UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4601

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

RICKEY LEE MILLER, JR., 

Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles, 

District Judge. (1:14-cr-00038-CCE-1) 

Submitted: March 17, 2015 Decided: April 1, 2015

Before WILKINSON and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior 

Circuit Judge. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Stephen F. Wallace, WALLACE LAW FIRM, High Point, North 

Carolina, for Appellant. Robert Albert Jamison Lang, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for 

Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
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PER CURIAM: 

Rickey Lee Miller, Jr., pled guilty to failure to appear 

for sentencing, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(1), 

(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2012). The district court calculated Miller’s 

Guidelines range at 10 to 16 months’ imprisonment, 

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (2013), and sentenced Miller 

to 14 months’ imprisonment. 

On appeal, counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no 

meritorious issues for appeal, but raising as issues for review 

whether the district court reversibly erred in accepting 

Miller’s guilty plea and abused its discretion in imposing 

sentence. Miller was informed of his right to file a pro se 

supplemental brief, but he has not done so. The Government 

declined to file a brief. We affirm. 

Because Miller did not move in the district court to 

withdraw his guilty plea, the adequacy of the Fed. R. Crim. P. 

11 hearing is reviewed for plain error only. United States v.

Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 524-26 (4th Cir. 2002). To demonstrate 

plain error, a defendant must show: (1) there was error; (2) the 

error was plain; and (3) the error affected his substantial 

rights. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). In 

the guilty plea context, a defendant meets his burden to 

establish that a plain error affected his substantial rights by 
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showing a reasonable probability that he would not have pled 

guilty but for the district court’s Rule 11 omissions. 

United States v. Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 343 (4th Cir. 2009). 

Our review of the transcript of the guilty plea hearing 

leads us to conclude that the district court substantially 

complied with the mandates of Rule 11 in accepting Miller’s 

guilty plea and that the court’s omissions did not affect 

Miller’s substantial rights. Critically, the transcript reveals 

that the district court ensured that the plea was supported by 

an independent basis in fact and that Miller entered the plea 

knowingly and voluntarily with an understanding of the 

consequences. United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116, 120 

(4th Cir. 1991). Accordingly, we discern no plain error in the 

district court’s acceptance of Miller’s guilty plea. 

Turning to Miller’s sentence, we review it for 

reasonableness “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion 

standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 51 (2007). 

This review entails appellate consideration of both the 

procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence. 

Id. at 51. In determining procedural reasonableness, we 

consider whether the district court properly calculated the 

defendant’s advisory Guidelines range, gave the parties an 

opportunity to argue for an appropriate sentence, considered the 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors, selected a sentence based on 
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clearly erroneous facts, and sufficiently explained the selected 

sentence. Id. at 49–51. 

If the sentence is free of “significant procedural error,” 

we review it for substantive reasonableness, “tak[ing] into 

account the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 51. Any 

sentence within a properly calculated Guidelines range is 

presumptively substantively reasonable. United States v. 

Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 

421 (2014). Such a presumption can only be rebutted by a 

showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against 

the § 3553(a) factors. Id. 

In this case, the district court correctly calculated and 

considered the advisory Guidelines range, heard argument from 

counsel, and heard allocution from Miller. The court explained 

that the 14-month sentence was warranted in light of the nature 

and circumstances of Miller’s offense conduct, his history and 

characteristics, and the need for the sentence to reflect the 

seriousness of the offense and to afford adequate deterrence to 

criminal conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2)(A)-(B). Miller 

does not offer any grounds to rebut the presumption on appeal 

that his within-Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse 

its discretion in sentencing Miller. 
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Finally, in accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the 

remainder of the record in this case and have found no 

meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm the district 

court’s judgment and amended judgment. This court requires that 

counsel inform Miller, in writing, of the right to petition the 

Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If 

Miller requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes 

that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move 

in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. 

Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on 

Miller. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED