United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 20-10344

Valerie Jackson, 

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Lupe Valdez; Marian Brown; Dallas County, Texas, 

Defendants—Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:18-CV-2935

Before Barksdale, Southwick, and Graves, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Valerie Jackson is a transgender woman who sued Dallas County, 

Texas, and its employees for violating her constitutional rights related to her 

gender identity. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Procedure 54(b), she appeals the 

district court’s denial of her motion for recusal and the Rule 12(b)(6) 

dismissal of Dallas County and Sheriffs Lupe Valdez and Marian Brown in 

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 29, 2021

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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their official capacities. We AFFIRM IN PART, REVERSE IN PART, 

and REMAND for further proceedings.

I. Background

Because this is an appeal from a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, the following 

are allegations from the operative complaint. 

Valerie Jackson is a transgender woman. She was assigned the sex of 

male at birth and had her gender legally changed to female prior to the events 

alleged in the instant case. 

On or about November 4, 2016, Jackson was arrested for unlawful 

possession of a weapon and taken to the Dallas County jail. During booking, 

an officer asked her standard intake questions and gave her a wristband 

identifying her gender as female. She was taken to an enclosed corner and 

ordered to lift her shirt and bra to expose her bare breasts, to which she 

complied. She was then escorted to a nurse. 

The nurse asked Jackson medical questions that led her to reveal that 

she was a transgender woman. The nurse left the paperwork the way it was 

filled out and concluded the medical assessment. When Jackson returned to 

the waiting area with the other female detainees, an officer asked her in front

of the other detainees if she had “a sex change or something” and whether 

she “had everything done even down there.” She answered yes so that the 

humiliation would end. 

Jackson was taken to the same enclosed corner and instructed to pull 

down her pants and underwear. When she asked why, an officer stated: “We 

need to know if you’ve had a sex change or not. We need to see if you have a 

penis or vagina. We have to protect you. We can’t put you with men if you 

have a vagina.” Jackson said she was not going to pull down her pants, and

the officer replied: “You are coming up in the system as male. It doesn’t 

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matter what you do, it can never be changed.” Jackson stated again that she 

was not going to pull down her pants and that she should not have to prove 

anything to them if none of the other women had to prove anything. The 

officer continued: “Now our policy is we have to verify that you’ve had a sex 

change. If you have a penis, you’re going with the men. If you have a vagina, 

you’re going with the women.” 

Jackson continued to insist that she did not want to pull her pants 

down. An officer told her that if she refused, they would transfer her to 

Parkland Hospital where she would have to show her genitals, thus adding 

hours to her incarceration. An officer also said: “That’s our policy. You can 

talk to [Sheriff] Lupe Valdez about it when you get out.” The officer 

explained that the process could not move forward without Jackson revealing 

her genitals. Feeling she had no other choice, Jackson complied with the strip 

search. 

After the search, Jackson was eventually placed in her own cell. She 

was then taken in a line with male inmates to court, and when she returned 

to the jail, she was taken to the male locker room and instructed to strip down 

and shower because “it was something everyone had to do.” An officer 

intervened and took her to a holding cell, where Jackson received a new 

wristband that identified her gender as male. Jackson was moved multiple 

times while waiting for her paperwork to be processed, each time 

encountering new officers and inmates who misidentified her gender. 

After being released from custody, Jackson filed a formal complaint 

regarding her treatment in the Dallas County jail. On November 7, 2016, 

Captain Shelley Knight with the Dallas County Sheriff’s Office was 

contacted by a local newspaper regarding Jackson’s treatment. Knight 

informed the newspaper that there was an investigation on the incident and 

that the intake video from November 4, 2016, was pulled. She also informed 

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the newspaper that she could see where some of the policy was misconstrued 

and other parts were not followed. 

On April 19, 2017, Jackson was arrested for the second time and taken 

to the Dallas County jail, where she was classified male and held with the 

male inmates. She asked the officers to contact Knight, who could explain 

that Jackson should be classified and placed with female inmates, but they 

refused. She was later forced to shower with male inmates. 

On June 15, 2018, Jackson was arrested for the third time and taken to 

the Dallas County jail, where she was again classified male and held with the 

male inmates. She was again forced to shower with male inmates. 

In November 2018, Jackson sued Dallas County, Texas; former 

Sheriff Lupe Valdez and current Sheriff Marian Brown in their official and 

individual capacities; and Officer Lizyamma Samuel, Officer Samuel Joseph, 

and Unknown Dallas County Employee III in their individual capacities 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of her Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights. 

In September 2019, the case was transferred to Judge Brantley Starr. 

