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S. HRG. 113–642 

CRUISE INDUSTRY OVERSIGHT: RECENT 

INCIDENTS SHOW NEED FOR STRONGER 

FOCUS ON CONSUMER PROTECTION 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 

SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JULY 24, 2013 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

( 

(II) 

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

MARK WARNER, Virginia 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Ranking 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

DEAN HELLER, Nevada 

DAN COATS, Indiana 

TIM SCOTT, South Carolina 

TED CRUZ, Texas 

DEB FISCHER, Nebraska 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF CHIESA, New Jersey 

ELLEN L. DONESKI, Staff Director 

JAMES REID, Deputy Staff Director 

JOHN WILLIAMS, General Counsel 

DAVID SCHWIETERT, Republican Staff Director 

NICK ROSSI, Republican Deputy Staff Director 

REBECCA SEIDEL, Republican General Counsel and Chief Investigator 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on July 24, 2013 ............................................................................... 1 

Statement of Senator Rockefeller ........................................................................... 1 

Statement of Senator Thune ................................................................................... 24 

Statement of Senator Nelson .................................................................................. 32 

Statement of Senator Schatz .................................................................................. 125 

Statement of Senator Begich .................................................................................. 128 

Statement of Senator Blumenthal .......................................................................... 131 

Statement of Senator Markey ................................................................................. 133 

WITNESSES

Rear Admiral Joseph Servidio, Assistant Commandant for Prevention Policy, 

United States Coast Guard ................................................................................. 25 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 27 

Ross A. Klein, Ph.D., Professor, Memorial University of Newfoundland in 

St. John’s, Newfoundland, Canada ..................................................................... 33 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 35 

Hon. Mark Rosenker, Former Chairman, National Transportation Safety 

Board and Member, Cruise Line International Association’s ‘‘Panel of Experts’’ ..................................................................................................................... 92

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 94 

Gerald Cahill, President and Chief Executive Officer, Carnival Cruise Lines ... 114 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 114 

Adam M. Goldstein, President and Chief Executive Officer, Royal Caribbean 

International ......................................................................................................... 118 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 120 

APPENDIX

Letter dated August 19, 2013 to Senator John D. Rockefeller IV from Kathy 

A. Notarianni, Ph.D., P.E., Head, Department of Fire Protection Engineering; Associate Professor, Fire Protection Engineering and Associate Professor, Mechanical Engineering and Chemical Engineering, Worcester Polytechnic Institute ................................................................................................... 147 

Response to written questions submitted to Rear Admiral Joseph Servidio by: 

Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV ............................................................................ 148 

Hon. Barbara Boxer ......................................................................................... 150 

Response to written questions submitted to Gerald Cahill by: 

Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV ............................................................................ 151 

Hon. Barbara Boxer ......................................................................................... 154 

Hon. Maria Cantwell ........................................................................................ 154 

Response to written questions submitted to Adam M. Goldstein by: 

Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV ............................................................................ 156 

Hon. Maria Cantwell ........................................................................................ 158 

Response to written questions submitted by Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV 

to Ross A. Klein, Ph.D. ........................................................................................ 159 

(1) 

CRUISE INDUSTRY OVERSIGHT: RECENT 

INCIDENTS SHOW NEED FOR STRONGER 

FOCUS ON CONSUMER PROTECTION 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 24, 2013 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:40 p.m., in room 

SR–253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John D. Rockefeller 

IV, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank all of you for being here. And I will proceed with an opening statement, followed by Senator Thune, and 

then we will go directly to testimony, and then we will have a lively discussion. 

Millions of Americans enjoy taking cruises every year. I completely understand why. Cruise lines sell people a fun-filled, oncein-a-lifetime dream vacation. Probably with that in mind, I guess, 

two my children have taken cruise line ships. And sometimes they 

get that dream. Sometimes they get that dream. But, as we all 

know, sometimes cruises hit rough waters and that dream can turn 

into a nightmare. 

In March 2012, after several very troubling safety incidents occurred on cruise ships, I held a hearing in this room to get answers 

about why passengers sometimes find themselves in harm’s way. It 

was a serious attempt to get answers. The leader of the Cruise Industry Trade Association sat right there and told me, basically, to 

trust her—that doesn’t come easily in the Senate, right?—to trust 

that the industry was engaged in a rigorous review of safety procedures that would fix everything. I did not entirely believe her at 

the time, but I felt like the industry needed a fair chance to correct 

their course. It has now been 16 months since that hearing, and 

I have not seen much evidence that things have changed. 

Since that hearing, since those empty promises, serious incidents 

continue to plague cruise ships. And I’m sorry about that. This conduct should make us all very angry. If the industry is seriously 

working to improve the safety and security of its ships, why have 

we witnessed so many serious incidents in the last 16 months? Is 

the industry really trying to adopt a culture of safety or are these 

safety reviews and temporary investments a cynical effort to 

counter bad publicity? That happens. 

2 

I seriously worked to improve the safety and security of these 

ships. Why have we witnessed so many serious incidents in the last 

16 months? I believe the culture of safety that Americans expect, 

as they should, is clearly not always a priority for cruise lines. 

That’s not necessarily restricted to cruise lines, I might say. I can 

think of a number of American industries where I might make the 

same comment. 

Cruise ships on fire and drifting at sea tend to make headlines, 

and we know how they impact passengers. But, cable news doesn’t 

cover the many crimes committed against individual passengers on 

cruise ships, which are just as concerning to me. 

We have been reviewing the industry for a while now, for quite 

a long while, and have found some sobering details. Consumers 

have the right to know what we have learned before they book 

their first or next dream vacation. For instance, if somebody steals 

your property or assaults you on a cruise ship, you cannot, obviously, call 911 and have the police there in a few minutes; you can 

only call the ship’s security officer, who, I think, predictably, happens to be an employee of the cruise line. That’s not a criticism, 

it’s just a fact. The cruise industry has fought to limit when and 

where passengers can file lawsuits, so it becomes incredibly difficult, if not impossible, to right these wrongs. 

I have placed, for your reading enjoyment, in front of you, this. 

I went to the ophthalmologist, 2 days ago, and, in spite of my very 

best efforts last night and this morning, I can’t read a word of this. 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. And, at one hearing, we were told that, when you 

are sold a ticket, that, after the ticket sale is made, then you peel 

off, and then you run into this. What this is are many pages, in 

absolutely the smallest type that I have ever seen in my entire life. 

It’s all about liability limitations. Not all of it, but a lot of it. It’s 

stunning. And what is most important to me, I guess, is that it 

isn’t readable. So, if it isn’t readable, is it, in fact, like it’s not there 

and that they’re not being warned? 

I don’t think people go on cruise ships with the idea of wanting 

to sue, but, after some of these incidents recently, it may be that 

people do have that in mind. 

Anyway, to make things worse, under current law, cruise ship 

crime report data is not available to the public. That’s crime data. 

That means consumers have no way to find out what their real 

risks are before they take a cruise. Now, granted, these are huge 

ships. I guess the largest one is now, what, 5,000-plus people and 

2,000 employees. And I’m not criticizing that. It’s a stunning sight 

to see, in the Virgin Islands or the Bahamas or somewhere. But, 

I’m—I can’t criticize that—but, implicit in 7,000 people on a ship 

in such tight quarters over a fairly long period of time, the possibility of predators and criminal activities, whether it be on persons 

or on property, is obviously large. 

During the last few months, my staff has been analyzing the FBI 

crime report. And that’s this. It’s the FBI crime report data that 

does not get publicly released. And I’m not doing it. They recently 

submitted a report to me on cruise ship crimes. That’s that. 

I ask unanimous consent to put this staff report in the record of 

this hearing. 

3 

[The information referred to follows:] 


724ROCK1.eps
4 

1 Cruise Line I A, CLIA Statement: Congressional Hearing (Mar. 27, 2001) (online at http:// 

www.cruising.org/vacation/node/316). 2 Congress found that ‘‘Passengers on cruise vessels have an inadequate appreciation of their 

potential vulnerability to crime while on ocean voyages, and those who may be victimized lack 

the information they need to understand their legal rights or to know whom to contact for help 

in the immediate aftermath of the crime.’’ Pub. L. No. 111–207, Sec. 2, (2010). 3 CVSSA classifies as crimes required to be reported to the FBI as all homicide, suspicious 

death, a missing United States national, kidnapping, assault with serious bodily injury, any offense to which section 2241, 2242, 2243, or 2244(a) or (c) of title 18 applies, firing or tampering 

with the vessel, or theft of money or property in excess of $10,000. Pub. L. No. 111–207. 4 CVSSA requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to maintain and publicly post a statistical compilation of alleged crimes reported and no longer under investigation by the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation. These statistics are published on the Coast Guard’s website. Pub. L. 

No. 111–207. 5Federal Bureau of Investigations, Crime Statistics, Uniform Crime Reports Web Site (online 

at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ucr-publications#Crime) (accessed June 10, 2013). 6The owner of a cruise vessel is required to keep logs of all allegations of crime but is only 

required to report certain types of crime incidents to the FBI. The owner of a cruise vessel may 

voluntary report other alleged crimes to the FBI. CVSSA provides that only the crimes that are 

required to be reported to the FBI must be reported publicly. These crimes include all homicide, 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary 

I. The Commerce Committee’s Review 

II. Background on Cruise Passenger Resources and Recourse Following a Crime Onboard 

A. Calling for Help 

B. Onboard Investigation 

C. Jurisdictional Issues 

D. Ticket Contracts Limit Passenger Rights 

E. Impact of Differences 

III. The CVSSA Crime Reporting Requirements 

IV. Analysis of Cruise Crime Statistics Since CVSSA 

V. Conclusion 

Appendices 

I. Alleged Crime Incident Data for 2011 and 2012 

II. Alleged Crime Victim Data for 2012 

III. U.S. Coast Guard Publicly Reported Cruise Crime Data for 2010, 2011, and 

2012 

Executive Summary 

For many passengers, a cruise is a dream vacation: a floating city full of exciting 

attractions and adventure for the whole family. However, crime on a cruise ship can 

turn a dream vacation into a nightmare. While crimes occur infrequently on cruise 

ships,1 when crime does occur onboard the victim often lacks the same access to law 

enforcement and emergency services—as well as avenues for recourse—that are 

available in the United States. Particularly given these differences, it is important 

that passengers are informed about crime on cruises before they travel. 

To increase transparency regarding crime on cruise vessels,2 Congress included in 

the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act of 2010 (CVSSA) public reporting requirements regarding cruise ship crime. Under the CVSSA, cruise lines must report to 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) any allegation of a crime 3 as soon as possible and the United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard)4 must maintain and publicly post on a website a statistical compilation of the alleged crimes. Unfortunately, 

the public reporting process established under this language is not providing consumers a complete view of crimes reported on cruise vessels. 

Actual Cruise Crime Data is Higher than Publicly Reported 

Unlike with crimes reported on land in the United States,5 the public database 

established pursuant to CVSSA discloses only those crimes that are no longer under 

investigation by the FBI. The law also requires only a subset of the types of crimes 

reported to the FBI to be reported publicly.6 Data the Committee on Commerce, 

5 

suspicious death, a missing United States national, kidnapping, assault with serious bodily injury, any offense to which section 2241, 2242, 2243, or 2244(a) or (c) of title 18 applies, firing 

or tampering with the vessel, or theft of money or property in excess of $10,000. Pub. L. No. 

111–207. The FBI records crimes reported to the Bureau, but not required to be reported or publicly listed by the Coast Guard, as ‘‘Other Crimes.’’ 

Science and Transportation obtained from Coast Guard and the FBI shows that, 

since passage of the CVSSA, the number of alleged crimes cruise lines reported to 

the FBI—including crimes reported voluntarily by cruise lines—is 30 times higher 

than the number of alleged crimes reported publicly. Since 2011, cruise lines have 

reported 959 alleged crimes to the FBI, while the Coast Guard reported only 31 alleged crimes publicly. 

Further, with respect to the categories of crimes for which the CVSSA specifically 

requires cruise lines to report alleged incidents to the FBI, the number of alleged 

crimes that cruise lines reported is over four times higher than the number of alleged crimes reported publicly. Since 2011, cruise lines have reported 130 of such 

alleged crimes to the FBI, while only 31 alleged crimes were reported publicly. 

Crimes Committed Against Minors are Unrepresented in Official Statistics 

The Committee’s review of cruise crime statistics also identified that crimes committed against minors are unrepresented in publicly available statistics. In cases of 

sexual assault, cruise crime data that is not publicly reported indicates minors are 

the victim in a significant percentage of total alleged sexual assaults. 


724RPT1.eps 724RPT2.eps
6 

7Testimony of Professor Ross Klein, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Oversight of the Cruise Ship Industry: Are Current Regulations Sufficient to Protect Passengers and the Environment?, 112th Cong. (Mar. 1, 2012). 8 Id. at p. 47. 9Letter from Stephen D. Kelly, Assistant Director, Office of Congressional Affairs, Federal Bureau of Investigation, to Senate Commerce Committee Chairman Rockefeller (July 16, 2012); 

Letter from Stephen D. Kelly, Assistant Director, Office of Congressional Affairs, Federal Bureau of Investigation, to Senate Commerce Committee Chairman Rockefeller (Apr. 4, 2013). 10The Coast Guard Cruise Crime Website (online at http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg2/cgis/ 

CruiseLine.asp) These statistics can be found attached to this report as Appendix III. 11Mystery at Sea: Who Polices the Ships?, New York Times (Feb. 26, 2006) (online at http:// 

www.nytimes.com/2006/02/26/travel/26crime.html?pagewanted=all&lr=1&). 12 Carnival Cruise Line Website (online at https://secure.carnival.com/cms/fun/cruisel control/securitylsafetylact.aspx) (accessed June 10, 2013). 13The National 911 Program (online at http://www.911.gov/about.html). 14See, e.g., Department of Justice, Crime Scene Investigation: A Guide for Law Enforcement 

(Jan. 2000) (online at http://www.nij.gov/nij/topics/law-enforcement/investigations/crimescene/guides/generalscenes/welcome.htm). 15See, e.g., Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Officer Requirements page (online at 

http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/Content/CJST/Menu/Officer-Requirements-Main-Page/LE-EthicalStandardsof-Conduct.aspx); FBI, Quick Facts (noting FBI core values include fairness) (online 

at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/quick-facts) (accessed June 28, 2013). 16Department of Justice, Crime Scene Investigation: A Guide for Law Enforcement (Jan. 

2000), pp.iii, 1, and 10. 17 House Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation of the Committee on 

Transportation and Infrastructure, Hearing on Crimes Against Americans on Cruise Ships, 

110th Cong. (Mar. 27, 2007), p. 30. 18Senate Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Security of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Hearing on Cruise 

I. The Commerce Committee’s Review 

In March 2012, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

held a hearing on the cruise industry and its ability to protect its passengers. The 

Committee received testimony raising concerns that the public was receiving incomplete information regarding alleged cruise crimes.7 At the hearing Ross Klein, a professor at Memorial University of Newfoundland, testified about his Freedom of Information (FOIA) request to the FBI for cruise crime data after the passage of 

CVSSA: 

The material returned in response was totally unhelpful. All useful information 

was redacted. As well, the FBI says they are not required to keep track of or 

report crimes committed on cruise ships unless they have opened a file of investigation and subsequently closed the file. That means that allegations of crime 

are no longer available for analysis . . . [This absence of data] is not in the interest of the public or in the spirit of the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act 

of 2010.’’ 8

To further examine these concerns, Committee Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV 

requested that the FBI provide the Committee the crime data that the cruise lines 

reported to the FBI since passage of CVSSA. Using the crime data provided by the 

FBI,9 Committee staff then compared this data to the publicly reported cruise crime 

data that is posted on the Coast Guard’s website.10

II. Background on Cruise Passenger Resources and Recourse Following a 

Crime Onboard 

According to the cruise industry, a cruise is as safe as ‘‘your average community 

in the United States,’’ 11 and ‘‘the incidence of crime onboard is very small given the 

large number of guests carried.’’ 12 However, there are significant differences between how crimes that occur on land in the United States are responded to as compared to crimes that occur on cruise vessels. 

A. Calling for Help 

In the United States, when a crime occurs, a victim or a witness to the crime generally can call 911 to access police, medical, and other services.13 Often, within minutes, law enforcement trained to investigate and eventually help prosecute criminals 

is on the scene.14 Law enforcement called to the scene is an impartial party to the 

investigation;15 they must protect the scene, take statements, and collect and preserve evidence in accordance with the law.16

When a crime occurs on a cruise vessel, it can be an entirely different story for 

the victim. Victims generally report crimes to cruise vessel security officers, who are 

employees of the cruise company.17 These employees do an initial investigation and 

determine when and whether to report a crime to law enforcement.18 As employees 

7 

Ship Safety: Examining Potential Steps for Keeping Americans Safe At Sea, 110th Cong. 

(June 19, 2008), pp. 55–56. 19 House Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation of the Committee on 

Transportation and Infrastructure, Hearing on Crimes Against Americans on Cruise Ships, 

110th Cong. (Mar. 27, 2007), p. 30. 20Senate Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Security of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Hearing on Cruise Ship Safety: Examining 

Potential Steps for Keeping Americans Safe At Sea, 110th Cong. (June 19, 2008), p. 13. 21 Id. p. 12. 22See Testimony of International Cruise Victims Association, Inc. President Kendall Carver, 

Cruise Ship Safety: Examining Potential Steps for Keeping Americans Safe at Sea (June 19, 

2008) (discussing cruise lines’ legal position and attaching legal memo by a leading cruise line 

taking this position) (online at http://www.internationalcruisevictims.org/files/Total-testimoney 

1a-1-withltitles.pdf) (accessed July 15, 2013). 23See, e.g., The World Today—Brimble inquest hears staff disturbed crime scene, ABC Online 

(June 15, 2006) (online at http://www.abc.net.au/cgibin/common/printfriendly.pl?http:// 

www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2006/s1663754.htm); Testimony of Professor Ross Klein, 

Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Oversight of the Cruise Ship Industry: Are Current Regulations Sufficient to Protect Passengers and the Environment?, 112th 

Cong. (Mar. 1, 2012), pp. 39 and 43 (stating that crew training for crime scenes is inadequate); 

Testimony of RAINN (Rape, Abuse, and Incest National Network), Senate Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Security, of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Cruise Ship Safety: Examining Potential 

Steps for Keeping Americans Safe at Sea, 110th Cong. (June 19, 2008), p. 12, 18 (discussing 

issues concerning contaminated evidence). 24 IMO is a United Nations agency that sets international standards for ship safety, security, 

and pollution. IMO, See About IMO page (on line at http://www.imo.org/About/Pages/Default.aspx). 25 International Maritime Organization, Collation and Preservation of Evidence Following an 

Allegation of a Serious Crime Having Taken Place on Board a Ship or Following a Report of 

a Missing Person from a Ship, and Pastoral and Medical Care of Victims, Legal Committee 

100th session, Agenda item 7 (I:/LEG/100/7.doc) (Feb. 8, 2013).The International Cruise Victims 

Association has raised concerns about the adequacy of these draft guidelines. See CDR. Mark 

Gaouette, USNR (Ret.), Unpublished paper entitled ICV Discussion on the IMO Legal Committee 

Guidelines: ‘‘Collation and Preservation of Evidence Following an Allegation of a Serious Crime’’ 

2013; Mark Gaouette, Campaigners and industry clash over crime guidelines, Fairplay (June 6, 

2013). 26Myers, Rosie, Cruise Industry Regulation: What Happens on Vacation Stays on Vacation, 

A&NZ Mar LJ (2007) (online at http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?collection=journals 

&handle=hein.journals/ausnewma21&div=11&id=&page=), pp. 109 and 114. 

of the cruise lines, these security officers do not have the same arm’s length relationship with the cruise lines as do local and Federal law enforcement officials.19

Rape, Abuse & Incest National Network (RAINN) testified before the Commerce 

Committee about the inherent difficulties victims face when reporting a crime that 

occurred onboard to security officers who work for the cruise company: 

You won’t have any rape crisis personnel onboard to support you, let alone law 

enforcement officials to come to your aid. You might turn to cruise ship employees for help, only to later find that the cruise line has a vested interest in 

shielding themselves against negative publicity or legal jeopardy. And you 

might wonder how any security personnel hired by the cruise line will react if 

presented with any situation that might give rise to a potential conflict of interest between their employer and yourself.20

B. Onboard Investigation 

Since law enforcement generally is not immediately present when a crime occurs 

on a cruise ship, the cruise ship security officers and sometimes the victims themselves are responsible for preserving the scene of the crime and any evidence.21 According to Congressional testimony, cruise lines have taken the position that they 

have no duty to investigate crimes.22 Victims groups and others have raised concerns that cruise lines have omitted basic steps such as taking witness statements 

and have lost, destroyed, or mishandled evidence.23 The International Maritime Organization 24 (IMO) is developing draft guidelines to help guide cruise line crew in 

crime scene preservation.25

C. Jurisdictional Issues 

Because of complex jurisdictional rules governing cruise line activities, in some 

cases passengers may not have the same legal protections on cruise vessels as they 

do in the United States.26 U.S. laws and protections only govern in certain circumstances and there are instances where U.S. law enforcement has limited jurisVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:32 May 14, 2015 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\94526.TXT JACKIE
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27Senate Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Security of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Crimes Against 

Americans on Cruise Ships, 110th Cong. (Mar. 27, 2007), p. 1. 28Senate Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Security of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Cruise Ship Safety: Examining Potential Steps for Keeping Americans Safe At Sea, 110th Cong. (June 19, 2008), 

p. 13. 29 Rosie Myers, Cruise Industry Regulation: What Happens on Vacation Stays on Vacation, 21 

Australian and New Zealand Maritime Law Journal (2007), pp. 106–107. 30 Id. at pp. 114–117. 31 Asia N. Wright, High Seas Ship Crimes, Loyola Maritime Law Journal 1 (2009), p. 8. 32 House Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation of the Committee on 

Transportation and Infrastructure, Hearing on Crimes Against Americans on Cruise Ships, 

110th Cong. (Mar. 27, 2007), p. 12. 33 House Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation of the Committee on 

Transportation and Infrastructure, Hearing on Crimes Against Americans on Cruise Ships, 

110th Cong. (Mar. 27, 2007), pp. 11–12; Asia N. Wright, High Seas Ship Crimes, Loyola Maritime Law Journal 1 (2009), p. 19. 34 Christopher Elliott, Can you trust the cruise lines’ new passenger ‘‘bill of rights’’?, Chicago 

Tribune (June 18, 2013) and Princess Cruises, Passage Contract (online at http:// 

www.princess.com/legal/passagelcontract/index.jsp). 35 Justice Thomas A. Dickerson, The Cruise Passengers’ Rights and Remedies: 2013 (June 10, 

2013) pp. 120–123. (online at http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/9jd/TacCertlpdfs/Dickerson lDocs/CRUISEPASSENGERSRIGHTS&REMEDIES2013ONLINE.pdf). 36Michael D. Eriksen, U.S. Maritime Public Policy Versus Ad-hoc Federal Forum Provisions 

in Cruise Tickets, The Florida Bar Journal Volume 80, p.11 (Dec. 2006) (online at http:// 

www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/JNJournal 

01.nsf/c0d731e03de9828d852574580042ae7a/ 

78faff425fc6f9e48525723300561ebf!OpenDocument&Highlight=0,*). 37 Justice Thomas A. Dickerson, The Cruise Passengers’ Rights and Remedies: 2013 (June 10, 

2013) (online at http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/9jd/TacCertlpdfs/DickersonlDocs/CRUISE 

PASSENGERSRIGHTS&REMEDIES2013ONLINE.pdf), pp. 127–128. 38 E.g., Princess Cruise Lines Passage Contract, p. 14 (online at http://www.princess.com/ 

legal/passagelcontract/index.jsp) (accessed July 1, 2013). 39 House Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation of the Committee on 

Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Crimes Against Americans on Cruise Ships, 110th 

Cong. (Mar. 27, 2007) pp. 158–159. 40 Id. 

diction over crimes.27 For example, a U.S. citizen can report a cruise crime to the 

FBI, but if the ship has left U.S. port the FBI is not typically in a position to act 

as an onboard police force immediately after the crime happens.28 Law enforcement 

may be located thousands of miles away 29 and may have to work through a myriad 

of jurisdictional issues with other countries that share jurisdiction over the incident.30

Further, only certain crimes meet the threshold for the FBI to intervene. Theft 

of items valued under a certain amount 31 or lack of evidence 32 may result in the 

FBI declining to investigate an alleged crime. Even if the FBI does investigate, another country’s law enforcement agency may play the lead role in investigating and 

prosecuting the crime.33

D. Ticket Contracts Limit Passenger Rights 

Passengers may also find their ability to pursue legal action limited by clauses 

in the passenger contract that provides the terms and conditions of a cruise.34 For 

example, ticket contracts may require that a passenger has to file a lawsuit in a 

much shorter period than if the crime had occurred on land.35 Contracts also may 

include restrictions on the location of where an aggrieved passenger can file a lawsuit—typically requiring actions to be brought in Florida, where the major cruise 

lines are based.36 Further, cruise contracts often require mandatory arbitration 37

or limit class action lawsuits.38

E. Impact of Differences 

The vast majority of cruise passengers are not victims of onboard crime. However, 

where a crime does occur, the difference between passenger resources and recourse 

available on a cruise vessel versus on land can be the difference between justice and 

injustice for a crime victim. A case in point is the account of Laurie Dishman, who 

testified to Congress that while she was traveling on a cruise to Mexico, a janitor 

who was ‘‘filling in’’ for a security guard raped her, leaving ligature marks on her 

neck and other physical evidence.39 According to Ms. Dishman’s testimony, following 

this incident, the cruise line personnel contaminated the scene, mishandled evidence, destroyed or ‘‘re-used’’ closed circuit television camera tapes, delayed notifying the FBI, delayed providing medical treatment, did not immediately seal the 

crime scene, and provided limited information to Ms. Dishman.40 Further, she statVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:32 May 14, 2015 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\94526.TXT JACKIE
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41 Id. 42 Id.; Senate Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine Infrastructure, 

Safety, and Security of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Hearing on 

Cruise Ship Safety: Examining Potential Steps for Keeping Americans Safe At Sea, 110th Cong. 

(June 19, 2008). 43 House Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation of the Committee on 

Transportation, Crimes Against Americans on Cruise Ships (110–21) (Mar. 27, 2007), pp. 2, 15– 

16. 44 Id. 45Kendall Carver and Jamie Barnett, International Cruise Victims Challenges Cruise Crime 

Statistics Provided by FBI (June 10, 2012) (online at http://internationalcruisevictims.active 

board.com/t49559394/icv-update-june-102012/?wlr=1354674534) 46Pub. L. No. 111–207. 47The Federal Bureau of Investigations, Uniform Crime Reporting Program page (online at 

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr); the State Department, International Travel Page (online 

at http://travel.state.gov/travel/cislpaltw/cis/cisl4965.html). 48See Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports, Crime in the United States, 

Statement of FBI Director Robert S. Mueller (noting: ‘‘The significant challenge of protecting life 

and property requires many different kinds of resources, including data such as the information 

found in this report. The highest mission of the FBI’s UCR Program is to provide information 

to help law enforcement and other community leaders better understand the issues they face 

and more effectively prepare to meet them each day’’) (online at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/ 

cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.2010/message-from-the-director). 49For example, numerous travel articles discuss crime as a factor for consumers considering 

tourist destinations. See, e.g., Komal Bakhru, Safest Vacation Destinations in the Caribbean 

(July 2011) (online at http://www.buzzle.com/articles/safest-vacation-destinations-in-the-caribbean.html). 50The CVSSA requires cruise lines to report to the FBI all incidents of homicide, suspicious 

death, a missing United States national, kidnapping, assault with serious bodily injury, any offense to which section 2241, 2242, 2243, or 2244(a) or (c) of title 18 applies, firing or tampering 

with the vessel, or theft of money or property in excess of $10,000. Pub. L. No. 111–207. 51 Id. 

ed that the FBI was not able to access the crime scene for several days. At the time, 

the FBI indicated they did not have enough evidence to further investigate the 

crime. The accused crew member was not arrested, and he was allowed to return 

to his home country.41

Stories like this and others provided impetus for Congress to enact a number of 

provisions addressing crime on cruise ships in the 2010 CVSSA.42

III. The CVSSA Crime Reporting Requirements 

In 2007, the FBI, Coast Guard, and the cruise lines agreed that cruise lines would 

voluntarily report to the FBI incidents involving serious violations of U.S. law: 

homicide, suspicious death, missing U.S. nationals, kidnapping, assault with bodily 

injury, sexual assaults, firing or tampering with vessels, and theft greater than 

$10,000.43

According to U.S. Coast Guard testimony, under this agreement, the FBI would 

annually compile this data and prepare a comprehensive report to share with the 

Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA). The Coast Guard encouraged CLIA 

to disclose this information to potential cruise ship passengers.44 A victims group 

indicated it had been able to obtain these statistics through FOIA requests.45 However, this information was not readily available to the public. 

