History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

and National Policy

1957-1960

20000920 124

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History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

And National Policy

Volume VII

1957-1960

Byron R. Fairchild

Walter S. Poole

Office of Joint History

Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Washington, DC 2000
The Library of Congress has catalogued Volume V as follows:

Watson, Robert J., 1920-

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1953-1954.

(History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff/Robert J. Watson; v.5)

Includes index.

1. United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff—History. 2. United StatesMilitary policy. I. Title. II. Series: Watson, Robert J., 1920-

History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; v. 5.

UA23.W366 1986 355.3'3042'0973 86-4621

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office

Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328

ISBN 0-16-050039-7
The Library of Congress has catalogued Volume V as follows:

Watson, Robert J., 1920-

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1953-1954.

(History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff/Robert J. Watson; v.5)

Includes index.

1. United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff—History. 2. United StatesMilitary policy. I. Title. II. Series: Watson, Robert J., 1920-

History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; v. 5.

UA23.W366 1986 355.3'3042'0973 86-4621

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office

Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOR Washington, DC 20402-9328

ISBN 0-16-050039-7

Preceding Page's Blank
Foreword

Established during World War II to advise the President regarding the strategic

direction of the armed forces of the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)

continued in existence after the war and, as military advisers and planners, have

played a significant role in the development of national policy. Knowledge of JCS

relations with the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of

Defense in the years since World War II is essential to an understanding of their

current work. An account of their activity in peacetime and during times of crisis

provides, moreover, an important series of chapters in the military history of the

United States. For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that an official

history be written for the record. Its value for instructional purposes, for the

orientation of officers newly assigned to the JCS organization and as a source of

information for staff studies, will be readily recognized.

The series, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, treats the activities of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff since the close of World War II. Because of the nature of

the activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as the sensitivity of the sources,

the volumes of the series were originally prepared in classified form.

Classification designations, in the text and footnotes, are those that appeared in

the original classified volume.

Volume VII describes JCS activities during the period 1957-1960 except for

activities related to Indochina which are covered in a separate series. Although

only the names of its principal authors appear on the title page, the preparation

of Volume VII was truly a collaborative effort. Originally written in the 1960s, the

classified publication had thirteen chapters. Initial drafts of eight chapters as well

as portions of several others were written by Dr. Byron R. Fairchild. After Dr.

Fairchild accepted a position with the Historical Office of the Department of

State, the remaining chapters were completed by Dr. Albert C. Stillson, Mrs.

Anne C. Webb, Mr. Morris J. MacGregor, and Mr. Kent S. Larsen. Revision and

editing were carried out by Mr. Vernon E. Davis; Miss Anna M. Siney prepared

the manuscript for classified publication.

During the early 1990s, Dr. Walter S. Poole reworked the classified

manuscript to prepare it for publication in its unclassified form. In addition to

reorganizing it to conform to the structure of earlier volumes in The Joint Chiefs of

Staff and National Policy series, Dr. Poole took advantage of the great amount of

material that had become available as well as the perspective afforded by thirty

years. While chapters 1 and 3 are largely Dr. Poole's work, chapters 2, 6, 9, and 11

are taken from the original with only minor revision. Chapters 5, 7, 8, 10, 13, 14,

and 15 contain material from the original version together with substantial

additions and revisions by Dr. Poole. Chapters 4 and 12 and the conclusion were

written by Dr. Poole. Mr. Willard J. Webb reviewed and critiqued the unclassified

version. Ms. Susan Carroll prepared the Index, and Ms. Penny Norman prepared

the manuscript for publication.
Foreword

The volume was reviewed for declassification by the appropriate US

Government departments and agencies and cleared for release. The volume is an

official publication of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but, inasmuch as the text has not

been considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it must be construed as descriptive

only and does not constitute the official position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on

any subject.

Washington, DC DAVID A. ARMSTRONG

February 2000 Director for Joint History

VI
Preface

From forty years' perspective, the second Eisenhower administration's record

in national security affairs seems better than many rated it at the time. The danger

posed by a "missile gap" was countered without resorting to massive

expenditures. Threats to West Berlin and to the "offshore islands" of Quemoy and

Matsu were mastered by relatively low-key responses. An intervention in Lebanon

was short and successful. Cuba, the Congo, and Southeast Asia remained volatile,

however, and all were approaching crisis states by January 1961.

The Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 designated the Joint

Chiefs of Staff as staff assisting the Secretary of Defense in his exercise of

direction over the unified and specified commands. That, in turn, prompted a

reorganization of the Joint Staff. The joint committees (Strategic Plans,

Intelligence, and Logistics) that had existed since 1947 were abolished; the

numbered "J" Directorates of a conventional staff replaced them.

General Nathan F. Twining, USAF, served as Chairman from August 1957

until September 1960. His contributions, although not well known, were

significant. He sided with the President, and broke with the Air Force, in

maintaining that a costly crash effort to develop and deploy missiles was

unnecessary. Twining also backed Eisenhower, and opposed the Service Chiefs,

in concluding that modest steps would be enough to make the Soviets shy away

from a confrontation over Berlin. The Chairman was instrumental, when the

Service Chiefs became deadlocked, in working out solutions that created the

Single Integrated Operational Plan and the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff.

An official history is the work of many hands, this one more so than most. In

writing and revising chapters, I built upon foundations laid by Dr. Byron R.

Fairchild and his collaborators. Mr. Willard J. Webb, Chief of what was then the

JCS Historical Division, reviewed my manuscript and proposed numerous

improvements. Dr. Robert J. Watson, whose authoritative History of the Office of

the Secretary of Defense: Into the Missile Age, 1956-1960 was published in 1997,

made valuable suggestions and provided information gathered from his research

at the Eisenhower Library. For any errors of fact or interpretation, however, I

alone bear responsibility.

WALTER S. POOLE

Vll
Contents

1. Working the Machinery of Government 1

An Experienced Team 2

The Structure of Decisionmaking 4

The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 4

The Joint Program for Planning 7

2. Backing Away from "Massive Retaliation" 11

Emphasizing a Nuclear Response 11

No Change of Course 17

A Nonnuclear Conflict Becomes Conceivable 23

A Final Revision 28

3. Budget Ceilings Shape Force Levels 31

1957 31

1958 36

1959 38

1960 40

Conclusion 42

4. Closing the "Missile Gap" 43

The "Sputnik" Supplemental 43

Setting Program Priorities 47

Achievements Exceed Expectations 50

The Single Integrated Operational Plan 51

5. Arms Control: The Moratorium on Nuclear Testing 55

The Linkage Issue 55

Separating the Testing Issue 61

The Decision to Suspend Testing 63

The "Threshold" Debate 66

The Bubble Bursts 70

Summation 72

IX
Contents

6. Maintaining the Military Assistance Program 73

1957 74

1958 79

1959 81

I960 85

Conclusion 86

Major Force Objectives 88

7. NATO Emphasizes Nuclear Capabilities 95

A New Strategic Concept 96

Cutbacks in Conventional Commitments? 98

MC-70 Sets Slightly Lower Force Goals 100

Cutting Back the US Commitment? 102

A Nuclear Arsenal for NATO 104

Origins of the Multilateral Force 107

8. Germany and Berlin 113

US Objectives Remain Unchanged 113

Reacting to the Rapacki Plan 117

Focusing on Prevention of Surprise Attack 120

Challenge over Berlin 125

9. The Middle East:

Implementing the Eisenhower Doctrine 135

Limitations of the Eisenhower Doctrine 135

Planning to Meet Aggression 136

Accenting the Political Dimension 143

Aiding Iraq and Jordan 145

Losing Bases in Morocco 148

10. The Middle East: Lebanon and After 151

Prelude to Intervention 151

The Marines Go Ashore 155

Stabilization Achieved 157

War Plans Reworked 160

Containing Nasser 163

11. What Role for CENTO? 167

The Baghdad Pact's Demise 167

CENTO Inherits Seemingly Insoluble Problems 170

Reflections 175
Contents

12. Cuba Becomes a Communist State 177

The Fall of Batista 177

Confrontation with Castro 180

Conclusion 182

13. The Cold War Comes to Africa 183

Defining a More Active Policy 183

The Congo: UN or US Intervention? 187

Pitfalls of Planning 193

Conclusion 196

14. The Far East: Holding the Line 197

Defining a Defense Perimeter 197

Modernizing Forces in South Korea 198

Reducing the US Presence in Japan 202

Revising the Japanese Security Treaty 205

Defining Taiwan's Role 207

Practicing Brinkmanship over Quemoy and Matsu 209

15. The Far East: Fissures in Containment 217

Failure To Mesh Planning: ANZUS and SEATO 217

Failure of Collective Action: Indonesia and Laos 221

16. Conclusion 227

Map: Deployment of United Nations Units 193

Abbreviations and Acronyms 231

Principal Civilian and Military Officers 233

Bibliographic Note 235

Notes 237

Index 263

XI
History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

and National Policy

1957-1960
1

Working the Machinery of Government

The antagonism between the United States and the Soviet Union, which had

come to seem permanent and implacable, dominated the international scene as

President Dwight D. Eisenhower entered his second term of office in January

1957. Lack of success in solving such persistent problems as the arms race and

the division of Germany, inability to prevent what looked like communist fishing

in troubled waters, and the apparently irresistible momentum of the Cold War

had taken on more menacing aspects as both superpowers acquired sizable

nuclear arsenals. At the time of President Eisenhower's second inauguration,

there still remained threatening repercussions from the Hungarian revolt and the

Suez crisis. For many people, however, the implications of an emerging "balance

of terror" had become the overriding concern. Peace seemed to depend upon

each superpower possessing the ability to destroy the other.

During the latter half of 1957, that balance seemed to shift markedly in the

Soviet Union's favor. On 26 August, 1957, Moscow announced the successful test

flight of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), something the United States

had not done. Then, dramatically, the Soviets launched the world's first earth

satellite on 4 October. "Sputnik," weighing 184 pounds, circled the earth every

ninety minutes. A second satellite, weighing 1,120 pounds and carrying a live

dog, went into orbit on 3 November. These feats, in the judgment of one contemporary observer, "provided the USSR and international Communism with a

world-wide psychological victory of the first order."1 Militarily, the survivability

of US strategic retaliatory forces seemed doubtful. How soon might the Soviets

have enough ICBMs to destroy US bombers by surprise attack?

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, who were military advisers to the President and the

National Security Council (NSC), faced what many believed would be a time of

mortal peril. First and foremost, the nuclear deterrent had to be kept viable.

Which missile programs should be accelerated and at what pace? Should reliance

on massive nuclear retaliation be modified to put more stress on conventional

capabilities? A succession of confrontations kept tensions high. Berlin, Lebanon,

and the "offshore islands" of Quemoy and Matsu became crisis points during
JCS and National Policy

1958-1959. The year 1960 witnessed not only troubles over Cuba, Laos, and the

Congo but also the downing of an American spy plane deep in Soviet territory

and the collapse of a summit meeting. As the Eisenhower years ended, the Cold

War was in a frigid state.

For many Americans, the late 1950s were a time of gnawing anxiety. A sizable

number became convinced that the West was losing the Cold War. The Joint

Chiefs of Staff gave voice to a fairly widespread feeling when, in March 1959, they

warned that the USSR was pursuing a "bold, dynamic, expansive strategy"

designed to achieve global hegemony. The free world, they charged, often reacted

with "passivity and lack of initiative." Whenever the Soviets created a crisis, they

complained, the West's standard response seemed to be, "How far can we retreat

from the status quo but still not seriously jeopardize our security or prestige?"2To

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this was thinly disguised defeatism. Events would prove

the pessimists wrong but at the time such feelings were very deeply held.

An Experienced Team

No President has entered office with more experience in national security

affairs than Dwight Eisenhower. Taken together, his successes in World War

II, his tenure as Army Chief of Staff, and his achievements while serving the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were unrivaled. Yet, during his first

term as President, Eisenhower's hallmark in dealing with military matters was

restraint. He kept a tight rein on defense spending and tried to avoid an atmosphere of constant crisis when dealing with communist challenges. Secretary of

State John Foster Dulles, who was the President's closest adviser about foreign

affairs, held some views that were more moderate and flexible than his public

image would have suggested. But Mr. Dulles did not survive Eisenhower's second term. A recurrence of colon cancer forced him to resign on 18 April 1959; he

died a month later. Under Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, who succeeded

him, did not attain the preeminence that Dulles had enjoyed.

Charles E. Wilson, a former president of General Motors, had been Secretary

of Defense since 1953. He concentrated on defense management, mediating many

roles and missions disputes among the Services. Wilson left office on 8 October

1957. His successor, Neil H. McElroy had been the head of Procter and Gamble;

he also devoted himself to managerial streamlining. McElroy agreed to serve for

only two years and resigned, some felt, just when he was starting to master the

job. The next Secretary was Thomas S. Gates, Jr., an investment banker who had

served as Under Secretary and then Secretary of the Navy and, finally, as Under

Secretary of Defense. Among other things, Gates instituted the practice of meeting regularly with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The men who held the post of Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, supported President Eisenhower's primary reliance on massive nuclear retaliation. During Eisenhower's first term, Admiral Arthur W Radford pressed hard for sizable conventional cutbacks, particularly in the Army, and thereby provoked sharp
Working the Machinery ofGovernment

disagreements among the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When Radford retired on 15

August 1957, the Chief of Staff, Air Force, succeeded him. General Nathan F.

Twining came to the job with wide experience in joint matters. In 1943, he had

been placed in tactical command of all Army, Navy, Marine, and allied air forces

in the South Pacific. Later that year, he transferred to the post of Commander of

Allied Strategic Air Forces in the Mediterranean. Twining advanced to Vice Chief

of Staff, Air Force, in 1950 and to the Chief of Staff in 1953. As Chairman, he reacted to Sputnik and the "missile gap" by supporting the President's policy of moderate budget increases rather than the Air Force's call for drastic measures. Twining proved less outspoken than Radford on how far to go in cutting conventional

forces and in confronting Communist China.

Inevitably, reliance upon nuclear retaliation left the Army as the least favored

Service when Defense budgets were being drawn up. General Maxwell D. Taylor

served as Chief of Staff from 30 June 1955 until 1 July 1959. He had commanded

the 101st Airborne Division in Europe during 1944-1945 and the Eighth Army in

Korea during 1953. But his tour as Chief of Staff proved an unhappy experience.

Constantly, Taylor found himself at odds with the Secretary of Defense and the

President. Soon after retiring, he published The Uncertain Trumpet in which he

criticized massive retaliation as outdated and called for "flexible response" with

greater reliance on conventional forces.

General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA, Taylor's successor, had unusually broad

politico-military experience. During World War II, he had served as Deputy Chief

of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, and played a key

part in negotiating the surrender of German forces in Italy and southern Austria.

In 1949, he was named first Director of the Office of Military Assistance. In 1957,

he became the Army's Vice Chief of Staff and then Chief of Staff two years later.

General Twining decided to retire on 30 September 1960, before a new administration took office. He knew, also, that the President wanted to make General

Lemnitzer Chairman.3 When Lemnitzer moved up, General George H. Decker

replaced him as Army Chief of Staff.

The Navy enjoyed an unusual continuity of leadership. Admiral Arleigh Burke

had won distinction in the war against Japan, first as commander of Destroyer

Squadron 23 and then as chief of staff to the Commander, Fast Carrier Task Force

58. During the Korean War, he spent six months as a member of the United Nations

(UN) delegation negotiating a military armistice. Burke was only a rear admiral,

eightieth in seniority, when President Eisenhower selected him to be Chief of

Naval Operations in 1955. After assuming office, Admiral Burke gave great emphasis to the Polaris ballistic missile submarine program, which moved forward rapidly. The President reappointed him in 1957 and, in 1959, considered Burke's performance good enough to nominate him for an unprecedented third term.

When General Twining became Chairman, General Thomas D. White succeeded him as Chief of Staff, Air Force. General White had spent most of World

War II in the United States, going to the Pacific only in September 1944. Subsequently, Pentagon assignments culminated in his 1953 appointment as Vice Chief

of Staff, Air Force. General Randolph McC. Pate served as Commandant of the

Marine Corps from 1 January 1956 until 31 December 1959. Repercussions from a
]CS and National Policy

training mishap in which six recruits drowned troubled General Pate's tenure.

The next Commandant, General David M. Shoup, was a colorful, blunt-spoken

man who had won the Congressional Medal of Honor at Tarawa in 1943.

The Structure of Decisionmaking

President Eisenhower, who was accustomed to a military staff organization,

constructed a somewhat similar structure for making and implementing

national security policy. A highly formalized, pyramidal organization came into

being. During eight years, the President presided over 339 meetings of the

National Security Council. Usually, the NSC considered papers which were

derived from twice-a-week, three-hour-long sessions of the NSC Planning Board.

The Board, which included a Joint Chiefs of Staff 0CS) representative, had broad

representation from executive agencies; the President's Special Assistant for

National Security Affairs served as its chairman. Its task, basically, lay in producing recommendations that reduced differences to "as clearly defined and narrow

an area as possible." Nonetheless, about two-thirds of the papers that went forward to the NSC did contain "splits."

The NSC meetings often did not go beyond debate and discussion; President

Eisenhower usually rendered his decision several days later. The task of implementation then fell to the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB). The Under Secretary of State (during 1960-1961, the President's Special Assistant for National

Security Affairs) chaired this body; the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the

Director, Central Intelligence, were among its members. Unlike the Planning

Board, it had no JCS representative. The OCB acquired a reputation as little more

than a paper mill, and President Eisenhower was not wholly satisfied with its

performance. According to one participant, however, the Board functioned best

when it functioned most informally, as when members exchanged views at weekly luncheons. In any case, the President did not wholly rely upon formal mechanisms. Often, during crises or after NSC meetings adjourned, he would talk with

a small group of trusted advisers. Here the President's Staff Secretary, Brigadier

General Andrew J. Goodpaster, USA, acted like a combined NSC Planning Board

and OCB.4The Joint Chiefs of Staff participated fully in this process. They critiqued the Planning Board's drafts; the Chairman or his representative attended

NSC meetings. Even when President Eisenhower resorted to small meetings in

the Oval Office, the Chairman took part when matters with military implications

were at issue.

The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958

R

evolutionary advances in military technology, particularly in missile delivery systems, underscored the need for a more direct and responsive chain of
Working the Machinery of Government

command. President Eisenhower believed that, just when Sputnik was raising

alarm, interservice feuding had undermined public confidence in military leadership. On 10 December 1957, General White urged his JCS colleagues to launch their

own study of Defense reorganization. Currently, he claimed, major JCS decisions

were being delayed and interservice controversies eluded solution. As a result,

civilian authorities had to render judgment upon purely military matters. One

week later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that an ad hoc committee headed by

Major General Earle G. Wheeler, USA, would review these matters, focusing on the

system for directing military forces in peace and wartime. This interservice committee submitted findings late in January 1958. Among other things, it suggested

that the Joint Chiefs of Staff assume operational responsibilities and that they,

rather than the Service Chiefs, act as executive agents for the unified commands.5

At the Pentagon, on 25 January, President Eisenhower conferred with senior

military and civilian officials. Admiral Radford, who had retired five months earlier, observed that the Service Chiefs never had adequate time to consider JCS business. He said that the Chairman was, in effect, the principal military adviser to the

Secretary of Defense. Admiral Burke argued that the joint committees, which are

described below, could be eliminated "with profit to all." Papers were better when

they reached the committees than when the committees finished with them. General Twining remarked that even his five-month tenure as Chairman led him to

agree—an opinion, he added, that he had not held before becoming Chairman.

President Eisenhower commented that the Joint Chiefs of Staff could agree about

overall strategic plans and concepts but not about "specifics of men and money."

Eisenhower called the existing system too complicated and favored replacing the

committee system with an integrated staff. Likewise, he had lost confidence in the

concept of an executive agent for strategic control. Instead, under the Secretary of

Defense, "the JCS must be supreme— If we cannot make decisions quickly, we

will lose our forces before they are ever effectively used."6

Concurrently, in his State of the Union message, President Eisenhower

announced that he soon would recommend reforms for Congress to consider.

Secretary McElroy then formed a committee chaired by Mr. Charles Coolidge to

assist him in proposing such reforms. Members included General Twining as

well as Admiral Radford and another former Chairman, General of the Army

Omar N. Bradley. General Twining sent copies of the Wheeler report to both Secretary McElroy and Mr. Coolidge. The Coolidge committee made no written

report. The Secretary, however, kept in constant touch with it while developing

his own recommendations for the President. Mr. McElroy also discussed his proposals with the Armed Forces Policy Council, which included the Service Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.7

On 3 April, President Eisenhower sent Congress a special message detailing his

proposals on Defense reorganization. These were the principal ones: First, all operational forces would be assigned to unified and specified commands, subject only to

exceptions personally approved by the Commander in Chief. Second, orders would

flow directly to unified commands from the President and the Secretary of Defense.

To this end, the Service Departments would be removed from the chain of command and lose their function as "executive agents" for the Secretary of Defense.
JCS and National Policy

Orders issued by the President and the Secretary would be transmitted through the

Joint Chiefs of Staff to commanders of unified and specified commands. Third, the

Secretary's military staff had to be strengthened by improving the way in which the

Joint Chiefs of Staff functioned. Henceforth, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would serve as

staff assisting the Secretary in his exercise of control over unified commands. For

this purpose, the Joint Staff's statutory size would increase; an integrated operations

division would be created and the existing system of joint committees abolished.

The Chairman would win a vote in JCS deliberations as well as authority to assign

duties to the Joint Staff and (with the Secretary's approval) appoint its Director.

Also, each Service Chief should be given clear legislative authority to delegate Service responsibilities to his Vice Chief. Once this change occurred, the Secretary

would require Service Chiefs to make JCS duties their principal responsibility.8

During Congressional hearings, Generals Twining, Taylor, and White all testified in support of the President's plan. So did Admiral Burke, although he voiced

concern that an enlarged Joint Staff might grow into a national general staff,

opening the way for a merger of the Services. General Twining described the

coordination procedures by which individual Service viewpoints would continue

receiving full consideration while the Joint Staff was developing its positions.

General Pate, however, opposed proposals relating to the unified commands.

Relaxing restrictions on the Secretary's power to transfer, reassign, consolidate,

or abolish combatant functions, he feared, might become a means to "rationalize

the Marine Corps out of a job." Pate also worried that a Chairman with enhanced

authority might abuse his office. Nonetheless, both houses passed this legislation; President Eisenhower signed it into law on 6 August 1958. The Joint Staff's

statutory size grew from 210 to 400 officers. The Act further stipulated that the

Joint Staff "shall not operate or be organized as an overall Armed Forces General

Staff and shall have no executive authority." Congress added this language to

ensure that nothing resembling the supposedly all-powerful Prussian General

Staff would emerge.9

Meantime, General Twining had asked the Director, Joint Staff, to recommend

changes needed to implement the President's plan. Late in April, the Director proposed recasting the Joint Staff's committees, groups, and teams into a conventional

military staff consisting of numbered directorates (J-l, Personnel; J-2, Intelligence;

J-3, Operations; J-4, Logistics; J-5, Plans; and J-6, Communications-Electronics).

Admiral Burke opposed such a "radical" shift as being "unreliable in time of peace

and not usable in time of war." If a J-Staff was instituted, he argued later, J-sections

should not exercise executive authority but be limited to a planning and advisory

role. General Pate, who also objected, saw a J-Staff as harboring "the substance of

creation of the single armed forces general staff." The Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed the Director to consider these arguments and draft alternatives.10

President Eisenhower already had ordered Secretary McElroy to do away with

the joint committee system. Early in June, General Twining abolished the following

part-time Joint Committees: Strategic Plans, Logistic Plans, Military Transportation,

Intelligence, and Communications-Electronics. He also redesignated the full-time

Joint Strategic Survey Committee as the Joint Strategic Survey Council (JSSC). On

13 August, one week after President Eisenhower signed the Reorganization Act,
Working the Machinery ofGovernment

the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved changes in which the Joint Staff grew from 210 to

400 officers and the old functional groups served as the nuclei for J-Directorates.

Thus the Joint Intelligence Group became J-2, the Joint Logistics Group became J-4,

the Joint Strategic Plans Group became J-5, and the Joint Communication/Electronics Directorate became J-6. The J-l had no counterpart in the old organization,

but personnel matters had been under the cognizance of the Joint Logistics Plans

Group. The J-3, of course, was new. As Admiral Burke and General Pate wished,

the J-Staff had no executive or command authority.11

With hindsight, the improvement in JCS performance wrought by these

reforms is not readily apparent. Familiar interservice divisions persisted; lowestcommon-denominator compromises remained a regular feature of the JCS system. Unified commanders did gain some stature and authority. But perhaps the

main benefits flowed to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Reorganization

clarified and strengthened the Secretary's position, giving him full authority over

the Military Departments. During the 1960s, the Office of the Secretary of

Defense's power would grow considerably at JCS expense.

The Joint Program for Planning

In 1952 the Joint Chiefs of Staff had decided to create a Joint Program for Planning. A family of long-, medium-, and short-range plans came into being. By

1957 the Joint Program for Planning contained the following components:

1. A Joint Long-Range Strategic Estimate (JLRSE) that would forecast, for a four-year

period beginning eight years in the future, the probable areas of conflict, an outline of the type of war expected, and the basic undertakings required. Each year,

by 30 September, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were supposed to note and disseminate

it. Primarily, the JLRSE would serve as a guide for research and development.

Though necessarily broad in nature, it would include a year-by-year forecast of

expected technological changes.

2. A Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) that would cover a three-year span beginning on 1 July four years after its approval. In April 1960, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

set the JSOP's effective date at five years, rather than four, subsequent to its

approval date. It provided strategic concepts for a war as well as the period preceding D-day and served as a guide for force development. Also, the JSOP would

provide the Services with a basis for drafting budgets to cover the fiscal year

immediately preceding D-day; aid in determining military assistance requirements; and supply short-range guidance for weapons development. A JSOP consisted of three sections, dealing with (a) peacetime or conflict short of general war,

(b) the first phase of a general war, and (c) the additional forces and resources

needed for the peacetime mobilization base as well as for US and allied mobilization requirements during the first forty-eight months of a general war. This midrange plan, to be disseminated every 30 June, would constitute the first step in

preparing the Defense Department's annual budget.

3. A Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) that would guide the disposition,

employment, and support of existing forces during the approaching fiscal year.
JCS and National Policy

This was the short-range plan that would go into effect if war began. It followed

the JSOP's format in providing guidance for three different contingencies. Every

year, by 31 December, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would approve and circulate a JSCP.

That way, unified and specified commanders would have time to prepare supporting plans prior to the JSCP's assumed D-day, 1 July.12

Severe interservice differences prevented the Joint Program for Planning from

functioning smoothly. The JSOP suffered most and became by far the weakest

link of a none-too-strong chain. In 1956, after the drafting of JSOP-60 had led to

many interservice differences, Secretary Wilson imposed stringent fiscal ceilings.

Admiral Radford then proposed, among other things, reducing overseas Army

units to small nuclear-armed task forces and limiting the mobilization base to

support of D-day forces only. Bitter opposition by the Army led to press revelations about Radford's plan and then to a six-month suspension of JSOP preparation. When work resumed in 1957, Service recommendations resulted in costs so

excessive that Secretary Wilson again imposed a strict budgetary ceiling. At last,

in January 1958, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent JSOP-61 to the Secretary accompanied by a statement that risks were incurred by keeping their force recommendations within Wilson's fiscal limits. Two months later, Wilson approved JSOP-61

as a common point of reference for strategic and mobilization planning. This

was, in fact, the first JSOP to reach completion.13

Merely producing a JSOP did not make that document influential. The problem of correlating military requirements with projected funding eluded solution.

Constantly, as will be seen, JSOP force-level recommendations fell between two

fires. Those that the Services proposed cost more than the administration was

willing to fund; those that the Secretary favored frequently proved too low to

meet the Services' requirements. The next plan, JSOP-62, contained force "tabs"

reflecting what each Service considered necessary for itself. This approach

returned JSOP planning to a more purely military basis, although the resulting

force levels clearly would not be the ones ultimately accepted by higher authority.

Early in June 1958, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent JSOP-62 to Secretary McElroy and

asked him to approve it, less the force tabs. On 31 March 1959, the Deputy Secretary approved all of JSOP-62 except the force tabs, related personnel strengths, the

mobilization concept, and the logistics annex—highly important exceptions!

Meanwhile, in February 1959, General Taylor urged that there be functional or

"horizontal" budget making, cutting across Service lines. While the JSOP's strategic concept was being developed, he suggested, the Joint Chiefs of Staff should

propose "criteria of sufficiency" for nuclear retaliatory forces, forward deployed

forces, strategic reserves, air defense units, and sea control forces. After the Secretary had given his approval, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would recommend the size

and type of forces within each category. The Services then would develop their

programs, which the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Comptroller would

consolidate into an "order of magnitude requirements budget." H

When the Joint Staff studied this proposal, Navy and Marine Corps spokesmen stated their opposition to substantive JCS participation in the making of

Service budgets. The upshot was a modest procedural change. On 1 May, the
Working the Machinery ofGovernment

Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed unified commanders to have their component

commanders submit advice on FY 1961 requirements to their respective Services. Also, such comments as unified commanders chose to give the Joint

Chiefs of Staff should be made only after consultation with their component

commanders. This was the first small step toward giving field commanders an

enhanced role in planning and programming.15

On January I960, the Joint Chiefs of Staff completed JSOP-63. General White

concurred only on condition that he be allowed to send Secretary Gates additional views. In them, he noted that JSOP-63 had been postponed until the National

Security Council rendered a decision about the size of the mobilization base.

Consequently, program and budget decisions were rendered prior to the production of JSOP-63. Moreover, he believed that JSOP-63 did not take into account

how the Reorganization Act enlarged the responsibilities of the unified commanders and modified those of the Services. Thus the resulting plan did not satisfy the JSOP's true purpose, which he described as "the definition of an over-all

national military posture toward which Service programs should be directed in

order to ensure a coordinated, balanced and effective military instrument in support of a national policy." Admiral Burke and General Lemnitzer, on the other

hand, believed White had overemphasized the JSOP's weaknesses. As Lemnitzer

observed, it would be meaningless, in a plan that began four years in the future,

to provide unified commanders with guidance about the operational employment of their forces.16

In April 1960, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to set the JSOP's effective date

five years, rather than four, from the date of approval. Thus the next JSOP would

have an M-day of 1 July 1965, even though it affected mainly the FY 1963 budget

cycle; it was designated JSOP-66.17In September the Joint Chiefs of Staff completed JSOP-66. They asked Secretary Gates simply to note its force tabs, which contained many interservice splits, and promised to reexamine them after the NSC

completed action on the FY 1962 budget. They recognized that force goals must

stay within budget ceilings but wanted to preserve the JSOP's validity as a statement of objectives consistent with their assessment of military needs. One year

earlier, Admiral Burke had urged the preparation of "a true mid-range objectives

plan," not a JSOP so constrained by budget ceilings as to be "an annual exercise

of balancing account books at the expense of military considerations."18 Whatever its faults, JSOP-66 had accomplished this purpose.

During Dwight Eisenhower's presidency, the Joint Program for Planning

proved much more successful in some respects than in others. By any measurement, the JSOP had fallen well short of the role intended for it. This came about

largely because, despite the Reorganization Act, interservice differences

remained just as great in 1960 as they had been in 1953. President Eisenhower's

NSC papers established national policy but did not reconcile the Services to the

priorities that they established.

The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan and the Joint Long-Range Strategic Estimate fared better. During 1957 and again during 1959-1960, interservice disputes

postponed (but did not prevent) the completion of JSCPs. Beginning with the
JCS and National Policy

publication of JSCP-62 in December 1960 and continuing thereafter, these plans

did appear regularly at the designated time.

Not so with the JLRSE. Efforts to prepare an estimate raised a basic question

about its purpose and content: Did strategy evolve from weapons, or did

weapons evolve from strategy? When a draft of JLRSE 68-71 appeared in October 1960, for example, the Joint Strategic Survey Council criticized it harshly.

Instead of indulging in free-ranging thought about conditions ten years hence,

said the Council, it simply accepted the appraisal and concept from JSOP-66.

Moreover, the JLRSE did not provide guidance to assist in carrying out or changing current policies and programs, nor did it establish a basis for evolving a longrange military strategy. On 13 October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted JLRSE

68-71 as it stood but agreed to consider the JSSC's recommendations in developing the next Estimate.19

During July 1960, meantime, each Service Chief had appraised existing methods for correlating budgetary with military planning. General Lemnitzer judged

the Joint Program for Planning to be adequate. Conversely, General White urged

"fundamental" revisions, aimed particularly at enhancing the role of unified and

specified commanders. Admiral Burke suggested broad changes, some of which

would be accomplished by the next administration:

The complexity of modern weapons requires years of research, development, test, and

evaluation.... To ensure steady and economical progress, a system must be funded at

a programmed rate. Present budgets are annual matters. They respond to pressures of

the current year.... Planning... is then subject to ups and downs which are costly and

disruptive of orderly progress. DOD action directed toward long-range program planning would place the current year's budget in proper perspective and would assist in

justifying individual programs as a whole rather than as yearly increments.20

At this point, though, no changes occurred. The Kennedy administration

would try to correlate all elements by introducing a radically different planningprogramming-budgeting system.

10
2

Backing Away from "Massive Retaliation"

Dedicated to providing maximum protection at a bearable cost, the Eisenhower administration had chosen from the outset to stress US superiority in nuclear

weapons. Its civilian leaders were determined to avoid hostilities of the scale and

character of the Korean conflict. Rather than maintain huge conventional forces,

the United States would make overwhelming nuclear striking power its chief contribution to the defense of the noncommunist world. This approach was termed

the "New Look." To deter aggression, the United States would rely on a proclaimed intention to retaliate with massive power at times and places of its own

choosing, with a clear implication that the aggressor's homeland would be the target. Though hindered by the demands of recurring crises and by commitments

arising from its alliance system, the United States, during President Eisenhower's

first term, had shaped its military policy and forces to accord with a strategy of

massive retaliation. Admiral Radford and, predictably enough, Air Force officers

backed the New Look. Army generals, seeing their Service relegated to a secondary role, argued against an undue reliance upon massive retaliation.

Emphasizing a Nuclear Response

When the second term began, Basic National Security Policy (BNSP) rested

on NSC 5602/1. This statement had been reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, along with other agencies, then adopted by the National Security Council

and approved by the President on 15 March 1956. According to it, the United

States and its allies must possess "for an indefinite period, military forces with

sufficient strength, flexibility and mobility.. .to deal swiftly and severely with

Communist overt aggression in its various forms and to cope successfully with

general war should it develop." Nuclear weapons were to continue being integrated into the nation's armory for use in general war and in military operations

short of general war as authorized by the President. To deter general war, the

11
JCS and National Policy

United States would rely upon its nuclear retaliatory power, in conjunction with

accelerated programs for continental defense. Deterring or defeating local

aggression would require "ready forces..., highly mobile and suitably

deployed" and sufficiently versatile to employ either conventional or nuclear

weapons. These forces needed a "flexible and selective nuclear capability," since

the United States did not intend to deny itself the use of nuclear weapons in a

local situation. But reliance on tactical nuclear capabilities should not become so

pronounced "that any decision to intervene against local aggression would

probably be tantamount to a decision to use nuclear weapons."1

There were those, among them the Army's Chief of Staff, who claimed that a

policy of concentrating attention on nuclear weapons resulted in relying on

massive retaliation as the means of meeting all situations. When presented in the

form of suggested changes to the BNSP, however, their case proved difficult to

argue effectively. The BNSP's language was, in fact, sufficiently broad to authorize a strengthening of nonnuclear forces such as its critics desired. The real issue

was the proper and feasible allocation of resources under NSC 5602/1—first the

allocation between the civilian economy and the Military Services and then the

specific apportionment among the Services, and particularly among the functions

they were designed to perform.

The 1957 review of the Basic National Security Policy began on 19 February,

when the NSC Planning Board circulated a report analyzing major changes in the

world. Foremost, of course, was the superpowers' ability to destroy each other

and how this situation deterred both nations from actions that risked general

war. Nonetheless, there was growing fear that nuclear war could come about by

a calculated Soviet surprise attack, by one superpower's move which the other

saw as unacceptably threatening, or by the spread of a local conflict.

The remaining problems had developed independently of the first. The Planning Board saw in the Suez crisis, the Polish disturbances, and the Hungarian

revolt evidence of a continuing decline in Western Europe's power position and a

weakening of the Soviet position in Eastern Europe. The Board also noted

problems posed by Communist China's continuing economic and military

growth, the rise of nationalism and anticolonialism in Africa and Asia, the

increasing role of the United Nations, and the growing influence of "neutralist"

nations, as well as continuing strains on the US budget.2

As its next step, the Planning Board intended to prepare papers on various

"major issues," which the NSC would discuss at meetings beginning on 28

March. In light of these discussions, the Board then would submit a revised

statement of BNSP, which the Council was supposed to consider on 16 May3

This procedure differed in two respects from those usually followed. For the

first time since 1953, when three ad hoc task forces launched a policy review by

preparing a series of analyses, the Planning Board proposed to seek guidance

from the NSC on various elements as the review progressed, instead of attempting to reconcile differences itself and then present the Council with a complete

draft. Perhaps more significantly, the Board hoped that the NSC would explore

Basic National Security Policy in an untrammeled intellectual exercise, without

regard for standing departmental positions. Thus, in its report of 19 February, the

12
Backing Away from "Massive Retaliation"

Board sought to interpret major problems as they appeared to a group of thinkers

and not necessarily as they were viewed by departmental representatives.

However laudable in conception, this new approach found the Council little

disposed to come to grips with an expression of opinion that lacked the usual

identification of departmental positions. No Council member found the Board's

report satisfactory, and Secretary of State Dulles was especially critical of it. The

Council's reaction augured ill for the success of the Planning Board's experiment.

A few days after the Board's report of 19 February reached the NSC, the

Defense Department gave the Council its own proposed guidelines for creating

military strength to support the existing BNSP. It marked a departure from

previous guidance, which had envisioned mobilization occurring over a period

of thirty-six months. When he forwarded the new concept to the Council on 25

February, Secretary Wilson pointed out that in the event of general war the

armed forces no longer could rely on a vast expansion of industry. The mobilization base, therefore, would have to be capable of equipping and maintaining the

armed forces at their full peacetime allowances, keeping selected reserve units

in a high state of readiness, permitting phased expansion over a six-month period, and meeting the combat requirements of all forces mobilized by M+6

months. Additionally, reasonably protected supply stocks would have to be

placed outside the continental United States before hostilities began, so that

overseas forces could perform their tasks without having to depend on resupply

from the United States. On 14 March, Admiral Radford explained these points

more fully to the NSC.4

In his presentation, Admiral Radford said that the main change affecting the

mobilization base stemmed from recognition that combat needs for the first phase

of general war had to be on hand before hostilities commenced. The six-month

level should not be considered an attempt to prejudge the length of mobilization

but was an arbitrary (albeit realistic) period. In other words, the M+6 period was

merely a way of expressing the force level for which logistical support would

have to be available on D-day. The strategic concept, Secretary Wilson had noted

and Admiral Radford now repeated, assumed that in operations short of general

war "atomic weapons will be used when required to achieve military objectives,"

subject to prior presidential approval. This was a considerably stronger statement

of intention than could be found in the Planning Board's draft.5

No doubt as a result of the unfavorable reception accorded the Planning

Board's report of 19 February, the Board's subsequent papers reverted to a more

familiar pattern. Although basic issues still underwent preliminary discussion,

papers increasingly reflected established departmental views. By 11 April, a gap

had widened in views about certain military provisions, chiefly those dealing

with the substitution of nuclear weapons for conventional firepower when waging limited wars. The issue was whether to revise current policy so as to express

without reservation an intent to rely upon nuclear weapons.

At the NSC meeting of 11 April, President Eisenhower made known his

opinion that existing policy should be revised. Responsibility for writing the

military portion of a draft BNSP went to the Defense Department and the

remaining portions to departments with primary interest. But the result was a

13
JCS and National Policy

more pronounced divergence than had occurred when the Planning Board's own

staff members did the drafting.6

In a draft BNSP submitted to the Council on 14 May, the Planning Board

changed Defense's phraseology in the hope of making the statement acceptable

to all concerned. The Board recommended placing "main, but not sole, reliance

on nuclear weapons," integrating them with other weapons in the US arsenal,

considering them "as conventional weapons from a military point of view," and

using them "when required to achieve military objectives."7Except for the reservation against placing sole reliance on nuclear weapons, the wording was that of

Admiral Radford's March presentation and Defense's April draft.8

The Planning Board also asserted that "the use of nuclear weapons in limited

war is unlikely by itself to result in general nuclear war." To put down local aggression before it escalated into general war, US forces must possess "a flexible and

selective nuclear capability and, when its use is required, apply it in a manner and

on a scale best calculated to prevent hostilities from broadening into general war."

The Board provoked another dispute by recommending that the United States

"continue to provide to allies capable of using them effectively" advanced

weapons systems less their nuclear elements. In addition, selected major allies

should be provided with "nuclear weapons with nuclear elements," and with

help in developing their own advanced weapons systems. No ally except the

United Kingdom, which already had become a nuclear power, would be eligible

for nuclear elements. Defense's draft had not excluded nuclear elements and

stipulated that only "small" weapons would be provided to allies.

A further point at issue was whether the national stockpile of strategic and

critical materials should be maintained at a three-year or a five-year level. On

this, the Planning Board's draft was terse and direct: "The United States should

not authorize further procurement for additions to the stockpile..., except to

complete the three-year objectives." The Defense Department wished to discontinue procurement of certain materials that, pursuant to Public Law 520, 79th

Congress, were being added to the stockpile in excess of military needs in order

to support domestic production. The stock of most items stood at the three-year

level.9 Actually, the Planning Board expressed Defense's views more succinctly

than had the latter in its own draft.

So deep-seated were interdepartmental differences, however, that the Planning Board's attempt at accommodation failed. The statement presented to the

NSC contained completely disparate views on critical issues. The State Department strongly opposed using nuclear weapons in limited wars, on grounds that

US public opinion would not accept, and US allies would not support, their use.

Secretary Dulles conceded that the time would come when small, tactical nuclear

weapons were available in sufficient quantity to permit using them as conventional weapons. Doubtless, by that time, attitudes and opinions would have

changed, but Dulles, pending a thorough analysis of limited use of force, deemed

premature a change in BNSP and a decision to provide selected allies with

components for nuclear weapons.10

14
Backing Away from "Massive Retaliation"

The Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) supported State about nuclear

weapons and also objected to changing the stockpiling provision. There should be

no change, ODM insisted, unless the NSC considered stockpiling as a domestic

issue and decided to withdraw production support programs. The Atomic Energy

Commission firmly opposed transferring nuclear warheads and revising the

Atomic Energy Act for this purpose.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had played no direct part in preparing Defense's

paper for the Planning Board. Their first opportunity to do so came in reviewing

NSC 5707/7, the Board's submission to the NSC. The Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC) prepared a critique, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered on 22

May. The JSSC recommended three changes. First, drop the statement that the

United States would "place main, but not sole, reliance" on nuclear weapons and

"consider them as conventional weapons." The JSSC favored saying that, in a

general war, nuclear weapons would be used from the outset no matter how a

war started, and that in military operations short of general war such weapons

would be used when required to achieve military objectives. Second, delete the

Board's claim that resorting to nuclear weapons in a limited war was unlikely to

result in general war. That struck the JSSC as a questionable conclusion, untested

by experience. Third, oppose any transfer of nuclear elements or warheads to the

allies. The JSSC also considered a study of limited war, such as State had suggested, to be unnecessary.11

The Chief of Staff, Air Force, judged the JSSC report generally unsatisfactory.

General Twining strongly urged acceptance of the Planning Board's draft, including its observation about the unlikelihood that using nuclear weapons in a limited war would lead to general war. Opposing the transfer of nuclear warheads, he

further pointed out, would prevent the completion of current and pending

arrangements with Canada and the United Kingdom. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, he

noted, were on record as favoring discussions with Canada, on the assumption

that the Atomic Energy Act would be amended to permit peacetime transfers of

nuclear weapons for continental air defense. General Twining stood with the

JSSC only in deeming a study of limited war to be unnecessary.12

By and large, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed with General Twining. The only

changes they recommended in the Board's draft were substituting "the United

Kingdom and Canada" for "selected major allies" as potential recipients of

nuclear warheads and deleting sentences that authorized assistance to major

allies in developing their own advanced weapons systems. They informed Secretary Wilson on 24 May that, with this modification, they considered the Planning

Board's paper militarily acceptable. The Secretaries of the Army and Navy, like

the JSSC, opposed a policy of placing main but not sole reliance on nuclear

weapons and considering them as conventional weapons. Nonetheless, Secretary

Wilson's staff advisers recommended that he accept JCS views.13

At its meeting on 27 May, the NSC agreed that nuclear weapons should indeed

be considered as conventional, standard weapons for US forces. Although this

was the first time that the Council had approved such a statement, the concept

itself was not new. It had been implicit from the first in military plans developed

to implement the New Look, and President Eisenhower already had indicated

15
JCS and National Policy

that BNSP should be brought into conformance with those plans. Still, the Council

did not fully accept the concept's implications. While eliminating any distinction

between the role of nuclear weapons in general war and in lesser hostilities, the

NSC nevertheless adopted Secretary Dulles' suggestion that such weapons be

used to achieve "national objectives," rather than "military objectives," as the

Planning Board had phrased it.

During a lengthy NSC discussion about limited war, Secretary Wilson voiced

concern over lack of definition for this term. He was convinced that the United

States should exploit its nuclear power, but he also believed that the proper

course was to stay out of all "little wars." At the suggestion of Mr. Robert Cutler,

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Council then agreed upon a

definition of limited war: participation of "limited U.S. forces" in "conflicts

occurring in less developed areas of the world." Military planning for such conflicts would be "based on the development of a flexible and selective capability,

including nuclear capability." This was somewhat more qualified than the

Planning Board's draft.

As for the disputed claim that using nuclear weapons in limited war was not

likely to spark a general war: Admiral Radford observed that a crisis over Berlin

and probably one over the Middle East could not be held down to a local war.

President Eisenhower objected that the passage in question was not, in substance, policy. Consequently, the NSC deleted this passage. The Council also

decided, with Secretary Wilson's agreement, to reject JCS and Planning Board

arguments against transferring nuclear weapons. Instead, the Council adopted

State's and the Atomic Energy Commission's views. Finally, as the Joint Chiefs of

Staff wished, the Council decided against pursuing a study of limited war which

the State Department had recommended.14

President Eisenhower approved a new delineation of BNSP in NSC 5707/8 on

3 June 1957. It downplayed the possibility that US forces, responding to local

aggression, might become extensively engaged in conventional warfare. Significantly, NSC 5707/8 did not retain its predecessor's cautionary statement that US

ready forces "must not become so dependent on tactical nuclear capabilities that

any decision to intervene against local aggression would probably be tantamount

to a decision to use nuclear weapons." NSC 5707/ 8 moved closer to a policy of

using nuclear weapons against local aggression but without affirming categorically that they would be used. It also redefined the mobilization base in terms of

a concept developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and then presented to the NSC

by Secretary Wilson on 25 February.15

Another month passed before the NSC reached agreement about the stockpile

problem. On 11 July, the Council agreed to hold stockpile procurement at the

three-year level, except that acquisition of the minerals in the domestic production support program would continue without regard for this limit. Although

their argument against making any exceptions failed, Secretary Wilson and the

Joint Chiefs of Staff could say their point had been acknowledged; this was a

political rather than a military matter.16

Additionally, the new BNSP seemed to put even greater emphasis upon

nuclear retaliatory power by placing less stress on continental defense. The old

16
Backing Awayfrom "Massive Retaliation"

statement had spoken of "accelerated" programs for continental defense; the new

statement called only for "adequate" programs. The NSC also reaffirmed the

importance of collective defense but agreed that dependence on overseas bases

was likely to diminish over the long run. Moreover, the Council wanted to

reduce military aid commitments by encouraging recipients (chiefly the nonEuropean ones) to place their armed forces on a self-supporting basis. They

should make their armed forces self-supporting by reducing them to the level

required for internal security while relying upon the United States for protection

against external aggression. Finally the new BNSP accentuated the need for fiscal

restraint by citing President Eisenhower's statement that he did not intend to ask

Congress for more than $39 billion in defense funds, which was the current level,

in any fiscal year during his remaining term.17

Approval of NSC 5707/8 marked the apogee of the New Look. On 25 July, Secretary Wilson presented the NSC with his proposed military programs for fiscal

years 1958 and 1959, with projections through 1961. His program followed closely the recommendations of Admiral Radford, which expressed what Radford

considered to be the New Look's logical extension in current circumstances.

Broadly, Wilson intended to "maximize air power and minimize the foot soldier";

chapter 3 provides the details about force planning. President Eisenhower

approved the programs for fiscal years 1958-1959 and even spoke of lowering

defense expenditures.18

There was no formal link between BNSP and the Joint Strategic Planning System, described in chapter 1. Obviously, though, the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan

and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan had to reflect the strategic concepts

described by NSC 5707/8. In both JSOP-61 and JSCP-59, the concept for general

war rested on a definition hammered out in 1956 and reargued during a NATO

review early in 1957. A general war would consist of, first, "an initial phase of

comparatively short duration... characterized by an intensive exchange of atomic blows and the initiation of operations and deployments... designed to achieve

strategic advantage" and, second, "a subsequent phase of short duration." As for

the role of nuclear weapons in operations short of general war, the two plans

simply repeated the BNSP's wording: such weapons "will be used, when

required, in order to achieve national objectives."19

No Change of Course

Challenges to the New Look came quickly. Dr. Henry A. Kissinger's Nuclear

Weapons and Foreign Policy held a place on the best-seller list for thirteen weeks

during the autumn of 1957. Those who read or heard about it probably carried

away one main idea: the advent of nuclear parity, while greatly lessening the likelihood of a deliberate resort to general war, would degrade the credibility of massive

retaliation as a deterrent to lesser aggressions and provocations by the Soviets. Did

the United States possess a suitable means of responding to what now seemed the

more likely form of communist challenge—small, limited, or "peripheral" wars?

17
JCS and National Policy

Dr. Kissinger's work suggested that it did not. Secretary Dulles undertook to rebut

some of the criticisms leveled at massive retaliation. Through an article published

in Foreign Affairs that fall, he outlined what amounted to an unclassified version

of NSC 5707/8. The United States, he wrote,

could not be content to rely on a peace which could be preserved only by a capacity

to destroy vast segments of the human race. Such a concept is acceptable only as a

last alternative. In recent years there has been no other. But the resourcefulness of

those who serve our nation in the field of science and weapon engineering now

shows that it is possible to alter the character of nuclear weapons Recent tests

point to the possibility of possessing nuclear weapons the destructiveness and

radiation effects of which can be substantially confined to predetermined targets.

In the future it may thus be feasible to place less reliance upon deterrence of vast

retaliatory power. It may be possible to defend countries by nuclear weapons so

mobile, or so placed, as to make military invasion with conventional forces a hazardous attempt... and thus confront any aggressor with the choice between failing or

himself initiating nuclear war against the defending country. Thus the tables may be

turned, in the sense that instead of those who are non-aggressive having to rely upon

all-out nuclear retaliatory power for their protection, would-be aggressors will be

unable to count on a successful conventional aggression, but must themselves weigh

the consequences of invoking nuclear war.20

Continuing US nuclear superiority, of course, was the premise upon which all

this rested. But then came the two "Sputniks" in October and November 1957. A

sense of apprehension, even approaching panic, swept over a good part of the

American public. What if, by 1960, the USSR had an arsenal of intercontinental

ballistic missiles and the United States had none? Which superpower then could

wield the threat of massive retaliation?

In its 1958 review of BNSP, the Planning Board avoided any major

reconsideration. The draft that it submitted to the NSC on 15 April did not, in its

military portion, differ appreciably from NSC 5707/8. The existing statement concerning the role of nuclear weapons remained intact, with an added recommendation that the nuclear stockpile include standard and "clean" weapons, which

would minimize radioactive fallout, in varying sizes "to provide flexible and

selective capabilities for general or limited war." The paragraph on localized conflicts repeated language in NSC 5707/8.

The only radical changes dealt with overseas bases and transferring nuclear

weapons to US allies. First, since intermediate-range ballistic missiles soon

would be deployed, the Board proposed a possible expansion of overseas bases.

Second, the Board contemplated transferring complete nuclear weapon systems,

although the warheads would remain under US control. A new provision called

for the United States to "consider the long-term development of a NATO nuclear

weapons authority to determine the requirements for, hold custody of, and

control the use of nuclear weapons, in accordance with NATO policy and plans

for defense of NATO areas." This was the first hint of what became, during the

1960s, US advocacy of a NATO multilateral force.21

Controversy did arise over NSC 5707/8's paragraph on limited war. When the

18
Backing Awayfrom "Massive Retaliation"

Planning Board submitted its draft to the NSC, a majority of the Board's members—State, Defense, Treasury, Budget, and JCS—wanted to postpone consideration of that paragraph until a State-Defense study had been completed. The NSC

had launched this study, a broad consideration of US and allied capabilities for

limited military operations, in January 1958.22 Commissioning of that study was

a result of the Gaither Report, described in chapter 4. Thus the rejection of State's

similar proposal had been reversed.

The Planning Board's Chairman, Mr. Robert Cutler, circulated his own view of

what the paragraph on limited war should say. In a draft dated 15 April, he

argued that it had become "increasingly important—while maintaining our

nuclear capability to deter general war—to develop further and maintain a capability to oppose limited military aggression," not simply in the less developed

areas of the world but wherever US security interests were involved. NSC 5707/ 8

stated that decisive defeat of local aggression by "prompt and resolute application of the degree of force necessary" was the best means of preventing such hostilities from broadening into general war. Mr. Cutler now suggested that the

United States provide itself the options of either reacting in this manner or

merely applying sufficient force to keep the area and scope of conflict limited and

to achieve such limited objectives as restoration of the status quo ante. It was

therefore necessary, he argued, to maintain highly mobile and suitably deployed

ready forces which, with allied help, would be adequate either to defeat or to

contain any such limited aggression. Planning for such forces should be "based

on a flexible and selective capability, including an appropriate nuclear capability

for use as authorized by the President." There could be limited wars for limited

objectives, perhaps fought with conventional weapons alone.23

Deputy Secretary Donald Quarles asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to review Mr.

Cutler's proposal. Their responses proved widely divergent. The Vice Chief of

Naval Operations endorsed Cutler's proposal. He criticized NSC 5707/8's strategy as neither appropriate to the current threat nor capable of being marketed to

the rest of the free world. The BNSP, he said, should recognize the existence of a

mutual deterrence to general war and the "reduced political usefulness" of massive retaliation as the principal means of ensuring the free world's security. That

would mean deleting the statement about placing main reliance on nuclear

weapons and considering nuclear weapons as conventional weapons.24

General Taylor took the same position. Increasingly, he was convinced, relative nuclear parity would deter both superpowers from resorting to massive

retaliation in any situation except an attack that threatened their national survival. Therefore, the United States must "maintain forces capable of reacting to

aggression with either nuclear or nonnuclear means in the most effective manner

to achieve US national objectives while at the same time minimizing the risk of

general war."

General Taylor looked upon limited war as essentially any conflict in which

the national survival of the United States or the USSR was not at stake, which

might include hostilities between US and Soviet forces, and which might be

"intense and of significant duration. The objective may require a military victory,

in the traditional sense, or some lesser solution which is to our net advantage."

19
JCS and National Policy

Arguing that limited aggression had become the more probable form of conflict,

Taylor claimed that "national policy should put increasing emphasis on suitable

ready forces with a flexible combat capability and provided with transportation

which insures their strategic mobility."25

General White, on the other hand, argued against adopting the Cutler proposal. To him, the approach of relative nuclear parity made the maintenance of

American nuclear power even more essential, since the possibility of failing to

deter an all-out Soviet attack remained the most dangerous threat to US security.

Primary reliance on nuclear weapons as a deterrent, and their selective use in

hostilities short of general war, impressed him as the only course of action "compatible with the economic well-being of the United States and the free world, and

hence with the preservation of our fundamental values and institutions." The

military establishment must include forces capable of deterring or defeating local

aggression, but NSC 5707/8 already recognized that need, by assuming that such

forces would be drawn from those readied for general war.

General White criticized the Cutler proposal for departing from "the concept

of the maintenance, as a matter of certainty, of safeguarded, effective nuclear retaliatory power by advocating an increase, presumably within existing means, in the

resources specifically tailored for limited aggression." That seemed to him a move

toward "attempting to match the Communist Bloc, world-wide, through means

not involving nuclear weapons." Previously in NSC, NATO, and other debates, he

pointed out, "similar proposals have been judged militarily unwise, practically

infeasible, and economically unsound." Moreover, General White saw "no apparent basis for the inferred axiom that a limited response to aggression will be more

likely to prevent broadening of hostilities than would the prompt and resolute

application of the degree of force necessary to defeat such aggression."26

Late in April, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded their opposing views to Secretary McElroy. Those of General Taylor, Admiral Burke, and General Pate were

consolidated into a single statement based on General Taylor's memorandum

above. The Chairman sided with General White. Limited wars, General Twining

believed, did not require a specially designed force but rather the political will to

employ available forces, including their nuclear firepower. In three years, he

noted, the number of low-yield nuclear weapons would be five times that of the

high-yield strategic weapons. This growing arsenal provided flexibility for reacting to localized aggression but should be created in addition to, and not as a substitute for, the "number one task" of maintaining the strategic deterrent.

General Twining considered the term "mutual deterrence" dangerous and

wanted it "stricken from our vocabulary." The USSR was being deterred from

acts of aggression by fear of the consequences, whereas the United States was not

being deterred from any course of action, since it harbored no expansionist aims.

To presume the existence of mutual deterrence, General Twining continued, was

to invite piecemeal Soviet aggression, since the United States could not prevent

aggression against a country such as Turkey except by using its massive retaliatory power against the USSR.27

Before the NSC, on 1 May, the Joint Chiefs of Staff presented their opposing

views. General Taylor, speaking also for Admiral Burke and General Pate, argued

20
Backing Awayfrom "Massive Retaliation"

that strategic nuclear weapons did not provide a means of maneuver. Therefore,

limited war forces must furnish the active elements of US military strategy. This

did not imply a vast expansion of forces or increased expenditure but rather a

shift of emphasis "directed at developing a truly balanced system of deterrent

forces." General White replied that developing and maintaining safeguarded,

effective nuclear retaliatory power as well as adequate continental defense, while

not the only priority tasks, did remain essential "/zrsf-priority tasks." Forces

needed to implement existing policy already existed within the US capability for

general war. Though requiring modernization, improvement, and continuing

attention, these forces were able to fulfill the aim of current policy. General White

assumed that any hostilities in the NATO area would continue to be regarded as

something more than "local aggression," and he strongly advocated maintaining

this distinction.28

General Twining began his presentation by stressing the harmful psychological consequences that he feared would flow from changing BNSP. The change

advocated by General Taylor, "even if absolutely sound," probably would

become known and have an extremely adverse effect on the will and confidence

of European allies. Also, the more the US Government talked of limited war as a

consequence of mutual deterrence, the greater would be the Soviets' assurance

that the United States would in fact accept such wars at whatever time and place

it might please Moscow to start them. Finally, if the American people gained the

impression that their leaders considered general war to be a remote possibility,

their will to keep facing courageously a dangerous world situation might erode.

General Twining emphasized what he called the "tremendous" US capability

to fight limited wars. This capability had not been fully used, he said, in Korea,

against China, in Indochina, or in Indonesia. The decision not to use full capabilities had been a political one, with which he had no quarrel; his point was that

political decisions had more bearing upon the waging of limited wars than did

military capabilities. Still, if an expansion of tactical forces was deemed desirable, this could be done within the framework of existing BNSP. But this could

not be done at the strategic deterrent's expense, because detracting from the

power of that deterrent and other general war forces would be "absolutely

fatal." Therefore, expansion could be accomplished only by making considerably more funds available.29

During the discussion following these presentations, President Eisenhower

expressed doubt that "small wars" could be waged in the NATO area without

expanding into general war. He asked for further study of this and other aspects

of deterrence. The NSC then asked the Defense Department to recommend what

revisions, if any, should be made in the BNSP. The Council, deciding to keep

BNSP as it was, adopted the Board's draft. President Eisenhower then gave it his

approval as NSC 5810/1.30 This was substantially what Generals Twining and

White had recommended.

In March, as mentioned earlier, the NSC had ordered a study of US and

allied capabilities to conduct limited military operations as far ahead as

mid-1961. Significantly, though, the study excluded operations that were either

covert in nature, conducted against overtly employed Soviet forces, or involved

21
JCS and National Policy

an enemy who used nuclear weapons. Another crucial assumption was that

"the United States could engage in effective military action against mainland

China without undue risk of initiating general war." The State Department prepared hypothetical scenarios for twelve situations in Europe, the Middle East,

and the Far East. The Joint Staff then drafted working papers estimating the

military reactions required. Subsequently, the Office of the Secretary of Defense

and Central Intelligence added their contributions.

The report, circulated for review in May, asserted that the United States could

successfully conduct limited operations. However, carrying out two concurrent

operations requiring major deployments and heavy logistic support probably

would compel a partial mobilization. According to the report, nuclear weapons

were not necessary "in every situation throughout the spectrum of military operations." But in some situations they evidently would be.31

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a commentary dated 11 June, stressed how the

study's limitations and artificialities prevented it from serving as a "conclusive

basis" for developing limited war forces. Six days later, Secretaries McElroy and

Dulles sent the NSC a similar critique. Among other things, they observed that

serious consideration would have to be given to proclaiming at least a national

emergency. Also, even one limited operation requiring major deployments and

heavy logistic support might necessitate a partial mobilization. On 26 June, the

NSC discussed both the report and the commentaries.32

Since the issue was not so much whether responding to limited war situations

required resorting to nuclear weapons as whether that condition should be

changed, this study did little to resolve differences. Generals Twining and White

endorsed NSC 5810/1; General Taylor, Admiral Burke, and General Pate still

rejected it. Already, Secretary McElroy had decided that the Twining-White view

should be the Defense Department's position. McElroy informed the NSC that,

since Soviet ability to precipitate general nuclear war still constituted the major

threat, he saw no reason to change BNSP. Military programs must continue giving highest priority to deterring all-out nuclear war. Even though US and allied

forces possessed "significant" capability to cope with a wide variety of limited

war situations, McElroy held that any hostilities with the Soviet Union could not

be confined to limited operations and limited objectives.33

During an NSC discussion on 24 July, Secretary Dulles agreed that no

change should be made in NSC 5810/1's military portion. He urged, however,

that it be kept under study and review. Four days later, President Eisenhower

approved Secretary McElroy's recommendation, with the understanding that

NSC 5810/1 would remain under continuing study.34 The "New Look" had survived a serious challenge.

Since the BNSP did not change, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not need to alter the

strategy portions of JSOP-62 and JSCP-59 in any significant way. Some small revisions did occur. In JSOP-62, the designation "limited war" replaced such terms as

"local aggression," "peripheral wars" or "hostilities short of general war." The

plan, however, did not provide a separate strategic concept for limited war.35

22
Backing Away from "Massive Retaliation"

A Nonnuclear Conflict Becomes Conceivable

To set the 1959 review of BNSP in motion, a Planning Board subcommittee

drawn from the Departments of State and Defense made a preliminary

review of the most contentious paragraphs in NSC 5810/1. These dealt with the

role and employment of nuclear weapons and with capabilities for limited war.

At the Defense member's suggestion, the State Department described the foreign

policy requirements that military strategy should satisfy. Moving far toward the

views of General Taylor and Admiral Burke, the State Department now stressed

the need for a limited war capability separate from strategic nuclear strength.

The latter would come into play in defense of vital US interests and in case of

substantial Soviet aggression against the NATO area. The former was conceived

to be primarily nonnuclear, for use against overt communist aggression outside

the NATO area. Flexibility was required, however, to permit limited and local use

of nuclear weapons against military targets if aggression continued.

Neither the Soviet Union nor US allies, in the Department of State's judgment,

doubted that the United States would use its strategic nuclear arsenal in a situation that clearly endangered vital US security interests, but doubts about whether

the United States would use its nuclear power in less grave situations were growing among the allies, in proportion to the growth of Soviet nuclear capabilities.

To rebuild the free world's confidence that local communist aggressions would

be deterred or defeated, the United States needed "an evident, adequate and flexible capability for military operations short of general war."36

Upon hearing these views, General Twining promptly informed Secretary

McElroy of his deep concern that "State Department pressures, augmented by

some unilateral Service pressures," were working toward an extremely dangerous revision of BNSP. To proceed in the direction indicated by the Department of

State would require either greatly increased budgets and force levels or lower

strategic nuclear strength and reduced combat capability of the tactical forces.

Barring a major budgetary increase, tactical forces (even though enlarged) would

be less powerful owing to political restrictions on the use of nuclear weapons,

while strategic nuclear capability would decline relative to the need, since a lesser portion of the fixed budget would be devoted to improving it.37 Shortly after

submitting this paper, dated 29 April, General Twining underwent major surgery

and thereafter took no active part in the debate. Already, on 18 April, Christian

Herter had succeeded the ailing John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State. On 1

July, General Taylor retired and General Lyman Lemnitzer succeeded him as

Chief of Staff, Army.

Divisions over the BNSP did not abate, however. A majority of the Planning

Board favored retaining NSC 5810/1's language about placing "main, but not

sole, reliance" on nuclear weapons and considering them as conventional

weapons. But the Department of State and the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM) proposed an alternative that distinguished between general and

limited war:

23
JCS and National Policy

It is the policy of the United States to integrate nuclear weapons with other

weapons in the arsenal of the United States; to place main reliance on nuclear weapons

in general war, remaining prepared to fight limited war with or without such weapons.

Nuclear weapons will be used when required to achieve national objectives. Advance

authorization for their use in either general or limited war is as determined by the President.38

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (minus, of course, the convalescent General Twining)

divided in the same way that they had split over the Cutler proposal—not surprisingly, since the State-OCDM draft was essentially the same thing. Generals

Taylor and Pate as well as Admiral Burke had endorsed the State-OCDM substitute; General White opposed it. General White also objected to an addition

designed to place some limit on the resources devoted to strengthening the

strategic deterrent. Other Service Chiefs, however, felt that the magnitude of

nuclear retaliatory capability should be determined by its sufficiency "to reduce

the Soviet power complex to impotency." A few months earlier, in congressional

testimony, General Taylor and Admiral Burke had argued that the number of

mass-destruction weapons exceeded the need, even when computed with ample

margins for all contingencies. Maintaining an excessive retaliatory force, they

said, was consuming funds that might better be devoted to improving limited

war capabilities. On another issue, whether to help friendly nations develop their

own nuclear weapons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reversed their stand of previous

years. Arguing that the policy of withholding aid had proved futile, they now

advocated such assistance. Ultimately, though, the NSC rejected their views.39

On 9 July 1959, the NSC discussed this proposed revision of BNSP and then

returned it to the Planning Board for further work. Mr. Gordon Gray, who had

succeeded Mr. Cutler as Chairman of the Planning Board, then circulated a new

paragraph on the use of nuclear weapons. He had prepared it on the basis of oral

remarks by President Eisenhower. The paragraph read as follows:

It is the policy of the United States to place main, but not sole, reliance on nuclear

weapons; to integrate nuclear weapons with other weapons in the Armed Forces of

the United States; and to use them when required to meet the nation's war objectives.

Planning should contemplate situations short of general war where the use of nuclear

weapons would manifestly not be militarily necessary nor appropriate to the accomplishment of national objectives, particularly in those areas where main Communist

power will not be brought to bear. All deployed organized units will be prepared to

use nuclear weapons when required in defense of the command. Advance authorization for the use of nuclear weapons is as determined by the President.

When the Planning Board met on 17 July, the Defense member tabled a note,

which had originated with Secretary McElroy, on the interpretation of this

redraft. The note prescribed that Mr. Gray's paragraph was not to be construed

as a change of policy. Rather, it clarified existing policy with respect to the use of

nuclear weapons and the requirement for maintaining balanced forces. A majority of the Planning Board approved the Defense Department's note. The Defense

member thereupon accepted Mr. Gray's paragraph, with the understanding that

24
Backing Awayfrom "Massive Retaliation"

the first sentence applied to both general and limited war and with extended

stipulations regarding the second sentence. Interpretation of the latter was to be

based, among other things, on an assumption that, in Europe, limited war

involving sizable US and Soviet forces was not a possibility, while situations

short of limited war, such as incursions and local hostile actions, were covered by

NATO's political directive and strategic concept.40

On 29 July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed this whole matter. General Lemnitzer recommended approving Mr. Gray's redraft but without the Defense

Department's note. He felt that the note would weaken Gray's redraft and, more

importantly, "might have the effect of continuing in force any misinterpretations

which may have become attached to the superseded language" of NSC 5810/1.

He also objected that the lengthy interpretation of Gray's second sentence by the

Defense Department would "introduce rigidity in our planning since it tends to

prejudge... the situation in which the United States will, or will not, use nuclear

weapons." The Joint Chiefs of Staff remained divided, however, and did not forward any written views to Secretary McElroy41

On 30 July, the NSC adopted Mr. Gray's wording about the use of nuclear

weapons, along with the Defense Department's note terming the new language a

clarification rather than a change of policy. With regard to deterring or countering

limited war, the Council modified the relevant paragraph in NSC 5810/1. It no

longer spoke of local aggression as that occurring in "less developed areas of the

world." Instead, it defined local aggression as "conflicts occurring outside the

NATO area," and in any event excluding any hostilities involving "sizable" US and

Soviet forces. President Eisenhower approved this new statement of BNSP, which

became effective on 5 August as NSC 5906/1.42 It certainly did not signify any

major change. Nonetheless, waging limited war without nuclear weapons emerged

as a distinct possibility. That marked a discernible retreat from NSC 5707/8.

In the course of BNSP review, the Planning Board undertook a thorough study

of mobilization base and stockpiling policies. Misunderstanding about the mobilization base concept had arisen in the two years since its adoption. The "M+6 factor," originally presented as an arbitrary means of establishing the force levels for

which supplies would have to be available when hostilities began, had instead

taken on the traditional meaning of a specific mobilization period prior to D-day.

At an NSC meeting on 18 December 1958, President Eisenhower had questioned

whether "a mobilization period of six months prior to D-day" could be assumed

and directed the Defense Department to keep this question under study43

This question bore on both the Board's review of BNSP and the Services'

logistical planning. In February 1959, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply and Logistics proposed guidelines that would, among other things: limit the

mobilization buildup to M+2 force levels prescribed by JSOP-61, instead of M+6

levels; limit reserves for general war to ninety days and prohibit establishment of

a pipeline; and confine mobilization planning to M+3 rather than M+6 months.

Deputy Secretary Quarles requested comments from the Joint Chiefs of Staff;

they learned, informally, that their views would be construed as advice on the

length of the mobilization period.44

25
JCS and National Policy

The Joint Chiefs of Staff judged the proposed guidance unsatisfactory, saying

that it would seriously restrict the attainment of objectives they had established

on the basis of military considerations. The fundamental purpose of objectives

planning, they stressed, would be vitiated unless logistics planning guidance

directly derived from and supported the strategy. Instead, the Services should

proceed with their FY 1960-1961 materiel planning under existing guidance.

After BNSP and the mobilization base concept had been reviewed, new guidelines should be included in the next Joint Strategic Objectives Plan, JSOP-63.

Deputy Secretary Quarles accepted JCS recommendations about current military

programs but kept the Assistant Secretary's proposal under consideration.45

On 27 July, after Mr. Quarles' death, the new Deputy Secretary, Thomas S.

Gates, Jr., circulated a draft that eliminated any reference to a specific time period

for mobilization. In fact, what previously had been covered by the term "mobilization base" now became the "military logistics base," providing requirements

for cold, limited, and general war.46

During JCS consideration of the new draft, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps

members strongly objected to dropping the M+6 factor. Nonetheless, on 12

August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted the new draft, subject to several

changes. They clarified the statement of requirements, eliminated references to

successive phases of general war as well as to different categories of forces having specific tasks within those phases, and generally simplified the text. Deputy

Secretary Gates accepted virtually all their recommendations.47

The NSC adopted and, on 14 October, President Eisenhower approved a statement defining the military logistics base as "the total of all resources available, or

which can be made available, to the military effort in order to meet foreseeable

wartime needs." It said nothing about phased expansion to M+6 levels. Accordingly, logistics requirements for general war were limited to those of the active forces

as of D-day, selected reserve forces having an initial general war mission, and such

additional forces as subsequently proved necessary to achieve national objectives.48

The new statement recognized explicitly, for the first time, the necessity of

including "appropriate consideration of nuclear damage" in planning for general

war. This was a new element also in formulating the strategic stockpile policy.

The Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, in 1958, had tied three-year stockpiling objectives to the extent to which supply sources outside North America

would be exploited. In place of this formula, the 1959 draft established as the

basis for determining stockpile objectives "the time required for supplies of

materials in a national emergency to meet essential needs of the emergency."

Besides a three-year ceiling, the draft set a floor of six months:

Pending a determination of the essential needs of the nation after a nuclear attack

(including reconstruction), the planning period should be limited to a maximum of

three years, provided that until such determination is made the 'maximum objective' should not be less than six months' usage by the U.S. industry in periods of

active demand.

26
Backing Awayfrom "Massive Retaliation"

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 6 November, informed Secretary McElroy that

they endorsed this change. A month later, on 3 December, the NSC adopted and

President Eisenhower approved OCDM's draft.49

In light of BNSP modifications, the Joint Chiefs of Staff made changes to

JSOP-62 and JSCP-60. Throughout JSOP-62, the phrase "limited war" replaced

such terms as "local aggression," "peripheral wars," or "hostilities short of

general war." The plan, however, did not provide a separate strategic concept for

limited war; nor were the categories of cold, limited, and general war defined,

except in a section giving a strategic appraisal of Soviet capabilities.

NSC 5906/1 reignited a long-running dispute over the nature and extent of

operations during the initial and subsequent phases of a general war. The Air

Force held that the initial nuclear exchange would be decisive and that subsequent operations would be primarily nuclear. The Army countered that the possibility of ground operations during the initial phase (or at least preparations for

them) should not be ignored, and that the subsequent phase would be much

broader in scope than the Air Force believed.

In JSOP-63, forwarded to Secretary Gates on 8 January 1960, the Joint Chiefs

of Staff merged opposing views by largely acknowledging the decisiveness of the

initial nuclear exchange without slighting the probable need for further operations to complete the victory. "The governing principle in the employment of

nuclear weapons in the initial phase is that the United States must

emerge... with the residual over-all advantage." The enemy's losses should be

such as "either to (a) bring about his capitulation, or (b) provide a margin of

advantage to the United States and its Allies sufficient to assure victory." The

subsequent phase would be "one of recovery, reconstitution of forces and

exploitation of the strategic advantage gained in the initial phase." At "the earliest practicable time," the United States and its allies would mount joint and combined offensive operations "to defeat remaining enemy military forces and to

attain other... war and post-war objectives."

For the first time, JSOP-63 included a strategic concept for limited war. Much

of what went into it, though, came from the statements of national and military

objectives or basic undertakings contained in previous plans. According to the

concept, planning should be based upon "a flexible and selective capability,

including nuclear capability for use in cases authorized by the President." To

deter limited war and either defeat an enemy or hold him until additional power

could be applied, the US military establishment would have to include ready

forces, highly mobile and suitably deployed. Whenever US forces were committed to a limited war, "force should be promptly and resolutely applied in a

degree necessary to defeat the enemy."50

Among JCS members, the drafting of JSCP-61 sparked a similar debate. The

draft contained a separate section with rather elaborate definitions of cold, limited, and general war. The Air Force's version made no provision for conflict with

the Soviet Union short of general war—a view that the other Services refused to

accept. In fact, as 1959 ended, it appeared that the Joint Chiefs of Staff might have

to send Secretary Gates two conflicting sets of definitions. This the Chairman was

loath to do. Finally, at a meeting on 29 February 1960 attended by the Secretary of

27
]CS and National Policy

Defense, conferees decided to omit the entire section on definitions. Instead, the

statement of military objectives incorporated brief phrases describing each type

of conflict without labeling them as definitions. Thus the approved JSCP listed

the military objectives "under conditions of cold war, which is the complete

scope of actions other than limited or general war that can be used in a power

struggle between nations," and in "limited war, an armed conflict short of general war, in which U.S. forces are overtly engaged," and in "general war, a war with

the USSR."51

A Final Revision

Since 1960 was to be the Eisenhower administration's final year, no full-scale

review of BNSP took place. Instead, on 7 April, President Eisenhower

directed the NSC to bring all policy papers up to date, in preparation for the

turnover. On 10 November 1960, the Planning Board advised Council members

that it had reviewed NSC 5906/1, found that paper still valid, and did not consider revision necessary.52

Earlier, in mid-July the Joint Chiefs of Staff had started their own revision, so

that they could hand the new administration their own proposed BNSP. It does

not appear, however, that they intended any radical recasting. The Joint Strategic

Survey Council recommended rewriting to eliminate "certain obscurities and

ambiguities" and to introduce a more positive tone. The JSSC envisioned a paper

"which is more dynamic and which would stimulate U.S. agencies to initiate

actions..., rather than be content with actions responsive to Sino-Soviet initiative." By the beginning of 1961, the JSSC had completed a paragraph-by-paragraph revision of NSC 5906/1. But that paper never received formal consideration. Instead, the Kennedy administration launched a much broader reappraisal

of national security policies.53

This time, the JSCP rather than the JSOP contained noteworthy changes. In

JSOP-66, unlike its predecessor, the Joint Chiefs of Staff made no distinction

between the two phases of general war. "The onset of a general war," the new

plan read, "probably will be characterized by an intensive exchange of nuclear

blows and the initiation of further operations and deployments by Army, Naval,

and Air Forces Offensive opportunities created by the initial exchange will

be exploited."54

The Joint Chiefs of Staff did recognize that the administration had become

more willing to accept the possibility of a nonnuclear conflict. JSCP-62, approved

on 27 December 1960, amended limited war guidance to allow more clearly for

operations without nuclear weapons. Further, JSCP-62 gave to USCINCEUR,

CINCNELM, CINCARIB, CINCPAC, and CINCLANT a new task of planning to

support "pro-western and neutral governments against communist or other antiwestern uprisings or movements." Further, guidance for Latin America stated

that if steps taken under the Rio Treaty against armed attack or aggression were

not successful, "overt unilateral action will be decided by the President, if he

28
Backing Awayfrom "Massive Retaliation"

deems appropriate, as a last resort." Fidel Castro's communization of Cuba,

described in chapter 12, had created a fresh danger.

The JSCP became the arena for arguing again about whether to retain existing

definitions of cold, limited, and general war. The Air Force insisted on doing so.

The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps remained unwilling to accept the view that

there could be no conflict with the Soviet Union short of general war. They

argued that the language being carried forward from JSCP-62 did not allow for

such contingencies as a confrontation with the Soviet Union in Africa, where the

national survival of neither superpower was at stake. On 27 December 1960, the

Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to retain the descriptions, as the Air Force desired.

General Decker, Admiral Burke, and General Shoup agreed on condition that it

be made a matter of record that they would have preferred changing them.55

Between 1957 and 1960, the Eisenhower administration underwent a modest

but marked shift in its thinking about limited war. NSC 5707/8 strongly implied

that tactical weapons would be employed against local aggression. NSC 5906/1,

by contrast, envisioned situations "where the use of nuclear weapons would

manifestly not be militarily necessary nor appropriate to the accomplishment of

national objectives " Further evidence of this change can be drawn from a

study, completed in September 1960, that analyzed US and allied capabilities for

conducting limited operations.

In mid-1959, senior officials agreed that limited war capabilities should

undergo a periodic review. For such an exercise, unlike the one described on

pages 23-26, the possibilities of direct Soviet involvement and an enemy's resorting to nuclear weapons were not ruled out. A group drawn from the Department

of State, OSD, JCS, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) studied five situations—Berlin, Laos, Iran, Quemoy and Matsu, and Korea—deemed representative of the areas and types of situations that the United States might confront.

When a draft report circulated in July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary

Gates a critique that challenged some of the report's basic assumptions. They

argued, for example, that the study downgraded the perception and resolution of

US allies by postulating an alarmed reaction to US military steps against overt

aggression. After reviewing the report's scenario for Laos, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

judged its principal weakness to be an assumption that North Vietnam would

continue attacking all by itself in the face of an expanding SEATO response. More

probably, China would sanction North Vietnam's attack beforehand and then

come to her aid if necessary.

The final report, appearing in September, rated US and allied strength adequate

(if augmented by a partial mobilization) to conduct operations in any one of the

five areas listed above. There were instances where escalation risked nuclear retaliation and broadening of the conflict. Meeting each of the five cases would require

substantial conventional forces, even if no nuclear weapons were employed. On 5

January 1961, presumably based upon this report, the NSC concluded that there

was no need for a "radical" reallocation of resources to strengthen nonnuclear

forces. Nonetheless, particularly among President-elect Kennedy and his advisers,

arguments against a nuclear strategy were gaining ground.56

29
3

Budget Ceilings Shape Force Levels

Ever since the Korean War had ended in July 1953, ground forces had been

contracting while strategic air power expanded. During President Eisenhower's

first term, the Army shrank from 1.5 to 1 million men; the Navy's strength

declined from 800,000 to 670,000 and the Marine Corps from 230,000 to 200,000

personnel. The Air Force, however, dropped only from 950,000 to 910,000. Predictably, within the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acrimony became commonplace. The

Army stoutly opposed continuing cutbacks which drained it more than any other

Service. The Navy also objected but not so outspokenly because it suffered less.

The Air Force, feeling itself to be the favored Service, wholeheartedly supported

the New Look. Admiral Radford, the Chairman, likewise advocated putting air

power first. These differences would persist throughout President Eisenhower's

second term.

1957

On 30 June 1956, major elements of the active armed forces included: an Army

of eighteen divisions and 998,000 personnel; a Navy and Marine Corps with

409 warships, three division/wing teams, and 677,000 personnel; and an Air

Force with 131 wings and 920,000 personnel. The Air Force was the only Service

that grew in size during FY 1956, by ten wings; all-jet, swept-wing B-52s were

replacing much slower piston and turbojet B-36s.

The administration's underlying approach to force planning, in Secretary

Wilson's words, consisted of maximizing firepower and minimizing the foot soldier. On 30 June 1957, Army divisions still numbered eighteen, but they were

being reorganized along "pentomic" lines, with each division built around five

small battle groups, five artillery battalions, and one nuclear-capable battery of

Honest John rockets. Under the FY 1958 force structure, approved by President

Eisenhower in December 1956, the Army would shrink again; so would the Air

31
JCS and National Policy

Force, this time, because of fighter and tactical bomber reductions. A growing

array of Army and Air Force missiles, as well as the advent of more effective aircraft, permitted these cutbacks without any sacrifice of combat power.1

The Basic National Security Policy was supposed to provide the starting point

for FY 1959 force planning. If matters had proceeded according to schedule, a

BNSP statement would have won approval in the early months of 1957. By 1

April, the Joint Staff would have drafted JSOP-61, covering a 36-month period

beginning on 1 July 1961; the Joint Chiefs of Staff were supposed to approve

JSOP-61 by 31 May. Then, during the summer, FY 1959 programs and budgets

would be reassessed and guidelines for preparation of the FY 1960 budget

developed. Work on a JSCP for the fiscal year beginning 1 July 1958 would have

started, so that an approved plan could emerge by 31 December.

Instead, as chapter 2 has shown, the process of BNSP review ran until 31 July

1957. More importantly, JSOP-61 had to be prepared after the overall level of

Defense expenditures—whose determination, in theory, the completed JSOP was

supposed to guide—already had been set. On 6 March 1957, Secretary Wilson

told the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assume that annual appropriations for FYs

1959-1960 would remain at $39 billion, the FY 1958 level. In particular, he wanted

them to weigh the merits of force modernization against the advantages of

keeping a large force in being (i.e., quality versus quantity). For planning

purposes, D-day would be assumed to occur after six months of mobilization, at

M+6. Finally, Secretary Wilson called for a single set of force "tabs" to meet the

eventualities of cold, limited, or general war.2

On 25 April, Admiral Radford advised Secretary Wilson that the Joint Chiefs

of Staff had failed thus far to produce what the Chairman considered workable

and realistic force tabs for the JSOP. Two approaches had been tried. In the first,

each Service listed the minimum forces it considered necessary to carry out

essential tasks. This effort yielded a clearly unattainable total of $52-55 billion per

year. In the second, Services assumed that funds would be divided among them

in the same proportion as in the FY 1958 budget. This exercise resulted in force

tabs which the Joint Chiefs of Staff judged inadequate in many respects.

Admiral Radford, for different reasons, questioned many points in this second

set of force tabs. The Services, he believed, had failed to follow the strategic

concept to its logical conclusion. The Air Force and the Navy had met the $39

billion ceiling by making deep cuts in modernization as well as research and

development programs. The Army proposed to reduce its active forces and

increase the Selective Reserves' strength. The Army's hope of deploying nineteen

divisions overseas during the first six months of a general war depended on having sufficient time for mobilization and undisrupted lines of communication.

Radford thought this unrealistic since, according to the strategic concept, nuclear

weapons would be used from the outset in general war. The Army apparently

anticipated peripheral wars "of considerable magnitude in which we do not use

atomic weapons." By contrast, Radford read the strategic concept as calling for

indigenous allied forces plus a small, highly mobile and thoroughly modernized

US ground force that, with air and naval support, could be deployed on short

32
Budget Ceilings Shape Force Levels

notice. The US force need not be large because it would be ready to employ

nuclear weapons whenever the occasion arose.

Admiral Radford asked Secretary Wilson to make several points "absolutely

clear" to the Service Chiefs. First, in general war, nuclear weapons would be used

from the outset. Second, in peripheral wars, nuclear weapons would be used

when necessary to achieve military objectives. Third, the annual budget would

remain at $39 billion. He also suggested stressing the desirability of reducing

overseas deployments as soon as politically feasible and holding the Selective

Reserve to the small numbers usable in the first few weeks of a general war.3

The Services tried again to produce a $39 billion force structure for JSOP-61—

and failed. The Acting Chairman, General Taylor, told Secretary Wilson on 15

May that they probably could reach agreement on a $41 to $42 billion budget.

Otherwise, they would have to submit force tabs that were split three ways and

based on conditional appropriations figures. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended suspending work on JSOP-61 until the FY 1958 budget became firm.

Wilson agreed to a delay, as long as there was hope of eventual agreement, but he

expected to see some overseas withdrawals and said that the budget ceiling

would not be raised.4

The Joint Chiefs of Staff remained deadlocked. On 16 July, the Chairman

informed Secretary Wilson that he saw little point in asking the Service Chiefs to

rework their figures without further guidance. At that point, Service positions on

the active force structure ran as follows:

FY1959 FY1961

Divisions

Army 16 15

Navy 15 13

Air Force 11 11

Personnel

Army 975,000 945,000

Navy 900,000 800,000

Air Force 825,000 805,000

vy

Attack Carriers

Navy 15 15

Army 14 11

Air Force 13 12

Personnel

Navy 655,000 645,000

Army 638,000 607,000

Air Force 647,000 586,000

33
]CS and National Policy

FY1959 FY1961

Marine Corps

Personnel

Navy 194,000 191,200

Army 196,000 188,000

Air Force 197,000 191,000

Air Force

Wings

Air Force 119 107

Navy 120 101

Army 112 87

Personnel

Air Force 900,000 875,000

Navy 850,000 840,000

Army 883,000 826,000

Admiral Radford argued that, in order to find a force structure that would fit

within the budget ceiling, "we must thoroughly understand and accept the

strategic concept " Properly applied, that concept would compel not only

reassessing plans for large-scale overseas deployments during the first six

months of war but also rejecting the possibility of employing large ground forces

in conflicts short of general war. Ground and tactical air force reductions should

follow from those factors, as well as from taking full account of allied capabilities. As new weapons entered the inventory, all Services should be able to provide the same level of defense with either fewer combat units or units with

reduced complements.

Further, Admiral Radford held that the administration's refusal to increase

defense spending underscored the need to scale back continental air defenses.

Instead of large expenditures on short-range missiles and fighter interceptors,

whose best efforts would not materially decrease overall damage, the program

should stress a perfected early warning system and retaliatory capability. Radford also concluded that "the United States cannot continue year after year to

maintain large overseas ground forces and land-based air forces." He, therefore,

advocated withdrawals from Europe, resolutely accepting the political difficulties involved.

The Chairman proposed concentrating cutbacks in Army and Marine divisions, Army air defense battalions, and interceptors, tactical, and airlift units. His

specific proposals appear below:5

34
Budget Ceilings Shape Force Levels

30 June 1959 30 June 1961

Army

Divisions 13 11

Personnel 850,000 700,000

Navy

Attack Carriers 14 13

Personnel 630,000 590,000

Marine Corps

Division/Wing Teams

Personnel

3

170,000

2

135,000

Air Force

Wings

Personnel

107

850,000

85

775,000

On 25 July, Secretary Wilson presented the NSC with his recommendations for

FYs 1958-1961. Generally adopting Admiral Radford's proposals, he forecast a

personnel reduction from the current 2,794,411 to 2,200,000 by mid-1961. Just

over half this cut would come from the Army, which he projected as declining

from the current 997,916 to 700,000. The Service Chiefs all gave the NSC their

views, and General Taylor naturally argued against steep Army cuts. Nonetheless, the Council substantially endorsed Wilson's program. President Eisenhower

said that, barring an unforeseen emergency or any major international or economic change, he would hold Defense spending to $38 billion annually for the

rest of his term. He warned, in fact, that Congress and the American public might

not support even that much.6

President Eisenhower approved the FY 1958 program as well as FY 1959

budget submissions under a $38 billion ceiling. Planning for FYs 1960-1961, he

continued, "should recognize the trend toward more expensive military equipment with some reductions in personnel." Secretary Wilson, on 6 August, prescribed the following personnel strengths for the Services:

1 Jan 1958 30Junl958 30Junl959

Army 950,000 900,000 850,000

Navy 660,000 645,000 630,000

Marine Corps 190,000 180,000 170,000

Air Force 900,000 875,000 850,000

Total 2,700,000 2,600,000 2,500,000

The figures in the third column, which went beyond what had been decided at

the NSC meeting, were precisely those that Admiral Radford had recommended.7

Their adoption symbolized the Chairman's emergence, de facto if not de jure, as

35
JCS and National Policy

the Secretary's principal military adviser. Conversely, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had

proven ineffective as a corporate advisory body.

In mid-October, the new Secretary, Neil McElroy, asked for fuller data about

Service programs plus an evaluation of whether these represented the most effective forces attainable within fiscal guidelines. The Services replied and, after

reviewing their presentations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1 November advised

Mr. McElroy that these comprised the "most effective" FY 1959 posture attainable. Among the major forces were: fourteen Army and three Marine divisions;

396 warships, including fourteen attack carriers; and 103 Air Force wings. They

added, though, that these levels represented a considerable reduction in size and

rate of modernization from FYs 1957-1958. In their judgment, too, such reductions would seriously affect overseas deployments. Europeans might use US

withdrawals as an excuse to cut their NATO commitments; attainment of US

objectives in the Far East also would grow more difficult.8

In the wake of "Sputnik," President Eisenhower agreed to support some

increases, provided the Defense budget remained below $40 billion. The Services

recommended $4 to $5 billion worth of additions for FY 1959; well over half these

funds were earmarked for missile systems and research and development efforts.

