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i 

87–616 2015

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–84] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2015 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING 

ON

FISCAL YEAR 2015 NATIONAL DEFENSE 

AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST 

FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 6, 2014 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California, Chairman 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York 

DEREK KILMER, Washington 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

WILLIAM L. ENYART, Illinois 

PETE P. GALLEGO, Texas 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

KARI BINGEN, Professional Staff Member 

MICHAEL CASEY, Professional Staff Member 

AARON FALK, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2014 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, March 6, 2014, Fiscal Year 2015 National Defense Authorization 

Budget Request from the Department of Defense ............................................. 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, March 6, 2014 ........................................................................................ 59 

THURSDAY, MARCH 6, 2014 

FISCAL YEAR 2015 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET 

REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services .................................................................. 1 

Sanchez, Hon. Loretta, a Representative from California, Committee on 

Armed Services ..................................................................................................... 2 

WITNESSES 

Dempsey, GEN Martin E., USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Department of Defense .................................................................................................... 7 

Hagel, Hon. Chuck, Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense; accompanied by Robert Hale, Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) ................. 3 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Dempsey, GEN Martin E. ................................................................................ 83 

Hagel, Hon. Chuck ........................................................................................... 66 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ .................................................................... 63 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ..................................................................... 64 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Arrow Weapon System document ................................................................... 104 

Mr. Forbes’ chart, ‘‘Timeline of the FY12-21 Funding Level National 

Defense (050) Base Funding’’ ....................................................................... 100 

Three charts displayed by Mr. Turner: 

US/Russian Stockpile Comparison .............................................................. 101 

The Approaching Delivery Platform Cliffs .................................................. 102 

Funding of DOD Nuclear Capabilities Relative to DOD Budget .............. 103 

U.S. Department of Defense Annual Report on Implementation of Executive Order 13595 and the U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace, 

and Security .................................................................................................. 107 

‘‘What Does $1 Billion Buy for DOD?’’ chart .................................................. 99 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Ms. Duckworth .................................................................................................. 146 
Page

IV 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING—Continued 

Mr. Kilmer ........................................................................................................ 146 

Mr. Kline ........................................................................................................... 145 

Mr. Rogers ......................................................................................................... 145 

Ms. Speier ......................................................................................................... 145 

Mr. Wittman ..................................................................................................... 145 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Barber ......................................................................................................... 162 

Mr. Bishop ......................................................................................................... 151 

Mr. Coffman ...................................................................................................... 166 

Mr. Conaway ..................................................................................................... 161 

Mr. Cooper ........................................................................................................ 151 

Mr. Enyart ........................................................................................................ 166 

Mr. Kline ........................................................................................................... 152 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 150 

Mr. Loebsack ..................................................................................................... 157 

Mr. McKeon ....................................................................................................... 149 

Mr. Palazzo ....................................................................................................... 169 

Mr. Shuster ....................................................................................................... 160 

Ms. Tsongas ...................................................................................................... 157 

Mr. Veasey ........................................................................................................ 170 
(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2015 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF 

DEFENSE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Thursday, March 6, 2014. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:35 a.m., in room 2118, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, 

A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. 

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. 

I would like to welcome Secretary Hagel, General Dempsey, and 

Mr. Hale here this morning, our comptroller. They will be testifying before the committee on the President’s fiscal year 2015 

budget request for the Department of Defense. 

This will be kind of a truncated session because we have votes 

probably about 10 o’clock. So we are going to try to be as—expeditious, which means I am going to try to keep my remarks a little 

short. 

Thank you, each of you, for your willingness to do the same. 

The White House fact sheet on the key budget issues makes it 

clear that defense is not a priority in this budget. And while no one 

would argue that hard choices will have to be made in light of the 

budget caps, the President seems to want it both ways with this 

budget request and defense strategy. 

Instead of making the really hard choices, it delivers false promises. Instead of delivering a sustainable strategy, it simply adds 

risk to the existing one. This is not sustainable. And this mixed 

message is not one we want to send to our All-Volunteer Force, to 

our allies and partners, and to our adversaries who would seek to 

test our resolve. 

I recognize the tough position you are in and you didn’t get to 

this budget on your own. Congress passed some laws that very 

much helped us get to this point. But we have to be working together. Congress has to be a partner in mitigating the damage and 

risks of the current budget trajectory. I hope today’s testimony will 

bring clarity to these issues and enable Congress to do just that. 

On a final note, Mr. Hale’s great work that he has done on this 

committee for years—this will be his last appearance before us, he 

hopes. He has been a man of great integrity, depth of knowledge, 

and has always been a straight shooter. 
2 

And we appreciate your work, Bob. America appreciates it. You 

have the admiration of this committee. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 63.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Sanchez. 

STATEMENT OF HON. LORETTA SANCHEZ, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CALIFORNIA, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, gentlemen, again for being before us today. 

I want to thank the chairman for acknowledging that this budget 

that we have in front of us, or the top numbers that we are seeing, 

came from this deal that was struck just recently and that the 

President has tried to—has put forward the numbers that this Congress basically gave to him. He signed that into law just a few 

months ago, and here we are. 

So it just comes back to some very difficult decisions. There has 

been criticism from Members on both sides of the aisle, also from 

this committee, about how there is not enough money in defense. 

Well, we are the one that gave him that law. 

He is sticking to it. To his credit, he has given us a wish list, 

a shortfall piece there where he has talked about additional funding the Congress could put forward in order to make better decisions with respect to this defense budget. 

So I guess I just would like to say it is up to us to work with 

the President, both sides, to figure out are we going to raise taxes, 

what type of cutting are we going to do, is there going to be a 

BRAC [Base Closure and Realignment] process. And I know people 

don’t like that—that word here—that acronym here, but it is dependent on us to ensure that we don’t hollow out the force. 

You know, I was with the—I went to visit the 82nd maybe about 

6 months ago and they were talking about what the budgets were 

doing. And they basically said, you know, ‘‘We are on a timeline 

where we are the first defense to go out if we are called up, and 

our first line, our first group of soldiers, are ready to go and they 

are trained up.’’ 

But what is happening to the next round or the next phase of 

people coming forward is that they are getting less training. They 

are getting less preparedness. They are doing ‘‘mano a mano,’’ if 

you will, individual things, training which is easier to do, but the 

comprehensive working with other units, working in other ways, 

going out into the made-up battlefield is not happening. 

And so we could end up, if this Congress doesn’t take this seriously, with a budget that really makes our military weak in what 

we need it to do. 

So I look forward to hearing your comments today. And, again, 

I think these are hard decisions for us to make, but we need to 

make them, because we are the ones, Article I, Section 8, that do 

this. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I will submit Mr. Smith’s remarks for the record. 

The CHAIRMAN. Those remarks will be included in the record 

without objection. Thank you. 
3 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 64.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary. 

STATEMENT OF HON. CHUCK HAGEL, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; ACCOMPANIED BY 

ROBERT HALE, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER) 

Secretary HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you to you and to Ranking Member Smith, Ms. Sanchez, for your comments, and to all the 

members of this committee. 

We very much appreciate an opportunity to appear before you 

and present the fiscal year 2015 budget and be prepared to try to 

explain not just the numbers, but also the reasons and the rationale behind the decisions that we have put forward to plan for our 

future and to associate that plan with the realities, yes, of the resources that we have, but, also, in coordination with the QDR 

[Quadrennial Defense Review], what was the strategy behind all of 

this. And we are prepared to do that. 

I also want to acknowledge Chairman Dempsey, Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, who has been a tremendous partner in this 

effort. I know this committee values his leadership and his service 

to his country, as we all do, and I just want to acknowledge his 

service and the vice chairman as well as all the chiefs and all of 

our military leaders. 

And with us today also is the senior enlisted member of our 

Armed Forces, and we very much appreciate our enlisted men and 

women who make it work, who make the system go. 

You have acknowledged Bob Hale’s contributions, Mr. Chairman. 

I would just add that everything you said is accurate. I know this 

body deals in accuracy. And I wanted to, for the record, note that 

he has been as close to an indispensable element of our efforts, not 

just this year in putting together—it was a very difficult year, 

which we all went through 16 days of government shutdown and 

furloughs, uncertainty, no budget, continuing resolutions. 

But it was Bob Hale and his team that were really the anchor 

that kept all this together. And we will miss him greatly, but he 

deserves to escape, and we will keep his phone number handy for 

any future reference. 

Mr. Chairman, you asked if I would make a couple of brief comments about the current situation in Ukraine that obviously is 

dominating everybody’s thinking and concerns today. And let me do 

that and then I will address my points in the opening statement 

regarding the budget and then ask Chairman Dempsey for his comments. 

Mr. Chairman, this administration’s efforts have been focused on 

first de-escalating—continuing to de-escalate the crisis in Ukraine, 

supporting the Ukrainian Government with economic assistance, 

with a particular interest and focus on the diplomatic tracks, economic tracks, which we are doing. 

Secretary Kerry is currently in a meeting with Foreign Minister 

Lavrov. I think you all are aware of the news that NATO [North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization] met again, European Union met 

again today. OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
4 

Europe] has observers starting to get into Ukraine. Different decisions have been made by some of our European partners, one being 

the announcement yesterday of the European Union’s $15 billion 

package of economic assistance to Ukraine. 

As you all know, Secretary Kerry noted we would commit a billion dollars. And I appreciate—and I know the President does—the 

Congress’s early review of that $1 billion economic assistance package to Ukraine. And we are also focused on reaffirming our commitments to allies in Central and Eastern Europe. 

I strongly support these efforts, the way it is being handled, the 

steps the President has taken to apply both the diplomatic and economic pressure on Russia, and the continued collaboration, coordination with our European partners. This includes the new visa restrictions and an Executive order authorizing sanctions that the 

White House announced this morning. 

Earlier this week, as you know, I directed Department of Defense 

[DOD] to suspend all military-to-military engagements and exercises with Russia, and yesterday I announced a series of steps that 

we will take to reinforce allies in Central and Eastern Europe during this crisis. 

These include stepping up our joint training through our aviation 

detachment in Poland, and I was advised this morning that that 

continues to move forward. I visited Poland a few weeks ago, and 

we are going to augment our participation in NATO’s ballistic air 

policing mission, and was advised this morning that we have six 

F–16s that have arrived in Latvia as of the last 24 hours. 

The events of the past week, I think to all of us, underscore the 

need for America’s continued global engagement and leadership. 

The President’s defense budget reflects that reality and it helps 

sustain our commitments and our leadership at a defining moment. 

Mr. Chairman, I believe this budget is far more than a set of 

numbers or just a list of decisions. It is both of those. But it is a 

statement of values and priorities. It is a realistic budget that prepares the United States military to defend our national security in 

a world that is becoming less predictable, more volatile and, in 

some ways, more threatening to our country and our interests. 

It is a plan that allows our military to meet America’s future 

challenges and threats. It matches our resources to our strategy. 

And it is a product of collaboration. All of DOD’s military/civilian 

leaders were involved in this process. As I noted, the chairman, the 

vice chairman, our service secretaries, our service chiefs, combatant 

commanders, senior enlisted, all at every level of our military leadership had input into this process. 

As we all know, America has been at war for the last 13 years. 

And as we end our second war of the last decade, our longest ever, 

this budget adapts and adjusts to new strategic realities and fiscal 

constraints while preparing for the future. 

This budget is not—is not business as usual. We are all living 

at a very unusual time. It may well be, when history records this 

time, a very defining time. I don’t think any of us, no matter how 

many years you have been in Congress, has ever worked through 

something like we are working through and have worked through 

the last 24 months of uncertainty, unpredictability, not just with 

resources and budgets, but how that ripples out and the con-
5 

sequences of that to every decision you make, I make, the leadership of this government makes. 

It begins to make the hard choices, the hard choices that will 

have to be made. The longer we defer these difficult decisions, the 

more risk we will have down the road, forcing our successors to 

face far more complicated and difficult choices in the future. Last year, DOD’s budget was cut $37 billion because of seques- tration on top of the $487 billion 10-year reduction under the Budget Control Act that DOD was already implementing. 

December’s bipartisan budget agreement gave DOD some tem- porary relief, but it still imposes more than $75 billion in cuts over 

the next 2 years. And unless Congress changes the law, sequestration will cut another $50 billion each year starting again in fiscal 

year 2016. 

The President’s 5-year plan provides a realistic alternative to se- questration-level cuts, projecting $115 billion more than current 

law allows. DOD requires that additional funding to implement our 

updated defense strategy as outlined in the Quadrennial Defense 

Review. 

As you know, the QDR takes a strategy-driven look at the security landscape over the coming decades. This QDR is not budgetdriven nor is it budget-blind. It builds on the President’s Defense 

Strategic Guidance and is informed by our resource limitations. It 

defines the risk assumed both under the President’s budget and 

under sequestration. Accounting for budget uncertainty and fiscal 

reality was the only realistic way to ensure a useful and relevant 

strategy. 

These are not ordinary times. The strategic priorities articulated 

in QDR represent America’s highest security interests: defending 

the homeland, building security globally, deterring aggression, and 

being ready and capable to win decisively against any adversary. 

The funding levels in the President’s budget let us execute this 

strategy with some increased risks, and we have been very clear 

about those risks in certain areas. These risks would be reduced if 

Congress approves the President’s Opportunity, Growth and Security Initiative, a proposal that would provide DOD with an additional $26 billion in fiscal year 2015 to improve readiness and modernization. My submitted statement, Mr. Chairman, contains details of this initiative, which I strongly support. 

Although our 5-year budget plan exceeds sequestration levels, 

over the past year, DOD has prepared detailed planning for continued sequestration-level cuts. This showed that a return to sequestration would impose some force structure reductions that simply 

can’t be implemented with the push of a button. It takes time to 

plan and implement. They require detailed planning and they require and need longer time horizons. 

Our 5-year defense plan, therefore, hedges and includes the sequestration-level force structure reductions that take longest to 

plan and to implement. The decommissioning of the aircraft carrier 

USS George Washington and the Army and Marine Corps end 

strength cuts below, below, our preferred levels. This was the responsible thing to do, given the uncertainty and the irregularity 

that has marked this budget process and the fact that sequestration remains the law of the land for fiscal year 2016 and beyond. 
6 

Our preferred force levels are fully funded in fiscal year 2015, 

and DOD leaders all agree that they can be sustained at the President’s budget levels. Accordingly, I have issued formal guidance to 

service leadership that we will fund our preferred force levels, 440- 

to 450,000 Active Army, 182,000 Marines, and 11 aircraft carriers, 

and not make these sequestration-level reductions if, if, we judge 

that Congress will fund DOD at the President’s budget levels over 

the next 5 years. DOD has a responsibility to prepare for all 

eventualities, just as Congress has a responsibility to provide DOD 

with some budget predictability. 

My submitted statement explains our budget details, Mr. Chairman, and the rationale behind all of our key decisions. But I want 

to before I close briefly address a couple of very critical issues. 

First, the balance between readiness, capability, and capacity. 

After more than a decade of long, large stability operations, we 

traded some capacity to protect readiness and to protect modernization. We did this as we shift the focus on future requirements, 

shaped by enduring and emerging threats. 

We have to be able to defeat terrorist threats and deter our adversaries with increasingly modern weapons and technological capabilities. We must also assure that America’s economic interests 

are protected through open sea lanes, freedom of the skies and 

space, and deal with one of the most urgent and real threats facing 

all nations, and that is cyber attacks. That is why we protected 

funding for cyber and special operations forces. 

For the Active Duty Army, we proposed drawing down about 440- 

to 450,000 soldiers. That is less than 10 percent below its size pre9/11. I believe this is adequate. Our leaders believe it is adequate 

for future demand. 

We will continue investing in high-end ground capabilities to 

keep our soldiers the most advanced on earth. Army National 

Guard and Reserve units will remain a vibrant part of our national 

defense and will draw down by 5 percent. 

We will also streamline Army helicopter force structure by reducing Guards fleet by 8 percent. The Active Army fleet will be cut by 

25 percent. But we will still maintain and keep these helicopters 

modernized as we move from a fleet of seven models to four. 

The Navy, for its part, will take 11 ships out of its operational 

inventory, but they will be modernized and returned to service with 

greater capability and longer life span. 

The Marine Corps will continue its planned drawdown to 

182,000, but will devote 900 more marines to increased embassy security. 

And the Air Force will retire the aging A–10, replacing it with 

more advanced multi-mission aircraft like the Joint Strike Fighter. 

The specific numbers and reasons for all my recommendations are 

included in the statement—my full statement. 

Regarding compensation reform, taking care of our people, Mr. 

Chairman, as everyone on this committee knows, means providing 

them with both fair compensation as well as the training and the 

tools they need to succeed in battle and always return home safely. 

To meet those obligations under constrained budgets, we need 

some modest adjustments to the growth in pay and benefits. All 

these savings will be reinvested in training and equipping our 
7 

troops. And there are no proposals to change retirement in this 

budget. 

Let me clarify what these compensation adjustments are and are 

not. 

First, we will continue to recommend pay raises. They won’t be 

substantial as in the past years—as substantial—but they will continue. 

Second, we will continue subsidizing off-base housing. The 100 

percent benefit of today will be reduced, but only to 95 percent, and 

it will be phased in over the next several years. 

Third, we are not shutting down any commissaries. We recommend gradually phasing out some subsidies, but only for domestic commissaries that are not in remote locations. 

Fourth, we recommend simplifying and modernizing our three 

TRICARE programs by merging them into one TRICARE system 

with modest increases in co-pays and deductibles for retirees and 

family members, and encourage using the most affordable means 

of care. Active Duty personnel will still receive healthcare that is 

entirely free. 

The President’s defense budget supports our defense strategy, defends this country and keeps our commitments to our people. However, these commitments would be seriously jeopardized by a return to sequestration-level spending. My submitted testimony details how sequestration would compromise our national security. 

The result would be a military that could not fulfill its defense 

strategy, putting at risk America’s traditional role as a guarantor 

of global security and, ultimately, our own security. 

This is not the military the President nor I want. It isn’t the 

military that this committee or this Congress wants for America’s 

future. But it is the path we are on unless Congress does something to change the law. 

Mr. Chairman, members of this committee, DOD leaders and I 

look forward to working with you as we make the difficult choices, 

and there will be difficult choices to be made to ensure that America’s security is there, will be there, and to ensure that we protect 

America’s national interests. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Hagel can be found in the 

Appendix on page 66.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Chairman, do you have an opening statement? 

General DEMPSEY. I can submit my opening statement for the 

record if you need the time to allow the Members to ask questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Votes have already been called. We are about 5 

minutes into the first vote, and it looks like we are going to be, 

like, 45 minutes. Could you just briefly summarize your statement. 

And then we will recess. 

General DEMPSEY. Okay. 

The CHAIRMAN. And then we will come back and get into the 

questions. 

STATEMENT OF GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA, CHAIRMAN, 

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

General DEMPSEY. Okay. Thanks, Chairman, Ranking Member 

Smith, Members. I appreciate your teamwork in trying to help us 
8 

work our way through not only our national security needs, but the 

resources available to meet them. 

Just want you all to know I am deeply engaged in our efforts to 

support the diplomatic approach to the resolution of Ukraine’s crisis. I am engaged with our NATO allies. I have spoken both yesterday and today with my Russian counterpart, General Valery 

Gerasimov, and will continue to maintain that line of communication. 

Secondly, I just returned from Afghanistan, and I would be remiss, we would all be remiss, if we don’t recall that we have got 

roughly 34,000 young men and women in uniform and many more 

than that civilians serving—continuing to serve in Afghanistan to 

ensure our continued security and, by the way, elsewhere around 

the globe, hundreds of thousands in more than 90 countries. What 

I left Afghanistan reminding those who serve there is 2015 appears 

to be uncertain, but we have got a lot of work left to do in 2014, 

and you can be sure that we will. 

And that brings me to the budget. The balance between our security demands and our available resources has rarely been more 

delicate. The Secretary walked you through the measures we are 

taking in this budget to try to balance as best we can national security and fiscal responsibilities. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I will end there. 

[The prepared statement of General Dempsey can be found in the 

Appendix on page 83.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

We will recess until the last vote, and then I would ask all the 

Members to return as quickly as you can. We will get right into the 

questioning. Thank you very much. 

The committee stands in recess. 

[Recess.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Committee will come to order. I apologize. That 

45 minutes grew to a lot more than that. I wish the budget would 

go up like that. 

I am going to go ahead and get started because your time is valuable and Members will be coming in. But I would like to have some 

clarification. 

You know, when we met—I think it was last week when you first 

rolled out the budget—you went through the numbers and we 

talked about the Army going down to 440,000. 

But as I have looked at the numbers, it appears to me that it 

really goes down to 420. The 440 is if sequestration goes away. I 

don’t see any way that it is going away right now. 

I think we need to clarify the confusion. 

The budget—we have the base budget that we agreed to—that 

the Budget Committee agreed to in December where they worked 

out the numbers between the House and the Senate, signed by the 

President. We came to a top line. And that is what I think the base 

budget is. 

But then we also here talk of 115 billion on top of that that goes 

out, you know, for the next 4 years. But that is above the sequestration number. And then there is the 26 billion that—or the 56 

billion that would be 28 for defense and 28 for social spending, if 
9 

some way something magical happened and we came up with some 

more money. 

But my understanding is the Senate isn’t even going to pass a 

budget this year, that we are basically going to have the number 

that was agreed to earlier and signed into law. 

So I am really not paying much attention to the 115, and I am 

not paying much attention to that 58, because I think that in the 

realm of it would be wonderful, but it is not going to happen. 

So I think we really have to live within right now something that 

I hate, and I am sure you do, and I think most of the members of 

the committee do. But it is the law and we are stuck with it right 

now. 

So am I clear on that? Is that the way it is? And is the Army, 

based on that, going down to an end strength of 420 and the Marines going down to 175,000? 

Secretary HAGEL. Let me respond, Mr. Chairman, and then I will 

ask the comptroller for his thoughts as well. 

Yes. What you have said as to what is in our budget request for 

2015 I think is pretty clear. Based on the bipartisan budget agreement cap, the 26 billion that you refer to is an additional request 

to try to buy back some of the readiness and modernization that 

we have lost over the last 2 years because of the huge abrupt cuts. 

So that is one part of it. 

The next piece, the FYDP [Future Years Defense Plan]—take the 

next 5 years—the $115 billion additional request, which is the 

President’s budget request, the plan that we have submitted along 

with that budget request does do what you said, factors in the reality of what the current law is now and reverts back to as far as 

reimposing sequestration in fiscal year 2016. 

Let me make one comment on why it was done that way, and 

then I will ask the comptroller for his thoughts. 

We didn’t get any adjustment in our numbers, as you know, until 

December, until the Congress came up with a bipartisan budget 

agreement, which then subsequently the President signed. 

So all year long we had been preparing a budget based on the 

law, just as you said, the reality of that, which actually began— 

and we never ever stop putting budgets together, as you know. 

But when I first directed the Strategic Choices and Management 

Review back in May, that very much informed us, that process, as 

well as the QDR and so on, as to what kind of budget we were 

going to report and present, which the Congress wants it—you 

have always wanted it on time. So we were under that deadline. 

So December comes along. We get new numbers and so on and so 

on. 

Rather than going back and starting all over and replanning for 

a whole new set of FYDP plans based on some of these new numbers, what we decided to do was take those post-2016 plans, planning, just as you say, for the reality of we may go back to the law, 

sequestration. 

But we deferred the tougher decisions on the time it takes, Army 

end strength being one of it, carrier being another. I noted this in 

my opening statement and I go into considerable detail, Mr. Chairman, in the written statement. 
10 

We can make those adjustments as we go along. The chiefs were 

part of this decision. I issued a formal memo on this this week. The 

chief supported it. They are in agreement with that. 

But let me stop there and see if the comptroller wants to add 

anything. 

Secretary HALE. Well, let me just briefly address fiscal year 

2015, the only year you are going to focus on. 

Is this better? Okay. 

Let me just briefly address 2015, the year for which you will authorize and appropriate funds. In that year, we have fully—the 

Army will go down, if my memory serves me right, to 490,000 by 

the end of 2015 and that we fully fund our ability in 2015 to maintain 11 carriers once the Ford comes in. 

So this is not an issue until the out-years. And then, as the Secretary said, because of the uncertainty because of the time to plan, 

yes, in a few cases, Army end strength, carriers, the out-years—far 

out-years of our 5-year plan do show decline to sequester levels. 

If we get an indication that Congress will appropriate at the 

higher levels, we will reverse that and go to our preferred force levels in later plans. But for 2015, it is not an issue. 

Does that help? 

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah. I think I understand it. 

I want to make sure the American people understand it. I want 

them to know what it is really right now so that they understand 

how bad it is and if we are going to be able to change sequestration—I think the American people are going to have to—I saw stories that seemed to get people’s attention, taking the Army down 

to 440,000. 

I want them to know it is going down to 420,000 and then—if 

they got upset with 440, they ought to really get upset with 420. 

Then we ought to start looking for more resources to get that up 

to a better number. 

Secretary HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, if I might, that is exactly why 

the President has asked for $115 billion more, to fulfill the strategies, the strategic interests, that need—that we need, the country 

needs, to protect this country, how we do that. 

And we say clearly this is about as transparent a process as I 

think has ever been run at the Pentagon. Everybody knows the 

risk and, if we get sequestration back, we risk a number of things, 

and the Army will go to 420,000. 

Now, tough, tough choices are coming here. You are going to 

have to help us make them. There isn’t any way around it. You 

have so much of a budget, so many resources, as you and I know, 

and I think that is your point. 

The CHAIRMAN. I have heard that a genius is somebody that understands something after they have heard it six times. And I am 

no genius, and I just want to make sure that people really get it. 

Sometimes we chew on these numbers so much that we think 

that everybody gets it. And they may think that we have that $115 

billion, or they may think that we have that $58 billion. And I 

want to make sure they understand, unless some law changes, we 

don’t. 

Chairman, do you have a comment? 
11 

General DEMPSEY. I just want to add briefly, Chairman, that I 

know you have had some concerns about the QDR and the thought 

that it was too resource-constrained. 

The CHAIRMAN. Some real concern. 

General DEMPSEY. No. I know. 

But I will say what the JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] have found 

useful—and that is probably the right word about the QDR—is 

that it is unconstrained in the sense that the budget and the $115 

billion that is over the BCA [Budget Control Act] levels is a reflection that it is not resource-constrained. It is certainly resourceinformed. 

And, beyond that, as you point out, Marine Corps and Army end 

strength is not accounted for anyplace right now. And so the QDR 

force that we have described is literally unconstrained by resources 

in the sense that we have given our best advice on what we think 

we need to meet the security needs of the Nation. 

The CHAIRMAN. The second part of my question is—I think I get 

where the money is right now and how the force is going down. 

There is talk of what our strategy is, and I really don’t know what 

our strategy is. 

I think since World War II up until a couple of years ago it was 

fight two major conflicts at the same time. Then I think we went 

to fight one and hold one. 

Has there been any change from that, or is that our strategy? 

Secretary HAGEL. That is part of the strategy. I had noted this 

in my opening comments, Mr. Chairman. 

But, first, we built the QDR off of the President’s Defense Strategic Guidance that he issued, as you know, in January of 2012. 

First priority is to protect the homeland. Another priority is to 

deter and defeat aggression globally. Another priority is global stability around the world and global security development globally. 

And the fourth is being able to defeat and, also, deal with a second 

front anywhere in the world, defeat an adversary and win a war 

globally and, also, deal with a second front, a second war. 

So when I say there are two pieces to that, I don’t think you can 

measure a strategy just on that alone. We have added, for example, 

new capabilities, increased funding in cyber, in special operations, 

intelligence security, and reconnaissance. The world is more complicated. In many ways, it is more dangerous. But it is more decentralized. There are different kinds of threats. 

We plan for every contingency, large wars, every possible threat 

to this country. So we have tried to balance that with the force 

structure, the modernization, the readiness, the capability, that we 

thought we would need. And I think in the QDR we reflect that 

pretty clearly. 

The CHAIRMAN. And then, with this complication of how much 

more difficult the world has become, one of the things that I think 

you have spoken about is that we are taking more risk, and all I 

have heard is more risk. 

Can we explain that a little bit more, how that comes down. To 

me, more risk means, like we have done after every war going into 

the next war, we lose a lot more lives because we have taken ourselves down too far. And that—losing lives is what the risk is to 

me. 
12 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, we do lay out the specifics of that risk. 

And I will mention a couple and then this might be a good question 

for the chairman to respond to as well. 

We lay these things out pretty clearly, I think, not only in my 

longer statement and in the QDR, but, also, in just conversations 

we have had. 

