NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

__________________________ 

OLIVER C. GEBHART 

Claimant-Appellant, 

v. 

ERIC K. SHINSEKI, SECRETARY OF VETERANS 

AFFAIRS, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

__________________________ 

2010-7050 

__________________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in case no. 09-2476, Judge Alan G. 

Lance, Sr. 

____________________________ 

Decided: June 11, 2010 

____________________________ 

OLIVER C. GEBHART, of Oregon, Missouri, pro se. 

ALEX P. HONTOS, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, of Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee. 

With him on the brief were TONY WEST, Assistant Attorney General, JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, Director, and TODD M.

HUGHES, Deputy Director. Of counsel on the brief were 
GEBHART v. DVA 2

DAVID J. BARRANS, Deputy Assistant General Counsel, 

and TRACEY P. WARREN, Attorney, United States Department of Veterans Affairs, Office of the General Counsel, 

Washington, DC. 

__________________________ 

Before LOURIE, LINN, and DYK, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

Oliver Gebhart appeals from the decision of the 

United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“the 

Veterans Court”) dismissing for lack of jurisdiction his 

petition for the extraordinary relief of a writ of mandamus. Gebhart v. Shinseki, No. 09-2476 (Vet. App. Nov. 

30, 2009). Because Gebhart has not shown the Veterans 

Court to have erred in its conclusion, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Gebhart filed a petition for extraordinary relief in the 

form of a writ of mandamus at the Veterans Court in 

June 2009. The petition referred to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals’ (“the Board’s”) “fail[ure] to recognize the 

receipt of Dpt. Of Veterans Affairs payment voucher from 

the WACO/AUSTIN, TX, DVA Processing Center of the 

Financial Management Service of the Philadelphia Financial Center.” Gebhart argued that “[i]njunctive relief can 

be used resolving and reconciling the unceasing use of a 

Remand Order.” 

In response to an order from the Veterans Court that 

he produce a copy of the contested Board decision, 

Gebhart filed a single page of a decision. That page 

appears to be a remand to the regional office on a claim 

for service connection for a heart disorder based on “the 

above development.” There is no date on the excerpted 
3 GEBHART v. DVA

page; however, it does state that the “claim must be 

afforded expeditious treatment.” 

The Veterans Court first determined that Gebhart 

“fail[ed] to satisfy any of the criteria governing the grant 

of a writ of mandamus.” The court then continued that, 

because it could not discern what relief Gebhart sought, it 

was “unable to discern whether issuance of the writ would 

aid in its prospective jurisdiction and, as a result, must 

hold that it is without jurisdiction to entertain the petition.” 

Gebhart timely appealed to this court. His initial 

brief was rejected for failure to comply with the court 

rules. A corrected brief was filed after the government 

had filed its response. A brief titled “Supplemental Merits Briefs [sic] pro se et en banc” attaching information 

relating to a criminal case against the manufacturers of 

certain defibrillators was considered to be Gebhart’s reply 

brief. We have reviewed all of these documents. Our 

jurisdiction in appeals from the Veterans Court rests on 

38 U.S.C. § 7292. 

DISCUSSION

The scope of our review of a Veterans Court decision 

is limited by statute. See 38 U.S.C. § 7292. Under section 

7292(a), we may review a decision by the Veterans Court 

with respect to the validity of “any statute or regulation . . 

. or any interpretation thereof (other than a determination as to a factual matter) that was relied on by the 

[Veterans] Court in making the decision.” Absent a 

constitutional issue, we may not review challenges to 

factual determinations or challenges to the application of 

a law or regulation to facts. Id. § 7292(d)(2). 

We review legal determinations without deference. 

See Bingham v. Nicholson, 421 F.3d 1346, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 
GEBHART v. DVA 4

2005). A determination as to the jurisdiction of the Veterans Court is legal in nature. See Maggitt v. West, 202 

F.3d 1370, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The denial of a petition 

for a writ of mandamus is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Lamb v. Principi, 284 F.3d 1378, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 

2002). 

Gebhart does not state the basis for his appeal of the 

Veterans Court decision dismissing his petition for mandamus for lack of jurisdiction.1 Rather, Gebhart appears 

to be challenging an underlying remand order issued by 

the Board to determine service connection. Gebhart also 

appears to challenge the assignment of two different 

docket numbers to his two previous appeals to the Veterans Court, “in effect double jeopardizing the Veteran.” 

However, neither of these issues is properly before us, and 

we address them only insofar as they relate to the dismissal by the Veterans Court for a lack of jurisdiction. 

The government argues that the Veterans Court correctly found that Gebhart failed to satisfy the criteria 

governing the grant of a writ of mandamus. Specifically, 

the government argues that Gebhart did not (1) show that 

he lacked adequate alternative means to attain the desired relief, thus ensuring that the writ is not used as a 

substitute for the appeals process; (2) demonstrate a clear 

and indisputable right to the writ; and (3) convince the 

 1 Gebhart similarly did not address the decision of 

the Veterans Court in either of his two previous appeals 

of Veterans Court decisions dismissing and denying his 

two previous petitions for mandamus, respectively. See

Gebhart v. Peake, No. 08-7037 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Gebhart 

does not address the decision of the Veterans Court 

denying his petition for mandamus.”); Gebhart v. Nicholson, 154 Fed. App’x 207, 209 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Gebhart 

does not address the decision of the Veterans Court or 

reference his petition.”). 
5 GEBHART v. DVA

court that the issuance of a writ is warranted, given the 

circumstance. See, e.g., Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. D.C., 542 

U.S. 367, 380-81 (2004). The government styles the 

decision of the Veterans Court as a denial of Gebhart’s 

petition for mandamus, and argues that such denial was 

well within the discretion of the court. However, the 

decision appealed was a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction 

and that is the decision we now review. 

We hold that the Veterans Court permissibly found 

that it lacked jurisdiction. The Veterans Court has authority to issue extraordinary writs under the All Writs 

Act in aid of its potential jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 

1651(a). However, the court “lacks appellate jurisdiction 

over any issue that cannot be the subject of a Board [of 

Veterans Appeals] decision.” Gebhart v. Nicholson, 154 

Fed. App’x 207, 209 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (nonprecedential) 

(quoting Yi v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 265, 267 (2001)). 

Here, the court was unable to determine the factual bases 

for jurisdiction because it was unclear what decision was 

being petitioned from and on what basis, despite a request for a copy of the decision. As a result, the court 

determined it was unable to conclude that any writ it 

might grant would be “in aid of its jurisdiction.” We have 

received no argument that the court erred in this finding, 

nor is there anything in the record to the contrary. 

Finally, we hasten to note for the benefit of this pro se 

veteran, that in view of the Board’s remand for the regional office to determine possible service connection for a 

heart disorder, Gebhart presently fails to satisfy the 

criterion for mandamus that he lacks any other avenue of 

relief. 
GEBHART v. DVA 6

Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Veterans 

Court dismissing Gebhart’s petition for mandamus relief 

for lack of jurisdiction. 

AFFIRMED