The final FY 1959 request totaled $39,145 billion in new obligational authority

and $39,779 billion in estimated expenditures. The administration also sought a

$1,270 billion supplemental appropriation for FY 1958. Congress voted a $1,260

billion supplemental appropriation for FY 1958 and $39,840 billion for the

Services during FY 1959.9

1958

Late in November 1957, the Joint Staff resumed work on JSOP-61. Planning,

Secretary McElroy instructed, should assume that force levels and personnel

strengths for FYs 1960-1961 probably would not exceed FY 1959 figures by more

than five percent. On 9 January 1958 the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded a finished

JSOP-61 to Mr. McElroy. Its force tabs for 1 July 1961 read as follows:

Army: 15 divisions (10 infantry, 3 armored, 2 airborne).

Navy: 397 warships, including 14 attack carriers and 3 ballistic missile

submarines.

Marine Corps: 3 division/wing teams.

Air Force: 101 wings (43 strategic, 25 air defense, 22 tactical, and 11 airlift).

Each Service Chief detailed the risks that his own Service would incur by

holding to these levels. General Taylor said, among other things, that logistic and

Service support for units overseas would be insufficient to sustain combat operations and absorb reinforcements. Also, Taylor did not consider the seven divisions that would be stationed in CONUS enough to deal with an emergency.

Admiral Burke claimed that naval forces were "marginal for the accomplishment

36
Budget Ceilings Shape Force Levels

of vital initial tasks." General White rated the Air Force capable of launching a

"significant" offensive, disrupting an air attack against the United States, and

providing in-place striking power overseas. However, the bomber fleet would be

hobbled because modernization was not progressing at an optimum rate and

complete dispersal of the strategic force remained out of reach. Deputy Secretary

Quarles approved JSOP-61 as a common point of reference for strategic and

mobilization planning but cautioned that it could not be used as "automatic justification of a personnel, procurement, installation, or budget program."10

Budget decisions for FY 1959 also served as guidance for FY 1960. JSOP-62,

submitted on 6 June 1958, contained force tabs prepared unilaterally by the individual Services. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized that the total cost of these

tabs, $57.4 billion, exceeded what would be available. They asked Secretary

McElroy to provide FY 1960-1961 fiscal guidance, not rigidly set, so that they

could reconsider JSOP-62's force tabs. As JSOP-62 now stood, tailored to $57.4

billion, its force tabs read as follows:

Army: 15 divisions (10 infantry, 3 armored, 2 airborne).

Navy: 413 warships, including 14 attack carriers, 9 ASW carriers, and

11 ballistic missile submarines.

Marine Corps: 3 division/wing teams.

Air Force: 110 wings (46 strategic, 27 air defense, 28 tactical, 9 airlift).

To compound JSOP-62's weaknesses, the Service Chiefs sharply criticized

each other's proposals. General Taylor remarked upon what struck him as excessive retaliatory capability. Until technical difficulties were solved, he argued,

plans for the Navy's fleet of ballistic missile submarines should not expand

beyond three. Taylor also called fourteen attack carriers excessive, since these

ships duplicated the capabilities of land-based aircraft as well as land- and shipbased missiles. Admiral Burke believed that the advent of strategic missiles

should cause a reduction in bombers, based upon comparison of delivery capability. General White claimed the Army could perform its functions with fewer

divisions, the Navy with fewer attack carriers. He also questioned whether, when

compared to bombers and land-based missiles, ballistic missile submarines could

pass the test of cost-effectiveness.11

Obviously, a paper burdened with all the shortcomings of JSOP-62 exercised

very little influence upon anybody. Fiscal and force planning continued, according to General Taylor, "in the usual way, each Service producing its budget in isolation from the others." By 2 December 1958, OSD officials had pared Service

requests from $48.5 to $40.85 billion in new obligational authority (NOA). But

President Eisenhower, deeply concerned over a $13 billion deficit for FY 1959, felt

that further cuts in military spending might be needed. At a Cabinet meeting on

3 December, attended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President asked each JCS

member to state his views. General Taylor protested the inadequacy of funds for

Army modernization and argued that the broader issue of keeping the economy

on a sound footing lay "outside of his responsibility." Admiral Burke said that

additional taxes should be voted if needed. General White thought that, over

37
JCS and National Policy

time, Defense reorganization would generate savings by eliminating duplication.

General Twining, speaking last, felt that US forces were sufficient to deter general

war and meet limited aggression. The important thing, he asserted, was to act

decisively in using available strength when a crisis occurred.12

On 6 December Secretary McElroy and General Twining presented the FY

1960 program to the NSC. McElroy described it as the best that could be developed, and the Chairman gave his personal opinion that it was adequate. President Eisenhower then approved the military program "in general," although asking that all possible economies be made. On 20 January 1959, the Joint Chiefs of

Staff formally advised Secretary McElroy that the FY 1960 budget adequately

provided for essential programs and contained no serious gaps. Each Service

Chief, however, had major reservations about funding levels for his own Service.

Congress finally appropriated $39.89 billion for the Services. On 30 June 1959

major force levels stood as follows:

Army: 15 divisions, 862,000 personnel.

Navy: 386 warships (including 14 attack carriers), 626,000 personnel.

Marine Corps: 3 division/wing teams, 176,000 personnel.

Air Force: 105 wings (43 strategic, 27 air defense, 35 tactical and airlift),

840,000 personnel.13

1959

In the spring of 1959, the Joint Chiefs of Staff began their work on the FY 1961

budget with an exercise proposed by General Twining. Each Service was asked

not only to formulate its own programs but also to propose objectives for the

others as well. As a ground rule in developing force levels, new obligational

authority was fixed at $41,379 billion in FY 1961, a figure which would increase

by 5 percent each year thereafter.

If this exercise was intended to demonstrate interservice cooperation, it had

exactly the opposite result. By including the utmost for itself and recommending

minimum amounts for the others, each Services' submission came close to the

overall targets. But the Service's estimates of their own needs—$55.3 billion—

totaled about 34 percent more than the established ceiling.14

On 8 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary McElroy a memorandum

outlining their areas of agreement and disagreement. The major interservice

splits are listed on page 39. Thus, thanks to its lack of "jointness," another JCS

paper left almost no imprint upon the force planning process.15

Late in June, the Service Secretaries decided to submit FY 1961 budgets equal

to the FY 1960 amount of new obligational authority, minus 10 percent of the

sums allocated for procurement, research and development, and construction.

Also, each Service would submit an addendum restoring that 10 percent sum

plus another $500 million. For all Services, the former approach would total

$38,759 billion, the latter $42,755 billion. On 1 July, Secretary McElroy discussed

38
Budget Ceilings Shape Force Levels

budget preparation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He granted them a two-week

period, following OSD's review, in which to advise him about the implications of

these budgets.16

FY1961 FY1963

Army Divisions

Army 15 15

Navy 14 14

Air Force 11 11

Attack Carriers

Army 12 8

Navy 14 14

Air Force 9 9

Strategic Bomber Wings

Army 33 19

Navy 34 24

Air Force 38 33

Intercontinental Ballistic

Missile Squadrons

Army N/A 21

Navy N/A 12

Air Force N/A 31

Ballistic Missile Submarines

Army 5 13

Navy 5 13

Air Force 5 9

On 27 October, the Secretary of Defense completed his initial examination of the

budget. The Joint Chiefs of Staff then began their two-week review. By 10 November, no meeting of the minds seemed imminent. Accordingly, General Twining felt

it necessary to force the pace by advising the Service Chiefs as follows:

I believe that the Secretary has provided... adequate information for us to proceed. I

intend that we proceed expeditiously now; failing that, I can assure you that the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, as a corporate body, will not be in a very strong position to comment

on the Secretary's final action, having failed to provide the Secretary with advice or

assistance in his deliberations leading to final action. He has requested this of us, and

has given us every reasonable opportunity to furnish him sound military advice in

support of a military budget that could be subjected to drastic curtailments in a

period of financial stringency.17

39
]CS and National Policy

On 13 November, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed upon a statement couched in

general terms that voiced their concern over the proposed budget's implications.

"The present margin of relative military capabilities is so thin," they agreed, "that

to further reduce US relative military strength without similar Soviet reductions,

would place the United States in a vulnerable position." Nonmilitary considerations, they recognized, would help determine the size and distribution of any

budget. Nonetheless, "there are risks in this proposed budget because of the

increase in enemy capabilities, rising costs, and the decrease in our relative military capability."18

Three days later, Secretary McElroy and General Twining flew to Augusta,

Georgia, where they talked with President Eisenhower about the budget. On 18

November, the Joint Chiefs as a body did the same. The President urged them to

take a fresh look at things that had become matters of habit, such as keeping sizable forces in Europe and two attack carriers in the Mediterranean. He outlined

the military's task as follows: "We should maintain the reserves for the whole

free world, and rely on local people to provide the local elements of defense,

especially on the ground. We should provide air, naval and mobile land forces."

He described the Joint Chiefs of Staff as being "the hinge between the professional forces and the supporting nation." Defense spending, he insisted, had to be

supported by taxes and not by deficit spending. Consequently, "we must cut off

every excrescence."19

On 25 November, the Defense budget was presented to the NSC. The administration ultimately requested, for the Services, an appropriation of $39,296

billion; Congress voted $40,549 billion. What did these sums buy? On 30 June

1960, major forces were constituted as follows:

Army: 14 divisions, 873,000 personnel.

Navy: 812 warships (including 14 attack carriers), 618,000 personnel.

Marine Corps: 3 division/wing teams, 171,000 personnel.

Air Force: 96 wings (40 strategic, 23 air defense, 33 tactical and airlift),

815,000 personnel.20

1960

Through JSOP-63, submitted to Secretary Gates on 8 January 1960, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff recommended force levels for 1 July 1963. Their figures were

based on an assumption that expenditures would increase at a rate of 5 percent

annually through FY 1963. For the only time during President Eisenhower's

second term, they forwarded a JSOP unburdened by interservice splits:

40
Budget Ceilings Shape Force Levels

Army: 14 divisions.

Navy: 15 attack carriers, 13 ballistic missile submarines.

Marine Corps: 3 division/wing teams.

Air Force: 405 B-47, 720 B-52, and 225 B-58 bombers; 130 Atlas, 120 Titan, and

150 Minuteman ICBMs.21

Secretary Gates, however, promulgated a different procedure for FY 1962

budgeting and force planning that rendered JSOP-63's recommendations obsolete. On 24 June 1960, he ordered each Service to draw up four alternative submissions: "A," 5 percent less than the new obligational authority for FY 1961;

"B," the same amount as FY 1961; "C," 5 percent more; and "D," containing additional programs deemed important enough to warrant serious consideration by

the Secretary. In his response, General Lemnitzer said the Army's structure

would be the same under "A," "B," and "C"; a "D" budget would allow one

more division and an array of smaller units. Admiral Burke reported that all four

alternatives could fund the same number of ships; only the number of personnel

would vary. General White found that Air Force units and personnel strength

would be identical under each alternative.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 16 August, sent Secretary Gates their assessment

of the Services' alternative submissions. They began by citing "increasing Communist boldness in international affairs," which they attributed to a Soviet perception that US national will was weakening and that relative military capabilities were shifting in the USSR's favor. The Joint Chiefs of Staff highlighted what

impressed them as the inadequacies of a straight-line "C" budget. First, the rising

price of goods and services raised the costs of readiness and effectiveness every

year. Second, since increasing Communist capabilities precluded cuts in quantitative commitments, qualitative reductions would be required. Third, increasing

lead times for development, procurement, and training lengthened the span

needed to transform additional resources into effective forces. Taken together,

these factors explained why force structures remained so similar under all four

alternatives. Over the long term, straight-line budgets would lead to annual qualitative cuts in flexibility, readiness, and effectiveness, to a continuing loss of

ability to expand rapidly during an emergency, and finally to the elimination of

combat units. Consequently, only a budget "significantly" above "C" would permit the improvements essential to maintaining an effective long-term posture.22

Meanwhile, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were working on JSOP-66. They had

agreed to base JSOP-66's force tabs upon FY 1961 expenditures, increased by 5

percent annually through FY 1966. This time, though, interservice differences

resurfaced with a vengeance. When JSOP-66 went to Secretary Gates on 20 September 1960, Admiral Burke and General Lemnitzer rejected as excessive the Air

Force's plans for its strategic retaliatory forces. General White, in turn, rated as

too rapid the pace of Army and Navy modernization programs, recommended

that carriers emphasize anti-submarine rather than attack missions, and

proposed reducing the ballistic missile submarine program. Burke had touted

submarines as superior to ICBMs because of their survivability; White stressed

41
JCS and National Policy

the comp .rative cheapness of Minuteman. The table below details how wide

these interservice divisions had become:

Available on 1 July 65:

Army Navy Air Force

Attack Carriers 14 14 10

ASW Carriers 9 9 13

Ballistic Missile Subs 21 21 15

B-52s 675 588 768

Atlas ICBMs 78 24 104

Titan ICBMs 140 90 180

Minuteman ICBMs 800 400 1,450

Secretary Gates noted these force tabs without, of course, approving any of

them.23

The administration decided to hold the Air Force and Navy fairly close to "A"

level funding while allowing the Army almost a "C" level. By 1 July 1962, if these

decisions stood, the active force structure would include: fourteen Army and

three Marine divisions; fourteen attack and nine ASW carriers; nine ballistic missile submarines; 780 B-47, 630 B-52, and eighty B-58 bombers; and fifty-eight

Titan and ninety-five Atlas ICBMs.24 The Kennedy administration, however, felt

compelled to embark upon a considerable expansion of the armed forces.

Conclusion

Consistently, force-planning debates showed the Joint Chiefs of Staff at their

fractious worst. Among the Service Chiefs, parochial interests remained predominant. Privately, in July 1959, President Eisenhower complained that he could

not "figure out what is causing the trouble in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The organization seems to be failing to do its job." When he made this observation, General

Lemnitzer was about to replace General Taylor as Army Chief of Staff. The President told Secretary McElroy that he hoped Lemnitzer would prove to be another

man like General Twining who, once a decision had been made, did not try to

undercut it by appealing to Congress or the media. McElroy suspected that Taylor

had allowed his subordinates to argue publicly against administration decisions.25

General Lemnitzer, as the President hoped, proved a loyal subordinate. Within the

Pentagon, though, guerrilla warfare remained as fierce as ever.

42
4

Closing the "Missile Gap"

Between 1957 and I960, no Defense issue aroused so much public concern as

the emergence of a "missile gap," in which the USSR appeared to be outstripping

the United States. President Eisenhower responded by accelerating some programs but flatly rejected calls for a massive "crash" effort. The Joint Chiefs of

Staff reacted along the same lines as they had during the force-level debates

described in chapter 3. Each Service pushed its own projects. The Air Force

wanted to deploy the largest possible number of Atlas, Titan and Minuteman

intercontinental ballistic missiles. A land-based ICBM would travel 5,500 nautical

miles. The Navy advocated cutting back ICBM production plans in favor of

Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), with a range of 1,200 nautical miles. The Army, seeing anti-ICBM (ABM) defense as its piece of the action,

zealously pushed the Nike-Zeus program.

The "Sputnik" Supplemental

By the mid-1950s, the superpowers plainly were racing to be first in deploying

ICBMs. On 13 September 1955, President Eisenhower decided that the ICBM

research and development effort should have "the highest priority above all others," and directed the Secretary of Defense to proceed "with maximum urgency."

By early 1957, Air Force plans called for the first Atlas ICBMs to become operational by 1960. The Air Force's Thor intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM),

with a range of 1,200 nautical miles, was slated to become operational during

1959-1960; the Army's Jupiter IRBM should follow a year or so later. According

to a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) issued on 12 March 1957, the Soviets

probably could deploy an IRBM in 1959 and an ICBM in 1960-1961.1

Late in August 1957, Moscow announced the successful flight-testing of an

ICBM. Sputnik I, the world's first earth satellite, weighing 184 pounds, went into

orbit on 4 October; Sputnik II, weighing 1,120 pounds, followed on 3 November.

43
JCS and National Policy

Clearly, the Soviets had a lead. Just how greatly this lead alarmed the American

public may be seen in the language of the Gaither Report. A panel of nongovernmental experts headed by H. Rowan Gaither, Jr., identified the foremost danger

facing the United States as strategic bombers' vulnerability to surprise attack

during a period of reduced tension, a weakness that would become critical by

early 1960. Therefore, an overriding priority must be given, in the short run, to

implementing promptly the bomber alert and dispersal measures already

planned by the Strategic Air Command (SAC). Over the longer term, there

should be accelerated missile production leading to the earliest possible deployment of IRBMs overseas, construction of hardened and dispersed ICBM silos,

and expansion of the Polaris submarine fleet. Every effort should be made to

have a significant number of IRBMs operational overseas by late 1958 and ICBMs

operational by late 1959. Specifically, the Panel recommended deploying 600

Atlas and Titans by mid-1963, bringing the first Polaris submarine into service by

1962, and completing eighteen of the submarines by 1965.

The report also recommended improving and extending radar warning nets,

developing ABMs, greatly augmenting antisubmarine programs, intensifying

intelligence efforts, and initiating a nationwide fallout shelter program. The

Gaither Panel estimated that the most urgent measures would cost $19 billion

over the coming five years. The other recommendations, including the shelter

program, were calculated as requiring an extra $25 billion over the same period.

But the Panel, which numbered such luminaries as former Secretary of Defense

Robert A. Lovett, declared such expenditures to be well within the country's economic capabilities. Members felt confident that the American people willingly

would shoulder heavy costs, if the national leadership effectively explained the

nature of the threat.2

After the NSC heard the Gaither Report on 7 November, its various recommendations were assigned to appropriate departments and agencies for study.

But before any responses appeared, a number of things took place. On 12

November, a new NIE tentatively advanced the operational date of a Soviet

IRBM to 1958, and the operational date of ten prototype Soviet ICBMs to 1959.

Two days later, the Services submitted about twenty supplemental proposals

costing between $4 and $5 billion. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 17 November,

endorsed a dozen of them costing around $1.5 billion. These included: Polaris,

$260 million; Thor IRBM, $154 million; Atlas ICBM, $159 million; ballistic missile

detection, $100 million.3

On 4 December, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary McElroy their response

to the Gaither Report. They fully agreed that hardened ICBM silos should be

completed as rapidly as possible and that proposed measures to disperse SAC

bombers and place more of them on alert status should be adopted, "although

the cost estimate appears open to question." Already, they had directed that

improving the defense of SAC bases against bomber attack should be among

those continental air defense programs having the highest priority. The Joint

Chiefs of Staff also had endorsed, as an urgent requirement, development of an

ABM system. They further noted that, by NSC direction, ICBM and IRBM

research and development programs already had been assigned the highest

44
Closing the "Missile Gap"

priority. Thus programs responsive to virtually all the report's recommendations

were already under way; the JCS response, in effect, endorsed all of them as worthy of emphasis. That they went no further probably reflected a recognition that,

to an unusual degree, a decision to accelerate efforts would depend on economic

and political judgments that were beyond their province.4

Bearing heavily on such judgments were comments forwarded to the NSC by

the Treasury Department, the Bureau of the Budget (BOB), and the Council of

Economic Advisers (CEA). All three concluded that the costs and economic consequences of adopting even a substantial portion of the report would be far

greater than estimated by the Gaither Panel. Its full adoption, they predicted,

would require either sharp tax increases or large deficit spending, as well as rigorous controls over credit, manpower, and materials to guard the economy

against dislocation and inflation.5These views, which were received in midDecember, may well have reinforced the President's native disposition against

what seemed like going to extremes.

Deputy Secretary Quarles, on 21 December, sent the NSC views which reflected JCS recommendations on most matters. Mr. Quarles reported that the number

of bombers able to get airborne, if they had between thirty minutes and two hours

of tactical warning, would rise from 157 on 1 January 1958 to 517 by 1 January

1959. (On 31 December 1957, SAC had 127 B/RB-36, 1,285 B-47, and 243 B-52

bombers.) The Gaither Panel envisaged deploying 600 ICBMs by mid-1963. Currently funded programs, according to Quarles, would provide forty Titan and

ninety Atlas ICBMs (four squadrons and nine squadrons, respectively) by then.

Considering the likely improvements in second-generation ICBMs, a goal of 600

first-generation types struck him as questionable. The Atlas was costly, cumbersome, and liquid-fueled; the second-generation Minuteman would be solidfueled, making it much easier to maintain on alert status and to place in hardened

silos. As for Polaris, three submarines were scheduled for completion by mid1961. The IRBM program also had been accelerated to provide 120 missiles by

early 1960, so production capability would exist to meet the Panel's goal of 240.6

Back in July 1957, the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG) had completed an evaluation of ABM efforts. WSEG responded to directives from the

Assistant Secretary (Research and Development) and from the Joint Chiefs of

Staff. Vice Admiral John H. Sides was its Director. The Group rated proposed

ABM systems as being able to defend targets against ICBM attacks

uncomplicated by decoys and electronic countermeasures (ECM). But by 1965,

the earliest time any ABM system could become operational, the Soviets probably would possess decoys and ECM. Until more was known about how to deal

with decoys and ECM, the Group thought it dangerous to concentrate upon a

single system or concept.7

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 16 December, informed Secretary McElroy that

they could not agree about whether ABMs deserved the same priority as ICBMs.

Only General Taylor advocated assigning the highest national priority to NikeZeus. Neither Admiral Burke nor General White considered Nike-Zeus sufficiently advanced to warrant excluding all other approaches. Burke and White therefore advocated concentrating on offensive systems: Atlas, Titan, and Polaris.8

45
JCS and National Policy

Meanwhile, on 10 December, a new and much more pessimistic NIE forecast

that the Soviets would deploy ten prototype ICBMs sometime between mid-1958

and mid-1959, one hundred operational ICBMs by mid-1960, and 500 within two or

three years after that. On 16 January 1958, the NSC decided that "predominant

emphasis should continue to be placed upon measures to strengthen effective US

nuclear retaliatory power as a deterrent and to improve US active defenses, as

compared with—but not to the exclusion of—passive defense measures " Six

days later, President Eisenhower awarded certain programs priority over all others

for research and development and for achieving initial operational capability.

These included, without one program having priority over another: (1) Atlas; (2)

Titan; (3) Thor and Jupiter; (4) Polaris; and (5) ABM systems, including Nike-Zeus.9

On 27 February, Secretary McElroy asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to review

Service suggestions for supplemental funding for FYs 1958 and 1959, assuming

the amounts would be either $1.5 or $2.5 billion. The JCS reply, dated 12 March,

came close to meeting the $1.5 billion limit. Each Service Chief, however, had

accepted with little change the full requests from his own Service while drastically cutting those from the others. A total reflecting what each Chief had requested

for his own Service would have come to more than $3.2 billion. The Secretary, on

17 March, circulated a "preliminary package" of eleven proposals. How the Joint

Chiefs of Staff responded to the main ones, two days later, appears below:

Projects Preliminary Cost (in millions)

SecDefView Army Navy Air Force Marines

Titan 100 0 0 100 100

Minuteman 125 24 24 125 125

Polaris 400 83 400 83 400

Nike-Zeus 225 682 108 225 225

It is interesting that only the Marine Corps, which had no stake in any of these

systems, agreed with the Secretary. General Taylor wanted to telescope NikeZeus' development and production time by two years, so that three batteries

could be deployed by December 1961. But none of his JCS colleagues supported

him and neither did Secretary McElroy. Ultimately, on 3 April, the administration

asked Congress for $1.59 billion overall: $50 million for Titan, $70 million for

Minuteman, $323.5 million for Polaris, and $195 million for Nike-Zeus.10

The deployment of IRBMs moved forward, probably driven more by political

and psychological factors than by military considerations. In March 1957, President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan had agreed to station

four squadrons (with fifteen missiles per squadron) in the United Kingdom. After

Great Britain had been supplied, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary McElroy in November 1957, there were thirteen other suitable locations. By October

1958, in light of budgetary considerations as well as some governments' reluctance to accept IRBMs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended holding deployments at eight squadrons. Ultimately, sixty Thors became operational in Britain

between June 1959 and April 1960, thirty Jupiters in Italy between April and July

46
Closing the "Missile Gap"

1961, and fifteen Jupiters in Turkey between November 1961 and March 1962—a

total of seven squadrons.11

Setting Program Priorities

President Eisenhower was determined to avoid simply throwing money at the

problem of the missile gap. Secretary McElroy, at an Armed Forces Policy

Council meeting on 28 January 1958, voiced concern about a number of things:

the growing number of offensive and defensive systems under development; the

fact that there was no overall evaluation comparing the merits of various systems; and the immediate possibility of overlap and duplication among strategic

delivery systems, such as bombers, Thor, Jupiter, Atlas, Polaris, and aircraft carriers. Two weeks later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the Weapons Systems

Evaluation Group to appraise offensive and defensive systems.12

WSEG's reply, which appeared on 15 July, measured deterrence as the ability

of bombers and missiles to survive a severe surprise missile attack and still retaliate and inflict considerable losses. If steps had to be taken to augment the deterrent posture during 1960-1962, then Titan and Polaris appeared to be the most

promising systems. The Group also advocated accelerating research and development on Minuteman. As for Nike-Zeus, technical problems had to be overcome (e.g., the effects of high-altitude nuclear detonations and the ability to

discriminate warheads from decoys) before "point" defense of retaliatory bases

could be made effective or the feasibility of area defense of cities determined.13

The NSC, on 13 October 1958, discussed WSEG's report. President Eisenhower

emphasized the need to identify "obsolescent, antithetical, or overlapping"

weapons systems. Unless tough decisions were taken to prevent unnecessary

spending, he feared that Americans would encounter increasing difficulty preserving their free way of life. On 6 December, the President increased ICBM

objectives from thirteen squadrons to twenty, nine of them Atlas and eleven

Titan. He also authorized construction of six Polaris submarines during FY 1959

and three more in FY 1960. Eisenhower authorized planning for another three

boats in FY 1961, bringing the total to twelve.14

At this point, the missile gap seemed real enough. On 28 November, an Atlas

was fired successfully over a 5,500 nautical mile range, equaling the Soviet feat of

fifteen months before. By mid-1962, according to best estimates, the US arsenal

would contain seventy-eight Atlas and forty-five Titans ready to fire, while the

Soviets would be deploying about 500 ICBMs. It must be remembered, though,

that administration leaders always believed that the US deterrent was fully adequate during 1957-1960. Even in the aftermath of Sputnik, when public concern

was at its height, President Eisenhower felt sure that "Soviet ICBMs will not

overmatch our bomber power in the next few years." As General Twining told

the President early in 1959, the Strategic Air Command was four times larger

than its Soviet counterpart and "ten times as good."15

47
JCS and National Policy

The ABM program remained a bone of contention. Early in November 1958,

an OSD Steering Group headed by Dr. Hector J. Skitter gave Secretary McElroy

its judgment that Nike-Zeus research and development were sufficiently

advanced to warrant an immediate transition to production. The Steering Group

believed that Nike-Zeus could distinguish light decoys from missile warheads, as

atmospheric re-entry slowed them down. The Steering Group acknowledged that

heavy, sophisticated decoys could saturate the defense. However, even against

heavy decoys, Nike-Zeus would force the enemy to use considerably more missiles in order to achieve a kill. No technology, either in hand or in prospect,

promised to be significantly better.

Deputy Secretary Quarles asked for JCS judgments. Their response, dated 24

November, restated a familiar division of opinion. General Taylor sided with the

Steering Group. Conversely, Admiral Burke, General Twining, and General

White rejected an immediate decision for production as "premature, unduly costly and unwise in light of the many serious developmental problems to which no

solution is now in sight." They did urge, however, that research and development efforts continue and expand as a matter of urgency16

The administration

decided against initiating production.

The Minuteman program was making good progress, and the Air Force

looked upon this solid-fuel ICBM as its best competitor against the Navy's solidfuel Polaris, which promised to become operational in 1960. The liquid-fuel Atlas

and Titan, by contrast, would be less reliable as well as harder to place in silos

and maintain on alert status. Back in August 1958, OSD's Director of Guided Missiles (DGM) had raised a question about Air Force plans to make Minuteman

operational by mid-1962. Would not extending its development time result in a

more desirable and effective system? He asked for a JCS judgment. In September,

before a reply appeared, the Air Force proposed making Minuteman a program

of the highest national priority. On 19 February 1959, the Joint Chiefs of Staff took

the position that Minuteman was "required as soon as possible without a crash

program." Establishing 1962 as the critical year, they said, called for an accuracy

in forecasting that was simply not attainable.17

On 18 August 1959, the NSC added Minuteman and Nike-Zeus to the list of

programs having the highest priority for research and development. Two months

later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff supplied Secretary McElroy with split opinions

about the proper production rate for Minuteman. General White wanted 150

operational missiles by mid-1963. He believed that by 1963-1964 the magnitude

of the threat would require an early and substantial ICBM augmentation. Minuteman, because of its simplicity, reliability, and cost-effectiveness, should constitute a major part of that augmentation. He considered 800 missiles by mid-1964

to be a reasonable and valid objective. Nonetheless, Admiral Burke and General

Lemnitzer recommended producing only fifty during the first year and stopping

at a total of 300 to 500. In justification, they cited numerous technical problems

that remained unresolved. General Twining did support White's plan for 150

missiles by mid-1963. Beyond that, however, he would endorse only those production commitments necessary to ensure that whatever objectives the Joint

Chiefs of Staff did establish could be met. Saying that the 1963-1964 threat "may"

48
Closing the "Missile Gap"

prove critical, Twining favored a production base big enough to permit acceleration if necessary. General White, by contrast, had called both the magnitude of

the threat and the need for substantial augmentation "evident."18

In mid-October 1959, the first Atlas became operationally ready. President

Eisenhower, on 13 January 1960, increased the ICBM program to twenty-seven

squadrons, thirteen of them Atlas and fourteen Titan. For Polaris, he continued

the policy of starting three submarines per year. The three to be started in FY

1961 would raise the total to twelve. He also authorized long lead-time planning

and procurement for another three boats.19

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Nike-Zeus proved a perennially divisive issue.

Late in September 1959, the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group circulated its

evaluation of Nike-Zeus' ability to defend population centers and retaliatory

bases. Nike-Zeus would work, WSEG concluded, only against small numbers of

warheads arriving simultaneously or against larger numbers spaced enough

apart so that they failed to overpower the defenses. Saturation attacks, employing either cluster warheads or well-coordinated launchings, could quickly overwhelm Nike-Zeus. Since cluster warheads appeared technically feasible for the

United States, presumably the Soviets were working along those lines too.20

Secretary Gates learned, through a memorandum dated 3 December, that JCS

divisions over Nike-Zeus had not closed. General Lemnitzer wanted FY 1961

funds used to start production. Installing thirty batteries with 1,500 missiles, he

declared, would add to the uncertainties and complexities facing an attacker.

Otherwise, in allocating missiles against targets, an adversary would be limited

only by the numbers and reliability of his own weapons. Admiral Burke still

believed that, since the "underlying development" of Nike-Zeus was incomplete,

production would be premature. Generals Twining and White, who also opposed

Nike-Zeus production, argued that the best defense lay in a good offense. Even

120 Nike-Zeus batteries, White claimed, could be beaten by "a few missiles with

cluster warheads or sophisticated decoys directed against only those Zeus

defenses the enemy chooses to attack." On 10 December, Secretary Gates decided

against putting Nike-Zeus into production.21

During the mid-1950s, SAC had started working on ways to keep one-third of

its bombers on 15-minute ground alert. General Thomas S. Power (Commander

in Chief, SAC) ordered that such an alert commence at several bases on 1 October

1957. Not until May 1960, however, did one-third of all bombers and tankers

attain 15-minute alert status. Meanwhile, in March 1959, General Power argued

for establishing an airborne alert as well. By January 1960, he believed, the Soviet

arsenal of ICBMs might reach 100—one year earlier than when the National

Intelligence Estimates forecast such a threat. On 30 April 1959, the Joint Chiefs of

Staff ordered CINCSAC to proceed with planning, training, and other necessary

measures but postponed actual execution. Each day, as a result, twelve B-52s ran

training and indoctrination flights.22

On 10 September 1959, Secretary McElroy asked for JCS opinions about establishing an airborne alert. Their reply, dated 28 October, cannot have been particularly helpful. General White recommended creating, by 1 April 1961, a capability

for keeping one-fourth of the B-52 fleet continuously airborne. To do that, an

49
JCS and National Policy

extra $325 million would be needed in FY 1961. Admiral Burke and General Lemnitzer felt that enough already had been done. If more Defense funds became

available, they said, such money could be better spent in other ways. General

Twining supported White's proposal but, under current budgetary guidelines,

saw no way of doing it "without unacceptable reductions and dislocations of

other essential programs."23

The FY 1961 budget provided for only six daily flights and for enough spare

parts to keep one-eighth of the B-52 force airborne by 1 April 1961. Late in June

1960, General Power proposed expanding the effort, by 1 November 1960, to

twenty-nine flights daily—one for each B-52 squadron. In justification, he cited

recent evidence of a "tough and uncompromising attitude" by the USSR. The

Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that six flights were too few but advised CINCSAC on

22 July that his proposal would interfere with achieving a one-eighth capability

by 1 April 1961. Nonetheless, General Power repeated his recommendation for

twenty-nine sorties per day. On 25 August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff told Power

that they approved his requirement, calling it "desirable and realistic."24

Achievements Exceed Expectations

The year 1960 witnessed major advances in US missile programs. Secretary

Gates, during congressional testimony on 1 February, predicted that the Soviets might enjoy a moderate numerical superiority in missiles during the next

three years. He insisted, however, that US retaliatory capability would remain

entirely adequate to deter aggression. A National Intelligence Estimate, issued

eight days later, concluded that the Soviet threat would be most serious in 1961.

After 1961, a tremendous increase in the number of Soviet ICBMs would be

required to destroy hardened US silos. And, even if the Soviets did launch a perfect surprise missile attack during 1961, enough US bombers probably would be

airborne to retaliate effectively.25

President Eisenhower, on 6 April, committed Minuteman to production and

set a goal of 150 operational missiles by mid-1963. On 5 October, he raised the

Polaris program from twelve to fourteen submarines and authorized long leadtime planning and procurement for five additional boats.26 The USS George Washington departed for the first Polaris patrol on 15 October; the USS Patrick Henry

followed on 31 December. The Soviets were some years away from deploying a

comparable system.

Was the missile gap narrowing? A National Intelligence Estimate issued on 16

August stated that the Soviets had only a few ICBMs operational as of 1 January

1960. Estimates of the number that would be available by mid-1963 varied widely, from a low of 200 by the Army to a high of 700 by the Air Force.27 Overflights

by U-2s, which ended abruptly in May 1960, did not supply enough evidence to

tell conclusively whether the Soviets were making major, rapid ICBM deployments. Only the evidence collected subsequently using other means definitely

50
Closing the "Missile Gap"

proved that they were not. By the summer of 1961, US officials knew that the

missile gap—which probably never existed—had disappeared.

The strides made by US missile programs between 1957 and 1960 were

impressive, but it is hard to say whether the Joint Chiefs of Staff deserved much

of the credit. Each Service Chief pushed his own program (Air Force: Minuteman; Navy: Polaris; Army: Nike-Zeus) and seemed willing to do so at the other

Services' expense. General Twining distanced himself somewhat from the Air

Force, as befitted his role as Chairman, and was the JCS member most in harmony with the views of civilian leaders. Clearly, though, the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group's reports stand out as being objective and influential. An evaluation done by WSEG during 1959-1960, described below, supports this judgment.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in July 1959, asked WSEG to evaluate offensive systems available during 1964-1967 from the standpoints of reliability, reaction time,

responsiveness to effective control, accuracy, vulnerability, and cost. Its response,

circulated on 30 December 1960, identified ballistic missiles as the primary systems to be used against "known fixed targets where time of delivery is of military importance." For a first strike, either Titan or a fixed (silo-based) Minuteman

appeared most suitable. For retaliation, fixed and mobile Minuteman as well as

Polaris all offered advantages, depending upon the particular circumstances.

Minuteman and an improved Titan II would be entering the inventory concurrently. WSEG rated Minuteman generally superior in terms of cost, effectiveness, and vulnerability. That left the large Titan II justified mainly where, for

certain targets, a single missile had to carry enough decoys or cluster warheads

to overwhelm any defenses. The B-70 bomber, which was still under development, appeared competitive with Minuteman "only if successful delivery of a

large number of weapons per bomber to different targets can be achieved." Much

more study, the Group believed, would be needed to ascertain whether that was

feasible.28 The Kennedy administration, after making its own appraisal, chose

much the same path that WSEG had proposed: increasing Minuteman and

Polaris, restricting Titan II, delaying Nike-Zeus; and killing the B-70.

The Single Integrated Operational Plan

The advent of IRBMs, ICBMs, and especially SLBMs focused attention on how

to plan, coordinate, and command a nuclear attack. Since 1955, the integration

of commanders' strike plans had taken place at annual World-Wide Coordination

Conferences, held at the Pentagon and (starting in 1958) monitored by a senior

member of the Joint Staff. In December 1958, Acting Secretary Quarles asked the

Joint Chiefs of Staff to produce a concept for employing Polaris and to recommend

how that system should fit into the unified and specified command structure.29

Six months went by before a JCS reply appeared—evidence of what deep

interservice differences this issue had provoked. Admiral Burke, in fact, discerned basic differences that went "to the very heart of our national strategy."

Polaris submarines would be operating in the same general area as air, surface,

51
JCS and National Policy

and subsurface naval forces. Unless all these forces were closely controlled and

coordinated, Burke argued, Polaris' effectiveness would be degraded and the

submarines subjected to unnecessary hazards. He deemed it "axiomatic" that

Polaris' full potential could best be achieved under commands having a proprietary interest in naval weapons systems. Consequently, Admiral Burke proposed

assigning the first submarines to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic

(CINCLANT), the later ones to the US Commander in Chief, Europe

(USCINCEUR), and the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC). General Pate

agreed with him. So did General Taylor, at least while Polaris remained untried

and unproven. By contrast, General White recommended creating a functional

unified command for strategic warfare. Such a command would have two subordinate components: one from the Air Force, containing USAF bombers and landbased missiles; and one from the Navy, comprising Polaris.30 Obviously, White

expected that an Air Force officer would head any unified strategic command.

Late in July 1959, after General Twining had recovered from surgery and

returned to duty, Secretary McElroy requested his views about procedures for

coordinating nuclear strike plans. Answering in mid-August, Twining said that

not much more progress could be achieved under existing arrangements. The

Chairman identified three thorny issues: the process of selecting targets, which

would determine how large a force was needed; the development of integrated

operational plans; and the question of operational control. Already, President

Eisenhower had ordered the NSC's Net Evaluation Subcommittee to appraise the

relative merits of (1) an urban-industrial target system favored by the Army, (2) a

more ambitious military target system advocated by the Air Force, and (3) an

optimum mix of the two. Once a targeting system had been chosen, Twining

believed, the commander responsible for the strategic mission should take the

initial steps to develop a national strategic target list. To perform that task, he

should be provided with an approved targeting philosophy and guidelines. After

Polaris had qualified as a proven weapons system, a unified strategic command

might become necessary. If not, Twining continued, the targets to be struck by

Polaris and the timing of such an attack ought to derive from a single integrated

operational plan. Soon, therefore, a nucleus of naval officers should be assigned

to CINCSAC's operational planning staff. The Chairman presented his JCS colleagues with eighteen questions. These included: What agency should develop a

national strategic target list, and what agency should review it? Do we need a

single integrated operational plan? Is there an immediate, or a more distant, need

for a unified strategic command?31

On 30 October, the Net Evaluation Subcommittee recommended adopting an

optimum mix target system. The Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed that approach

and, on 12 February 1960, President Eisenhower approved it. But this did not

bring command and coordination problems any closer to solution. On 6 May

1960, Secretary Gates learned from a JCS memorandum where each Service Chief

stood. General Lemnitzer wanted the Joint Chiefs of Staff to issue a single "strategic" plan, as opposed to an "operational" one. It would contain a national strategic target list and assign geographic areas to unified and specified commanders,

who then would coordinate the planning and execution of attacks within those

52
Closing the "Missile Gap"

areas. Creating a new command, Lemnitzer claimed, would establish a single

superior commander. Such a position would impinge upon other unified and

specified commanders, take away responsibilities properly borne by the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, and preclude the decentralization necessary to deal with the fluid

and unpredictable situation following a massive nuclear attack. General Shoup

took approximately the same position.

Admiral Burke, reaffirming his earlier recommendation, also opposed a single

command. Establishing one, he argued, would mean either withdrawing forces

from unified and specified commanders or denying them the prerogative of

striking critical targets immediately. Thus, for all its apparent simplicity, a unified

strategic command would raise more problems than it solved. The Joint Chiefs of

Staff, enjoying access to all necessary resources, could and should prepare a

national strategic target system.

General White again argued for a unified strategic command. He also held

that the Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC), was uniquely

qualified and equipped to develop a national strategic target list and a single

integrated operational plan. The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in his

opinion, was neither conceived nor designed to carry out such detailed planning;

its proper role lay in review.32

After meeting with Secretary Gates on 30 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff tried

once more to reach agreement—and failed. On 16 August, following what he

called "exhaustive" discussions with JCS members, the Secretary rendered his

decision. His solution came fairly close to what General Twining had suggested

back in August 1959. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would prepare and promulgate a

National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy. Gates saw no need for a new unified command. Instead, CINCSAC, taking on an added role as Director of Strategic Target Planning, would develop a National Strategic Target List (NSTL) and a

Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP). The Joint Chiefs of Staff were to

review and approve both the NSTL and the SIOP. In his capacity as Director,

CINCSAC would organize a Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS), with a

deputy from a different Service.

Admiral Burke still wanted the Joint Staff to prepare a target list and an operational plan. Otherwise, he maintained, the JSTPS would use SAC's methods and

procedures, which might prove unsuitable for other unified commands. Why

not, then, make a test run prior to a final decision? This was thrashed out on 11

August, at a stormy meeting with the President. General Twining argued that

"we have tried to coordinate separate activities in this field for ten years, and we

have failed utterly." He identified, as the crux of the problem, the Navy's twentyyear long opposition to serving under a single commander. Burke replied that all

the Navy's operating forces were under unified commanders, which was not the

case with the other Services. (True, but naval forces all were assigned to commands headed by admirals, while major Army and Air Force units were assigned

to commands headed by officers from other Services.) Secretary Gates said that

the basic issue was having an integrated plan. When Burke replied that he supported an integrated plan which assigned tasks rather than specified details,

Gates countered that Burke did not truly support it because specific detail was

53
JCS and National Policy

the essence of a real and effective integrated plan. Coordination was not integration. President Eisenhower commented that the first strike required rigid,

detailed planning; putting large forces outside the plan would defeat the whole

concept of our retaliatory effort, which took priority over everything else. However, when the President spoke approvingly of a trial plan, General Twining said

"he would have to speak frankly and say that if it were announced that this effort

were a trial effort, the Navy would sabotage it." Eisenhower replied that it was

wrong to talk of sabotage and cautioned that too much emotion was being displayed. He said that if Admiral Burke accepted the premise that for the first

strike no unified commander would do other than what he was told to do, then

matters could be resolved.33 Essentially, the Gates-Twining approach won out.

On 18 August, General Power assumed the duties of Director, Strategic Target

Planning; Rear Admiral (subsequently, Vice Admiral) Edward N. Parker became

his deputy. A JCS liaison group, which was an integral part of the Joint Staff,

assisted the Director in interpreting JCS guidance and informing the Joint Chiefs

of Staff as well as the Services of progress in preparing the NSTL and the SIOP.

The first SIOP won JCS approval in December 1960 and became effective on

1 April 1961.34

Perhaps Secretary Gates' solution appears sound because it left no Service

fully satisfied. The Air Force certainly was disappointed by its failure to gain control, through a new unified command, over all strategic weapons systems. The

Navy's attitude can be inferred from the fact that it tacitly allowed the Air Force

to dominate the JSTPS. Nevertheless, these arrangements would remain

unchanged during thirty years of cold war.

54
5

Arms Control: The Moratorium

on Nuclear Testing

During 1957-1960, arms control became an area where public concern collided with what the Joint Chiefs of Staff saw as military necessity. Explosions of

thermonuclear or "hydrogen" weapons produced radioactive fallout great

enough to trigger worldwide protests against the continuation of such tests. But

the Joint Chiefs of Staff deemed continued testing essential to develop reliable

warheads for ICBMs, SLBMs, and ABMs. Obviously, on this issue, no compromise could emerge.

The Linkage Issue

As 1956 ended, the superpowers stood far apart on arms control issues. On 17

November, Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin offered a comprehensive plan

that included immediate cessation of all nuclear weapons testing, destruction of

all nuclear weapons, and major military manpower cuts. An international body

with undefined powers would exercise control over these measures. To prevent

surprise attack, though, control posts would be established at major ports, air terminals, and rail junctions. All these proposals had been made before, but Bulganin added a new one: aerial inspection of an area in Central Europe extending

eight hundred kilometers on each side of the "Iron Curtain."1

Only four days later, on 21 November, President Eisenhower approved a new

statement of US policy. Its main features read as follows:

1. Halt the production of new fissionable material for weapons purposes on 31

December 1957, or as soon as possible thereafter, and within one month after an

inspection system began functioning satisfactorily. Upon implementation of that

measure, all future production would be stockpiled for nonweapons purposes

under international supervision. Possessors of nuclear weapons would transfer

55
JCS and National Policy

previously produced materials in agreed, equitable, and proportionate increments. During early stages of this transfer, the United States must retain a "very

substantial" weapons capability.

2. After the steps above had been implemented, the United States would be willing

"to limit or to eliminate" nuclear tests. In the interim, such tests should be conducted after advance notice and under limited international observation.

3. To assure that outer space would be used for peaceful and scientific purposes only,

there should be agreements prohibiting "the production of objects designed for

travel in or projection through outer space for military purposes."

4. Negotiations should continue for an "open skies" plan of mutual aerial reconnaissance and an exchange of military "blueprints" in combination with Premier Bulganin's proposal for ground observation posts. As a safeguard against surprise

attack, an inspection and control system with air and ground components should

be progressively developed and installed. To promote the opening of the USSR to

such inspections, there could be minor mutual reductions in conventional arms

and in personnel, down to a first-stage level of 2.5 million men.

On 14 January 1958, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., presented these proposals to the United Nations General Assembly, with small changes. He spoke of

limiting, and ultimately eliminating, nuclear tests. For obvious reasons, he did

not mention retaining a very substantial US weapons capability during the early

stages of transferring fissionable material.2

Meanwhile, the President's Special Assistant for Disarmament Matters, Mr.

Harold E. Stassen, had begun drafting a general disarmament treaty. To assist him,

a White House Disarmament Staff had been established, a special interdepartmental committee appointed, and eight presidential task groups created. A draft

would be presented to the UN Disarmament Committee's five-power subcommittee (US, UK, France, Canada, and USSR) when it met in London in March 1957.

First, of course, agreement would have to be achieved among the Western allies.

During December 1956 and January 1957, Mr. Stassen and his assistants discussed the proposals above with representatives of the Western powers. Mr.

Stassen outlined a flexible approach. The United States should be willing "to get

moving on the conventional side of disarmament, on the surprise attack factors,

on the problem of reducing the volume of nuclear threat—either all together or

any one." Although these proposals generally represented only a first stage program, some might serve as stepping-stones while others might fit into succeeding stages. Stassen emphasized that, except for those related to outer space, all

these proposals were inseparably linked together. For every reduction, limitation,

or commitment, there must be adequate and effective inspection measures. Each

new step would be contingent on the adequacy of the inspection system devised

for the preceding one. Moreover, each step—indeed, any piecemeal approach—

should help movement toward a broad, comprehensive agreement.3

On 10 December, only a few days after work on a draft treaty began, Deputy

Secretary of Defense Reuben Robertson suggested to Mr. Stassen that priority be

given to perfecting an inspection and control system. Stassen, however, had no

intention of letting such an effort delay the drafting of a treaty. Secretary Wilson

then posed a number of questions for the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Would it be more

56
Arms Control: The Moratorium on Nuclear Testing

desirable to incorporate nuclear, conventional, and outer space weapons in a single

treaty or to deal with them separately? What minimum requirements for effective

inspection should be set? What types of weapons and forces ought to be included

in the first stage of reductions?4

The Joint Chiefs of Staff reply, dated 4 February 1957, recommended treating

nuclear, conventional, and outer space weapon areas as a whole and incorporating them within a single treaty. Primary emphasis, however, should be placed not

on conventional cutbacks but upon the limiting elements of a "nuclear weapons

system capable of conducting great surprise attack." This position, they said, had

been fixed at the London Disarmament Conference of March 1956, when the United States had rejected Soviet proposals on grounds that an agreement must provide for inspection, control, and limitation in all three weapon areas simultaneously. They knew of no change in Soviet policy that would require a revision of

the US position. Minimum US requirements included the unimpeded right to

inspect nuclear delivery systems, the exchange of military blueprints and satisfactory verification of them, aerial inspection of any significant military activity, a US

majority on international inspection teams in the USSR, and finally, facilities for

"full, free, rapid, and uninterrupted transmission" from members of inspection

teams to regulating agencies and to the US Government.5

Subsequently, Mr. Stassen suggested determining overall force levels by

assigning manpower quotas to various types of armaments: for example, a B-47

medium bomber would be "worth" 188 men. The Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly

objected, principally because many dual-capable systems had been designed primarily as nuclear weapons, so no measurable relationship existed between the

personnel and the systems. Furthermore, the rigid formula proposed by Mr.

Stassen would not permit the United States to absorb reductions where they

would least affect the deterrent.6

The White House Disarmament Staff outlined a control and inspection system

based on two geographical areas—one in Europe and the other embracing eastern Siberia and the northwestern corner of North America. On 20 March, Secretary Wilson proposed a system based on objects of inspection rather than areas.

Following an exchange of blueprints and establishment of a verification organization, controls would successively be placed on nine categories of armaments,

beginning with long- and medium-range missiles, then moving to long- and

medium-range bombers, and so on. Wilson repeated the JCS position that a

weapon-manpower formula might be developed from verified blueprints, but

agreement on general principles must be reached first.7

On 18 March, the UN Disarmament Subcommittee convened in London. At

Bermuda, on 21 to 24 March, President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan agreed that nuclear testing had to continue for the present. Both governments, though, would be willing to register advance notice of tests and accept

limited international observation, if the Soviets did likewise. The USSR promptly

stated its willingness to agree upon a temporary cessation of tests. Mr. Stassen,

on 13 April, urged the administration to consider a 12-month suspension

beginning on 1 August 1958.8

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JCS and National Policy

Should a suspension of nuclear tests be separated from other arms control

measures? Major General Herbert B. Loper, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

for Atomic Energy and Defense member of the President's Special Committee on

Disarmament, advised committee colleagues that his department could not support Mr. Stassen's proposal as it stood. A suspension of tests would have to be

contingent upon the prior cessation of nuclear production and the transfer of

nuclear materials to nonweapons stockpiles, under a functioning inspection and

control system. General Loper also proposed including, as an inseparable provision, reductions to 2.5 million men and concomitant cuts in armaments, through

a formula worked out as part of the agreement.9

On 9 May, with the Soviets showing signs of flexibility at the London talks,

Secretary Dulles asked Mr. Stassen to outline the type of limited agreement that he

believed would be acceptable to the United Kingdom, France, and West Germany

as well as the USSR. Stassen's response was "limited" primarily in the sense that

many of the specific measures necessary for carrying out the agreement were left

for future negotiation. Among other things, it proposed prohibiting nonnuclear

powers from manufacturing nuclear weapons, stopping all military production of

fissionable materials, transferring equitable proportionate quantities to peaceful

uses, and establishing aerial inspection zones with ground control posts. When a

partial agreement treaty became effective, signatories would suspend all nuclear

tests for twelve months. Those twelve months would be devoted to devising an

inspection system. Failure to agree upon and install one would nullify any obligation to continue the suspension beyond twelve months.10

Secretary Wilson displayed a chilling lack of enthusiasm for Mr. Stassen's proposals. Believing that the proposals approved on 21 November 1956 had defined

the outer limits of a safe position, he saw Stassen's plan as a projection well beyond

those limits. He told Secretary Dulles that a European zonal arrangement, by

reducing conventional forces and prohibiting nuclear weapons within that zone,

would render NATO forces incapable of sustained defense. Wilson also opposed

either reducing the armed forces below 2.5 million or suspending nuclear testing,

no matter what conditions were attached to either commitment. Even if those conditions were not met, he felt sure that the government would be unable to resist

public pressure to fulfill any commitments. He would accept nothing more than

limitations upon testing, rather than cessation, even though the statement of 21

November specifically mentioned the possibility of prohibiting nuclear tests. In

summary, the Secretary characterized Stassen's proposals as a mistaken attempt

"to settle too many things too far ahead ... in too much detail." "

Mr. Stassen stoutly defended his plan as providing major assurance against a

large-scale surprise attack and improving the prospects for evolutionary change

in Central Europe and the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, in a memorandum dated

22 May, the Joint Chiefs of Staff called his plan "completely unacceptable." Yet,

whereas Secretary Wilson had criticized Stassen's proposals for going into too

much detail, the Joint Chiefs of Staff judged them in many respects unduly vague

and indefinite. The respective zones, for instance, should be proportionate areas

of equal strategic importance, not equal geographic areas. The objects of ground

inspection should be defined and ought to include air bases; provision should be

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Arms Control: The Moratorium on Nuclear Testing

made for simultaneous aerial inspection, fixed ground control posts, and fully

mobile ground inspection teams.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff labeled as unacceptable a prohibition of nuclear

weapons in the Russian and Central European aerial inspection zones. Prohibiting other nations from joining the nuclear ranks would preclude NATO's use of

US nuclear capabilities and negate joint plans for US-Canadian air defense of

North America. The approved strategic concept relied on just the opposite—an

improving nuclear capability. Equally unpalatable were provisions that would

not only prohibit future production of fissionable material for weapons purposes

but also require the transfer of all material not already contained within nuclear

weapons. They viewed the latter as impractical and beyond any effective inspection, since it was virtually impossible to account for past production. No less

objectionable, because of its crippling effect on research and development programs, was a provision banning ICBMs and guided missiles as well as regulating

outer space objects.

Mr. Stassen's timetable also came in for criticism. The exchange of blueprints

should occur on the effective date of the agreement rather than later in the first

phase, particularly since ground posts could be located appropriately only on the

basis of information supplied by blueprints. Moreover, no provision had been

made for progressively expanding the zones to allow complete inspection at an

early date. Instead, Stassen would not expand the inspection system until firstyear reductions in armaments had been completed. The reductions themselves

were of such scope as to require inspections covering the entire territories of the

signatory states. But, the Joint Chiefs of Staff observed, the USSR's vast size made

the requisite expansion of an inspection system within one year impossible.

Finally, and broadly, they argued that reductions below 2.5 million men and progressive restrictions on nuclear weapons would "completely negate present United States military planning and prevent the fulfillment of collective defense obligations throughout the world." On 24 May, Deputy Secretary Quarles forwarded

the JCS views to Mr. Dulles.12

Meantime, Mr. Stassen had made some modifications to his proposals. A

White House meeting on 25 May, attended by Admiral Radford and presided

over by the President, produced more revisions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff judged

that, while the new plan still had serious faults, most of the objectionable features

in the original proposal had been remedied. Even so, they desired more explicit

language indicating that the initial zone of inspection would expand by orderly

stages and that treaty signatories would be free to employ nuclear weapons

against a nonnuclear attack that could not be repelled otherwise.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff reiterated their concern that too little time had been

allowed for establishing an inspection system and once more argued that an

exchange of blueprints should precede establishment of an inspection system.

The European-Russian zonal arrangement would do no harm at best, they said,

and at worst inflict irreparable injury upon NATO. In fact, they considered that

risk so serious as to warrant separating the zonal proposal from the rest.

As for a twelve month suspension of tests, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed

that it would be "psychologically impossible" for the United States to resume

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JCS and National Policy

testing after the twelve months expired. Only irrefutable evidence of Soviet cheating would restore US freedom of action. "Therefore, provisions for obtaining such

irrefutable evidence through an effective inspection system must be agreed to

prior to any suspension of testing." Mr. Quarles forwarded these remarks to Secretary Dulles, adding that he generally agreed with them.13

From further interdepartmental discussions there emerged a "US Position on

the First Phase of Disarmament," which President Eisenhower approved on 12

June. On 29 August, the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Canada

jointly presented a comprehensive plan before the UN Disarmament Subcommittee, which was meeting in London. Its main features read as follows:

1. Within one year after adoption, the United States and the USSR would reduce their

armed forces to 2.5 million personnel each, France and the United Kingdom to

750,000 each. Further cutbacks would follow, contingent upon verification of compliance and progress toward solving political issues.

2. Each party would assume as obligation not to use nuclear weapons except in

self-defense.

3. Once an effective inspection system had been installed, all future production of fissionable materials would be devoted to nonweapons purposes. Previously produced materials would be transferred equitably, in successive quantities, from

weapons to nonweapons purposes.

4. All parties would suspend nuclear testing for 12 months, if there was prior agreement about establishing controls, including inspection posts within the territories

of the USSR, the United Kingdom, the United States, the Pacific Ocean area, and

such other places as might prove necessary. The suspension would continue for

another 12 months after that if progress also was being made toward supervising

the cessation of fissionable materials production for weapons purposes.

5. To safeguard against surprise attack, zonal inspection would be established by

opening one of two zones. One proposed zone would cover territory north of the

Arctic Circle; another would include much of Western Europe as well as a significant part of Soviet territory. Once again, agreement upon an inspection system had

to come first. Besides opening the skies to aerial observation, there would be

mobile ground teams as well as ground observation posts at principal ports, railway junctions, main highways, and important airfields.14

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had scored some important victories, particularly in

maintaining the linkage between a suspension of testing and a production cutoff

and in making agreement upon an effective inspection system precede anything

else. The ban on ICBMs and guided missiles disappeared. Already, though,

Soviet spokesmen had heaped scorn on the plan's separate elements as they

appeared. Instead, the USSR began to concentrate upon nuclear testing alone.

Nothing loosened the deadlock, and the London negotiations adjourned sine die

on 6 September.

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Arms Control: The Moratorium on Nuclear Testing

Separating the Testing Issue

In mid-September 1957, the United States announced that it would carry out a

series of tests at the Eniwetok proving area during the coming spring.

Mr. Stassen, on 23 September, proposed to Secretary Dulles that there be bilateral

negotiations with the USSR for the sole purpose of obtaining an agreement to

ban nuclear tests after the Eniwetok series ended. He believed that, divorced

from the other provisions of the 29 August plan, such a prohibition stood a fair

chance of winning acceptance.15

Secretary Dulles concluded that Stassen wanted to "seek some sort of an

agreement with the Russians on almost any terms—their terms, if necessary."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, whose views he requested, declared Stassen's proposal

to be inconsistent with what they believed to be US security interests. They considered all elements of the 29 August plan inseparable. Mr. Stassen's proposal,

however, contained no provisions for halting fissionable materials production for

weapons purposes or installing an inspection system. In fact, except for the effective date, Stassen's proposal paralleled a Soviet resolution presented in the UN

General Assembly three days earlier. Mr. Quarles, supporting their views, told

Secretary Dulles that the Defense Department opposed Stassen's approach. Subsequently, the President decided against any change of position but did endorse

an effort to ascertain how far the Soviets would "open up" for inspection.16

On 18 November, in the wake of Sputnik, Secretary Dulles asked the Defense

Department to develop an outline inspection plan for ensuring that outer space

would be reserved for peaceful purposes. Just after Christmas, the indefatigable

Mr. Stassen elaborated upon his earlier proposal. First would come installation in

the USSR of eight to twelve inspection stations for monitoring nuclear tests, a like

number in the United States, and a suitable number in the Pacific. Next, the United States, the USSR, and all other nations whose territory would be subject to

inspection would suspend tests for two years. Additionally, to guard against surprise attack, two inspection zones roughly similar to those defined in the 29

August proposals would be established. Finally, Stassen recommended establishing a multilateral technical committee to study an inspection system for outer

space objects.17

Acting on their own initiative, the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 31 December

informed Secretary McElroy that Stassen's latest ideas still posed unacceptable

security risks. None of his suggestions could be divorced from a comprehensive

proposal without incurring this objection. General Twining presented these

views to the NSC on 6 January 1958. Secretary McElroy, Secretary Dulles, and the

Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) supported him. Stressing

how a change in the US position would affect world opinion, Dulles disagreed

with Stassen's argument that this proposal would be acceptable to the Western

allies. The British had tests scheduled, and the French were striving to become a

nuclear power.

President Eisenhower, apparently swayed by fear that a bilateral agreement

with Moscow might cause fissures within NATO, decided to stand by the 29

August proposals, at least for the time being. However, the President approved

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JCS and National Policy

his Science Advisory Committee's recommendation that there be interdepartmental technical studies on the feasibility of monitoring a halt in nuclear testing

and an outer space agreement. Since the Defense Department had not yet

answered Mr. Dulles' request for an outline inspection plan, Secretary McElroy

decided to defer a response.18

In February 1958, Mr. Stassen resigned and tried to re-ignite his political

career. After his departure, ironically, the approach which he had advocated

unsuccessfully began gaining ground. From this point on, the administration

concentrated not upon a comprehensive program but upon reaching separate

agreements to stop nuclear testing and safeguard against surprise attack. But the

Joint Chiefs of Staff steadily maintained that such agreements, when pursued

without regard for the inseparability provision of the 29 August proposals, did

not meet their minimum security requirements.

Late in February 1958, in connection with studies commissioned by the Science Advisory Committee, Deputy Secretary of Defense Quarles asked the Joint

Chiefs of Staff to evaluate how a total suspension of nuclear testing would affect

the relative military positions of the United States and the USSR. They replied

that, in order to keep approximate technological and engineering parity with the

USSR, a suspension of testing must be accompanied by a complete, verifiable

suspension of weapons production.19

Deputy Secretary Quarles, himself a distinguished scientist, assessed the superpowers' positions more optimistically. In transmitting JCS views to the chairman of

the Science Advisory Committee's working group, he wrote that the United States

possessed an advantage in technological development and would continue to do

so through the end of 1958. Eventually, he continued, the USSR would achieve parity regardless of whether testing stopped. But he agreed with the Joint Chiefs of

Staff that a cessation of testing would be militarily acceptable only as part of a

broader agreement offering very large compensatory advantages.20

On 24 March, President Eisenhower discussed the testing issue with senior

advisers, including General Twining, Secretary McElroy, and Deputy Secretary

Quarles. According to US intelligence, Moscow would announce a unilateral suspension of testing as soon as the USSR's current series of tests ended. Hardtack

was scheduled to start in ten days and run until August. Secretary Dulles urged

the President to announce immediately that, after Hardtack, no further testing

would occur during his term of office. Dulles said that he "desperately" wanted

some gesture to influence world opinion. Defense and AEC representatives

strongly opposed such an announcement, and Dulles withdrew his proposal to

stop testing. General Twining said that he failed to see how stopping tests would

reduce world tension, "because everybody knows we already have a stockpile

large enough to completely obliterate the Soviet Union." The President replied

that world anxiety over testing, even if not well founded, did exist and was itself

a cause of tension. Sooner or later, he predicted, the United States would have to

accept a suspension.21

The momentum for a policy change kept building. On 27 March, the Science

Advisory Committee's working group completed its assessment of the difficulties in monitoring a test ban. For reasons different from those stated by the Joint

62
Arms Control: The Moratorium on Nuclear Testing

Chiefs of Staff, the group considered it "undesirable and practically not feasible"

to halt testing before Hardtack ended. In fact, judging that the views of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff and Mr. Quarles related in part to matters beyond the scope of its

inquiry, the group did not take account of them. They were, however, circulated

to the NSC.22

The Decision to Suspend Testing

On 31 March, the Soviet Union scored a propaganda coup by announcing a

unilateral suspension of all nuclear testing. Of course, if other powers

refused to follow suit, the Soviets said that they reserved the right to resume testing. Three days later, the NSC discussed the working group's report as well as

JCS and OSD views. After a meeting in Puerto Rico that ran from 8 to 10 April,

the Science Advisory Committee decided that a test ban "would leave the US in a

position of technical superiority for at least several years." Accordingly, it recommended negotiating "a satisfactory agreement for sustained test cessation as

soon as possible after the Hardtack tests." The President's Special Assistant for

Science and Technology, Dr. James Killian, presented these findings to the Chief

Executive on 17 April. Secretary Dulles, now a full-fledged apostle of suspension,

took the next step. He drafted, and on 28 April President Eisenhower dispatched

to Chairman Nikita Khrushchev, a letter proposing that a technical conference

convene to work out the inspection system for a future test ban.23 By separating a

suspension of testing from a stoppage of production, the Chief Executive had

taken a decisive step; linkage was dead.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were not consulted during the deliberations that led

to this turnabout. President Eisenhower obviously believed that their anxieties

were exaggerated. On 30 April, in the wake of his decision, the Joint Chiefs of

Staff sent Secretary McElroy a "reiteration and amplification" of their views

about why testing should continue. They asked the Secretary to convey their

views to President Eisenhower. Mr. Quarles did so on 9 May, together with his

own general concurrence.24

On 1 July, a conference of technical experts convened in Geneva. Besides the

two superpowers, representatives of the United Kingdom, France, Canada,

Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania attended. In mid-August, a week before

the experts completed their task, the State Department proposed changing US

policy to separate a cessation of testing from a halt in fissionable material production for weapons purposes. The administration, according to State, should

announce its intention to resume testing in two years unless an agreement to stop

production had been reached in the meantime. The Office of the Secretary of

Defense opposed such a separation and drafted an alternative. Deputy Secretary

Quarles asked for a JCS appraisal of both proposals.25

Their reply, dated 15 August, discussed no "cause for a basic change in the military factors which influenced the views expressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in

earlier memoranda— " When Deputy Secretary Quarles forwarded JCS views to

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JCS and National Policy

the President, as they requested, he added his own judgment that military factors

weighed heavily against a decision to discontinue testing. But he recognized that

"international political factors" might prove controlling, and in that case, he was

prepared to support a revision of policy26 An air of artificiality surrounds this

whole exercise. It is impossible to imagine the President doing anything other

than ratifying his earlier decision to separate testing from production.

From Geneva, on 21 August, the conference of experts issued a report

concluding that it was "technically feasible" to create "a workable and effective

control system" to detect testing violations. There should be one hundred to 110

control posts on the various continents, sixty on islands, and another ten aboard

ships. This network would have a good chance of detecting explosions as low as

one kiloton on the earth's surface and as high as fifty kilometers. As for underground explosions, these posts could identify as being of natural origin about 90

percent of those earthquakes whose signals were equivalent at least to five kilotons. The next day, President Eisenhower announced a one-year suspension of

testing, effective 31 October, provided the USSR entered into negotiations and

refrained from further tests of its own. Whether the US suspension would continue depended upon (1) whether an inspection system was functioning effectively

and (2) whether substantial progress toward major arms control measures was

taking place. General Twining privately told the Chief Executive, "This is the

worst mistake you've ever made, Mr. President. You'll regret it."27

The USSR agreed to convene at Geneva, on 31 October, a Conference on the

Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests attended by US, UK, and Soviet representatives. However, on 30 August, Chairman Khrushchev stated that recent US

and UK tests in the Pacific plus forthcoming ones at the Nevada proving ground

freed the USSR from any further obligations under its 31 March statement.

Accordingly, the Soviets opened a new series of their own on 30 September.28

In preparation for the Geneva conference, an interagency working group drafted a proposed treaty. Although the Office of the Secretary of Defense was represented on this group and the Services informally submitted views to International

Security Affairs (ISA), no request came for JCS views. Accordingly, on 15 October,

Admiral Burke urged his colleagues to define what they considered the essential

elements of national security in a draft treaty. He defined them as follows:

(1) The right to use nuclear weapons in warfare.

(2) A one-year suspension of testing, extendable on a year-by-year basis.

(3) Absolute safeguards against surreptitious testing, particularly in the guise of

peaceful applications of nuclear explosives.

(4) Prompt establishment of an international control system.

(5) A veto-proof international organization to administer the control system.

(6) The legal obligation of all nuclear powers to institute a suspension simultaneously at a mutually agreed-upon date, "not at some indefinite time to be later set by

the international control organization."

(7) The right to resume testing if, after one year, a control system either had not been

established or was not functioning to the satisfaction of all powers.

(8) Adequate notice of intention not to renew the suspension.

(9) Automatic abrogation of all obligations immediately upon any violation, any

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Arms Control: The Moratorium on Nuclear Testing

interference with efforts of the control organization to investigate possible explosions, or the successful testing of a nuclear device by a nonsignatory power.

(10) The reinstatement of abrogated obligations only after negotiation of a new

agreement.

Admiral Burke urged that these views be presented to the interagency

working group, and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be afforded a chance to review

the final draft treaty before the US delegation went to Geneva. On 21 October,

the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary McElroy a memorandum containing all

these recommendations.29

Actually, the US delegation left for Geneva before a final draft had been

drawn up, but Acting Secretary Quarles judged a preliminary version, as well as

a statement of the US position made available on 1 November, to be substantially

in accord with JCS recommendations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff saw matters differently and held out against any change.30

The Geneva conference began inauspiciously. Two Soviet nuclear tests, on 1

and 3 November, were detected and announced by the United States. After that,

apparently, no more explosions took place in the USSR. Two issues, however,

deadlocked the Geneva talks. Soviet negotiators insisted (1) that on-site inspection require the host nation's consent and (2) that teams manning the ground

posts be almost totally dominated by the host country. The Western powers, of

course, rejected these positions as amounting to self-enforcement.31

On 10 November, another experts' conference assembled at Geneva to study

methods of safeguarding against surprise attack. In preparing guidance for the

US delegation, the President's science advisers had insisted that military, political, and technical questions were inextricably mixed. They argued, in fact, that

the surprise attack conference could not succeed unless it considered the general

problem of disarmament.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, conversely, sought to confine the terms of reference

within narrow limits: a common understanding about either the feasibility of

detecting or methods of inspecting against surprise attack. They deemed measures of general disarmament, such as limitations on the disposition, readiness,

size, and type of forces, as well as "purely political questions," to be inappropriate subjects for technical discussions. If they were included, the Soviets could

advance a wide range of subjects, such as the elimination of overseas bases and

the establishment of denuclearized zones, which for a decade the United States

repeatedly had rejected.32

Deputy Secretary Quarles, Under Secretary of State Herter, and Dr. Killian

agreed that terms of reference should be limited along lines recommended by the

Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, if the Soviets seemed willing to make "constructive progress in substantive discussions of the agenda," the US delegation should

request authority to discuss "the effect that hypothetical limitations on instruments of surprise attack might have on the problem of reducing the danger of

surprise attack." In fact, that very issue proved to be the rock on which the conference foundered. The Soviets promptly insisted upon discussing force

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JCS and National Policy

limitations and political matters. The Western powers refused to do so and the

conference adjourned on 18 December 1958, never to resume.33

Afterwards, senior US military delegates gave General Twining their judgment that Soviet behavior had saved the Western powers from pursuing an "illconceived" agenda. Its underlying concept struck them as unsound and

impractical. To create and maintain powerful forces for defense while simultaneously developing complex machinery to prevent these forces from performing

their mission was anomalous and contradictory. A technical assessment of surprise attack could not be made except in connection with the "real world situation." Thus the Soviet position, they believed, had "great validity." Future talks

should be preceded by thorough studies and ought to take place during or after

negotiations over concrete proposals for the phased reduction of armaments.34

The "Threshold" Debate

Meantime, test ban negotiations ran up against a new obstacle. Project Argus,

carried out during August and September, involved explosions three hundred miles above the South Atlantic which escaped detection. Then Hardtack II

tests, made in Nevada during September and October, indicated that distinguishing underground explosions from earthquakes would be much more difficult

than previously supposed. Apparently, too, the number of earthquakes equivalent to a given low-yield blast was considerably higher than had been calculated.

Therefore, to hold down the number of inspections, the threshold or allowable

yield for underground explosions would have to be revised upward. On 28

December, at President Eisenhower's request, Dr. Killian appointed a panel

chaired by Dr. Lloyd Berkner to study the feasibility of detecting underground

tests. The Berkner panel reported, in March 1959, that the Geneva system could

not identify blasts below twenty kilotons. To make matters worse, "decoupling"

techniques could reduce the seismic signal by a factor of ten or more.35

There were severe limits, evidently, upon what types of explosions could be

detected. In a letter to Premier Khrushchev dated 13 April, President Eisenhower

proposed a suspension of atmospheric testing up to an altitude of fifty kilometers. The Soviet leader replied that all tests should be stopped and an annual

limit placed upon the number of inspections.36

The one-year suspension of US testing would end on 31 October 1959. If President Eisenhower did not renew it, plans were being laid for a series of tests in

mid-1960. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 27 May, defined for Secretary McElroy the

areas in which they discerned pressing needs for more data on weapons effects.

These were antisubmarine warfare, surface war at sea, coastal defense against

bursts from large-yield weapons that exploded over the sea, ballistic missile

defense, communications and radar systems, air defense, structural design of

military installations, and tactical land warfare.37

Back in August 1958, President Eisenhower had appointed a Committee of

Principals to formulate arms control policy. Its membership consisted of the

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Arms Control: The Moratorium on Nuclear Testing

Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the AEC, and the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology. General Twining was not a principal but did attend a number of these meetings. On 23 July 1959, Eisenhower requested a prompt interdepartmental study

on the subject of resuming nuclear tests. Six days later, he approved a "phased"

approach to negotiations that would exclude underground tests from any

agreement. But when the Committee of Principals met on 13 August, Deputy

Secretary Gates learned that Eisenhower had decided to extend the moratorium

by two months, until 31 December. According to Dr. George Kistiakowsky, who

had taken Dr. Killian's post, Gates' reaction was "wild." The Joint Chiefs of

Staff, he insisted, would have to be consulted.38

On 14 August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary McElroy that the

longer the wait, the greater the danger—a rumor could arise about the questionable safety of US weapons. Such a rumor could have catastrophic effects upon US

ability to maintain overseas storage bases, strip alerts, air alert exercises, and

logistic movements.

On 21 August, through another memorandum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued

that the long-range effects of a test ban would be distinctly disadvantageous.

They considered testing essential not only for the programs they had listed in

their paper of 30 April 1958 but also to obtain the weapons-effects data cited in

their memorandum of 27 May 1959. They believed that the "inevitable result" of

continued suspension "must be stagnation in the effectiveness of our present

weapons systems," an antiquated stockpile "of questionable reliability and confidence," and finally a stoppage of production followed by physical deterioration

of the stockpile. The Joint Chiefs of Staff asked that both of their August papers

be passed on to President Eisenhower.39

On 26 August the State Department announced a two-month extension of the

moratorium. The Joint Chiefs' recommendations reached Secretary McElroy only

after Dr. Kistiakowsky's panel had finished its review of the issue. Defense and

AEC representatives raised all the points made in the JCS memorandums above,

but President Eisenhower rendered his decision before the panel finished its

work. On 14 September, Secretary McElroy did forward JCS views to the President. However, he added his own belief that world opinion and public concern

about fallout precluded relatively unlimited testing. He suggested, instead, (1)

seeking a suspension agreement that still allowed underground testing and (2)

resuming underground tests after 31 December, unless a comprehensive agreement had been concluded by then.40

In October, the Committee of Principals recommended convening a SovietAmerican technical conference to consider the problems about detecting underground tests that had been raised by Hardtack II data. Such a meeting did

convene but ended amid failure and recrimination in December. The Committee

of Principals, reconvening on 28 December, agreed to seek a ban on atmospheric

tests and on underground explosions above a specified kiloton level or "threshold." The Joint Chiefs of Staff had fallen into line grudgingly. General Twining

told committee members that, although they were now prepared to accept an adequately controlled cessation of tests, they had always thought that any cessation

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JCS and National Policy

was "a big mistake." They were convinced that, once tests stopped, "we would

never be able to resume them."

On 29 December, President Eisenhower ended the formal moratorium. He

publicly promised, though, that "we shall not resume... without announcing

our intentions in advance of any resumption." A panel of the President's Science

Advisory Committee favored setting the threshold for underground tests at

explosions registering 4.75 or more on the Richter earthquake scale, thereby

permitting detection of tests above twenty kilotons. After initial resistance, Secretary Gates endorsed this new approach; the administration announced it on 11

February I960.41

Meanwhile, during the summer of 1959, a State-Defense study group began

an overall review of US policy and positions. Mr. Charles A. Coolidge, a Boston

lawyer and former Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, headed this

group. It considered partial as well as comprehensive measures, giving particular

attention to measures that might reduce the danger of surprise attack or unintentional war.

As 1960 opened, the whole pace of arms negotiations was quickening. A Ten

Nation Disarmament Conference would be opening at Geneva on 15 March. To

settle upon a joint approach beforehand, US, UK, French, Canadian, and Italian

representatives would start consultations in Washington during late January. The

Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized a need for continuous, specialized staff support.

Accordingly, in December 1959, they established the Office of Special Assistant

for Disarmament Affairs and named Rear Admiral Paul L. Dudley as its head.42

Mr. Coolidge submitted his report on New Year's Day 1960. He recommended

discarding the comprehensive "package" approach to arms control, which dated

from 1957 and which the Joint Chiefs of Staff had never liked. In a commentary

to the Secretary of Defense dated 8 February, they observed that "the major difficulty with the 1957 policy has been the restrictive nature of a 'package' approach,

the various elements of which are so interdependent." They wanted Coolidge's

report sent to the NSC. Secretary Gates concurred. Secretary Herter, however,

saw it simply as another contribution to interdepartmental preparations for the

Ten Power Disarmament Conference.43 Ultimately, in fact, the report did become

simply another contribution.

On 4 February, the State Department circulated a draft policy statement which

had won Secretary Herter's approval. The ISA judged it unsatisfactory, and Rear

Admiral Dudley informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he strongly supported

ISA's view. Admiral Dudley highlighted three areas of disagreement. First,

should each superpower be allowed, initially, an overall ceiling of 2.5 or 2.1 million personnel? State favored the latter figure, ISA the former. Second, should we

try to negotiate a cessation of fissionable materials production for military purposes? Third, would it be wise to seek a halt to the testing of long-range missiles

as well as restrictions on their deployment? To both questions, State said yes

while ISA answered no. Admiral Dudley worried that "decisions will be taken

quickly that might be considered by the military authorities to be exceedingly

dangerous to our security."44

68
Arms Control: The Moratorium on Nuclear Testing

Admiral Burke warned his JCS colleagues that, if they were to have "any

effect at all at this critical juncture," their views must be expressed promptly and

unanimously. Accordingly, on 12 February, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Secretary Gates that they considered State's draft unacceptable in its broad approach

as well as in a fair number of its specific proposals; they enumerated twenty

"specific principals" to guide arms control policy. Fourteen of them were taken

from a paper drafted about two weeks earlier by ISA; the others showed an

unmistakable affinity with Mr. Coolidge's recommendations.

Secretary Gates informed the Secretary of State that he generally agreed

with JCS views. Answering on 21 February, Secretary Herter denied that State

was proposing measures merely because they might prove acceptable to the

USSR. Areas of agreement, though, must contain sufficient mutual value to be

accepted by each party. For instance, the Soviets would not break their curtain

of secrecy unless inspection was accompanied by some measures which

justified such a concession.45

President Eisenhower already had approved tabling a proposal to halt the

military production of fissionable materials. The State Department recommended

seeking a transfer of agreed quantities of fissionable materials to nonweapons

uses. Responding to ISA's request for their views, on 2 March the Joint Chiefs of

Staff argued against early dismantling.46

Simultaneously, Secretary Gates asked for a "definitive" JCS appraisal of how

stopping IRBM and ICBM flight-testing in 1962, 1963, or 1965 would affect the

posture of the United States and its allies vis-ä-vis the Communist Bloc. The Joint

Chiefs of Staff replied on 2 March, detailing the disadvantages that they believed

would affect a range of weapons systems.47

Meanwhile, a State-Defense meeting attended by Secretaries Gates and Herter

resulted in agreement on a working paper that Admiral Dudley felt conformed

with JCS views enough to make it acceptable. That working paper, however, was

not deemed sacrosanct, and changes were made or taken under consideration

during February. Numerous revisions took place without JCS participation. The

Joint Chiefs of Staff asked that they be afforded an opportunity to review and

comment on all substantive changes. In reply, Deputy Secretary James Douglas

warned that time pressures frequently might preclude formal, deliberate consideration. Keeping in close touch with ISA's disarmament staff struck him as the

best way to stay abreast of developments.48

At Geneva, on 14 March, the Western powers made public their "working

paper on general disarmament." Immediately, according to their paper, each

superpower should limit itself to a personnel ceiling of 2.5 million. Joint studies

ought to be undertaken, for example, of how to verify a stoppage of fissionable

materials production for weapons purposes, the transfer of such materials to

peaceful uses, measures to give greater protection against surprise attack, and a

ban on orbiting or stationing weapons of mass destruction in outer space. Nothing

was said about halting the flight-testing of long-range missiles. The working

paper stated that, once a control system began operating effectively and progress

was being made in conventional disarmament, military production of fissionable

materials would cease and agreed quantities would be transferred to nonweapons

69
JCS and National Policy

uses. The United States and the USSR would lower their personnel ceilings to 2.1

million each.49

A limited ban on nuclear testing still seemed like the measure most likely to

succeed. On 19 March, the Soviets declared themselves willing to accept a supervised ban on atmospheric, underwater, and underground tests measuring 4.75 or

more, in return for an indefinite, unsupervised moratorium on underground tests

below 4.75. After meetings on 23 and 24 March, the Committee of Principals recommended a positive reply. Deputy Secretary Douglas saw an advantage in

opening the USSR to limited inspection. At an NSC meeting the next day, President Eisenhower decided to offer the Soviets a one- or two-year unsupervised

moratorium. On 29 March, he and Prime Minister Macmillan announced that, as

soon as a treaty had been signed and arrangements made to improve control

methods for underground events below 4.75, they would institute a voluntary

moratorium on tests below that threshold. In mid-May, British, French, and

American leaders would be meeting Premier Khrushchev in Paris. There, if the

duration of a moratorium and the annual number of inspections could be settled,

a test ban agreement seemed within easy reach.50

The Bubble Bursts

The tale of how high hopes came to naught is startling and dramatic. On 1

May 1960, following a flight plan approved by President Eisenhower, a U-2

reconnaissance aircraft went deep inside Soviet territory. The President's son,

who was working in the White House, later recalled that General Twining had

been "very anxious" for this particular mission to proceed. Premier Khrushchev,

on 5 May, announced that an American plane on a "bandit flight" over his country had been shot down. The administration claimed that a weather research

plane had been lost. But Khrushchev, two days later, revealed that "we have

parts of the plane and we also have the pilot, who is quite alive and kicking." The

State Department put out a communique denying that an overflight had been

authorized. Secretary Gates, behind the scenes, insisted that more must be said to

avoid any implication that military officers were acting on their own. On 9 May,

State issued a clarification that President Eisenhower had approved the U-2

overflight program but not this particular mission. The Soviet Government used

bitter language in condemning US behavior. President Eisenhower responded by

publicly calling U-2 flights "a distasteful but vital necessity."51

When the Paris summit meeting opened on 16 May, Premier Khrushchev

demanded an apology from President Eisenhower as a precondition for further

talks. Eisenhower said that no more flights would occur during his tenure but

went no further. So, after loosing some choice invective, Khrushchev brought the

conference to an abrupt end. Shortly after returning to Washington, Eisenhower

told Dr. Kistiakowsky "very sadly that he saw nothing worthwhile left for him to

do now until the end of his presidency."52

70
Arms Control: The Moratorium on Nuclear Testing

Nonetheless, on 2 June, the USSR published a plan that emphasized the early

dismantling of nuclear delivery systems and foreign bases. The Joint Chiefs of

Staff declared it unacceptable; Secretary Gates agreed with that assessment.53

An interdepartmental group drafted relatively minor revisions to the Western

position which the Joint Chiefs of Staff received for review on 21 June. The next

day, Secretary Gates received their reply deeming the revisions militarily acceptable. No matter! At Geneva, on 27 June, all Communist Bloc delegations abruptly

withdrew from the Ten Nation Conference before US spokesmen even could table

these proposals. At least for the next six months, another avenue to arms control

was closed.54

In September, both President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev came to

New York and addressed the General Assembly of the United Nations. When

General Twining reviewed a draft of the President's speech, he identified several

passages that struck him as drastic departures from the US proposals tabled at

Geneva on 27 June. It advocated, for example, a reduction of nuclear capabilities

without requiring substantial reductions of conventional armaments and failed

to specify that general disarmament must be under effective international control. Twining objected to the following specific suggestions: that the United

Nations call on members not to engage in military activities on celestial bodies;

that an urgent study of the control of nuclear delivery systems be undertaken;

and that production plants be shut down one by one. When he spoke on 22 September, President Eisenhower declared that controls must extend to both "conventional and non-conventional" weapons and omitted any specific suggestion

for studying how to control nuclear delivery systems. In all other respects,

though, his address retained the features that General Twining had considered

unsound.55 When Premier Khrushchev spoke, his verbal pyrotechnics about

other issues overshadowed his disarmament proposals.

Late in October, Ambassador James J. Wadsworth repeated before a UN subcommittee US proposals that had been presented back in August to the UN

Disarmament Committee. The Joint Chiefs of Staff registered objections, which

Secretary Gates incorporated in a November letter to the Secretary of State.

Replying in December, Secretary Herter said that all Ambassador Wadsworth's

remarks, except for one that he had identified as his personal opinion, were legitimate restatements of the President's 22 September address and hence accorded

with national policy.56 In any case, the General Assembly session ended without

registering any forward movement.

Heightened international tensions prompted the Joint Chiefs of Staff to press

for a tougher stance on a test ban. They argued against a threshold proposal on

13 June, and on 26 August urgently recommended a resumption of initially limited testing. Acting Secretary Douglas replied that, following further studies and

consultations, "specific and comprehensive" recommendations would go to the

Committee of Principals and the President.57

Instead, nothing happened. So, on 21 November, the Joint Chiefs of Staff presented Secretary Gates with another memorandum describing how they believed

time was "working to our disadvantage." During the last two years, they repeated,

the USSR could have been conducting underground tests that escaped detection.

71
JCS and National Policy

Even after an agreement was reached, four to six years would be spent implementing control arrangements. Obviously, Soviet cheating over such an extended period

could cost the United States its relative nuclear superiority. The Joint Chiefs of Staff

considered it imperative that their arguments in favor of nuclear testing be brought

immediately to the highest officials' attention. Secretary Gates decided not to

approach the President, presumably because the changeover to a new administration had started. President Eisenhower privately believed testing should resume

but felt that a decision properly rested with the incoming Chief Executive.58

Summation

If President Eisenhower had followed JCS advice, there certainly would have

been no testing moratorium and probably no changes of position about any

other aspects of arms control. In extenuation, though, it must be remembered

how the Joint Chiefs of Staff viewed their basic responsibilities. Charged with

maintaining the military security of the United States, they did not feel free to

endorse proposals whose adoption might jeopardize the nation's military position vis-ä-vis the USSR. Their duty lay in making clear to their superiors the military consequences of every arms control measure, so that this factor would

receive full weight during policy deliberations. No one could deny that the Joint

Chiefs of Staff had been forthright in discharging this responsibility.

72
Maintaining the Military

Assistance Program

6

When describing the late 1950s, generalizations about trends in the military

assistance program (MAP) become well-nigh impossible. In 1950, the Korean War

triggered a buildup that made Western Europe the chief beneficiary of a tremendously increased, rapidly accelerated military assistance effort. After hostilities in

Korea ended, the growing strength and prosperity of Western Europe made possible a curtailment of aid in that direction. But recurrent alarms and crises in Asia

and the Middle East prevented similar retrenchments there. Although the value

of MAP goods and services provided to Western Europe in 1957 still exceeded

that to all other countries combined, it was less than what it had been in the peak

year of 1953. Two years later, in 1959, aid to Western Europe had declined by 48

percent, and eastern Asia alone was receiving a larger share than Europe. However, as a result of increased emphasis on missiles and advanced aircraft, the

value of deliveries and services to Europe during FY 1960 rose nearly 23 percent

over the preceding fiscal year. Once again, the value of aid to Europe exceeded

that extended to any other single region and accounted for approximately 47 percent of all military assistance. The table below lists annual deliveries by major

regions, in millions of dollars:

FY 1958 FY1959 FY1960 FY1961

Europe 571 927 911 873

Near East and

South Asia 246 637 507 392

East Asia 563 747 748 587

Annual MAP appropriations, which Congress always cut between 10 and 20 percent below the President's request, amounted to $1.3 billion for FY 1958, $1.5

billion for FY 1959, $1.3 billion for FY 1960, and (in response to greater global

tensions) $1.8 billion for FY 1961.l

73
JCS and National Policy

1957

In preparing annual military assistance programs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had a

two-fold responsibility; first, to provide the Assistant Secretary of Defense

(International Security Affairs) with "broad program guidance from a military

standpoint"; and second, to review in relation to each country's military requirements the forces which the US Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs)

recommended for support. The purpose of the JCS review was to determine

whether the recommended forces and supporting facilities were adequate without being excessive, whether the relative importance and timing of projects

accorded with Defense guidance and priority lists established by US commanders in the area, and whether these forces' combat readiness was consistent with

their mission, probable employment, and proximity of supply sources and with

US plans and objectives.2

The logical sequence of MAP development proceeded from establishing the

priority of allocations to the formulation of general program guidance, then

moved to the adoption of a tentative program based on country requirements,

and finally, to determination of a "refined" program based on budgetary considerations. As 1957 opened, the Defense Department was preparing the military

assistance program for FY 1958 and the budget request for FY 1959 MAP funds.

Concurrently, in connection with the NSC's periodic review of military assistance, Defense had to consider changes that had been proposed in the NSC's

statement of priorities governing worldwide allocations of military equipment.

On 11 August 1955, President Eisenhower had approved NSC 5517/1, a

statement of priorities that served as general guidance for the peacetime allocation of equipment to US forces and to countries receiving military assistance.

The only aid program in the first priority group was that covering materiel

needed by Chinese Nationalist forces for current combat operations. Second

priority belonged to NATO forces "on active front line duty in areas vital to US

security, when the nation contributing such forces has the capacity to maintain

them," along with Canadian units specifically designated for defense of the

United States and Canada. In third priority were all other NATO and Chinese

Nationalist forces, South Korea, Pakistan, Yugoslavia, Japan, and the air

defense of Spain.

These priorities were subject to a number of qualifications that gave them considerable flexibility. Allocations were governed by the definition of "priority"

which the Joint Chiefs of Staff adopted in consonance with their war plans. As so

defined, the term priority simply indicated relative importance and was not to be

taken in "an exclusive and final sense." Allocations of lesser priority need not

necessarily depend upon whether adequate provision already had been made for

higher priority allocations. Also, the need for adjusting priorities to take account

of current capabilities was recognized.3

During the summer of 1956, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had proposed revisions to

NSC 5517/1. Considering the description of NATO forces in the second priority to

be "vague and insufficiently definitive," and maintaining that delays in delivering

equipment were reducing the effectiveness of South Korean forces, they

74
Maintaining the Military Assistance Program

recommended changing the former to read "D-Day or M-Day forces (other than

US) vital to US security deployed in Europe, including Greece and Turkey," and

raising South Korean forces from third to second priority.4 Deputy Secretary of

Defense Reuben Robertson agreed and forwarded these proposals to the NSC

Planning Board. A debate over sending tactical nuclear weapons to Korea led the

Board to defer action. When it did take up the matter early in February 1957, the

Board was unable to devise an accommodation between Defense's recommendations and State's objections.