The combatant commanders who will be up here—we have two 

of them over on the Senate side today. You have hearings scheduled for the next few weeks. 

The CHAIRMAN. We had three yesterday. 

Secretary HAGEL. Three yesterday. 

They will lay these things out clearly, too. 

But, here, let me just take one general perspective on this and 

give it to you on what does this actually mean when you talk about 

risks. And then I will ask the chairman, if that is okay, to respond. 

Risks are more than just reducing numbers. It isn’t just capacity. 

Part of it, it is the readiness of the force you have. Are they capable, ready, agile? Are they modern? Are they equipped? Do they 

need what they require? Can they be moved on time? Can we respond quickly all over the world to any contingency? 

Those are also part of the arc of the risk that—clearly that we 

would subject our military to, but our country to, the further down 

you take this budget because we won’t have the resources to provide that modernization, to provide that readiness. 

We already know that from the last 2 years, especially the last 

year, when our Navy, Air Force, and Army, Marines, we are all 

cutting back on their readiness, training, and everything that goes 

with it, the support systems that go with it. 

So if that is a good jumping-off point generally, let me ask the 

chairman to respond to that as well. 

General DEMPSEY. Let me give you a brief answer in this setting 

and then commit to following up with you, because the issue of risk 

is a very complex subject. 

We generally measure risk in capability, capacity, and readiness. 

The capability of the joint force, how it works together, which is to 

say what can it do; capacity, how often can it do it based on the 

size of the force; and then the third one is readiness. 

And so the way I would describe the risk we face today is we 

have a significant near-term readiness risk that has been accruing—and we have testified to this before—that we are digging ourselves a readiness hole out of which it will take us several years 

to climb. So near-term readiness is the real risk we run. 

Eventually we can bring the force into balance where the money 

we are committing and investing—enough of it goes into manpower, enough into training, enough into readiness, enough into 

modernization, enough into infrastructure, we can bring it into balance. 

If we go to full sequestration, the risk we run there is it is too 

small, frankly. The capacity becomes the limiting factor. And I 

think we have articulated that as well as we can, but we will keep 

at it. 

The CHAIRMAN. I think one of the main reasons why we want the 

military to be so strong is it keeps us out of war. The deterrent is 

only a deterrent until it stops becoming a deterrent, and then we 
13 

all pay a big price, especially those in uniform that are out there 

that have to do it. So thank you very much. 

Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I want to particularly thank Under Secretary Hale for his 

service. It is probably the last time you will appear before us. And 

admit it. You will miss us. Okay. Probably not. But there are other 

aspects of the job I am sure you will miss. 

You know, in all seriousness, you have done a fabulous job and 

great to work with. And, gosh, I can’t imagine more difficult times 

for the person who is supposed to look after the budget and try to 

figure out what is going on. 

And just following up on the chairman’s remarks, actually, it is 

fairly clear. About 3 years ago this administration said, you know, 

looking out at the next 10 years, what should our defense strategy 

be. 

Now, we get into this interesting argument about whether or not 

that strategy should be at all informed by the amount of resources 

that you anticipate having. 

You know, I have long felt that it is just common sense that, of 

course, any strategy you are going to put together is going to be 

informed, at least in part, by the amount of resources that you anticipate having. 

You can put together a beautiful strategy, but if you don’t have 

the money, you know, then that is not going to be a very effective 

strategy. But I will leave that debate aside for the moment. 

Just say whatever it was. Put together a strategy. And, you 

know, we had anticipated cutting—a decrease in the increase, really—roughly $500 billion over the course of 10 years and then built 

that strategy. 

Well, that was all well and good until the Budget Control Act 

came along and took another $487 billion whack out of the budget. 

And then, of course, sequestration hit for 2 years, a couple CRs 

[continuing resolutions], and you wound up with substantially less 

money than you thought you were going to have when you built 

that strategy. 

And I think what is reflective of this budget that the President 

has submitted is the fact that this budget in fiscal year 2015, but 

especially going forward with 8 more years of sequestration still on 

the books—that amount of money is not enough to adequately fund 

the strategy that the President and DOD would like to do, and that 

is why they put in $115 billion for the 4 out-years. That is why 

they said, ‘‘Here is $28 billion more we would like to have.’’ 

And, by the way, it wasn’t just magical thinking. They did actually put in offsets for the 56, counting the other discretionary 

spending. They put offsets in and said, ‘‘Look, if we could do it, if 

the law could be changed, we would like to not spend money here 

and spend $28 more billion on defense.’’ 

Sequestration and where we are at is going to be devastating to 

defense. But I will say that one of the things that harmed the ability of the American people to understand this is the fact that the 

message that has come out ever since a week ago, when the budget 

was first not quite released, but at least explained, when, Mr. Sec-
14 

retary, you sort of gave the outline of it, is the message from the 

Republican party has been Obama’s cutting defense, you know. 

So the American people get the impression that: Look, there is 

not really a problem here. If the administration would simply 

choose not to cut defense, everything would be fine. And that is 

simply false. 

The administration has budgeted to the number that we all gave 

him. The chairman sort of acknowledged that just a moment ago. 

I wrote down the quote here. ‘‘It is the law, and we are stuck with 

it right now.’’ 

So why, if that is the case, we continually hear Republicans saying the Obama administration is bound and determined to cut defense and that is all this is about—as long as you deliver that message, we got no hope in getting out of this because the American 

people will just say, ‘‘Well, he can change his mind and we are 

fine.’’ 

No. Sequestration, the law of the land that we passed and, yes, 

the President signed—we are all in this together, but the top line 

is the top line. That is the number we have got. This budget does 

not choose to cut defense. It merely follows the law that has been 

passed. 

Now, I and, I think, a lot of people on this committee want to 

see that law change. I would turn off sequestration tomorrow without an offset. I think sequestration has been devastating to this 

economy and, more than anything, devastating to our national security. 

Now, I would prefer that we come up with some grand bargain 

and get tax increases and, you know, reductions in—find some way 

to have a better balance. But if I have to choose between where we 

are at now and simply turning off sequestration so we stop kicking 

the hell out of our defense budget and not, incidentally, our infrastructure and all manner of other important aspects of the discretionary budget, I would turn it off. But that is not going to happen, 

and I think the chairman acknowledges that. So we got the number 

we got. 

Now, the important thing about this hearing is going to be how 

this body chooses to approach what you guys have already approached. You have had to make the decision. You have had to put 

together a budget based on that top-line law of the land that is not 

going to change. 

You haven’t had the luxury of the fantasy that we all have to 

imagine that somehow we can oppose every cut, offer no alternative 

cuts, and complain about the size of the budget. 

So, you know, you have made the decision on the A–10. You have 

made the decision on force structure, on mothballing 11 cruisers, 

on a lot of compensation issues, including the housing allowance, 

some minor savings in the commissaries, a whole bunch of issues 

which are politically unpopular. 

And I hope, though I doubt this will be the case, that over the 

course of the next couple hours we don’t just beat you up over 

every isolated one of those decisions. I hope that, if we say we don’t 

like this decision, we will say, ‘‘Well, here is what I would have 

done differently. Here is a cut that I would have made that would 

put the force in a better place.’’ 
15 

Because I do not expect this body to simply rubber-stamp what 

you offered us. Not our job. We are supposed to exercise oversight, 

and if we disagree, we will make some changes. We had the whole 

Block 30 U–2 thing, and we disagreed. Now we are moving—and 

that is fine. 

But to simply say the administration is fecklessly cutting the 

budget and not offer an alternative is really going to spin us into 

the ground in all the ways that you just described. So I hope we 

have a more productive discussion on that. 

I will ask, of that series of things that—you know, you all are 

out there—of the cuts that have been made, did you consider alternatives? 

If we were to come along, for instance, and say—you know, I 

think it is 3.5 billion if we don’t get rid of the A–10. I forget. It 

is like 4 billion, 5 billion for the cruisers. 

You know, let’s take $10 billion of those cuts. And I will give you 

the thought experiment which we ought to be doing, but haven’t to 

this point, and say, if you were going to get $10 billion from some 

place other than those things that we just talked about, what else 

did you consider, and what might be an option? 

Secretary HAGEL. Mr. Smith, thank you. 

We did. And we have presented some of those. I will just give you 

an example. 

On the $26 billion that we have asked for for increase in this 

budget—this top-line budget for fiscal year 2015, we would roughly 

take that money, if that is what you are talking about, and then 

the out-year money, too, if we could—— 

Mr. SMITH. No. That is not what I am talking about. Sorry. 

Maybe I wasn’t clear there. 

What I am saying is: Accept the top line as it is. Okay? You have 

made the cuts that you have made. I am not talking about what 

would you add. 

I am talking about, if you get political pushback, for instance, to 

the tune of $10 billion, we won’t retire the A–10 and we won’t 

mothball the cruisers, you know, we won’t reduce the housing allowance, whatever—let’s say that we—and I think the number is 

going to be a little bit higher than $10 billion that we want to 

whack out of it, unfortunately. 

But let’s be modest for the moment and say we whack out $10 

billion of your cuts. What would you have to do? How would you 

make up that $10 billion? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well—and I know the chairman wanted to respond as well—if it is a matter of whacking out, if that is your 

question, those decisions as to which programs, which platforms, 

where would you continue to take those $10 billion cuts or whatever, we have thought through that, and that is part of the risk 

that we talk about that we lay out. 

And I will ask the chairman to go into more specifics, but let me 

just generally make this comment, as I already have. 

We will have to continue to put our security and our ability to 

protect this country at risk because you are going to continue to 

take down the entire infrastructure which supports readiness, continues to give us a modernization edge—— 
16 

Mr. SMITH. It is always helpful to see what readiness is. Basically, you know, you won’t—General, why don’t you take a crack 

at it. 

General DEMPSEY. Ranking Member Smith, we have tried to 

keep the joint force in balance. You know, you will hear some think 

tanks suggest, well, you know, get rid of a service or completely, 

you know, change the structure of our aviation capabilities. 

I would be happy to enter into the record a document here that is titled, ‘‘What does $1 billion buy?’’ It is just a menu of—so if you 

were to whack out $10 billion, you could get a sense, I think, for 

where we would have to go to find that. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 99.] 

General DEMPSEY. So here is just some examples. On the mod- ernization side, $1 billion buys 10 Joint Strike Fighters—that is an 

example—or 2 Littoral Combat Ships or 5 P–8s [Poseidon], 980 precision-guided munitions. 

And on the readiness side, a billion dollars pays for 12 F–16 

squadrons to maintain readiness for a year or 3 Army brigade combat teams readiness for a year. 

So we can tell you with some clarity—not some clarity—with 

great clarity what we would have to do if you don’t accept our recommendations. And then, you know, you will have to decide whether that is an even greater cost than the ones that we are proposing. 

Mr. SMITH. That is exactly what I was looking for. Thank you 

very much. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Thornberry. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, it seems to me, regardless of how the overall 

budget issues are decided, it is a matter of some urgency for both 

of us to try to get more value out of the money we spend on defense. 

And I know there is lots of folks here who want to work with you 

to assist in reducing the overhead and bureaucracy costs of the Department, but the chairman and Mr. Smith also are interested in 

acquisition reform, taking the next steps to try to be smarter about 

the goods and services that we buy. We have had very positive discussions with Mr. Kendall, for example, in working together. 

But what I want to ask you is this. It looks to me like, to really 

get to the heart of some of the acquisition issues, it is more than 

Mr. Kendall’s shop. It gets into personnel issues and a whole variety of things that, really, only at the top with some attention can 

these issues be solved. So lots of demands for your time and attention, I realize. 

But my question is: Is improving our acquisition system one of 

those things that you think is important enough for you to devote 

personal attention to trying to make it happen, working with both 

the House and the Senate to get more value out of the money we 

spend? 

Secretary HAGEL. Congressman, it is. I have made that a priority. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Mr. Kendall, who, as you appropriately note, has been working very closely 
17 

with this committee, as well as in the Senate, on this issue, meets 

with me once a week on this particular issue. 

I get a briefing from him. He goes over where we are, what have 

we done, what have we accomplished, Better Buying Power, all the 

different programs that are now in place. 

We can do better. We must do better. We have put a particular 

focus on efficiency. I didn’t just start that. As you know, Secretary 

Gates was focused on it. Panetta was focused on it. I am focused 

on it. We have to do that. 

I think Secretary Kendall is doing an extremely effective job at 

this. We have structured that Department. He has restructured it. 

It is across the board. It is everything we are doing. And part of 

that is driven, of course, by the realities of resource restraints. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Sure. 

Secretary HAGEL. But you have to do it, and we are doing it. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, I appreciate that. As I say, I think it is 

going to require your attention to overcome some of these obstacles 

because there is just going to be a reluctance to change. 

General Dempsey, let me change the subject completely. 

There are some people, as you know, who express admiration for 

what Mr. Snowden has done and his illegal disclosures. Most people don’t realize that a lot of what he has disclosed has nothing to 

do with NSA [National Security Agency], but it has to do with our 

military. 

So in this setting, can you describe, as best you can, what damage his disclosures have done to our military and how much it is 

going to cost to fix them. 

General DEMPSEY. The candid answer is we don’t know yet. But 

let me tell you what we do know. 

The vast majority of the documents that Mr. Snowden exfiltrated 

from our highest levels of security—the vast majority had nothing 

to do with exposing government oversight of domestic activities. 

The vast majority of those were related to our military capabilities, 

operations, tactics, techniques, and procedures. 

We have got a mitigation oversight task force that the Secretary 

of Defense has chartered where, with other agencies of government, 

we are working our way through that which we believe he has 

exfiltrated—and we have, I think, a fairly significant amount of 

knowledge in that regard—and looking at the—red-teaming it, if 

you will, looking at what it could be used for and trying to mitigate 

the effects. 

The mitigation task force will need to function for about 2 years. 

That is the magnitude of this challenge. And I suspect it could cost 

billions of dollars to overcome the loss of security that has been imposed on us. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you again, Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey, for 

being before us. 

I understand that the Department had to work with the budget 

that the Congress set for you, and I understand also that, under 

such budgetary constraints, you have to make tradeoffs. 
18 

However, while the President proposes cutting the National 

Guard and Reserves, reducing commissary services, retiring aircraft and reducing the U.S. military’s end strength, some cuts of 

which I agree with and some I don’t—especially when we see the 

real details, we will be able to tell better—the Department of Defense continues to make an exception for nuclear weapons spending. 

According to the CBO [Congressional Budget Office], between 

2014 and 2023, the cost of the administration’s plans for nuclear 

forces will total over $355 billion. And, as we know, the United 

States has the largest arsenal of nuclear weapons. 

And I find it extremely disturbing that we are continuing to 

spend such significant amounts on nuclear weapons when we have 

more than enough to meet our national security needs. 

I don’t know about my colleagues, but I would rather keep my 

National Guard and Reserves than have another round of nuclear 

weapons built. 

And so if you can both comment on that and provide this committee with an answer on whether you believe nuclear nonproliferation activities are important. 

Because this 2015 budget continues at least to demonstrate to 

me that the Department doesn’t give it a high priority. You have 

cut again GTRI [Global Threat Reduction Initiative], and I am concerned about the non-proliferation programs. 

If you could answer that, I would like that. 

Secretary HAGEL. Thank you, Congresswoman. 

First, let me just make a general comment about the prioritization of the budget and where we cut and the priorities we have 

made. 

As General Dempsey just noted, as I noted in my opening statement, we came at this from a balanced perspective, how do we balance our forces, our modernization, our research, our technology, 

our people, the obligations we have to the people, our commitments 

around the world. So that is first. 

Specific to your nuclear question, first, nuclear weapons have 

been—I think most everybody agrees our ability to possess nuclear 

weapons and the capability that it has brought us has probably 

done as much to deter aggression, nuclear deterrence, and the start 

of a World War III as any one thing, other things, too. 

The safe, reliable, secure, and ready maintenance and posture of 

those nuclear weapons that we do have and which have been coming down, as you know, through a series of treaties, the most recent being the new START [Strategic Arms Reduction] Treaty, 

which the Senate, as you know, ratified just a couple of years ago, 

continues to reduce our nuclear warheads and delivery mechanisms. We are complying with that new START Treaty now. 

We are doing the things that we believe we must do to maintain 

that safe, secure, ready nuclear force, at the same time balancing 

all our other interests as well, but it is an important part of our 

arsenal, the triad system that has been a significant deterrent in 

the world since World War II. 

But that doesn’t negate the efforts on non-proliferation. I think 

the President’s position has been very clear on this. That said, we 
19 

live in the real world that we live in; so, I think we have balanced 

this about right. 

I don’t know if you want to add anything to that. 

General DEMPSEY. Yeah. I think you wanted my insights as well. 

And I speak in this regard on behalf of the joint chiefs because, of 

course, we have discussed and debated this among ourselves. And 

I think we have allocated an appropriate and adequate amount of 

money into non-proliferation in our budget. 

And in terms of the nuclear arsenal, we are firmly committed— 

our recommendation is to remain firmly committed to the triad, the 

three legs of the nuclear capability, and that any further reduction 

should be done only through negotiations, not unilaterally, and 

that we should commit to modernizing the stockpile while we have 

it. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. I look forward to delving deeper into this subject. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. I just, based on your question, told the staff that 

we need to have a classified briefing. And that will be open to all 

members of the committee. I think it is time that we have that 

again. 

Mr. Forbes. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. And, Mr. Chairman, I ask that I get an opportunity to sit on that strategic force because I think it would be very 

interesting for everybody to really figure out what is going on. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Gentlemen, thank you all for coming here. We just 

wish we had more time to listen to you. 

And, Mr. Secretary, I know you had limited time to talk about 

the funding and, if you had more time—because I know you pointed out the $37 billion of sequestration and the impacts on there. 

I note, if you had had more time, you would have probably talked about the $778 billion of cuts the administration took before sequestration, $291 billion in what they called self-imposed efficiencies, and then $487 billion. 

We are going to give you this chart that the House staff prepared 

and ask if you would reply back in writing if any of those numbers 

are incorrect. 

[The chart referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 

100.] 

Mr. FORBES. Second thing is: I have heard kind of this movement 

of the President’s just complying with the law. But in point of fact, 

this budget is $115 billion above the law. 

And then I hear that the President is trying to get his defense 

strategy, but this budget is actually $345 billion less than the 

budget submitted for the defense strategy in 2012, which the chairman testified then, on April 19, if we cut one more dollar, we 

couldn’t do the defense strategy. 

So at some time if you would just respond back to us in writing 

as to whether my numbers are incorrect. 

[No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. FORBES. Second thing: If you would let us know anytime— 

because I just must have missed the hearing—I wasn’t there—that 
20 

the administration on any of the $778 billion of cuts ever expressed 

concern and said, ‘‘This is too many cuts. We shouldn’t be doing 

those.’’ If you would get back to us on those. 

Chairman Dempsey, I would like to ask you—I am concerned because, when this administration came into office, the Russians 

asked us to take our missile defense systems out of Europe. We did 

it. We can turn on the TV [television]. Didn’t work too well for us. 

Second thing I am concerned about now is we have had three administrations, including the Obama administration, when looking 

at the anti-personnel mine ban convention, which is the Ottawa 

Treaty, has said that would be bad for us from a strategic point of 

view, including this administration in 2009. 

Clinton administration actually said that those mines were an 

integral component of U.S. capability to deter and defend South 

Korea from North Korea. 

My question to you is: In your best professional military judgment, what advice could you give this committee about the military 

impact if we were to sign that treaty? 

General DEMPSEY. Summit Ottawa, the convention on land 

mines, I have rendered my military advice that I consider land 

mines, especially the ones that we have, anti-personnel land mines, 

and the way we have designed them, that is to say, self-destruct— 

they can be set for 4 hours, 48 hours or 15 days and then they selfdestruct—that I consider them to be an important tool in the arsenal of the Armed Forces of the United States. 

Mr. FORBES. And, Mr. Chairman, can you tell us whether or not 

there has been a military assessment that has been done at the 

Pentagon, any white papers that have been written, on the importance of those land mines or the impact this treaty would have, if 

we were to sign it. 

General DEMPSEY. Yes, there have. And, importantly, you point 

out the currency of the threat on the Korean Peninsula, and that 

has been factored in as well. 

Mr. FORBES. And could you share either on a classified or unclassified basis with this committee that paper so we can at least look 

at that assessment and what it would be? 

General DEMPSEY. I will take your request as an official request 

and respond accordingly. 

[The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. 

And one last question: Mr. Chairman, has anything changed between 2009 and today that would render our use of those mines 

any less important than it was in 2009? 

General DEMPSEY. My military judgment is actually that the tensions on the peninsula have increased. 

Mr. FORBES. Good. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you all for your leadership. 

Mr. Hale, best wishes to you. 
21 

Yesterday in a hearing we had basically an oversight roundtable 

discussion with Secretary Flournoy, with General Mattis, and Dr. 

Dale, and they all expressed concern over the absence of a kind of 

whole-of-government national strategy. 

Now, we know that we have—I think we have a better whole-ofgovernment approach amongst the agencies today. But when we 

talk about strategy, is there collaboration between the QDR and 

the QDDR [Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review], the 

State Department’s Quadrennial Defense Review? 

And how can we work better with you all to really define a national strategy better that would inform the discussion that we are 

having right now? 

Secretary HAGEL. Congresswoman, the QDR, as you know, prescribed by Congress, which is law, is a Department of Defenseoriented assessment, strategic review, analysis, focused on our Department of Defense strategies. 

That does not disconnect from the rest of the so-called whole-ofgovernment environment that we deal with, too, but it is a prescribed DOD document. 

Now, the QDR aside, we meet all the time in deputies meetings 

and the National Security Staff agency at the White House, the 

principals National Security Council, our people—State Department, intelligence agencies, Department of Energy, Department of 

Homeland Security, Department of Treasury. 

We have connecting areas of responsibility that overlap in the 

whole of government all the time. So that is something that is actually becoming more and more a reality if for no other reason than 

the kind of world that we live in. 

Mrs. DAVIS. I think there is a recognition of a better working relationship surely, but I guess, when we talk about national security 

and how that is reflected in what we are—you know, as we move 

forward and with our budget, they are suggesting that they don’t 

think it is there, and I think others have as well. 

So to the extent that we can improve upon that, it might be helpful and it might help us better define, you know, whether it is resources and budget. 

I mean, what is the goal? I think there seems to be a concern 

that perhaps at least this QDR doesn’t reflect it as well as it 

should. 

Thank you. 

I also wanted to ask you about prioritizing the cuts to the military personnel that were proposed in the President’s budget. 

I am wondering, of those cuts, what would be simply non-negotiable and—in an effort to protect our readiness? And, in fact, how 

do we set assist those non-negotiable discussions with keeping faith 

with our force, which we all, of course, feel very strongly about 

doing? 

Secretary HAGEL. First, of course, we need a force structure that 

is capable of protecting this country, of fulfilling the missions that 

we have asked our Department of Defense, specifically our services, 

to fulfill. So we are close, I think, to your question, to your point 

about non-negotiable, kind of bottom line here. 

And we have talked about this in the risks that we lay out on 

the continued budget restraints—resource restraints. We are talk-
22 

ing about the Army, 420,000. The reality of that may be the recommendation we make. That is getting us perilously dangerously 

close to a line here that none of us want. 

There are lines, as I think you are implying here, in every service, all the platforms, that really, really violate the ability to protect this country. And we lay those risks out in the QDR and in 

my statement and in connecting documents with the budget. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

And I certainly hope you would continue to do that. I think it 

was very clear, and I would encourage the kind of discussion that 

we had earlier about, you know, what does it take. 

We know that the committee for a number of reasons has ignored 

recommendations—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlelady’s time has expired. 

I am going to have to watch this real close because we are going 

to be at a hard stop at 1:30, the next vote. 

General DEMPSEY. Can I take 20 seconds, Mr. Chairman? 

I will tell you what I think would be unacceptable, if we continue 

to kick this can down the road, believing somehow that it will 

somehow be solved by our successors when, in fact, because we are 

kicking it down the road, not making the kind of tough decisions 

we need to make collaboratively, we are eating away at the Nation’s readiness for conflict, which does reduce our deterrent capability. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Bishop. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, General, everyone has been thanking you for 

being here. I would like to say the same thing, except, to be honest, 

I can’t find anything in this budget for which I am thankful. 

But, General Dempsey, if I could ask you first. 

Based on the nuclear posture review, the QDR, and even the new 

nuclear employment guidance, I am under the assumption that 

perhaps the debate is over, that the administration, the chiefs and 

you all agree now that maintaining the nuclear triad because of its 

advantages for our defense as well as deterrence is the approach— 

is definitely the approach. 

Am I correct in that assumption, for the record? 

General DEMPSEY. For the record, I can speak for myself and the 

joint chiefs. And you are correct. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you. That is important. 

Can I ask, Mr. Secretary, in this budget, our land-based ICBMs 

[intercontinental ballistic missiles] will start aging out in 2020. 

And I find nothing in this budget for the Air Force that will actually give a follow-on effort to sustain them. 

What does the administration plan to do, if anything, with what 

appears to be a widening gap between the U.S. and other nuclear 

nations in modernizing our nuclear capabilities, especially post2020? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, it is not because we don’t believe that it 

is necessary. It is an area that we have given considerable attention to. We will continue to do that. 

We focused this budget on where we thought our most significant 

priorities were as we, to your point, age out. And I just recently 
23 

visited some of those sites when I was in Sandia a couple of 

months ago. 

So I am very much aware—— 

Mr. BISHOP. So you are telling me there is not a specific plan 

right now post-2020? 

General DEMPSEY. We have not laid it out. 

Mr. BISHOP. All right. Is it the assumption or the presentation 

of the Department of Defense that retiring the A–10s is a budgetsaver? 

Secretary HAGEL. Yes. 

Mr. BISHOP. Then, isn’t it true that, if you are doing close air 

support missions, that the fighter platform is more expensive per 

hour than the A–10? 

Secretary HAGEL. I am going to let you hear also from the chairman, but let me respond to that. 

There are many considerations that we had to give. And, by the 

way, this was a recommendation by the Air Force and by a former 

A–10 pilot, the chief of staff of the Air Force. I know he will be up 

here and you will have an opportunity to ask him specifically that 

question. 

But the entire realm of consideration when you talk about 

vertical cutoff of a 40-year-old platform versus a more modern and 

versatile platform for our future were all considerations, and it 

does factor in every dynamic of the question. 

But building to the future, I will let the chairman add to that, 

too. 

General DEMPSEY. Congressman, the A–10—the Chief of Staff of 

the Air Force is trying to reduce the number of platforms in his inventory. 

And every time you reduce a platform, you reduce the logistics 

tail and the infrastructure associated with it, which is a significant 

cost savings. 

There are many other platforms that can deliver close air support, and that has been the judgment of the Air Force, and I support it. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you. You have answered the question in a 

roundabout way. 

Let me come up with another couple of things. I will make these 

quick questions if you give me quick answers. 

Is it the position of the Department that moving the Apache combat aircraft from National Guard to the Active Force is a moneysaver? And have you done a cost-benefit analysis of it? 

Secretary HAGEL. Yes. 

Mr. BISHOP. You have done the cost-benefit analysis? 

Secretary HAGEL. We have done that. But what is the whole 

point behind having an attack helicopter, that analysis, as to the 

readiness and the use and where they are most effective, that was 

also a significant part of the decisions that we made. 

Mr. BISHOP. All right. I am on my yellow sign here; so, I am 

going to try to do these last two very quickly. 

Sometimes there is talk about a BRAC. In absence of congressional reauthorization for the BRAC process, does the administration intend to effectuate any kind of BRAC action independent of 

congressional action? 
24 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, first, we will follow the law. As you probably know, in Title 10—I think it is section 2687—the Secretary 

does have some authorities in reorganizing different bases. We 

need a BRAC. We can’t continue to carry overhead we don’t need. 

We—— 

Mr. BISHOP. So the answer was you may do something without 

congressional reauthorization? 

Secretary HAGEL. As I said, I will follow the law, but I have authority now, Congressman. 

Mr. BISHOP. I have 10 seconds. I will throw this out and ask for 

a written response some other time. 

Number one, I would like to find out, in BRACs in the past, how 

much of those lands that have been BRACed have actually gone 

into private sector versus simply being given on to a taxpayer in 

another unit, as in the Park Service, et cetera? 

And I will ask you about sequestration later because I am out 

of time. Sorry. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Secretary Hagel, 

Chairman. 

And, Mr. Hale, thank you for your service, and I wish you all the 

best as well. 

Mr. Secretary, if I could start with you, I want to focus first on 

cyber and Cyber Command. 