Jackson moved for recusal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455(a), arguing that 

Judge Starr held a bias against members of the LGBTQ community. The 

motion was denied. On motion, the district court later dismissed Dallas 

County and Valdez and Brown in their official capacities under Rule 12(b)(6).

Jackson timely appealed. 

II. Motion to Recuse

A. Standard of Review

We review the denial of a motion to recuse for abuse of discretion. 

Patterson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 335 F.3d 476, 483 (5th Cir. 2003). 

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B. Legal Analysis

Jackson argues that the district court erred in denying her motion to 

recuse because of his personal bias against members of the LGBTQ 

community. Specifically, in an affidavit attached to the motion, Jackson 

averred that prior to his appointment to the federal bench, Judge Starr 

advocated against equal rights for members of the LGBTQ community as a 

Deputy Attorney General for the State of Texas by challenging federal 

guidance that directed schools to permit transgender students to use 

bathrooms that align with their gender identity; defending the right of county 

clerks to refuse to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples; and testifying

about state legislation that would protect adoption agencies that refuse to 

place children with same-sex couples. Further, Jackson stated that the judge 

“refused” to answer questions regarding the legal treatment of LGBTQ 

people during his judicial confirmation process, and that he supported the 

judicial nomination of Jeffrey Mateer, who said that transgender children 

were part of “Satan’s plan.” 

Section 144 aims exclusively at actual bias or prejudice. Patterson, 335 

F.3d at 483. It requires a judge to recuse if a party to the proceeding “makes 

and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the 

matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in 

favor of any adverse party.” 28 U.S.C. § 144. The affidavit must “state the 

facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or prejudice exists” and “shall 

be accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record stating that it is made in 

good faith.” Id. The judge must pass on the sufficiency of the affidavit but 

may not pass on the truth of the affidavit’s allegations. Patterson, 335 F.3d at 

483. A legally sufficient affidavit must: (1) state material facts with 

particularity; (2) state facts that, if true, would convince a reasonable person 

that a bias exists; and (3) state facts that show the bias is personal, as opposed 

to judicial, in nature. Id.

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Section 455(a) deals not only with actual bias and other forms of 

partiality, but also with the appearance of partiality. It requires a judge to 

“disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might 

reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). A party seeking such 

disqualification “must show that, if a reasonable man knew of all the 

circumstances, he would harbor doubts about the judge’s impartiality.” 

Travelers Ins. Co. v. Liljeberg Enters., Inc., 38 F.3d 1404, 1408 (5th Cir. 1994) 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The objective standard 

relies on the “well-informed, thoughtful and objective observer, rather than 

the hypersensitive, cynical, and suspicious person.” Andrade v. Chojnacki, 

338 F.3d 448, 455 (5th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). “The review of a recusal order under § 455(a) is ‘extremely fact 

intensive and fact bound,’ thus a close recitation of the factual basis for the 

[party’s] recusal motion is necessary.” Republic of Panama v. Am. Tobacco Co., 

217 F.3d 343, 346 (5th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

We agree with Jackson that the district court improperly addressed 

the truth of her affidavit under section 144. In reviewing a section 144 motion, 

the district court must only pass on the sufficiency of the affidavit and not its 

truth. Patterson, 335 F.3d at 483. Judge Starr, however, expressly addressed 

the truth of Jackson’s affidavit—claiming, inter alia, that Jackson 

“misconstrues the positions that this judge advocated on behalf of his 

client.” Judge Starr then evaluated, contested, and corrected each section of 

Jackson’s affidavit. Instead, the district court should have stopped with this 

statement: “Instead of demonstrating personal bias, Jackson’s allegations are 

merely against the positions Texas advanced in litigation and state ‘no 

specific facts that would suggest that this judge would be anything but 

impartial in deciding the case before him.’” 

While we admonish the district court for addressing the truth of 

Jackson’s affidavit, contrary to the directives of section 144, we nevertheless

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conclude that it properly denied the recusal motion under both statutory 

provisions. Jackson did not state facts in her affidavit showing that the judge 

harbored an actual bias against Jackson under section 144 nor did she

demonstrate that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned

under section 455(a). Jackson cited to examples of the judge’s past legal 

advocacy in the course and scope of his employment for the State of Texas, 

during which the judge made statements reflecting solely the legal positions 

of his client, not his personal views. A lawyer often takes legal positions on 

behalf of his client that he may or may not personally agree with, and the 

statements made by Judge Starr when he was a Deputy Attorney General 

only involved pertinent legal issues; that is, they were interpretations of 

statutes, caselaw, and administrative rules and reflected no personal animus 

against LGBTQ people.

