tajik female, interview, Injil health care clinic, Injil District, Herat Province, December 

2012.

32. Thirty-five-year-old Hazara female, focus group discussion, Haji Baba Abbas Village, Herat Province, 

December 17, 2012.

33. Sixteen-year-old Uzbek female, interview, Sar-e Pol City, Sar-e Pol Province, August 2012. 

34. During the Taliban period, the Civil Code was pending. Interpretations of Hanafi jurisprudence and executive decrees by then-head of state Mullah Omar were relied upon in place of the civil code. Mullah Omar 

issued a decree in September 1998 that included four articles related to the issue of running away, which read 

(translation by USIP): “Article 1: In a murder case, Afghan Muslim citizens cannot give a woman as Deyah 

(blood money), compromise or under any other title to the family of the murdered; Article 2: (1) Afghan 

Muslim citizens cannot force a widow to get married with a member of the husband’s family; (2) A widowed 

woman can get married at her full discretion under provisions of Islamic Sharia; Article 3: All staff members 

of the Emarah and judges are obliged to seriously punish those who violate provisions of this decree.” See 

Official Gazette number 788, decree number 104, September 9, 1998, copy on file with authors. 
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PEACEWORKS 98

35. A March 2012 declaration by the Ulema Council expounded at some length on the rights of women under 

Islam, including the right to freely choose her spouse. See the English translation of the Ulema Council’s 

declaration about women, March 2, 2012, at D. http://afghanistananalysis.wordpress.com/2012/03/04/

english-translation-of-ulema-councils-declaration-about-women/. In Dari, http://president.gov.af/fa/

news/7489.

36. Diya Nijhowne and Lauryn Oates, “Living with Violence: A National Report on Domestic Abuse in 

Afghanistan” (Kabul: Global Rights, March 2008).

37. Ibid.

38. Afghan Ministry of Public Health et al., Afghanistan Mortality Survey, table 3.11, “Age at first marriage” 

(2010), 52.

39. “Afghanistan: Child Forced Marriages Still a Common Tradition,” IRIN, Kabul, February 23, 2007, www.

irinnews.org/indepthmain.aspx?InDepthID=28&ReportID=69984. 

40. Ibid., 15.

41. Sixteen-year-old Uzbek female, interview, Sar-e Pol City, Sar-e Pol Province, August 2012. 

42. Twenty-two-year-old Hazara female police officer, focus group discussion, Nili City, Daykundi Province, 

September 13, 2012. 

43. Thirty-year-old Pashtun male head of court, interview, Aqcha District, Jowzjan Province, December 6, 

2012. 

44. Thirty-seven-year-old Tajik female, focus group discussion, Haji Yahya Village, Injil District, Herat 

Province, December 19, 2012.

45. Sixty-year-old Hazara female head of NSP shura in focus group discussion, Qaf Village, Shahristan 

District, Daykundi Province, September 19, 2012. 

46. Sixteen-year-old Uzbek female, interview, Sar-e Pol City, Sar-e Pol Province, August 2012.

47. Twenty-five-year-old Tajik female, interview, Injil health care clinic, Injil District, Herat Province, 

December 2012. 

48. Nijhowne and Oates, “Living with Violence.”

49. Ibid., 1.

50. A 2012 UNAMA report assessing violence against women noted that a nearly 50 percent increase in cases 

of violence reported by the AIHRC from 2011 to 2012 was a sign of greater sensitization to violence against 

women as a crime. See UNAMA, “Still a Long Way to Go,” 2. The AIHRC registered six thousand cases 

of domestic violence in the first six months of 2013. See UNAMA Press Statement, http://unama.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=bTiClHtLkbU%3d&tabid=12316&language=en-US.

51. Article 5 of EVAW articulates twenty-two acts defined as “violence against women,” which include acts of 

physical, emotional, and economic abuse. Law on the Elimination of Violence Against Women 

(Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2009). Article 5 states: The commission of 

the following acts shall be deemed as violence against women: 1. Sexual assault, Rape; 2. Forcing into 

prostitution; 3. Recording the identity of the victim and publishing it in a manner that damage the personality of victim; 4. Setting into flames, using chemicals or other dangerous substances; 5. Forcing into selfimmolation or suicide or using poisonous or other dangerous substances; 6. Causing injury or disability; 7. 