In January, four military officers from the four services, all fellows with the Center for a New American Security, drafted a report 

noting that, ‘‘In the cyber domain’’—and I quote—‘‘the services risk 

building similar capabilities in different ways to conduct the same 

mission with significant duplication and overlap,’’ end quote. 

Do you believe that the DOD is appropriately structured to avoid 

this concern? And what effect would the potential elevation of 

CYBERCOM [Cyber Command] to the status of a functional combatant command might have on those concerns? 

Secretary HAGEL. I do believe that we have a cyber oversight 

structure at the Pentagon that is appropriate with the right people, 

competent people. It is something that I pay a lot of attention to. 

Cyber Command is an integral part of our system, of our structure. Whether it should be a combatant command, I will ask for a 

recommendation, if that should come, from the Chairman of Joint 

Chiefs. But right now I have confidence in the system and the 

structure we have 

General DEMPSEY. Congressman, I am not concerned that we are 

building redundancy. Our task at building out our cyber forces is 

so significant that we have had—we, of necessity, have had to do 

it through the services. 

At some point in the future, we might adapt. But, for now, I am 

quite confident we are doing it the right way, to include what we 

need here for a national mission force and, also, to support combatant commanders. 

Secondly, on your question about whether it should be a unified 

command or a functional command, the greater good, in my view— 

our view, the joint chiefs, was to keep CYBERCOM dual-hatted 

with the National Security Agency [NSA]—and, therefore, we con-
25 

sidered that to be more important—and leave CYBERCOM subordinates to STRATCOM [U.S. Strategic Command]. I think we are 

in a pretty good place right now. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary, on those. 

And I will follow those closely. So thank you for your work on 

that. 

Mr. Secretary, the Quadrennial Defense Review released this 

week states that we will seek to sustain priority investments in 

science and technology, research and development both within the 

defense sector and beyond. 

So, with that, I am certainly pleased to hear this emphasis, and 

I believe that we share the same commitments to future capabilities, such as directed energy weapons, electromagnetic rail guns, 

and advanced cyber and space capabilities that, obviously, would be 

so critical to our ability to project power in the future. 

However, I am very concerned about the pressure that budget 

cuts right now are placing on our R&D [research and development] 

priorities. And what I wanted to know is—and how, of course, that 

might affect the agility of our development system, the balance between service, lab, and industry-funded research and whether it 

might cause the Department to become increasingly risk averse 

when it comes to new technologies. 

Could you speak to the health of our defense R&D ecosystem and 

what areas cause you concern? 

Secretary HAGEL. First, the area of research and development, 

technology, science, the focus that the Pentagon has always put 

into that budget, it is a high priority, will continue to be a high 

priority, must be a high priority, because it is there that, really, 

the laboratory of all these ideas has to begin. It is the incubator. 

It is how everything in life starts in technology. 

If we don’t prioritize that, long term we run a big risk. And I 

don’t think any of the leaders at the Pentagon, certainly not this 

Secretary of Defense, would jeopardize our security. So it is that 

way. So it is a priority. It will continue to be a priority. It is funded 

with, we think, an adequate budget. 

On other areas that bother me in liabilities and risks, it is the 

uncertainty part as much as anything else that we have been dealing with in our planning—— 

Mr. LANGEVIN. We are not sacrificing future R&D right now because of a tight budget? 

Secretary HAGEL. No, we are not. I mean, we can go through the 

specific programs, but I think I list those pretty well, where the 

risks are, what my concerns are. 

Secretary HALE. It grows slightly in this budget, and anything 

that grows at all in this budget stands out. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you all. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Kline. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you to the witnesses, being here today. 

To any of you—any of the three of you down there, did you in 

the course of the Strategic Choices Management Review or budget 
26 

preparation or any other analysis—did you ask for or generate 

plans to consolidate COCOM [combatant command] headquarters? 

General DEMPSEY. We have taken a look at the Unified Command Plan, the geographic combatant commands and the functionals, and our judgment at this point was that we needed to retain 

the current structure. However, they are subject to the 20 percent 

manpower reductions that the Secretary imposed last year. 

Mr. KLINE. Well, I appreciate the manpower reduction piece, but 

that doesn’t really get at the heart of the issue, from my perspective. 

We have built a lot of commands over time, and we were just 

talking about Cyber Command and co-locating it—or dual-hatting 

it, I think is the correct phrase, with NSA. We created AFRICOM 

[U.S. Africa Command] at a time of adequate financial resources. 

We are having a little difficulty finding a home for it. 

But it does seem to me that, in times like these when we are 

looking at sequestration and really tight budgets, that it would 

make sense to look at consolidating some of those four-star commands, those COCOMs. And so you have answered my question. 

And what I would like to be able to get from you at some time 

is a look at what that planning is. I really, really think it is time 

because we are not in a time of adequate financial resources. In 

fact, that is the whole gist of all of this discussion here today. 

Times are really, really tight and, yet, we have quite a significant 

number of them. 

So I would ask for that information, if you can get that to me. 

That is an official request. Please get that to us. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 145.] 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman yields back. 

Mr. Cooper. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, to the Secretary, to the 

General, and Mr. Hale, we will miss you. 

I hope this committee will not blame the Pentagon for obeying 

the law, because Congress made up the budget, and all of us would 

like it to be larger, more flexible, but this committee so far hasn’t 

shown it is willing to do more than to blame the administration for 

budget cuts that Congress has passed. 

At last year’s markup, we didn’t even use the real budget numbers. We used the sequestration-free numbers, the imaginary numbers, the fantasy numbers. 

It is almost like magical thinking. So I hope that this year, we 

will be more realistic and join with the Pentagon in trying to make 

the hard decisions that need to be made so that we can have a 

maximum warfighting capability on whatever budget Congress 

comes up with, because let me remind my colleagues, we could 

have a larger budget if we had the courage to vote for it. We could 

find the savings in other places. We could have additional revenues, but that is what is lacking is congressional courage. So let’s 

not blame the witnesses. They are doing the best they can under 

very difficult circumstances. 

One of my colleagues asked questions about the BRAC earlier, 

the extent to which the Pentagon had flexibility to make base clos-
27 

ing decisions on its own. BRAC is one of the most visible areas in 

which we in Congress have tied the Pentagon’s hands, because 

there is surplus capacity in our defense establishment. Some of it 

the Pentagon officials have been urging there would be reductions 

for for years, and yet, in some cases, we even prevent the study of 

such savings. That is truly amazing. 

So not only can we have whatever budgets Congress is willing, 

brave enough to pass, we can offer more flexibility to the Pentagon 

so that you can make maximum effective use of the dollars that 

you do have. And so often, for parochial interests, this committee 

refuses to allow you that freedom. That is wrong. 

So would the witnesses be kind enough to give me an estimate, 

a rough estimate of the overall surplus capability that the Pentagon now has that could possibly be downsized, reduced appropriately, taken off our hands by a BRAC-type process? 

Secretary HAGEL. We can provide that, Congressman, and I appreciate your comments, and we will provide it. 

And Mr. Chairman, we would be very happy to provide it—— 

Secretary HALE. I can give them to you. 

Secretary HAGEL. We have got a bottom line number. 

Mr. COOPER. A bottom line number would be great from Mr. 

Hale, his valedictory comment. 

Secretary HAGEL. I think you are going to want probably some 

sense of how we arrived at that, too, which we will provide. 

Secretary HALE. So we can’t put it in for BRAC, but if we go back 

to the studies that were done just before the last round, we knew 

we had about 25 percent infrastructure that didn’t get eliminated 

in the last round of BRAC. It is probably higher now. But I agree 

with the Secretary; we will give you a better number. 

Mr. COOPER. I have heard the 25 percent number for years. That 

is a lot of surplus capacity. And just because it is located in someone’s State or congressional district doesn’t mean that should be 

immune from a sensible process of strengthening America’s defenses. I have heard from defense contractors, as most of my colleagues have, that it is not so much the cuts they are worried 

about, it is the lack of flexibility in implementing the budget. 

So why don’t we untie the hands of our own Pentagon, so that 

you can be all that you can be, so that you can be as effective as 

possible? That is really the responsibility of this committee and of 

the Armed Services Committee in the Senate. And we all can do 

better if we claim to be proponents of strong national defense, of 

allowing you the tools and the flexibility to have a strong national 

defense. We should not be the obstacle on this committee to having 

the Pentagon be capable of maximum effectiveness. 

So there are a number of issues that we could get into. I am on 

the subcommittee that does strategic forces. Let me remind my colleagues that just to maintain our nuclear establishment, the triad, 

for example, that is so beloved, that is a $355 billion obligation in 

the coming years according to CBO; $355 billion, just for what is 

considered an actually relatively small element of our Pentagon’s 

finances. 

So we in Congress need to be preparing for those obligations to 

be met and fulfilled and possibly even exceeded. But this Congress 

so far does not have the ambition to do the job that I think most 
28 

folks in our Nation want to see this Congress do. So if you want 

to blame anybody, all this committee needs to do is look in the mirror. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Just to clarify the record a little bit, the President submitted a budget last year. We passed a budget in the 

House. The Armed Services Committee passed our National Defense Authorization Act in conformity with those numbers. You are 

right, they were Monopoly numbers, but it was what the budget 

passed. We conformed with that, and at least this year, we do have 

a budget that has been accepted by the House and Senate, and 

signed into law by the President, and that is what we are—that is 

what we will be working to on our budget for this year. 

Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, Chairman Dempsey, good to see you. I greatly appreciate you guys being here, and under this really difficult environment, your questions are really important today. 

And the difficult environment that we have, obviously, is the 

budgetary environment and also then the threat environment, especially under the—in the light of what we have seen in Russia. 

As there has been some discussion about our nuclear deterrent, I 

just wanted to put some graphs up to frame some of my questions. 

The first is, there was previously a discussion. 

And Mr. Secretary, I think you did an excellent job of talking 

about the issue of proliferation versus our own nuclear deterrent. 

You affirmed a strong commitment to a nuclear deterrent. I always 

want to make the point that non-proliferation is about the other 

guy, but there was a statement that the United States has the 

largest arsenal of nuclear weapons, and we all know that that is 

not the case. And I want to show this chart, because it really illustrates it greatly. The chart is actually a reverse one, meaning the 

point in the middle is present as you are moving inward, where everybody was and where they are going to. This is the United 

States, and this is Russia. So we are not sitting on the largest nuclear weapons arsenal. 

[The chart referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 

101.] 

Mr. TURNER. Now, with respect to cuts and the issue of—questions that you guys were all being asked and what we know that 

we need to do with our nuclear weapons, because I was looking at 

your QDR, and after you do the assessments of the top six things 

that we need to do militarily, it says that, based on these six interests, the joint chiefs prioritized these missions. And the number 

one that was prioritized in the QDR was maintain a secure and effective nuclear deterrent, number one. And I think it is important 

because of what it has done to make certain that we have peace 

and stability. 

This chart is the one that shows the cliff that we are on with our 

current nuclear weapons. Because everybody knows, you buy one of 

these things, it is not like you are done. They decay. They decline. 

We have to maintain and modernize them. Every one of them have 

this cliff that is coming up, and so our need to invest is important. 
29 

[The chart referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 

102.] 

Mr. TURNER. Here is the chart that shows the investment that 

DOD is currently on. You can see there has been a decline, decline, 

decline, and there is this uptick. Even with this uptick, it is only 

going to be about 4 percent of overall DOD spending. 

[The chart referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 

103.] 

Mr. TURNER. So my question to you, Mr. Secretary is, recognizing 

your vast experience within the Senate and also with the Atlantic 

Council, your relationship with Europe as being a strong proponent 

of the Transatlantic Alliance is one that is incredibly important, as 

we see that now Russia has not felt deterred and has moved into 

Ukraine. We have the New York Times reporting that Russia, perhaps, has a new ground launch cruise missile that perhaps violates 

INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty]. Clearly, everyone 

is looking for the United States to take action. 

Mr. Secretary, what do we need to do in this year’s budgetary 

document and in our authorization document with respect to the 

QDR and your work to ensure that we respond to strengthen our 

relationship with Europe and deter Russia in the future? 

Secretary HAGEL. Congressman, thank you. First, one of the 

points that I have continually made, and I think it has been reflected in our priorities at DOD, what the President has said, what 

Secretary of State Kerry is presently doing in Europe and trying 

to work through this Ukrainian crisis with our European partners, 

with our NATO partners—NATO has been meeting. I was in 

NATO last week for 2 days. The focus that we continue to put on 

missile defense in Europe, I was in Poland a few weeks ago where, 

as you know, we will be doing more with them, missile defense, Romania. The commitment that we have expressed clearly, completely, and again, reflected in our budget, reflected, I think, in everything we are doing with our force posturing, with our relationships using European forums, our economic, diplomatic efforts; that 

commitment remains steadfast. I said it in Munich. I said it at 

NATO, and I think it has been—the message has been clearly 

given by the President on down in this administration. 

Mr. TURNER. Well, I appreciate your answer. 

And Chairman McKeon, I think one of the most important things 

that we need to do is to make certain that the administration’s policy with respect to Russia reflect a change in this upcoming NDAA 

[National Defense Authorization Act]. The Washington Post just recently said that the foreign policy of this administration is based 

on fantasy; that fantasy being with respect to Russia. I think that 

we need to begin to signal that change and that change needs to 

be in this NDAA and we certainly look forward to a dialogue as to 

the way both of you believe we need to send that signal to Russia. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Secretary 

Hagel, General Dempsey, Mr. Hale, thank you for your extraordinary service, and your testimony this morning. 
30 

I greatly appreciate the commitment to the rebalance in the fiscal year 2015 budget. I think there is more that our government 

can do to support it, but I am very grateful for what they have 

done so far. Last year’s defense authorization bill made important 

progress on the realignment of Marines from Okinawa to Guam. 

And I am grateful for that. The Governor of Okinawa signing the 

landfill permit was a critical milestone and showed good faith from 

Japan to move forward. 

However, there are still restrictions in law on the obligation and 

expenditures of these funds. How important is it to remove these 

restrictions so that we can spend their funds, and do you hear from 

Japan about this matter? 

Mr. Secretary. 

Secretary HAGEL. Obviously, Japan is a very key, important partner. We count on Japan, that relationship. We have a mutual defense treaty with Japan, working closely with the government of 

Japan, and what they are doing, the ‘‘Tippy Two’’ radar site, which 

they agreed on last year, as you note, the Futenma move and the 

landfill permit. So we will continue to stay closely aligned with 

Japan as we see an Asia-Pacific expand become more and more important to the world, world affairs, our economy, our relationships. 

With our rebalance, that partnership will remain strong. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Would there be any way that we could lift these 

restrictions on the spending of these funds? 

Secretary HAGEL. On Okinawa? Well, as you know, and as you 

have noted in your comments, we will be moving and rotating Marines, rotating now in Australia, moving them to Guam, doing the 

things that you are well aware of. Again, I would say in answer 

to your question about restriction of funds or any area touching 

those funds, we have tried to balance the requirements that we 

think we need for our future and especially as we stay committed 

to the Asia-Pacific. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. I have another question for you, Mr. 

Secretary. Can you comment on the importance of the National 

Guard State Partnership Program [SPP]? I noted that the QDR 

talks about the importance of building a capacity partnership. And 

the SPP program does just that, and I know our combatant commanders are very supportive of this. Are we looking to expand this 

program further in the Pacific and Africa Commands AOR [area of 

responsibility]? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, those relationships continue to be very 

strong. I am going to ask the chairman if he would like to respond 

to this. It will continue to be strong. It has been very effective, and 

we look forward to find ways to broaden and expand it. 

Mr. Chairman. 

General DEMPSEY. And we reflected the support of the program 

in the budget, and in fact, just this last week, there were two more 

nations entered into the State Partnership Program. Yeah, it is a 

very effective program. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Since I am the ranking member on the Readiness 

Subcommittee, I wonder if you could just briefly, if not here because of the time situation, discuss the readiness consequences if 

the anticipated savings needed to fund improved readiness are not 
31 

achieved in the coming year. What is the most serious risk if this 

should occur? 

General DEMPSEY. Well, as you know, Congresswoman, we submit a readiness report monthly, and it has reflected the fact that, 

given not only the depth, but the mechanism of sequestration, we 

have had no choice, literally, no choice but to go and raid our readiness accounts in order to find the money to achieve the depth of 

the reductions. And so we have about a 2- or 3-year significant 

readiness hole that we need to begin to fill back in. And it is one 

of the reasons I am very supportive of the $26 billion add because 

in general terms, about 40 percent of that would go to readiness; 

about 40 percent to modernization; about 20 percent to 

sustainment, repair, and maintenance of facilities that are underinvested in right now in the current budget. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, General. 

And I yield back, Mr. Chair. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary, thanks for being here. As you know, I chair the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, and I am very concerned about Russia’s 

activities in violation of the INF Treaty. I know you have had 

seven engagements with your Russian counterparts in the last year 

since you became the Defense Secretary. Could you share with the 

committee the message you conveyed to him about our concerns 

over this INF Treaty? 

Secretary HAGEL. Congressman, as you know, in these conversations and you are correct, I have a very open line of communication 

with the Russian Minister of Defense, and I just spoke to him a 

few days ago. We talk about everything, of course. This specific 

subject is one that we have generally talked about, mainly when 

I talk with him and we have a regular conference call, then we talk 

when we are not just scheduled to talk, but when issues come up, 

like Ukraine, and so on. 

But because the State Department has the main, as you know, 

certification issue on this determination responsibility, we work 

with them. But this is a general area that I do discuss with him. 

Mr. ROGERS. How about NATO? I know you met three times with 

NATO. Tell me about the concerns they have expressed and what 

we have done to reassure them that we are taking this seriously. 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, I know, and I noted in my opening comments about some of the actions that NATO is taking now, we are 

taking. As I noted also, I was just at a 2-day NATO meeting in 

Brussels last week. We conveyed a NATO Ukraine commission 

meeting. At that meeting was then the Acting Minister of Defense 

for the Ukraine. As you know, NATO had a meeting yesterday with 

the NATO Russian commission. The NATO piece of this continues 

to be very important. 

We continue to stay closely aligned with and connected to NATO. 

I noted some actions that I have taken and directed yesterday regarding our partners in that area. So NATO remains a committed 

partner. We are committed to that relationship. We will fully stay 

committed to that partnership because—— 
32 

Mr. ROGERS. Did NATO express to you concern that maybe we 

weren’t as committed to it? And did they express any aggravation 

that we have known about these activities since 2008 and they just 

learned about them in January of this year? 

Secretary HAGEL. No, they did not to me, and they have never 

in all of my official NATO forum meetings, and my many, many bilateral NATO Defense Minister meetings have ever expressed that 

kind of doubt to me about any of this. I know the chairman will 

want to say something, too, but go ahead, please. 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you share my view that they are in violation of 

the treaty, the INF Treaty? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, again, I haven’t seen all of the documentation on it, and I—we are asking for that now. I am asking 

for that, but that is the way I would answer it. We would be very 

happy to come up here and give you a clear—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Before we get—— 

Secretary HAGEL [continuing]. Closed briefing on this. 

Mr. ROGERS. Go ahead, General. 

General DEMPSEY. That report is not due until April, Congressman, on the potential violation, and it will have to be done in a 

very classified setting as you well know. My NATO partners are 

concerned about that, but they are also concerned about Russia’s 

intervention into Ukraine on the basis of ethnic discrimination because, as you know, those borders in Eastern Europe, I mean, there 

are 400,000 ethnic Romanians living in Western Ukraine. So, you 

know, this is a—would be a terrible precedent if this became a 

commonplace occurrence. That is what they are worried about. 

Mr. ROGERS. And I don’t blame them. 

General DEMPSEY. Yeah. 

Mr. ROGERS. You know, this is their backyard. 

But Mr. Secretary, I have got three questions that I would like 

for you to have responded to in writing. They are—and they deal 

with the manner in which we would deal with Russia about these 

deployed forces that are in violation of the treaty. 

First, when it comes to Aegis Weapon System, which is at the 

heart of Aegis Ashore technology, it was designed in part to defeat 

cruise missiles. Would the sites in Poland and Romania add value 

to the defense of our allies and deployed forces? That is the first 

question. 

Second, we will have a third Aegis Ashore battery in Hawaii at 

the conclusion of testing. What value would it have if it moved to 

the Pacific or the Baltic States to help defend our allies against 

Russia’s INF violations. 

And finally, how much would it cost to rotate U.S. dual-capable 

aircraft to NATO-allied states to help defend Europe from Russia’s 

INF violations. If you would have those in writing, I would appreciate it. 

Secretary HAGEL. We will respond. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 145.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Tsongas. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 
33 

And thank you all for being here. You are making very difficult 

choices, very challenging choices, and I don’t envy you that. And 

I think we here in Congress have to be a part of that process as 

you move forward and try to find the best way to best protect our 

country. 

One of the things, and we have had some reference to it, is that, 

you know, in the course of this, I think the military have to be well 

positioned to take advantage of technological advancements while 

being mindful of the economic realities that we face today. We all 

confront this in our daily lives. All of our lives are changing as a 

result of those extraordinary advancements, and the military certainly is part of it. I happen to be from Massachusetts, a State 

whose ecosystem is focused on addressing these challenges. And we 

continue to invest in some of the best technological minds and resources that our country has to offer. And we serve as a willing and 

able partner to the military. 

We have heard Mr. Thornberry reference the acquisition process. 

And I think that the type of rapid technological innovation that the 

military is trying to take advantage of places great pressure on 

DOD’s acquisition system, specifically, in the realm of information 

technology [IT] and cyber. And it is in these realms where the ability to rapidly assess needs and field new technologies is critical. 

And DOD will increasingly need an acquisition system that works 

for IT and cyber. So just a comment that I hope, as you are looking 

at all of this, you are paying particular attention to creating vehicles that enable you to be very responsive in real time to take advantage of emerging technologies and to better protect our country. 

And Secretary Hagel, I am encouraged by your statement regarding the importance of research and development. The QDR strongly 

emphasizes the important role that QDR and innovation will play 

in our ability to meet future threats as well. 

But based on budget requests over the last 5 years, we as a country have been less inclined to put our money where our mouth is. 

In fact, partly due to congressional action, defense-related R&D has 

taken the deepest percentage cut during the downturn since World 

War II. So this is a big concern for me despite your comments. I 

appreciate your comments. But we do know that these kinds of advances and this kind of investment does take money. So it is just 

a comment that, do we want to make this real, not just in words 

only? 

I do want to turn, though, to the issue of sexual assault. There 

are important votes taking place today in the Senate reflective of 

this body and the Senate, deep concern about the prevalence of sexual assault. You both have worked very hard with Congress to create more tools to fight sexual assault. We appreciate that. One of 

those tools is creation of the Special Victim’s Counsel Program giving military victims of sexual assault an access to an attorney. We 

have mandated that the Air Force’s Special Victim’s Counsel Program be implemented by every service. We hear very encouraging 

stories about how many survivors are taking advantage of this and 

to real effect. But we do know that these tools only work if commanders and every service member under their command are 

aware that these tools exist, and we still do hear stories that there 

is not as broad an understanding of this as there should be. 
34 

So, General Dempsey, could you tell me more about how you are 

making sure that service members are aware of the resources 

available to them to fight sexual assault? How are we making sure 

that every officer and enlisted member knows about these tools? 

General DEMPSEY. Three things, briefly. One is, we are currently 

under a mandated 1-year review that was directed by the President 

of the United States. So this has the interest of the Commander 

in Chief. We are also working with the guidance of the Secretary 

of Defense, 21 initiatives. And then internally, as a JCS, we are 

meeting to establish our own initiatives and to make sure we have 

got the metrics right, make sure we have got the media, meaning 

social media, which is where these kids normally dwell these days. 

We have got the right information mechanisms to do that. And I 

just to assure you of that, I was in Ramstein Air Base on the way 

back from Afghanistan and asked to meet with one of the Air 

Force’s special victim’s counselors so she could tell me what her 

scope is, how she feels about her ability to reach out to folks. She 

was actually quite content, I suppose, that the information is available and that she had access and she had the authority she needed 

to perform her duties. But look, we just got to keep at it. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlelady’s time is expired. 

Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you all for being here. 

General Dempsey, thank you for your magnificent service to the 

country and to the cause of human freedom. 

And Mr. Hale, thank you for your service to this committee, and 

I wish you the best in the future. 

And Mr. Secretary, thank you for your service to the country and 

this administration. 

I will start with you, if I could, and let me first ask you for diplomatic immunity here. I constantly find myself shaking my head at 

the decisions and actions of this President, but it seems the greatest consistency that he has had is in the perpetration of one foreign 

policy and national security debacle after another. The administration has now ensconced Iran in a protocol that is really protected, 

allowing them to enrich uranium all the while they are modernizing their missile defense or their missile capability faster than 

ever before. 

And I don’t know of any credible voice, Mr. Secretary, anywhere 

who would deny where we now live in a world where the modernization and proliferation of ballistic missiles is not at an all-time 

high or is at an all-time high. I don’t know that anyone would deny 

that. So yet, today, the President of the United States and the Secretary of Defense presents this committee with the lowest budget 

for the Missile Defense Agency ever presented by this President in 

the 5 years of his Presidency. And I guess my question very simply 

is: Is the lowest budget for missile defense in the last 5 years the 

best way that you, sir, know how to show a strong and continued 

commitment to homeland and NATO and missile defenses, and is 

this the best way to protect the American people and our allies? 

Secretary HAGEL. Congressman, ballistic missile defense is a priority. I announced last year that we were increasing our missile 

interceptors by 14, building 44, we would have total. 
35 

Mr. FRANKS. Forgive me, sir, that is after this administration 

canceled them previously, but please proceed. 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, all I can answer for—— 

Mr. FRANKS. Yes, sir. 

Secretary HAGEL [continuing]. Is since I have been here and 

what I have done, and you asked, I think, partly the question directed at me, and so I can only account for my actions as Secretary 

of Defense, and that is first. 

Second, I think I have been very clear, and I think Secretary of 

Defense before me, Secretary Panetta, and before him, the importance of missile defense. I think other ways we have shown the importance of that is continuing our missile defense system in Europe 

with our European partners. As I noted, I was just in Poland. I just 

noted to the Congresswoman, that in relationship to our partnership with the Japanese ‘‘Tippy Two’’ radar sites, as this is a global 

issue in defense of our country, we, as you know, we need those 

sites, the Aegis missile defense capacity as we station it, posture 

it, position it working with allies, continues to be a priority. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, let me shift gears on you here. 

Secretary HAGEL. So I think we are pretty clear on this. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, I don’t think the budget represents that. I 

don’t think that it indicates that. But in any case, I will move on 

to a different question. 

As you know, we are on a path to reducing our strategic nuclear 

deterrence in accordance with the New START Treaty, which really 

reduced American capability far more than it did Russia’s. And 

now according to the QDR that you just released, the United States 

would be, quote, ‘‘The United States would be prepared to reduce 

ceilings on deployed strategic warheads by as much as an additional one-third below New START levels.’’ 

Now, Mr. Secretary, I have got to tell you, this is a trajectory 

that frightens me because it seems a strategy designed by those 

who live in a world of grand vision rather than one of the—the 

world of the one that we live in. And I guess I first ask you, do 

you put your full faith in Russia actually complying with another 

round of reductions, and do you feel that this will make the United 

States safer 20 years from now? 

Secretary HAGEL. My first answer would be, as I have given 

more than once, on more than one occasion, President Reagan commented about ‘‘trust but verify.’’ That is why we have verification 

built into all of our treaties. And that is the only thing that works 

in any way. As to the New START Treaty, we are complying with 

the requirements of the New START Treaty. That is law, as you 

know. The United States Senate, after the President submitted it, 

ratified that treaty. As has been noted, there would be no unilateral actions taken by this administration on going below the current levels. Those would have to all be, as we have done in every 

administration, negotiated through treaties. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Secretary HAGEL. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Speier. 
36 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Chairman, thank you to Chairman Dempsey, 

Secretary Hagel, and Mr. Hale. I thank you all for your extraordinary leadership. 

Let me say to Secretary Hagel and Chairman Dempsey that in 

my conversations with you privately, you have both shown to have 

a great deal of commitment to address the issue of sexual assault 

and rape in the military, and I believe you. But I must tell you, 

I have grave reservations about those in positions of authority 

right under you that are not necessarily taking your direction seriously. 

Over a year ago, Vice Chair Winnefeld convened a meeting at the 

Pentagon, in which Members of the House and Senate were invited, and many generals sat around a very large table to discuss 

this issue. It was a good meeting. And the vice chair had indicated 

at that time that there would be more. That was over a year ago. 

There has never been another meeting. 