If the instant case involved the judge’s former employer or the same 

exact issue, recusal could be warranted. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(3) (requiring 

recusal where a judge previously served in governmental employment and 

expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in 

controversy); Panama, 217 F.3d at 347 (holding that the judge’s name listed 

on motion to file an amicus brief asserting allegations against tobacco 

companies similar to the ones made in the instant case against the defendant 

tobacco company may lead a reasonable person to doubt his impartiality). But 

the district judge’s prior participation in high-profile cases involving a group 

of people with which Jackson identifies, without more, is insufficient to 

support a finding of actual bias or an appearance of bias. See Higganbotham v. 

Oklahoma ex rel. Okla. Transp. Comm’n, 328 F.3d 638, 645 (10th Cir. 2003) 

(“It is, of course, an inescapable part of our system of government that judges 

are drawn primarily from lawyers who have participated in public and 

political affairs.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

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Additionally, the affidavit and exhibits submitted by Jackson indicate 

that Judge Starr answered, during the judicial confirmation process, that he 

would set aside his personal beliefs and apply binding precedent when asked 

about the legal treatment of LGBTQ individuals. His answers support the 

conclusion that he is committed to applying the law accordingly. Lastly, the 

judge’s support of Mateer’s judicial nomination does not amount to a 

support of Mateer’s statements or beliefs. We cannot say that the district 

judge’s decision not to recuse himself pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 

455(a) was an abuse of discretion. 

III. Motion to Dismiss

A. Standard of Review

We review de novo a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under 

Rule 12(b)(6). Powers v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 951 F.3d 298, 305 (5th Cir. 

2020). “The court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the 

light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Id. (citation omitted). A plaintiff must 

plead specific facts, not merely conclusory allegations to state a claim for 

relief that is facially plausible. Id. “A claim has facial plausibility when the 

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. 

(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “The factual allegations 

need not be detailed, but they must be enough to raise a right to relief above 

the speculative level, assuming all the allegations are true.” Id. (citing Bell 

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007)).

B. Legal Analysis

On appeal, Jackson argues that the district court erred in dismissing 

her § 1983 claims of municipal liability against Dallas County and Sheriffs 

Valdez and Brown in their official capacities. 

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To prevail against a municipality like Dallas County, a plaintiff must 

prove three elements: (1) Dallas County had a policy or custom, of which (2) 

a Dallas County policymaker can be charged with actual or constructive 

knowledge, and (3) a constitutional violation whose “moving force” is the 

policy or custom. World Wide Street Preachers Fellowship v. Town of Columbia, 

591 F.3d 747, 753 (5th Cir. 2009); see also Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 

U.S. 658, 694 (1978). To state a cognizable failure-to-train claim, a plaintiff 

must plead facts plausibly demonstrating that: (1) the municipality’s training 

procedures were inadequate; (2) the municipality was deliberately indifferent 

in adopting its training policy; and (3) the inadequate training policy directly 

caused the constitutional violations in question. World Wide, 591 F.3d at 756.

Jackson articulates two theories of municipal liability: (1) a policy of 

strip searching transgender detainees for the sole purpose of determining the 

detainee’s gender and classifying them solely on their biological sex, and (2) 

the failure to train and supervise employees to follow official policy 

prohibiting strip searches and the classification of transgender inmates solely 

on their sex assigned at birth. We address each theory in turn. 

i. Policy

A policy may be evidenced by “[a] policy statement, ordinance, 

regulation or decision that is officially adopted and promulgated by the 

municipality's lawmaking officers or by an official to whom the lawmakers 

have delegated policy-making authority;” or “a persistent, widespread 

practice of City officials or employees, which, although not authorized by 

officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well-settled as 

to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy.” Pineda v. City 

of Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Webster v. City of 

Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc)). “A customary policy 

consists of actions that have occurred for so long and with such frequency 

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that the course of conduct demonstrates the governing body’s knowledge and 

acceptance of the disputed conduct.” Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls, 614 

F.3d 161, 169 (5th Cir. 2010). To plausibly plead a practice “so persistent and 

widespread as to practically have the force of law,” a plaintiff must do more 

than describe the incident that gave rise to his injury. Peña v. City of Rio 

Grande, 879 F.3d 613, 622 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 563 

U.S. 51, 61 (2011)). A pattern requires similarity and specificity, as well as 

“sufficiently numerous prior incidents” as opposed to “isolated instances.” 

Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 851 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting 

McConney v. City of Houston, 863 F.2d 1180, 1184 (5th Cir. 1989)).

“[O]ccasional acts of untrained policemen are not otherwise attributed to 

city policy or custom.” Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 768 n.3 (5th 

Cir. 1984).

