Judge Kelly died on October 21, 1998. This opinion is consistent with the vote 1

he cast at conference on this case.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 97-2945EM

_____________

Credit Lyonnais, S.A. *

*

Appellant, *

* On Appeal from the United

v. * States District Court

* for the Eastern District

* of Missouri.

SGC International, Incorporated, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: September 22, 1998

Filed: November 5, 1998 

___________

Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, WOLLMAN, and KELLY, Circuit Judges. 1

___________

RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

Credit Lyonnais, S.A., a French bank, appeals the District Court’s denial of a

motion to compel two depositions as part of post-judgment discovery. We believe that

the District Court erred in denying Credit Lyonnais’s motion to compel, and we

therefore reverse the Court’s decision.
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Credit Lyonnais initially sought to recover $1,000,000 from SGC International,

Inc., money that was sent by a mistaken wire transfer to SGC’s Swiss bank account.

When SGC refused to return the money, Credit Lyonnais filed suit against SGC for

unjust enrichment, money had and received, and conversion. The District Court

entered summary judgment in Credit Lyonnais’s favor on the unjust-enrichment and

money-had-and-received claims and dismissed the conversion claim. 

Since the entry of summary judgment awarding Credit Lyonnais $1,411,581.61

on October 25, 1996, Credit Lyonnais has unsuccessfully sought to recover the money

from SGC. Credit Lyonnais tried to engage in discovery of SGC’s assets in order to

execute the judgment, but SGC failed to respond to Credit Lyonnais’s interrogatories

and production requests. In a motion to compel filed on December 17, 1996, Credit

Lyonnais then asked the District Court to order SGC to respond. The District Court

entered the order on January 17, 1997, but the order failed to elicit a response from

SGC. 

Prior to, and at the time of, the entry of summary judgment, Franz Sedelmayer

was SGC’s president. He identified himself as SGC’s chief executive officer as well

as its sole director and owner. SGC had no other employees, officers, or shareholders,

and Sedelmayer had sole responsibility for all of SGC’s activities. On December 4,

1996, however, Sedelmayer claimed to have resigned as SGC’s president. Although

Sedelmayer may have resigned as SGC’s president, Credit Lyonnais believes he is still

SGC’s secretary. Additionally, Sedelmayer was president at the time of the events

leading up to Credit Lyonnais’s summary-judgment award.

Credit Lyonnais then sought to depose both SGC and Sedelmayer, in his official

capacity as corporate officer. Prior to serving the deposition notices, Credit Lyonnais

had not sought to depose either SGC or Sedelmayer following the October 25, 1996,

judgment award. Credit Lyonnais had only attempted to engage in discovery of SGC’s

assets only through interrogatories and production requests. The deposition notice to
Credit Lyonnais also filed a motion to hold SGC and Sedelmayer in contempt. 2

The District Court granted the motion as to SGC and denied it as to Sedelmayer.

During oral argument Credit Lyonnais did not raise the contempt issue and indicated

that it now seeks only the opportunity to depose SGC and Sedelmayer. This opinion

therefore addresses only the motion to compel. SGC did not trouble itself to file a brief

or appear at oral argument.

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Sedelmayer indicated that Credit Lyonnais wanted information about Sedelmayer’s

assets and asset transfers. Credit Lyonnais also sought documents related to

Sedelmayer’s personal assets. SGC and Sedelmayer failed to appear for the

depositions. Credit Lyonnais then filed the motion to compel upon which this appeal

is based.2

We review the District Court’s application of discovery rules under an abuse-ofdiscretion standard. See National Service Industries, Inc. v. Vafla Corp., 694 F.2d 246,

250 (11th Cir. 1982); Brown v. Arlen Management Corp., 663 F.2d 575, 580 (5 Cir. th

1981). We believe that the District Court abused its discretion in denying Credit

Lyonnais’s motion to compel in its entirety. 

The rules for depositions and discovery “are to be accorded a broad and liberal

treatment.” Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947). The right to conduct

discovery applies both before and after judgment. See United States v. McWhirter,

376 F.2d 102, 106 (5 Cir. 1967). Rule 69(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure th

specifically provides the right to post-judgment discovery “[i]n aid of the judgment.”