There was an email in March of 2011 by a brigadier general after 

meeting with a Congresswoman, in which he apologized for 

emailing it late because he had masturbated three times over the 

past 2 hours after meeting with a Congresswoman. That was in an 

email, an official email to one of his superiors or many more, and 

nothing happened. And it was only until that email was exposed 

in another sexual abuse case that there was any punishment levelled. And I question what the punishment is when, in fact, this 

general is now working for you, General Dempsey, in the Joint 

Staff. 

I met yesterday with General Snow, the newest SAPRO [Sexual 

Assault Prevention and Response Office] director. And what he 

said to me was when he was given the post, his superior said to 

him, ‘‘You know, I know this isn’t on your bucket list.’’ This is not 

some, you know, take-one-for-the-team position. And yet, we have 

had four SAPRO directors in the last 4 or 5 years, and they are 

only 18-month stints. So if they are only 18-month stints and you 

bring someone in who has no expertise, no background, what is our 

expectation about how seriously we are really taking these cases? 

Now, let me start with you Secretary Hagel. You ordered a directive—— 

General DEMPSEY. Could I respond? Would it be appropriate? 

Ms. SPEIER. Yes, certainly you can. 

General DEMPSEY. First of all, just because you haven’t been invited to a meeting, Congresswoman, please don’t assume that there 

haven’t been other meetings. I mean, I mentioned earlier I had 

many sessions with the Joint Chiefs. 

Ms. SPEIER. No, I meant with Members of Congress. It was one 

that was going to reconvene. 

General DEMPSEY. Sure, no, I understand, and I will go back and 

research why we haven’t invited you back. But there has been 

plenty of meetings. 

Secondly, on that young man who as—who you say—that is part 

of an ongoing investigation and action that I simply can’t—that I 

can’t talk about because of the ongoing investigation. 

And, you know, to your third point about the bucket list comment, I am the one that made that. Now, let me tell you why I 

made it. I wanted to get his reaction. I wanted to see if he was 
37 

going to take this job with the fervor and commitment that I wanted. And if he had said, ‘‘Yeah, you are right, General, this is not 

on my bucket list,’’ he wouldn’t have been hired. I am the one that 

said that. 

Ms. SPEIER. All right. Secretary Hagel, you asked that all of the 

services rescreen all soldiers who were in, quote, ‘‘positions of 

trust,’’ including sexual assault counselors, recruiters, and drill sergeants. The Army disqualified 585 soldiers as counselors, recruiters, or drill sergeants because they discovered infractions of sexual 

assault, child abuse, or drunk driving. The Navy only dropped 

three recruiters and two counselors. The Air Force dropped zero, 

and the Marine Corps dropped zero. 

Now, my question is, first of all, this was not going to be made 

public, except for the fact that it was leaked to a reporter, and that 

is how it became public to Members of Congress. The disparity of 

having 588 in the Army who are disqualified, zero in the Air Force, 

zero in the Marine Corps, and only 5 in the Navy suggests that 

they are using different means by which to do the screening. 

As I understand it, in some cases, all they did was determine 

whether or not they were on a civilian sexual predator registry. So 

I guess my question to you is, are you going to reissue another directive? Are you going to ask the Air Force and the Marine Corps 

to go back and scrub like the Army did, and will you make it public? 

The CHAIRMAN. Would you please respond for the record? 

The gentlelady’s time is expired. 

Secretary HAGEL. I will. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 145.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Hagel, General Dempsey, and Mr. Hale, thank you for 

your service. I have communicated with officials from Israeli missile defense forces. They say that Israel would much better be able 

to meet its security needs if that part of the Obama budget were 

increased by $350 million. 

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to put into the record 

documents received from the Israeli Missile Defense Organization 

asking for additional funding in this budget. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 104.] 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. 

Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey, the outcome of the 

Obama administration’s attempts to negotiate verifiable—a verifiable end to Iran’s program to produce a nuclear weapon is still up 

in the air. However, apart from that, Iran continues to support terrorism and instability around the world. It is proven that they supplied the explosives and weapons to kill hundreds of our soldiers 

and Marines in Iraq. And they are continuing programs to develop 

ballistic missiles and other weapons of mass destruction. Should 

companies that do business with the Department of Defense also 

be doing business with Iran? 
38 

Secretary HAGEL. Congressman, we have sanctions in place, as 

you know, to address that. And companies would violate those 

sanctions if they were doing that kind of business with Iran. I 

might also add, if I might, Congressman, on the missile defense 

with Israel, I probably speak as much with the defense minister of 

Israel, General Ya’alon, as any one defense minister. And the commitments that we have made to the missile defense systems in 

Israel remain very clear. They are in the budget, Iron Dome, David’s Sling. So I would like to have more money, too, in my budget. 

But I don’t think there is any equivocation or question about our 

commitment to those systems. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Well, I appreciate what has been done. I am just 

thinking this is something we should give more attention to, and 

we will continue those discussions in committee here. 

And on the sanctions issue, one news report has indicated that 

companies doing business with the Department of Defense to the 

tune of the $100 billion are looking at doing more business with 

Tehran now that the sort of floodgates have been open, and some 

people would disagree with that term ‘‘floodgates’’ since this recent 

deal with Iran, but that is how some people out there in the business world are looking at it. 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, as you have noted, regarding floodgates, 

no floodgates have been open. We still keep our strong sanctions 

on Iran. No deal has been made with Iran. What is in place is— 

and is clicking down, that 60, or 6-month process to build, if we 

can, a framework of engagement with the Iranians and our National Security Council countries and ours to get to what we want 

to get to, and that is to assure that Iran does not have—doesn’t get 

nuclear weapons. The other issues that you mentioned, which we 

are quite mindful of—and as I have said many times, others have 

said in this administration, including the President, they are a 

state sponsor of terrorism. So we have to deal with that as well. 

But there is no opening of floodgates. The sanctions are still there. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay, thank you for that answer. And also, Secretary Hagel, given the Russian push into the Ukraine, the uncertainty involving Iran we just touched on, continuing instability in 

North Korea, Chinese expansion, the loss of almost 2 million documents through Edward Snowden’s treachery, potential cyber attacks from shadowy players, were it not for budget constraints, 

would you be advocating for the reductions that are in this budget? 

Secretary HAGEL. I wouldn’t be advocating for the reductions in 

the budget at all. Reposturing, resetting based on coming out of, as 

I have said, two of America’s longest wars, one of them America’s 

longest war, we have always done that. New threats, and you just 

presented an inventory of many of those, starting with cyber; we 

need to restructure, reposture regardless of the resources. 

Mr. LAMBORN. I am just wondering when the concentration is on 

the mission versus the budget, and which comes first. 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, the strategy and the mission has to come 

first, but I don’t think, other than you are interested in a college 

paper seminar project, if you can’t implement the strategy, and if 

it is not resource—if it is not resource-facilitated, not driven, a 

business plan that our chairman has probably put together many 

of them. I have done so, many of you on this committee have over 
39 

the years. I never put together a business plan or a strategy, unless I didn’t think how was I going to implement that, and how was 

I going to carry that out. 

So it is the strategy, the mission, the responsibilities, of course, 

and then you build out, but you still have to connect the resources 

to it. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. 

Secretary HAGEL. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Barber. 

Mr. BARBER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I just want to, before I begin my questions, I want to join 

with my colleagues in thanking you, Mr. Hale, for your service to 

this country, for your integrity and hard work. We will miss you, 

and we wish you well. 

Mr. Secretary, and Mr. Chairman, I really appreciate the challenges that you face in developing a budget under the sequestration 

requirements. I think we all understand that that is almost an impossible task. There is no question that we have to reduce our debt 

and deficit, but I share the view of many in this committee and in 

the Congress that sequestration is absolutely the wrong way to do 

it. And I believe it seriously is compromising our national security. 

Chairman Dempsey, let me pose my first question to you. But I 

will preface it by talking a little bit about my district and the men 

and women of the Air Force and the Army who serve our country 

there. 

I am very proud to represent Davis-Monthan Air Force Base 

where I grew up as a kid, home to the 355th Fighter Wing, where 

the A–10 operates and is training the next generation of close air 

support pilots. I also represent the Army Garrison at Fort 

Huachuca, and I have adopted the 162nd Air National Guard 

Fighter Wing of the Air National Guard just across my district line. 

And I would hope, Mr. Secretary and Mr. Chairman, that you could 

come and visit our district, and meet the men and women who are 

serving this country so courageously. I hope you can come when the 

weather is cooler than it is here but not as cold as it is now. It will 

be good to come in the spring or in the fall. 

These military installations have a long and distinguished history of defending the Nation. And the budget proposal you put forward this week, last week calls for the divestment of the A–10. 

Mr. Chairman, I understand the need to find budget savings. 

However, the A–10 I think we all know plays a crucial role in protecting our service members on the ground, a role that simply cannot be suitably replicated in all aspects by any other aircraft in our 

inventory at this time. I am a supporter of the F–35. I am a supporter of UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles]. I believe that other airframes can perform aspects of close air support, but none can take 

the place and perform like the A–10. Just yesterday, in this hearing room, General—Admiral Locklear said there are capabilities 

out there that will not, will not parallel what the A–10 can offer. 

General Austin in the same hearing said that he had seen the A– 

10s perform magnificently in Iraq and Afghanistan. And previously, Major General Bill Hix made the critical crucial point that 

the A–10 serves as a flying artillery when ground troops cannot 
40 

be—request indirect fire support due to logistical issues. And just 

7 months ago, in this hearing room as well, General Welch told me, 

quote, ‘‘Until the Air Force, until the Air Force has sufficient numbers of F–35s, the Air Force intends to keep the A–10 viable and 

combat ready.’’ 

And Mr. Chairman, from an Army officer’s perspective, who has 

commanded ground troops, how is it possible that it is not in our 

Nation’s best interest to keep this proven workhorse flying? 

I would ask Mr. Secretary, since we are getting close to time, ask 

the same question of you. We, I believe, are making a grave mistake in divesting ourselves of the A–10, when it is performing so 

magnificently and there is no other airframe that can do the job 

it has done. 

Mr. Chairman Dempsey and Mr. Secretary. 

General DEMPSEY. Yeah, and I will make this brief, Congressman. The A–10 is a wonderful system, but it is also an old system. 

And it is also vulnerable in a high-intensity environment in a way 

that it is not vulnerable today in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Air 

Force has other platforms that can produce that flying artillery you 

described, so does the Army, called the Apache helicopter. It is a 

prudent budget decision made in the face of significant cuts. If we 

had the money we thought we would have, you know, in 2010, we 

probably wouldn’t be having this conversation, but we are having 

this conversation. 

Secretary HAGEL. Congressman, the only thing I would add is 

that this was a recommendation that the Air Force made to me, 

General Welch. You know, he is a former A–10 pilot. It is not a 

matter of, was it a platform that wasn’t everything you said it was. 

But General Dempsey just laid out the realities of a 40-year platform when we are looking down the road at the kind of requirements we are going to need in the future with the restraints we 

have. 

Mr. BARBER. Let me just add I have got 4 seconds. We have put 

$1.1 billion in upgrading this aircraft—we need to keep it flying. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman’s time is expired. 

Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Chairman 

Dempsey, Secretary Hagel, Mr. Hale. 

Thank you all so much for your service to our Nation. Thanks for 

joining us today. Secretary Hagel, let me begin with this: You have 

spoken very eloquently about the increased risk around the world 

that we face, the threats that are out there. You have heard Members here speak about the specifics of those threats. I want to look 

in a little broader perspective, as you have identified those threats. 

In looking at the budget that you projected going forward, I am 

curious as to how you feel that budget in the face of those threats 

relates to, in any way, shape, or form there being an increased risk 

to the men and women that serve this Nation if they are placed 

in a conflict. And then, secondly, under this budget scenario, is 

there any possibility that there is an increased situation where we 

may not win in a conflict? I think those are two things that are 

very, very concerning to me. I want to get your perspective on that. 

Again, any increased risk to the men and women in harm’s way 
41 

and any increased possibility that we may lose in a conflict that we 

might become engaged in. 

Secretary HAGEL. Congressman, thank you. 

Your first question, increased risk to the men and women in uniform that we would send, have sent, into harm’s way. I don’t know 

if you were here, and a couple of my opening comments on this specific issue. So I won’t replow that same ground. But as you said, 

in way of your question, as I noted in my statement, how we take 

care of our men and women isn’t just compensation. Yes, that is 

a big part of it. But it is, to your point, making certain, no question 

that they are prepared in every way. 

That has been a priority, will continue to be a priority. Any time 

you take cuts the size that we are taking, and the steep abrupt 

cuts that we are taking, there is going to be risk. I mean, look at 

the Army last year and the Marines, for example, and ground 

troops. What the Army in particular had to do to do is stand down 

much of their training. Well, that cuts right into readiness, and 

that cuts right to risk. That is just one element. 

But the budget we propose over the next 5 years we think addresses that. The chairman will give his opinion on this, but this 

was not without the chiefs, our senior enlisted, without the complete integration and involvement of our uniform military. 

On the larger, the second question was the risk on—— 

Mr. WITTMAN. Well, is there any increased possibility that in a 

conflict—— 

Secretary HAGEL. War, we lose a war? 

Mr. WITTMAN [continuing]. That we might lose. 

Secretary HAGEL. First, the world is uncertain. I can’t guarantee 

the outcome of anything. But what we are trying to do, as I said, 

in the strategic guidance that the President gave us in 2012, what 

our QDR was based on, what our focus was based on, is winning 

wars. And I noted that. The world is unpredictable. But we want 

to be prepared to win a war. And that is the kind of budget that 

we have presented. That is the focus. That is our priority. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. 

Chairman Dempsey, I am going to get your perspective, but I 

want also if you would, to drill down a little bit and give us the 

perspective, too, on the challenges with the Army that it now is 

having to face a decreased capacity in end strength and decreased 

capability as far as less modernization and what does that mean 

for them in having to carry out OPLANs [operation plans] and 

CONPLANs [Concept of Operations Plans] that they are going to 

be faced with? If you could obviously answer the general question, 

but then drill down a little bit as to the Army perspective. 

General DEMPSEY. Yeah, what I will do is just give you—I will 

react to your question, but actually, I would like to take it for the 

record, the opportunity to answer. This is a very profound question. 

This is the question we have been struggling with for 3 years, 

frankly. But I will tell you this: In 2020, we will still be the most 

powerful nation in the world if we achieve the promises in the 

QDR. And the promises in the QDR actually involve institutional 

reform, flexibility, so that we can take the money that the country 

has decided to invest in us and use it to keep the force in balance. 

If we can do that, then in 2020, I have confidence in telling you 
42 

we will still be the most powerful nation in the world, with over 

1 million men and women in uniform. That is not counting the 

Guard and Reserve. It will be up around 2 million with the strongest system of alliances, a global network of forward-operating bases 

and allies and partners, control of the global commons, but not unchallenged and not at times at risk. Let me answer that question 

more fully for the record. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Sure, very good. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 145.] 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman’s time is expired. Thank you. 

Mr. Kilmer. 

Mr. KILMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you each for being here. 

Mr. Secretary, I wanted to start by asking about the role of the 

Reserve Component in the National Guard. Would you agree that 

there are some missions that are best suited for the Active Component and others that are best suited for the Reserve Component 

and additionally, would you agree that, despite who takes the leadership in a given role, both Active and Reserve Components should 

be equally capable of providing forces for all mission sets? 

Secretary HAGEL. First, thank you, Congressman. 

First, as I said, and I said in my opening statement, I have said, 

all the chiefs have said, it is reflected in the budget. The Active 

Army is integrated into—or the other way around, the National 

Guard Reserve integrated into the Active in the sense that it is 

part of our complete national security enterprise and our military. 

They are vital, the National Guard and Reserve, to that system, 

and they will be. That is first. 

Second, the National Guard has different responsibilities, Reserves do, than the Active Duty. The Active Duty is there for one 

reason. That is Active Duty. They have got to be prepared, agile, 

immediate. They have got to have the equipment, the training, everything that sets them up for that mission and to accomplish that 

mission. The National Guard Reserves aren’t the same, but they integrate. They work together. The Reserves, National Guard work 

in Afghanistan and Iraq, very important. But that also includes the 

training, and the preparation, and the movement, and logistics that 

go with being able to move your combat brigades and all of the 

things that go into that. That also gets us into the aviation piece 

of that; what do the Governors need in order to use the National 

Guard to fulfill their requirements as well as keeping the National 

Guard and Reserves ready and so on? 

We have tried to focus on that balance as we go forward on requirements that we know we are going to have, threats that are 

out there, and that is the kind of strategic guidance that we use 

to prepare the budget. 

Mr. KILMER. Thank you. 

With the time I have remaining, I wanted to ask also about, after 

reviewing the budget, and reflecting on the rebound toward Asia, 

I am concerned and hearing concern about the reduction to the 

Navy ship depot maintenance budget of $1.4 billion. And there is 

an operations cut in that regard as well. I remember the old FRAM 

oil filter, ‘‘Pay me now or pay later.’’ Does this set us up for more 
43 

costly bills down the road if we use our ships more and can’t repair 

them? Wouldn’t we then have to move up our plans to replace some 

of these tired vessels to ensure our overall capacity? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, Congressman, I think that gets to the 

point of what the Navy has recommended, and some of the, I think, 

pretty creative ideas they have got and being able to bring some 

of our ships out and upgrade them and overhaul them, not taking 

them out of the fleet, but bringing more capacity, longer lifespan. 

I mean, all of these things are part of addressing your question; 

this also, within the framework of the budget restraints we have, 

the resource restraints. 

Mr. KILMER. Thank you. 

And I may just ask for the answer in follow-up. Mr. Hale, I am 

encouraged by the serious look that is taking place on acquisition 

reform. I wanted to get your sense of what needs to be done to 

properly address this issue? I am sure that there are—that both 

policy and process are factors in this, and I wanted to get a sense 

of what do you think the biggest factors are in that regard? 

Secretary HALE. Well, I think I am going to let Frank Kendall 

answer that one for the record primarily, but I will say, we are 

pursuing a variety of initiatives, as I think you are aware; a greater use of competition, increasing our trade craft and services contracting, because we spend so much on that, and I think we can 

do better. We have seen some tangible results, like less funding or 

less cost for the EELV [Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle] contract. I think we are on the way. It deserves more work, and it will 

get it, and I am going to let him expand on that. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 146.] 

Mr. KILMER. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. WILSON [presiding]. Thank you. 

We now proceed to Dr. John Fleming of Louisiana. 

Dr. FLEMING. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I want to thank our panel of witnesses today. Thank you for 

your service to our Nation. 

I want to change the subject a little bit here. Secretary Hagel, 

in January, the DOD published a revised instruction that was in 

response to the religious liberty language included in both the fiscal year 2013 and fiscal year 2014 NDAA. However, the directive 

failed in a number of ways to address the concerns of Members of 

Congress, which I noted in a letter sent to you this week. It was 

March 4th. You probably haven’t had a chance to review it yet. 

Mr. Secretary, can you explain how the Department intends to 

ensure that protection is provided for a service member’s freedom 

to discuss, explain, mention, and reference their specific faith tenets, either in private or in public, while completing an official 

military duty? And just to mention here also, the directive does 

specifically but very narrowly address such things as attire, jewelry, headwear, and so forth. But it seems to ignore the really important parts of this, which is, again, the freedom to discuss, explain, mention, and reference their specific faith tenets. 

Secretary HAGEL. You note, Congressman, the memo—standards 

that we have published to bring a service-wide standard to ac-
44 

knowledge religious freedom, expression of that, but at the same 

time, not proselytizing, and there is a difference. We tried to give 

some framework of standards across all of the services. On the— 

you mentioned specifically headwear. Some of the specific areas 

that are always close calls, the good order and discipline of our system has to be maintained. 

We have given the local commanders the call on their judgment, 

depending on the mission. We are not trying to inhibit anyone’s 

freedoms to express themselves praying five times a day, but it 

can’t interfere with the mission of the military either. It has to 

maintain the good order and discipline of the military. 

So the local commander is an important last arbiter in this. Each 

command, each situation is a little different. We try to build in 

flexibility to that. But for example, no member of the clergy is told 

to, is expected to, should, is forced to do something that would be 

against his or her religion. So we tried to give a standard but also 

some flexibility. 

Dr. FLEMING. Well, Mr. Secretary, I mean, for instance, we get 

reports that members somehow are disciplined or told to remove a 

Bible that is on their desk. In one case, there was some prose written, I think, by a chaplain. It had to do with the old standard, 

‘‘There is no such thing as an atheist in a fox hole.’’ We hear about 

prayers that have to receive some sort of scrutiny by command, the 

word ‘‘Jesus’’ removed. And so what I am saying is, it doesn’t appear, at least thus far, that the directives have addressed this at 

all. Again, it is jewelry, it is cosmetic things which I think does not 

address what we put in the NDAA both in fiscal year 2013, and 

2014. 

Secretary HAGEL. First of all, I am not aware of the specific 

issues, and I would be glad to look into them. 

Dr. FLEMING. They are all outlined in ‘‘A Clear and Present Danger,’’ through the Family Research Council, so I will be happy to 

upload that to you. 

Secretary HAGEL. Okay. But to your bigger question and answer, 

local commanders have authority and responsibility to make those 

kind of calls, based on what they think is appropriate for their 

command. Again, we have tried to give them some overall guidance 

for all our services, but I would be glad to look at the specifics of 

this. 

Dr. FLEMING. Well, I guess a good start would be the letter that 

we have sent you, which, of course, you have not had an opportunity—— 

Secretary HAGEL. I have not seen it yet, but I will look at it and 

respond. 

Dr. FLEMING. So I think that would be a good start on this. We 

have already had one hearing. I think we planned for another one 

soon. In fact, Mr. Wilson is the subcommittee chairman of that 

committee, so we would like to delve into this further. 

Secretary HAGEL. I will respond to you. 

Dr. FLEMING. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you. 

Ms. Duckworth. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
45 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. I have some significant 

concerns. You know, after a year of various representatives from 

DOD testifying to your commitment to maintaining the National 

Guard as an operational force, I am concerned that the proposals 

as pertaining to the Guard aviation really does change the fundamental nature of that. By taking away the AH–64s [Apache helicopters], by taking away the Apaches, you have basically gotten rid 

of the combat aviation brigades in the Guard, so that instead of 

having aviation for combat, aviation brigades, you now have combat support, aviation support brigades. Does that not change the 

fundamental nature of the divisions, the Guard divisions, and how 

they can go into the fight? 

Secretary HAGEL. If I might, I am going to ask the chairman to 

respond to this because the chairman, with his experience to begin 

with, has something to say about this, but more to the point, he 

and the chiefs, in particular the Army chief—and by the way, the 

National Guard chief, General Frank Grass, who was involved in 

all of this and, as you know, has a voice at the table with the other 

chiefs. And he is an important voice in all of this. And we listened 

carefully, obviously, to what General Grass’s viewpoints were. I 

want you to know, first of all, before I ask the chairman to respond, 

is that we took a very clear look at all of this, what we are going 

to need for the future, roles of the Guard, Reserve, Active, how we 

bring value added to all of that, as we must, for the future. So if 

I might, I will ask the chairman to respond to that. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Just before you respond, General Dempsey, 

just quickly, I understand that both General Grass and, of course, 

the Army chief himself had input into this. I do find myself somewhat skeptical when I hear the Army chief talking about how National Guard troops and Reserve troops only train 39 days a year 

when we all know darn well that most of them do certainly more 

than that, and I certainly did more than that as an aviator. 

And I think that was either a careless statement or a statement 

meant to deceive. So I do have some skepticism when it comes to 

the Army chief’s desire to not cannibalize the Guard in order to 

maintain his force. 

With that, General Dempsey. 

Secretary HAGEL. General, may I just respond quickly. I am well 

aware of the comment. I am well aware of your concerns. I am also 

well aware of your distinguished service as an aviator. So I do 

know that you know exactly what you are talking about on this 

issue, so thank you. 

Mr. Chairman. 

General DEMPSEY. In the limited time available, but I am sure 

this will be a longer conversation as this evolves. But the Army’s 

motivation in moving, particularly the Apache around is they are 

trying to move from seven air frames to four. I think you probably 

know that. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. I don’t have a dog in this hunt because there 

is no Apaches in Illinois, so it is not a fight that I am in. But my 

question is, what does this do to the fundamental nature of the divisions in the Guard, as opposed to the Active Duty divisions if you 

take away the CABs [combat aviation brigades] out of the Guard’s 

division? 
46 

General DEMPSEY. You correctly point out that the aviation aspect—the combat aviation aspect of the Guard division will be fundamentally altered. But I do think, in terms of them remaining 

operational and having the other, I don’t know, 12 or 15 systems 

that define combat capable, in some ways, it will make us more 

interdependent, frankly, the Guard, the Active and the Reserve 

Component. And that is where I think we are headed by the way, 

more interdependence as opposed to interoperability. And by the 

way, the Air Force is probably ahead of us—ahead of the Army in 

that regard. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. I only have a minute left. I will take your answer for the record. I would like to know what analysis you did into 

the Active Duty taking over of equipment that was purchased with 

NGREA [National Guard & Reserve Equipment Appropriation] 

funding, specifically the 72s, the Lakotas, that many of them were 

bought with 2012 NGREA funding. That is funding that is provided 

by Congress directly to the Guard and to the Reserve to purchase 

equipment for a dual-use function, both combat and domestic, and 

if there is any analysis that you did on whether or not you can actually do that. Thank you. 

General DEMPSEY. Yeah, we will, Congresswoman. By the way, 

I am reminded that it is very challenging to have a conversation 

with a helicopter pilot about Army aviation. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 146.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Dempsey, thank you for your service as the Chairman 

of Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

And, Secretary Hagel, as the Secretary of Defense. 

And thank you both for your service in the United States Army 

as combat veterans. 

Our previous National Defense Authorization Act authorized the 

National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force, and I have 

got the report here. And it was issued on January 30 to the Congress, and it is very impressive. And I think one of the thesis of 

this report is that in order to save money without compromising capability, that we need to push more capability. We need to look at 

the force structure, and in this report, it looks at the United States 

Air Force and says, what can we do in the Guard and Reserve 

versus what can we do on Active Duty in terms of saving money? 

Your predecessor, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, would tell us 

in these hearings that the trajectory of personnel cost is going to 

eat into acquisition costs, irrespective of what else happens to the 

budget. 

And so we now have, I think, I am co-sponsoring an amendment 

by Chairman Wilson of South Carolina, in the Personnel Subcommittee, that would set up the same process for the United 

States Army in terms of looking at its force structure and what 

could be done in the Guard and Reserve. I am writing amendments 

to do the same for the United States Marine Corps and the Navy. 

And so I am wondering where you see this going, because I really 

think that this is, having served in both the Army and the Marine 
47 

Corps and in both their Reserve Components, I mean, I really 

think that we can rely on the Guard and Reserve more than we 

do, albeit we don’t want to go back, as they transition from an 

operational reserve to a strategic reserve, we have got to make sure 

that we address their training requirements. We don’t want to go 

back to the status quo ante when Reserve units are showing up or 

Guard units are showing up for the first call and were ill-prepared 

to go to combat. 

General Dempsey, I am wondering if you could address that. 

General DEMPSEY. You know, you are not going to find a bigger 

fan of the Guard and Reserve than me, having served 3 years in 

Iraq almost consecutively. But I also, as we continue to do this 

analysis, and I think the Army, I am not sure whether we need a 

study or not. Frankly, it would depend on what charter you gave 

it and what composition you would direct. But let me set that aside 

for a minute. If you want someone to be ready and as capable as 

someone who is Active, then you have to pay for them to achieve 

that level of readiness. This really is not magic. So if you want a 

Guard who is ready tonight, it is going to cost you the same, precisely the same, as it will cost you to have an Active Duty. The 

issue for us is, again, that word keeps coming back, balance. And 

we are eager to have that conversation. We are not trying to direct 

it in any one particular direction. We think we have got in the 

Army’s plan the proper balance. If someone suggests otherwise, 

then let’s have that conversation. 

Mr. COFFMAN. We will have that conversation. And what you 

have just mentioned doesn’t take into account the legacy cost 

where, you know, an Active Duty soldier may, with 20 years, retires at age, say, 40, 42, is going to draw 50 percent of their base 

pay from the date of retirement, whereas that reservist with 20 

years is not going to draw it until age 60. There is significant legacy cost differences. 

Mr. Secretary, do you have any comments on this? 

Secretary HAGEL. I think that the chairman laid it out pretty 

clearly, and I would just add to one thing he said. We are not trying to push anybody aside here. We would welcome the input and 

the ideas and just as Chairman Dempsey said. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Well, I think we are clearly going to look at how 

we structure this. I think these findings are impressive in this report. I have written the four recommendations in amendment form 

that I am going to try to put into the National Defense Authorization Act that will produce savings. And we are going to take the 

same processes to all the other branches of service. 

Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

General DEMPSEY. If I could, Mr. Chairman, I just want to ensure—I don’t know this, but I suspect the Air Force hasn’t had 

time to, not rebut it, but comment upon it and present their alternative view. And I would hate to have the recommendations in that 

review be placed into the NDAA in a binding fashion before we 

have this debate. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, in accordance to this report, the 

Air Force fully participated in it. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 
48 

Mr. Peters. 

Mr. PETERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, gentlemen, for your time today and for your service to our country. 

Particularly to Mr. Hale, congratulations, and we wish you good 

luck. 

I wanted to draw your attention, if I could, with my time to the $20 billion or so we spend every year on energy in the Department 

and to raise a little comment in response to something I heard 

about what happened at yesterday’s Senate Armed Services Committee, where some of the folks attacked the Navy’s investments in 

bio fuels, including algae and alternative energy resources. 

For my part, I wanted to just encourage you that I agree with 

you that the investments are designed to enhance operational security and that reducing the reliance on conventional fuels and improving the energy efficiency of our operations and installations 

has both strategic and tactical benefits but also promotes cost savings, which is important for us to support your mission as well, in 

terms of equipping our soldiers and our warfighters and our bases. 

So I want to commend the Department and the services for all 

the work they do and have continued to do to promote energy security and efficiency. I know there is a lot more work to do, but I just 

wanted to thank you, in particular, Mr. Secretary, for signing the 

letter to Senator Mikulski, dated January 2 with Secretary Vilsack 

and Secretary Moniz. I appreciate that. 

My question on this was to sort of maybe give us an update on 

the latest initiatives to integrate energy considerations into planning and force development activities and then maybe give us some 

sense of how we can be helpful here at Congress in supporting that 

effort. 

Secretary HAGEL. Thank you, Congressman. You know, we have 

an Office of Energy Resources Development and Assistant Secretary, and you deal with her I am sure and know her well. Starting with your number that we are in the area of about $20 billion 

roughly of what we expend, DOD, on fuel and what it takes to propel this large enterprise. And we are constantly working inside, 

with others outside, as we develop research and finding ways to, 

yes, get cheaper, more effective, more efficient ways of producing 

energy, but secure, secure energy. And we have I think, over the 

last 10 years, done a lot of interesting things. I mean, you know 

about the third-party private sector investments on some of our 

bases where we get first priority to that energy. It is much cheaper. 

It is secure. It is there. But also, as you know well, we are all over 

the world, ships, planes, bases. So it is not just North America. We 

have got to rely on secure energy sources everywhere in the world, 

so we are constantly working to improve that and find new ways 

to do it and will continue to do. 

General DEMPSEY. If I could add from the military JCS perspective, we are interested in becoming more efficient, saving money, 

and so forth. But if you are looking for where you can be helpful, 

operational energy. For example, a U.S. Army or Marine Corps infantry platoon probably carries about 400 pounds of batteries in 

order to power all the devices that we have given them over time. 

To the extent that we can invest in and find ways to either improve 
49 

the batteries or somehow replace them, then we become more combat effective. And that is what we are interested in. 

Mr. PETERS. I appreciate that. I always recount the story of my 

first visit from the Commandant of the Marines, as a member of 

this committee. He sat down with a whole group of top level Marine Corps officers, and the thing he wanted to talk to me about 

was solar energy. Not because he is a tree hugger, but in terms of 

in the battlefield, it has become so useful. And, of course, that is 

what this committee is about. So we want to be helpful and supportive. And also I know there are a lot of new smart grid technologies that help you out in the field remain independent from 

electric grids that might not be the most friendly in terms of our 

relationship with those countries. So I appreciate what you are 

doing. Thanks again for your service, and thank you for being here 

today. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

We are getting close to our final series of votes, and I want to 

ask unanimous consent to enter Members’ comments in the record 

for those who are in attendance but don’t have a chance to address 

the witnesses, and then I would ask that those Members’ questions 

be responded to the record promptly if you could. 

Secretary HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, we will prioritize all those 

questions and get them back to you immediately. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I will be brief and try to give additional Members a chance 

to ask the question. You have been sitting there for 4 hours, I 

guess, since 9:30 answering questions. And I have been sitting here 

wondering if I was going to get to ask one, so I don’t know who 

has got the worst seat in the house. 

Just the point I would like to make, I know a lot of tough decisions are having to be made, and we are trying to balance national 

security with some very serious constraints. And I do hope that, 

after the upcoming elections, that we will get back to trying to get 

to the big deal where we are able to get the priorities of this country in order. 

It is clear to me that defense cannot take all of the cuts that are 

coming to the discretionary side of the equation, and choices have 

to be made. With that, I would make this one point. The A–10s, 

and I know you have heard a lot about it. The F–35 has not proven 

itself in battle yet. Once the F–35 has proven itself in battle, I may 

feel differently about this. And I certainly respect General Welsh 

and all of you at the table as well. But for the same price over the 

course of 5 years, you can have 212 F–35s and 246 A–10s, or you 

can have 238 F–35s, according to the numbers that come from 

what you have given us. So that is 212 F–35s and 246 A–10s or 

238 F–35s over the 5-year period, and I would just respectfully submit that the 246 A–10s are more important to national security 

and protecting our men and women and our troops in combat and 

can do more than 26 F–35s can. 

One of our admirals yesterday, was it Locklear, said that, you 

know, no matter how good the plane is or the ship is, it can’t be 
50 

in two places at one time. And I would just hope that you would 

consider that recommendation as we go forward. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield the remainder of my 

time so that other Members can ask questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you to the witnesses, and particularly to Mr. Hale, 

went through that audit review subcommittee at 8:00 in the morning every week for a while, and you did great work helping us with 

that. So congratulations on a great career. 

Mr. Secretary, your budget in terms of shipbuilding is going to 

keep the Seapower committee busy this year, but again, obviously, 

a lot of hard work and thought has been put into it. And, again, 

we look forward to working with Secretary Mabus and others in 

that process. The investment in the SSBN [ballistic missile submarine] design account of $1.2 billion, I think, again, follows up all 

of the strategic review studies, Nuclear Posture Review, QDR, et 

cetera, about how important the replacement of the Ohio program 

is to our national defense. That, number one, is a very good move 

in terms of trying to bring down the costs, because the more design 

we can put on requirements and to get that—and they have made 

great progress going from $7 billion to $5 billion a copy. 

Again, this budget I think shows it is serious, (a) about the importance of the program and (b) about trying to continue that process of cost reduction. But obviously, looking out, we are going to 

hit a point when we have to start building these, that the strain 

on the shipbuilding account is going to be a bulge, and something 

has got to give here in terms of whether we can continue to maintain a 300-ship Navy and obviously meet this critical requirement. 

You know, Secretary Mabus was quoted the other day about the 

fact that we need to start having a national conversation about 

how we fund this program. It is a strategic, you know, issue in 

terms of our national defense. The triad post-SALT II [Strategic 

Arms Limitation Talks] is going to show that sea-based nuclear deterrents is most survivable and probably is going to be the heaviest 

leg of the triad. And I guess the question is how do we get that 

conversation out of the realm of bar talk and start really having 

it serious, in terms of this committee and the Pentagon, in terms 

of, you know, whether again we fund it like we did missile defense 

and sort of outside of the Navy’s account or whether we have to 

look at, you know, restructuring again the respective branches’ 

budgets? 

Again, we have got good work from CRS [Congressional Research 

Service] that shows it is less than 1 percent of DOD’s overall budget. But again, I think it is an issue that 2021, when we started 

buying these things, seemed maybe a long way away. It is not. We 

have got to start really focusing on this issue if we are going to protect the shipbuilding plan. 

Secretary HAGEL. First, thank you, Congressman, for all of your 

time on this. I know how integral you have been and how important your leadership has been to this. As to your question, how do 

you develop a national conversation, I suspect to start with, the 

budget that we are presenting this week and the QDR that was 
51 

brought up this week is going to generate some considerable interest and dialogue as we go along, as it should. It will come out of 

this committee. It will come out of the Budget Committee. It will 

be out of Appropriations. Everybody will have a hand at giving 

their opinion, as well as all the think tanks and all the writers and 

everybody who has something to say about this. 

Then I think the military organizations, military associations, 

those groups always have a perspective on this. And I suspect they 

will also weigh in on their perspective to your point, not just this 

budget but this budget being kind of the platform that can be used 

for that larger debate, which you are talking about, which you are 

right needs to be had, as to how does it integrate overall into our 

larger security system and our future, economics, all that go into 

that as well. So I think your point is right. I would welcome that. 

I think we are willing partners in that, and I think surely we 

have manifested that in every way, and we participate in every 

forum we are invited to. I know that is not a good answer—— 

Mr. COURTNEY. Well, I think it is actually. It gives us some direction as we approach markup down the road. We really need to start 

incorporating some real language so that this issue gets fleshed out 

and, again, outside of just a sort of informal process, but we need 

to focus on this because it is going to be a big issue for the Navy’s 

shipbuilding plan, and we want to balance all that. So I appreciate 

that answer. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Nugent. 

Mr. NUGENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank this distinguished panel. 

And first of all, I am going to submit questions to the record, but 

I just want to make a statement, and particularly as it relates to 

our National Guard and our aviators. I don’t have a dog in the 

fight as it relates to the Apaches, but I have had the National 

Guard folks come and talk to me about their brigade combat team 

structure as it mirrors the Army, and so I get that. 

But I will say from a dad of three soldiers, one who is an Army 

National Guard chopper pilot, they train. It is not—when I was in 

the Air National Guard, we trained twice a month, and then we did 

our summer camp. These guys train all the time. I mean, they 

train not only on the weekend drill, but they train to keep proficient because they have to meet the same standards as any other 

helicopter pilot within the Army. So I just want to make sure that 

that is clear in regards to my stance. 

One last thing, as it relates to BRAC, I was not here when the 

last BRAC took place, but could you tell me, since 2005 BRAC, 

what are the savings that we accrued since then? Do we have a 

dollar amount of what we have saved? 

Secretary HAGEL. We do and the comptroller can go into as much 

detail as you want, but just very quickly, we are realizing from the 

past BRACs, I believe about $12 billion annually in savings, and 

we have all that documented how did we get to that and so on. The 

last BRAC, 2005, which gets held up is the bad BRAC, costs us 

money and so on and so on. That BRAC is not a good one to compare, partly because—— 
52 

Mr. NUGENT. So the next BRAC is going to be better? 

Secretary HAGEL. No, no. Go back—— 

Mr. NUGENT. I see Mr. Hale’s head shaking yes. 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, the next BRAC will be better, but for 

comparison reasons, you can’t compare something that hasn’t happened. For comparison reasons, the 2005 BRAC was as much about 

reorganization as it was about savings and doing the other things 

that you normally get out of BRAC, or at least that is the mission 

of BRAC, to eliminate overhead that you don’t need. Past BRACs 

have done that, and we have accomplished significant savings, and 

I think we are looking at future BRACs if we can do this, and I 

will let Mr. Hale respond here, that it may be $2 billion a year. 

Mr. NUGENT. I don’t mean to cut you short, Mr. Secretary. Mr. 

Hale, if you would respond for the record to me because I would 

like to yield the rest of my time to Mrs. Walorski if she would like. 

Thank you very much again, gentlemen. 

[No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

Mrs. WALORSKI. Thank you, Representative Nugent. 

Gentlemen, thanks for being here. 

General Dempsey, what has been your role in the foreign transfers for transfers of GTMO [Guantanamo Bay Naval Base] detainees? 

General DEMPSEY. I don’t have a role in the process, a formal 

role in the process, but the Secretary of Defense takes me into consultation. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. Do you concur on all those transfers? Do you 

have an official—— 

General DEMPSEY. I don’t have the responsibility to concur, but 

I consult. In other words, I discuss with the Secretary of Defense 

the risk in the transfer. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. Do you have any concerns about the potential 

risk of GTMO detainees to Yemen? 

General DEMPSEY. Yemen is a rather unstable platform and so 

the Yemenese in GTMO are a particular challenge to us. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. Do you agree with the White House assessment 

that there are some GTMO detainees that are too dangerous to 

transfer or release? 

General DEMPSEY. In general, I agree that, of the 155 population, 

there are some who are too dangerous to transfer or release. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. And, Secretary Hagel, is the administration’s 

policy still that the issue of concurrence from all national security 

principals is the needed before a foreign transfer? 

Secretary HAGEL. Yes, and we do that. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. And do you have any reason to believe there will 

be changes to this practice of concurrence? 

Secretary HAGEL. No. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. What happens if analysis by the Intelligence 

Community of a particular host country’s capacity, willingness, and 

past practices impacts your determinations? So what if another 

agency comes up and says we have a problem, for example, moving 

to the Sudan or releasing these people; what happens then? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, we have to resolve it. I mean, you have 

given me a hypothetical, so we have to resolve it. So far, since I 
53 

have been Secretary of Defense, every decision that I have made 

a determination on here has been concurred to. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. And do you have any reason to believe that that 

concurrence process will change? 

Secretary HAGEL. No. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. Thank you. I yield back my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, the OCO [Overseas Contingency Operation] budget that you propose is of $79 billion, and yet we don’t have an 

agreement with the Afghan Government about what to do, presumably until after the Presidential election in April. So can you give 

us an idea what the $79 billion is for? 

Secretary HAGEL. Yes, I can. It is not all Afghanistan, as you 

know. To answer that, I will ask the comptroller to—— 

Mr. LARSEN. Just give me the $79 billion part. 

Secretary HALE. The $79 billion is a placeholder. We don’t have 

an OCO budget and won’t until conditions permit the President to 

make a decision about enduring presence, so there is no content behind it. It is simply a placeholder. 

Mr. LARSEN. A $79 billion placeholder? 

Secretary HALE. Right. 

Mr. LARSEN. Which is kind of in line, well, last year was 80-ish; 

the year before was 80-ish. 

Secretary HALE. It is based on the request from last year and no 

more, no less. It is a placeholder. Once we get that decision, we will 

do a formal budget amendment, and then you will have detail behind it. 

Mr. LARSEN. With regards to the BAH, Basic Housing Allowance, 

you noted in your either testimony or in the backup material that 

the average for someone across the force will be about 5 percent 

out of pocket after the changes. That is a mean average, so who 

is it—how is that going to fall? How is that going to distribute? 

Who is going to be paying zero percent, and who is going to be paying 10 percent? 

Secretary HAGEL. Congressman, everybody will be paying something. 

Mr. LARSEN. I understand that. Okay. 

Secretary HAGEL. So 5 percent is as low as we believe it would 

go or as much as we would ask anyone to pay out of pocket. 

Mr. LARSEN. So the backup documents we have say an average 

of 5 percent. 

Secretary HALE. Let me add to that. The way we are designing 

it is so that the out-of-pocket cost is equal by pay grade, because 

we felt that would be more understandable. 

Mr. LARSEN. Proportional. 

Secretary HALE. And so it is going to vary by the high- or lowcost areas, and we can supply for the record the range. None will 

be zero, as the Secretary said. Some will be less than 5; some more. 

Mr. LARSEN. All right. And finally, on TRICARE for Life, you are 

submitting a previous proposal on TRICARE for Life, what was the 

previous proposal? 
54 

Secretary HALE. That there would be an enrollment fee of up to 1 percent of retired pay, with a maximum $300 per individual, except for flag and general officer retirees. Then it would be $400. 

Mr. LARSEN. And that is for new retirees, not for existing. 

Secretary HALE. Correct. Only those who enter on or after enactment. 

Mr. LARSEN. Great. I just want to know what my phone calls are 

going to be about. I appreciate it very much. 

Secretary HALE. Glad to help. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you. Yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. I would just like to clarify the question about 

OCO. That doesn’t just count Afghanistan, does it? And it does 

have other, AFRICOM, there are some other expenses in there. 

And then we don’t yet know what the final disposition of Afghanistan is going to be, so that number could go higher or it could go 

lower once you get to the point of actually looking at it, right? 

Secretary HALE. Right. I suspect it will be lower, but we don’t 

know yet. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Bridenstine. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Hagel, the President’s initiative, the Opportunity, Se- curity and Growth Initiative in the budget request offers $26 billion for additional defense spending, which I think is appropriate. 

I think a lot of people on this committee would agree that the defense budget is inadequate, in large part because of Congress, and 

we want to get it fixed. The challenge is it has been tied to an additional $30 billion in 

domestic social spending. I was wondering in your opinion, do you 

think the President would be open to the idea of supporting the Department of Defense with that $26 billion apart from the additional 

$30 billion in domestic social spending. 

Secretary HAGEL. That is a decision that the President would 

have to make, and I can’t negotiate that for him, but I believe that 

that was presented as part of the total. Our $26 billion is part of 

the total package, and that is the way it came in. But that would 

not be my role or responsibility. We are part of the total of the I 

think 58, 56, 58, yeah. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. So, as the Secretary of Defense, your personal opinion, do you think that it is right to hold that $26 billion hostage for an additional $30 billion in social spending? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, my personal opinion is an opinion of the 

Secretary of Defense, and so—— 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Would you share that with us, as the Secretary of Defense, would that be your opinion that it is inappropriate to hold the $26 billion hostage to an additional 30? 

Secretary HAGEL. No. That was part of the President’s total 

budget, just as we are part of the administration. And it was presented that way. Again, that is not my area. I think the OMB [Office of Management and Budget] Director was up here today. That 

would be a question I think for her. No, we are part of the administration’s budget proposal as a whole. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Right. But the whole package, the whole initiative, is what is troubling. I would like—— 
55 

Secretary HAGEL. I support the whole package, if that is what 

you are getting at. But that is not my responsibility. My responsibility is this $26 billion and doing everything I can to convince the 

Congress that my part of it is worthy of the consideration. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. I think the challenge a lot of us have on this 

committee is the fact that we want to be there. We want to help, 

but it is difficult when the President puts us in a position where, 

okay, we will do that if, if you agree to an additional $30 billion 

in social spending, and that makes a lot of us look at the President’s budget request and not take the military, the Department of 

Defense provision seriously, because it is almost like he put a poison pill intentionally so that the $26 billion would never get voted 

on. That is the challenge a lot of us on this side of the aisle see 

in this President’s budget request. 

I have got about a minute and 50 remaining. The next question 

is, when you think about the nation of Israel and the United States 

and our support for the nation of Israel, if Israel were to be attacked today from Iran or another neighboring country, is the 

United States currently prepared and ready to respond to that attack? 

Secretary HAGEL. Go ahead. 

General DEMPSEY. Yes, we have some defense agreements with 

Israel and contingency plans to support them. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Roger that. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gallego. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Dempsey, you talked about, there is no choice but to raid 

the readiness accounts and that we have dug a 2- to 3-year readiness hole. Part of the challenge is that when I go home, people 

don’t see sequester as a big deal. Perhaps they don’t understand. 

Perhaps they don’t, so how would you—you know, the district that 

I represent from El Paso with Fort Bliss presence, Joint Base San 

Antonio on the other end, and Laughlin in the middle, it is clearly 

a huge issue. So how would you, if people say, for example, you can 

find more money through efficiencies, can you find more money 

through efficiencies? I mean, is that enough? Are there enough efficiencies out there to save you? 

General DEMPSEY. No, that is the right question, Congressman. 

Of course we can find more money in efficiencies, but we are talking about if you add up all of the different reductions that we are 

faced with, it comes out to a little over a trillion dollars. You can’t 

find a trillion dollars worth of efficiency. I think the Secretary has 

driven us to wring out as much as we can, and we are still looking. 

The reason your constituents don’t feel it though, is if you have 

got a unit at Fort Bliss or any other post, camp, or station in any 

of the other Armed Forces, what the community sees is whether 

those men and women are still getting paid. Are they still coming 

downtown to use restaurants and make purchases. They don’t really see that they may be on the base not training. 

And so let me use the basketball analogy. It is that time of year. 

It is March Madness, and I don’t mean the budget, although I 

might make that analogy. You know, if you have a basketball team, 

you can train it at individual skills. Then you put it together to 

scrimmage itself, and then, at some point, you scrimmage another 
56 

team. And then, at some point, you actually put it in a game. Because of this readiness hole, there is a large portion of the Armed 

Forces that are doing individual drills and maybe playing games 

against themselves. But they are not training against a world-class 

adversary like you would at the National Training Center or someplace. 

Mr. GALLEGO. And so that ability not to train, does that in a very 

real way endanger our men and women in uniform as they go 

about trying to accomplish their missions? 

General DEMPSEY. I can give you a one-word answer to that: Yes. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Can you give me examples of how you would, as 

a believer in plain English as opposed to—the only part of politics 

I don’t like is the political part because we all get caught up in the 

politics of it all. In very plain English, what has the sequester 

done, in two sentences or less, what has the sequester done to the 

military might of the United States? 

General DEMPSEY. In two sentences or less, it has forced us to 

make some bad investment decisions because we haven’t had certainty, time, or flexibility to do otherwise, and it has put us in a 

position where we have had to raid—let me use another word—rob 

our readiness accounts in order to get the money we need to reduce, you know, to find where we can reduce it, because we don’t 

have access to the other places in the near term. 

Mr. GALLEGO. And the impact of robbing those readiness is 

what? 

General DEMPSEY. Is that we are far less ready than we should 

be for the world that we confront. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

We have just under 6 minutes left in the vote. We have one final 

Member’s questions to work in, but we have 314 that haven’t voted. 

So, Mr. Byrne. 

Mr. BYRNE. Secretary Hagel, I want to ask you some questions 

about the Littoral Combat Ship [LCS]. In your memo of 24 February to the Secretary of Navy and in your prepared remarks 

today, which are virtually identical, you say that you want to see 

some alternative proposals made regarding the procurement of a 

capable and lethal small surface combatant generally consistent 

with the capabilities of a frigate. And then you give the Secretary 

of the Navy three options, one of which is to continue with the existing LCS, or modified LCS, and the other is to go forward with 

another existing vessel, or to design a new vessel. 

So let me ask a couple of questions. With regard to the LCS, 

clearly, by virtue of your wording there, if the Secretary of the 

Navy can show you that he can meet your requirements on capability and lethality, you would accept either an existing Littoral 

Combat Ship or modified version Littoral Combat Ship, would you 

not? 

Secretary HAGEL. I don’t think that was an option I gave in my 

directive as to go ahead with the LCS as it is. I think if you reread 

that, Congressman, I don’t think that was what I said. 

Mr. BYRNE. Well, I will read it back to you. It says, options considered should include a completely new design—— 
57 

Secretary HAGEL. A completely new design is not the same LCS. 

Mr. BYRNE. Existing ships design, and you say including the 

LCS. Then you say and a modified LCS, so by virtue of the fact 

that you include in your parenthetical including the LCS and an 

existing ship design, that would mean the existing LCS design? 

Secretary HAGEL. I have given the Secretary of the Navy and the 

Chief of Naval Operations not options; I have given them directives 

as to what I want to see for them to come back to me, survivability, 

combat power, more capability. Can they do that with an existing 

design that would give more survivability, more capability, more 

combat power? That is not, in my opinion, why we need automatically 52 of the LCS’s. The original point was the LCS is fulfilling, 

will fulfill the mission that we have asked it to fulfill. That is not 

in dispute. The bigger question—and I suspect you have read the 

entire memo—if you build out the LCS system to 52, in a 300-ship 

Navy, that represents about a sixth of our Navy. Every test we 

have seen—never designed to do otherwise, which I agree with— 

but it doesn’t have the survivability, capability, firepower, as ships 

we may well need to confront much more sophisticated adversaries, 

especially in the Asia-Pacific, in the next few years. 

Mr. BYRNE. If it met those requirements, though, you would accept a modified LCS? 

Secretary HAGEL. I have said that, yes, yes, if it meets those requirements. 

Mr. BYRNE. Now, let me go to the other, and these were, the way 

I read it, it looks like these were options that you gave for him to 

look at and give you reports on. One was the development of a new 

design. In our current fiscal environment, which is very limited, as 

we have heard all day, is it practical, is it good common sense that 

we would actually go and design a new ship with the long time period that it would take to develop that ship and the attendant expense now that we have reached a fairly low expense on a per ship 

basis with the LCS down to $350 million a vessel? 

Secretary HAGEL. Well, let’s start with the LCS production lines 

as they are. As you know there are two different hulls; one made 

in Alabama and one made in Wisconsin. So there are variations to 

those hulls, and then you put on top of that the profiles and what 

we need to adjust there. What the Chief of Naval Operations 

[CNO] has advised me and combat surface commanders have advised me, and I have gone to talk to every one of them, including 

your guest yesterday afternoon, Admiral Locklear, about this, is 

you don’t need to go back and spend billions of dollars of redesigning a ship. There is a lot of design already that you could build 

on the existing systems or match and mix and so on. CNO says it 

is doable. All of his commanders tell me it is doable to come back 

to them—back to me within the timeframe I have asked. And they 

have agreed with that. I think the CNO will tell you that, and I 

think Secretary Mabus will tell you that. 

Mr. BYRNE. Well, I have talked to Secretary Mabus, and he has 

made it very clear that he considers the LCS to be a significant 

part of the future of the Navy. And one of the things that you have 

charged him with doing is looking at a potential new ship design 

that is based upon a frigate. The last frigate we commissioned was 
58 

over 25 years ago. We don’t have a frigate in operation or a shipyard that—— 

Secretary HAGEL. I didn’t say based on a frigate. I referenced 

frigate in there, like a frigate. So it doesn’t need to be a frigate. 

Mr. BYRNE. We would have to design a new frigate or something 

like a frigate to meet that requirement if we didn’t go with existing 

design. 

Secretary HAGEL. That is your opinion, which I respect. What I 

am saying is the reference I am making is the CNO told me, sitting 

in my office, that they could do this; they could comply with my request. Secretary Mabus knows about this. He said, and he said it 

in a speech last week downtown, that it was a fair request, and he 

looked forward to complying to it and with it. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman’s time—— 

Secretary HAGEL. I know LCS is important to the Secretary. I 

spent a lot of time with the Secretary. I don’t discount his advice, 

but there is enough testing out there, Congressman, that tells me 

and others who have evaluated this ship that there is a big, big 

question whether we want a sixth of our Navy to be LCS’s. 

Mr. BYRNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. But if we had a 500-ship Navy—— 

Mr. BYRNE. We will buy more. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman’s time is expired. 

Thank you very much for your patience, for your explanations. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 2:00 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 6, 2014 

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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MARCH 6, 2014 

(145) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KLINE 

Secretary HAGEL and General DEMPSEY. DOD considered some options for consolidating Combatant Command HQ staffs as part of our annual budget development 

and review process. However, we did not move forward with any changes in this 

year’s request. We believe the current structure of six geographic and three functional combatant commands remains the most effective construct to address today’s 

global security environment and the Unified Command Plan reflects this assessment. However, in accordance with Secretary Hagel’s QDR direction, we are proceeding with a 20 percent reduction in all command staffs to provide future cost savings consistent with the intent of sequestration. [See page 26.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS 

Secretary HAGEL Yes. The planned Aegis Ashore sites in Poland and Romania will 

add value to the defense of our allies and deployed forces in the European Command 

Theater of Operations. The Aegis Ashore Weapon System is a regional defense system designed to defeat short- and medium range ballistic missiles, and eventually 

intermediate range ballistic missiles. The system re-hosts the Aegis Ballistic Missile 

Defense (BMD) components of the Navy Aegis BMD Destroyer, including the water 

(surface ship) radar surveillance and control (SPY) radar, vertical launching system, 

computing infrastructure, command, control, communications, computers and intelligence systems and operator consoles in the ashore configuration. In its current 

configuration, Aegis Ashore cannot defeat cruise missiles, but that capability could 

be restored with software modifications and additional hardware. 

The Aegis Ashore System is designed so it can be constructed, disassembled, and 

moved, if necessary. However, it is not designed to counter ballistic missile threats 

from Russia. 

The Department already has dual capable aircraft rotating to NATO-allied states 

in support of our deterrence mission in Europe. [See page 32.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN 

General DEMPSEY. Any diminution of resources brings added risk to both the force 

and our military strategy. With respect to the Army, these risks will be manifested 

in less capacity and lower readiness. While it is unlikely we would lose a conflict, 

the cost of prevailing may now be higher, in both economic and human terms. To 

mitigate these risks, we must maintain and develop key capabilities. Therefore, 

modernization programs that provide the technological overmatch needed to deter 

or defeat our adversaries must be preserved. Specifically, it is critical we maintain 

an intelligence apparatus capable of providing the warning and time required to mobilize capacity and regenerate readiness in response to a crisis. This budget aims 

to strike this delicate balance between capability, capacity, and readiness that ensures we will win any conflict while managing the risks to our men and women.