Battery and laceration; 8. Selling and buying women for the purpose or under pretext of marriage; 9. Baad 

(retribution of a woman for a murder, to restore peace etc...); 10. Force marriage; 11. Prohibiting from right 

of marriage or choosing husband; 12. Marriage before the legal age; 13. Abusing, humiliating, intimidating; 

14. Harassment/persecution; 15. Forced isolation; 16. Forcing woman to drug addiction; 17. Depriving from 

inheritance; 18. Preventing from possession of personal property; 19. Deterring from right to education, 

work and access to health services; 20. Forced labor; 21. Marrying more than one wife without observing 

Article 86 of Civil Code; and 22. Denial of relationship.

See Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Justice, Official Gazette, “Law on Elimination of Violence 

against Women (EVAW),” Kabul, August 1, 2009, 6–7, www.laoa.af/laws/law_on_eliminaton_of_violence_against_women.pdf.

52. Women and Children Legal Research Foundation, “Women’s Access to Justice: Problems and Challenges,” 

(2008), 35, www.wclrf.org.af/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Women-Access-To-Justice-Final.pdf.

53. Ibid.

54. Twenty-year-old Hazara female police officer, focus group discussion, Nili City, Daykundi Province, 

September 13, 2012. 

55. Thirty-four-year-old Uzbek male, interview, Aqcha District, Jowzjan Province, June 13, 2012. 

56. Thirty-two-year-old Tajik female, interview, Haji Yahya Village, Injil District, Herat Province, December 

2012. 

57. Forty-five-year-old Tajik female; see note 40. 

58. Thirty-four-year-old Uzbek male; see note 66. 
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59. Twenty-year-old Hazara female police officer, focus group discussion, Nili City, Daykundi Province, 

September 13, 2012. 

60. UNAMA, “Still a Long Way to Go,” 22. 

61. The UNAMA report on the enforcement of the EVAW law noted that a statement by the High Council of 

the Supreme Court clarifying how courts should deal with running-away cases was intended to curtail the 

practice but their clarification has instead been interpreted and used to legitimize a continuation of it. Ibid., 

22‒23. 

62. A Human Rights Watch report on moral crimes noted that they continue to be “rampant” despite increasing 

pardons of women and girls charged with moral crimes by President Hamid Karzai. “I Had to Run Away” 

(Human Rights Watch, Kabul, March 2012). 

63. Ibid., 2–3. Women prison in Afghanistan number 769 (202 in Kabul and 150 in Herat absorbing the most 

female prisoners) out of a total of 25,690. There are thirty-four female prisons of a total of seventy nationwide. See Central Statistics Office, Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, http://cso.gov.af/

Content/files/04%20Social%20Statistics.pdf. 

64. Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Afghanistan: Surge in Women Jailed for ‘Moral Crimes,’” (Human Rights Watch 

Report, May 21, 2013), www.hrw.org/news/2013/05/21/afghanistan-surge-women-jailed-moral-crimes..

65. Thirty-year-old Jugi female, interview, Sar-e Pol City, Sar-e Pol Province, July 2012. 

66. Women who had not received their mahr—the nuptial gift to which a bride is entitled through her marriage 

and allowed an unfettered right to use under Islamic law—or whose families had not received a bride-price 

tended to have even less economic security or independence, which would enable them to leave the marriage 

if needed later. See also Hamid Khan, Practitioner’s Guide: Islamic Law, International Network to Promote 

the Rule of Law, (July 2013), 63, http://inprol.org/sites/default/files/publications/2013/islamic_law_guidejuly_2013_final_0.pdf.

67. Thirty-seven-year-old Tajik female,, focus group discussion, Haji Yahya Village, Injil District, Herat 

Province, December 19, 2012. 

68. Sixty-five-year-old Hazara male, focus group discussion, Kajgeer Village, Shahristan, Daykundi Province, 

September 18, 2012. 

69. Thirty-four-year-old Tajik female, interview, Parachi Village, Paghman District, Kabul Province, April 

2012.

70. John Esposito, ed., The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World, vol. 2, 565.

71. Afghan report to CEDAW, 75. 

72. Women and Children’s Legal Research Foundation, “Women’s Access to Inheritance” (September 2013), 

13, www.wclrf.org.af/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Womens-access-to-inheritance-English-book.pdf. 

73. Thirty-year-old Pashtun male head of court, interview, Aqcha District, Jowzjan Province, December 6, 

2012. 