One of the ways Congress sought in the CVSSA to improve the safety of cruise 

passengers was to provide for greater transparency in reporting crimes that occur 

on cruise ships.46 In most major U.S. localities and foreign countries, the public can 

view local crime statistics based on crimes reported.47 The FBI views these crime 

statistics as an important and helpful tool.48 The public can use information regarding the occurrence of crimes to make more informed decisions about their travel and 

actions.49

The CVSSA includes language providing for public access to crime reports for 

cruise lines similar to reports the public can access regarding communities across 

the country. Toward that end, the law requires cruise lines to report a specific set 

of crimes to the FBI that (1) occur on a vessel owned by a U.S. person, (2) involve 

a U.S. national, (3) that occur in U.S. waters, or (4) will depart from or arrive at 

a U.S. port.50 Additionally, the Coast Guard must make these crime statistics publicly available online.51 However, unlike crime reporting on land in the United 

10 

52Federal Bureau of Investigations, Crime Statistics, Uniform Crime Reports Web Site (online 

at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ucr-publications#Crime) (accessed June 10, 2013). 53 Under the CVSSA, the incidents of homicide, suspicious death, a missing United States national, kidnapping, assault with serious bodily injury, any offense to which section 2241, 2242, 

2243, or 2244(a) or (c) of title 18 applies, firing or tampering with the vessel, or theft of money 

or property in excess of $10,000, that are reported and are no longer under investigation by the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation must be maintained on an Internet site that provides a numerical accounting of each of these incidents. Pub. L. No. 111–207 (2010). 54Pub. L. No. 111–207. 55 Id. 56To conduct this analysis, Committee staff reviewed publicly available cruise crime statistics 

and those requested by the Chairman, and by victim advocate groups through Freedom of Information Requests (FOIA). Letter from Stephen D. Kelly, Assistant Director, Office of Congressional Affairs, Federal Bureau of Investigation, to Senate Commerce Committee Chairman 

Rockefeller (July 16, 2012); Letter from Stephen D. Kelly, Assistant Director, Office of Congressional Affairs, Federal Bureau of Investigation, to Senate Commerce Committee Chairman 

Rockefeller (Apr. 4, 2013); Letter from David M. Hardy Section Chief, Record/Information Dissemination Section, Records Management Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, to Mr. Kendall Carver, International Cruise Victims Association (June 14, 2013) regarding FOIA request 

for 2012 cruise crime data submitted to the FBI. Appendix I includes the incident data analyzed 

to determine total alleged crimes reported to the FBI versus total alleged crimes reported publicly in 2011 and 2012. The FBI provided such incident data for 2011 and the incident data for 

2012 was drawn from an FBI response to a FOIA request. The FBI also provided the Committee 

data for 2012 that tallies victims of alleged crimes—as opposed to incidents of alleged crimes— 

and this data is shown in Appendix II. 

States,52 the FBI interprets the CVSSA to require public reporting of only those incidents that are no longer under investigation by the FBI.53

The CVSSA also requires cruise lines to keep logs of all complaints of crimes committed on any voyage that embarks or disembarks passengers in the United 

States.54 This requirement covers a broader range of crimes than those required to 

be reported to the FBI. Under the CVSSA, cruise lines may voluntarily report any 

of the alleged incidents that do not fall under the category of incidents required to 

be reported, and many cruise lines have voluntarily provided this information to the 

FBI.55

While CVSSA attempted to improve public access to reported cruise crime data, 

today complete information is still not publicly released. 

IV. Analysis of Cruise Crime Statistics Since CVSSA 

Cruise crime data reviewed by Commerce Committee staff 56 shows that since enactment of CVSSA, the public has not been able to access complete information regarding reported crimes aboard cruise vessels. Since passage of the CVSSA, the 

total number of alleged crimes cruise lines reported to the FBI—including both incidents reported voluntarily and those required to be reported to the FBI by cruise 

lines—is 30 times higher than the number of alleged crimes reported publicly. Since 

2011, cruise lines have reported 959 alleged crimes to the FBI, while the Coast 

Guard reported only 31 alleged crimes publicly. 

11 

Figure I: Discrepancies Between Publicly and FBI Reported Cruise Crime Data 

There is also a significant discrepancy between the total crimes in the categories 

of crime for which CVSSA mandates reporting to the FBI, and total crimes in these 

categories that are reported publicly. According to the FBI, for the years 2011 and 

2012, the total alleged crimes that cruise lines reported to the FBI, in categories 

where reporting is required, was 130—over four times the total reported publicly by 

the Coast Guard. Figure II shows this difference. 

Figure II: Cruise Crime Statistics Reported to the FBI and by the Coast Guard, Excluding Crimes Voluntarily Reported to the FBI 


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57 Id. 58Letter from Stephen D. Kelly, Assistant Director, Office of Congressional Affairs, Federal 

Bureau of Investigation, to Senate Commerce Committee Chairman Rockefeller (Apr. 4, 2013). 59KTOO, Ketchikan DA Investigating Alleged Cruise Ship Sexual Assault (July 12, 2013). 60 USA Today, Watchdogs Urge Better Reporting of Cruise Ship Crime (June 10, 2013). 

Figure III provides additional detail, displaying by categories of crime the difference between the number of alleged crimes reported to the FBI by cruise lines 

and the number of alleged crimes reported publicly. 

Figure III: Detailed Cruise Crime Statistics as Reported by the FBI and Coast 

Guard 57

In some cases, as with assaults with serious injury reported in 2011, the number 

of crimes publicly reported matches the number of crimes reported to the FBI. In 

most cases, however, the number of crimes reported to the FBI differs significantly 

from the number reported publicly. For example, with respect to alleged sexual assault crimes, the 13 alleged crimes publicly reported in 2011 represented only 31 

percent of the 42 alleged crimes reported to the FBI, and in 2012 the 11 alleged 

crimes publicly reported represented only 38 percent of the 28 alleged crimes reported to the FBI. Figure III also shows that the FBI receives cruise line data on 

‘‘other crimes’’ that is not shared publicly. 

In addition to the discrepancy between total alleged crimes reported to the FBI 

and total alleged crimes reported publicly, the FBI also receives additional victim 

detail not reported publicly concerning the age of victims of reported crimes. According to the FBI, of the 29 alleged reported sexual assault victims in 2012, 10—or 34 

percent—were minors. Figure IV depicts this added detail that the FBI obtains 

when gathering cruise crime data with specific regard to alleged sexual assaults. 

Figure IV—2012 Sexual Assault Data as Reported by the FBI 58

Two recent media accounts of alleged sexual assaults on board cruise ships, one 

involving an alleged groping of a 12-year-old girl by a passenger,59 and one involving an alleged groping of an 11-year-old girl by a crew member,60 are reminders 

that minors as well as adults can be victims of crimes onboard cruise ships. 

V. Conclusion 

Since the enactment of CVSSA, the number of alleged crimes reported by cruise 

lines to the FBI have been substantially higher than the number reported publicly. 

Further, the public does not currently have the ability to assess the extent to which 

minors are victims of cruise crime because this information is not currently publicly 

released. 


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The CHAIRMAN. Our exhaustive oversight of the cruise industry 

and the recent events that have left thousands stranded at sea 

make it absolutely clear that more needs to be done. So, this week 

I took action. I introduced new legislation to make the common 

sense consumer protection improvements the cruise lines have not 

been willing to make on their own. 

At this point, incidentally, I should thank the Royal Caribbean 

CEO for coming. He was the most cooperative. And I don’t know 

what he’s going to say, but he came, and it was his own decision, 

and I want to thank him for that. 

Consumers deserve to know what rights and protections they 

have, and, more importantly, that they do not have, on their cruise. 

I have been assured repeatedly by the industry, that things will get 

better. 

Take a look at the events over the past 16 months and tell me 

if this is what you think ‘‘better’’ looks like. Cruise lines are on notice that the safety and protection of passengers is now their number one priority, whether they like it or not. 

That is the conclusion of my statement, and I turn now to Senator John Thune, the Ranking Member, whom I’m very fortunate 

to be able to work with. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA 

Senator THUNE. Likewise. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding 

this hearing today. And I want to thank our witnesses for being 

here to testify. 

Ensuring safety across all modes of transportation is one of this 

committee’s most important functions. And recent events, in several modes, whether by air, rail, or sea, have demonstrated how 

challenging this can be. This task can be made even more difficult 

when a vessel like a cruise ship must travel through several jurisdictions during a single voyage. 

For instance, when a cruise ship embarks from a U.S. port, the 

cruise line must ensure compliance with safety regulations through 

coordination with the industry, the U.S. Coast Guard, and with foreign governments in countries through which the cruise ship is 

passing, either by sailing in foreign territorial waters or docking at 

a port within a foreign government’s jurisdiction. 

While the cruise ship industry’s safety record is generally good, 

there have been a few troubling incidents in recent years. The most 

tragic of these was the fatal accident involving the Costa 

Concordia, which ran aground off the coast of Italy in 2012. Thankfully, other incidents, other recent incidents, including those involving ships departing from U.S. ports, have not resulted in fatalities 

or significant injuries. Nevertheless, these particular incidents, 

which received significant media attention, did underscore the challenges and discomfort that passengers can be subjected to, including days without power or plumbing, and raise questions about the 

protections afforded to U.S. passengers. 

In the wake of these incidents, the cruise ship industry has 

taken several noteworthy steps to further ensure the safety and 

comfort of its customers and crews. The industry should be commended for its adoption of the Cruise Industry Passenger Bill of 

25 

Rights, which includes the right to disembark from a ship if essential provisions cannot be provided; the right to a refund for a trip 

canceled due to mechanical failures; and the right to an emergency 

power source in the case of a generator failure. As the Chairman 

has noted, however, the Committee has an interest in ensuring 

that these commitments are translating into better experiences for 

passengers. 

So, I look forward to hearing more from our witnesses about 

these and other steps the cruise industry has taken to improve 

safety. 

Additionally, I am interested in hearing from the Coast Guard 

about any recommendations stemming from their investigations of 

recent cruise ship incidents and the work that they’re doing at the 

Cruise Ship National Center of Expertise, in Everglades, Florida. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for holding this hearing, and I 

want to thank our witnesses for being here and for their willingness to testify. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Thune. 

I think we should just move right into the witnesses. That’s not 

pleasing to three distinguished colleagues of mine over there, but 

they’ll have a lot of time to ask questions and to engage. 

Why don’t we just start the way it is here: Rear Admiral Joseph 

Servidio, Assistant Commandant for Prevention and Policy, United 

States Coast Guard. 

STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL JOSEPH SERVIDIO, 

ASSISTANT COMMANDANT FOR PREVENTION POLICY, 

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD 

Admiral SERVIDIO. Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member 

Thune, members of the Committee, good afternoon. On behalf of 

the Commandant and the men and women of your Coast Guard 

who perform our challenging safety, security, and environmental 

stewardship missions each day, including our response to the blowout well going on in the Gulf right now, sir, I thank you for your 

continuing strong support of our service. And, Mr. Chairman, 

thank you for your oversight. 

Today, I look forward to telling you how the Coast Guard regulates foreign-flagged cruise ships to ensure they are as safe as possible for the U.S. passengers who embark them. I want to leave you 

with three messages, sir: that we have a robust inspection regime 

for foreign-flagged cruise ships; I believe, the strongest port state 

control program in the world; that we have trained vessel inspectors and a National Center for Expertise to provide consistency in 

identifying risks and enforcing compliance; and that we have an assertive investigations process, a feedback loop informing our inspectors and our inspections, as well as our forward-leaning standards 

development process. We’re looking to address today’s and tomorrow’s potential risks. 

Our regulatory oversight of cruise ships starts when they are 

still on the drawing board. Coast Guard naval architects review design drawings with a focus on critical elements, like fire- and lifesafety plans, including structural fire protection and emergency escape routes. Once the design drawings are reviewed, we send our 

inspectors overseas to conduct onsite inspections and see if the vesVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:32 May 14, 2015 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\94526.TXT JACKIE
26 

sels are constructed as they are designed. Once the ship is complete, it must pass the rigorous inspection initial exam before we 

allow it to embark passengers in U.S. ports. Finally, once in service, the ship is regularly inspected and will be examined on a riskbased schedule at least semiannually. 

If we have any concerns about a ship’s safety, we will not permit 

it to embark passengers until our concerns are addressed. For example, several weeks ago, the Carnival Triumph was attempting to 

return to service after suffering an engine-room fire. Before we 

would allow it back into service, Triumph had to pass an initial inspection, which included Coast Guard inspectors examining fire-detection, firefighting, and lifesaving systems and observing the crew 

conduct safety drills. Triumph did not initially pass, the captain of 

the port formally detained the vessel. Triumph eventually did pass, 

but, because it was detained, we’ll be conducting more frequent inspections on the vessel. 

Inspecting these vessels is difficult, sir. Modern cruise ships are 

some of the most sophisticated vessels on the water today, due to 

their size and their complexity. To ensure our Coast Guard inspectors are experts, we leverage our National Cruise Ship Center of 

Expertise, in Fort Lauderdale. The NCOE collects studies and applies lessons learned from inspections and casualty investigations, 

and uses them to update our cruise ship inspection procedures, 

courses, and job aids. 

As an example, the Coast Guard was, and is, actively involved 

in a number of investigations. We’ve learned that our attention to 

detail on structural fire protection has worked. Systems generally 

performed well; they protected passengers and they likely saved 

lives. However, we also learned, in the Carnival Splendor investigation, that we need to inspect some areas more closely, like fixed 

engine-room firefighting systems, as well as to focus on higher-risk 

engine-room fires and drill evaluations. With the NCOE, we have 

adjusted our inspection procedures to make these changes. 

Because almost all of the cruise ships are foreign flagged, we are 

exerting leadership internationally to make cruise ships safer. Last 

month, I attended the IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee meeting. 

At this session, we adopted an amendment that requires passengers to receive safety instructions prior to, or immediately after, 

departure. We also tasked IMO experts to study how cruise ship 

designs can be enhanced to increase survivability. 

In summary, the Coast Guard is dedicated to ensuring the safety 

and security of every cruise passenger and crew member, as well 

as protecting our environment. Our oversight of foreign cruise 

ships is comprehensive, but we strive to improve, every day. We’re 

learning from our casualty investigations and working on better 

leading indicators. And, although leadership at the—and, through 

leadership at the IMO, we’re looking to mitigate tomorrow’s, as 

well as today’s, risks. 

I thank you again for the opportunity to testify, and I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Servidio follows:] 

27 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL JOSEPH SERVIDIO, ASSISTANT

COMMANDANT FOR PREVENTION POLICY, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

Introduction 

Good morning Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Thune, and distinguished members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss issues related to cruise ship safety. I would like to provide background into the 

Coast Guard’s oversight of the cruise industry, highlight what we’ve learned and implemented from recent casualties, and discuss the effectiveness of our Port State 

Control system in holding cruise industry companies and their vessels accountable 

for safe passenger operations. 

In my role as the Coast Guard’s Assistant Commandant for Prevention Policy, I 

am responsible for setting standards for safety, security, and environmental stewardship for commercial vessels, facilities, and mariners, ensuring compliance with 

those standards, and conducting investigations of violations and accidents. 

Over the past three years we’ve seen a number of high profile ship casualties 

within the cruise industry, fires aboard the Carnival Splendor, Carnival Triumph 

and Grandeur of the Seas highlight serious questions about the design, maintenance 

and operation of fire safety equipment on board these vessels, as well as their companies’ safety management cultures. As the United States’ lead as a Port State for 

holding foreign companies accountable for the safe and secure design and operation 

of these vessels, I am very concerned about these failures. I am working to ensure 

that the Coast Guard thoroughly reviews each incident to determine causes and 

identify corrective actions and hold the cruise lines accountable for improving safety 

aboard vessels through increased examination and oversight. Additionally we will 

work through the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to update the design 

and operational standards for cruise ships based on these incidents. 

We recently completed our investigation into the Carnival Splendor engine explosion and debilitating fire. We are treating the recommendations for Coast Guard action in that report as requirements, and based on that report, the Coast Guard is 

changing its examination program for foreign cruise ships to examine CO2 system 

installations and arrangements more closely. Additionally, we have increased our 

expectations for successful fire drills. We have also made recommendations to Carnival Corporation to improve their training programs. I will cover these recent developments in more detail a bit later in my testimony. 

In late June, I led the U.S. delegation to the 92nd session of the IMO Maritime 

Safety Committee. At this session, we adopted new rules governing cruise ship passenger safety briefings which will become mandatory in July 2015. These new rules 

ensure that whenever U.S. passengers board a Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) regulated passenger ship for more than 24 hours, they will receive a detailed safety 

briefing either prior to, or immediately after, the vessel gets underway. This regulatory change elevates the standard globally for approximately one third of all cruise 

passengers who don’t embark ships in the U.S. 

Further, based in part on our proposals at this June session, IMO has commenced 

reviewing design standards in order to make cruise ships safer, and even more damage-tolerant, through improved survivability standards. 

Modern Standards for Cruise Ships 

Over the past decade, the international shipping community, through the IMO 

and with Coast Guard leadership, has moved decisively toward a proactive approach 

to passenger ship safety. With cruise ships growing progressively in size and capacity, in May 2000 the IMO agreed to undertake a holistic examination of safety 

issues pertaining to passenger ships, with particular emphasis on large cruise ships. 

The outcome of this proactive initiative is an entirely new prevention-and survivability-based regulatory philosophy for cruise ship design, construction, and operation. 

The U.S., through the efforts of the Coast Guard, has taken a very active leadership role throughout this initiative, putting forward many of the recommendations 

for action taken by the various IMO Sub-Committees. This effort identified a number of areas of concern related to cruise ships, and resulted in substantial amendments to major IMO conventions, including SOLAS, International Convention for 

the Prevention of Pollution From Ships (MARPOL) 73/78, International Tonnage, 

Standards for Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping (STCW) and Load Line 

conventions. These amendments address surveys, structures, stability, machinery, 

fire safety, lifesaving equipment, communications, navigation equipment, safety 

management, maritime security, pollution prevention, crew competency, watertight 

integrity, and safe loading. 

28 

Significant improvements under the five main pillars of the IMO initiative entered into force in July 2010 include: 

• Prevention: Amendments to the STCW Code and supporting guidelines focus on 

navigation safety and resource management; 

• Improved survivability: New SOLAS requirements for the ‘‘safe return to port’’ 

concept address essential system redundancy, management of emergencies, and 

casualty mitigation, including the new concept of dedicated shipboard safety 

centers to manage emergencies; 

• Regulatory flexibility: Amendments to SOLAS provide a methodology for the approval of new and innovative safety technologies and arrangements; 

• Operations in areas remote from SAR facilities: Guidelines on external support 

from SAR authorities, as well as guidance to assist seafarers taking part in SAR 

operations have been developed; and finally; and 

• Health safety and medical care: Guidelines on establishing medical safety programs, and a revised Guide on Cold Water Survival. 

Other recent improvements include stability and survivability of cruise ships 

through new probabilistic subdivision and damage stability regulations, and flooding 

detection systems; improved voyage planning, particularly in remote and high latitude areas; and voyage data recorders. As a separate initiative, stemming from the 

2006 fire aboard the Star Princess, significant improvements have been made to the 

fire safety features of external areas on cruise ships. Overall, the past decade has 

been an enormous leap forward in cruise ship safety measures and has been largely 

proactive to casualties. The U.S. Coast Guard’s leadership in the international community with respect to cruise ship safety measures and our support to foreign casualty investigations evidences our dedication to the world wide safety of U.S. passengers. 

The Safety, Security, and Environmental Protection Net 

The IMO conventions form the basis for the international safety, security, and 

stewardship net designed to ensure consistent standards across the world wide fleet 

of cruise ships. Owners and operators, vessel crews, classification societies, flag 

states (or their recognized organizations when delegated to act on the behalf of the 

flag state), and port states each have distinct roles in ensuring compliance with 

those standards. Each of these entities performs specific roles intended to maximize 

safety, security, and environmental protection. 

Flag states have the primary responsibility to ensure their vessels meet international and domestic standards. They often achieve this through recognized third 

party organizations who certify that vessels meet design, construction, operating, 

and manning requirements throughout the life of the vessel. 

Port states verify substantial compliance with international standards and ensure 

compliance with applicable domestic requirements for vessels of all flags calling in 

their ports. As the port state authority for the U.S., the Coast Guard has established a robust control verification program that subjects cruise ships calling in U.S. 

ports to a much higher level of scrutiny than other foreign flag vessels, and much 

higher than any other port state requires for foreign flag cruise ships in their ports. 

Although we cannot provide total quality control for foreign cruise ships visiting 

our ports, we do take prompt action to ensure deficiencies we find during our examinations are corrected in an expeditious manner. If a deficiency is serious, we ensure 

it gets corrected before the vessel leaves port. When one or more deficiencies lead 

us to conclude a ship is substandard, we detain the vessel. A detention means the 

vessel cannot leave port until the serious deficiencies are corrected. We report the 

detention to IMO and list the vessel on international forums as a detained vessel, 

and we will examine the vessel more frequently for a period of three years. 

Most recently, the Coast Guard detained the Carnival Triumph after it was found 

to have three serious deficiencies at its first examination after completing repairs 

following the February 2013 fire. As described above, the vessel was held in port 

until these deficiencies were corrected, we reported the detention to IMO and listed 

the vessel as detained on our website, and the vessel will be subject to quarterly 

examinations for three years. This detention demonstrates the effectiveness of our 

control verification program, as well as our willingness to hold substandard vessels 

accountable. 

Coast Guard Control Verification Program for Foreign Flag Cruise Ships 

All foreign flag cruise ships arriving in the United States that embark passengers 

or make a U.S. port call while carrying U.S. citizens as passengers must participate 

in the control verification process. Cruise ships that return to U.S. service after a 

29 

prolonged absence are treated as if they had never been in service in the U.S. and 

must undergo the entire process again. 

The Coast Guard control verification program includes initial, annual, and periodic examinations for foreign flag cruise ships calling in our ports. Further, it includes concept review during the very earliest stages of design and pre-construction 

planning by Coast Guard naval architects and fire protection engineers, mid-construction inspections at the builder’s yard by Coast Guard marine inspectors, an initial operational inspection of the vessel upon completion of construction, and at least 

annual inspections while the vessel is in service in U.S. ports. This regime allows 

the Coast Guard to determine that the vessel is in substantial compliance with all 

applicable international and domestic standards. 

The engineering review of plans for structural fire protection arrangements provides an additional level of assurance that shipboard fire safety arrangements meet 

international standards. After review, these same engineers visit the ship to confirm 

that the arrangements on the vessel are the same as those shown on the structural 

fire protection plans. On the basis of this initial examination, the Coast Guard 

issues a certificate of compliance that allows the vessel to operate in U.S. ports. 

The annual examination ensures that foreign cruise ships continue to maintain 

the systems the Coast Guard previously examined during the initial exam in proper 

operating condition and that the flag administration has performed annual renewal 

surveys as required by SOLAS. Inspectors focus on marine environmental protection, firefighting, lifesaving, and emergency systems and witness a comprehensive 

fire and boat drill by the crew. In addition, inspectors examine the vessel for modifications that would affect the vessel’s structural fire protection and means of escape. They also check for modifications completed without the vessel’s flag administration approval. After a satisfactory annual examination, the Coast Guard re-issues 

a certificate of compliance. 

Periodic examinations are also conducted, typically midway between the annual 

examinations. These examinations are more limited in scope but still compliment 

the more comprehensive annuals, and they are intended to ensure vessels are being 

operated in a safe manner. The periodic examinations focus on the performance of 

officers and crew, with specific attention paid to their training on and knowledge 

of the ship’s emergency procedures, environmental protection, security, firefighting, 

lifesaving systems, and conduct during the drills. To ensure the overall material 

condition of the ship has not appreciably changed since the annual examination, inspectors randomly select sample items for examination. 

Inspectors also vary the scope of the examination depending on such factors as 

the material condition of the vessel, recordkeeping, the maintenance of the vessel, 

and the professionalism and training of the crew. At every Coast Guard examination 

of a foreign cruise ship, the inspectors will determine whether the vessel is in substantial compliance with the international convention standards. 

Investigations 

Foreign vessels operating in U.S. waters are required by U.S. law to report accidents immediately. Upon accident notification, we proactively investigate casualties 

meeting a threshold to determine causes and issue safety recommendations to prevent recurrences. 

This is a continuous improvement process which incorporates lessons learned 

from accident investigations to enhance cruise ship safety and ensure compliance 

with national and international laws. 

After the Costa Concordia incident, and as a ‘‘Substantially Interested State’’ in 

accordance with IMO Protocols, the Coast Guard immediately offered technical expertise and support to the Government of Italy’s marine casualty investigation. 

Similarly, following the Carnival Triumph fire and the Grandeur of the Seas fire, 

the Coast Guard is participating in the investigations with the vessel’s flag state 

of the Bahamas as a Substantially Interested State. It is long standing practice to 

cooperate in all manner of accident investigations involving different flag and coastal states and the Coast Guard routinely acts in this accord. 

After the Carnival Splendor fire in November 2010, the Coast Guard reached out 

to Panama, the vessel’s flag state, to offer assistance. In accordance with international protocols and at the request of Panama, the Coast Guard took the lead for 

the investigation into this casualty. While this incident did not lead to major damage to the vessel, injury or loss of life, the investigation revealed a number of major 

safety concerns. As a result, the Coast Guard immediately issued two safety alerts 

to advise the industry of potential CO2 system problems. 

The Coast Guard report of investigation which was released on July 15, 2013, also 

contains five safety recommendations. Three of the recommendations are addressed 

to Carnival and Panama (as the flag state) to ensure that the conditions which conVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:32 May 14, 2015 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\94526.TXT JACKIE
30 

tributed to the fire, are addressed appropriately. In addition, there are two safety 

recommendations which are aimed at exercising and enhancing the Coast Guard’s 

role as the Port State for this and many other foreign flag cruise ships. These recommendations will be implemented by my staff and will ensure that Coast Guard 

Port State Control Officers are armed with the information needed to not only 

evaluate the mechanical systems onboard these complex vessels, but the human element as well. 

Investigations informing the Control Verification Process and other actions 

In its role as a Port State, the Coast Guard employs casualty investigation lessons 

learned where practical and appropriate to inform the Control Verification process. 

For example, as a result of the Costa Concordia incident, we directed Coast Guard 

field inspectors to witness the passenger muster required by SOLAS whenever they 

are aboard a cruise ship conducting an initial, annual, or periodic examination. Our 

personnel witness these musters either immediately before or during vessel departure from port. In conjunction, the cruise industry associations announced a new 

emergency drill policy requiring mandatory muster for embarking passengers prior 

to departure from port. 

As a result of the Carnival Splendor casualty, we are directing Coast Guard field 

inspectors to examine vessel CO2 systems more closely during examinations. There 

was evidence that the CO2 system had not been installed and maintained properly, 

and we are looking at sister vessels for similar problems. Any similar problems will 

require swift correction. We have also increased our expectations for the fire drills 

we witness during our examinations. Too often, ships perform drills for our inspectors which do not address a fire in a high-risk area such as an engine room. We 

will direct ships to perform an engineroom fire drill during the next examination 

of all vessels, and will expect such demonstrations periodically thereafter. 

Following the Carnival Triumph fire in the Gulf of Mexico in February of 2013, 

we engaged aggressively in Carnival’s Safety Management System (SMS) by requesting them and the vessel’s flag state (the Bahamas) to hold their annual audit 

early, with which they complied. We participated in Carnival’s company level SMS 

Document of Compliance audit conducted by Lloyd’s Registry in April, and plan to 

observe one of their shipboard SMS audits. Based on the most recent audit results, 

we have been generally satisfied with Carnival’s SMS implementation, and will continue to keep a close eye on their progress. 

A more recent casualty to the Grandeur of the Seas yielded several observations 

which we are taking immediate action to correct. One involves a deluge system 

valve that protected the mooring deck area that had caught fire. The valve was located in an area made inaccessible due to the fire. Our inspectors will examine sister ships for similar problems. Another observation involved un-insulated aluminum 

deck hatches which failed and allowed the fire to affect adjacent spaces. Again, our 

inspectors will examine sister ships for similar problems. 

Search and Rescue (SAR) and Mass Rescue Operations (MRO) 

The Coast Guard has maintained a sound relationship with the cruise lines regarding search and rescue and medical evacuations. For the Coast Guard, a Mass 

Rescue Operation involving a cruise ship casualty offshore, with potentially thousands of passengers and crew forced to evacuate into lifeboats and the water, presents our greatest search and rescue challenge. 

Working with cruise line and passenger vessel companies, the Coast Guard continues to develop and improve SAR and MRO contingency plans. In addition to internal Coast Guard SAR plans, the Coast Guard holds a copy of cruise ship SAR 

plans and is able to incorporate the cruise ship plans into our overall SAR planning. 

The Coast Guard also meets periodically with cruise line medical personnel to discuss plans for medical emergencies. 

Coast Guard passenger vessel safety personnel at each of our Districts assist in 

the conduct and coordination of Coast Guard mass rescue exercises. Over the last 

five years, the Coast Guard conducted thirty-six mass rescue exercises involving 

passenger vessels, three of which involved a cruise ship. 

Mass rescue exercises have been structured around a five-year cycle. The Coast 

Guard has directed that, at a minimum, each Coast Guard District conduct and/or 

participate in one discussion based (e.g., seminar, workshop, game, or tabletop) and 

one operations based (e.g., drills, functional, full scale) mass rescue exercise over a 

five year period. 

To meet this exercise requirement the Coast Guard initiated a five-year mass rescue exercise series known as ‘‘Black Swan.’’ The exercise series commenced in April 

2013 with a full scale exercise on a passenger ship in Freeport, Bahamas, and will 

continue with a full scale exercise in Hawaii in 2015 and Norfolk in 2017. The scope 

31 

of these exercises provides a valuable opportunity to identify and resolve the difficulties associated with rescuing hundreds or thousands of people. Black Swan will 

continue to focus on the exercise of Coast Guard mass rescue plans, coordination 

with other authorities and industry partners, notification and information processes, 

personnel accountability, and unique challenges of embarking thousands of survivors on rescue ships from the water, lifeboats and rafts, and rescued passenger 

and crew support. 