Jackson alleged that she was forced to be examined in 2016 and was 

misclassified in 2016, 2017, and 2018; and that Dallas County officers forced 

another transgender female detainee named C.W. “to undress, spread her 

buttocks, show the bottom of her feet and then put on male jail attire” in 

2013. Jackson also alleged that the officers stated to her: “Now our policy is 

we have to verify that you’ve had a sex change. If you have a penis, you’re 

going with the men. If you have a vagina, you’re going with the women,” and 

“That’s our policy. You can talk to Lupe Valdez about it when you get out.” 

She was also told: “It’s not uncommon for men that look like women to be 

sitting in the men’s section and vice versa. You’ll probably see some like you 

over there. You aren’t the first and you won’t be the last.” When she asked 

to remain in a certain area to avoid potential harassment from male detainees, 

an officer denied the request: “No, you’re going with the men because that’s 

what you are. You’re a man.” 

Because we must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view those 

facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we conclude that Jackson 

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sufficiently pleaded a policy of strip searching transgender detainees for the 

sole purpose of determining their gender and classifying them solely on their 

biological sex. Specifically, her complaint alleged that she and another 

transgender female detainee were forced to endure two strip searches for 

determining their physical sex characteristics and four instances of being 

classified based on their anatomy. Further, alleged statements made by 

county employees support the reasonable inference that other transgender 

detainees have been treated similarly; for instance, officers told Jackson that 

it was their “policy” to classify detainees solely based on biological sex and 

that “[y]ou aren’t the first and you won’t be the last” transgender person to 

be placed with detainees of the same biological sex. In other words, the 

statements suggest that the way Jackson was treated is the norm rather than 

the exception.

While it is true that the complaint alleged fewer instances than we 

have typically held are sufficient to survive post-discovery stages of a Monell 

claim in other contexts, Jackson is only in the early stages of litigation without 

the benefit of discovery. Cf. Peterson, 588 F.3d at 851–52 & n.4 (holding that 

27 incidents of excessive force in four years, “with no context as to the overall 

number of arrests or any comparisons to other cities” was insufficient to 

survive summary judgment on the custom theory). Further, we have affirmed 

the dismissal of Monell claims where the plaintiff had alleged only one or two 

incidents of unconstitutional conduct. See, e.g., Ratliff v. Aransas Cty., 948 

F.3d 281, 285 (5th Cir. 2020) (affirming dismissal of Monell excessive-force 

claim where “the complaint’s only specific facts appear in the section laying 

out the events that gave rise to this action”); Culbertson v. Lykos, 790 F.3d 

608, 628 (5th Cir. 2015) (finding no allegation of a widespread practice of 

retaliation where the plaintiffs alleged “there was a retaliatory campaign 

against them” but “offered no evidence that similar retaliation had 

victimized others”); Prince v. Curry, 423 F. App’x 447, 451 (5th Cir. 2011) 

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(affirming dismissal of municipal liability claims where the alleged “existence 

of only one or, at most, two other similarly situated defendants” or “of one 

or two prior incidents” do not “plausibly suggest that [the county] has a 

policy or custom of unconstitutionally subjecting sex offenders to enhanced 

sentences”).

Here, Jackson alleged that she and another transgender female 

detainee experienced multiple instances of strip searches and sex-based 

classifications. We also acknowledge Jackson’s point that the population of 

transgender detainees is relatively small, so the number of similar incidents 

alleged or possibly discovered later in litigation will likely be less than those 

in other municipality liability cases. Thus, construing Jackson’s allegations in 

a manner required for Rule 12(b)(6) motions, this is a close call that, at this 

stage of the proceeding, should have gone in Jackson’s favor. Although her

Monell claim “ultimately may not withstand a motion for summary judgment 

filed after discovery, or prevail at trial, neither scenario is determinative of 

this appeal.” Covington v. City of Madisonville, 812 F. App’x 219, 228 (5th 

Cir. 2020) (reversing dismissal of § 1983 failure-to-supervise claim based on 

the officer’s misconduct relative to plaintiff’s false arrest). Accordingly, the 

district court erred in concluding that Jackson did not plead a policy of strip 

searches and sex-based classifications of transgender detainees. 

Next, we address whether Jackson sufficiently pled that the 

policymaker of Dallas County had actual or constructive knowledge of the 

policy:

Actual knowledge may be shown by such means as discussions 

at council meetings or receipt of written information. 

Constructive knowledge may be attributed to the governing 

body on the ground that it would have known of the violations 

if it had properly exercised its responsibilities, as, for example, 

where the violations were so persistent and widespread that 

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they were the subject of prolonged public discussion or of a 

high degree of publicity.

