The Newport Papers 

Gary Anderson 

I Colonel, u.s. Marine Corps 

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 

NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND 
BEYOND MAHAN 
Naval War College 

Newport, Rhode Island 

CENTER FOR NAVAL WARFARE STUDIES 

Newport Paper #5 

August 1993 

"The Newport Papers" series is a vehicle for distribution of substantial work 

by, especially, members of the Naval War College's teaching and research 

faculty and students. Papers are drawn generally from manuscripts not 

scheduled for publication either as articles in the Naval War College Review or 

as boks from the Naval War College Press but that nonetheless merit extensive 

distribution. Candidates are considered by an editorial board under the auspices 

of the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies. 

The views expressed in The Newport Papers are those of the authors and not 

necessarily those of the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy. 

Correspondence concerning The Newport Papers should be addressed to the 

Dean of Naval Warfare Studies. Requests for additional copies or for permanent 

distribution should be directed to the President, Code 32A, Naval War College, 

686 Cushing Road, Newport, Rhode Island 02841-1207. Telephone (401) 

841-2236 or DSN 948-2236, and fax (401) 841-3579. 
Beyond Mahan 

A 

Proposal for a 

U.S. Naval Strategy 

in the 

Twenty-First Century 

Gary Anderson 

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps 
Illustrations 

Preface ... 

I. Forward Presence 

n. Crisis Response . 

Contents 

m. Nuclear Deterrence and Recovery 

IV. Reconstitution . 

V. Conclusions. 

Glossary .. 

The Author . 

• \I 

· \Iii 

· 1 

13 

33 

37 

45 

49 

51 
Illustrations 

Force Composition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

MAGTF Mission Profiles and Strategic Niches . 

MPF Concept. . . . . . . . . . . 

Boundaries between Fleet CinCs 

Balanced Operational Navy-Marine Corps Staffs. 

Naval Expeditionary Force .......... . 

CentCom Naval Command during the Gulf War 

NEF Command of All Naval Forces in LBCA 

Overall Command Relationship . 

Flexible Objective Concept ... 

Alternative Focus of Effort Sites 

Seizing the Airport/Seaport Lodgement . 

Sequencing of Joint Forces into Theater 

Reconstitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

6 

7 

9 

11 

12 

20 

21 

22 

23 

27 

28 

29 

30 

41 
Preface 

The momentous events of 1989-1991 marked the end of the Soviet Union 

and, as a result, its threat to the interests of the free world. One of those 

free-world interests was-and is-the ability to use the planet's seas and oceans 

on all lawful occasions. Another is not to be threatened by hostile seaborne 

forces. 

Though most ships of the old Soviet fleet still exist, the political will to use 

them as the old rulers used them has vanished. Now an impoverished and 

geographically, demographically, and industrially reduced Russia has difficulty 

even in maintaining the visible shells of its former naval might. 

With its only rival at sea self-humbled, the United States now has unchallenged maritime superiority and, as part of that, presumptive blue-water sea 

control. Other nations may subject us to harassment at sea in a regional 

contingency, but any country's ability to build a serious blue-water challenge 

would take years and enormous expense. 

Alfred Thayer Mahan argued that control of the seas was a worthy goal, and 

he devoted most of his writing on how to achieve that end. Now that we hold 

unchallenged presumptive sea control, we must reach beyond Mahan's mark 

and develop new and appropriate ways to protect our country's interests. Most 

of those ways will be to affect people and events above the high-water mark. 

Late in 1991, the National Command Authority published a new national 

security strategy that stressed a regional rather than a global approach.} Shortly 

thereafter the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) issued a new national military strategy 

which also stresses a regional approach.2 The new military strategy has as its 

basis four fundamental legs: forward presence, crisis response, strategic deterrence, and reconstitution. This study examines the naval strategic contribution 

to each of those legs. 

Now more than half a decade old, the Goldwater-Nichols Act strengthened 

both the unified Commanders in Chief (CinCs) and the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. Its influence is becoming ever more apparent and is bringing 

about profound change in the way the U.S. naval services do business. Service 

chiefs are now providers of forces to the warfighting regional commanders. The 

underlying reality here is that Service strategic policy formulation, doctrine, 
and force structure are both more joint and more customer-oriented than before. 

The reality that they must continue on that course is explored in this study. 

Late in 1991, the Secretary of the Navy directed the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) to convene a 

naval force capabilities planning effort (NFCPE) to determine a new strategic 

direction for the naval services. The document that resulted is titled ..... From 

the Sea." It includes several bold new steps in designing a suitable naval strategy 

and its corresponding doctrine; however, it is merely a first step. Much more 

needs to be done if we are to succeed in creating a naval capability truly in step 

with the times. This study uses" ... From the Sea" as a departure point to make 

the recommendations that this author believes are necessary to flesh out that 

document and make the concepts found in it work. 3 

viii 
Forward Presence 

What Is Forward Presence and Why Do We Need It? Forward presence 

operations were once a "lesser included case" within the concept of a global 

containment policy. This policy was largely implemented through a strategy of 

forward defense against the threat of aggression from the Communist bloc. An 

extensive network of bases supported the forward deployments. Together they 

were regarded as our first line of defense against Soviet expansionism. While 

the regional stability that resulted from such endeavors was necessary to support 

the strategy, it remained a secondary consideration of that strategy. 

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent absence of a true global 

superpower threat ended the need for a worldwide containment strategy but led 

to the need for both regional national security and military strategies. The nature 

of this new environment is also characterized by a significant decrease in the 

availability of forward bases worldwide.4 However, U.S. planners realize that 

a strong forward presence is required in order to nurture stability on a regionby-region basis; hence, forward presence has become one of the four foundations of the new U.S. National Military Strategy.5 There are three major areas 

of endeavor in which forward presence will be vital to regional stability: 

Prevention. The old adage, "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of 

cure" is highly applicable here. Prevention is a function of deterrence plus early 

reaction. Should deterrence fail, early reaction can prevent a minor crisis from 

growing into a major one. Perhaps the most striking example of forward 

presence as a deterrent is the long-standing U.S. presence in Western Europe, 

which symbolizes resolve and the inevitability of immediate escalation should 

an act of aggression bring the perpetrator into direct conflict with the United 

States. During the early stages of the Cold War, the U.S. presence in Europe 

was used as a "trip wire" that threatened the Soviet Union with a massive 

nuclear response should it invade Western Europe.6 Later, more emphasis was 

placed on conventional forces and the concept of global forward defense.' With 
The Newport Papers 

the dissolution of the Soviet Union, many in the United States saw the potential 

to withdraw U.S. forces from Europe; interestingly enough, we are now finding 

that a U.S. presence in Europe as well as in other regions is still considered to 

be a stabilizing factor by regional leaders there. 

This is true also in the Middle East and the Pacific Rim, where continued 

U.S. presence encourages regional stability, perhaps because the United States 

often serves as an "honest broker" among the leaders of nations who are, by 

heritage, extremely suspicious of one another. 

How effective is deterrence? While it is always difficult to prove the negative 

case, we know that in areas such as Korea and Western Europe, where the 

United States has shown clear and unambiguous resolve, that resolve has never 

been tested. In 1950, when we led others to believe South Korea was outside 

our defensive perimeter and thus of little concern to us, the result was a costly 

war. In the summer of 1990, the United States sent ambiguous signals about 

what it might do if Kuwait were invaded by Iraq. And so, even though we had 

naval presence in the area, our resolve was tested quickly by Saddam Hussein, 

who mistakenly perceived a lack of resolve; and,just as in Korea in 1950, war 

resulted-a conflict that might otherwise have been avoided. The deterrent 

effect of forward presence is a function of the credibiility of that presence and 

the perception of resolve emanating from Washington. If either is perceived to 

be lacking, the deterrent effect is diminished. 

If a crisis cannot be deterred, there are situations in which the judicious and 

prompt use of forces forward will contain a crisis and prevent escalation. Some 

critics of the U.S. conduct of the 1975 Mayaguez crisis believe that the prompt 

use of U.S. force probably averted a long-term hostage crisis similar to those 

the nation endured following the capture of the USS Pueblo in 1968 and of the 

U.S. Embassy in Teheran in 1979. The use of non-combatant evacuation 

operations (NEOs) has almost certainly saved the lives of many American 

citizens over the years. In the last two decades, NEOs have been conducted by 

forward deployed naval forces in diverse places such as Vietnam, Cyprus, 

Yemen, Lebanon, Liberia, and Somalia. The general trend toward localized 

instability and problems of governance throughout the world indicates that 

NEOs will be conducted more frequently in the future. 

Although not generally associated with vital U.S. interests, the ability to use 

forward presence forces to conduct humanitarian operations has been a fortunate by-product of forward presence operations. Recent humanitarian operations in Somalia, Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Kurdistan have been 

successful in demonstrating an American commitment to, and rapid responsiveness in, helping friends in need. 

2 
Anderson 

The early use of our forward presence forces in Somalia and Iraq in late 1992 

and 1993 to react quickly to a developing crisis are good examples here. The 

traditional forward presence mix of carrier battle group, ARG/MEU, and MPS 

were the initial naval components of the U.S. response. 

In addition, the active participation of U.S. military forces in the war on drugs 

has become a prominent element of forward presence in several regions. The 

United States is now gaining enough experience in these operations to develop 

a sense for the kind of skills and force structure needed in each region. These 

operations appear to work well in areas where we have chosen to apply them 

(and they are exhibiting benefits that outweigh the costs). 

Access to Resources and Markets. Another argument for conducting 

forward presence operations to preserve stability is that it protects continued 

U.S. access to resources and ensures stable markets for U.S. trade. It is unfair 

to say that the United States went to war in 1991 solely to ensure access to 

Middle East oil. Nevertheless, if the oil supply were under the control of a 

hostile power, the U.S. strategic-economic position would be severely undermined. There is no way to prove that the Gulf war could have been prevented 

by a more aggressive and visible forward presence in that region, but there is a 

growing body of evidence to substantiate that the prevention of a crisis is critical 

to preserving the economic well-being of a nation. Professor Richard N. 

Cooper, a Harvard economist and pioneer of this premise, reasons that there 

was a direct correlation between the 1991-1992 recession and the crisis in the 

Gulf.8 The point to be made here is that avoiding a crisis saves money by 

avoiding the kind of recessionary impact which Professor Cooper discusses. 

By concluding that a crisis led to recession in the Gulf case, Professor Cooper 

indirectly begs a comparison with the absence of recession in 1987-1988 when 

the United States forcefully and decisively reflagged Kuwaiti tankers and 

adequately protected them with an enhanced U.S. forward naval presence. 

Despite several shooting incidents, no real crisis evolved, and no recession 

creating oil price hikes resulted as it did in 1973 and 1979 when real or imagined 

oil supply crises occurred. It would appear that the perception of stability can 

be as important as its actual existence. 

In the Far East, stability is considered a vital regional issue. Public 

pronouncements of leaders such as Lee Quan Yew of Singapore stress that 

fact.9 The point is made even more forcefully by people from abroad who visit 

the United States or live here for business purposes. The Japanese are particularly concerned with sustaining an ongoing U.S. presence to preserve regional 

stability.IO Nations in that part of the world that are mutually suspicious 

maintain bilateral security agreements with the United States. This tends to 

ameliorate local animosities and suspicions. These bilateral agreements and the 

3 
The Newport Papers 

presence of the U. S. Seventh Fleet and other U. S. military units tend to temper 

regional antagonisms. 

But what good does this stability provide the U.S. taxpayer? The answer is, 

regional stability encourages regional prosperity. The Economist recently observed-as have many other news media-that the Far East is the fastest 

growing economic market in the world. 11 This is crucial to American workers 

who desperately seek overseas markets for their products; the markets exist, 

and it behooves us to invest in their growth. In 1991, U.S. exports to the region 

grew by 20 percent.12 That figure is expected to continue increasing as U.S. 

manufacturers seize opportunities to cater to the newly affluent Far East 

consumers. Stable foreign markets mean jobs at home. 

In the Third World, coalition-building is perceived as a slow, long-tenn 

process. The bilateral alliances that the United States has built in both the 

Mid-East and the Far East are considered by some as the seeds of future standing 

regional coalitions. However, the potting soil for those seeds is U.S. forward 

presence. Without that presence, with its web of bilateral arrangements, 

regional security mechanisms will probably not sprout. This long-tenn investment in regional security will eventually enable us to greatly reduce the naval 

forces committed to these regions as our presence is replaced largely by 

coalition partners. Unlike the immediate and precipitous flight from forward 

presence advocated by some, this long-tenn plan will avoid our having to 

"reinvent the wheel" as we have done again and again in the Middle East and 

Europe. The current evolution of Nato into a coalition in which U.S. troops will 

not be the primary military force did not occur quickly. Coalition-building is a 

long-tenn investment. 