Cruise Ship Security and Crime 

The events of September 11, 2001, spurred the development of the Maritime 

Transportation Security Act (MTSA) and the IMO International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, both of which are rigorously enforced by the Coast 

Guard. The Coast Guard examines every cruise ship that visits the U.S. for compliance with MTSA and ISPS requirements during the ship’s annual and periodic Control Verification exam, as well as on a random basis throughout the year during unannounced port security checks. 

Despite this security compliance regime, there have been serious incidents and 

crimes that have affected U.S. citizens aboard foreign-flagged cruise ships. This has 

led to an increased focus on protecting our citizens both in port and while they are 

at sea. In 2010, Congress enacted the Cruise Ship Security and Safety Act of 2010 

(CVSSA) which prescribes security and safety requirements for designated cruise 

ships. 

CVSSA addresses many areas that affect personal safety and security, including: 

ship design; better public access to information about crime aboard cruise ships; improved precautions, response, medical care, support for victims of sexual assault; 

preservation of evidence necessary to prosecute criminals; and more consistent and 

complete reports. Some of these requirements went into effect when the President 

signed the legislation on July 27, 2010; however, there are areas that require implementation through the publication of regulations. 

Thus far, the Coast Guard has completed the following actions with respect to implementing the CVSSA: 

• The Coast Guard published policy establishing guidelines for Coast Guard Marine Inspectors examining cruise vessels for compliance to include physical requirements, such as: rail heights; door peep-holes (similar to hotel doors), which 

allow cabin occupants to see who is outside; and the passenger security guide. 

• The Coast Guard established an Internet-based portal (NCC@uscg.mil) to facilitate electronic submission of crime reports. 

• The Coast Guard established a web link to publish cruise ship sexual assault 

and criminal activity data received from the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

(FBI) in accordance with the Act: http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg2/cgis/. 

• An Inter-agency workgroup consisting of Coast Guard, FBI, and the Maritime 

Administration personnel completed development of a model course addressing 

crime scene preservation standards and curricula. 

• The Coast Guard published policy promulgating training standards and curricula for the certification of passenger vessel security personnel. 

Closing 

In closing, let me emphasize that the Coast Guard understands and embraces our 

lead role in protecting our most precious cargo—people, who are carried aboard 

cruise ships in many of the world’s most pristine marine environments. We continue 

to place the highest priority on enforcing compliance with safety, security and environmental regulations on those vessels that embark passengers in the United States 

and embark U.S. passengers world-wide. 

We have a strong and effective port state control program for foreign cruise ships 

and will continue to ensure that vessels calling on ports in the United States are 

in substantial compliance with applicable international and domestic standards. 

Through proactive oversight and enforcement, we participate in casualty investigations, even those taking place overseas, and we lead efforts at the IMO to improve maritime safety, security, and environmental protection standards. As those 

investigation results are analyzed, the Coast Guard will continue to capture the lessons learned and incorporate them into our safety regime, and continue to recommend international requirement updates where necessary. Internally, we are also 

changing our examination procedures to address the lessons made apparent from 

other recent cruise ship fire casualties and ensure our port state control examinations target areas of concern. 

32 

The Coast Guard looks forward to continued cooperation with this committee, passenger victims groups, and the passenger vessel industry to maximize cruise vessel 

safety, security, and environmental protection. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today. I will be pleased to answer 

any questions you may have. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

I want to make two announcements at this point. One is that 

Senator Nelson—obviously, from Florida—this is a big deal, this 

hearing, for him—has left another hearing that he’s chairing and, 

I think, is going back, and he asked me if he could make a short 

statement. 

I’m looking at my three esteemed colleagues over there, praying 

for sympathetic looks. 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. The Ranking Member is sympathetic, so Senator—— 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. We’re very, very, very sympathetic. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. And the other thing is, I would ask Committee 

staff to remove these photographs. They’ve been up, now, and I 

want this to be unfettered exchange, as opposed to pictorial matters. 

Please go ahead, Senator Nelson. 

STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and to my colleagues, for your indulgence. 

As scheduling would have it, the Aging Committee is meeting, 

right now, of which I’m chairing. Senator Collins is taking the 

gavel while I’m gone, and I must return. But, I did want to thank 

you for your consideration that I could make—Chairman, could 

make a statement. And I look forward to reviewing the legislation 

that you have filed. 

All of us here have a responsibility to ensure that cruise passengers are safe, that ships are well maintained, in top condition, 

and the crew members onboard these ships are well trained and 

thoroughly prepared to handle any situation that might arise at 

sea. So, we, obviously, all of us, have a keen interest in this, naturally. 

The cruise industry is of concern to us, in my state. They have 

a major presence in Florida. They employ over 130,000 people. In 

my state, cruising accounted for $6.7 billion in total economic impact in Florida, and, last year, nearly 6 million cruise passengers 

departed from ports in Florida. So, I can share with the members 

of this committee that, in my meetings with the industry, I have 

stressed that passenger and crew safety must be the industry’s top 

priority. The industry has responded to me that it is making a 

good-faith effort in prioritizing and improving its safety programs 

and that it is ready to work with this committee, and with you, Mr. 

Chairman, and they hope to continue this improvement. 

And I want to thank you again for your efforts, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank you, as the Chairman of our overall committee, on 

33 

the work that you do to ensure the safety of the traveling public, 

not just on the seas, but in all means of travel. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. And, you’re right, it’s in all means of travel. 

Senator NELSON. It is. 

The CHAIRMAN. And thank you for coming here. 

Senator NELSON. And I—with your permission, I will return to 

my chairing duties over at Aging. 

The CHAIRMAN. Uh-huh. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson. 

Dr. Ross Klein is Professor of the School of Social Work, which 

resonates with me, at St. Johns College, Memorial University of 

Newfoundland. 

Please. 

STATEMENT OF ROSS A. KLEIN, PH.D., PROFESSOR, 

MEMORIAL UNIVERSITY OF NEWFOUNDLAND 

IN ST. JOHN’S, NEWFOUNDLAND, CANADA 

Dr. KLEIN. OK, thank you. It is an honor to be asked to share 

my knowledge and insights with the U.S. Senate Committee on 

Commerce, Science, and Transportation. 

In my brief oral remarks, I will identify some of the key points 

in my written submission. 

The cruise industry has received considerable attention in the 

media in recent years. In 2013 alone, the media has reported for 

cruise ships: three running aground; five with fires; two collisions; 

19 mechanical problems, including power loss, propulsion problems, 

and generator problems; 10 canceled port calls and/or changes in 

itinerary; 16 cruises with delayed embarkation and/or debarkation; 

two cruises where passengers have been bumped; and eight ships 

that have failed U.S. health inspection. 

In response to the negative publicity from these events and Senator Schumer’s call for greater consumer protection, the Cruise 

Lines International Association, in late May, issued its Passenger 

Bill of Rights, an obvious public relations initiative. A systematic 

evaluation reveals that, while many of the promises, on their face, 

are reassuring to cruise passengers, a deeper look indicates the 

Passenger Bill of Rights is filled with empty promises. 

Take, for example, number 5, the right to a ship crew that is 

properly trained in emergency and evacuation procedures. There is 

a huge chasm between being properly trained and those same crew 

members demonstrating, through behavior, competence in executing emergency and evacuation procedures. 

Take for example the U.S. Coast Guard’s investigation of the fire 

and power loss of Carnival Splendor. It indicates a number of instances of human error. 

Also take the cost of Concordia. 

I doubt that crew members were not properly trained, but what 

assurances does a CLIA Passenger Bill of Rights provide that 

training will be reflected in behavior, and what recourse does a 

passenger have when this, or any right, is not realized? 

Also take for example right number 1, the right to disembark a 

docked ship if essential provisions cannot be adequately provided. 

34 

What cruise passenger would not be reassured by this? But, how 

is this right fulfilled when a ship is dead in the water for 3 or 4 

days, and being towed to port? And once the ship returns to port, 

who decides how quickly the disembarkation will begin, and does 

the passenger have any rights if it takes longer than they think is 

fair? Coming up with a list of rights is easy. But, as they say, the 

devil is in the details. 

Perhaps more troubling are contradictions between CLIA’s Passenger Bill of Rights and the typical cruise passenger contract. 

There’s no indication which takes precedence, especially given the 

restrictiveness of the passenger cruise contract with regard to 

rights held by a cruise passenger, particularly in comparison to the 

rights of the cruise line, and the extreme limitations on the cruise 

line’s liability for almost anything that happens on a cruise ship. 

My written testimony systematically analyzes CLIA’s Bill of 

Rights and a typical cruise passenger contract. This analysis points 

to the need for better consumer protection of cruise passengers, 

much like the protections that are available to passengers on other 

modes of commercial transportation, including air carriers. 

My written testimony also provides systematic analysis of the 

Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act of 2010. I look at the implications of differences between the Act, as initially introduced, and 

the final Act that was passed. I also look at issues that are not adequately addressed by the current Act. 

One major issue is the reporting of statistics on crime on cruise 

ships. The original intent was that the Act would make available 

all reported crimes on cruise ships. In practice, there are many 

crimes that are neither—that are either not being reported to the 

FBI or which the FBI chooses not to make available to the American public. Take as just one example the fact that, for a 15-month 

period, the FBI reports a single case of sexual assault on Norwegian Cruise Line, but, in the legal case, in discovery, they disclosed that there were 23 sexual assaults for that same time period. 

Access to comprehensive, reliable data is essential if we’re going 

to be able to do a proper social epidemiological analysis of the problems, especially as relates to crimes against children. 

Now, another point worth mention is the nature of security on 

a cruise ship. Presently, a crime committed on a cruise ship is initially investigated by security personnel who are cruise line employees. They are not independent, as would be the case for a crime 

reported on land. The cruise line employee is clearly in a conflictof-interest position. This doesn’t give much confidence to a victim 

of a crime on a cruise ship. 

I will stop my oral testimony here. I invite all interested to read 

my written testimony for a deeper understanding of my insights 

and resulting concerns. I certainly welcome the Committee’s questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Klein follows:] 

35 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROSS A. KLEIN, PH.D., PROFESSOR, MEMORIAL UNIVERSITY

OF NEWFOUNDLAND IN ST. JOHN’S, NEWFOUNDLAND, CANADA

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Oral Testimony 

Written Testimony 

I. Safety and Security of Cruise Ships 

The Nature of the Problem 

Lessons to be Learned from These Events 

The Relative Absence of Reliable Data 

Frequency and Types of Events 

Discernable Insights from Data 

Learning from Success, Not Just Accidents 

Regulation and Oversight of the Cruise Industry 

II. Safety and Security of Cruise Passengers 

Scope of the Problem 

The Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act of 2010 

From Hearings to Legislation 

Persons Overboard 

Sexual Assaults 

Prevention 

Intervention 

Investigation 

Prosecution 

Other Crimes 

III. Consumer Rights and Cruise Ship Liability 

CLIA Bill of Rights 

The Right to Disembark a Docked Ship 

The Right to a Full Refund 

The Right to Medical Care 

The Right to Timely Information 

The Right to Trained Crew 

The Right to an Emergency Power Source 

The Right to Transportation 

The Right to Lodging 

The Right to a Toll-Free Number 

The Right to Have Published 

CLIA Passenger Bill of Rights and the Cruise Contract 

What the CLIA Passenger Bill of Rights Does Not Include 

Passenger Rights 

Cruise Line Rights 

Issues of Liability 

Illness Outbreaks 

Independent Contractors 

Medical Care 

Shore excursions 

Sexual Assaults 

Limit of Liability 

IV. In Closing 

V. Summary of Recommendations 

Appendix 1: Summary of Cruise Ship Incidents, January 2009–June 2013 

Appendix 2: Ships with Two or More Mechanical Incidents, January 2009–June 

2013 

Appendix 3: Summary of Persons Overboard, January 1995–June 2013 

Appendix 4: Drug Busts, January 2009–June 2013 

Appendix 5: Sex at Sea: Sexual Crimes Aboard Cruise Ships 

36 

ORAL TESTIMONY

It is an honor to be asked to share my knowledge and insights with the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. In my brief oral remarks 

I will identify some of the key points in my written submission. 

The cruise industry has received considerable attention in the media in recent 

years. In 2013 alone the media reports for cruise ships: 3 running aground; 5 fires; 

2 collisions; 19 mechanical problems including power loss, propulsion problems, and 

generator problems; 10 canceled port calls and/or changes in itinerary; 16 cruises 

with delayed embarkation and/or disembarkation; 2 cruises where passengers were 

bumped; and 8 ships that have failed U.S. health inspections. 

In response to the negative publicity from these events, and Senator Schumer’s 

call for greater consumer protection, the Cruise Lines International Association 

(CLIA) in late-May issued its Passenger Bill of Rights—an obvious public relations 

initiative. Sadly, a systematic evaluation reveals that while many of the promises 

on their face are reassuring to cruise passengers, a deeper look indicates the Passenger Bill of Rights is filled with empty promises. Take for example Right #5—The 

right to a ship crew that is properly trained in emergency and evacuation procedures. There is a huge chasm between being properly trained and those same crewmembers demonstrating through behavior competence in executing emergency and 

evacuation procedures. Take for example the U.S. Coast Guard’s investigation of the 

fire and power loss of Carnival Splendor in 2010. It indicates human error in a fire 

alarm being reset, leading to a 15-minute delay in activation of an automatic firesuppression system; the crew’s lack of familiarity with the engine room, which hampered their ability to locate and fight the fire; and the captain ventilating the compartment where the fire began before it was fully extinguished, allowing the flames 

to flare again. I doubt the crewmembers were not properly trained, but what assurance does CLIA’s Passenger Bill of Rights provide that training will be reflected in 

action. And what recourse does a passenger have when this or any Right is not realized? 

Also take for example Right #1—The right to disembark a docked ship if essential 

provisions cannot adequately be provided onboard. What cruise passenger would not 

be reassured by this, but how is this Right fulfilled when a ship is dead in the water 

for 3 or 4 days and being towed to port? And once the ship returns to port, who 

decides how quickly disembarkation will begin? Does a passenger have any right to 

contest a decision to keep them onboard? 

Coming up with a list of ‘‘mom-and-apple-pie’’ rights is easy. But as they say, the 

devil is in the details. 

Perhaps more troubling are contradictions between CLIA’s Passenger Bill of 

Rights and the typical cruise passenger contract. There is no indication which takes 

precedence, especially given the restrictiveness of the passenger cruise contract with 

regard to rights held by a cruise passenger (particularly in comparison to the rights 

of the cruise line) and the extreme limitations on the cruise line’s liability for almost 

anything that happens on a cruise ship. My written testimony systematically analyses CLIA’s Bill of Rights and typical passenger cruise contracts. This analysis 

points to the need for better consumer protection of cruise passengers, much like 

the protections available to passengers on other modes of commercial transportation, including air carriers. 

My written testimony also provides systematic analysis of the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act of 2010. I look at the implications of differences between the 

Act as initially introduced and the final Act passed. I also look at issues that are 

not adequately addressed by the current Act. One major issue is the reporting of 

statistics of crime on cruise ships. The original intent was that the Act would make 

available all reported crimes on cruise ships. In practice, there are many crimes that 

are either not being reported to the FBI or which the FBI chooses not to make available to the American public. Take as just one example the fact that for one 15- 

month period the FBI reports a single case of sexual assault on Norwegian Cruise 

Line; however records disclosed in discovery indicate the number was actually 23. 

Access to reliable data is important for passengers who have a right to know the 

relative risk, including between one cruise line and another and ideally between one 

cruise ship and another. Through a Freedom of Information request by International 

Cruise Victims Association I was given 12-months of data to analyze. The analysis 

was illuminating. It revealed where sexual assaults occur, the identity of perpetrators and victims, and the conditions surrounding an attack (including the presence 

of alcohol and the high rate of victimization of children). Availability of such data 

is important for passengers, and access to data is essential for a proper social epidemiological analysis of the problem. 

37 

1Ward, V. 2012. ‘‘Costa Allegra: Passengers Tell of ‘Hell’ On-board.’’ The Telegraph (March 

1). 2See Brown, R., K. Severson, and B. Meier. 2013. ‘‘Cruise Line’s Woes are Far From Over 

as Ship Makes Port,’’ New York Times, (February 15). 3 All of these events are reported at Events at Sea (www.cruisejunkie.com/events.html) 

I will stop my oral testimony here. I invite all interested to read my written testimony for a deeper understanding of my insights and resulting concerns. I welcome 

the Committee’s questions. 

WRITTEN TESTIMONY

It is an extreme honor to be asked to share my knowledge and insights with the 

U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. My testimony 

focuses on the parameters I was given when I was invited to testify: 

• safety and security issues relating to cruise ships (e.g., fires, collisions, and 

other accidents); 

• safety and security of cruise ship passengers, including discussion of the Cruise 

Vessel Security and Safety act of 2010; 

• consumer rights and issues relating to cruise ship liability, including discussion 

of CLIA’s Passenger Bill of Rights. 

I. Safety and Security of Cruise Ships 

As the luxury liner finally made it to shore . . . [passengers] expressed disgust 

at the way they had been treated . . . Conditions inside the cabins were said to 

have been ‘‘beyond horrific’’ due to the lack of air conditioning and running water. 

Lavatories overflowed and they were fed on little but spam sandwiches. They were 

forced to sleep on deck in sweltering temperatures of up to 35C (95F) and said that 

the stench in the corridors and cabins was so bad it would remain with them ‘‘for 

a long time’’ . . . ‘‘Sheer luck has disguised the incompetence from start to finish. 

Some people are blissfully unaware of how lucky they are.’’ 

The alarm was first raised at around 1.30 p.m. on Monday when an electrical 

fault caused a fire in the engine room and power was lost . . . All passengers were 

told to go to their muster stations, at which point many said they feared they would 

have to abandon ship . . . It then took three hours to conduct a roll call amid chaotic scenes and growing panic. As black smoke billowed from one of the chimneys, 

it became immediately clear that a fire had broken out on board. 

American Gordon Bradwell, 72, from Georgia, who used to work in the travel industry, was on the cruise ship with his wife Eleanor when the engine caught fire. 

‘‘It was very tense,’’ he said. ‘‘We are just happy to have got through it. We were 

very hot and the sewage was very poor. Right now we’re delighted to be off the ship. 

We are living off adrenalin right now. We have been eating dried sandwiches for 

three days so we are looking forward to eating a proper meal. After the fire broke 

out there was nothing to propel the ship along. Things deteriorated rather quickly. 

There was no running water so we had go back to living a primitive existence. The 

cabin temperature reached 110F so we had to sleep on the deck.’’ 1

One might think this describes the ordeal on Carnival Triumph in February 2013, 

but it is about an almost identical incident occurring a year earlier in February 

2012. The Costa Allegra experienced an engine fire, causing a loss of all power and 

setting it adrift for three days in the Indian Ocean. It was finally towed to Port Victoria on the island of Mahe in the Seychelles where passengers disembarked. The 

ship was decommissioned and scrapped after the incident. 

A. The Nature of the Problem 

The cruise industry would like us to believe incidents such as the one described 

above, and the eerily similar incident involving Carnival Triumph which had an engine fire knocking out all power and setting the ship adrift for five days 2—finally 

arriving in Mobile under tow—are uncommon. The question isn’t whether they are 

uncommon, but how common they are. Take for example the following engine fires, 

all involving members of the Cruise Lines International Association:3

• June 2009—Royal Princess had an engine room fire while leaving Port Said, 

Egypt. The ship returned to the port the next day and after evaluation of damage the cruise was terminated. 

• November 2010—Carnival Splendor has engine room fire setting it adrift; the 

ship was finally towed to San Diego (150 miles north) even though it was 55 

miles west of Punta San Jacinto, Mexico. It was a five day ordeal for pasVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:32 May 14, 2015 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\94526.TXT JACKIE
38 

4See United States Coast Guard. 2013. Report of Investigation into the Fire Onboard the Carnival Splendor which Occurred in the Pacific Ocean Off the Coast of Mexico on November 8, 

2010, which Resulted in Complete Loss of Power, MISLE Incident Investigation Activity Number: 3897765 (July 15). 

sengers. Initially there was no electricity and toilets did not work, but toilets 

were restored by the end of the first day although there was no air conditioning 

and no hot food service. The ship’s engine that failed had had five alarms between July 21, 2010 and November 5, 2010, most recently repaired on November 5, 2010; the fire occurred on November 8, 2010.4

• September 2011—Hurtigruten’s Nordyls suffered an engine room fire, killing 

two crew members and injuring 16. The ship was evacuated by lifeboat and the 

cruise was terminated. The Washington Post reported salvage teams pumped 

water from the cruise liner in danger of capsizing, reducing the tilt 21.7 degrees 

in the morning to 16 degrees in the evening. 

• October 2011—Cunard Line’s Queen Mary 2 suffered an engine fire causing a 

loss of power while in a major storm (two other ships chose to turn back from 

the storm, but the Queen Mary decided to battle through). Staff members were 

given a 90 minute warning in order to prepare to deploy the lifeboats. Guests 

had their children dropped off and their animals picked up from the kennels. 

Power was restored, but people were understandably shaken up. Three weeks 

later the ship twice went dead in the water on a transAtalantic cruise. And 

again in February 2012 the ship had a total power failure and was dead in the 

water. 

• March 2012—Azamara Quest had an engine room fire, injuring five crew members (one critically), setting the ship adrift between Manila and Borneo. The 

ship was able to restore power and some propulsion after 24 hours and limped 

to Sandakan, Malaysia, arriving three days after the fire. The cruise was terminated and passengers flown home. 

• April 2012—Adventure of the Seas had an engine room fire causing section 6 

of the ship to be temporarily evacuated. The ship was adrift for 1–2 hours and 

then continued on one engine. 

• November 2012—Adventure of the Seas had an engine room fire while crossing 

the Atlantic causing a brief loss of power and electricity. 

• February 2013—Carnival Triumph suffers an engine room fire, setting it adrift 

for five days without power, air conditioning, or toilets. Initial plans were to tow 

the ship to the closest port, Progresso, Mexico, however a decision was subsequently made to tow the ship to Mobile. NOTE: The ship was reported to have 

technical problems with its propulsion system affecting its cruising speed and 

causing a six hour delay in its return to port two weeks before; 

• June 2013—Pullmantur’s Zenith had a disabling engine fire and had to be 

towed to port (Venice, Italy) 

There are also ships running aground (19 since 2009) with some incidents leading 

to termination of the cruise. Some examples include: 

• January 2009—Hurtigruten’s Richard With ran aground at the port of Trondheim on the west coast of Norway suffering propeller damage and taking on 

water through a leak in a seal. All 153 passengers were evacuated by the local 

emergency services from land. 

• February 2009—Quark Expeditions’ Ocean Nova ran aground off Antarctica. 

Passengers were evacuated to other ships. Unofficial sources report the ship’s 

engines were turned off for maintenance when the ship was blown aground. 

• August 2010—Clipper Adventurer ran aground in Canada’s Northwest Passage. 

Passengers wer transported to Coppermine, Nunavut to be transported home. 

• October 2010—Celebrity Cruises’ Century damaged its rudder at Villefranchesur-Mer. Cruise terminated. 

• March 2013—Hurtigruten’s Kong Harald was forced to wait for the tide to come 

in and lift the ship off the underground rock at the entrance to Trollfjord where 

it was grounded and the hull breached. Once the incoming tide freed the ship 

it carried on to Svolvaer, where all 258 passengers onboard disembarked and 

were flown home today. 

• March 2013—Coastal and Maritime Voyages’ Marco Polo ran aground just outside Sortland in Vestera ̊len causing a leak in a ballast tank. 

• March 2013—Lindblad Expeditions’ National Geographic Sea Lion hit a rock in 

the Las Perlas Islands, about 70 nautical miles from Panama City. The ship 

39 

sustained damage to its hull and one propeller during the incident, but after 

clearance from the U.S. Coast Guard returned to Panama City on its own 

power. The cruise was terminated. 

It isn’t just engine fires and ships running aground. There are other problems 

worth note: 

• March 2009—P&O Cruises’ Aurora experienced propulsion problems four hours 

after leaving Sydney. It limped to Auckland where passengers remained onboard for five days while repairs were completed. The world cruise itinerary was 

changed. 

• April 2009—Passengers were told upon embarkation on Seven Seas Voyager 

that most port calls between Dubai and Rome were canceled because of propulsion problems; the next two cruises canceled. 

• November 2009—Norwegian Dawn lost power for hours (and no air conditioning). Power was restored and the ship sailed to San Juan from where passengers were flown home. This and the next cruise were canceled. 

• February 2010—Costa Europa collided with pier in Sharm-el-Sheikh, ripping a 

hole in the side of the ship and flooding crew cabins. Three crewmembers were 

killed; four passengers were injured. The 18-day cruise from Dubai to Savona 

was terminated and passengers flown home. 

• February 2010—P&O Australia’s Pacific Dawn was delayed in port for 18 hours 

because of propulsion and maintenance problems; its itinerary is changed. Two 

months later the ship lost power and propulsion and narrowly missed collision 

with a bridge in Brisbane. 

• May 2010—P&O Cruises’ Artemis notified passengers upon boarding that engine problems require one port to be dropped from the itinerary. But once underway on the 20 day cruise, originally with ten scheduled port calls, passengers were issued a revised itinerary with four ports calls, only three of which 

were on the original itinerary. 

• June 2010—Celebrity Cruises’ Infinity was delayed five or six hours because of 

engine problems causing a port call to be canceled. Five days later an electrical 

fire caused a power loss for several hours. 

• February 2011—P&O Australia’s Pacific Sun delayed 24 hours in its arrival at 

Newcastle because of engine problems; several port calls canceled. Propulsion 

problems in November 2010 caused a 10-hour delayed arrival in Melbourne, engine problems cause a cruise to be canceled in April 2010, mechanical problems 

caused two ports calls to be canceled, and in November 2009 a cruise was canceled to permit repair of the propulsion system. 

• March 2011—MSC’s Opera twice collided with pier at Buenos Aires damaging 

several cabins and delaying departure for 10 hours while repairs completed. 

September 2011—Toilets in front and mid-ship cabins were inoperable for a day 

on Carnival Imagination. Passengers were told to use public washrooms in the 

aft section. 

• May 2011—MSC’s Opera had failure of an electric panel causing power loss for 

8.5 hours. The ship was towed to port and the cruise canceled. 

• November 2011—Carnival Splendor collided with pier in Puerto Vallarta, requiring it to stay an extra day to complete repairs; the next port call was canceled. 

• January 2012—Costa Concordia hits a rock off the Italian coast and capsizes 

killing 32 people. 

• February 2012—Enchantment of the Seas left Baltimore 24 hours late after unsuccessful attempts to repair an engine. The ship started the cruise on one engine, sailing at half speed, and the itinerary changed. Two weeks later the 

cruise had propulsion problems that left it in Port Canaveral for 27 hours for 

repairs, again requiring a change to the itinerary. 

• March 2012—Silversea Cruises’ Silver Shadow collided with container ship in 

Viet Nam holing the cargo ship; only minor damage to the cruise ship. Passengers were frightened. 

• October 2012—Celebrity Cruises’ Summit had a tender run aground with 93 

passengers and 2 crew members. The tender suffered major damage and passengers were rescued by a fishing boat and whale-watching boat. 

• November 2012—Saga Ruby had engine problems that required the current 

cruise to be canceled. 

40 

5 Conant, E. 2013. ‘‘Carnival from Hell: The Warning Signs Before the Triumph Disaster,’’ 

Newsweek (February 22). 6 Rosenbloom, S. 2013. ‘‘How normal are cruise mishaps,’’ New York Times (May 8, 2013). 

• March 2013—A malfunction of the backup emergency power diesel generator 

caused power outages and plumbing issues on Carnival Dream and led to a 

cruise being terminated in Saint Maarten and passengers flown home. 

• March 2013—Steering problems required Carnival Elation to have a tugboat escort to port. 

• March 2013—Carnival Legend was disabled and stuck in Costa Maya for a day. 

It finally got underway at reduced speed and dropped a port call to arrive on 

time at its port of disembarkation. The itinerary of the subsequent cruise was 

changed because of propulsion problems. 

• March 2013—Seven Seas Voyager suffered propulsion problems causing ports to 

be skipped. 

• April 2013—Crown Princess began a cruise with 410 cabins having toilets that 

would not flush. Until they were fixed, passengers needed to go to public bathrooms (even during the middle of the night). 

The list can go on. Appendix 2 lists cruise ships having two or more incidents between January 2009 and June 2013. It shows 353 incidents involving mechanical 

problems and accidents, approximately 80 incidents per year. 

The obvious question is how such events can be so common. A February 2013 in 

Newsweek gives the perspective of Jim Hall, head of the National Transportation 

Safety Board during the Clinton administration: 

[He] says the industry is watched over by ‘‘paper tigers’’ like the International 

Maritime Organization and suffers from ‘‘bad actors’’ . . . ‘‘The maritime industry is the oldest transportation industry around. We’re talking centuries. It’s a 

culture that has never been broken as the aviation industry was, and you see 

evidence of that culture in the [Costa Concordia] accident,’’ says Hall. 

Ships may seem and feel American but are mostly ‘‘flagged’’ in countries like 

the Bahamas or Panama in order to operate outside of what he says are reasonable safety standards. ‘‘It is, and has been, an outlaw industry,’’ says Hall. ‘‘People who book cruises should be aware of that.’’ 5

B. Lessons to be Learned from These Events 

My point is not to muckrake, listing all that goes wrong with cruise ships. My 

analysis instead provides insights. By knowing the problems, we can identify potential solutions. The available data raises several issues. 