74. Forty-five-year-old Hazara female in focus group discussion, Qaf Village, Shahristan District, Daykundi 

Province, September 19, 2012.

75. Nijhowne and Oates, “Living with Violence.” 

76. See Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Justice Official Gazette, “Law on Elimination of Violence 

against Women (EVAW),” Kabul, August 1, 2009, 6, www.laoa.af/laws/law_on_eliminaton_of_violence_

against_women.pdf. 

77. UNAMA, “Still a Long Way to Go,” 21. 

78. Article 132 (4) specifies that it is “the duty of the wife to defer to her husband’s inclination for sexual enjoyment.” The law applies only to Shiite citizens and is commonly referred to as the “Shiite Family Law.” The 

unofficial English translation of the Shite Personal Status Law (April 2009) is available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/4a24ed5b2.html. Although many women’s rights advocates argued that this law effectively 

legalized marital rape, others argued that interpretation was not necessarily clear from the text. 

79. UNAMA, “Silence is Violence” (research report prepared for UNAMA and OHCHR, Kabul, 2009), 2, 

available at http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/vaw-english.pdf.

80. Thirty-three-year-old male vaccinator, interview, Aqcha District, Jowzjan Province, June 6, 2012. 

81. Ali Wardak, Daud Saba, and Halima Kazem, Afghanistan Human Development Report 2007: Bridging 

Modernity and Tradition (Kabul: Center for Policy and Human Development and UNDP, 2007), http://

planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/upload/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_hdr2007.pdf. 

82. Thirty-six-year-old Tajik female, interview, Parachi Village, Paghman District, Kabul Province, April 

2012. A mother in the Paghman District described advice she had given her daughter, “Women usually do 

not seek help from the shura, and try to solve their problems within family and do not discuss their problems 

within shura. For instance, as I said before, my daughter has five children, but sometimes she has conflict 

with her husband and comes to me. I advise her to stop the dispute even though her husband may be guilty. 

I do not want her to make her life worse.”

83. Thirty-eight-year-old Pashtun widow, focus group discussion, Paghman District, Kabul Province, April 2012. 
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84. A domestic violence abuse victim who ultimately filed for divorce said, “Everybody said that I should be 

patient. My parents encouraged me to be patient and then I would see good results in my life. But I have not 

seen that” (twenty-one-year-old Hazara female, interview, Hoquq Department, Herat Province, December 

2012). A female police officer describes the principle of modesty as follows: “Women have to hide all things, 

such as domestic violence and disputes and problems within the family” (thirty-eight-year-old Pashtun 

female police officer, interview, Ghalay Amir Village, Paghman District, Kabul Province, April 2012). 

85. Forty-two-year-old Pashtun female teacher, interview, Mohammed Khel Village, Paghman District, Kabul 

Province, April 2012. 

86. The term is common in Hazara language and derives from the terms to make and to hide—roughly translated as one who is able to hide problems (thirty-seven-year-old Hazara female, focus group discussion, Qaf 

Village, Shahristan District, Daykundi Province, September 19, 2012).

87. Ba hawsilah (patient person) is the Dari term used to refer to the act of contrition, apology, or demonstration 

of respect paid by a woman to others. This often includes admitting guilt or wrong, even if it is not the case, 

for the sake of internal family harmony.

88. Thirty-eight-year-old Pashtun widow, focus group discussion, Paghman District, Kabul Province, April 

2012. 

89. Ibid. 

90. Thirty-four-year-old Tajik female, see note 82.

91. Thirty-four-year-old Pashtun woman, focus group discussion, Paghman Town, Paghman District, Kabul 

Province, April 2012.

92. Thirty-four-year-old Tajik female, see note 82.

93. Wardak, Saba, and Kazem, Afghanistan Human Development Report 2007.

94. Even in communities that granted women a relatively greater level of access to community mechanisms, it 

was typically with the permission of or through the representation of a male family member. 

95. Twenty-five-year-old Pashtun female, see note 27.

96. Decisions are often based on an oral code of customary law, which tends to be collectively described as 

Pashtunwali and embraces a wide range of practices that vary by region, tribe, and the local customs. See the 

International Legal Foundation (ILF) report, “The Customary Laws of Afghanistan” (Kabul, 2004), http://

theilf.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/reports-ilfa-customary-laws.pdf. 