This concept for regional security requires patience in addition to the 

long-tenn approach to coalition building. It also requires a short-tenn investment in continued forward presence, which will ultimately pay off handsomely 

if handled properly. The use of forward-deployed U.S. forces to encourage 

long-tenn multinational confidence-building measures is a low investment for 

a future with high return potential. In both Korea and Europe, U.S. forces have 

provided both the nucleus around which successful security structures have 

been built and the glue to hold them together. Our current ability to draw down 

U.S. forces is a measure of success, not retrenchment. 

The key to this long-tenn process of using our web of bilateral agreements 

to build future coalitions is the participation of forward presence forces in 

bilateral exercises. Many of these exercises are naval in character. USCentCom, 

in particular, is being extremely innovative in its use of the Marine expeditionary unit, special operations capable (MEU[SOC]), with its associated amphibious ready group (ARG), as a non-intrusive tool for conducting an 

4 
Anderson 

aggressive bilateral exercise program in its area of concern, while simultaneously encouraging multilateral exercises as a step toward regional collective security. In this manner, the advantage of coalition building becomes a 

welcome by-product of an already needed forward presence mission. 

Is Forward Presence Really Vital? How important is forward presence compared to crisis response? We may liken presence to the cop on the beat deterring 

crime on the scene, and crisis response to a police policy that, from a centralized 

location, reacts to a crime in progress. It is much less expensive to prevent a 

crisis than it is to react to one. Of course, if a crisis erupts anyway, one must 

act swiftly and forcibly. The events in the Persian Gulf in 1990-1991 illustrate 

this. Neither forward presence nor crisis response is more important than the 

other, and neither is complete without the other. 

The Naval Aspects of Forward Presence. The announced policy of the U.S. 

military for the next decade is to reduce overseas basing while simultaneously 

maintaining an active forward presence in those regions where it is vital to U.S. 

national securityY The most obvious candidate for carrying out most such 

missions will be our naval forces; by naval, we speak of both Navy and Marine 

Corps forces. A look at the proposed composition of forces articulated in the 

new National Military Strategy confirms this, as outlined in figure 1. 

Speaking to the staff of II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) in Okinawa 

in 1989, shortly after he asumed command, Lieutenant General (then Major 

General) H. C. Stackpole il stated the need for forward presence forces to be 

credible, sustainable, and flexible.14 That statement remains relevant today, 

although given today's technology, this does not necessarily mean a large 

ground force. The new National Military Strategy does not necessarily call for 

our forces to defend forward, but it definitely rejects the notion that such forces 

be a mere "trip wire."ls General Carl Mundy, Commandant of the U.S. Marine 

Corps, foresees that these naval elements will provide the capability for U.S. 

joint reaction forces to respond in a timely fashion should deterrence or 

containment of a crisis fail or should a disaster require rapid, self-sustained 

relief forces.16 This enabling function provides impetus to the concepts of 

credibility, sustainability, and flexibility articulated by Lieutenant General 

Stackpole. For example, in 1990, Marine Corps maritime prepositioning forces 

(MPF) provided the first credible and sustainable U.S. ground forces in Saudi 

Arabia. Within twenty days of the beginning of the deployment, over 33,00 

Marines, complete with armor and aircraft, were deployed in Saudi Arabia with 

thirty days of supplies and equipment. Some of these supplies sustained Army 

and Air Force units until their supplies arrived in September. The basic 

5 
The Newport Papers 

Force Composition 

n.n BASEmB�E 

I Strategic 

Bombers 8-52 + B-1 B-S2H + B-1 + B-2 

Missiles 1000 550 

SS8Ns 34 18 

I Any I Active 16 Divisions 12 Divisions 

Reserve 10 Divisions 6 Divisions 

Cadre 2 Divisions 

� Ships 530 (IS CV8Gs) 450 (12 CV8Gs) Supports Forward 

Active 13 Air Wings 11 Air Wings Deployed Forces. 

Reserve 2 Air Wings 2 Air Wings 

I USMC 

Active 3MEFs 3MEFs One MEF Forward 

Reserve 1 D1vlslon/Wlng 1 Divlsion/Wlng Deployed; others In 

support 

I Air Force I Active 22FWE ISFWE 

Reserve 12FWE 11 FWE 

CVBG: Carrier Battle Group MEF: Marine Expeditionary Force FWE: Fighter Wing Equivalent 

Source: Adapted from draft document of the National Military Strategy. September 1991. 

Figure I 

capabilities required to introduce these key concepts into each of the three 

regions are listed below. 

Credibility. Because of the general need to gain and maintain air superiority, 

and given our desire to reduce overeseas basing, it is necessary to keep an 

aircraft carrier (or its equivalent) in each of the three vital regions. But, as a 

result of the demise of the fonner Soviet Union and the resulting reduced threat 

to our carriers, in most cases the number of escorts that each carrier needs may 

be reduced. 

The presence of a carrier battle group or a similar capability is as much a 

political signal of U.S. interest in the region as it is a military instrument. This 

visible manifestation of U.S. power and resolve reassures allies and keeps 

potential adversaries warned of the consequences of their actions. For the near 

tenn, an aircraft carrier group, or a like capability, along with an ARG/MEU 

(SOC), and an MPS appear to be the bottom line of forward presence in the 

Mediterranean, Persian Gulf region, and WestPac. 

Flexibility. The flexibility necessary to implement the National Military 

Strategy from a forward presence perspective resides largely in the capability 

of the ARG/MEU(SOC). The eighteen mission profiles of the MEU(SOC) are 

listed in figure 2. These mission profiles allow the MEU(SOC) to contribute 

substantially in responding quickly to a minor crisis before it becomes 

6 
Anderson 

MAGTF Mision ProfIles and Strategic Niches 

Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) [MEU(SOC)]. The MEU(SOC) is 

the Marine Corps' primary instrument for forward presence operations. Aside from being forward 

deployed to demonstrate U.S. interest and resolve in a region, it has the capability to car out 

the following mision profiles in order to protect U.S. interests by quickly dealing with. or 

containing, a lesr regional contingency: 

• Amphibious raids 

• Limited objective attacks 

• Reinforcement operations 

• Deception operations 

• Fire support control operations 

• Counterintelligence operations 

• In extremis hostage rescue 

• Non-combatant evacuations (NE0s) 

• Tactical recovery of aircraft and 

personnel (TRAP) 

• Military operations in urban 

terrain (MOUl) 

• Security operations 

• Show of force 

• Civil Afairs operations 

• Clandestine recovery operations 

• Specialized demolitions 

• Shipboarding operations 

• Electronic warfare operations 

• Gas/oil platfonn seizure 

(Although not a SOC capability, MEUs can asist in the conduct of humanitarian asistance 

operations.) 

Source: Data from advertised Marine Capabilities in Headquarters u.s. Marine Corps publications. 

Figure 2 

uncontrollable. The capability to conduct opposed NEOs is particularly attractive in an era of increasing governance problems. 

Although not currently listed as among the missions to be performed by an 

ARG/MEU(SOC), such a force can conduct humanitarian asistance/disaster 

relief operations as shown by the Bangladesh episode in 1991 and that in 

Somalia in 1992-1993. This sea-based capability gives U.S. policymakers 

greater flexibility than alternative options do. 

In addition, the ARG/MEU (SOC) can use the flexibility offered by sea-basing 

to begin building multilateral military cooperation from the existing web of 

bilateral agreements in the Middle East and the Pacific Rim. The non-intrusiveness offered by sea-basing allows the ARG/MEU(SOC) the versatility to exercise 

at sea and in the air with one partner, while conducting an amphibious exercise 

with another in an overall coalition-like manner, without forcing the potentially 

contentious issues that would emerge in conventional multilateral ground 

exercises. 

SustainabiJity. The fmal leg of this forward presence triad is the capacity to 

sustain forces up front during the initial stages of a crisis. In this respect, 

sustainability becomes the first manifestation of the enabling bridge between 

7 
The Newport Papers 

forward presence and crisis response. It is not limited to the expertise of naval 

forces to sustain themselves; it also facilitates the capability to support other 

forces flowing into theater in the early stages of a crisis, such as in 1990 when 

Marine and Navy forces logistically supported Anny and Air Force units 

extensively during the first week of Operation Desert Shield.17 

Having sustainable forward deployed forces in regions where we have vital 

interests will provide special challenges in an era of dwindling forward basing. 

In a speh in Indonesia on 30 April 1991, then U.S. Secretary of Defense 

Richard Cheney reaffinned that the United States would look for means other 

than basing to support forward presence operations.18 Commander Barry 

Coombs of the Naval War College has investigated this area and maintains that 

"while current basing is adequate for peacetime forward presence operations, 

surge or extended operations may be difficult to support from the logistics 

standpoint. Innovative solutions for logistics support to combat forces are 

required in view of basing losses. These solutions may rest in expanded 

prepositioning, increased Navy use of strategic sealift and contract commercial 

asts, stronger host nation support (HNS) agreements, or in enhancing the 

scope of the Combat Logistics Force ... 19 

The maritime prepositioning force (MPF) program provides one of the key 

elements in General Mundy's enabling bridge concept. Although the entire MPF 

operation can best be viewed as a crisis action mechanism, the fact that the ships 

of the maritime prepositioning squadrons (MPS), which actually car the heavy 

equipment for the MPF, are forward deployed in the region, makes MPS a de 

facto forward presence aset. Figure 3 is a description of the MPF concept for 

readers not familiar with the program. To fully demonstrate its capability, the 

MPF should be exercised frequently as part of the overall U.S. program to 

support alliances and bilateral agreements. 

In forums and war games conducted since the end of the Gulf War, there has 

been a general consensus among strategic thinkers that had the maritime 

prepositioning squadron (MPS) from Diego Garcia ben moved early in the 

crisis before the invasion of Kuwait, the signal of U.S. resolve, with adequate 

attendant publicity, might have altered the Iraqi course of action. It is true that 

there is some question whether the Iraqis were capable of accurately assesing 

MPF capability in order to properly read the signal. Both of these arguments 

point toward more aggresive use of the MPF as a forward presence tool in 

non-crises. An extensive program of exercise offloads would demonstrate the 

program's capability in defensively reinforcing threatened friends as well as its 

ability to enhance our offensive amphibious capability. Both U.S. Commander 

in Chief Pacific Command (USCinCPac) and U.S. Commander in Chief CentralCommand (USCinCCent)have embarked on such programs.2O 

8 
Anderson 

MPFCONCEPT 

J. R. Nunes, j. 

Source: Redrawn from U,S. Marine Corps Operations Handbok 1-5. 

Figure 3 

What Is New in the Regional Approach? Thus far in this discussion, naval 

forces in the new world order probably look much like naval forces in the Cold 

War. On the surface, this is true; the day-to-day capabilities that are needed in 

a region to cover the range of stability requirements that have been discussed 

do appear familiar, but surface appearances can indeed be deceiving. During 

the Cold War, it was necessary for our forces to be reasonably concentrated in 

order to be prepared for battle, which theoretically could have erupted at any 

time. Carriers generally needed constant escort, and they maintained a high 

level of combat readiness at all times. Day-to-day, region-by-region, the 

situation has changed. A much higher degree of independent steaming is 

allowable, and carriers will not require all the combat capabilities of a CBVG 

all of the time. 

A higher degree of independent steaming will allow naval forces to "show 

the flag" in more ports and in more peacetime exercises than was previously 

possible, while continuing to maintain the preparedness of naval force packages 

that are necessary to concentrate quickly to deal with brewing crises. Some 

9 
The Newport Papers 

planners liken this capability to a soccer game where well-drilled team members 

spread out to play their positions until a friendly scoring opportunity or 

opposition threat requires a combination of players to deal with the situation. 

Once the situation has pased, the players resume their original positions. Figure 

4 illustrates this concept. 

The playing field in figure 4 is superimposed on a map that transcends two 

CinCs' boundaries in order to show the need to make boundaries between fleet 

CinCs much more permeable than they have been?l This is a fundamental 

change occurring since the Goldwater-Nichols military reform legislation 

pased in the mid-eighties. The regional warfighting CinCs are the employers 

of forces, while the Services act as providers. The Services would be ill-advised 

to put themselves in a position of telling the warfighting CinC that he cannot 

have a certain force package in a timely manner due to geographic internal 

Service constraints; thus, the requirement for increasing permeability of boundaries. 