1. The Relative Absence of Reliable Data 

‘‘No one is systematically collecting data of collisions, fires, evacuations, 

groundings, sinkings,’’ says Jim Walker, a maritime lawyer, to the New York Times. 

The article goes on to say: 

‘‘The reason for the lack of data is that cruise lines, while based in the United 

States, typically incorporate and register their ships overseas. Industry experts 

say the only place cruise lines are obligated to report anything is to the state 

under whose laws the ship operates.’’ 6

As the article points out, there remains no comprehensive public database of 

events at sea like fires, power failures, and evacuations except the data available 

at my website, Cruise Junkie dot Com. 

While I take this acknowledgement as a compliment, it identifies a major gap in 

available information. My data is based on reports available in the public media 

and, on occasion, reports from passengers and/or crewmembers. There are many incidents occurring that never reach the public domain. Consequently, there is no way 

for passengers to know the track record of an individual cruise line or the ships 

comprising the line. 

The data I have benefits greatly from the efforts of Senator Rockefeller who made 

public a list of casualty investigations by the U.S. Coast Guard for 2008–2012 and 

the Sun-Sentinel, which posted online U.S. Coast Guard data received through a 

Freedom of Information request. While the two datasets have considerable overlap, 

there are incidents on one list not appearing on the other, and incidents in my 

dataset that appear on neither. 

Making data available is more important than simply making passengers aware. 

It allows a sort of social epidemiology of cruise ship incidents from which patterns 

can be discerned and potential solutions formulated. Rather than seeing each major 

41 

incident as unique and unrelated to anything before it, a comprehensive data set 

permits early identification of trends or common problems. Unlike the airline industry, which is governed by the FAA, there is no similar authority when it comes to 

the cruise industry. 

Recommendation #1: There is need for systematic reporting of all cruise ship incidents to an independent, central authority charged with responsibility for data 

analysis and policy and operational recommendations. 

2. Frequency and Types of Events 

There is a range of incidents occurring on cruise ships. Between January 2009 

and June 2013 there were more than 350 incidents involving mechanical problems 

or accidents (see Appendix 1). The most frequent incidents were: 

• propulsion and engine problems (average 19.59 per year)—7 in which cruise 

ships were known to go adrift; 

• fires (average 13.56 per year)—6 known to require evacuation and 4 with loss 

of power; 

• material failure and lifeboat failure (average 13.33 per year); and 

• collisions (average 11.56 per year). 

These four categories account for 261 incidents—all combined yielding an average 

58 incidents per year. As seen in Appendix 1, less frequent incidents include loss 

of power (n=21), running aground (n=19), maneuverability and steering problems 

(n=15), experiencing a severe list (n=11), and technical (n=8) and electrical (n=8) 

problems. It needs to be remembered that these accounts rely on public reports, so 

the list is largely incomplete and underrepresents the actual frequency. For example, as relates to fires, a ship officer recently wrote to me saying: 

Every ship, almost weekly, has some type of fire incident. This could be something as simple as a cigarette butt in a trash can or a fire in the silo of the 

incinerator, or a grease fire, toaster fire, electrical cord fire in the galley. These 

are never reported because they are put out quickly, within minutes. However, 

there are fires happening on ships every single week. (Private correspondence) 

In part related to these incidents, and in part related to weather-related factors 

(not including tropical storms and hurricanes), there were 104 cruises (average 23 

per year) with media-reported canceled port calls, 69 cruises with media-reported 

itinerary changes, 25 cruises with media-reported canceled cruises, and 73 cruises 

with media-reported delays in embarkation/debarkation. In sum, there are 271 incidents resulting in a cruise itinerary provided passengers when he or she booked the 

cruise being different than the itinerary delivered. The number is undoubtedly considerably higher given that there is no centralized collection of data on the degree 

to which cruise ships approximate their published itinerary, and my data does not 

include cruise itinerary changes caused by hurricanes or tropical storms. 

Recommendation #2: Similar to data maintained on airlines documenting ‘‘on 

time’’ performance, there should be a mechanism whereby cruise ships and cruise 

lines have reported their adherence to itineraries and on time performance. 

3. Discernable Insights from Data 

Based on cursory analysis of the limited data available—approximately 1,500 incidents in four-and-a-half years (an average 333 per year)—there are two insights 

that stand out. First is that Carnival Cruise Lines is disproportionately represented. 

Appendix 2 shows ships with two or more mechanical incidents from January 2009 

through June 2013. Not only does Carnival Cruise Lines have a higher proportion 

of its fleet included on the list (19 of 23 (82.6 percent) versus 10 of 16 (62.5 percent) 

for Princess Cruises, 10 of 21 (47.6 percent) for Royal Caribbean International, and 

4 of 11 (36.3 percent) for Celebrity Cruises), but it has a higher average rate of incidents per ship listed (3.89 for Carnival Cruise Lines versus 3.40 for Princess 

Cruises, 3.25 for Celebrity Cruises, and 3.20 for Royal Caribbean International). An 

obvious question is why the rate of incidents for Carnival Cruise Lines would be 

20 percent higher than for Royal Caribbean International; 30 percent higher than 

for Holland America Line and P&O Cruises, both of which are also owned by Carnival Corporation. 

One factor may be the number and training of staff, but this is based on conjecture. An inside source in Royal Caribbean Cruises Limited wrote to me after the 

Carnival Triumph fire saying: 

42 

7 United States Coast Guard. 2013. Report of Investigation into the Fire Onboard the Carnival 

Splendor which Occurred in the Pacific Ocean Off the Coast of Mexico on November 8, 2010, 

which Resulted in Complete Loss of Power, MISLE Incident Investigation Activity Number: 

3897765 (July 15). 

I’ve worked at RCCL for many years. Over the last 10 years they have been 

steadily decreasing the number of marine employees. These are the employees 

that navigate and maintain the engines and the main employees dealing with 

life saving. If there is a fire—it’s the marine team suiting up and fighting the 

fires. If the ship is listing or sinking—it’s the marine team dealing with technical systems such as water tight doors, moving tank contents from one area 

to another, making contact with rescue services, lowering life boats, etc. 

The reason for the decrease in marine manning? It’s purely driven by concern 

for profit. You can get rid of two marine employees who do not generate any 

income (they just play a major role in saving lives if something goes wrong) and 

replace them with a hotel employee such as a marketing and revenue manager 

or a maıˆtre ‘d for income-generating specialty restaurants, or bar supervisors. 

Many times employees are cut in the marine department or doubled up in cabins so the company can revamp the crew cabins into sellable cruise guest cabins. 

Approximately 5 years ago RCCL got rid of the safety officer position and combined the job with the chief officer position. There is now talk about changing 

the marine contracts for 3 stripe officers from 10 weeks/10 weeks off to 4 

months on/2 months off so they match the hotel officer positions. The degree 

of technical knowledge needed, and the tremendous life saving responsibility 

marine officers have, is in no way equal to the demands placed on hotel officers 

to sell another drink. When the ship is sinking—do you want a marine officer 

that knows the technical systems or do you want a hotel officer selling you another beer as you are stepping into a lifeboat? (Personal correspondence) 

While these comments are specific to one corporation, it raises to the forefront the 

degree to which this pattern is common to other cruise lines. Anecdotal accounts indicate changes of the same nature are taking place within Carnival Cruise Lines. 

This leads to a question requiring empirical research using reliable data. The problem is that such data is not available, largely because systematic independent oversight of the cruise industry is lacking. It is in stark contrast to the airline industry 

where oversight and reporting is the norm. 

Recommendation #3: There is need for greater oversight and monitoring of the 

cruise industry in order to monitor changing trends and to determine whether these 

changes are related to changes in safety and/or casualties. 

A second insight from the data is a preliminary conclusion also based in part on 

anecdotal information. It appears there is a pattern of incidents involving ships 

built on the Destiny platform (Destiny-class and Dream-class ships): my understanding is that Carnival Destiny, Carnival Triumph, Carnival Splendor, Carnival 

Glory, Carnival Breeze, Carnival Dream, Carnival Liberty, and Carnival Magic have 

all reported electrical and/or propulsion issues, power losses, and some electrical 

fires over the last three years or so (not all of these have been reported in the media 

and are thus not included in my dataset); Costa Concordia, Costa Magica, Costa 

Serena and Costa Pacifica have also reported similar problems during this timespan—all of these ships are Destiny platform design ships. 

The relevant difference between Destiny platform and the Spirit/Vista 1/Vista 2/ 

Signature classes is simple. Destiny platform ships have only been built at 

Fincantieri shipyards in Italy from a design by Fincantieri. Spirit & Vista 1 class 

ships originated in Kvaener Masa shipyards and were then adapted/enlarged by 

Fincantieri. The original blueprints had more than enough redundancy to allow for 

growth and design tweaks. There is limited redundancy built into the Destiny platform ships, which may be why they suffer from systemic failures. 

This is illustrated in the report of the Carnival Splendor fire, leading to the ship 

losing all power and going dead in the water. The report observes that ‘‘vessel engineers were unable to restart the unaffected main generators due to extensive damage to cables in the aft engine room.’’ 7 It goes on to state, there is ‘‘susceptibility 

of the Carnival Splendor and all Dream class vessels to a complete loss of power 

resulting from damage to a single area of electrical system components in either the 

forward or aft engine room.’’ Presumably, with appropriate redundancy the main 

generators would have been functional. 

The report also observes design flaws that cut across Dream class (and presumably Destiny platform vessels). These include air cooler drainage problems, noted as 

43 

8See ‘‘Carnival Cruise Lines announces fleetwide $300 million program to enhance operating 

reliability and guest comfort.’’ April 17, 2013. Online at: http://carnival-news.com/2013/04/17/ 

carnival-cruise-lines-announces-fleetwide-300-million-program-to-enhance-operating-reliabilityand-guest-comfort/ 9Wolfe, K.A. 2013. ‘‘Horrific Carnival cruise gets D.C.’s attention,’’ Politico (February 27). 

far back as October 2009 and documented problems with the CO2 system. That 

these problems were identified as early as 2009, and may have been factors in the 

catastrophic nature of both the Carnival Splendor and Carnival Triumph fires lends 

convincing support for increased independent oversight of the cruise industry. 

Carnival Cruise Lines appears to address the shortcoming of redundancy through 

its announcement April 17, 2013, of a $300 million program to enhance operating 

reliability, an initiative spurred by the Carnival Triumph fire in February 2013. As 

stated in the company’s press release, the initiative will add an additional emergency generator on each vessel and install a second permanent back-up power system. There will also be increased fire prevention, detection and suppression systems. 

As well, there will be modifications to decrease the likelihood of losing propulsion 

or primary power. 

The modifications will include a reconfiguration of certain engine-related electrical components. On ships where these enhancements will be made, the design 

of specialized components will require longer lead times for completion.8

While the company deserves recognition of the steps being taken, an obvious question is how many of these enhancements involve adding components that were not 

originally included in the ship’s design, but are normally included in the design of 

ships operated by other cruise lines and/or built and designed by other ship yards. 

An independent audit is the only reliable means for determining the situation. 

More serious is that the company did not appear to maximize learning from the 

Carnival Splendor fire in 2010. First, a report about the incident was not issued 

until three years later, perhaps because responsibility rested with Panamanian authorities; this even though Carnival Cruise Lines had employed a number of experts 

to provide them with analysis of causes of the fire. However, a preliminary U.S. 

Coast Guard investigation revealed several holes in the ship’s fire fighting methodology, not to mention significant errors in its firefighting operations manual. 

According to a marine advisory issue by the Coast Guard, the Splendor’s firefighting instruction manual was riddled with problems, including references to 

‘‘pulling’’ valves that actually needed to be turned to operate, incorrect descriptions of system locations, inaccurate graphics and schematics and confusing instructions such as: ‘‘Once the fire has been extinguished, make sure that the 

temperature has decreased before investigate the area same time is needed to 

wait hours.’’ 9

Recommendation #4: Ships operating from U.S. ports should be obligatorily subject to accident investigations by the National Transportation Safety Board as a condition of using U.S. ports, and should be subject to the same fines and other administrative actions the NTSB is empowered to take with other modes of commercial 

transportation. 

4. Learning from Success, Not Just Accidents 

So far I have looked at what might be learned from accidents and things that go 

wrong on cruise ships. There is another way to look at the data; concentrate on 

those cruise ships and cruise lines that appear to be under-represented when it 

comes to incidents. For example, among the mass market cruise lines Norwegian 

Cruise Line and MSC Cruises appear to have much lower incidence of fires, 

groundings, engine failures and accidents than others in this class. It would be interesting to know what those cruise lines are doing differently than Carnival Cruise 

Lines and Royal Caribbean International. The problem is that cruise lines under 

Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA) tend to not effectively differentiate 

themselves with regard to such things, and the consuming public lacks reliable data 

on which to compare cruise lines. As an authority on the cruise industry I am often 

asked what cruise line or cruise ship is the safest. I can give an anecdotal response, 

but without adequate data it is difficult to give a fully informed response. 

There are similar contrasts among cruise lines in the premium and ultra-luxury 

segments, however they aren’t as stark as among the mass market cruise lines. It 

appears that Oceania Cruises has a better record than Celebrity Cruises and both 

have a better record than Holland America Line; all have a better record than Princess Cruises. Similarly, Seabourn Cruises appears to have fewer incidents than 

44 

Silverseas Cruises and both less than Regent Seven Seas Cruises. Seadream Yacht 

Club has a lower incidence rate than any of the ships in the ultra-luxury category. 

Again, it appears that some companies are doing a far-better job than others. Research on what they are doing, whether in staffing and training or in ship design 

and maintenance, is worth attention. This would naturally be something undertaken by an industry-based body, but this is unlikely to happen given the dominance in CLIA of under-achievers. As well, such research must be done by a whollyindependent researcher. 

Recommendation #5: There needs to be funded research, ideally provided by the 

cruise industry to a wholly independent body, to learn from those cruise lines that 

appear to be effective in reducing incidents and accidents. 

5. Regulation and Oversight of the Cruise Industry 

Unlike the airline industry, the cruise industry is largely self-regulated. As foreign-registered vessels operated by foreign-located corporations, cruise ships are not 

subject to many regulations and laws in the U.S. However, cruise ships operating 

from U.S. ports are subject to regular safety inspections by the U.S. Coast Guard 

and they voluntarily participate in the Vessel Sanitation Program of the Centers for 

Disease Control (CDC) and report illness outbreaks affected 3 percent or more of 

passengers and/or 2 percent or more of crew members on ships operating from a 

U.S. port (ships operating from foreign ports, but sailing with a majority or U.S. 

passengers do not have to file illness reports with the CDC). While reports of CDC 

activities are available online, reports of U.S. Coast Guard inspections are not. 

I received from a San Francisco-based NBC-affiliate a set of inspections (Annual 

Control Verification Exam) done by the U.S. Coast Guard in San Francisco from 

2002 to 2012; they had been acquired through a Freedom of Information request. 

These reports spanning 82 pages were illuminating. It was interesting to see the 

types of deficiencies identified by inspectors (e.g., fuel leaks, water leaks from fire 

pumps, many lifeboat problems, missing or faulty equipment, faulty fire extinguishers, improper record keeping of required information, exposed live electric 

wires, faulty doors, mixing of segregated garbage streams (including hazardous 

waste), fire risks, security deficiencies, and more) and the length of time permitted 

for correction of some of the deficiencies. Given these are annual inspections, it is 

difficult to know how long deficiencies were overlooked or ignored. Of greater concern is that these inspections are not entirely unannounced, so officers and crew 

often prepare for them and the most obvious problems are corrected in advance. 

In extreme cases, a matter identified in the Annual Control Verification Exam 

was referred to the vessel’s Classification Society (e.g., Lloyd’s Register, Bureau 

Veritas, Registro Italiano Navale, Det Norske Veritas), which certifies the ship’s 

safety and seaworthiness. While these societies appear to be independent, they earn 

their income from cruise lines and may be conflicted when taking action that can 

cost the cruise line money or cause a ship to be taken out of service. For example, 

there is a fair number of cases where ships have been judged to have insufficient 

lifeboat space for the number of passengers. In some, the Classification Society has 

instructed the cruise line to book fewer passengers on the ship until the lifeboat(s) 

has/have been repaired. In others, the Classification Society has permitted the 

cruise ship to accommodate passengers on inflatable rafts rather than lifeboats. It 

is unclear whether this is a reasonable solution if there were need for emergency 

evacuation, especially if like the Costa Concordia half of the lifeboats cannot be deployed. 

There is also need for the U.S. Coast Guard to oversee and review the work of 

classification societies. For example, the report of the Carnival Splendor fire indicates: 

The firefighting manual available to officers onboard the Carnival Splendor referred to a CO2 system but not the one that was installed onboard the vessel. 

Related system photographs, images, schematics and diagrams were also found 

to be inaccurate. 

A review of CO2 system documents revealed a RINA approved test memoranda 

dated October 20, 2006, which established the following procedure for testing 

the CO2 system: (1) select the zone or line, (2) observe the shutdowns of ventilation systems, machinery and other warning alarms and then (3) move to the 

gas-release procedure, which included cylinder selection for the particular zone 

and verification of pressurization of the manifold, etc. Another document that 

appears to be part of a RINA approval letter dated December 28, 2008, describes the operational procedure in exact reverse order. 

45 

10Seatrade Insider. 2001. ‘‘Another Ship Sprinkler Problem,’’ Seatrade Insider (June 5). 11 BBC News. 2004. ‘‘Urgent Safety Work Starts on QM2,’’ BBC News (June 26). 12Testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Hearings on ‘‘Oversight of the Cruise Industry,’’ March 1, 2012; Testimony before the Subcommittee 

on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Security, Senate 

Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, June 19, 2008; Testimony before Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Hearings on ‘‘Crimes Against Americans on Cruise Ships, March 27, 2007. 13See www.cruisejunkie.com/Overboard.html 

In this instance, ship’s crew opened the cylinder valves first. As a result, the 

pressure differential across the zone valve prevented opening of the ball valve. 

This reminds me of publicly-reported findings in 2001 and 2004 respectively, both 

involving a ship approved by their Classification Society. The first involves Holland 

America Line’s Zaandam. In May 2001 a crew member noticed a sprinkler head 

missing from a passenger cabin and upon investigation found that a branch of the 

sprinkler system did not connect to the main water supply. The problem was corrected.10

In the second, the British Marine and Coastguard Agency ordered Cunard Line’s 

Queen Mary 2 in June 2004 to fit extra sprinklers in the ship’s 1,300 passenger cabins. A BBC investigation revealed material used in the ships’ bathroom units did 

not meet international fire safety regulations. A short-term remedy was fitting all 

cabins with an extra smoke detector, but the ship must also add extra sprinklers 

in bathrooms. The ship is estimated to contain 140,000 pounds (63,503 kilograms) 

of the material causing concern.11

Recommendation #6: Ships should have thorough and exhaustive safety inspections by the U.S. Coast Guard without advance warning. Full reports (including all 

details) of cruise ship inspections by the U.S. Coast Guard should be available online. 

The importance of an unannounced, surprise inspection is demonstrated by a recent health inspection of Silversea Cruise’s Silver Shadow. The ship had never had 

an inspection score of 99 in May 2012 and 95 in September 2012, however following 

complaints to the CDC from crewmembers a surprise inspection was done June 17, 

2013, and the ship received a failing score of 84. Crewmembers had alleged that 

they were forced to store raw meat, salami, fish, cakes, and every kind of culinary 

preparations in their cabins and remote hallways to avoid inspections by the U.S. 

Public Health (USPH), and that some spoilable food items were kept out of the refrigerator in cabins and hallways but were served the following day to the cruise 

passengers. Other complaints included the alleged use of out-of-date ingredients 

which were served to the guests. Again, the importance of inspections being done 

unannounced and without advance notice cannot be stressed enough. 

II. Safety and Security of Cruise Passengers 

Previous committee hearings have dealt with safety and security of cruise passengers.12 I won’t duplicate that information here, except to summarize some important points. 

A. Scope of the Problem 

It is worth noting that the only comprehensive dataset for crime on cruise ships 

is based on data provided by the FBI in response to a Freedom of Information request by the International Cruise Victims Association. Between October 1, 2007 and 

September 30, 2008, the data reveals there were 115 simple assaults, 16 assaults 

with serious bodily injury, 89 thefts less then $10,000, 12 thefts more than $10,000, 

154 sex related incidents, 7 people overboard, and 3 drug arrests. A comprehensive 

analysis of the data on sexual assaults on cruise ships is reported in ‘‘Sex at Sea: 

Sexual Crimes Aboard Cruise Ships,’’ published in 2011 in the Journal of Tourism 

in Marine Environments (see Appendix 4). 

Two areas are worth further mention here because the data is not reported elsewhere. First, is persons overboard. Since 1995, there have been 201 reports of persons gone overboard from passenger ships.13 As shown in Appendix 3, 73.8 percent 

were male, 26.2 percent female. On average, males are a shade younger than females (38.85 percent vs 42.11 percent). The majority go overboard from cruise ships: 

91.4 percent from a cruise ship, 8.6 percent from a ferry. While data is limited, we 

know that the person overboard was rescued alive in 16.7 percent of cases, 11 percent cases were a confirmed suicide, and all indications are that 3.3 percent of cases 

involve murder. Alcohol was a factor in at least 6.2 percent of cases, a fight with 

a significant other in 7.1 percent of cases, 2.4 percent followed a significant loss in 

46 

14 Yoshino, K. 2007. ‘‘Cruise Industry’s Dark Waters: What Happens at Sea Stays There as 

Crimes on Lineres Go Unresolved,’’ Los Angeles Times (January 20). 15Klein, R. A. 2007. ‘‘Crime Against Americans on Cruise Ships,’’ Testimony Before the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, United States House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, March 27. 

the casino, and 9.5 percent were witnessed and confirmed to be a fall. These numbers will be discussed further later. 

The second area worth mention is drug arrests. Between January 2009 and June 

2013 there were 53 media reports of drug arrests on cruise ships involving 87 people. Based on cases where data is available, we know that males are more likely 

to be arrested than females (83.33 percent vs 16.66 percent); the average age is the 

same for both genders. The largest number of individual incidents occur in Bermuda 

(n=27) where cruise ships are routinely searched by government officials using drugsniffing dogs; the U.S. had 8 incidents involving the arrest of 27 individuals, in all 

cases the person was apprehended by Customs and Border Protection agents. Ships 

with the largest number arrests are Norwegian Dawn (9) and Explorer of the Seas 

(6) (see Appendix 4). Most frequently, drug arrests are for small amounts of marijuana, from several grams to less than an ounce. 

B. The Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act of 2010 (CVSSA) 

The Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act was introduced in 2008 following Congressional hearings in 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008. The hearings in 2005 were convened in December by two subcommittees of the House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform: the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging 

Threats and International Relations chaired by Christopher Shays and the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources chaired by Mark 

Souder. The hearings had a twofold purpose. First, given the recent attack of the 

Seabourn Spirit by pirates off the coast of Somalia, they sought to determine the 

decision-making procedures and processes that were in place to determine the extent to which the U.S. Government responds to a ship being attacked by terrorists 

or pirates. The second purpose of the hearings was to determine jurisdictional conflicts that occur when U.S. citizens traveling on a foreign-flagged vessel are involved 

in a criminal incident. These incidents included sexual assaults, physical assaults, 

robbery, and missing persons. The hearings concluded with an assurance they would 

reconvene in March in order to hear directly from victims. 

Hearings were reconvened in March 2006. The Committee heard from six victims 

of crime on cruise ships: three victims of a sexual assault, two families with three 

persons overboard (one mysterious, one alcohol-related fall), and one incident involving a theft of $6,700. The Committee also heard from International Cruise Victims 

Association (ICV), which presented 10 recommendations, many of which would be 

incorporated in the CVSSA; and from an expert hired by the cruise industry who 

claimed the rate of sexual assault on cruise ships was half the rate on land. The 

Committee appeared to be sceptical about the reliability of crime statistics and acknowledged the absence of reliable data on persons overboard from cruise ships. 

Subsequent to the hearing Representative Shays introduced on June 28, 2006 HR 

5707, Cruise Line Accurate Safety Statistics Act. The bill was straightforward. It required cruise ships that call at a port in the United States to report all crimes occurring on the ship in which a U.S. citizen is involved. It also required this information to be made available to the public on the Internet. The cruise industry didn’t 

embrace the legislation and with the current session of Congress near-complete the 

legislation died in committee. 

In March 2007 hearings were held by the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation of the House of Representatives Committee on Transportation 

and Infrastructure. Two things appear to have solidified support for the hearings. 

First, the Los Angeles Times published an article on January 20, 2007, which based 

on internal documents from Royal Caribbean said sex-related onboard incidents was 

a larger problem than the cruise industry suggested in March 2006. The documents 

revealed 273 reported incidents within a period of thirty-two months, including 99 

cases of sexual harassment, 81 of sexual assault, 52 of inappropriate touching, 28 

of sexual battery and 13 cases that fit into other categories.14 When the companyspecific numbers were subjected to the same statistical analysis as done with industry-wide data in James Fox’s 2006 testimony before Congress, the rate of sexual assault was not half the average rate for rape in the U.S., but 50 percent greater than 

the U.S. rate.15

The second factor that pushed for a new round of hearings was that Representative Doris Matsui from California had a constituent, Laurie Dishman, appeal for 

help following non-prosecution of a rape by a security officer on a Royal Caribbean 

47 

16Dale, T. 2007. ‘‘Cruise Ship Security Practices and Procedures,’’ Testimony Before the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, United States House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, September 19. 

International’s Vision of the Seas. Matsui was not only concerned about the way 

Laurie had been treated and her case handled, but also with discrepancies in crime 

statistics. 

These hearings opened with the FBI and Coast Guard announcing that an agreement had just been reached with the cruise industry whereby cruise line members 

of the Cruise Line International Association (CLIA) agreed to report to the FBI (either a field office in the U.S. or the FBI Legal Attache ́ at an embassy or consulate 

closest to the vessel’s location at the time of the incident) all crimes against Americans on their ships. To many the timing of the announcement was suspicious. As 

well, the agreement appeared to be a rehash of the ‘‘zero tolerance’’ policy announced by the International Council of Cruise Lines in 1999 and it was redundant 

to reporting requirements already in place. The key difference was the agreement 

provided a standardized form for reporting crimes that the FBI could use to establish a data set from which reports could be drawn for Congress and other government authorities. The data would not to be available to the public. The hearings 

also heard from ICV, Laurie Dishman, a sociologist who reported on analysis of the 

crime statistics presented in the Los Angeles Times, an attorney who represents 

cruise victims, and representatives of the cruise industry. At the end of the hearings 

the subcommittee chair, Elijah Cummings, called on CLIA and ICV to get together 

and to attempt to find some common ground and solutions. He said he’d prefer a 

solution that did not require legislation, but also said that legislation was always 

an option. He gave the two sides six months and said the hearings would reconvene 

in September. 

With no solution from collaboration between ICV and CLIA, hearings were reconvened in September 2007. The day before the Congressional subcommittee reconvened September 19, 2007, Representatives Matsui and Shays with twenty-three cosponsors introduced a House Resolution to call attention to the growing level of 

crime on cruise ships and the lack of Federal regulations overseeing the cruise industry. The purpose of the reconvened hearings was to receive an update on the status of discussions between ICV and CLIA and to examine whether the security practices and procedures aboard cruise ships are adequate to ensure the safety of all 

passengers. As before, it received testimony from the FBI and Coast Guard, which 

discussed the implementation of the reporting framework announced at the previous 

hearings; from ICV and several of its members (parents of a 21-year-old who fell 

overboard while throwing up over a railing, two sexual assault victims, a surviving 

family member whose father died in a cruise ship fire); and from the cruise industry. Not surprisingly the cruise industry painted a picture that said everything was 

under control, that it is working diligently to improve situations raised as sources 

of concern by its critics, and that cruises continue to be safe.16 The claim of safety 

was based in large part on the FBI receiving from cruise ships only forty-one reports 

of sexual assault and twenty-eight cases of sexual contact between April 1 and August 23, 2007. Together, these numbers give an annualized rate for sexual abuse 

on CLIA member cruise lines of 172 incidents; a rate of 56.9 per 100,000 passengers—several fold higher than the rate claimed in the 2006 hearings. The industry also used the hearings to announce formation of its survivors’ working group, 

a group that ostensibly attempted to supplant ICV. 

Less than a week after the hearings, the House Committee on Homeland Security 

approved by voice vote inclusion of language in the Coast Guard Authorization Act 

requiring cruise lines to notify the Department of Homeland Security Secretary of 

security-related incidents involving U.S. persons when it advises its next port of call 

of its arrival. Incidents required to be reported under the legislation include any act 

that results in death, serious bodily injury, sexual assault, a missing person, or that 

poses a significant threat to the cruise ship, any cruise ship passenger, any port facility, or any person in or near the port. Unlike Representative Shays’ Cruise Line 

Accurate Safety Statistics Act, the reports would not be made public. 

At the same time there was a move involving Senator John Kerry and Representatives Matsui, Shays, and Maloney to write legislation that would require cruise 

ships to immediately notify the FBI about crimes, suicides, and disappearances. The 

legislation would also provide protocols for collecting evidence. The legislation in 

many ways is like the agreement announced in March 2007 between CLIA and the 

FBI would be mandatory. A key requirement of any legislation or regulation, if it 

is to be useful to the public, is public disclosure. Passengers should know the history 

of problems and incidents on a cruise ship, much the same as they can view reports 

48 

of sanitation inspections conducted on cruise ships by the Centers for Disease Control. 

The Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Security of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and 

Transportation held hearings in June 2008. The hearings heard from ICV; CLIA; 

the Rape, Abuse, Incest and Neglect Network (RAINN); and a sociologist reporting 

on analysis of sexual assault data and on persons overboard. The information presented was similar to previous hearings in the House of Representatives, however 

RAINN discussed the need and methods for providing support to victims of sexual 

assault on cruise ships. The CVSSA was introduced shortly after the hearings. 

1. From Hearings to Legislation 

A key advocate for legislation was the International Cruise Victims Association, 

formed when its founders (Ken Carver whose 40 year old daughter mysteriously 

went missing in 2004 from Mercury, a Celebrity ship; Bree Smith whose 26 year 

old brother mysteriously went missing in on his honeymoon in 2005 from Brilliance 

of the Seas, a Royal Caribbean ship; Son Michael Pham whose parents aged 67 and 

71 mysteriously went missing in 2005 from Carnival Destiny; the parents of 23 year 

old Amy Bradley who mysteriously went missing in 1998 from Rhapsody of the Seas, 

a Royal Caribbean ship; and the parents of 22 year old James Scavone who mysteriously went missing in 1999 from Carnival Destiny) met at the 2005 hearings. The 

sponsor of the CVSSA in 2008 in the U.S. House of Representatives was Doris Matsui (HR 6408); in the U.S. Senate John Kerry (S 3204). The legislation was reintroduced in 2009 as HR 3360 and S 588 and subsequently passed, becoming Public 

Law 111–207. 

The initial version of the CVSSA reflected concerns raised in hearings and contained solutions to identified problems. However, a number of provisions of the Act 

when it was first introduced in 2008 and in March 2009 were changed when introduced in the Senate in June 2009, presumably partially in response to lobbying by 

the cruise industry or others. These changes and other elements of the legislation 

will guide this discussion. 

2. Persons Overboard 

The number of people going overboard from cruise ships is significant: between 

20 and 25 a year since 2009. It is known that in 9.5 percent of cases the person 

fell overboard, however if we trust cruise industry claims—they often say a passenger has fallen or jumped even if the assertion cannot be independently corroborated—then the percentage is much higher. With that in mind, it is curious that 

the original version of the CVSSA stated, ‘‘The vessel shall be equipped with ship 

rails that are located not less than 41⁄2 feet above the deck’’ (§ 3507 (a)(1)(A)). However the legislation passed set the height one foot lower at 42 inches. In retrospect, 

it would appear the original provision of 54 inches (41⁄2 feet) may be more reasonable as an impediment to passengers falling overboard. 

A second change is seen in § 3507(a)(1)(D). The original proposed legislation stated, ‘‘The vessel shall integrate technology that can be used for detecting passengers 

who have fallen overboard, to the extent that such technology is available.’’ Such 

technology is available, but there are cost implications. 

The revised legislation states, ‘‘The vessel shall integrate technology that can be 

used for capturing images of passengers or detecting passengers who have fallen 

overboard, to the extent that such technology is available.’’ While close-circuit television (CCTV) technology (used to capture images of persons going overboard) may 

be effective if it were monitored in real-time, it is of little use when tapes are reviewed only after it is known a person has disappeared. In addition, there are issues 

with whether CCTV cameras cover all relevant areas where a person may go overboard, and whether images are readily made available when requested. In a recent 

case in which I was retained as an expert witness we found that the CCTV images 

were recorded using old technology (not in a format easily viewed) and when converted the images were of limited probative value. Again, it would appear that the 

original legislation proposed in 2007 was more effective in identifying when a person 

goes overboard and in causing a response that is more likely to lead to a live rescue. 

Many of the 16.7 percent of cases where a person is rescued alive is when their disappearance is observed and reported to officers who immediately execute rescue procedures. 

Data also indicates there is sufficient number of cases of persons going overboard 

when they are intoxicated. In two known cases the person was bending over the 

railing while throwing-up over the side of the ship. This is further reason for raising 

railing height, but also reinforces the need for stringent rules for the responsible 

service of alcohol; not just training, but practice. 

49 

One other concern is the way the FBI interprets the CVSSA. International Cruise 

Victims Association reports they have been told by the FBI that a person overboard 

is not necessarily a crime and thus will not be investigated and not included in the 

FBI’s official statistics. It is difficult to understand how a determination can be 

made about whether a case of a person overboard is not a crime without a proper 

investigation. Even if CCTV videotapes show a person falling overboard, an investigation may be warranted to determine the conditions surrounding the incident, for 

example whether intoxication is an issue and whether the cruise ship was responsible in serving alcohol. Current wording of the CVSSA does not classify a person 

overboard as a crime. 

Recommendation #7: Original provisions of the CVSSA regarding railing height 

and technology to detect passengers who have fallen overboard be reconsidered. 

3. Sexual Assaults 

Contrary to cruise industry claims, sexual assaults are an ongoing problem on 

cruise ships. Just in the past couple of months there have been media reports of 

a 12-year-old girl groped on Celebrity Century by a 30-year-old male passenger, and 

an 11-year-old girl molested by a crew member on Disney Dream. In neither case 

was the perpetrator arrested or prosecuted; in the latter, the crewmember was 

offloaded by the cruise line in the Bahamas and flown home to India at the cruise 

line’s expense. Data from the FBI for October 2007 through September 2008 reveals 

that at least 18 percent of sexual assault victims are younger than age 18. The data 

was secured through a freedom of information request. 

Unfortunately, reliable data is hard to come by. No comprehensive FBI data has 

been available since 2008. The only other data available for analysis was provided 

in the discovery phase of lawsuits, yielding incident reports from 1998 through 2002 

for one cruise line; 1998 through 2005 for another. In a recent lawsuit involving the 

sexual assault of a minor a cruise line was ordered by the judge to disclose to the 

plaintiff’s attorney all reported cases of sexual assault for the previous five years. 

The cruise line settled the case out of court in order to avoid complying with the 

court order. 

There is much to be learned from incident reports of sexual assault. We know that 

the most frequent perpetrator among crewmembers (between 50 percent and 77 percent of sexual assaults on passengers are perpetrated by a crew member) is a room 

steward (34.8 percent) followed by dining room waiter (25 percent) and bar worker 

(13.2 percent). We also know that the most frequent location for the assault is a 

passenger cabin (36.4 percent) and that alcohol is a factor in 36 percent of incidents 

involving minors. Having detailed data permits identification of risk and of potential 

solutions or means for ameliorating the problem. However, changes to the CVSSA 

between the first versions to the version passed make this data much more difficult 

to access and thus more difficult for proper prevention and intervention. The following discussion will be organized around prevention, intervention, investigation, 

and prosecution. 

Prevention 

The best way to deal with sexual assault is to have methods of primary prevention. One of the most effective methods is for passengers to know the risk. That is 

why the initial version of the CVSSA not only required all sexual assaults to be reported to the FBI but that ‘‘The Secretary shall maintain, on an Internet site of the 

department in which the Coast Guard is operating, a numerical accounting of the 

missing persons and alleged crimes . . .’’ (§ 3507(c)(4)(A)). But the section was 

changed in the final version to read, ‘‘The Secretary shall maintain a statistical compilation of all incidents described in paragraph (3)(A)(i) on an Internet site that provides a numerical accounting of the missing persons and alleged crimes recorded in 

each report filed under paragraph (3)(A)(i) that are no longer under investigation 

by the Federal Bureau of Investigation’’ (§ 3507(e)(4)(A)0. 

The result is that the FBI only publicly discloses those cases where they have 

opened a case and they have subsequently closed the case. Those incidents judged 

to be he said-she said, or where sufficient evidence is not available, do not have an 

investigation so appear to be not reported. Unlike crimes on land that are included 

in Uniform Crime Statistics and that reflect all complaints of a crime, crimes on 

cruise ships are only publicly recorded when the FBI has decided first that an investigation is warranted and second when the investigation is closed. The result is that 

the number of publicly reported sexual assaults on cruise ships is grossly under-reported. The one-year data for 2007–08 reported 154 sex-related incidents. In stark 

contrast, the FBI dataset on the U.S. Coast Guard website (which is difficult to find) 

reports 11 incidents in 2012 (data for 2010 and 2011 was not accessible). More illuVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:32 May 14, 2015 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\94526.TXT JACKIE
50 

minating is a recent case I was involved with. The FBI indicated that the cruise 

line (NCL) had one case of sexual assault in 15 months, but records disclosed in 

discovery indicated the cruise line had received (and we assume reported to the FBI 

in compliance with the CVSSA) 23 complaints. The change in the language of the 

Act effectively makes invisible the true scale of the problem of sexual assault and 

undermines passenger awareness of the need to protect themselves and their children. 

Recommendation #8: The CVSSA should require reported cases of sexual assault 

committed on a cruise ship be displayed online and broken down by cruise line and 

cruise ship. In addition, the raw data of cases should be made available upon request 

for statistical/sociological analysis in order to permit a social epidemiology of the 

problem. 

A provision that was not changed, but that may need to be revisited relates to 

crew access to passenger cabins. § 3507(f)(1) states that a cruise ship shall ‘‘establish 

and implement procedures and restrictions concerning—(A) which crewmembers 

have access to passenger staterooms; and (B) the periods during which they have 

access; and (2) ensure that the procedures and restrictions are fully and properly 

implemented and periodically reviewed.’’ While this provision is clear in its intent, 

it may not be specific enough in its statement. I am not sure if it effectively addresses certain incidents of sexual assault. Take for example the teenage daughter left 

in her parent’s cabin who is walked in upon and sexually assaulted by a crew member gaining access with a room key; or the adult woman who returns to her room 

in the middle of the afternoon and when she walks out of the shower finds a crew 

member in her room and is raped; or a woman who wakes in the middle of the night 

and finds a crew member standing over her and is assaulted. These cases are not 

anomalies, but even if they were they demonstrate why there is clear need for strict 

restrictions on crewmember access to passenger cabins. As it stands, restrictions on 

access to passenger cabins by room stewards, maintenance people, minibar stockers, 

and others are unclear. This may be addressed in legislation that more clearly identifies parameters for when crew members have access to passenger cabins (e.g., between 9:00 AM and 11:59 AM, and between 6:00 PM and 9:00 PM). At the very 

least, passengers should be told what hours of the day a crewmember may have access to their cabin. 

Recommendation #9: The CVSSA should require passengers to be advised of the 

hours during which crewmembers may access their cabin without specific permission 

from the passenger. 

Another strategy for prevention, as well as useful for investigation, is CCTV cameras. There are two issues. One is that cruise ships often have real cameras and 

dummy cameras around the ship. Consequently, a crewmember may take a passenger to an area with no camera or a dummy camera and then assault them. This 

was the case when an 8-year-old girl was molested on a cruise ship: a cleaner led 

her down a hallway with the promise he would help her find her way back to her 

family’s cabin. He knew where there were active cameras and where there were 

dummy cameras. 

A second related issue is where live cameras are located. In a recent case in which 

I served as an expert witness I raised concern about where cameras were and were 

not located, pointing out that cameras were not directed toward areas that I believed were high risk. The cruise line’s attorney countered that the CVSSA only requires that ‘‘The owner of a vessel . . . shall maintain a video surveillance system 

to assist in documenting crimes on the vessel and in providing evidence for the prosecution of such crimes’’ (§ 3507(b)(1). In this case the area not being covered was 

the entrance to public washrooms even though one data set indicates that 4.4 percent (n=14) of sexual assaults occur in public washrooms. While it shouldn’t be necessary for an act to clearly specify where CCTV surveillance should take place, the 

current language of the Act is so vague that it can be effectively used to counter 

and/or undermine victim claims when an assault occurs. As has already been mentioned, the videotapes that were provided by the cruise line in this case were of such 

poor quality that they had no probative value. 

Recommendation #10: The CVSSA more clearly and specifically state requirements for CCTV surveillance and the quality and format of tape recordings. 

A final method of prevention is making passengers aware of the risk of crime on 

cruise ships. I have already discussed the quality of information reported on the 

website maintained by the U.S. Coast Guard, however the website is difficult to find 

and for most passengers does not alert them to the risk. Perhaps a better way to 

alert passengers of onboard risk is through the ‘‘Security Guide’’ required under 

51 

§ 3507(c)(1)(A) of the Act. Presently the Act requires the guide to be available for 

each passenger, but doesn’t specify how availability is achieved. The Act requires 

the guide to ‘‘provide a description of medical and security personnel designated on 

board to prevent and respond to criminal and medical situations with 24 hour contact instructions’’ and to describe the jurisdictional authority applicable and the law 

enforcement process available with respect to reporting a crime. However there is 

no requirement for the guide to include a clear statement of what crimes occur on 

cruise ships, nor for it to educate passengers in methods and/or strategies for reducing vulnerability to crime. The guide could be an effective method for forewarning 

passengers of known dangers. 

Ironically, passengers are often advised in port lectures of things they can do to 

reduce the likelihood of becoming a victim to crime ashore, but there is no parallel 

information for how to reduce the likelihood of crime onboard the ship. It is reasonable to expect a cruise ship to alert parents to the need to supervise their children 

and to be aware of the risk of child sexual assault onboard, to advise adult passengers of the risk of sexual assault and the most common places and scenarios 

where these occur—this may include advice to keep track of one’s drink to be sure 

it is not drugged or otherwise tampered with. The data on sexual assaults provides 

considerable insight into where and when sexual assaults occur; information that 

passengers would benefit from knowing. 

Recommendation #11: The CVSSA explicitly require the ‘‘Security Guide’’ be 

placed in plain sight in every passenger cabin and that the content of the guide include information about the types of crimes on cruise ships, where they commonly 

occur, and steps a passenger can take to decrease the likelihood of becoming a victim 

of crime. 

Intervention 

Despite best efforts, it is likely some sexual assaults will occur on cruise ships. 

The issue then is how victims will be treated. Again, there was a critical change 

from early drafts of the CVSSA and the Act that subsequently passed into law. 

§ 3507(e)(3) stated, 

. . . make available on the vessel at all times an individual licensed to practice 

as a medical doctor in the United States to promptly perform such an examination upon request and to provide proper medical treatment of a victim, including antiretroviral medications and other medications that may prevent the 

transmission of human immunodeficiency virus and other sexually transmitted 

diseases. 

This was replaced with § 3507(d)(3) that reads: 

(3) make available on the vessel at all times medical staff who have undergoe 

a credentialing process to verify that he or she—(A) possesses a current physician’s or registered nurse’s license and—(i) has at least 3 years of post-graduate 

or postregistration clinical practice in general and emergency medicine; or (ii) 

holds board certification in emergency medicine, family practice medicine, or internal medicine;. . .and (C) meets guidelines established by the American College of Emergency Physicians relating to the treatment and care of victims of 

sexual assault. 

The most significant change is the required qualifications of the person providing 

medical care to a sexual assault victim. The original draft clearly required a physician who is licensed to practice in the United States; the change permits either a 

doctor or a nurse and makes no reference to where that person was trained or 

where they are licensed. This change is significant. 

There are several reasons why this change may be of concern. First, some may 

believe a physician would be better able to deal with a medical issue. But more importantly is where that doctor was trained and is licensed. There has traditionally 

been a wide variation in medical care on cruise ships. Some cruise lines have chosen 

only physicians trained and licensed in the U.S., Canada, or U.K.; others have 

drawn physicians from a variety of countries because they are able to pay significantly less. This is not to impugn the competence of all foreign-trained physicians, 

but there may be issues around language (competence in English, which is important given the nuances and emotions at play in a sexual assault), issues around culture and different views about women and sexuality, and differences in knowledge 

of clinical guidelines common in the U.S. Perhaps more important is that when 

there is malpractice a physician in the U.S., Canada, or the U.K. may be easy to 

find, but a physician from a developing country or a non-English speaking country 

may be exceedingly difficult for a patient to track down. 

52 

The reference in the CVSSA to guidelines established by the American College of 

Emergency Physicians may be seen as a way of dealing with some of these concerns. 

However a review of the Policy Compendium (2013 Edition) of the American College 

of Emergency Physicians (ACEP) brings other issues to the forefront. The Compendium reads: 

The sexually assaulted patient, who may be an adult or child of either sex, presents special medical, psychological, and legal needs. ACEP believes that all patients who report a sexual assault are entitled to prompt access to emergency 

medical care and competent collection of evidence that will assist in the investigation and prosecution of the incident. ACEP has therefore developed the following guidelines: 

• With the cooperative efforts of local governments, law enforcement agencies, 

hospitals, courts, and other relevant organizations, each county, state or other 

geographic area should establish a community plan to deal with the sexually 

assaulted patient. The plan should ensure that capable, trained personnel and 

appropriate equipment are available for treating sexual assault patients. 

• Each community plan should address the medical, psychological, safety, and 

legal needs of the sexually assaulted patient. The plan should provide for 

counseling, and should specifically address pregnancy and testing for and 

treatment of sexually transmissible diseases, including HIV. 

• Each hospital should provide for access to appropriate medical, technical, and 

psychological support for the patient. A community may elect to establish, 

under the supervision of a physician, an alternative medical site, which specializes in the care of the sexually assaulted patient and provides medical and 

psychological support capabilities when no other injuries are evident. 

• A victim of sexual assault should be offered prophylaxis for pregnancy and 

for sexually transmitted diseases, subject to informed consent and consistent 

with current treatment guidelines. Physicians and allied health practitioners 

who find this practice morally objectionable or who practice at hospitals that 

prohibit prophylaxis or contraception should offer to refer victims of sexual 

assault to another provider who can provide these services in a timely fashion. 

• Specially trained, nonphysician medical personnel should be allowed to perform evidentiary examinations in jurisdictions in which evidence collected in 

such a manner is admissible in criminal cases. 

• Physicians and trained medical staff who collect evidence, perform in good 

faith, and follow protocols should be immune from civil or criminal penalties 

related to evidence collection, documentation of findings, and recording of the 

patient’s subjective complaints. 

• For the special diagnostic and therapeutic needs of the pediatric patient, a 

community plan should provide for primary referral centers with expertise 

and ancillary social services that support a multidisciplinary approach. 

• As part of its ongoing quality management activities, the hospital should establish patient care criteria for the management of the sexually assaulted patient and monitor staff performance. 

• ED staff should have ongoing training and education in the management of 

the sexually assaulted patient. 

• ACEP supports appropriate measures to prevent sexual assault in the community. 

First, and perhaps most important, is the guidelines place the emergency care 

physician as the primary care provider to a victim of sexual assault. Nonphyscian 

medical personnel may be allowed to perform evidentiary examinations, however the 

guidelines do not contemplate a nurse being responsible for the care received by a 

sexual assault victim. The CVSSA contradicts this by permitting it. 

Second, the guidelines set expectations on the community, including ongoing quality management activities, however these do not appear to be part of what a cruise 

ship does, especially with physicians typically working a four-month (or less) contract. The infirmary on a cruise ship is not comparable to a land-based hospital and 

it is difficult for it to comply with the guidelines. 

One guideline that is of particular note is that the ACEP expects the physician 

to support appropriate measures to prevent sexual assault in the community. As has 

already been discussed, there is much more a cruise ship can do to prevent sexual 

assault and to, in turn, comply with this guideline. One has to wonder whether an 

53 

under-contract physician who is considered an independent contractor is in a position to effectively advocate on such a matter. 

Finally, the guidelines are explicit that the psychological and safety needs of a 

sexual assault victim be addressed. It also has very specific expectations for how the 

pediatric patient will be treated, including referral centers and ancillary social services. These ‘‘best practices’’ are not available on a cruise ship. There are no psychological services available onboard, and cruise ships do not typically take responsibility for referring the sexual assault victim (especially a child) to appropriate therapeutic and support services. As well, a victim of sexual assault will often see their 

perpetrator wandering freely on the cruise ship, which seriously questions the commitment to the victim’s need for feeling safe. In both cases discussed above, of the 

11-year-old and 12-year-old girls recently sexually assaulted, the perpetrator was 

not apprehended in a timely manner (in one case the perpetrator was not apprehended at all). 

While the intent of the CVSSA in referencing the ACEP guideline is laudable, it 

is an empty gesture when the guidelines do not fit with the setting. More appropriate would be language that addresses: (1) the qualifications of the physician 

charged with treating sexual assault victims; (2) the appropriate role played by nonphysician medical personnel; and (3) the provision of psychological and therapeutic 

services both onboard and appropriate referrals for when the victim returns home 

from the ship. These latter requirements may be met through a partnership with 

land-based organizations such as RAINN or with land-based service providers. Interestingly, based on the landscape of onboard sexual assaults I advocated in my 

2002 book, Cruise Ship Blues: The Underside of the Cruise Industry, that cruise 

ships invest in having a counselor onboard a ship, both for passengers and crew. 

I write: 

The counselor would be someone competent in dealing with cases of sexual assault, who could serve as an ombudsperson in matters arising between passengers and staff or between shipboard employees. If a counselor is to be effective and seen as someone to turn to, it is essential that he or she be independent of the ship’s hierarchical structure—a status similar to the ship’s physician who on medical matters essentially answers to no one onboard, not even 

the captain. Counselors would need to be independent, and independently available. The simple fact is that abuses are known to occur on ships, but the information is kept within the shipboard community. The only way that information 

gets out is by having an outsider brought in (p. 161). 

I know this was read by cruise industry executives and their lawyers, but it had 

no apparent effect. 

Recommendation #12: The CVSSA should require onboard physicians to be 

board certified in emergency medicine, family practice medicine, or internal medicine 

in the U.S., U.K., Canada, Australia, France, or Germany. Further, there should be 

clear statements about how cruise ships will treat the psychological and safety needs 

of sexual assault victims, especially victims who are minors. 

Investigation 

Proper investigation of cruise ship crimes and preservation of evidence is critical, 

especially in a case of sexual assault. In addition, there needs to be proper procedures for ensuring chain of evidence requirements. Though beyond my expertise, I 

have to wonder whether evidence collected and secured by a shipboard safety officer 

will stand up in a shore side court of law. I suspect a critical issue will also be 

whether the safety officer is available to testify in a criminal prosecution or a civil 

case, especially if the case is against his/her employer. 

This raises a critical issue with regard to the independence and impartiality of 

onboard security officers. On land when there is a sexual assault the victim can talk 

to their local law enforcement office, which is totally independent of the perpetrator, 

and they receive medical care and support services from professionals who are also 

independent of the perpetrator. On a cruise ship, a victim’s case is investigated by 

an employee of the cruise line, a relationship that becomes particularly thorny when 

the perpetrator is also a cruise line employee—the most recent comprehensive data 

of sexual assaults on cruise ships indicates that the majority are perpetrated by a 

cruise ship employee; and then their medical care is provided by another employee 

of the cruise line. This situation does not engender the same level of trust a victim 

is likely to have when dealing with the same issue on land. 

Recommendation #13: Cruise ships should be required to have a private, independent law enforcement agent for purposes of crime investigation. These would be 

similar to the wholly-independent Ocean Rangers placed on cruise ships by the State 

54 

of Alaska to monitor discharge of waste streams while the ship is in Alaska state 

waters. 

Notwithstanding the above, § 3508(a) of the CVSSA states that the Secretary 

‘‘shall develop training standards and curricula to allow for the certification of passenger vessel security personnel, crewmembers, and law enforcement officials on the 

appropriate methods for prevention, detection, evidence preservation, and reporting 

of criminal activities in the international maritime environment.’’ The intent of this 

provision is clear, however the execution appears to be problematic. Compliance is 

ostensibly effected by Model Course CVSSA 11–01: Crime Prevention, Detection, Evidence Preservation and Reporting. This is an on-line course that takes eight hours 

(one day) to complete. Aside from there being no direct contact between an instructor and a student, there is a total of three hours devoted to ‘‘Crime Scene Actions,’’ 

which includes techniques used by law enforcement, action required to preserve different crime scenes, and access control. There is extremely limited content on collection and preservation of evidence. The stated measure of competence for this threehour module is that ‘‘requirements related to reporting and recording of serious 

crimes are correctly identified and demonstrated.’’ It is unclear from the manual 

how students are tested (although it appears that the most likely method is multiple 

choice and other closed-choice exams) and whether the student can learn in three 

hours the skills and knowledge commonly possessed by crime scene investigators on 

shore. While the course may be useful for training support personnel to a professionally trained investigator, it appears inadequate preparation if the concern is 

with gathering evidence that will withstand the requirements of land-based law enforcement and a court of law. 

Recommendation #14: In the absence of a professionally qualified crime scene investigator, a cruise ship should be required to have onboard a staff person with more 

than adequate training in all facets of crime scene preservation, collection of evidence, and methods to ensure proper chain of evidence. 

Prosecution 

The final area to consider regarding sexual assault is prosecution of the perpetrator. I have already addressed the need for evidence to facilitate prosecution. Another critical issue is to detain the offender. This may be more easily done when 

the perpetrator is a crewmember, however when a passenger perpetrates a sexual 

assault he or she should also be detained for law enforcement personnel at the next 

U.S. port. It is unfortunate when a crewmember is flown to his home country from 

a foreign port rather than having to face prosecution, especially when the crime is 

irrefutably caught on videotape, as was the case of the 11-year-old girl molested on 

Disney Dream in May 2013. It is equally sad that a 30-year-old man who groped 

a 12 year old girl can wander freely on the ship while the girl and her family are 

reminded of the ordeal every time they see him. 

Recommendation #15: Cruise ship personnel should take more seriously their responsibility to detain perpetrators of sexual assault until the ship arrives at its next 

U.S. port. Further, Congress should contemplate whether there needs to be a legislated requirement to ensure perpetrators are isolated from the general public onboard 

the ship and held for delivery to land-based law enforcement personnel. 

4. Other Crimes 

There are two crimes for which the FBI collected data in 2007–08, but that are not required to be reported under the CVSSA. One is a theft of less than $10,000— 

there were 89 in the one year period 2007–08. The other is simple assault—there 

were 115 in the same one year period. It doesn’t seem right that these crimes are 

not recorded and that victim rights are apparently truncated. 

As regards theft, there is the obvious fact that crew members know that a theft of less than $10,000 will not only not be prosecuted, but will not be recorded. This 

seems like an open door for a permissible level of crime. Why $10,000 rather than 

$9,800? The amount appears arbitrary. However, more importantly, by not collecting data there is no ability for analysis to discern patterns or trends that might 

inform interdiction or prevention. As well, there is no way to know whether the 

problem is increasing or decreasing, and whether the problem on cruise ships is 

greater or lesser than on land. 

Judge Thomas A. Dickerson of the New York State 9th Judicial District makes 

the same point, but more eloquently: 

[The Act does not] . . . require the reporting of thefts which are between $1,000 

and $9,999 in value. These problems may be resolved as follows. First, requiring 

owners to report thefts less than $10,000 would allow local law enforcement to 

55 

17Dickerson, T.A. and S. L. Sgroi. 2012. ‘‘Recent Developments in Maritime Law,’’ Presented 

at the Joint Judicial Seminar Program for the Appellate Divisions for the First and Second Judicial Departments, April 25. Available at: <www.nycourts.gov/courts/9jd/TacCertlpdfs/ 

DickersonlDocs/recentldevlmaritimelaw.pdf> 

investigate and deter future crimes. Second, mandating owners to include the 

recorded thefts of property valued between $1,000 and $9,999 on the USCG 

website would allow prospective cruise passengers to better appreciate the risks 

associated with cruises. An even more effective method would be to breakdown 

the USCG online reporting by individual cruise ships, rather than by cruise 

lines, as is currently required.17

There are similar concerns with regard to simple assault. What if the assault is 

a case of domestic violence (a fair proportion of which do fall within this category)— 

why would this not be reported and considered for prosecution, especially if the victim decides to press charges. Also, what is the fine line between a simple assault 

and an assault with serious bodily injury? Are cruise ship personnel expert in making this determination? I think not. But most importantly is the fact that having 

this data is useful both to determine changes over time as well as to compare the 

situation between different cruise ships and between cruise ships and incidence on 

land. It would seem it is in the interest of the cruise industry to have this data collected, unless they are concerned that the rate onboard their ships is higher than 

the rate onshore. 

Recommendation #16: The CVSSA should require reporting to the FBI of all onboard crime, including thefts less than $10,000 and simple assaults. 

III. Consumer Rights and Cruise Ship Liability 

The issue of consumer rights was directly addressed by CLIA’s recent announcement of its Passenger Bill of Bights. This will be discussed first. I will then shift 

to the broader issue of liability as it applies to cruise ships and cruise lines. 