The rule further provides that the judgment creditor “may obtain discovery from any

person . . . in the manner provided in these rules or . . . by the practice of the state in

which the district court is held.” Id. Missouri’s Rules of Civil Procedure allow postjudgment discovery of “matters . . . relevant to the discovery of assets or income

subject to . . . the satisfaction of judgments.” Mo. R. Civ. P. 76.28. Additionally, the

rule governing depositions provides a broad right. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30. A party may
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depose almost anyone, including corporations, who may provide relevant information.

Under these rules, Credit Lyonnais has a right to conduct reasonable postjudgment discovery and to inquire into SGC’s assets. Credit Lyonnais “is entitled to

a very thorough examination of the judgment debtor.” Caisson Corp. v. County West

Building Corp., 62 F.R.D. 331, 335 (E.D. Pa. 1974). The District Court recognized

this right when it granted the January 17, 1997, order to SGC to respond to Credit

Lyonnais’s written discovery requests. SGC, however, failed to respond. Credit

Lyonnais then sought to depose both SGC and Sedelmayer, in his capacity as corporate

officer. Credit Lyonnais presented evidence depicting the close relationship between

Sedelmayer and SGC. This evidence suggests that the inquiry into SGC’s assets

requires deposing both Sedelmayer and SGC. 

The law allows judgment creditors to conduct full post-judgment discovery to

aid in executing judgment. See White v. General Motors Corp., 1990 WL 47437 at *

1 (D. Kan. 1990) (citing Caisson, 62 F.R.D. at 335). The District Court, however,

denied all of Credit Lyonnais’s motion to compel the depositions. The Court based its

denial on the scope of the subject matter identified in the deposition notices. Some of

the subjects identified in the deposition notice relate to Sedelmayer’s personal finances

and assets. Credit Lyonnais also seeks information related to transfers of assets

between Sedelmayer and SGC. 

Credit Lyonnais wants to examine the relationship between Sedelmayer and

SGC. As SGC’s sole officer, director, shareholder, and decision-maker, Sedelmayer

is closely linked to SGC. Additionally, both SGC’s and Sedelmayer’s failure to

comply with the District Court’s earlier discovery order, as well as the failure to pay

the judgment, lend support to Credit Lyonnais’s motion to compel. The relationship

between Sedelmayer and SGC “is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about the bona

fides of [any] transfer of assets between them.” Magnaleasing, Inc.v. Staten Island
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Mall, 76 F.R.D. 559, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (citing Caisson, 62 F.R.D. at 335). Credit

Lyonnais believes it should be allowed to inquire into the relationship between

Sedelmayer and SGC. We agree.

Although Sedelmayer may no longer be the president of SGC, the circumstances

of his resignation, and his role at SGC after his resignation, remain unclear.

Sedelmayer cannot use his resignation as a complete excuse to avoid the deposition.

Credit Lyonnais has good reason to want to know about the relationship between SGC

and Sedelmayer in order to execute its judgment against SGC. Inquiring into the

circumstances of Sedelmayer’s resignation will help shed light on the relationship. 

The District Court does have discretion to limit the scope of discovery. See

Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co., 585 F.2d 877, 898 (8 Cir. 1978). The th

Court denied the motion to compel because it found the scope of the subjects identified

in the deposition notices objectionable. We see no indication that any of the subjects

included fall outside the scope of what the law allows. The District Court can,

however, limit the scope of the material about which Credit Lyonnais may depose SGC

and Sedelmayer, if it has a good reason to do so. We leave this sort of fine tuning to

the District Court on remand, but we stress that the presumption should be in favor of

full discovery of any matters arguably related to Credit Lyonnais's efforts to trace SGC

assets and otherwise to enforce its judgment. Matters relating to Sedelmayer's personal

finances seem to us -- subject to such further reasonable inquiry as the District Court

may think proper -- to be proper subjects of discovery. 

Reversed and remanded with instructions.
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A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.