The State-Defense split over NATO revolved around whether D-day or M-day

forces deployed outside Europe were sufficiently capable of fulfilling their NATO

mission to warrant second priority. The JCS recommendation, which originated

with General Taylor, may have been nothing more than an attempt to give

USCINCEUR a measure of flexibility in applying priorities.5 But the recommendations submitted to the NSC did not include a stipulation that USCINCEUR determine whether a recipient nation could maintain D-day or M-day forces. State

Department representatives viewed the recommendation as an attempt to reduce

the priority given French NATO forces that had been redeployed to fight the Algerian rebellion. According to the JCS Special Assistant for NSC Affairs, State was

"congenitally distrustful" ofJCS proposals, particularly those applicable to NATO.6

The State-Defense split highlighted one of the major problems facing the

North Atlantic alliance. With the bulk of the French Army tied down by the

Algerian insurrection, only five of the seventeen French divisions allocated to

NATO by the alliance's 1956 force goals remained on the Continent. State did not

want French forces in North Africa to forfeit their priority. The Joint Chiefs of

Staff disagreed. On 15 February 1957, they advised Secretary Wilson that second

priority should be limited to D-day or M-day forces positioned in Western

Europe and Turkey for immediate action against aggression by the Soviet bloc.

Units deployed elsewhere, such as Algeria, should not be considered available

for "active front line duty" and thus should not enjoy second priority.7

The JCS proposal for raising Korean forces from third to second priority also

became entangled in an extraneous issue. The $610 million in economic and military aid tentatively programmed for Korea during FY 1958 was by far the largest

sum allocated to any single country. The administration was looking for ways to

cut it, and a proposal had been made to reduce the active strength of Republic of

Korea (ROK) ground forces. In October 1956, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had proposed transferring four ROK infantry divisions from active to reserve status over

the next two years, subject to several conditions: necessary reserve facilities

should be made ready beforehand; prior provision should be made for the

reserves' adequacy and effectiveness; and US forces in Korea first should be provided with modern weapons. The State Department opposed introducing

nuclear-capable weapons, and this issue was still under discussion when the

question of priorities came before the NSC in February 1957.8

During a debate before the NSC Planning Board, State's representative objected to raising Korea's priority unless "advanced weapons" were specifically

excluded from that change. The JCS and OSD members countered that a priority

change would apply only to currently approved programs and that a priority

75
JCS and National Policy

statement was not the proper vehicle for introducing a larger policy question.

Unable to resolve either the Korean or the NATO dispute, the Planning Board

submitted both to the NSC.9

The National Security Council ruled in favor of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

although it did not precisely follow their recommendations. NATO forces in the

second priority were confined to those "deployed in Europe and Turkey, and

bases overseas essential thereto." President Eisenhower made the addition about

bases overseas. As for Korean forces' priority, Eisenhower felt that rigid guidance

was inappropriate for officers of the rank and status of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

When Mr. Cutler pointed out that the statement of priorities was sufficiently flexible as it stood to permit a higher priority for Korea, President Eisenhower decided to handle the change as an "administrative matter" rather than an amendment

to the policy statement.10

To help prepare the FY 1958 MAP and develop FY 1959 budget requests, the

Assistant Secretary (ISA) asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 11 February 1957 to

recommend changes in currently approved force objectives and in the unified

commands' priority lists of accomplishments. Replying nine days later, the

Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a reply in which they redrafted the entire military portion of the programming guidance. However, they characterized priority lists of

accomplishments as having negligible value in guiding MAP development and

saw no point in recommending changes to them. But they did offer the following views about which countries among the thirty-nine MAP recipients

deserved first priority:

European Area: West Germany, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.

Middle East and Africa: Iran.

Far East: Japan, Republic of China (Taiwan), South Korea, Thailand, and South

Vietnam.

Latin America: Brazil.

They also recommended raising Iraq from third to second priority along with

Pakistan, since Iraqi forces were committed to defending Baghdad Pact nations

against Soviet aggression and helping hold the main lines of resistance in the

event of general war. In the Far East, the Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted to give Thailand first priority, the Philippines second, and Laos and Cambodia only third,

because they felt that aid should be "maximized for countries ... strongly aligned

with the United States, and minimized for countries whose orientation is drifting

toward the Soviet bloc."

Major force objectives proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which appear on

pages 88-93, embodied changes recommended during the preceding twelve

months by the Services and by the Military Assistance Advisory Groups. For

Korea, as noted earlier, the Joint Chiefs of Staff favored transferring four infantry

divisions from active to reserve status. They also proposed reorganizing the

Cambodian and Vietnamese armed forces without changing their actual

strengths. Late in the summer of 1956, against the advice of CINCPAC and the

country team, President Eisenhower had approved limiting the Cambodian

76
Maintaining the Military Assistance Program

armed forces' mission to one of internal security. Revision in the Vietnamese

Army's objectives, recommended by the MAAG Chief, added two divisions by

making a change in the type of unit, so that objectives would correspond with

the actual establishment.11

The Joint Strategic Plans Committee began drafting guidance for the FY 1959

military assistance program. However, its members could not settle an interservice argument over whether Japan had the resources and "tradition" needed to

build and maintain a navy capable of controlling Far Eastern waters. The Navy

and Marine Corps said yes and urged a sizable increase in objectives. The Army

and Air Force, on the other hand, objected in light of limited MAP funds, the serious impact on other Services' programs, and Japanese reluctance to increase their

defense budget. On 20 February 1957, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided in favor of

the Army-Air Force view.12

The Joint Chiefs sought a number of other minor additions: one cruiser and

one light bomber squadron for Pakistan; ten minesweepers for Greece; two submarines for Chile; and two destroyer-type vessels for Brazil, two for Ecuador,

three for Peru, and one for Uruguay. In preparation for a conversion from propeller to jet aircraft, they recommended reductions totaling 143 fighter-bombers

in the air forces of eight Latin American countries.

On 14 March 1957, Assistant Secretary Mansfield D. Sprague informed Admiral Radford that Greek and Pakistani increases were not being included since

they would not be supported by grant aid before 1960. The naval increases for

Chile, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay were not included in programming guidance

because the vessels were to be offered as a loan, without expense to the United

States; recipients would bear the cost of maintenance and rehabilitation. All other

JCS recommendations won approval.13

Three weeks later, responding to objections by CINCPAC and the country

team, the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged Secretary Wilson to consider expanding the

Cambodians' mission from internal security to limited defense against external

attack. On 7 May, however, Wilson replied that in view of unchanged attitudes

expressed at recent NSC meetings and of the President's desire for smaller aid

programs for Southeast Asia, he did not want to bring this issue before the NSC.14

Throughout 1957, the Joint Chiefs of Staff debated whether to change the

method used in computing force levels that were a basis for determining the

amount of MAP support. As recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in February and defined in the programming guidance, the stated force objectives were

the major combat units that the administration expected each country eventually

to contribute for the common defense. These objectives originally had been

intended to represent the upper ceiling on US support, not the forces that necessarily would be supported. Inevitably, though, the ceiling had tended to become

the floor below which support could not fall. In the absence of a specific list of

forces eligible for support in any given fiscal year, the force objectives themselves

came to be used as an eligibility list. When they reviewed program guidance in

February, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had expressed concern about the disparity

between definition and actual practice. Because of "political considerations, compromise with national authorities concerned, and other factors," they decided

77
JCS and National Policy

that the definition was not an accurate description of force objectives. Almost

identical criticism of the force objectives appeared in a report by the General

Accounting Office dated 31 March.15

In their recommendation to Secretary Wilson, however, the Joint Chiefs of

Staff did not mention their concern. They accepted both the questionable definition and the corresponding list of force objectives. In a separate action, though,

they instructed their Special Assistant for Mutual Defense Affairs to study the

matter. Late in April, Admiral Burke pointed out that meaningful criteria for

determining either force objectives as currently defined or forces eligible for

MAP support were lacking. He recommended retaining the definition of force

objectives but limiting the forces listed to those reasonably attainable in four

years and to units either on active duty or capable of mobilization within thirty

days. A separate listing of forces eligible for support should be made, he said,

within the limits established by the force objectives, and he suggested a number

of specific criteria for eligibility.16

In mid-May, General Twining raised an issue that Admiral Burke had

touched only lightly. Burke had noted the desirability of establishing allied

force objectives that would complement the efforts of US forces but considered

it impractical to establish this as a criterion because it depended heavily upon

joint agreements and national decisions about the positioning and employment

of US forces. But, in Twining's judgment, to do otherwise was "fallacious planning." The effort to pattern indigenous forces after US examples and to establish balanced forces within each country, he believed, had resulted in sending

highly complex and expensive equipment to countries which could not use

such armaments effectively. Also, MAAG chiefs and US commanders had been

encouraged to advocate progressively larger indigenous forces, even though

US units now had more effective weapons and greater nuclear capabilities.

Accordingly, General Twining proposed that the basic objective be to make up

the equipment shortages of those indigenous units capable of complementing

US forces. The equipment provided should consist of relatively inexpensive,

uncomplicated types, easy to maintain and operate, and not necessarily drawn

from US inventories.17

On 14 November 1957, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary McElroy their

views about a new basis for defining MAP force objectives. The term should no

longer be applied to the total requirements for allied forces, they argued, but

only to those combat units that could be activated, equipped, and supported by

the beginning of the mid-range period (1962-1965) and were either beyond the

allies' capability to raise and maintain or were units that the United States had

committed itself to support. Further, such units should be within the total

forces that the administration had determined should be developed and maintained for any of the following purposes: preserving internal security; guarding

against communist or communist-inspired aggression; contributing to the free

world's collective military strength during the mid-range period; or ensuring

that necessary bases and strategic facilities would remain available to the

United States.

78
Maintaining the Military Assistance Program

How could this new definition be translated into numbers and types of units?

First, each country's total strategic requirement had to be established. Estimating

the overall requirements meant taking into consideration the force goals

developed by NATO and other allied pact agencies, but the results would not

necessarily coincide. Assumptions were made that, during the next 3 M years, the

global politico-military situation would remain basically unchanged and that

economic conditions in most allied countries would improve somewhat. Further,

it was assumed that the United States would make nuclear delivery systems

available to selected allies, deploy forces (nuclear as well as nonnuclear) when

needed to support allies, and fulfill its international commitments in the event of

overt communist aggression. Additionally, each country's forces were assumed

to be capable of maintaining their own internal security. Finally, it was to be

assumed that new obligational authority for MAP during FYs 1959-1961 probably would not exceed the 1958 appropriation.

The Secretary of Defense and the NSC had made three decisions that bore

directly upon the size and type of units included in the force objectives. First,

nuclear-capable missile systems being made available to chosen allies would be

included in grant aid programs. Second, a general reduction in MAP expenditures should occur, either by cutting a standard percentage from each country's

total or by reducing in degrees that varied according to individual circumstances.

Third, sales programs should be substituted for grant aid wherever possible.18

1958

On 30 January 1958, as recommendations for FY1960 programming guidance,

the Joint Chiefs of Staff resubmitted to Secretary McElroy the general views

and definitions of force objectives expressed in their memorandum of 14 November 1957. The main differences from the objectives listed on pages 88-93, were the

inclusion of missile units for most of the European countries as well as Japan and

Taiwan and the elimination or reduction of MAP support (missile units excepted)

for those nations whose economic development made such support seem unnecessary. Also, no MAP force objectives were listed for Yugoslavia. Marshal Tito's

rapprochement with Moscow had led the Yugoslav Government, in December

1957, to express gratitude for past US assistance but ask that MAP now be terminated.

In the JCS submission of 30 January 1958, Army objectives were the same as

those listed in February 1957, except for minor changes affecting the Philippines

and several Latin American countries. Navy and Air Force objectives underwent

more extensive readjustments. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended sizable

naval reductions for Japan and the NATO countries (Turkey excepted), with

smaller reductions or no changes in air units. For Turkey, the Philippines, South

Korea, Taiwan (Republic of China), South Vietnam, and seven of the Latin American nations, small increases were recommended in the destroyer, patrol vessel,

79
JCS and National Policy

and minesweeper categories, and a substitution of antisubmarine, air-sea rescue,

or reconnaissance units for fighter-bomber or light bomber squadrons.19

Secretary McElroy disallowed any increases for Turkey, South Korea, Taiwan,

or Latin America. He also deemed inappropriate a few units carried in the

previous year's approved force objectives that had not been included in any

commitments or tentative programs. With these exceptions, and subject to interagency coordination, he informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 12 March that their

strategic and force objectives would be incorporated in the Defense Department's

programming guidance.20

Concurrently, a minor change was made in the NSC's statement of worldwide

priorities. Like the revision of force objectives, it represented a recognition of

actual practice rather than a shift of policy. The existing statement, NSC 5517/1,

had placed in first priority all materiel required by Taiwanese (or Chinese

Nationalist) forces for current combat operations. However, approved and projected aid programs for Taiwan made no provision for furnishing equipment

under that priority. Therefore, on 29 January 1958, Secretary McElroy proposed

that the NSC place all Chinese Nationalist forces under Priority III, the status that

governed current programs. Such a change would not preclude the expeditious

replacement of combat losses, he explained, since the February 1957 decision

about South Korea's priority would permit the use of "administrative flexibility"

to award Taiwan a higher priority if necessary. The Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed

his proposal and so did the State Department, on condition that there would be

no significant slowdown in deliveries. Upon this basis, President Eisenhower

approved the change on 12 March.21

Administrative flexibility would be needed because, unlike 1957, the year

1958 witnessed a succession of crises: Lebanon in July, the offshore islands of

Quemoy and Matsu in August, and Berlin in November. The confrontation over

Quemoy and Matsu, described in chapter 14, put MAP under the greatest strain.

Emergency allocations during August exhausted the balance of the FY 1958 program for Nationalist China. As the communist bombardment continued without

letup and requests for additional aid flowed into Washington, materiel programmed for delivery during FY 1959 had to be delivered immediately and,

indeed, substantial additions made to the FY 1959 program. On 5 September, the

Office of the Assistant Secretary (ISA) authorized the Military Departments to

divert major materiel programmed for other countries but not yet delivered. A

few days later, the Departments received authority to deliver, as replacements for

items expended or lost in combat, requested items not available in approved programs. Upper limits were set at $10 million for the Army and $2 million each for

the Air Force and Navy.22

Such a prompt and effective response to the Taiwan emergency came about at

the expense of established order and regularity. In language reminiscent of that

used eleven years earlier when the Greek-Turkish crisis had called for extraordinary measures, the Director, Joint Military Assistance Affairs, observed early in

December 1958: "At present, funds must be diverted from other MAP recipients

to meet these unforeseen threats. Programming under such a procedure tends to

become meaningless, military balance in support of US strategic concepts

80
Maintaining the Military Assistance Program

becomes distorted beyond the point of acceptable risk to US security." The cost of

emergency aid to Taiwan, over and above the FY 1959 program, came to approximately $200 million by 31 October. By the end of 1958, according to JCS

estimates, that amount would reach approximately $350 million.23

1959

During mid-summer 1958, at the height of the Taiwan crisis, the Joint Chiefs

of Staff embarked upon their annual review of force objectives, strategic priorities, and other elements that would go into the making of MAP guidance for

FY 1961. This process consumed the remaining months of 1958. The proposed

revisions to Defense's programming guidance, which they submitted to Secretary

McElroy on 14 January 1959, were considerably more extensive than those of the

preceding year.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested that Secretary McElroy provide them with

an estimated dollar ceiling, within which they would develop and submit a balanced, worldwide program based on individual Service submissions. After

reviewing JCS recommendations and submitting them to interagency coordination, the Assistant Secretary (ISA) should transmit the revised program together

with the reasons for any substantive changes to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the unified commands, and the Military Departments. After refinement, the program

would be returned through the Joint Chiefs of Staff for final review and coordination by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Joint Chiefs of Staff claimed

that this procedure would enable them to prepare a balanced, integrated, and

effective program within fiscal limitations. They did not mention that such

reforms would enhance their role and place them in a new relationship to the

Military Departments, the unified commands, and ISA during the programming

process. The 1958 Reorganization Act could be invoked to justify such changes,

and creation of the Draper Committee (described on page 83) gave further impetus for a JCS initiative.

Defining force objectives caused some contention within the Joint Staff. Rather

than continuing to describe strategic force objectives as those "considered desirable ... and which should be in existence by the beginning" of the mid-range

period, a draft report by the Joint Staff proposed substituting "considered to be

reasonably attainable by the beginning of the mid-range period." The Army and

Navy withheld concurrence, on grounds that the phrase "reasonably attainable"

was meaningless, needless, and dangerous to the integrity of the JCS responsibility for providing advice on a professional military basis. Before final action was

taken on the report, the Army-Navy view had won acceptance.24

The previous definition of force objectives had embodied a descriptive statement taken from the US strategic concept and applicable to forces comprising the

strategic force objectives. The Joint Chiefs of Staff now decided to clarify that

statement by eliminating whatever language did not apply to MAP force

objectives (i.e., forces recommended for MAP support). They also spelled out

81
JCS and National Policy

what had been implicit in the old definition, that among the forces eligible for

grant assistance were those that the United States had committed itself to support for political reasons.

Turning to regional guidance, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended replacing

functional priorities and general objectives with a list of missions, tasks, and

requirements for each region and country. In the European area, France was raised

from second to first priority, Spain moved from second to third, and Yugoslavia

(somewhat belatedly) was dropped from the list completely. In the Middle East,

Jordan and Saudi Arabia were lowered from first to second priority, Pakistan

raised from second to first, and Iraq deleted for reasons described in chapter 11.

They proposed no changes for the Far East or the Western Hemisphere.

As for Army force objectives, the changes recommended for NATO countries

(Greece, Turkey, and Italy excepted) primarily involved adding Honest John surface-to-surface and Hawk air defense missile battalions. Since negotiations for

deploying IRBMs in France had collapsed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff deleted the

squadron previously included. They recommended making eligible for MAP

support one IRBM squadron slated for Greece, one for Turkey, and an additional

one for Italy, for a total of two there.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed reducing Greek Army divisions eligible for

MAP support from eleven to ten, so as to accord with NATO requirements, dropping one Italian division, and reorganizing Turkish units into formations presumably better designed to use Turkey's largely unskilled manpower. Cuts in

naval objectives were confined primarily to France, Italy, and the Netherlands;

the ships involved were mostly patrol craft, minesweepers, destroyers, and

destroyer escorts. The number of Air Force squadrons eligible for MAP support

remained virtually unchanged.

Moving to the Middle East, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed rather substantial additions to the objectives for Iran and Pakistan. In September 1958, the

Headquarters, United States European Command (USEUCOM), had recommended expanding Iranian ground forces in order to strengthen border defenses.

In place of twelve infantry divisions, half of them at reduced strength, and five

brigades, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended supporting thirteen full-strength

divisions and adding two fighter squadrons as well. As for Pakistan, they reinserted the cruiser that had been disallowed two years earlier and added one tactical reconnaissance squadron and ten patrol vessels. The latter had been recommended by USEUCOM to help prevent smuggling and for "political reasons."25

In the Far East, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended increasing antisubmarine vessels, landing craft, and naval transports for all countries except landlocked Laos. Japan should get one aircraft carrier, the Philippines one destroyer

or destroyer escort, and Taiwan three vessels of either type. Changes in Army

objectives included: for Taiwan, dropping four infantry and adding two armored

divisions; for Laos, replace one parachute and seven infantry battalions with one

infantry regiment and two airborne battalions; for Thailand, adding two infantry

divisions, one reserve division, and one airborne battalion and eliminating one

regimental combat team.

82
Maintaining the Military Assistance Program

For Latin America, finally, the principal revisions concerned objectives for

Brazil. The Joint Chiefs of Staff advocated inserting one aircraft carrier and

twelve minesweepers and, for the army, deleting two infantry regiments and

adding airborne, field artillery, armored cavalry, and combat engineer units.

The JCS memorandum provided only meager explanatory comments. Except

for citing political considerations in a few instances, their justification was always

the same: "To align force objectives with the threat, mission, tasks, and capability

of country to absorb." Even when a more explicit reason was available, they did

not give it. For example, the armored division that they recommended dropping

from Italian objectives was in fact being deactivated. Likewise, the Dutch tactical

reconnaissance squadron that they added would replace a missile squadron carried on previous lists which the Dutch did not want and had agreed to trade with

West Germany for the reconnaissance squadron. The 10,000-man Philippine Constabulary had been supported by MAP for eight years without having been listed

among the force objectives. Adding it now meant no change, just a belated recognition of actual fact.26

These recommendations fared poorly at ISA's hands. ISA spokesmen, at the

yearly programming conference for representatives of unified commands, held

on 19 January 1959, circulated a draft containing markedly different force objectives from those in the JCS memorandum above. Those for the NATO countries,

being based exclusively on NATO's minimum requirements, included none of

the Joint Chiefs' recommendations. Most of the Hawk units were disallowed on

grounds that prospective recipients intended to fill their needs from European

production. The ISA also expunged increases for Iran and Pakistan, most naval

increases for the Far East, additional armored divisions for Taiwan, and increases for Thailand. Except for Brazil, Latin America had generally the same force

objectives as in 1958. ISA held that, in those countries, military forces were an

undesirable drain on local resources and provided less protection than sound

economic development.

Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that ISA's draft showed evidence of

an erroneous application of NATO requirements, that their own recommendations were in consonance with basic national security policy, and that the financial burden should be calculated with an awareness that the listed units need

not be supported in full, nevertheless, very few of the JCS recommendations

survived. Those that did were mainly the IRBM squadrons for Western Europe

as well as most of the reductions. The final programming guidance issued by

ISA on 5 August contained no specific definition of force objectives, nor were the

programming procedures proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff adopted.27

On Capitol Hill, the military assistance program was being criticized as a

costly anachronism. In August 1958, for example, eight Senators told the Chief

Executive that they believed military aid was being given too much importance

and economic aid too little. Three months later, at the urging of Secretaries

McElroy and Dulles, President Eisenhower appointed a committee to appraise

how well MAP could advance US interests. Mr. William H. Draper, a former

Under Secretary of the Army, served as the committee's chairman; Admiral

Radford was one of the members. In March 1959, the Draper Committee

83
JCS and National Policy

released preliminary conclusions calling for a long-range program of $2.4 billion annually. "In our fascination with our own mistakes," the committee cautioned, "and the constant use of foreign aid as a whipping boy, we may be

choking this vital feature of our national security policy to death." The final

report, made public on 20 August, maintained that any "marked decline" in

MAP would pose a serious threat to free world security.28 Congress did not

appropriate anything like $2.4 billion, as the figures on page 73 show, but neither did it impose major reductions.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had given the Draper Committee their views on a

broad range of issues, arguing for improved programming procedures, long-range

planning, and the establishment of dollar guidelines prior to the development of

country programs. The committee endorsed the idea of decentralizing programming procedures by giving more responsibility to unified commands. It did not,

however, accept the JCS view that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should have a role in the

programming process similar to the one they had in the planning process. The

committee recommended vesting full responsibility for the program's operation in

a Director of Military Assistance working under the Assistant Secretary (ISA). The

Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred, with the proviso that the Director always be a military officer of appropriately high rank. They opposed the committee's further recommendation that a separate staff, independent of the Director's office, be created

to conduct a continuing evaluation of the program. Neither the JCS proviso regarding the Director nor their objection to an independent evaluation staff found its

way into the committee's report; but General Williston B. Palmer, USA, did become

the first Director of Military Assistance.29

The Defense Department put into effect a worldwide, long-range plan and

added dollar guidelines to the programming instructions. The distinction

between planning and programming became more sharply etched by documenting the former in the shape of a Military Assistance Plan. As one of the first steps

in implementing the Draper Committee's recommendations, the State Department, the International Cooperation Agency, and ISA jointly formulated a statement of the general political, economic, and military objectives to be sought and

the appropriate courses of action. This statement—the Mutual Security Objectives Plan—presented the objectives and courses of action worldwide, regionally,

and country by country. With the addition of dollar guidelines, it constituted the

Basic Planning Document for preparation of the final Military Assistance Plan by

the various unified commands.

On 20 October 1959, also as guidance for developing the Military Assistance

Plan, the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided unified commanders with an Annex to the

Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for 1 July 1963. It included overall strategic priorities, missions, tasks, requirements, and force objectives for allied nations as well

as those that might become allies during limited or general war. As J-5 characterized it, the guidance constituted "the initial step in the implementation of the

long-range military assistance planning and decentralization concept

recommended by the Draper Committee."30

84
Maintaining the Military Assistance Program

1960

On 15 December 1959, the unified commands and the Joint Chiefs of Staff

received a draft Basic Planning Document for FYs 1962-1966. A dollar ceiling

established by Secretary Gates was to replace force objectives as the basis of country programs. This ceiling, which amounted to $2.2 billion per year, represented

the average value of deliveries during 1955-1959. Accordingly, the Document set

annual expenditure limits at $1.12 billion for the EUCOM area (i.e., Europe, Near

and Middle East, South Asia); $140 million for regional programs administered by

the Defense Representative to the North Atlantic and Mediterranean Areas

(DEFREPNAMA) (i.e., Infrastructure, Weapons Production Program, and International Military Headquarters), plus $40 million for the Mutual Weapons Development Program also administered by DEFREPNAMA; $800 million for the Pacific

Command (PACOM) area (i.e., Far East and Southeast Asia); and $55 million for

Latin America. Within these limits, the unified commands were to establish the

number and types of major combat units that MAP could support.31

The final Basic Planning Document, issued by ISA on 31 March 1960,

expressed fiscal guidelines as an "assumption," for planning purposes only,

that $2.2 billion in new appropriations would be requested each year, which

with the carryover from previous years would permit an annual "average level

of accomplishment" around the same amount. Thus the guidelines constituted

neither delivery ceilings nor expenditure allowances. The Joint Chiefs of Staff

had argued, without success, that control of expenditures and deliveries could

be effected more easily through the military departments than by the unified

commands and that dollar guidelines should be expressed in terms of

obligational authority32

Through a memorandum dated 17 February 1960, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

had urged numerous revisions to the draft Basic Planning Document. Their seventy-three pages of recommendations constituted approximately one page of

comment for every two pages of the draft Document. Most of their recommendations sought to bring the Document's language into line with the tasks and

missions set forth in the Annex to JSOP-63; the remainder would give greater

emphasis to the military aspects of stated objectives. The JCS recommendations

totaled approximately 180. About 55 percent were adopted as recommended;

approximately 11 percent were accepted in substance but not in that exact wording; 9 percent were incorporated partly or with qualifications attached; and 21

percent were rejected.33

In preparing the Military Assistance Plan, however, the unified commands

had looked for guidance to the draft document of 15 December 1959. The unified

commands' submissions then were revised by ISA in light of the 31 March Planning Document and forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review in the form

of ISA staff papers. The JCS critique, dated 15 July, claimed that ISA placed too

much emphasis on political and financial aspects, instead of giving "paramount

importance" to military requirements. Nevertheless, they judged the submissions

to be "feasible and supportable at this point," since they would be further revised

each year.34

85
JCS and National Policy

The Military Assistance Plan that won State-Defense approval on 1 August 1960

amounted to an expanded version of ISA's staff papers, substantially unchanged.

For individual countries within each area (Latin America excepted) it analyzed the

enemy threat, force capabilities, and related economic and political factors. The US

objectives—economic, political, and military—with respect to each country were

summarized and the major combat units constituting Mutual Security Forces

listed. The latter were no longer the mold within which MAP would be shaped but

a goal toward which the program would be directed. In numbers and types, and

by definition, they resembled what previously had been designated as "strategic

force objectives." Indeed, the Plan's definition combined the one that the Joint

Chiefs of Staff earlier had approved with the one they had considered but rejected.

"Mutual Security Forces," it read, were those "desirable and reasonably feasible of

accomplishment "

As the measure for feasibility, the plan estimated the annual level of financial

effort that each country might be expected to devote to defense and the amount

of US aid required, within Defense's regional dollar guidelines. Finally, the plan

summarized key projects deemed worthy of support that eventually might constitute country programs. The projects, approved as of 1 August 1960, provided a

basis for listing the estimated funds to be programmed during FYs 1962-1964

and the cost of deliveries through FY 1966.35

Conclusion

The military assistance program suffered from two recurring problems. First, a

gap remained between what ought to be done to attain the ends sought and

what could be done within the limits of available resources. Second, the impact of

crises on established plans and programs, or how to meet emergencies without disrupting the entire order of things, eluded solution. The Draper Committee noted

that, in FY 1954, the backlog of undelivered MAP goods came to $8.4 billion. When

FY 1960 ended, that backlog had shrunk to about $2 billion, putting MAP almost

on a pay-as-you-go basis. Flexibility diminished greatly; no longer could

undelivered balances be shifted from country programs to crisis areas. The shift in

1960 to a dollar ceiling as the basis for programming actions and the adoption of a

five-year plan represented procedural attempts to solve these problems. The Joint

Chiefs of Staff tried but failed to gain a larger voice in military assistance

programming. Instead, creating a Director of Military Assistance as well as an

independent evaluation staff under the Assistant Secretary (ISA) put more power

in OSD's hands.

As the Eisenhower administration ended, the military assistance program was

coming under heavy criticism from the Treasury Department and the Budget

Bureau. During an NSC meeting on 31 October 1960, General Lemnitzer argued for

an annual appropriation of $2.4 billion, so that deliveries could continue at a rate of

$2.2 billion per year. He described MAP as a "vital component" of our security policy, deserving strong support. However, Secretary of the Treasury Robert Anderson

86
Maintaining the Military Assistance Program

emphasized the damage being done by a growing US balance of payments deficit.

Never in his lifetime, Anderson insisted, had the United States faced such a serious

problem. The drain on US gold reserves and the loss of confidence in the dollar

simply could not continue. Even so, Secretaries Gates and Herter claimed that cutting the modest programs for Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, and Japan could stir

fears abroad of a return to "Fortress America" and lead allies to reduce their efforts.

Secretary Anderson's rejoinder was blunt: "If our alliances are that weak, the time

has come to reappraise them."36 The outgoing administration deferred any

decisions, of course, but these issues would last as long as the Cold War.

87
JCS and National Policy

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93
NATO Emphasizes Nuclear Capabilities

The North Atlantic Treaty, considered the keystone of US foreign policy

bound its signatories to treat "an armed attack against one or more of them in

Europe or North America" as "an attack against them all." Each party would take

"such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore

and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area."1Fifteen nations belonged

to NATO: the United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Canada, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Portugal, Greece, and Turkey.

To help make the treaty more than words, a unique organizational structure

had come into being. At its apex stood the North Atlantic Council, consisting of

foreign and/or defense ministers from each country, which gave political guidance to the military authorities. A Military Committee, normally consisting of one

chief of staff or his representative from each country, provided advice to the

Council as well as guidance and direction to subordinate military authorities.

Since the Military Committee met infrequently, a three-member executive agency

called the Standing Group undertook the detailed work required for strategic

direction, coordination, and integration of defense plans. Only US, UK, and

French officers served on the Standing Group; a Military Representatives Committee that included all members kept other allies in touch with the Standing

Group and vice versa.

NATO had three major commands: Europe, Atlantic, and Channel. In 1957,

the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), was General Lauris

Norstad, USAF; the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT), was

Admiral Jerauld Wright, USN; a British officer, Admiral Sir Guy Grantham, held

the post of Commander in Chief, Channel Command (CINCHAN). General

Norstad wore a second hat as US Commander in Chief, Europe; Admiral Wright

did the same as US Commander in Chief, Atlantic. An annual review of NATO's

force requirements began early every year with the issuance of a detailed questionnaire to member states. From their replies, the NATO staff would recommend

the major commands' "firm" force goals for the following year, "provisional"

95
JCS and National Policy

goals for the second year, and "planning" goals for the third. The North Atlantic

Council, in December, would give final approval.

A New Strategic Concept

In December 1954, through MC 48, the North Atlantic Council had adopted a

strategy that placed primary reliance on nuclear weapons and combat-ready

conventional forces in being. The alliance's military authorities decided that the

active forces in Europe needed to carry out MC 48 totaled 58 % divisions, 1,197

naval vessels, and 8,810 aircraft. Yet, when 1956 ended, substantial shortfalls in

all these categories still remained.2 At that time, US forces either assigned or earmarked for assignment to SACEUR included:

Army: Five divisions in West Germany and eleven more in CONUS that could reach

Europe between D+30 and D+180.

Navy: Sixth Fleet with two attack carriers, three cruisers, and sixteen destroyers in

the Mediterranean, which would be augmented by D+30 with two Marine

division/wing teams as well as two attack carriers and other warships from

the Pacific.

Air Force: Six light bomber and twelve interceptor and twenty fighter-bomber

squadrons in Europe; three light bomber and thirteen fighter-bomber

squadrons earmarked in CONUS.3

Conventional forces served as NATO's shield but nuclear forces were its

sword. During the latter part of 1956, the British pressed for a new strategic concept that would emphasize deterrence through thermonuclear weapons and

reduce conventional forces. The Eisenhower administration opposed any implication that NATO strategy should rely entirely upon nuclear retaliation.4 Also,

during the latter part of 1956, the Standing Group drafted a new strategic concept

for defense of the treaty area. The US Representative to the Standing Group, General Leon W. Johnson, USAF, sent this draft to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 18 January 1957. He recommended that they approve it as written.5

Essentially, the draft concept stated that NATO could not prevent the rapid

overrunning of Western Europe without immediately employing nuclear weapons.

In case of general war, therefore, NATO would have to use nuclear weapons

promptly, regardless of whether the Soviets did so. Logically, then, a war would

divide into two phases. The first would be short and violent; the second would be

marked by regrouping and operations leading to a conclusion of the conflict.

When they reviewed this draft, the Joint Chiefs of Staff split along the same

lines as they had during the strategy and force planning debates described in

chapters 2 and 3. General Twining maintained that the initial nuclear exchange

would last only a few hours or days, that it would decide the war's outcome, that

large-scale organized operations could last no longer than thirty days, and that

any subsequent operations would be limited ones. Conversely, Admiral Burke

96
NATO Emphasizes Nuclear Capabilities

and General Taylor held that large-scale operations could go on longer and might

well decide the war's outcome.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff settled upon a compromise that skirted around their

differences without really solving them. Through memorandums to General

Johnson and Secretary Wilson dated 9 February 1958, they recommended

describing the first phase as being one "of comparatively short duration " The

second phase, they proposed, would be one of "indeterminate duration." They

favored deleting a reference to "limited" operations and speaking simply of "military operations leading to a conclusion of the war."6

General Johnson soon reported that Standing Group members disagreed over

the wording used to describe how long the first phase of a war would last.

Should it be "comparatively short" or "not likely to exceed 30 days?" He asked

for authority to accept a compromise. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 26 March,

authorized him to accept either alternative, or a combination of them, as necessary to obtain agreement. They preferred language stating that phase two would

be of indeterminate duration, and that plans should ensure an immediate capability to exploit superiority gained during the first phase. The State Department

concurred but cautioned that JCS language might conflict with what State called

"the clear priority for/forces-in-being" during the first phase.7

The Standing Group worked out a compromise on the first phase's duration

that contained both definitions. The JCS objection to speaking about "limited

operations" during the second phase also won acceptance. On 9 May, the North

Atlantic Council approved MC 14/2, a strategic concept for overall defense of the

NATO area. Stated in very general terms, it rejected the idea of defending Europe

by fighting a large-scale conventional war. There might be incursions, infiltrations, or local hostile actions, and the allies had to be capable of stopping them by

conventional means. But NATO would not try to wage a limited war against the

Soviet Union. Even if the USSR did not employ nuclear weapons, NATO must be

prepared to do so.

MC 14/2 harmonized with NSC 5707/8, the statement of basic national

security policy described in chapter 2 that President Eisenhower approved on 3

June. Like MC 14/2, NSC 5707/8 downplayed the possibility that US forces might

become extensively engaged in conventional warfare. In 1959, through NSC

5906/1, the administration modified this concept by placing main but not sole

reliance on nuclear weapons. But, according to the new US policy, planning for

conventional, limited war would exclude not only the NATO area but also hostilities anywhere that involved sizable US and Soviet forces.8

Thus a willingness to

employ nuclear weapons promptly in general war remained the centerpiece of

NATO strategy.

Since it was the product of prolonged negotiations and compromises, MC 14/2

contained some ambiguous language that was open to interpretations. What,

exactly, were incidents short of general war and how should NATO respond to

them? General Norstad wanted enough nonnuclear strength to impose a true

pause and not serve merely as a tripwire. In briefing the North Atlantic Council,

he described shield forces as providing the essential alternative to resorting to the

"ultimate capability." If there were only token conventional forces, he warned,

97
JCS and National Policy

NATO would invite local actions and be compelled to reply principally upon

massive retaliation.9

Cutbacks in Conventional Commitments?

President Eisenhower, in October 1956, said he was convinced US divisions in

Europe should not be withdrawn "at this time."10 The adoption of MC 14/2

strongly implied that, in the defense of Western Europe, nuclear firepower would

be substituted for manpower. On 6 June 1957, during a conference aboard the

USS Saratoga attended by most NSC members, President Eisenhower said that he

did not see how divisions based in the United States but committed for deployment to Europe could play any part in a general war. Perhaps, he remarked, their

NATO commitment should be rescinded. The question soon became whether, if

that happened, the units themselves could be eliminated or reduced, particularly

those designated as "second echelon divisions."

There were nine divisions—three Regular Army and six National Guard—in

this second echelon category, the lowest of all priorities for US forces committed

to NATO. Highest, of course, were the five Army divisions in West Germany.

Next came five "M-day divisions"—three Army and two Marine—stationed in

the United States. In case of a surprise attack, they probably could not reach

Europe in time to influence the critical first phase of operations. Nonetheless,

General Norstad expected them to play a significant role in the second phase,

assuming they could reach Europe on or before D+30. These M-day divisions

also were the best-trained units in the strategic reserve. If a period of tension preceded the attack, they might reach Europe in time to have an important effect

upon initial operations.

At President Eisenhower's direction, Secretary Dulles queried the Supreme

Allied Commander, Europe, about eliminating the commitment of divisions

located in the United States. General Norstad believed that as long as the five Mday divisions were retained for any purpose they should remain committed to

NATO. Releasing them from their NATO commitment, he felt sure, would

prompt the European allies to question US support and interest. Conversely,

eliminating some of the nine second echelon divisions would have no significant

impact upon NATO, either psychologically or militarily, if it was properly presented. Retention or reduction of second echelon divisions, he advised Secretary

Dulles on 1 October, should be determined by their national rather than their

NATO role. They should remain committed to NATO, though, as long as they

continued in existence.11

Secretary Dulles proposed that he, Secretary Wilson, and Admiral Radford

recommend to the President that any reduction be taken from the second echelon divisions and then, if necessary, from M-day forces in the United States.

Assistant Secretary Sprague requested JCS comments. Their answer, dated 18

September, stated that the Services' force structures were determined by national requirements stemming from national objectives that were worldwide in

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scope. Therefore, eliminating a contingent NATO commitment would not necessarily eliminate the requirement to maintain the forces concerned.12

By this time, Secretary Wilson had directed the Services to cut 100,000 personnel by the year's close and another 100,000 by 30 June 1958. During the summer

of 1957, before the full impact of these reductions had been studied and separate

Service programs prepared, SACEUR, SACLANT, and CINCHAN initiated studies projecting their minimum requirements for the next several years. These ran

through 1963 for SACEUR and through 1962 for SACLANT.

Concurrently, for the Annual Review, the Defense Department had to list firm,

provisional, and planning force goals through 1960. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on

17 July, recommended to Secretary Wilson that the US reply to the NATO

Defense Planning Questionnaire include the following units for 1958:

Army: Eight divisions available on M-day, followed by nine more in the second

echelon.

Navy: Eight attack carriers, ten cruisers, 147 destroyers, and sixty-six submarines

available on D-day; one battleship, ten attack carriers, eleven cruisers, 149 destroy

ers, and sixty-nine submarines available by D+30.

Marine Corps: Two division/wing teams available on D-day.

Air Force: Thirteen fighter/interceptor squadrons in Europe; sixteen fighter-bomber

squadrons in Europe and fourteen earmarked in CONUS; six light bomber

squadrons in Europe and three earmarked in CONUS.13

By early October, the administration had decided to limit FY 1958 and 1959

expenditures to $38 billion annually and to cut personnel to 2.5 million by 30

June 1959. Secretary Wilson asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff whether any changes

should be made in US force goals for NATO. On 11 October, the Joint Chiefs of

Staff apprised General Norstad of tentative Service plans to cut 11,000 men from

US Army, Europe, and to pare US Air Forces, Europe, to thirty-one combat

squadrons by 1963. SACEUR's own requirements study, mentioned above,

reflected two changes: the second echelon divisions in the United States were

deleted and USAF combat squadrons in Europe would fall from forty-nine in

1957 to thirty-five in 1963. The latter change would be offset by a corresponding

increase in allied nuclear capability as well as a buildup of missile units.

Nonetheless, Norstad responded by calling this "the worst possible time" for cutbacks in light of Sputnik and continued Middle East turmoil. The example set by

the United States, he warned, might well prove irresistible to the allies.14

Writing to Secretary McElroy on 23 October 1957, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

proposed changing the Air Force's commitments to NATO as follows:

2958: Nine fighter/interceptor squadrons in Europe; seventeen fighter-bomber

squadrons in Europe and nineteen earmarked in CONUS; three light bomber

squadrons in Europe.

1959-1960: Seven fighter/interceptor squadrons in Europe; eighteen fighter-bomber

squadrons in Europe and eighteen earmarked in CONUS; three light bomber

squadrons in Europe.15

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At a 12 November conference attended by Secretary McElroy and Generals

Norstad, Taylor, and White, it was agreed that USAF combat squadrons would

not be reduced below SACEUR's minimum requirements. Cuts would be limited

to transport and troop carrier squadrons. After returning to Paris, Norstad

reported that, by 30 June 1959, 4,600 personnel could be trimmed from US Army,

Europe, without eliminating any battle groups. Instead, he would speed up integration of Italian troops into the Southern European Task Force, transfer equipment from two Honest John missile battalions to the allies, reduce headquarters

strength of US Army, Europe, and "squeeze" the line of communications. No

announcement of any major cutbacks should take place until after the year's end,

when State and Defense would be considering an overall NATO report on

minimum force requirements.16

MC-70 Sets Slightly Lower Force Goals

The NATO report mentioned above was supposed to translate MC 14/2's

strategic concept into a specific pattern of forces. Work began in the Standing

Group. Late in January 1958, Army and Air Force planners proposed telling the

Standing Group that five divisions would remain in Europe and that the nine second echelon divisions would retain their NATO status. During a State-Defense

conference on 10 January, Secretary Dulles had confirmed his understanding that

these divisions were being retained for "purely national military reasons," there

being no NATO or other foreign policy consideration that required their commitment to NATO. He agreed that as long as the divisions were being retained for

national reasons they should remain committed to NATO.17

The Joint Chiefs of Staff split their comments on the NATO report, now

known as MC-70, into two parts: one set on the report itself, the other on the

force tables appended to it. Through a memorandum dated 14 February 1958,

they recommended nearly one hundred changes to the report. Their principal

points had to do with the relative importance of missiles compared to manned

bombers and the significance to be attached to forces in being. On the former, the

effect of their recommendations was to minimize the importance of missiles as a

nuclear delivery system during 1958-1963. On the latter, they attached less

importance to forces in being, pointing out that other forces (including those in

the second echelon) were part of the deterrent and might contribute to wartime

tasks. Finally, they urged that references to war with the Soviet Union be

changed to read "general war."18

Through a critique dated 27 February, the Joint Chiefs of Staff labeled MC-70's

force tables "acceptable for the purposes intended," subject to a few amendments.

The tables for US forces were "in consonance with Service programs through 1

July 1961" and "reasonable prognostications thereafter." Of course, they advised

Secretary McElroy, approving MC-70 should not be construed as committing the

United States to provide the allies with enough equipment to let them meet their

goals. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also cautioned that modern weapons requirements

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and deployments, while desirable, were not entirely necessarily attainable within

this time period.19

In the end, less than half the JCS recommendations about the NATO report

were incorporated without change into the final, approved version. Most of their

views about the implications of missile development, for example, won adoption. Other proposals were incorporated in part or in substance, while about thirty were rejected outright. Their suggestion that references to conflict with the

USSR be narrowed to "general war" ran afoul of the State Department's view that

this was not the place to define types of war. The US Representative to the Standing Group was granted latitude in seeking the change sought by the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, and as a result it was not done. Likewise, State and OSD agreed that the

Joint Chiefs' emphasis on forces in being had to be softened, as did their implication that the allies should commit themselves now to achieve specific force goals

during 1959-1961.20

Deputy Secretary Quarles did not accept JCS views about either second echelon divisions or earmarked air and naval forces. He deleted second echelon divisions from the table of NATO requirements. Instead, they would be listed as a

separate category of reserves, maintained for national reasons. Likewise, earmarked naval and air units in excess of stated NATO requirements should be

shown in a similar, separate category of reserve forces. Mr. Quarles worried that

allied countries might also include forces in excess of those requested by major

NATO commanders and thus generate requirements for additional US military

assistance. The inclusion of excess forces in NATO requirements, he feared, might

be used to justify Service programs larger than those in the current JSOP.21

Most of the JCS revisions that survived interdepartmental review were incorporated into the final version of NATO's "Minimum Essential Force Requirements, 1958-1963." On 14 March 1958, the Military Committee amended and then

approved this document as MC-70; its goals for 1963 included fifty-five active

divisions and 4,802 aircraft. General Twining, who attended the Military Committee meeting, gave his judgment that US interests had been "fully protected." He

stressed, however, that considerable give and take had been necessary to reconcile

discordant national views. In fact, Twining advised his JCS colleagues,

Recalling the magnitude of the US guidance furnished the United States Representative

to the Standing Group, I am convinced that we contributed in no small measure to this

problem. Our contribution toward a solution must, it seems to me, lie in reducing to the

minimum the comments developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other US agencies.

While we must adopt the strongest possible position on each and every issue which

affects our vital security interests, we must avoid generation of minor comments which,

in the final analysis, have little influence on the main issues.22

During the next two years, the US military presence in Europe underwent

only minor changes. Thus the JCS recommendations for 1960, submitted as a

response to the Annual Review in June 1959, read as follows:

Army: Eight divisions (five in West Germany, three in CONUS) available on M-day,

nine more in the second echelon. In 1960, the Army would meet MC-70's goals for

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surface-to-surface missile units. Five Honest John, six Corporal and four Lacrosse

battalions, as well as two Redstone groups, would be stationed in Europe.

Navy/Marine Corps: Six attack carriers, seven cruisers, 129 destroyers, sixty-six sub

marines, and two Marine division/wing teams immediately available.

Air Force: Seven fighter/interceptor, twenty-one fighter-bomber, and three light

bomber squadrons in Europe; ten to twelve squadrons in CONUS "from which

reinforcement for Allied Command Europe may be allocated."23

Cutting Back the US Commitment?

President Eisenhower felt a personal obligation to start bringing some US

troops back from Europe. In 1951, when he was SACEUR, the dispatch of

four US divisions to Germany had sparked considerable opposition among Congress and the American public. Eisenhower's aim as SACEUR, he constantly had

assured congressional delegations, was "to strive for a very intensive but relatively short program of American assistance which should begin to pass its peak,

especially in ground force content, within two and one-half or three years." Writing to President Truman in July 1951, Eisenhower estimated that ground reductions should prove possible "within some 4-8 years."24 But eight years had

passed and nothing had happened. Yet the United Kingdom, during 1957-1958,

took steps to reduce the British Army of the Rhine by 30 percent and to cut its

Second Tactical Air Force even more. West Germany informed the allies that it

would have 300,000 men under arms by April 1961, well short of the original

goal of 500,000. Sizable French forces remained in North Africa, fighting the

uprising in Algeria.

During the early autumn of 1959, the Air Force reacted to what it saw as stringent budgetary guidance by proposing to withdraw fourteen squadrons of all

types from the USAF units committed to NATO during 1960. But General Norstad

reacted just as vigorously as he had when reductions were proposed in 1957. There

would be no way to minimize the political impact, he warned Assistant Secretary

John Irwin; even the suggestion that such a move was being considered could

prove disastrous. Confidence in US leadership would be undermined, the trend

toward increased allied defense budgets reversed, and the Western position in

negotiations with the USSR weakened. Secretary Irwin assured him that the United

States would stand by the figures reported to NATO for the 1959 Annual Review.25

In mid-October, during a discussion with State Department officials, the President suggested appointing a European to be SACEUR, ending military assistance

to Europe, and keeping only one US division there. On 2 November, Secretary

McElroy asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to draft a presidential statement about

reducing US forces in Europe. The JCS organization began composing responses

that emphasized the dangers of such a step. On 11 November, the NSC discussed

whether to cut US commitments in Europe. President Eisenhower maintained

that "the US had maneuvered itself into a greater position of responsibility than

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was necessary." He recognized, however, that political groundwork had to be

laid before any shifting of burdens took place. Secretary McElroy said that maintaining a strategic nuclear deterrent should be the most important US contribution to NATO. Two divisions in Europe, he thought, would be enough to demonstrate US determination. But McElroy agreed with President Eisenhower and

Secretary Herter that this was not the time to announce a reduction of ground

forces: "To do so would lead the Europeans to feel that we were reneging on our

commitments and would throw away our bargaining position vis-ä-vis the

USSR." Secretary of the Treasury Robert Anderson and Budget Director Maurice

Stans emphasized how keeping so many troops in Europe had aggravated the

budget and balance-of-payments deficits. Nonetheless, President Eisenhower

decided against making any significant cuts in NATO-committed forces during

1960 "unless agreed to through negotiations." He also asked the State and

Defense Departments to recommend what the future roles and contributions of

NATO members ought to be.26

As a first step, on 16 November, the NSC ordered a State-Defense study of

NATO's defense posture. Simultaneously, the President talked with General

Twining about modest US withdrawals. The Air Force, Twining replied, would

like to pull out some of its units. Eisenhower remarked that he could not break

faith with NATO allies and withdraw any forces during 1960. When he conferred

with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 18 November, though, the President asked them

to "take a new look" at long-standing deployments, such as the Sixth Fleet in the

Mediterranean and ground forces in Europe.27

The NSC's guidance, in effect, called for more study and postponed a decision. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in July 1960, recommended a response to the annual review that showed no changes of any consequence for 1961. As had been

agreed in 1959, three light bomber squadrons were retained in Europe by dropping two all-weather fighter squadrons. But the Air Force projected subsequent

withdrawals that, in 1963, would leave only eigthteen strike and four fighter

squadrons in Europe. Qualitative improvements would offset these quantitative

reductions to some extent.28

In September 1960, ISA completed a study, "NATO in the 1960's," written in

response to the NSC directive of November 1959. According to the study, NATO

possessed only "marginal capabilities" to deny an attacker any option except allout attack, thereby risking nuclear retaliation. Consequently, NATO's shield

forces should be made adequate (1) to deny the Soviets any options except all-out

assault or abstention from attack and (2) to initiate and carry on tactical nuclear

warfare. Assistant Secretary Irwin asked for JCS comments. Their critique, dated

28 October, once again demonstrated the difficulty of reconciling Service viewpoints. General White wanted to place equal emphasis upon nuclear and conventional capabilities. But Admiral Burke, General Shoup, and General Decker all

advocated putting greater emphasis upon increases in conventional strength. The

Chairman, General Lemnitzer, supported them. Secretary Gates, however, chose

to adopt General White's view.29 By then, of course, the transition to a new

administration had begun.

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During his final weeks in office, fiscal pressures drove President Eisenhower to

weigh making the major cutbacks that he repeatedly had postponed. On 16

November, he ordered a drastic reduction in the number of military dependents

overseas. Nonetheless, West Germany rejected Washington's request that it contribute $600 million to help support the US troops stationed there. At a White

House meeting on 30 November, Secretary of the Treasury Robert Anderson

stressed the danger created by continuing budget and balance-of-payments

deficits. "We have now reached the end of an era," Anderson argued, "and we can

no longer live as we did in the past." President Eisenhower remarked that "we are

now approaching the hardest choice possible to make." The world situation had

grown worse but "we can defeat ourselves by violating fiscal soundness." Eisenhower talked about informing NATO that "we plan to withdraw two divisions.

We should reduce the overstaffed NATO infrastructure, bring home Americans,

and hire French and Germans."30 But he left office without taking any action.

In sum, the adoption of MC 14/2 and MC-70 seems to have had very little

impact upon US deployments in Europe and US commitments to NATO. Political

and psychological factors, as President Eisenhower recognized, preserved the US

presence without significant change. It is noteworthy that the Air Force, alone

among the Services, constantly tried to remove units from Allied Command

Europe. The Army and Navy saw Europe's defense as their major mission and

justification. The Air Force focused upon general war, which to airmen meant a

short, intense nuclear exchange. In such a conflict, obviously, conventional forces

would play only a minor part.

A Nuclear Arsenal for NATO

Although nuclear retaliation was the centerpiece of NATO strategy, only the

United States possessed the means to accomplish it. The United Kingdom

had a small number of weapons and bombers to deliver them. France had begun

a research and development program but, in 1957, stood some years away from

exploding a nuclear device. There was growing concern that West Germany also

might be tempted to join the nuclear club. In principle, the solution seemed simple: allay the allies' concerns and satisfy their aspirations by creating a NATO

nuclear force or stockpile. In practice, though, obstacles would prove enormous.

A system already existed for integrating US nuclear weapons into Allied

Command Europe. Each year General Norstad, as USCINCEUR, received from

the Joint Chiefs of Staff an allocation of nuclear weapons based on the requirements of NATO defense plans. As SACEUR, he in turn applied these allocations

to the various programs and regional commands. Then, after approving the operational plans of his regional commanders, General Norstad reverted to his role as

USCINCEUR and put the weapons into the custody of US Special Weapons

Units. These units were distributed so as to make nuclear weapons readily

available to the appropriate delivery force. When the need arose, and after

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authority to employ nuclear weapons had been granted, custodians would

release weapons to the delivery forces.31

By January 1957, US Thor and Jupiter IRBMs were entering the final testing

stage and were scheduled to go into production about ten months later. For the

past eigthteen months, the United States and the United Kingdom had been

exchanging technical information about these missiles to the extent permitted by

the Atomic Energy Act, as amended in 1954. Other considerations, too, made it

timely to consider emplacing IRBMs on British soil. The British were implementing their own version of the New Look, building more long-range bombers while

cutting back on their conventional commitments to NATO. The deployment of

IRBMs, especially if a certain measure of control was vested in British authorities,

might induce the British to spend less on nuclear and more on nonnuclear arms.

Early in January 1957, Assistant Secretary Gordon Gray informed Admiral Radford that forthcoming talks with British officials would present an opportunity to

open negotiations about IRBM deployments.32

Writing to Secretary Wilson on 24 January 1957, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended providing the British with four squadrons of Thor IRBMs "at the earliest

practicable date." Of course, they emhasized, US personnel must retain custody

and provide security for the warheads. They favored an agreement under which,

in the event of hostilities, warheads would be transferred and operational employment coordinated through arrangements similar to those covering the transfer of

weapons to, and their employment by, Royal Air Force (RAF) bombers.33

On 29 January, Secretary Wilson and Admiral Radford conferred with British

representatives. Stressing the need to disperse NATO's retaliatory capability,

Radford warned that dispersal measures in Britain would be inadequate without

IRBM deployments. The British were receptive towards IRBMs but refused to

consider reducing their bomber force until IRBMs were actually on hand. In

Bermuda, on 21 to 24 March, President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan agreed in principle that IRBMs would be stationed in the United Kingdom.34

The French also appeared interested in acquiring IRBMs. In July 1957, when

Admiral Radford attended a meeting of the Military Committee, his French

counterpart asked about the conditions under which France might obtain them.

On 24 September, the French Ambassador in Washington formally requested

talks leading to an arrangement like that with the British.35

By this time, in Washington, interdepartmental discussions had produced the

idea of a "NATO Common Stockpile," in which would be maintained (under US

control) all the nuclear warheads for NATO weapons. The French apparently

held a different conception, in which NATO would have at least a measure of

control over stockpiling and employment.

Responding on 18 October to a request from Assistant Secretary Sprague, the

Joint Chiefs of Staff dwelt at some length on the "dangerous implications" of the

term, "NATO Common Stockpile." They wanted to draft a document titled "Procedures for Providing US Atomic Weapons for the Common Defense of the

NATO Area," and submit it for approval by appropriate NATO agencies. Mr.

Sprague agreed but asked them to prepare a position paper for use at the NATO

Heads of Government and Ministerial Meeting in December. In an answer dated

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14 November, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended continuing the existing system by which nuclear weapons were made available to Allied Command Europe.

For the future, the United States might propose that delivery forces of other

allies, as well as the United Kingdom and nations for which Honest John deployments were planned, be made eligible to receive nuclear weapons.

The proposal that Secretary Dulles presented to the North Atlantic Council on

16 December followed JCS wishes rather than those of General Norstad and the

French. The United States, Dulles said, was prepared to participate in a stockpile

system within which "nuclear warheads would be deployed under United States

custody in accordance with NATO defensive planning and in agreement with the

nations directly concerned. In the event of hostilities, nuclear warheads would be

released to the appropriate Supreme Allied Commander for employment by

nuclear-capable NATO forces." The United States also was prepared to provide

IRBMs "for deployment in accordance with the plans of SACEUR," their deployment being "subject to agreement between SACEUR and the countries directly

concerned." Such matters as materiel and training would be handled by bilateral

agreements between each country and the United States. The IRBM warheads

would become "a part of the NATO atomic stockpile system."36

An agreement concluded with the British on 22 February 1958 specified that,

although the nuclear warheads for Thor IRBMs would remain "in full United

States ownership, custody and control in accordance with United States law," the

decision to launch would be "a matter for joint decision between the two governments." This language about joint decision repeated the wording of a US-UK

agreement dating from 1951. The French, by contrast, hoped to gain full control

over nuclear warheads. Meanwhile, negotiations about IRBM deployments had

begun with Italy; General Norstad hoped that progress in these talks would prod

the French into being more flexible. During the spring of 1958, however, an army

revolt in Algeria threw France into political chaos. Out of the turmoil emerged the

Fifth Republic with a new government headed by an outspoken critic of NATO,

General Charles de Gaulle. The IRBM discussions with France came to a halt.37

In October 1958, the United States and Italy reached agreement in principle to

deploy two Jupiter squadrons (thirty missiles). By then, with ICBM programs

making good progress, the Services began leaning toward IRBM cutbacks. On 31

October 1958, in fact, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that IRBM production be curtailed. General Norstad now proposed adding only one IRBM

squadron to Greece and one to Turkey beyond the two for Italy and four in the

United Kingdom. The Joint Chiefs of Staff favored even deeper cutbacks, leaving

only four in the United Kingdom, one for Turkey, one for an unspecified NATO

area, one for Okinawa, and one for Alaska. Negotiations with Italy went forward,

however, on the basis of two squadrons. Final arrangements were concluded in

March 1959; the first Jupiter complex became operational in March 1960. Meantime, four Thor squadrons (sixty missiles) became operational in the United

Kingdom between June 1959 and April 1960. Political problems and funding difficulties not only brought an end to discussions with Greece but also delayed

agreement with Turkey until October 1959. Sites for the Jupiter squadron in

Turkey only became operational between November 1961 and March 1962.38

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Origins of the Multilateral Force

Of course, IRBM deployments did not solve the issue of nuclear sharing.

Early in 1959, the NSC Planning Board began a review of basic national

security policy that is described in chapter 2. A draft circulated in June argued

that the United States should discourage:

(1) The development by additional nations of national nuclear weapons production

capabilities.

(2) The acquisition of national control over nuclear weapons components by nations

which do not now possess them.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, reversing their stand of previous years, claimed that

such an approach had proved sterile and tended to alienate our most reliable

allies. They now argued that "it should be US policy to exchange with, or provide to, additional selected allies scientific and technical information "

President Eisenhower accepted JCS arguments. According to NSC 5906/1,

approved on 5 August, the United States should enhance selected allies' capabilities by exchanging with them or providing to them information, materials, or

weapons. In anticipation of this step, the administration should give urgent consideration to developing NATO arrangements for the custody and control of

nuclear weapons.39

Just when US interest in Thor and Jupiter started to wane, NATO's interest in a

weapon with a range of 300 to 1,500 miles began to mount. The SACEUR wanted

to have a second generation of IRBMs operational by 1963. In November 1958, a

NATO working group discussed the possibility of adapting the Polaris submarinelaunched ballistic missile to intermediate-range purposes. Besides the technical

arguments in its favor, Polaris probably would be available no later than mid-1963.

Early in 1959, Deputy Secretary Quarles asked for a JCS assessment of the

problems posed by furnishing NATO Europe with second-generation IRBMs.

They replied, on 16 April, that a military requirement for such weapons did exist.

But they opposed any relaxation of US/SACEUR control over warheads: "So long

as the United States is the sole supplier of these weapons to the West, we should

retain absolute control over their use." Four months later, Secretary McElroy

raised these issues again. His queries, and the JCS responses dated 15 October,

are summarized below:

1. Did the Joint Chiefs of Staff favor changing US policy so as to permit allies to develop nationally-controlled nuclear forces? No. If an ally or friendly neutral seemed

capable of becoming a nuclear power, offer US-produced weapons under controls

to be determined. Every effort should be made to dissuade a nation from attaining a

nuclear capability outside the control of a regional defense organization.

2. Should the French nuclear program be provided with technical information and

assistance? Yes, but only in support of established NATO objectives.

3. Should the United States release weapons to allied ownership or custody in conditions short of war? Yes, in principle. Studies of how to carry out a liberalized policy

ought to be prepared.

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4. Which of two IRBM alternatives seemed preferable? First, furnish a limited number of Polaris missiles (with warheads remaining under US control), and then help

the allies produce either a version of Polaris designed to meet national as well as

NATO needs or a European IRBM. Second, explore the feasibility of meeting

SACEUR's needs by developing other missile characteristics and target dates. The

Joint Chiefs of Staff supported the first alternative.40

Meantime, in October 1959, General Norstad had recommended that NATO

military authorities establish a requirement for a medium-range ballistic missile

(MRBM) with characteristics similar to Polaris. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 8 January 1960, sent Secretary Gates a split opinion. General White recommended

rejecting SACEUR's requirement. He did not believe that, by 1963, any US

weapon system could be modified to meet all of General Norstad's needs. Further, past experience led him to conclude that the costs would tax US as well as

allied resources severely. These and other reasons led him to conclude that an

extended-range Pershing missile might serve the purpose.

Admiral Burke and General Lemnitzer, supported by the Chairman, did

endorse SACEUR's proposal. Such an endorsement, they noted, would simply

constitute step two in a lengthy nine-step NATO procedure. Thus the United

States would not, at that point, be committing itself to any subsequent actions.

Burke and Lemnitzer also thought it unlikely that a single system could meet all

the characteristics in SACEUR's requirement. Accordingly, they wanted to consider fulfilling the requirement with two separate missile systems. The administration did follow the JCS majority and approved SACEUR's requirement.41

Following a conference between Secretary Gates and the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

the Office of Defense Research and Engineering in OSD reviewed alternatives for

a mobile IRBM, available by 1963, with a range of 400-800 nautical miles.

Research and Engineering concluded that Polaris provided the "highest confidence" for any range up to 1,200 nautical miles; Pershing could meet a 400 nautical mile requirement with only "fair" confidence.

Secretary Gates, on 19 February 1960, told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the

time had come "to secure Defense and interagency agreement on a specific missile and a specific proposal to make to the NATO countries outlining the limits of

US assistance." He presented for their consideration a proposal that the United

States make available fifty complete Polaris missiles through grant aid, as well as

reimbursable parts and components for another thirty missiles to be assembled

in European factories.42

Answering ten days later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff supported giving $100 million of grant aid in order to provide fifty complete missiles as well as technical

and facilities assistance. Interestingly, they did not specify that Polaris should be

the only missile considered. They also endorsed SACEUR's revised requirement

for 300 MRBMs by 1965 and again recommended entering bilateral arrangements

for furnishing additional missiles to those nations that insisted upon having more

than a capability within NATO (i.e., France). By a memorandum dated 11 March,

they advocated a bilateral arrangement for providing the United Kingdom with

Polaris submarines and bomber-launched Skybolt air-to-ground missiles, if the

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British would help NATO deploy 300 MRBMs by 1965. When Prime Minister

Macmillan visited Washington during 27 to 31 March, President Eisenhower

promised to make available either Skybolts or Polaris missiles (minus warheads).

The British then canceled their own Blue Streak ballistic missile. France, meanwhile, had exploded its first nuclear device on 13 February I960.43

Shortly before Secretary Gates left for the Paris meeting of the NATO Defense

Ministers on 31 March, MRBM proposals were altered at the State Department's

insistence. The offer to provide fifty missiles as grant aid disappeared, as did any

mention of US approval of national missiles over and above national requirements. Late in April, just before President de Gaulle arrived in Washington for an

official visit, officers representing General Twining urged OSD officials to reargue

the issue with the State Department. Nonetheless, State continued to oppose

offering de Gaulle a bilateral MRBM agreement similar to the US-UK arrangement in exchange for France's participation in the NATO MRBM program. State

prevailed and no such offer was made.44

During the summer of 1960, State and Defense restudied the entire subject of

MRBM armament for NATO. On 1 August, Acting Secretary of Defense James H.

Douglas told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he considered the United States committed to supplying NATO with Polaris missiles, at least in limited numbers.

Still, he asked for an assessment of existing and proposed MRBMs in order to

avoid any repetition of the Thor/Jupiter duplication. The Army responded by

proposing an extended-range Pershing, the Navy a land-based Polaris, and the

Air Force a tactical ballistic missile. Rejecting all three, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on

29 September, recommended that a smaller, more flexible, land-based system of

"third generation" missiles adaptable to surface ships as well as hardened

ground sites be developed as soon as possible.

The National Security Council, in November 1959, had commissioned a StateDefense study of NATO's defense posture over the long term. As part of the

preparation for a report, an ad hoc working group drawn from State, Defense,

and the Atomic Energy Commission drafted a study of "Pros and Cons of

Nuclear Sharing with Allies." Should the President, it asked, be permitted to sell

or otherwise make nuclear weapons available to selected allies? State and AEC

saw no need for doing so and considered the disadvantages sufficient to recommend against any immediate action. Defense did see a need to give the President

enough flexibility to negotiate agreements.

On 9 September 1960, Assistant Secretary Irwin asked for JCS comments. Their

assessment, submitted two weeks later, labeled the State-Defense-AEC study inadequate because it addressed the overall problem rather than the specific issue of

NATO and France. The arguments purporting to present pros and cons, they

claimed, were actually weighted to support positions reached independently of

the arguments. Single sets of facts were "twisted to argue both ways." The working group had not considered JCS views.45

A lengthy report on NATO's "Tasks for the 1960's," responding to the NSC

directive, appeared late in August. This document, which treated the overall problem of nuclear sharing, had been drafted in the State Department under the direction of Mr. Robert R. Bowie. Once again, the Joint Chiefs of Staff found nothing to

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applaud. What they viewed as a desirable end—using bilateral arrangements to

help selected allies achieve a nuclear capability—the Bowie Report regarded as a

dubious means by which to reconcile European nationalisms, US nuclear preponderance, and the common defense. Instead, the Bowie group proposed an interim

force of twelve to fourteen US-manned Polaris submarines under SACEUR's control in peace and war. It would be succeeded by a permanent multinational force

manned, administered, owned, and financed multilaterally and, like the interim

force, controlled by SACEUR.46

Since their viewpoint differed so fundamentally from that of the Bowie

Report, the Joint Chiefs of Staff could not do otherwise than label the report

unacceptable, centering upon the questions of bilateral agreements and arrangements for the custody and employment of NATO-committed weapons.47

Regardless of the form in which the problem was presented, the Joint Chiefs

of Staff consistently had been unwilling to recommend a specific missile as the

answer to the MRBM conundrum. Nevertheless, by mid-September a definite

proposal to offer Polaris as the nucleus of a NATO deterrent had emerged from

State-Defense discussions. By the month's close, Assistant Secretary Irwin and

Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Foy D. Köhler had drafted a

proposal that, by the end of 1963, five Polaris submarines be committed to

SACEUR as an interim force. Allied governments would contribute approximately one hundred additional missiles to help meet MRBM requirements through

1964. For maximum security and survivability, these too should be seaborne

Polaris missiles. Furthermore, the United States would offer to facilitate creation

of a permanent multilateral force if other NATO governments, in conjunction

with SACEUR, developed a plan that was accepted by the North Atlantic Council

and met certain other conditions.

At a White House meeting early in October, President Eisenhower decided

that basic conditions for the permanent force should include mixed manning of

ships (to the extent considered operationally feasible by SACEUR) along with

multilateral ownership, financing, and control. However, if detailed examination

and negotiation revealed multilateral ownership to be infeasible, the United

States would not insist upon it.48

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 25 October, submitted advice that only served to

make a murky situation even more opaque. They agreed upon the importance of

permitting the United States to use its contribution to the NATO MRBM force for

national purposes, without obtaining specific approval from the North Atlantic

Council. They disagreed, though, about how the Irwin-Kohler proposal should

be revised to reflect their views and, specifically, what it should say about the

role of SACEUR.

Admiral Burke and General Decker argued that, in case of a Soviet nuclear

attack, employment of both the interim and the permanent forces should be

decided by SACEUR. For other contingencies, decisions ought to be taken in

accordance with existing procedures or any other procedure approved by the

North Atlantic Council. General White, conversely, recommended that the interim force be available for use "in accordance with procedures as approved by the

North Atlantic Council to meet specific military situations" and that the existing

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NATO Emphasizes Nuclear Capabilities

"prerogative of independent US action with any or all US forces... be zealously

retained." As for the permanent force, White proposed that MRBMs "be released

to and employed by national forces committed to NATO" under the same procedures that he had outlined for the interim force. In effect, he seemed to be saying,

the commitment of national forces to NATO roles would constitute the establishment of a multilateral force.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff claimed that President Eisenhower's decision could

be better expressed by omitting multilateral ownership and financing as basic

conditions for establishing the permanent force, specifying only that such ownership and financing should be further explored. General White wanted the reference to mixed manning dropped, but Admiral Burke and General Decker supported President Eisenhower's position that the permanent force have mixed

manning "to the extent considered operationally feasible by SACEUR." Lastly,

should seaborne Polaris be specified as the missile for the permanent force?

Admiral Burke answered yes; Generals Decker and White said no.49

Since the Joint Chiefs of Staff spoke with several voices, Secretary Gates chose

to rely upon a memorandum written in ISA. He held to his original view that

Polaris was the most practicable answer to the MRBM problem. As for operational control, he solved the problem of dealing with the interim force of five

Polaris submarines by not specifying any procedure, which in effect placed them

in the same category as all other national forces committed to NATO. Gates also

pared the basic conditions governing the permanent force to "multilateral control" alone, with multilateral ownership and financing left for later examination

and negotiation. Mixed manning, he concluded, should be adopted to the extent

considered operationally feasible by SACEUR.50

At the NATO Ministerial Meeting on 16 December, Secretary of State Herter

put forward an MRBM proposal that went well beyond JCS wishes. Presenting it

as a "concept for consideration," he described the force in terms that ignored

even the narrow area of agreement the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been able to

reach. The force, Secretary Herter said, would be "truly multilateral, with multilateral ownership, financing, and control, and would include mixed manning to

the extent considered operationally feasible by SACEUR." Herter skirted the

issue of how a decision to employ the force would be made, merely observing

that some suitable formula would have to be developed. The commitment of five

Polaris submarines with eigthy missiles as an interim force and the further sale of

approximately one hundred seaborne missiles, which Herter tabled as a firm

offer, substantially paralleled the KohlerTrwin proposal. And, with that, the matter had to be left for the next administration.

Nuclear sharing proved to be a Gordian knot that no one could sever. Political

considerations dominated the decisions taken to meet NATO's IRBM and MRBM

requirements. How far was the United States willing to go in sharing control over

nuclear warheads? The Joint Chiefs of Staff pressed, without success, for a bilateral arrangement to help France acquire a nuclear capability. Yet, where custody and

control were involved, they directed their attention mainly to procedures that

would not disrupt the status quo. They responded as though the exercise of control by the United States was immutably fixed and not a matter for discussion.

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JCS and National Policy

President de Gaulle obviously felt otherwise. When the Joint Chiefs of Staff could

not entirely avoid the control issue—as in their consideration of the Kohler-Irwin

proposal—they failed to reach agreement. Yet it would be unfair to single out the

Joint Chiefs of Staff for criticism. They were far from alone in having reservations

about mixed manning and multilateral control. Even though US officials were to

expend much effort during the early 1960s promoting a multilateral force, Europeans' hostility killed it. Ultimately, as the Joint Chiefs of Staff wished, US control

remained unshaken.

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8

Germany and Berlin

In Europe, the Cold War's onset dashed hopes of securing what Oliver

Cromwell called a "Peace without a worm in it." Temporary dispositions made

in 1945, pending the signing of a peace treaty with Germany, had hardened into

almost unshakable positions. Germany stopped being a piece to be fitted into the

postwar mosaic and became a valuable counter in the East-West contest. West

Germany, or the Federal Republic of Germany, became a member of NATO in

1955 and started to rearm. The Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted West Germany to

remain firmly wedded to the North Atlantic alliance. They saw no practicable

way, without endangering the military balance, either to reunify and neutralize

Germany or to establish a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe.

US Objectives Remain Unchanged

'urrent US policy toward Germany had been set forth in NSC 160/1, which

. dated from 1953. It defined US objectives as follows:

1. Ensure West Germany's firm association with the western community.

2. Provide for an effective contribution by that nation to the effective strength of the

West.

3. Bring about Germany's reunification on a basis that would, as a maximum, ensure

a united Germany's firm association with the western powers and, as a minimum,

pose no threat to US security.1

As 1956 ended, the NSC Operations Coordinating Board reported that many

of the courses of action listed in NSC 160/1 had been overtaken by events. Most

importantly, the creation of West German military forces was proceeding but

lagged well behind earlier expectations. At Lisbon, in 1952, the North Atlantic

Council had set goals that included twelve divisions and 1,158 aircraft. When

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JCS and National Policy

West Germany entered NATO in 1955, a goal of 270,000 men under arms had

been set for 1957. That objective now had been reduced to 125,000.2

On 31 January 1957, the NSC directed its Planning Board to consider a review

of policy toward Germany. The result was NSC 5727, circulated on 13 December.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended deletion of a paragraph calling for development of alternative methods to bring about the reunification of Germany.

Alternatives should be considered, they said, only if the administration became

convinced that its original goal of reunifying Germany through free elections

could not be attained. The Planning Board circulated a new draft in January 1958

which contained minor revisions to reflect December deliberations by the NATO

heads of government. The JCS recommendation above had been overruled.

Nonetheless, the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed the new draft. On 7 February

1958, President Eisenhower approved it as NSC 5803.3

The statement of policy in NSC 5803 aimed at encouraging a greater West

German contribution to the political, economic, and military strength of the West.

Specifically, US objectives included:

1. Seeking an adequate West German financial contribution to support allied forces in

the Federal Republic, at least until that country assumed full responsibility for

achieving its NATO force goals.

2. Continuing to press for reunification through free, all-German elections, under

conditions that would take into account the legitimate security interests of all

countries concerned, making clear that reunification was essential to any genuine

relaxation of East-West tension. The United States would not agree, however, to

any reunification involving:

a. Communist domination of a reunified Germany.

b. A federal Germany that would perpetuate the existing Communist

government of East Germany.

c. The withdrawal of US and other allied forces from West Germany without an

effective military quid pro quo from the Soviet Union and its satellites.

d. The political or military neutralization of Germany.

Although the time was not propitious for advancing new US proposals on

reunification, policymakers should give continuing attention to developing alternatives for a long-run solution.4

By the fall of 1957, the West German armed forces, or "Bundeswehr" had grown

to 140,000 personnel. Seven army divisions had been placed under NATO command, albeit at less than full strength, and two more would be activated in the fall

of 1958. The West German Government planned to have twelve divisions, forty air

squadrons, and a small naval arm in operational status by 1961. The Bundeswehr

then would total 350,000 men, well under the 1955 goal of 518,00 by the end of

1959.5East Germany, meanwhile, was creating a considerably smaller force.

Rearmament, of course, further dimmed the already remote prospects for unification and neutralization. The US policy, NSC 5524/1, had been established at

the time of the 1955 Geneva summit conference and remained in effect throughout the Eisenhower years. It defined the long-range US objectives in Europe as

bringing about the retraction of Soviet power from Central and Eastern Europe,

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Germany and Berlin

keeping a united Germany in NATO, and establishing arrangements to ensure

lasting security in Europe. The United States would not accept a regional security

arrangement that expressed or implied acceptance of permanent Soviet domination over Eastern Europe, compromised NATO's effectiveness, or prevented the

establishment of a free, united Germany.

In the meantime, according to NSC 5524/1, the administration would seek the

continued strengthening of NATO and other Western defenses, especially by providing for a West German contribution as well as a continuing US presence in

Europe. NSC 5524/1 included the essence of the "Eden Plan," presented to the

USSR during the Berlin foreign ministers' conference of October 1955. The Eden

Plan, which took its name from the British Prime Minister, encompassed a complete scheme for reunifying Germany and assuring European security by interlocking stages. It had three elements: reunification through free elections; concluding a treaty of assurance among Germany, the United States, the USSR, the

United Kingdom, Poland, and Czechoslovakia; and limiting and controlling

armaments along both sides of Germany's eastern frontier, with mutual radar

inspection. The Eden Plan continued to represent the basic Western position

throughout the 1950s.6

When 1956 ended, neither NATO nor the Warsaw Pact seemed in sound

condition. The USSR had faced what it called "deviation" in Poland and had

intervened to suppress an anticommunist revolt in Hungary. During the Suez crisis, the United States sharply condemned actions taken by France and Great

Britain. Possibly attempting to capitalize upon Western disunity Soviet Premier

Nikolai Bulganin, on 17 November, proposed a mutual reduction of forces, a ban

on nuclear weapons, reductions in and eventual elimination of foreign forces in

Europe, some inspection measures, and a nonaggression pact between the two

blocs. The Soviets wanted these proposals discussed before the UN Disarmament

Subcommittee. The Western powers refused, on grounds that they were ready to

discuss disengagement and other European security arrangements only in connection with German reunification. A UN subcommittee did not strike them as

the proper forum for such talks.7

Concurrently, on 16 November, Admiral Burke urged his JCS colleagues to

consider endorsing a British proposal to create, in connection with Germany's

reunification, zones where armaments would be either reduced or eliminated. The

Joint Chiefs of Staff referred this proposal to the Joint Strategic Survey Committee.

The JSSC acknowledged that either creating a demilitarized zone or neutralizing

some satellites while maintaining NATO's integrity would be militarily advantageous to the United States, but the problem of German unification remained, and

the US Government should not retreat from its position that unification "in freedom" must precede any agreement to change allied military deployments. The

JSSC concluded and, on 12 December, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed not to pursue Admiral Burke's suggestion. It was unrealistic, the committee suggested, to

suppose that the Soviets would consider such a plan without calling for the relocation or withdrawal of US forces based in Europe. Just recently, in fact, the Soviet

Ambassador to the United Nations had said that the USSR would remove its

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JCS and National Policy

troops from Warsaw Pact countries "as soon as you withdraw your troops from

Western Germany as soon as you liquidate your bases on foreign territory."8

On 24 January 1957, Admiral Radford asked the JSSC to renew its study of

European security arrangements. He had concurred in the JCS decision above

but now observed that proposals of this sort seemed to have popular appeal. He

anticipated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff soon might be required to express their

views on such matters, since the State Department was considering a French suggestion to establish a Four Power Working Group on European security. Admiral

Radford felt that, in formulating US policy, the great strides made in weapons

technology should be taken into account. The advent of tactical nuclear weapons,

he argued, soon would permit reductions of US forces deployed to Europe. This

was an echo of his 1956 proposal to make drastic cuts in conventional ground

and tactical air units. Radford requested the Joint Strategic Survey Committee to

submit their views on European security arrangements, "in light of the currently

approved Strategic Concept."9

The JSSC, replying on 14 March, concluded that:

1. For at least the next fiscal year, the state of weapons development would notjustify

changing the US force commitments to NATO. In succeeding years, though,

progressive reductions might be warranted.

2. Attainment of NATO's current force goals, including greater nuclear capability for

Allied Command Europe, lay at least several years in the future. Moreover, there

was no basis for assuming that, either during the buildup or when NATO units

became fully armed with nuclear weapons, relative capabilities vis-ä-vis the USSR

would have improved enough to permit force reductions. Furthermore, said the

JSSC, continuous modernization was an agreed and valid objective in itself,

required by the strategic concept. It should not be used as a basis for proposing

reductions during negotiations about European security.

3. In view of known Soviet objectives, NATO must maintain solidarity in strength

and avoid any negotiations with the USSR likely to weaken or dissolve the

alliance. Under current circumstances, the JSSC believed, any proposals for significant reductions to US forces in NATO would risk the alliance's collapse.

4. Disarmament talks should be confined to the UN framework and not be permitted

to obscure negotiations about basic European issues. Unless there were compensatory, adequate, and worldwide safeguards, disarmament in Europe alone could

weaken the West. The administration and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had opposed

regional arrangements and should continue to do so.

5. Finally, if the United States found itself drawn into negotiations during the immediate future, NSC 5524/1 provided appropriate guidance.

The European situation as well as recent indications of a hardened Soviet attitude prevented any relaxation of the Western position, the JSSC added. It recommended, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 27 March approved, continuing to use

NSC 5524/1 as the basis of their position.10

A Four Power Working Group on German reunification and European security did meet in Washington from 6 to 15 March. In its report, the US, UK, French,

and West German Governments recommended that the basic Western position be

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Germany and Berlin

maintained but that efforts be intensified to promote a better public understanding of it. To this end, the Working Group suggested clarifying and amplifying a

proposal made at the 1955 Geneva summit meeting that had alluded to a demilitarized zone through phrasing that referred to "special measures" near the

border. The Working Group saw some political advantage in putting forward a

precise proposal for the possibility of a reunified Germany joining NATO. That

could entail either complete demilitarization of East Germany or special arrangements governing the disposition of any military forces and installations. The

Working Group saw little likelihood, in the near future, either that the Soviets

would be receptive to new Western suggestions or that the USSR would put forward satisfactory proposals of its own. Assistant Secretary Sprague informed the

Joint Chiefs of Staff that no military studies need be prepared at this point, since

the Working Group had not recommended departures from military positions

established for the 1955 Geneva conference.11

With West German elections approaching, however, US and UK leaders decided

that a more positive approach was needed. Accordingly, the four powers decided

that the Working Group would reconvene in May. Since this would involve reexamining the military aspects of policies established in 1955, Assistant Secretary

Sprague now asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to reappraise them, taking account of

technological advances, military reorganization, and tactical innovations.12

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 26 April, forwarded to Secretary Wilson the position they had established one month earlier. This, in turn, became Defense's position. When the Four Power Working Group met on 13 May, it drafted a presentation of the Geneva proposals, which was published on 29 July 1957 as the Berlin

Declaration.13 This was not the more positive approach envisaged by US and UK

leaders back in April but simply a restatement and clarification of an existing

position. That, of course, was exactly what the Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted.

Reacting to the Rapacki Plan

Anew proposal did appear from the other side of the "Iron Curtain." Speaking before the UN General Assembly on 2 October 1957, Poland's Foreign

Minister, Adam Rapacki, called for the creation of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe. Premier Bulganin repeated the offer, coupled with calls for another

summit conference as well as negotiations about disarmament and European

security, through a letter to President Eisenhower dated 10 December. On 14 February 1958, Foreign Minister Rapacki formally presented the US Government

with the details of his plan. Within Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and

West Germany, the manufacture and stockpiling of nuclear weapons would be

prohibited, as would the emplacement and installation of equipment designed

for their servicing. The countries in the zone, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the USSR, and other countries with forces in the area would undertake not to allow any nuclear weapons or equipment (including launchers) in the

zone. The United States and the USSR, as well as any other nuclear powers,

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JCS and National Policy

would pledge not to use nuclear weapons against any territory within the zone.

To ensure implementation of these obligations, the states concerned would create

a system of broad and effective control within the zone.14

Already, in January, the State Department had circulated a preliminary assessment that the Rapacki Plan posed unacceptable security risks for the West. It

would freeze the division of Germany and offered no prospect of progress in settling European problems. By excluding nuclear weapons from Germany, it would

invalidate the NATO strategy adopted in 1954. Nevertheless, the State Department urged that NATO as well as the Defense Department study this proposal

because of the public attention it was receiving. On 24 February, Under Secretary

of State Herter asked for the Department of Defense's views on the plan's military aspects, particularly the inspection requirements.15

Assistant Secretary Sprague referred this request to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Their reply, dated 11 March, opposed a formal exchange with the Polish Government over military details of the inspection scheme, mainly on security grounds

but also because focusing on this aspect might enable the Poles to enhance the

apparent worth of their plan before world opinion. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs

of Staff concentrated upon the Rapacki Plan's broader implications. They found

in it decided military disadvantages for the West. Broadly put, Allied Command

Europe would lose its nuclear superiority but the Warsaw Pact would maintain

its conventional advantage. The result could be the erosion and eventual collapse

of Western Europe's military strength as well as the concept of collective defense

under NATO.

The US Government, they continued, should emphasize to any NATO allies

who might be attracted by the Rapacki Plan that it would:

1. Reduce the effectiveness of West Germany's contribution to the defense of Western

Europe.

2. Increase the hazard of a Soviet surprise attack, through acceptance of an inadequate inspection system.

3. Require retreat from NATO's forward strategy, which depended upon nuclear

weapons.

4. Create a situation that could lead to further Western concession under the duress

of Soviet nuclear blackmail.

As for the denuclearized zone that constituted the Rapacki Plan's central

feature, the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed themselves forcefully:

It is naive to assume that if general war were initiated, the parties would continue to

abide by an agreement not to fire nuclear weapons against the territory of the zone or

against any targets situated in the zone This commitment would be honored only

as long as it was in the military interest of both sides. For example, if the zone were

overrun by enemy ground forces in support of a ground offensive against France,

Belgium, and Denmark, the Western allies, in continuing to abide by this agreement

would be affording the enemy a nuclear-free safe-haven from which to launch an

overwhelming ground attack which might be successful with conventional weapons

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Germany and Berlin

alone, particularly if supported by IRBM nuclear attacks launched from Hungary and

the Western part of the USSR and aircraft overflying the zone.

Obviously, therefore, the plan struck them as unacceptable. On 20 March,

Deputy Secretary Quarles forwarded JCS views to Secretary Dulles, adding his

own opinion that the JCS memorandum plus the Department of State's earlier

appraisal constituted an adequate basis for rejecting the Rapacki Plan.16

On 3 May, the United States formally rejected the Rapacki Plan, declaring it

too limited in scope either to reduce the danger of nuclear war or to provide a

dependable basis for European security. It neither dealt with the essential question of nuclear weapons production nor took account of current inadequacies in

detecting nuclear weapons. Since main launching sites remained unaffected, the

plan depended upon the good intentions of powers outside the denuclearized

zone. Finally, accepting Germany's division would perpetuate the basic cause of

tension in Europe.17

Preparations were being made, however, for the negotiations proposed by

Premier Bulganin back in December. On 11 February 1958, Secretary Dulles had

cautioned Secretary McElroy that the United States should be prepared to discuss

specific proposals on reunification and European security, in order to formulate a

"persuasive" Western position that would capture the support of German and

world opinion. He asked the Defense Department to study arms and force limitation arrangements for Central Europe, assuming a reunified Germany either

remained in NATO or withdrew from it.18

Through a memorandum to Secretary McElroy dated 27 March, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff stated their belief that any tampering with allied deployments in

Germany, such as total or partial withdrawal, establishment of demilitarized

zones, or limitations upon forces and armaments, would require major concessions by the Soviets. Such concessions were necessary to compensate for the risks

incurred by such adjustments: maldeployment, retreat from a forward strategy,

the weakening of NATO, and de-emphasis on collective security arrangements in

general. In fact, regional restriction of armaments involved even more risks than

clearcut relocation. This impressed them as being especially true for arrangements to restrict the use of nuclear weapons, such as the Rapacki Plan. Therefore,

the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that:

1. The United States could accept withdrawal of all foreign forces from reunified

Germany, either in or out of NATO, provided that:

a. Allied forces in West Germany could be relocated in areas contiguous to Germany;

b. Soviet forces in Germany were repositioned behind the borders of the USSR;

c. Germany was allowed a compensatory military buildup;

d. The agreement could be adequately enforced.

2. Withdrawal or disengagement from a divided Germany posed unacceptable

military risks, as would the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe.

In sum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff saw no reason to modify the policies set forth

in NSC 5524/1.19

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JCS and National Policy

Secretary McElroy informed Secretary Dulles that, with one exception, he supported JCS views. While the United States should explore the possibilities of

redeployment with its NATO allies, Secretary McElroy believed that relocating a

substantial number of US forces to contiguous areas would create such political,

financial, and military difficulties that US troops probably would have to be

withdrawn from the continent altogether. This, said the Secretary, accentuated

the need to assure Germany's right to raise and maintain adequate forces. McElroy also felt that the United States must continue linking European security

arrangements with German reunification. NATO's conventional "shield" forces,

as the Joint Chiefs of Staff had pointed out, could not by themselves defend Western Europe. Consequently, creating a nuclear-free zone, thinning out US and

allied forces, or withdrawing them from a divided Germany would leave an

inadequate military structure as long as the political problems that originally

justified the buildup remained unresolved.20

Focusing on Prevention of Surprise Attack

Instead of a summit conference, the USSR, on 27 November 1958, demanded

that negotiations start within six months to terminate the four-power occupation regime in Berlin and establish West Berlin as a separate, demilitarized free

city. Failing such negotiations, the Soviets would transfer all their Berlin occupation rights to the East German Government. The next section describes US and

allied reactions. Briefly, they denounced the proposed Soviet moves as illegal and

insisted that Berlin negotiations occur within a wider framework of German and

European security.

The USSR, on 10 January 1959, declined to link the Berlin problem with either

German reunification or European security. The Soviets did, however, renew

their long-standing proposal to conclude an all-German peace treaty and settle

the Berlin matter within that framework. That opened up a wider area for diplomatic maneuvering, and the Western powers started drafting counterproposals.21

By 6 March, an interdepartmental group chaired by a State Department

official, and including JCS and OSD representatives, had developed a paper on

the entire complex of problems concerning Germany. Their purpose was to provide guidance for the Four Power Working Group on German reunification and

European security, scheduled to reconvene in Paris on 9 March. The paper proposed a draft treaty or a statement of the principles that would govern one and a

comprehensive plan covering reunification, European security, and Berlin, which

would be put into effect by stages. The plan contained provisions for a Special

Security Area consisting of Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and possibly Hungary, with arms restrictions and an inspection system similar to those of the

Rapacki Plan. No chemical and bacteriological weapons or nuclear warheads

would be produced or stationed in the Special Security Area. There also would

be restrictions on the emplacement of missiles and ceilings on the number of

foreign and indigenous troops allowed in the area. An inspection system,

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Germany and Berlin

established to reduce the danger of surprise attack, subsequently would expand

to cover proportionate areas of the United States and the USSR. Stage I of the

plan provided for the unification of East and West Berlin, through free elections

held under UN auspices. Simultaneously, another UN-supervised plebiscite

would determine which foreign troops, if any, would remain in the city.22

On that same day, 6 March, Deputy Secretary Quarles sent the State Department a preliminary assessment registering emphatic disagreement with provisions governing the Special Security Area and objecting that the area itself was

the one defined in the Rapacki Plan. He listed the same four risks that the Joint

Chiefs of Staff had listed in their memorandum of 11 March 1958 (see p. 118). Mr.