Finally, regionalization may well mean that forward presence force packages 

can be closely tailored to suit regional peculiarities. For example, an MEU(SOC) 

in the Middle East may be built around mobile assets, such as the light armored 

vehicle, to allow for substantial distances which may have to be traveled over 

the ground. In addition, the absence of a high-intensity Soviet air and submarine 

threat may, in most regions, allow for a greater number of attack aircraft aboard 

carriers (at the expense of ASW aircraft) in order to counter the criticism in 

some quarters that the Navy did not bring enough "air-to-mud" capability to 

the theater during Operation Desert Storm. Some regional situations may 

actually allow us to combine functions of the ARG and CBVG or the ARG and 

MPS should the need arise. 

The Role of Naval Forward Presence in Alliance Maintenance and Coalition-Building. Naval forces play an extensive role in maintaining our alliances 

and bilateral agreements worldwide. The majority of this effort is in the form 

of comprehensive exercise programs, the size and scope of which vary from 

region to region. Given the demise of the Soviet Union as a superpower threat, 

Nato exercises in Europe can be expected to decrease. The number of bilateral 

exercises in the Middle East, particularly in the Persian Gulf, has expanded 

exponentially as a result of the 1991 war. In the Pacific, we can expect the 

number of exercises to remain steady or even increase in the event we begin 

doing bilateral work with the Russians. We have not designed regional force 

structure around exercise programs, but in the future we need to ensure that we 

have sufficient assets to participate fully in exercises that support alliances and 

bilateral agreements. This is particularly important in the Middle East and 

10 
Anderson 

Boundaries Between Fleet CinCs 

J,A. �uoes, Jr 

Source: Redrawn from Secretary of the Navy draft Force Capabilities Planng Effort, dated February 

1992. Concept introduced by Colonel Mike Strickland, USMC. 

Figure 4 

Pacific Rim where we are attempting to build our web of bilateral agreements 

into lasting, standing multinational mechanisms. 

Recommendations. The naval services must develop, for each of the unified 

CinCs, forward presence force packages sufficient both to maintain stability in 

their region and to assure the CinCs that they can count on the naval share of 

these forces that would be needed to handle crises should such arise. The mix 

of capabilities will be distinctive to each region. The variables will include 

forces for drug interdiction and for exercises in support of alliances and bilateral 

agreements. However, in the three regions deemed to be of vital interest to the 

United States, several core capabilities are essential. These are: a CBVG-like 

capability on station constantly or nearly so; an ARG/MEU(SOC)-like capability; 

and an MPS and suitable afloat forward sea-based sustainability. The last of 

these is necesary to support the transition to crisis response. 

Each region should have a standing expeditionary naval headquarters in 

order to furnish the necessary local expertise for command and control of naval 

expeditionary forces (NEFs). Such headquarters, which would replace the 

current numbered fleets, would consist of balanced operational Navy-Marine 

Corps staffs as outlined in figure 5. Command would alternate between Navy 

11 
The Newport Papers 

Balanced Operational Navy-Marine Corps StatTs 

I Cine I I CIaC I 

NEF NEF 

COMMANDER COMMANDER 

NED 

COMMANDER 

I I 1 

SEA MANEUVER LAND MANEUVER SEA MANEUVER LAND MANEUVER 

ELEMENT ELEMENT ELEMENT ELEMENT 

SUPPORT SUPPORT 

ELEMENT ELEMENT 

Source: Redrawn from February 1991 draft Force Capabilities Plang Effort (unpublished White Paper). 

This draft eventually resulted in M ••• From the Sea, published by the Secretary of the Navy late in 1992. 

FIgureS 

and Marine Corps officers. The staff would have a heavier regional politicalmilitary orientation than today's numbered fleets. 

As illustrated on the left of figure 5, the naval expeditionary force, with its 

thre primary elements, would be organized administratively and for combat 

in a major regional contingency. For day-to-day forward presence operations 

it would use deployed naval expeditionary task forces as shown on the right of 

the diagram. Each could be a miniature representation of the NEF, although 

some might look like the conventional ARGs, MPS, and carrier battle groups 

that we deploy today. In all cases, they would employ a "blue-gren" staff mix. 

Finally, boundaries between fleet CinCs should become much more permeable, and standardized doctrine should be developed at a joint naval (NavyMarine Corps) doctrine center. 

12 
Crisis Response 

Desert Storm Is Not Necessarily the Future. In 1967 the Israeli anned forces 

easily defeated the combined forces of their Arab opponents in a six-day 

campaign. For six years thereafter, Israel was generally considered to be the 

premier military power in the Middle East; most observers felt that the Arabs 

lacked the technological sophistication and military skill to challenge the 

Israelis seriously. The Egyptians and Syrians did not accept this evaluation. 

They carefully gathered lessons learned from the 1967 war and used the 

advantages of emerging technologies to overcome the qualitative Israeli superiority in tank and air crews. The Israelis had become complacent, and they paid 

the price for their overconfidence. 

In a surprise attack in 1973, the Egyptians and the Syrians struck. Using 

anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles and well-drilled assault troops, the Arabs 

crossed into territory occupied by the Israelis and established bridgeheads that, 

for a time, they succeeded in defending.22 Although the Israelis rallied from 

their initial suprise and achieved a tactical and operational victory, the strategic 

results led to peace talks that constitute what the Arabs have always considered 

to be a moral victory. 

23 

Just as in 1967, the U.S. -led coalition victory over Iraq in 1991 is viewed by 

some in the United States and abroad as a seminal event in military history and 

the beginning of an era of unchallenged U.S. military superiority. To accept 

this viewpoint without reservation may well be as dangerous as was the postwar 

Israeli overconfidence in 1967-1973. 

We must assume that potential future adversaries, the Iraqis included, will 

refuse to accept the verdict of Desert Stonn as conclusive proof of unchallenged 

U.S. military superiority. We must asume further that these potential future 

adversaries are studying the 1991 results as carefully as the Egyptians and 

Syrians studied those of 1967. 
The Newport Papers 

How would an opponent such as Iraq attempt to deal with us by learning 

from Desert Shield and Desert Storm? His first moves would probably be 

political acts to deny us basing and overflight rights from neighbors of his 

intended victim. This would foreclose our ability to repeat our long force 

buildup in Saudi Arabia prior to Operation Desert Storm. Next, an aggressor 

would be well advised to accumulate sufficient "state-of-the art" technology to 

deny us sea control near his littoral waters to ensure that we cannot get close 

enough to conduct power projection, particularly in the form of amphibious 

operations. If a future opponent could replicate a modem technological 

equivalent of the kind of point defense that the fortifications of Charleston, 

South Carolina, provided during the Civil War-and Charleston was the 

Union's greatest naval frustration of that war-he might well put U.S. leaders 

in a situation where the price to be paid exceeds the value to be gained through 

military action.24 He would also mine nearby choke points, such as the Strait 

of Hormuz, which we would need to get U.S. forces to the theater. He would 

probably try to preemptively attack the ports and airfields through which we 

would attempt a DesertShield-type buildup. This might be done through the 

use of special operations, chemical weapons, or even nuclear weapons. Jamming or otherwise denying us the satellite communications links so vital in 

Desert Shield and Desert Storm would be a logical step as well. Once the United 

States is denied a base of operations in the area, the aggressor could pick off 

his victim and attempt to consolidate his gains quickly, before we could react. 

He could hope to render a U.S. response too expensive to contemplate. We must 

consider how we would have reacted in Saudi Arabia had access to Dhahran 

and Jubail been denied us. In the case of an Iraqi or Iranian action, it might well 

be that a diplomatic settlement extorted from the Gulf Cooperation Council 

states would effectively freeze us out of the Middle East. 

The Naval Dimension. With the possible exception of the first step, the 

worst-case adversary strategy described above would be aimed at denying us 

both the naval bridge to, and the door into, the theater of operations. In all 

probability, most potential adversaries realize that they probably cannot stand 

up to the array of power that faced Iraq after six months ofU .S. military buildup 

in Saudi Arabia. Considering that, they probably will not even try to do so; thus, 

the strategy of denying us the buildup in the first place. Given the choice 

between negotiations on unfavorable terms or having to fight their way back 

into the theater, some players simulating the U.S. national leadership in seminar 

war games on this subject have chosen to negotiate at unfavorable terms to U.S. 

and allied interests, with all of the negative implications of so doing. Stated 

simply, we surrendered.25 

14 
Anderson 

Given current amphibious ship decommissioning projections, it is conceivable that if the u.s. forces on the ground were overrun early, we would not have 

enough amphibious assault or follow-on shipping to re-enter the Arabian 

peninsula between the years 1997 and 200. 

In either case, the protection of our enabling bridge into the theater, or the 

need to "kick down the door" should that bridge be disrupted, is primarily a 

naval function. The capabilities needed will be endangered if we shape the 

post-Cold War Navy as we shaped it to meet a blue-water threat. The results 

of Desert Stonn indicate that our naval littoral capability needs considerable 

work if it is truly to become the naval focus of effort in the coming years. Our 

capability to clear mines in a timely manner was shown to be woefully 

inadequate.26 Similarly, our ability to conduct strike operations from aircraft 

carriers in support of ground troops was far below that required. Further, our 

shallow water antisubmarine warfare capability is currently por-to-nonexistent. Finally, as we have seen, our ability to enter forcibly anywhere will be 

uncertain if present amphibious force projections are not improved.27 

At all costs we should ensure that our naval forces can provide our national 

leaders with viable and acceptable options with which to overcome the kind of 

strategic challenge posed by the hypothetical enemy described above. 

The Desert Storm That Did Not Happen. In Washington today, it is 

fashionable, particularly among Congressional thinkers, to expres future force 

structure in Desert Stonn equivalents. This is a convenient budgetary tool; in 

strategic tenns, however, these equivalents mean little if our naval enabling 

bridge is disrupted before we enter into a Desert Stonn-type position. The 

ability to prevent that from happening is not only a function of numbers of ships, 

it is also a function of the kinds of ships we have. We must ensure that among 

them will be enough with the capabilities for intelligence and command and 

control infrastructure. That depends on decisions in the fields of strategy, 

doctrine, and force structure. 

The Civil War Analogy. The U.S. Navy's great sea control conflict was World 

War II. In the Pacific, the Navy battled a Japanese fleet that in the early stages 

of the war came very close to victory and that remained a fonnidable threat 

until the last year of the conflict. In the Atlantic and European theaters, the 

Gennans opposed the Allies with a naval force designed more to deny us free 

use of the sea than to use it themselves. Much the same was true in World War 

I. In the Spanish-American War, although the Spanish fleet was second-rate, 

the United States Navy was forced to deal with it before undertaking other 

military operations. When sea control is not presumptive, all other requirements, 

15 
The Newport Papers 

including power projection, will be hazardous until the issue of sea control has 

been resolved. 

When sea control is presumptive, it is a different matter entirely. Sea control 

can be presumed when the foe either has no ability to contest control or does 

not wish to risk its forces in such a contest. We fought our war with Mexico, 

the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the war with Iraq with at least 

presumptive sea control. The difficulty has been in translating sea power into 

action capable of directly influencing events ashore. The United States has 

normally addressed this issue through a combination of blockade and power 

projection. 

The United States enjoyed presumptive sea control during the Civil War, 

although in a different way from some of the cases discussed above because, 

for the most part, the United States had to acquire its advanced bases by taking 

them from the enemy. Once that was done, Union naval forces could begin to 

influence events ashore. In Vietnam, Korea, and in Desert Shield and Desert 

Storm, the United States had unopposed acces to bases ashore very close to 

the fighting fronts. In the future, the United States may fmd itself in a situation 

more resembling that of the Civil War than those of more recent times. 

In the Civil War, the purpose of the naval expeditionary campaigns was to 

influence directly events ashore; this meant that the targets for naval campaigning were primarily on land. Realizing this, Confederate strategists hardened the 

most obvious landing locations with field fortifications, built ironclads, and 

depended on mobile reserves to deal with Federal attempts at deep amphibious 

operations such as the Peninsula Campaign. 

From the perspective of the U.S. strategists, the two primary tools of the 

Federal Navy during the Civil War were the blockade and the amphibious thrust 

to seize key points and to tie down Confederate troops. Though relying on 

advanced bases usually seized from the foe, blockading was mainly an outgrowth of sea control, whereas Federal power projection efforts were primarily 

naval expeditionary efforts, using the Army as the ground part of the effort. 