[See page 41.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER 

Secretary HAGEL As you know, last May, I ordered refresher training and a review of credentials and qualifications of Sexual Assault Response Coordinators 

(SARCs), Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Victim Advocates (VA), 

and recruiters. Some of the Services expanded their reviews. In addition, subsequent and separate from these reviews, the Department published detailed criteria 

for the screening, selection, training, certification, and decertification of SARCs and 

SAPR VAs who serve the Department. These criteria were published in January 

2014, and such exacting standards should help ensure that the Department fields 

professionals of the highest caliber in our advocacy programs. 
146 

Based upon the practices identified by the Services and our Defense Sexual Assault Advocate Certification Program, I intend to direct the Acting Under Secretary 

of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to review and determine if additional standards are necessary to screen, select, train, and certify occupants of sensitive positions supporting SAPR or those who directly engage, support, or instruct our newest 

and most vulnerable service members. These positions include: SARCs, SAPR VAs, 

recruiters, healthcare providers authorized to conduct a Sexual Assault Forensic 

Exam, Special Victims Capability Investigators, Special Victims Capability Legal 

Team, Special Victims Counsel, and initial military trainers. Following this review, 

I will determine if a rescreening of these sensitive positions is necessary. [See page 

37.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KILMER 

Secretary HAGEL The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics (USD(AT&L)), the Honorable Frank Kendall, directed a number of parallel 

efforts to institute a continuous improvement process for the Defense acquisition 

system. Prominent elements include: Better Buying Power initiatives; an interim 

policy update to the Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 5000.02, ‘‘Operation 

of the Defense Acquisition System’’; a more dynamic coupling of military requirements and Defense Acquisition processes; and a review of current statutes aimed 

at suggesting a comprehensive consolidation and streamlining of legislative prescriptions for Defense acquisition. 

If the Congressman or the Committee would like more information on any of 

these initiatives directed by Mr. Kendall, his staff would welcome the opportunity 

to provide a briefing. [See page 43.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. DUCKWORTH 

Secretary HAGEL. No UH–72 Lakota’s purchased with NGREA funds have been 

transferred from the Army National Guard (ARNG) to the Active Component Army. 

The ARNG received two UH–72 Lakota’s from NGREA funding in 2012 and were 

funded for an additional 127 aircraft from 2009 thru 2012. The two UH–72’s that 

were purchased with NGREA funds were delivered in 2013 to the ARNG’s High-Altitude Army National Guard Aviation Training Site (HAATS) in Centennial, Colorado. HAATS provides high altitude training for military pilots from all Services 

and components, as well as to approved international aircrew. This unit has a training mission and there is no intent to remove any Lakotas from the ARNG at this 

time. 

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs tracks all equipment procured for the National Guard and Reserve, including the equipment filtered through 

the Active procurement appropriations as well as that procured using NGREA. The 

ARNG is currently scheduled to receive an additional 34 UH–72’s in the FY2013 P– 

1R as well as a Congressional addition in FY 2014 of $75M for 10 aircraft. [See 

page 46.] 

General DEMPSEY. No UH–72 Lakota aircraft, NGREA or otherwise funded, have 

ever been transferred from the National Guard to the Active Army. Such a transfer 

was initially considered under the Army’s Aviation Restructuring Initiative, but ultimately rejected. Any transfers of aircraft that may occur between the National 

Guard and the active Army as part of this initiative will be in full compliance with 

all applicable laws. [See page 46.] 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 6, 2014 

(149) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MCKEON 

Mr. MCKEON. We’ve had many lessons learned from contracting actions during 

contingency operations and there is no doubt we will rely on contract support in future contingencies, be it humanitarian relief or full-spectrum combat operations. 

What are you doing to not only plan for contract support during a contingency, but 

to educate and train your personnel so they are prepared to develop requirements, 

and execute and oversee contracting actions in order to properly respond in a contingency. Are you adequately resourced to plan, execute, and oversee the contract support you would need in the event of a major contingency? 

Secretary HAGEL. In conjunction with the Joint Staff and the Services, the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) continues to institutionalize operational contract 

support (OCS) through a variety of initiatives in the areas of education, training, 

joint exercises, and doctrine; incorporating lessons learned from exercises and current operations. The Department has established the OCS Functional Capabilities 

Integration Board to actively monitor all ongoing and planned OCS related initiatives across the Department. 

Initiatives include: expanding OCS training for contingency contracting officers, 

planners and senior leaders; infusing OCS into operational plans and developing 

OCS planning factors; developing automated tools; developing an OCS common operating picture; integrating OCS into the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Exercise 

Program and executing stand-alone OCS focused joint exercises; testing the OCS 

Mission Integrator (OMI) Concept; developing OCS measures of effectiveness; and, 

formalizing our measure of OCS readiness using the Defense Readiness Reporting 

System. 

While the Department has made progress in establishing a burgeoning OCS capability for current and future contingency operations, funding for OCS initiatives will 

continue to face resourcing challenges and fiscal risk in light of the Department’s 

overall limited resources. 

Mr. MCKEON. We’ve had many lessons learned from contracting actions during 

contingency operations and there is no doubt we will rely on contract support in future contingencies, be it humanitarian relief or full-spectrum combat operations. 

What are you doing to not only plan for contract support during a contingency, but 

to educate and train your personnel so they are prepared to develop requirements, 

and execute and oversee contracting actions in order to properly respond in a contingency. Are you adequately resourced to plan, execute, and oversee the contract support you would need in the event of a major contingency? 

General DEMPSEY. Resourcing to plan, execute, oversee and integrate operational 

contract support (OCS) across the Department of Defense has many facets, multiple 

equities, and currently disparate resourcing streams. As such, achieving the ability 

to adequately plan, execute and oversee contract support in event of a major contingency requires a culture change that can only occur with institutionalization of the 

key tenants of OCS across the DOTMLPF–P spectrum from strategic to tactical levels. The FY14–17 OCS Action Plan, currently in staffing, includes over 180 strategic 

actions to address the highest priority gaps outlined in the 2011 Joint Requirements 

Oversight Council-approved OCS Initial Capability Document. In scoping the associated tasks and setting completion dates, the Action Plan’s stakeholders have 

factored-in available resources. However, more work remains to be done to determine the full set of actions and costs. The Department provided a ‘‘Report on Contingency Contracting and Operational Contract Support (OCS) Lessons Learned’’ in 

December 2013. This report addressed OCS efforts across doctrine, organization, 

training, materiel, leadership & education, personnel, facilities and policy 

(DOTMLPF–P) in response to Title VIII, Items of Special Interest, Report on Contingency Contracting Lessons Learned, of the fiscal year 2013 House Armed Services Committee (HASC) Report (112–479). The report highlights the Department’s 

progress since 2003 in developing and implementing actions to educate and train 

acquisition and non-acquisition personnel in requirements development and the 

planning, execution, and oversight of contracting actions, what we call ‘‘OCS’’, in response to contingencies. Since submission of that report, the Department: 
150 

• Conducted the first-ever OCS joint exercise (OCSJX) in January 2014 with over 

500 participants including contractors. • Taught the Joint OCS Planning and Execution Course (JOPEC) to 113 students 

from four geographic combatant commands (GCC) with plans to train an additional 106 students from the other GCCs before the end of the fiscal year. • Provided the Joint Forces Staff College tailored educational material for integrating OCS into their Joint and Combined Warfighting School (JCWS) curriculum. The Joint and Combined Warfighting School plans to adapt this new 

material fully to their existing curriculum by the 2nd quarter FY15. 

• Is updating the ‘‘Introductory OCS Commander and Staff Course’’ for the department’s on-line training program, ‘‘Joint Knowledge Online,’’ with release 

aligned to publication of the updated Joint Publication 4–10, Operational Contract Support, this FY. 

• Began initial planning with U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) to serve as the 

supported commander for OCSJX 2015. 

• Initiated an effort with USPACOM to demonstrate the OCS Mission Integrator 

(OMI) element identified in the approved OCS Joint Concept. 

As stated in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Department is committed 

to the opportunity represented by a Total Force mindset. Properly integrated and 

managed, OCS can help mitigate the risks intrinsic in a smaller, uniformed force 

structure and address many lessons from the last decade of war. To assure this outcome, it would benefit from continued institutionalization across DOTMLPF–P. 

The OCS Joint Concept was approved by JROCM 159–13 and guides OCS capability development for JF 2020. The OCS Joint Concept is aligned to the Capstone 

Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) and depicts a Total Force enabling concept 

that integrates OCS into global military operations. The OMI is the major organizational solution element in the OCS Joint Concept. The 2014 QDR states, ‘‘Given the 

planned reductions to the uniformed force, changes to our force structure, and the 

Department’s strategic direction under fiscal constraints, the Department must continue to find efficiencies in its total force of active and reserve military, civilian personnel, and contracted support. The Department needs the flexibility to size and 

structure all elements of its Total Force in a manner that most efficiently and effectively meets mission requirements, delivers the readiness our Commanders require, 

and preserves the viability, morale, and welfare of the All-Volunteer Force.’’ 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Each of the COCOMs that have testified before this committee 

this year have expressed their dependence on key enablers, in particular ISR. Understanding that there are very real budget limitations that you have had to work 

within, where have you had to accept risk across the Department’s ISR capabilities, 

and are you comfortable with the balance between the DOD’s ISR resources and 

those of the Intelligence Community? 

Secretary HAGEL. The Department of Defense’s FY 2015 budget request reflects 

those critical choices necessary to address key intelligence requirements in support 

of today’s operations, while making the necessary investments to maintain our intelligence advantage. In this period of declining resources, however, those choices come 

with increased levels of risk for some mission areas. For instance, reductions to 

force end-strength pose some mission risk as the intelligence challenges that DOD 

faces, now and in the future, will continue to increase in number and complexity. 

As part of these budget-driven manpower reductions, DOD reduced the direct support staffs at the COCOMs’ J–2s and Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOCs). 

Global rivals and potential adversaries are developing advanced capabilities and 

sophisticated weapons systems, which will inevitably post increased risks to our 

forces and National Security. To meet these emerging threats, more advanced systems and capabilities will be required. However, existing budget constraints have 

forced DOD to terminate or delay some operational or modernization programs in 

order to protect higher priorities in procurement, research, and development. For example, DOD’s decision to retire the U–2 and retain the RQ–4B (Global Hawk Block 

30) acknowledges our willingness to accept a capability risk in manned high-altitude 

ISR in favor of long-term affordability. 

It is the Department’s position that the FY 2015 President’s budget request 

strikes an effective balance between the resources of the DOD ISR enterprise and 

those of the Intelligence Community. As always, DOD will continue to work closely 

with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to adjust resources as needed 

in order to continue providing unmatched ISR capabilities in support of the National 

Security Strategy. 
151 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BISHOP 

Mr. BISHOP. With regard to prior rounds of Defense Base Closures and Realignments (BRAC), how many bases which were closed in the 1991, 1993, 1995, and 

2005 rounds of BRAC have ended up in private ownership (meaning private sector 

or non-profit)? You may answer in terms of total acreage or percentages of bases. 

Secretary HAGEL. The Department tracks property disposed under BRAC by acreage across conveyance or disposal methods delegated by the General Services Administration. The 1988, 1991, 1993, 1995, and 2005 rounds of BRAC resulted in the 

Department conveying 168,099 acres (35%) of the property to Federal agencies, and 

307,883 acres (65%) to non-Federal users, including state and local governments, 

non-profits, and private-sector interests. 

Mr. BISHOP. With regard to prior rounds of Defense Base Closures and Realignments (BRAC), how many bases which were closed in the 1991, 1993, 1995, and 

2005 rounds of BRAC have ended up in private ownership (meaning private sector 

or non-profit)? You may answer in terms of total acreage or percentages of bases. 

General DEMPSEY. There are a range of BRAC property disposal authorities for 

public benefit uses, such as parks, schools, and law enforcement. Public benefit conveyances (surplus real property converted for public uses) account for 14% (69,009 

acres) of disposed BRAC properties. In addition, BRAC property can be conveyed to 

a Local Redevelopment Authority (LRA), which is a DOD-recognized public entity, 

through an Economic Development Conveyance (EDC), for job creation purposes. 

EDCs account for 28% (133,060 acres) of disposed acreage. Once conveyed, the LRA, 

rather than the Department of Defense, may lease or sell this property to the private sector for economic development purposes. BRAC property also can be conveyed 

directly to the private sector through a public bid sale process, and this disposal 

method accounts for 2% (8,622 acres) of disposed BRAC properties. Other BRAC disposal methods include conservation conveyances (13%/60,646 acres), DOD-to-DOD 

transfers (3%/14,288 acres), Federal transfers (15%/72,791 acres), reversions where 

future interest is retained (18%/86,393 acres), negotiated sales to public entities 

(2%/11,193 acres), and other miscellaneous disposal methods (4%/19,980 acres). 

NOTE: Answer coordinated with USD(I&E) Office of Economic Adjustment using 

GSA 2012 BRAC Oversight Report dtd December 31, 2012. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER 

Mr. COOPER. As we continue modernization of our nuclear deterrent and prepare 

to invest $355 billion in the nuclear weapons enterprise (CBO estimate), can the 

pursuit of further verifiable nuclear weapons reductions increase national security? 

What are Russian (and Chinese) concerns about discussing further nuclear weapons 

reductions? 

Secretary HAGEL. In the course of developing the current nuclear employment 

guidance, the Administration determined that the United States can pursue some 

further reductions while maintaining strategic deterrence and stability, regional deterrence, and assurance of our allies and partners. However, any such reductions 

should only be conducted on a mutually agreed upon basis. Russia has so far shown 

no interest in negotiating further reductions, nor would the current climate be conducive to such negotiations. 

The United States does not anticipate negotiating nuclear arms reductions with 

China in the near term. Rather, our goal is to engage in a meaningful and sustained 

dialogue about how each side views nuclear weapons and their respective military 

modernization, because this can play a role over time in preventing miscommunication, misperception, and miscalculation in the relationship. We will continue to discuss such matters in the P5. 

Mr. COOPER. As we continue modernization of our nuclear deterrent and prepare 

to invest $355 billion in the nuclear weapons enterprise (CBO estimate), can the 

pursuit of further verifiable nuclear weapons reductions increase national security? 

What are Russian (and Chinese) concerns about discussing further nuclear weapons 

reductions? 

General DEMPSEY. The United States can pursue further reductions while maintaining strategic deterrence and stability, regional deterrence, and assurance of our 

allies and partners. However, I believe such reductions should only be done on a 

mutually negotiated basis, with full consideration for the trajectory of other potential threats and in a manner that maintains strategic stability. Even then, our plan 

to modernize our nuclear deterrent and recapitalize its supporting infrastructure remains fragile and very vulnerable to additional budget cuts, which could alter our 

calculus for maintaining strategic stability. 
152 

As we continue to implement guidance from the Nuclear Posture Review and the 

most recent nuclear weapons employment strategy, we remain focused on maintaining and improving strategic stability with Russia and China. We intend to maintain 

this stability with the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons. However, Russia, 

by its words and actions, has demonstrated no interest in negotiating further reductions until after the New START Treaty limits are achieved and we will not enter 

into any agreement with the Russian Federation that is not in the national security 

interest of the United States. Russia has expressed significant reticence with proceeding down a path of further strategic nuclear reductions without including other 

nuclear weapons states in the next phase of disarmament. Furthermore, Russia perceives the West as having technologically and numerically superior conventional 

forces; its primary defense against an overwhelming conventional threat remains its 

nuclear deterrent. Therefore, it seeks to retain the level of these forces as long as 

it can while modernizing its conventional forces to a level commensurate with peer 

competitors. With regard to Chinese interest in nuclear weapons reductions, we continue to discuss such matters in the P5 although China has not expressed interest 

in such reductions. 

Sources: FACT SHEET: Nuclear Weapons Employment Strategy of the United 

States, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/19/fact-sheet-nuclearweapons-employment-strategy-united-states Report on Nuclear Weapons Employment Strategy of the United States (RNES), Specified in Section 491 of 10 U.S.C. 

http://www.defense.gov/pubs/ 

reporttoCongressonUSNuclearEmploymentStrategy_Section491.pdf 

Mr. COOPER. Do you support the process by which the DOD is considering reducing potentially up to 50 ICBMs to determine how to best implement New START 

and ensure we maintain a strong nuclear deterrent? Why is this process important? 

What would be the consequence of prohibiting any reductions to the number of 

ICBM and ICBM silos? 

General DEMPSEY. The Department has carefully considered the strategic implications of the various options for implementing a nuclear force structure within New 

START limits. I have supported and participated in this process, which concluded 

with the announcement of a treaty-compliant U.S. strategic force structure composed in part of 400 deployed Minuteman III ICBMs, for a total of 454 deployed and 

non-deployed launchers of ICBMs. We’ve taken the New START reductions in a 

manner that best preserves our TRIAD. Prohibiting reductions in any one leg of the 

TRIAD will have a profound affect on the other legs. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KLINE 

Mr. KLINE. During the DOD’s Strategic Choices Management Review (SCMR) and 

development of the FY15 DOD Budget Request—did you task Combatant Commanders to submit plans to consolidate HQ staff and move to a more streamlined 

or regionally aligned Combatant Command structure that reduces the number of 

commands? 

Secretary HAGEL. During the Strategic Choices Management Review the headquarters team, which included representatives from Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, the Military Departments, and the Combatant Commands, did consider all options including consolidation of the Combatant Commands. Given the global security environment, the SCMR ultimately decided that 

the current structure of six geographic commands and three functional commands 

remains the most effective construct. While the Department will continue to exploit 

opportunities to reduce costs, including organizational modifications, it must also 

ensure that critical operational capacities necessary to attain national security objectives are preserved. 

Mr. KLINE. While the Department of Defense developed the FY15 budget request, 

did the Department of Defense review plans to consolidate Combatant Command 

HQ staff? If so, why did the Department not move forward with such a plan? How 

much money and manpower did the Department of Defense project would be saved 

by consolidation of Combatant Commands? 

Secretary HAGEL. DOD considered some options for consolidating Combatant 

Command HQ staffs as part of our annual budget development and review process. 

However, the department did not move forward with any changes in this year’s request. The current structure of six geographic and three functional combatant commands remains the most effective construct to address today’s global security environment and the Unified Command Plan reflects this assessment. However, in accordance with the QDR’s direction, the department is proceeding with a 20 percent 
153 

reduction in all command staffs to provide future cost savings consistent with the 

intent of sequestration. 

Mr. KLINE. What is the status of DOD’s implementation of all four of GAO’s recommendations in its May 2013 Report (GAO–13–293) entitled—‘‘DOD Needs to Periodically Review and Improve Visibility Of Combatant Commands’ Resources?’’ 

Secretary HAGEL. The DOD has begun implementing the four recommendations 

identified by GAO in its May 2013 Report (GAO–13–293) entitled—‘‘DOD Needs to 

Periodically Review and Improve Visibility Of Combatant Commands’ Resources.’’ • GAO Recommendation 1: Periodic evaluation of the Combatant Commands and 

their existing size and structure to meet their current missions. While the Department non-concurred with this recommendation, the Joint Manpower and 

Personnel Program, CJCS Instruction (CJCSI) 1001.01A, is currently under revision and the DOD is examining other methods to determine the proper size 

and structure of Combatant Commands. • GAO Recommendation 2: Requirement for the Combatant Commands to identify, manage, and track all personnel data. The Department concurred with this 

recommendation and is revising CJCSI 1001.01A as well as the DOD Directive 

Guidance for Management of Manpower (DOD Directive 1100.4). Moreover, the 

Fourth Estate Manpower Tracking System (formerly e-JMAPS) will track all 

personnel data, including temporary personnel, and identify specific guidelines 

and timelines to input/review personnel data. • GAO Recommendation 3: Requirement for the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, and the Service components develop and implement a formal process to 

gather information on Service component commands’ personnel. The Department concurred with this recommendation. Currently, the Joint Staff’s formal 

process is to request assistance from the Service Components to track personnel 

billets. • GAO Recommendation 4: Provide full-time equivalent information and detailed 

funding information for each combatant command with the annual budget documents. The Department concurred with this recommendation and is currently 

working with the Services to determine the most efficient method for collecting 

this level of information. The method for collecting this information will be included in an update to the DOD Financial Management Regulation (FMR) 

(DOD FMR 7000.14R) to support the future Program Budget Review cycle. 

Mr. KLINE. What is the current status of implementation of the TRICARE Prime 

changes for those retirees not within 100 miles of a Military Treatment Facility 

(MTF) that began on October 1, 2013? Is the Department of Defense keeping statistics on retirees transitioned from TRICARE Prime to TRICARE Standard? Is the 

Department of Defense tracking the changes in costs to the retirees who were 

transitioned beginning October 1, 2013, to TRICARE Standard from TRICARE 

Prime? What is the DOD’s estimated savings and cost rationalization for 

transitioning retirees outside the 40 mile radius of an MTF (now 100 miles under 

the FY14 NDAA) from TRICARE Prime to TRICARE Standard? 

Secretary HAGEL. The TRICARE beneficiaries who were not eligible to continue 

their TRICARE Prime enrollment, had on October 1, 2013, immediate access to 

TRICARE Standard. The Department is not tracking these beneficiaries, although 

it initially identified 181,000, of the 5.4 million TRICARE Prime enrollees, impacted 

by the closure of the Prime Service Area (PSA) where they live. Approximately 

32,600 of those beneficiaries re-enrolled in a remaining PSA. The Department did 

not close a PSA built around a military treatment facility (MTF) or base realignment (BRAC) site. In 2009, a TRICARE Standard beneficiary paid about $19.50 

more per month in out-of-pocket costs compared to a TRICARE Prime beneficiary. 

Eliminating the non-MTF and non-BRAC PSAs reduces the cost of administering 

TRICARE by approximately $45 to $56 million per year. The projected savings are 

based on a TRICARE Prime enrollee’s healthcare cost being about $600 more per 

year than the cost of providing TRICARE Standard, and the administrative savings 

involved with establishing and maintaining the PSAs. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 gives the beneficiaries dis-enrolled from TRICARE 

Prime on October 1, 2013, due to the PSA changes, a ‘‘one-time’’ election to continue 

their TRICARE Prime enrollment. Dis-enrolled beneficiaries who reside: (1) in a zip 

code that was a PSA as of September 30, 2013, and (2) within 100 miles of a military MTF, are eligible to make this one-time election. To ensure the affected beneficiaries are aware of their one-time enrollment option, they will be mailed a letter 

advising them of re-enrollment options and processes. The letters will be mailed at 

the end of April 2014. The beneficiaries will have until June 30, 2014, to make their 

election. 

Mr. KLINE. There remains two vacancies on the Advisory Committee on Arlington 

National Cemetery. When does the Department of Defense intend to fill the two cur-
154 

rent vacancies on the Advisory Committee on Arlington National Cemetery? Does 

the Department of Defense intend to nominate a member with a background in the 

United States Marine Corps to fill at least one of the positions? 

Secretary HAGEL. The Army is currently processing nominations and diligently 

working to fill the two current vacancies. With regard to the composition of the Advisory Committee, the Secretary of the Army is committed to ensuring the Advisory 

Committee is comprised of members who are committed to our nation’s veterans and 

their families with demonstrated technical expertise, professional preeminence, relevant points of view, and no potential conflict of interests. 

Diverse representation of all constituent interest is critical to meeting the Committee’s chartered purpose. The Secretary of the Army is committed to ensuring that 

all branches of the military services are represented, as well as ensuring, whenever 

possible, appropriate Gold Star Family representation on the Committee. Additionally, subcommittee representation beyond parent committee members has yet to be 

finalized, but the intent is to round out the subcommittees with members having 

specific interest or expertise in a subcommittee’s area of responsibility. 

Mr. KLINE. What does the Department of Defense plan to do to address the recent 

ethics and integrity issues? 

Secretary HAGEL. There are a variety of efforts and specialized training programs 

underway in DOD that are being managed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

the Joint Staff, and the Military Departments. Key among these efforts are a number of professional character initiatives for flag and general officers developed by the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and endorsed by the Secretary of Defense. 

These initiatives include staff assistance visits to the Combatant Commands to review practices and procedures with respect to, for example, acceptance of gifts and 

use of Government vehicles and military aircraft. Senior leader ethics continuing 

education will occur as a follow-up to the staff assist visits. Further, a characterfocused 360 degree assessment for military leaders is undergoing testing with full 

implementation among the Joint Staff and Combatant Commander general and flag 

officers by mid-summer 2014. 

Several of these professional character initiatives include enhancements to DOD’s 

ethics program that are being managed by the DOD Office of General Counsel 

(OGC). For example, last year, OGC created the Committee on Standards of Conduct (CSC). The CSC was established in response to requests for enhanced clarity 

and consistency in the legal interpretations of DOD regulations and other policies 

which promote the ethical conduct of DOD military and civilian personnel and the 

proper use of DOD resources. Its purpose is to facilitate the resolution or reconciliation of disparate legal interpretations of DOD ethics policy issuances, thereby promoting consistency in legal advice. 

Additionally, in 2013, the Department’s Office of General Counsel (OGC) conducted leader-led, values-based ethics training for the personnel of the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense. The live training sessions were intended to better equip DOD 

personnel to evaluate ethical dilemmas and make ethical decisions relying on both 

ethics regulations and fundamental ethical values. OGC will continue to facilitate 

leader-led values-based training in 2014. Importantly, OGC also made its valuesbased ethics training materials available to the Military Departments and the Joint 

Staff, and encouraged them to use these materials as part of their 2014 training. 

The Military Departments and the Joint Staff are currently investigating how to include these materials in their annual ethics training. 

In addition to these professional character initiatives, I directed an assessment of 

the curricula of a variety of professional military education offerings available to 

military officers at every stage of their careers, as well as an evaluation as to 

whether these educational opportunities sufficiently reflect and reinforce fundamental ethical values and the hallmarks of ethical leadership. The review by the 

Chairman and Service Chiefs documented that core values and ethical leadership 

are a major focus of professional military education (PME) throughout the Department. 

Earlier this year, Chairman Dempsey and I appeared in a broadcast on the Pentagon Channel, during which we emphasized the importance of leadership, professionalism, and character to members of the DOD community. 

Finally, on March 25, 2014, I announced the appointment of Navy Rear Admiral 

Margaret Klein to serve as my senior advisor for military professionalism. Rear Admiral Klein will serve as the coordinator for the DOD to help to ensure the effective 

integration and implementation of ongoing efforts to further improve professional 

conduct, to include moral and ethical decision-making. Under the charter of her new 

office she will make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Military Departments, as appropriate, in order to 

complement and enhance the efforts listed above. 
155 

Mr. KLINE. Does the Department plan to appoint a panel or military or civilian 

lead to review current accountability standards to address ethics and integrity 

issues? Has the Department of Defense looked at expanding 360 reviews for Commanders and Senior Enlisted at all levels? Has the Department of Defense looked 

at new DOD screening methods for entry level—mid level—or senior level leaders 

to address ethics and integrity issues? Has the Department of Defense looked at 

current whistleblower protections and issues with service members that come forward having a hard time getting retaliatory information from their service records 

which effectively discourages reporting? 

Secretary HAGEL. I recently appointed Rear Admiral Klein to serve as my senior 

advisor for military professionalism. I anticipate that among her core responsibilities, she will examine accountability standards and measures as they relate to 

issues of integrity and military professionalism. 

The Joint Staff is developing a 360 degree assessment focused on character for 

general and flag officers serving in joint assignments. Testing of the 360 degree assessment instrument is on track for the April-May 2014 timeframe. Once the 360 

degree tool is fully vetted and implemented, the Joint Staff will look to expand it 

to Joint Staff Senior Executive Service, military O–6, and civilian GS–15 personnel. 

Each of the Military Departments has a variant of the 360 degree assessment tool 

in use or under development. The Army’s 360 degree program is the most mature, 

while the Air Force instituted a general officer 360 degree program in 2013. The 

Navy uses a 360 degree instrument for new flag officers and for some two- and 

three-star officers. The Marines’ program is in the initial development stage. 

Character and standards of conduct are considered in each of the service officer 

and enlisted military performance evaluation processes, and service members receive feedback on their performance as part of those processes. 

When a service member is a victim of reprisal for being a whistleblower, the service member may petition his or her Military Department’s Board for Correction of 

Military (or Naval) Records for relief. The Boards consider each petition carefully, 

and have broad discretion to fashion relief appropriate to the circumstances of each 

case. Given the availability and robust nature of this remedy for whistleblowers who 

suffer reprisal, and the few cases where those service members who petition the 

Boards express disagreement with the resulting Board action; the Department currently has no plans to further review this issue. However, the Department will continue to monitor this issue, and will take action should doing so become appropriate. 