Pineda, 291 F.3d at 330. Jackson alleged that either Sheriffs Valdez or Brown 

served as policy maker for Dallas County “in relation to the policies, written 

and unwritten, regarding detainees held in the custody of the Dallas County 

Sheriff’s Department and confined in the Dallas County jail.” Appellees do 

not dispute the identity of the policymaker, but they argue that no knowledge 

of a policy can be imputed onto the sheriff. We disagree. The complaint 

plausibly pled that the sheriff had actual or constructive knowledge of a policy

of strip searches and sex-based classifications of transgender detainees. In 

addition to the allegations regarding the frequency of these incidents and the 

officers’ statements made to Jackson, Jackson alleged that she filed a formal 

complaint after her first arrest; a local newspaper contacted the sheriff’s 

department about Jackson’s treatment; and the department informed the 

newspaper of a pending investigation and that the intake video was pulled. 

These pleaded facts support the reasonable inference that the policymaker 

should have known or been aware of such incidents occurring in the jail. 

Accordingly, the district court also erred in concluding that Jackson failed to 

plead that the county policymaker had actual or constructive knowledge of a 

policy of strip searches and sex-based classifications of transgender 

detainees.

However, there is no district court ruling for us to review on whether 

a municipal policy requiring the treatment described in the complaint would 

violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights; that is, the third element of a 

municipal liability claim. Thus, we remand for further proceedings so that 

the district court may fully address the constitutionality of strip searching

transgender detainees for the sole purpose of determining their gender and 

classifying them based solely on their biological sex.

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ii. Failure to Train or Supervise

When a municipal entity enacts a facially valid policy but fails to train 

its employees to implement it in a constitutional manner, that failure 

constitutes “official policy” that can support municipal liability if it 

“amounts to deliberate indifference.” Littell v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 894 

F.3d 616, 624 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 

388 (1989)). “‘Deliberate indifference’ is a stringent standard of fault, 

requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious 

consequence of his action.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 61 (quoting Bd. of Cty. 

Comm’rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997)). Thus, when a 

municipality’s policymakers are on actual or constructive notice that a 

particular omission in their training program causes municipal employees to 

violate citizens’ constitutional rights, the municipality may be deemed 

deliberately indifferent if the policymakers choose to retain that program. Id.

Deliberate indifference may be proven in one of two ways. Littell, 894 

F.3d at 624. First, “municipal employees will violate constitutional rights ‘so 

often’ that the factfinder can infer from the pattern of violations that ‘the 

need for further training must have been plainly obvious to the . . . 

policymakers.’” Id. (quoting Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10) (alteration in 

original). This proof-by-pattern method is “ordinarily necessary.” Id. 

(quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 409). Absent proof of pattern, deliberate 

indifference can still be inferred in a limited set of cases, where “evidence of 

a single violation of federal rights, accompanied by a showing that a 

municipality has failed to train its employees to handle recurring situations 

presenting an obvious potential for such a violation, [can] trigger municipal 

liability.” Brown, 520 U.S. at 409 (citing Canton, 489 U.S. at 390). This 

“single-incident” exception applies when “the risk of constitutional 

violations was or should have been an ‘obvious’ or ‘highly predictable 

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consequence’ of the alleged training inadequacy.” Littell, 894 F.3d at 624 

(quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 409).

Jackson attempts to establish deliberate indifference under the 

“pattern” theory, so we do not address the “single-incident” exception. See 

Adams v. Unione Mediterranea Di Sicurta, 364 F.3d 646, 653 (5th Cir. 2004) 

(“Issues not raised or inadequately briefed on appeal are waived.”). Again, 

we conclude that Jackson sufficiently pleaded facts that Dallas County 

employees conducted strip searches and classified transgender detainees 

solely on the basis of biological sex as to give rise to a widespread pattern.

Further, Jackson’s allegations that federal and county regulations prohibit 

searches of transgender detainees for the sole purpose of determining their 

genital status, yet employees conducted such searches regularly and called

them county “policy,” support the inference that Dallas County failed to 

adequately train its employees on how to process and screen transgender 

detainees in their jail facilities. Accordingly, the district court erred in 

concluding that Jackson failed to plead that the county’s failure to train 

amounted to deliberate indifference. 

But again, because there is no district court ruling for us to review on 

whether the county’s failure to train its employees caused the violation of a 

constitutional right, we remand for further proceedings so that the district 

court may fully address the constitutionality of strip searching transgender 

detainees for the sole purpose of determining their gender and classifying 

them based solely on their biological sex. 

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the denial of the motion to 

recuse, REVERSE the dismissal of the municipal liability claims against 

Dallas County and Valdez and Brown in their official capacities, and 

REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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