There were three primary methods of reducing the Confederate point 

defenses. The first was to pound them into submission, which worked at 

Port Royal and Fort Henry but failed at Charleston and Fort Donelson. Next 

was to run by them and-if necessary-attack them from the rear, as was done 

at Mobile Bay and New Orleans. The third method was to land troops where 

the Confederates were weak and envelop the target from another direction. This 

was accomplished at Vicksburg but failed in the Peninsula Campaign. 

The parallel with the present situation is three-fold. First, the Union's leaders 

in the Civil War faced a situation in which they obtained presumptive sea 

control with a force structure largely designed for a different mission. The 

16 
A nderson 

orientation of the Union Navy at the start of the Civil War was predicated upon 

harasing operations at sea against a superior foe, presumably Great Britain.28 

It was incumbent upon the Union naval commanders of the Civil War to grow 

a new force. Similarly, as we enter the post-industrial era, we also have a force 

that is not entirely appropriate for the strategic situation we face. While we are 

in a position to downsize, we are challenged to deal with presumptive sea 

control using a force structured to do something else. 

The second parallel to the Civil War concerns our need to project power over 

vast distances into areas where we do not have bases. 

A third parallel concerns major technological change. The Confederates 

attempted to challenge the presumptive Union sea control with torpedoes 

(mines), ironclads, and improved shore-to-ship gunnery. The Union responded 

with technological innovations of its own. By war's end, the United States had 

a naval force well suited for littoral warfare on a grand scale, a navy which, 

once the Confederacy had been destroyed, it quickly scrapped in favor of one 

more suited to traditional U.S. naval missions.29 

The main difference between our situation and that faced by the Union is 

that the Union was confronted by a coherent threat to its survival. Although any 

threat to us is incoherent in the extreme, the two situations have an overarching 

parallel in that each, in its own way, represents a key turning point in the way 

U.S. naval forces do business. 

The Union's leaders responded to the challenges of the Civil War with 

innovations in strategy, tactics, and interservice cooperation, many of which 

were born of desperation. Cooperation with the Army was probably better in 

that conflict than it was prior to the war, and it was not nearly as good again 

until World War II. The navy accepted two key missions. The first was purely 

strategic, in the form of a naval blockade that eventually played a key supporting 

role in breaking the South's will to fight. The second was power projection. 

The blockade became increasingly effective and was a major factor in the 

South's eventual collapse. It was made possible by presumptive Union sea 

control, a presumption that was never seriously challenged during the course 

of the war. To be sure, Southern raiders such as the CSS Alabama were an 

expensive annoyance, but Navy Secretary Gideon Welles wisely kept the focus 

of effort on the blockade despite strong pressure by Northern commercial 

interests to do otherwise. This presumptive sea control would have been 

overturned by British entry into the war; fortunately (since it might well have 

been decisive in the favor of the Confederacy), that did not come to pas. 

The Confederacy made several attempts to challenge the blockade with ironclad 

technology; the most notable of these was highlighted by the Monitor-Merrimac 

confrontation. Such clashes made headlines when they occurred, but the U.S. 

17 
The Newport Papers 

public and Congress generally presumed Northern sea superiority. Similar 

conditions prevailed in the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and in the recent 

Gulf war. In those instances, sea control would never have been truly appreciated unless it had been lost. 

Most of the Civil War naval battles took place when the Union attempted to 

project power against the shore. In this regard, that war was perhaps more like 

World War n in the Pacific than it was to Korea, Vietnam, or the recent war in 

the Gulf. Sea power had to be applied against the shore in areas far removed 

from the bases the United States had. The primary difference between the 

Pacific War, the Civil War, and our situation today is that in the Pacific War 

there was a powerful opposing fleet. Necessarily, all other naval force structure 

was secondary to that needed to win sea control. For the most part, this force 

structuring formula was applied during the Cold War due to the sea denial threat 

posed by the Soviet Navy. The limited wars previously mentioned, which were 

fought under the Cold War umbrella (Desert Storm included), were lesser 

included cases that were fought using the active sea control force structure. 

The primary strategic thrust of Union planning was to develop a two-phased 

approach to power projection campaigns. The first phase was to seize an 

advanced base deep in Confederate territory. In some cases, such as at New 

Orleans, Union forces "kicked down the door" in order to create their advanced 

bases. On the Peninsula, the Union Navy landed General George B. 

McClellan's army where the enemy was not, and it built up a logistics base from 

scratch in a manner similar to the current Navy-Marine Corps "over-thehorizon" concept. 

Unfortunately for McClellan, he found that getting ashore is only half of the 

equation; once ashore, the ultimate objective must still be obtained. Former 

Secretary of the Navy James Webb pointed this out forcefully to naval planners 

during his tenure, and the observation remains valid today. The key point here 

is that Union naval supremacy made it possible for the Union army to begin 

operations far from its own bases. 

One of the most striking aspects of the rapidly evolving Union strategy 

during the Civil War was the way in which it forced jointness upon often 

unwilling participants. Some combinations of commanders did it better than 

others. General Ulysses S. Grant and Admiral David D. Porter eventually found 

the proper joint mix, but it was not done without a number of false starts.30 In 

the absence of a developed amphibious doctrine, and lacking the robust Marine 

Corps amphibious capability developed in the twentieth century, Army and 

Navy planners improvised as best they could. The end result was not pretty, but 

it generally got the job done. 

18 
Anderson 

The LiUoral Battle Space Control Area (LBCA). During an era of singlesuperpower naval superiority, as in the Civil War, the door through which we 

choose to project sea power ashore and transfonn it into effective actions on 

land is the point at which most naval battles will occur. This area includes the 

point at which we choose to place forces ashore, and the area needed to build 

these forces into a true joint warfighting capability, as well as the sea, air, and 

space areas adjacent to this landward requirement. If this description sounds 

similar to that of the traditional amphibious objective area (AOA), the similarity 

is deliberate; it is the essence of the shift from a blue-water to a littoral naval 

strategic focus. 

One tenn that might be applied to this expanded area is the "battle space." 

In order to stress the sea-air-shore aspect of the problem, it is preferable to refer 

to it as the littoral battle space control area (LBCA). This area can be envisioned 

as being far larger than the traditional AOA, for it must accommodate all the 

operations of a naval expeditionary force, including its aircraft carriers. 

The LBCA is envisioned as the naval component commander's zone of action 

within the overall battle space controlled by the CinC, sub-unified commander, 

or joint task force commander. If naval forces are first on the scene, the LBCA 

might well include the CinC's entire battle space. As other forces enter the 

theater through the bridge and door provided by naval forces, the LBCA would 

shrink to a size adequate to accommodate the seaward (predominately Navy) 

and landward (predominately Marine Corps) operations of the naval forces. 

The Naval Expeditionary Force. The commander of the regionally oriented 

naval expeditionary force command element, which was designed to manage 

forward presence in chapter 1, would become the naval operational commander 

in a major regional contingency. The NEF, as originally envisioned by the 

NFCPE, is outlined in figure 6. As ajoint Navy-Marine Corps staff, this element 

would coordinate the overall naval warfighting effort in the theater. The NEF 

commander would be an officer of either the Marine Corps or Navy, as 

appropriate, and he would command and control all the aspects of the landward 

and seaward sectors of the LBCA. This would avoid the confusing and potentially disastrous command relationships of Operations Desert Shield and Desert 

Stonn, as shown in figure 7. It would replace them with a cleaner configuration, 

as shown in figure 8, with the NEF commander in charge of all operational 

warfighting naval forces. CA TF/CLF planning relationships remain, using new 

names, but this new relationship is more easily translated into joint tenns. The 

littoral battles pace control area is the naval component commander's AOR. This 

relationship is much more easily understood than the AOA. It also eliminates 

the argument over service versus functional componency. In either situation, 

the Naval Component Commander (NCC)owns all naval forces. 

19 
The Newport Papers 

Naval Expeditionary Force 

CIDC 

NEF 

COMMANDER 

I I 

SEA MANEUVER LAND MANEUVER 

ELEMENT ELEMENT 

SUPPORT 

ELEMENT 

Source: Redrawn from NFCPE Report (Quantico: Marine Corps Wargaming and Asent Center, 

1992). 

FIgure 6 

Figure 7 is a rough approximation of the naval command relationships in the 

CentCom area of responsibility during the Gulf war. The landward area of what 

could be called the littoral zone belonged to the commanding general of I MEF, 

the warfighting operational Marine commander, who was also dual-hatted as 

the Marine component commander. Commander, Seventh Fleet, was the 

Navy component commander as well as the Navy warfighting commander. He 

had two Marine expeditionary brigades and one MEU under his command 

afloat. There was no one in charge of the overall littoral effort. The fmal decision 

not to conduct an amphibious landing was made at a conference involving 

ComMarCent, ComNavCent , and CinCCentCom (General Norman 

Schwartzkopt). 

The command relationship in figure 8 has the NEF commander in charge of 

all naval forces in the LBCA. His Marine Corps subordinate (land maneuver 

element commander) commands forces ashore, while his Navy subordinate (sea 

maneuver element commander) commands those afloat. A supporting element 

renders logistical (less combat service) support to both. A naval component 

commander would remain with the CinC to asist in political-military and 

strategic planning. He would be the senior naval officer in theater; as such he 

would be responsible for joint strategic naval planning as well as strategic 

logistics. The command relationship is shown in figure 9. 

20 
CentCom Naval Command during the Gulf War 

• As-Samawah 

IRAQ 

While 

• Brown 

FOB Cobra. • 

• Rochambeau 

De facm boundary 

as shown on ofcial 

Iraqi and Saudi maps 

(alignment apximate) . 

• An-Nasiriyah 

SAUDI ARABIA 

Boundary representations are not necessarily authorittive. 

Source: Redrawn from DoD Title V Report to Congres on the Gulf War, April 1992. 

Figure 7 

Anderson 

IRAN 

J.R. NIl,., Jr. 

The Naval Component Commander. One of the primary criticisms of the naval 

conduct of Operation Desert Storm was of the lack of a strategic naval 

representative in the CinC 's headquarters at RiyadhY The warfighting tacticaJjoperational commanders of both the Navy and Marine components were 

dual-hatted as component commanders. This arrangement was both difficult 

and confusing. At the same time, the commanders of the Navy 's Pacific Fleet 

and the Marine Corps' Fleet Marine Corps Pacific were relegated to the status 

of providers of forces and monitors of the situation; this was a far cry from their 

active operationaJjstrategic roles in World War II. This situation repeated itself 

in Operations Sea Angel and Fiery Vigil, the humanitarian relief operations in 

Bangladesh and the Philippines respectively. The Marine Corps has reacted to 

this situation by designating the commanding general of the Fleet Marine Force 

21 
The Newport Papers 

NEF Command of All Naval Forces in LBCA 

• As·Samawah 

IRAQ 

White 

_ Brown 

FOB Cobra- -

• Rochambeau 

De fact:I boundary 

as Ihown on oIfidai 

Iraqi and Saudi mapa 

(aliglment apximate) . 

• An-Nasiriyah 

SAUDI ARABIA 

Boundary representations are not necesly authoritative. 

Source: Redrawn from DoD Title V Report to Congres on the Gulf War, April 1992. 

Figure 8 

IRAN 

L.BCA 

LBCA 

J.R. Nu ... Jr. 

Pacific as the Marine component commander for the Pacific Command 

(paCom) and Central Command (CentCom) contingencies. 32 The Navy has 

designated a separate Navy component commander for CentCom. CinCPacFleet remains the Navy component commander for PaCom. A single designated 

naval component headquarters is needed to handle naval componency issues. 

Separate component and operational commanders are not needed in all cases. 

Lesser regional contingencies such as NEOs and humanitarian operations may 

not require such arrangements. The naval component commander would free 

the NEF commander from the burden of regional strategic planning and allow 

him to concentrate on operational matters. 

It would be best if the Navy and Marine Corps were to combine the staff of 

the two fleet CinCs with those of the two Fleet Marine Force headquarters into 

two super-CinCs (CinC Naval Forces Atlantic and CinC Naval Forces Pacific) 

in order to create a joint naval headquarters. This headquarters would provide 

forces to the unified CinCs on a day-to-day basis as well as develop a series of 

22 
Anderson 

Overall Command Relationship 

I CinC I 

Naval Component 

Command 

Naval 

Expeditionary 

Force 

Figure 9 

deployable Navy-Marine Corps naval component command battle staffs to 

handle the forward supporting plans as well as naval component issues in a 

theater during contingencies. Navy and Marine Corps flag officers would rotate 

in command; the notion that one has to be a qualified ship' s commanding officer 

or a regimental commander to do strategic or operational planning at the joint 

level in our new littoral naval environment is no longer supportable. As the NEF 

commander assumes the function of the naval operational commander, the 

naval component commander becomes the chief naval strategist in the theater. 

