The Honorable H. Franklin Waters, United States District Judge for the Western 1

District of Arkansas.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 96-3988

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Kirk D. Sykes, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Arkansas.

The City of Gentry, Arkansas; The City *

Council of Gentry, Arkansas; Robert D. *

Abrahamson, Mayor, City of Gentry, *

Arkansas, *

*

Appellees. *

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Submitted: May 23, 1997

 Filed: June 13, 1997

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Before MURPHY, HEANEY, and MAGILL, Circuit Judges.

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MAGILL, Circuit Judge.

Kirk D. Sykes, the former police chief of Gentry, Arkansas, appeals the district

court's grant of summary judgment against him in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) action 1

against the City of Gentry. We affirm.
 Gentry is considered a city of the first class. 2

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I.

On March 22, 1995, Sykes was hired as the chief of police of Gentry, Arkansas.

At the time Sykes was hired, § 14-43-504(e)(2) of the Arkansas Code provided that

"Mayors shall have the power to choose and appoint the chief of the police department

. . . who shall hold office until the following election for mayor, and until a successor

is appointed by the incoming mayor, unless sooner removed for cause . . . ." Ark. Code

Ann. § 14-43-504(e)(2) (Michie 1987). Section 14-43-505 provided that a police chief

could be removed for inefficiency, misconduct, or neglect of duty by a majority vote

of the city council. Ark. Code Ann. § 14-43-505 (Michie 1987). In an unappealed

case not involving the instant parties, the United States District Court for the Western

District of Arkansas held that these provisions created a property interest for a police

chief in the position. See Pearson v. City of Paris, 839 F. Supp. 645, 650 (W.D. Ark.

1993). Accordingly, the Pearson court held that the termination of a police chief

without cause constituted a deprivation of property without due process, a violation of

the Fourteenth Amendment that was actionable under § 1983. Id. at 649.

On April 5, 1995, about two weeks after Sykes was hired, the Arkansas

Legislature enacted Ark. Code Ann. § 14-42-110 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1995).

Section 110 provides that:

Mayors in cities of the first class and second class and incorporated towns

shall have the power to appoint and remove all department heads,

including city and town marshals appointed, unless the city or town

council shall, by a two-thirds (2/3) majority of the total membership of the

council, vote to override the mayor's action.

Ark. Code Ann. § 14-42-110 (emphasis added).2
 Sykes also sought relief under the Fair Labor Standards Act for unpaid overtime 3

and under various state causes of action. The district court denied relief under these

theories, and Sykes does not pursue them on appeal.

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On November 9, 1995, the Mayor of Gentry terminated Sykes without cause.

The City Council considered the termination and a motion was made to override it, but

failed for want of a second. 

Sykes subsequently brought this action in the district court under § 1983. The 3

district court denied relief, concluding that, while Sykes once had a property interest

in his position, that property interest was destroyed when the Arkansas Legislature

enacted § 110. Sykes now appeals.

II.

Sykes argues that his property interest in his position, created by § 504, was not

lost by the subsequent enactment of § 110 because this would constitute a retroactive

effect of the new statute. Because Arkansas law disfavors retroactive effects of

statutes, see State v. Kansas City & Memphis Ry. & Bridge Co., 174 S.W. 248, 251

(Ark. 1914), Sykes contends that his property interest was unaffected by the change in

the law.

Sykes's argument is meritless. Had Sykes been terminated prior to the enactment

of § 110, he perhaps would have had an argument for retroactivity. As it is, the impact

of § 110 is purely prospective.

This Court has repeatedly held that a state may legislatively eliminate a

previously conferred property interest in state employment. See Packett v. Stenberg,

969 F.2d 721, 726 (8th Cir. 1992). "While the legislative alteration or elimination of

a previously conferred property interest may be a deprivation, the legislative process
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itself provides citizens with the process they are due." Id. See also Gattis v. Gravette,

806 F.2d 778, 781 (8th Cir. 1986) ("[T]he legislature which creates a property interest

may rescind it, whether the legislative body is federal or state and whether the interest

is an entitlement to economic benefits, a statutory cause of action or civil service job

protections. By the time appellant discharged appellees, the Arkansas Legislature had

removed appellees' employment position from those entitled to civil service system

protections. Accordingly, the property interest previously conferred . . . had been

extinguished . . . . [Because] the legislative process affords all the procedural due

process required by the Constitution, the elimination of appellees' property interest in

employment, although a deprivation, was not a deprivation without due process under

the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution." (emphasis added)).

Any property interest Sykes had in his position was eliminated when the

Arkansas Legislature enacted § 110. Because Sykes had no property interest in his

position, there was no due process violation when he was terminated. Accordingly, the

district court’s grant of summary judgment is affirmed.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.