Quarles also worried that there would be demands to expand the area and establish similar zones elsewhere in the world. He believed, too, that discussing such

proposals in isolation from the general problem of surprise attack and disarmament ran contrary to national policy.23

On 10 March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff formally recorded their full agreement

with Secretary Quarles' view of the serious risks incurred by a Special Security

Area. Their comments almost exactly paralleled those they had made one year

earlier about the Rapacki Plan. They even opposed involving the United Nations

over Berlin, noting that to hold a plebiscite on the status of forces would be to

vacate the Western allies' legal right to remain there. Since reunification appeared

unobtainable in the near future, they recommended concentrating upon the

immediate problem of maintaining access to West Berlin. The Western allies

should seek permanent control over transportation and communications between

West Germany and West Berlin in exchange for the following commitments:

1. Reaffirm the US intention to use military force only to defend its vital interests

against aggression.

2. Acknowledge the East German regime as a de facto provisional government,

pending reunification.

3. Support arrangements to permit free trade between East and West Germany.

The Office of International Security Affairs informed State that "the emphasis

placed upon the Berlin problem by the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be reflected in

US efforts to develop proposals for negotiation with the USSR."24

Before the month was out, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had further occasion to

appraise the US position. They did so in preparation for a conference of Western

foreign ministers. Since the plan for a Special Security Area had not changed substantially during the interim, the Joint Chiefs of Staff took this opportunity to

criticize the European security proposals in more detail than before. They

opposed missile restrictions as well as a prohibition upon the production of

chemical, bacteriological, and nuclear weapons as impractical because adequate

inspection was technically infeasible. The Special Security Area, they also

believed, was too small to allow effective protection against surprise attack by

aircraft and missiles. Any inspection system developed for the area should deal

solely with verification that agreed commitments were being implemented rather

than as increased protection against surprise attack. Finally, if any disarmament

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measures at all were to be included, then the entire proposal of 29 August 1957

(described in chapter 5) should be included. This point flowed from the JCS

belief that regional arrangements were useless as long as the USSR maintained

enormous military power within its own borders.25

The State Department decided that only some elements of the 29 August 1957

proposal were applicable to German reunification and European security. In particular, a provision tying force cutbacks to general arms reduction was added to

the plan. Through a letter to his counterpart in ISA, Assistant Secretary of State

Livingston Merchant defended the Special Security Area proposal. While Soviet

agreement seemed improbable, "reasonable proposals which would not be disadvantageous if accepted" must be presented for psychological and propaganda

reasons. For this purpose, Merchant continued, the most appropriate security

measures seemed to be those involving inspection and observation for protection

against surprise attack. In formulating the plan, he said, the prime consideration

had not been what proposals were most valuable but which ones would be

"new" and posed no danger to US security. He asked the Defense Department to

estimate, under several conditions, appropriate ceilings in the Special Security

Area for the forces of a reunified Germany and for non-German forces.26

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 10 April, criticized such proposals as being too

detailed and complex, if they were to be presented for psychological and propaganda reasons alone. The departure from established US policy would be detected and, because it would be taken as an indication of weakness, handicap the

United States in future negotiations. They restated their belief that the proposals

were framed in too narrow a context and might harm global US interests. Again,

they rejected the idea that an inspection system in Europe could help prevent

surprise attack. The Joint Chiefs of Staff deemed it premature and unwise to propose specific force ceilings within the Special Security Area. Since the Soviet

threat to NATO remained the same, NATO's current force goals for West Germany represented reasonable ceilings in the Special Security Area for a reunified

Germany and for non-German NATO forces, under the conditions stated.27

The Western foreign ministers, meeting in Paris during 29 to 30 April, established final negotiating positions on German reunification, European security,

and Berlin. Afterwards the JCS representative, Rear Admiral Paul L. Dudley,

characterized these positions as "satisfactory from a military point of view." West

Germany opposed defining the Special Security Area as "Germany, Poland,

Czechoslovakia, and possibly Hungary" as discriminating against Germany and

following the Rapacki Plan too closely. The foreign ministers substituted "a zone

comprising areas of comparable size and importance on either side of a line to be

determined." The provision for an inspection zone against surprise attack was

watered down to a general statement that such measures "could be undertaken

in such geographical areas throughout the world" as might be agreed upon by

the states concerned. Instead of specific ceilings for indigenous forces, the Western powers would talk about ceilings for a unified Germany similar to the limitations upon West Germany prescribed by the Paris Accord of 23 October 1954.

Since the French opposed specific proposals for global numerical ceilings, these

too were treated in broad terms. The foreign ministers also rejected proposals,

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Germany and Berlin

opposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to prohibit the stationing of IRBMs in Central Europe and to conduct a plebiscite in Berlin.28

Thus, in essence, the Western powers stood by the Eden Plan. Unlike the Eden

Plan, though, they set up a four-stage schedule for accomplishing objectives,

linked with a general reduction of armaments. The new plan still envisaged

reunification through free elections, which the Soviets were known to oppose. It

also retained another feature known to be particularly objectionable to the USSR:

a united Germany could join NATO, although the Soviets would be offered additional security guarantees.

At Geneva, in May 1959, the Western foreign ministers presented these proposals to their Soviet counterpart, Andrei Gromyko. It soon became clear that

Gromyko would have nothing to do with them, so Western spokesmen had little

choice but to discuss the Berlin issue by itself. Gromyko called upon the Western

powers to reduce their garrisons in West Berlin, which numbered around 11,000,

to "symbolic" contingents. On 16 June, they replied with an "interim" offer not to

increase their forces in West Berlin, not to arm them with nuclear weapons (which

they had no intention of doing anyway), and not to countenance subversive activities against East Berlin and East Germany if the USSR gave a corresponding

pledge. No agreement proved possible and the meeting recessed for a month.

When the conference resumed in July, Foreign Minister Gromyko chose to link

the Berlin question with that of an all-German committee to prepare for a peace

treaty. The Western powers then found themselves in the position of having to

argue for an agreement about Berlin alone. "We have reached a point," the

French Foreign Minister observed, "where neither side knows what the other is

talking about." The foreign ministers' conference adjourned on 5 August with

nothing accomplished.29

Late in 1959, as the Berlin confrontation eased, preparations for a summit conference began in earnest. Among the materials that received extensive study was

a proposal for a European inspection zone to prevent surprise ground attack.

General Lauris Norstad, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, had made this

suggestion in March 1958. Essentially, a zone in Central Europe would be policed

by joint air and ground inspection teams as well as overlapping radar, coupled

with a freeze on nonindigenous forces at current levels.

General Norstad, in April 1960, submitted a revised and expanded version of

his plan. Past proposals, he pointed out, had contained features that made them

militarily unacceptable to the West. The Eden Plan, for instance, envisaged a

demilitarized zone too narrow for practical value in the fast-moving situations of

modern war. The Rapacki Plan would have deprived NATO of its nuclear shield

while leaving the USSR's massive conventional forces within striking distance of

Western Europe. Instead, Norstad argued, a zonal plan must not change basic

power relationships and must confine itself to very limited aims. He outlined a

system of mobile ground inspection covering as large an area as possible

between the Atlantic and the Urals, but as an "irreducible minimum the two Germanies, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Benelux, and at least part of Denmark, or the

equivalent." Aerial inspection would cover an area at least as great. In sum,

Norstad believed this plan might fill a need "for the West to have in reserve the

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possibility of a fresh proposal if we are to emerge from another round of negotiations with the Soviets with unimpaired NATO unity."30

On 27 April, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary Gates what seemed like a

qualified approval of the Norstad plan. Against the advantage of eliminating the

threat of a surprise ground attack lay a larger consideration that "the threat to

NATO is posed by the entire military strength of the USSR and not by any single

component thereof." The intelligence gain, of course, would depend upon the

zone's size. If it stretched from the Atlantic to the Urals, valuable target intelligence would be gleaned. If the minimum zone was adopted, however, the great

majority of strategic targets in the USSR would not be exposed.31

The following day, though, Assistant Secretary Irwin recorded his impression

that the JCS reply had been shaped by a desire to avoid throwing roadblocks in

the way of a political decision to proceed with the Norstad plan. He had been

told informally that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would support a Defense position

that the risks involved in presenting this plan at the summit conference outweighed any advantages.32

As chapter 5 relates, the Paris summit meeting of May 1960 abruptly ended in

failure, even before detailed proposals could be tabled. The next month, the United States tabled a general provision for a European inspection zone at the Ten

Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva. By then, however, the Soviets had

walked out of that conference too. The remainder of 1960 passed without further

talks on European security.

By the end of 1960, West Germany had become fully integrated into NATO's

political, economic, and military fabric. The Bundeswehr, nearing its goal of

twelve divisions, soon would represent the largest European contingent in

NATO.33 Of course, the problems of German reunification and European security

were no nearer solution in 1960 than they had been in 1957. The Soviet Union

could not agree to reunification through free elections because this almost certainly would result in a Germany committed to the West. Similarly, the Western

powers could not agree to European security measures that would prevent establishment of a free, united Germany, imply acceptance of Soviet domination over

the satellites, or compromise NATO's effectiveness.

Neither superpower judged the steps required to achieve German reunification to be compatible with its own security. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in their recommendations, explicitly recognized this fact. To them, the most important goal

in Europe was building a strong NATO. The necessary corollary to this lay in creating a strong West German force committed to defending Western Europe. Thus,

in their judgment, measures for disengagement, for regional disarmament or

denuclearization, and for inspection zones in Central Europe were digressions

from the central concern and usually inimical to US security interests. When

negotiations failed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not displeased.

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Germany and Berlin

Challenge over Berlin

When World War II ended, the United States, the USSR, the United Kingdom, and France divided Berlin as well as Germany into four separate

occupation zones. But Berlin lay 110 miles within what became the Soviet satellite state of East Germany. In 1945, the four occupying powers had concluded

written agreements about a system of air traffic control, including three air corridors linking Berlin with the Western zones of Germany. Only a verbal understanding, however, allowed the Western powers to use a major highway and a

rail line. In June 1948, the USSR blockaded all ground access to West Berlin. The

Western powers responded with an airlift that kept their sectors supplied with

the necessities of life. The Soviets, in May 1949, ended their blockade and relative

calm enveloped Berlin. Berlin now had two separate governments, with a communist regime in East Berlin and a noncommunist one in the three sectors that

comprised West Berlin.

The vulnerability of West Berlin compelled US policymakers to keep contingency plans under continuous scrutiny. Abandoning the city, successive US

administrations were convinced, would deal a devastating blow to Western unity.

NSC 5404/1, approved by the National Security Council in January 1954, declared

that if the USSR restricted access it would be "of crucial importance to demonstrate at once the firm intent of the United States not to tolerate such action." If the

Soviets persisted in threatening access, the United States and its allies should take

immediate and forceful countermeasures, even though they risked general war.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff heartily endorsed this statement of purpose.34

These broad policies were translated into specific military plans by USEUCOM

Plans (Berlin) 10-55 and 12-55, dated 6 July and 17 November 1955, respectively.

In case of blockade or serious restrictions upon access, USCINCEUR outlined in

the 10-55 Plan two courses of action. While the force employed to ascertain Soviet

intentions would not exceed one reinforced platoon, the size of forces needed to

reopen access could not be determined in advance. The plan, however, would not

provide for a progressive commitment. If the initial US thrust met determined

Soviet opposition, no additional forces would be sent into action. They would be

reserved, instead, for the general war that probably would follow.

Plan 12-55, the air counterpart of Plan 10-55, outlined a strictly limited objective of preventing the depletion of supplies built up in West Berlin since the

1948-1949 blockade. An all-out airlift, it was felt, would be essentially defensive

and thereby leave the Western powers open to recurring Soviet pressure. Also,

the Soviets now possessed electronic devices to harass airlift radio and radar,

thus rendering alt-weather flying difficult and costly. On 8 May 1956, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff approved both Plans 10-55 and 12-55. Subsequently, they accepted a change in Plan 10-55 deleting armed action by rail as well as by road,

because trains could be rerouted or blocked very easily.35

Between 1949 and 1957, the Soviets occasionally resorted to minor pinpricks

about access rights but did nothing that caused real alarm. When the administration reviewed US policy toward Germany at the end of 1957, it decided that the

portion regarding Berlin in NSC 5404/1 remained valid and needed no change.

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JCS and National Polio/

Accordingly, that portion was incorporated into the new paper on Germany, NSC

5803, as Supplement I.36

The comparative quiet enveloping Berlin vanished on 27 November 1958,

when the USSR informed the Western powers of its intention to alter the city's

basic status. Wartime arrangements had lost their validity, Moscow maintained.

In their place, a demilitarized West Berlin would become "an independent political unit—a free city without any state, including both existing German states,

interfering in its political life." If such a solution had not been negotiated by 27

May 1959, the USSR would transfer to the East German Government all the occupation and access functions that it had been performing since 1945.37

On 14 December 1958, the Foreign Ministers of France, West Germany, and

the United Kingdom joined Secretary Dulles in issuing an unqualified rejection of

the Soviet proposals. Two days later, the full North Atlantic Council declared that

no member state could approve a solution that jeopardized the three powers'

right to remain in Berlin as long as their responsibilities so required, or any solution that did not assure free access to the city, or one that failed to resolve the

German question as a whole. On 31 December, the US Government declared its

willingness to discuss, "in an atmosphere free of coercion or threats,... the question of Berlin in the wider framework of negotiations for a solution of the German problem as well as that of European security."38

Combined military planning proved much more difficult to carry out. The

Defense Department, with JCS concurrence, proposed on 9 December that the

United States, the United Kingdom, and France revise their contingency plans

immediately to "eliminate all dealing" with East German rail and highway control officials. Two days later, US officials proposed to the British and French that

certain actions be taken jointly if East Germany assumed control over access to

Berlin. But neither ally would agree to the portion of the proposal calling for military force to reopen surface access before resorting to an airlift had been considered.39

At a meeting of US, UK, and French representatives on 5 January 1959, allied

spokesmen asked to see a statement of the preparations needed to prove determination "on a large scale" to foes and friends alike. Eight days later, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary McElroy a list of preparations they deemed necessary to demonstrate allied firmness. Both the Soviet Union and US allies, they

emphasized, "must be convinced of our willingness to use whatever degree of

force may be necessary to accomplish this objective." To achieve that objective,

the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted an extensive list of preparatory measures,

which would start with small steps in January and move to some degree of mobilization late in March. Soon after the 27 May deadline passed, a small motor convoy would move along the autobahn to Berlin. If the convoy was stopped or cut

off, an allied force not exceeding one reinforced division would go to its rescue.

Should that effort also meet strong resistance, the imminence of general war

must be recognized.40

The Secretary of Defense promptly forwarded this memorandum to Secretary

Dulles. Mr. McElroy said that he recognized, as did the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that a

good many measures could not be carried out at the times proposed "for

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political, budgetary, or other reasons." Nonetheless, he and they believed that a

firm political decision should precede detailed military planning. That decision

should embody the following principles: First, a stoppage of surface access

would be met by necessary military action on the ground, not by the "evasion" of

an airlift. Second, a challenge would be met wherever it occurred—in the air, on

the ground, or both. Third, initial actions would be followed by an increasing use

of force, accepting the risk of general war.41

On 29 January, President Eisenhower reviewed Berlin planning with State and

Defense officials. Secretary Dulles challenged the JCS proposal promptly to commit a division, on grounds that allied opinion could not be sufficiently mobilized

by 27 May to permit the immediate use of so large a force. He argued, and Secretary McElroy agreed, that time should elapse between the first probe and the use

of appreciable force. The Chief Executive also commented that one division was

either too much or too little. General Twining made a forceful reply: "The Joint

Chiefs of Staff fear that the United States will go half way and then quit. They

feel that if we do not carry through with our resolution to risk general war we

might as well get out of Europe." President Eisenhower pointed out that allied

support was essential, and Dulles' approach was designed to ensure it. Even

Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, he added, might not go along with a "Berlin or

bust" action. Eisenhower said that US policy must compel the Soviets to use

force, rather than merely throw up obstructions," after which we are in a position

to issue an ultimatum prior to initiation of general war."42

A low-key approach to the Berlin situation, approved by President Eisenhower on 30 January, provided for taking quiet preparatory measures that Soviet

intelligence would detect but that would not cause public alarm. If access routes

were obstructed and more open measures of readiness failed to make the Soviets

draw back, the three powers then should decide whether to apply greater pressure by employing additional forces. General Twining, on 2 February, gave Secretary McElroy and General Norstad a list of possible military actions. The low-key

approach was presented to the British and French Governments on 18 February

as a basis for further planning.43

During a JCS meeting on 4 March, it was agreed that each Service Chief

would submit a list of actions that would improve readiness for general war.

Since they all made submissions the next day, Service Staffs obviously had been

spending a good deal of time on the matter. Some of their most significant recommendations are listed below:

Army: On 27 March, alert ready reserve divisions for active duty and begin sending

10,000 replacements to US Army, Europe. On 17 April, issue a presidential proclamation and call one million men to active duty, effective 17 May.

Navy: By 15 April, place thirty destroyers from the reserve fleet in full operational

readiness. Early in May, establish an antisubmarine barrier between Greenland,

Iceland, and the United Kingdom.

Air Force: On 27 April, alert selected Air Reserve and Air National Guard for possible

callup; place Strategic Air Command on increased alert and readiness status. On

20 May, execute worldwide dispersal programs and place overseas tactical offensive forces on a one-third ground alert.

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Marine Corps: Deploy one-third of a division/wing team to Europe by 20 May and

have the rest of the team ready for sea movement.44

The NSC, convening on 5 March, decided to continue the low-key approach.

President Eisenhower stated that "there would be nothing worse than for us to

mobilize, which would in effect constitute a victory for the Russians." General

Twining presented, and the Chief Executive approved, General Norstad's request

for another 7,000 US Army personnel. But the President added that this should

be made public only through a routine announcement. The next day, among

themselves, the Joint Chiefs of Staff voiced deep concern. The administration, in

their judgment, seemed mainly concerned with avoiding anything that might

create public alarm. They believed that "if war comes we will not be in a better

position in the future than we are right now." They did not seek a decision to go

to war but, rather, a decision to do what was needed to prepare for one. An

informed public, they were convinced, would not take alarm but see such steps

as simple prudence.45

President Eisenhower did not believe that a conventional buildup would

impress Soviet leaders. Concurrently, in fact, the Chairman of the Senate Armed

Services Committee asked the President whether he wanted more forces. No,

Eisenhower replied; a mobilization adding two or three divisions to counter the

USSR's 175 divisions would make no sense. He did not believe all-out war would

come, but added that if it did "we must have the crust to follow through." On 9

March, General Twining told the President that some Service Chiefs felt the

administration was "not going far enough in responding to the Berlin crisis." Significantly, Twining added that he did not share their view. President Eisenhower

responded by stressing the necessity to avoid over-reacting because he anticipated continuous Soviet attempts around the world to "throw us off balance." He

remained sure about the adequacy of a defense program based on "deterrence,

our air power, our missiles, and our allies." In his judgment, the proposal to

increase US Army, Europe, by 7,000 men was intended "primarily... to give General Taylor ammunition for avoiding his programmed cut of 30,000."46

A JCS memorandum to Secretary McElroy, dated 11 March, listed what they

saw as three important defects in the low-key approach. First, it limited measures

to quiet, preparatory steps. Second, it did not face up to the vital need for immediate decisions that should be taken in view of the risk of general war. Third, and

most serious of all, it failed to make an unqualified assertion of the determination

to fight if all other measures were of no avail. In order to convince Soviet leaders

that the United States would risk a general war over Berlin, open preparations to

fight were necessary. Losing Berlin, the Joint Chiefs of Staff bluntly told Secretary

McElroy, "would be a political and military disaster." Concessions that might lead

to such a loss had the potential to prove equally dangerous. Nevertheless, they

believed it unlikely that the USSR would risk general war to evict the Western

powers. The Soviet leaders, they concluded, probably recognized that the United

States could inflict greater damage upon the USSR than it would receive.47

Five days later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent the Secretary another paper that

revealed their sense of beleaguered frustration. The USSR, they maintained,

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continues to pursue an uncompromisingly aggressive policy designed to achieve its goal

of global hegemony.... The Soviets have pursued a bold, dynamic, expansive strategy... with demands for changing the world situation in the Soviets' favor. Their final

fall-back position is always the status quo. On the side of the Free World there often has

been relative passivity and lack of initiative. The Western Powers seem to have developed a standard response to the Soviet-created crisis: 'How far can we retreat from the

status quo but still not SERIOUSLY jeopardize our security or prestige?' This attitude

apparently stimulates the Soviet appetite for ever bolder adventures.

To reverse this psychology, they recommended a "drastic" policy revision and

suggested three alternatives for doing it. First, serve notice that if the Soviets

turned access control over to East Germany, the Western powers then would recognize West Germany as the sole legal government of all Germany. Second,

announce that if a turnover occurred, the Western powers reserved the right to

exercise throughout Germany the occupational authority heretofore exercised by

the USSR. Third, be prepared to recognize the East German regime as a de facto

provisional government in return for granting the Western powers absolute and

unconditional control over access routes, guaranteeing against any interference

with access, and accepting the continued presence of allied garrisons in West

Berlin. Secretary McElroy transmitted this paper to the State Department without

comment. In reply, the Acting Secretary of State promised to give it "serious

study." He denied, though, that Soviet policy was invariably active and US policy

invariably passive. Might not the Soviets be reacting to West Berlin's disruptive

influence upon East Germany and to Western initiatives for German unification?48

On 4 April 1959, the three powers agreed upon a basic policy for joint planning and action. Drafted by State Department officials in collaboration with representatives from the British and French embassies, it made provision for planning (but not actually carrying out) more elaborate military measures in Europe,

which would be generally observable. These would include steps to be taken

after the Soviets turned their control functions over to East German authorities as

well as measures to be carried out after allied traffic had been forcibly obstructed.

Tripartite plans should include an initial probe to determine Soviet and East German intentions, economic and other nonmilitary measures appropriate to the

occasion, and measures to maintain air access.49

Meantime, pursuant to a State-Defense recommendation, President Eisenhower on 17 March had ordered an interdepartmental analysis of the politico-military

implications of undertaking substantial efforts to reopen ground and air access,

reprisals in other areas, and general war preparations. A draft report was circulated early in April. Its conclusions, which included two noteworthy reservations

by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, are summarized below:

1. A reinforced battalion seemed enough to constitute a substantial probe. Using up

to a reinforced division, with tactical air support, probably would not be enough to

reopen and maintain ground access to West Berlin. The Joint Chiefs of Staff

reserved judgment about this finding.

2. Air access could be reestablished and maintained, although not without serious

risk of combat. If long continued, such a garrison airlift probably would induce the

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Soviets to seek a peaceful solution rather than take more drastic action. Again, the

Joint Chiefs of Staff reserved judgment.

3. Naval reprisals against Soviet and East German shipping incurred a major risk of

retaliation and probably would not alter the Soviet position on Berlin.

4. The full range of general war preparations probably would convince the Soviets

of Western determination and lead to concessions by them. However, the risks of

miscalculation that might result from such a drastic step were such that the

United States should not proceed unless it was prepared to resort to general war

at any moment.50

On 18 April, Acting Secretary of State Robert Murphy sent President Eisenhower this report as well as one that appraised non-military countermeasures.

Both studies, said Murphy, concluded that a very substantial political effort would

be required beforehand to muster public support. Whether these measures

achieved their aim would depend on how seriously the Soviets viewed the risk of

general war. Influencing the Soviets, in turn, depended upon pressing ahead with

convincing preparatory steps. A graduated application of pressures appeared to

be the politically desirable course, since it would help retain free world support

and avoid prematurely engaging the full prestige of Soviet bloc countries. On the

other hand, such an approach would leave the duration of a crisis uncertain, perhaps allow access interference to continue, and possibly create difficulties about

securing allied and neutral support for an eventual resort to force. Therefore, to

preserve maximum flexibility, Murphy recommended delaying any decision

about timing and sequence of actions. On 23 April, the NSC authorized the

Defense Department to use the military countermeasures study as a basis for initial planning. Any decisions about actually executing such plans, the President

added, would be made "in the light of circumstances as they develop." General

Norstad received both studies, but they were withheld from the allies.51

Meanwhile, machinery for accomplishing tripartite military planning had

been established. General Norstad had proposed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 17

March that a small staff designated by the name LIVE OAK be attached to USEUCOM headquarters to draft tripartite plans. On 1 April, after receiving French

and British approval, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized USCINCEUR to establish LIVE OAK, which he did two weeks later. President Eisenhower created an

interdepartmental Coordinating Group for Berlin Contingency Planning, chaired

by the Deputy Under Secretary of State; the Director, J-5, served as JCS representative. It coordinated the political, economic, and military measures contained in

the contingency plans and served as the conduit for placing US positions before

tripartite planners in Washington.

The LIVE OAK staff quickly enumerated quiet, preparatory measures and followed these with a plan for the initial probe. On 18 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

informed USCINCEUR that, since the foreign ministers' conference might collapse and be followed by Soviet provocations, all contingency planning must be

completed as soon as possible. By early August, LIVE OAK planners had completed a study of more elaborate military measures. The Joint Chiefs of Staff

found it generally in consonance with US policy.52

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In May 1959, as page 123 has recounted, the four-power conference of foreign

ministers opened by discussing German and European security but finally

focused upon Berlin. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in mid-July, suggested tabling a

proposal to scrap existing air and surface access arrangements in favor of a single

air and surface corridor. Initially, for bargaining purposes, the Western powers

could demand a corridor one hundred miles wide over which the West German

Government would have full sovereignty. The minimum position would be a

corridor sixty miles wide, in which control over "Western traffic" would be vested in the Western allies. This proposal, they claimed, had the merit of providing a

negotiable position without bringing forward the issue of recognizing the East

German regime.53 US negotiators never tabled this proposal.

The Soviets had let the six-month deadline pass, on 27 May, without taking

any action. The USSR long had maintained that the Berlin problem could be

solved only by a heads of government meeting, and their performance at the foreign ministers' conference may have been designed to prove this point. On 5

August, two days before the conference ended, President Eisenhower invited Premier Khrushchev to visit the United States. Their talks at Camp David, late in September, were more evocative of spirit than productive of tangible result. The two

leaders did agree, though, that while Berlin negotiations should not be prolonged

indefinitely, no fixed time limit was being set upon them.54 During the last days of

December, the four powers agreed to hold a summit meeting in May 1960.

For some time, the Soviets had been asserting that Western aircraft using the

corridor to Berlin were forbidden to fly above 10,000 feet, allegedly for safety reasons. The Western powers denied any right to impose such a restriction. On 26

March 1959, after President Eisenhower had approved a State-Defense recommendation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed USCINCEUR to start military transport

flights above 10,000 feet at once, "openly and in a normal fashion." Two roundtrip flights occurred—the first on 27 March, the second on 15 April—and both

were harassed by Soviet planes and protested by the Soviet Government. The

State Department decided that these flights had adequately demonstrated the US

position. During the remainder of 1959, the Joint Chiefs of Staff unsuccessfully

urged that such flights be resumed. The State Department interposed a series of

vetoes. First, it was unwilling to give the Soviets an opportunity to jeopardize the

foreign ministers' conference or the Camp David meeting; then it worried lest the

matter become an issue in Great Britain's October elections; later, State did not

want to endanger the conclusion of arrangements for the Paris summit meeting.55

Even though tension eased, unilateral and tripartite planning went forward.

In mid-December 1959, French and British members of the LIVE OAK staff

received authority to proceed with the planning outlined in the "more elaborate

military measures" of the preceding August. Concurrently, USCINCEUR completed a new unilateral contingency plan, OPLAN 200-10, which consolidated

and superseded the four basic Berlin plans, two of which had been in effect since

1955. This new plan was forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1 February

1960; they approved it, with a few minor changes, on 17 May.56

Premier Khrushchev had said in January 1960 that if the heads of state did not

reach an agreement about Berlin, he would sign a separate peace treaty with East

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Germany. On 28 March, Acting Secretary Douglas asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff

whether the US military posture in mid-summer would permit contingency plans

to be carried out and what additional actions, relative to US military interests in

Berlin, should be taken if the Soviets announced their firm intention to sign a

separate treaty. Their reply, dated 12 May, assured him that plans could be implemented. Since the execution of these plans carried a risk of general war, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff once again recommended measures to improve the US position

and demonstrate readiness to risk such a conflict. Such measures should include

an increased alert, dispersal, and some degree of mobilization. As for Berlin itself,

they saw no need for additional steps beyond those envisaged by unilateral and

tripartite planning.57

The Paris summit meeting ended in a quick and spectacular collapse for reasons explained in chapter 5. Responding to a request from the Deputy Secretary

of Defense on 12 August 1960, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded a checklist of

possible provocations together with military and nonmilitary countermeasures.

These included:

1. Increased tension and/or an imminent turnover of access control to East Germany:

among the twenty-one measures were flying through the air corridors above 10,000

feet and conducting extensive military exercises in Europe.

2. Actual turnover of control to East Germany: the fourteen options included bringing US forces in Europe to full strength and establishing an antisubmarine barrier

patrol along the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom line.

3. Imposition of formalities or controls unacceptable to the allies: the thirty-six measures included alerting CONUS-based forces and placing allied forces in Europe on

the ready.

4. Interruption or suspension of air or ground traffic: among the twenty-four measures were declaration of a national emergency, initiation of mobilization, deployment of additional forces to Europe, launching of a probe, and initiation of a garrison airlift.

5. Failure of negotiation and continued obstruction of allied traffic: the ten options

included execution of electronic and naval countermeasures as well as military

operations to reopen access.58

West Berlin's economy depended upon artificial stimuli and outside aid. By

autumn, the Soviets seemed to be aiming at a most vulnerable point, the economic connection of West Berlin with Western Europe. Late in September, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff voiced concern that Soviet economic pressures were being carried

out with some effectiveness and in a diffuse way, avoiding any identifiably hostile act. After characterizing the Western response as slow and limited, they

expressed a fear that West Berlin's economic viability gradually could be

destroyed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended urgent consideration of additional and more stringent countermeasures. The United States, they argued,

should launch a program of political and military actions "before the continued

freedom of West Berlin came into doubt."

In reply, Under Secretary of State Livingston Merchant warned against "firing

off all of our ammunition at once or too soon." These harassments called for

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reaction by West Germany, in his opinion, and that country was instituting

economic countermeasures. Bonn, for example, had threatened to cancel a trade

agreement with East Germany The NSC Operations Coordinating Board also

expressed concern about West Berlin's economic prospects over the long run.

On 1 December, the National Security Council agreed that the Planning Board

should bring the Berlin portion of NSC 5803 up to date. Here, though, President

Eisenhower's stewardship of the Berlin issue ended.59

The Berlin story can be summed up by saying that, during 1959, President

Eisenhower prevented a confrontation from escalating into a crisis. He held to a

low-key approach, rejecting JCS warnings that sizable, overt military preparations were necessary to deter the USSR. In their memorandum of 16 March 1959,

the Joint Chiefs of Staff condemned what they saw as a policy of "relative passivity and lack of initiative " But here a defensive success that simply preserved

the status quo proved quite sufficient. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, along with a great

many others, did not perceive that time was slowly working in the West's favor.

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9

The Middle East: Implementing the

Eisenhower Doctrine

Limitations of the Eisenhower Doctrine

By January 1957, the Middle East had become one of the Cold War's most

volatile battlegrounds. The region contained huge petroleum deposits, and

the economies of Western Europe depended upon oil imported from the Middle

East. The need to keep oil-exporting countries pro-Western in their orientation

was obvious, but the difficulties of doing so were equally apparent. The colonial

era left a legacy of anti-Western feeling among peoples of the area. Political currents in this unstable region were made more turbulent by the establishment of

Israel as a Jewish state. No sooner did Jewish leaders proclaim Israel's existence

in May 1948 than the surrounding Arab states launched an attack. Israel won a

decisive military success, but the 1949 armistice left larger political issues and

enmities unresolved. As early as 1947, the Joint Chiefs of Staff worried that US

support of Israel could alienate the Arabs, endanger access to oil, and spread

Soviet influence throughout the area.

In October 1956, after President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez

Canal Company, Great Britain and France joined with Israel in attacking Egypt.

Israeli forces halted after occupying the Sinai peninsula, the Gaza strip, and

Sharm al-Shaykh at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba. British and French troops

seized Port Said and were ready to press on, but strong US pressure led them to

accept a cease-fire and then to withdraw. The USSR, which had threatened to

intervene on Nasser's behalf, gained political credit with the Arabs. Conversely,

the Suez debacle destroyed British and French influence. President Nasser

emerged as the Arab world's hero. The Eisenhower administration took no comfort from that, because Nasser's fiery rhetoric suggested an affinity with

communism and threatened the conservative, pro-Western monarchies of Saudi

Arabia, Jordan, and Iraq.

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JCS and National Policy

The US Government felt obliged to cultivate both sides in the Arab-Israeli

conflict. The Arab countries had vital oil fields and strategic locations; Israel

could invoke a common bond of democracy and appeal to the Jewish community

in the United States. Early in 1957, a confrontation between the United States and

Israel took place. The Israelis evacuated Sinai proper but remained in Gaza on

grounds that it had been a base for guerrilla raids, and in Sharm al-Shaykh

because they wanted to end Egypt's blockade of the Persian Gulf. President

Eisenhower insisted that Israel comply with UN resolutions calling for complete

evacuation. On 1 March, under heavy US pressure, Israel did agree to withdraw.

A 5,700-man United Nations Emergency Force took up positions on the Egyptian

side of the border.

Planning to Meet Aggression

The spread of Soviet control into the Middle East remained President Eisenhower's uppermost concern. On 5 January 1957, the Chief Executive asked

Congress for a joint resolution authorizing him to use US armed forces as he

deemed necessary under carefully defined conditions. These were: to protect the

territorial integrity and political independence of any Middle Eastern country

requesting help, when faced with overt armed aggression from a country controlled by international communism. The President also sought authority to

establish a Military Assistance Program for any country in the area that requested one. Congress passed a resolution that became known as the "Eisenhower

Doctrine"; the Chief Executive signed it on 9 March. In Eisenhower's judgment,

this resolution provided "the consent of the Congress in proclaiming the administration's resolve to block the Soviet Union's march to the Mediterranean, to the

Suez Canal and the pipelines, and to the underground lakes of oil which fuel the

homes and factories of Western Europe."1

Although Admiral Radford had been informed of the steps leading to President Eisenhower's statement of 5 January, the Joint Chiefs of Staff received no

opportunity to contribute to its development. While Congress debated the precise form to give to the Eisenhower Doctrine, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

were analyzing its military implications and its potential impact upon Military

Assistance Programs. Through a memorandum to Secretary Wilson dated 1 February, they recommended increased military aid only to Iraq and Turkey, plus

beginning a modest program for Lebanon. Proclaiming a doctrine that provided

for US military intervention, they believed, would have greater weight than any

prospective increase in the defensive strength of Middle Eastern countries.2

Meanwhile, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had instructed their Joint Middle East

Planning Committee (JMEPC) to consider several questions. Could the United

States cope militarily with an "extreme Soviet reaction" probably resulting in

general war? How would the joint resolution affect military planning with

Middle Eastern countries? What military commitments should the United States

be prepared to undertake in the region?3

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Replying on 20 February, the JMEPC noted that the Joint Strategic Capabilities

Plan, as well as subsidiary plans, were designed to deal with an extreme Soviet

reaction resulting in general war. Existing plans could be modified to deal with

communist-inspired limited war. The committee also concluded that planning

with Middle Eastern countries could best be accomplished through the Baghdad

Pact organization, described in chapter 11, and by bilateral planning. A unified

command for the Middle East would provide the necessary centralized control

and coordination. Planning objectives ought to include improved facilities for

logistical support. Until a general US defense plan for the Middle East won

approval, the JMEPC could see no sure basis for determining what military commitments might be required. During peacetime, though, large numbers of combat forces should not be stationed in the area.4

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 6 March, referred the JMEPC's report to the Joint

Strategic Plans Committee (JSPC). Already, on 15 February, the JSPC had been

directed to examine the prospects for military planning talks with Middle Eastern nations. Country by country, what subjects should US representatives cover

in these conversations, what agency should conduct the talks, and at what level

of commitment? The JSPC submitted its report on 14 March, two days after President Eisenhower announced that Ambassador James P. Richards, formerly a

Democratic Congressman, would tour Middle Eastern countries explaining the

Eisenhower Doctrine and receiving reactions to it. The JSPC recommended that,

as soon as the Richards mission ended, preliminary talks with Middle East governments should be undertaken by a group composed of a JCS officer as senior

member, a member of the JSPC, and either the Deputy Director for Military

Assistance Affairs or his representative. Subsequently, another group assisted by

officers representing the Services, USCINCEUR, and CINCNELM should visit

countries to conduct detailed planning. Activation of a centralized command,

while desirable, did not appear necessary to carry out planning negotiations.

The JSPC listed five objectives for the preliminary talks. First, explain the

Eisenhower Doctrine's military aspects and US readiness to assist independent

nations against Soviet aggression. Second, after US concepts for defense of the

Middle East had been developed, gain local acceptance of them. Third, assess the

magnitude of the area-wide defense problem. Fourth, induce governments to be

realistic in their planning by taking full account of the vast contribution the United States could make, by removing obstacles to stationing troops of one Middle

East country in another's territory, and by prestocking and preparing defense

positions for use by another country's forces. Fifth, stimulate preparation of a

common defense plan for the area.5

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 22 March, sent Secretary Wilson a memorandum

which could serve to inform the State Department of these proposals. They felt

that preliminary talks should be confined to the Baghdad Pact's regional members—Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan—unless after consultations with Ambassador Richards it appeared beneficial to include other countries visited by him.

They also decided that the preliminary planning group should consist of three

flag officers, including one of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.6

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JCS and National Policy

Assistant Secretary Sprague forwarded these proposals to the State Department on 28 March. A few days earlier, the administration had announced that the

United States would begin actively participating in the work of the Baghdad

Pact's Military Committee. General Twining had been chosen to head the preliminary planning group. Since the Military Committee would meet at Karachi early

in June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff designated him to represent the Defense Department at that meeting also.7

By late April, the idea had taken hold that full participation in the Military

Committee was a sufficient step for the time being. On 14 May, General Twining

and the two officers chosen to assist him met with State Department representatives. All agreed that, at this point, a visit by the preliminary planning group

would be premature.8

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 13 June, sent Secretary Wilson their assessment

of the Eisenhower Doctrine's military implications. This was their contribution

to a study ordered three months earlier by the National Security Council. The

JCS response specified three situations for which US plans were required. First,

in a global war, the JSCP called for a strategic defensive in the Middle East,

with US and allied strategic air offensives making the major contribution. Second, for an Arab-Israeli war, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and British military planners had exchanged but not finalized contingency plans. These plans aimed

primarily at deterring Arab-Israeli hostilities and, if war began, at rapid intervention to localize and terminate them. The Eisenhower Doctrine, of course,

would not apply to such situations.

The third situation, the one envisaged by the Eisenhower Doctrine, involved

US assistance against armed aggression by a country controlled by international

communism. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that, in the near future, the two

countries most likely to fall under communist domination were Egypt and Syria,

although Jordan might also succumb if King Hussein were overthrown or assassinated. Syrian aggression, with Soviet assistance in aircraft or technicians, might

be directed against Iraq or Jordan, but there were so many other possibilities that

contingency plans could not be prepared for all of them. While they would have

to appraise each situation as it arose, the Joint Chiefs of Staff expected that only

small mobile US forces would be required. Certain countries (a draft had mentioned Iraq) might have to prepare bases to receive US forces. Special equipment

might have to be prestocked at these locations, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff did

not yet intend to initiate any actions for that purpose. Finally, they believed that

changes in the Military Assistance Program should occur over the long term, not

the immediate future, and affect MAP's pattern rather than its scope. For FY 1959,

in fact, they visualized no changes.9

On 26 June, Secretary Wilson forwarded JCS views to the National Security

Council and indicated his general agreement with them. However, subsequent

discussion in the NSC Planning Board raised a number of questions. How and to

what extent were planning and operations to be coordinated with Middle Eastern

governments and armed forces? In the event of overt Soviet aggression, would the

United States implement its global war plans or undertake limited counteraction?

In the latter case, were there enough small mobile forces? If the Soviets decided to

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commit "volunteers," what would be the appropriate US response? The Planning

Board concluded that these questions could best be answered within the context

of an NSC review of overall policy toward the Middle East.10

During an NSC meeting on 18 July, President Eisenhower voiced concern that

the Planning Board might be stepping into the field of contingency planning. He

directed Secretary Wilson, Secretary Dulles, and Admiral Radford, in consultation with the Director, Central Intelligence, and Mr. Cutler, to determine what

contingencies the United States should prepare to meet. After the Joint Chiefs of

Staff had appraised US capabilities, the NSC then would decide what the Planning Board should do.11

At an interdepartmental meeting five days later, Admiral Radford outlined the

JCS concept of operations. If UN sanction proved unobtainable, he listed six unilateral courses of action: deterrent action to prevent hostilities; maritime blockade for

the same purpose; direct aerial intervention; air, ground, and naval intervention;

maritime blockade and air intervention; and, finally, a combination of maritime

blockade plus air, ground, and naval intervention. Prior to intervention in certain

areas, the necessary base, landing, and transit rights would have to be obtained.

Admiral Radford related that available naval forces included the Sixth Fleet in

the Mediterranean, built around two attack carriers, as well as a destroyer division and command ship operating in the Persian Gulf area. A Marine

division/wing team could move from the East Coast to the Middle East in less

than a month. The Air Force could quickly deploy one fighter-bomber wing, one

tactical reconnaissance squadron, and one tactical bomber squadron from

Europe; one medium bomber wing based in North Africa could deliver backup

strikes. The Army immediately could move an advance party of six hundred men

with three hundred tons of equipment from Europe; a regimental combat team of

eleven thousand men could follow by air and sea. Two infantry divisions from

the United States could arrive in less than two months, but Radford believed that

small, mobile forces could handle most situations "provided the United States

reacts with decision and dispatch." After hearing this presentation, Mr. Cutler

decided that a formal submission of JCS views would not be necessary.12

It would be wrong, however, to assume that a family of plans existed in mid1957. One of the more basic items, Middle East Emergency Defense Plan 1-57,

was drafted by the JMEPC and then forwarded to the Joint Strategic Plans Committee in the spring of 1957 but did not reach the stage of final JCS consideration

until February 1958. Even in its uncompleted state, though, the plan had frequent

bearing upon other actions.

In July 1957, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered the preparation of guidance for

officers of the US Element, Baghdad Pact, and of the Military Assistance Advisory Groups in Turkey, Iraq, and Iran. The result, which they approved on 23 October, described an optimum defense as one that would (1) prevent an initial Soviet

advance from breaching the Elburz Mountain line along Iran's northern border

and reaching the Zagros Mountain passes in southern Iran as well as (2) hold the

Erzurum-Lake Van line in eastern Turkey and Pakistan's northern frontier.

Indigenous defenders would be supported by US strategic air forces and other

ground and air forces with special delivery capabilities.13

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JCS and National Policy

Meanwhile, the Commander in Chief, Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and

Mediterranean (CINCNELM), continued to discharge planning responsibilities

that arose from his duties as Commander in Chief, Specified Command, Middle

East (CINCSPECOMME). Late in September 1957, Admiral Walter F. Boone submitted his CINCSPECOMME OPLANs 219-57 and 215-58. The former covered

general war; the latter provided for US intervention under conditions short of

general war.14

According to OPLAN 219-57, defense during general war would be based

upon trying to hold the positions mentioned in the guidance above. Prior to Dday, OPLAN 219-57 continued, the United States would deploy very limited

ground forces with special capabilities, rotate a small number of air squadrons

for familiarization and training, and expand MAAGs and Missions. Relatively

minor resources would be diverted from other theaters. Admiral Boone was convinced that a small investment of resources prior to hostilities would "bring a

greatly magnified return," affording a reasonable prospect of defending the most

critical areas.15

The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Admiral Boone that current plans did not

contemplate a buildup of MAAGs and Missions. Nor did the Joint Strategic

Capabilities Plan allocate specific D-day forces in general war. No forces, except

on a rotational basis, were available to supplement those currently assigned. For

planning purposes only, the availability of small ground units with special delivery capabilities could be assumed. But they saw no point, even for planning purposes, in listing post-D-day forces. Subject to these caveats—which went far

towards nullifying Admiral Boone's basic concept—the Joint Chiefs of Staff

accepted OPLAN 219-57 as a suitable interim basis for planning.16

Review of OPLAN 215-58 triggered a dispute within the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The plan contemplated using a task force consisting of two airborne battle

groups from Europe, the Sixth Fleet's striking force of two carriers, two heavy

cruisers and twenty destroyers, one Marine battalion landing team, one fighterbomber wing, one tactical bomber squadron, and one tactical reconnaissance

squadron. The general concept of operations rested on a naval blockade of the

aggressor, as the initial step, in conjunction with air operations to neutralize the

aggressor's air power and destroy his military resources. The next step would be

insertion of Army and Marine units.17

Admiral Burke endorsed OPLAN 215-58, but Generals Taylor and White had

major objections to it. Besides noting that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not tasked

Admiral Boone with preparing a plan to support the Eisenhower Doctrine, General Taylor expressed doubt that the task organizations approved for meeting

Arab-Israeli contingencies would prove suitable. Larger forces, he believed,

might be necessary for situations covered by the Eisenhower Doctrine. Going further, General White recommended deleting portions that related to operations in

support of the Eisenhower Doctrine. Instead, each specific situation should be

appraised as it arose. He opposed combining such a plan with one for intervening in an Arab-Israeli conflict, since a response to the latter would have nothing

to do with the Eisenhower Doctrine.18

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On 3 December, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed ONCNELM that OPLAN

215-58 had been approved, subject to certain modifications. They deemed the

portion responding to the Eisenhower Doctrine suitable as "a basis of departure"

for future planning. As a situation arose, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would furnish

ONCNELM with guidance prior to approval of each specific plan. In fact, they

intended to provide a directive regarding the detailed planning required in light

of the Eisenhower Doctrine. For the time being, however, they approved his

using suitable portions of OPLAN 215-58 to plan for intervention in the event of

an uprising in Jordan or Lebanon.19

Replying two days later, ONCNELM argued against having a separate plan

for Eisenhower Doctrine contingencies, instead of using OPLAN 215-58 for that

as well as Arab-Israeli hostilities. A single plan, he said, would not only reduce

the workload but also have the virtue of simplicity, since the forces, command

relationships, communications, and intelligence and logistics procedures were

common to both requirements. Therefore, he wanted OPLAN 215-58 considered

responsive for all conditions short of general war. General Norstad, the

USONCEUR, strongly concurred.20

After extended consideration, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to let ONCNELM use OPLAN 215-58 as the basis for a plan outlining the intelligence, logistics, communications, and command arrangements for limited war. Extra tabs

would cover specific operations directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As revised

and distributed by dNOMELM on 17 March 1958, OPLAN 215-58 carried separate tabs for intervening to support the governments of Lebanon and Jordan and

for protecting US citizens and interests in Saudi Arabia. Early in April, at JCS

direction, another tab was attached to cover intervention in Saudi Arabia in the

event of a threatened coup d'etat against King Ibn Saud.21

Meanwhile, the Middle East Emergency Defense Plan had at last reached the

final stage of consideration. In its early stages, the Services had disagreed over

the general concept of operations and the designation of forces to be made available after hostilities began. In May 1957, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided that the

plan should contain a statement that "since the character and duration of the subsequent operations in the Middle East cannot be predicted with any assurance of

accuracy, the forces required for these subsequent operations must be determined

and deployed in the light of the then existing situation."22

Admiral Burke interpreted the statement above to mean that, after an initial

nuclear exchange, some forces would deploy to the Middle East. General White,

conversely, held that planning for general war should not contemplate large-scale

ground conflict in the Middle East. Means of surface transportation were

extremely limited, terrain features unfavorable, and key targets highly vulnerable to air attack. The Soviets, he argued, needed only to deliver a relatively small

number of nuclear weapons in order to accomplish quickly their logical objectives in general war. White defined these objectives as destroying those elements

of US and allied military power that were significant for general war operations

and denying oil resources and base facilities to the United States and its allies.

Soviet success would render the Middle East relatively unimportant,

strategically, to either side. But General White also saw the Middle East as a

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JCS and National Policy

region where air weapons could achieve US objectives with the least expenditure

of resources. Accordingly, he proposed that the plan clearly indicate an intention

to rely primarily upon air-delivered weapons, and that large-scale ground operations were not contemplated.23

The Joint Chiefs of Staff finally approved, late in February 1958, a concept not

far from the one General White advocated. They had to ensure the Emergency

Defense Plan's conformity with guidance they had provided to the US Element

Baghdad Pact in October 1957, with the JSCP they approved the following

month, and with their comments on OPLAN 219-57. Consequently, the plan stated that "the initial defense of the Middle East must depend largely on strategic

air operations against targets in the area of the Soviet Union contiguous to the

Middle East and on operations of indigenous forces supported by small nuclear

delivery forces." Since the results of a Soviet nuclear attack could not be forecast,

the Joint Chiefs of Staff would decide whether to employ forces "in the light of

the existing world situation." Under this prescription, major deployments did

not appear likely.

The plan recognized, however, that general war might begin as an outgrowth

of local or limited war in the Middle East, in which case "the US might have

achieved a significant degree of mobilization, deployment and commitment of

resources prior to D-day." While the nature of subsequent operations still would

depend on JCS decision, the inference could be drawn that prior commitments

might lead to continuing operations, requiring deployments beyond a small scale.

Except in Turkey, a NATO ally, very few US forces would be stationed in the

Middle East during peacetime. They consisted mainly of the MAAGs and US

Military Missions in Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan. The current JSCP did not allocate

specific D-day forces to defend the Middle East in general war. For planning purposes, however, a number of small, specialized Army units were listed as available prior to D-day. Four destroyers, one command ship, and one air division

containing eight squadrons of various types completed the listing.

According to the plan's concept of operations, strategic air attacks upon installations and troop concentrations adjacent to the Middle East would so drastically

reduce the Soviet threat that indigenous forces might be able to hold either the

Elburz Mountains, Azerbaijan, eastern Turkey and northwestern Pakistan or secondary positions in the Zagros Mountains. Indigenous defenders would be supported by "such US ground and air nuclear delivery forces as may be deployed

in the area." All forces would serve under a Commander in Chief, Middle East,

designated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This unified command would have the

following mission:

To conduct a strategic defense of the Middle East in order to hold the approaches to

the Cairo-Suez-Aden area and the Persian Gulf and to ensure to the maximum extent

practicable the continued availability of Middle East bases, oil and other resources; or,

if this is not possible, to deny them to the enemy.

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The Middle East: Implementing the Eisenhower Doctrine

On 28 February 1958, the Emergency Defense Plan won JCS approval. Two

weeks later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted it to CINCNELM accompanied by

instructions that he prepare detailed operational plans.24

To sum up, the Eisenhower Doctrine had implications for the Joint Chiefs of

Staff in four general areas. First, it raised the possibility of massive increases in

the Military Assistance Program, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided that no

major changes were necessary. Second, it seemed to promote the holding of military planning talks with Middle Eastern nations, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff

long had favored. Soon, however, they accepted the administration's judgment

that US participation in the Baghdad Pact's Military Committee would meet this

need. Third, the doctrine required a review of US capabilities for meeting "an

extreme Soviet reaction"—in other words, general war. Fourth, the doctrine

raised questions concerning the means for meeting extended US military commitments. Within this area fell preparation of a regional defense plan as well as

appropriate contingency plans.

Broadly stated, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised against adopting any hard

and fast course of action. Rather, each situation should be assessed and acted

upon according to the circumstances of the moment. Use of forces other than

those already in the theater was not expected although not ruled out. The Joint

Chiefs of Staff did not believe that the spread of communist domination could be

prevented by military means alone. Underlying conditions that made the Middle

East unstable had to be cured. To do so, as will appear below, the Joint Chiefs of

Staff urged "decisive US political and diplomatic action to solve the present

Arab-Israeli dispute."25

Accenting the Political Dimension

On 8 August 1957, the NSC directed its Planning Board to prepare a revised

statement of US policy toward the Middle East. During this process, the

views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were presented through their representative on

the board. Beyond that, on their own initiative, they gave Secretary Wilson a

statement on 4 December which they asked that he pass on to Secretary Dulles

and the NSC. In it, they expressed deep concern over "the unsatisfactory politicomilitary situation in the Middle East, which they consider stems basically from

the unresolved Arab-Israeli problem, and which poses a serious threat to the

security of the United States and the Free World." They defined three basic issues

that had to be resolved before stability could be attained. First, the current

boundaries of Israel must be fixed and agreed upon. Second, the Western powers

must guarantee that Israel would not thereafter expand territorially. Third, the

problem of Palestinian refugees must be settled.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were convinced that unresolved problems offered

opportunities for Soviet exploitation, leading to a further spread of communist

domination and control. Military action alone, they emphasized, could not

prevent such a spread. Only immediate, decisive action by the United States to

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JCS and National Policy

resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute could preserve the pro-Western orientation of

Arab nations. They concluded with a pointed remark: "The threat to US security

inherent in failing to take the initiative in solving this problem is so great as to

transcend the interests of any minority group within the United States." Deputy

Secretary Quarles informed Secretary Dulles that he supported these views.26

During a State-JCS discussion on 13 December, Admiral Burke said the Joint

Chiefs of Staff saw evidence that, if the Arabs were protected against further

Israeli expansion, they would accept the 1949 armistice lines as final boundaries.

He acknowledged that this would be an "imposed solution," employing military

measures, and spoke about a direct relationship between Israel's policy of unlimited immigration and Arab fear of further Israeli expansion. To solve the refugee

problem, Admiral Burke suggested that Israel might allow some Palestinians to

return and buy off the rest through compensation and economic development

programs. Assistant Secretary of State William Rountree gave his opinion that

there was no prospect of exchanging current boundaries for a guarantee of no

Israeli expansion. He deemed it unrealistic to think of imposing a solution.

Unless terms of settlement enjoyed Arab support, even regimes friendly to the

United States would be overthrown. Admiral Burke remonstrated that waiting

until Israel and Egypt were ready to accept a formula would only work to the

USSR's advantage.27

The State-Defense split resurfaced when the Planning Board circulated NSC

5801, a new statement of policy intended to replace NSC 5428, which dated from

mid-1954. The "northern tier" concept of collective defense, which had loomed so

large in 1954, was nowhere mentioned. NSC 5801 downplayed military assistance in favor of measures to encourage economic development. Likewise, in the

event of a renewed Arab-Israeli conflict, military measures against aggression

received less prominence than political efforts to achieve a negotiated solution.

Defense representatives recommended developing, as a matter of priority,

proposals under which Arabs and Israelis could work toward a peaceful and

equitable settlement. State Department spokesmen, on the other hand, thought it

sufficient constantly to explore prospects and possibilities of persuading the

parties to work toward a settlement along the lines proposed by Secretary Dulles

on 26 August 1955. At that time, Dulles had held out the possibility of US participation in an international loan to help Israel compensate refugees and in formal

treaty engagements to prevent boundaries from being changed by force.28

Writing to Secretary McElroy on 17 January 1958, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

endorsed NSC 5801, subject to acceptance of Defense's position. However, when

the NSC met six days later, State's proposal carried the day. This decision followed a review by Secretary Dulles of past US efforts and particularly of the disappointing Arab and Israeli response to his proposals of August 1955, which he

considered the product of his department's best thinking. President Eisenhower

judged that State's approach offered more flexibility.29

The Chief Executive approved NSC 5801/1 on 24 January 1958. Its statement

of "Long-Range US Policy Toward the Near East" set forth four major objectives:

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The Middle East: Implementing the Eisenhower Doctrine

1. Maintain for the United States and its allies the resources, strategic positions, and

passage rights of the area while denying them to the Soviet bloc.

2. Preserve stable, friendly, and progressive governments in the Middle East.

3. Achieve an early resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute.

4. Prevent further extension of Soviet influence and reduce its existing sway.

To achieve these objectives, the United States would:

1. Assume major leadership responsibility for the free world.

2. Seek to guide revolutionary and nationalistic pressures into orderly channels, not

antagonistic to the West.

3. Encourage economic development and be prepared, if necessary, to increase economic aid.

4. Provide military aid to friendly countries.

Specific courses of action defined by NSC 5801 /1 included implementing the

Eisenhower Doctrine while supporting but not formally joining the Baghdad

Pact. If necessary, the United States would accept a neutralist orientation by some

nations and assist them in order to develop local noncommunist strength. While

supporting the ideal of Arab unity, the United States would seek to counterbalance Egypt's preponderant position of leadership in the Arab world by strengthening more moderate regimes. The administration might also urge Iraq to exercise constructive leadership and discreetly encourage the ultimate federation of

Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Iraq—all, at that point, moderate and pro-Western

monarchies. Lebanon's Government would get political support and military

assistance for internal security purposes. The United States also would inform

and work with the British Government to the extent compatible with US interests

but be somewhat more guarded in consulting and informing the French.30

Aiding Iraq and Jordan

On 5 January 1957, President Eisenhower asked Congress to appropriate for

discretionary use, under the Mutual Security Act, an additional $200 million

annually during FYs 1958 and 1959. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 1 February,

advised Secretary Wilson that supporting local governments should be an objective of the Military Assistance Program in some cases. As a general rule, however,

they felt that such support ought to be undertaken "through emphasis on the

announced intentions of the United States rather than on expansion of support

for indigenous forces." They recommended immediate increases only for Turkey

and Iraq and the addition of only one country, Lebanon.

Most of the additions they recommended for the Turkish and Iraqi programs

were ones that they already had proposed and on which starts now could be

made. For Turkey, this involved replacing over-age ships and obsolescent

airplanes. For Iraq, funds would be used to finance pilot training and to support

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3 % rather than two divisions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had carefully avoided proposing grant aid to countries where doing so might exacerbate regional tensions,

particularly the Arab-Israeli conflict. In the case of Lebanon, however, they found

overriding factors: the strategic importance of its communications and logistics

facilities; the resolutely pro-Western attitude of the Lebanese Government; and

the coercive pressures being exerted upon Lebanon by Syria and Egypt. The Joint

Chiefs of Staff recommended what was principally a defense support program,

for such purposes as improving port and airfield facilities and providing petroleum storage at Beirut. Deputy Secretary Robertson endorsed these proposals and

forwarded them to the State Department, where they could be used in preparing

guidance for Ambassador Richards.31

The Richards mission, meantime, had toured the Middle East explaining the

Eisenhower Doctrine and getting local reactions to it. The mission entered into

commitments with six countries totaling more than $57 million: $35,847 million

to carry out JCS recommendations for Iraq, Turkey, and Lebanon; $2,995 million

for the Ethiopian and $8,044 million for the Iranian Armies; and $10,391 million

for the Pakistani Army and Air Force. But it was Jordan that provided the first

test for US policy. Palace intrigues and popular disturbances engineered by proNasser elements threatened to overthrow the monarchy and set in motion a

scramble for Jordan's territory by its more powerful neighbors. On 25 April 1957,

the administration announced that the Sixth Fleet had been ordered to the eastern Mediterranean. On that same day, King Hussein began a purge of his government. On 29 April, the United States announced that Jordan would get an emergency grant of $10 million.32

Like the movement of the Sixth Fleet, the emergency grant did not hinge upon

the Eisenhower Doctrine. The State Department made clear that this grant would

come from regular funds and would be used solely for economic development

and budget support. On 2 May, however, the US Ambassador in Amman reported that Hussein was now ready to sign an aid agreement; he favored prompt

measures of military and financial assistance. Concurrently, the US Military

Attache in Amman reported that Jordan was preparing military aid requests that

struck him as excessive. They included equipment for one infantry and one

armored division, two AAA gun battalions, eighty-four aircraft (forty of them

jets), and twelve motor torpedo boats.33

Jordan's armed forces were small, built around a 22,000-man army of one

infantry division and one armored brigade. The JCS memorandum of 1 February

had stated that Jordan possessed only limited strategic value, that no military

assistance should be furnished without obtaining "firm assurances that such aid

will be used to further Middle East stability," and that aid should be provided

only to maintain existing forces, not to create new ones. Yet advice from the

Ambassador and the Attache so impressed General Taylor with the need for an

early decision on providing substantial military support that, on 7 May, he urged

the Joint Chiefs of Staff to study this problem as a matter of urgency. In the meantime, however, conferences between ISA and Joint Staff representatives had produced an agreed Defense position. They acted upon the premise that military

assistance should be granted for political reasons. While support for Jordan's

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budget constituted the greatest need, deliveries of military equipment should

occur as soon as possible. President Eisenhower should be asked to sign a determination that such assistance was important to US security, thus permitting use

of $20 million from a special fund authorized by the Mutual Security Act. The

President did so and, on 29 June, the two governments exchanged notes stipulating that the United States would provide $10 million in economic assistance and

$10 million for procurement of military goods and services.34 Hussein survived

because the Jordanian Army remained loyal to him. He made himself, in effect, a

client of the United States.

Early in 1958, President Nasser seemed to take a great stride toward leadership of the Arab world when Egypt and Syria joined to create the United Arab

Republic. Immediately afterward, Iraq and Jordan announced their agreement to

form a federated Arab Union. Iraq's King Faisal became head of state; Jordan's

King Hussein, his cousin, acted as deputy head. The prime mover behind this

Union was Nuri Said, a veteran Iraqi politician who became Premier on 3 March

1958. Shortly before becoming Premier, Nuri told the US Ambassador in Baghdad that his acceptance depended upon US willingness to provide combat aircraft—specifically, two jet interceptor squadrons and training personnel. On 11

March, the British Government urged the United States to extend additional aid

as quickly as possible, not only by accelerated jet aircraft deliveries but also by

economic and financial support. A Defense Department survey team already had

been organized; it arrived in Baghdad several days later.35

In the autumn of 1957, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended immediate

delivery of twenty-five F-86F jet interceptors. The State Department vetoed that

proposal as politically unwise. By agreement with the United States, the British

bore primary responsibility for training and equipping the Iraqi Air Force and by

the beginning of 1958, had re-equipped one of Iraq's five squadrons with fifteen

Hawker Hunter M-VI jets. In mid-February 1958, after returning from a meeting of

the Baghdad Pact's Military Committee, General Taylor reopened the aircraft issue.

Writing to Assistant Secretary Sprague, he pointed out that Britain might not be

able to support modernizing the entire Iraqi Air Force and that a combination of

US and British aircraft might prove difficult for either country to support.36

The US Air Force Survey Team, after returning from Baghdad, reported that

the Iraqis wanted six aircraft delivered within a few weeks, followed by a phased

expansion to ten fighter-bomber squadrons over the next three and a half years.

The team believed that periodically staging US tactical units through Iraq could

reduce these requirements. But the team also favored making a decision on the

basic question without delay.37

At a meeting on 22 April, Assistant Secretary Sprague and Under Secretary of

State Herter decided to provide Iraq with fifteen F-86Fs, a small number of

which would be sent as soon as possible. Sprague informed the Joint Chiefs of

Staff about this decision and asked for their advice about how to implement it.

Rather than the crash program they had proposed the previous autumn, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff now favored a more routine approach, no doubt because the aircraft available then had since been disposed of. Therefore, in a reply dated 23

May, they advised making deliveries in an orderly manner but with the United

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JCS and National Policy

States assuming primary responsibility for training and equipping Iraq's armed

forces. The first five F-86Fs reached Iraq on 16 June; another ten were slated for

delivery during the next three months.38

Meantime, in mid-March 1958, President Eisenhower had asked the State and

Defense Departments to explore ways of supporting Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and

Saudi Arabia. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, writing to Secretary McElroy on 16 May,

began by repeating their earlier recommendations for resolving the Arab-Israeli

problem: agree upon fixed boundaries for Israel; establish a reasonable guarantee

that Israel would not expand territorially thereafter; and solve the Palestinian

refugee problem. Then they offered purely military proposals: Provide Iraq with

one or two fighter/bomber squadrons, as recorded above. Improve early warning

and air control radar capabilities of Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia.

Expand the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Iraq to deal with Arab Union

matters. Provide aid and training support to help Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and

Saudi Arabia coordinate their internal security efforts. Establish a small training

mission in Lebanon. By 1 July, the administration approved all these actions; some

were implemented in part, while others were postponed for political reasons.

On 14 July, as chapter 10 relates, an army coup overthrew the pro-Western

regime in Iraq; King Faisal and Premier Nuri Said were executed. All deliveries

of grant aid and military sales materiel halted immediately. The US training mission withdrew in September. The value of military goods and services furnished

to Iraq, which had totaled $13.1 million in FY 1957 and $21.3 million in FY 1958,

dropped to approximately $100,000 in each of the two succeeding years.39

The shortcomings of the Eisenhower Doctrine now were manifest. Overt communist aggression, against which the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed most of their

attention, never materialized. Political instability, heightened by the appeal of

President Nasser's pan-Arab radicalism, posed the immediate danger to US interests and influence. Simply providing pro-Western regimes with equipment and

training could do little to diminish that danger. In Lebanon, as the next chapter

will relate, direct US intervention became necessary.

Losing Bases in Morocco

In North Africa, the conflicting demands of Arab nationalism and the North

Atlantic alliance prevented US objectives from being achieved. The administration's aims were clear-cut and simple: preserve the US military presence and

counter Soviet or other anti-Western penetration. But the Algerian rebellion,

which pitted French troops against a largely Arab and Moslem population,

tended to unite former colonial peoples against the West.

Under a 1950 agreement with France, the United States operated four strategic

bomber bases in Morocco. As a newly independent country, Morocco in 1956

accepted US use of these bases "in principle" but refused to recognize the validity of the Franco-American agreement. President Eisenhower, in October 1956,

approved a policy statement that base rights should be maintained by all feasible

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means, including reasonable quid pro quos. Responding to a presidential query,

the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 21 November advised that it was technically feasible

to develop bases in Spain as substitutes. They warned, however, that adequate

substitutes could not be completed before 1962. Ability to execute war plans

would be significantly reduced if Moroccan bases closed before Spanish ones

opened. Moreover, the dispersion afforded by having bases in both Morocco and

Spain would afford greater protection and operational flexibility to US forces.40

The United States opened base rights negotiations with Morocco in May 1957,

but these proved sporadic and unsuccessful. The failure could be traced to three

factors: Moroccan suspicions that the United States was supporting France in the

Algerian war; France's scheduling of nuclear tests in the Sahara; and nationalist

emotions aroused by the presence of US, French, and Spanish forces in Morocco.

By August 1958, nationalist pressures had grown to a point where Deputy Secretary Quarles asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to reassess the need for Moroccan

bases. They replied by reaffirming the position outlined above. Moroccan bases,

they noted, provided sites at which bombers could land after striking targets

during general war as well as positions from which to mount limited war operations. Fixed installations in Spanish Morocco were needed to carry out effective

surveillance of the Gibraltar Strait, and the US Navy had at Port Lyautey essential point-to-point relay, primary fleet, and general broadcasting facilities. Thus

Moroccan bases, representing a foothold in Africa, constituted a strategic advantage over the USSR.41

The National Security Council, on 27 August, decided to recognize the principle of eventual evacuation but to seek to remain as long as seven years. The US

Government privately informed Moroccan officials of this decision and offered to

settle for a five-year tenure. Although King Mohammed and his Prime Minister

proved willing to negotiate about the length, both demanded that the United

States promptly and publicly accept the principle of evacuation.42

Despite these developments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff still emphasized the

importance of retaining Moroccan bases "until the need for them no longer

exists." During meetings with State and ISA representatives on 21 November

1958 and 12 June 1959, they argued that this need would continue "beyond any

of the periods now under discussion." Withdrawal under pressure, they warned,

would establish a precedent and thus nourish similar resistance to US presence in

Libya, the Philippines, and other host countries.43

Concurrently, the NSC ordered its Planning Board to review policy toward

North Africa. A majority of board members wanted to maintain Moroccan bases

"for the maximum feasible time." A minority, consisting of representatives from

OSD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization,

preferred a statement acknowledging the principle of eventual evacuation but

more accurately a continuing strategic requirement for these bases. The Council

accepted the minority's view and NSC 5911/1, approved by President Eisenhower

on 4 November 1959, read as follows:

... endeavor, within the limits of feasibility, to maintain access to US bases for as long

as they are required, being prepared to this end to offer reasonable quid pro quos, to

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reach satisfactory agreement regarding tenure, and to conclude such other arrangements with Morocco as may be deemed appropriate and essential to the retention of

the bases, including public acknowledgment of the principle of eventual evacuation

and the relinquishment of non-essential facilities.44

The language of NSC 5911/1 was elastic enough to convert an apparent JCS

victory into a defeat. President Eisenhower had scheduled a mid-December visit

to Morocco. On 27 November 1959, after coordination with Defense, the State

Department recommended that the President propose to King Mohammed a

withdrawal from the air bases by the end of 1963. Communications facilities at

Kenitra, however, should be the subject of later agreements. On 22 December,

President Eisenhower and King Mohammed announced that one airfield would

be released in three months and US forces would leave Morocco by 31 December

1963. Kenitra remained a separate issue.45

Writing to Secretary Gates on 17 February 1960, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

recommended seeking: a guarantee that released air bases would not be made

available to powers unfriendly to the United States; an agreement allowing US

re-entry if military developments so dictated; and retention of the Kenitra facilities for an indefinite period beyond 1963. Late in July, they warned again that

Kenitra was essential. If the sites there could not be held beyond 1963, similar

facilities would have to be constructed in Spain or elsewhere at considerable cost.

Subsequently, the United States did obtain a guarantee against unfriendly

nations gaining access and was able to keep Kenitra facilities operating. But a reentry agreement proved unattainable.46

By 1963, Moroccan bases mattered less than they had ten years earlier.

Through the mid-1950s, when medium-range B-29s, B-50s, and B-47s formed

the backbone of Strategic Air Command, plans called for those bombers to move

to England and Morocco, then launch sorties against the USSR from those sites.

By contrast, intercontinental B-52s could fly directly from the United States and,

following an attack, land in Morocco or elsewhere. The B-52 force grew from

ninety-seven in December 1956 to 538 by December 1960. What really worried

the Joint Chiefs of Staff was not losing Moroccan bases but setting a precedent

that would encourage evictions elsewhere. As Admiral Burke argued during a

State-Defense meeting late in 1958, "If our position is eroded in Morocco the

repercussions will be felt not only in Spain but, for example, in the Philippines,

Libya and Japan as well."47

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10

The Middle East: Lebanon and After

Prelude to Intervention

Lebanon provided the setting in 1958 for a US military intervention. What the

administration did bore no relation to the Eisenhower Doctrine, authorizing

the Chief Executive to use US armed forces to protect the territorial integrity and

political independence of any Middle Eastern country requesting help when

faced with overt armed aggression from a country controlled by international

communism. Instead, behind President Eisenhower's decision to intervene lay

the tangled story of a country coming to the verge of dissolution. A National

Covenant dating from 1943 provided, among other things, that Lebanon's President should be a Maronite Christian and the Premier a Sunni Moslem; Christians

also received a six-to-five advantage in the Chamber of Deputies. By the mid1950s, Moslems claimed that they had become a majority of the population,

deserving more power; Christians refused to allow a census. As 1958 opened,

and Syria joined with Egypt to form a United Arab Republic, many Lebanese

Moslems felt drawn to the pan-Arabism preached by Egypt's President Gamal

Nasser. Christians, including President Camille Chamoun, naturally opposed

pan-Arabism and looked upon friendly relations with the West as the only

guarantee of Lebanon's independence.

The US Government, meanwhile, was worrying about Lebanon falling into

the Soviet orbit. On 7 September 1957, in the President's name, Secretary Dulles

issued a statement voicing concern over "the apparently growing Soviet Communist domination of Syria and the large build-up there of Soviet-bloc arms...

which could not be justified by purely defensive needs." The previous day, with

State Department concurrence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had advised US

commanders in Europe and the Mediterranean that "Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon and

Jordan are most seriously concerned over threat to their own security posed by

progressive takeover of Syria by pro-Soviet elements" and were making

defensive dispositions that US officials agreed were prudent.1

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JCS and National Policy

During September 1957, the United States and the United Kingdom agreed to

establish a working group in Washington. Its task was to consider threats that

would stem from a complete communist domination of Syria. In preparation for

a meeting with his British counterpart, Secretary Dulles put a question to the

Joint Chiefs of Staff: If coups d'etat in Lebanon and/or Jordan led local governments to request US intervention, what forces could be made available in 24, 48,

and 72 hours? Their reply, dated 17 October, listed the units designated in CINCNELM's OPLAN 215-56 and in his revised and extended plan, then under JCS

review but not yet approved. These included: two Army airborne battle groups

from Europe; the Sixth Fleet with a Marine battalion landing team embarked; and

Air Force units from Europe and North Africa. Under most circumstances, virtually all these forces could reach the Lebanon-Jordan area in 72 hours. Under optimum conditions, most air units could begin operations within 12 hours; some

Army units could arrive within 24 hours; the Sixth Fleet could start air operations in 24 hours and start landing Marines in Lebanon within 36 hours. This

document was given to the British and an equivalent paper received from them.2

During the first days of November, Egypt and Syria opened a virulent press

and radio campaign calling for the assassination of King Hussein—the same fate

that had befallen his grandfather only six years earlier. The State Department, on

8 November, recommended urgent preparation of a plan for US-UK intervention

"in the event of an imminent or actual coup d'etat in Lebanon and /or Jordan." On

14 November, the Joint Chiefs of Staff named Major General Verdi B. Barnes,

USA, who was chairman of their Joint Middle East Planning Committee, to be

JCS spokesman in talks with British representatives.3

A JMEPC plan for unilateral intervention, completed two days earlier, provided the basis for all subsequent planning, both unilateral and combined. It listed

the same forces as those described above, and presumed the use of staging bases

in Cyprus, Libya, and Turkey as well as staging and overflight rights in Canada,

France, Italy, Greece, and the United Kingdom.

The plan itself had three phases. Alerting and assembling of forces would take

place in the first phase; aNCNELM, as commander of the prospective operation,

would establish his headquarters in the area.4The second phase would see

deployment get under way, with Army troops either flying directly to airfields in

Jordan and Beirut or moving to Turkey and preparing there for an airdrop.

Marines would land either in the vicinity of Beirut or at a port from which they

could be flown to Jordan. The Sixth Fleet would move into position; Air Force

combat units would deploy to Turkey or Cyprus and prepare for immediate

action. During the third phase, which might overlap the second, Army units supported by Marines would secure airfields, seize communications centers and

seats of authority in the capital, and take actions necessary to uphold or re-establish the government's authority Land-based and carrier-based planes would control the air, provide reconnaissance, and support the ground forces. After CINCNELM had recast OPLAN 215-56 to conform with this concept, the Joint Chiefs

of Staff approved it for emergency use on 27 November 1957. Several days later,

they completed their review of OPLAN 215-58, which had been in progress since

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September. With JCS approval on 3 December, OPLAN 215-58 superseded

OPLAN 215-56.5

Meanwhile, talks with British representatives resulted in a draft US-UK contingency plan being submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 29 November. In

most respects, it simply extended the JMEPC's plan by adding assignments for

available British forces. It differed, though, in having Marines make the initial

landing if Lebanon was the objective; Army troops would be employed if the target area was Jordan. In all cases, US and British forces would operate under their

own national commands, effecting coordination through liaison arrangements.6

The real obstacles to US-UK planning were political, not military. Admiral

Burke, who during the early phases of the 1956 Suez crisis had favored supporting the British militarily, now took a completely different tack. He recommended

telling Secretary McElroy that:

... the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the implementation of such a plan would be

disastrous to the US position in both the United Nations and with the remainder of

the Arab world. This would be a military campaign with political overtones comparable in many respects to the United Kingdom-France-Israeli debacle of 1956 which

dropped British-French prestige to an all-time low and contributed greatly to advancing the position of the Soviet Union in the Middle East. Combined US-UK military

action without political support and military cooperation from Iraq and Saudi Arabia

would place the United States at a most serious disadvantage.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 10 January 1958, recommended against continued

planning with the British for the time being. As justification, they cited a

possibility of compromising the plan and thereby jeopardizing the US position in

the United Nations and the Arab world. The State Department concurred.7

From the very inception of planning, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had emphasized

the importance of obtaining staging and overflight rights. Through a memorandum dated 27 November 1957, they stressed the importance of base availability

in Libya, Cyprus, and especially Adana, Turkey. Assistant Secretary Sprague

hand-carried their memorandum to Assistant Secretary of State William Rountree. The State Department, however, decided against initiating any negotiations.

It did so partly in response to a message from USCINCEUR. General Norstad

had been directed to prestock certain Army supplies at Adana. Prestocking, he

pointed out in reply, could not proceed without the Turks' becoming aware of its

purpose, since the materiel would have to clear Turkish customs inspection. Furthermore, authority to use Adana provided only for US operations in support of

NATO. Late in March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked Secretary McElroy to urge

the State Department to reconsider its decision not to proceed with negotiations.8

Some weeks later, events in Lebanon forced State's hand.

President Camille Chamoun's attempt to change the Lebanese constitution in

order to secure his re-election precipitated a crisis. On 8 May, following the

assassination of a Chamoun opponent, Christian and Moslem factions began

fighting in Beirut. Chamoun asked the US, UK, and French Governments

whether they would intervene if requested. Following a White House meeting

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JCS and National Policy

on 13 May, Secretary Dulles instructed Ambassador Robert McClintock to tell

Chamoun that a request should be made only under the most compelling necessity when Lebanon's integrity was threatened and the country's own forces were

insufficient. Dulles listed three further conditions: Lebanon must complain to

the UN Security Council about outside interference; some Arab states should

publicly support Lebanon's appeal; and President Chamoun would not push his

candidacy for re-election if doing so endangered the country's stability and proWestern orientation. If those conditions were met, the United States would send

combat forces with the dual mission of protecting US nationals and property

and assisting Lebanon "in its military program."9

On that same day, 13 May, the administration undertook preparatory military

measures. At the President's direction, Admiral Burke ordered Admiral James L.

Holloway, Jr., who was the CINCNELM, to sail amphibious ships with embarked

Marines toward the eastern Mediterranean. On 14 May, Admiral Holloway

received orders to proceed with detailed US-UK operational planning. Two days

later, CINCNELM sent the Joint Chiefs of Staff an outline plan that had won

British approval. Christened BLUE BAT, it differed from the US-UK plan drafted

in November 1957 by providing for combined operations under a combined commander, Admiral Holloway. Major forces would include two US Army airborne

battle groups, two Marine battalion landing teams, and one British infantry

brigade group. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, also on 16 May, directed USCINCEUR to

bring one Army battle group to a state of readiness that would enable it to arrive

in Lebanon within twenty-four hours after the order to proceed. Twenty-six

C-124 transports flew from the United States to Germany. On 17 May, BLUE BAT

won JCS approval.10

The Joint Chiefs of Staff again queried the State Department about obtaining

staging and overflight rights. When State indicated its reluctance to approach

governments until a decision to intervene actually had been made, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff on 16 May instructed CINCNELM that, in the absence of such

rights, he was nevertheless to proceed with the operation when ordered. A very

few days later, State did prepare messages instructing appropriate ambassadors

to request overflight and staging rights; they would be dispatched whenever a

decision to intervene was reached.11

Aided by emergency deliveries of US arms and police equipment, government forces established control over most of Lebanon, except for the northern

part along the Syrian border. The Joint Chiefs of Staff issued orders relaxing the

readiness of forces in Germany. The Sixth Fleet retained only one attack carrier

group and half the amphibious force within twelve hours' steaming from

Lebanon's coast; the remainder departed for visits to Greek and Turkish ports.12

On 22 May, Lebanon formally complained to the United Nations that the

United Arab Republic (UAR) was interfering in its internal affairs. The UN Security Council voted to send an observer group. Iraq and Jordan voiced support for

the Lebanese Government.

Even though the immediate crisis eased, the fissures within Lebanese society remained. The regular Lebanese Army, a composite of the religious and

political factions that divided the country, was employed mainly to guard

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public buildings, major highways, and the Beirut airport. Its Christian commander, General Fuad Chehab, worried that Moslem soldiers might refuse to

act against their co-religionists.

A White House meeting on 15 June, attended by General Twining, produced

some rather gloomy predictions. Should intervention become necessary, it

appeared likely that US forces would find themselves fighting UAR-controlled

insurrectionists, besides facing antagonism from large segments of the population

who opposed foreign intervention in principle. Substantial US forces might have to

be committed for an indefinite period to cope with terrorist activities and to block

supplies corning to the insurrectionists from Syria. Secretary Dulles also felt that,

under current conditions, intervention would lay the United States open to charges

of undermining the UN observation effort. But Dulles asserted, and President

Eisenhower agreed, that if Chamoun requested intervention and the United States

did not respond, every pro-Western government in the area would disappear.13

Early in July, the UN observer group submitted an inconclusive report. It did

not confirm charges that men and supplies were coming over the Syrian border.

Often, however, UN teams had found themselves handicapped or entirely frustrated in their efforts to enter areas controlled by insurrectionists. On 9 July, President Chamoun publicly stated that he would leave office when his current term

expired. Thus the last of the conditions specified by Secretary Dulles on 13 May

had been fulfilled.14

The Marines Go Ashore

In Baghdad during the early hours of 14 July 1958, army officers seized control

of the Iraqi Government, executed King Faisal, and swept away every vestige

of the pro-Western regime. Brigadier General Abdul Karim Kassem led a cabinet

of colonels and leftist civilians. President Chamoun immediately summoned

Ambassador Robert McClintock and demanded US intervention in Lebanon

within forty-eight hours. He already had requested British help and shortly

would ask for French assistance as well.15

The administration responded promptly. Senior officials, meeting at 0930,

agreed that the consequences of doing nothing would be dire indeed. First,

"Nasser would take over the whole area." Second, the United States would lose

influence throughout the Middle East and base rights could be jeopardized.

Third, US credibility throughout the world would be "brought into question."

General Twining gave his opinion that "we had no alternative but to go in." At a

White House meeting later that morning, President Eisenhower said "it was clear

in his mind that we must act, or get out of the Middle East entirely." He felt certain that "to lose this area by inaction would be far worse than the loss in China,

because of the strategic position and resources of the Middle East." The President

and his principal advisers briefed twenty-two Senators and Congressmen early

in the afternoon. Secretary Dulles advocated intervention as the lesser of two

evils: "If we go in, our action is likely to accentuate the anti-Western feeling of the

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JCS and National Policy

Arab masses Our intervention would not therefore be likely to be a quick and

easy solution." However, if the United States failed to act, "the non-Nasser governments in the Middle East and adjoining areas would be quickly overthrown."

Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan would trace US inaction to fear of the Soviet Union

and so lose confidence in the United States. Some congressional leaders voiced

reservations and few strongly supported the venture.16

After the congressional briefing, President Eisenhower and a small group of

advisers—again including General Twining—settled upon specific actions. That

morning, Admiral Burke had called CINCNELM's headquarters in London to

warn that intervention might soon be ordered. Late in the afternoon, Admiral

Burke conveyed the President's decision by directing CINCNELM and the Commander, Sixth Fleet, to sail the entire fleet eastward as soon as possible and begin

landing Marines on 15 July at 1500 Beirut time (0900 Washington time). Essentially, since the part to be played by the British remained undecided, they were to

execute the US portion of BLUE BAT. During the evening of 14 July, at 2031 Washington time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered USCINCEUR to have one Army battle group and its airlift ready to land at Beirut airport within twenty-four hours,

or thirty-six hours if an airdrop proved necessary.17

In mid-afternoon on 15 July, a Marine battalion landing team (BLT) went

ashore just south of Beirut. Observed by curious sunbathers and soft drink vendors, their landing was unopposed. Seventy minutes later, at 1610 Beirut time,

they secured the airport. General Twining promptly informed the President that

operations were going well. He reported that two more BLTs would land the next

day and that two Army airborne battle groups could arrive from Germany within twelve hours, providing "a very respectable force in the area." Twining said

that "he and the Chiefs are strongly of the view that going into Lebanon was the

right thing to do." The Joint Chiefs of Staff favored putting the Strategic Air

Command (SAC) on increased alert. Twining worried that moving tankers into

forward areas "could well occasion a good deal of alarm," but the President

decided to deploy a few of them overseas. Eisenhower also approved a JCS recommendation to increase Air Defense Command's readiness. Twining further

noted that two divisions in CONUS, one Army and one Marine, had been alerted

for possible movement to Europe or the Mediterranean. Most of the Marine division could move within ten days aboard Navy ships. Deploying the remainder of

it, as well as all the 101st Airborne Division, would require chartered vessels.

Twining proposed, and Eisenhower agreed, to put units on alert and plan for

their deployment but delay any actual chartering.18

Perhaps inevitably, the Marines' arrival on Lebanese soil generated some friction between US diplomats and military officers on the scene. General Chehab

had not been told about the landing until just before it was to occur. Fearing that

strongly divergent reactions could lead to disintegration of the Lebanese Army,

he urgently requested that no troops disembark. Ambassador McClintock

responded by asking the Task Force Commander to dock his ships in Beirut with

the Marines remaining aboard. The Commander refused, citing orders from his

military superiors. Chamoun asked the Ambassador for Marines to protect the

presidential palace, but they did not go. Chehab protested against the Marines'

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occupation of the airport, without effect. A vexed Ambassador McClintock

requested from Washington "immediate instructions to whoever is in command

of landing forces that he must get in touch with me and likewise take my judgment on matters of vital political importance." That evening, he and CINCNELM

received a directive affirming that "in case of difference between the military

commander and the local US Diplomatic Representative in regard to political

matters relating exclusively to Lebanon, the views of the latter shall be controlling." Admiral Holloway who had been in Washington when the crisis broke,

flew into Beirut airport before dawn on 16 July and then raised his flag aboard

the command ship USS laconic. He and Ambassador McClintock soon developed

a fairly smooth working relationship.19

The intervention in Lebanon proved to be a purely American undertaking.

France, barely recovered from its own political turmoil, took no part beyond having a cruiser and three destroyers sail into Beirut harbor during 18-19 July.20

The British Government decided to hold its forces in readiness for possible

action in Jordan, rather than follow US units into Lebanon as the BLUE BAT plan

provided. On 16 July, King Hussein called urgently for US and UK military assistance. "We are already half pregnant," General White remarked during a JCS

meeting. "We should go the whole way and not get an abortion." Nonetheless,

the administration decided against sending US troops to Jordan. Almost three

thousand British paratroopers, aided by considerable US logistical and

diplomatic support, went to bolster King Hussein.21

Stabilization Achieved

At 0730 on 16 July, a second Marine battalion landing team went ashore.

There had been, in fact, three BLTs with the Sixth Fleet when the operation

began. The third had only recently arrived, to replace one retained beyond its

normal rotation date. In the absence of British participation, this third BLT filled

the role assigned to British forces in BLUE BAT and came across a beach north of

Beirut on the morning of 18 July. A fourth battalion, airlifted from the United

States via Port Lyautey Morocco, reached the city between 18 and 20 July. It was

embarked and held as a reserve afloat.22

The day of 19 July also had been taken up with the arrival of an Army airborne battle group from the 24th Infantry Division, flown from Germany by way

of Adana, Turkey. More Army combat and service support units followed. A tank

battalion and other service support troops sailed by sea from French and German

ports. Their arrival and unloading, between 3 and 5 August, added seventy-two

tanks and more than five thousand Army personnel to US strength in Lebanon.

On 5 August there were 5,842 Marines and 8,515 Army troops in country, all

deployed around the Beirut area. This proved to be the peak figure, since certain

service units soon were transferred to Iskenderun, Turkey. Even so, the total of

US forces remained approximately twice that of the 7,000-man Lebanese Army23

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JCS and National Policy

In view of the operation's size and complexity, Admiral Holloway had proposed on 21 July that a two- or three-star Army or Marine general immediately

be assigned to command land forces as Commander, American Land Forces

(COMAMLANFOR). Two days later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved his

request. Major General Paul D. Adams, USA, was designated COMAMLANFOR.

Admiral Holloway retained "overall command and responsibility for major military and policy decisions." General Adams, with an Army and Marine staff,

directed all joint aspects of land operations and support planning in the Middle

East area; he also assisted Admiral Holloway in maintaining liaison with General

Chehab and other commanders. Adams reached Beirut from Germany on 24 July

and formally assumed the duties of COMAMLANFOR two days later.24

The availability of overflight and landing rights, which had worried the Joint

Chiefs of Staff so much, did pose some problems but never hampered operations.

On the evening of 15 July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised General Norstad that

the State Department was trying to obtain all necessary rights but so far had

received approval only from Turkey. If favorable replies were not received before

the airlifting of units began, he was authorized "to overfly France, Italy, and

Greece and land at Marseilles, Naples, and Athens."25

France and Italy gave their consent; Wheelus Air Base in Libya became available for limited use, provided there was no publicity. But Austria, which had

declared its "perpetual neutrality" in 1955, strongly protested when large numbers of US aircraft overflew the country on 16 July. The Austrian Government

declared that it was not in a position to permit overflights by "any state whatever." On 19 July, the US Ambassador in Vienna advised that any further overflights would seriously compromise the US moral and propaganda position. Both

the State Department and Headquarters, US Air Force, concurred. Since passage

over Switzerland also had been denied, aircraft flying from Germany to the Middle East had to take a 300-mile detour by way of France.26

The Greek Government cooperated within carefully circumscribed limits.

Concerned about possible reprisals against its nationals in Egypt and elsewhere,

Greece on 17 July forbade further landings on its territory. On the following day,

however, the US Air Force Attache in Athens reported that the Greek Air Force

was willing to ignore occasional landings, provided they attracted no undue

attention. On 19 July, the Greek Government officially modified its position to

that extent, with a stipulation that the destination of eastbound planes should be

Turkey only27

The immediate purpose of US military intervention, of course, was to stabilize

the political situation in Lebanon. President Eisenhower publicly pledged that US

troops would leave as soon as the United Nations took "further effective steps

designed to safeguard Lebanese independence." But the two superpowers

exchanged verbal pyrotechnics and, before the United Nations, blocked each

other's initiatives.28 A more productive path began opening when President Eisenhower's special political representative, Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert

Murphy, arrived in Beirut on 16 July. The US military presence, complemented by

Mr. Murphy's negotiations with factional leaders, restored a good measure of

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calm. On 31 July, the Lebanese Parliament elected General Chehab to succeed

Chamoun as President; Chehab's inauguration was set for 23 September.29

On 5 August, Admiral Holloway informed Admiral Burke that he had started

preparing plans for a phased withdrawal. General Chehab, he observed, could

hardly do otherwise than set the withdrawal of foreign forces as an early objective of his administration. The early departure of some Marine units, Holloway

believed, would aid Chehab in resisting extremists. His recommendation arrived

just as the Joint Chiefs of Staff were considering the same matter. Later that same

day, they directed Admiral Holloway to begin planning an "orderly but prompt"

withdrawal. Since the State Department had indicated the political desirability of

reducing US personnel, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Holloway a further message

asking him to propose more immediate reductions.30

Replying on 7 August, Admiral Holloway recommended that one Marine BLT

be embarked as a floating reserve, that the unloading of all except essential supplies be halted, and that a transport be held at Beirut to take aboard the Army

tank battalion if a larger withdrawal was decided upon. Within a few days, Holloway added, he and Ambassador McClintock would be discussing the Marine

BLT's embarkation with President-elect Chehab. After consulting the State

Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that approval of the Marines'

embarkation must await the outcome of that meeting. They approved the other

two recommendations.31

During the meeting on 11 August, President-elect Chehab deemed it important that the Marines' embarkation begin before the UN General Assembly

resumed its session on 13 August. A voluntary pullout, made with the Lebanese

Government's approval and before the Soviet UN delegation had a chance to

speak, would avoid any appearance that the United States had acted under a

Soviet threat. The Joint Chiefs of Staff promptly approved.