97. What distinguishes these semigovernmental shuras from traditional shura formations is that individuals 

have been directly paid to take part in these bodies. In addition, the semi-governmental shuras have the right 

to designate how government or foreign funds are spent within a community. Such power, derived from 

external sources, has helped boost the authority of members of the semi-governmental shuras over other 

areas of community life, including dispute resolution. See also sixty-year-old Pashtun mother of community 

leader, focus group discussion, Tabai Village, Aqcha District, Jowzjan Province, June 24, 2012. 

98. Erica Gaston, Akbar Sarwari, and Arne Strand, “Lessons Learned on Traditional Dispute Resolution in 

Afghanistan” (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, April 2013), http://www.usip.org/sites/default/

files/Traditional_Dispute_Resolution_April2013.pdf. See also Seth Peavy, “Opportunities and Challenges 

for Justice Linkages: Case Studies from Kunduz & Takhar” (Kabul: CPAU, 2012), http://cpau.org.af/

manimages/publications/CPAU_Justice_Linkages_Report2012.pdf. 

99. Fifty-year-old Hazara woman, focus group discussion, Qaf Village, Shahristan District, Daykundi 

Province, September 19, 2012; thirty-two-year-old Tajik female. 

100. Twenty-five-year-old Hazara female, focus group discussion, Faiz Abad Village, Shahristan District, 

Daykundi Province, September 18, 2012.

101. Twenty-three-year-old Hazara female, focus group discussion, Faizabad Village, Shahristan District, 

Daykundi Province, September 18, 2012.

102. Thirty-six-year-old Tajik female head of women’s NSP shura, interview, Parachi Village, Paghman District, 

Kabul Province, April 2012. 

103. Fifteen-year-old Pashtun girl, interview, Sar-e Pol City, Sar-e Pol Province, July 2012.

104. Forty-year-old Pashtun woman, focus group discussion, Tabai Village, Aqcha District, Jowzjan Province, 

June 24, 2012.

105. USAID, “USAID Country Profile, Property Rights and Resource Governance, Afghanistan” (2013), 8. 

http://usaidlandtenure.net/sites/default/files/country-profiles/full-reports/USAID_Land_Tenure_

Afghanistan_Profile.pdf/. An Afghan property law expert noted in an interview with the author that this 

property ownership by women has declined by as much as half since 2002 (January 28, 2013, Kabul). 

106. Labor participation rate, “Percent of Female Population Age 15 and Above,” World Bank Data Bank, http://

data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.FE.ZS-. 

107. Thirty-four-year-old Tajik female, see note 82.

108. Forty-year-old Tajik female, focus group discussion, Sar Asiab Mukhtar Village, Injil District, Herat 

Province, December 23, 2012. 
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109. E-mail correspondence with Rachel Reid, women’s rights advocate, May 3, 2014. 

110. Sylvana Sinha, “Traditional Dispute Resolution and Afghanistan’s Women,” PeaceBrief no. 117 (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, December 2011), www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/PB117.pdf. 

111. Twenty-four-year-old Hazara female, focus group discussion, Haji Baba Abbas Village, Herat City, Herat 

Province, December 17, 2012.

112. Sixty-five-year-old Tajik male shura member, interview, Sar Asiab Mukhtar Village, Injil District, Herat 

Province, December 23, 2012.

113. See, for example, the Pesh Kepa village community, with a female NSP, headed by a fifty- to fifty-five-yearold Hazara woman in Sar-e Pol Province. Also, Homa Rahimi, a thirty-eight-year-old Hazara female, 

director of women’s affairs in Daykundi, claims to have registered 155 women shuras in Daykundi Province. 

114. Thirty-seven-year-old Tajik female teacher and head of Mohammad shura, interview, Haji Yahya Village, 

Injil District, Herat Province, December 18, 2012.

115. Thirty-two-year-old Tajik female, focus group discussion, Haji Yahya Village, Injil District, Herat Province, 

December 19, 2012.

116. Thirty-three-year-old Hazara female divorcee, interview, Shahristan District, Herat Province, December 

2012.

117. HRW, “Afghanistan: Surge in Women Jailed for Moral Crimes.” 

118. Fifty-five-year-old Uzbek woman, interview, Aqcha District, Jowzjan Province, June 2012. 

119. Eighteen-year-old male student, in focus group discussion, Qala Ameer Village, Paghman District, Kabul 

Province, March 13, 2012.

