18-563

Singh v. Barr

BIA

A088 186 012

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER

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At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 

for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 

United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 10th day of September, two thousand twenty.

PRESENT:

ROSEMARY S. POOLER,

RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,

MICHAEL H. PARK,

Circuit Judges.

_____________________________________

KARAMJIT SINGH,

Petitioner,

v. 18-563

NAC

WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent.

_____________________________________

FOR PETITIONER: Jaspreet Singh, Jackson Heights, 

NY.

FOR RESPONDENT: Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney 

General; Anthony C. Payne, 

Assistant Director; Liza S. 

Murcia, Attorney, Office of 

Immigration Litigation, United 

States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC.
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UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 

is DENIED.

Petitioner Karamjit Singh, a native and citizen of India, 

seeks review of a February 12, 2018 decision of the BIA 

denying his motion to reopen. In re Karamjit Singh, No. A

088 186 012 (B.I.A. Feb. 12, 2018). We assume the parties’ 

familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

We review a denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of 

discretion. Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 168–69 

(2d Cir. 2008). When the agency considers relevant evidence 

of country conditions in evaluating a motion to reopen, we 

review its factual findings under the substantial evidence 

standard. Id. at 169.

An alien seeking to reopen may file one motion to reopen 

no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision. 

See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i). However, these time

and number limitations do not apply if the motion is filed in 

order to apply for asylum “based on changed country conditions 

arising in the country of nationality or the country to which 
3

removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and 

was not available and would not have been discovered or 

presented at the previous hearing.” 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). 

It is undisputed that Singh’s motion was number barred and 

untimely because it was his second motion to reopen, filed 

seven years after his removal order. 

The agency’s determination that Singh failed to establish 

a material change in country conditions is supported by 

substantial evidence. See Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 169; 

see also In re S–Y–G–, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253 (BIA 2007)

(explaining that in evaluating evidence of changed country 

conditions, the BIA “compare[s] the evidence of country 

conditions submitted with the motion to those that existed at 

the time of the merits hearing below”). The BIA considered 

Singh’s evidence, which consisted of news articles and 

reports describing general human rights conditions in India. 

His evidence showed some attacks on Sikhs both before and 

after his hearing and did not show worsened conditions for 

Sikhs and Khalistan supporters since the 2008 hearing. 

Accordingly, the agency reasonably concluded that the country 
4

conditions evidence was insufficient to demonstrate a change 

in conditions material to Singh’s alleged fear of persecution 

as a Sikh political activist. See 8 

U.S.C. 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) (requiring evidence of changed 

circumstances to be “material” to asylum eligibility); see 

also In re J-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 976, 981 (BIA 1997) (noting 

that an alien seeking reopening based on changed country 

conditions must show that the change will materially affect 

the basis of his asylum claim).

Singh argues that his personal statement that the police 

arrested his father in 2017 in an attempt to locate him is 

sufficient to establish changed conditions. But the agency 

was not required to credit that uncorroborated statement 

because Singh was found not credible in the underlying 

proceedings. See Qin Wen Zheng v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 143, 

146–47 (2d Cir. 2007).

Singh also argues that he is prima facie eligible for 

asylum despite the underlying adverse credibility ruling

because his current fear is based on a subsequent event (i.e., 

his father’s arrest). But as already noted, the BIA was not 

required to credit this statement. Id. In addition, the 
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factual predicate of Singh’s claim of future persecution was 

not independent from Singh’s previous testimony that was not 

found reliable. Singh alleged that his father was arrested 

because of Singh’s past political activities, but the IJ did 

not credit Singh’s testimony regarding his past political 

activities. Accordingly, in light of the IJ’s past adverse 

credibility ruling as to past persecution, Singh’s claim 

based on fear of future persecution is not viable. See Paul 

v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 154 (2d Cir. 2006). Given Singh’s 

failure to establish a material change in conditions in India, 

the BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying his motion as 

untimely and number barred. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), 

(C)(i), (ii).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and 

stays VACATED.

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 

Clerk of Court