More embarkations followed. With the last of the Marines scheduled to leave

on 30 September and the political and security situation continuing to improve,

Admiral Holloway on 14 September recommended the withdrawal of heavy

Army equipment and service units as soon as shipping was available. Combat

units would be gone completely by 15 October. The Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized an initial withdrawal of Army service units. As for the remainder of the

troops, they advised Holloway that "the best answer we now have" was one

given informally by State Department spokesmen. Remaining forces, State

hoped, could be withdrawn by 31 October if conditions in Lebanon remained stable. A token force might have to stay, though, until the British left Jordan.

During the next three weeks Marines completed their withdrawal, heavy

Army equipment as well as various support units started returning to Europe,

and Admiral Holloway submitted timetables for the removal of all remaining

forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved this latest plan on 7 October. The final

elements actually sailed from Beirut on 25 October. The British completed their

withdrawal from Jordan on 2 November.

The disengagement from Lebanon took place at the very time, from early

August through October, when the Taiwan Straits crisis arose (see chapter 14).

Measures to prepare for possible hostilities with China had no direct impact on

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scheduled ground withdrawals from Lebanon, but one carrier and four destroyers were transferred from the Mediterranean to the Far East during the last week

of August. One further move indicated the rising concern over Taiwan. Admiral

Burke, on 17 July, had directed the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT), to put one reinforced Marine BLT aboard fast shipping and send it to

the Persian Gulf. After passing the tip of India, the task group came under Admiral Holloway's operational control on 1 August. Two days later, however, Admiral Burke directed the task group to return to Singapore and revert to CINCPACFLT's control.

What did the US intervention accomplish? Arguably, US credibility had been

bolstered and President Nasser's pan-Arab ambitions somewhat deflated. A relatively stable government was established in Beirut. But the United States had to

accept that Lebanon's new government would be neutralist, not pro-Western.

President Chamoun had officially endorsed the Eisenhower Doctrine; President

Chehab abrogated that endorsement. The country remained fairly peaceful until,

in the mid-1970s, long-simmering tensions erupted into a ruinous civil war.

It would be useful to consider why the US intervention of 1958 succeeded

while that of 1982-1984 failed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff fully supported the former but harbored serious reservations about the latter. During the latter intervention, American firepower was used to bolster a minority, sectarian regime, thereby making US forces participants in Lebanon's civil war. The 1958 intervention,

by contrast, never went beyond a "show of force." As Admiral Holloway reported, "The US military power in Lebanon was applied in the most restrained manner and did not result in death, wounds or property damage to any Lebanese or

foreign faction in Lebanon." Rules of engagement stipulated that "US military

forces would not fire unless fired upon, but if fired upon would return fire to the

source with the next larger weapon above that used against US forces." Some US

aircraft were damaged by ground fire, and one soldier was killed by sniper fire

on Beirut's outskirts. Yet, as the J-3 observed, no Lebanese faction resorted to

"direct or significant hostile action."32 Keeping US political aims modest and US

weapons unused may have been the keys to success.

War Plans Reworked

In October 1958, the Operations Directorate of the Joint Staff undertook to assess

"lessons learned" from the intervention. First, the J-3 reported, lack of a formal

checklist had led to some confusion within the Joint Staff about responsibilities

and procedures immediately after President Eisenhower decided to send in

troops. A list for each approved limited war plan ought to include draft messages,

alert and deployment measures, the degree of alert and force and force adjustments needed to maintain the general war posture, and mechanisms for coordination with other agencies. Also, the feasibility of a uniform alert system should

undergo study. The J-3 further noted that the Commander in Chief, Continental

Air Defense (CINCONAD), the Commander in Chief, Alaska (CINCAL), and the

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Commander in Chief, Caribbean (CINCARIB), had neither been provided with

Lebanon plans nor informed of the impending operation until after the Marines

had landed. That was done because of security factors as well as a belief that intervention was not likely to lead to general war. But, concluding that the possibility

of general war was inherent in any limited war operation, J-3 recommended providing every unified and specified command with all limited war plans (except

supersensitive ones) and informing them about pending operations and degrees

of alert. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved all these proposals on 31 October. On

25 August 1959, they established a uniform alert system with five conditions ranging from normal readiness (DEFCON 5) to the maximum posture (DEFCON l).33

The Lebanon intervention made only a modest impact upon subsequent war

plans. In mid-April 1959, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent unified and specified commanders an assessment of lessons learned that highlighted the problem of staging and overflight rights. The refusal of Austria and Switzerland to permit passage, plus the restrictions imposed by Greece, made alternate routes and staging

rights a primary concern of planners. Admiral Holloway applied this lesson

when preparing a revision of OPLAN 215-58, the plan for limited war operations

in the Middle East. The draft OPLAN 215-59, which he submitted to the Joint

Chiefs of Staff on 10 July 1959, listed primary and alternate air routes for specific

operations. Also, whereas OPLAN 215-58 had assumed that necessary transit

and overflight rights would be obtained before a plan was executed, OPLAN

215-59 specified that such clearances would be obtained when the Joint Chiefs of

Staff actually directed execution. Similarly, a determination whether to schedule

flights over countries that had not yet granted permission would be made "by

higher authority at the time.34

In general concept, draft OPLAN 215-59 differed little from its predecessor.

The separate section distinguishing operations under the Eisenhower Doctrine

from other situations disappeared. In addition to Lebanon, Jordan, and Saudi

Arabia, which had been included in OPLAN 215-58, the new plan provided for

military action in Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Sudan, and Ethiopia. The Joint Chiefs of

Staff approved the revision on 31 December 1959, subject to amendments that

included a number of changes in terminology applicable throughout it.

CINCNELM then rewrote the plan, which ultimately was issued on 14 March

1960 as OPLAN 215-60.35

The British, with scant success, pressed for an extension to the scope of combined US-UK planning. Late in July 1958, a planning group representing

CINCNELM and the British Chiefs of Staff began a study of the Persian Gulf

area. The Joint Chiefs of Staff favored this effort but continued to believe that any

revival of the US-UK Combined Chiefs of Staff organization of World War II was

undesirable. Accordingly, on 1 August, they dispatched tentative guidance to

CINCNELM and other commanders, applicable to all US-UK planning discussions. Talks relating to the Middle East could be undertaken at all levels,

exchange of information was authorized, and all commands would maintain

close liaison with the British. Use of the term "combined planning" would be

avoided, however, as would any suggestion of a combined staff arrangement. No

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commander could commit either US forces or the US Government in support of

any combined plan without specific JCS approval.36

On 23 August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent CINCNELM a reaffirmation of

their guidance with further elaboration: "In general, US military planning and

operations with the UK should be on the basis of coordination as distinguished

from combined or joint plans and operations." They did authorize coordinated

planning with respect to Libya and the Sudan. Force requirements could be

included in the plans, provided they were realistic and reasonably attainable.37

Under the informal designation "US/UK Planning Group," the planners in

London produced a series of studies over the next several months. In consonance

with JCS guidance, they were intended primarily to coordinate existing unilateral

plans rather than to devise new combined ones. The first, dealing with the Persian Gulf, was submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff early in September 1958. It

explored the effects of simultaneously implementing the British plan for Kuwait

and the US plan for intervention in Saudi Arabia, contained in OPLAN 215-58.38

Yet, as time would show, the planning group was kicking the dying embers of

Anglo-American collaboration. Soon the United Kingdom would start liquidating its role east of Suez.

A change in the dimensions of CINCNELM's other planning responsibilities

occurred during 1960. This came about, in part, from JCS consideration of a revision to the Middle East Emergency Defense Plan (EDP) for a general war. Review

of J-5's draft39 brought forth divergent views among the Joint Chiefs of Staff

regarding the extent to which CINCNELM should exercise general war responsibilities in the Middle East and whether he or CINCLANT should supervise planning for naval operations in the area. These differences highlighted a need for

fundamental decisions regarding CINCNELM's status.

On 3 February 1960, Secretary Gates issued a series of decisions designed to

"insure effective command arrangements in the Middle East, pending the establishment of a Middle East Command." To strengthen his role as a specified commander, CINCNELM would establish a unified staff, separate from the naval staff

that served him in his capacity as Navy component commander to USCINCEUR.

In this latter capacity he would henceforth be designated Commander in Chief,

US Naval Forces, Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR). As CINCNELM, he would undertake contingency planning and conduct such operations in the Middle East as the

Joint Chiefs of Staff might direct. The title, Commander in Chief, Specified Command, Middle East (CINCSPECOMME), went out of existence.40

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 16 March, approved Middle East EDP 1-60. No

doubt in recognition of the meagerness of US forces normally stationed in the

Middle East, the new plan spelled out a somewhat more modest mission than its

predecessor: Assist in conducting a strategic defense of the region during general

war, holding the approaches to the Cairo-Suez-Aden area and the Persian Gulf

"as far forward as possible in the CENTO [Central Treaty Organization] area."

Like its predecessor, EDP 1-60 stressed the importance of CENTO rather than US

forces; attacks launched by strategic retaliatory forces would constitute the major

US contribution.

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With the establishment of CINCNELM's unified staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

on 23 August assigned CINCNELM the responsibility for general war planning.

This planning responsibility had resided in the Joint Staff since February 1956,

being discharged first by the Joint Middle East Planning Committee and then by

the J-5. The change meant that future EDPs would not originate in the Joint Staff.

Rather, they would be drafted in CINCNELM's headquarters and then submitted

to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval.41

Containing Nasser

The Iraqi revolution, the Lebanon landing, and the British intervention in Jordan set in motion a reappraisal of the basic US policy towards the Middle

East. The existing statement, NSC 5801/1, had been adopted in January 1958. It

continued, with relatively little change, objectives dating back at least to 1954,

although it presented a new approach for dealing with them. In broad terms,

these objectives were:

1. Denial of the Middle East to communist domination.

2. Continued availability to the West of essential oil requirements and strategic

locations, including bases, communication, and transit rights.

3. Early resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict on a basis ensuring the continued

independence of Israel.

4. Economic and social development of the area that would not only further the

attainment of immediate US political goals but also promote long-term political

stability and friendly relations with the West.42

In reappraising these objectives, the NSC Planning Board questioned whether

some of them could be reconciled with the rise of "radical Pan-Arab nationalism"

and whether certain others were mutually compatible. The board suggested that

two objectives—denial of the area to communist domination and continued

availability of oil—were of overriding importance, the "bedrock minimum necessary to protect our interests." The remaining objectives were secondary and

might be sacrificed, if necessary, to ensure attainment of the "bedrock" ones.43

President Nasser's emergence as "symbol and leader" of pan-Arab nationalism, and the USSR's readiness to further its objectives by encouraging Arab distrust of the West, indicated to a majority of the Planning Board that the United

States should accept the fact of pan-Arab nationalism and seek a limited understanding with Nasser. To be cast in the role of Nasser's opponent, they felt, would

leave the Soviet Union as his champion. The question was how far to go in

accommodating US policy to the apparent reality of Nasser's primacy. Rigid US

opposition to Nasser simply did not strike them as a viable policy. However,

when the Planning Board's final draft went forward to the NSC on 3 October

1958, Defense and Treasury representatives filed a dissenting opinion.44

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JCS and National Policy

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, through a memorandum to Secretary McElroy dated

13 October, also challenged the majority view. On the basic issue, they defined

the problem as that of reversing the unfavorable trend in the Arab world, divorcing the pan-Arab movement from Nasser's leadership, and bringing a "legitimate" type of Arab nationalism to the fore. This had been the Defense-Treasury

position. The majority's draft, by contrast, had spoken of reaching an "understanding" with Nasser and other radical pan-Arab leaders and establishing a

working relationship with them.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that dealings with Nasser be confined

to specific problems involving relations with the United Arab Republic, not the

Arab world as a whole, and that the United States work more closely with "legitimate" Arab nationalism but not with aggressive types represented by Nasser. In

their judgment,

... the radical elements of Pan Arab nationalism, as symbolized by Nasser, are characterized by many elements inimical to basic US objectives in the Near East, such as:

unscrupulous expansionist tendencies; interference, including incitement to

violence, in the affairs of neighboring nations; and unfriendly propaganda activities

directed against other nations of the Near East, the West in general, and the United

States in particular.

A complete accommodation to Nasser, therefore, would "compromise basic

US principles."

The Planning Board's draft also contained divergent views on such subjects as

the Arab-Israeli dispute and the proper US attitude toward the development of

neutralism. The Joint Chiefs of Staff advocated adoption of what they considered

the more positive provision, the one calculated to produce an "active program to

win the Near Eastern States to the side of the Free World." They still believed, as

they had in 1957, that the United States should undertake immediate political initiatives looking toward an Arab-Israeli settlement.45

Noting that Saudi Arabia might curtail US rights at Dhahran Air Base or close

US facilities there, the draft declared that the United States should be prepared to

reduce or remove its personnel. The Joint Chiefs of Staff objected to including

such a statement. Dhahran was the only sizable military installation available in

the area, and there was a valid continuing requirement for its use. Accordingly,

barring political or economic blackmail by the Saudis, they opposed giving any

serious consideration to reductions or withdrawal.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also favored changing a statement that the United

States should provide "limited" military aid as a counter to Soviet offers. They

would substitute "sufficient military aid to meet the terms of Soviet offers," so that

planning and budgeting for this purpose would not fall short of the need. They

further recommended deleting a sentence indicating US readiness to continue aiding Iraq. Either asking Iraq to continue programs repudiated by the new regime or

offering aid before Iraq requested it could degrade US prestige in the area.46

As finally approved by President Eisenhower on 4 November 1958, NSC 5820/1

contained some modest changes from the initial draft that might be attributed to

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The Middle East: Lebanon and After

the JCS submission. The United States would "seek opportunities to take the initiative" regarding a broad settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Military aid to Middle Eastern states would be offered in "minimum" rather than "limited" amounts.

The only JCS recommendation accepted outright was deletion of the paragraph

concerning withdrawal from Dhahran. Conditions regarding military assistance to

Iraq had been stiffened and now came considerably closer to the JCS view. Sympathetic consideration would be given to continuing assistance in limited amounts, if

the Iraqis were prepared to cooperate in making such continuation fruitful. If not,

the administration would take the initiative in terminating aid.

On the basic question of relations with President Nasser, NSC 5820/1 had been

shaded somewhat toward the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, even to the extent

of using some of their phrases. Nonetheless, its main thrust was not the one they

had recommended. NSC 5820/1 did not differentiate sharply between "legitimate"

Arab nationalism and other brands when it set forth the following guidance:

Endeavor to establish an effective working relationship with Arab nationalism while

at the same time seeking constructively to influence and stabilize the movement and

to contain its outward thrust, and recognizing that a policy of US accommodation to

radical pan-Arab nationalism as symbolized by Nasser would include many elements

contrary to US interests.

The United States would seek to normalize relations with the United Arab

Republic and to deal with Nasser not as head of the Arab world but "as head of

the UAR on specific problems and issues, area-wide as well as local, affecting the

UAR's legitimate interests " While discreetly encouraging developments that

might lessen Nasser's predominant position, officials implementing this policy

must recognize that "too direct efforts" might prove counterproductive.

To sum up, NSC 5820/1 was unequivocal in defining the two primary objectives of US policy: denial of the area to Soviet domination and continued availability of enough oil to meet Western Europe's requirements. All other objectives,

including a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute, were subordinate and merely "desirable."47

Over the short term, matters did seem to improve. The NSC OCB, early in

1960, presented a report that called attention to a general lessening of tension in

the region. The board took particular note of an improvement in relations

between Nasser and the West, exemplified by resumption of diplomatic relations

between the UAR and the United Kingdom. The current situation, the OCB continued, did not justify as much emphasis on the aggressive, expansionist tendencies of radical pan-Arabism as NSC 5820/1 had placed on them. Furthermore, the

rapid development of new oil fields in North Africa had lessened Western

Europe's need for Middle East oil.48

The NSC Planning Board then produced a draft policy statement noting that

the dynamism of Arab nationalism had lost a good deal of its radical and unifying

appeal. The Arab states in general and Nasser in particular had shown a growing

awareness of the communist threat. The prevailing attitude of neutralism did not

necessarily pose an insurmountable obstacle to attaining US objectives. For the

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JCS and National Policy

United States, the major problem lay in the simple fact that the USSR had

achieved a "substantial entry" into the Middle East.

The board cited special problems peculiar to the area: the difficulty of maintaining a demonstrably impartial position in the Arab-Israeli dispute; King Hussein's dependence on the US and UK Governments; retaining friendly relations

with the Arab states while appropriately supporting vital British interests in the

area; and Western Europe's continued dependence on Middle East oil. The NSC

Planning Board was less sanguine than the OCB about the effect of North African

oil discoveries. The board's draft drew no distinction between primary and secondary objectives, except to say that continued denial of the area to Soviet domination remained of paramount importance. The Joint Chiefs of Staff found this

draft statement, NSC 6011, militarily acceptable. The NSC adopted it without

change on 15 July, and President Eisenhower approved it a few days later.49

Time would show that JCS fears of pan-Arab radicalism were exaggerated.

Arabs outside Egypt applauded President Nasser but would not embrace his

pan-Arab aspirations. The Arab-Israeli conflict, however, remained an enormous

obstacle to regional peace and to the increase of US influence. The Joint Chiefs of

Staff could feel justified in arguing that the United States would have to take the

initiative in seeking a settlement.

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11

What Role for CENTO?

The system of collective defense that emerged by 1957 presented what

appeared to be a globe-girdling wall of containment against communist expansion. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the west and the Southeast Asia

Treaty Organization (SEATO) in the east, linked by the Baghdad Pact in the

middle, seemed to provide a well-ordered design for the free world's defense. Yet

the pattern was more apparent than real. Disparate capabilities, dissimilar interests, and differing shades of concern for the threat so separated the three

alliances that a common role and single purpose could scarcely be taken for

granted. The United States was a pillar of NATO but kept SEATO at arm's length

and did not formally join the Baghdad Pact. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff

strongly advocated US membership in the Baghdad Pact and later in its successor, the Central Treaty Organization, the State Department blocked their recommendations. Secretary Dulles believed that, in the Middle East, US adherence

would be widely interpreted as a move against Arab unity. Also, at home, there

might be almost irresistible pressure to extend Israel a security guarantee.1

The Baghdad Pact's Demise

Created in 1955, the Baghdad Pact consisted of Iran, Iraq (its only Arab

member), Pakistan, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. In April 1956, the United States did join in the work of the Pact's Economic and Counter-Subversion Committees. Concurrently, the Pact's Military Committee accepted a US offer to have

the Joint Chiefs of Staff evaluate and comment on its studies. By March 1957, after

promulgating the Eisenhower Doctrine, the administration concluded that closer

association with the Pact (but not membership in it) had become politically feasible. One month later, after the State Department determined that Pact members

fully supported military ties with the United States, Washington publicly

announced its willingness to participate in the Pact's military planning activities.2

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JCS and National Policy

The United States joined the Military Committee in June 1957. By then, the

Joint Chiefs of Staff already had reviewed all strategic studies prepared by the

Pact's planners and found them generally compatible with US plans. But they

restricted their attention to general war situations resulting from Soviet or Sovietinspired aggression. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did so because the administration

judged that participation in limited war planning could lead to US involvement

in purely local disputes and thus prove just as politically objectionable as formal

membership in the Pact.3

The Joint Chiefs of Staff viewed strategic air attacks upon the Soviet Union as

the main US contribution to helping Pact members defend the mountain line in

eastern Turkey, Azerbaijan, the Elburz Mountains, and the northwestern frontier

of Pakistan. If that line was lost, there would be fallback positions in the Zagros

Mountain passes. For planning purposes, the US Element, Baghdad Pact

(USEBP), and appropriate Military Assistance Advisory Groups were told to

assume that small, specialized US units would aid the defenders. The Joint

Chiefs of Staff made clear to these commanders, however, that no US forces actually would be committed to protect the Pact area. During global war, defense of

the Middle East would depend largely on whether Pact members had succeeded

in substantially increasing their strength and subordinating strong national views

to the Pact's overall objective.4

A comparison of Joint Strategic Capabilities Plans would indicate that, as the

United States drew closer to the Pact, the Joint Chiefs of Staff enlarged their estimate of what territory could be defended. JSCP 56-58, approved in December

1956, stated that the allies should hold as a minimum the approaches to the CairoSuez-Aden area. One year later, JSCP-59 spoke of holding the approaches to the

Cairo-Suez-Aden area as well as the Persian Gulf area.5 A comparison of these

JSCPs with the JCS concept for employing Pact forces would lead to the following

conclusion: The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that, if Baghdad Pact forces failed to

hold the Elburz and then the Zagros lines, the West would be no worse off than if

the Pact had not existed. If Pact forces succeeded in their primary defense

missions, however, most of the Middle East might be denied to the Soviets.

Unfortunately, the Joint Chiefs of Staff encountered extreme difficulty in reconciling defense concepts they deemed militarily sound with what the State

Department judged politically acceptable. In January 1958, for example, Pakistan

wanted the Military Committee to discuss its study, "The Afghanistan Threat to

West Pakistan." The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended instructing the US representative to the Military Committee to regard tribal warfare as a form of limited

warfare and endorse, for planning purposes, consideration of the Afghan threat.

The State Department objected that doing so would broaden the Pact's objectives

into combating aggression from all quarters. Actually, State observed, Soviet

arms deliveries had not materially increased Afghan capabilities, and Afghan

claims that these arms were used mostly to maintain internal order deserved

some credence. State suspected that the Baghdad Pact had employed the phrase

"Communist-inspired and aided aggression" in order to give the study enough

respectability to elicit US approval.6

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What Rolefor CENTO?

Subsequent State-Defense meetings led to a conclusion that the US representative should disassociate himself from any discussion of the Afghan problem.

General Taylor, who acted as US representative when the Military Committee

met, induced the Pakistanis to delay placing their Afghan study before the

committee. But six months later both Pakistan and Iraq called for deliberations

on the Afghan menace, whereupon the United States formally disassociated itself

from this planning activity.7

Another interdepartmental dispute erupted in September 1957, when the Joint

Chiefs of Staff recommended appointing a US Military Representative for the

Middle East (USMILREPME), who would coordinate programs supporting the

region's defense. They saw no immediate need to create a US unified command

in the Middle East, because no US forces would be in the Pact area (Turkey

excepted) until hostilities began.8

Informal State-JCS conferences during November and December 1957 led the

State Department to conclude that such an appointment was politically infeasible,

because the USMILREPME "would inevitably become the target of Communist

and hostile Arab nationalist propaganda, and as such would increase tensions

within the area." The Joint Chiefs of Staff raised this issue again with Secretary

McElroy in May 1958. But, since the Secretary opposed taking action until the

State Department changed its position, the Joint Chiefs of Staff terminated their

consideration of this subject.9

The Joint Chiefs of Staff assigned priority to endorsing and aiding the development of an integrated command system for Pact forces. In their judgment,

creating the nucleus of a command structure—including an operational headquarters and communications system—was essential not only for mounting an

effective regional defense but also for overcoming an impression of US reluctance

to participate in the Pact's expansion of its planning activities.10

During negotiations leading to US participation in the Military Committee,

the administration had raised objections to a proposal by the Pact's Ministerial

Council to establish a command system. Laying that proposal aside, the Pact

instead set up a Combined Military Planning Staff (CMPS), authorized to develop defense plans but not to exercise either command or training functions. But

the State Department deemed establishment of a command structure premature.

First, State held, such an addition was not needed immediately; the CMPS should

be developed further before an even more ambitious structure replaced it. Second, doubt existed as to whether all Pact members—and particularly Iraqfavored a command system. Third, the United States would face pressure to

increase its financial and military commitments. The State and Defense Departments should estimate what this increase might be; a full appraisal of the

command proposal then could follow.11

The dovetailing of US and Baghdad Pact strategy depended significantly upon

the Pact's appreciation of the effects and value of nuclear operations. The Joint

Chiefs of Staff found that a study of the Pact's ground force requirements, undertaken by the CMPS in 1957, did not sufficiently recognize how strategic nuclear

strikes would affect operations by Soviet ground forces. US officials gave Pact

planners estimates of the anticipated results from nuclear strikes. Nonetheless, in

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JCS and National Policy

mid-1958, the Joint Chiefs of Staff still were disturbed by the planners' tendency to

minimize the consequences and military value of nuclear attacks.12

CENTO Inherits Seemingly Insoluble Problems

The Baghdad Pact's Council of Ministers, joined by Secretary Dulles but without any Iraqis, met in London during 28-29 July 1958. Participants signed a

declaration stating that "the need which called the Pact into being is greater than

ever," and noting that the United States had agreed to cooperate with members

"for their security and defense, and will promptly enter into agreements

designed to give effect to this cooperation." General Lyman Lemnitzer, Army

Vice Chief of Staff and a member of the US delegation, felt that the United States

had assumed most if not all the obligations of full membership. The State Department, however, affirmed the primacy of the Eisenhower Doctrine, which avoided

any specific commitments.13

On 8 October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered their Joint Middle East Planning Committee to look again at the question of US participation and membership in the Pact. Simultaneously, they advised Secretary McElroy that the Iraqi

revolution "made it more necessary than ever that the US demonstrate in a concrete manner its active support of the Pact." They envisaged a "peacetime nucleus headquarters" evolving along "classic J-type lines." Eventually, a command

system would prepare regional defense plans, coordinate and direct training and

combined exercises, provide the basis for establishing a wartime command post,

and plan for creation of subordinate headquarters. The Joint Chiefs of Staff

acknowledged that establishment of an integrated command system "would

probably have to be followed at some future date by the earmarking of forces."14

Coping with the Iraqi revolution's military consequences led to still another

State-JCS dispute. If Soviet forces invaded Iran's northern province of Azerbaijan,

four Iraqi divisions had been slated to defend the Zagros passes in northeastern

Iraq, adjacent to Iran. The Joint Chiefs of Staff contemplated possibly having Turkish divisions violate Iraq's neutrality in order to secure the Zagros passes; Iranian

divisions might supplement this effort. The State Department, seeing many obstacles to such a strategy, countered by asking: If Turkey violated the sovereignty of a

neutral Iraq which then joined forces with the Soviet Union, would not Iraq

invoke the United Arab Republic's obligations under the Arab Collective Security

Pact and the new United Arab Republic-Iraq alliance of 19 July 1958? Such a

development would certainly influence Lebanese, Saudi Arabian, and even

Jordanian reactions.15

On 15 November, President Eisenhower approved a statement of policy

toward the Middle East. According to NSC 5820/1, which is more fully described

in chapter 10, the administration would "avoid for the present any active efforts to

enlist Arab nations in regional collective security arrangements" and "acquiesce in

but not actively encourage Iraqi withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact." Ten days

earlier, General Twining had attended a meeting of the Pact's Military Committee.

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What Rolefor CENTO?

On 18 November, the Chairman circulated among his JCS colleagues a

memorandum that challenged NSC 5820/1:

US participation in the Military Committee without full membership in the Pact is

creating uncertainties and difficulties which will not further US interests in the area.

Some of the Pakistanis and the Iranians, in particular, seem to have three major

reservations as to intentions and attitudes of the US.

a. They believe that US positions taken in military planning are influenced too

much by State Department guidance, and that we are not capable of participation in pure military requirements planning. For example,... the Turks, Paks

and Iranians have definitely written off Iraq as hostile and read them out of the

party, while our political echelons are still attempting to "wean" Iraq away from

the Communists.

b. They do not understand our political motives in staying out of the Pact. In the

eyes of some of the planners, we wish to dictate military policy with no accompanying political responsibility. Our recognition of Iraq, our delicate handling

of those who murdered the pro-western regime, and our lack of position on the

trials of the remaining pro-western Iraqi leaders contribute to this uncertainty

in their minds.

c. Our aid to India is considered reward for neutrality; whereas our proven friends,

who are willing to stand up and be counted, are receiving less assistance than

required

I am convinced that our problems in this part of the world, like many others, are

more political and economic than military. Therefore, I believe that the JCS may have

to take the leadership in formulating specific recommendations for the Department

of State with respect to the political and economic factors which are slowly but

surely defeating military efforts in the Near and Middle East and in Africa.

On 2 December, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to end the JMEPC's study of

US participation in the pact and to make a fresh start.16

General Twining did not wait for completion of the new study. On 23

December, he sent Secretary McElroy an analysis that paralleled the one quoted

above. He recommended, as a matter of urgency, that the United States:

1. Become a full member of the treaty organization.

2. Support a strengthened staff structure that required, in the immediate future,

neither a supreme commander nor commitment of national forces.

3. Accept the Pact's force goals for planning purposes only, without promising

military aid for their realization.

On 7 January 1959, Secretary McElroy forwarded General Twining's paper to

the Secretary of State, together with his own endorsement.17

Shortly thereafter, the Joint Staff completed its study of US association with

the Pact. On 15 January 1959, just before the Pact's Council and Military Committee opened a meeting in Karachi, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary McElroy

a memorandum that supported and largely duplicated the one submitted by

General Twining. Additionally, though, they suggested measures that would

enable the United States to exercise more initiative in Pact affairs until US

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JCS and National Polio/

membership became politically feasible. The most important of these included

expediting the establishment of a command system, participating more actively

in the Pact's training exercises, and encouraging senior US military officers to

visit the treaty area under Pact auspices.18

On 16 January, just as OSD officials were starting to evaluate the JCS memorandum, Deputy Under Secretary of State Murphy delivered a critique of the

analysis prepared by General Twining and endorsed by Secretary McElroy. Murphy stated that US diplomats attending the Pact's Council sessions had not

encountered the criticisms cited by General Twining in his memorandum of 18

November. The State Department still firmly opposed US membership in the

Pact. Membership, Murphy wrote,

would reduce our capability to exercise a moderating influence in the Middle East as

a whole, and... we doubt that Senate consent to ratification could be obtained— In

our judgment, the Pact members understand fully our reasons for not adhering to the

Pact, and while perhaps preferring full adherence, are not unduly concerned over our

unwillingness to do so.

Assistant Secretary Sprague informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the State

Department's view constituted the US position.19

Aided by warnings from the US Ambassadors to Turkey and Iran, who

emphasized the necessity of convincing regional members that "the US seriously

intends to support the Pact," the Joint Chiefs of Staff in August 1959 reopened the

issue of US membership. The Pact's collapse, they cautioned Secretary McElroy,

would be a serious blow to US interests and have repercussions extending far

beyond the Middle East. Soviet pressure upon Iran might become overpowering,

and the likelihood of Soviet domination over both Iran and Iraq would greatly

increase. "A wedge could thus be driven between NATO and SEATO that would

weaken the collective security system of the whole Free World." Besides affirming that "it is militarily desirable that the US join the Pact now," the Joint Chiefs

of Staff suggested initiating a number of efforts to enhance the Pact's standing.

One of these was immediate establishment of a Permanent Military Deputies

Group (PMDG), whose Chief of Staff always would be a US officer. Agreeing

with most of these suggestions, including the PMDG, Assistant Secretary Irwin

advised the State Department that a thorough review of US policy was urgently

required. The JCS recommendation that a military representative to the PMDG be

appointed won Secretary McElroy's endorsement and, on 5 September, President

Eisenhower's approval. This was a three-star position, rotating among the Services. Lieutenant General Elmer J. Rogers, USAF, became US Representative

effective 1 January I960.20

During July 1959, three months after Iraq's formal withdrawal from the Pact, the

name Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) came into common usage. The need to

mesh US with CENTO planning seemed, if anything, greater than under the

Baghdad Pact. Increasingly, for instance, the activities of the Combined Military

Planning Staff clashed with major aspects of the administration's national security

concept. CENTO's members clung to their desire to prepare for contingencies

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What Rolefor CENTO?

arising from limited aggression and local insurrections as well as from general war.

Further planning, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed, likely would revive such problems as sharing US nuclear weapons and establishing a command system as well

as reveal the inadequacies of regional forces, leading to calls for US reinforcements

when in fact none would be available. Hence, in June and again in October 1959,

the Joint Chiefs of Staff advocated having CENTO prepare an emergency defense

plan, lay down a program for future studies, and set about creating a command

system. Such steps could create political difficulties, they admitted, but failure to

improve CENTO's capabilities and to build up members' confidence also would be

costly to US security interests.21

These recommendations drew from the State Department either reformulated

rejections or carefully qualified acceptances. State persisted in opposing US

membership. It agreed to the principle of US leadership in CENTO affairs, if US

aid programs and political-military commitments were not increased thereby.

State also sanctioned what it called a "practical" plan for the organization and

conduct of war, such as the Joint Chiefs of Staff had drafted in August. Written so

as to overcome political objections against full-scale contingency planning, the

JCS draft had split the CENTO area into Eastern, Central, and Western sectors,

defended respectively by Pakistani, Iranian, and Turkish forces. Pakistan, Iran,

and Turkey each would defend its own soil, without sending forces to other

members' territory. Coordination could be effected through the PMDG, with

CENTO's Council, Deputies, and Military Committee formulating overall guidance. Of course, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not regard such arrangements as

satisfactory substitutes for contingency planning and a command system.22

The year 1960 witnessed restatements of old arguments without any

resolution of them. The United States would not and perhaps could not deny

unequivocally that CENTO eventually might obtain low-yield nuclear weapons.

CENTO members therefore continued to assume the availability of such weapons

in their defense studies. So long as CENTO did this, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had

little choice but to object that this aspect of planning was unrealistic.23

Judging between CENTO's need for a command structure and its craving for

nuclear weapons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff probably assigned more importance to

the former. In March 1960, they again advocated creating a command system,

even though they admitted that doing so could lead to pressure for activating a

US Middle East Command, stationing forces in the area, and providing more aid

through the Military Assistance Program. The OSD reacted favorably at first but,

after learning that the State Department remained opposed, decided to accept

State's view.

The State Department did soften its position enough to favor contingency

planning for a command system that would be available "on a standby basis"

should the CENTO Ministerial Council decide such a structure was necessary and

politically desirable. Yet State still doubted whether, as the Joint Chiefs of Staff

believed, US opposition to a formal command structure would create a crisis of

confidence within CENTO.24

Ground defense of the treaty area also proved a contentious issue. The United

States hoped, as an essential minimum in general war, to prevent a Soviet

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JCS and National Policy

advance to the Mediterranean and the head of the Persian Gulf. By 1960, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff were giving more attention to the Persian Gulf, because NATO

planning already dealt with a Soviet thrust through Turkey to the Mediterranean.

Predictably, however, Iran and Pakistan refused to turn defense of the Persian

Gulf into a primary objective rather than a last resort. To them, that meant surrendering large parts of their territories without a fight. The Military Committee's

planning assumption read that CENTO's ground defenses should ensure the

integrity of the region "as a whole." Iran and Pakistan interpreted that as requiring preparations for a determined defense as close to the Soviet border as

possible. A desire by the Shah to become CENTO's commander, if only in a titular

capacity, added another complication. Would the JCS concept for emphasizing

protection of the Persian Gulf be implemented by a commander who harbored

serious reservations about it?25

In September 1960, the PMDG endorsed a plan to delineate CENTO's defense

and command zones according to national boundaries. This was substantially the

"practical" plan outlined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and endorsed by the State

Department. Yet CENTO's incomplete structure allowed regional members to give

special if not overriding consideration to local problems and interests. Pakistan,

for instance, rated the threat from India greater than any other, including the

USSR. Consequently, Pakistan deployed 5M US-supported divisions to meet that

threat and considered them unavailable for CENTO's plans. The Pakistanis listed

only twenty thousand border guards as being available for CENTO planning.26

Military planning, then, remained ineffective. The Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that

many of CENTO's deficiencies flowed from one source: an insufficiently positive

US approach to the treaty organization, its weaknesses, and its development.

Accordingly, in October 1960, they sent Secretary Gates a "systematic" analysis of

CENTO's military importance. They began by saying that, after five years of existence, CENTO still had no command organization, no agreed military plans, no

effective liaison with NATO and SEATO, no arrangements for tactical nuclear

support, and no modern air defense equipment. The Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that

three considerations largely defined US interests in the Middle East. These were:

1. CENTO's regional members formed a land barrier to Soviet expansion into the

Middle East and Africa as well as to Soviet efforts to "reach the warm seas."

2. By land, sea, and air the Middle East served as a crossroads linking three continents.

3. Middle East oil would remain significant to Western Europe for many years to come.

Thus a strong CENTO would make up a vital strand in the chain of

containment.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff rated a moderately improved defensive posture for

CENTO to be both feasible and desirable. Such an effort, they added, need not

require the United States either to invest a disproportionate share of its resources

nor to shoulder unacceptable political burdens. What would be required of the

United States was a more positive approach to CENTO. After describing Iran as

"the soft spot in the CENTO defense line," the Joint Chiefs of Staff listed a

number of specific steps that could improve CENTO's effectiveness. Besides the

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What Rolefor CENTO?

familiar ones of US membership and a command structure, they mentioned programming Hawk surface-to-air missiles for Iran and Pakistan, arranging formal

liaison with NATO and SEATO, and allocating very limited numbers of tactical

nuclear weapons, controlled by US personnel, in support of all CENTO forces.

Deputy Secretary Douglas forwarded the JCS views to Secretary Herter on

31 October and asked for urgent State-Defense consultations about it.27 But the

national election occurred only eight days later, and nothing more transpired

before the new president took office.

Reflections

The United States never joined CENTO, and CENTO never reached anything

like a robust state. Yet the wisdom of hindsight casts doubt upon JCS claims

that full US membership would have generated among regional members both

confidence in and willingness to sacrifice for an anti-Soviet defense policy. Could

anything, for instance, have persuaded Pakistan's leaders to put aside their fear

of an attack by India? Moreover, the State Department was probably right when

it found the same major flaw in almost every JCS proposal for nourishing

CENTO's viability: CENTO's military posture might well be improved but at the

expense of US interests in the Middle East as a whole. The State Department

believed that a policy of strengthening CENTO would only accentuate the differences between CENTO's regional members and their Middle Eastern neighbors.

The result, State felt, would undercut attempts to demonstrate that friendly relations with the United States were not incompatible with either Arab nationalism

or nonalignment. These considerations, plus a reluctance to assume greater commitments that might inescapably follow joining CENTO, led the administration to

reject most JCS recommendations. Thus CENTO fell between two stools, neither

doing much to enhance US objectives in the Middle East nor creating a strong

barrier against the spread of Soviet influence.

175
12

Cuba Becomes a Communist State

After a left-leaning government in Guatemala was toppled during 1954, the

Eisenhower administration relegated Latin America to a low priority. The Cuban

revolution changed that. In January 1959, Fidel Castro took power and soon led

Cuba into a virtual alliance with the Soviet Union. Thus communism gained a

foothold in the Western Hemisphere. Many Latin American governments were

either dictatorships or oligarchies with little popular support; Cuba might be a

harbinger of more leftist revolutions. By the summer of 1960, the National

Security Council was discussing Cuba practically every week.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were in the forefront of those urging strong action

against Cuba. Even before Castro came to power, they warned their superiors

against undercutting the existing government because they suspected that Castro

harbored communist inclinations. By early 1960, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed

that Castro's regime had become such a serious threat to US security that

multilateral or even unilateral military intervention would be justified. The

Eisenhower administration decided that anticommunist exiles would be

organized and trained to invade Cuba.

The Fall of Batista

Fidel Castro first tried and failed to overthrow the dictatorship of Fulgencio

Batista in 1953. Three years later, he and a handful of followers landed in eastern Cuba and began battling government forces from the remote fastness of the

Sierra Maestra Mountains. Batista resorted to ever harsher repression, thereby

driving more Cubans into Castro's camp. Slowly but steadily, Castro's guerrillas

gained strength.

The United States could not avoid at least the appearance of taking sides in

Cuba's civil war. Between FY 1953 and FY 1958, Cuba received $9.8 million in

grant military aid. The objective of this aid program, like those for other Latin

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JCS and National Policy

American nations, was to provide military assistance "essential to the continued

and increased effectiveness of those forces which are a necessary contribution to

the defense of the hemisphere." The State and Defense Departments put a broader

interpretation on this guidance by ranking the results to be sought from Latin aid

programs in the following order: first, protect the military investment that already

had been made, giving emphasis to maintenance and training; second, strengthen

hemisphere defense through internal security and local protective measures; third,

encourage political stability and a pro-US orientation.1 Thus internal security and

political stability were considered elements of hemisphere defense.

In 1958, the Defense Department listed Cuban forces required for hemisphere

defense as three infantry battalions, three destroyer escorts, three patrol vessels,

eight minesweepers, nine anti-submarine warfare (ASW) patrol aircraft, and one

transport and one fighter-bomber squadron. One infantry battalion as well as all

naval and air forces except the minesweepers and one patrol vessel were eligible

for MAP support by grant aid. Of course, to contend with Castro's guerrillas and

other dissidents, Batista was maintaining a considerably larger force. This raised

the issue of whether the United States was soiling its image through identification,

albeit indirectly, with a dictator. Much of the grant aid had been devoted to training Cuban officers in the United States. By June 1958, for example, 75 percent of

the air force's pilots and almost all its technicians had attended US courses.2

Under the provisions of a 1952 bilateral agreement, Cuba could not use military aid for purposes other than those for which it was given, without prior

approval by the United States. Of course, Batista would have been extremely

hard put to fight the insurgents without employing either equipment obtained

from the United States or personnel trained there. On 14 March 1958, the State

Department decided that Batista was violating the 1952 agreement; it suspended

action on all Cuban arms requests and shipments.3

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had not been consulted about this decision. On 19

April, Admiral Burke informed his JCS colleagues that he viewed the suspension

as inconsistent with national policy. The Cuban Government, he thought, could

well construe it as an unfriendly act or at least as "an unwarranted adjudication

by the US Government of actions taken by a friendly government to suppress

elements of rebellion." He wanted the Joint Chiefs of Staff to recommend a

resumption of deliveries. After a JCS discussion, during which General White

recommended waiting until State's views became better known, Admiral Burke

withdrew his recommendation.4

On 15 June, at the State Department's instruction, the US Ambassador asked

the Cuban Government to withdraw all MAP equipment and MAP-trained

personnel from operations against the insurgents. Although the Office of International Security Affairs had agreed to State's instruction "in substance," the Joint

Chiefs of Staff again had been neither consulted nor informed beforehand. Admiral Burke cautioned his colleagues against endorsing a policy that MAP forces

could be used only as permitted by the United States. If such a policy was

applied universally, he argued, countries like Cuba where revolutions were "a

normal political gambit" would be increasingly reluctant to accept US aid and

would look elsewhere for training and equipment. "The importance of keeping

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Cuba Becomes a Communist State

these countries in the Western orbit," he continued, "transcends the importance

of insisting upon a literal interpretation of the MDA agreement." At a State-JCS

meeting on 27 June, Admiral Burke argued that "we were trying to tell a sovereign nation what to do." Batista's army, he said, was "fighting elements allied

with communism." By requiring withdrawal of MAP equipment and MAPtrained personnel, the United States in effect would be aiding the insurgents.

General Taylor also voiced surprise at State's action, since internal stability was a

major objective of the Mutual Security Program. In response, State and Defense

agreed to restudy this issue.5

Before a decision was reached, Castro found a way to strike at Batista through

the United States. Near the US naval base at Guantanamo, on the evening of 27

June 1958, his guerrillas seized a bus and abducted the thirty Navy and Marine

Corps enlisted men aboard. Two weeks later, they were still being held hostage and

US prestige was beginning to suffer. On 12 July, at Admiral Burke's instigation, the

Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to Secretary McElroy that the administration

remove all restrictions on military aid to the Batista government, request that government to obtain the hostages' release within seventy-two hours, offer any assistance necessary to that end, and start moving a Marine Regimental Landing Team

to Guantanamo. Concurrently, the Cuban Government should be asked to let US

forces help recover the hostages if they were not released within seventy-two

hours, and the guerrillas warned accordingly. No action resulted, though, because

on 18 July the guerrillas unexpectedly released all hostages. Castro probably felt

that he had achieved his objectives of demonstrating Batista's impotence and

embarrassing the United States as well.6

Congress, meantime, had displayed increasing concern about instability in

Latin America and the possible misuse of military aid. As a result, the Mutual

Security Act signed by President Eisenhower on 30 June 1958 stipulated that

"internal security requirements shall not normally be the basis for military assistance programs to the American Republics." The Defense Department's Programming Guidance dated 15 July incorporated this guidance word for word, although

"political stability" remained a major objective of the Mutual Security Program.7

The administration did approve selling very small amounts of noncombat

equipment to Batista's government. By the beginning of December 1958, however,

Castro's insurgents were rapidly gaining ground. General White, on 9 December,

told his JCS colleagues that he believed the arms embargo was doing a

considerable amount of harm. Goodwill between the two governments was being

dissipated, he maintained. Moreover, the effectiveness of US military missions had

been reduced and the Batista government's efforts to end the insurgency obstructed. The insurgents, according to General White, were "in league with communism." The Batista government's efforts, on the other hand, were being directed

toward protecting lives and property (including US investments) as well as maintaining law and order. He noted that an election had just taken place. Nonetheless,

the rebels continued to oppose "the duly elected government by armed violence."8

In these circumstances, withholding support was contrary to "official broad US

policy toward Latin America." General White favored, a JCS recommendation to

end the embargo, reemphasize the importance of adhering to "agreed US policy

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]CS and National Policy

toward Latin America," and strengthen relationships and goodwill between the US

and Cuban Governments.9

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved this recommendation on 23 December, after

amending General White's reference to the insurgents' link with communism to

read that Castro's organization had "undoubtedly been penetrated by Communists." By 30 December, when they forwarded this paper to Secretary McElroy,

Batista's days in power were clearly numbered. At an interdepartmental meeting

held on New Year's Eve, discussion centered upon what the successor regime

might look like. Admiral Burke remarked that "even though we grant Castro is not

a Communist the situation appears to be very good for a Communist take-over."I0

Confrontation with Castro

On 1 January 1959, Fulgencio Batista fled Cuba. After Castro took power, the

question of communist influence within his regime quickly became the central one for US policymakers. Condemnations of Yankee imperialism became a

staple of Castro's rhetoric; expropriations of US-owned businesses occurred at an

accelerating pace. In July 1959, Secretary of State Christian Herter decided that

"we could no longer work with the Cuban government." But the administration

delayed definitive action until, late in October, Castro purged "moderates" from

his government and bitterly denounced the United States. Accordingly, early in

November, President Eisenhower decided that "all actions and policies of the

United States government should be designed to encourage within Cuba and

elsewhere in Latin America opposition to the extremist, anti-American course of

the Castro regime— " "

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 6 November 1959, directed ONCLANT to prepare

plans for (1) the protection of US nationals as well as US equipment and property

and (2) armed intervention in Cuba, either unilaterally or sponsored by the Organization of American States (OAS). Then, on 13 February 1960, the Cuban and

Soviet Governments signed agreements whereby the USSR undertook to supply

$100 million in credits, provide technical assistance for constructing industrial

facilities, and purchase five million tons of sugar over five years. Castro was

making his course clear to the world.

Admiral Burke emerged once more as the advocate of a forceful policy. On 19

February, he warned his JCS colleagues that little time remained "to stem the

Kremlin's incursion into this hemisphere." Consequently, Admiral Burke advocated initiating measures that would lead to "the establishment of a stable,

friendly, non-communist government in Cuba." He circulated a study that outlined three alternatives: multilateral action through the Organization of American

States, unilateral overt action by the United States, and covert unilateral US

action. Burke recommended a sequence of steps. He suggested immediately

documenting and publicizing the fact of a communist takeover, covertly supporting the Cuban opposition, and being prepared to use force in safeguarding and

evacuating US nationals.12 After gaining sufficient support among members, the

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Cuba Becomes a Communist State

United States should have the Organization of American States call upon Cuba to

place herself under OAS auspices. If that failed, forcible intervention by the OAS

would be the next step. As a last resort, or if time did not permit multilateral

action, the United States should be ready to act militarily by itself.13

On 2 March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary McElroy that the

Cuban Government "appears to be following the path of International Communism." Since such a regime would pose "a direct threat to the security of the

United States" and provide a base for spreading communist influence in the

Western Hemisphere, the Joint Chiefs of Staff favored "positive action" to

reestablish a friendly government. To further that end, they recommended bringing Admiral Burke's study to the attention of the National Security Council. Five

days earlier, in fact, Admiral Burke had sent copies of it to State and ISA.14

On 10 March, the NSC discussed policy options. Admiral Burke, who attended as Acting Chairman, had an opportunity to mention the study's alternatives.

That same day, Under Secretary of State Livingston Merchant assured Admiral

Burke by letter that most of the actions mentioned in the study "were initiated

some time ago and are constantly being intensified." Merchant defined the primary US objective as creating "an effective, patriotic movement friendly to the

United States within Cuba and among Cuban exiles "

At a State-JCS meeting on 11 March, it was brought out that the Joint Chiefs of

Staff had approved plans for multilateral or unilateral intervention, which could

be put into effect on a few hours' notice. A State Department representative said

that anti-Castro activities were proceeding slowly, in part because the current

National Intelligence Estimate stated that Cuba was not Communist dominated.

Admiral Burke replied that "if the Cuban Government was not communist nevertheless it was still acting like a communist government." In closing, Burke

emphasized "how disturbed he and the Chiefs were over the Cuban situation

and asked that Mr. Merchant let them know what they could do about it." Subsequently, Admiral Burke decided against forwarding the JCS memorandum of 2

March to the NSC. Instead, he gave copies of the correspondence between himself and Under Secretary Merchant to the President's Special Assistant for

National Security Affairs.15

Much more was afoot. The "5412 Committee," an NSC subcommittee which

reviewed covert action proposals, produced a plan for toppling Castro. The first

step would be to form a moderate opposition group in exile. Then, over perhaps

eight months, a paramilitary force of exiles would be organized and trained outside the United States. Cadres then would reenter Cuba to organize and lead

resistance forces. On 17 March, at a White House conference attended by Admiral Burke, President Eisenhower decided to go ahead with this plan, saying that

he knew of none better for dealing with the situation.16 This was the genesis of

what became the landing at the Bay of Pigs.

Any doubts about Fidel Castro's intentions disappeared during the summer of

1960. When US-owned refineries refused to accept Soviet oil, Castro nationalized

them. After the Eisenhower administration drastically reduced Cuba's sugar

quota, Castro appealed to the UN Security Council for protection against

"reprisals and aggressive acts" by the United States. Moscow offered protection.

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JCS and National Policy

On 9 July Premier Khrushchev declared that, "Figuratively speaking, in case of

need Soviet artillerymen can support the Cuban people with their rocket fire if the

aggressive forces in the Pentagon dare to launch an intervention against Cuba."17

Castro promptly began acquiring an arsenal. Early in September, the first major

arms shipment from the Soviet bloc reached Cuba; it included ten tanks and one

hundred antiaircraft guns. At an NSC meeting later that month, the Director, Central Intelligence, gave his judgment that Cuba had become "virtually a member of

the Communist Bloc." When Castro addressed the UN General Assembly on 26

September, Admiral Burke found in his speech indications that Castro might

declare null and void the treaty under which the United States maintained Guantanamo Naval Base. At Admiral Burke's urging, on 29 September the Joint Chiefs

of Staff told Secretary Gates that they assumed Guantanamo would remain a US

base even if Castro denounced the treaty, and that it would be defended against all

forms of pressure including military attack. They wanted him to obtain State's formal concurrence that this was indeed US policy.18

During a State-JCS meeting on 30 September, Under Secretary Merchant

raised the subject of Guantanamo. He doubted whether the Cuban leader would

do more than talk because US retention of Guantanamo had much value for Castro as an emotional propaganda issue. General White, in a humorous vein,

inquired "whether it was time to turn Cuba back to Spain." General Twining

asked what State's position would be if Castro did attack. Should Cubans fire the

first shot, Merchant replied, "then all bets are off for in effect we are at war with

the Castro regime."19

The administration evidently pinned its hopes upon what the paramilitary

force of exiles would do. Central Intelligence organized and directed this force. But

efforts to launch guerrilla operations in the Escambray Mountains did not fare

well. Accordingly, early in December, the concept of operations underwent a major

change. After preliminary air strikes, 600-750 heavily armed men would land in

Cuba. This force would hold a beachhead with the aim of attracting dissidents and,

ultimately, triggering a general uprising.20 Preparations would not be completed,

though, until some time after the next President took office. Crucial decisions

would await the new administration.

Conclusion

Viewed solely from the JCS perspective, Cuban policymaking seems to be the

story of Admiral Burke and not that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is hard to

find another instance where one member—who was not the Chairman, but a Service Chief—took such a dominant position. Admiral Burke detected a communist danger very early and was among the first to contemplate military intervention. No doubt the fact that Cuba lay within CINCLANTs area of responsibility

helped account for his high profile. Beyond that, personal conviction and a forceful personality must also have contributed. Consequently, in this case, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff followed his lead and the corporate body became an extension of

one individual.

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13

The Cold War Comes to Africa

Defining a More Active Policy

The ending of European colonial rule over much of sub-Sahara Africa compelled US policymakers to deal with a part of the world which, until now,

they had been able to ignore. In 1957, Great Britain's Gold Coast colony became

the independent nation of Ghana; Nigeria won its sovereignty in 1960. Guinea,

in 1958, severed all ties with France; Togoland and the Cameroons gained their

independence two years later. In 1960, Italy and Great Britain relinquished

Somalia while Belgium ended its rule over the Congo. Thus, during President

Eisenhower's second term, the political face of sub-Sahara Africa changed

beyond recognition.

The NSC Planning Board, in July 1957, circulated a draft statement proposing

what policy should be during the next three years. Sub-Sahara Africa, the draft

noted, was a primary source of several strategic materials and potentially a major

market for US goods. The region offered alternative air and sea routes to the Far

East which, in communist hands, would pose a strategic threat to the West.

Finally, serious disorders might cause a military drain on several NATO partners

and weaken Western Europe's economy.

The draft outlined a series of diplomatic, scientific, economic, cultural, and

psychological activities designed to convince the emerging African states that

their interests lay in close association with the West. No military action or assistance programs were contemplated, and the draft merely called for periodic surveys to determine any changes in US strategic requirements. On 16 August, the

Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed this approach. One week later, President Eisenhower approved the draft as NSC 5719/1, after the National Security Council added a

phrase that indicated "growing concern" about potential communist influence.

The Council also noted remarks by General Twining about the strategic importance of sub-Sahara Africa.1

Almost one year later, the NSC Planning Board decided to revise the military

and strategic portions of NSC 5719/1. It eliminated a description of the region's

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JCS and National Policy

strategic value as "limited." A statement about the importance of denying the

area to communist control became instead a positive assertion that "it is essential

that the United States take the necessary steps to ensure denial of this potentially

critical area to the Communists." The NSC Planners repeated their earlier conclusion that no immediate action seemed necessary, apart from keeping the area

under periodic survey. They also added a recommendation that the administration pursue "political accommodation that would promote assurance of early

success if base rights are needed in the future."2

The Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted a still more radical revision. Writing to Secretary McElroy on 1 August 1958, they noted that communist efforts to infiltrate

Africa likely would intensify and that recent events in the Middle East had put

US lines of communication at greater risk, thus enhancing the strategic importance of sub-Sahara Africa. Therefore, they took issue with the Planning Board's

conclusion that "no immediate action appears called for." They favored deleting

that statement and adding language that "the United States should now develop

political accommodation that would promote assurance of early success."

Through a paragraph added at Admiral Burke's behest, the Joint Chiefs of

Staff urged that US policy reflect "the increasing strategic significance of the

area from the military aspects, particularly in light of the dangers inherent in

any further Communist penetration." They stressed the need for "vigorous"

implementation of policy and used the adjective again in calling for "a modest

but vigorous national program employing all instruments of national power to

create a strong US position in Central Africa, an area in which the United States

should exert much more interest than it has in the past." These views went to

the NSC on 5 August.3

During an NSC discussion on 7 August, General White suggested that the Services could prepare the way for establishing naval bases, air routes, and guided

missile sites. President Eisenhower disagreed, saying that education and cultural

relations should come first: "We must win Africa, but we can't win it by military

activity." The Planning Board then developed a new version of the policy paper,

which the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed on 20 August. The NSC accepted it and,

with President Eisenhower's approval, on 26 August promulgated the new policy

as NSC 5818. Paragraph 11 of NSC 5719/1 had warned that the African people,

uncommitted as yet, would in the long run shape their course according to their

own best interests. Therefore, US policies must convince them that their goals

could be best and most advantageously achieved by association with the West.

These policies could not be effective "if the African feels he is merely a pawn in a

power struggle." The Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended revision to reflect "a

positive and timely approach." The NSC decided merely to substitute wording

that US policies must "be designed to convince the African that the United States

wants to help him achieve his economic, political and cultural goals without

insisting that he align himself in the East-West power struggle." The new

guidelines were, if anything, less assertive than the old.

The other relevant paragraphs in NSC 5818 read as follows:

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The Cold War Comes to Africa

19. The military and strategic value of the area arises from its strategic materials and

geographic location, especially with reference to sea and air routes alternate to

those through the Middle East.

20. Policy Guidance: The area should be kept under periodic survey to determine any

changes in our strategic requirements. Moreover, the United States should,

through economic, political, and cultural means, develop a political climate which

would facilitate early success if base rights are needed in the future.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had proposed two changes in paragraph 20. One—

that the disavowal of a need for immediate action be eliminated—won adoption.

The other—that the United States should "now" develop political accommodation—lost out to language that was a shade more specific but struck no note of

urgency.4 All told, NSC 5818 did not point the way to a "modest but vigorous

national program" as advocated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In September 1959, as the rush toward independence accelerated across

Africa, the NSC OCB proposed that a policy review take place. The Planning

Board prepared two draft statements as the OCB recommended, one covering

South, Central, and East Africa, the other dealing with West Africa. The policy

proposed for South, Central, and East Africa5differed from NSC 5818 mainly in

emphasis, as the following quotations from the new draft demonstrate:

7. In the event of war or loss of Western access to air and sea routes through the

Middle East, control of sea and air communications in this area of Africa would

be extremely important. Under these circumstances, our primary strategic military interest is to deny the area to Communist control. In the future, moreover,

there may be more significant requirements (military and other) for US use of

rights and facilities in the area. Installations in this area are already becoming

increasingly important to US research and development in, and exploitation of,

the fields of outer space, missile weaponry, and world-wide communications

24. Keep the area under periodic survey to determine any changes in the US appraisal of its strategic value to the United States, bearing in mind that the United States

may, in the future, require bases or facilities.

25. Discourage the development of an arms race in Africa and of the concept that the

United States is prepared to provide military assistance to any nation which desires

it. As countries in the area become independent, encourage them to maintain adequately equipped and trained internal security forces. In those cases where external

assistance is required for this purpose, encourage the appropriate former metropole

to provide such assistance. If this approach fails and if required to achieve US objectives, consider providing US assistance to meet minimum legitimate security

requirements, including technical training in US military institutions.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff found this statement acceptable and so informed Secretary Gates on 8 January 1960. The NSC adopted it six days later. After receiving

President Eisenhower's approval, it was circulated for implementation as NSC

6001 on 19 January.6

The policy paper for West Africa corresponded closely with NSC 6001. Here,

too, the dislocations and disruption likely to attend the first stages of independence would provide opportunities for communist penetration and exploitation.

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]CS and National Policy

An additional guideline was inserted, however, upon the recommendation of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff. In order to keep adequately informed of regional military

developments, they said, the presence of "technically competent observers"

appeared mandatory. On 7 April 1960, the NSC accepted this addition, with the

proviso that each case of establishing military observers would be subject to the

Secretary of State's approval. Two days later President Eisenhower approved the

amended policy statement, and it was issued as NSC 6005/1.7

The Joint Chiefs of Staff bore responsibility for periodically surveying Africa's

strategic importance and for helping the Assistant Secretary (ISA) support the

State Department's efforts to project US influence into the area. They sought State

Department approval for establishing military attache offices in some states as

soon as they achieved independence and augmenting other offices already in

being. The State Department, concerned lest the presence of additional attaches

provoke an arms race or be viewed by the former colonial powers as a US attempt

to supplant their influence, was unwilling to approve these requests in full. On 20

June 1960, State and Defense representatives agreed that full attache offices would

be created in Ghana, Liberia, and Nigeria. In the Belgian Congo, then on the verge

of independence, a two-man office was to be created. A decision about requirements for the Mali Federation, Guinea, and Kenya would be deferred.8

The time-honored practice of "showing the flag" offered another way for the

military to help advance foreign policy objectives. In 1958 and again in 1959,

naval units of the South Atlantic Force made goodwill cruises to African ports.

During the summer of 1960, as troubles in the Congo worsened, the Navy informally proposed to the State Department and the Joint Staff that a small task force

sail to southern African waters. Admiral Burke advised his JCS colleagues that

maintaining a presence, for four or five months, of two destroyers and two landing ships with one Marine company embarked would foster goodwill through

port visits, publicize US capabilities to assist local governments, and be prepared

for evacuation missions as well as unilateral action.9

The Army doubted whether Admiral Burke's proposal met current conditions in Africa; the Air Force deplored its failure to recognize the United

Nations' interest. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 28 September, decided that they

need take no action. Such cruises, they indicated, were within the scope of CINCLANT's discretionary authority. Accordingly, during the winter of 1960-1961,

the Commander, South Atlantic Force, sent a small number of ships to cruise

and visit ports.10

Meantime, in April 1960, the NSC had initiated a review of US policy toward

sub-Sahara Africa. In July the State Department circulated a discussion paper

noting that, between 1960 and 1962, at least twenty African states, many of them

lacking stable political and administrative systems, would become independent.

Most disturbing for US policy, according to State, was the probability that withdrawal of European control would provide "an unparalleled opportunity" for

Soviet bloc penetration.

The State Department saw no alternative to relying upon the former colonial

powers, or metropoles, as aid providers. However, Africans' suspicions toward

their former rulers and the Europeans' declining political influence lent

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The Cold War Comes to Africa

increasing importance to the United Nations as a vehicle for economic and

technical assistance. The United States should simplify, or be prepared to

waive, some of its more cumbersome aid formalities, in order to respond quickly when crises arose. Furthermore, the United States must identify itself with

Africans' legitimate aspirations, even though doing so would strain US ties

with Europe. As for military assistance, the State Department defined the problem as preventing new states from dissipating resources on establishments that

were beyond their needs, while still encouraging them to look to the West for

their legitimate needs. The answer, State seemed to suggest, might lie in some

sort of international control over arms shipments.11

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, through a critique dated 28 July, characterized the

Department of State's treatment of military assistance as "hesitant and timid," particularly in comparison with the approach taken toward technical and economic

aid. The State Department, they said, seemed "acutely preoccupied with efforts to

avoid an arms race in Africa." This was a desirable objective, but overemphasizing it might jeopardize US security interests at critical moments when prompt

action became necessary. A timely, effective Military Assistance Program should

derive from an assessment of how much each new state mattered to US interests,

early knowledge of whether the metropole intended to extend aid, and evaluation

of how a new state would respond to aid from the metropole.12

The NSC Planning Board produced a revised paper with some minor revisions (e.g., placing more stress on Chinese Communist activities). The Joint

Chiefs of Staff considered their criticisms equally applicable to it, and their views

were made known to the NSC on 16 August. Two days later, the National Security Council directed its planners to review NSC 6001 and 6005/1. When the year

ended, though, no changes had occurred.13

The difficulties of prescribing one general policy for a mosaic of states were all

too clear. In particular, the legacy of colonialism militated against attaining the

basic US objective, to prevent communist powers from gaining a foothold in the

region. Communism and its pitfalls were quite remote from the Africans' experience. Conversely, the rallying cry of nationalism, sometimes reinforced by racial

appeals, struck responsive chords. Wherever the interests of the metropole and

the aspirations of the local populace failed to coincide, the United States found

itself caught between the two. The Congo crisis, described below, provides a case

study of such a dilemma.

The Congo: UN or US Intervention?

On 30 June 1960, the Belgian Congo became the Republic of the Congo, with

Patrice Lumumba as its Prime Minister and Joseph Kasavubu as Head of

State.14 Lumumba's fiery personality, coupled with his party's emergence as the

largest single bloc in the Chamber of Representatives, won him far more

prominence than any other Congolese leader. Hardly had independence

celebrations ended when the new nation began dissolving in anarchy. Congolese

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JCS and National Policy

soldiers in a provincial town mutinied on 5 July. Other units broke apart and

chaos spread rapidly across the country. By 7 July, terrified Europeans were pouring into the capital of Leopoldville and across the river to Brazzaville in the

French Congo. The Belgian Government, which still had 2,500 troops in the

Congo, sent 1,200 reinforcements to protect its citizens. These troops went into

action against Congolese on 10 July and, during the next week, intervened in

more than twenty localities.

Meanwhile, on 8 July, the State Department decided that US citizens must be

evacuated. Rear Admiral Frank O'Beirne, who was the Director, J-3, established a

small task force in the Pentagon's Joint War Room (JWR) to serve as an information center and coordinate requests for assistance. The task force began with two

officers and rose to five, including representatives of the Logistics Directorate,

J-4. Helicopters and C-124 transports were brought from Germany and Libya

into Brazzaville. Admiral O'Beirne instructed the European Command to place

two rifle companies in readiness. As further insurance, the carrier USS Wasp in

the Caribbean took on one Marine company with eight helicopters and six light

transport planes, then steamed toward the Congo River's mouth.15

The issue soon changed from how to take US civilians out into whether US

troops should be sent in. On 10 July, Prime Minister Lumumba and President

Kasavubu appealed for a United Nations military force to help restore order. The

next day, perhaps with Belgian encouragement, Moise Tshombe declared the

independence of mineral-rich Katanga province. Albert Kalonji followed suit in

adjacent Kasai. On 12 July, a group of cabinet officers led by Deputy Prime Minister Antoine Gizenga and Foreign Minister Justin Bomboko presented US Ambassador Clare Timberlake with a request for two thousand US troops "to insure the

maintenance of order in the lower Congo and Leopoldville." The Ambassador

replied that, unless there was enough food in Leopoldville to forestall riots, he

would oppose bringing in US troops. Timberlake then telephoned the State

Department. He preferred sending troops under the aegis of the United Nations,

but whatever the decision, he believed that moving two infantry companies from

Germany to Brazzaville would have a "very desirable effect." Timberlake also

reported an urgent need for one hundred tons of flour.16

The J-3 already had compiled a list of available forces. Two companies from

Germany could reach Leopoldville in 24 hours. A full battle group (1,425 men)

could arrive from Europe in 40 hours; one company from the Strategic Army

Command in the continental United States (CONUS) could get there in 43

hours, one battle group in 50; two Marine battalions (2,500 men) could be

moved to the Congo in 52 hours. Later on 12 July, at a meeting that Admiral

Burke attended as Acting Chairman, Secretary Herter stated President Eisenhower's position that no US troops should be sent "unless they were absolutely

essential to save lives." The United Nations, Herter continued, should provide

troops and military advisers, preferably French-speaking Africans. Conferees

discussed the possibility of a temporary combined command. Admiral Burke

felt that it should be a United Nations Command and that no US forces should

be placed under either Belgian or Congolese command. At this point, he

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The Cold War Comes to Africa

agreed, the "most logical" course lay in providing logistical support for African

contingents rather than committing US troops.17

President Eisenhower was vacationing at Newport, Rhode Island. When Secretary Herter telephoned him at noon on 12 July, the President said that "we are

always willing to do our duty through the UN but we are not going to unilaterally get into this." During that afternoon, the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed Ambassador Timberlake's recommendation. They considered a J-3 draft that listed a

number of political factors to be weighed prior to any decision about sending US

forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff deemed the inclusion of political factors unnecessary or inappropriate, with one exception: if a United Nations command was

organized, the possibility of a Soviet demand for representation equal to that of

the United States would have to be considered. The JCS memorandum forwarded to Secretary Gates that same day described action by the United Nations as

"the more prudent and desirable course." However, should the UN fail to take

"appropriate" or "effective" steps, the administration should "consider unilateral

action in order to preclude Communist exploitation of the situation." The Joint

Chiefs of Staff also included J-3's list of available units. Deputy Secretary Douglas promptly sent this memorandum to Secretary Herter, adding that he shared

their views about the desirability of UN action.18

On 13 July, conferees from the State Department, the Joint Staff, ISA, and the

Services considered a number of requests. USCINCEUR had raised a question of

whether aviation gasoline should be sent to Congolese airfields and reported that

the Belgians intended to request logistical support for the airlift of their troops.

Ambassador Timberlake wanted Air Force personnel and equipment dispatched

to Kamina Airfield in Katanga. The Defense Department reopened the issue of

sending military attaches to the Congo. Conferees decided that logistical support

should be limited to that required to help evacuate US citizens; none would be

given the Belgians except as part of a UN effort. Soon afterward, decisions were

taken that no aviation gasoline would be shipped for the time being, that three

attaches would be appointed, and that Air Force technicians and communications equipment could be sent to Kamina.19

That same day, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to urge reconsideration of

logistical support for Belgian troops. They advised Secretary Gates that European Command had the necessary aircraft and equipment, and that aviation

fuel was on hand at Dakar in Senegal and Accra in Ghana. They deemed prompt

action to restore order in the Congo to be "mandatory and in the best interests of

the United States." While furnishing assistance through the United Nations

remained the desirable course, the United States "should be prepared to provide

the requested assistance unilaterally in order to preclude Communist exploitation of the situation leading, eventually, to the Republic of Congo falling under

Communist domination."20

During the early morning hours of 14 July, the UN Security Council adopted a

resolution calling for the withdrawal of Belgian troops and authorizing Secretary-General Dag Hammarksjöld to take the steps necessary to provide military

aid until such time as Congolese national security forces could fully meet their

tasks. Creation of a UN Emergency Force (UNEF) followed promptly. Hours after

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]CS and National Policy

the resolution passed, ISA officials asked the J-3 Battle Staff to start planning the

transportation of 1,000 to 1,200 Tunisian soldiers to the Congo. The J-3 Battle

Staff, in turn, directed EUCOM's Operations Division to undertake this task.

During 15-16 June, C-124s carrying the first contingent of Tunisian troops landed

at Leopoldville. By 21 July, US aircraft had brought to Leopoldville a force

exceeding 3,000 soldiers (1,073 from Tunisia, 637 from Ghana, nearly 900 from

Morocco, and about 560 from Sweden) with more than two hundred tons of

equipment. By this time, the UNEF totaled approximately 5,200 men, of whom

about 850 had been transported by the British and around 500 by the Soviets;

Ethiopia provided the airlift for 617 men of its own contingent. Air deliveries of

foodstuffs (mostly flour) had begun on 15 July. Moreover, US European Command provided the UNEF with ten C-47 transports, 4,000 helmet liners painted

UN blue, and 300,000 "C" rations. To carry out these tasks, four C-124 squadrons

were sent to Europe.21

The UNEF's arrival did not seem to damp the fires of crisis. On the evening of

17 July, Lumumba and Kasavubu threatened to ask for Soviet intervention unless

the UN secured removal of all Belgian troops by midnight on 19 July. At an NSC

meeting two days later, the Director, Central Intelligence, characterized Lumumba as "a Castro or worse" and stated his assumption that "Lumumba has been

bought by the Communists."22

Belgian forces now had grown to approximately 7,400 men (including one battalion in neighboring Rwanda-Urundi), most of whom were in Leopoldville

province. On 19 July, the Belgian commander and UN representatives agreed that

UN forces would relieve all Belgian troops in the Leopoldville area by 23 July.

The UN Security Council, on 22 July, called upon Belgium "to implement

speedily" the 14 July resolution calling for withdrawal. The word "speedily"

represented a compromise between the Soviet preference for "immediately" and

the US desire for "as soon as possible."23 By the beginning of August, Belgians

had withdrawn either to the port of Kitona or into Katanga province as UN

contingents replaced them. During the next month, Belgian tactical units

departed Katanga as well.

The prospect of communist intervention, raised by Prime Minister Lumumba's threat to call in Soviet troops unless the Belgians left immediately, prompted

the Joint Chiefs of Staff to consider strong countermeasures. Writing to Secretary

Gates on 22 July, they recommended inducing the United Nations to:

1. Declare an embargo on arms shipments to the Congo and a blockade against further

introduction of troops other than those belonging to the UNEF.

2. Earnestly caution the Soviet Union not to interfere in the Congo.

3. Close all Congolese airports to Soviet military airlifts and be ready to block runways.

4. Prepare to prevent ships from entering the mouth of the lower Congo.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also believed that, working both directly and through

the United Nations, the US Government should bring pressure upon countries

along the air route to deny the Soviets overflight privileges and staging rights. If

the Sino-Soviet bloc either intervened or attempted to do so, the United States

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The Cold War Comes to Africa

should take such steps within the UN as would lead to early withdrawal of

Belgian as well as Sino-Soviet forces. Acting unilaterally, if necessary, the United

States should be prepared to take whatever military action appeared necessary to

prevent or defeat Soviet intervention. On 23 July, these views were forwarded to

Secretary Herter. Eight days later, at an NSC meeting, General Twining voiced

concern that Belgian bases at Katona and Kamina might fall into Soviet hands.

Fully accepting JCS advice, the Council decided to be prepared "at any time to

take appropriate military action to prevent or defeat Soviet military intervention

in the Congo." The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 5 August, directed J-5 to prepare a

suitable contingency plan.24

By early August, 115 USAF transport aircraft were allocated to Congo operations.25 Slightly more than one hundred Air Force and Army personnel were stationed in the Congo itself. Although aviation fuel supplies were scarce during the

airlift's early days, corrective steps eased the situation. When stocks at the staging point of Lano in Nigeria ran short after the first three or four days, planes

were diverted to Accra in Ghana. A similar shortage developed there too, but

when the carrier USS Wasp arrived off the coast, on 26 July, it delivered some

200,000 gallons. A Swedish port unit moved into Matadi, near the Congo's

mouth, and reopened the pipeline to Leopoldville. After commercial as well as

US Navy tankers reached Matadi, Lagos, and Dakar, adequate reserves appeared

to be assured.26

On 4 August, the Air Force became Executive Agent for the Secretary of

Defense, with authority to perform all fiscal functions associated with Congo

operations. The State Department was supposed to pass all UN requirements to

the Air Force, which in turn would transmit to the J-3 Battle Staff whatever called

for air or sealift. The Air Force directly handled all transfers of parts or equipment from CONUS. Yet although the Air Force had replaced ISA as intermediary,

in practice requests and information involving EUCOM's resources still went

from the Department of State directly to the Battle Staff.27

The UNEF could not avoid becoming a participant in Congolese politics. On

12 August, Secretary-General Hammarksjöld flew to secessionist Katanga and

arranged with Moise Tshombe for a transfer of duties from Belgian to UN forces.

Prime Minister Lumumba, who saw the agreement as prolonging a secession that

he very much wanted to end, bitterly denounced Hammarksjöld. The Congolese

Government and people, he declared on 15 August, had lost confidence in the

Secretary-General. His denunciation sent shock waves through Washington. At

an NSC meeting on 18 August, Under Secretary of State Douglas Dillon warned

that the UNEF's elimination would be a "disaster," perhaps leading to Soviet

intervention. He characterized Lumumba as "working to serve the purposes of

the Soviets"; the Director, Central Intelligence, added that Lumumba was "in

Soviet pay." President Eisenhower said that "we were talking of one man forcing

us out of the Congo; of Lumumba supported by the Soviets." He thought "the

possibility that the UN would be forced out was simply inconceivable. We

should keep the UN in the Congo even if we had to ask for European troops to

do it. We should do so even if such action was used by the Soviets as the basis for

starting a fight."28

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JCS and National Policy

Meantime, on 6 August, Admiral Burke cautioned his JCS colleagues about a

possibility that the Soviet bloc might gain control over Kitona and the neighboring

naval base at Banana, at the Congo's mouth. To assure their continued availability

to the Western powers and their denial to Soviet forces, he recommended: starting

action to ensure that the UN assumed "timely control"; providing adequate maintenance and operation of the facilities through Military Assistance Programs

offered by the United States and other friendly governments, coupled with training for Congolese personnel; and, finally, taking covert action in all of the above to

assure a "pro-Western orientation."29

After reviewing Admiral Burke's recommendations, General Lemnitzer

observed that the same considerations applied to Kamina base in Katanga, which

also could serve as a staging area. Since potential trouble spots existed in the

Middle and Far East as well as Africa, he argued, overflight privileges and staging facilities were growing ever more important. General Lemnitzer therefore

favored including Kamina in the recommendations concerning Kitona and

Banana. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved Admiral Burke's recommendations,

with this amendment, on 18 August and asked Secretary Gates to present their

views to the Secretary of State.30

The State Department fully supported keeping bases in the Congo out of Soviet hands but endorsed only the proposal to help the UN assume timely control

over facilities. Acting Secretary Dillon also noted that NSC 6001, described earlier

in this chapter, expressed US strategic interest in sub-Sahara Africa only in most

general terms. This was, to his knowledge, the first time that Defense had indicated any specific strategic interest in the region. He suggested that the Defense

Department define US strategic interest more precisely, so that it could be written

into a revised NSC paper.31

Assistant Secretary (ISA) John Irwin believed that the JCS recommendations

just rejected by the State Department warranted further consideration. The

"fluid" situation, he told Under Secretary of State Douglas Dillon on 23 September, offered excellent opportunities for their successful implementation, "which

the passage of time may remove." Consequently, JCS proposals would be placed

before the State-Defense-CIA Congo Contingency Planning Group.32

The Congo situation was more than fluid; it was chaotic. As August ended,

the UNEF totaled 19,341 personnel; its main contingents came from Ethiopia,

Ghana, Guinea, Indonesia, Ireland, Morocco, and Tunisia. The map on page 193

shows how these units were deployed. By 3 September, all Belgian tactical units

had departed the Congo; there remained only 1,500 support personnel and technicians at Kamina and Kitona, plus a few advisers retained by Tshombe.

Lumumba evidently decided to rely on Soviet military aid to crush the secessions in Kasai and Katanga. By late August, more than one hundred Soviet and

Czech "technicians" were in the Congo; ten Ilyushin transports arrived at Stanleyville in Oriental province; the Soviets made available to Lumumba one hundred trucks which they had just landed at Matadi in response to a UN request. But

Lumumba's campaign in Kasai failed and, on 5 September, President Kasavubu

dismissed him from office. Lumumba fought back and won support from the

Congolese Chamber of Representatives. Then, on 14 September, the Chief of Staff

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The Cold War Comes to Africa

Deployment of Units of the United Nations Force as at 19 August 1960.

of the Congolese Army, Colonel Joseph Mobutu, assumed power and "neutralized" all politicians until the year's end. The US Government was delighted when

Colonel Mobutu promptly closed the Czech and Soviet embassies.33

Pitfalls of Planning

The NSC, on 1 August, had directed that military plans be prepared to counter

possible Soviet intervention. Progress was long delayed, however, by

disagreement among the Services over which agency ought to bear responsibility

for planning. The J-5, on 20 August, recommended that overall responsibility be

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JCS and National Policy

assigned to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic, Admiral Robert L. Dennison. In

part, this choice seems to have been reached through a process of elimination.

The Joint Staff, according to J-5, should not be responsible for preparing either

command level or detailed theater level plans. To do so would be inconsistent

with the primary JCS responsibility of providing strategic guidance to commanders, require a more adequate technical staff and library, and compel the Joint

Chiefs of Staff to review their own plans (instead of resorting to an outside

appraisal) and coordinate annexes with those of their subordinates.

Having narrowed the choice to ONCLANT, USCINCEUR, or CINCNELM, J-5

listed the advantages and disadvantages of each. But it would appear unlikely that

J-5 based its recommendations on these pros and cons, since CINCLANT lacked

important advantages listed for USCINCEUR and CINCNELM, such as an experienced, fully manned contingency planning staff, conveniently located for coordination with associated nations. CINCLANT also lacked USCINCEUR's advantage of

controlling sizeable forces from all Services, readily available for deployment. Only

one of the four advantages listed for CINCLANT—that it was least likely to be

simultaneously involved in other large-scale contingency operations—could be

considered absolute, and there would be subsequent disagreement about its accuracy. Similarly, the disadvantages listed by J-5 provided little basis for rational

choice. Probably the deciding factors were "additional considerations," which to

J-5 indicated the desirability of establishing a new unified command responsible

for sub-Sahara Africa. If that occurred, J-5 suggested, it would be better not to

assign contingency planning to either USCINCEUR or CINCNELM.34

As a guideline for planning, J-5 considered that under ideal conditions and

assuming limited or ineffective resistance, the USSR had a marginal capability of

putting one airborne division (8,500-9,000 men) into the Congo by D+4. About

1,600 men, flying from the southern Caucasus, could land in the Stanleyville

area in twenty-four to thirty-six hours. Another 6,000 men could follow no earlier than D+2, and the remainder not before D+3. The J-5 rated a landing from the

sea very unlikely.

The most probable scenario for US action, J-5 believed, would involve an initial Soviet air and sea movement into an area in which UN forces still were operating. The United States immediately would provide UN troops with tactical air

support, deny sea and air lanes to Soviet forces, and introduce US ground units

at an early stage. To minimize the danger of general war, initial operations

should be limited as far as practicable to the general area of the Congo.

Both the Army and the Air Force opposed designating CINCLANT to prepare

contingency plans for the Congo. General Lemnitzer argued that CINCLANT had

no plans that either covered the employment of large Air Force and Army units or

ones that could be modified to apply to the Congo; CINCLANT also lacked Army

and Air Force component commanders who could prepare detailed plans. The

Army further claimed, contrary to J-5, that CINCLANT was the commander most

likely to be involved simultaneously in other contingency operations, and that his

headquarters in Norfolk was remote from the nations having an interest in the

Congo. The initial forces were most readily available from Europe and, until

seaborne forces arrived, USCINCEUR would have to furnish logistical support.

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The Cold War Comes to Africa

The Army, therefore, considered USCINCEUR better qualified to perform the planning. (Although the European Command had an Army preponderance,

USCINCEUR in 1960 was an Air Force officer, General Lauris Norstad.)

For similar reasons, General White also favored designating USCINCEUR. On

another plane, he took exception to J-5's proposed guidance which envisaged

limited military action between the United States and the USSR. NSC 5906/1,

the current statement of Basic National Security Policy, did not allow for limited

war with the Soviet Union, the Air Force noted. Consequently, Soviet intervention in the Congo should be construed as an indication that the USSR was willing to risk a general war in order to achieve its objectives.

Although basic differences narrowed during the next two months, agreement

seemed no nearer. A draft plan accepting the risk of general war and skirting the

issue of command responsibility nevertheless ran afoul of the latter issue and

failed to win approval.35 Generals Lemnitzer and Shoup found an overriding

objection in USCINCEUR's supporting relationship to NATO. They proposed, as

an interim measure, that a Joint Task Force commanded by an Army officer be

established to draft detailed plans. Admiral Burke immediately countered that

CINCLANT should be directed to proceed with theater level planning and a

Joint Task Force established under CINCLANT to prepare supporting plans.

General Shoup proposed simply extending CINCLANT's responsibilities to

include sub-Sahara Africa. On 24 September, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded

their divided views to the Secretary of Defense.36

After a discussion with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 26 September, Secretary

Gates said that he favored establishing a new specified command with planning

responsibilities for sub-Sahara Africa. On 6 October, he asked the Joint Chiefs of

Staff to consider the feasibility and desirability of such an arrangement. General

White objected that the situation was moving too fast to permit the loss of time

entailed in obtaining presidential approval for a specified command. Subsequently, he joined General Decker in recommending establishment of an interim

joint task force, which eventually should become the specified command's headquarters. General Shoup, unconvinced that a new command was necessary, reiterated his position, stated above. Admiral Burke still preferred giving planning

responsibility to CINCLANT. Finally, though, he endorsed a specified command,

provided that CINCLANT retained control of operations in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, including those supporting ground and air operations in the specified

command's area. General Lemnitzer, who was now Chairman, supported

Generals White and Decker.37

Reversing himself, Secretary Gates decided on 21 November that CINCLANT

should bear responsibility for developing and maintaining operational plans. He

directed that there be established, under CINCLANT, a Joint Task Force

commanded by an Army lieutenant general, comprising a modest permanent

planning staff and such forces as might be made available to conduct operations.38

On 9 December, and on two succeeding occasions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed but failed to resolve whether Secretary Gates intended CINCLANT to have

operational as well as planning responsibilities. At a meeting on 29 December,

Gates told them that he intended CINCLANT to bear overall responsibility for

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]CS and National Policy

both planning and operations until he and they took "affirmative steps" to change

matters. Once the Joint Task Force Commander became established ashore in a

large-scale operation, for example, he might relieve CINCLANT of overall operational command. If the undertaking was large enough, Gates continued, the Joint

Task Force Commander might become head of a unified command.39

This clarification removed the last hurdle, for on 9 December the Joint Chiefs

of Staff had approved the nomination of Lieutenant General Paul L. Freeman, Jr.,

USA, to command the Joint Task Force. On 4 January 1961, CINCLANT received

official notification that he now carried responsibility for planning and

operations with respect to sub-Sahara Africa.40

Conclusion

Autumn 1960 brought the Congo's travail no closer to resolution. On 27

November, Patrice Lumumba slipped past the UN and Congolese troops

guarding his Leopoldville home and headed toward Stanleyville in Oriental

province. He was captured and, on 2 December, came back to Leopoldville as a

prisoner. From there, he was taken to a town ninety miles away. Antoine Gizenga

assumed Lumumba's mantle, announcing that he now represented the Congo's

lawful government and that Stanleyville had become the legal capital. By midJanuary 1961, pro-Lumumba forces apparently controlled almost half the country. In Katanga, Moise Tshombe's secessionist regime still survived. All too clearly, the UNEF had not brought order out of chaos.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff looked at the Congo strictly in terms of Cold War

competition. To them, Soviet support for Lumumba (and, after his arrest, for

Gizenga) marked the first round of an East-West struggle for Africa. They

preferred to work through the United Nations but favored unilateral action, if

necessary, to prevent the establishment of a Soviet military beachhead. Evidence

suggesting a CIA role in schemes to assassinate Lumumba shows how deeply a

crisis atmosphere permeated the administration. Even President Eisenhower,

who usually was the reverse of an alarmist, remarked that "in the last twelve

months the world has developed a... ferment greater than he could remember in

recent times."41 With hindsight, it can be said that these fears were exaggerated.

But that was not how matters looked in 1960.

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14

The Far East: Holding the Line

Defining a Defense Perimeter

During the early 1950s the United States created a defensive cordon along

China's eastern and southern borders. This came about through military

action and by a series of alliances and mutual defense treaties. Containment was

the essential element in NSC 5429/5, a policy statement approved by President

Eisenhower in December 1954 and still current in 1957. It defined the primary

problem in the Far East as being the serious threat to US interests posed by "the

spread of hostile Communist power on the continent of Asia over all of Mainland

China, North Korea and, more recently, over the northern part of Viet Nam." The

United States should be "clear and strong in its resolve to defend vital interests,"

ready to risk a war without trying to provoke one. Protecting the security of the

offshore island chain—Japan, the Ryukyus, Taiwan, the Philippines, Australia,

and New Zealand—constituted "an element essential to US security." As for the

Asian mainland, in the event of an unprovoked attack on the Republic of Korea,

US armed forces would be employed against the aggressor. If necessary and feasible, US forces also would oppose any attack in the area covered by the Manila

Pact, which is described in chapter 15. Either an attack or a threat of one against

any country not covered by a security treaty would signify a renewal of aggressive purposes, creating a menace so grave as to justify the President in asking for

congressional authority to take action, including the use of armed forces.1

A Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan for 1 July 1956-30 June 1958 translated policy objectives into military tasks. The JSCP prescribed that in a general war the

Commander in Chief, Pacific, would conduct a strategic defense and prepare for

offensive operations along a line running from the Malay Peninsula's Kra Isthmus through the South China Sea, Taiwan, the East China and Japan Seas, up to

the Bering Strait. CINCPAC's tasks included: tying down the maximum number

of Sino-Soviet bloc forces and neutralizing support bases; defending the Republic

of Korea, but not to the prejudice of his primary duty of protecting Japan and

Okinawa; providing naval and air support to facilitate operations by Chinese

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JCS and National Policy

Nationalist forces against the mainland; and assisting in the defense of Taiwan

and the Pescadores, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand,

and the Philippines. If compelled by enemy pressure, he would evacuate US,

UN, and if possible Republic of Korea (ROK) forces from Korea, as well as help

the British to evacuate Hong Kong.2

The "New Look" called for relying on strategic nuclear retaliation and

strengthening "indigenous security efforts" to defend against local aggression.

Yet, during the first Eisenhower administration, the application of New Look

principles had resulted in only minor adjustments to US overseas deployments.

Demands for more drastic changes followed the promulgation of what some

called the "new New Look," President Eisenhower's 1956 decision to hold the

line on defense spending. Several key officials, particularly Secretary Wilson and

Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey, were convinced that even greater

reliance could be placed upon nuclear retaliation. They pressed for substantial

reductions in overseas deployments and military assistance. According to the JCS

representative on the NSC Planning Board, these men considered the high cost of

defense to be "the root of the evil."3Thus the Joint Chiefs of Staff had to balance

the requirements of containment against the demands for economy. How they

did so provides the major theme of this chapter.

Modernizing Forces in South Korea

Four years after the armistice, the United States still maintained in the Republic of Korea under a United Nations Command about 50,000 troops, including

two conventionally-equipped Army divisions and one fighter-bomber wing. The

Military Assistance Program supported a 700,000-man ROK force, including an

army of twenty active and ten reserve divisions, a 71-ship navy, and a 225-plane

air force. Late in October 1956, President Eisenhower ordered the NSC Planning

Board to review the scope and allocation of aid to Korea, as well as other nations,

and recommend revisions.4

Already, on 11 October 1956, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended maintaining a minimum US force of two infantry divisions and one fighter-bomber

wing, together with an ROK force of seventeen active and fourteen reserve divisions, sixty-one ships, and six fighter-bomber squadrons. However, they predicated this recommendation upon a modernization of US forces and equipment,

which should include nuclear weapons. Such a modernization, they declared, was

mandatory before a realistic assessment of minimum force levels could be made.

Regardless of the numerical ratio between opposing forces, the United Nations

Command could not deter a renewal of hostilities unless its obsolete and obsolescent equipment was replaced. Paragraph 13d of the 1953 Armistice Agreement

forbade the introduction of new weapons and equipment into Korea, except to

replace destroyed, damaged, or worn-out weapons "on the basis of piece-for-piece

of the same effectiveness and the same type." While the communists consistently

had been violating this provision, the UN Command had respected it.5

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The Far East: Holding the Line

On 14 January 1957, the NSC Planning Board circulated an evaluation of four

alternative military programs. These are summarized below:

A. Continue the existing program. US forces would include two divisions and three

jet fighter-bomber squadrons, all conventionally armed; ROK units would contain

twenty active divisions and ten reserve divisions, as well as three jet fighterbomber squadrons, with three more planned.

B. Convert four active ROK divisions into reserve ones and convert three pistonengine fighter-bomber squadrons into jet ones. Keep US forces at current levels

but equip them with dual-capable weapons able to fire nuclear as well as conventional warheads.