An NEF commander fights at the operational level of war. The ability to plan 

and operate in a joint and combined environment will take precedence over 

ship-handling or MEF tactical skills. 

Naval Aviation Integration. The integration of naval (Navy and Marine Corps) 

fixed-wing aviation arose late in 1 991 as a result of the desire on the part of the 

OpNav staff to ensure that enough aircraft were available to provide a full air 

wing to each of the carriers envisioned in the base force.

33 This was to be 

accomplished by assigning some Marine Corps squadrons aboard carriers. This 

has been done before and some Marines see it as a way to ensure that Marine 

aviation support to troops ashore comes early in a littoral amphibious campaign. 

There are serious issues, however, that need to be resolved before integration 

is implemented. 

The first issue involves the command philosophy of the carrier air wing and 

23 
The Newport Papers 

its staffmg. Many Marines, and not a few sailors, point out that there must be 

a quid pro quo; in a littoral environment they feel that asigning Marine 

squadrons to carrier air wings (CVWs) commanded exclusively by Navy 

officers is both unfair and unwise. If the emphasis is littoral, Marines are going 

to need to learn to do carrier operations better, and Navy pilots must get better 

at air-to-mud work. A truly integrated command and staff arrangement is 

appropriate. These Marines argue that the composition of the CVW staff should 

be Navy-Marine and that command should rotate on a "blue-green" basis. This 

author agrees. 

If we are to develop a truly better naval support of ground forces and a more 

joint orientation in general, Marine Corps command and staff expertise is 

essential to the CVW's ability to plan and execute this improved support. Marine 

aviators are trained to understand ground tactics and combined arms warfare; 

the more senior officers will have attended other service schools as well. In 

addition, many Marine aviators have served exchange tours with ground units. 

They will be excellent facilitators for "purpling" the CVW. In this manner, the 

true "naval air wing" can be formed for effective carrier air support of littoral 

operations. By the same reasoning, Navy aviators should be given some of the 

same cross-training opportunities as Marines. 

A second major issue that must be addressed before real naval aviation 

integration can be realized is the need for naval aviation to go ashore in an 

expeditionary environment; as the littoral battle moves inland, this will be an 

ongoing requirement. If the CVW needs to be backfilled to replace aviation units 

that have gone ashore, procedures must be devised to accommodate that. We 

need also to address the matter of "yellow gear," the equipment at air bases and 

in carriers needed to support an aviation unit ashore. Marine ground support 

equipment is expeditionary, while comparable Navy equipment generally is 

not. If that fact were to be allowed to govern action, it would lead to the carrier's 

Marine Corps squadrons being dispatched when aviation is to be based ashore, 

while the Navy squadrons stayed afloat. But aviation ground support equipment 

aboard the MPF ships and T-AK aviation support ships can support the Navy's 

squadrons ashore. Navy squadrons from carriers not deployed to the crisis area 

would then backfill the carrier. In Desert Storm, six carriers were deployed. 

This means that if the base force figure of twelve carriers holds true for forward 

presence rotation, and six remains an adequate figure for crisis response, there 

will be six carriers capable of backfilling the Marine aircraft sent ashore. Such 

an arrangement is acceptable for short regional contingencies. A large threat 

would require reconstitution as outlined in chapter IV. 

24 
Anderson 

Naval Deep Strike Capability. In this era of littoral warfare, how much deep 

strike capability does the United States Navy need? This is an area in which we 

have not yet reached a consensus. Many people believe that the maximum limit 

is 500 nautical miles; others hold that 1 80 is sufficient. The strike radius from 

carrier-based aircraft should extend to the farthest landward boundary of the 

LBCA. If the LBCA is to be extended beyond an agreed-upon range limit for 

carrier-based aircraft, landward bases must then be procured inside the LBCA 

to do so. TLAMs or Air Force aircraft should be used for special strikes beyond 

naval aircraft range. The concept here is that the range should fit the battle space 

of the force. This requires study by a joint air-ground group in order to determine 

how deep "deep enough" really is. 

The other key question for fixed-wing aviation is "How much technology is 

enough?" Do we need stealth now that the Soviets are no longer around to 

upgrade air defense technology significantly? Perhaps we would be better off 

to skip production generations of technology if there is no threat on the horizon 

to challenge significantly what we have now. The current proposal to use F- 14 

airframes to replace the aging A-6 appears to be a reasonable fix until we see 

a threat on the horizon that will warrant development of a follow-on. This issue 

is dependent on our being able to give the F- 14 an all-weather attack capability. 

Perhaps now is the time to propose interest-bearing "seed bank" accounts to 

Congress, allowing the services to store money saved by skipping generations 

of new aircraft and then permitting them to buy a truly revolutionary system in 

sufficient numbers when it is really needed. 

Joint Forces Air Component Command (JFACC). The IFACC was one of the 

most difficult issues to emerge from Operation Desert Storm after-action 

review. The Defense Department after-action report on the war in the Gulf 

called for more interoperability between the Navy and other U.S. armed service 

components and for attempts to centralize coordination of aviation efforts 

between them.34 The degree to which centralization is needed varies from 

contingency to contingency; Operation Sea Angel, the humanitarian asistance 

operation in Bangladesh, did not need nearly the degree of centralization 

required of Operation Desert Storm. However, when complicated centralization 

is needed, the requirement is immensely difficult; Lieutenant General H.C. 

Stackpole ITI pointed out recently that the Navy does not have the capability to 

run a Desert Storm-type IFACC at sea without taking a major Navy platform 

(i.e., CV or LCe) out of combatant status.3S This is a grave deficiency for our 

naval forces if we are to use them as command posts for joint operations. 

25 
The Newport Papers 

Emerging Nal1al Litoral Warfare Doctrine. How would a naval littoral 

campaign work as an enabling bridge for a joint operation? What follows is a 

view of how naval doctrine for such operations should emerge. 

Phase I. Achieving Superiority in the Littoral Battle Space Control 

Area. The LBCA can be defined as the land, sea, air, and space area requiring 

our control in order to ensure that an enemy can

ot foil any proposed naval 

operation of ours. The square (or cubic) mileage will vary depending chiefly 

on the size, technological sophistication, and military capability of our opponent. 

If we contemplate only an MPF offload to reinforce a threatened ally, the job 

will be easy initially; it would probably entail bringing in sufficient naval forces 

to protect the offload. Ifthe enemy chooses not to interfere, the operation might 

well end at Phase I. If Operation Desert Shield had caused Saddam Husin to 

abandon Kuwait in the fall of 1990, the situation would have been roughly 

analogous to the successful Phase I stand-alone effort. However, the joint 

enabling role played by naval forces in the events leading up to the great 

offensive of Desert Storm is probably a more predictive model for a Phase I 

operation in a major regional contingency. Naval forces provided the early air 

power, credible land power, and joint sustainment for the early phases of the 

crisis. During the buildup phase, sealift provided the vast majority of sustainment. 

If entry into the theater needs to be forcible, Phase I becomes the precursor 

to a standard amphibious operation. Control of the LBCA may well require a 

substantial air-sea-space battle. The use of the word space here is not used in 

an attempt to appear overly visionary. We need control of space to ensure that 

such seemingly simple factors as unhindered use of our satcom links remain 

presumptive; we would not assume that a future opponent will be as accommodating as Saddam Hus

in in that regard. (National assets can provide space 

control, but such control must be a valid as

umption in establishing LBCA 

control.) If an amphibious operation is needed, the LBCA will need to include 

a number of enemy port and airfield complexes within its boundaries as 

potential objectives to keep the opposition uncertain of the actual objective. If 

we are to utilize truly the spirit of maneuver warfare, we will also keep the 

actual objective flexible as well. Figure 10 outlines the concept. 

The most fundamental change in naval warfare occurs in phase I. Control of 

the LBCA will not be a lesser included naval requirement in the future; it will 

be the primary rationale for naval force structure. Sailors and Marines who 

cannot accept that development will not be competitive in a rapidly changing 

joint warfighting environment. 

26 
<l 

U 

CD --' 

o 

I 

25 

I 

50 

I 

Miles 

Anderson 

Flexible Objective Concept 

1 00 

I 

150 

I 

Sufficient sea space to protect carriers and 

amphibious ships 1rom shore·based weapons 

systems. Landings are over-the-horizon 

operations. 

LBCA 

rCD 

o 

» 

The LBCA consists of the sea, air, land, and space area required to ensure that naval operations 

can be conducted without enemy interference. If an amphibious operation is involved, the LBCA should 

include at least two, and preferably more, port/airfield complexes in order to confuse the enemy as to 

the ultimate objective. 

J.R. Nunes. Jr. 

Source: Redrawn from Marini! Corps Gauni!, vol. 76, no. 6, June 1 992, p.40. 

Figure 10 

Phase II. Probing for the Seams. If presumptive blue-water sea control is 

the major strategic change of the new world order, the LCAC-LAV-helicopter 

(LLH) team may well be the great operational breakthrough. As used here, the 

tenn "helicopter" includes the medium lift requirement (such as the V -22) as 

well as existing helicopters. In the past, not only were our choices of places to 

land restricted, but once our forces had been deposited ashore, they were 

committed to their beachhead both physically and psychologically. We could 

try to land where the enemy was not, but we were committed even if we guessed 

wrong. The LLH team has changed all of that. Now, we can launch multiple 

probes toward a series of widely separated objectives. We can then choose from 

among them the landing sites we want. If a landing site proves to be unproductive, 

27 
The Newport Papers 

o 

I 

25 

I 

50 

I 

Alternative Focus of Effort Sites 

� Probe 

� 

Miles 

r 

[D 

o 

}> 

The probing stage is characterized by the use of a number of probes by LCACs carrying LAVs and 

supported by helicopters to ensure that beaches and landing zones are reasonably clear of opposition. 

If that is not the case, these reconnaissance assets can be quickly withdrawn. In this way, the best focus 

of effort can be determined. 

Source: Redrawn from Marine Corps Gazene, vol. 76, no. 6, June 1992, p. 40. 

Figure 11 

J.R Nunes, Jr. 

we can disengage much more readily than we were able to do in the past. Figure 

11 illustrates this concept. 

Moderately productive sites can be used for deception, for supporting 

attacks, and as candidates to shift the focus of effort to as the situation dictates. 

This allows us to keep the enemy off balance, unsure of our actual objective, 

and reacting to our previous move as we begin the next. The LLH team becomes 

the moral equivalent of the swift German reconnaissance forces that made the 

blitzkrieg concept so successful by fmding and exploiting seams in enemy 

defenses in order to allow other forces to flow through in what Liddel Hart 

called a "raging torrent." 

Pbase il. Seizing tbe Lodgement. Once a fmal airport/seaport lodgement 

has ben selected and a focus of effort determined, it can be seized from a 

direction that wi1l most disrupt our opponent, as outlined in figure 12. This 

28 
o 

I 

25 

I 

Seizing the Airport/Seaport Lodgement 

50 

I 

Miles 

Anderson 

Having secured a temporary lodgement, the landing force builds up combat power and strike toward 

the main objective from unanticipated directions. 

J.A N ... Jr. 

Source: Redrawn from Marine Corps Gal.ene, vol. 76, no. 6, June 1992, p. 41. 

Figure 12 

fast-moving, hard-hitting attack will be facilitated by air-delivered precisionguided munitions (PGMs), Tomahawk-type missiles (TLAMs), and deep strikes 

by Air Force stealth aircraft against targets which, though outside the LBCA, 

might interfere with our operation by means of long-range capabilities or 

fast-moving reserve forces. Better maps than we now have are necessary to 

accomplish all of this. 

Phase IV. The Joint Raging Torrent. Once we are established ashore, we 

can introduce war-winning joint forces into theater. This means that naval 

forces will allow the introduction of Army and Air Force packages capable of 

providing the hammer to end the conflict on terms favorable to the United States 

and its allies, as was done in Operation Desert Storm where the MPF capability 

was a major joint enabler in the early Desert Shield phase. Early response is a 

naval forte, as is continued seaborne sustainment. 

29 
The Newport Papers 

We must make this transition more seamlesly connected than it was in 

Desert Storm. This sequencing of joint forces into the theater should be done 

in a maner that does not allow the opponent opportunity to organize his forces 

or plans. He must be kept "sightles" and continually reacting to our previous 

move as we proceed with our next. Figure 13 illustrates this concept. We fully 

expect that naval forces will contribute to the war-winning hammer, but we 

expect this phase to be one where AirfLand Doctrine takes the lead. 