120. Thirty-eight-year-old Pashtun female, see note 104.

121. Thirty-five-year-old male, interview, Mohammad Khil Village, Paghman District, Kabul Province, March 

14, 2012.

122. Thirty-four-year-old Tajik female, see note 82.

123. Alissa Rubin, “Afghan Policewomen Say Sexual Harassment is Rife,” New York Times, September 16, 2013, 

www.nytimes.com/2013/09/17/world/asia/afghan-policewomen-report-high-levels-of-sexual-harassment.

html?_r=0.

124. Forty-five-year-old Uzbek female, interview, Herat City, Herat Province, December 18, 2012.

125. HRW, “Afghanistan: Surge in Women Jailed for Moral Crimes”; HRW, “I Had to Run Away.” 

126. Forty-two-year-old Tajik female executive director of Voice of Women Afghanistan, interview, Herat City, 

Herat Province, January 27, 2013.

127. Forty-two-year old Tajik female, see note 126.

128. Anastasiya Hozyainova, “Sharia and Women’s Rights.”

129. Thirty-eight-year-old Hazara male, focus group discussion, Kajgeer Village, Shahristan District, Daykundi 

Province, September 17, 2012.

130. According to the Asia Foundation Survey of 2013, corruption is perceived as the second biggest problem 

facing Afghanistan after insecurity. See http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/2013AfghanSurvey.pdf, 

5‒6. See also the UNODC report, “Corruption in Afghanistan: Recent Patterns and Integrity Challenges 

in the Public Sector” (in collaboration with Islamic Republic of Afghanistan High Office of Oversight and 

Anti-Corruption, October 2013), 26, www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/corruption/

Corruption_Afghanistan_2013.pdf

131. Alissa Rubin, “Justice for Abused Afghan Women Still Elusive UN Report Says,” New York Times, 

December 9, 2013, www.nytimes.com/2013/12/09/world/asia/justice-for-abused-afghan-women-still-elusive-un-report-says.html?ref=alissajohannsenrubin. 

132. Twenty-four-year-old Hazara girl, interview, Nili District, Daykundi Province, September 15, 2012. 

133. See Constitution of Afghanistan, www.embassyofafghanistan.org/page/constitution 

134. Nineteen-year-old Tajik girl, focus group discussion, Haji Yahya Village, Injil District, Herat Province, 

December 19, 2012.

135. Twenty-year-old police officer, see note 70.

136. Twenty-five-year-old Hazara female, interview, Nili District, Daykundi Province, September 14, 2012.

137. See Caroline Sage, Nicholas Menzies, and Michael Woolcock, “Taking the Rules of the Game Seriously: 

Mainstreaming Justice in Development, The World Bank’s Justice for the Poor Program” (Justice and 

Development Working Paper Series, World Bank, 2009), http://a4id.org/sites/default/files/Taking

%20the%20Rules%20of%20the%20Game%20Seriously%20-%20Mainstreaming%20Justice%20in%20

Development.pdf. 

138. Thirty-four-year-old Tajik female, see note 82.

139. Thirty-year-old Uzbek female, interview, Sar-e Pol City, Sar-e Pol Province, July 2012.

140. Urfi documentation is typically used to refer to customary or religious documents that are similar to contracts but are not universally recognized in all jurisdictions of Afghan courts.
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141. See website of Trading Economics, “Urban Population in Afghanistan,” citing 2012 data from the World 

Bank, www.tradingeconomics.com/afghanistan/urban-population-wb-data.html. 

142. Forty-three-year-old male head of huqoq, interview, Aqcha District, Jowzjan Province, June 12, 2012.

143. Eighteen-year-old male student, focus group discussion, Qala Ameer Village, Paghman District, Kabul 

Province, March 13, 2012. 

144. Hozyainova, “Sharia and Women’s Rights,” note 16. 

145. Thirty-year-old Hazara female, focus group discussion, Haji Baba Abbas Village, Center of Herat, Herat 

Province, December 17, 2012

146. “It would be good if all the women had nikah khat [marriage certificate], but still many of the women do not 

have a tazkera even. It would be better if first of all women had tazkeras. How can they prove that they are 

from Afghanistan when they don’t have any tazkera or nikah khat. The women and their families need to 

provide these documents to women” (Twenty-five-year-old Tajik female, focus group discussion, Haji Yahya 

Village, Injil District, Herat Province, December 19, 2012). 