C. Cut the ROK Army to ten active and twenty reserve divisions while maintaining US

forces at current levels. All six ROK fighter-bomber squadrons would be jetequipped. ROK units would acquire nuclear-capable weapons of such types as were

already in Korea but not more advanced ones such as the 280-mm gun, Honest

John, Corporal, or Redstone tactical surface-to-surface missiles. US units, remaining

at currentlevels, also would gain only limited numbers of dual-capable weapons.

D. The ROK Army would have ten active and twenty reserve divisions but no dualcapable weapons. The ROK Air Force would consist of twelve fighter and fighterbomber squadrons, enough to offset North Korean air strength. US forces would

be organized as under alternative B.

None of these alternatives provided for the storage of nuclear weapons in

Korea.6

Admiral Radford's Special Assistant for NSC Affairs told the Chairman that

alternatives C and D were "essentially straw men." Although both would permit

cuts in spending, neither would likely be supported by any member of the NSC.

The Defense Department would reject C because it failed to provide for US force

modernization; the State Department probably would not want to urge upon

President Rhee reductions of the size called for in alternative C. State also would

condemn alternative D because it violated the Armistice Agreement and would

be unsatisfactory to Rhee. The basic military issue, therefore, was whether the

Department of State "will accept the fact that sooner or later Paragraph 13d of

the Armistice Agreement must be disregarded."7

Writing to Secretary McElroy on 24 January 1957, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended adopting alternative B, even though they wanted to end the policy of

storing only conventional munitions. Through another memorandum, submitted

two weeks later, they urged the Secretary to change storage policies for Korea,

the Philippines, and Taiwan. The administration postponed a decision about

Korea, pending completion of the current policy review.8

On 31 January 1957, the National Security Council reviewed these alternatives.

Admiral Burke, who was Acting Chairman, added an argument to support alternative B. When the aged Synghman Rhee died, South Korea might fall into chaos and

the communists could make another bid for conquest. Consequently, US forces in

Korea had to be ready for any contingency. Secretary Wilson saw no danger of war

and wanted the United States to start "untangling" itself from Korea. Secretary of

the Treasury George Humphrey argued that continuing the worldwide military

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JCS and National Policy

assistance program on its current scale would prove "suicidal." Sole reliance upon

massive retaliatory capability struck him as the only solution. Secretary Dulles, in

rebuttal, foresaw very great difficulty in persuading friends and allies to accept

such a strategy. Admiral Burke argued that alternative B might convince the South

Koreans "that the United States had the military power on hand in South Korea to

defend them" and so serve as the first step in a series of reductions.9

The NSC directed its Planning Board to prepare a new policy statement incorporating a military program based on alternative B and to plan ROK force reductions over the longer range.10 Thus the JCS alternative won approval, but the

argument over modernization remained unresolved. When the Board drafted a

revision, JCS and OSD representatives found themselves at odds with State's

spokesman. The State Department wanted US forces provided with nuclear-capable weapons only if the Secretaries of State and Defense became convinced that

such action was essential to bring about reductions in ROK forces and military

assistance expenses. Even then, no nuclear warheads actually would be stored in

Korea. To the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the underlying issue was whether the United

States should continue to accept the risk of adhering to paragraph 13d while

communist violations continued. On 1 March, they forwarded evidence of violations that the State Department could use when this problem was brought before

the United Nations.11

When the NSC met on 4 April, the Department of State and Defense remained

split over whether to put dual-capable Honest Johns and 280-mm guns in Korea.

Secretary Dulles doubted whether "it was really worthwhile to be regarded by

our friends and allies as violators of a solemn international agreement simply in

order to get these two weapons in the hands of our forces in Korea." Admiral

Radford replied that the Armistice Agreement's strict wording would put the

United States "into just as much hot water" if it introduced any new weapons at

all. Therefore, "we might just as well go the whole hog and introduce the entire

list " Radford claimed that weapons like the 280-mm guns, which he deemed

vital for defending cities such as Seoul which lay close to the border, were more

important than nuclear-capable jet aircraft. In fact, he maintained that Honest

Johns and 280-mm guns mattered more to the Defense Department than all the

other modernization items put together. The NSC reached no decision. When the

Board circulated a slightly revised paper on 10 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

found it unacceptable and reaffirmed their position. Approval of State's position,

they added, would only "sanction continued delays and postponement in

implementing a required security program."12

On 13 June, after another NSC debate, President Eisenhower decided against

deploying Honest Johns and 280-mm guns for the time being. Eisenhower also

concluded that, in light of rising defense costs and the deterrent provided by US

retaliatory capability, ROK forces should be substantially reduced. He ordered

the US Ambassador and the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command

(CINCUNC), to negotiate reductions with President Synghman Rhee, offering in

return to modernize US forces and convert three ROK squadrons to jet aircraft.13

The United Nations Command, on 21 June, announced the temporary suspension of compliance with paragraph 13d of the Armistice Agreement. On that same

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The Far East: Holding the Line

day, General Lyman Lemnitzer, Ambassador Walter Dowling and the CINCUNC,

spoke with President Rhee. But Rhee resisted the idea of reductions, particularly

in regard to the ROK Army.14

The approved list of new equipment included F-86 and F-100 fighters as well

as B-57 tactical bombers; the State Department had vetoed Honest John missiles

and 280 mm artillery. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 17 July, again urged Secretary

Wilson to obtain the President's approval for immediate introduction of 280 mm

guns and Honest Johns and for changing storage policies. Once again, the administration disapproved. On 6 August, the Planning Board circulated a draft that incorporated the substance of President Eisenhower's 13 June decisions. The Joint Chiefs

of Staff naturally objected to continuing the same storage policy. Nonetheless, on 8

August, the Council adopted the Board's draft, which became NSC 5702/2.

During the NSC meeting, Secretary Dulles said that new weapons should not

be introduced until President Rhee gave a firm commitment to reduce his forces.

Rhee, he warned, would be a hard bargainer. The United States, Dulles added,

could not continue providing Korea with $600 million annually in military and

economic aid. If the NSC did not cut these costs, Congress would. Secretary Wilson observed that introducing 280 mm guns and Honest Johns would allow

reductions of 8,000 US personnel and four ROK divisions.15

President Rhee did prove to be a hard bargainer. NSC 5707/2 called for reducing the active ROK Army by at least four divisions. Not until 5 November did

Rhee agree to inactivate two divisions by 31 May 1958, in return for enough jets

to equip three squadrons. After many months of negotiations, the Korean Government agreed to reduce the authorized strength of ROK forces from 720,000 to

630,000 men during FY 1959. On 17 January 1958, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

received a long-sought authorization to change storage policy; the Air Force soon

deployed the Matador-equipped 588* Tactical Missile Group.16 Thus the Joint

Chiefs of Staff had achieved all their policy objectives.

A revised statement of national policy, approved by the NSC in August 1958,

contemplated further gradual reductions in ROK forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff

concurred but reversed themselves in June 1959 when a new policy review took

place. In their judgment, difficulties in negotiating renewal of the US-Japan Security Treaty made doubtful the future availability of Japanese bases from which

US forces could support Korean operations. Consequently, more ROK reductions

would incur unacceptable military risks. The National Security Council accepted

the JCS position and NSC 5907, the new statement approved by President Eisenhower on 1 July 1959, contained nothing about future ROK reductions.17

A postscript must be added. By the end of 1959, octogenarian President Synghman Rhee had become isolated and unpopular with his people. Elections in

1960 occasioned widespread fraud and violence. Protests led to bloody repression that only triggered more demonstrations. Finally, on 27 April, Rhee

resigned and left the country, ushering in a short-lived democracy. Soon afterward, the number of US troops in Korea rose somewhat. Because of manpower

and budgetary limitations, Korean nationals comprised 25 percent of the personnel in the two US divisions. Beginning in mid-July, 3,000 US Army troops

arrived to replace most of them.18

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JCS and National Policy

Reducing the US Presence in Japan

In 1953, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had predicated some of their "New Look" force

levels upon substantial progress in Japanese rearmament. By 1957, they

assumed, US forces would have redeployed from Japan and become part of a

mobile strategic reserve. Things did not work out that way. Steadily, during the

1950s, Japan increased its political influence and economic strength but shied

away from a corresponding expansion of its military power. The original JCS

goals were a 15-division army, a navy with 300,000 tons of shipping, and a 36-

squadron air force. Instead, early in 1957, Japanese Self-Defense Forces totaled

only six army divisions, a navy of 62,000 tons, and four air force squadrons.19

The current statement of US policy, NSC 5516/1, dated from April 1955. Taking note of growing nationalist and neutralist sentiment among Japanese, NSC

5516/1 concluded that the US-Japan relationship should change from dependency into partnership. The United States would help Japan's Self-Defense Forces

grow to the point where they could assume primary responsibility for protecting

the home islands, allowing a corollary withdrawal of US forces. Reversion of the

Ryukyu, Bonin, and Volcano Islands from US control back to Japanese sovereignty could not come about as long as tensions in East Asia persisted. The administration, however, would try to placate the Japanese by considering their request

for "fuller relations" with the islands.20

When 1957 opened, there were very nearly 100,000 US military personnel still

in Japan. In February, nonetheless, the NSC Operations Coordinating Board concluded that any attempt by a Japanese Cabinet to initiate a substantial rearmament program or promote participation in a collective security system probably

would fail. The strength of popular opposition might be lessened, though, if the

United States responded favorably to desires that arose from strong national feeling. The Japanese wanted to share more equally in decisions affecting their territory and to reduce the level of US forces. They particularly wanted to regain control

of Okinawa—the 1951 peace treaty had acknowledged Japan's "residual sovereignty" over the Ryukyus—and to repatriate several thousand Bonin islanders.21

Preparations for Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi's visit to Washington, scheduled for June 1957, helped spur major US decisions. The 1951 security treaty had

recognized the US right to "dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and

about Japan." Dissatisfied with what they considered a subordinate position, the

Japanese urged a number of changes. Make disposition and use of US forces in

Japan a matter for joint agreement. Limit the treaty to five years' duration, after

which it would run indefinitely unless terminated by either party at one year's

notice. Build up the Self-Defense Force, allowing as many US forces as possible

(including all ground combat units) to leave Japan. Release some US bases to

alleviate "inconveniences and hardships" on the local population. Announce a

US decision to relinquish control over the Ryukyus, Bonins, and Volcanos after

ten years or even sooner if circumstances permitted. Meantime, allow former

islanders to return home and grant some autonomy to the Ryukyus. From Tokyo,

US Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II warned that a turning point in US-Japanese relations was at hand. Unless the United States moved promptly to place the

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The Far East: Holding the Line

relationship on a "really equal basis," Prime Minister Kishi easily could tap a

strong vein of neutralist sentiment and lead Japan down that path.22

In Washington, during the spring of 1957, a State-Defense working group

started preparing positions for the Kishi visit. Drawing upon views submitted by

General Lemnitzer and Admiral Felix Stump (CINCFE and C1NCPAC), the group

prepared a draft that described Japan's "miniscule" forces as "inadequate... to

justify a claim of equality of contribution within capabilities." The group

opposed either making any changes to the security treaty or accepting any

degree of control over the use of US forces outside Japan, such as in the Bonins or

Ryukyus. The current treaty should remain in force pending the establishment of

"other satisfactory arrangements." An adequate Japanese defense force, the

group held, was essential to such arrangements. In the way of concessions, the

group recommended abrogating the US right to intervene against internal disturbances. Suitable arrangements also could be made for joint use of facilities. More

importantly, the group proposed establishing a high-level group in Tokyo to consult about defense problems, especially strategy, force goals, deployments,

weapons systems, and logistics.23

In their commentary, dated 11 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that organizing a high-level group would "place the US in an untenable position" by creating an official body at a level above CINCFE and the US Ambassador. They

argued, too, that the mention of "strategy" implied that US war plans would be

made available to the Japanese. Instead, they suggested that informal high-level

groups confer in Tokyo on an ad hoc basis about "Communist strength and

intentions in the Far East; countermeasures to be taken by Japan, the US and

other free nations; and, Japan's defense planning and US military assistance."24

On 15 June, the group circulated a revised draft that incorporated at least a

semblance of the JCS recommendation. The new paper, while still rejecting

immediate revision of the security treaty, suggested working toward "some form

of long-term mutual security relationship" that would "be responsive to the various strategic, political and economic considerations involved." After the Washington visit, Prime Minister Kishi and Ambassador MacArthur could work out

basic principles for a new treaty relationship and then consider establishing an

ad hoc high-level group to implement the understandings achieved.25

Concurrently, ISA asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to appraise the long-range

implications of changing Japanese attitudes outlined above by Ambassador

MacArthur. Replying on 13 June, they remained convinced that Japan was capable of a greater defense effort. Once Japan achieved the capability and assumed

responsibility for its own defense, US forces would no longer be required. Phasing down US forces before Japan attained its goals would weaken that nation's

defenses, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized that other considerations might

justify accepting this risk. They insisted, however, that the Ryukyus, Bonins, and

Volcanos must remain under US control because bases there were essential to forward deployments.26

Just how far the Joint Chiefs of Staff were willing to go in adjusting to changed

conditions became clear when the Armed Forces Policy Council convened the

next day. Admiral Radford raised the possibility of a total US withdrawal from

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JCS and National Policy

Japan, if the Japanese wished it. The Council agreed, subject to certain conditions.

First, the Japanese must initiate the request. Second, the fact that this was a Japanese initiative must be made clear to the world and, particularly, to the SEATO

countries. Third, withdrawal should be phased to avoid an abrupt weakening of

the US posture in the Far East. Council members discussed whether such an offer

might induce the Japanese to speed their own rearmament. Obviously, the total

withdrawal offer was genuine and not designed merely as a negotiating device.

The Council also discussed an immediate partial withdrawal, which President

Eisenhower had authorized during a conversation with Secretary Wilson on 6

June. The Secretary, in turn, asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to study 40 and 50 percent reductions, including redeployment of all Army and Marine combat units by

1 January 1958 with remaining cuts to be completed six months later. On 18 June,

they presented a preliminary study to the Armed Forces Policy Council. Members concluded that the study proved President Eisenhower's objective of a substantial cut could be carried out.27

High-level talks with Prime Minister Kishi took place during 19-21 June. During a discussion with Kishi on 20 June, Admiral Radford stressed the growing

cost of US efforts and the need for allies to bear a larger burden. Budget limitations, said the Chairman, were dictating a major reduction of US forces in Japan.

If Japan deemed it necessary, he continued, there could be a total withdrawal.

Such a step, Radford told Kishi, might induce Japan to do more for itself. Secretary Dulles spoke in support of JCS views, particularly about retaining US control over the Bonins and Ryukyus. The next day, Radford advised Secretary

Dulles that at least 50 percent of US forces, including all ground combat elements, would be withdrawn over the next twelve months.28 As will be seen, the

Chairman somewhat overstated the pace of the US pullout.

On 21 June, when the visit ended, President Eisenhower and Prime Minister

Kishi issued a joint communique announcing that Japan was planning a defense

buildup, that the United States was substantially reducing its forces in Japan,

including a total withdrawal of ground combat forces; and that further US reductions were planned as Japanese capabilities grew. The United States reaffirmed its

intention to maintain control over the Bonins and Ryukyus "so long as the conditions of threat and tension exist in the Far East." The two leaders also announced

establishment of an intergovernmental committee to study problems arising in

relation to the security treaty and to consider adjusting defense arrangements.

The 1951 security treaty, they affirmed, was designed to be transitional in character and should not keep its current form in perpetuity.29

On 10 July 1957, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary Wilson a study detailing withdrawals of 36,683 men (the 40 percent alternative) and 46,508 men (the

50 percent alternative). The proposed cuts were not mathematically exact, so as

to preserve a proper balance in the remaining force structure. After some revisions required by Secretary Wilson had been made, withdrawals began on 2

August. On 15 October, the Army's 1

st Cavalry Division completed its relocation

to Korea. By mid-1959, the number of US personnel in Japan stood 49 percent

below the 1957 figure.30

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The Far East: Holding the Line

Revising the Japanese Security Treaty

Withdrawing ground combat troops and forming a Japanese-American Committee on security eased the immediate pressure for revision of the security treaty. But the Japanese still had other concerns. On 8 August 1958, in preparation for a visit by the Japanese foreign Minister, Deputy Secretary Quarles asked

the Joint Chiefs of Staff whether they favored retaining the old treaty, modifying

it, or negotiating a new one.31 Before they could reply, the State Department recommended discussing a new treaty. General Twining, on 9 September, informed

Secretary McElroy that he opposed "throwing out" the treaty and its accompanying Administrative Agreement at the start of discussions. The administration

should merely say that it was prepared to discuss a re-examination of security

relations. Japan, the Chairman acknowledged, might be justified in asking for

some changes. But "with no practical capability for self-defense, now or in the

next few years, Japan is not in a position to demand that the United States guarentee her security while hobbling the United States means to do so."32

On 10 September, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Secretary McElroy that they

preferred modifying the treaty through an exchange of diplomatic notes that

would not require senatorial consent. They saw no overriding military objection

to a new treaty, if an adequate quid pro quo could be obtained. The United

States, they agreed, could consult with Japan before employing forces either

based in or operating from Japan and could pledge that any such employment

would be consistent with the principles of the UN Charter. In no event, though,

should Japan be given a veto over the employment of US forces. The Joint Chiefs

of Staff also insisted that US forces remain in Japan, that these forces be free to

operate against communist disturbances elsewhere in Asia, and that rights conferred by the Administrative Agreement remain unimpaired. Finally, recognizing

the deeply emotional nature of Japanese opposition to nuclear weapons, they

deemed it inadvisable to seek any change regarding nuclear storage.33

The administration decided to negotiate a new security treaty. The State

Department prepared a draft but the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a commentary dated

23 September, found that it contained only one of the elements they considered

essential—a reaffirmation of the Administrative Agreement.34 Secretary McElroy,

convinced that the Japanese never would accept consultation limited to emergency operations only, decided to accept the State Department's broader wording. As for naval visits and freedom to operate outside Japan, he suggested raising these issues during negotiations so that the record would reflect US interest

in these matters. The State Department agreed, and on 29 September Ambassador MacArthur received a modified draft for presentation to the Japanese. The

Ambassador also received instructions to forestall any attempt at renegotiating

the Administrative Agreement and to seek acceptance of the matters raised by

Secretary McElroy.35

The Japanese presented their formal response in April 1959. During the ensuing negotiations, four issues proved to have particular concern for the Joint

Chiefs of Staff: the geographic scope of the treaty, the Administrative Agreement,

consultation about US deployments, and support for the UN Command in Korea.

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JCS and National Policy

Some modest changes, approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, made the Administrative Agreement more palatable to the Japanese public. These included elimination of a financial contribution to support US forces in Japan, allowing the Japanese greater authority in conducting customs examinations, and giving Japanese

employed by the United States the same rights granted them by Japanese law.36

The question of what territory the treaty ought to cover was not as simple as it

might seem. The US draft had the treaty area cover all US territories and trust

islands around Japan (i.e., the Mariana, Caroline, and Marshall archipelagoes). To

accord with their own constitution, the Japanese were unwilling to include anything except the home islands, Bonins, Volcanos, and Ryukyus. The Joint Chiefs

of Staff, on 1 December 1958, reminded Secretary McElroy that the United States

would gain nothing from including the Bonins, Volcanos, and Ryukyus. The

Japanese would provide at least passive support in their defense anyway, and

including those islands would give Japan a political lever toward re-establishing

administrative control. If Japan was unwilling to consider an attack on US forces

outside the home islands as a treaty violation, the United States should not allow

the Bonins, Ryukyus, and Volcanos to be included. The State and Defense

Departments agreed. Japan, nonetheless, kept pressing for inclusion. That did not

come about, but an agreed minute to the new treaty did recognize Japan's concern for their welfare and safety as well as its desire to consult with the United

States in the event of an attack against them.37

For the Japanese, a consultation formula about the use of US forces in Japan

constituted the heart of any new treaty. In final form, the new treaty called for a

public exchange of notes providing for prior consultation with respect to "major

changes" in the deployment of US forces, their equipment, and the use of bases

and facilities. A further understanding, not made public at the time, gave the

United States latitude over visits to Japan by certain categories of warships and

aircraft, logistics operations from bases in Japan during peace or war, rotation or

minor augmentation of US units, and total withdrawal of US forces. In a communique accompanying announcement of the new treaty, President Eisenhower

assured Prime Minister Kishi that the United States had no intention of acting "in

a manner contrary to the wishes of the Japanese Government with respect to

matters involving prior consultation " Admiral Harry D. Felt, the CINCPAC,

had strongly objected that such language would allow a later Japanese contention that consultation really meant agreement or consent in all cases. The Joint

Chiefs of Staff assured him that the communique, which President Eisenhower

already had approved, was general enough to preserve freedom of action.38

In Washington, on 19 January 1960, Prime Minister Kishi and Secretary Herter

signed the new Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. With only slight

modifications, it contained all the provisions considered essential by the Joint

Chiefs of Staff. The United States moved closer to an equal military partnership

with Japan. Base rights and privileges would continue, although subject to a

fuller exercise of Japanese sovereignty. Any increased burdens imposed under

the new Administrative Agreement were far outweighed by the political advantages of the new treaty.

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The Far East: Holding the Line

In Japan, though, the aftermath was raucous. If anything, Ambassador

MacArthur may have underestimated the power of neutralist and pacifist feeling.

Protests, fueled by charges that U-2 spy planes might fly from Japanese bases,

grew into mass demonstrations. Kishi's resort to questionable parliamentary tactics in getting the Diet's approval brought passions nearly to a fever pitch. On 16

June, after 20,000 protesters occupied part of the Diet building, Kishi asked President Eisenhower to cancel an impending "good will" visit. The treaty formally

went into effect on 23 June; Kishi resigned less than a month later. Still, the ruling

pro-US party won a November election; security ties between the two nations

would stay firm.39

Meanwhile, on 11 June, President Eisenhower had approved a fresh statement

of US policy towards Japan. While NSC 6008/1 was being drafted by the NSC

Planning Board, disagreements arose about four points in its military guidance.

First, JCS and OSD spokesmen wanted the United States to take the initiative in

making "discreet efforts" to induce Japan to extend its defense mission beyond

the home islands. The Board's majority favored responding to Japanese initiatives

but not stimulating them, and the NSC agreed. Second, the State and Defense

Departments felt that, while a lessening of US assistance remained the ultimate

goal, substantially reducing the military assistance program during the next few

years would have seriously adverse effects. The Departments of the Treasury and

Commerce and the Budget Bureau wanted a prompt start for consultations about

an orderly reduction and early elimination of new commitments for grant aid.

The NSC compromised, saying that such consultations would begin "as soon as

deemed feasible by the President." Third, JCS and OSD spokesmen wanted US

control over the Bonins, Volcanos, and Ryukyus to remain undiminished "for the

duration of international tensions in the Far East." The Board's majority supported doing so merely "as long as it is essential to our vital national security interests." The Council took the problem out of a time frame, deciding simply to

"maintain the degree of control... deemed by the President to be essential to our

vital security interests." Lastly, the State Department asked that Japanese

requests for closer ties with the Ryukyus be "acceded to whenever reasonable

and not inconsistent" with US security interests. The JCS and OSD spokesmen,

repeating the position outlined in NSC 5516/1, wanted such requests "considered

sympathetically" consistent with US interests. This time, the NSC adopted

Defense's position.40 During the 1960s, Okinawa would prove a major irritant in

US-Japanese relations.

Defining Taiwan's Role

Taiwan, seat of Chiang Kai-shek's refugee Government of the Republic of

China (GRC), remained a vital link in the offshore island chain of containment. A Mutual Defense Treaty dating from 1954 committed the United States to

defend Taiwan and the nearby Penghu (or Pescadores) Islands. In January 1955,

the communist regime on mainland China seemed to be preparing an assault

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JCS and National Policy

against Taiwan. Congress passed a joint resolution authorizing the President to

use US forces "as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack, this authority to include the

securing and protection of such related positions and territories ... as he judges

to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa."

According to NSC 5503, approved by President Eisenhower at the same time,

it was also US policy to avoid "any appearance of an obligation" to guarantee

Chiang's return to power on the mainland. Moreover, the United States would

not agree to offensive actions against mainland China, except under circumstances approved by the President. The sole exception lay in permitting prompt

and clear retaliation against US-approved military targets, chosen in part to minimize the possibility of provoking further Chinese reaction.41

Chiang's regime could not have survived without US subsidies and support.

In 1956, the United States was funding more than 60 percent of Chiang's military

establishment, at an annual cost running above $200 million. Accordingly, just as

in the case of Korea, President Eisenhower ordered the NSC Planning Board to

review the scope and allocation of economic and military aid.42

The Planning Board reviewed NSC 5503 and, on 9 September 1957, submitted a

report that contained split views about critical issues. The Budget Bureau's

spokesman wanted the mission of Chiang's Nationalist forces limited to defending

Taiwan, the Penghu Islands, and the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. State

Department and JCS representatives, by contrast, interpreted NSC 5503 as providing for a Nationalist role in collective defense of the Far East, including preparations for offensive operations. Restrictions imposed upon Chiang during the Taiwan Straits confrontation of 1954-1955, and spelled out in NSC 5503, were not

intended to eliminate forever the offensive use of Nationalist troops. As a standing

threat to China's flank, Nationalists could reduce the likelihood of Chinese aggression elsewhere. They were more valuable than other noncommunist Asian forces

because, if used against the mainland, they would have a powerful political as well

as military effect. The Budget Bureau dismissed this position as unrealistic. Despite

substantial US aid, the Nationalists still were incapable of self-defense without US

intervention. Therefore, assigning a mission beyond self-defense would divert US

resources into programs "running counter to prudent US advice" and inhibit the

attainment of other objectives. On 17 September, the Joint Chiefs of Staff formally

endorsed the position taken by State and JCS representatives.43

When the NSC debated these differences on 2 October, Secretary Dulles said

that only the hope of returning to the mainland sustained Nationalist morale. In

his judgment, all the offshore island and peninsular nations were maintaining

their will to freedom because they hoped "that Communist China will one day

blow up." President Eisenhower agreed "heartily" and emphatically rejected the

Budget Bureau's position. The Director, Bureau of the Budget, replied that he

sought to guard against a Nationalist buildup rather than bring about a reduction of Chiang's forces. The new policy statement—NSC 5723, which President

Eisenhower approved on 4 October—stated that military assistance should

enable the Nationalists to contribute to collective noncommunist strength in the

Far East, and to take other mutually-agreed upon actions directed primarily

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toward and limited by what was deemed necessary to maintain Nationalist

morale.44 In essence, the JCS view had prevailed.

Practicing Brinkmanship over Quemoy and Matsu

At the beginning of August 1958, just when US intervention in Lebanon was

reaching its peak strength, China brought strong military pressure against

the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. Quemoy, with a land area of thirtyseven square miles, lies less than five miles off the mainland port of Amoy.

Matsu, not even five square miles in area, lies east of the mainland port of Foochow. The Nationalist government was maintaining an army of 450,000 men, one

Marine division, a modest navy, and an air force that included 450 jet fighters.

About 13 percent of Taiwan's gross national product was being devoted to

defense—one of the highest figures in the noncommunist world. Over a number

of months, contrary to US advice, Chiang steadily had enlarged the Quemoy and

Matsu garrisons until seven divisions and more than 100,000 men were stationed

there. Since the GRC was proclaiming its determination to hold the offshore

islands at all costs, failure to do so might well shatter Nationalist morale.

The new confrontation began shortly after consultations took place between

Soviet and Chinese leaders and was accompanied by communist pronouncements that Taiwan's "liberation" lay close at hand. Nonetheless, on 2 August, the

State Department informed Ambassador Everett Drumright in Taipei that the

Joint Chiefs of Staff saw no evidence suggesting that offensive action was imminent. The Ambassador was instructed to allay the GRC's sense of alarm and

remind the Nationalists of their obligation to consult the US Government before

taking offensive action against the mainland. Within a few days, two Air Force

units were scheduled to land in Taiwan for a previously scheduled visit. The

Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 1 August, had decided that their arrival would meet the

needs of the moment.45

Very soon, the Nationalist government submitted more requests. The

administration moved to strengthen Nationalist air capabilities and particularly

to preserve qualitative air superiority. Senior State Department officials met

with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 15 August; everyone agreed that losing the offshore islands almost inevitably would lead to attacks on Taiwan "in which the

free world has such a vital stake." All considerations moved to a new level of

intensity on 23 August, because on that day the Chinese communists opened a

heavy bombardment of Quemoy. Secretary Dulles immediately issued a public

statement that "it would be highly hazardous for anyone to assume that if the

Chinese Communists were to ... attack and seek to conquer these islands, that

could be a limited operation.46

Ambassador Drumright promptly cabled Washington that Chiang was determined to hold the offshore islands and would feel forced to retaliate if the

shelling continued. The next day, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised CESJCPAC that

US policy almost certainly would be "to make sure that neither ChiNats nor our209
JCS and National Policy

selves can be labeled aggressors" as the result of a premature attack against the

mainland. But they also notified commanders of all unified and specified commands that US forces might become involved "if military activity of the Chinese

Communists against the offshore islands increases to the point of seriously

endangering these islands."47

On 25 August, as Nationalist resupply ships enroute to the offshore islands

came under attack, President Eisenhower met with his senior advisers, among

whom were General Twining and Admiral Burke. Eisenhower remarked that

Chiang had tied his whole regime to the offshore islands' fate, but the Chief Executive "did not wish to put ourselves on the line with a full commitment. The Orientals can be very devious; they would then call the tune." Consequently, he preferred to stand on the language of the 1955 congressional resolution and

Secretary Dulles' statement of 23 August. General Twining presented, and President Eisenhower approved, a message directing CTNCPAC to:

1. Reinforce US air defenses on Taiwan at his discretion and prepare to assume

responsibility for Taiwan's air defense, using US forces to the extent practicable.

2. Prepare to escort and protect Nationalist supply ships steaming to the offshore

islands.

3. Augment the Seventh Fleet as practicable, sailing the attack carrier USS Midway

and other units from Pearl Harbor. The carrier USS Essex and four destroyers also

were en route from the Mediterranean.

4. Prepare to assist the Nationalists in countering any major attack against the principal offshore islands.48

Although conventional weapons alone probably would be authorized for initial attacks, CINCPAC should be prepared to strike targets deeper inside China

with other weapons. (In his memoirs, Eisenhower stated that he and Secretary

Dulles were willing to contemplate using nuclear weapons, against strictly military targets and with techniques that would limit fallout and civilian casualties.)

The President made one important deletion to General Twining's draft. Admiral Felt would not inform GRC officials that he had been directed to prepare to

escort their supply ships and to join in action against the mainland if a major

attack occurred. CINCPAC promptly endorsed this deletion, saying he deemed it

desirable to keep both Nationalists and communists uncertain about what

actions the United States would take.49

General Twining also gave the President a draft statement of US policy

accompanied by a supporting rationale. According to the statement, loss of the

offshore islands could not be permitted. Otherwise, encroachments would continue until Taiwan had been lost and the GRC destroyed. If major air or

amphibious attacks seriously endangered Quemoy and Matsu, the US Government should approve Nationalist retaliation against nearby mainland bases. The

United States also would reinforce defenders to the extent necessary and might

join in attacking land bases, perhaps even employing nuclear weapons to attain

military objectives. Hostilities would have to be brought to a rapid conclusion,

since "a major involvement or prolonged operations would seriously diminish

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The Far East: Holding the Line

our military capabilities in other areas or for general war." But world opinion

must recognize China as the aggressor. Unless US and Nationalist forces rigorously avoided any move that would becloud this issue, "our Allies, particularly

Japan and the Philippines, will not loyally support us and may deny us use of

bases for our forces." President Eisenhower did not approve the policy

statement. Presumably, he wanted to preserve flexibility by avoiding any

predetermined courses of action.50

By 28 August, resupplying the offshore islands had emerged as the critical

issue. Vice Admiral A.K. Doyle asked for authority to escort and protect supply

ships and to authorize Nationalist air attacks on artillery positions. The JCS reply,

sent after a White House discussion the next day, outlined a three-phased concept. In phase one, where matters now stood, the United States would furnish

material and logistic assistance, including convoy protection. In phase two, initiated by an assault "with evident intent to capture one or more of the principal

Offshore Islands," US forces would directly assist in defending the islands,

including attacks on artillery positions and local airfields. Hostile action in the

international waters around Taiwan and the Penghu Islands or an invasion of

them would touch off phase three, during which US forces would "extend action

as appropriate." In no phase, however, could nuclear weapons be used until

specifically authorized by the President.

The JCS reply further directed Admirals Felt and Doyle to:

1. Give convoy escort and protection as far as the three-mile limit, to the extent militarily necessary.

2. Maintain freedom of the seas in the Taiwan Strait "by action confined to international waters."

3. Assume responsibility for air defense of Taiwan and the Penghus, at Admiral

Doyle's discretion and after consultation with Nationalist authorities, thus releasing Chiang's air force to defend the offshore islands and provide air cover for the

supply convoys.

Although the reply did not authorize Nationalist air action against communist

artillery positions, it did state that the shipment of twelve eight-inch howitzers

was being expedited to improve counterbattery fire. Moreover, if Nationalist

planes met communist aircraft that were attacking Quemoy and Matsu, the United States would consider that the inherent right of self-defense permitted pursuit

back to mainland bases. Admiral Felt also was authorized to turn over to the GRC

as many as eight Landing Craft, Mechanized (LCMs) and twenty-eight Landing

Craft, Vehicle and Personnel (LCVPs) that were en route to the Seventh Fleet.51

By 13 August, local US commanders concluded—and Admiral Felt agreed—

that Quemoy's defenders "can be strangled if we do not take more positive

action." So CINCPAC proposed providing air cover and escorts up to the beaches;

he would interpret such orders as allowing him to neutralize any interference.

Two days later, Secretaries Dulles and Herter held a very revealing discussion

with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Twining said that, if intervention became

necessary, all Defense studies had shown that using small nuclear weapons

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against mainland airfields and shore batteries was "the only way to do the job;"

the Chinese Communists, he and his colleagues believed, "should be told that this

was our intention." Admiral Burke commented that "the argument that nothing is

worth a world war was the reason why the Communists had been winning all

along." Secretary Dulles said that, if we initiated the use of nuclear weapons, the

Japanese Government might be forced to demand withdrawal of US forces from

Japan, or at least cessation of Japan-based support for US operations. If reactions

were so hostile as to inhibit using nuclear weapons except to defend Western

Europe or retaliate against a Soviet attack, Dulles asked, "was our reliance on their

use correct and productive?" Admiral Burke considered this simply part of a

Communist-inspired war of nerves. General Taylor, however, felt that this "vividly pointed up the need for flexibility of forces" and advocated a carefully orchestrated military response. General Twining responded that the United States could

not afford enough divisions to meet Communist conventional forces. General

White argued that a World War II-size air force was financially out of reach.

Admiral Burke commented that heavy losses in naval aircraft would be hard to

replace. General Twining said that "he could not understand the public horror at

the idea of using nuclear weapons and insisted that we must get used to the idea

that such weapons had to be used." Summing up, Secretary Dulles asserted that

"if we shrink from using nuclear weapons when military circumstances so

require, then we will have to reconsider our whole defense posture."52

Through a memorandum to Secretary McElroy four days later, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff addressed broader aspects of the situation. They asserted that

measures taken to meet the offshore islands emergency, added to the Lebanon

operation and other commitments around the world, had spread US forces "dangerously thin." Uncertainty about whether nuclear weapons would be used

aggravated this condition. This spreading of US strength struck them as an integral part of communist strategy and, therefore, a matter of grave concern. If yet

another demand upon already dispersed US forces arose, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

thought it probable that a partial mobilization would be required.

Moving away from military matters, the Joint Chiefs of Staff voiced anxiety

over the "apparent apathy or lack of information or understanding on the part of

the US public and the allied world at large." The free world seemed to them emotionally and psychologically unprepared for a deep involvement of US forces that

might occur at any time. The Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested a series of steps to

marshal US and allied support. They also proposed delivering a statement of the

US position, through diplomatic channels, to the Nationalists, the Chinese communists, and the USSR. At that point, in fact, a good part of US opinion was not

backing the administration. On 6 September, for example, former Secretary of

State Dean Acheson publicly declared that "We seem to be drifting, either dazed

or indifferent, toward war with China, a war without friends or allies, and over

issues which the administration has not presented to the American people, and

which are not worth a single American life."53

Meantime, on 29 August, the Commander, Seventh Fleet, warned that artillery

batteries must be silenced if the offshore islands were to be supplied and defended. Two days later, CINCPAC cabled the Joint Chiefs of Staff that Quemoy's

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The Far East: Holding the Line

defenders could be "strangled" unless US forces took "more positive action." He

recommended extending the US air and naval escort up to Quemoy's eastern

beaches, with instructions to ensure that supplies landed, and that the communists be so informed. Admiral Felt would interpret such orders as allowing him

to neutralize any Chinese communist interference.

At the White House on 6 September, General Twining handed President

Eisenhower a proposal for meeting a major amphibious attack upon the offshore

islands. Twining recommended giving the Joint Chiefs of Staff authority to

approve US air support for Nationalist planes that were striking enemy forces

and mainland targets. An unsympathetic President pointedly recalled a JCS estimate that US air support would not be required unless Chinese aircraft made

massive air attacks to assist a landing. If such a situation developed, there would

be time to reach a decision.

Once again, President Eisenhower decided to preserve as much freedom of

action as possible. If the Chinese communists launched a major landing operation solely against the offshore islands, the Joint Chiefs of Staff could approve

Nationalist air action against mainland targets and order US forces to strike

against invaders actually moving to the islands. However, Eisenhower reserved

to himself the decision to launch US air attacks against the mainland. If an attack

against Taiwan as well as the offshore islands moved so rapidly as to preclude

consultation with the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff could alert US forces

worldwide, order CINCPAC to augment the US forces defending Taiwan, and

approve strikes at mainland bases with all the forces that CINCPAC could bring

to bear. Under all circumstances, though, Eisenhower reserved to himself the

decision to use nuclear weapons.54

A small cooling of the crisis atmosphere occurred when China's Foreign Minister Chou En-lai proposed, on 6 September, that there be talks between the United

States and China. Chou proposed that the two countries' Ambassadors in Warsaw,

who had met intermittently to discuss various issues, take up this problem. Five

days later, President Eisenhower reviewed matters with Secretary McElroy. The

Secretary said it was clear that, if military factors alone were to be considered, the

Joint Chiefs of Staff believed the offshore islands should be vacated. Eisenhower

observed that he was trying "to find a way in which a strong country can conciliate. It is not adequate simply to say that we will stand on Quemoy and Matsu. We

must move beyond that." Hours later, in a nationwide address, the President said

that "no American boy will be asked by me to fightjust for Quemoy." But the bombardment formed "part of what is indeed an ambitious plan of armed conquest"

which "would liquidate all of the free world positions in the Western Pacific

area— " Even so, he stressed that "diplomacy can and should find a way out."55

On 15 September, ambassadorial talks began in Warsaw.

Admiral Felt, on 11 September, renewed his recommendation for US air and

naval escort to go as far as Quemoy's beaches. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however,

considered it possible that the Nationalists were being "deliberately inept" so as

to draw the United States into hostilities. Consequently, they informed CINCPAC

the next day, the administration had to be certain that Quemoy would fall

"despite all (the) GRC can and should do" before considering direct action

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against Chinese installations. The Nationalists must be made to understand that,

before US forces would assume greater responsibility, they must demonstrate

real determination about bringing convoys to the beaches under fire.56

The Nationalists quickly improved their performance in convoying and

unloading supplies under fire. During August, 424 Sidewinders had been

shipped to Taiwan. Consequently, in the air, Sidewinder-equipped Nationalist

planes outfought China's MiG-17s. On the morning of 29 September, General

Twining told President Eisenhower that the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed the supply crisis had been "broken." Nonetheless, Eisenhower remarked that "something must be done to make Chiang more flexible in his approach"; the President

"did not like to wage a fight on the ground of someone else's choosing " General Twining replied that Defense officials would start thinking about how to get

Chiang out of Quemoy and Matsu.57

During a press conference on 30 September, Secretary Dulles struck conciliatory notes. The United States, he emphasized, had no legal or treaty commitments

either to defend the offshore islands or to help the Nationalists return to the

mainland. He also remarked that the stationing of large forces on Quemoy and

Matsu had been "rather foolish." If a dependable cease-fire could be arranged, he

added, it would not be prudent to keep them there.58

On 5 October, China announced a one-week cease-fire starting the next day,

on condition that the United States stop convoying supply ships. Obviously, this

was a face-saving formula to cover retreat. Admiral Felt, on 6 October, received

the following instructions: unless the GRC raised strenuous objections, stop

using US ships and aircraft to escort convoys as long as the Chinese withheld

their fire; encourage the Nationalists to make a maximum resupply effort during

the lull; order the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Taiwan, to survey the offshore islands; and maintain current readiness for action.59

On 12 October, Communist China extended the cease-fire for two weeks and

began talking about "peaceful liberation." The next day, General Twining told

President Eisenhower that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary Dulles had

reached a consensus that at least two-thirds of the troops on Quemoy should

withdraw after Chinese artillery fire had "quieted." Dulles also would explore

the possibility of demilitarizing the offshore islands. Twining said that, in

exchange for evacuation, the United States could offer to modernize Chiang's

army and part of his air force (although the latter would be very expensive) and

to provide some shipping and amphibious lift. Finally, Twining informed Eisenhower that the MAAG had found morale in Quemoy to be quite high, damage

from the bombardment slight, and the command in very good shape.60

The GRC, on 14 October, hinted that it would reduce offshore garrisons if the

United States supplied newer weapons and stronger fortifications for defense of

the offshore islands. Secretary Dulles flew to Taipei and started negotiations that

ultimately traded a 15,000-man reduction for additional US tanks and artillery.

After delivering artillery barrages timed for Dulles' visit, China announced on 25

October a policy that it would bombard the offshore islands during odd-numbered days only. The Nationalists sent resupply ships on even-numbered days;

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US ships and planes never resumed escort operations. By 1 December, US forces

in the Taiwan area had returned to normal strengths and operating procedures.61

The offshore islands constituted a potential time bomb that never exploded. A

good deal was risked but nothing was lost. Whether this outcome was the result

of skill or luck may long be debated. The administration did not enjoy the bipartisan support evident during the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1954-1955 or the Berlin

confrontation and the Lebanon intervention of 1958-1959. Partly because of this,

perhaps, President Eisenhower took the utmost care to preserve US freedom of

action. The Joint Chiefs of Staff naturally wanted to have clear-cut plans ready for

every contingency. The President kept them, along with Chiang Kai-shek, on a

fairly tight leash.

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15

The Far East: Fissures in Containment

In Southeast Asia during the late 1950s, the dike of containment began leaking

badly. Here, ultimately, US foreign policy would suffer its greatest failure during

the Cold War. The Joint Chiefs of Staff proved ready to embrace every alliance

except one: the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. Only very limited integration

of US planning and force requirements with multilateral efforts took place. Since

a separate series describes developments in Indochina, this chapter will address a

narrower question: Why did collective security, which was so successful in Western Europe and even in Northeast Asia, prove unworkable in Southeast Asia?

Failure To Mesh Planning: ANZUS and SEATO

The year 1954 witnessed France's defeat at Dien Bien Phu, Indochina. That victory by the communist-led Viet Minh was quickly followed by the Geneva

agreements that created Laos, Cambodia, and the two Vietnams—a communist

North and a noncommunist South—as independent states. Fearing further communist expansion into Southeast Asia, the United States took the lead in creating a

regional defense system. The Manila Pact, signed in September 1954, joined the

United States, the United Kingdom, France, Thailand, Pakistan, the Philippines,

Australia, and New Zealand in what came to be called the Southeast Treaty Organization (SEATO). Its central provision stipulated that members would, in case of

armed attack upon any of them, act to meet the common danger in accordance

with their constitutional processes. A separate protocol designated Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam as additional areas where the occurrence of armed aggression would be recognized as a threat calling for action under the treaty.1

The basic statement of US policy toward mainland Southeast Asia was NSC

5612/1, approved by President Eisenhower on 5 September 1956. With modest

revisions, it remained in force throughout the second Eisenhower

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administration.2 NSC 5612/1 recognized that the United States, as the "only

major outside source of power," would have to provide the basic shield against a

"Russian-Chinese Communist thrust into Southeast Asia." If aggression

occurred, "the provisions of the UN Charter or the SEATO Treaty should be

invoked, but the United States should not forgo necessary action... because of

the possibility that other allies might be loath to participate or to furnish more

than token military forces."

Among SEATO members who seemed disposed toward an active role were

Australia and New Zealand, with whom the United States had additional ties

through the 1951 ANZUS Treaty. Through NSC 5713/2, which President Eisenhower approved in August 1957, the administration defined its long-range interests towards Australia and New Zealand. Significantly, NSC 5713/2 viewed the

importance of ANZUS largely in terms of its relationship to SEATO. ANZUS,

which the NSC paper described as the "strategic core of SEATO planning," permitted the coordination of national defense plans that had been worked out unilaterally by the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. This coordination was

held to be particularly important because ANZUS might be able to act in some

areas, such as Indonesia, that SEATO could not or would not protect. ANZUS also

facilitated discussion of many defense problems that could not be aired within the

larger and less homogeneous SEATO organization. Indeed, preliminary discussion

within ANZUS helped to generate the support that Australia and New Zealand

gave "almost without exception" to US policies during SEATO meetings.3

Even collectively, the Far Eastern members of ANZUS and SEATO possessed

only modest military strength. According to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

for 1 July 1956 through 30 June 1958, ANZUS and SEATO ground forces would

have to carry on limited initial resistance until the mobile striking power of the

United States could be brought into action. Nonetheless, the administration

imposed important restrictions upon the development of the two treaty organizations and their military planning. These restrictions, in whose formulation the

Joint Chiefs of Staff had played a leading part, can be summarized as follows:

1. ANZUS and SEATO should duplicate neither NATO's organizational structure

nor its major "standing" military forces. Creating such ANZUS-SEATO forces

would require the designation and positioning of US units for defense of Southeast Asia, contravening the policy of keeping US forces free to respond anywhere

in the Far East.

2. ANZUS and SEATO should not make plans to defend Southeast Asia during a global war, since the area then would become a tertiary theater of operations. In a global

war, the Kra Isthmus on the Malay peninsula would become the line of defense.4

Thus, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff undertook to mesh ANZUS and SEATO

with US defense policy, they faced a fundamental problem: developing any really

effective SEATO plans would breach the restrictions imposed by US policy, but

the continuation of these restrictions could threaten SEATO's viability as an

instrument of collective defense and an aid to US security.

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The Far East: Fissures in Containment

By 1957, SEATO had gained—theoretically at least—the ability to complement

US planning for situations short of general war. The labors of the SEATO Military

Advisers, the advisers' own Planning Staff, and a variety of ad hoc committees

set up by the advisers paved the way for creation of a SEATO Military Planning

Office (SMPO), which began operations in Bangkok on 1 March 1957. Over the

next two years, the advisers and the SMPO worked on plans for such contingencies as: defense of Southeast Asia, including East Pakistan, against a ChineseNorth Vietnamese attack; overt aggression against the Philippines; measures to

counter communist insurgency; and creation of a SEATO force to help the government of Laos combat the communist-led Pathet Lao. Also, steps were taken

toward agreeing upon a command structure for a SEATO force.

With minor exceptions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff found these plans to be compatible with US defense concepts and with CINCPAC's operational plans. Such

compatibility was achieved with relative ease because CINCPAC served as the US

Military Adviser to SEATO and because the advisers received their directives from

political-military authorities in their own governments, not from SEATO itself.

In one sense, however, the SMPO's planning activities were too successful. As

plans became more refined, pressures began to build within SEATO for more

detailed information concerning the availability of US forces to support them.

Repeatedly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had warned the Secretary of Defense that

such a development could lead eventually to the earmarking of US forces for

defense of Southeast Asia.5 But by early 1959, these pressures had increased to

the point where, if no adequate response was made, it seemed likely that Southeast Asian members' confidence in collective security would erode.

Within ANZUS, Australia wanted more information about US intentions and

capabilities in order to facilitate Australian—not ANZUS—planning. In May

1957, the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged Secretary Wilson to continue the policy of

opposing any combined requirements planning by ANZUS and SEATO because

such planning would result in the commitment of US forces to defend Southeast

Asia. Without jeopardizing this policy, they suggested, US spokesmen could discuss in broad terms the "capabilities and methods of providing support to the

ANZUS-SEATO nations," thereby drawing a background for Australian planning. Information that could be given to Australia included the major US forces

deployed in the Western Pacific and the forces available to CINCPAC for his contingency planning.6

Basically the same policy was applied to SEATO. In 1959, as the next section

explains in some detail, CINCPAC asked permission to give the SEATO Military

Advisers detailed estimates of what US forces might be available to implement an

SMPO plan for sending a SEATO force to assist the Laotian Government in countering communist insurgency. Yet CINCPAC specifically excluded major US combat forces from these estimates. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, after receiving a J-3 report

that SMPO and US plans were compatible, endorsed CINCPAC's recommendation.

In ratifying this position, State and Defense instructed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to

make certain that CINCPAC's disclosure to the Military Advisers left no doubt as

to the US position on two points. First, insofar as possible, the SEATO force should

be composed of forces from Southeast Asian nations. Second, the US contribution

219
JCS and National Policy

should be primarily logistical.7In effect, CINCPAC won authority to discuss US

capabilities and methods of providing essentially logistical support for a SEATO

plan that accorded with one worked out unilaterally by the United States.

For different reasons, the administration moved gingerly in dealing with the

question of how to defend the SEATO area during a general war. Clearly, the

allies could not be told that US forces would defend nothing north of the Kra

Isthmus. Yet several Asian members were pressing for development of a SEATO

general war plan. Pakistan led this movement. As a member of the Baghdad Pact

and then of CENTO, Pakistanis knew that a study on defending the Baghdad

Pact area had been completed. Parallel planning by SEATO seemed to them a reasonable goal.

When the ANZUS Council met in 1956, Australia and New Zealand had promised to join the United States in opposing a SEATO study of general war. But the

Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that a flat "No" would not suffice. In January 1957, they

advised Secretary Wilson that a SEATO study of general war should be turned

aside only "if it can be done without seriously undermining the confidence of the

Asian members "If the Asians proved unwilling to abandon such a study, the

Joint Chiefs of Staff were willing to see it done on three conditions. First, limit the

study to broad general terms. Second, reach agreement about assumptions on the

effects of Soviet nuclear weapons. Third, reach agreement on assumptions regarding plans and forces of free world nations and defense organizations outside the

SEATO area. Planners would employ such assumptions in lieu of seeking disclosures from the nations and organizations concerned.8

While OSD officials approved the JCS position as a last line of resistance, they

hoped to avoid even a tightly circumscribed global war study. Further StateDefense review of SEATO members' sentiments led the administration to take the

following position: Try to convince members that "planning for a war limited to

the treaty area would be adequate for defense in a global war— Such a course of

action would appear a diplomatic means of disposing of this study and would

still offer a route for graceful retirement should the Asian members indicate

strongly held opposition."9

At their sixth meeting, held in March 1957, SEATO's Military Advisers decided that their limited war studies would be adaptable for global considerations

because "the residual threat to the mainland of South East Asia in global war

would be no greater, and may be less, than in limited war."10Pakistan's adviser,

seeking political approval of a global war study, dissented. In the fall of 1958, he

again argued for such a study. The advisers formally took note of these views but

also "noted that the greatest danger to the Treaty Area was subversion, followed

by limited war, and that the work of the Military Planning Office should be

directed to first things first."11 Thus the US objective was achieved.

Subsequently, without SEATO's knowledge, US general war plans were

changed in the way that Asian members desired. JSCP-59, approved by the Joint

Chiefs of Staff in November 1957, repeated that the United States and its allies

should hold along the Kra Isthmus, abandoning the bulk of Southeast Asia.12In

January 1959, CINCPAC warned the Joint Chiefs of Staff about a growing feeling

in several countries that the United States would not help them meet all types of

220
The Far East: Fissures in Containment

aggression. To stem this disillusionment, he proposed having the JSCP lay down

a more flexible line of resistance located as far forward as possible. Hence he proposed the following change:

The defense of Southeast Asia, undertaken in conjunction with our Allies, will occur

as far forward as possible, holding strong points in Burma and the area south of central Thailand-Pakse-Tourane. Should this concept fail..., the US with its remaining

allies should hold the Malay Peninsula and either hold or neutralize Indonesia.13

The Joint Chiefs of Staff did expand their objectives. JSCP-61, which they

approved in April 1960, stated that "the United States and its Allies will hold in

Southeast Asia as far forward as possible..." during general war. However,

"holding action in the area will have to be accomplished by allied forces unless US

forces have been previously deployed."14 Yet, since the allies were not informed of

this change, their morale and determination cannot have been improved by it.

Moreover, by 1960, crises in Indonesia and Laos had revealed weaknesses in both

ANZUS and SEATO that overshadowed issues of general war strategy.

Two alliance systems—SEATO and CENTO, described in chapter 11—suffered

from crippling weaknesses. Yet, from the standpoint of military planning, their

problems were quite different. The Joint Chiefs of Staff restricted SEATO's development but called for strong measures to build up CENTO. In large part, this

approach reflected a conviction at all levels of the administration that SEATO

should endeavor to cope with limited war threats while CENTO should concern

itself with direct Soviet aggression. Thus, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, CENTO required a sound global war plan whereas SEATO needed several

different limited war plans. Defending the CENTO area would require using at

least some nuclear weapons, whereas defending the SEATO area very likely

would not. CENTO also needed a formally established command to implement

its global war plan, while SEATO would need a variety of commands and commanders depending upon the contingency in question. US forces eventually

might be earmarked for CENTO but definitely not for SEATO. Ultimately, of

course, CENTO never had to face a decision about military action while SEATO

did. The next section sheds some light on why SEATO failed this test.

Failure of Collective Action: Indonesia and Laos

Indonesia, under President Sukarno, appeared to be turning into an authoritarian state with an adventurist, pro-communist foreign policy. That, at least, was

the opinion among US policymakers. In 1957, antigovernment risings occurred

on the islands of Sumatra and Sulawesi. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that

Indonesia's loss to the Communist Bloc would do irreparable and catastrophic

damage to the posiiton of the US and its allies in the Far East. Therefore, they recommended starting a token military assistance program immediately and

preparing to give "timely and effective support to, and if necessary assist in the

221
JCS and National Policy

creation of, a non-Communist nationalist government when the inevitable crisis

in Java comes to pass."15 On 15 February 1958, the rebels announced formation of

a rival government. The resulting civil war lasted three months, and for a time it

seemed that the United States and the USSR would be supporting opposite sides,

in a manner resembling the Spanish civil war of the 1930s.

NSC 5713/2 had stated that ANZUS planning facilities might prove more

appropriate for "certain phases of the problem posed by the possibility of Communist subversion of all or part of Indonesia." The ANZUS powers judged that

SEATO, because of hesitancy among some members, would hinder rather than

facilitate any military efforts to keep communists from gaining control over

Indonesia. By early March 1958, the ANZUS Military Staff Planners had prepared

recommendations for aiding the rebel government with measures including financial, technical, and logistical support. The planners also drew up an operational

planning study outlining ANZUS military action, but they made clear that it constituted only a basis for possible future operations and not a commitment to act.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 8 April, asked Secretary McElroy to approve the

Staff Planners' report and to seek State Department concurrence. The Office of

the Secretary of Defense did so but State delayed a decision.16Sukarno's forces,

meantime, had landed on the rebel-held island of Sumatra. Military supplies in

modest amounts were reaching the rebels by air and sea. Although the administration wanted the rebels to win, it would not countenance the only sure way to

success: overt action.

On 8 April, when Sukarno's forces were about to make another landing on

Sumatra to capture the town of Padang, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary

McElroy a warning. The Soviets were increasing their influence over Sukarno's

government by introducing merchant ships, crews, and supplies; Soviet aircraft

soon would arrive as well. In these circumstances, the rebels' defeat "would

almost certainly lead to Communist domination of Indonesia." Such a turn of

events would cause serious reactions in Malaya and Thailand, probable trouble

in Laos, and possible trouble in Cambodia. SEATO could disappear as a viable

pact. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended relaxing restrictions on

US policy and accelerating efforts to prevent Indonesia's loss to communism.17

Some things were done18 but not enough to turn the tide. The rebels lost Padang

on 18 April. When their capital in Sumatra fell on 4 May, the back of the rebellion

was broken. At that time, the ANZUS Council still had not approved the planners' report. Under President Sukarno, Indonesia continued on a leftward course

until the revolution of 1965.

In Laos, after the 1954 Geneva conference, long negotiations had led to creation of a coalition government that included the communist Pathet Lao. In

1959, this Government of National Union fell apart and a communist insurgency

quickly gathered strength. Writing to Secretary McElroy on 4 September 1959,

the Joint Chiefs of Staff voiced grave concern over what they called "the increasingly strong Communist invasion of Laos." According to their information, the

Pathet Lao were receiving powerful outside support. The Joint Chiefs of Staff

did not believe that measures taken and those contemplated would ensure the

defense of northern or even southern Laos. The necessary steps might well lead

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The Far East: Fissures in Containment

to US military intervention, for which SEATO provided a legal basis. They recommended, as a matter of urgency, recasting policy to eliminate all restrictions

upon US actions, whether taken unilaterally or in conjunction with allies. Diplomatic efforts should be initiated to provide military assistance and learn what

support the non-SEATO allies of the United States could supply. At a StateDefense meeting that same day, Admiral Burke stated his belief that "someone

may have to move in fast."19

The Royal Lao Government was reluctant to invoke SEATO's assistance; Australia, New Zealand, France, and the United Kingdom reportedly were reluctant

to have SEATO intervene. The administration decided unilaterally to make standby deployments, so that US forces could respond to an emergency or backstop a

decision by the Government of Thailand to send its own troops into Laos.20 But

fighting tapered off, perhaps due to the prompt arrival of United Nations

observers, and the immediate crisis eased.

Under SEATO auspices, a plan for intervening to assist the Laotian Government against a communist insurgency was being written. During a White House

meeting on 11 September, President Eisenhower said "he assumed that it was our

policy to do whatever was necessary militarily under SEATO and that we would

not do anything completely by ourselves. If we acted unilaterally, then he did not

see why we should have Collective Security Pacts." One week later, with State

and Defense concurrence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised CINCPAC that

SEATO's plan should be designed to involve as many members as possible,

avoiding "any impression that we can swing the whole thing alone." The United

States already was prepared to make logistic and supporting units available. The

Joint Chiefs of Staff, with State and Defense concurrence, now added two battalion landing teams and a composite air strike force.21

Early in May 1960, CINCPAC informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that SEATO

Planners had to know the details of force contributions in order to refine their

plan. Admiral Felt calculated that about 12,000 US personnel would be provided,

including 5,000 for logistics support, 5,120 for a composite brigade (one Army

battle group and one Marine battalion landing team with its own air and logistic

elements), and 780 for an air component built around one tactical fighter

squadron. Initially, Admiral Felt said that he intended to let SEATO Planners

know only the "general magnitude" of personnel and units, hoping to encourage

headquarters and support contributions from other nations. The Joint Chiefs of

Staff postponed decisions about logistics support and about revealing the details

of a US contribution.22

Laos reclaimed the world's attention when, on 9 August 1960, paratroop Captain Kong Le and his men seized the country's administrative capital of Vientiane, promising to establish a truly neutral government. The United States

responded by providing support to General Phoumi Nosavan, who represented

himself as being strongly anticommunist. The United States limited its efforts,

though. Among other reasons, the Departments of State and Defense feared that

all-out backing for Phoumi would risk a sharp break with the United Kingdom,

France, Australia, and New Zealand, quite conceivably leading to SEATO's eventual collapse. Phoumi's troops retook Vientiane in mid-December. A pro-Western

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JCS and National Policy

government was organized with Prince Boun Oum as Premier and Phoumi as his

deputy. Kong Le then joined with the Pathet Lao, who were getting substantial

help from a Soviet airlift. During a White House meeting on 31 December, President Eisenhower emphasized "that we must not allow Laos to fall to the Communists, even if it involves war in which the US acts with allies or unilaterally."23

Meantime, SEATO's Military Advisers had agreed upon "assumptions" that, if

intervention occurred, Thailand would provide the Force Commander and the

United States a Vice Commander. During the first few days of January 1961, a

new round of fighting in Laos gave the Pathet Lao control over the crucial Plaine

des Jarres. On 13 January, the US Representative to SEATO, U. Alexis Johnson,

warned Secretary Gates that SEATO's morale was at a low ebb. Unless steps were

taken to persuade Asian members that SEATO could play a useful role in Laos,

he believed that the organization might be fatally discredited.24

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the next day, sent Secretary Gates their conclusion

that the United States "must take immediate and decisive actions to defeat the

aggressors in Laos or face the possibility of a neutral or Communist-dominated

Southeast Asia." At an appropriate time, SEATO's agreement should be sought

for sending a force into Laos. But there was considerable doubt that France and

the United Kingdom would go along. If unanimity proved unattainable and

SEATO could not act, they continued, the United States should press for agreement by as many members as possible to intervene in accordance with the principles prescribed by the Treaty. Only after this approach had been tried and failed

should consideration be given to unilateral intervention, either by the United

States or by a country such as Thailand. Secretary Gates endorsed these views

and so informed the Secretary of State. He added that, if the pace of events precluded political action, unilateral US intervention might be necessary to help

spur a multilateral response. During a State-Defense meeting, however, Gates

voiced "grave concern" that SEATO appeared to be a "paper tiger" dominated by

the French and British. On 19 January, his last full day in office, President Eisenhower told his successor that intervention through SEATO would be "far better"

than formation of a government with communist participation. Eisenhower

looked upon unilateral US intervention as "a last desperate effort." Loss of Laos,

he said, would be "the beginning of the loss of most of the Far East."25

The feasibility of SEATO intervention was promptly put to the test. On 22 January, Premier Boun Oum asked SEATO to send, "as a preliminary measure preceding any direct intervention," a commission that would investigate the extent

of interference by communist powers. When SEATO's Council of Representatives

gathered the next day, all members agreed that any reply must reject the implication that sending a mission would be "preliminary" to direct intervention. The

United States continued seeking ways to send SEATO investigators but some

allies, particularly the French, opposed even that step and nothing was done.26

Early in March, the Pathet Lao scored such military successes against the

Boun Oum/Phoumi forces that a complete communist victory in fairly short

order seemed possible. The SEATO Council of Ministers met during 27-29 March.

The United States tabled a draft resolution declaring SEATO's

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The Far East: Fissures in Containment

firm resolve... not to acquiesce in the overthrow of the Royal Lao Government by

these Communist-supported rebels or to countenance the destruction of the territorial

integrity of that kingdom. Accordingly, SEATO and its member countries will if necessary take whatever action may be necessary appropriate in the circumstances.

What the Council approved, however, was a milder statement that if diplomatic efforts failed, "and there continues to be an active military attempt to gain

control of Laos, members of SEATO are prepared, within the terms of the treaty,

to take whatever action may be appropriate in the circumstances."27

The Laotian crisis peaked late in April as the Pathet Lao kept advancing and

the Boun Oum/Phoumi forces came near collapse. Military intervention became

a very real possibility. On 28 April, the US member urged SEATO's Council of

Representatives to seek approval for a "Charter Yellow" alert warning that

would precede military action.28

During the next week, intensive efforts by the United States and other governments culminated in an announcement of a cease-fire to be followed by a peace

conference. On 4 May the US spokesman told SEATO Representatives that a decision about Charter Yellow could be postponed. This bypassing of SEATO probably dealt a fatal blow to any lingering hope for collective action. Asian and Pacific members had expected strong US leadership that would overcome French and

British reluctance to act. They saw no evidence of it and were deeply disappointed. One member bluntly described SEATO as "a dead horse."29

In fact, from this

point forward, SEATO played virtually no part in a steadily escalating war for

Indochina.

Twice, the United States deliberately bypassed SEATO. In both cases, unanimity appeared unattainable. The Joint Chiefs of Staff shied away from detailed

multilateral planning. Politically as well as militarily, the obstacles to collective

action should have alerted US policymakers to the fact that erroneous assumptions underlay some of their basic purposes and objectives in the area. In Western

Europe, shared values and stable governments solidified NATO. In Northeast

Asia, Japan had a nascent democracy and the benefit of geographic isolation;

South Korea also enjoyed the protection afforded by a peninsula. The fragile governments in Laos and South Vietnam enjoyed none of these advantages. Consequently countries that readily joined the United States in other collective security

enterprises shied away from this one.

225
16

Conclusion

The late 1950s stand out as an unusual period because the fear and pessimism

that became fairly widespread among the American public proved to have little

foundation. Sputnik seemed to show that the Soviets had won a crucial technological advantage. Cuba became a communist beachhead in the Western Hemisphere;

the Congo appeared ripe for plucking by Moscow or Peking; the governments of

Laos and South Vietnam looked more shaky every day. Yet the missile gap quickly

disappeared and the communist surge into the Third World slowly petered out.

Bracketed between the Korean War and the Vietnam War, the Eisenhower years

seem almost like an oasis of calm and safety. What many contemporaries labeled

passivity came, with the passage of years, to look more often like prudence.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff faced situations that tested their commitment to

"jointness" as well as their skill in crisis management. President Eisenhower

clearly was disappointed by their performance in the joint arena. He had placed

his old service, the Army, at the bottom of the priority list and expected the Service Chiefs to be equally broad-minded. That, of course, did not happen. Chapters 3 and 4 recount the recurring splits over conventional, ICBM, SLBM, and

Nike-Zeus levels. What becomes clear, however, is the Chairman's emergence as

pre-eminent adviser to the Secretary of Defense and the President. In 1957, Secretary Wilson accepted Admiral Radford's force-level proposals virtually without

change. General Twining usually stood with the President even to the point of

breaking with his old service, the Air Force. It seems plain that the Single Integrated Operational Plan reflected the preferences of General Twining more than

that of any Service Chief. General White appeared preoccupied with aggrandizing the Air Force, General Taylor with preventing major cutbacks in the Army,

and Admiral Burke with protecting the Navy against any encroachments.

Although collective security stood as the centerpiece of US foreign policy, the

problem posed by managing assorted alliances varied widely. For NATO, nuclear

sharing became the premier issue. The Joint Chiefs of Staff sought a solution that

would bring all national nuclear forces, except that of the United States, under

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JCS and National Policy

NATO control. They wanted to help France become a nuclear power, but only so

that power could be subsumed within a NATO nuclear force. Not surprisingly

President Charles de Gaulle found that approach unacceptable. As for CENTO, the

Joint Chiefs of Staff claimed that nothing less than full US membership could give

it vitality. The State Department blocked their recommendations, judging that

political alienation of the Arab states would more than offset any improvements to

regional military planning. When the US-Japan Security Treaty underwent revision, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ensured that Japanese bases would remain available

to support UN operations in any new Korean war. For SEATO, however, a very different story unfolded. The Joint Chiefs of Staff feared that combined planning

could lead to a commitment of US forces to defend Southeast Asia. When the test

of collective action came in Laos, they inclined toward unilateral measures.

Frequently, in times of crisis, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were more pro-active,

more ready to "lean forward" than was the President. When Quemoy and

Matsu were being bombarded, they asked the Chief Executive to give advance

approval for air strikes against the mainland under certain conditions; he

refused. Early in 1959, when a confrontation over Berlin seemed possible, the

Service Chiefs pressed for major mobilization. General Twining told President

Eisenhower that he did not share their view. All JCS members joined, though, in

criticizing the President's low-key approach as inadequate. When the Congo fell

into chaos, the administration pursued its objectives by working through a United Nations Emergency Force. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, going further, were willing to take whatever unilateral action appeared necessary to prevent or defeat

Soviet intervention. In Laos, too, they were ready to step in alone while the President clung to a hope of collective action. Lebanon, on the other hand, stands as

a textbook case of civil-military accord. At every step, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

understood and fully agreed with what the President was doing. Military plans

and political objectives were meshed; the pitfalls in anything other than a tightly

circumscribed intervention were recognized.

Finally, in very broad terms, how accurate was the Joint Chiefs' appraisal of

overall US capabilities? In December 1958, General Twining told the Cabinet that

he felt US forces were sufficient to deter general war and meet limited aggression.1 Eleven months later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff declared the margin of US

superiority to be "so thin" that any reductions unmatched by corresponding

Soviet cutbacks would "place the United States in a vulnerable position"2—carefully hedged words that bore the mark of interservice compromise. In September

1960, General Twining advised the Armed Forces Policy Council that, while US

capability to deliver nuclear weapons had increased, the growth of similar Soviet

capabilites meant that "our relative posture may have weakened during the past

year." US forces could counter one limited aggression, he said, but would be

hard pressed to carry out two operations simultaneously.3The crucial point of

these assessments lay in their tacit acknowledgment that US superiority, however

thin or circumscribed it might be, did exist. Turning to Soviet and Chinese leaders, one can infer from their behavior (as distinct from their often belligerent rhetoric) that the men in Moscow and Peiping saw matters about the same way. The

Chinese backed away from a confrontation over Quemoy and Matsu. Even

228
Conclusion

around Berlin, where their conventional advantage was overwhelming, the

Soviets did not mount a military challenge. Thus, whatever problems US policymakers may have faced, military inferiority was not one of them.

229
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

ABM

AEC

ANZUS

ASW

anti-ICBM

Atomic Energy Commission

Australia, New Zealand, and United States

anti-submarine warfare

BLT

BNSP

CENTO

CIA

CINCAL

CINCARIB

CINCHAN

CINCLANT

CINCNELM

CINCONAD

CINCPAC

CINCPACFLT

CINCSAC

CINCSPECOMME

CINCUNC

CINCUSNAVEUR

CMPS

COMAMLANFOR

CONUS

DEFREPNAMA

DGM

battalion landing team

Basic National Security Policy

Central Treaty Organization

Central Intelligence Agency

Commander in Chief, Alaska

Commander in Chief, Caribbean

Commander in Chief, Channel Command

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

Commander in Chief, Naval Forces,

Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean

Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet

Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command

Commander in Chief, Specified Command,

Middle East

Commander in Chief, United Nations Command

Commander in Chief, US Naval Forces, Europe

Combined Military Planning Staff

Commander, American Land Forces

Continental United States

Defense Representative to the North Atlantic

and Mediterranean Areas

Director of Guided Missiles

ECM

EDP

GRC

ICBM

IRBM

ISA

electronic countermeasures

Emergency Defense Plan

Government of the Republic of China

intercontinental ballistic missile

intermediate-range ballistic missile

International Security Affairs

231
Abbreviations and Acronyms

JCS

JIOA

JLRSE

JMEPC

JSCP

JSOP

JSPC

JSSC

JWR

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency

Joint Long-Range Strategic Estimate

Joint Middle East Planning Committee

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

Joint Strategic Objectives Plan

Joint Strategic Plans Committee

Joint Strategic Survey Council

Joint War Room

MAAGs

MAP

MRBM

NATO

NIE

NOA

NSC

NSTL

OAS

OCB

OCDM

ODM

OSD

PMDG

Military Assistance Advisory Groups

Military Assistance Program

medium-range ballistic missile

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

National Intelligence Estimate

new obligational authority

National Security Council

National Strategic Target List

Organization of American States

Operations Coordinating Board

Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Office of Defense Mobilization

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Permanent Military Deputies Group

RAF

ROK

SAC

SACEUR

SACLANT

SEATO

SIOP

SLBMs

SMPO

Royal Air Force

Republic of Korea

Strategic Air Command

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

Single Integrated Operational Plan

submarine-launched ballistic missiles

SEATO Military Planning Office

UN

UNEF

USCINCEUR

USEBP

USMILREPME

WSEG

United Nations

UN Emergency Force

US Commander in Chief, Europe

US Element, Baghdad Pact

US Military Representative for the Middle East

Weapons Systems Evaluation Group

232
Principal Civilian and Military Officers

President and Commander in Chief

Dwight D. Eisenhower 20 Jan 53-20 Jan 61

Secretary of State

John Foster Dulles 21 Jan 53-18 Apr 59

Christian A. Herter 22 Apr 59-20 Jan 61

Secretary ofDefense

Charles E. Wilson 28 Jan 53-08 Oct 57

Neil H. McElroy 09 Oct 57-01 Dec 59

Thomas S. Gates, Jr. 02 Dec 59-20 Jan 61

Deputy Secretary ofDefense

Reuben B. Robertson, Jr. 05 Aug 55-23 Apr 57

Donald A. Quarles 01 May 57-08 May 59

Thomas S. Gates, Jr. 08 Jun 59-01 Dec 59

James H. Douglas, Jr 11 Dec 59-20 Jan 61

Assistant Secretary ofDefense

(International Security Affairs)

Gordon Gray 14 Jul 55-27 Feb 57

Mansfield D. Sprague 28 Feb 57-03 Sep 58

John N. Irwin II 26 Sep 58-20 Jan 61

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Admiral Arthur W. Radford 15 Aug 53-15 Aug 57

General Nathan F. Twining, USAF 15 Aug 57-30 Sep 60

General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA 01 Oct 60-30 Sep 62

Chiefof Staff, US Army

General Maxwell D. Taylor 30 Jun 55-01 Jul 59

General Lyman L. Lemnitzer 01 Jul 59-30 Sep 60

General George H. Decker 01 Oct 60-30 Sep 62

ChiefofNaval Operations

Admiral Arleigh A. Burke 17 Aug 55-01 Aug 61

Chiefof Staff, US Air Force

General Nathan F. Twining 30 Jun 53-30 Jun 57

General Thomas D. White 01 Jul 57-30 Jun 61

233
Principal Civilian and Military Officers

Commandant, US Marine Corps

General Randolph McC. Pate 01 Jan 56-31 Dec 59

General David M. Shoup 01 Jan 60-31 Dec 63

Director, Joint Staff

Vice Admiral Bernard L. Austin 15 Mar 56-31 Mar 58

Lieutenant General Oliver S. Picher, USAF 01 Apr 58-31 Mar 60

Lieutenant General Earle G. Wheeler, USA 01 Apr 60-24 Feb 62

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

Admiral Jerauld Wright 12 Apr 54-28 Feb 60

Admiral Robert L. Dennison 29 Feb 60-29 Apr 63

Commander in Chief, European Command

General Lauris Norstad, USAF 20 Nov 56-31 Oct 62

Commander in Chief, US Naval Forces,

Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean

Admiral Walter F Boone 01 May 56-20 Feb 58

Admiral James L. Holloway, Jr. 21 Feb 58-31 Mar 59

Admiral Robert L. Dennison 01 Apr 59-17 Feb 60

Admiral Harold P. Smith 18 Feb 60-08 Apr 63

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Admiral Felix B. Stump 10 Jul 53-30 Jul 58

Admiral Harry D. Felt 31 Jul 58-29 Jun 64

Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command

General Curtis E. LeMay, USAF 19 Oct 48-30 Jun 57

General Thomas S. Power, USAF 01 Jul 57-30 Nov 64

234
Bibliographie Note

This history is based primarily on the official documents contained in the

master record files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Other sources include the records

of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and agencies of the Joint Staff. The volumes

published by the Department of State in its Foreign Relations of the United States

series have been used extensively.

During 1957-1958, the records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were organized

under a case file system that had been in use since 1942. This system is identified

by the prefix CCS (for the Combined Chiefs of Staff) attached to each file folder

title. An example would be CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec 24. In 1959, a Joint

Master File system was introduced. Under the old system, documents usually

were filed chronologically so that a directive from the Secretary of Defense and

the JCS response to it often appeared in different sections. In the new system,

each file or folder contained the records of a single action from its beginning until

its end. Footnote citations from the new system contain the prefix JMF, as in JMF

3001 (14 Apr 61) sec 1, or JMF 9172 Berlin/9105 (21 Sep 60). Also, beginning in

1959, memorandums addressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of

Defense, and occasionally to other heads of departments or agencies, bore the

designation "JCSM" with a serial number applied chronologically, as in

JCSM-1-59, 6 January 1959, or JCSM-408-59, 1 October 1959. Within each footnote, the file location is the last element given. When several documents are

cited, all those contained in a footnote "sentence," closed by a period, are located

in the file cited at the end of that sentence. "Same file" rather than "Ibid." is used

for repeated, successive references to the same file.

Some documents, usually those that were widely distributed and locatable

without reference to JCS records, are cited without a file number. From the great

volume of military and diplomatic messages, only those directly related to

subjects under JCS consideration became part of the permanent JCS file.

235
Notes

Chapter 1. Working the Machinery of Government

1. Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs: 1957 (1958), p. 1.

2. JCSM-93-59 to SecDef, 16 Mar 59, JCS 1907/180, TS, JMF 9172 Berlin/9105 (6 Mar 59). Chapter

8, pages 128-129, describes this memorandum in the context of a looming confrontation over Berlin.

3. Nathan F. Twining interviewed by John T. Mason, Jr., 1967, pp. 244-245, Columbia University

Oral History Project.

4. Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden Hand Presidency (1982), pp. 124-134,263.

5. CSAFM-306-57 to JCS, 10 Dec 57, JCS 1977/24, U; Dec On JCS 1977/26, 18 Dec 57, U; CCS 040

(11-2-43) sec. 21. Rpt, Ad Hoc Cmte to JCS, "Organization of the Department of Defense," 24 Jan 58, U,

CCS 040 (11 Jan 58). General Wheeler became Chief of Staff of the Army in 1962 and Chairman in 1964.

6. MFR by BG Goodpaster, "Meeting at the Pentagon, Saturday, 25 January 1958," 30 Jan 58,

WHO, Ofc of Staff Secy, DOD Sub ser, Box 1, Folder DOD vol. 2 (4) (Jan 58); MFR by Bryce Harlow, 30

Jan 58, Ann Whitman File, Diary Series; Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

7. Foreign Relations of the United States: 1955-1957, vol. 19, pp. 624-628. Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958 (1959), pp. 7-8. Joint History Office, Organizational Development of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff: 1942-1989 (1989), pp. 36.

8. Public Papers: Eisenhower, 1958, pp. 279-283.

9. Organizational Development: 1942-1989, pp. 39-40.

10. CM-106-58 to JCS, 7 Apr 58, JCS 1977/30, CCS 040 (11-2-43) sec. 21. JCS 1977/31, 22 Apr 58,

same file, BP pt. 7. JCS 1977/33, 28 Apr 58, same file, sec. 22. JCS 1977/36, 28 Apr 58, same file, sec. 23.

JCS 1977/38, 7 May 58, and JCS 1977/41, 26 May 58, same file, BP pt. 11.

11. CM-125-58 to JCS, 27 May 58, CCS 300 (1-25-43) sec. 23. JCS 1977/55, 30 Jul 58, and Dec On,

18 Aug 58, CCS 040 (11-2-43) BP pt. 12.

12. JCS MOP 84,14 Jul 52, JCS 2089/3, CCS 381 (11-29-49) sec. 3. JCS MOP 84, 1st Rev., 27 Jul 55,

JCS 2089/12, CCS 381 (11-29-49) sec. 23. JCS 2143/102, 8 Apr 60, JMF 3130 (3 Feb 60). This section

draws heavily upon a monograph by the Joint History Office, The Evolution of the Joint Strategic Planning System, 1947-1989.

13. Kenneth W. Condit, The Joint Chiefs of Staffand National Policy: 1955-1956, chap. 2. The drafting

of JSOP-61 is described in chap. 3 of this volume.

14. CSAM-32-59 to JCS, 10 Feb 59, JCS 1800/279, JMF 7000 (1959).

15. SM-201-59 to Dir, JPO, 19 Feb 59; JPOM-35-59 to Action Officers, 21 Mar 59; JMF 7000 (1959).

SM-456-59 to CINCAL et al., 1 May 59, JMF 7000 (6 Apr 59) pt. 1. JCS MOP 84, 2nd Rev., 10 Jun 59,

JCS 2089/13, JMF 3100 (12 Apr 59).

16. JCSM-3-60 to SecDef, 8 Jan 60, JCS 2143/86, JMF 3130 (9 Sep 59).

17. JCS 2143/102, 8 Apr 60, JMF 3130 (3 Feb 60).

18. JCSM-410-60 to SecDef, 20 Sep 60, JCS 2143/105, JMF 3130 (30 Apr 60) sec. 6. Memo, CNO to

JCS, 14 Sep 59, JMF 3130 (3 Feb 60).

19. JCS 1920/10 and 1920/11,13 Oct 60, JMF 3110 (19 Jan 60).

20. CM-674-60 to JCS, 13 Jul 60, JCS 1800/354, JMF 7000 (24 Jun 60) sec. 1. CSAM-248-60 to JCS,

25 Jul 60, JCS 1800/355; CSAFM-347-60 to JCS, 25 Jul 60, JCS 1800/356; Memo, CNO to JCS, 27 Jul 60,

JCS 1800/357; same file, sec. 2.

Chapter 2. Backing Away from "Massive Retaliation"

1. NSC 5602/1, 15 Mar 56, TS, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec. 61. Printed in Foreign Relations of the

United States: 1955-1957, vol. 19, pp. 242-268. The nuclear stockpile rose from 3,692 weapons and

9,188 megatons in 1956 to 5,543 weapons and 17,545 megatons in 1957 and to 18,638 weapons and

20,491 megatons in 1960. DOE, "Drawing Back the Curtain of Secrecy," RDD-5,1 Jan 99, Appendix D.

2. NSC 5707,19 Feb 57, U, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec. 67.

3. Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC, 19 Feb 57, C, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec. 67.

4. Memo, SecDef to ExecSecy, NSC, 25 Feb 57, U, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec. 67.

237
Notes to Pages 13-22

5. Presentation by CJCS before NSC, "Basic Military Concept...," 14 Mar 57, TS, CCS 381 US

(1-31-50) sec. 68.

6. Memo, SpecAsst for NSC Affairs to CJCS, "Basic National Security Policy," 24 May 57, TS,

CJCS File NSC 5707.

7. NSC 5707,14 May 57, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec. 70.

8. DOD Draft Revision of NSC 5602/1, End to Memo, Dir, NSC Sect to NSC Ping Board, 24 Apr

57, U, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec. 69.

9. OSD Notes to SecDef, "Basic National Security Policy: Stockpiling," for NSC Mtg of 11 Jul 57,

U, CJCS File NSC 5707.

10. Ann to NSC 5707/7, "State Reservation on Pars. 11, 15, and 17," 14 May 57, TS, CCS 381 US

(1-31-50) sec. 70.

11. JCS 2101/265, 20 May 57, TS, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec. 70.

12. CSAFM-133-57 to JCS, 21 May 57, TS, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec. 70.

13. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5707/7)," 24 May 57, JCS

2101/265, TS, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec. 70. OSD Notes to SecDef, same subj., for NSC Mtg of 27 May

57, TS, CJCS File NSC 5707.

14. Foreign Relations: 1955-1957, vol. 19, pp. 488-507. NSC Action No. 1728, 27 May 57, TS.

15. NSC 5707/8, 3 Jun 57, U, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec. 71.

16. OSD Notes to SecDef, "Basic National Security Policy: Stockpiling," for NSC Mtg of 11 Jul 57,

S, CJCS File NSC 5707. N/H of JCS 2101/269, 7 Aug 57, S, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec. 71.

17. The President's statement is contained in NSC Action No. 1643, 21 Dec 56, TS. Foreign Relations: 1955-1957, vol. 19, pp. 394.

18. CM-502-57 to SecDef, 16 Jul 57, U; "Presentation to the President and National Security

Council by the Department of Defense on the Military Programs for Fiscal Years '58, '59, '60, & '61,

July 25, 1957," U; CJCS File 111 1957. Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (1959), p. 51. NSC

Action No. 1755, TS. Foreign Relations: 1955-1957, vol. 19, pp. 549-553, 556-565. Memo, SpecAsst to

Pres for NSA to SecDef, 31 Jul 57, U, CJCS File 111.

19. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for 1 July 1961 (M-Day)," 9 Jan 58, CCS

381 (11-29-49) BP pt. 25. JSCP1 Jul 58-30 Jun 59, JCS 1844/243, TS, same file, BP pt. 24.

20. John Foster Dulles, "Challenge and Response in United States Policy," Foreign Affairs, Oct

57, p. 31.

21. NSC 5810,15 Apr 58, TS, CJCS File NSC 5810.

22. NSC Actions No. 1842(g), 16 Jan 58, No. 1844, 22 Jan 58, TS.

23. Memo, Mr. Cutler to Ping Board, 15 Apr 58, TS, CJCS File 5810.

24. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 18 Apr 58, JCS 2101/307, TS; Memo, VCNO to CJCS, "JCS

2101/306—Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5810)," 21 Apr 58, TS; CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec. 77.

25. CSAM-82-58 to JCS, 22 Apr 58, TS, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec. 77.

26. CSAFM-117-58 to JCS, 22 Apr 58, TS; CSAFMs 127 & 128-58 to JCS, 24 Apr 58, TS; CCS 381

US (1-31-50) sec. 77.

27. Memos, JCS to SecDef, "Basic National Security Policy," 25 Apr 58, JCS 2101/309 & 310, TS,

CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec. 78. Memo, CJCS to SecDef, "Basic National Security Policy," 22 Apr 58, TS,

CJCS File NSC 5810. Unlike General White, General Twining did not feel that a final decision about

BNSP should await completion of the interdepartmental study on limited war. CM-114-58 to SecDef,

25 Apr 58, JCS 2101/311, TS, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec. 78.

28. "The Chief of Staff's Presentation Before the National Security Council, 1 May 1958," End to

Memo, CSA to CJCS, 3 May 58, TS; "Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5810) (Remarks by Chief of

Staff, USAF)," End to Memo, VCSAF to CJCS, 8 May 58, TS; CJCS File NSC 5810.

29. "Statement by General Nathan F. Twining, USAF, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Before

the National Security Council on Basic National Security Policy, 1 May 1958," TS, CJCS File NSC 5810.

At a later NSC session, General Taylor, Admiral Burke, and General Pate challenged the Chairman's

claim that the changes they recommended could be accomplished under the existing BNSP: "The fact

remains that these objectives have not been achieved in the past and that the current text has been

read, or perhaps misread, to support the overriding importance of a policy of massive retaliation."

CM-152-58 to NSC, 23 Jul 58, JCS 2101/323, TS, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec. 79.

30. Memo, DepSecDef to SecArmy et al., "Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5810): Points

Raised by the President," 9 May 58, TS, CJCS File NSC 5810.

31. N/H of JCS 1812/85, 27 Mar 58, CCS 381 (11-22-57) sec. 1. DM-149-58 to JCS, 7 May 58, JCS

1812/92; Rpt, "US and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to 1 July 1961," n.d., End B

to JCS 2285/1, TS, same file, sec. 2.

238
Notes to Pages 22-34

32. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Study Relative to the Capabilities of Forces for Limited Military Operations," 11 Jun 58, JCS 2285/1, TS; Memo, SecState and SecDef to NSC, 17 Jun 58, JCS 2285/3, TS, CCS

381 (11-22-57) sec. 2. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 9 Jul 58, JCS 2285/5, TS, same file, sec. 3.

33. CM-152-58 to SecDef, 23 Jul 58, TS; Memo, SecDef to NSC, 18 Jun 58, End to Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC, 21 Jul 58, TS; CJCS File NSC 5810.

34. NSC Action No. 1952, 25 Jul 58, TS; Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC, 30 Jul 58, TS; CJCS File

NSC 5810.

35. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for 1 July 1962 (M-Day)," 6 Jun 58, TS,

CCS 381 (11-29-49) BP pt. 28.

36. DOS, "Summary Statement of Foreign Policy Requirements Bearing upon US Strategy," 25

Apr 59, JCS 2101/342, TS, JMF 3001 (6 May 59).

37. Memo, CJCS to SecDef, "Basic National Security Policy," 30 Apr 59, TS, CJCS File NSC 5906.

38. NSC 5906, 8 Jun 59, TS, JMF 3001 (8 Jun 59).

39. JCSM-239-59 to SecDef, 20 Jun 59, TS, JCS 2101/351, TS, JMF 3001 (8 Jun 59). DOD Appropriations for 1960, Hearings before the Subcom/Com on Appropriations, 86th Cong, 1st sess, pt. 1, pp.

330-331,589-594.

40. SM-741-59 (Revised) to JCS, 23 Jul 59, TS, JMF 3001 (20 Jul 59).

41. Note to Control Div., "SM-741-59—Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5906)," 29 Jul 59, U;

JCS 2101/360, 30 Jul 59, TS; JMF 3001 (20 Jul 59).

42. NSC Action No. 2114, 30 Jul 59, TS. NSC 5906/1,5 Aug 59, TS, JMF 3001 (5 Aug 59) sec. 1.

43. NSC Action No. 2019,18 Dec 58, S.

44. Memo, ActgSecDef to CJCS, 19 Feb 59, JCS 1725/337, S; Bfg Sheet for CJCS for JCS Mtg on 13

Mar 59, Agenda Item 1 (JCS 1725/338), S; JMF 4000 (13 Mar 59).

45. JCSM-88-59 to SecDef, 17 Mar 59, S; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS et al., 8 Apr 59, JCS 1725/341,

S; JMF 4000 (13 Mar 59).

46. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 27 Jul 59, JCS 2101/358, S, JMF 3001 (27 Jul 59).

47. JCS 2101/361, 5 Aug 59, TS; JCSM-324-59 to SecDef, 12 Aug 59, JCS 2101/361, TS; Memo,

DepSecDef to CJCS, 24 Aug 59, JCS 2101/365, TS; JCSM-357-59 to SecDef, 31 Aug 59, JCS 2101/366,

TS; JMF 3001 (27 Jul 59).

48. NSC Action No. 2131,1 Oct 59, approved by the President on 14 Oct 59, TS.

49. Memo, Dir, OCDM to ExecSecy, NSC, 28 Oct 59, S; JCSM-465-59 to SecDef, 6 Nov 59, JCS

2101/376, S, JMF 3001 (8 Oct 59).

50. Drafts presenting divergent views are in JMF 3130 (25 Nov 59) Gps 1 & 2. JCSM-3-60 to

SecDef, 8 Jan 60, JCS 2143/89, TS, same file, Gp 3.

51. CM-415-59 to SecDef, 26 Oct 59, TS; Dec On JCS 1844/296, 29 Feb 60, TS, JMF 3120 (24 Aug

59). JCS 1844/320, 12 Jan 60, TS, JMF 3120 (23 Mar 59) sec. 2. SM-389-60 to CINCAL et al., "JSCP, 1

July 1960-30 June 1961," 21 Apr 60, TS, JMF 3120 (21 Apr 60).

52. NSC Action No. 2215-c, 7 Apr 60, TS. Memo, ExecSecy, NSC, to NSC, "Basic National Security

Policy," 10 Nov 60, TS, JMF 3001 (5 Aug 59) pt. 1.

53. Note to Control Div, "Basic National Security Policy," 15 Jul 60, S; JCS 2101/401, 14 Sep 60, S;

JMF 3001 (15 Jul 60). MFR by Dr. Byron Fairchild on research in JSSC files, 28 Feb 62.

54. JCSM-410-60 to SecDef, 20 Sep 60, JCS 2143/105, TS, JMF 3130 (30 Apr 60) sec. 6.

55. JCS 1844/324, 14 Oct 60, TS; J-5 Bfg Sheet for CJCS, 20 Oct 60, TS; Dec On JCS 1844/324, 27

Dec 60, TS, JMF 3120 (24 Aug 60) sec. 1.