<t: 

U 

m 

-' 

o 

I 

25 

I 

Sequencing of Joint Forces into Theater 

Heavy Reinforcement 

Once the fi nal lodgment is secure, the joint torrent operation is launched to move to conflict 

termination with terms favorable to the U nited States and its allies. This sequencing must be 'seamless' and relatively rapid ; in other words, more rapid than that of enemy's capability to react. 

J.A. Nunes. Jr 

SOUTce: Redrawn from Marine Corps Gazette, vol. 76, no. 6, June 1992, p. 41. 

FIgure 13 

Phase V. Turning Out the Lights and Closing the Door. As in the Gulf 

war, we can expect naval forces to be the first to go in and the last to leave. The 

integrity of the LBCA must be maintained until it is no longer required. When 

everyone else has gone home, the Navy-Marine Corps team must continue to 

30 
Anderson 

provide the forward presence that will reinforce the lessons of the 1990-1991 

Gulf crisis and minimize the chance of a reccurrence.36 

So What Is Really New? For the most part, things will not really change that 

much for Marines. The Marine Corps was well on its way toward an over-thehorizon doctrine in coordination with our amphibious brethren in the Navy long 

before the momentous events of 1989-1991. The real change will be in naval 

force structure and doctrine. By switching our focus from blue water to the 

littorals, Navy officers will need to commit themselves to new challenges such 

as mine countermeasures, shallow-water anti-submarine operations, and the 

integration of joint air operations in the maritime environment. Our next 

Nimitzes and Halseys may well look more like Farraguts and Porters. We may 

truly find the future in the past. 

Recommendations. There will be those in the Navy and Marine Corps who 

view the following recommendations as heretical. Some of the recommendations result from issues proposed by the Naval Force Capabilities Planning 

Effort that resulted in " ... From the Sea"; others are those proposed but 

considered to be too radical for inclusion in that document's recommendations; 

and others are the author's own. 

Doctrine. The naval services should develop a joint Navy/Marine Corps 

doctrine center with rotating command to build littoral doctrine.37 The Marine 

Corps currently has a doctrine center, and the Navy is developing one under the 

cognizance of CinCLantFleet in Norfolk. However, that is merely a beginning. 

Separate, independent, Navy-Marine entities will not do the job. We must "bite 

the bullet" and become naval in the Navy-Marine sense of the word if we are 

ever to become truly joint. Moves in this direction are occurring as this is being 

written. 

Naval Expeditionary Force (NEF) Capability. The NEF should become 

the primary naval operational warfighter in major regional contingencies. 

Develop a True Naval Component for the Unified CinCs. Combine the 

existing Navy and Marine component staffs in the Atlantic and Pacific into 

Naval Forces Lant and Pac. Structure the staffs as joint Navy-Marine organizations and rotate command between Navy and Marine flag officers. 

Mine Countermeasures (MCM). First, the Navy must develop a truly 

mobile and capable MCM capability. That means being able to get the assets to 

where they are needed in a timely manner. This is an area where capabilities 

may be centrally pooled for dispatch to a crisis area as needed. Although the 

LLH team affords a better capability than traditional landing craft for avoiding 

mined areas in amphibious operations, we cannot rationalize away the requirement 

31 
The Newport Papers 

to clear mines effectively from key areas such as ports and choke points when 

the occasion demands it. We will need to use the ports eventually. It may well 

be necesry to explore better ways of integrating Coast Guard capabilities into 

this effort under overall naval cognizance. 

Shallow-Water Antisubmarine Warfare. Sometimes it will be esntial to 

be able to destroy enemy submarines in shallow water. Perhaps it will be 

posible to use emerging technologies to conduct these operations. Like the 

minesweeping capability, these asts need not be forward deployed on a 

constant basis; however, they do need to be rapidly deployable. This area ranks 

with MCM as a high priority challenge. 

Improved Defense against Anti-Ship Missiles. The point defense aspects 

of littoral warfare demand constant improvement in this area. 

Joint Forces Air Component Command (JFACC) at Sea. Naval forces 

must be able to do this without taking a platform out of combatant status. We 

currently do not have CVs or LCes to spare. It may be that this capability can 

be poled for dispatch to the crisis area as needed. 

Protection of Satcom Capabilities. This may not be entirely a naval 

responsibility, but our naval forces should participate fully in the mechanisms 

being developed to ensure the integrity of our entire command and control 

infrastructure in any theater. 

Improved Sea-Based Logistics Capability. Strong emphasis should be 

placed on sea-based logistics and strong host nation support agreements that 

are well insulated from political-military disruption by potential theater adversaries. However, the long-term goal of naval contingencies should be to carry 

and store all logistics afloat, transferring items and materiel to other ships and 

commands ashore as needed. 

32 
Nuclear Deterrence and Recovery 

What Has Not Changed. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and much that 

followed, a thennonuclear exchange between the United States and Rusia is 

more unlikely than ever. Still, the Russian Federation remains the only nation 

on earth capable of destroying the United States. Consequently, the United 

States retains a "strategic" nuclear deterrent of which the ballistic missile 

submarines of the United States Navy are the most survivable portion. They 

can expect to remain so until developments render them unnecessary. The last 

such development may be a long time in coming. 

What Has Changed. As the threat of a superpower nuclear exchange has sunk, 

the threat of regional nuclear proliferation and use has risen. Because the United 

States does not yet have a finnly stated policy on these issues, it is difficult to 

predict the Navy's future role in this field. Indeed, the line between "strategic" 

nuclear deterrence and regional conventional deterrence is fuzzy. Some U.S. 

experts argue strongly for an across-the-board policy of no proliferation and 

masive retaliation for any first use anywhere, even if this means unilateral 

action by the United States in situations where vital U.S. interests are not 

threatened. This is intended to send a strong message against nuclear proliferation. Not everyone shares this view. 

It is clear that there has been proliferation on the part of lesser powers. Four 

of the fonner Soviet republics have nuclear weapons. Despite promises and 

strong international pressures to move those weapons to Rusia, as of this 

writing, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and the Ukraine have not done so. There have 

even ben pres reports that Kazakhstan has sold a nuclear weapon to Iran. In 

addition, Pakistan appears to have a nuclear capability to rival that of India. 

These alanning developments make urgent the rapid development of antiproliferation regimes, but there is no consensus as to the fonn that those regimes 

should take. 
The Newport Papers 

Weapons Security and Accountability. This is a major problem in the 

former Soviet republics. Although there is reasonable asurance that "strategic" 

weapons are accounted for, there is no similar asurance of an accurate count 

of "tactical" nuclear weapons. U.S. naval forces may well be called upon to 

provide expertise in this area, to participate in international teams of inspection, 

or to contribute consultants in support of future arms control agreements. Some 

believe that the likelihood of a nuclear accident in both the former Soviet Union 

and the Third World is increasing. Should one occur, U.S. naval forces, 

particularly the ARG/MEU(SOC)s and the MPF capability in some form may be 

called upon to conduct humanitarian asistance, disaster, relief, or radiologist 

decontamination operations. This has implications for both logistics and training. Similar accidents with chemical weapons may also lead to a call for help. 3

8 

Furthermore, there is a very real possibility of nuclear use or accident in our 

future. 

Proliferation Easier to Deal with Than Post-Proliferation. Proliferation 

is the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a state or other actor previously without 

them. Post-proliferation problems that treat the threatened use of nuclear 

weapons or decisions about what to do with them are even more difficult than 

managing the proliferation stage itself. Once a weapon is produced, it is difficult 

to find and deal with, whereas production means and suppliers are easier to cope 

with when proliferation is occurring; this does not mean that this is an easy 

process, as demonstrated by U.S. and UN experience in Iraq and Korea. The 

Israeli air strike on an Iraqi nuclear reactor in 198 1 exemplifies a successful 

action during the proliferation stage. The discussion concerning the difficulty 

of confirming the existence of a Kazakhstan-supplied Iranian bomb, as well as 

the debate about what to do about it, outlines the problems of post-proliferation. 

One thing seems certain, naval forces are likely to be the military response of 

first consideration in a proliferation or post-proliferation crisis. An MEU(SOC) 

raid, TLAM strike, or naval air strike are the most likely on-scene options for 

immediate use. Other naval options range from support of human intelligence 

and reconnaissance to the use of aircraft carrier battle groups and amphibious 

forces as a show of force or strike force, if required.39 

The Problems of Preemption. It is difficult to determine how best to 

preempt the firing of a nuclear weapon by a Third World power, even if a 

ready-to-shoot weapon were found. Moreover, not many people, either before 

or after the event, are likely to be enthusiastic about conducting a preemptive 

nuclear attack to dissuade the firing of such a weapon by a Third World actor. 

The naval instruments of preemption would be the same as those we use today 

for dealing with crises and providing forward presence and strategic deterrence. 

34 
Anderson 

Naturally, one turns to the thought of mounting an overwhelming conventional as

ult on such an actor, but one must question whether such an asult 

would prevent or would encourage the weapon's possessor to fIre it. It is clear 

that our human intelligence in such situations must get much better. So must 

our knowledge of how naval forces can support human intelligence activities. 

Retaliation. The threat of retaliation to punish the perpetrator of a nuclear 

attack and to deter further conduct of this nature is also a matter for concern. 

But again, it is unclear whether retaliation should be nuclear, conventional, or 

should be contemplated at all. Normal naval forces would have a key role in 

supporting either conventional or nuclear retaliation. The primary challenge in 

an era of reduced U.S. force structure would be to ensure that the forces retain 

the capability to conduct such operations. 

The United Nations and other Collective Regimes. After a long period of 

indifference, this subject has regained life. The need for some degree of 

long-range seaborne logistical support, particularly from Military Sealift Command (MSC) vessels, seems to characterize most of the new thought on this 

subject. None, however, require forces or techniques not already in the inventory. 

Observations. The evolving nature of nuclear deterrence may make the very 

idea of "strategic deterrence" obsolete, replacing it with a concept that runs the 

gamut from deterring Rusian nuclear use to supporting international anns 

control regimes. To do any such thing at all, will, of course, require policy 

decisions; however, naval leaders will be required to monitor developments 

closely, because the forces they command will be required to play a significant 

role in virtually every policy enforcement action that can reasonably be contemplated. 

Recommendations. The area of standard nuclear strategic deterrence is one 

where the new world order may actually be less complicated than the old. Naval 

forces will simply be doing the same thing in the future that they have in the 

past, but they will be doing less of it. However, an entirely new set of policy 

and strategy imperatives may arise in response to Third World nuclear proliferation. Most of these will not require radically new naval capabilities. However, 

the following recommendations are in order. 

Support for Human Intelligence Collection and Reconnaisance. In this 

area, forward deployed naval forces must strive constantly for improvement. 

Target information will be the absolute first priority in both proliferation and 

post-proliferation operations. We must improve naval capabilities in both joint 

35 
The Newport Papers 

operations and operations in conjunction with national intelligence asts. This 

includes naval support of special operations forces. 

Radiological and Nuclear Weapons Expertise. We must work on our 

ability to do radiological decontamination on short notice to ensure that it does 

not atrophy. This includes our ability to do so in both combat and humanitarian 

situations. As part of our preemption capability, as well as to contribute to 

nuclear safety operations, we must be able to rapidly deploy teams capable of 

disarming or disabling nuclear devices. These teams need not necesrily be 

made up of naval personnel, but they will have to fit in with MEU(SOC) or SEAL 

methods of entry and withdrawal. In this regard, we should explore the possibilities of virtual reality technology as a way of providing technical expertise 

to remote locations without the physical presence of the technician.4O 

Global Protection against Limited Strikes (GPALS). The shipboard compatibility of anti-ballistic missile systems should also continue to be a priority 

subject of study. We canot count on land-based Patriot systems in all situations. 

Humanitarian Capabilities in Nuclear Disasters. The ability of U.S. naval 

forces to react to a nuclear disaster in a timely and effective manner should be 

reviewed. This is particularly true in the case of reconfiguring the modules 

being developed for MPF ships for low-intensity conflict or humanitarian 

asistance operations. Although not truly a deterrent, this capability may well 

be the military option most likely to be used, given the notoriously low safety 

standards for nuclear facilities in places such as the former Soviet Union. 