A. CLIA Passenger Bill of Rights 

The CLIA Bill of Rights is as interesting for what it includes as for what it does 

not include. It was announced May 22, 2013 just five days before a fire on Grandeur 

of the Sea; probably motivated in large part by a series of problems before and following the media-focused fire on the Carnival Triumph and by Senator Schumer’s 

stated intent to develop a passenger bill of rights. In the month before the Carnival 

Triumph fire, five ships experienced propulsion problems causing delay and/or requiring itinerary changes: Carnival Splendor, Carnival Destiny, Carnival Legend, 

Carnival Triumph, and P&O Cruises’ Aurora (all ships operated by Carnival Corporation). In the several months following the Carnival Triumph fire there were the 

following: 

• Seabourn Odyssey had a power failure and was towed to port in New Zealand; 

• Cunard Line’s Queen Elizabeth had a collision with a tug boat packed with 

pleasure seekers in New Zealand; 

• Hurtigruten’s Kong Herald ran aground and the cruise was canceled; 

• Coastal and Maritime Voyage’s Marco Polo was holed and canceled its cruise; 

• Carnival Dream had generator problems and ended a cruise early, flying passengers home from Saint Maarten; 

• Carnival Legend had propulsion problems and was stuck for a day in Costa 

Maya; the ship altered the itinerary on this cruise and the next because of continuing problems; 

• Carnival Elation had steering problems and required assistance of a tug to 

navigate to New Orleans; 

• P&O’s Ventura had propulsion problems transatlantic and changed its itinerary; 

• Regent Seven Seas’ Voyager had propulsion problems causing significant delays; 

• Carnival Sunshine canceled two cruises because of longer-than-anticipated time 

in dry dock; when the ship finally left dry dock passengers complained that 

work was still being done and some ship services are unavailable; 

• Celebrity Millennium had propulsion problems that caused itinerary changes, at 

one point being dead in the water for three hours in the South China Sea; 

• Carnival Ecstasy experienced a power failure; 

• Coral Princess experienced a fire; 

56 

And then comes the Passenger Bill of Rights—no doubt a public relations initiative to counter the wave of bad publicity (notably, all but three of the problems occurred on ships operated by Carnival Corporation). In announcing the Bill of Rights 

CLIA stated that they detail CLIA members’ ‘‘commitment to the safety, comfort 

and care of guests.’’ CLIA also stated the Bill of Rights ‘‘codifies many longstanding 

practices of CLIA members and goes beyond these to further inform cruise guests 

of the industry’s commitment to their comfort and care.’’ The obvious question then 

is what is new about the Bill of Rights. I will address this and then consider what 

isn’t contained in the Bill of Rights. 

1. The right to disembark a docked ship if essential provisions such as food, water, 

restroom facilities and access to medical care cannot adequately be provided onboard, 

subject only to the Master’s concern for passenger safety and security and customs 

and immigration requirements of the port. 

This Right makes perfect sense if a ship is alongside a pier, however it does not 

consider the issue of passengers who are stranded on ships without electrical power, 

propulsion, toilets, air conditioning and adequate food for three to five days. What 

are the rights of those passengers? Getting off a ship when it is docked is an easy 

Right to guarantee. However there are still questions. As Senator Schumer observes 

in his May 21, 2013 letter to CLIA, who determines that essential provisions cannot 

be adequately provided? If someone on the ship or the cruise line is the decision 

maker, how can passengers appeal that decision? But there is also the issue of disembarking in a port that requires clearance by customs and immigration officials. 

A cruise ship can prevent disembarkation if local port authorities do not cooperate. 

What are the rights of passengers then? 

The issue of landing and needing clearance from immigration officials was raised 

as a potential concern when Carnival Triumph had its fire and the company decided 

to tow the ship to a U.S. port rather than to a closer Mexican port. The explanation 

given was that many passengers didn’t have passports, so disembarking in Mexico 

and repatriating to the U.S. could be problematic. Does the location of a ship truncate one’s rights? On surface the Right sounds reasonable, but in the concrete situation with a range of conditions it isn’t as straightforward. 

2. The right to a full refund for a trip that is canceled due to mechanical failures, 

or a partial refund for voyages that are terminated early due to those failures. 

Again, the Right is straightforward and sounds reasonable. If a product paid for 

is not delivered there will be a refund. But the Right does not indicate whether the 

refund is in cash and how long it will take for the refund to be processed—the passenger paid for their cruise 60–90 days in advance of the cruise so shouldn’t they 

be entitled to the income generated by the cruise line for the period of time it held 

the money on deposit? As well, how is a partial refund calculated and what mechanism is in place for a passenger to challenge the entitlement offered by the cruise 

line. 

But there is a larger issue. What is a passenger’s Right when they fly to a distant 

port and learn upon arrival that their ship will not depart? Will the cruise line reimburse their travel costs to the port on top of refunding the cruise fare? This is 

not clear from the Passenger Bill of Rights. The Passenger Bill of Rights is also not 

clear about a passenger’s rights if a cruise line leaves port with a cruise ship that 

it is known will not be able to fulfill the published itinerary, as was the case on 

a couple of cruises listed in Appendix 2. 

A related issue is how the Passenger Bill of Rights applies to a missed port and/ 

or changed itinerary. There is a significant number of these as noted in Appendix 

2 (see for example Aurora (March 2009), Seven Seas Voyager (April 2009), Pacific 

Dawn (February 2010), Artemis (May 2010), Infinity (June 2010), Pacific Sun (February 2011), Enchantment of the Seas (February 2012), Carnival Legend (March 

2013), Seven Seas Voyager (March 2013), Crown Princess (April 2013)). Do passengers have the right to be refunded port fees, taxes, and port related services for 

which they have already paid when a port call skipped, and is this payment in cash 

rather than the typical practice of an onboard credit? Are they entitled to an additional payment for failure to deliver the published itinerary, especially when the 

change is due to a mechanical problem or failure? And should passengers have a 

right to be reimbursed for costs associated with an independently arranged shore 

excursion in a port call that is skipped or canceled? Finally, how are these refunds 

computed and by what means does a passenger have a right to dispute that computation? As the saying goes, the devil is in the details. 

While the Passenger Bill of Rights appears to address canceled cruises, albeit 

without sufficient clarity, it does not address the much more common occurrence of 

port calls that are canceled. What rights do passengers have in these cases? 

57 

3. The right to have available on board ships operating beyond rivers or coastal 

waters full-time, professional emergency medical attention, as needed until shore side 

medical care becomes available. 

Having on board professional emergency medical attention has been a long-standing practice on cruise ships—in fact it is required by International Labor Organization Convention 164, entitled ‘‘Health Protection and Medical Care for Seafarers,’’ 

requiring that ships ‘‘:engaged in international voyages of more than three days’ duration shall carry a medical doctor as a member of crew responsible for providing 

medical care.’’ However the qualifications of medical personnel has varied widely. 

In most cases a physician and/or a nurse provide medical services. Some cruise lines 

have a policy of only using medical professionals trained and board certified in the 

U.S., Canada, or U.K. Other cruise lines, in part because the fee paid is less, draw 

medical professionals from a range of countries. In all cases, medical professionals 

are considered independent contractors—they are paid a fee by the cruise line and 

receive a commission based on charges for medical services and prescriptions/supplies. Though the physician wears a senior officer’s uniform and is considered a 

member of the crew, she or he is not a cruise line employee and the cruise line 

claims no liability for his or her medical practice. 

While the Right states a standard practice, and reiterates a requirement of the 

CVSSA, it does not indicate a substantial fee is charged for emergency medical attention. The Passenger Bill of Rights should have greater transparency, clearly indicating that medical services on board a ship are fee-for-service. In addition, passengers have the Right to know the limitations on medical services on board a ship. 

One issue is the scope of practice of the individual physician. An equally, if not more 

important issue, is the limited nature of a ship’s infirmary. There may be limited 

diagnostic facility (e.g., no X-rays or complex blood tests) and there is no surgical 

theatre. As an experienced emergency physician on board a cruise ship told me, ‘‘my 

greatest fear is an ectopic pregnancy that needs emergency surgery—there is very 

little I can do in the middle of the ocean.’’ 

What this suggests is that the Passenger Bill of Rights should include useful information about the limits of medical care on a cruise ship so a passenger can make 

an informed decision and not go onboard expecting services that will not be available. In the absence of such information, the obvious question is whether a cruise 

ship, by the Passenger Bill of Rights, is accepting liability for cases where emergency medical attention may be inadequate or otherwise lacking in an emergency 

medical situation. What recourse is available to a passenger in such a case? 

4. The right to timely information updates as to any adjustments in the itinerary 

of the ship in the event of a mechanical failure or emergency, as well as timely updates of the status of efforts to address mechanical failures. 

On surface this right sounds ideal—what else could a passenger expect? However 

the term ‘‘timely’’ is subjective. I have been on cruises where timely was measured 

in hours (sometimes many hours) whereas I as a passenger measure timely in quarter hours. It would be helpful to a passenger in understanding the Right to know 

what is meant by timely. Aside from that, how will these information updates be 

provided—via public announcements on board or by written notifications? And what 

recourse does a passenger have if information updates are not timely? Are they entitled to compensation or some other consideration? In many ways the Right can easily become an empty promise. 

Another term requiring definition is ‘‘mechanical failure or emergency.’’ This presumably includes a situation where a ship is dead in the water or has an extended 

power loss. But does it also apply to a ship that has a propulsion problem causing 

it to sail at reduced speeds, or a medical emergency that delays a ship and causes 

a change in itinerary. It would seem that what the industry should be stating is 

that a passenger has a Right ‘‘to timely information updates as to any adjustments 

in the itinerary of the ship’’—full stop. 

The Right leaves unstated what compensation, if any, is available to passengers 

when a port call is dropped or an itinerary is changed. Will they be refunded all 

port fees, taxes and other port use expenses associated with that port? This was addressed above. In any case, the Passenger Bill of Rights should be explicit about the 

parameters for what their rights are and what their rights are not. 

5. The right to a ship crew that is properly trained in emergency and evacuation 

procedures. 

This is certainly a fair expectation on the part of passengers. However, there is 

a huge chasm between being properly trained in emergency and evacuation procedures—there may not be basis to argue that crewmembers aren’t trained—and those 

58 

18Dolan, J. 2013. ‘‘Crew Error Cited in Carnival Ship Fire that Led to Nightmare Tow,’’ Los 

Angeles Times (July 16). 19 U.S. Coast Guard. 2013. Report of Investigation into the Fire Onboard the Carnival Splendor which Occurred in the Pacific Ocean off the Coast of Mexico on November 8, 2010, which 

Resulted in Complete Loss of Power. MISLE Incident Investigation Activity Number 3897765. 

same crewmembers demonstrating through behavior competence in executing emergency and evacuation procedures. 

Unfortunately, there is a track record of crewmembers not demonstrating this 

competence, not only in emergency situations but in periodic inspections by the U.S. 

Coast Guard and in annual U.S. Coast Guard Control Verification exams. The report of the Carnival Splendor fire is a good example of the point I am making. Officers were likely properly trained, however the reports says that one reason for the 

catastrophic nature of the fire was human error—when the fire alarm first went off 

on the ship’s bridge, a crew member reset it, leading to a 15-minute delay in the 

activation of an automatic fire-suppression system. The report also faults the crew’s 

‘‘lack of familiarity with the engine room,’’ which hampered their ability to locate 

and fight the fire, and the captain’s decision to ‘‘ventilate’’ the compartment where 

the fire began before it was fully extinguished, allowing the flames to flare again.18

Two questions derive from these points. First, what will the cruise industry require to ensure that all crewmembers are properly trained—will current regimes of 

training be augmented or bolstered? How will proper training in emergency and 

evacuation procedures be verified? Second, what recourse does a passenger have 

when crewmembers do not demonstrate competence in emergency and evacuation 

procedures? Will the cruise line waive damage limits contained in the Passenger 

Contract and/or permit a passenger to file a lawsuit (including for emotional distress, mental suffering/anguish or psychological injury, presently excluded from the 

cruise line’s liability) for demonstrated failure of competence in emergency and evacuation procedures? These should be explicitly laid out in the Passenger Bill of 

Rights. 

6. The right to an emergency power source in the case of a main generator failure. 

Like other items in the Passenger Bill of Rights, the obvious question is what is 

included under ‘‘main generator failure’’ and what is excluded? We can point to Carnival Splendor, which had six diesel engines—a fire in one engine caused extensive 

damage to cables in the aft engine room that meant vessel engineers were unable 

to restart the unaffected main generator.19 How can CLIA guarantee that a similar 

or more catastrophic event wouldn’t happen on another ship? In the case of the Carnival Splendor it wasn’t that the main generator failed, but that the cables carrying 

power from the generator had been destroyed. Also on the Carnival Splendor the 

emergency generator apparently continued to work, but only provided power to 

emergency services. Does this technically comply with the right stipulated? 

In the case of Carnival Dream in March 2013, news reports indicate the main 

power generator had not failed, but the backup emergency diesel generator had 

failed, thus causing the cruise to be terminated when the ship was in Saint 

Maarten. This illustrates the confusion in the language in the Right—what is it actually telling a passenger and whether what is being promised can actually be delivered? And if the Right is not fulfilled, what recourse does a passenger have? 

This issue is made even more confusing when considering the number of cruise 

ships that have lost power and gone adrift—some for short periods of time; others 

for longer periods of time. How does this Right apply to a passenger in this situation? Does this Right apply to all power outages or only power outages of a certain 

duration and/or only power outages caused by failure of the main generator? Assuming a passenger has a Right to an emergency power source, what happens if it isn’t 

provided; what recourse or compensation is available to them? There are many 

questions raised by this Right, which on surface is intended to reinforce a sense of 

security, but upon reflection is potentially an empty promise. 

7. The right to transportation to the ship’s scheduled port of disembarkation or the 

passenger’s home city in the event a cruise is terminated early due to mechanical failures. 

This Right is already a common practice of the cruise industry, however the Passenger Bill of Rights doesn’t address two situations. First, what Right does a passenger have when a cruise ends early and passengers are returned to the port of 

embarkation—does the cruise line assume responsibility for the additional travel 

costs (and change fees on airline tickets) associated with getting from the port of 

disembarkation, does the cruise line assume responsibility for lodging and food expenses incurred by the passenger in getting home, and does the cruise line provide 

59 

compensation for a passenger who arrives home later than scheduled thereby losing 

salary from missed work and having expenses for childcare etcetera? The Right to 

transportation doesn’t appear to extend to these issues. Related to this is whether 

a passenger is accommodated in the same class of service on airlines and the same 

class of hotel that they normally choose. How long will a passenger wait for reimbursement of these costs and what mechanism is in place if there is a dispute between a cruise line and the passenger about the amount due to the passenger? Does 

the cruise line waive the Passenger Contract so the passenger can pursue a case 

in a court of law of their choosing (for example, if they live outside the U.S. or in 

a location remote from the court specified in the Passenger Contract’s forum selection clause)? 

Second, the Passenger Bill of Rights does not address the Right a passenger has 

when a ship arrives late in a port of disembarkation and the passenger has arranged his/her own transportation. Does a passenger in this case have the Right to 

have the cruise line assume responsibility for all additional travel costs (in the class 

of service originally booked) as well as lodging and food expenses incurred in getting 

home, and does the cruise line provide compensation for a passenger who arrives 

home later than scheduled thereby losing salary from missed work and having expenses for childcare etcetera? This is an area of rights that is not addressed at all 

in the Passenger Bill of Rights. 

8. The right to lodging if disembarkation and an overnight stay in an unscheduled 

port are required when a cruise is terminated early due to mechanical failures. 

Does this Right only apply to a cruise terminated due to a mechanical failure, or 

to any cruise terminated early? CLIA’s choice of more restrictive language suggests 

there are many situations when a cruise may be terminated in an unscheduled port 

of call and lodging would not be provided. How does this Right interface with the 

Passenger Bill of Rights’ #1? 

This Right also says nothing about the quality of the lodging provided. Does a cot 

in a high school gymnasium qualify as ‘‘lodging’’? Does lodging include a private 

bathroom? Based on past events, it is possible to imagine a range of scenarios. What 

Right to lodging, precisely, does a passenger have and will the cruise line assume 

all costs associated with that lodging? What recourse does a passenger have when 

the lodging provided is unacceptable. 

9. The right to have included on each cruise line’s website a toll-free phone line 

that can be used for questions or information concerning any aspect of shipboard operations. 

Cruise lines already have toll-free numbers accessible from telephones in the U.S. 

Will access to these numbers extend to all ports of call on the cruise line’s itinerary 

and to all countries from which passengers are drawn? More importantly, what will 

be done to ensure that the information provided by an operator at a toll-free number 

has accurate and correct information? Take for example the following correspondence I received from the parent of a passenger on Carnival Legend March 14, 2013: 

The ship is disabled and stuck in Costa Maya on March 13, 2013. I spoke with 

Carnival last night about how this might effect the itinerary because my daughter is on the ship. They told me they did not know anything about an alteration 

in the cruise schedule and would only tell me the ship was moving. I called the 

ship to try to speak with my daughter today and while I did not reach her, the 

ship officer confirmed to me that they were in Costa Maya and not Belize yesterday. Her boyfriend called Carnival this morning as well and they denied the 

ship was in Costa Maya and called it a rumor. I can understand a mechanical 

issue that needs to be addressed although this seems to be a big problem with 

this company. I cannot tolerate flat out lying and misinformation that they are 

providing about the Legend. 

What changes or initiatives are being undertaken by CLIA and its member lines 

in order to avoid a similar situation? What recourse does a passenger and/or his/ 

her family have when misinformation is provided or information is withheld? 

10. The right to have this Cruise Line Passenger Bill of Rights published on 

each line’s website. 

This seems like the easiest Right to realize, however a quick survey of CLIA-member cruise line websites on July 15, 2013, found that the Passenger Bill of Rights 

was apparently not published on 13 of the 26 member lines’ website. CLIA’s 

May 22, 2013, Press Release (Cruise Industry Adopts Passenger Bill of Rights) 

states that publishing the Passenger Bill of Rights on a cruise line’s website is a 

condition of membership in CLIA. Are these 13 members no longer members of 

60 

20See http://www.carnival.com/about-carnival/legal-notice/port-cancellation-policy.aspx 

CLIA? What right or recourse does a passenger have if they have purchased a ticket 

from one of these lines in the past eight weeks—does the Passenger Bill of Rights 

apply to them? 

CLIA Passenger Bill of Rights and the Cruise Contract 

There is one additional issue with the Passenger Bill of Rights. CLIA promised 

that the Passenger Bill of Rights would be added to Cruise Passenger Contracts. 

This is laudable, but this is not apparent from Passenger Contracts displayed on 

cruise line websites, but more importantly there is no mention of how conflicts and 

contradictions between the Passenger Bill of Rights and the Cruise Passenger Contract are resolved. Which has precedence? According to the standard passenger contract the cruise line has the right to alter a cruise itinerary for any reason and the 

passenger has no recourse. As Carnival Cruise Lines states in its hard-to-find 

‘‘Cruise Cancellation and Itinerary Change Policy’’ states: 

In the event an itinerary change becomes necessary while the ship is at sea or 

when notice prior to sailing is not feasible, Carnival and/or the Master will attempt to substitute an alternative port. Carnival and/or the Master may, in 

their discretion and for any purpose, deviate in any direction or for any purpose 

from the direct or usual course, and omit or change any or all ports of calls, 

arrival or departure times, with or without notice, for any reason whatsoever, 

all such deviations being considered as forming part of and included in the proposed voyage. Carnival shall have no liability for any refund or other damages 

in such circumstances.20

In terms of itinerary changes before a ship leaves port, the policy states: 

Due to the nature of a cruise vacation, itinerary changes sometimes become necessary for safety, weather or other reasons beyond the control of Carnival. If 

the itinerary change is for reasons beyond Carnival’s exclusive control, including but not limited to safety, security, weather, strikes, tides, hostilities, civil 

unrest, port closings, emergency debarkations of guests or crew, late air, sea, 

car or motor coach departures or arrivals, mechanical breakdowns or problems 

not known to Carnival, itinerary changes consistent with U.S. State Department travel warnings/advisories or other applicable U.S. or foreign governmental advisories, guests will not be provided any compensation. Guests electing to cancel will be subject to the standard cancellation terms. 

And in terms of passenger costs resulting from cruise cancellations or itinerary 

changes the policy states: 

Carnival shall not be liable to guests for any charges, fees or expenses paid or 

owed to third parties by guests (such as air travel booked by a guest directly 

with an airline) in connection with a cancelled cruise or an itinerary change for 

any reason. 

Carnival Cruise Lines’ Passenger Contract is even more restrictive: 

(c) If the performance of the proposed voyage is hindered or prevented (or in 

the opinion of Carnival or the Master is likely to be hindered or prevented) by 

war, hostilities, blockage, ice, labor conflicts, strikes on board or ashore, restraint of Princes, Rulers or People, seizure under legal process, breakdown of 

the Vessel, congestion, docking difficulties or any other cause whatsoever or if 

Carnival or the Master considers that for any reason whatsoever, proceeding to, 

attempting to enter, or entering or remaining at the port of Guest’s destination 

may expose the Vessel to risk or loss or damage or be likely to delay her, the 

Guest and his baggage may be landed at the port of embarkation or at any port 

or place at which the Vessel may call, at which time the responsibility of Carnival shall cease and this contract shall be deemed to have been fully performed, 

or if the Guest has not embarked, Carnival may cancel the proposed voyage without liability to refund passage money or fares paid in advance. (emphasis added) 

These statements appear at variance with a number of items in the Passenger 

Bill of Rights. It appears disingenuous to promote a Passenger Bill of Rights without also clarifying how conflicts between those rights and the cruise passenger contract are to be resolved. 

A common theme across all elements in the Passenger Bill of Rights is how a passenger deals with a Right that has not been fulfilled or has been directly violated. 

Are these rights ultimately governed by the cruise passenger contract that sets clear 

terms about when and how complaints and legal action must filed, and where law 

61 

21 It is worth mention that Royal Caribbean Cruises Limited, in anticipation of these hearings 

and concern that the facts might paint an unkind picture, sent an e-mail to all employees asking 

them to write their Senator with the following text: Dear Senator, As one of your constituents 

Continued 

suits must be filed? Forum selection clauses effectively truncate a passengers rights 

under the Passenger Bill of Rights given the requirement that legal action can only 

be taken in a court located in the state where the cruise line’s corporate headquarters is located (most frequently Florida). The cruise passenger contract also includes a ‘‘class action waiver,’’ prohibiting a passenger from taking any legal action 

as a member of a class or as a participant in a class action. For many passengers 

these are impediments to taking any action and they often resign to accepting whatever the cruise line offers, if anything. 

B. What the CLIA Passenger Bill of Rights Does Not Include 

1. Passenger Rights 

There are a number of things obviously missing from the CLIA Passenger Bill of 

Rights. Some of these have already been mentioned: 

• There is no mention of the recourse a passenger has if one of the Rights is not 

fulfilled or realized. 

• There is no indication of how a partial refund will be computed and whether 

that refund is provided in cash or, as common in the industry, as a discount 

on a future cruise or an onboard credit. 

• There is no mention of whether the cruise line is responsible for ancillary costs 

when a cruise is cancelled, including change fees for airline tickets and for the 

costs of the tickets themselves, the cost of lodging required in travel to the passenger’s home city, and support for food and incidentals associated with delays 

in getting from the ship to the passenger’s home city. 

• There is no mention of what rights a passenger has when a port of call is canceled. Some cruise lines refund ‘‘port fees and taxes,’’ however these are given 

as an onboard credit rather than as a cash refund. As well, there is no transparency with regard to the amount refunded. Some cruise lines average the cost 

of port fees and taxes so a refund for one port is the same as the other even 

though actual fees can vary widely from one port to another. Also, it isn’t transparent whether costs other than port taxes and fees that are not paid by the 

cruise line because of the canceled port call are also refunded to the passenger. 

There is considerable need for greater clarity and transparency around passenger rights when a port call is canceled. 

• There is no mention of what rights a passenger has when a cruise itinerary is 

changed, such as a cruise sailing the Eastern Caribbean instead of the Western 

Caribbean because of propulsion problems, or a cruise going to Canada instead 

of the Caribbean because of weather. The Passenger Cruise Contract is clear 

that the cruise line has no obligation or responsibility to provide compensation 

in these situations. This absence of rights should be clearly articulated in the 

Passenger Bill of Rights. 

• There is no mention of the rights a passenger has when embarkation is delayed. 

Does a passenger have a Right to meal vouchers or compensation for meals purchased (as is common in airline travel)? Also, after how many hours of waiting 

in a cruise terminal is the cruise line obligated to provide either lodging or a 

comfortable setting to wait? A comprehensive Passenger Bill of Rights would address these situations given the frequency of delayed embarkations. 

• There is no mention of a passenger’s rights when a cruise arrives late in its 

port of disembarkation, causing the passenger to miss transportation arrangements for their trip to their home city. 

In addition there are some rights that should be directly addressed. 

The Passenger Bill of Rights should clearly articulate the rights of a passenger 

who is ‘‘bumped’’ from a cruise because of overbooking or other issues. The most recent cases involve Carnival Sunshine, which bumped passengers on its June 7, 

2013, cruise because a number of cabins were needed for contractors completing 

work that was not completed while the ship was in dry dock. Similarly, passengers 

in 78 cabins on Grandeur of the Seas were bumped from the July 12, 2013 (and perhaps the July 19th), sailing because cabins were needed for workers who were still 

making repairs following the fire earlier in the year. Some of these bumped passengers had their cruise canceled because the ship had been out of service for repairs, and here they were bumped from their replacement cruise.21

62 

and an employee of lllllllllllllll, one of the major cruise lines serving North 

America, I am contacting you today out of concern regarding the July 24 Senate Commerce 

Committee hearing regarding the cruise industry. As an individual who is intimately familiar 

with cruising, it is apparent to me that there has been a great deal of misinformation and distortion regarding the industry in recent months. As one of your constituents, I am concerned 

that the industry will be unfairly portrayed at this hearing. As someone that works in the cruise 

line industry, I know firsthand that cruising is extremely safe and well regulated at the national 

level, by the U.S. Coast Guard, and by international authorities. Additionally, the cruise industry directly benefits businesses in all 50 states, generating over 355,000 jobs and over $42 billion 

in economic impact. It provides $17.4 billion in wages to American workers each year. I would 

greatly appreciate your support to ensure that the cruise industry receives a fair and balanced 

hearing. Thank you for your time and attention to this matter and your service to our Nation. 

Sincerely, Your Name 

Similarly, the Passenger Bill of Rights should discuss a passenger’s rights when 

they are expelled from a cruise ship, often for questionable reasons and the result 

is loss of cruise fare and their having responsibility for transportation from the port 

where they are left. Between January 2009 and June 30, 2013, there are eight cases 

list on my website where a passenger has been evicted or expelled (these are only 

ones reported in the media). These passengers have no right to appeal or recourse. 

The cruise line Cruise Passenger Contract gives them this unilateral, uncontestable 

Right to evict or expel, without liability. 

The Passenger Bill of Rights does not address a passenger’s rights when they miss 

the ship because of flight delays or because of weather conditions (such as Hurricane Sandy in the fall of 2013 when passengers lost their cruise fare because they 

couldn’t get to the ship). The cruise lines generally take the position that this type 

of situation is not their problem. A passenger without trip insurance is responsible 

for lost cruise fares and/or additional travel costs to join the ship at a later point. 

Further, it there are reports that some benefits under trip insurance policies offered 

by the cruise line are more restrictive in the benefits they provide than insurance 

policies offered independent of the cruise line. 

The Passenger Bill of Rights does not address a passenger’s rights to have safety 

concerns taken seriously. Though not the first time I have received this sort of information, on June 21, 2013, I received the following from a cruise passenger: 

We have just disembarked after a 7-day Alaskan cruise aboard Celebrity Solstice. We frequented the quasar dance club each night. On night two I noticed 

at 2300 (11pm), when the club only allows 18 and over, a crew member used 

a small rope to tie the handles of one of the two exits closed to prevent access. 

Not must looped but tied in a fashion that untying would be impossible is a 

smoke filled environment or panic. This room is required to have two emergency 

exits and this exit was clearly marked ‘‘emergency exit’’. This happened three 

nights in a row. I brought my concerns to the attention of guest services requesting to speak to the ships Safety Officer. I was told that another passenger 

had requested to speak with him also but he stated that he was ‘‘too busy with 

paperwork to speak to anyone’’. The guest services person apologized and drafted an e-mail to him explaining my concerns and that I am a 28 year firefighter. 

That night in quasar the doors were once again tied closed. As of this writing 

no staff or crew has contacted me. I would encourage that all passengers be 

aware of their surroundings. It appears Celebrity is not concerned with safety 

and if this blatant example of reckless disregard for its passengers and crew 

in a public space is allowed to exist, then I am wondering what other safety 

issues exist that we did not see. 

It would seem this passenger’s expectations were realistic, but they were ignored. 

Did he have any rights? And what rights were available for this disregard of concern for fire safety? 

Finally, the Passenger Bill of Rights does not address the Right to be free of sexual assault by crewmembers or cruise ship employees, or the Right to be free of 

other types of crime. This type of assurance seems only natural given the rate of 

sexual assault on cruise ships, but it is obviously one that would be difficult to fulfill 

(although no less difficult than some of the other rights included in the Passenger 

Bill of Rights). In this line of thought, the Passenger Bill of Rights should also contain a Right to contact the FBI directly from the ship when a victim of a crime. 

This Right is accorded by the CVSSA, so it should be provided, however most victims will be unaware of what is available to them without it explicitly being stated 

in something like a Passenger Bill of Rights. Alternatively, a cruise ship may be required to provide a crime victim with an information sheet outlining the rights and 

the options available to them, including the telephone numbers for relevant law enVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:32 May 14, 2015 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00066 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\94526.TXT JACKIE
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22Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2003. Voluntary Approaches to 

Environmental Policy: Effectiveness, Efficiency, and Usage in Policy Mixes, Paris:OECD. 23See section 2(d) of Carnival Cruise Lines’ passenger contract. 

forcement agencies, and agencies that provide direct services or referral to services 

that are likely to be needed by the victim. 