56. Memo, DepSecDef to SecState and DCI, 1 Jul 59, TS; Memo, SecState to DepSecDef, 10 Jul 59, TS;

Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 21 Jul 59, TS; all in JCS 2285/13, TS, JMF 3072 (21 Jul 59). JCS 2285/19,13 Jul

59, TS, same file, sec. 2. JCSM-324-60 to SecDef, 27 Jul 60, JCS 2285/20, TS, same file, sec. 3. "United

States and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to 1 July 1962," 28 Sep 60, JCS 2285/22,

TS, same file, sec. 6. Memo, ExecSecy, NSC, to SecDef and CJCS, 10 Jan 61, TS, same file, sec. 7.

Chapter 3. Budget Ceilings Shape Force Levels

1. DOD Semiannual Reports, January 1 to June 30, 1956, pp. 2-5; January 1 to June 30, 1957, pp.

4-6. Foreign Relations ofthe United States: 1955-1957 (1990), pp. 384-394.

2. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 6 Mar 57, JCS 2143/68, U, CCS 381 (11-29^9) sec. 33.

3. CM-480-57 to SecDef, 25 Apr 57, TS, CJCS File 111, 1957.

4. CSAFM-113-57 to JCS, 29 Apr 57, TS; SM-357-57 to JCS, 10 May 57, TS; Unsigned Note,

"JSOP-61 Unresolved Issues," file date of 10 May 57, S; MFR by CSA, "Meeting of the JCS with Secretary Wilson on JSOP-61," 27 May 57, S; CCS 381 (11-29^9) sec. 33.

5. CM-502-57 to SecDef, 16 Jul 57, CJCS File HI, 1957. Printed in Foreign Relations: 1955-1957, vol.

19 (1990), pp. 549-553.

239
Notes to Pages 35^4

6. "Presentation to the President and National Security Council by the Department of Defense on

the Military Programs for Fiscal Years '58, '59, '60, & '61, July 25, 57," U, CJCS File 111, 1957. The

meeting is fully described in Foreign Relations: 1955-1957, vol. 19, pp. 553-565. NSC Action No. 1755.

The preliminary draft of NSC Action No. 1755 included the last sentence above. President Eisenhower

deleted it before publication but instructed Mr. Cutler to tell the Secretary that his warning must constantly be kept in mind. Memo, SpecAsst for NSA to SecDef, 31 Jul 57, CJCS File 111, 1957.

7. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., "Advance Planning Required in Connection with the FY '59 Budget," 6 Aug 57, CJCS File 111, 1957. Printed in Foreign Relations: 1955-1957, vol. 19, pp. 574-578.

8. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 17 Oct 57, JCS 1800/258, U, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec. 59. Memo, JCS

to SecDef, 1 Nov 57, JCS 1800/261, U, same file, sec. 60.

9. CM-42-57 to CSA et al., 15 Nov 57, TS, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec. 61. The Budget of the United States

Governmentfor the Fiscal Year Ending June 30,1959 (1958), pp. 434, 450, 468, 471, 504.

10. DM-350-57 to CJCS, 26 Nov 57, TS, CCS 381 (11-29^9) sec. 34. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 6

Dec 57, JCS 1800/263, S, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec. 62. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Joint Strategic Objectives

Plan for 1 July 1961 (M-Day)," 9 Jan 58, TS, CCS 381 (11-29-49) BP pt. 25.

11. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for 1 July 1962," 6 Jun 58, JCS 2143/78,

TS, CCS 381 (11-29-49) BP pt. 28.

12. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet, pp. 69-70. DOD "Summary of NOA, Direct Obligations and

Expenditures by Budget Category, FY 1958, FY 1959, FY 1960," n.d., U, CCS 370 (8-19-15) sec. 64. The

3 December meeting is described in Douglas Kinnard's President Eiscnhozvcr and Strategy Management:

A Study in Defense Politics (1977), p. 96.

13." Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS et al., 22 Dec 58, JCS 1800/275, TS; CM-280-59 to SecDef, 20 Jan 59,

U; JMF 7000 (1959). DOD "Summary of NOA, Direct Obligations and Net Expenditures by Budget Category, FY 1958, FY 1959, FY 1960," U, CCS 370 (8-19-15) sec. 64. DOD Annual Reportfor FY 1960, pp. 4-11.

14. CM-354-59 to JCS, 29 Apr 59. JCS 1800/288, 26 May 59, TS, JMF 7000 (6 Apr 59). Alfred Goldberg, "Strategy and Money: The Defense Budget for FY 1961," USAF History Liaison Office, Jul 63,

pp. 9-17.

15. JCSM-217-59 to SecDef, 8 Jun 59, JCS 1800/288, TS, JMF 7000 (6 Apr 59) sec. 4.

16. Joint Secys Advice of Action, 2 Jul 59, App to JCS 1800/294, U; Memo, C. A. Randall (MilAsst

to SecDef) to DJS, 2 Jul 59, End to JCS 1800/294, U, JMF 7000 (2 Jul 59).

17. CM-123-59 to CNO et al., 10 Nov 59, U.

18. SM-1156-59 to JCS, 13 Nov 59, TS, JMF 7000 (17 Nov 59).

19. "Memorandum of Conference with the President, November 18, 1959—Augusta" by BG

Goodpaster, 20 Jan 60, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Staff Notes—Nov 1959 (2).

20. JCS 1800/320, 8 Dec 59, U, JMF 7000 (2 Dec 59). The Budget of the U.S. Government, FY 1961, p.

440. Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense: July 1,1959 to June 30, 1960, pp. 7-11.

21. JSOP-63, transmitted via JCSM-3-60 to SecDef, 8 Jan 60, JCS 2143/89, TS, JMF 3130 (25 Nov 59).

22. "DOD Joint Secretaries Advice of Action, 24 Jun 60," JCS 1800/342, U; "DOD AFPC Advice of

Action," 7 Jul 60, JCS 1800/353, U; JCSM-350-60 to SecDef, 16 Aug 60, JCS 1800/359, U; JMF 7000 (24

Jun 60).

23. JCSM^UO-60 and CM-607-60 to SecDef, 20 Sep 60, JCS 2143/105, TS, JMF 3130 (30 Apr 60)

sec. 6. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 17 Nov 60, JCS 2143/113, S, same file, sec. 7.

24. CM-65-61 to McNamara, 17 Jan 61, U, JMF 7000 (16 Jan 61). No Minuteman ICBMs would be

operational in mid-1962, but by mid-1963,150 missiles would be.

25. "Memorandum of Conference with the President, July 14, 1959," by BG Goodpaster, 15 Jul 59,

Eisenhower Library, Staff Notes, July '59 (3). "Memorandum of Conference with the President, June 30,

1959," 2 Jul 59, Eisenhower Library, Staff Notes, June 16-30 '59 (2). In 1956, Admiral Radford's proposal to make major cuts in ground forces had been leaked to the press, apparently by Army officers.

Chapter 4. Closing the "Missile Gap"

1. Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC, "Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Programs," 16 Sep 55, TS,

CCS 040 (11-2-43) sec. 18. Draft of Statement of General Twining before the House Appropriations

Com, 20 Feb 57, CVC TS 34-57, TS, Speech File, CJCS File. NIE 11-5-57,12 Mar 57, TS.

2. NSC 5724, 7 Nov 57, JCS 2101/282, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) BP pt. 14. Printed in Foreign Relations:

1955-1957, vol. 19, pp. 638-661.

3. NIE 11-4-57,12 Nov 57, printed in Foreign Relations: 1955-1957, vol. 19, pp. 665-672. CM-12-57

to CSA et al., 15 Nov 57, TS; Memo, JCS to SecDef, "FY 1959 Budget," 17 Nov 57, JCS 1800/262, U,

CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec. 61. Almost all the documents cited in this chapter, as well as many related

papers, are summarized in "Chronology of Significant Events and Decisions Relating to the US Missile and Earth Satellite Development Programs: May 1942 through October 1960," TS, Joint History

240
Notes to Pages 45-50

Office. Most National Intelligence Estimates, for example, are described in the Chronology but do not

appear in JCS files.

4. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Report to the President by the Security Resources Panel of the ODM Science Advisory Committee," 4 Dec 57, JCS 2101/284, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec. 74. On 16 December,

the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Mr. McElroy that they could not reach agreement about whether

ABMs deserved the same overriding priority as that awarded to ICBM development. Memo, JCS to

SecDef, "Anti-Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Development," 16 Dec 57, JCS 1899/372, U, CCS 381

US (5-23-46) sec. 90.

5. NSC 5724/1,16 Dec 57, JCS 2101/287, U, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec. 74 and BP pt. 14.

6. Memo, DepSecDef to GEN Cutler, "Comments and Recommendations by the Department of

Defense on the Report to the President by the Security Resources Panel," 21 Dec 57, TS, CCS 381 US

(1-31-50) BP pt. 14. An expanded and slightly modified version was submitted on 31 December. N/H

of NSC 5724/1, 31 Dec 57, TS, same file. HQ, SAC, The Development of Strategic Air Command:

1946-1973, p. 52.

7. WSEG Rpt. 21, "Defense Against Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles," 5 Jul 57, Att to Memo, Dir,

WSEG to CJCS, 30 Aug 57, JCS 1899/356, U, CCS 381 US (5-23-46) sec. 85.

8. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Anti-Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Developments," 16 Dec 57, JCS

1899/372, U, CCS 381 US (5-23-46) sec. 91.

9. SNIE 11-10-57,10 Dec 57, TS. NSC Actions 1842 and 1846,16 and 22 Jan 58, TS.

10. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 27 Feb 58, JCS 1800/265, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec. 62. Memo, JCS to

SecDef, "Additional Funding for Priority Projects in FY 58 and FY 59," 12 Mar 58, JCS 1800/266, TS,

same file, BP pt. 10. Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 19 Mar 59, JCS 1800/268, same file, BP pt. 11. JCS

1800/269,3 Apr 58, same file, sec. 63.

11. Jacob Neufeld, The Development of Ballistic Missiles in the United States Air Force: 1945-1960

(1990), pp. 224-227.

12. AFPC Advice of Action, "Evaluation of Offensive and Defensive Weapons Systems," 30 Jan

58, JCS 1620/173, S; Dec On JCS 1620/174, 10 Feb 58, U; SM-106-58 to Dir, WSEG, 10 Feb 58, S; CCS

471.6 (5-31-44) sec. 14.

13. WSEG Final Report No. 30, "Offensive and Defensive Weapons Systems," 15 Jul 58, JCS

1620/189, TS, CCS 471.6 (5-31-44) BP pt. 6A.

14. NSC Actions 1994 and 2013, approved by President on 16 Oct 58 and 6 Dec 58, TS, respectively.

15. Memo, MilAsst to CJCS to Sen. Symington, "Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles," 20 and 21 Jan

59, TS, CJCS File, 471.6 (1959). Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower the President (1984), p. 495.

16. Rpt, OSD Ballistic Missile Defense Steering Group to SecDef, "Considerations and Recommendations Concerning a Production Decision for Nike-Zeus," 7 Nov 58, JCS 1620/201, S, CCS 471.6

(5-31-14) sec. 24. Dr. Skifter was a Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Research

and Engineering). Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Guided Missile Systems," 24 Nov 58, JCS 1620/204, S, same

file, sec. 25.

17. Memo, DGM, OSD to CJCS, 7 Aug 58, JCS 1620/193, S, CCS 471.6 (5-31-44) sec. 20. Memo,

DGM, OSD to CJCS, 6 Nov 58, JCS 1620/200, S, same file, sec. 24. JCSM-61-59 to SecDef, 12 Feb 59,

JCS 1620/244, U, JMF 4730 (18 Feb 59).

18. NSC Action 2118, 18 Aug 59, TS. JCSM-414-59 to SecDef, 12 Oct 59, JCS 1620/277, TS;

CM-407-59 to SecDef, 12 Oct 59, N/H ofJCS 1620/277, 29 Dec 59, TS; JMF 4730 (29 Jun 59).

19. NSC Action 2168, 7 Jan 60, approved by the President on 13 Jan 60, TS.

20. WSEG Rpt No. 45, "Potential Contribution of Nike-Zeus to Defense of US Population and Its

Industrial Base...," 23 Sep 59, Att to Memo, Dir, WSEG to CJCS, 25 Sep 59, JCS 1620/273, U, JMF 4714

(15 Oct 59).

21. JCSM-499-59 and CM-437-59 to SecDef, 3 Dec 59, JCS 1620/284, U, JMF 4714 (15 Oct 59).

22. HQ, SAC, The Development of Strategic Air Command: 1946-1986, pp. 65, 92. Memo, CINCSAC

to JCS, 6 Mar 59, JCS 1899/446, U, JMF 3340 (29 Apr 59). JCSM-163-59 to SecDef, 30 Apr 59, JCS

1620/243, TS, JMF 4700 (29 Apr 59).

23. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 10 Sep 59, JCS 1899/509, U; Memo, SecAF(FM) to ASD(C), 25 Sep 59,

JCS 1899/522, U; JCSM-444-59 and CM-418-59 to SecDef, 28 Oct 59, JCS 1899/527, U, JMF 3340 (10

Sep 59).

24. JCS 1899/589, 18 Jul 60, U; Memo, CINCSAC to JCS, 23 Jun 60, JCS 1899/589, U; Msg, JCS

980399 to CINCSAC, 22 Jul 60, JCS 1899/591, U; Msg, JCS 981918 to CINCSAC, 25 Aug 60, JCS

1899/597, U, JMF 3340 (23 Jun 60).

25. Hearings, DOD Appropriationsfor 1961, S. Com on Appropriations, 86th Cong., 2nd sess., pp.

3-17. NIE 11-8-59, 9 Feb 60, TS.

26. NSC Action 2207,1 Apr 60, approved by the President on 6 Apr 60, TS.

27. NIE 11-4-60,16 Aug 60, TS.

241
Notes to Pages 51-63

28. SM-660-59 to Dir, WSEG, 9 Jul 59, JCS 1812/104, U, JMF 522 (26 Jan 59). WSEG Rpt. 50, "Evaluation of Strategie Offensive Weapons Systems," 27 Dec 60, Att to Memo, Dir, WSEG to CJCS, 30 Dec

60, JCS 1620/321, TS, JMF 4600 (30 Dec 60).

29. Memo, ActgSecDef to CJCS, 24 Dec 58, JCS 1620/209, U, JMF 4720 (5 Jan 59).

30. Memo, JCS to SecDef, 8 May 59, JCS 1620/257, TS, JMF 4720 (5 Jan 59).

31. CM-380-59 to SecDef, 17 Aug 59, JCS 2056/131, TS; CM-386-59 to JCS, 24 Aug 59, JCS

2056/134, U; JMF 3205 (17 Aug 59) sec. 1.

32. CM-449-60 to Pres, 12 Feb 60, and Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to SecDef and CJCS, 17 Feb 60, both

in JCS 2056/145, TS, JMF 3001 (20 Feb 59). JCSM-193-60 to SecDef, 6 May 60, JCS 2056/156, TS, JMF

3205 (17 Aug 59) sec. 2.

33. Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 3 (1996), pp. 442-451.

34. JCSM-280-60 to SecDef, 7 Jul 60, JCS 2056/163, TS, JMF 3205 (17 Aug 59) sec. 4. Memo, SecDef

to CJCS, 16 Aug 60, JCS 2056/164, same file, sec. 6 JCSM-560-60 to SecDef, 9 Dec 60, JCS 2056/194, U,

same file, sec. 8. HQ, SAC, History and Research DID., History of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff:

Background and Preparation ofSIOP-62, pp. 10-13, U.

Chapter 5. Arms Control: The Moratorium on Nuclear Testing

1. DOS, Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, pp. 720-729.

2. Ann to NSC Action No. 1553, 21 Nov 56, JCS 1731/214, CCS 092 (4-14-15) sec. 66. DOS Bulletin,

11 Feb 57, pp. 225-228.

3. White House Disarmament Staff Secretariat Notes 122, 19 Dec 56, and 123, 21 Dec 56, S, CCS

092 (4-14-45) BP pt. 7.

4. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 20 Dec 56, JCS 1731/213, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec. 66.

5. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Disarmament," 4 Feb 57, JCS 1731/215, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec. 67.

6. Memo, Stassen to SecDef, 20 Feb 57, JCS 1731/218, S; Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Disarmament," 5

Mar 57, JCS 1731/219, S; CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec. 67.

7. Summary Minutes, Mtgs of the President's Special Com, 29 Jan 57 (DPC/RA-42), 5 Feb 57

(DPC/RA^3), 11 Feb 57 (DPC/RA-44); Draft Position Paper, DPC Note 113, 29 Jan 57, and Ann II to

DPC Note 113, R-l, 27 Feb 57; CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec. 67. Ltr, SecDef to Stassen, 20 Mar 57, End B to

N/H of JCS 1731/219,1 Apr 57, TS, same file, BP, pt. 8. Printed in Foreign Relations of the United States:

1955-1957, vol. 20, pp. 464-466.

8. DOS Bulletin, 8 Apr 57, pp. 561-562. NY Times, 27 Mar 57, p. 1. Proposal for 12-Month Moratorium on Tests, 13 Apr 57, DPC Note 139, 30 Apr 57, CCS 092 (4-14-15) BP pt. 9.

9. Memo, ATSD(AE) to ASD(ISA), 17 Apr 57, JCS 1731/222, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec. 68. Defense

Position on Test Limitation, 20 Apr 57, Addendum 1 to DPC Note 193, 9 May 57, same file, BP pt. 9.

10. JCS 1731/223, 18 May 57, S; Ltr, Stassen to SecDef, 18 May 57, JCS 1731/225, S; CCS 092

(4_14_45) sec. 68. Printed in Foreign Relations: 1955-1957, vol. 20, pp. 526-528.

11. Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 17 May 57, JCS 1731/223, U, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec. 68. Printed in Foreign Relations: 1955-1957, vol. 20, pp. 510-513.

12. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Disarmament," 22 May 57, JCS 1731/226, S, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec.

68. Both the JCS memo and Mr. Quarles' letter are printed in Foreign Relations: 1955-1957, vol. 20,

pp. 539-543.

13. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Disarmament Planning," 6 Jun 57, JCS 1731/228, U, CCS 092 (4-14-45)

sec. 69. Printed in Foreign Relations: 1955-1957, vol. 20, pp. 599-604.

14. DOS Bulletin, 16 Sep 57, pp. 451-455.

15. Memo, Mr. Stassen to SecState, 23 Sep 57, JCS 1731/243, S, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec. 73

16. Foreign Relations: 1955-1957, vol. 20, pp. 725-730, 739-740. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Disarmament," 30 Sep 57, JCS 1731/243, S; "Summary of Developments in the UN" in Memo, LGEN A. P. Fox

(ISA) to DepSecDef, 8 Nov 57, JCS 1731/245, S; CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec. 73.

17. "Revision of US Policy on Disarmament," n.d., transmitted via Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC,

26 Dec 57, S, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec. 73.

18 Memo, JCS to SecDef, "US Policy on Control of Armaments," 31 Dec 57, JCS 1731/247, U;

Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC, same subj, 9 Jan 58, S; N/H of JCS 1731/246, 13 Jan 58, U; CCS 092

(4-14-45) sec. 73. N/H of JCS 1731/248,13 Feb 58, S, same file, sec. 74.

19. JCS 1731/251, 6 Mar 58, S, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec. 75.

20. N/H of JCS 1731/254, 28 Mar 58, TS, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec. 75.

21. MFR by BG Goodpaster, 24 Mar 58, Eisenhower Library, Diary Series.

22. Rpt of NSC Ad Hoc Working Group on Technical Feasibility of a Cessation of Nuclear Testing,

27 Mar 58, TS, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP pt. 10. Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC, "Technical Feasibility of

Cessation of Nuclear Testing," 2 Apr 58, TS, same file, sec. 75.

242
Notes to Pages 63-69

23. NSC Action 1889, 3 Apr 58, TS. Robert A. Divine, Blowing On the Wind (1978), pp. 200, 209-211.

Public Papers: Eisenhower, 1958, pp. 350-351.

24. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Nuclear Testing," 30 Apr 58, JCS 1731/255, TS; N/H of JCS 1731/255,

15 May 58, TS; CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec. 76.

25. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, "Revision of US Position on First Phase of Disarmament as Proposed by Department of State (14 August 1958)," 15 Aug 58, JCS 1731/261, S, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec. 77.

26. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Nuclear Testing," 15 Aug 58, JCS 1731/261, S; N/H of JCS 1731/261, 22

Aug 58, S; CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec. 77.

27. DOS Bulletin, 22 Sep 58, pp. 452-462. Public Papers: Eisenhower, 1958, pp. 635-636. Nathan F.

Twining interviewed by John T. Mason, Jr., 1967, pp. 57 and 238, Columbia University Oral History

Project.

28. Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs: 1958 (1959), pp. 66-67, 76-77.

29. JCS 1731/281, 16 Oct 58, U; Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Proposed Treaty on the Suspension of

Nuclear Test Explosions," 21 Oct 58, JCS 1731/281, U; CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec. 81.

30. Ltr, SecState to Pres, 16 Nov 58, End A CM-235-58 to JCS, 24 Nov 58, S, CCS 092 (4-14-45)

sec. 83. JCS 1731/294,11 Dec 58, S, same file, sec. 84.

31. Divine, Blowing on the Wind, pp. 237-238, 243-244.

32. Rpt of Interagency Working Group on Surprise Attack, 15 Aug 58, TS, CCS 092 (4-14-45) BP

pt. 11. Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 8 Sep 58, JCS 1731/264, TS; Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Preparations for... Talks on Surprise Attack," 24 Sep 58, JCS 1731/273, TS, same file, sec. 79. MFR by LGEN C.

E. Byers, OASD(ISA), "Meeting of Principals... Surprise Attack Safeguard Conf.," 16 Oct 58, TS, same

file, sec. 81.

33. JCS 1731/285, 28 Oct 58, S, CCS 092 (4-1445) sec. 82. DOS Bulletin, 5 Jan 59, p. 13.

34. Ltr, LGEN E. T. Williams, LGEN F. H. Griswold, and VADM S. H. Ingersoll to CJCS, 17 (18)

Dec 58, C, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec. 84.

35. NY Times, 19 Mar 59, p. 1. Memo, Dr. Killian to DepSecDef, "Review of Hardtack II Seismic

Data," 9 Dec 58, JCS 1731/295, U, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec. 84. DOS Bulletin, 6 Jul 59, pp. 16-19.

36. DOS Bulletin, 18 May 59, pp. 704-705.

37. JCSM-201-59 to SecDef, 27 May 59, JCS 1731/309, U, JMF 4613 (26 May 59).

38. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 23 Jul 59, JCS 2179/182, S; SM-754-59 to JCS, 29 Jul 59; JMF 4613

(23 Jul 59). Divine, Blowing on the Wind, p. 285.

39. JCSM-332-59 to SecDef, 14 Aug 59, JCS 2179/188, TS, JMF 4613 (14 Aug 59). JCSM-337-59 to

SecDef, 21 Aug 59, JCS 2179/183, S, JMF 4613 (23 Jul 59). Concurrently, at Admiral Burke's instigation,

the Joint Chiefs of Staff voiced doubts about US ability to identify underwater explosions. Claiming

that the Soviets might evade detection by using deep water lakes and inland seas, they argued for

grouping underground with underwater tests in any agreement. Secretary McElroy disagreed, citing

the "political and psychological implications incident to underwater testing," and so advised the

President. JCS 2179/186, 7 Aug 60, S; JCSM-326-59 to SecDef, 13 Aug 59, JCS 2179/186, S; N/H of JCS

2179/186,24 Aug 59, S; JMF 4613 (7 Aug 59).

40. N/Hs of JCS 1731/183, 17 and 22 Sep 59, TS, JMF 4613 (23 Jul 59). On 29 September, Acting

Secretary Gates advised the State Department that Defense opposed inspection quotas, even in principle, as well as bans on outer space and underground tests. Ltr, ActgSecDef to USecState, 29 Sep 59,

JCS 2179/195, TS, JMF 4613 (7 Aug 59).

41. State Dept. MemCon, "Nuclear Test Cessation Policy," 28 Dec 59, folder 388.3,1959 and 1960,

Box 6, Misc. Sensitive Records of OSD 1951-1966, Records Group 330, NARA. Divine, Blowing on the

Wind, pp. 293-298. DOS Bulletin, 29 Feb 60, pp. 327-328.

42. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 15 Jul 59, JCS 1731/317, U, JMF 3050 (15 Jul 59). SM-1183-59 to

Dir, J-l, 25 Nov 59, U; Dec On JCS 1731/321, 10 Dec 59, U; N/H of JCS 1731/321, 14 Dec 59, U; JMF

3050 (14 Apr 59).

43. JCS 1731/328, 20 Jan 60, U, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec. 1. Rpt of the Joint State Dept-Defense Dept

Study on Disarmament, 1 Jan 60, S, same file, Report Folder. JCSM-46-60 to SecDef, 8 Feb 60, JCS

1731/333, S; 1st N/H of JCS 1731/333, 18 Feb 60, S; same file, sec. 1. 1st N/H of JCS 1731/340, 25 Feb

60, S, same file, sec. 2.

44. Memo, Philip J. Farley to DASD(ISA) R. H. Knight, 4 Feb 60, JCS 1731/339, C; Memo, RADM

Dudley to CJCS, 5 Feb 60, JCS 1731/339, S; JM 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec. 2.

45. JCSM-51-60 to SecDef, 12 Feb 60, JCS 1731/340, S, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec. 3. For ISA's outline,

see Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 2 Feb 60, JCS 1731/335, S, same file, sec. 2. 1st and 2nd N/Hs of JCS

1731/340, 18 and 25 Feb 60, S, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec. 2. The JCS consistently substituted "arms control" for "disarmament" wherever the latter appeared in ISA's outline.

46. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS et al., 19 Apr 60, JCS 1731/371, S, same file, sec. 6. JCSM-197-60 to

SecDef, 10 May 60, JCS 1731/377, same file, sec. 7.

243
Notes to Pages 69-79

47. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 24 Feb 60, JCS 1731/342, TS; JCSM-74-60 to SecDef, 2 Mar 60, JCS

1731/346, TS, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec. 3.

48. SM-181-60 to JCS, 25 Feb 60, S; JCSM-117-60 to SecDef, 23 Mar 60, JCS 1731/362, S; 1st N/H

of JCS 1731/362,11 Apr 60, S; JMF 3060 (1 Jan 60) sec. 3. In mid-March, Secretary Gates made ISA the

focal point for Defense's contacts with other departments and agencies about arms control matters.

Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 18 Mar 60, JCS 1731/363, U, same file.

49. SM-181-60 to JCS, 25 Feb 60, S, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec. 3. DOS Bulletin, 4 Apr 60, pp. 511-513.

50. Divine, Blowing on the Wind, pp. 299-302. Defense's position is summarized in Ltr, SecDef to

SecState, 28 Apr 60, JCS 1731/374, S, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec. 6.

51. Ambrose, Eisenhower the President, pp. 569-576. John S. D. Eisenhower interviewed by Dr.

Maurice Matloff, 22 Oct 84, p. 42, OSD Historical Office. DOS Bulletin, 23 May 60, pp. 816-819; 30 May

60, pp. 851-852.

52. Ambrose, Eisenhower the President, pp. 577-580.

53. JCSM-250-60 to SecDef, 10 Jun 60, JCS 1731/392, S; N/H of JCS 1731/392, 21 Jun 60, S; JMF

3050 (1 Jan 60) sec. 10.

54. JCS 1731/399, 21 Jun 60, S, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec. 12. JCSM-264-60 to SecDef, 22 Jun 60,

1731/400, S, same file, sec. 13. DOS Bulletin, 18 Jul 60, pp. 90-92.

55. Memo, CJCS to Pres, "Arms Control Proposals and Your Speech at the United Nations, 22

September 1960," 15 Sep 60, S, CJCS File 388.3 Disarmament. DOS Bulletin, 10 Oct 60, pp. 554-556.

56. DOS Bulletin, 14 Nov 60, pp. 760-769. JCSM-487-60 to SecDef, 28 Oct 60, JCS 1731/415, S; 1st

and 2nd N/Hs of JCS 1731/415, 30 Nov and 20 Dec 60, S; JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec. 18.

57. JCSM-236-60 to SecDef, 13 Jun 60, JCS 1731/389, S, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec. 10. JCSM-374-60

to SecDef, 26 Aug 60, JCS 2179/221, TS; N/H of JCS 2179/221,19 Sep 60, TS; JMF 4613 (28 Apr 60).

58. JCSM-528-60 to SecDef, 21 Nov 60, JCS 2179/228, U; N/H of JCS 2179/228, 20 Dec 60, U; JMF

4613 (28 Apr 60). Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace (1965), p. 481. The Geneva negotiations on test

suspension had remained in session, even though talks appeared stalemated.

Chapter 6. Maintaining the Military Assistance Program

1. "US Foreign Assistance: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, 1 July 1945-30 June 1961

(Revised)," AID, Statistics and Reports Div. NY Times, 29 Aug 57, p. 1; 24 Aug 58, p. 1; 16 Sep 59, p. 23;

18 Jun 60, p.l; 26 Aug 60, p. 1; and 27 Aug 60, p. 1.

2. DOD Instruction S-2110.20,13 Mar 57, S, CCS 092 (8-22^6) (2) BP pt. 16.

3. NSC 5517/1,13 Jul 55, U, CCS 092 (8-22-46) (2) sec. 13.

4. JCS 2099/703,12 Feb 57, TS, CCS 092 (8-22-J6) (2) sec. 39. Memo, DepSecDef to ExecSecy, NSC,

6 Sep 56, TS; Bfg Sheet for SecDef, 313* NSC Mtg, Feb 57, Item 5, TS; CJCS File "NSC 5517."

5. JCS 2099/606,11 Apr 56, U, CCS 092 (8-22^6) (2) sec. 27.

6. Memo, LGEN F. W. Farrell to CJCS, 18 Feb 57, TS, CJCS File "NSC 5717." General Farrell, who

was Special Assistant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for NSC Affairs, believed that State had become "congenitally distrustful" of JCS proposals brought before the Planning Board, particularly those applicable to NATO.

7. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Priorities Relative to Pre-D-Day Allocation of Military Equipment," 15

Feb 57, JCS 2099/703, TS, CCS 092 (8-22-46) (2) sec. 39.

8. JCS 2099/706,18 Feb 57, TS, CCS 092 (8-22-46) BP pt. 16.

9. Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC, 5 Feb 57, CCS 092 (8-22^6) (2) sec. 38. Memo, JCS to SecDef,

"Priorities Relative to Pre-D-Day Allocation of Military Equipment," 15 Feb 57, JCS 2099/703, TS,

same file, sec. 39. Bfg Sheet for SecDef, 313th NSC Mtg, Feb 57, Item 5; Memo, LGEN Farrell to CJCS,

18 Feb 57, TS, CJCS file "NSC 5717."

10. NSC Action No. 1670, TS, 21 Feb 57.

11. JCS 2099/694,22 Jan 57, U, CCS 092 (8-22^6) sec. 38.

12. JCS 2099/706,18 Feb 57, and Dec On, 20 Feb 57, S, CCS 092 (8-22-46) BP pt. 16.

13. N/H of JCS 2099/706, 21 Mar 57, S, CCS 092 (8-22^6) (2) BP pt. 16.

14. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Mission of the Cambodian Armed Forces," 3 Apr 57, JCS 2099/710, TS;

N/H of JCS 2099/710,10 May 57, TS, CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec. 41.

15. "United States Defense Policies in 1957," 85th Cong., 2nd sess, H. Doc. 436 (1957), pp. 41-42.

16. JCS 2099/715, 24 Apr 57, U, CCS 092 (8-22^6) sec. 42.

17. JCS 2099/717,16 May 57, U, CCS 092 (8-22^6) sec. 42.

18. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Development of Military Assistance Program Force Objectives," 14

Nov 57, JCS 2099/749, U, CCS 092 (8-22-46) BP pt. 19.

244
Notes to Pages 80-98

19. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Military Advice Relating to the FY 1960 Military Assistance Programming Guidance," 30 Jan 58, S, CCS 092 (8-22-46) BP pt. 21. Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in

World Affairs: 1957 (1958), p. 314.

20. N/ H of JCS 2099/765,18 Mar 58, S, CCS 092 (8-22-46) BP pt. 21.

21. JCS 2099/767, 6 Feb 58, TS; Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Priorities Relative to Pre-D-Day Allocations

of Military Equipment," 28 Feb 58, JCS 2099/770, TS; CCS 092 (8-22^6) (2) sec. 49.

22. Msg, ASD(ISA) DEF 947626 to CINCPAC and Mil Depts, 5 Sep 58, S, CCS 092 (8-22-46) (2)

sec. 56. Msg, DEF 947973 to CINCPAC et al. 12 Sep 58, S, same file, sec. 58.

23. SM-1010-58 to President's Committee for the Study of the US Military Assistance Program, 12

Dec 58, CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec. 61. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Supplemental Appropriation to the FY 1959

Military Assistance Program," 31 Oct 58, JCS 2099/853, U, same file, sec. 59.

24. JCS 2099/847, 27 Dec 58, S; 2nd Corrig. to JCS 2099/847, 9 Jan 59, S; CCS 092 (8-22-46) (2) BP

pt. 25.

25. JCS 2099/813,15 Sep 58, S, CCS 092 (8-22^6) (2) sec. 57.

26. JCS 2099/800, 7 Aug 58, S, CCS 092 (8-22^6) (2) sec. 55. JCS 2099/824, 10 Oct 58, S, same

file, sec. 58.

27. JCS 2099/862,11 Feb 59, U, JMF 4060 (25 Feb 59). JCS 2099/864,18 Feb 59, S, JMF 4060 (18 Feb

59). Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 27 Apr 59; JCSM-206-59 to SecDef, 29 May 59, JCS 2099/895, U, JMF

4060 (29 May 59). Country and Regional Programming Guidance, 1 Aug 59, transmitted by Memo,

ASD(ISA) to CJCS et al, 5 Aug 59, S, JMF 4060 (5 Aug 59).

28. Ltr, Pres to Wm. H. Draper, 24 Nov 58, JCS 2099/841, U, CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec. 61. NY Times,

18 Mar 59, p. 1; 21 Aug 59, p. 1.

29. SM-1010-58 to Draper Com, 12 Dec 58, S, CCS 092 (8-22-46) (2) sec. 61. SM-527-59 to Chm,

Draper Com, 27 May 59, C, JMF 4060 (25 May 59). JCSM-247-59 to SecDef, 25 Jun 59, JCS 2099/901, U,

JMF 4060 (20 Jun 59). Composite Report of the President's Committee to Study the US Military Assistance Program, 17 Aug 59, U; N/H of 2101/367,22 Sep 59, U; JMF 4060 (14 Aug 59) vol. 1.

30. SM-1048-59 to CINCAL et al., 20 Oct 59, JCS 2099/946, S, JMF 3130 (25 Sep 59) Gp 2. J-5 Bfg

Sheet for CJCS on JCS 2099/946, S, same file, Gp 1.

31. OASD(ISA), "Military Assistance Basic Planning Document, World-Wide," 15 Dec 59, S, JMF

4060 (17 Sep 59) Gp 1. JCS 2099/937, 22 Sep 59, U, same file, Gp 1-A. Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC,

"Long-Range Military Assistance Plans," 7 Oct 60, TS, JMF 4060 (7 Oct 60) sec. 1.

32. OASD(ISA), "Military Assistance Basic Planning Document, World-Wide," 31 Mar 60, S, JMF

4060 (31 Mar 60). One JCS proposal was adopted. Supply Operations funds, previously included in

the allocations to unified command areas, now were separately listed and earmarked to be administered in Washington.

33. JCSM-54-60 to SecDef, 17 Feb 60, JCS 2099/974, S, JMF 4060 (17 Sep 59) sec. 3. The fate of the

remaining 4 percent cannot be determined conclusively from available records.

34. JCS 2099/999,12 Jul 60, S; JCSM-299-60 to SecDef, 15 Jul 60, JCS 2099/999, S, JMF 4060 (30 Jun

60) sec. 3.

35. OASD(ISA), "Military Assistance Plan, FY 1962-1966," 1 Aug 60, S, JMF 4060 (1 Aug 60) sec. 1.

36. Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 4 (1992), pp. 523-542.

Chapter 7. NATO Emphasizes Nuclear Capabilities

1. For the treaty's text, see DOS Bulletin, 20 Mar 49, pp. 339-342.

2. See Kenneth W. Condit, The Joint Chiefs ofStaffand National Policy: 1955-1956, chap. 7.

3. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Order of Battle Report to SACEUR...," 23 Jan 57, JCS 2073/1346, U,

CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48)(2) sec. 71.

4. Foreign Relations: 1955-1957, vol. 4 (1986), pp. 84-87, 96-98.

5. USM-4-57 to JCS, 18 Jan 57, JCS 2073/1350, U, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48)(2) sec. 72.

6. Memo, CSAFM-33-57 to JCS, 5 Feb 57, U; CSAM-30-57 to JCS, 9 Feb 57 (apparently misdated

for 7 Feb), U; Memo, CNO to JCS, "JCS 2073/1353...," 4 Feb 57, U; SM-111-57 to US Rep to NAMC

and Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Over-all Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO Area," 11 Feb 57,

JCS 2073/1353, U; CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48) sec. 73.

7. Memo, USREP SG to JCS, 27 Feb 57, S, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-21-48) sec. 75. SM-238-57

to USREP SG and Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Over-all Strategic Concept...," 26 Mar 57, JCS 2073/1379, S;

N/H of JCS 2073/1379,12 Apr 57, S; same file, sec. 76.

8. See chap. 2, pp. 24-26.

9. Foreign Relations: 1957-1960, vol. 4, pp. 170-171.

10. Foreign Relations: 1957-1960, vol. 4, p. 99.

245
Notes to Pages 98-105

11. Foreign Relations: 1955-1957, vol. 19 (1990), p. 524. Ltr, Gen. Norstad to SecState, 2 Jul 57, Tab to

App B to JCS 2073/1434, TS, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48)(2) sec. 85. N/H of JCS 2073/1436, 24

Dec 57, TS, same file, sec. 86.

12. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 12 Aug 57, JCS 2073/1434, TS, CCS 092 Western Europe

(3-12-48)(2) sec. 85. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Reduction of US Army Commitments to NATO," 18 Sep

57, JCS 2073/1436, TS, same file, sec. 86.

13. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "US Reply to the Questionnaire for the 1957 NATO Annual Review," 17

Jul 57, JCS 2073/1419, TS, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48)(2) BP pt. 15.

14. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 3 Oct 57, JCS 2073/1452, TS, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48)(2) sec.

88. CSAFM-239-57 to JCS, 8 Oct 57, JCS 2073/1455, U; Msg, USNMR, Paris, ALO 953 to CJCS, 18 Oct

57, TS; same file, sec. 89.

15. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Changes in NATO Force Goals," 23 Oct 57, JCS 2073/1460, TS, CCS 092

Western Europe (3-12-48)(2) sec. 89.

16. Msg, USNMR Paris to DA, 18 Nov 57, DA IN 71824, TS; Msg, DEF 932882 to USRO Paris, 19

Nov 57, TS, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48)(2) sec. 91.

17. AF Planner's Memo 5-58, 28 Jan 58, TS; Army Flimsy, "The Minimum Essential Force

Requirements 1958-1963 (MC-70)," 29 Jan 58, TS; CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48)(2) sec. 87. N/H

ofJCS 2073/1436, 24 Jan 58, TS, same file, sec. 86.

18. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Minimum Essential Force Requirements, 1958-1963," 14 Feb 58, JCS

2073/1520, TS, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48)(2) sec. 99.

19. Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 27 Feb 58, JCS 2073/1526, TS, CCS 092 Western Europe

(3-12-48)(2) sec. 100.

20. Memo, AsstSecState Elbrick to DASD(ISA), 21 Feb 58, and Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 28 Feb

58, JCS 2073/1532, TS, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48)(2) sec. 101.

21. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 4 Mar 58, JCS 2073/1535, U; AFPC Advice of Action, 11 Mar 58, S;

CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48)(2) sec. 101.

22. CSAFM-46-58 to JCS, 7 Mar 58, U; JCS 2073/1537,11 Mar 58, U; CCS 092 (3-12-48)(2) sec. 101.

JCS 2073/1545, 26 Mar 58, U; same file, sec. 102.

23. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "US Reply to the 1958 Annual Review Questionnaire," 14 Jul 58, JCS

2073/1604, S, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48)(2) sec. 110, BP pt. 2. JCSM-238-59 to SecDef, 20 Jun

59, JCS 2073/1785, U, JMF 9050/3410 (13 May 59).

24. Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: 1890-1952 (1983), p. 506.

25. Memo, VCSAF and CSAF to SecAF, 9 Sep 59, JCS 1800/304, U, JMF 7000 (15 Sep 59). Msg, DEF

966521 to USNMR, Paris, 8 Oct 59, S; Msg, USNMR, Paris, ALO 145 to OSD, 10 Oct 59, DA IN 253234,

S; JMF 9050/3410 (8 Oct 59).

26. Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 7, pt. 1 (1993), p. 488. CSAM-356-59 to JCS, 2 Nov 59, JCS

2147/185, U; JSSC 34-59 to CJCS, 5 Nov 59, U, and Director's Flimsy, 13 Nov 59, U; both in JCS

2147/185, U; N/H of JCS 2147/185, 20 Nov 59, U; JMF 3410 (2 Nov 59). "Memorandum of Discussion

at the 424th NSC Meeting, Wednesday, November 11, 1959," 12 Nov 59, Dwight D. Eisenhower

Library. General White represented General Twining at this meeting. Printed in Foreign Relations:

1958-1960, vol. 7, pt. 1, pp. 504-515. Interestingly, the Air Force interpreted the NSC's guidance as

meaning that "some reduction in the US commitment to NATO should be made provided appropriate action is taken to prevent an undesirable political reaction." Views of CSAF, App B to Encl B to

JCS 2305/142,16 Jun 60, TS, JMF 9050/3410 (23 May 60).

27. "Memorandum of Conference with the President, Monday, 16 November 1959, Augusta,

Georgia, 8:30 AM," by BG Goodpaster, 2 Dec 59, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Staff Notes—Nov

'59(3). "Memorandum of Conference with the President, November 18, 1959—Augusta," by BG

Goodpaster, 20 Jan 60, Eisenhower Library, Staff Notes—Nov '59(2).

28. JCSM-316-60 to SecDef, 22 Jul 60, JCS 2305/169, TS, JMF 9050/3410 (23 May 60) sec. 4.

29. Rpt by ISA, "NATO in the 1960s: US Policy Considerations," 9 Sep 60, Att to Memo, ASD(ISA)

to CJCS, 23 Sep 60, JCS 2305/228, S, JMF 9050/3000 (29 Aug 60) sec. 2. JCSM^90-60 and CM-17-60 to

SecDef, 28 Oct 60, JCS 2305/263, U; N/H of JCS 2305/263,18 Nov 60, U; same file, sec. 3

30. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs: 1960 (1961), pp. 56-57, 144. Foreign Relations:

1958-1960, vol. 4, pp. 544, 546. President Kennedy promptly rescinded the order to bring home military dependents.

31. The system is described in App to Encl A to JCS 2019/257, 9 Nov 57, TS, CCS 471.6 (8-19-45)

sec. 103. For a good survey of nuclear-sharing proposals, see John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic

Theory of Decision (1974), chap. 7.

32. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 4 Jan 57, JCS 1620/133, TS, CCS 334 GMC (1-16-45) sec. 16.

33. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Visit of UK Minister of Defense, 28-29 January 1957," 24 Jan 57, JCS

2116/109, TS, CCS 337 (4-19-50) sec. 17.

246
Notes to Pages 105-114

34. Memo by DJS, "Points of Discussion during Luncheon in Mr. Wilson's Office," 29 Jan 57, TS,

CCS 334 GMC (1-16-45) sec. 17. Memo, DepSecDef to SecArmy et al, 1 Apr 57, JCS 2116/111, TS; Ltr,

SecDef to Pres, 17 Apr 57, TS; same file, sec. 18. DOS Bulletin, 8 Apr 57, pp. 561-562. Chap. 7 of Harold

Macmillan, Riding the Storm: 1956-1959 (1971) provides background.

35. CM-509-57 to SecDef, 19 Jul 57, TS; Msg, State 1186 to Paris, 24 Sep 57, TS; CCS 337 (4-19-50)

sec. 18.

36. DOS Bulletin, 6 Jan 58, pp. 8,14.

37. DOS Bulletin, 17 Mar 58, pp. 418-419. Foreign Relations: 1951, vol. 1 (1979), pp. 893-894, 900.

MFR by ASD(ISA), "Meeting between Sec McElroy and Gen. Norstad, 25 Mar 58," 26 Mar 58, TS, CCS

092 Western Europe (3-12-48)(2) sec. 102. Msg, USNMR, Paris, ALO 626 to ASD(ISA), 11 Jun 58, TS,

same file, sec. 109. JCS 2277/33, 12 May 58, TS, CCS 471.6 (5-31-44) sec. 18. Soon after becoming

France's President, de Gaulle proposed to Eisenhower and Macmillan that their three governments

establish a new body to make joint decisions about issues affecting world security. The Joint Chiefs of

Staff opposed this proposal as having "highly undesirable military implications"; the US and UK governments politely rejected it. Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 7, pt. 2, pp. 81-83,108-109. Memo, JCS

to SecDef, "French Proposal for a Tripartite World-wide Organization," 30 Oct 59, JCS 2278/5, U; CCS

092 Western Europe (3-12-48)(2) sec. 120. Subsequently, France accepted a US offer to equip some

NATO-committed units in Germany with Nike and Honest John missiles. These forces would be supported by the NATO atomic stockpile. Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 7, pt. 2, pp. 235-236, 418-419.

38. Director's Flimsy, 15 Oct 58, TS, CCS 471.6 (8-1545) sec. 122. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "IRBM

Deployments," 31 Oct 58, JCS 2277/48, S; N/H of JCS 2277/48,1 Dec 58, TS; CCS 334 (5-31-44) sec. 24.

Jacob Neufeld, The Development of Ballistic Missiles in the United States Air Force: 1945-1960 (1990), pp.

222-227. No IRBMs were deployed to Alaska or Okinawa.

39. NSC 5906, 8 Jun 59, TS, N/H of JCS 2101/348,10 Jun 59; JCSM-290-59 to SecDef, 29 Jul 59, JCS

2101/356, U; NSC 5906/1, 5 Aug 59, TS; JMF 3001 (8 Jun 59).

40. JCSM-143-59 to SecDef, 16 Apr 59, JCS 2073/1753, TS, JMF 9050/4720 (13 Jan 59). Memo,

SecDef to CJCS, 4 Aug 59, JCS 2073/1804, S; JCSM-427-59 to SecDef, 15 Oct 59, JCS 2073/1824, S; JMF

9050/4720 (4 Aug 59). JCS 2305/53,20 Feb 60, TS, JMF 9050/4720 (16 Oct 59) sec. 2.

41. JCSM-531-59 to SecDef and CM-447-60 to SecDef, 8 Jan 60, JCS 2305/24, TS; N/H of JCS

2305/24,27 Jan 60, TS; JMF 9050/4720 (16 Oct 59) sec. 1.

42. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 19 Feb 60, JCS 2305/55, S, JMF 9050/4720 (16 Oct 59) sec. 2.

43. JCSM-70-60 to SecDef, 29 Feb 60, JCS 2305/55, S, JMF 9050/4720 (16 Oct 59) sec. 2. See also

JCSM-20-60 to SecDef and CM-476-60 to SecDef, 26 Jan 60, JCS 2278/16, TS, JMF 9164/9105 (3 Aug

59). Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 7, pt. 2, pp. 863-865.

44. CM-550-60 to SecDef, 14 Jun 60, JCS 2305/143, S, JMF 9050/4720 (16 Oct 59) sec. 2.

45. Memo, Exec Secy, NSC to NSC, 23 Aug 60, JCS 2220/186, TS; JCSM-420-60 to SecDef, 23 Sep

60, JCS 2305/221, TS; JMF 4610 (23 Aug 60) sec. 1.

46. DOS Bowie Rpt, "The North Atlantic Nations: Tasks for the 1960's" Att to Memo, ActgSecState

to CJCS, 29 Aug 60, JCS 2305/209, S; JMF 9050/3050 (29 Aug 59).

47. Navy Planner's Memo 159-60 to Dir, J-5, 5 Oct 60, TS, JMF 4610 (23 Aug 60) sec. 1. Memo,

CNO to JCS, "JCS 2305/239...," 7 Oct 60, TS; JCS 2305/242, 8 Oct 60, TS; JCSM467-60 to SecDef, 17

Oct 60, JCS 2305/239; same file, sec. 2.

48. Memo, AsstSecState Köhler and ASD(ISA) to SecState and SecDef, 27 Sep 60, JCS 2305/229, S;

Memo, ISA for Staff Distribution 1-16097/60 with Att State-Defense Agreement, S; JMF 9050/4720 (27

Sep 60) sec. 1. JCS Supplemental Bfg Sheet for CJCS, Ops Deps Mtg, 11 Oct 60, "DOD Position on

Nuclear Sharing with Allies," n.d., TS, same file, sec. 2.

49. JCSM-478-60 to SecDef, 25 Oct 60, JCS 2305/253, S, JMF 9050/4720 (27 Sep 60).

50. ISA Memo 1-16097-60, "NATO MRBMs," Draft of 3 Nov 60, S; Note to Control Div, General

Ruffner's Draft Message re: 'POLARIS'," 9 Nov 60, C; JMF 9050/4720 (27 Sep 60).

Chapter 8. Germany and Berlin

1. NSC 160/1,17 Aug 53, JCS 2124/91, U, CCS 092 Germany (5-4-49) BP pt. 2A. Printed in Foreign

Relations: 1952-1954, vol. 7 (1986), pp. 510-520.

2. OCB Progress Report on US Policy toward the Federal Republic, 5 Dec 56, S, CCS 381 (8-20-43)

sec. 39.

3. NSC Action No. 1664-b, 4 Feb 57, TS. Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC, "US Policy Toward Germany," 13 Dec 57, JCS 2124/187, TS; N/H of JCS 2124/187, 15 Jan 58, TS; CCS 092 Germany (5-4-49)

sec. 34 and BP pt. 3. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "US Policy Toward Germany (NSC 5727)," 20 Dec 57, JCS

2124/188, U; Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Revisions to NSC 5727," 21 Jan 58, JCS 2124/189, U; same file, sec.

247
Notes to Pages 114-125

34. Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC, "US Policy Toward Germany," 7 Feb 58, JCS 2124/190, TS, same

file, sec. 35.

4. NSC 5803, 7 Feb 58, JCS 2124/190, TS, CCS 092 Germany (5-4-49) sec. 35.

5. OCB Progress Report on NSC 5803, 3 Sep 58, N/H of JCS 2124/190, S, CCS 092 Germany

(5-1-49) sec. 35.

6. NSC 5524/1,13 Jul 55, JCS 2249/3, U; N/H of JCS 2249/3,4 Jan 56, U; CCS 337 (4-19-50) sec. 14.

DOS, Documents on Germany: 1944-1961 (1961), p. 146.

7. WHDS Sect Note 112, "Eisenhower-Bulganin Correspondence," 21 Nov 56, U, CCS 092

(4_14-^5) BP pt. 7. DPC Note 122, "Response to Soviet Proposals for Troop Withdrawals in Europe,"

18 Feb 57, U, same file, BP pt. 8.

8. JCS 2124/179,16 Nov 56, TS; JCS 2124/181,12 Dec 56, U, CCS 092 Germany (5-1-49) sec. 32.

9. CM-433-57 to JSSC, 24 Jan 57, JCS 1731/217, U, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec. 67. The strategic concept is described in chapter 2.

10. JCS 1731/220,14 Mar 57, U, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec. 67.

11. Rpt of the Four Power Working Group on German Reunification in Relation to European

Security, 6-15 Mar 57, Washington, DC, S, CCS 092 Germany (5-4-49) sec. 33. Memo, ASD(ISA) to

CJCS, same subj, 26 Mar 57, JCS 2249/17, S, same file.

12. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 15 Apr 57, JCS 2249/18, U, CCS 092 Germany (5-4-49) sec. 33.

13. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "US Military Position on European Security and German Reunification," 15 Apr 57, JCS 2249/19, U; Msg, Bonn 4392 to SecState, 13 May 57, U; CCS 092 Germany

(5-4-49) sec. 33. Documents on Germany, 1944-1961, pp. 244-245.

14. JCS 1731/250,4 Mar 58, U, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec. 74.

15. Msg, State TOPOL 2486 to Paris et al., 21 Jan 58, S; Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 1 Mar 58, JCS

1731/250, S; CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec. 74.

16. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Establishment of a Denuclearized Zone in Central Europe," 11 Mar 58,

JCS 1731/253, U; N/H of JCS 1731/253, 25 Mar 58; U, CCS 092 (4-14-45) sec. 75.

17. Documents on Germany, 1944-1961, pp. 297-299.

18. Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 11 Feb 58, JCS 2124/191, S, CCS 092 Germany (5-4-49) sec. 35. Memo,

ASD(ISA) to JCS, 21 Feb 58, JCS 2116/120, S, CCS 337 (4-19-50) sec. 18.

19. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "European Security and German Reunification," 27 Mar 58, JCS

2124/192, S, CCS 092 Germany (5-4-49) BP pt. 3. The JCS also directed the JSSC to appraise all policy

issues likely to come up at a summit conference. The committee reported that existing JCS positions

constituted adequate guidance for developing any positions. JCS 2116/125, 15 Jul 58, S, CCS 337

(4-19-50) sec. 19.

20. N/H of JCS 2124/192,16 Apr 58, S, CCS 092 Germany (5-4-49) BP pt. 3.

21. DOS Bulletin, 9 Mar 59, pp. 333-343.

22. DOS Working Paper on European Security and German Reunification, 6 Mar 59, JCS

2124/200, JMF 9172/9105 (10 Mar 59).

23. Ltr, DepSecDef to ActgSecState, 6 Mar 59, App C to JCS 2124/200, S, JMF 9172/9105 (10 Mar

59).

24. JCSM-81-59 to SecDef, 10 Mar 59, JCS 2124/201, S; N/H of JCS 2124/201, 7 Apr 59, S, JMF

9172/9105 (10 Mar 59).

25. Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 28 Mar 59, JCS 2124/206, S; JCSM-115-59 to SecDef, 30 Mar 59, JCS

2124/207, S; JMF 9172/9105 (30 Mar 59).

26. Memo, AsstSecState for European Affairs to ASD(ISA), 9 Apr 59, JCS 2124/208, S, JMF

9172/9105 (10 Apr 59).

27. JCSM-134-59 to SecDef, 10 Apr 59, JCS 2124/210, S, JMF 9172/9105 (10 Apr 59).

28. MFR by RADM Paul L. Dudley, "Quadripartite Meeting (US, UK, France, and Germany) on

Tuesday, 31 March," End to SM-352-59 to JCS, 2 Apr 59, JCS 2124/212, S, JMF 5400 (59).

29. Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs: 1959 (1960), pp. 151-157,162.

30. Msg, Paris 4800 to SecState, 15 Apr 60, S; Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 17 Apr 60, JCS 1731/369,

S; JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec. 6.

31. JCSM-179-60 to SecDef, 27 Apr 60, JCS 1731/372, S, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec. 7.

32. 1st N/H of JCS 1731/372, 6 Jun 60, S, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec. 7.

33. OCB Progress Rpt on Germany, 4 Sep 58-2 Nov 60, 4th N/H of JCS 2124/190, 14 Nov 60, S,

CCS 092 Germany (5-4-49) sec. 35.

34. NSC 5404/1, 25 Jan 54, U; Memo, JCS to SecDef, "NSC 5404—United States Policy on Berlin,"

19 Jan 54, JCS 1907/103, U; CCS 381 (8-20-43) sec. 33.

35. USEUCOM Plan (Berlin) 10-55, 6 Jul 55 (forwarded to JCS, 11 Aug 55), TS; USEUCOM Plan

12-55, 17 Nov 55 (forwarded to JCS, 1 Jan 56), TS; CCS 381 (8-20-43) BP pt. 1. SM-356-56 to

USCINCEUR, 8 May 56, JCS 1907/137, U; N/H of JCS 1907/128, 25 Mar 57, TS; same file, sec. 38. At

248
Notes to Pages 126-132

the Joint Chiefs' request, USCINCEUR prepared an annex covering psychological warfare operations;

it won JCS approval on 30 April 1957. SM-334-57 to USCINCEUR, 30 Apr 57, JCS 1907/148, U, same

file, sec. 39.

36. Memo, Dir of Coordinating Secretariat to NSC Planning Board, 14 Oct 57, S; Note by ExecSecy,

NSC to NSC, "US Policy Toward Germany," 7 Feb 58, TS; CCS 092 Germany (5-4-49) sec. 35. Late in

1956, the Soviets began demanding to see the identification cards of enlisted men in military convoys

traveling the autobahn. General H. I. Hodes, the CINCUSAREUR, urged firm measures of resistance.

The State and Defense Departments disapproved, noting among other things that British and French

personnel always had shown their cards upon request. Msg, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 2 Feb 57, DA IN

292771, U, CCS 381 (8-20-13) sec. 39. Msg, CSA to CINCUSAREUR, 9 Feb 57, DA 917643, U, CCS 092

Germany (5-4-49) sec. 32.

37. DOS Bulletin, 19 Jan 59, pp. 81-88.

38. DOS Bulletin, 29 Dec 58, pp. 1041-1042; 5 Jan 59, p. 4. For the US reply to the Soviets, dated 31

December, see ibid., 19 Jan 59, pp. 79-81.

39. Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 8 (1993), pp. 161-162. N/Hs of JCS 1907/160,11 Dec 58 and 7

Jan 59, TS, CCS 381 (8-29-43) sec. 42.

40. Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 8, pp. 240-244. JCSM-16-59 to SecDef, 13 Jan 59, JCS

1907/162, TS, JMF 9172 Berlin/9105 (12 Jan 59).

41. Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 8, pp. 269-270. N/H of JCS 1907/162,16 Jan 59, TS, JMF 9172

Berlin/9105 (12 Jan 59).

42. Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 8, pp. 300-305

43. CM-289-59 to SecDef, 2 Feb 59, TS; Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 2 Feb 59, TS; JCS 1907/165, 16 Feb

59, TS; JMF 9172 Berlin/9105 (59). DOS, "Berlin Contingency Planning," 18 Feb 59, JCS 1907/173, S,

JMF 9172 Berlin/9105 (6 Mar 59).

44. Memo, CNO to JCS, 5 Mar 59, S; Memo, CMC to JCS, 5 Mar 59, JCS 1907/168, U;

CSAFM-85-59 to JCS, 5 Mar 59, JCS 1907/172, TS; JCS 1907/171, 6 Mar 59, TS; JMF 9172 Berlin/9105 (4

Mar 59).

45. This paragraph is based upon annotations made on the Navy copy of JCS 1907/165.

46. "Memo of Conf with the President, March 6,1959—5:00 PM" by John S. D. Eisenhower, 7 Mar

59, U; "Memo of Conf with the President, March 9,1959—10:30 AM" by John S. D. Eisenhower, 9 Mar

59, U; Staff Notes 1-15 Nov 59, DDE Diary Series, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

47. JCSM-82-59 to SecDef, 11 Mar 59, JCS 1907/175, TS, JMF 9172 Berlin/9105 (6 Mar 59).

48. JCSM-93-59 to SecDef, 16 Mar 59, JCS 1907/180, TS; N/H of JCS 1907/180, 23 Apr 59, TS; JMF

9172 Berlin/9105 (6 Mar 59).

49. DOS, "Berlin Contingency Planning," 4 Apr 59, JCS 1907/190, S, JMF 9172 Berlin/9105 (4

Apr 59).

50. JCSM-108-59 to SecDef, 26 Mar 59, JCS 1907/185, TS; End C to JCSM-128-59 to SecDef, 9 Apr

59, JCS 1907/189, TS; JMF 9172 Berlin/9105 (23 Apr 59) sec. 1.

51. Memo, ActgSecState to Pres, 18 Apr 59, JCS 1907/195, TS; Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 1 May

59, JCS 1907/201, TS; JMF 9172 Berlin/9105 (23 Apr 59) pt. 5.

52. Msg, USCINCEUR ALO 284 to CJCS, 17 Mar 59, TS; Msg, JCS 957254 to USCINCEUR, 1 Apr

59, JCS 1907/187, TS; JMF 9172 Berlin/5000 (1 Apr 59). Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 1 May 59, JCS

1907/201, TS; N/H of JCS 1907/189, 22 Jun 59, TS; JMF 9172 Berlin/9105 (23 Apr 59) pt. 5.

JCSM-355-59 to SecDef, 31 Aug 59, JCS 1907/237, TS, JMF 9172 Berlin/ 9105 (26 Jun 59).

53. JCSM-275-59 to SecDef, 16 Jul 59, JCS 1907/216, S, JMF 9172 Berlin/9105 (8 Jul 59).

54. Public Papers ofthe Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959, p. 696.

55. Memo, SecState and SecDef to Pres, 17 Mar 59, TS, JMF 9172 Berlin/9105 (23 Apr 59) pt. 1.

Msg, JCS 956971 to USCINCEUR, 26 Mar 59, TS; Msg, USCINCEUR to JCS, 29 Mar 59, DA IN 201928,

S; JMF 9172 Berlin/9010 (18 Feb 60) sec. 1. USEUCOM Annual Historical Report: 1959, pp. 142-143, S.

DOS Bulletin, 4 May 59, p. 633. Msg, JCS 960809 to USCINCEUR, 9 Jun 59, JCS 1907/209, JMF 9172

Berlin/9010 (7 Apr 59). JCSM-203-59 to SecDef, 28 May 59, JCS 1907/208, S; N/Hs of JCS 1907/208, 6

& 14 Jul 59, S; JMF 9172 Berlin/9010 (21 Apr 59). JCSM-338-59 to SecDef, 19 Aug 59, JCS 1907/232, TS;

N/Hs of JCS 1907/232, 23 Sep and 2 Oct 59, TS; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 2 Oct 59, JCS 1907/242, S;

JCSM-500-59 to SecDef, 27 Nov 59, JCS 1907/252, S; JCSM-541-59 to SecDef, 31 Dec 59, JCS 1907/255,

S; JMF Berlin/9010 (7 Aug 59).

56. Msg, USCINCEUR to JCS, 17 Dec 59, DA IN 269996, TS, JMF 9172 Berlin/9105 (26 Jun 59).

SM-480-60 to USCINCEUR, 17 May 60, JCS 2052/413, TS, JMF 3145 (1 Feb 60).

57. Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs: 1960 (1961), pp. 79-80. Memo, ActgSecDef to CJCS, 28 Mar 60, JCS 1907/263, TS; JCSM-202-60 to SecDef, 12 May 60, JCS 1907/266, TS;

JMF 9172 Berlin/9105 (28 Mar 60).

249
Notes to Pages 132-142

58. Memo, DepSccDef to CJCS, 10 Jun 60, JCS 1907/272, U; JCSM-349-60 to SecDef, 12 Aug 60,

JCS 1907/274, TS; JMF 9172 Berlin/9105 (28 Mar 60) sec. 2. The groundwork for JCSM-349-60 was

done not by the Joint Staff but by an interdepartmental working goup under the Coordinating Group

for Berlin Contingency Planning.

59. JCSM-439-60 to SecDef, 29 Sep 60, JCS 1907/279, TS; N/H of JCS 1907/279, 4 Oct 59, TS; JMF

9172 Berlin/9105 (21 Sep 60). Subsequently, State asked the JCS to suggest which measures, chosen

from a list that had been drawn up the previous summer, could be emphasized in tripartite discussions. The JCS had not responded by the time the Eisenhower administration left office. N/H of JCS

1907/279,13 Oct 60, TS, same file. OCS Progress Report on Germany, 4 Sep 58 through 2 Nov 60, N/H

of JCS 2124/190,14 Nov 60, S, CCS 092 Germany (5-4-49) sec. 35. NSC Action No. 2338, 1 Dec 60, TS.

Chapter 9. The Middle East: Implementing the Eisenhower Doctrine

1. Public Papers of the Presidents: Eisenhower, 1957, pp. 6-16. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace

(1965), pp. 182-183.

2. Foreign Relations: 1955-1957, vol. 12 (1991), pp. 412, 415. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Military Aid

Aspects of the Administration's Proposed Joint Resolution...," 1 Fob 57, JCS 1887/340, U, CCS 381

EMMEA (11-19-47) sec. 55.

3. SM-65-57 to JMEPC, 22 Jan 57, S, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec. 54. The JMEPC then consisted of three one-star officers, supported by a staff of nine field-grade officers. Soon afterward, in an

organizational change, the three general officers were replaced by a single two-star officer, Major

General Verdi Barnes, USA.

4. JCS 1887/342, 20 Feb 57, U, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-1947) sec. 55.

5. N/H of JCS 1887/342, 7 Mar 57, U; JCS 1887/343, 1 Mar 57, U; DM-73-57 to JMEPC and DepDir

for Strategic Plans, 15 Feb 57, U; CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec. 55. JCS 1887/347, 14 Mar 57, U,

same file, sec. 56.

6. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Military Planning Talks with Middle Eastern Countries," 22 Mar 57, JCS

1887/348, U, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec. 56.

7. Ltr, ASD(ISA) to DepUSecState, 28 Mar 57, JCS 1887/349, U; JCS 1887/351, 23 Apr 57, U; CCS

381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec. 56. DOS Bulletin, 8 Apr 57, p. 561.

8. JCS 1887/355,11 May 57, U, and Dec On, 14 May 57, U, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec. 56.

9. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 4 Mar 57, JCS 1887/345, TS, CCS 092 Iran (4-23-48) sec. 19. Memo,

JCS to SecDef, "Military Implications of Joint Resolution 117 on the Middle East," 13 Jun 57, JCS

1887/363, U, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec. 60.

10. Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC, "Military Implications of Joint Resolution 117 on the Middle

East," 16 Jul 57, TS, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec. 63.

11. NSC Action No. 1753,18 Jul 57, TS.

12. Presentation by CJCS before Joint State-Defense Conference, 23 Jul 57, JCS 1887/385, TS; JCS

1887/385,1 Aug 57, TS; CCS 381 EMMEA (11-1947) sec. 63.

13. SM-558-57 to JMEPC, 26 Jul 57, TS, CCS 381 (3-14-49) sec. 3. JCS 2268/6, 18 Oct 57, and Dec

On, 23 Oct 57, TS, CCS 381 (8-14-57) sec. 5.

14. JCS 2034/30, 7 Oct 57, U; JCS 2034/31, 9 Oct 57, U; CCS 381 (3-14-49) sec. 4 and BP pt. 5.

Pending activation of a Middle East Command, CINCNELM had taken the added title of CINCSPECOMME.

15. CINCSPECOMME OPLAN 219-57 (Draft), 27 Aug 57, CCS 381 (3-14-49) BP pt. 5. Ltr, CINCNELM to JCS et al, 27 Sep 57, TS, same file, sec. 3.

16. SM-874-57 to CINCNELM, 11 Dec 57, JCS 2034/37, TS, CCS 381 (3-14-49) sec. 6.

17. CINCSPECOMME OPLAN 215-58 (Draft), 27 Sep 57, TS, CCS 381 (3-14-49) BP pt. 5.

18. JCS 2034/34,12 Nov 57, TS; JCS 2034/36, 19 Nov 57, TS; JCS 2034/38, 21 Nov 57, TS; CCS 381

(3-14-49) sec. 4.

19. Msg, JCS 933492 to CINCNELM, 3 Dec 57, TS; SM-847-57 to CINCNELM, 29 Nov 57, TS; both

in JCS 2034/39, CCS 381 (3-14-49) sec. 5.

20. Msg, CINCSPECOMME to JCS, 051611Z Dec 57, TS; Msg, USCINCEUR to JCS, 6 Dec 57, DA

IN 76437, TS; CCS 381 (3-14-49) sec. 5.

21. SM-126-58 to CINCNELM, 21 Feb 58, JCS 1887/433, U, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec. 68.

CINCSPECOMME OPLAN 215-58, 17 Mar 58, TS, CCS 381 (3-14-49) BP pt. 6. Msg, JCS 938896 to

CINCSPECOMME et al., 22 Mar 58, JCS 1887/438, TS, same file, sec. 5. Msg, JCS 939730 to CINCSPECOMME, 7 Apr 58, JCS 1887/446, U, same file, sec. 6.

22. JCS 2268, 8 May 58, U, CCS 381 (3-14-49) sec. 3.

23. JCS 2268/7, 21 Oct 57, TS; JCS 2268/8, 29 Oct 57, TS; CCS 381 (3-14-49) sec. 4.

250

1
Notes to Pages 143-150

24. Middle East Emergency Defense Plan 1-58, 7 Mar 58, CCS 381 (3-14-49) BP pt. 6. Dec On JCS

2268/10, 3 Mar 58, TS; SM-193-58 to CINCNELM, 14 Mar 58, JCS 2268/10, TS; same file, sec. 7.

25. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Resolution of the Middle East Question," 4 Dec 57, JCS 1887/409, U,

CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec. 4.

26. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Resolution of the Middle East Question," 4 Dec 57, JCS 1887/409, U;

N/H of JCS 1887/409, 10 Dec 57, U; CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec. 4. Printed in Foreign Relations: 1955-1957,

vol. 17 (1990), pp. 837-838.

27. Memo of Discussion, State—JCS Mtg, 13 Dec 57. Printed in Foreign Relations: 1955-1957, vol.

17, pp. 852-856.

28. NSC 5801, 10 Jan 58, JCS 1887/428, TS, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec. 67. DOS Bulletin, 5

Sep 55, pp. 378-380.

29. Memo, JCS to SecDef, 17 Jan 58, JCS 1887/429, TS, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec. 67. NSC

Action No. 1845,23 Jan 58, TS.

30. NSC 5801/1,24 Jan 58, TS, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) BP pt. 7.

31. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Military Aid Aspects of the Administration's Proposed Joint Resolution,.. .," 1 Feb 57, JCS 1887/340, TS, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec. 55. N/H of JCS 1887/340,19 Feb

57Pr'%same file, sec. 54. _.•..

32. Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs: 1957 (1958), pp. 181-186. The reports

sent by Ambassador Richards from various countries are printed in Foreign Relations: 1955-1957, vol.

12 (1991).

33. Msg, Amman 1501 to SecState, 3 May 57, S; Msg, USARMA, Amman C-40 to ACSI, 4 May 57,

S; CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec. 58.

34. On 8 May, General Taylor withdrew his request for an urgent JCS study. JCS 2105/51, 7 May

57, U; Msg, State 1646 to Amman, 7 May 57, S; N/H of JCS 2105/51, 8 May 57, U; CCS 381 EMMEA

(U-19-47) sec. 58. JCS 1887/340, 31 Jan 57, TS, same file, BP pt. 5. DM-159-57 to CJCS, TS, CCS 092

(8-22-46)(2) sec. 42. DOS Bulletin, 22 Jul 57, p. 146.

35. Msg, Baghdad 1327 to SecState, 12 Feb 58, TS; Msg, Manila SECTO 12 to SecState, 11 Mar 58,

TS; CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec. 68.

36. JCS 1887/456,12 May 58, TS, CCS 092 (8-22-46)(2) sec. 51.

37. Rpt of USAF Survey Team to Iraq, 9 Apr 58, S, CCS 092 (8-22-46) BP pt. 22.

38. Msg, SecState 2827 to Baghdad, 30 Apr 58, S; Memo ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 29 Apr 58, JCS

1887/453, S, CCS 092 (8-22-46) sec. 51. Msg, SecState 2827 to Baghdad, 30 Apr 58, S, CCS 381 EMMEA

(11_19_47) Sec. 70. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Recommendations...Jet Aircraft to Iraq," 23 May 58, JCS

1887/456, TS; CCS 092 (8-22-46) (2) sec. 51. N/H of JCS 1887/452, 8 Jul 58, TS, CCS 381 EMMEA

(11-19-47) sec. 69.

39. Msg, DA (DCSLOG) 944728 to USCINCEUR et al., 14 Jul 58, S, CCS 092 (8-22-46)(2) sec. 52.

Msg, SecState 960 to Baghdad, 10 Sep 58, JCS 1887/501, S, CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec. 9. AID, Statistics and

Reports Div., U. US Foreign Assistance: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, 1 Jul 45-30 Jun 61.

40. NSC 5614/1, 3 Oct 56, S; Memo, JCS to SecDef, "US Policy Toward Tunisia, Morocco, and

Algeria," 21 Nov 56, JCS 2121/14, TS; CCS 092 Africa (4-20-50) sec. 4.

41. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 5 Aug 58, JCS 570/469, TS; Memo, JCS to SecDef, "US Bases in

Morocco," 15 Aug 58, JCS 570/470, TS, CCS 360 (12-9-42) sec. 94.

42. Memo of Discussion, NSC Mtg, 27 Aug 59. Printed in Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 13

(1992), pp. 767-770. Memo, SecDef to SecArmy et al., 9 Sep 58, JCS 570/472, S, CCS 360 (12-9-42) sec.

94. Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 17 Dec 58, JCS 570/475, S, same file, sec. 95. DM-341-59 to JCS, 9 Jun 59, S,

JMF 9118.3/4920 (23 Apr 59) GP1. NSC 5911/1,4 Nov 59, JMF 9110/9105 (3 Aug 59). Printed in Foreign

Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 13, pp. 615-625.

43. N/H of JCS 570/487, 16 Jun 59, TS, JMF 9118.3/4920 (23 Apr 59) GP 1. Memo of Discussion,

State—JCS Mtgs, 12 Jun 59. Printed in Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 13 (1992), pp. 779-782.

44. NSC Action No. 2088, 21 May 59, U; NSC 5911, 3 Aug 59, U; Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC,

"Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria," 13 Aug 59, S; NSC 5911/1,4 Nov 59, U, JMF 9110/9105 (3 Aug 59). Printed in Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 13, pp. 615-625. On 16 September, French President Charles de

Gaulle announced a program that promised self-determination for Algeria, based on a referendum to

be held after the cessation of hostilities. NSC 5911/1 spoke of supporting and discreetly encouraging a

settlement along these lines but did not specify how the US Government might do so.

45. JCS 570/502,17 Feb 60, TS, JMF 9118.2/4920 (23 Apr 59) GP 2. DOS Bulletin, 11 Jan 60, p. 57.

46. JCSM-52-60 to SecDef, 17 Feb 60, JCS 570/502, JMF 9118.2/4920 (23 Apr 59) GP 2. JCSM

317-60 to SecDef, 25 Jul 60, JCS 570/513, S; SM-702-60 to CINCSAC, 25 Jul 60, S; same file, sec. 3. JCS

570/532,17 Apr 61, S, JMF 9118.3/4920 (13 Apr 61).

47. Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 13, p. 782.

251
Notes to Pages 151-156

Chapter 10. The Middle East—Lebanon and After

1. DOS Bulletin, 23 Sep 57, p. 487. Msg, JCS 929140 to USCINCEUR et al., 6 Sep 57, TS, CCS 381

(8-23-57) sec. 1.

2. Draft DM to JCS, "Disestablishment of the US-UK Working Group," n.d. (c. 11 Apr 58), TS

CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec. 6. CM-24-57 to SecState, 17 Oct 57, with attachments, TS; BCOS

JP(57)134(Final), "Jordan and the Lebanon," 17 Oct 57, with attached receipt form; same file, sec. 1.

3. Ltr, DepUSecState to CJCS, 8 Nov 57, TS; Msg, JCS 932741 to USCINCEUR et al., 15 Nov 57 TS

CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec. 2.

4. The Commander in Chief, US Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (CINCNELM),

used the title Commander in Chief, US Specified Command, Middle East (CINCSPECOMME), when

planning or conducting operations in the Middle East. However, in the interest of simplicity, the title

CINCNELM has been employed throughout this chapter.

5. Memo, CINCSPECOMME to JCS, 22 Nov 57, JCS 2034/40, U; Msg, JCS 933332 to CINCSPECOMME, 27 Nov 57, JCS 2034/41, TS; CCS 381 (3-14-49) sec. 5. The JCS formally approved the

JMEPC's plan through Dec On JCS 1887/410, 27 Nov 57, TS, CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec. 2. Msg, JCS °?^92

to CINCNELM, 3 Dec 57, JCS 2034/39, TS, CCS 381 (3-14-49) sec. 5. Chapter 9 treats apprcn Jfef

OPLAN 215-58 in more detail.

6. JCS 1887/419,29 Nov 57, TS, CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec. 4.

7. JCS 1887/419, 29 Nov 57, TS, CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec. 4. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Contingency

Plan for US-UK Military Action...," 10 Jan 58, JCS 1887/427, TS; N/H of JCS 1887/427, 8 Apr 58, TS;

same file, sec. 5. Early in April, the JCS informed the representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff that

they saw no need for detailed combined planning. SM-252-58 to BCS Reps, 7 Apr 58, JCS 1887/427,

TS, CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec. 6. As will be seen, though, such planning did start in mid-May.

8. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Staging Rights in Turkey, Libya and Cyprus...," 27 Nov 57, JCS

1887/410, and attached MFR by Paul Kearney, 6 Dec 57, TS, CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec 3 Msg

USCINCEUR to JCS, 7 Mar 58, DA IN 99028, TS; JCS 1887/439, 20 Mar 58, TS, same file, sec. 5. Memo,'

JCS to SecDef, "Staging and Prestocking Rights in Turkey, Libya and Cyprus," 28 Mar 58, JCS

1887/439, TS, same file, sec. 6.

9. MFR by BG Goodpaster, 15 May 58, U, Dwight D. Eisenhower Diary Series, May 1958—Staff

Notes (2), Eisenhower Library. Msg, SecState 4271 to Lebanon, 13 May 58, U, CCS 381 Lebanon

(5-13-58) sec. 1. Printed in Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 11 (1992), pp. 49-50.

10. Msg, CNO to CINCNELM, 132307Z May 58, TS; Msg, JCS 941734 to CINCNELM, 14 May 58

TS; Msg, CNO to CINCNELM, 141537Z May 58; Msg, CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 162001Z May 58

TS; Msg, JCS 941927 to USCINCEUR and CINCNELM, 16 May 58, TS; Msg, HQ USAF 9720 to COMMATS, 171752Z May 58, TS; Msg, JCS 941935 to CINCSPECOMME, 17 May 58, TS; CCS 381 Lebanon

(5-13-58) sec. 1. Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 11, p. 60.

11. Msg, JCS 941855 to CINCSPECOMME, 16 May 58, TS; Memo, COL D. J. Decker, JMEPC, to

CNO, "Meeting at Department of State, 1115 Monday, 19 May 58," 19 May 58, TS; CCS 381 Lebanon

(5-13-58) sec. 1. By 20 June, the State Department was contemplating asking Turkey to permit prestocking several hundred tons of Army ammunition, to be followed later by moderate amounts of

tanks, artillery, and aircraft. If intervention occurred, State anticipated no difficulty about obtaining

staging rights. Msg, JCS 943672 to USCINCEUR, 20 Jun 58, TS, same file, sec. 2.

12. Msg, JCS 942263 to USCINCEUR et al., 23 May 58, TS, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec. 2.

13. Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 11, pp. 133-137.

14. NY Times, 5 Jul 58, p. 2; 11 Jul 58, p. 6.

15. Msg, Beirut 358 to SecState, 14 Jul 58, TS, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec. 3. Chamoun

invoked the Eisenhower Doctrine, arguing that Lebanese Moslems were being helped by Syria, which

had received arms from the Soviet Union. However, no US spokesman described the US intervention

that followed as an action taken pursuant to the Eisenhower Doctrine. Rather, President Eisenhower

several times cited the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter.

16. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, pp. 269-271. Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 11, pp. 209-215,

218-226. From Beirut, the US Ambassador cautioned that "Chamoun may regard this opportunity as

his last card to play to bring about friendly military intervention in Lebanon." Therefore, US intervention could be justified only "in light of broader intelligence and political and strategic considerations

affecting the entire Middle East." Ibid., pp. 215-216.

17. Msg, CNO to CINCNELM and COMSIXTHFLT, 142223Z Jul 58, TS; Msg, CNO to CINCSPECOMME and COMSIXTHFLT, 142249Z Jul 58, TS; Msg, JCS 944751 to USCINCEUR et al., 150031Z

Jul 58, S; CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec. 3. Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 11, pp. 226-228,231.

18. Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 11, pp. 245-246.

252
Notes to Pages 157-161

19 Ms« Beirut 401 to SecState, 15 Jul 58, DA IN 133066, S. Msg, Beirut 406 to SecState, 151836Z

Jul 58 DA IN 133525, TS; Msg, JCS 944787 to CINCSPECOMME, 152122Z Jul 58, TS; Dec On JCS

1887/476 15 Jul 58, TS; CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec. 3. Msg, SecState 217 to Beirut, 15 Jul 58, TS.

Msg CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 160644Z Jul 58, TS, same file. Time, 4 Aug 58, p. 13. Late on the

morning of 16 July, the Ambassador and the Admiral personally led a Marine column through a

Lebanese Army roadblock of tanks and recoilless rifles. Msg, CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 192226Z Jul

58 TS- Msg, Beirut 428 to SecState, 16 Jul 58, TS; CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec. 3. Msg, CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 162056Z Jul 58, TS, JMEPG Lebanon Msg File. Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol.

11, pp. 247-251,253-255.

20. This was probably just as well because, prior to 14 July, President Chamoun had been advised

that the United States would object strongly to participation by French forces in any intervention.

Lebanese Moslems sympathized with their fellow Moslems in Algeria who were rebelling agamst

French rule. Msg, SecState 4390 to Beirut, 18 May 58, TS; Msgs, Beirut 4773 and 4774 to SecState, 16

Uft2L Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p. 273. Msg, Amman 132 to SecState, 16 Jul 58, DA IN 133649, TS.

Geraxal White's remark appeared in the transcript of a JCS meeting; the transcript has been

desWed. Msg, JCS 945452 to CINCSPECOMME, 24 Jul 58, TS, CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec. 6. Reasons for

not sending US troops to Jordan are explained in Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 11, pp. 309, 312

344, 347-349. On 18 July, after a discussion between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the UK Chief of

Defense Staff, the Joint Staff was directed to draft an outline plan for US-UK occupation of Iraq. The

Joint Chiefs of Staff received such a plan on 21 August and formally noted it on 3 October, stating that

it should be used in connection with the Joint Staff's review of CINCSPECOMME OPLAN 215-58.

SM-494-58 to Chm, JMEPG and DDSP, TS, CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec. 6. JCS 1887/493,21 Aug 58, and Dec

On, 3 Oct 58, TS, same file, sec. 8.

22 Msg CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 162056Z Jul 58, TS, JMEPG Lebanon Message File. Msg,

CINCSPECOMME to JCS, 171916Z Jul 58, TS, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec. 3. Msg, CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 192226Z Jul 58, C; Msg, COMAMLANFOR to CINCSPECOMME, 201133Z Jul

58, S, JMEPG Lebanon Msg File.

23. Msg, CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 192226Z Jul 58, C; Msg, USAFE ADVON to CSAF, APEX

0078 201418Z Jul 58, S; JMEPG Lebanon Msg File. Joint War Room Report No. 10 (Middle East), 23 Jul

58, TS, CCS 319.1 (7-16-58) sec. 1. JWR Rpts No. 12 (Middle East), 25 Jul 58, No. 14, 27 Jul 58, No. 22,4

Aug 58, and No. 23, 5 Aug 58, TS, same file, sec. 2. It should be mentioned that, throughout the US

intervention, Navy and Air Force planes conducted numerous low-level fly-bys over Lebanon.

24 Msg, CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 211341Z Jul 58, TS; Msg, CNO to CINCSPECOMME,

231423Z Jul 58, C; Msg, DA to USCINCEUR et al., DA 945322, 23 Jul 58, TS; CCS 381 Lebanon

(5-13-58) sec. 3. Msg, CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 242331Z Jul 58, TS, same file, sec. 4. Msg, CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 261001Z Jul 58, C, JMEPG Lebanon Msg File.

25 Msg JCS 944826 to USCINCEUR, 152339Z Jul 58, TS, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec. 3.

26 Msg, Vienna 168 to SecState, 16 Jul 58, DA IN 134178, C. Msg, Vienna 191 to SecState, 19 Jul 58,

S. Msg, SecState 180 to Vienna, 19 Jul 58, S. Msg, HQ, USAF to CINCUSAFE, APEX 000080, 201730Z

Jul 58, S, JMEPG Lebanon Msg File.

27 Msg JCS 944989 to USCINCEUR, 171710Z Jul 58, S, CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec. 3. Msg,

Athens 153 to SecState, 17 Jul 58, S. Msg, USAIRA Athens to USAFE ADVON, 181045Z Jul 58, S; Msg,

Athens 176 to SecState, 19 Jul 58, DA IN 135133, S; Msg, USAIRA Athens to Hq USAF et al., C-71,

19U45Z Jul 58, S; JMEPG Lebanon Msg File.

28. NY Times, 16 Jul 58, p. 1. See DOS Bulletin, 4 Aug 58, p. 182; 11 Aug 58, pp. 229-235; 18 Aug 58,

pp. 274-277.

29. See Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (1964), chap. 27.

30. Msg, CINCNELM to CNO, 051101Z Aug 58, TS; Msgs, JCS 946103 and 946107 to CINCSPECOMME, 5 Aug 58, S; CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec. 4.

31. Msg, CINCSPECOMME to CNO, 072216Z Aug 58, TS; Msg, CNO to CINCSPECOMME,

081931Z TS; CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec. 4.

32. CINCSPECOMME Command Report, "Operation 'BLUE BAT'," 5 Dec 58, S, CCS 381 Lebanon

(5-13-58) BP. JCS 2295/5, 3 Apr 59, TS, JMF 3023 (14 Apr 59).

33 JCS 2293/1 23 Oct 58, U; SM-840-58 to Dir, J-3, 31 Oct 58, U; CCS 381 Lebanon (5-13-58) sec.

5. More assessments may be found in JCS 2295/3, 9 Feb 59, U, JMF 3203 (6 Feb 59) and JCS 2295/5, 3

Apr 59, U, JMF 3203 (14 Apr 59). JCS Bfg Sheet for CJCS, 14 May 59, U; JCS 1968/50, 25 Jun 59, U;

SM-833-59 to CSA et al., 25 Aug 59, JCS 1968/50, U; JMF 3180 (20 Apr 59) sec. 1.

34. CINCSPECOMME OPLAN 215-59, 10 Jul 59, TS, JMF 3147 (10 Jul 59) sec. 1. The new plan

assumed that Turkey would grant passage rights and make bases available. OPLAN 215-59 would

253
Notes to Pages 161-172

employ three Marine BLTs, the number actually landed during the intervention, rather than the two

listed in OPLAN 215-58.

35. SM-1311-59 to CINCNELM, 31 Dec 59, JCS 2034/98, TS, JMF 3147 (10 Jul 59) CINCNELM

Annual Historical Report: 1960, p. 1.

-,oJLSM~:

533

-

58 t0 ,CS'6 AuS58'TS; Ms8' JCS 945925 to CINCNELM et al., 1 Aug 58, JCS 1887/485, TS; CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec. 7. - ö °< jv-o

37. Msg, JCS 946999 to CINCSPECOMME, 23 Aug 58, TS, CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec 8

i<KQ3TJ

CS 1887/494'2

^P 58' ^

CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec. 8. CINCNELM Annual Historical Report:

39. JCS 2268/32,29 Oct 59, TS, JMF 9180/3100 (22 Sep 59) sec. 1.

40. Memo, ActgSecDef to CJCS, 3 Feb 60, JCS 1259/500, U, JMF 5167 (3 Feb 60) sec 1

41. Msg, CINCNELM to JCS, 281457Z Jul 60, JMF 5167 (3 Feb 60) sec. 2. Dec On JCS 2268/39 24

Aug 60; SM-1077-60 to CINCAL et al., 25 Oct 60, JCS 2268/39; N/H of JCS 2268/39, 28 Oct 60- IMF

5167 (19 Aug 60).

42. NSC Actions No. 1951, 24 Jul 58, and No. 1955, 31 Jul 58. Chapter 9 describes the development

and approval of NSC 5808/1. r

43. Memo, ActgExecSecy, NSC to NSC, "Factors Affecting US Policy toward the Near East "119

Aug 58, CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec. 8.

44. NSC Action No. 1973, 21 Aug 58. NSC 5820,3 Oct 58, CCS 381 (8-23-57) BP pt 1

45. See chap. 9, pp. 143-144.

46. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "US Policy Toward the Near East (NSC 5820)," 13 Oct 58 JCS 1887/506-

Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC, 14 Oct 58; CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec 10

47. NSC 5820/1,4 Nov 58, CCS 381 (8-23-57) BP.

48. OCB, "Report on the Near East (NSC 5820/1)," 3 Feb 60, JMF 9180/9105 (3 Feb 60)

49. NSC 6011,17 Jun 60; JCSM-275-60 to SecDef, 5 Jul 60, JCS 1887/594; Memo, ExecSecv, NSC to

NSC, 19 Jul 60; JMF 9180/9105 (17 Jun 60). y

Chapter 11. What Role for CENTO?

1. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "US Adherence to the Baghdad Pact," 23 Mar 56, JCS 1887/156 U CCS

381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec. 28. Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 23 Apr 56, JCS 1887/197, TS, same file sec 35

2. JCS 1887/356,14 May 57, U, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec. 58 ' '

3. JCS 1887/470,18 Jul 58, U, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec. 71. JCS 2273/47 21 Ian 58 TS CCS

381 (8-14-47) sec. 8. ' '

4. Dec On JCS 2268/6, 23 Oct 57, TS, CCS 381 (8-14-57) sec. 5. JCS 2273/44, 3 Dec 57, TS same

file, sec. 7.

5. JSCP 56-58,17 Dec 56, JCS 1844/210, TS, CCS 381 (11-29-49) BP pt. 16D. Dec On JCS 1844/238

9 Dec 57, TS, same file, BP pt. 22. '

6. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Supplemental Guidance for DOD Representative " 6 Ian 58 ICS

2273/46, TS; JCS 2273/47, 21 Jan 58, TS, CCS 381 (8-14-57) sec. 8 ""

7. Msg, USEBP to OSD and JCS, 11 Jun 58, DA IN 123873, CCS 381 (8-14-57) sec. 8.

8. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "US Military Representative in the Middle East" 19 Serj 57 ICS

1887/391, TS, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec. 65 P'

9. N/H of JCS 1887/450,13 Jun 58, U, CCS 381 EMMEA (11-19-47) sec. 69.

10. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Integrated Military Command Structure for the Baghdad Pact" 23

May 58, JCS 2273/76, U, CCS 381 (8-14-57) sec. 12.

11. Memo, DepUSecState to ASD(ISA), 3 Jun 58, TS; Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 4 Jun 58 TS- N/H

ofJCS 2273/80, 6 Jun 58, TS, CCS 381 (8-14-57) sec. 12. '

12. JCS 1887/454, 6 May 58, TS, CCS 81 (8-14-57) sec. 13. JCS 2273/72, 1 May 58, TS, same file

sec. 11.

13. DOS Bulletin, 18 Aug 58, pp. 272-273. Msg, London SECTO 18 to SecState, 29 Jul 58, DA IN

726527, U, CCS 381 (8-14-57) sec. 13. JCS 2273/85, 15 Aug 58, TS; JCS 2273/86, 3 Sep 58, TS; N/H of

JCS 2273/86,27 Oct 58, TS; same file, sec. 14. P'

X3

'

JN/not

14. SM-779-58 to Chm, JMEPG, 14 Oct 58, U; Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Baghdad Pact Command

System," 13 Oct 58, JCS 2273/91, TS, CCS 381 (8-14-57) sec. 16.