36 
IV 

Reconstitution 

This Is Not the End of History. The events of 1989- 199 1, which signalled the 

end of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, and a superpower naval threat to the 

United States and it allies, should not be viewed as an end to history. At some 

point-perhaps in the distant future, perhaps not-the United States may again 

face another superpower competitor with aspirations and agendas which the 

United States will view as hostile to its own.41 We cannot tell whether such a 

threat will resemble that of the former Soviet Union or stem from a combination 

of power and an ideology or economic philosophy so alien to our own that we 

will consider our vital interests to be threatened. 

When the original draft of the current National Military Strategy appeared 

in the summer of 199 1, the section on reconstitution postulated a renewed 

hostility on the part of an intact Soviet Union.42 Estimates at the time on the 

Soviet ability to reconstitute into a credible threat ranged from eighteen to 

thirty-six months. That draft was prepared before the breakup of the Union into 

fifteen fractious and independent republics. That breakup slowed the former 

Soviet Union's ability to reconstitute so much that a decade might be needed 

to reach the old threat level. It was agreed that this time frame would hold true 

generally for other "potential" superpowers developing a military capability to 

challenge the United States on a global basis. This means that for a decade 

indications and warning of trouble on the horizon likely will be highly visible. 

In any case, the Soviet Union no longer exists. As a result, some observers 

ask whether reconsitution should remain a critical leg of the National Military 

Strategy. It remains the strategy's most difficult and potentially the most 

contentious aspect. Because so little written work has been done on this 

forgotten leg of the National Military Strategy, many of the proposals are the 

author's own, derived from his participation in war games, seminars, and 

discussions on the subject with DoD and service officials. 
The Newport Papers 

Part of the problem lies in grasping the meaning of the concept. The National 

Military Strategy dermes reconstitution as follows: "As we reduce the size of 

our military forces in response to the demise of the global threat, we must 

preserve a credible capability to forestall any potential adversary from competing militarily with the United States. This 'reconstitution' is intended to deter 

such a power from militarizing and, if deterrence fails, to provide a global 

warfighting capability. Reconstitution involves fielding, forming, and training 

new fighting units [emphasis added]. This includes initially drawing on cadretype units and laid up military assets, particularly shipping; mobilizing previously trained or new manpower; and activating the industrial base on a large 

scale so as to equip these new forces. Reconstitution also involves maintaining 

technology, doctrine, training, experienced military personnel, and the innovation neces

ry to retain the competitive edge in decisive areas of potential 

military competition. "43 

The definition listed above has several potential, if inadvertent, red herrings. 

First, in the context of reconstitution, "mobilization" is not generally meant to 

be a call-up of forces but a call-up of assets that have been released to 

non-military purposes in the wake of the Cold War. Second, reconstitution is 

not meant as a threat to economic development on the part of present (potential 

superpower) friends and allies; it is contemplated as a deterrent to the development of a superpower military capability by a potential foe.44 

The Nal1al Dimension. The deterrent factor inherent in reconstitution is particularly relevant here. One of the key causes of the economic collapse of the 

Soviet Union was its attempt to keep up with the United States as an economic 

and a military superpower. The enormous capital investment in Admiral Sergei 

Gorshkov's "blue water" navy may well have been the proverbial straw that 

broke the camel's back for the Soviets. That cost will be an enormous consideration for a potential foe considering its transformation into a military superpower; therein lies the deterrent value for the United States of possessing a 

reconstitution capability. However, that reconstitution capability must be 

credible; to be credible, it must be affordable. A potential foe must know that 

we can beat a potential superpower threat without doing to ourselves what the 

Soviets did to themselves. 

The cost of reconstitution is a major problem, especially for the Navy, which 

needs expensive ships, aircraft, sensors, and weapons. Not only must we 

accustom ourselves to making do longer with old models, but also we must 

make do with fewer than before. Because of our declining domestic industrial 

base, we must avoid scrapping old ships and replacing them with new ones. To 

fail in this regard could price us out of reconstitution altogether. In itself, 

38 
Anderson 

reconstitution is a fragile concept because it entails the kind of long-range 

strategic thinking that is not often practiced in the United States. Congres and 

the public are probably willing to spend pennies for an ounce of prevention, but 

they are unlikely to invest in thinly disguised subsidies for the ailing U.S. 

shipbuilding industry. 

What is needed then is a reconstitution philosophy that reflects the fact that 

this leg of the National Military Strategy is a hedge against a future anns race. 

As the largesse of the Reagan defense buildup fades ever further into the past, 

the manner in which we reduce our power will entail making very soon some 

profound decisions about reconstitution which, if they prove mistaken, will not 

be reversible. 

Assumptions. There are several key asumptions implicit in this discussion. 

First, any threat or combination of threats that arise will do so with approximately a decade' s worth of indications and warning. 

Second, over the next few decades the basic ship propulsion units and hull 

types presently in use will remain operable and no radical technology will 

render them obsolete.45 We must assume further that any radical development 

in these technologies by a potentially hostile power would initiate a corresponding development by the United States, and that accordingly, in the absence of 

such a threat, the United States would not invest in such development. 

Third, most new weapons technologies can be modularized in such a way as 

to be attached to existing hulls rather than requiring "keel-up" development. 

This is not always a popular assumption, but it is technically feasible.46 

Fourth and finally, nuclear submarines can indeed be mothballed for later 

use should the need arise.47 The notion that we cannot do so is being discredited 

rapidly. A senior naval officer admonished his peers to this effect at a recent 

war game. 

Crafting a Naval Reconstitution Strategy. A naval reconstitution strategy 

should have four legs: science and technology, production planning, personnel 

planning, and strategic and doctrinal thought. Each leg should be designed 

carefully and incorporated into the build-down before we make decisions from 

which we cannot recover. 

Science and Technology. We must be careful not to squander our technological superiority. It is perishable. There are ways both to protect our 

advanced technology and to share much of it with our allies. If, however, we 

should be tempted to spread the fmancial burden of advancing new technologies 

by giving some of our ideas to our allies for development, we could mourn that 

decision for a long time. Despite current goodwill, today's allies may well be 

39 
The Newport Papers 

tomorrow's adversaries or neutrals. We would regret it deeply if by our own 

hand we had frozen ourselves out of our own technologies. 

This is not to advocate producing advanced systems simply because we have 

the means to do so. We do need to demonstrate, however, that we can build 

advanced systems in such numbers that a potential foe would know he could 

not win a new arms race. 

Production. The key to the effective use of the production leg of reconstitution to deter a potential competitor from building a threatening military 

capability is to show that we can make an arms race prohibitively expensive. 

To take a naval example, we must carefully preserve and maintain the ships we 

are now taking out of active service. If these ships remain competitive in coming 

decades, we will have a commanding lead before we cross the starting line. 

A potential competitor will then have to build sufficient ships and weapon 

systems to challenge us on a global scale. If we build our naval reconstitution 

capability on the premise that 2010 or 2030 we will be able to pull good ships 

out of mothballs and place "state-of-the-art" weapons modules on them, we 

will have tripled the difficulty for the would-be challenger. To compete with 

us, the challenger must first build a naval capability comparable to our unreconstituted peacetime naval establishment. This would be a daunting and 

expensive proposition. It could not be kept secret. 

His second challenge would be to overcome our lead in ship construction. 

With our ability to bring out old ships with new weapons modules at approximately half the cost of building a completely new ship (this obviously 

depends on the absolute cost of technology in the "out years"), the competitor 

would have to pay a "buy-in" cost of at least thre times our own simply to join 

the superpower naval club. In contrast, if we adopt an all-new reconstitution 

capability, our opponent will need to invest only enough to match our peacetime 

naval capability before he can run with us ship-for-ship in a naval arms race. 

This is particularly true for submarines. Truly, in reconstitution, better is the 

enemy of good enough. The curve in figure 14 demonstrates that if reconsitution 

is properly conceived, the United States can confront, at an affordable cost to 

itself, a potential opponent with a crushing economic challenge. 

If a technological development comparable to the Civil War ironclad technology-leap arises, rendering current ships obsolete, the arguments above 

would become moot, and we would be compelled to invest in new technology. 

But that does not render the policy of creative mothballing ineffective as a 

prudent hedge against a future naval arms race. 

The money saved in buying ships can be used for capitalizing on new weapon 

systems, EW suites, and information warfare capabilities. Even in the "worst 

case" situation where we would need to build entirely new hulls and propulsion 

40 
COST 

U.S. NAVAL 

FORCE LEVEL .. 

AT DAY 1 OF 

RECONSTITUTION 

Reconstitution 

��- 

FOR CE STRUCTU RE SIZE 

- - - --U.S. CURVE 

OPPONENT CURVE 

Figure 14 

Anderson 

OPPONENT COST 

APPROX 2 TIMES 

THAT OF OURS AS 

BOTH BUI LD UP 

I OPPONENT'S BUY-IN 

COST 

J.R. Nunes, Jr 

systems to counter a radically new emerging technology, the skills needed may 

be so new that old shipyards would be rendered cost-ineffective anyway.48 

Some new construction will be needed to maintain required defense skills, but 

this author believes we would be prudent to limit this to what is essential. 

The only area where the argument cited above may not apply entirely is in 

the construction of nuclear submarines; this industry has some very perishable 

skills. If some form of subsidy is needed to keep those skills current and present 

in the shipyard, we should find a way that is more economical than building 

uneeded and unwanted attack submarines. Perhaps a solution would be to keep 

one of the submarine yards "warm" by mothballing submarines as they are 

decommissioned. 

We must also keep open production lines for scarce, slowly produced 

munitions to replace those munitions expended in regional contingencies and 

also for expansion in case of reconstitution. The answer here may well be to 

encourage "skunk works" contractors who will respond to small orders while 

keeping key-skills personnel employed as an educational base for expansion. 

41 
7'he Newport Papers 

People Programs. How do we best sustain the skills needed to conduct 

blue-water sea control without bankrupting the personnel accounts of the naval 

services? The reserves are an obvious answer. Today we have two essential 

types of reservists in the Navy: those who support the active duty establishment 

such as the TAR program, and those who support expansion in mobilizationmine warfare is a current capability here. A recent seminar on reserve 

capabilities suggested a third category that would embody a reconstitution po

l. 

A first step in such a progam would be to shift the Navy's mine warfare 

capability from the reserves into regular service and replace it with much of 

what is now in the active anti-submarine community. If properly managed, the 

reserve surge mobilization capability can be used as a reconstitution cadre. 

It is important to remember here the disimilarity between reconstitution and 

mobilization. We mobilize what is currently in the reserves. We reconstitute to 

give us a greater mobilization capability. If a P-3 squadron is in reserve status, 

it can be mobilized to help in a regional contingency where there is a moderate 

submarine threat. With a reasonable investment, that squadron can also be 

prepared to act as cadre for reconstitution expansion. By educating the squadron 

members to accept positions of responsibility two levels above those that they 

are holding, we pave the way for the expanded schools and training squadrons 

that would put real teeth into the naval reconstitution capability. This 

philosophy was adopted by General Hans von Seeckt when he prepared the 

Gennan l00,OO-man anny to expand in the years between the world wars, 

although our problem is not as severe as that which the Gennans faced. The 

successes of the Gennan Anny between 1939 and 1942 attest to the efficacy of 

a "two-up" educational philosophy.49 

The same could be provided to reserves maintaining laid-up ships. Training 

units could concentrate on maintaining the cadre for schools, stresing bluewater sea control skills not needed on a day-to-day active service basis but vital 

for reconstitution to deal with an emerging blue-water threat. This would 

require frequent exercises with the active forces to keep these skills reasonably 

fresh. 

The Marine Corps presently maintains a balanced reserve component for 

mobilization and would not need to reorganize as thoroughly as the Navy to 

transition from a blue-water to a littoral strategy. However, the Marine Corps 

Reserve would be an excellent place to create the cadres for expansion during 

a time of reconstitution. 

The education of mid-level officers in operational and strategic thought 

would be an absolute imperative for regulars and reserves alike. Consideration 

should be given to a second year "art of naval warfare" course at the Naval War 

College, similar to the courses at Leavenworth, Maxwell, and Quantico. 

42 
Anderson 

Doctrine. Blue-water sea control doctrine should not be abandoned but put 

on the shelf and refined as new technologies become available. It should also 

be exercised and war-gamed, although not nearly as frequently as littoral 

operations. The reconstitution cadres should be carefully integrated into such 

exercises, and the essentials of blue-water sea control should be taught in 

service schools. The naval doctrine center should refine this subject and keep 

it current with state-of-the-art technology. However, it should be recognized as 

a future case rather than a prerequisite to littoral warfare. Some degree of risk 

must be accepted in a time of scarce resources. We will have to accept the fact 

that we will not have a top-of-the-line blue-water navy in the absence of a high 

seas threat. Our alternative is to become irrelevant to real defense needs. 