147. Frud Bezhan, “Afghan Women’s Shelters Face Uncertain Future,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 23, 

2012, www.rferl.org/content/afghanistan-womens-shelters-uncertain-future/24653459.html; see also Human 

Rights Watch, “Afghanistan: Government Takeover of Shelters Threatens Women’s Safety” (February 13, 

2011), www.hrw.org/news/2011/02/13/afghanistan-government-takeover-shelters-threatens-women-s-safety. 
 5

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan 

institution established and funded by Congress. Its goals are to 

help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, promote postconflict 

peacebuilding, and increase conflict-management tools, capacity, and 

intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering 

others with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Chairman of the Board: Steven J. Hadley

Vice Chairman: George E. Moose

Acting President: Kristin Lord

Chief Financial Officer: Michael Graham

Board of Directors

Stephen J. Hadley, (Chair), Principal, RiceHadleyGates, LLC, 

Washington, D.C.• George E. Moose (Vice Chair), Adjunct Professor of 

Practice, The George Washington University, Washington, D.C. • Judy 

Ansley, Former Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security 

Advisor under George W. Bush, Washington, D.C. • Eric Edelman, 

Hertog Distinguished Practitioner in Residence, Johns Hopkins University 

School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D.C. • Joseph 

Eldridge, University Chaplain and Senior Adjunct Professorial Lecturer, 

School of International Service, American University • Kerry Kennedy, 

President, Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights, 

Washington, D.C. • Ikram U. Khan, President, Quality Care Consultants, 

LLC, Las Vegas, Nev. • Stephen D. Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor 

of International Relations, Stanford University, Palo Alto, Calif. • John 

A. Lancaster, Former Executive Director, International Council on Independent Living, Potsdam, N.Y. • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor of Law, 

George Mason University, Fairfax, Va. • J. Robinson West, Chairman, 

PFC Energy, Washington, D.C. • Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice President, 

Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, Washington, D.C.

Members Ex Officio

John Kerry, Secretary of State • Chuck Hagel, Secretary of Defense 

• Gregg F. Martin, Major General, U.S. Army; President, National 

Defense University • Kristin Lord, Acting President, United States 

Institute of Peace (nonvoting)
2 Looking for Justice UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE • 2301 CONSTITUTION AVE., NW • WASHINGTON, DC 20037 • USIP.ORG 

Despite tremendous gains in women’s rights since the fall of the 

Taliban in 2002, Afghan women still face enormous challenges 

to accessing justice. Drawn from more than six months of indepth field research in five Afghan provinces in 2011 and 2012, 

this report documents the pervasive inequality and suffering 

of women across Afghanistan. No interviewees were able to 

describe a situation in which a woman was treated equally to a 

man or could fully exercise her rights to seek justice, and many 

of the cases documented stemmed from violations of women’s 

most fundamental rights, including domestic abuse, rape or 

sexual assault, and punishment or imprisonment for running 

away from home. This report probes how and where women 

pursue justice, what barriers they face, and what the Afghan 

government and international donors and programmers might 

do to help ensure long-term, sustainable access for women to 

justice in Afghanistan.

Related Links 

■ Engaging Afghan Religious Leaders for Women’s Rights by Palwasha L. Kakar 

(Peace Brief, June 2014)

■ Sharia and Women’s Rights in Afghanistan by Anastasiya Hozyainova 

(Special Report, May 2014)

■ Common Strategies for Women in Transition Countries by Steven E. Steiner 

(Peace Brief, September 2013)

■ Peacebuilding Efforts of Women from Afghanistan and Iraq: Lessons in 

Transition by Kathleen Kuehnast, Manal Omar, Steven E. Steiner, and 

Hodei Sultan (Special Report, November 2012)

■ Learning from Women’s Success in the 2010 Afghan Elections by Scott Worden 

and Nina Sudhakar (Special Report, June 2012)

■ Lessons from Women’s Programs in Afghanistan and Iraq by Kathleen 

Kuehnast, Manal Omar, Steven E. Steiner, and Hodei Sultan (Special 

Report, March 2012)

■ Women and War: Power and Protection in the 21st Century edited by Kathleen 

Kuehnast, Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, and Helga Hernes (2011)

■ Gender, Conflict, and Peacebuilding by Kimberly Theidon and Kelly Phenice 

with Elizabeth Murray (Peaceworks, September 2011)

PEACEWORKS • JULY 2014 • NO. 98