15. Dec On JCS 2273/94, 8 Oct 58, TS; N/ H ofJCS 2273/94,4 Nov 58, TS, CCS 381 (8-14-57) sec 15

16. NSC 5820/1,4 Nov 58, JCS 1887/511, TS, CCS 381 (8-23-57) sec. 11 and BP. CM-229-58 to TCs'

18 Nov 58, JCS 2273/100, TS, CCS 381 (8-14-57) sec. 16. '

17. CM-253-58 to SecDef, 23 Dec 58, JCS 2273/105, S; N/H of JCS 2273/105, 9 Jan 59, S- CCS 381

(8-14-57) sec. 17.

18. JCSM-20-59 to SecDef, 15 Jan 59, JCS 2273/113, TS, JMF 9070 (15 Jan 59).

254
Notes to Pages 172-182

19. N/H of JCS 2273/113,3 Mar 59, TS, JMF 9070 (15 Jan 59).

20. Msg, Ankara 788 to SecState, 11 Jun 59, S; Airgram, Tehran to SecState, 2 Jul 59, S;

JCSM-331-59 to SecDef, 13 Aug 59, JCS 2273/191, TS; N/Hs of JCS 2273/191, 3 Sep, 10 Sep, and 7 Oct

59, U; JMF 9070 (29 Jul 59).

21. JCSM-207-59 to SecDef, 2 Jun 59, JCS 2273/155, TS, JMF 9050/5410 (20 Jan 59). JCSM-411-59

to SecDef, 2 Oct 59, JCS 2273/205, S, JMF 9070/5410 (1 Oct 59).

22. JCSM-331-59 to SecDef, 13 Aug 59, JCS 2273/191, TS; 5th N/H of JCS 2273/191, 28 Oct 59, TS;

JMF 9070 (29 Jul 59).

23. Msg, JCS 971547 to Chief, US Element, CENTO, 27 Jan 60, JCS 2273/227, TS, JMF 9070/3071

(30 Apr 59).

24. JCSM-110-60 to SecDef, 18 Mar 60, JCS 2273/234, U; Msg, SecState 24670 to Ankara, 24 Mar

60, S; 2nd N/H of JCS 2273/234,28 Mar 60, U; JMF 9070/5000 (5 Mar 60).

25. Msg, JCS 983100 to CHUSELM CENTO, 20 Sep 60, JCS 2273/275, TS, JMF 9070/3071 (15 Jun 60).

JCS 2273/205,1 Oct 59, S, JMF 9070/5410 (1 Oct 59). JCS 2273/191,6 Aug 59, TS, JMF 9070 (29 Jul 59).

26. Msg, CHUSELM CENTO to JCS, DA IN 65819,12 Dec 60, S, JMF 9070/5000 (24 Aug 60).

27. JCSM-449-60 to SecDef, 10 Oct 60, JCS 2273/276, S; N/H of JCS 2273/276, 3 Nov 60, S, JMF

9070/5000 (12 Aug 60).

Chapter 12. Cuba Becomes a Communist State

1. Rpt by House Foreign Affairs Com, US Overseas Loans and Grants: July 1,1965-June 30,1966, p.

35. JCS 2099/765,24 Jan 58, S, CCS 092 (8-22^6) (2) BP pt. 21.

2. JCS 2099/765, 24 Jun 58, S, CCS 092 (8-22-46) (2) BP pt 21. DOD Instruction S-2110,15 Jul 58, S,

same file, BP pt. 22. Msg, Havana 846 to State, 15 Jun 58, CCS 381 Western Hemisphere (3-22-48) sec. 38.

3. Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 6, p. 60.

4. JCS 1976/243, 22 Apr 58, U; N/H of JCS 1976/243, 27 May 58, U; CCS 381 Western Hemisphere

(3-22-48) sec. 37. CSAFM-132-58 to JCS, 29 Apr 58, U, same file, sec. 38.

5. Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 6, pp. 106-107, pp. 117-119. JCS 1976/249, 20 Jun 58, U, CCS

381 Western Hemisphere (3-22-48) sec. 38.

6. JCS 1976/251, 10 Jul 58, U; Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Cuba," 11 Jul 58, JCS 1976/251, U, CCS 381

Western Hemisphere (3-22-48) sec. 38. Printed in Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 6, pp. 140,145. On

12 July, the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, concluded that failure to win the hostages'

release was "unspectacularly but seriously eroding our national prestige not only in Latin America

but also in other areas of the world." Ibid., p. 148.

7. Mutual Security Act of 1958, chap. 1, sec. 105 (4). DOD Instruction S-2110.21,15 Jul 58, CCS 092

(8-22-46) (2) BPpt. 22.

8. According to documents cited in Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 6, pp. 249-250, the November election occurred in an atmosphere of intimidation created by both Batista and Castro and only a

small part of the electorate went to the polls.

9. Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 6, pp. 159, 278-279. JCS 1976/259, 9 Dec 58, U, CCS 381 Western Hemisphere (3-22-48) sec. 39.

10. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Status of Relations with Cuba," 30 Dec 58, JCS 1976/259, U, CCS 381

Western Hemisphere (3-22-48) sec. 39. Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 6, p. 326.

11. Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 6, pp. 656-658,732-733.

12. "Should Castro fall or be assassinated," according to the study, "mob action... would probably. .. jeopardize the safety of Americans in Cuba."

13. Msg, JCS 968022 to CINCLANT, 6 Nov 59, JCS 2304, TS, JMF 9123/3100 (4 Nov 59). NY Times,

14 Feb 60, p. 1. Memo, CNO to JCS, 19 Feb 60, JCS 2304/2, U, JMF 9123/9105 (19 Feb 60).

14. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "US Action in Cuba," 2 Mar 60, JCS 2304/2, U, JMF 9123/9105 (19 Feb

60). Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 6, pp. 813-814,822.

15. Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 6, pp. 832-845. On 22 March, a new NIE dated 22 March concluded that Castro and his government were not, and would not soon become, "demonstrably under

the domination or control of the international Communist movement." Ibid., p. 871. N/H of JCS

2304/2,23 Mar 60, U, JMF 9123/9105 (19 Feb 60).

16. Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 6, pp. 850-851,861-863.

17. Ibid., pp. 979-982,996.

18. Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 6, pp. 1074,1076-77. JCSM-442-60 to SecDef, 29 Sep 60, JCS

2304/9, U, JMF 9123/9420 (22 Sep 60). The Guantanamo base agreement of 1903 had been amended

and reaffirmed through a 1934 treaty which stipulated that changes could be made only by mutual

consent. Thus, in effect, the United States held a lease in perpetuity.

255
Notes to Pages 182-190

19. Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 6, pp. 1078-1080. On 4 October, Gates told Secretary Herter

that he had reaffirmed to the JCS instructions that Guantanamo be held against all forms of harassment, including armed attack. Ibid, pp. 1080,1087. N/H of JCS 2304/9, 7 Oct 60, U, JMF 9123/4920 (22

Sep 60).

20. Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 6, pp. 1126,1175.

Chapter 13. The Cold War Comes to Africa

1. NSC 5719, 31 Jul 57, S, CCS 092 Africa (4-20-50) sec. 5. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "US Policy

Toward Africa South of the Sahara...," 16 Aug 57, C; NSC 5719/1, 23 Aug 57, U, same file, sec. 6. The

Memo of Discussion of the NSC meeting on 22 August as well as NSC 5719/1 are printed in Foreign

Relations of the United States: 1955-1957, vol. 13 (1989), pp. 71-87.

2. Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC, 29 Jul 58, with proposed revisions of NSC 5719/1, S, CCS 092

Africa (4-20-50) sec. 7.

3. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "US Policy Toward Africa...," 1 Aug 58, JCS 2121/27, U; Memo,

DepASD(ISA) to ExecSecy, NSC, 5 Aug 58, U; CCS 092 Africa (4-20-50) sec. 7.

4. Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC, 12 Aug 58, JCS 2121/29, U; Memo, JCS to SecDef, "US Policy

Toward Africa...," 20 Aug 58, JCS 2121/30, U; NSC 5818, 26 Aug 58, U, CCS 092 Africa (4-20-50) sec.

8. Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 14 (1992), pp. 21, 23-38.

5. The area covered consisted of that part of Africa lying south of the northern borders of the Belgian Congo, Uganda, and Kenya but excluding the Malagasy Republic (Madagascar).

6. OCB Report on Africa South of Sahara, 30 Sep 59, U, JMF 9110/9105 (30 Sep 59). NSC 5920, 31

Dec 59, U; JCSM-15-60 to SecDef, 8 Jan 60, JCS 2121/58, U; JMF 9110/9105 (31 Dec 59). NSC 6001, 19

Jan 60, U; Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS et al., 2 Feb 60, JCS 2121/60, U; JMF 9110/9105 (19 Jan 60). NSC

6001 is printed in Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 14, pp. 79-86.

7. West Africa was defined as the area bounded on the north by the Spanish Sahara, Algeria, and

Libya; on the south by the Belgian Congo; on the east by the Sudan (but including the Malagasy

Republic); and on the west by the Atlantic Ocean. NSC 6005, 29 Feb 60, U; JCSM-94-60 to SecDef, 14

Mar 60, JCS 2121/62, U; NSC 6005/1, 9 Apr 60; JMF 9110/9105 (29 Feb 60). NSC 6005/1 is printed in

Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 14, pp. 117-126.

8. Ltr, DepUSecState to Asst to SecDef (Special Operations (SO)), 24 Jun 60, S; Memo, Asst to

SecDef (SO) to DepSecDef, n.d. (written between 14 and 27 Jul 60), S; JMF 9110/9105 (21 Jun 60).

9. JCS 2121/74, 30 Aug 60, S; JCS 2121/75, 6 Sep 60, U; JMF 9110/9108 (15 Aug 60).

10. CSAM-322-60 to JCS, 13 Sep 60, S; CSAFM-454-60 to JCS, 23 Sep 60, S; Note to Control Div.,

"JCS 2121/75-Proposed Naval Task Force," 28 Sep 60, U; JMF 9110/9108 (15 Aug 60). CINCLANT Historical Report ofHeadquarters Operations: 1960, p. Ill—6, U.

11. NSC Action No. 2219(b), 14 Apr 60, U. Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC, 12 Jul 60, JCS 2121/68,

U, JMF 9110/9105 (12 Jul 60).

12. JCSM-327-60 to SecDef, 28 Jul 60, JCS 2121/69, U, JMF 9110/9105 (12 Jul 60).

13. Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC, 10 Aug 60, JCS 2121/72, S; JCS 2121/72, 11 Aug 60, S; Memo,

ActgExecSecy, NSC to NSC, 16 Aug 60, S; JMF 9110/9105 (12 Jul 60). 1st N/H of JCS 2121/76, 3 Nov 60,

S, JMF 9110/9105 (23 Sep 60). Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 14, pp. 147-159. The JCS recommended

a number of specific measures to increase US influence. See CSAFM-524-60 to JCS, 14 Nov 60, S, JMF

9110/9105 (29 Feb 60) and pertinent papers of the JCS 2121 series in JMF 9110/9105 (23 Sep 60).

14. The capital of Leopoldville has been renamed Kinshasa; Katanga province is now Shaba.

15. J2DM-258-60 to DJS, 8 Jul 60, U, JMF 9111/9108 (8 Jul 60) sec. 1. Entries for 8, 9, and 12 Jul 60,

U, Joint War Room Congo Log. Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency (JIOA) Sitrep No. 6, 12 Jul 60,

JIOA File, Evacuation Situation in the Congo, U. CAPT E. G. Gardner, USN, JIOA, J-2, 20 Mar 61, and

COL R. E. Tiede, USAF, J-3, 7 Mar and 16 May 61 interviewed by Dr. Byron Fairchild. CINCLANT Op

Order 39-60, 8 Jul 60, JIOA File, Evacuation Situation in the Congo. The Joint War Room was the forerunner of the National Military Command Center.

16. JCS 2262/20,12 Jul 60, U, JMF 9111/9108 (8 Jul 60) sec. 1.

17. JIOA Sitrep No. 2, 8 Jul 60, JIOA File, Evacuation Situation in the Congo. Entry for 12 Jul 60,

JWR Congo Log. JCS 2262/21,13 Jul 60, TS, JMF 9111/9108 (8 Jul 60) sec. 1.

18. Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 14, pp. 295-296. SM-672-60 to JCS, 12 Jul 60, TS; JCSM-295-60 to

SecDef, 12 Jul 60, JCS 2262/22, TS; 1st N/H ofJCS 2262/22,14 Jul 60, TS, JMF 9111/9108 (8 Jul 60) sec. 1.

19. Entries for 12 and 13 Jul 60, U, JWR Congo Log.

20. JCSM-301-60 to SecDef, 13 Jul 60, JCS 2262/24, TS, JMF 9111/9108 (8 Jul 60) sec. 1.

21. Ends 1 & 2 to JWR Sitrep 7-60, 22 Jul 60, U; End 4 to JWR Sitrep 8-60, 22 Jul 60, U; JMF

9111/9108 (8 Jul 60) sec 1. DOS Bulletin, 8 Aug 60, p. 223. Entries for 16 and 19 Jul 60, JWR Congo Log.

JWR Sitreps 2-60,17 Jul 60; 3-60,18 Jul 60; 4-60,19 Jul 60; 6-60, 21 Jul 60; 7-60, 22 Jul 60; 10-60, 25 Jul

256
Notes to Pages 190-197

60; 11-60, 26 Jul 60; JMF 9111/9108 (15 Jul 60) sec. 1. The pork content of "C" rations would make

them unsuitable for Moslem troops, but USCINCEUR protested that removal would require 35,000

man-hours. Because of pressing need, the UNEF decided to separate pork contents after delivery.

Msg, JCS 980155 to CSAF, 16 Jul 60, U; Memo, Dir, J-3 to DJS, "EUCOM Air Lift Status," 19 Jul 60, U;

Note by SJCS, "Decision on Deployment of C-124 Aircraft," 19 Jul 60, U; Msg, JCS 501784 to CSAF

and USCINCEUR, 19 Jul 60, U; JMF 9111/9108 (8 Jul 60) sec. 1.

22. Madeleine G. Kalb, The Congo Cables (1982), p. 29.

23. DOS Bulletin, 8 Aug 60, pp. 221-223. On 21 July, to speed the Belgian exodus, Ambassador

Timberlake and the USCINCEUR representative in the Congo agreed that US aircraft would move

troops to the port of Kitona. The J-3 Battle Staff postponed any movement, citing lack of authorization

for intra-Congo troop airlifts. State granted such authority next morning, but by then US representatives had worked out an arrangement with Belgium's Sabena Airlines. Entries for 21 (1025,1255,1310,

1645,1935, and 2045) and 22 Jul 60, JWR Congo Log. JWR Sitrep 8-60, 23 Jul 60, U, JMF 9111/9108 (15

Jul 60) sec. 1.

24. JCSM-321-60 to SecDef, 22 Jul 60, JCS 2262/25, U; Memo, ActgDir, Off of NSC Affairs,

OASD(ISA) to SecState, 23 Jul 60, S; J-5 Bfg Sheet for CJCS, 22 Jul 60, S; JMF 9111/9108 (8 Jul 60) sec. 2.

Kalb, The Congo Cables, p. 38. NSC Action No. 2276,1 Aug 60, approved by the President, 12 Aug 60.

Note to Control Div., "Congo Situation," 5 Aug 60, S; SM-759-60 to Dir, J-5, 5 Aug 60, C; same file.

Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 14, pp. 338-342, 346-349, 372-375. There was some evidence of Chinese activity, which presumably explains why the JCS referred to "the Sino-Soviet bloc."

25. The fleet consisted of forty-seven C-130s and sixty-eight C-124s, and included EUCOM's

entire complement of C-130s. Entry for 8 Aug 60 (1417), JWR Congo Log.

26. JWR Sitrep 8-60, 23 Jul 60; JWR Sitreps 10-60, 25 Jul 60, and 12-60, 27 Jul 60; JMF 9111/9108

(15 Jul 60) sec. 1.

27. 2nd N/H of JCS 2262/29, 8 Aug 60, U, JMF 9111/9108 (8 Jul 60) sec. 2. Entries for 8 Aug 60

(1725 and 2140), 11 Aug 60 (1205 and 1215), and 13 Aug 60 (1100), and Att MFR, "Functions of DA/F

and JCS in Supporting UN Activities in Congo," n.d., JWR Congo Log. HQ USAF Ltr, "Procedures for

DOD Assistance Provided in Support of UN Activities Associated with the Republic of the Congo," 5

Oct 60, U. COL R. E. Tiede, USAF, J-3 (JWR), 16 May 61, interviewed by Dr. Byron Fairchild.

28. Kalb, The Congo Cables, pp. 53-54. Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 14, pp. 421^24.

29. JCS 2262/32,9 Aug 60, U, JMF 9111/9105 (6 Aug 60).

30. CSAM-286-60 to JCS, 15 Aug 60, U; JCSM-363-60 to SecDef, 18 Aug 60, JCS 2262/32, U; JMF

9111/9105 (6 Aug 60). JCSM-363 is printed in Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 14, pp. 425-427.

31. Ltr, ActgSecState to DepSecDef, 16 Sep 60, JCS 2262/45, S, JMF 9111/9105 (6 Aug 60).

32. Ltr, ASD(ISA) to USecState, 23 Sep 60, JCS 2262/45, U, JMF 9111/9105 (6 Aug 60).

33. ACDA, United Nations Peacekeeping in the Congo: 1960-1964 (1966) vol. 3, app. 0-3. Kalb, The

Congo Cables, pp. 60-90. On 25 August, an NSC Special Group concluded that Lumumba's removal

from high office "must be an urgent and prime objective and that under existing conditions this

should be a high priority of our covert action." Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 14, p. 443.

34. JCS 2262/36,20 Aug 60, TS, JMF 9111/9108 (8 Jul 60) sec. 3.

35. JCS 2262/43, 8 Sep 60, TS, JMF 9111/9108 (8 Jul 60) sec. 5.

36. CSAM-345-60 to JCS, 23 Sep 60, TS; Memo, CNO to JCS, 23 Sep 60, TS; CMCM-40-60 to JCS,

22 Sep 60, TS; JCSM-425-60 to SecDef, 24 Sep 60, JCS 2262/36, TS, JMF 9111/9108 (8 Jul 60) sec. 5.

37. JCS 2262/47, 30 Sep 60, U; JCS 2262/48, 4 Oct 60, TS; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 6 Oct 60, JCS

2262/49, U; CSAM-368-60 to JCS, S; CM-19-60 to SecDef, 29 Oct 60, JCS 2262/53, TS; JMF 9111/9108

(8 Jul 60) sec. 5.

38. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 21 Nov 60, JCS 2262/56, U, JMF 9111/9108 (8 Jul 60) sec. 7.

39. JCS 2262/59, 6 Dec 60, U; CSAFM-563-60 to JCS, 8 Dec 60, U; Note by SJCS, "Decision on JCS

2262/59 and /60," 9 Dec 60, U; JCS 2262/61,12 Dec 60, U; Note to Control Div., "JCS 2262/61," 21 Dec

60, U; 1st N/ H of JCS 2262/56,29 Dec 60, U; JMF 9111/9108 (8 Jul 60) sec. 7.

40. Dec On JCS 2262/60, 12 Dec 60, U, JMF 9111/9108 (8 Jul 60) sec. 7. Msg, JCS 988107 to CINCLANT, 4 Jan 61, U, JMF 5162 (30 Dec 60) sec. 1.

41. See "An Interim Report of the Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations with

Respect to Intelligence Activities, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders," 1975, 94th

Cong., 1st sess. Much of this material is presented in Kalb, The Congo Cables. President Eisenhower's

remark, made on 1 August 1960, appears in Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 14, p. 377.

Chapter 14. The Far East: Holding the Line

1. NSC 5429/5, 22 Dec 54, U, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) sec. 90. Printed in Foreign Relations:

1952-1954, vol. 12 (1984), pp. 1062-1072.

257
Notes to Pages 198-203

2. JSCP 56-58, 21 Dec 56, JCS 1844/210, TS, CCS 381 (11-29-49) BP pt. 16D. The tasks assigned to

CINCPAC included most of those formerly allotted to the Commander in Chief, Far East, a post that

was disestablished on 1 July 1957.

3. NSC 162/2,19 Oct 53, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) sec. 30. Printed in Foreign Relations: 1952-1954, vol.

2 (1984), pp. 577-597. Memo, SpecAsst for NSC Affairs to CJCS, 24 Jun 57, TS, CCS 381 (4-11-57) sec. 1.

4. JCS 1776/563,11 Oct 56, U, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45)(2) sec. 3. NSC Action No. 1624, 26 Oct

56, TS.

5. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "US Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea," 11 Oct 56, JCS

1776/563, U, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19^5)(2) sec. 9. According to JCS estimates, North Korean armed

forces included eighteen infantry divisions and 625 aircraft, including 310 jets. Memo, JCS to SecDef,

same subj, 4 Jan 57, JCS 1776/566, U, same file, sec. 10. DOS Bulletin, 3 Aug 53, pp. 132-139.

6. NSC 5702, 14 Jan 57, TS, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45)(2) sec. 10. Printed in Foreign Relations:

1955-1957, vol. 22, pt. 2, pp. 374-384.

7. Memo, SpecAsst for NSC Affairs (LGEN F. W. Farrell, USA) to CJCS, "Evaluation of Alternative Military Programs for Korea-NSC 5702," 30 Jan 57, TS, CJCS File "NSC 5702 Korea."

8. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Evaluation of Alternative Military Programs for Korea-NSC 5702," 24

Jan 57, JCS 1776/568, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45)(2) sec. 10. Printed in Foreign Relations: 1955-1957,

vol. 22, pt. 2, pp. 389-390. Memo, JCS to SecDef, "Storage Problems in Certain Overseas Areas," 6 Feb

57, JCS 2019/212, TS; N/H of JCS 2019/212, 21 Mar 57, TS; CCS 471.6 (8-15-45) sec. 89. Memo, SecDef

to CJCS, 19 Jun 57, JCS 2019/227, 20 Jun 57, same file, sec. 95.

9. Foreign Relations: 1955-1957, vol. 22, pt. 2, pp. 392^102.

10. N/H of JCS 1776/568, 21 Feb 57, U, CCS 381.23 Korea (3-19-45)(2) sec. 10.

11. NSC 5702/1, 18 Mar 57, TS, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45)(2) sec. 12. Memo, JCS to SecDef,

"Communist Violations of Paragraph 13d...," 1 Mar 57, JCS 1776/571, U, same file, sec. 11. Memo, JCS

to SecDef, "US Policy Toward Korea (NSC 5702/1)," 29 Mar 57, JCS 1776/573, U, same file, sec. 12.

12. Foreign Relations: 1955-1957, vol. 22, pt. 2, pp. 420-427. Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC, "US

Policy Toward Korea," 10 Jun 57, TS; Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj., 12 Jun 57, JCS 1776/574, U,

CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45)(2) sec. 12.

13. Foreign Relations: 1955-1957, vol. 22, pt. 2, pp. 443-454. Memo, SecDef to CJCS et al., 19 Jun 57,

JCS 1776/575, TS, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45)(2) sec. 12.

14. DOS Bulletin, 8 Jul 57, pp. 58-59. Foreign Relations: 1955-1957, vol. 22, pt. 2, pp. A59-462.

15. Foreign Relations: 1955-1957, vol. 22, pt. 2, pp. 415-416, 467-468, 480-498. Memo, ExecSecy,

NSC to NSC, 5 Aug 57, JCS 1776/581, TS; Memo, JCS to SecDef, 6 Aug 57, JCS 1776/582, TS; CCS

383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec. 14.

16. Msg, CINCUNC to DA, 6 Nov 57, DA IN 68972, S; N/H of JCS 1776/583, 16 Aug 57, TS; CCS

383.21 Korea (3-19-45)(2) sec. 14. Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 17 Jan 58, JCS 2019/277, TS; Ltr, ASD (ISA)

to AsstSecState, 21 Jan 58, JCS 2019/279; CCS 471.6 (8-15^5) sec. 108. Foreign Relations: 1958-1960,

vol. 18, pp. 431-432, 452-455, 468^71, 505-507. The value of grant military assistance deliveries to

South Korea declined from $331.1 million in FY 1958 to $190.5 million in FY 1959. Rpt House Foreign

Affairs Com, US Overseas Loans and Grants: July 1,1945 to June 30,1966, 89th Cong., 2d sess (1966), p.

66.

17. NSC 5817, 11 Aug 58, TS; Memo, JCS to SecDef, 29 Jul 58, JCS 1776/590, U; CCS 383.21 Korea

(3-19-45)(2) sec. 16. Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC, 17 Jun 59, JCS 1776/605, TS; JCSM-242-59 to

SecDef, 22 Jun 59, JCS 1776/606, TS; NSC 5907, 1 Jul 59, TS; JMF 9144/9105 (17 Jun 59). Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 18, pp. 474-476, 480-489, 559-579.

18. Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs: 1960 (1961), pp. 263-265. NY Times, 18

Jul 60, p. 1.

19. Foreign Relations: 1955-1957, vol. 23, pt. 1, (1991), p. 355.

20. NSC 5516/1, 9 Apr 55, U, CCS 092 Japan (12-12-50) BP pt. 2. Printed in Foreign Relations:

1955-1957, vol. 23, pt. 1, pp. 52-62.

21. OCB, "Progress Report on 'US Policy Toward Japan' (NSC 5516/1)," 6 Feb 57, TS, CCS 092

Japan (12-12-50) BPpt. 2.

22. DOS Bulletin, 17 Sep 51, pp. 464-465. Msgs, Tokyo 2304 and 2306 to SecState, 13 Apr 57, U;

Msg, CINCFE to DA, 21 May 57, DA IN 22719, TS; Msg, Tokyo 2336 to SecState, 17 Apr 57, U; CCS 092

Japan (12-12-50) sec. 23. Foreign Relations: 1955-1957, vol. 23, pp. 277-279.

23. SM-188-57 to GEN Everest et al., 11 Jun 57, U, CCS 092 Japan (12-12-50) sec. 23A.

24. Memo, JCS to SecDef, 11 Jun 57, JCS 2180/97, U, CCS 092 Japan (12-12-50) sec. 23A.

25. KIV 3/1, "Security and Defense," 15 Jun 57, S, CCS 092 Japan (12-12-50) BP pt. 3.

26. Memo, DASD(ISA) to CJCS, 31 May 57, JCS 2180/94, S, CCS 092 Japan (12-12-50) sec. 23.

Memo, JCS to SecDef, 13 Jun 57, JCS 2180/95, U, same file, sec. 23A. The JCS maintained that allowing

258
Notes to Pages 204-210

former residents to return to the Bonin Islands would "largely negate" their potential usefulness. Foreign Relations: 1955-1957, vol. 23, p. 376.

27. Foreign Relations: 1955-1957, vol. 23, pp. 343-346. MFR by Chief, Histories Branch, JCS Hist

Div., "Information from AFPC Files," 21 Oct 66. AFPC Advice of Action, "Reduction of US Military

Forces Stationed in Japan," 19 Jun 57, TS; AFPC Advice of Action, 20 Jun 57, JCS 2180/99, TS;

DM-196-57 to JCS, 17 Jun 57, TS; DM-197-57 to JCS, 18 Jun 57, TS; CCS 092 Japan (12-12-50) sec. 23A.

28. Memo of Conv, "Meeting at State Thursday, 20 June 1957, Discussion of Over-all US-Japanese

Political, Military, and Economic Relations," 21 Jun 57, S, CCS 092 Japan (12-12-50) sec. 24. Foreign

Relations: 1955-1957, vol. 23, p. 404. Major meetings during Kishi's visit are documented in ibid., pp.

369-415.

29. DOS Bulletin, 8 Jul 57, pp. 51-53.

30. Memo, JCS to SecDef, 10 Jul 57, JCS 2180/101, U; Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 15 Jul 57, JCS

2180/102, TS; CCS 092 Japan (12-12-50) sec. 24. Memo, JCS to SecDef, 2 Aug 57, JCS 2180/103, TS;

SM-564-57 to CSA et al., 2 Aug 57, JCS 2180/103, TS; same file, sec. 25. One regiment of the 3d Marine

Division was stationed in Japan; it now joined the rest of the division on Okinawa. The 1st Marine

Aircraft Wing, also in Japan, could not move to Okinawa until facilities became available during the

latter part of 1960. NY Times, 22 Jun 57, p. 4. JCSM-64-59 to SecDef, 20 Feb 59, JCS 2180/129, TS, JMF

9143/3400 (20 Feb 59).

31. OCB, "Report on Japan (NSC 5516/1)," 23 Jul 58, CCS 092 Japan (12-12-50) sec. 27. MFR by

CAPT T. F. Howe, USN, 29 Jan 60, JCS 2180/147, S, JMF 9143/9010 (20 Feb 59). This MFR traces the

changes in JCS, OSD, and State positions taken in the period leading to the signing of a new security

treaty. The account hereafter often relies on this source without citing it.

32. Memo, DepSecDef to CJCS, 8 Aug 58, JCS 2180/118, S, CCS 092 Japan (12-12-50) sec. 27.

Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 8 Sep 58, JCS 2180/121, S; CM-171-58 to SecDef, 9 Sep 58, JCS 2180/121, S;

same file, sec. 28. The Administrative Agreement covered use of facilities, sharing of costs, jurisdiction

over US personnel, and methods of consultation necessary for US forces to carry out their security

mission. For its text, see DOS Bulletin, 10 Mar 52, pp. 382-392.

33. Memo, JCS to SecDef, 10 Sep 58, JCS 2180/120, U, CCS 092 Japan (12-12-50) sec. 28.

34. Memo, JCS to SecDef, 23 Sep 58, JCS 2180/124, S, CCS 092 Japan (12-12-50) sec. 28.

35. N/H of JCS 2180/124, 2 Oct 58, S, CCS 092 Japan (12-12-50) sec. 28. Msg, SecState 474 to

Tokyo, 29 Sep 58, S.

36. JCSM-188-59 to SecDef, 15 May 59, JCS 2180/134, U; Agreement Under Article VI of the

Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, 19 Jan 60, U; JMF 9143/9010 (20 Feb 59).

37. Memo, JCS to SecDef, 1 Dec 58, JCS 2180/127, U; Ltr, ASD(ISA) to AsstSecState, 24 Dec 58, S;

CCS 092 Japan (12-12-50) sec. 29.

38. JCSM-176-59 to SecDef, 9 May 59, JCS 2180/133, U; JCSM-189-59 to SecDef, 15 May 59, JCS

2180/135, C; JMF 9143/9010 (20 Feb 59) Gp. 1. JCSM-233-59 to SecDef, 17 Jun 59, JCS 2180/137, C,

same file, sec. 2. DOS Bulletin, 8 Feb 60, pp. 179-181. Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 180543Z Jan 60, C; Msg,

JCS 971104 to CINCPAC, 18 Jan 60, C, JMF 9143/9010 (20 Feb 59).

39. DOS Bulletin, 8 Feb 60, pp. 183-201. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs: 1960, pp.

270-271.

40. NSC Actions No. 2072, 30 Apr 59, and 2219, 15 Apr 60, TS. NSC 6008, 20 May 60, TS; NSC

6008/1, 11 Jun 60, TS; JCSM-226-60 to SecDef, 27 May 60, JCS 2180/149, C; 1st N/H of JCS 2180/150,

28 Jun 60, S; JMF 9143/9105 (20 May 60).

41. NSC 5503, 14 Jan 55, U, CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) sec. 17. Printed in Foreign Relations:

1955-1957, vol. 2 (1986), pp. 30-34. DOS Bulletin, 7 Feb 55, p. 213. The JCS role in the Taiwan Straits

confrontation of 1955 is described in Kenneth W. Condit, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy:

1955-1956 (1992), chap. 11.

42. NSC Action No. 1624, 26 Oct 56, U. NIE 43-2-57,27 Aug 57, U, CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) BP

pt. 5. Printed in Foreign Relations: 1955-1957, vol. 3, pp. 585-593.

43. Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC, 9 Sep 57, JCS 1966/122, U; Memo, JCS to SecDef, 17 Sep 57, JCS

1966/123, U; CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) sec. 34. Printed in Foreign Relations: 1955-1957, vol. 3, pp.

593-599.

44. Foreign Relations: 1955-1957, vol. 3, pp. 611-623. For a list of Nationalist offensive actions that

did and did not require US endorsement, see ibid., pp. 645-648.

45. Msg, CNO to CINCPAC, 021947Z Aug 58, S; Msg, State 81 to Taipei, 2 Aug 58, S; CCS 381

Formosa (11-8-48) sec. 37.

46. Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 19 (1996), pp. 56-60. DOS Bulletin, 8 Sep 58, p. 379.

47. Msg, Taipei 212 to SecState, 23 Aug 58, TS; Msg, JCS 947007 to CINCPAC, 24 Aug 58, TS; Msg,

JCS 247006 to CINCAL et al., 24 Aug 58, TS; CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) sec. 37.

259
Notes to Pages 210-219

48. The "principal" offshore islands were defined as Quemoy, Little Quemoy, and the five larger islands of the Matsu group. Msg, SecState 138 to Taipei, 25 Aug 58, TS, CCS 381 Formosa

(11-8-48) sec. 37.

49. Msg, JCS 947046 to CINCPAC and COMTAIWANDEFCOM, 25 Aug 58, TS; Msg, CINCPAC

to JCS, 260843Z Aug 58, TS, CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) sec. 37. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, pp. 295,

691-693. The JCS also advised CINCPAC that augmentations to the Military Assistance Program

authorized on 22 August would be implemented immediately. Overall, the value of grant military

assistance deliveries rose from $162.2 million in FY 1958 to $239.5 million in FY 1959, then fell back to

$139.9 million in FY 1960. Rpt by House Foreign Affairs Com, US Overseas Loans and Grants: July 3,

1945 to June 30,1960, p. 61.

50. "Memo of Conf with the President in the Shelter-August 25,1958" by BG Goodpaster, 29 Aug

58, U, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower Diary, Aug 58-Staff Notes (1), Eisenhower Library. Sm-599-58

to CJCS et al„ 25 Aug 58, TS, CCS 381 (11-8-48) sec. 37.

51. "Memo of Conf with the President, August 29,1958, 9:00 AM" by BG Goodpaster, 29 Aug 58,

Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower Diary, Aug 58-Staff Notes (1), U, Eisenhower Library. Msg, JCS

947298 to CINCPAC and COMTAIWANDEFCOM, 29 Aug 58, TS; CSAFM-258-58 to JCS, 3 Sep 85,

TS; CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) sec. 38. On 5 September, CINCPAC submitted a plan for phased conventional defense against limited aggression. The JCS approved it five days later. SM-647-58 to

CINCPAC, 10 Sep 58, TS, CCS 381 (4-16-49) sec. 7. This was Annex H to CINCPAC OPLAN 25-58,16

May 58, TS, same file, BP, pt. 7.

52. Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 19, pp. 108-109,115-122.

53. Memo, JCS to SecDef, 6 Sep 58, JCS 2118/10, U, CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) sec. 38A. Note to

Control Div, "Attached Memorandum... Taiwan Straits Situation," 2 Sep 58, CJCS File 901 China. NY

Times, 7 Sep 58, p. 3.

54. "Memo of Conference with the President, September 6,1958—1:30 Luncheon at the Mansion"

by BG Goodpaster, 8 Sep 58, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower Diary, Staff Notes-Sep 58, Eisenhower

Library. CM-169-58 to SecState, 8 Sep 58, TS, CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) sec. 38A. SM-177-58 to JCS,

15 Sep 58, same file, sec. 39.

55. "Memo of Conference with the President, September 11,1958-3:15 PM" by BG Goodpaster, 15

Sep 58, U, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower Diary, Staff Notes-Sep 58, Eisenhower Library. Public Papers

of the Presidents: Dmight D. Eisenhower: 1958 (1959), pp. 694-700. See also Secretary Dulles' statement of

4 September in DOS Bulletin, 22 Sep 58, pp. 445^46.

56. Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 111245Z Sep 58, TS; Msg, JCS 947931 to COMNAVPHIL for CINCPAC,

12 Sep 58, TS; CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) sec. 39. Concurrently, Gen. Twining stated his feeling that

"the real danger is that the GRC will start some sort of adventure on its own which will have the

effect of drawing the US in." Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 19, p. 197.

57. "Memo of Conference with the President, September 29, 1958, 10:30 AM" by BG Goodpaster,

30 Sep 58, U, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower Diary, Staff Notes-Sep 58, Eisenhower Library.

58. DOS Bulletin, 20 Oct 58, p. 597-604.

59. NY Times, 6 Oct 58, p. 1. Msg, CNO to CINCPAC, 060435Z Oct 58, TS, CCS 381 Formosa

(11-8-48) sec. 40.

60. "Memo of Conference with the President, October 13, 1958, 8:30 AM" by BG Goodpaster, 15

Oct 58, U, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower Diary, Staff Notes—Oct 58, Eisenhower Library.

61. DOS Bulletin, 10 Nov 58, pp. 721-722. JCS 2118/125, 5 Nov 58, U, CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48)

sec. 41. SITREP125,21 Nov 58, TS, CCS 319.1 (7-16-58) sec. 6.

Chapter 15. The Far East: Fissures in Containment

1. DOS Bulletin, 20 Sep 54, pp. 393-395.

2. NSC 5612/1, 5 Sep 56, U, JCS 1992/565, U, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48)(2) sec. 26 and BP pt. 6. Printed in United States-Vietnam Relations: 1945-1967 (1971) bk. 10, pp. 1082-1095. Later revisions were

NSC 5809, 2 Apr 58, JCS 1992/652, same file, and NSC 6012, 25 Jul 60, JCS 1992/831, JMF 9150/9105

(11 Jul 60). They are printed in Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 16, pp. 26-38 and 209-229.

3. NSC 5713/2, 23 Aug 57, JCS 2190/48; Memo, JCS to SecDef, 16 Aug 57, JCS 2190/46, U; CCS 381

(2-18-51) sec. 8. NSC 5713/2 is printed in Foreign Relations: 1955-1957, vol. 21, pp. 365-372. The

ANZUS treaty's text is in DOS Bulletin, 23 Jul 51, pp. 148-149.

4. JSCP 1 Jul 56-30 Jun 58,17 Dec 56, JCS 1844/210, TS, CCS 381 (11-29^9) BP pt. 16D. JSCP 1 Jul

58-30 Jun 59,13 Dec 57, JCS 1844/243, TS, same file, BP pt. 24.

5. See, for example, Memo, JCS to SecDef, 16 Nov 56, JCS 1992/576, TS, CCS 092 Asia

(6-25-48)(2) sec. 27A.

260
Notes to Pages 219-228

6. Minutes of ANZUS Meetings, 11 Oct 54 and 24 Sep 55, S, CCS 381 (2-18-51) sec. 4. Memo, JCS

to SecDef, 15 May 57, JCS 2190/37, TS, same file, sec. 6.

7. JCSM-103-59 to SecDef, 23 Mar 59, JCS 1992/702, U; N/H of JCS 1992/702, 9 Apr 59, U; JMF

9060 (20 Mar 59). JCS 1992/738,4 Sep 59, U; Msg, JCS 965035 to CINCPAC, 9 Sep 59, JCS 1992/738, U;

JMF 9060/3100 (26 Aug 59).

8. Memo, JCS to SecDef, 9 Jan 57, JCS 1992/586, U, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48)(2) sec. 29.

9. Ltr, ASD(ISA) to AsstSecState(FE), 4 Feb 57, JCS 1992/590, U, CCS 092 Asia (6-2S48) sec. 30.

10. Rpt of the Sixth Military Advisers Meeting—Canberra, March 1957, MA6thM, 10 Mar 57,

Summary Rpt, p. 3, and app B, p. 1, U. Printed in Foreign Relations: 1955-1957, vol. 21, pp. 295-304.

11. Rpt of the Ninth Military Advisers Conference, Bangkok, September 1958, MA9thM, Summary Rpt, p. 9, U.

12. JSCP-59 (1 Jul 58-30 Jun 59), 26 Nov 57, JCS 1844/238, TS, CCS 381 (11-29-49) sec. 34 and BP

pt. 22.

13. JCS 1992/691, 2 Feb 59, TS; Msg, JCS 394046 to CINCPAC, 27 Feb 59, U; JMF 3120 (26 Jan 59).

14. JSCP-61,21 Apr 60, JCS 1844/273, TS, JMF 3120 (21 Apr 60).

15. Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 17 (1994), pp. 30-34. Java was Indonesia's most populous

island, containing the capital of Djakarta.

16. Msg, DEF 937808 to CINCPAC, 28 Feb 58, TS, CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48)(2) sec. 34. Memo, JCS to

SecDef, 8 Apr 58, JCS 2190/53, TS; N/H of JCS 2190/53, 20 May 58, TS; OASD(ISA) MFR, "Status

Report on the State Department Review of the ANZUS Military Staff Planners Report No. 4," 4 Jun 58,

TS, CCS 381 (2-18-51) sec. 9.

17. Memo, JCS to SecDef, 8 Apr 58, JCS 1992/651, TS; CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48)(2) sec. 38.

18. See JCS 1992/653, 9 Apr 58, TS; JCS 1992/655,16 Apr 58, TS; CCS 092 Indonesia (4^-58) sec. 1.

19. Memo, JCSM-374-59 to SecDef, 4 Sep 59, JCS 1992/742, U, JMF 9155.2/9108 (3 Sep 59). Printed in Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 16 (1992), pp. 588-589.

20. DOS Memo of Conv, "Meeting on Laos, 4:30 p.m., September 4, 1959," 4 Sep 59, U, JMF

9155.2/5410 (4 Sep 59). Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 16, pp. 592-600. Msg, State 553 to Bangkok, 6

Sep 59, TS, JMF 9060/3100 (13 Sep 59).

21. Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 16, p. 620. Msg, JCS 965642 to CINCPAC, 18 Sep 59, TS, JMF

9060/3100 (13 Sep 59).

22. Ltr, CINCPAC to JCS, 7 May 60, JCS 1992/802, U; Msg, JCS 977269 to CINCPAC, 16 May 60,

JCS 1992/805, U; JMF 9060/3100 (26 Aug 59).

23. Foreign Relations: 1958-1960, vol. 16, pp. 848,1029.

24. JCS 1992/865, 2 Nov 60, U, JMF 9060/3100 (2 Nov 60). Msg, Bangkok 1240 to SecState, 13

Jan 61, S.

25. JCSM-13-61 to SecDef, 14 Jan 61, JCS 1992/894, TS; N/H of JCS 1992/894, 27 Jan 61, TS; JMF

9155.2/9105 (30 Dec 60). On 19 January, Gates sent copies of both memos to his successor, Robert S.

McNamara. Foreign Relations: 1961-1963, vol. 24 (1994), pp. 12-25. Fred I. Greenstein and Richard H.

Immerman, "What Did Eisenhower Tell Kennedy about Indochina?," Journal ofAmerican History, Sep

92, p. 576.

26. Msgs, Bangkok 1287 and 1288 to SecState, 23 Jan 61, C. Msgs, Bangkok 1439 and 1440, 14

Feb 61, S.

27. Msgs, Bangkok to State, SECTOs 17, 25, and 29, dated 27, 28, and 30 Mar 61, S. Msg, SecState

Circular 1489,29 Mar 61, C.

28. Msgs, Bangkok 1925 and 1936, 27 and 28 April 61, TS.

29. Msg, Bangkok 1984 to SecState, 5 May 61, S. Msg, Bangkok 1994 to SecState, 8 May 61, S.

Chapter 16. Conclusion

1. Kinnard, President Eisenhower and Strategy Management, p. 96.

2. SM-1156-59 to JCS, 13 Nov 59, TS, JMF 7000 (13 Nov 59).

3. "Remarks by the CJCS at the AFPC Meeting Week of 29 August 1960," Box 6, AFPC Folder,

OASD (Comptroller) File. The meeting took place on 2 September.

261
Index

Acheson, Dean: 212

Adams, Major General Paul D., USA: 158

Adenauer, Konrad: 127

Afghanistan: 168-69

Africa: 183-96,256n5,256«7,256nl3

Air Defense Command: 156

Air defense missile battalions: 82, 83

Air Force, US

and Africa: 186

and China: 209, 210,213-15

and the Congo: 189,191,194,195

and force planning: 32,37

forces assigned to SACEUR: 96, 99-100,101,

102,103,104

and ICBMs: 43,48

and Korea: 201

and the Middle East: 139,147,152,158, 253n22

and military assistance program: 77, 79-80

and modernization: 37

and NATO force planning: 96,99-100

and New Look policy: 11

and planning for Berlin crisis: 127

and planning for general war: 27

strength: 31-32,34,35, 36, 37,38,39,40-42

and united commands: 53-54

Aircraft: 31,39,41,42,45,49-52, 70-71

Alaska: 106,247n3S

Algeria: 75,102,106,148,149,251n44,253n20

Allied Command Europe: 102,104,105-06,116,

118. See also Supreme Allied Commander,

Europe

Anderson, Robert: 86-87,103,104

Anti-ballistic missiles: 43,44,45, 46,47-49,

241n4. See also Nike-Zeus program

Antisubmarine programs: 44

ANZUS Treaty: 218, 219,222

Appropriations, military: 38,40, 73, 79. See also

Budgets, military

Arab-Israeli conflict: 135-36,138,140-41,143-14,

145,146,148,163,164-65,166

Arab nationalism: 135,146,147,148,164,165-66,

169,175

Arab Union: 147,148

Armed Forces Policy Council: 5,47,203-04,228

Arms control: 55-72,116,243n45,244n4S

Army, US

and anti-ballistic missile defense: 43

and the Congo: 188,191,194-95

and force planning: 32,36, 37

forces assigned to SACEUR: 96,98,99,100,

101-02,104

and Jupiter IRBM: 43

and Korea: 198,199,201

and the Middle East: 139,152,153,154,156,

157-60

and military assistance program: 77, 79-80,81

and NATO force planning: 96,98,99,100,

101-02

and New Look policy: 11

and Nike-Zeus program: 43

and planning for Berlin crisis: 127

and planning for general war: 27

strength: 31-32,33,35,36,37,38,39,40-42

and unified commands: 53-54

Army Chief of Staff: 3,12, 23,42. See also Decker,

General George H.; Lemnitzer, General

Lyman L.; Taylor, General Maxwell D.

Asia, military assistance to: 73,76, 82, 83. See also

specific countries

Assistant Secretary of Defense (International

Security Affairs): 74, 76,80,81, 83,84,85, 86,

103, 111, 121,122,146-47,149,186,203,

243«45,244n4S

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Research and

Development): 45,241nl6

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply and

Logistics: 25-26

Atomic Energy Act: 15,105

Atomic Energy Commission: 15,16, 61,62,67,

109

Australia: 197-98,217,218,219,220,223

Austria: 158,161

Baghdad Pact: 76,137,138,139,142,143,145,

147,167-72,220

Ballistic missile detection: 44

Barnes, Major General Verdi B., USA: 152,250n3

Basic National Security Policy (BNSP): 11,12-17,

18,21,22,23-28,32,195,238n27,238n29

Batista, Fulgencio: 177-80,255nS

Bay of Pigs: 181

Belgian Congo: 186,187-93

Belgium: 87, 95,187-88,189-91,192,257n23

Berkner, Lloyd: 66

Berlin: 80,120-24,125-33,228-29,250«5S,

250n59

Berlin Declaration: 117

BLUE BAT: 154,156,157

Bomber alert and dispersal measures: 44,45,

263
Index

49-50

Bomboko, Justin: 188

Bonin Islands: 202, 203, 204,206, 207,258-59«26

Boone, Admiral Walter F.: 140

Boun Oum, Prince of Laos: 223-24, 225

Bowie, Robert R.: 109-10

Bowie Report: 110

Bradley, General Omar N., USA: 5

Brazil: 76, 77, 83

British Chiefs of Staff: 161-62

Budget, Bureau of the: 45, 86, 207, 208

Budget process

Eisenhower and: 17, 37, 38

and force planning: 32, 33-34, 37-39

and Gates: 41

and Service chiefs: 36-39,41

Budgets, military

and Eisenhower: 35, 36,40

FY1958: 33

FY1958 supplement: 36,46

FY 1959: 32, 33-34,37

FY 1959 supplement: 46

FY 1960: 32, 33, 37,38

FY 1961: 33-34, 38-39,50

FY 1962:41

and JSOP: 7, 8,9

and the NSC: 35-36, 38,40

Bulganin, Nikolai: 55, 56,115,117,119

Burke, Admiral Arleigh: 3, 227, 238M29

and Africa: 184,186,188-89

and arms control policy: 69

and bomber alert and dispersal measures: 50

and budget development: 37,41-42

and China: 210,212

and the Congo: 192,195

and Cuba: 178-79,180-81,182

and Defense reorganization: 5, 6, 7

and force planning: 36-37, 41

and Germany: 115-16

and ICBMs: 48

and JSOP-63: 9

and Korea: 199-200

and Laos: 223

and limited war: 20-21,22, 23, 24, 29

and the Middle East: 140,141,144,150,153,

154,156,159,160

and military assistance program: 78

and NATO: 96-97,103,108,110-11

and Nike-Zeus program: 45,48,49

and nuclear testing: 64-65, 243w39

and nuclear weapons: 108

and operational planning: 51-52, 53-54

and strategic planning: 10

Cambodia: 76-77,217, 222

Canada: 152

and arms control: 56,59, 60,68

military assistance to: 74

and NATO: 95

and nuclear testing: 63

and nuclear weapons: 15

Castro, Fidel: 177,178,179-82, 255H8, 255?;J2,

255«25

Central Europe: 58, 59,117-20,122,123-24

Central Intelligence, Director of: 4, 67,139,182,

190,191,196

Central Intelligence Agency: 22, 29

Central Treaty Organization (CENTO): 162,167,

172-75, 220, 221, 228

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff: 6. See also

Lemnitzer, General Lyman L., USA;

Radford, Admiral Arthur W.; Twining,

General Nathan F., USAF

Chamoun, Camille: 151,153-54,155,156-57,159,

160,252H15,252H16,253H20

Chehab, General Fuad (Lebanon): 155,156-57,

158,159,160

Chiang Kai-shek: 207-08,209-10, 214, 215

Chief of Naval Operations: 3. See also Burke,

Admiral Arleigh

Chief of Staff, Air Force: 3,15. Sec also White,

General Thomas D.

Chile: 77

China, People's Republic of: 22,187,190-91,197,

207-15,228, 257«24

China, Republic of (Taiwan): 159-60,197-98,

207-15, 260»56

deployment of nuclear-capable weapons to: 79

military assistance to: 74, 76, 79-81,82, 83,

208-09, 211-14, 260n49

and offshore islands: 80-81, 209-15,260n48

and storage of nuclear weapons: 199

threat from mainland China: 208-15, 260w53

Chinese Nationalists. See China, Republic of

(Taiwan)

Chou En-lai: 213

CINCLANT. Sec Commander in Chief, Atlantic

CINCNELM. See Commander in Chief, Naval

Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean

CINCPAC. See Commander in Chief, Pacific

CINCSAC. See Commander in Chief, Strategic

Air Command

Cold War: 1-2,135,183-96

Commandant, US Marine Corps: 3-4. Sec also

Pate, General Randolph McG; Shoup,

General David M.

Commander in Chief, Atlantic (CINCLANT): 52,

162,180,182,186,193-96

Commander in Chief, Channel Command

(CINCHAN): 95, 99

Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE): 203,

258n2

Commander in Chief, Naval Forces, Eastern

Atlantic and Mediterranean (CINCNELM):

137,140,141,143,152,154,156-57,161,162,

163,194, 250nU, 252n4

Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC): 52,

264
Index

76-77,197,209-10,211-14, 219-21, 223,

258«2,260n49, 260n51

Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet: 160

Commander in Chief, Specified Command,

Middle East: 140,162, 250n34,252«4

Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command

(CINCSAC): 49-50, 52,53. See also Power,

General Thomas S.

Commander in Chief, US Naval Forces, Europe:

162

Communism

and Africa: 183-84,185,187,189,190

and China: 197

and Cuba: 177,179-82,255«15

and the Far East: 217-18,219,221-25

and the Middle East: 135-38,143-44,145,148,

151,152,163,165-66,167,168,169

Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear

Weapons Tests: 64, 65-66

Congo, Republic of the: 187-93,194-96,228,

256nU, 257n23,257«33

Continental defense: 11-12,15,16-17, 21,34,

44-45,46,59, 74

Coolidge, Charles A.: 5, 68, 69

Coordinating Group for Berlin Contingency

Planning: 130, 250n5S

Council of Economic Advisers: 45

Cromwell, Oliver: 113

Cuba: 177-82, 255n6,255n8,255nl2,255nl5,

255nl8

Cutler, Robert: 16,19,20,24, 76,139,240n6

Cyprus, 152,153

Czechoslovakia: 63,115,117,120,122,192-93

de Gaulle, Charles: 106-07,109,112,228,247n37,

251«44

Decker, General George H., USA: 3,29,103,

110-11,195

Defense, Office of the Secretary of: 7

and ABM program: 48

and budgets: 8,37,38-39

Director of Guided Missiles: 48

and Germany: 120

and Japan: 207

and the Middle East: 172,173

and military assistance program: 75-76,81, 86

and NATO: 101,109

and nuclear testing: 63, 64

Office of Defense Research and Engineering:

108

and study of limited war capabilities: 22, 29

Defense, Secretary of: 5-6,27-28, 67, 79,195,219,

222. See also Gates, Thomas S., Jr.; McElroy,

Neil H.; Wilson, Charles E.

Defense, US Department of

and 1957 review of BNSP: 13-14

and Africa: 186,189,192

and aid to Latin America: 178,179

and arms control: 244n48

and Berlin: 126-27,129,130,131,249«36

and Cuba: 179

and force objectives: 99,100

and Germany: 122

and Japan: 203,206, 207

and Korea: 199,200

and Laos: 223-24

and limited war: 24-25

and the Middle East: 138,144,146-47,148,150,

163-64,169,175

and military assistance program: 74, 75,80, 81,

84,86

and NATO: 97,100,103,109,110

and nuclear stockpiles: 14

and nuclear testing: 61-62,243«40

and Rapacki Plan: 118-19

and SEATO/ANZUS planning: 219-20

Defense Reorganization Act of 1958:4-7

Defense Representative to the North Atlantic

and Mediterranean Areas: 85

Denmark: 95

Dennison, Admiral Robert L.: 193-94

Dillon, Douglas: 191,192

Douglas, James H.: 69, 70, 71,109,132,175,189

Doyle, Admiral A. K.: 211

Draper, William H.: 83-84

Draper Committee: 81,83-84, 86

Drumright, Everett: 209-10

Dudley, Rear Admiral Paul L.: 68-69,122

Dulles, John Foster: 2,23

and 1957 review of BNSP: 13

and arms control: 58,59, 60,119-20

and Berlin; 126-27

and China: 208, 209,210,211-12,214

defense of massive retaliation policy: 18

and Japan: 204

and Korea: 200, 201

and the Middle East: 139,143-44,151,152,

153-54,155-56,167,170

and military assistance program: 83-84

and NATO: 98-99,100,106

and nuclear testing: 61-62, 63

and use of nuclear weapons in limited war: 14,

16,18,22

Early warning system: 34,44

Earth satellites: 1,43-44. See also Sputnik

Economic development in the Middle East:

143-44,145,146,147,163,171

Ecuador: 77

Eden Plan: 115,123

Egypt: 135-36,138,144,145,146,147,151,152,

158,166

Eisenhower, President Dwight D.: 1,2,3, 227,

228,240w6, 247n37

and 1957 review of BNSP: 13-14,15-16

and 1959 review of BNSP: 25

and 1960 review of BNSP: 28

265
Index

and Africa: 183,184,185,186,188

and arms control: 55-56, 59,60, 69, 70-71,117

and Berlin: 127,128,129,130,131,133

and China: 197,208, 210,211,213,214,215

and the Congo: 188-89,191,196

and Cuba: 180,181

and Defense Reorganization Act of 1958: 5-7

and Defense spending: 17,35,36, 37-38, 40,

104,198

and force planning: 31-32, 35

and Germany: 114,117

and Japan: 204,206, 207

and the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 6-7,42, 63, 67, 72

and Korea: 198, 200,201

and the Middle East: 136,137,139,144-45,147,

148-50,151,155,156,158-59,160,164-65,

166,170-71,172,252«15

and military assistance program: 74, 76-77, 80,

83-84,102-03

and the "missile gap": 43,45,46, 47, 50

and mobilization requirements: 25, 26

and national security policy: 4

and NATO: 96, 97, 98,102-03,105,109,110, 111

and nuclear stockpile: 26

and nuclear testing: 55-56, 57,61-62, 63-64, 66,

67,68, 70, 72, 243«39

and nuclear weapons for allies: 105,107,109

and operational planning: 52, 53-54

and overseas deployment of missiles: 46-47

and Southeast Asia: 217-18,223-24

and use of nuclear weapons in limited war:

15-16, 21,24

Eisenhower administration: 11, 29, 31,135,177,

181-82

Eisenhower Doctrine: 135-50,151,160,161,167,

170,252nl5

Eniwetok proving area: 61

Ethiopia: 146,161,190,192

Faisal, King of Iraq: 147,148,155

Fallout shelter program: 44

Farrell, Lieutenant General F. W.: 244«6

Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany).

See Germany, Federal Republic of

Felt, Admiral Harry D.: 206, 210,211,213-14, 223

Fissionable material: 55-56,58,59, 60, 63,68-70

Force levels

Air Force: 31-32,34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 4(M2

and arms control: 55,57, 58,59, 60, 68-70

Army: 31-32, 33, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39,40-12

Marine Corps: 31, 34, 35,36,37,38,40-42

Navy: 31, 33,35,36,37,38,39,40-42

Force objectives

allies: 75, 76-79, 80, 81-83, 84, 85, 86,99,113-14

NATO: 95-96, 98-99,100-102,113-14,116,122

Force planning

and Allied capabilities: 34

and BNSP: 32

deployments overseas: 33, 34, 36

and Gates: 41

guidance for: 7, 8,9,13, 31-32, 33, 38-39,

240M25

and McElroy: 36, 38-39

and modernization: 32,36, 41

and Radford: 33-36

and Soviet military capabilities: 40, 41

Foreign Affairs: 18

Formosa: 208

Four Power Working Group on German

reunification and European security:

116-17,120,131

France

and Algerian rebellion: 75,102,251«44, 253n20

and arms control: 56,58, 60, 68,122

and Berlin: 125,126,127,129,130,131, 249ri36

and Germany: 116-17,122,123

and the Middle East: 135,145,148,149,152,

153-54,155,157,158,253n20

military assistance to: 75, 82

and NATO: 95

and nuclear testing: 61, 63, 70

and nuclear weapons: 104,105,106,107,

108-09,111-12,228

relationship with United States: 115

and Southeast Asia: 217, 223-24, 225

Freeman, Lieutenant General Paul L., Jr., USA:

196

Gaither, H. Rowan, Jr.: 44

Gaither Report: 19, 44-45

Gates, Thomas S., Jr.: 2, 70,150

and Africa: 185,195-96

and arms control: 68, 69, 71, 244n48

and budget development: 41-42

and the Congo: 189,190,192,195

and Cuba: 182, 256«19

force planning: 41

and JSOP-63: 27,40-41

and JSOP-66: 9

and Laos: 224, 261«25

and the Middle East: 162,174

and military assistance program: 85, 87

and missile program: 50

and mobilization requirements: 26

and NATO: 103,108,109, 111, 124

and Nike-Zeus program: 49

and nuclear testing: 67, 68, 71-72, 243n40

and nuclear weapons: 108

and operational planning: 52-54

General Accounting Office: 78

General war

definition of: 17, 27-28, 29

deterrence of: 11-12,14,19, 20, 21, 22,100,101,

103,110,118-19

force planning for: 32-33, 34

and the Middle East: 137,138-39,140,141-13,

162,163,167,170-71,172-75

266
Index

mobilization for: 13

planning for: 26-27, 96,125-26,127,128,129,

130,132,141,168,197-98

and planning for Far East defense: 219,220-21

and use of nuclear weapons: 96, 97-98,118-19,

169-70

George Washington, USS: 50

German Democratic Republic (East Germany):

114-15,117,119,120,121,123,125,126,129,

130,131-33

Germany, Federal Republic of (West Germany):

113-33

and arms control: 58,117

and Berlin: 126,127,129,130,131,132-33

military assistance to: 76,83

military forces: 113-14

and NATO: 95,101,113-15,117,118,123,124

and nuclear weapons: 104,118

as part of proposed denuclearized zone:

117-24

reunification with East Germany: 113,114-15,

116-17,119,120-21,122,123,124,129,

248nl9

US forces in: 96,98,101,102,104,115-16,119,

154,156,157,158,188, 247n37

US objectives in: 113-17

Ghana: 186,189,190,191,192

Gizenga, Antoine: 188,196

Goodpaster, Brigadier General Andrew J.: 4

Goodwill cruises: 186

Grant aid programs: 79, 81-82,108-09,146,148,

177-78,207,258nl6,260n49

Grantham, Admiral Sir Guy (Great Britain): 95

Gray, Gordon: 24-25,105

Greece: 75, 77,82, 95,106,152,154,158,161

Gromyko, Andrei: 123

Guantanamo Naval Base, Cuba: 179,182, 255nl8,

256nl9

Guided missiles: 59, 60

Guinea: 186,192

Hammarksjöld, Dag: 189-90,191

Hardtack: 62-63, 66,67

Herter, Christian A.: 2,23,65-66, 68,69, 71,103,

111, 118,147,175,180,188-89,191, 206,

211-12,256nl9

Hodes, General H. I., USA: 249n36

Holloway, Admiral James L., Jr.: 154,157,158,

159,160,161

Hostages, US military personnel held by Castro:

179, 255n6

Humphrey, George: 198,199-200

Hungary: 115,120,122

Hussein, King of Jordan: 138,146-47,152,157,

166

Iceland: 95

India: 171,174,175

Indochina: 217

Indonesia: 218,221-22,261nl5

Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)

and arms control: 59, 60, 69

Atlas: 41,42,43,44,45,46,47,48,49

deployment of: 50-51

and Gaither Report: 44,45

hardened silos for: 44, 50

Minuteman: 41-42,43,45,46,47,48-49,50, 51,

240n24

production of: 45,48-49,50

research and development: 43,44-45,46,48,

241n4

Soviet: 1,3,18,43,44,46,47,49,50-51

squadrons: 39,45,46-47,49

Titans: 41,42,43,44,45,46,47,48,49,51

Intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs):

and arms control: 69

deployment overseas: 44,46-47,82,83,105,

106,107-08,123,247n3S

Jupiter: 43,46-47,105,106,107,109

mobile: 108

production of: 45,105

research and development: 44-45,46,105

Soviet: 43,44

squadrons: 82, 83,106

Thor: 43,44,46,47,105,106,107,109

International Cooperation Agency: 84

International Security Affairs (ISA): 64, 68-69,

178,181,189-90,191

Interservice feuding: 5, 8, 9-10,24-25,26-29,

31-34, 37,38-42,48-49,51-54,103

Iran: 76,82, 83,137,139,142,145,146,156,161,

167,170,171,172,173-75

Iraq: 76,82,135,136,137,138,139,142,145-46,

147-48,151,153,154,155,161,163,164,165,

167,169,170-71,172,253n21

Irwin, John: 102,103,109,110, 111, 112,124,172,

192

Israel: 135-36,138,140-41,143-44,148,153,163,

167

Italy: 46, 68, 82,83, 87, 95,100,106,152,158

Japan: 197-98,201, 202-07,211,225,228,

258-59«26

deployment of nuclear-capable weapons to: 79

military assistance to: 74, 76, 77, 79-80, 82,87,

203,207

rearmament of: 202-04,205

US forces in: 202,203-04,205,206,211,212,

259n30,259«32

Johnson, General Leon W., USAF: 96,97

Johnson, U. Alexis: 224

Joint Chiefs of Staff

and 1957 review of BNSP: 15,16-17

and Africa: 184-96,256nl3

and arms control: 56-60, 65, 66,68-69, 71,

267
Index

118-19

and Berlin: 125-33, 248-49n35, 250»59

and bomber alert and dispersal measures:

44-45, 49-50

and China: 208, 209-15, 260n49,26ön51

and the Congo: 189,190-93, 257M24

and Cuba: 177-82, 256M19

and Defense reorganization: 5-6

Deputy Director for Intelligence: 255»6

and development of Service budgets: 8-9,

31-42

Director, Joint Military Assistance Affairs: 80

and force planning: 32-34,36-42, 98-99,

100-102,103

and Germany: 113,114,115-16,117-33, 248;il9

ineffective as advisory body: 36,227-28

and interservice feuding: 5,24-25, 26, 27-28,

29, 31, 32-34, 37,38-42,48-49, 51-54,103

J-3:160-61,188,189-90,191, 219, 257n23

J-4:188

J-5: 84,130,162,163,191,193-94,195

and Japan: 203-07, 258-59«26

Joint Middle East Planning Committee:

136-37,139,152,153,163,170,171, 250«3

and Korea: 75-76,198-201, 258H5

and Laos: 222-25

and Lebanon: 252n7

and limited war: 19, 20-22, 24, 25,27, 28, 29,

160-63

and the Middle East: 136-50,151-66,167-70,

252«7,253;i21

and military assistance programs: 74-87,

108-09,245)i32

and "missile gap": 43,44, 45, 46-47,48, 51

and mobilization requirements: 25-26

and NATO strategy: 96-97, 98-99,103,104,

105-06,109-12, 244n6,246n26, 247H37

and Nike-Zeus: 43,45,46,47-48, 49

and nuclear stockpile: 24,26

and nuclear testing: 55, 58-60, 61, 62, 63-66,

67-68, 71-72, 243w39, 243n45

and nuclear weapons: 105-06,107-08,109-12,

118-19

and nuclear weapons for major allies: 24

Office of Special Assistant for Disarmament

Affairs: 68

and operational planning: 51-54

Operations Directorate: 160-61

and planning for defense of the Far East:

218-21, 225

and planning for general war: 27,162,163,168

response to Gaither Report: 44-45

role of in chain of command: 5-6

Special Assistant for Mutual Defense Affairs:

78

Special Assistant for NSC Affairs: 75, 244n6

views sent to McElroy: 20, 23, 26,46,48, 241 n4

and WSEG: 45

Joint Long-Range Strategic Estimate: 7, 9-10

Joint Program for Planning: 7-10

Joint Staff, organization of: 6-7

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP): 7-8, 9-10,

17, 32,137,138,140,142,168

JSCP-56-58:168,197-98, 218

JSCP-59:17, 22,168, 220-21

JSCP-60: 27

JSCP-61: 27-28, 221

JSCP-62: 9-10, 28, 29

Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP): 7, 8,17, 84

JSOP-60: 8

JSOP-61: 8,17, 25, 32, 33, 36-37

JSOP-62: 8, 22, 27, 37

JSOP-63: 9, 26, 27, 4041, 85

JSOP-66: 9,10, 28, 41

Joint Strategic Plans Committee

and the Middle East: 137,139

and military assistance program: 77

Joint Strategic Survey Council ÖSSC): 6,10

and 1957 review of BNSP: 15

and 1960 review of BNSP: 28

and Germany: 115-16, 248«!9

and nuclear weapons for major allies: 15

and use of nuclear weapons in limited war: 15

Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff: 53, 54

Joint War Room: 188, 256nl5

Jordan: 82,135,138,141,145,14^47,148,151,

152,153,154,157,159,161,163,170

Kalonji, Albert: 188

Kasavubu, Joseph: 187-88,190,192

Kassem, Brigadier General Abdul Karim (Iraq):

155

Kennedy, John F.: 246H30

Kennedy administration: 10, 28, 42, 51

Kenya: 186

Khrushchev, Nikita: 63, 64, 66, 70-71,131-32,182

Killian, James: 63, 65-66, 67

Kishi, Nobusuke: 202-03, 204, 206, 207

Kissinger, Henry A.: 17-18

Kistiakowsky, George: 67, 70-71

Köhler, FoyD.: 110, 111, 112

Kong Le, Captain (Laos): 223-24

Korea, North: 197, 258»5

Korea, Republic of (South Korea): 74-77, 79-80,

197-201, 204, 258/(76

Kuwait: 161,162

Laos: 76, 82, 217, 219,221, 222-25, 228

Latin America: 76, 77, 79-80, 82, 83, 85, 86,

177-82, 255n6

Lebanon: 80,136,141,145,146,148,151,152,

153-61,163,170, 209, 228, 252»7, 252n25,

252M16, 253nl9, 253n20, 253«22, 253»34

Lemnitzer, General Lyman L., USA: 3,9,10, 23,

25, 41, 42, 48, 49, 50, 52-53, 86,103,108,170,

192,194,195, 203

268
Index

Liberia: 186

Libya: 149,150,152,153,158,162,188

Limited war

definition of: 16,19-20,27-28,29

deterrence of: 17-18,21, 25

and the Far East: 219-21

and the Middle East: 137,138-39,141-42,

160-63,168,172-75

planning for: 160-63,168,194-96,238«27

planning for the use of nuclear weapons in:

13-14,15-16,19-22,23-29,33

political decisions regarding: 21

strategic concept for: 27,137,195

study of US and allied capabilities for: 18-19,

21-22,29

LIVE OAK: 130-31

Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr.: 56

London Disarmament Conference (March 1956):

57

Loper, Major General Herbert B.: 58

Lovett, Robert A.: 44

Lumumba, Patrice: 187-88,190,191,192,196,

257n33

Luxembourg: 95

MacArthur, Douglas, II: 202-03,205,207

Macmillan, Harold: 46,57, 70,105,109,247«37

Mali Federation: 186

Manila Pact: 197,217

Marine Corps, US

and Africa: 186

and the Congo: 188

forces assigned to SACEUR: 96,98,99,102

and Japan: 259n30

and Joint Chiefs of Staff role in budget

development: 8-9

and the Middle East: 152,153,154,156-61,

253nl9,253-54n34

and military assistance program: 77

and missile research and development: 46

and planning for Berlin crisis: 128

strength: 31,34,35, 36,37,38,40-42

Massive retaliation policy: 11-29,34,46,47,50,

96-98,103,198,200,238n29

Matsu: 80,208, 209-15,228,260n48

McClintock, Robert: 153-54,155,156-57,159

McElroy, Neil H.: 2,241«4

and Africa: 184

and Berlin: 126-27,128-29

and bomber alert and dispersal measures:

49-50

and budget development: 37-39,40

and China: 212, 213

and Cuba: 179,180,181

and Defense reorganization: 5

and force planning: 36, 37,38

and Germany: 119-20

and Japan: 205,206

Joint Chiefs of Staff views sent to: 20,23,26,

46,48

andJSOP-62:8

and Korea: 199

and Laos: 222

and limited war: 22,24

and the Middle East: 144,148,153,164,169,

170,171-72

and military assistance program: 78, 79,80, 81,

83-84

and missile research and development: 46,47,

48

and NATO: 99-101,102-03,104

and nuclear testing: 61-62, 63, 65,66,67,

243n39

and nuclear weapons: 107

and operational planning: 52

and SEATO/ANZUS planning: 222

McNamara, Robert S.: 261n25

Medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs):

108-09,110-11

Merchant, Livingston: 122,132-33,181,182

Middle East: 135-50,151-66. See also specific

countries

military assistance to: 73, 76, 82

and NATO: 99

Middle East Emergency Defense Plan 1-57:139,

141-42,143,162,163

Middle East Emergency Defense Plan 1-60:162

Military Assistance Plan: 84,85-86

Military assistance program: 7, 73-93,136,138,

143,145,146-47,148,164-65,173,178-79,

187,192,198,199-200,201,203,207,208-09,

221-22, 223,245w32,245n33,258nl6,260n49

"Missile gap": 43-54

Missiles. See also Intercontinental ballistic

missiles; Intermediate-range ballistic

missiles

deployed overseas: 82,99,100,101-02,106,

200-201

and force planning: 32

HonestJohns: 82,100,101-02,106,200, 201,

247n37

Pershing: 108,109

Skybolt: 108-09

strategic: 37

on submarines: 36,37. See also Submarines,

Polaris

Mobilization requirements: 7-9,13,16,25-26

Mobutu, Colonel Joseph (Congo): 192-93

Modernization, funding for: 37-38

Mohammed, King of Morocco: 149,150

Morocco: 148-50,157,190,192

Murphy, Robert: 130,158-59,172

Mutual Security Act: 145,147,179

Mutual Security Objectives Plan: 84

Mutual Security Program: 179

Mutual Weapons Development Program: 85

269
Index

Nasser, Gamal Abdel: 135,146,147,148,151,155,

160,163-66

National Intelligence Estimates

and arms race: 43, 44, 46, 49, 50

and Cuba: 181, 255nl5

National Military Command Center: 256M25

National Security Council: 4

and 1957 review of BNSP: 12-13,14,15-16

and 1958 review of BNSP: 18-19, 21

and 1959 review of BNSP: 23, 24, 25

5412 Committee: 181

and Africa: 183-86,187,190,193-94

and Berlin: 125-26,128,130,133

and China: 208-09

and the Congo: 190-91, 257n33

and Cuba: 177,181,182

and Defense budget: 35-36, 38, 40

and the Eisenhower Doctrine: 138-39

and Gaither Report: 44

and Japan: 202

and Korea: 199-200, 201

and the Middle East: 138-39,149

and military assistance program: 74-76, 77, 79,

80

and "missile gap": 44,47,48

and NATO strategy: 98,102-03, 246»26

Net Evaluation Subcommittee: 52-53

and nuclear stockpiling: 14-15,46

and nuclear testing: 61, 63, 70

and nuclear weapons: 109

Operations Coordination Board: 113-14,133,

165,166,185, 202

National Security Council Planning Board: 4

and 1957 review of BNSP: 12-17

and 1958 review of BNSP: 18-19, 21

and 1959 review of BNSP: 23, 24, 25

and 1960 review of BNSP: 28

and Africa: 183-84,185,187

and China: 208

and Germany: 114

and interdepartmental differences: 13-14,

244«6

and Japan: 207

and Korea: 198-99, 200, 201

and the Middle East: 138-39,143,144,149-50,

163-64,165-66

and military assistance program: 75-76, 86-87

and nuclear weapons: 107

National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy:

53

"NATO in the 1960's": 103

Navy, US

and China: 210,213-15

and the Congo: 191

and force planning: 32, 36-37

forces assigned to SACEUR: 96, 99,101,102,

104

and goodwill cruises: 186

and ICBM production: 43,48

and Joint Chiefs of Staff role in budget

development: 8-9

and the Middle East: 139,140-41,149,152,

253H22

and military assistance program: 77, 79-80, 81

and planning for Berlin crisis: 127

and SLBMs: 43

strength: 31, 33, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40-42

and unified commands: 53-54

Netherlands, the: 82, 83, 87,95

"New Look" policy: 11,16-18, 22,31,198, 202

New Zealand: 197-98, 217, 218, 220, 223

Nigeria: 186,191

Nike-Zeus program: 43,45, 46,47-48,49, 51,

247»37

Norstad, General Lauris, USAF: 95, 97-98, 99,

100,102,104,106,108,123-24,127,128,130,

141,153,158,195

North Africa: 148-50,165,166

North Atlantic Council: 95-96, 97-98, 106,

110-11,113-14,126

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO):

227-28

and arms control: 58, 59

force objectives: 78-79, 82, 83, 95-96, 98-99,

100-102,113-14,116,122

and force planning: 36

and Germany: 113-14, 115-16,118,122,123-24

hostilities involving member nations: 21, 23,

24-25

and military assistance program: 74-76, 79-80,

82,101,102-03

and multinational force: 110-12

and nuclear testing: 61-62

nuclear weapons authority: 18

organization of: 95-96

reliance on nuclear weapons: 96, 97-98, 99,

103,104-06,116,118

Standing Group: 95, 96, 97,100

strategy: 96-98,118

US forces assigned to: 96, 98, 99-103,104,116,

119,120, 246n26

North Atlantic Treaty Organization documents

MC 14/2: 97-98, 100,104

MC 48:96

MC 70:100-102, 104

Norway: 95

NSC 160/1: 113

NSC 5404/1:125-26

NSC 5428:144

NSC 5429/5:197

NSC 5503: 208

NSC 5516/1: 202, 207

NSC 5517/1: 74-75, 80

NSC 5524/1:114-15,116,119

NSC 5602/1:11,12

NSC 5612/1: 217-18

NSC 5702/2: 201

NSC 5707/7:15

NSC 5707/8:16,17,18-19, 20, 25, 29, 97

NSC 5713/2: 218, 222

270
Index

NSC 5719/1:183-84

NSC 5723:208-09

NSC 5727:114

NSC 5801:144

NSC 5801/1:144-45,163

NSC 5803:114,125-26,133

NSC 5810/1: 21,22,23,25

NSC 5818:184-85

NSC 5820/1:164-65,170-71

NSC 5906/1:25,27,28,29,97,107,195

NSC 5907:201

NSC 5911/1:149-50,251n44

NSC 6001:185,187,192

NSC 6005/1:186,187

NSC 6008/1:207

NSC 6011:166

NSC Action No. 1755: 240«6

Nuclear-capable weapons, deployment overseas:

75-76, 79,199,200

Nuclear technology, transference to major allies:

14,15,16,18,24

Nuclear testing

at Eniwetok: 61

inspection system for: 56, 57, 61, 62-63, 64-65,

66, 67-68, 70,243n39,243n40

international observation of: 56,57,61, 62-63

and NATO: 61-62

suspension of: 55-60,61-66,67, 71-72,244n5S

Nuclear warheads, US control of: 18,107,110,

111-12

Nuclear weapons

and China: 210,211-12, 213

deployment overseas: 75,104-06,108-09,205

and force planning: 32-33

for Korea: 199, 200,201

low-yield: 20

and Middle East defense: 169-70,173,174-75

moratorium on testing of: 55-72

for NATO allies: 108-12,227-28

NATO control of: 18,104-08

and NATO strategy: 96, 97-98,99,103,104-06

"no first use" of: 60

planning for use of in limited war: 13-14,

15-16,17-18,19-22,23-29,33

proposals for destruction of: 55

public opinion on testing of: 55,58,59-60

public opinion on use of: 14,18,205

and Rapacki Plan: 117-20

stockpiles: 14-15,16,18, 24,25,26,117, 237n3

tactical: 12,18, 75,116

targeting system for: 52-53

transference to major allies: 14,15,16,18,

104-06

US superiority in: 11,18

Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, by Henry A.

Kissinger: 17-18

Nuri Said: 147,148

O'Beirne, Rear Admiral Frank: 188

Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

(OCDM): 23-24,26

Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM): 15

Oil-exporting countries: 135-36,142,163,165,

166,174

Okinawa: 106,197-98,202, 207,247n38,259«30

"Open skies" plan: 56

Operations Coordinating Board (OCB): 4

OPLANs

200-10:131,215

215-56:152-53

215-58:140-41,152-53,161,162,253n21,

253-54«34

215-59:161,253-54n34

215-60:161

219-57:140,142

Organization of American States: 180-81

Outer space, peaceful use of: 56-57,59, 61-62,

69-70

Pakistan: 139,156, 217,219,220

and Middle East defense: 137,142,167,168-69,

171,173-75

military assistance to: 74,76, 77,82,83,146

Palestine: 143,144,148

Palmer, General Williston B., USA: 84

Pan-Arabism: 145,151,160,163-64,165,166,167

Parker, Vice Admiral Edward N.: 54

Pate, General Randolph McC, USMC: 3-4, 6, 7,

20-21,22,24, 52,238n29

Patrick Henry, USS: 50

Penghu Islands: 207-08,211

Peoples Republic of China. See China, Peoples

Republic of

Peru: 77

Pescadores Islands: 207-08,211

Philippines: 76, 79-80, 82,83,149,150,197-98,

199,211,217,219

Phoumi Nosavan, General (Laos): 223-24,225

Poland: 63,115,117,118,120,122

Portugal: 95

Power, General Thomas S.: 49,50,54

President's Special Assistant for Disarmament

Matters: 56

President's Special Assistant for National

Security Affairs: 4,181

President's Special Assistant for Science and

Technology: 67

President's Special Committee on Disarmament:

58,67,70, 71

Project Argus: 66

Public opinion

and Berlin: 127,130

and China: 211, 212

and Cuba: 255«6

and Germany: 116-17,118,119,122

international: 61,62, 67

and "missile gap": 44,47

and nuclear testing: 14,18,55,58,59-60,61,62,67

271
Index

and nuclear weapons: 212

United States: 14

and US role in the Middle East: 155-56,158,

160,169

and use of nuclear weapons: 14

Quarles, Donald: 19, 25, 26, 37,45, 48, 51, 59-60,

61-66,101,107,119,121,144,149, 205

Quemoy: 80, 208, 209-15, 228, Z60n48

Radar warning nets: 44

Radford, Admiral Arthur W.: 2-3,227

and 1957 review of BNSP: 13,14,16-17

and arms control: 59

and budget development: 33, 34

and Defense reorganization: 5

and force planning: 32-33, 34-36, 240n25

and Germany: 116

and Japan: 203-04

andJSOP-61:8

and Korea: 199, 200

and the Middle East: 136,139

and military assistance program: 77, 83-84

and NATO: 98-99,105

and New Look policy: 11, 31

and nuclear weapons: 105

Radioactive fallout: 55, 67

Rapacki, Adam: 117

Rapacki Plan: 117-20,121,122,123

Research and development: 32, 43, 44-48

Rhee, Synghman: 199-201

Richards, James P.: 137,146

Robertson, Reuben: 56-57, 75,146

Rogers, Lieutenant General Elmer J., USAF: 172

Romania: 63

Rountree, William: 144,153

Ryukyu Islands: 197, 202,203, 204, 206, 207

Saratoga, USS: 98

Saud, King Ibn of Saudi Arabia: 141

Saudi Arabia: 82,135,141,145,148,153,161,162,

164-65,170

Science Advisory Committee: 61-63, 68

Selective Reserves strength: 32, 33

Shoup, General David M., USMC: 4, 29, 53,103,

195

Sides, Vice Admiral John H.: 45

Single integrated operational plan: 51-54, 227

Sixth Fleet: 139,146,152,154,156,157

Skifter, Hector J.: 48, 241rcl6

South Atlantic Force: 186

South Korea. See Korea, Republic of

South Vietnam: 76-77, 79-80

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO):

217-21, 222-23,224-25, 228

Southern Europe Task Force: 100

Spain: 74, 82,149,150

Sprague, Mansfield D.: 77, 98-99,105-06,117,

118,138,147-18,153,172

Sputnik: 1, 3,18, 36, 43-44, 61

Staging and overflight rights

and the Congo: 192

and Middle East intervention: 152, 153,154,

158,161, 252»22, 253-54»34

Stans, Maurice: 103

Stassen, Harold E.: 56-59, 61, 62

State, Secretary of: 67, 69,186,192. See also

Dulles, John Foster; Herter, Christian A.

State, US Department of

and 1959 review of BNSP: 23-24

and Africa: 186-87,188,189,191

and aid to Latin America: 178-79

and arms control policy: 68-69

and Berlin: 126-27,129,131, 249»36, 250»59

and China: 208, 209

and the Congo: 188,189,191,192, 257»23

and Cuba: 178-79,181,182

and deployment of nuclear-capable weapons:

75

and Germany: 116,120-22

and Japan: 203, 205, 206, 207

and Korea: 199, 200, 201

and Laos: 223-24

and the Middle East: 137-38,144,146,147,148,

149,150,151,152,153,154,158,159,167-68,

169,170,171,172,173,174-75, 228, 252»12,

252/;36,253»19

and military assistance program: 75, 80, 84, 86

and NATO: 97,100,101,102,103,109-10

and NSC: 244n6

and nuclear testing: 63, 67, 243N40

and Rapacki Plan: 118-19

and SEATO/ANZUS planning: 219-20, 222

and study of limited war capabilities: 22, 29

and transference of nuclear weapons to major

allies: 16

and use of nuclear weapons in limited war: 14,

15,23

State-Defense-CIA Congo Contingency Planning

Group: 192

Strategic Air Command: 44, 45, 47, 49,127,150,

156

Strategic Army Command: 188

Stump, Admiral Felix: 203

Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs):

43,48,49, 50, 51,107-08

Submarines

ballistic missiles for: 36, 37, 39, 40, 41,42

Polaris: 43,44,45,46,47,48,49, 50,51-52,

107-09,110, 111

Sudan: 161,162

Suez crisis: 115, 135,136

Sukarno: 221, 222

Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic

(SACLANT): 95, 99. See also Wright,

Admiral Jerauld

272
Index

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR):

95,96, 98, 99,100,102,104,106,107-09,

110-11. See also Norstad, General Lauris,

USAF

Surprise attack

risk of: 118

safeguards against: 55,56, 57,58-59,60,61, 62,

65-66, 68,69-70,120-24

US vulnerability to: 44,47

Sweden: 190,191

Switzerland: 158,161

Syria: 138,146,147,151,152,154,155,252nl5

Taconic, USS: 157

Taiwan Straits crisis: 159-60,209-15

Taylor, General Maxwell D., USA: 3,23,128, 227,

238rc29

and budget development: 8,33, 37

and China: 212

and Cuba: 179

and Defense reorganization: 6

and force planning: 33,35, 36, 37

and limited war: 19-21,22,23,24

and the Middle East: 140,146-47,169,251rc34

and military assistance program: 75

and NATO: 96-97,100

and Nike-Zeus program: 45,46,48

and operational planning: 52

Ten Nation Disarmament Conference (March

1960): 68, 71,124

Thailand: 76, 82, 83,217,222, 223,224

Timberlake, Clare: 188,189,257n23

Tito, Marshal: 79

Treasury, US Department of the: 45, 86,163-64,

207

Tshombe, Moise: 188,191,192,196

Tunisia: 189-90,192

Turkey: 156,158

IRBMs deployed in: 46-47

and Middle East defense: 137,142,167,168,

169,170,171,172,173-74, 252nll,

253-54n34

military assistance to: 75, 76, 79-80,82,136,

139,145-46

and NATO: 95,106,153

and United Arab Republic: 151

US bases in: 152,153,154,157

Twining, General Nathan E, USAF: 3,24,42,47,

70,227

and 1957 review of BNSP: 15

and Africa: 183,191

and arms control: 71

and Berlin: 127,128,228

and bomber alert and dispersal measures: 50

and budget development: 38,40

and China: 210-12,213,214, 260n56

and Cuba: 182

and Defense reorganization: 5, 6

and force planning: 39

and ICBMs: 48-49,51

and Japan: 205

and Joint Staff organization: 6-7

and limited war: 20,21,22,23, 238n27

and the Middle East: 138,155,156,170-71,172

and military assistance program: 78

and NATO: 96,101,103,109,246n26

and Nike-Zeus program: 48,49

and nuclear testing: 61, 62, 64,66,67-68

and operational planning: 52,53,54

Uncertain Trumpet, The, by General Maxwell D.

Taylor: 3

Unified commanders, role in budget

development: 8-9

Unified strategic command: 51-54

Uniform alert system: 160-61

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

and Africa: 186-87,190-94

and arms control: 55,57,58, 60, 65-66,70-71,

118-19

and Berlin: 120,121,125-33, 249n36

and China: 209,212

and the Congo: 186-87,190-93,194-95,196

and Cuba: 177,180,181-82

and Germany: 114-16,117,119,122,123-24

ICBMs: 1, 3,18,43,44,46,47,49, 50-51

and inspection plans: 55, 56, 59, 61, 69, 70

IRBMs: 43,44

and limited wars: 17-18, 22,23,24-25,27, 29

and massive retaliation policy: 17-18, 20,21,22

and the Middle East: 135-39,141-45,148-49,

151,153,156,159,163-66,168-70,172-75,

252«15

and the "missile gap": 43-54

and NATO strategy: 96, 97, 99,100,101,103,

116

and nuclear testing: 55, 61, 63, 64, 65, 70

and Southeast Asia: 222, 224

and Sputnik: 1,18

United Arab Republic: 147,151,154,155,164,

165,170

United Kingdom

and arms control: 56, 58, 60, 68

and Berlin: 125,126,127,129,130,131

and the Congo: 190

and the Far East: 198, 217,223-24,225

and Germany: 115,116-17,249n36

and the Middle East: 135,138,145,147,150,

152,153-54,155,156,157,159,161-62,165,

166,167,253n21

military assistance to: 76

and NATO: 95,96,102

and nuclear testing: 61, 63, 64, 66, 70

and nuclear weapons: 14,15,104,105,106,

108-09

placement of missiles in: 46

relationship with the United States: 115

US planning with: 152,153-54,155,156,157,

273
Index

159,161-62,252n7,253w22

United Nations

and Africa: 186-87

and the Congo: 189-92,196

and Korea: 200

and the Middle East: 153,155,158

and Southeast Asia: 223

United Nations Command in Korea: 198,

200-201,205-206

United Nations Disarmament Subcommittee: 56,

57,60, 71,115

United Nations Emergency Force: 136,189-90,

191,192,194,196, 228, 256-57«22

United Nations General Assembly: 56, 61, 71,

117,159,182

United Nations Security Council: 154,181-82,

189-90

US Air Forces, Europe: 99

US Army, Europe: 99,100,127,128

USCINCEUR. See US Commander in Chief,

Europe

US Commander in Chief, Atlantic: 95. See also

Wright, Admiral Jerauld

US Commander in Chief, Europe (USCINCEUR):

52, 75,95,104,125,130-31,137,141,153,

154,156,162,189,194-95, 248-49w35,

256-57n22, 257n23. See also Norstad,

General Lauris, USAF

US Congress

and China: 208

and Defense reorganization: 5-6

and Eisenhower Doctrine: 136

and intervention in Lebanon: 155-56

and Latin America: 179

and military appropriations: 38, 40

and military assistance program: 83-84,145

and nuclear stockpile: 14

US European Command: 82, 85,125,130,188,

189-90,191,195, 257«25

US-Japan Security Treaty: 201, 205-07

US Military Assistance Advisory Groups

(MAAGs): 74, 76-77, 78,139,140,142,148,

168, 214

US Pacific Command: 85

US Senate Armed Services Committee: 128

US Special Weapons Units: 104-05

Uruguay: 77

Vietnam: 197,217, 219,225

Volcano Islands: 202, 203, 206, 207

Wadsworth, James J.: 71

Warsaw Pact: 115-16,118

Warships, numbers of: 31, 33, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39,

40,41,42

Wasp, USS: 188,191

274

Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG): 45,

47, 49, 51

Wheeler, Major General Earle G., USA: 5

Wheelus Air Base, Libya: 158

White, General Thomas D., USAF: 3, 227

and Africa: 184, 195

and bomber alert and dispersal measures:

49-50

and budget development: 37-38, 41-12

and China: 212

and Cuba: 178,179-80,182

and Defense reorganization: 5, 6,37-38

and force planning: 37, 41

and ICBMs: 48^9

and JSOP-63: 9

and limited war: 20, 21, 22, 24

and the Middle East: 140,141-42,157

and NATO: 100,103,108,110-11, 246n26

and Nike-Zeus program: 45, 48, 49

and nuclear weapons: 108

and operational planning: 52, 53

and strategic planning: 10

White House Disarmament Staff: 56, 57

Wilson, Charles E.: 2,227

and 1957 review of BNSP: 13,15,16-17

and arms control: 56-57, 58

and force planning: 31, 32, 33, 35, 98-99,198

and Germany: 117

and Japan: 204

andJSOP-61:8

and Korea: 199, 201

and the Middle East: 136,137,138,139,143,

145

and military assistance program: 75, 77, 78,198

and NATO: 97, 98-99,105

and nuclear weapons: 105,198

and SEATO/ANZUS planning: 219, 220

World-Wide Coordination Conferences: 51

Wright, Admiral Jerauld: 95

Yugoslavia: 74, 79, 82