In sum, it appears the Passenger Bill of Rights is a public relations initiative that 

on its face accords more rights and protection to a passenger than is realistically 

the case. One problem is the many empty or nonspecific promises contained in the 

Passenger Bill of Rights, but a larger problem is there is no clear recourse for a 

passenger who believes the rights promised have not been provided. This is all 

based essentially based on a matter of trust, however as was observed by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 2003, trust (or voluntary approaches) does not substantively change the status quo of the way things 

are done. Focusing specifically on environmental policy, the OECD notes few cases 

where voluntary approaches have improved the environment beyond a business as 

usual baseline.22

Recommendation #17: Given the imprecise nature of the CLIA Passenger Bill of 

Rights, there is an obvious need for a legislated solution. Passenger rights can only 

be achieved by legislation that puts into place clear and specific measures for consumer protection, similar to those available to passengers of other modes of commercial transportation. 

This recommendation for greater consumer protection may help level the field between the rights of cruise passengers in the U.K. versus in the U.S. Unlike the U.S., 

there have been a number of successful lawsuits in the U.K. for ‘‘cruises from hell,’’ 

with problems ranging from illness outbreaks, lapses in service, and ships having 

facilities that are not in proper repair or that remain under construction following 

time in dry dock. 

2. Cruise Line Rights 

While the typical Passenger Cruise Contract accords few rights to the cruise passenger, it gives many rights to the cruise line. Unfortunately, the cruise passenger 

contract is rarely given to the passenger when they make their booking and put 

down a deposit. Further, they are not usually given a copy of the passenger contract 

before making full payment for their cruise 60–90 days before the cruise. Most frequently a copy of the cruise passenger contract is provided in small print on the 

back of the tickets sent to a passenger to be used for boarding. By accepting the 

ticket the passenger acknowledges receipt of applicable brochures and agrees to 

abide by the terms and conditions of the cruise line’s brochures and website, including but not limited to the information contained in the ‘‘Frequently Asked Questions’’ and ‘‘Embarkation Information’’ sections.23 At this point the passenger’s 

rights have already been compromised—he or she cannot cancel the cruise without 

losing all monies paid. A cruise line would likely say that the passenger could have 

downloaded the passenger contract from the company’s website, however a more 

proactive approach by the cruise line would make sense. When I buy an airline ticket I receive the passenger contract when I print or receive the ticket and I have 

24 hours to cancel that ticket without loss of funds. It only seems reasonable that 

a cruise passenger should receive a copy of the cruise passenger contract before his 

or her Right to a refund passes. 

As regards rights, there is an asymmetric power relationship between a passenger 

and a cruise ship. As already seen, the cruise line holds all of the power when it 

comes to itinerary changes and canceled cruises, and when it comes to crime. The 

cruise line similarly has full control over how to resolve customer service issues— 

not just evictions and expulsions, but lapses in providing the services and care a 

passenger is led to believe will be provided by advertising and promotional materials. The cruise contract either truncates a passenger’s rights in most situations, 

or reinforces the cruise line’s Right at the detriment of the passenger. 

Some of the cruise line’s rights appear unreasonable. For example, Carnival 

Cruise Line’s contract states: 

Carnival reserves the right to increase published fares and air fare supplements 

without prior notice. However, fully paid or deposited guests will be protected, 

except for fares listed, quoted, advertised or booked in error, fuel supplements, 

government taxes, other surcharges and changes to deposit, payment and cancellation terms/conditions, which are subject to change without notice. In the 

event that a cruise fare listed, quoted or advertised through any website, Carnival sales person, travel agent or any other source is booked but is incorrect 

64 

24 Coverage under the Warsaw Convention is approximately US$1,663; under the Montreal 

Convention US$20 per kg for loss of or damage or delay to checked baggage, and US$400 for 

unchecked package. 25LaMendola B. and T. Steighorst. 2002. ‘‘Cruise Lines Blame Passengers for 3rd Viral Outbreak on Ship,’’ Sun—Sentinel (November 12). 

due to an electronic error, typographical error, human error or any other error 

causing the fare to be listed, quoted or advertised for an amount not intended 

by Carnival, Carnival reserves the right to correct the erroneous fare by requesting the Guest to pay the correct fare intended, or by canceling the cruise 

in exchange for a full refund, but in no event shall Carnival be obligated to 

honor any such booking resulting from the error or otherwise be liable in such 

circumstances. 

Thus, a passenger can book a cruise only to be told later that they owe additional 

funds for a fuel supplement, surcharge, or government taxes. As well, if the company makes an error in booking a cruise at a fare it didn’t mean to, the passenger 

has no right to receive the fare advertised and under which the cruise ticket was 

issued. This is another stark contrast with the airline industry. 

The passenger contract also gives the cruise line the right to cancel the cruise contract at its discretion (and without the passengers consent)—the passenger has no 

reciprocal right. The cruise line also has no obligation to provide a passenger the 

cabin reserved when a reservation was made. As Carnival Cruise Lines’ contract 

states, ‘‘Carnival reserves the right to move Guests to a comparable stateroom for 

any reason, including but not limited to, instances in which a stateroom is booked 

with fewer than the maximum number of Guests the stateroom can accommodate.’’ 

Again, the passenger has no recourse. 

Finally, the cruise line retains an exclusive right to use photographs and videotapes of a passenger onboard a ship with no limitation (including in advertising and 

publicity) and without the passenger’s consent. Imagine taking a cruise and some 

time later seeing an advertisement or video with your image in a photograph or videotape (including when doing something silly or foolish). To some of us, this would 

be construed as a violation of privacy. Rightfully, consent should be required for use 

of anyone’s image in a public forum. 

3. Issues of Liability 

In addition to issue of the cruise line’s rights is the extreme limits placed on the 

company’s liability. For claims not involving personal injury, illness, or death a passenger must give notice of claim within 30 days of disembarkation from the vessel. 

Claims involving personal injury, illness or death must be filed with the company 

within 6 months of the injury, event, illness or death and a lawsuit must be filed 

within a year. In all cases that legal action is taken, it must be filed in the U.S. 

District Court or state court where the cruise line’s headquarters is located (referred 

to as a forum selection clause). As already mentioned, this severely limits the option 

available to many passengers. 

Baggage and Personal Effects 

Even when legal action may be initiated, there are other limits. Many passenger 

cruise contracts limit the liability of the cruise line for lost or damaged luggage and 

personal effects. For example, Carnival Cruise Lines’ passenger contract states ‘‘. . . 

that the aggregate value of Guest’s property does not exceed $50 USD per guest or 

bag with a maximum value of $100 USD per stateroom regardless of the number 

of occupants or bags.’’ Consequently, a family of four whose luggage is lost by the 

cruise line is due only $100—this doesn’t even cover the cost of the luggage, much 

less the contents. A passenger can increase these limits by declaring a higher value 

and paying 5 percent of the declared value to the cruise line. In contrast, the passenger contract for an air carrier limits liability to approximately $1,500 per passenger.24 A family of four on a cruise would have to pay $280 to the cruise line for 

the same level of coverage provided automatically by an air carrier. 

Illness Outbreaks 

Cruise lines operating out of U.S. ports and serving U.S. ports have successfully 

avoided liability for illness outbreaks. This has not consistently been the case in the 

U.K. where there are stronger consumer protection laws. Part of the cruise industry’s defense is their mantra that ‘‘passengers bring the illness with them,’’ thereby 

coloring itself as an unwilling victim. As Rose Abello, vice president of Public Relations of Holland America Line stated, ‘‘The ship is not sick. There are sick people 

getting on the ship.’’ 25 This mantra was first used in late-2002 when there was a 

wave of very visible norovirus outbreaks on cruise ships, and it proved effective. InVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:32 May 14, 2015 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00068 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\94526.TXT JACKIE
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terestingly, The International Council of Cruise Lines (ICCL) laid out its strategy 

at the 2003 World Cruise Tourism Summit on March 3, 2003. An almost-inspirational video was shown about the situation in which the industry found itself and 

the way that it successfully responded on the public relations front. 

At the start of the video, the industry was depicted as receiving an inordinate 

amount of attention for a series of norovirus outbreaks on cruise ships. Illness on 

cruise ships had been the topic of stories on mainstream television: Inside Edition, 

CNN, NBC, and many others. The industry had even become the brunt of jokes on 

late night television—Jay Leno and David Letterman among others. Evening news 

with increasing frequency showed people who had become sick on board ships. 

The video described the industry’s media strategy had three elements: provide 

talking points to cruise executives and others in a position to present the industry’s 

position, arrange as many media interviews as possible, and flood the media with 

positive information about the cruise industry. It proactively distributed pictures 

and video footage showing ships being disinfected, and engaged in positive messaging. Carnival Cruise Lines’ president, Bob Dickinson, framed the problem as part 

of a national epidemic and said there was no cause-and-effect with regard to 

norovirus on cruise ships. Colin Veitch, NCL’s CEO, pointed to the incidence of 

norovirus in the general population to minimize the problem as unique to cruise 

ships. The industry also enlisted the help of third parties in its campaign, most significantly the Centers for Disease Control. It helped promote the idea that people 

get sick on airplanes too, but they don’t experience symptoms until they get home 

so they don’t associate it with air travel. 

ICCL’s video concluded with ‘‘Smooth Seas Ahead.’’ The industry successfully 

fought off the negative media attention and reframed the issue. Its message was two 

pronged: cruises are a great vacation at a good price, and why worry about 

norovirus—it is as common as the common cold. You can’t argue with that. The 

media became desensitized to the issue and most of the 79 outbreaks affecting 6,630 

people in 2003 and 2004 went unnoticed. The problem continues: in 2012 the were 

were 34 known outbreaks affecting 5,542 passengers. 

When an outbreak does happen ill passengers often are quarantined in their cabin 

for days; whether they receive any compensation is wholly at the cruise line’s discretion. However, cruise lines are not as innocent or defenseless as they would like to 

appear. In 2005 and again in 2008 I argued in my books, in response to claims by 

the industry that the low incidence among prove that norovirus is largely a passenger problem, that there are systemic disadvantages for crewmembers to report 

when they are ill. This position appears to be supported by recent CDC health inspections that have identified cases where crewmembers have continued to report 

to work despite being ill, including in positions of food handling and food service. 

The problem for passengers is that cruise lines have effectively escaped liability 

for illness among passengers. To my knowledge there have been no successful lawsuits in the U.S. for these outbreaks even though similar lawsuits have been successful under consumer protection laws in the U.K. 

Independent Contractors 

A cruise ship is populated with many independent contractors whose behavior and 

practice the cruise line assumes no liability. Most visibly these include medical services (physician(s) and nurse(s)), but spa and personal care services (including health 

and beauty staff), photographers and video diary staff, retail shop personnel, casino 

workers, art auctioneers, and all other concessionaires. Even though many of these 

people wear clothing with the cruise line’s logo, and in the case of medical personnel 

officer uniforms, they are not considered cruise line employees. Unbeknownst to 

most passengers, the cruise ship has no liability for services provided and billed to 

the passenger’s onboard account. The status of these groups as independent service 

providers over whom the cruise line has no authority, control, or responsibility (even 

though tacitly endorsed by the cruise line) needs to be more clearly visible to passengers. At the very least, there should be signage or formal notification to passengers of this fact. 

Medical Care 

Medical services are a bit different. In an emergency situation, the passenger has 

no choice but to accept the service of medical personal who the cruise line has 

judged to be appropriate for medical care on its ship. But the cruise ship has no 

liability for their practice. It is a hard concept to get one’s head around given the 

service is offered by the cruise line and the cruise ship collects the fees. But the 

nature of this arrangement was supported by the Florida Supreme Court in February 2007 and by the U.S. Supreme Court in October 2007. 

66 

26Supreme Court of Florida. 2007. Carnival Corporation vs. Darce Carlisle, Case No. SC 04– 

393, February 15. 27 Chen, S. 2007. ‘‘Trouble at Sea: Free-Agent Doctors,’’ Wall Street Journal (October 24). 

The case began ten years before in March 1997. Fourteen-year-old Elizabeth Carlisle was on a Caribbean cruise on Carnival Destiny with her family. On the second 

night out of Miami she developed severe abdominal pain. She consulted the ship’s 

physician, Dr. Mauro Neri, who had finished medical school in his native Italy in 

1981 and had held nine medical jobs in Italy, Africa and England in the fifteen 

years before joining Carnival Cruise Lines. His salary was $1,057 a month. Dr. Neri 

advised that Elizabeth was suffering from the flu and sent her on her way. But her 

pain became worse. On the third visit to the infirmary, after Elizabeth’s parents 

specifically asked whether the problem could be appendicitis, Dr. Neri conducted his 

first physical exam. He responded that he was sure the problem was not the girl’s 

appendix. 

When the pain continued to grow worse Elizabeth’s parents called their family 

physician in Michigan, who advised they return home. The family took the advice, 

and shortly after arriving home Elizabeth underwent emergency surgery to remove 

her ruptured appendix. The infection had rendered the fourteen year old sterile and 

caused lifelong medical problems. Elizabeth sued Carnival Cruise Lines in Florida 

state court, a case she lost on Carnival’s motion for summary judgement. The cruise 

line claimed it was not responsible for the medical negligence of the doctor on board 

and pointed to the fine print in the passenger cruise contract to support its position. 

The family appealed the Circuit Court’s decision to Florida’s Third District Court 

of Appeal, where the parents argued the cruise line was vicariously liable for the 

doctor’s negligence. Judge Joseph Nesbitt agreed and reversed the lower court’s decision. The judge held that the cruise line had control over the doctor’s medical services for agency law purposes; the doctor was to provide medical services to passengers and crew in accordance with the cruise line’s guidelines. And as it was foreseeable that some passengers at sea would develop medical problems (and that the 

only realistic alternative for such a passenger was treatment by the ship’s doctor) 

the cruise line had an element of control over the doctor-patient relationship. As 

such, the cruise line’s duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances extended to the actions of a ship’s doctor placed onboard by the cruise line. The doctor 

was an agent of the cruise line and his negligence was imputed to the cruise line. 

This invalidated the cruise ticket’s purported limitation of the cruise line’s liability 

for the negligence of its agents. 

Judge Nesbitt’s decision was groundbreaking. It was likely the very first case 

where a cruise line was held responsible for the care provided by a ship’s physician. 

Not surprisingly, Carnival appealed the case to the Florida Supreme Court. While 

the court almost agreed with the lower court’s assertion that times had changed and 

that a doctor’s negligence at sea also shows negligence by the cruise line, it ultimately found in favour of Carnival. Justice Peggy Quince wrote in her opinion: 

We find merit in the plaintiff ’s argument and the reasoning of the district 

court. However, because this is a maritime case, this Court and the Florida district courts of appeal must adhere to the Federal principles of harmony and uniformity when applying Federal maritime law.26

The case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court and the court refused to hear 

it. The Florida Supreme Court’s decision was the final word. If the Carlisle family 

wanted to pursue the case they would have to sue the physician directly. But this 

would be difficult in their case, and in most involving medical malpractice on cruise 

ships, given that they’d first have to locate the physician in his present home. 

Cruise lines historically have not provided assistance with locating former staff 

members. In addition, malpractice cases involving treatment in international waters 

must be filed in the courts of the physician’s country of origin, which is both difficult 

and expensive.27

Shore Excursions 

Shore excursions are a major source of income for a cruise ship—the cruise ship 

retains 50—70 percent or more of what a passenger pays for the tour. These tours 

are sold onboard at a Shore Excursion Desk by staff members wearing the cruise 

line’s uniform. But when something goes wrong on a shore excursion, the cruise line 

is quick to remind the passenger that they are not liable; shore excursions are provided by independent contractors. Appendix 1 indicates 14 known deaths on shore 

excursions (these are only incidents that have been reported in the media; there are 

many more than this) and five robberies ashore (some at knife or gun point) on 

67 

28Glass, J. 1996. ‘‘Compromise on U.S. Cruise Tort,’’ Lloyd’s List (October 1), p. 1. 29Fox, L. and B. R. Fox. 1995. ‘‘Anchored in the Docks, Washington Post (October 8), p. E4. 30 Rowe, S. 1996. ‘‘There Oughta Be a Law,’’ Miami New Times (March 21). 31 Ibid. 32Glass, J. 1996. ‘‘Compromise on U.S. Cruise Tort,’’ Lloyd’s List (October 1), p. 1. 

shore excursions affecting dozens of passengers—these again are only those that 

have been reported in the media so they underrepresent the true number. 

If there is an injury or death on a shore excursion, the cruise passenger’s options 

are limited in U.S. courts. Their options in a court in the country where the shore 

excursion was offered may also offer few options. The problem is that shore excursions are largely unregulated, except by the cruise line itself, and some can be quite 

dangerous. 

While the cruise line has no liability for shore excursions, they tend to dissuade 

passengers from taking tours that are independently available. They may talk about 

safety concerns for a tour that is not approved, and will often warn passengers that 

the advantage of the ship-sponsored tour is that if they are delayed the ship will 

wait for them. In contrast, the ship will not wait for a passenger delayed on an independent tour. While more and more passengers are choosing to make private arrangements for land-based tours, those who make advance plans may find they are 

out money when a ship alters its itinerary or cancels a port call. 

Sexual Assaults 

The issue of liability for sexual assaults reached public attention in the mid1990s. A tort reform measure attached to the Coast Guard Reauthorization bill had 

passed on May 9, 1995. The amendment, for the most part written by the ICCL, 

was introduced by Representative Don Young. He referred to it as a ‘‘noncontroversial manager’s amendment.’’ 28 It passed the House by a vote of 406 to 12. Only 

afterwards did people read the final print. 

One provision, directed at mounting claims from injuries and sexual assaults, limited liability to passengers and crew for ‘‘infliction of emotional distress, mental suffering or psychological injury’’ unless negligence or an intentional act can be proven. 

The American Trial Lawyers Association characterized the amendments as ‘‘dangerous legislation’’ that ‘‘jeopardized the safety of women on cruise ships.’’ Opposition also came from the Women’s Defense Fund, the National Organization for 

Women’s Legal Defense Fund, the Maritime Committee of the AFL–CIO, and rape 

treatment centers.29

The amendment languished for more than a year waiting to go to a House–Senate 

conference where lawmakers would resolve the House and Senate versions of the 

Coast Guard Reauthorization Bill. Lobbying by the industry continued, including a 

delegation of cruise line executives led by Micky Arison in March 1996. He and Celebrity Cruise’s president Richard Sasso met with Senator Larry Pressler and separately with other members of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and 

Transportation. Pressler chaired the Committee and would serve on the conference 

committee charged with reconciling the House and Senate versions.30 By October 1, 

1996, a compromise had been negotiated. Ernest Hollings, from the Senate’s Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee, observed before the Conference 

Committee that no one knew if the cruise ship people had enough votes to push the 

amendments through, but the cruise industry figured they were 50 percent there 

and didn’t have much to lose.31 When the Conference Committee convened, Senator 

Hollings threatened to kill the entire reauthorization bill if ICCL’s amendments remained. In the end he capitulated after amended language was adopted for the two 

provisions. 

In the final version, ship owners were prohibited from limiting their liability in 

cases involving sexual harassment, sexual misbehavior, assault, or rape in cases 

where the victim is physically injured. Limitations were allowed in all other situations.32 Current passenger cruise contracts read, as does Carnival Cruise Line’s, the 

cruise line shall not be liable to the passenger for damages for emotional distress, 

mental suffering/anguish or psychological injury of any kind under any circumstances, except when such damages were caused by the negligence of Carnival 

and resulted from the same passenger sustaining actual physical injury, or having 

been at risk of actual physical injury, or when such damages are held to be intentionally inflicted by the cruise line. Consequently, unless a cruise line can be found 

negligent, a victim of a sexual assault, whether be a crew member or a fellow passenger, has no claim for emotional distress, mental suffering/anguish or psychological injury. This position appears insensitive, especially to those (including children) victimized by a cruise ship employee. 

68 

Limit of Liability 

In addition to the issues already discussed, there is one other limitation on a 

cruise line’s liability that is worth mention; specifically that the cruise line is not 

liable for the intentional or negligent acts of any persons not employed by the cruise 

line (including independent contractors and other passengers) nor for any intentional or negligent acts of cruise ship employees committed while off duty or outside 

the course and scope of their employment. This last exclusion is a huge loophole 

given the cruise line has no responsibility when a crewmember commits a sexual 

assault when off duty. As well, they are not responsible when the sexual assault 

is not part of the scope of their employment—by its very nature, an assault would 

be outside the scope on one’s employment. While there are a large number of lawsuits filed against cruise lines for sexual assaults, the vast majority of these are settled out of court, presumably because the cruise line wishes to avoid negative publicity. However, in how many of these cases can the cruise line effectively use the 

disclaimer in the passenger cruise contract? 

Recommendation #18: Given the many limits on cruise line liability, there 

should be a requirement that cruise lines provide passengers, in advance of when 

penalties accrue for cancelation, a clear statement in plain, clear English (and 

French or Spanish as required) of all limits on liability and laying out all rights 

that can be freely exercised, without limitation, by the passenger. 

Recommendation #19: That consumer protection legislation be promulgated that 

extends to cruise passenger common rights and opportunities for complaint or other 

action similar to those available to consumers of other services, especially transportation services such as train, airlines, and other commercial carriers. 

IV. In Closing 

Thank you again for the opportunity to share my observations and insights generated from my 17 years as an academic whose research has focused on the cruise 

industry. I welcome your questions. 

V. Summary of Recommendations 

Recommendation #1: There is need for systematic reporting of all cruise ship incidents to an independent, central authority charged with responsibility for data 

analysis and policy and operational recommendations. 

Recommendation #2: Similar to data maintained on airlines documenting ‘‘on 

time’’ performance, there should be a mechanism whereby cruise ships and cruise 

lines have reported their adherence to itineraries and on time performance. 

Recommendation #3: There is need for greater oversight and monitoring of the 

cruise industry in order to monitor changing trends and to determine whether these 

changes are related to changes in safety and/or casualties. 

Recommendation #4: Ships operating from U.S. ports should be obligatorily subject to accident investigations by the National Transportation Safety Board as a condition of using U.S. ports, and should be subject to fines and other administrative 

actions the NTSB is empowered to take with other modes of commercial transportation. 

Recommendation #5: There needs to be funded research, ideally provided by the 

cruise industry to a wholly independent body, to learn from those cruise lines that 

appear to be effective in reducing incidents and accidents. 

Recommendation #6: Ships should have thorough and exhaustive safety inspections by the U.S. Coast Guard without advance warning. Full reports (including all 

details) of cruise ship inspections by the U.S. Coast Guard should be available online. 

Recommendation #7: Original provisions of the CVSSA regarding railing height 

and technology to detect passengers who have fallen overboard be reconsidered. 

Recommendation #8: The CVSSA should require reported cases of sexual assault 

committed on a cruise ship be displayed online and broken down by cruise line and 

cruise ship. In addition, the raw data of cases should be made available upon request 

for statistical/sociological analysis in order to permit a social epidemiology of the 

problem. 

Recommendation #9: The CVSSA should require passengers to be advised of the 

hours during which crewmembers may access their cabin without specific permission 

from the passenger. 

69 

1Data based on media and other reports as recorded at Cruise Junkie dot Com 

Recommendation #10: The CVSSA more clearly and specifically state requirements for CCTV surveillance and the quality and format of tape recordings. 

Recommendation #11: The CVSSA explicitly require the ‘‘Security Guide’’ be 

placed in plain sight in every passenger cabin and that the content of the guide include information about the types of crimes on cruise ships, where they commonly 

occur, and steps a passenger can take to decrease the likelihood of becoming a victim 

of crime. 

Recommendation #12: The CVSSA should require onboard physicians to be 

board certified in emergency medicine, family practice medicine, or internal medicine 

in the U.S., U.K., Canada, Australia, France, or Germany. Further, there should be 

clear statements about how cruise ships will treat the psychological and safety needs 

of sexual assault victims, especially victims who are minors. 

Recommendation #13: Cruise ships should be required to have a private, independent law enforcement agent for purposes of crime investigation. These would be 

similar to the wholly-independent Ocean Rangers placed on cruise ships by the State 

of Alaska to monitor discharge of waste streams while the ship is in Alaska state 

waters. 

Recommendation #14: In the absence of a professionally qualified crime scene investigator, a cruise ship should be required to have onboard a staff person with more 

than adequate training in all facets of crime scene preservation, collection of evidence, and methods to ensure proper chain of evidence. 

Recommendation #15: Cruise ship personnel should take more seriously their responsibility to detain perpetrators of sexual assault until the ship arrives at its next 

U.S. port. Further, Congress should contemplate whether there needs to be a legislated requirement to ensure perpetrators are isolated from the general public onboard 

the ship and held for delivery to land-based law enforcement personnel. 

Recommendation #16: The CVSSA should require reporting to the FBI of all on- board crime, including thefts less than $10,000 and simple assaults. 

Recommendation #17: Given the imprecise nature of the CLIA Passenger Bill of 

Rights, there is an obvious need for a legislated solution. Passenger rights can only 

be achieved by legislation that puts into place clear and specific measures for consumer protection. 

Recommendation #18: Given the many limits on cruise line liability, there 

should be a requirement that cruise lines provide passengers, in advance of when 

penalties accrue for cancelation, a clear statement in plain, clear English (and 

French or Spanish as required) of all limits on liability and laying out all rights 

that can be freely exercised, without limitation, by the passenger. 

Recommendation #19: That consumer protection legislation be promulgated that 

extends to cruise passenger common rights and opportunities for complaint or other 

action similar to those available to consumers of other services, especially transportation services such as train, airlines, and other commercial carriers. 

Appendix 1: Summary of Cruise Ship Incidents, January 2009–June 2013 1

Cancelations, Itinerary Changes, Missed Port Calls (N=271) *

Cruise with Media-Reported Canceled Port Calls 104 

Cruise with Media-Reported Itinerary Changes 69 

Cruise with Media-Reported Canceled Cruises 25 

Cruise with Media-Reported Delayed Embarkation and/or debarkation: 73 

*Does not include changes caused by a hurricane or tropical storm 

Mechanical Problems (N=353) 

Aground 19 

Collision 37 

Collision with Pier 15 

Damage in Storm 5 

Detained for Safety 5 

Electrical Problems 8 

Engine Problems 26 

Fire (6 evacuation; 4 power loss) 61 

Generator Problems 5 

Lifeboat Failure 7 

70 

Maneuverability/Steering Problems 15 

Material Failure 53 

Power Loss (7 adrift, 1 towed) 21 

Propulsion Problems (7 adrift) 62 

Severe List 11 

Technical Problems 8 

Deaths on Shore (N=37) 

Dive/Scuba (1 on Shore Excursion) 4 

Jet Ski 1 

Parasailing (3 on Shore Excursion) 3 

Snorkeling (3 on Shore Excursion) 8 

Swimming (7 on Shore Excursion) 13 

Other 8 

Miscellaneous (N=269) 

Accidents Ashore (8 on Shore Excursion) 10 

Bomb Threats: 14 

Child Pornography Seized 8 

Illness Outbreaks 189 

Injuries on Shorex (n=52) 5 

Passengers expelled/evicted 11 

Robberies Ashore (5 on Shore Excursion) 13 

Onboard Falls (3 deaths) 9 

Thefts > $10K 10 

Appendix 2: Ships with Two or More Mechanical Incidents, January 2009– 

June 2013 

A. Carnival Corporation (7 companies, 45 ships, 145 incidents) 

Carnival Cruise Lines (19 ships, 74 incidents) 

Carnival Destiny (n=6) 

11/18/2009 Primary motor unit 1 tripped due to malfunction 

1/26/2010 Propulsion problems; itinerary changed, cruises canceled 

10/22/2010 Propulsion problems; primary motor two faulty 

9/10/2011 Lifeboat damaged—removed for repair 

1/7/2012 Material failure 

1/24/2013 Problem with stern thrusters; itinerary changed 

Carnival Dream (n=3) 

7/6/2011 Propulsion problems; change from Western Caribbean to Eastern Caribbean 

itinerary 

10/7/2012 Fire 

3/14/2013 Malfunction of backup emergency diesel generator, power outages and plumbing 

issues; cruise canceled in St. Maarten 

Ecstasy (n=5) 

1/19/2009 Propulsion problems; operating on half power 

2/13/2009 Fire 

1/28/2010 Collision with gangway 

4/22/2010 Severe list to avoid buoy; damage and 60 injuries 

4/18/2013 Power failure; some onboard attribute it to a fire 

Elation (n=3) 

10/20/2009 Propulsion problems as a result of failure with electronic control system 

1/13/2011 Technical problem with propulsion system; port call skipped 

3/14/2013 Steering problems; tugboat escort required 

Fantasy (n=4) 

1/29/2009 Equipment failure in steering system 

1/5/2010 Lifeboat failure/material failure 

7/27/2011 Collision with Imagination; minor damage 

10/17/2011 Vessel maneuverability problem; arrives in port late 

Fascination (n=3) 

7/1/2010 Loss of power for several hours, adrift; late arrival 

2/27/2011 Material failure 

1/19/2013 Late return from dry dock; 7 hour delay 

Carnival Freedom (n=3) 

2/6/2010 Fire in crew cabin 

71 

6/27/2011 Blackout due to generator failure; fuel oil filters cleaned, fuel oil purifiers started 

and chemical treatment added to the both service tanks. 