Mr. KLINE. Does the DOD have a requirement to report to Congress when the Department or a specific service begins any investigation of an ethics lapse or widespread integrity violation issue? 

Secretary HAGEL. DOD and the Military Departments Inspectors General initiate 

investigations into alleged ethics violations. However, there is no requirement for 

reporting to Congress on such initiation. Reporting such information before a thorough and objective investigation is completed risks harm to the investigative process, as well as to the individual’s privacy, personal reputation, and right to impartial adjudication of the allegations. The DOD Inspector General provides Congress 

with a semi-annual report that summarizes its work, as well as the work of the 

audit and investigative agencies of the Military Departments. This report highlights, among other things, substantiated cases of senior official misconduct, criminal convictions, and suspensions and debarments of non-Federal entities. 

Mr. KLINE. While the Department of Defense developed the FY15 budget request, 

did the Department of Defense review plans to consolidate Combatant Command 

HQ staff? If so, why did the Department not move forward with such a plan? How 

much money and manpower did the Department of Defense project would be saved 

by consolidation of Combatant Commands? 

General DEMPSEY. DOD considered some options for consolidating Combatant 

Command HQ staffs as part of our annual budget development and review process. 

However, we did not move forward with any changes in this year’s request. We believe the current structure of six geographic and three functional combatant commands remains the most effective construct to address today’s global security environment and the Unified Command Plan reflects this assessment. However, in accordance with Secretary Hagel’s QDR direction, we are proceeding with a 20 percent 

reduction in all command staffs to provide future cost savings consistent with the 

intent of sequestration. 

Mr. KLINE. What does the Department of Defense plan to do to address the recent 

ethics and integrity issues? 

General DEMPSEY. The Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense staff 

(OSD) have been working a number of general and flag officer (G/FO) professional 

character initiatives since Spring 2013. The OSD-led initiatives focus primarily on 

the clarification and standardization of ethics rules and regulations concerning such 
156 

issues as the use of enlisted aides, personal security details, gifts, and spouse travel. 

The Joint Staff-led initiatives include the following: 

• A character-focused 360 degree assessment for all Joint Staff and Combatant 

Command G/FOs is in development; testing of the assessment instrument is on 

track for Apr-May 2014 

• Ethics staff assist visits to the ensure Combatant Command HQ compliance 

with ethics rules and regulations; as of 31 Mar 2014, visits have been completed 

at USSOUTHCOM, USEUCOM, USAFRICOM, USCENTCOM, and USSOCOM. 

The remaining CCMDs are scheduled for visits in the near term. 

• Senior leader ethics continuing education will occur as a follow up to each of 

the staff assist visits at the combatant commands to provide feedback from 

those visits as well as an educational roundtable led by a Senior Fellow and 

ethics subject matter expert 

• A handbook on standards of ethical conduct was created for joint G/FOs and 

their support staffs to aid them in issues related to ethics rules and regulations 

• Annual senior leader ethics training has been updated to incorporate best practices for the Services, including interactive vignettes that focus on the application of judgment and self-awareness 

• Ethics curriculum in Professional Military Education is being updated to ensure 

a greater focus on ethical decision making based on the shared values of the 

Profession of Arms 

On 25 March, 2014, the Secretary of Defense appointed RADM Margaret ‘‘Peg’’ 

Klein as his Senior Advisor for Military Professionalism. RADM Klein will coordinate the actions of the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, and each of the military services—working directly with the Service Secretaries and the Service 

Chiefs—on the Department of Defense’s (DOD) focus on ethics, character, and competence in all activities at every level of command with an uncompromising culture 

of accountability. This effort is in the very initial stages and the scope and functions 

of that office will be further developed by RADM Klein and her support staff in the 

Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. 

Mr. KLINE. Does the Department plan to appoint a panel or military or civilian 

lead to review current accountability standards to address ethics and integrity 

issues? Has the Department of Defense looked at expanding 360 reviews for Commanders and Senior Enlisted at all levels? Has the Department of Defense looked 

at new DOD screening methods for entry level—mid level—or senior level leaders 

to address ethics and integrity issues? Has the Department of Defense looked at 

current whistleblower protections and issues with service members that come forward having a hard time getting retaliatory information from their service records 

which effectively discourages reporting? 

General DEMPSEY. On 25 March, 2014, the Secretary of Defense appointed RADM 

Margaret ‘‘Peg’’ Klein as his Senior Advisor for Military Professionalism. RADM 

Klein will coordinate the actions of the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, and 

each of the military services—working directly with the Service Secretaries and the 

Service Chiefs—on the Department of Defense’s (DOD) focus on ethics, character, 

and competence in all activities at every level of command with an uncompromising 

culture of accountability. This effort is in the very initial stages and the scope and 

functions of that office will be further developed by RADM Klein and her support 

staff in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. 

In addition, as one of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s general and flag 

officer professional character initiatives, the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s 

Standards of Conduct Office established the Committee on the Standards of Conduct 

in Nov 2013 to review and clarify legal interpretations of issues related to ethics 

rules and regulations. 

The Joint Staff is developing a 360 assessment focused on character for general 

and flag officers serving in joint assignments (e.g: On the Joint Staff and Combatant 

Commands.) Testing of the 360 assessment instrument is on track for Apr-May 

2014. Once the 360 is implemented and fully vetted, the Joint Staff will look to expand it to Joint Staff and Combatant Command General and Flag officers, Senior 

Executive Service, military O6, and civilian GS15 personnel. 

Each of the Services has various levels of 360 assessments in use or under development. The Army’s 360 program is the most mature, while the Air Force instituted 

a general officer 360 program in 2013. The Navy uses a 360 instrument for new flag 

officers and some two- and three-star officers and the Marines’ program is in the 

initial development stage. 
157 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOEBSACK 

Mr. LOEBSACK. The 2014 Omnibus required the Army to workload the Army arsenals to efficient levels. How will you ensure sufficient workload is infused into the 

arsenals to keep them efficient, not just warm? Where will this workload come 

from? (the Army, Defense Logistics Agency, other Services, etc). When can we expect 

a full plan to implement this requirement to be released? 

Secretary HAGEL. The Department is working in several aligned areas to assist 

the Army arsenals identify and obtain workload from a variety of sources. 

There is an emerging policy framework, designed to identify sustaining workloads 

and critical arsenal manufacturing capabilities. This framework is currently being 

reviewed within the Department, with estimated publication early this summer. 

Other on-going actions by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the 

Army include: 

• Developing a more refined process to identify arsenal critical manufacturing capabilities and workloads necessary to sustain those capabilities. 

• Implementing the web-centric Materiel Enterprise Capabilities Database. This 

tool is designed to showcase the arsenals’ current capabilities and workforce 

skills to the full range of potential Military Service customers. 

• Developing and implementing a framework that supports use of the arsenals to 

satisfy Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and other service manufacturing requirements. 

• Publishing an Army policy that encourages program managers (PMs) to utilize 

arsenals for manufacturing requirements. 

• Encouraging the use of available legal authorities to derive workloads from 

sales outside the Department, increasing public-private partnering, and supporting foreign military sales. 

The size of the arsenals coupled with the current period of declining resources, 

however, does challenge the Department’s ability to identify sufficient workload to 

operate the Army arsenals as efficiently and effectively as both the Congress and 

the Department would like. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS 

Ms. TSONGAS. As part of the negotiated FY2014 National Defense Authorization 

Act, Congress included report language requiring DLA to conduct a market survey 

to determine if and how many athletic footwear suppliers currently have or will 

have in the near future the ability to produce a 100% Berry compliant shoe that 

can be issued to enlisted recruits when they report for duty. 

DLA issued another Sources Sought announcement in late January, 2014 calling 

for industry input by February 14, 2014. DLA is currently in the process of assessing the responses received to determine the capacity of domestic footwear suppliers 

to provide the quantity, quality and kind of footwear required within cost limits. 

What were the results of the 2014 Sources Sought announcement insofar as the 

number, names, and capacities of the total number of respondents and of the total 

number of respondents, how many of the respondents did DLA determine to have 

the capability and capacity to produce Berry compliant athletic footwear? 

Secretary HAGEL. Currently there is no known source of a fully domestic/Berry 

Amendment compliant athletic shoe being sold commercially in the marketplace. 

Four firms responded and indicated the capacity to produce a fully domestic/Berry 

Compliant shoe. These firms have also indicated that all component materials and 

subassemblies would be fully domestic in their product offering. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Once the DLA has qualified a sufficient number of sources with the 

capability to produce a Berry compliant shoe, what is the Department’s plan—to include anticipated quantities, costs, timelines and other acquisition metrics—regarding the pursuit of further procurement actions such as the issuance of a Request 

for Proposal for the acquisition of Berry compliant athletic footwear for initial entry 

recruits in FY2014? 

Secretary HAGEL. On April 25, 2014, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a 

policy memorandum with respect to athletic shoes offered to recruits at basic training. Though at present time no footwear manufacturer sells Berry Amendment-compliant athletic shoes in the commercial marketplace, under this policy memo DOD 

recognizes the potential for such shoes to enter the market in the future and has 

an interest in having its recruits purchase domestically manufactured athletic shoes 

to the maximum extent practicable. Currently, DLA does not have a requirement 

from the Services to purchase Berry compliant athletic shoes and does not anticipate requirements in the near term. If DLA receives a requirement from the Serv-
158 

ices to purchase athletic shoes, the procurement will be compliant with the restrictions of the Berry Amendment. 

Ms. TSONGAS. What is the breakdown of resources the Department has allocated 

toward the implementation of the National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security? 

Secretary HAGEL. The Department has not captured the entirety of the funding 

that supports the U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security (NAP) 

because the effort is incorporated into many ongoing activities of the Department, 

including integration of NAP objectives into key policy and strategic guidance, and 

training addressing NAP objectives. A copy of the ‘‘U.S. Department of Defense Annual Report on Implementation of Executive Order 13595 and the U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security’’ is attached. The report describes how instruction on Women, Peace, and Security issues, including the value of inclusive 

participation in conflict prevention, peace processes, and security initiatives; international human rights law and international humanitarian law; protection of civilians; prevention of sexual and gender-based violence; prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse; and combating trafficking in persons have become a part of the 

Department’s internal employee and service member practices, and how NAP objectives are included in the Department’s partner nation capacity building strategies. 

[The report referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 103.] 

Ms. TSONGAS. For the first time since the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund was 

established, money was explicitly authorized last year for recruitment and retention 

of women in the Afghan Security Forces. How will that money be directed to impact 

not only the number of women in the forces but also the institutional reforms required to ensure safe and equitable service of women? 

General DEMPSEY. DOD has yet to finalize its 2014 financial activity plan for allo- cating the $25 million dollars set aside in the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund for 

women’s issues. Initial discussions among the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

State Department, Joint Staff, United States Central Command, United States 

Forces–Afghanistan and Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan, 

have focused on expanding and upgrading facilities for women in the Afghanistan 

National Security Forces as well as other gender-focused institutional reforms. 

Ms. TSONGAS. What institutional reforms and programmatic interventions can be 

employed to reduce the incidence of sexual violence, harassment, and death threats 

against the women who serve in the Afghan National Security Forces? 

General DEMPSEY. The implementation of a gender policy within Afghanistan’s 

National Security Forces is a complex, long-term project, but there has been significant progress. DOD maintains a robust program dedicated to improving the recruitment, retention, and treatment of women in the ANSF. This program is centered 

on Gender Advisors working closely with their Afghan partners on various initiatives and programs to reduce sexual violence, harassment, and death threats to 

women serving in the ANSF. For example; on 25 November 2013, Afghanistan observed the International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women. This 

day also marked the beginning of a 16-day comprehensive campaign against genderbased violence. This campaign was heavily supported and funded by the United 

States. 

The Afghan Ministry of Defense (MoD) Human Rights and Gender Integration 

(HR&GI) office lacks sufficient expertise and resources to implement female management policies. The HR&GI sought external support in order to increase training 

and education capacity for Afghanistan National Army on human rights and gender 

integration issues. 

Under the leadership of Minister Daudzai, the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI) 

has shown significant support for women, and is taking steps to better protect and 

empower female police and staff. Shortly after taking office, Mintster Daudzai promoted COL Hekmat Shahi, director of the Gender, Human Rights, and Children’s 

Rights Directorate (GHRCR) to Brigadier General and enhanced the status of 

GHRCR by moving it from and Office to a Directorate. In late 2013, the GHRCR 

Directorate and the Strategy and Policy Directorate developed a strategy for properly integrating females into the Afghanistan National Police and improving gender 

rights across Afghanistan. 

The ANSF institutional reforms are a positive sign that, at all levels, the Afghan 

government leadership is dedicated to improving the treatment of women. Although 

there is much yet to be accomplished, DOD remains committed to using a portion 

of Afghanistan Security Force Funds to support these efforts. 

Ms. TSONGAS. How do you intend to ensure attention to and oversight of DOD elements implementing the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 

among the senior leadership of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint 

Staff? 
159 

General DEMPSEY. The Joint Staff worked closely with OSD to develop and approve implementation guidance for the U.S. National Action Plan (NAP) on Women, 

Peace, and Security (WPS). As a result, DOD now has an active WPS working group 

that shares best practices to identify and solve NAP implementation issues at the 

appropriate level. 

Ms. TSONGAS. General Dempsey, you mentioned during the hearing that you are 

using new media to inform commanders and servicemembers about resources to prevent sexual assault. As I mentioned during the hearing, these tools only work if 

commanders and every servicemember under their command are aware that they 

exist. I am concerned about your efforts to make people aware of the availability 

of the Special Victims Counsel program. Can you elaborate on what specific steps 

you are taking to inform servicemembers of the special victims counsel program? 

General DEMPSEY. I can assure you that the Special Victim’s Counsel is well publicized and I personally use every opportunity to discuss how important it is that 

all leaders and service members are aware of the legal assistance available to victims of sexual assault. In addition to SVC information that is posted on Service 

Judge Advocate General and Sexual Assault Prevention and Response websites, 

each Military Department has launched an aggressive campaign to ensure widest 

dissemination of information on the Special Victims Counsel program. 

Army: The Army publicized the program and services available to service members through Army-wide, national and local installation news media. 

• SVCs have conducted numerous town halls at local installations. 

• The Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) Program 

Office published a ‘‘STAND TO!’’ article on the SVC program which reached approximately 15,600 subscribers and was posted to the Department of Defense 

website, which reached an even more sizable audience. 

• The SHARP program, in coordination with OTJAG, developed an original video 

vignette that highlights victim legal support. The video vignette is published on 

the SHARP website and is available for use by all Army Command SHARP program managers in communicating to their publics about SHARP victim support 

services. 

• SVCs are directed to conduct outreach with installation stakeholders after attending their training course. Required stakeholders are Victim Advocates, 

SARCs, SHARP Program Managers, Medical Community, Senior Judge Advocates, Commanders. Navy: The Navy currently has 26 of 29 Victims’ Legal 

Counsel (VLC) in place in 21 different locations around the Fleet. 

• Numerous articles on the VLC program and services have appeared in Navywide publications and local base newspapers. 

• As of 28 March 2014, attorneys in the program had conducted 389 outreach 

briefs to 9,001 attendees. 

• A VLCP NAVADMIN (message) will be released and trigger the distribution of 

VLC posters and tri-folds (already prepared) to local commands to be placed on 

bulletin boards and other public areas around command spaces. The Navy plans 

to set up a blog once the NAVADMIN has been released. 

• In addition to educating personnel outside the JAG Corps, the VLCP office has 

provided information on the standup and operation of the VLCP to JAG Corps 

leadership and Staff Judge Advocates stationed around the Fleet. 

• The Navy VLC program has a link on the JAG Corps website which can be 

found at www.jag.navy.mil. 

Air Force: The AF trained all personnel involved in the military justice process 

about the SVC program so they are knowledgeable and aware. The first official person to come in contact with the victim is required to notify the victim that they 

might be eligible for the service and can request SVC (SARC, OSI, VA, TC). 

• Initially, the AF conducted a media blitz where many local bases ran stories on 

the SVC program in base papers. AF also conducted several national-level 

media interviews to get the message out and released a PSA to air on base commander channels. 

• Leveraged formal gatherings and groups to further educate leadership around 

the force. For instance, the SVC program was also briefed to all wing commanders at the Chief’s SAPR Summit and is also briefed during the new wing 

commander’s orientation course. 

• Conducts outreach by briefing at Commander’s calls, Newcomer briefings, First 

Term Airman Center, and other org groups (Top 3, etc.). 

• Designed posters that provide information about the SVC program and how to 

contact an SVC. The posters are distributed throughout the AF and located on 

unit bulletin boards. For bases without an SVC, SARCs include info about the 

program during their info briefings to the base. 
160 

• In addition to information about the SVC program on the JAGC public 

webpage, there is a JAGC Facebook page. 

Marine Corps: The Marine Corps Victims’ Legal Counsel Organization (VLCO) 

has fifteen active duty judge advocates located among the four regional Legal Services Support Sections (LSSS) and their outlying installations. These judge advocates, along with Headquarters Marine Corps, have ensured the widest dissemination of information about the availability of victim legal services for service members and military dependents. 

• In October 2013, the Marine Corps published MARADMIN 583/13 to all service 

members to announce the establishment of VLCO and revised its Legal Administration Manual (LEGADMINMAN) for commanders. A VLCO public website 

has also been established. 

• Between October 2013—February 2014, the VLCO Officer-in-Charge traveled 

extensively throughout the Marine Corps in all four regions to inform key personnel about VLCO services, including meetings and presentations with commanders, SARCs and victim advocates, Family Advocacy personnel, VWAP personnel, military criminal investigators, and judge advocates. 

• Outreach efforts continue by Regional Victims’ Legal Counsel (RVLC) based out 

of MCB Quantico (VA), Camp Lejeune (NC), Camp Pendleton (CA) and Camp 

Butler (Okinawa) spreading awareness of victim legal services via meetings and 

unit presentations. 

• VLCO personnel have conducted several interviews with newspaper reporters to 

support articles published in national and local installation newspapers. 

National Guard: The stand-up of the NG SVC program is pending a policy authorization from the Secretary of Army; such policy authorization is required based on 

the legislative implementation of a SVC program. Specifically, Section 1716 of 

NDAA FY 14 limits the SVC services to those individuals eligible for military assistance under 10 U.S.C. § 1044e. Under 10 U.S.C. § 1044e, NG members are not generally eligible for legal assistance unless they are serving on active duty, have retired, or have recently mobilized for more than 30 days. Currently requests for SVC 

representation are being handled on a case-by-case basis in coordination with the 

OTJAG. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER 

Mr. SHUSTER. Within the QDR an emphasis is placed on innovation. Will the emphasis on innovation apply to the ‘‘new normal’’ challenges that deal with the violent extremists threats? Will this emphasis on innovation aid in the Train, Advise, 

and Assist mission in Afghanistan? 

Secretary HAGEL. In pursuing the Department’s objective to disrupt violent extremists who threaten the United States, national interests, and those of our allies 

and partners, are furthered by innovation and adaptation. The QDR report’s emphasis on innovation includes our ongoing efforts to find new ways to maximize our 

partners’ contributions to their own security and to coordinate planning on combined activities to pursue shared goals. 

As stated in the QDR report, the Department will rebalance counterterrorism efforts toward a greater emphasis on building partner capacity, especially in fragile 

states. At the same time, we will be retaining our own robust capability for direct 

action, including pursuing innovation in the areas of intelligence, persistent surveillance, precision strike, and the use of Special Operations Forces. Combatant Commanders will also invigorate their efforts to adjust contingency planning to reflect 

more closely the changing strategic environment. 

One aspect of innovation as envisioned in the QDR is drawn from the Department’s experience in building both the Iraqi and Afghan Armed forces; both efforts 

yielded valuable lessons about how to build partner security capacity and train, advise, and assist (TAA) partner nation forces more effectively. These efforts included 

the use of U.S. general purpose forces (GPF) to do a large-scale TAA mission by 

partnering with host nation forces at the operational and tactical levels. In Afghanistan, this concept was refined by establishing and deploying Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs), which are combat units re-missioned to conduct TAA. In addition, significant amounts of funding were appropriated to the Department of Defense to train and equip Iraqi and Afghan military and police forces, and to enable 

those forces to assume security for their own country. This was a departure from 

using traditional Title 22 security assistance funding. Programs like the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund have afforded flexibility to implement a sizable program 

in a hostile environment. For the post-2014 TAA mission in Afghanistan, DOD will 
161 

seek continued funding for the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) so that they 

may continue to improve their capabilities in security in Afghanistan. 

Mr. SHUSTER. As we decrease our military, budget China has increased theirs. 

How will the United States gain transparency of China’s increase in applications? 

Secretary HAGEL. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY 

Mr. CONAWAY. DOD financial management resources: Now more than ever, it 

makes sense for the DOD to be able to manage its books and failing to properly 

source the audit mission would be disastrous and a moral killer, effectively stunting 

progress and momentum, progress that cannot be restarted with the flip of a switch. 

Does the Department have the necessary resources to ensure that the FIAR plan 

continues to move forward? 

Secretary HAGEL. Yes. Despite recent challenges with the Defense budget, substantial funds have been set aside to support achievement of auditable financial 

statements. For Fiscal Year (FY) 2015, the Department budgeted over $600 million 

for audit readiness efforts, including retaining independent public accounting firms 

to conduct validations and audits and resolve financial system deficiencies. Congress 

can assist by continuing to focus on the Department’s FIAR requirements and by 

ensuring that sufficient funds are available in a stable budget environment. 

Resources also include people. The Department needs to hire more experienced 

and qualified employees to support audits. Attracting certified public accountants 

has been difficult, and ongoing hiring freezes exacerbate the problem. The Department has put in place a course-based financial management certification program. 

Additionally, the Department is delivering immediate, practical training on the importance of audit readiness to financial managers as well as others who play a role. 

Through these employee training initiatives and programs, the Department seeks 

to ensure that the financial management workforce has the knowledge, skills, and 

abilities necessary to meet DOD resourcing challenges and achieve auditable financial statements. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Can you assure the committee that the FIAR plan will move 

ahead? 

Secretary HAGEL. Yes, the FIAR plan will continue to guide the Department, moving forward. The goals and priorities laid out in the FIAR Plan Status Report are 

sound, and we are making progress. Further, the FIAR approach to achieving audit 

readiness is both sensible and cost-effective, and the Government Accountability Office and DOD Office of the Inspector General agree. Recently, the U.S. Marine Corps 

received an unmodified (favorable) audit opinion on its Schedule of Budgetary Activity, becoming the first military service in the Department to garner a favorable 

audit opinion. This significant accomplishment demonstrates that a military service 

can achieve audit readiness, and it validates the FIAR approach. Most of the Department, including the three remaining military services, plan to follow this model 

in FY 2015. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Can you assure the committee that the audit mission will remain 

a priority for you and the leadership within the DOD? 

Secretary HAGEL. Yes, the audit mission will continue to be a priority until we 

have institutionalized it as part of our routine business. The Department’s senior 

leaders and I are closely monitoring progress, addressing challenges, and focusing 

people and resources on the work needed to accomplish audit readiness on the 

Schedule of Budgetary Activity by September 30, 2014, and full financial statements’ audit readiness by September 30, 2017. I have made that commitment, and 

have been joined by senior leaders of the Services and other defense organizations. 

Including FIAR objectives in Senior Executive Service performance plans is helping 

to sustain that leadership commitment. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Can you comment on what appears to be a lack of progress and 

the 4th estates’ leadership’s commitment to getting audit done? 

Secretary HAGEL. A number of 4th Estate agencies have achieved a favorable 

audit opinion on their financial statements and are in sustainment. The remaining 

4th Estate agencies are correcting deficiencies and enhancing internal controls with 

the goal of earning unqualified opinions. As with the military services, the 4th Estate has achieved audit readiness on appropriations received and is preparing for 

Schedule of Budgetary Activity (SBA) audits to begin in FY 2015. Organizations 

within the 4th Estate that are not already under audit have submitted their initial 

management assertions. Our financial audit team within the Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) is evaluating these submissions while also work-
162 

ing to establish a common audit infrastructure to support future defense-wide SBA 

audits. Estate progress will be monitored within our ongoing governance process 

that includes engagement with agencies’ senior leaders as well as leaders on my immediate staff. We are making progress and 4th Estate leaders are fully involved. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Last year we discussed the U.S. response to the ongoing situation 

in Syria; to date there have been 126K deaths, there are currently 2.5M refugees, 

and 6.5M displaced people. As well, there are now an estimated 10K Sunni Jihadist 

foreign fighters operating in Syria, all of which has had a destabilizing effect in Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq—where ISIS has conducted several prison breaks to source 

terrorist fighters. To date, our leadership in this conflict can account for only 4% 

of priority one and priority two chemicals that have been removed from Syria: 1) 

What has to happen—what is the threshold—for the U.S. to take a larger, more direct role in shaping the outcome in Syria? 2) If the Assad regime does not fully comply with the chemical weapons agreement, what policy tools, approach, and military 

posture will the U.S. employ to respond? 

Secretary HAGEL. The U.S. approach to Syria involves the entire government; 

there is no U.S. military solution to this very complex, long-term problem, but we 

are operating three lines of effort. First, we are supporting our partners in the region, including Syria’s neighbors, with border security as they face a variety of challenges stemming from the Syrian conflict. Second, we continue to work with the 

international community to provide humanitarian aid to the Syrian people. Third, 

we continue to support, along with the State Department and other U.S. departments and agencies, the moderate opposition in Syria as a means of countering both 

the Assad regime and the extremist groups. Any changes in U.S. policy on Syria 

would be forged through a whole-of-government approach. 

Regarding the chemical weapons issue, as of March 6, 2014, 28.6 percent of the 

total chemicals slated for removal have been removed from Syria, which includes 

18.9 percent of Priority 1 chemicals and 50.9 percent of Priority 2 chemicals. We 

expect the Syrian Government to fully comply with its responsibilities under UN Security Council Resolution 2118 and the relevant decisions of the Organization for 

the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Executive Council. UN Security 

Council Resolution 2118 allows for regular review of Syria’s progress, or lack thereof, and provides for referral of cases of non-compliance with OPCW decisions or 

UNSCR 2118 to the UN Security Council to consider imposition of measures under 

Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Important strategic air bases located in Qatar and United Arab 

Emirates provide the U.S. with the ability to project force, conduct Intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance (ISR) missions, and further reassure Gulf partners 

that the U.S. continues to be engaged in the region. These bases are financed 

through Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds. 1) If OCO funds are cut 

from the FY15 budget due to the drawdown and subsequent end to the U.S. war 

in Afghanistan, how will you seek funding to continue operations from these bases, 

or will the U.S. terminate operations at these bases? 

Secretary HAGEL. In September 2012, the Deputy Secretary of Defense published 

a memorandum detailing the global defense posture enduring location master list. 

This document defines locations, spread throughout the world, and their intended 

use. The Air Force bases in Qatar and the United Arab Emirate have been identified as enduring locations. Both locations are currently operating in an expanded 

capacity and are expected to be properly scoped upon the end of operations in Afghanistan. The Air Force will continue requesting OCO resources to support expanded operating functions until base operations are adjusted for the enduring mission. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BARBER 

Mr. BARBER. Is the Army planning on consolidating all or some of the Army Test 

and Evaluation Command (ATEC) mission sets? If so, what ATEC sites are currently being considered for consolidation, and where would the mission be moved? 

Secretary HAGEL. ATEC is not planning to reorganize or consolidate mission sets. 

If future studies and analysis were to conclude the need to internally reorganize or 

consolidate subordinate commands within ATEC, the command would use the appropriate channels within the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, 

and the Congress to properly inform all relevant stakeholders. 

Mr. BARBER. If the Army were to relocate its developmental tester for C4ISR from 

the environmentally unique location at the Electronic Proving Ground at Fort 

Huachuca to a lab environment, how would this impact future research and development of C4ISR assets for the military? 
163 

Secretary HAGEL. Given the nature of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) testing, the Army cannot relocate developmental testing to a purely lab-based environment. Effective developmental testing requires open air or field testing under operationally realistic 

conditions. The Army is not changing its developmental test protocols and plans to 

continue the balanced use of lab-based and open air or field testing. 

Mr. BARBER. During the decisionmaking process to recommend divestiture of the 

A–10, did the Department consider Ground Commanders’ input on the capabilities 

needed to best support troops on the ground when they request close air support. 