React Incrementally to I&W if Necessary. The need to reconstitute totally 

might not become immediately apparent, and the naval services might need to 

react incrementally as bits and pieces of the puzzle become clear. This will be 

particularly true if we become aware that another power is pursuing 

breakthrough developments in the key elements of naval technologies listed 

earlier in this chapter. The naval services may find themselves in the position 

of playing "Paul Revere," calling for the implementation of reconstitution. 

A Final Observation. In reconstitution, we find one of the purest examples of 

the naval forces' capability to act as a political-economic instrument of U.S. 

policy. Our obvious readiness to reconstitute could well become our best 

insurance of never having to do it. 

43 

v 

Conclusions 

T

he United States has entered an era in which this nation is the world's 

only true superpower, in every sense of the word. Although the threat of 

global war and that of a nuclear holocaust has lessened, we are still far short of 

world peace. There are few nations that have enjoyed our situation, and certainly 

there are no exact parallels. The new National Security and Military strategies 

are an attempt to deal with the emerging world order in a manner that will 

prevent wars, if possible, or win decisively should prevention fail. The new 

strategies stress working with and through multinational instruments such as 

the United Nations to achieve security and order. The naval policy, strategy, 

and doctrinal developments advocated in this study define the naval contribution to the national strategy. They would provide a Navy and Marine Corps 

better unified in purpose and function than before. They also would be in 

synchronization with the joint approach to military operations that has ben 

evolving in the wake of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. 

The proposed strategy presented herein is an alternative to that proposed by 

Admiral Paul David Miller, who at the time of this writing is CinCLant. Admiral 

Miller's concept of adaptive joint force packaging foresees using a naval force 

structure that has grown smaller than that which existed in 1989, but one that 

has grown smaller in the same Cold War proportions of carriers, submarines, 

ASW assets, escorts, MeM, and amphibious shipping. Admiral Miller's 

proposal gives the CinCs less than optimal packages. 

The naval force structure advocated in this paper would also have fewer 

ships, but it would give the CinCs adequate carriers, ARG/MEU packages, and 

MPS to accomplish the forward presence missions they deem vital. 

The force structure advocated here foresees a navy of about 350-375 ships, 

achieved by making do with fewer escorts, submarines, and ASW asets. It is a 

navy driven by warflghters' dreams and not by the aspirations of parochial 

service desires. That is the wave of the future. 

, 

I 

[ ! I ! 

i 

f ( 
The Newport Papers 

The development of naval strategy beyond Mahan will be a dynamic proces. 

Having achieved naval supremacy, our goal now must be to use that power in 

search of a true Pax Universalis. 

46 
Notes 

1. The National Military Strategy of the United States (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 

1 992). 

2. The National Secun·ty Strategy of the United States (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 

1 991). 

3 . . .. From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 2 1st Century (Washington: 

U.S. Dept. of the Navy) . 

4. The National Military Strategy, p.7. 

5. Ibid. 

6. Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: Macmilan, 1 973), p. 395. 

7. Richard A. Preston and Sydney F. Wise, Men in A nns (New York: Holt, Rinehart, 

and Winston, 1 979), p. 364. 

8. Richard N. Cooper, "Oil, the Middle East, and the World Economy," revised 

unpublished manuscript dated October 1 99 1 , Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass ., p. 1. 

9. Robert Elegant, PacifIC Destiny: Inside Asia Today (New York: Crown Publishing 

Inc.), p. 1 78. 

1 0. This was the view expressed by Japanese milit ry, civil, and business visitors to the 

Naval War College and the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard during the 

1 991-1 992 school year. The author and other members of the Center for Naval Warfare 

Studies staff at the Naval War College, Newport, R.I., had the opportunity to discuss a wide 

range of issues with these people during their visits to Newport and Cambridge. 

11. "Asia's Emerging Economies," The Economist, 16 November 1 991 , p. 16. 

12. Noburu Yamaguchi, unpublished research done while a National Security Fellow at 

the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies a t th e Harvard Center for Strategic Studies, 1 991-1 992. 

1 3. The National Military Strategy, p. 7. 

1 4. Exerpted from author's notes taken as a briefing attendee at Marine Corps Fellows 

brief, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., 1 991 . 

1 5. The National Military Strategy, p. 1 0. 

1 6. Carl E. Mundy,Jr., General, U.S. Marine Corps, Commandant of the Marine Corps, 

"Naval Forces and Power Projection, the Marine Corps Gazette, January 1 992, p. 17. 

17. Ibid. 

1 8. Richard B. Cheney, U.S. Secretary of Defense, "Cheney Reaffirms U.S. Commitment to Security in Asia, Pacific," Indonesia Times, 30 April 1 992, p. 1. 

1 9. Barry Coombs, Commander, USN, analyst with the Center for Naval Warfare 

Studies at the Naval War College, Newport, R.I., unclassified excerpt from an unpublished 

War College study on Pacific basing. 

20. Information provided by USCinCPac and USCinCCent st ffS, 1 992. 

21. Naval Force Capabilities Planning Effort Phase II Seminar Quick Look Report, (hereafter 

NFCPE Report) (Quantico: Marine Corps Wargaming and Assessment Center, 1 992) , p. ii. 

22. Chaim Herzog, The A rab-Israeli Wars (New York: Random House, 1 982), p. 210. 

23. Burdi Magdouk Zohdy, The Ramadan War (Dunn Loring, Va. : Dupuy Associates, 

1 973), p. 1 93. 

24. Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 

1 973), pp. 171-72. 

25. Information provided by Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps Staff, 1 992. 

26. Richard B. Cheney, U.S. Secret ry of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: A 

Final Report to Congress (Title X Report) (Washington: U.S. Dept. of Defense, 1 992) , p. 299. 

27. Marine Corps Concepts and Issues (Washington: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 

1 992), p. 32. 

28. Preston and Wise, p. 215. 

29. Weigley, p. 1 67. 

30. Some Union genenls, such as Ben Buder, had to be sacked because they could not 

work effectively with the Navy. Navy Secretary Gideon Welles fired Rear Admiral Samuel 

F. Du Pont when he failed to take Charleston by frontal assault after the Army had squandered 

an opportunity to take the Charleston forts by coming in the "back door" in a joint 

amphibious operation through Stono I nlet. See Weigley, p. 101 . 

31. Cheney, Title X Report, p. K-1 5. 
The Newport Papers 

32. Infonnation provided by Headquarters, u.s. Marine Corps Staff, April 1 992. 

33. This later resulted in a directive from the Secretary of the Navy to the CNO and 

CMC to explore stn.tegies for naval aviation integration. 

34. Cheney, Title X Report, pp. 246-47. 

35. NFCPE Report, p. 15. 

36. An early version of chis section appeared as an article entided, "Beyond Mahan: Naval 

Doctrine in the Post-Cold War World' in Marine Corps Gazette, June 1 992. Use in this fonn 

is by permission of the Marine Corps Association. 

37. NFCPE Report, p. 17. 

38. Implications of Recent Nuclear Proliferation and Post-Proliferation Games for the Marine Corps 

(Newport, R.I.: Stn.tegy and Campaign Department Report 3-92, Center for Naval Warfare 

Studies, Naval War College, 1 992) , p. 4. 

39. Most of the foregoing observations stem from the author's notes while he was serving 

as an analyst on games concerned with these issues in 1 99 1 . 

40. This idea has been advanced by Robert Steele of Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps. 

41 . It is difficult to conceive of a world where "the young and the resdes" will not aspire 

to superpower status. True, it took nearly a century after the death of Napoleon for the 

British Empire to be faced with a naval superpower challenger, and the Byzantine Empire 

had several hundred years of unchallenged naval supremacy. However, the best way to avoid 

such a chalenge is to make it forever too hard to do. 

42. Dick Cheney, A nnual Report to the Congress of the United States (Washington: U.s. 

Govt. Print. Off., 1 992) , p. 9. 

43. The National Military Strategy, p. 7. 

44. Ibid. , p. 7. 

45. Mr. Bud Hay, director of the Advanced Concepts Department of the Center for 

Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War College, Newport, R.I., made this point in an 

interview for this study. Mr. Hay has served as the director and organizer of several war 

games and seminars examining the reconstitution issue. 

46. Ibid. 

47. Comments from a senior naval officer at a recent war game. 

48. Hay Interview. 

49. Trevor Dupuy, A Qnius for War (Englewood Cliffi, NJ.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1 977), 

p. 221. 

48 
ABN Corps 

AFLD 

AOA 

AOR 

ARG 

ARG/MEU 

ASW 

CATF/CLF 

CentCom 

CinC 

CinCCentCom 

CinCPacFleet 

CMC 

CNO 

CornMarCent 

ComNavCent 

CV 

CVBG 

CVW 

EW 

FEBA 

FIE 

FOB 

FWE 

GPALS 

HNS 

I&W 

JCS 

JFACC 

JFC-E 

JFC-N 

LAV 

LCAC 

LCC 

Glossary 

Airborne Corps 

Airfield 

Amphibious Objective Area 

Area of Responsibility 

Amphibious Ready Group 

Amphibious Ready Group/ 

Marine Expeditionary Unit 

Antisubmarine Warfare 

Commander Amphibious Task Force/ 

Commander Landing Force 

Central Command 

Commander in Chief 

Commander in Chief Central Command 

Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet 

Commandant of the Marine Corps 

Chief of Naval Operations 

Commander Marine Component, 

Central Command 

Commander Naval Component, 

Central Command 

Aircraft Carrier 

Aircraft Carrier Battle Group 

Carrier Air Wing 

Electronic Warfare 

Forward Edge of the Battle Area 

Fly-in-Echelon 

Forward Operating Base 

Fighter Wing Equivalent 

Global Protection Against Limited Strikes 

Host Nation Support 

Indications and Warning 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Joint Forces Air Component Command 

Joint Forces Command-East 

Joint Forces Command-North 

Light Armored Vehicles 

Landing Craft Air Cushion 

Amphibious Command Ship 
The Newport Papers 

LLH 

MAGTF 

MARCENT 

MCM 

MEB 

MED 

MEF 

MEU(SOC) 

MOUT 

MPF 

MPS 

MRC 

Nato 

NCC 

NEF 

NETF 

NEO 

NFCPE 

OBJ 

PaCom 

PGM 

Satcom 

SEAL 

SOC 

SSN 

T-AK 

TLAM 

TRAP 

TAR 

USCentCom 

USCinCCent 

USCinCPac 

WestPac 

LCAC-LHV Helicopter 

Marine Air Ground Task Force 

Marines Central Command 

Mine Countermeasures 

Marine Expeditionary Brigade 

Mediterranean 

Marine Expeditionary Force 

Marine Expeditionary Unit, 

Special Operations Capable 

Military Operations in Urban Terrain 

Maritime Prepositioning Forces 

Maritime Prepositioning Squadron 

Major Regional Contingency 

North Atlantic Treaty Organiztion 

Naval Component Commander 

Naval Expeditionary Force 

Naval Expeditionary Task Force 

Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation 

Naval Force Capabilities Planning Effort 

Objective 

Pacific Command 

Precision-Guided Munitions 

Satellite Communications 

Sea, Air, Land (Team) 

Special Operations Capable 

Nuclear-Powered Attack Submarine 

Aviation Logistics Ships 

Tomahawk Land Attack Missile 

Training and Administration of Reserves 

Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and personnel 

U.S. Central Command 

U.S. Commander in Chief Central Command 

U.S. Commander in Chief Pacific Command 

Western Pacific 

50 
The Author 

Colonel Gary Anderson is a Marine Corps infantry officer who served as the 

Marine Corps representative to the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval 

War College during the 1 99 1 -92 academic year. He is an honor graduate of the 

Marine Corps Command and Staff College and the National Defense 

University's Security Program. He recently graduated from the Marine Corps 

War College. He is also a graduate of the Naval War College Continuing 

Education Management program and holds a master's degre in public administration from Pepperdine University. 

His recent operational asignments include command of the Third Light 

Armored Infantry Battalion and a tour as the operations officer of il MEF in 

Okinawa. From 1 986-87 he served as a UN observer in Lebanon and Israel. 

He also served as the J -3 for Joint Task Force Sea Angel, the 1991 humanitarian 

asistance operation in Bangladesh. Colonel Anderson is Course Director for 

Amphibious and Offensive Operations at the Marine Corps Command and Staff 

College at Quantico, Virginia.