How did the Department get this input? What was the input from Ground Commanders and Combatant Commanders? 

Secretary HAGEL. Ground Commanders’ input was considered during the development of the FY15 budget. Services and Combatant Commanders were actively engaged during deliberations and decision making. While acknowledging the reliable 

performance of the A–10, Ground Commanders and Combatant Commanders are 

not wedded to a specific aircraft but require the Close Air Support (CAS) capability 

that the A–10 and other proven aircraft, such as the F–15E, F–16, B–1, and F/A– 

18, and in the near future, the F–35 provide. Since 2006, about 80% of CAS missions have been executed by platforms other than the A–10. With the A–10 divestiture, other multi-role aircraft provide a balanced capability across multiple mission 

sets for the Combatant Commanders, and the Department saves resources by divesting an entire weapon system. 

Mr. BARBER. What factors did the Department of Defense analyze to determine 

its proposed slowdown of military compensation and benefits? 

Secretary HAGEL. The Department’s military and civilian leaders conducted a 

broad analysis to arrive at our proposed package of compensation adjustments. The 

Department took a holistic approach to this issue and carefully crafted the proposals 

to reform military compensation in a fair, responsible, and sustainable way. The Department considered the impact of these adjustments on military members and their 

families, recognizing that no one serving our nation in uniform is overpaid for what 

they do, but also that if we continue on the current course, the choices will only 

grow more difficult and painful. The Department considered how military compensation compares with private-sector compensation, both before and after the proposed 

changes. Military members currently receive a robust package of pay and benefits, 

and after the proposed changes, the package will remain robust and will continue 

to compare very favorably with the private sector. Finally, the Department considered the need to balance the member’s quality of life and quality of service as well 

as the benefits of reinvesting the funds from slowing compensation growth into 

training and readiness. Overall, even after making these changes and slowing the 

growth in military compensation, the Department will still be able to recruit and 

retain a high-quality force and offer generous, competitive, and sustainable benefits. 

Mr. BARBER. If there is a decrease in military compensation and benefits, what 

is the expected affect to retention and recruitment in our All-Volunteer Force? 

Secretary HAGEL. The Department’s military and civilian leaders conducted substantial analysis to arrive at our proposed package of compensation adjustments. 

The Department concluded that, even after making these changes and slowing the 

growth in military compensation, the Department will still be able to recruit and 

retain a high quality force and offer generous, competitive, and sustainable benefits. 

Mr. BARBER. Has the Department of Defense, in concert with the Department of 

Veterans Affairs, considered other courses of action to decrease military healthcare 

spending rather than the TRICARE changes that were presented? If so, then what 

were those courses of action considered? 

Secretary HAGEL. We actively work with the Department of Veterans Affairs to 

identify opportunities to provide quality care more efficiently, conveniently and at 

a lower overall cost to the Government. Examples of our successful initiatives include Joint Incentive Fund projects in which we jointly position resources to serve 

the largest population at the lowest cost and partnering to deliver cost effective, 

timely Integrated Disability Evaluation System physical exams that reduce the cost 

of disability exams to the Government and the complexity to the patient. In recent 

years, additional emphasis was placed on achieving savings and efficiencies within 

the operational environment of the Military Health System to complement our efforts with the VA. This has been a success story, with roughly $3 billion in savings 

per year achieved through programs like Federal Ceiling Pricing (a discount drug 

program) and implementing the Outpatient Prospective Payment system (a transition to more favorable Medicare rates for private hospitals). 

The Department of Defense will continue to look for ways to operate more efficiently, and effectively, to better serve our service members and veterans. 
164 

Mr. BARBER. Has the Department of Defense done any economic analysis of how 

military personnel reductions and military weapon divestment will affect local 

economies surrounding DOD installations? 

Secretary HAGEL. The Department has not conducted such an analysis. DOD’s Office of Economic Adjustment has authority to assist states and localities to conduct 

such analysis as part of a broader economic adjustment response once a reduction 

is publicly announced and found to have a direct and significant adverse consequence on the local area. 

Within this budget, the Department is balancing readiness, capability, and capacity—making sure that whatever size force we have, we can afford to keep our people 

properly trained, equipped, compensated and prepared to accomplish their mission. 

As significant force structure reductions take place, the excess infrastructure associated with that force structure must also be reduced. If not, readiness, modernization, and even more force structure will have to be cut. The most efficient and effective way to eliminate excess infrastructure is through the Base Realignment and 

Closure process—thus the Department’s request for a 2017 round. 

BRAC is the only fair, objective, and proven process for closing and realigning installations. BRAC provides a sound analytical process that places military value 

above all other considerations. Additionally, when the Department closes and realigns bases within the statutory BRAC process, the local community is a key participant. BRAC allows communities a role in re-use decisions for the property, provides them assistance in developing a redevelopment strategy and offers the community the opportunity to obtain the property at low cost or, in some cases, no cost 

provided their redevelopment plan creates jobs. 

Mr. BARBER. The A–10 has recently been installed with advanced targeting pods, 

the latest in guided weapons, new electronics and new wings which will extend the 

life of the planes in a cost-effective way. 

Considering we do not know the type of conflicts we may face in the coming decade, whether it be further insurgency or possibly more terrorism, an asymmetric 

war or another large land conflict with a growing super power. 

We just don’t know. 

The point is, Mr. Secretary, should we not be prepared for all contingencies? Don’t 

we owe that to our nation and our service members? 

Should we not have the tools at hand to ably prosecute whatever we may face, 

especially a strong and capable tool such as the A–10 that has proven itself in war, 

performed different roles such as combat and rescue, received new modifications, 

and successfully protected thousands of ground troops? 

Secretary HAGEL. The A–10 has received periodic upgrades as do all other aircraft 

in the DOD inventory. What is unique is that the A–10 was designed for a single 

mission in an era that cannot compare nor predict the proliferation of threats to the 

aircraft that we see today. The A–10 was optimized to fly low and slow in permissive environments in order to achieve the accuracy and effectiveness demanded by 

the supported ground forces. Unfortunately, in a fiscally-constrained environment, 

the Department no longer retains the luxury of operating and sustaining single-mission aircraft. Divesting the entire fleet provides significant savings that cannot be 

obtained by divesting only portions of a fleet because we are also able to eliminate 

the infrastructure associated with the fleet, including training units, test units, and 

development of future sustainability programs. During Desert Storm (1991), six of 

the thirteen USAF aircraft lost to enemy fire were A–10s. Infrared missiles, carried 

by enemy troops, were responsible for the greatest number of losses by any single 

platform during Desert Storm. Small arms fire and anti-aircraft artillery also damaged thirteen additional A–10s. The losses were substantial enough that commanders had to reconsider A–10 tasking against the formidable front-line Iraqi 

units. 

With the uncertainty that lies in predicting future conflicts, we owe the nation 

flexible weapons systems that can perform and deliver in any future contested environment. Even today, the A–10 provides only a fraction of the Close Air Support 

(CAS) required in theater. The capabilities of the A–10 are replicated throughout 

the DOD TACAIR inventory. Aircraft other than the A–10 have effectively provided 

over 80% of the required CAS missions in our most recent conflicts. With modern 

sensors, communications, and precision-guided munitions, the air forces can now 

achieve the desired effects with speed and from higher altitudes, allowing us to do 

the job with more survivable aircraft and tactics, while simultaneously providing the 

Combatant Commander the options required in other mission sets. Finally, the Department has long planned to eventually replace the A–10C fleet with the F–35A 

Joint Strike Fighter. As we await the delivery of more F–35s, the F–15E, F–16, and 

F/A–18 have proven their ability to provide highly effective CAS. 
165 

Mr. BARBER. Secretary Hagel, you mentioned cyber security as an important priority for DOD and I could not agree more with your sentiment. 

While we continue improving our cyber defense to meet the rapidly changing technology through research and development, it is important that we have the infrastructure to adequately test these technologies. 

I want to bring to your attention an important aspect of this endeavor. In my district, we have Fort Huachuca’s Electronic Proving Ground (EPG). 

This installation is the Army’s C5I (command, control, communications, computers, cyber and intelligence) Developmental Tester which uses its infrastructure 

and unique geographical location to provide the best real world tests. 

This area has the most pristine electronic range with the most quiet electromagnetic spectrum and no over flights by aircraft. This ultimately allows realistic 

testing of important cyber assets that will improve DOD’s mission. Mr. Secretary, 

would you agree that the Army should utilize all of its developmental testing assets 

for C5I? Would you also agree that it should use both its environmentally unique 

test ranges as well as its laboratories, so that we can best provide for the future 

research and development for DOD’s important mission of cyber warfare? 

Secretary HAGEL. The Department of the Army will continue to use all of its research and development and test and evaluation capabilities to support the maturation and development of current and future technologies in support of cybersecurity, 

cyberwarfare, and command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence 

system acquisition. These assets include laboratories, controlled ranges, and operationally realistic test environments. 

Mr. BARBER. During the decisionmaking process to recommend divestiture of the 

A–10, did the Department consider Ground Commanders’ input on the capabilities 

needed to best support troops on the ground when they request close air support. 

How did the Department get this input? What was the input from Ground Commanders and Combatant Commanders? 

General DEMPSEY. Ground Commanders’ input was considered during the development of the FY15 budget. Services and Combatant Commanders were actively engaged during deliberations and decision making. While acknowledging the reliable 

performance of the A–10, Ground Commanders and Combatant Commanders are 

not wedded to a specific aircraft but require the Close Air Support (CAS) capability 

that the A–10 and other proven aircraft, such as the F–15E, F–16, B–1, and F/A– 

18, and in the near future, the F–35 provide. Since 2006, about 80% of CAS missions have been executed by platforms other than the A–10. With the A–10 divestiture, other multi-role aircraft provide a balanced capability across multiple mission 

sets for the Combatant Commanders, and the Department saves resources by divesting an entire weapon system. 

Mr. BARBER. What factors did the Department of Defense analyze to determine 

its proposed slowdown of military compensation and benefits? 

General DEMPSEY. The Department’s military and civilian leaders conducted substantial analysis to arrive at the proposed package of pay and compensation adjustments. The overarching factor that encompassed the Department’s analysis was balance. Balance between force structure, readiness, and modernization is required to 

ensure the best possible training and equipment for our warriors heading into combat. Balance requires the ability to recruit and retain the all-volunteer force by providing a competitive package of pay and benefits. The Department determined that 

by making the proposed changes to slow the growth of military compensation, and 

reinvesting the savings into readiness and modernization, it would be able to recruit 

and retain a high quality, balanced force earning competitive and sustainable benefits. 

Mr. BARBER. If there is a decrease in military compensation and benefits, what 

is the expected affect to retention and recruitment in our All-Volunteer Force? 

General DEMPSEY. The Department’s military and civilian leaders conducted substantial analysis to arrive at our proposed package of compensation adjustments. 

The Department concluded that, even after making these changes and slowing the 

growth in military compensation, the Department will still be able to recruit and 

retain a high-quality force and offer generous, competitive, and sustainable benefits. 

Mr. BARBER. Has the Department of Defense done any economic analysis of how 

military personnel reductions and military weapon divestment will affect local 

economies surrounding DOD installations? 

General DEMPSEY. The Department has not conducted such an analysis. DOD’s 

Office of Economic Adjustment has authority to assist states and localities to conduct such analysis as part of a broader economic adjustment response once a reduction is publicly announced and found to have a direct and significant adverse consequence on the local area. 
166 

Mr. BARBER. I represent Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, home to the 355th Fighter Wing, operating the A–10 and training the next generation of close air support 

pilots. 

The budget proposal you have put forward calls for the divestment of the A–10. 

Mr. Chairman, I understand the need to find budget savings, however, the A–10 

plays a crucial role in protecting our service members on the ground—a role that 

cannot be suitably replicated in all aspects by any other aircraft in our inventory 

at this time. 

I am a supporter of the F–35, I am a supporter of UAVs, I believe that other airframes can perform aspects of close air support, but none can take the place at this 

moment and perform like the A–10. 

Admiral Locklear said ‘‘there are capabilities out there that will not parallel what 

the A–10 can offer’’. 

General Austin said that he has seen A–10s perform wonderfully in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Major General Bill Hix made the crucial point that the A–10 serves as flying artillery when ground troops cannot request indirect fire support due to logistical issues. 

Just seven months ago, General Welsh told me, quote: ‘‘until the Air Force has 

sufficient numbers of F–35s, the Air Force intends to keep the A–10 viable and combat ready’’. Mr. Chairman, from an Army Officer’s perspective who has commanded 

ground troops, has the A–10 not provided a diverse close air support capability for 

our service members on the ground? 

Is it truly not in our nation’s interest to keep this proven workhorse up and running? 

General DEMPSEY. Undoubtedly, the A–10 has served as a proven, reliable, and 

lethal Close Air Support (CAS) platform and become a popular workhorse for the 

Department. The decision to retire the A–10 is driven by both operational and budgetary considerations. Preparing for the future contested environment, in light of the 

current fiscal environment, demands difficult choices. 

The future non-permissive environment, characterized by networked anti-access 

area denial (A2AD) threats requires both force modernization and prioritizing capable, multi-role aircraft over single mission, legacy aircraft whose effectiveness and 

survivability are significantly threatened by a non-permissive environment. While 

the A–10 is a CAS-centric aircraft, enabled by its focused capability in that mission, 

since 2006, about 80% of combat CAS missions have been effectively executed by 

other aircraft, including as the F–15E, F–16, B–1, and F/A–18. Enabling Combatant 

Commanders by prioritizing multi-role aircraft that are both proven to capably support our service members on the ground and more effectively operate in contested 

environments, and modernizing the force with strike platforms, such as the F–35 

and Long Range Strike Bomber, will best posture the Department for the future. A–10 fleet divestiture saves the Department over $3.5 billion and avoids cuts to 

capable, multi-role aircraft that ultimately provide the Combatant Commanders 

with comprehensive capabilities across the spectrum of conflict and required mission 

sets. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN 

Mr. COFFMAN. Are there currently any provisions in U.S.C 2687 concerning BRAC 

that reports on excess capacity and overhead of Department of Defense facilities 

which are based overseas? 

Secretary HAGEL. No, 10 U.S.C. 2687 only applies to military installations ‘‘located within any of the several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth 

of Puerto Rico, American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, the Commonwealth of the 

Northern Mariana Islands, or Guam.’’ 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ENYART 

Mr. ENYART. The F/A–18 E and F Super-hornet and the E/A–18G Growler are 

made across the river from my district in St. Louis and employ thousands of folks 

from my region in Southern Illinois. Was the effect on the industrial base given 

thought to, when the budget was being constructed, not including funding for these 

two strategic platforms? Also, will we lose capabilities in the war fight by not having 

these fighters in production? What savings are being generated by not including the 

Super-hornet and Growler in DOD’s budget? 

Secretary HAGEL. The effect on the industrial base is an important consideration, 

which was factored into the Department’s investment planning and budget preparation. However, budget reductions have and will continue to decrease research, devel-
167 

opment, and production for many defense systems. For the tactical aircraft industrial base, I am most concerned about maintaining engineering design capabilities. 

To address this, the Department has initiated an Air Dominance Initiative led by 

the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency with extensive participation from 

both the Navy and the Air Force partnered with major tactical aviation industry 

suppliers. Additionally, the Department continues to promote competition and innovation in aeronautics with investments in enabling technologies and programs, including the Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike aircraft 

and the Long-Range Strike Bomber. These should present opportunities for the engineering and manufacturing workforce to transition to new programs as the Department’s requirements evolve. 

In terms of capability, the Department is committed to achieving the best possible 

balance between affordability and capability in our carrier tactical aviation programs. The Navy has a validated requirement for 563 F/A–18E/F and 135 EA–18G 

aircraft, which will be met with delivery of the final EA–18G in 2016. The Navy 

successfully extended the life of over 100 F/A 18A–D with its high flight hour inspection program and is working to extend the life on another 100+ aircraft. The 

Navy estimates there is sufficient life and capabilities in its existing and planned 

strike fighter inventory to accomplish its warfighting missions. 

The savings achieved in a single year by not procuring additional Super Hornet 

and Growler aircraft in DOD’s budget could be approximated by the average procurement unit cost, which is $72.2 million for the F/A–18E/F (base year 2000 dollars) and $67.5 million for the EA 18G (base year 2004 dollars), multiplied by the 

quantity desired. This figure would exclude the far greater long term costs of manning, training, maintaining, and operating the additional platforms, which would 

offset other funding priorities. 

Mr. ENYART. DOD is recommending reducing the end strength of the National 

Guard to at least 335,000 from a current end strength of 350,000. After 12 years 

of war, I am a firm believer that the Guard is a battle-tested, cost-effective force 

capable of providing the surge capacity we need in time of conflict. Should not we 

be increasing the end strength of the Guard in the face of fiscal constraints? 

Secretary HAGEL. The National Guard continues to be a vital part of the National 

Security Enterprise. The last 12+ years of war have proven that the National Guard 

will always answer the call with distinction for the Nation. Going forward, the current Defense Strategy suggests the Department will not need as many ground forces 

in the future. That is due to the capabilities of our allies and advances in technology. As a result, the budget calls for reductions in ground forces. The proposed 

reduction is also informed by a fiscally constrained budget. The Department values 

the capabilities and cost effectiveness of the National Guard and Reserve. As a result, the Reserve component numbers will not be reduced as much as the Active 

component. The current Active component/Reserve component mix in the Army will 

be altered with Reserve components becoming a larger percentage of the force than 

ever before. 

While the Reserve component preserves capability and capacity for times of crisis, 

cost is not the only consideration in determining end strength. Forces that are needed immediately in times of crisis will normally be in the Active component, with the 

National Guard providing depth in an extended conflict as well as forces to support 

Homeland Defense missions. In keeping with the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, 

the Department will continue efforts to achieve the appropriate end strength for all 

components to respond quickly and effectively, while not sizing the force for longterm stability operations. 

Mr. ENYART. DOD is recommending that we transfer all of the Apaches from the 

Guard to the active component and rumor has it that some of these Apaches will 

be placed in idle status once transferred. How can we maintain an operational reserve force if they don’t have the same equipment to train with as their brothers 

and sisters in the active component? 

Secretary HAGEL. First, the Army will reduce the total number of AH–64 Apaches 

by more than 120 aircraft to meet the Army’s new acquisition objective of 690. This 

is in keeping with the Army’s Aviation Restructure Initiative that will rebalance 

aviation force structure in order to maintain readiness and modernization under the 

Budget Control Act spending caps. The Army must concentrate the low-density, 

high-demand Apache helicopter in the Active component where readiness and ability 

to deploy is greatest. The Apache helicopters that will transfer to the Active component will not be placed in idle status. Those aircraft will be repurposed to conduct 

the armed scout mission and replace the OH–58D Kiowa Warriors that are being 

divested of by the Army to save over $10 billion. The Army National Guard will 

maintain its entire fleet of CH–47 Chinook and UH–72A Lakota helicopters and will 

receive an additional 111 UH–60 Blackhawk helicopters. 
168 

Second, transferring the Apache helicopters will not relegate the National Guard 

to being a strategic reserve. The Army will continue to rely on the National Guard 

for its capability, to include command and control, and the strategic depth it provides. Contrary to some public claims, UH–60 Blackhawk and CH–47 Chinook helicopters are combat aircraft and are essential for combat operations, while the UH– 

60 medical evacuation aircraft and crews conduct heroic rescues on the front lines 

of combat. The experience and capability resident in the National Guard will continue to be essential to our Nation’s defense at home and overseas, especially with 

our Regular force shouldering disproportionate reductions to its aviation forces. 

The differing organizational structure of each component is driven by the strategic 

and operational warplans and homeland defense requirements. The National Guard 

does not, and will not, look identical to the Active component, yet it is, and will remain, an effective fighting force. The Army National Guard will continue to be optimized with ‘‘dual use’’ equipment and formations that are capable of supporting 

States and Governors as well as Combatant Commanders when mobilized. The 

Apache helicopter does not have a role in Title 32 missions. By contrast, the 

Blackhawk helicopter is vital to homeland missions such as disaster response and 

has flown more than any other combat aircraft in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Mr. ENYART. The F/A–18 E and F Super-hornet and the E/A–18G Growler are 

made across the river from my district in St. Louis and employ thousands of folks 

from my region in Southern Illinois. Was the effect on the industrial base given 

thought to, when the budget was being constructed, not including funding for these 

two strategic platforms? Also, will we lose capabilities in the war fight by not having 

these fighters in production? What savings are being generated by not including the 

Super-hornet and Growler in DOD’s budget? 

General DEMPSEY. Budget cuts will decrease production and R&D for many defense systems. For the tactical aircraft industrial base, the biggest concern is maintaining engineering design capabilities. To address this, the Department has initiated an Air Dominance Initiative (ADI) led by DARPA, with extensive participation 

from both the Navy and Air Force partnered with major tactical aviation industry 

suppliers. This ADI team is exploring concepts for the next generation of air dominance and undertaking prototyping efforts based on the results of concept exploration. 

We will not lose future capabilities based on a decrease in production. The Navy 

continues to manage its strike fighter inventory to ensure it meets future requirements. To mitigate delays in the F–35 program, the Navy increased its procurement 

objective of F/A–18E/F from 462 aircraft to 563 aircraft. Also, the Navy successfully 

extended the life of over 100 F/A–18A–D with its High Flight Hour Inspection program and is working to extend the life on another 100+ aircraft. Due to the additional F/A–18E/F inventory and extended service life on the F/A–18A–D, the Navy 

believes there is sufficient life in its existing strike fighter inventory making any 

projected shortfall manageable until F–35 reaches full operational capability. Therefore, the Navy does not have a requirement to procure additional F/A–18E/F aircraft 

at this time. 

The Department determined that buying 24 additional Super Hornets would cost 

the Navy approximately $1.96 billion, and 22 additional Growlers would cost about 

$2.1 billion. When balanced against other higher priority programs with decreasing 

budgets, the Department cannot afford to procure additional F–18 E and F and EA– 

18G aircraft. 

Mr. ENYART. DOD is recommending reducing the end strength of the National 

Guard to at least 335,000 from a current end strength of 350,000. After 12 years 

of war, I am a firm believer that the Guard is a battle-tested, cost-effective force 

capable of providing the surge capacity we need in time of conflict. Should not we 

be increasing the end strength of the Guard in the face of fiscal constraints? 

General DEMPSEY. Our National Guard has certainly proven itself as a capable 

and effective force. However, growing any part of the force, in this budgetary environment, is simply not feasible. We intend to maintain the Reserve Components as 

a full spectrum force capable of supporting their homeland defense and other important missions and balanced against COCOM requirements. We carefully weighed 

warfighting requirements to meet operational plans to help determine the right mix 

of active and reserve component forces as well as those missions best suited for each 

component. 

Mr. ENYART. DOD is recommending that we transfer all of the Apaches from the 

Guard to the active component and rumor has it that some of these Apaches will 

be placed in idle status once transferred. How can we maintain an operational reserve force if they don’t have the same equipment to train with as their brothers 

and sisters in the active component? 
169 

General DEMPSEY. The full details pertaining to the Army’s Aviation Restructuring Initiative have not been finalized by the Department of the Army. Currently, 

no aircraft have been transferred from the National Guard to the Active Army 

under this proposal. Any transfers of aircraft that do ultimately occur will be done 

so in a way that best positions the Total Army to meet both its state and federal 

mission requirements. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. PALAZZO 

Mr. PALAZZO. Mr. Secretary, it wasn’t too long ago that I had someone, a senior 

civilian official in the Department of Defense, tell me that they believe the Department of Defense was (strongly) committed to another round of BRAC, would you 

agree with that statement? 

Secretary HAGEL. Yes, I am strongly committed to another round of BRAC; this 

is why it is included in the budget request. Decreasing budgets underscore the requirement to eliminate excess infrastructure to avoid wasting resources maintaining 

unnecessary facilities—resources that could be much better spent on readiness and 

modernization. The overhead cost to operate, maintain, and protect bases is substantial. In recent years, the Department has spent about $23 billion a year on facilities construction, sustainment and recapitalization. Other costs associated with 

operating military installations (e.g., utilities, custodial and refuse collection, environmental services, logistics, religious services and programs, payroll support, personnel management, morale, welfare and recreation services, and physical security) 

have averaged about $28 billion a year. 

The Department is significantly reducing force structure because of funding constraints. The Department needs to also reduce the overhead associated with that 

force structure. If the Department does not do this, readiness, modernization, and 

even more force structure will have to be cut. 

The projection is that the Department can achieve recurring savings on the order 

of $2 billion/year with another round. The Department expects to save enough during the 6-year implementation period that it would balance out during that timeframe. Programmatically, what is at stake is approximately $2 billion/year starting 

in 2024. 

Mr. PALAZZO. That same individual told me that they knew that the Department 

of Defense was going to continue to take painful cuts from the military until BRAC 

was viewed as the lesser of two evils, would you agree with that statement? 

Secretary HAGEL. Let me address that question from two perspectives. First, without BRAC and other efficiency initiatives, the Department will certainly have to 

take ‘‘painful cuts’’ elsewhere in the budget. Funding constraints are driving reductions in force structure, investment accounts and readiness. Without rationalizing 

infrastructure to force structure, the Department is forced to pay to maintain 

unneeded facilities. 

Second, without a BRAC, bases will face increasingly difficult challenges. Force 

structure reductions will result in reduced loading and emptier bases. Strained facilities sustainment budgets will worsen facility conditions, exacerbated by the need 

to maintain excess facilities. In essence, without BRAC or any other initiative to reduce infrastructure, bases will be increasingly hollowed out. Local communities will 

see economic benefits from all bases decrease to varying degrees. The Department 

must explore ways to address this situation, but without BRAC the options are far 

more limited. 

It makes the most sense to embark upon an analytical, transparent, apolitical 

process such as BRAC. BRAC will ensure the Department is fully utilizing the bases 

it keeps, and will turn over excess infrastructure to local communities for economic 

development. 

Mr. PALAZZO. In your best judgment, and as a former Senator familiar with the 

mandatory spending accounts, how would you compare the rate of growth between 

mandatory spending and what we currently spend on our nation’s defense? Would 

you say those are comparable? 

Secretary HAGEL. Between Fiscal Years (FY) 2013 and 2021, which are the years 

impacted by the Budget Control Act (BCA), the President’s Budget for FY 2015 proposes discretionary spending for base budget Defense programs, which results in 

outlays that grow at an average annual rate of approximately 1.5 percent. Outlays 

for mandatory programs grow at an average annual rate of approximately 6 percent 

over the same period. 

The modest annual growth for the Defense discretionary base budget under the 

President’s Budget is bolstered by the President’s Budget being approximately $150 

billion above sequestration levels between FY 2016 and FY 2021. This additional 
170 

funding, combined with the relief from full sequestration provided in FY 2013, 2014, 

and 2015, is helpful in supporting military readiness and some modernization efforts; however, the Department could still see up to 80 percent of the original Budget Control Act sequestration level reductions of over $900 billion, compared to the 

President’s Budget FY 2012, if nothing is done to eliminate sequestration in FY 

2016 and beyond. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. VEASEY 

Mr. VEASEY. Secretary Hagel, thank you for being here today and thank you for 

your service to our country. I am concerned about the balance of forces between our 

Active Duty Army, Guard, and Reserve Components. Specifically, the data from the 

Army is using authorized end strength numbers for the Army National Guard. For 

the Active Component, why is the Army using the wartime surge number of 570,000 

instead of the authorized end strength number of 490,000? 

Secretary HAGEL. The numbers used in calculating the percentage of reductions 

in end strength were taken directly from the authorized end strength in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011. 

The downsizing of the Army began in Fiscal Year 2011, at which time the congressionally authorized end strengths were 569,400 Regular, 358,200 Guard, and 

205,000 Reserve. The President’s Fiscal Year 2015 budget request supports force 

levels of 440,000–450,000 Regular, 335,000 Guard, and 195,000 Reserve by the end 

of Fiscal Year 2017. From a Fiscal Year 2011 baseline, those force levels represent 

force reductions of about 120,000–130,000 Regular (¥21 to 23 percent), 23,000 

Guard (¥6 percent), and 10,000 Reserve (¥5 percent). 

In comparison to pre-war levels the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2000 authorized Army force levels of 480,000 Regular, 350,000 Guard, and 

205,000 Reserve. If Fiscal Year 2000 authorized end strengths were to be used as 

the baseline for Army force reductions associated with the President’s Fiscal Year 

2015 budget request, military personnel reductions would be 30,000–40,000 Regular 

(¥6 to 8 percent), 15,000 Guard (¥4 percent), and 10,000 Reserve (¥5 percent) by 

the end of Fiscal Year 2017. 

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