8/21/2011 Material failure 

Carnival Glory (n=3) 

5/15/2011 Vessel maneuverability 

11/14/2012 Material failure 

12/2/2012 Propulsion problems 

Holiday (transferred to Iberocruises in 2010) (n=4) 

1/20/2009 Material failure 

2/6/2009 Technical problem causing reduced speeds; dropped port call on this and next 

cruise 

3/9/2009 Material failure 

4/11/2009 Material failure 

Imagination (n=3) 

7/13/2010 Fire in the elevator machinery room leaving two passenger elevators and one crew 

elevator inoperable 

7/27/2011 Collision with Fantasy 

9/28/2011 Toilets in front and midship inoperable for day 

Carnival Legend (n=10) 

3/21/2009 Smoke and fire system on Deck B–A–1 in fault and not operating properly 

6/21/2009 Unpalatable water in cabins 

9/30/2009 Collision with Enchantment of the Seas; minor damage 

2/7/2010 Maneuverability problems given malfunctioning azipod 

2/14/2010 Mechanical problems cause seven-hour delay leaving Tampa, itinerary changed; 

vessel pitched when leaving Roatan, maybe caused by touching channel wall 

7/11/2010 Loss of propulsion on port azipod while entering port; faulty circuit breaker 

tripped 

1/17/2012 Material failure 

1/29/2012 Technical problem with starboard azipod causes late arrival (5 hours) and delayed 

embarkation (2 hours) 

3/14/2013 Disabled and stuck in Costa Maya; a day later underway with reduced speed and 

changed itinerary 

3/16/2013 Propulsion problems; changed itinerary 

Carnival Liberty (n=4) 

4/26/2010 Problems with palatable water in cabin 

11/5/2010 Two diesel generators shutdown because of malfunction 

1/15/2012 Technical problem, severe list 

11/25/2012 Loss of electrical power 

Carnival Miracle (n=3) 

1/10/2010 Lifeboat material failure 

1/28/2010 Collision with pier at Port Zante (St. Kitts); stay overnight for repairs and arrive 

late for disembarkation 

1/18/2011 Lifeboat material failure 

Carnival Paradise (n=2) 

8/31/2012 Material failure 

10/1/2012 Partial loss of propulsion; power loss 

Carnival Pride (n=2) 

5/16/2009 Fire in battery room 

3/31/2011 Blown from mooring at Port Canaveral; delayed departure 

Sensation (n=2) 

2/9/2012 Burst pipe floods 10–20 cabins; departure delayed 4–5 hours 

5/22/2012 Fire 

Carnival Splendor (n=7) 

11/8/2009 Delay in Long Beach (7 hours) to repair fire door 

11/25/2009 Collision with Radiance of the Seas in Puerto Vallarta 

12/17/2009 Collision with pier in Puerto Vallarta, stayed until 3:30PM next day for repairs; 

next port call canceled 

2/18/2010 Sharp turn (radar missed some small yachts in path) causes flooding onboard 

11/8/2010 Fire lasting several hours knocks out all power, ship towed back to San Diego; 

this and next 8–10 cruise canceled 

1/6/2013 Itinerary changed to permit two days in Puerto Valllarta for repair of damage to 

propulsion system 

1/13/2013 Cruise delayed one day given repair of propulsion system; itinerary changed 

72 

Carnival Triumph (n=4) 

3/14/2010 Vessel maneuverability 

11/18/2010 Oil leak from shaft seal of forward bow thruster; disabled until repairs made 

1/27/2013 Technical problem with propulsion system affecting cruising speed; 6 hour delay 

in return to port 

2/10/2013 Disabling fire, adrift for days with no power/electricity, towed to port; cruise canceled 

Carnival Victory (n=2) 

1/17/2010 Failure of UPS battery charger 

1/20/2013 Propulsion problem; leaves port almost 24 hours late, itinerary change 

Costa Cruises (1 ship, 2 incidents) 

Costa Europa (n=2) 

3/5/2009 Propulsion problems lead to passenger revolt; ports missed 

2/26/2010 Collision with pier in Sharm-el-Sheikh killing three crew and injuring four passengers; cruise canceled 

Cunard Line (1 ship, 6 incidents) 

Queen Mary 2 (n=6) 

7/22/2009 Broke from mooring lines; damage to stern, four hour delayed departure 

9/23/2010 Loss of electric and all power for an hour after explosion in electric panel 

10/5/2011 Fire causes power loss in major storm, damage onboard; arrive in NYC 2 hours 

late 

10/17/2011 Went ‘‘dead in the water’’ twice during transatlantic cruise 

2/4/2012 Total power failure, ‘‘dead in the water’’ 

10/23/2012 Material failure 

Holland America Line (7 ships, 21 incidents) 

Maasdam (n=4) 

3/17/2009 Fire in crew galley 

5/22/2009 Severe list caused by pilot error 

8/8/2012 Sewage and refuse from ship washes up on shore at Nahant, MA 

6/13/2013 Port forward propulsion system malfunctioning; 2.5 hour delayed departure and 

sailing at reduced speed 

Prinsendam (n=2) 

9/11/2010 Major damage from storm—50 windows blown out (with flooding) and dent in 

prow of ship 

12/17/2010 Lifeboat failure 

Ryndam (n=2) 

11/18/2012 Material failure 

6/8/2013 Fire—40 minute wait for all clear after initial alarm 

Statendam (n=2) 

12/21/2009 Engine problems, changed itinerary 

9/22/2012 Fuel pump explosion causes two hour power outage 

Westerdam (n=2) 

5/11/2011 Collision with ice; damage 15 feet below water line 

10/28/2011 Fire 

Zaandam (n=6) 

1/13/2009 Alternator of #5 generator exploded causing switchboard to ground out; emergency 

generator started 43 second later 

7/13/2010 Fire 

7/28/2010 Loss of electrical power 

8/11/2010 Material failure 

6/7/2011 Material failure 

10/19/2012 Mechanical problems and/or flooding onboard 

Zuiderdam (n=3) 

7/8/2010 Material failure 

2/9/2012 Fire in engine room 

9/25/2012 Material failure 

P&O Cruises (4 ships, 12 incidents) 

Artemis (n=2) 

4/7/2010 Engine problems, skipped St. Barts 

5/8/2010 Engine problems, itinerary changed from 10 ports to 4 ports (Pax advised when 

boarding that there were engine problems and 1 port would be skipped) 

73 

Aurora (n=4) 

3/3/2009 Propulsion problems—Broke down 4 hours after leaving Sydney. Stuck in Auckland (with passengers aboard) for five days for repairs. Itinerary changed 

9/18/2009 Mechanical problems and loss of bow thruster; changed itinerary 

9/30/2011 Electrical problems delay for three hours departure from Portland, ME 

2/8/2013 Fault with port propeller shaft. Delayed in Auckland, dropped two port calls 

Oriana (n=4) 

8/5/2010 Delayed four hours in Dubrovnik; computers crash causing loss of steering system 

8/7/2010 Fire on tender 

11/30/2010 Engine breakdowns; missed port call 

6/2/2011 Collision with pier 

Ventura (n=2) 

10/18/2012 60 mm crack on full width of deck 14; passengers advised to not use balconies 

3/17/2013 Propulsion problems cause missed ports and itinerary changes 

P&O Australia (3 ships, 10 incidents) 

Pacific Dawn (n=3) 

1/8/2009 Engine problems; arrival in Sydney 10 hours late 

2/15/2010 Propulsion and maintenance problems cause 18 hour delayed departure; itinerary 

changed 

4/10/2010 Loss of power and propulsion; near miss collision with bridge 

Pacific Pearl (n=2) 

2/2/2011 Three-meter-across chandelier falls three storeys into cafe ́ area in atrium 

2/3/2011 Lack of running water and working toilets 

Pacific Sun (Left fleet in 2012) (n=5) 

11/10/2009 Cruise canceled to permit repair of propulsion system 

3/13/2010 Mechanical problems cause canceled port calls at Suva and Denarau 

4/21/2010 Engine problems; cruise canceled 

11/2/2010 Propulsion problem; 10 hour delayed arrival at Melbourne 

2/28/2011 Engine problems, 24 hour delayed arrival at Newcastle; several ports canceled 

Princess Cruises (10 ships, 34 incidents) 

Caribbean Princess (n=9) 

10/16/2009 Severe list, storm damage 

4/5/2010 Severe list, steering malfunction 

5/9/2010 Collision with gangway; departure delayed several hours 

8/8/2010 Material failure 

2/4/2012 Engine problems—delays 

2/25/2012 Material failure 

3/12/2012 Engine problems—next two cruises canceled 

6/8/21012 Technical fault; remain in port overnight, itinerary changed 

12/15/2012 Loss of electrical power 

Coral Princess (n=3) 

3/19/2009 Propulsion problems; missed port 

8/19/2011 Turbine oil system failure; switch to diesel electric power 

5/2/2013 Fire 

Crown Princess (n=3) 

6/20/2009 Fire in passenger cabin 

7/17/2012 Electrical fire in passenger cabin 

4/13/2013 Toilets in 410 cabins not operational 

Dawn Princess (n=3) 

6/15/2010 Propulsion breakdown, adrift for 2.25 hours; restored and sailing at reduced speed 

7/16/2010 Engine problems; missed port call 

10/27/2011 Mechanical problem; missed port call 

Emerald Princess (n=2) 

7/26/2010 Electrical failure leads to propulsion problems; no A/C; repaired in 6 hours 

5/17/2011 Collision with fuel barge damages several lifeboats 

Golden Princess (n=3) 

1/22/2009 Near-collision with fishing vessel 

3/22/2009 Fire in engine room 

3/28/2012 Vessel maneuverability 

Royal Princess (n=2) 

6/18/2009 Fire in engine room as leaving Port Said, passengers called to muster stations; 

cruise and next cruise canceled 

74 

4/9/2010 Break in fire hose fitting causes extensive damage to restaurants; water leaked all 

the way down to crew decks 

Sapphire Princess (n=4) 

7/12/2010 Severe list to avoid collision with whale 

2/4/2011 Loss of electrical power 

2/26/2011 Material failure 

9/7/2011 2 pleasure boats swamped and float dock damaged by ship’s wake when maneuvering in Ketchikan Harbour 

Star Princess (n=3) 

3/21/2011 Material failure 

7/1/2012 Material failure 

8/2/2012 Material failure 

Sun Princess (n=2) 

7/25/2012 Material failure 

8/27/2012 Transformer blown leading to loss of power adrift for 3.5 hours 

B. Royal Caribbean Cruises Limited 

Celebrity Cruises (4 ships, 13 incidents) 

Century (n=4) 

10/15/2010 Rudder damaged, stranded in Villefranche-sur-Mer; cruise canceled 

10/22/2011 Vessel maneuverability problems 

3/25/2012 Engine problems, late departure and late arrival 

10/28/2012 Fire 

Infinity (n=3) 

6/22/2010 Material failure 

6/26/2010 5–6 hour delayed departure because of engine problems, canceled port call; five 

days later an electrical fire causes power loss for several hours 

8/23/2012 Material failure 

Millennium (n=2) 

3/9/2009 Cruise canceled to allow repair of problem with bearing on propeller shaft 

4/9/2013 Electrical problem adversely affects propulsion, dead in water for 3 hours; port 

call at Hanoi canceled 

Summit (n=4) 

1/10/2009 Electrical problem causes cruise to be shortened by one day and itinerary changed 

2/27/2010 Material failure 

4/9/2011 Loss of electrical power 

10/5/2012 Tender runs aground with 93 passengers and 2 crew, sustains major damage 

Pullmantur (1 ship, 2 incidents) 

Zenith (n=2) 

8/18/2009 Fire while docked in Stockholm, evacuated; departed one day late, itinerary 

changes 

6/25/2013 Fire in engine room disables ship; towed to port 

Royal Caribbean International (10 ships, 32 incidents) 

Allure of the Seas (n=2) 

1/29/2012 Fire in incinerator area 

4/12/2012 Fire in engine room, section 6 of ship evacuated; drift 1–2 hours and then operated on 1 engine 

Brilliance of the Seas (n=2) 

10/13/2009 Windows broken out in storm and 35 passenger cabins flooded, delayed departure 

from Barcelona 

12/12/2010 Severe list while entering Alexandria, Egypt; 30 passengers injured 

Enchantment of the Seas (n=5) 

7/21/2009 Material failure 

3/23/2010 Load sharing problem shuts down engine 4 

7/27/2011 Steering gear pump failure on pump #4 

2/20/2012 Propulsion problems—one propeller broken; delayed departure by 24 hours, 

changed itinerary, sailing at half speed 

3/10/2012 Propulsion problems; spent 27 hours in Port Canaveral to accommodate repairs, 

itinerary changed 

Explorer of the Seas (n=7) 

2/5/2009 Propeller damaged causes change in itinerary on this cruise and next 

4/14/2009 Changes in itinerary for several upcoming cruises; too late to cancel, no explanation 

75 

9/30/2009 Collision with Carnival Legend; minor damage 

1/13/2010 Delayed departure because delayed arrival from drydock 

3/14/2010 Severe list due to human error; injuries and considerable damage 

9/14/2012 Collision with Norwegian Star when mooring line breaks; minimal damage 

10/29/2012 Sailed into Hurricane Sandy 

Grandeur of the Seas (n=3) 

2/26/2009 Loss of two engines; material failure 

7/30/2009 Loss of power due to malfunctioning power inverter; loss of electrical power 

5/27/2013 Fire; cruise canceled 

Jewel of the Seas (n=3) 

8/3/2010 One hydraulic motor not working forcing reduced speeds; itinerary changes 

12/7/2010 Collision with 500 meter long 2 foot wide flexible plastic pipe, becoming wrapped 

around front of ship 

9/6/2012 4.5 hour delay leaving Cape Liberty; no reason given 

Legend of the Seas (n=2) 

2/9/2009 Pulled into Key West for unscheduled stop because of faulty azipod and leaking oil 

(needed boom around ship); repaired by day’s end 

1/30/2012 Fire in bar (Cafe ́ Promenade) 

Majesty of the Sea (n=4) 

8/13/2010 Lifeboat malfunction when lowered; damaged and release of oil 

9/30/2011 Vessel maneuverability 

11/2/2011 Material failure 

11/7/2011 Material failure 

Oasis of the Seas (n=2) 

5/7/2010 Emergency generator damaged; given three months to repair 

11/16/2012 Vessel maneuverability 

Radiance of the Seas (n=2) 

11/25/2009 Collision with Carnival Splendor in Puerto Vallarta; minor damage 

1/27/2011 Ship is operating under USCG COTP due to one of two main propulsion azipods 

not working; repairs anticipated in fall 2011 

C. Prestige Cruise Holdings (3 companies, 5 ships, 14 incidents) 

Norwegian Cruise Line (2 ships, 4 incidents) 

Norwegian Dawn (n=2) 

11/27/2009 Loss of power for hours (no A/C), ship disembarks in San Juan instead of Miami; 

this and next cruise canceled 

8/27/2010 Leaves Bermuda 11 hours early because engine problems cause slower speeds; 

want to arrive in NYC on time 

Norwegian Star (n=2) 

4/28/2012 Collision while docking 

9/14/2012 Collision with Explorer of the Seas when mooring line breaks; minimal damage 

Oceania Cruise (1 ship, 3 incidents) 

Regatta (n=3) 

6/20/2011 Material failure 

7/24/2011 Material failure 

10/19/2012 Electrical outage; delayed return to port (NYC) by several hours 

Regent Seven Seas Cruises (2 ships, 7 incidents) 

Seven Seas Navigator (n=2) 

10/25/2011 Material failure; one day delayed departure from Charleston, itinerary change 

11/9/2011 Material failure 

Seven Seas Voyager (n=5) 

3/22/2009 Propulsion problems (fishing net caught in azipod), reduced speed; many ports 

canceled 

4/1/2009 Passengers told upon embarkation that most port calls canceled from Dubai to 

Rome because of propulsion problems; following two cruises canceled 

12/14/2009 One azipod fails so sailing at reduced speed; port call canceled 

10/4/2010 Podded propulsion system fails; passengers flown home from Athens, 2 cruises 

canceled 

3/17/2013 Propulsion problem; skipped ports and itinerary changes 

D. Independent Cruise Lines 

Avalon Waterways (1 ship, 3 incidents) 

Avalon Tranquility (n=3) 

7/23/2009 Collision with the tall ship Schoenbrunn, a 1912-built paddlesteamer 

76 

*The data contained in this table is based on available information. Details were not consistently available for each incident. See www.cruisejunkie.com/Overboard.html for details. 

9/5/2011 Collision with cargo ship—holed, cruise ended 

12/13/2011 Fire in generator room 

Celebration Cruises (1 ship, 2 incidents) 

Bahamas Celebration (n=2) 

2/1/2012 Maneuverability problems 

3/30/2012 Maneuverability problems 

Fred Olsen Cruises (1 ship, 2 incidents) 

Black Watch (n=2) 

10/21/2009 Severe list—navigational error while entering La Coruna Harbour (Spain) 

8/12/2010 Collision with iceberg—damage superficial 

Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC) (2 ships, 5 incidents) 

Opera (n=3) 

3/30/2011 Collision with pier (twice), damage to several cabins; delayed 10 hours for repairs 

5/15/2011 Failure of an electric panel causes power loss for 8.5 hours; towed to port and 

cruise canceled 

5/27/2011 Detained by UK authorities for noncompliance with safety regulations 

Poesia (n=2) 

1/7/2012 Ran aground in Bahamas; waited for high tide to refloat 

1/10/2012 Collision with pier while leaving Jamaican port 

Saga Cruises (1 ship, 3 incidents) 

Saga Ruby (n=3) 

10/12/2009 Collision with pier, emergency repairs to bow; itinerary changes 

11/11/2012 Engine problems; remainder of cruise canceled 

1/7/2013 Mechanical problems with crankshaft; current world cruise delayed ten days 

Silversea Cruises (1 ship, 2 incidents) 

Silver Shadow (n=2) 

3/19/12 Collision with container ship off Vietnam; major damage to container ship, minor 

damage to cruise ship 

9/9/2012 Material failure 

Thomson Cruises (1 ship, 3 incidents) 

Thomson Dream (n=3) 

7/25/2010 Plumbing/sewage problems 

1/17/2011 Starboard engine fire 

5/20/2012 Severe list following two maneuvers caused by ‘‘slip of the hand’’; major damage 

Travel Dynamics International (1 ship, 3 incidents) 

Clelia II (n=3) 

12/26/2009 Propeller damaged, loss of power; escorted to port, next cruise canceled 

9/1/2010 Loss of electrical power (human error) 

12/9/2010 Wave in storm breaks bridge window; damage to electronics, affecting engine performance 

Voyages of Discovery/Coastal and Maritime Voyages (1 ship, 4 incidents) 

Discovery (n=4) 

10/15/2009 Engine problems; port missed 

12/05/2009 Delayed return from drydock; itinerary changed 

3/4/2013 Ship detained in UK for safety issues; cruise canceled 

5/7/2013 Deep cleaning after illness outbreak delays departure; itinerary change 

Appendix 3: Summary of Persons Overboard, January 1995–June 2013 

(n=210)*

A. Gender 

Male 73.8% 

Female 26.2% 

B. Age by Gender 

Total Male Female 

Mean Range Mean Range Mean Range 

39.82 14–90 38.85 14–90 42.11 15–79 

77 

1Data based on media and other reports as recorded at Cruise Junkie dot Com 

C. Vessel 

Cruise 91.4% 

Ferry 8.6% 

D. Passenger vs 

Crew 

Passenger 75% 

Crew 25% 

E. Rescued 16.7% 

F. Alcohol 6.2% 

G. Suicide 11.0% 

H. Murder 3.3% 

I. Fall 9.5% 

J. Casino loss 2.4% 

K. Fight 7.1% 

Appendix 4: Drug Busts, January 2009–June 2013 1

A. Gender 

Male 83.33% 

Female 16.66% 

B. Age by Gender 

Total Male Female 

Mean Range Mean Range Mean Range 

38.5 19–74 38.6 19–74 38.25 20–54 

C. Drug Busts by Country (N=53) 

Bermuda 27 

U.S. 8 (27 persons) 

Belize: 6 

UK 6 

St. Kitts-Nevis 2 

Jamaica 1 

Cayman Islands 1 

Australia 1 

Spain 1 (9 persons) 

D. Drug Busts by U.S. State/City 

Florida 3 (17 persons) 

Baltimore 2 

Alaska 1 

U.S. Virgin Islands 1 

Puerto Rico 1 

E. Ships with 2 or More Drug Busts 

Norwegian Dawn 9 

Explorer of the Seas 6 

Black Watch 3 

Enchantment of the Seas 3 

Summit 3 

Allure of the Seas 2 

Bahamas Celebration 2 

Grandeur of the Seas 2 

Grand Princess 2 

Norwegian Gem 2 

Poesia 2 

78 

Appendix 5: Klein, R.A. and J. Poulston. 2011. ‘‘Sex at Sea: Sexual Crimes Aboard 

Cruise Ships,’’ Journal of Tourism in Marine Environments, 7:2, pp. 67–80. 


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92 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, sir. 

And now we will go to The Honorable Mark Rosenker, who’s the 

former Chairman of the NTSB—that is, the National Transportation Safety Board—and member of the Cruise Line International 

Association’s ‘‘Panel of Experts.’’ 

Please. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MARK ROSENKER, FORMER CHAIRMAN, 

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD AND MEMBER 

OF THE CRUISE LINE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION’S 

‘‘PANEL OF EXPERTS’’ 

Mr. ROSENKER. Thank you—having trouble getting this—there it 

goes. 

The CHAIRMAN. OK. 

Mr. ROSENKER. Thank you, Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking 

Member Thune, distinguished members of the Committee. Thank 

you very much for inviting me to testify today. 

Until August of 2009, I served as the 11th Chairman of the 

NTSB. I’m also a retired Major General in the United States Air 

Force Reserve. Prior to being appointed and confirmed to the 

NTSB, I served as Deputy Assistant to the President and Director 

of the White House Military Office for President George W. Bush, 

with responsibility for all DOD support to the President and Vice 

President. As part of my responsibilities, I was traveling with the 

President on September 11, 2001. 

I welcome the opportunity to once again testify before this important committee and applaud its focus, not only on cruise ship safety, but safety in all modes of transportation in our Nation. 

I’m testifying today in my capacity as a member of the Independent Panel of Experts established by the Cruise Lines International Association. The panel was put in place as part of the 

Global Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review, launched in 

January 2012, following the Concordia accident. The review was focused on the critical human factors and operational aspects of maritime safety, and was introduced to identify best practices and develop new policies that could be implemented to rapidly further enhance crew passenger and crew safety. The review was led by senior industry executives responsible for maritime safety. 

Ultimately, the review resulted in the industry’s adoption of 10 

policies that were submitted to, and accepted by, the IMO. The 

IMO is an independent international maritime regulatory body, 

with 170 member states, including the United States, which mandates global standards for the safety and operation of all ships, including cruise ships. 

The Independent Panel of Experts was formally appointed in 

April 2012 to provide an impartial assessment of the review’s recommendations. I took this panel’s efforts extremely seriously and 

approached it with the same unwavering commitment that I had 

as NTSB Chair, to raise the bar of safety even higher on this already safe industry. 

The CHAIRMAN. The Committee was appointed by whom? 

Mr. ROSENKER. CLIA. Oh, which committee are you talking 

about, sir? 

The CHAIRMAN. The one you—that you—— 

93 

Mr. ROSENKER. CLIA. CLIA created this Independent Panel of 

Experts. 

The CHAIRMAN. That’s the association, then. 

Mr. ROSENKER. Yes, sir. 

Each member of the panel has extensive experience in the maritime regulatory and/or accident investigation fields. The other 

members are Stephen Mayer, a retired Rear Admiral in the Royal 

Navy and led the U.K. Marine Accident Investigation Branch, the 

equivalent of their NTSB for marine; Willem de Ruiter—he led the 

European Maritime Safety Agency; and Dr. Jack Spencer, who led 

the Office of Maritime Safety at the NTSB when I was there and 

is also a retired Coast Guard Officer. 

The panel deeply examines the issues and policies considered by 

the industry. We are a deliberative body that is independent of 

CLIA’s technical and regulatory advisory committees. Our advice, 

counsel, and recommendations cover a wide range of topics and are 

delivered to CLIA’s board of directors, executive committee, and 

other advisory committees, as appropriate. 

We find our views to be well received, and candor is a hallmark 

of our confidential deliberations. At times, the deliberations among 

the panel members, themselves, have been very spirited. This has 

further assisted CLIA in highlighting for its members the various 

thoughtful perspectives of complex safety issues and the related 

policy implications. 

Every aspect of the cruise industry is heavily regulated and monitored by the United States, EU, and international maritime law to 

protect the safety of passengers and crew members. The panel has 

helped to strengthen and improve the wide-ranging policies that 

were put forth by the industry as part of the review. But, we also 

provided many new and innovative ideas and recommendations 

that were incorporated into the final policies as well as other initiatives. 

When I was Chairman of the NTSB, I closely monitored trends 

in safety across every sector of transportation. I applied my experiences and knowledge of transportation safety to the panel as we 

evaluated and suggested policies and best-practice improvements. I 

can say, unequivocally, that the cruise industry has been very receptive to our input. I’ve been impressed with the level of collaboration of this industry with its regulators and other stakeholders. 

Panel members have been extremely impressed with the speed 

with which the industry adopted the 10 policies developed by review, all of which exceed current international regulatory requirements. 

As an avid cruiser, I also know that cruise vacations are not only 

quite enjoyable, but, most importantly, extremely safe. The panel’s 

work continues as we are advising and assisting the cruise industry in providing ideas, guidance, and impartial analysis as it reviews and seeks improvements to shipboard operations and safety. 

Thank you again, sir, and I look forward to the questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rosenker follows:] 

94 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MARK ROSENKER, FORMER CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL

TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD; AND MEMBER, CRUISE LINE INTERNATIONAL

ASSOCIATION’S ‘‘PANEL OF EXPERTS’’ 

Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Thune and distinguished members of the 

Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today. My name is Mark Rosenker 

and I am a former Chairman of the United States National Transportation Safety 

Board and a retired United States Air Force Reserve Major General. I also served 

as Deputy Assistant to President George W. Bush and Director of the White House 

Military Office. I welcome the opportunity to testify before this committee, which 

served as my authorizing committee during my tenure as Chairman of the National 

Transportation Safety Board. 

I am testifying today in my capacity as a member of the independent Panel of 

Experts established by the Cruise Lines International Association, or CLIA. The 

independent Panel of Experts was put in place as part of the Global Cruise Industry 

Operational Safety Review, which was launched in January 2012 by the industry 

in the wake of the Concordia incident. The Review was introduced as part of the 

cruise line industry’s efforts to execute on their stated commitment to continuous 

improvement and innovation in shipboard operations and safety. It focused on the 

critical human factors and operational aspects of maritime safety. 

The Review was introduced to identify best practices and develop new policies 

that could be implemented rapidly on an industry-wide basis to further enhance the 

safety of passengers and crew. It took the lead in identifying additional best practices for industry-wide implementation and ultimately, formal submission to the 

International Maritime Organization, as appropriate, that could strengthen the 

cruise industry’s safety record. [See appendix] The International Maritime Organization is an international maritime regulatory body with 170 Member States including the United States, which mandates global standards for the safety and operation 

of cruise ships. The Review was guided by a task force consisting of senior industry 

executives from CLIA member lines with responsibility for maritime safety. To commence the Review, CLIA’s member lines took a detailed look at existing safety procedures and practices. Senior cruise line executives undertook internal reviews of 

their own operational safety practices and procedures concerning issues of navigation, evacuation, emergency training, and related practices and procedures. 

The independent Panel of Experts was formally appointed in April 2012 to provide 

an impartial assessment of the recommendations developed by the Review. Collectively, those of us on the Panel of Experts bring well over a century of experience 

in transportation and safety to the table. Our backgrounds include senior positions 

with a diverse mix of organizations. Each Panel member has deep experience in the 

maritime, regulatory and accident investigation fields and the Panel is balanced 

geographically with equal representation from the United States and Europe. The 

three other members of the panel are Rear Admiral (Ret.) Stephen Meyer, Dr. Jack 

Spencer, and Willem de Ruiter. 

Stephen Meyer is a retired Rear Admiral in the Royal Navy. He is a former commander of a number of Royal Navy Ships and was the former head of the United 

Kingdom Marine Accident Investigation Branch. 

Dr. Jack Spencer is the former Director of the Office of Marine Safety at the National Transportation Safety Board. Dr. Spencer has more than 40 years of experience with the U.S. Coast Guard, American Bureau of Shipping, and National Transportation Safety Board. For 30 years, he has been on United States delegations to 

the International Maritime Organization. 

Willem de Ruiter is former head of the European Maritime Safety Agency 

(EMSA). In 2003, Mr. de Ruiter was appointed as the first executive director of 

EMSA and charged with building up the organization. He joined EMSA after a distinguished career in the Dutch government and at the European Commission. 

The independent Panel of Experts was formally appointed in April 2012 to provide 

an impartial assessment of the Review’s recommendations. I took this panel extremely seriously and approached it with the same unwavering commitment that I 

had as NTSB Chair to raise the bar of safety even higher for this safe sector. 

The Panel takes a very active view of the issues being discussed and policies being 

developed by CLIA that relate to all aspects of maritime safety. We are a deliberative body that is independent of CLIA’s technical and regulatory advisory committees. Our advice, counsel and recommendations have covered a wide range of topics 

and are delivered to CLIA’s Board of Directors, Executive Committee, and other advisory committees as appropriate. We are all experienced professionals and we find 

our views to be well-received and that candor is a hallmark of our confidential deliberations. We are a group of highly critical and deeply committed experts and we are 

never bashful about sharing what we are thinking either as individuals or as a 

95 

Panel. At times our deliberations between the Panel members have been very spirited. This has further assisted CLIA in highlighting for their members the various 

thoughtful perspectives of complex safety issues and the related policy implications. 

As someone with four decades of experience in the transportation and technology 

industries, I’ve always known that the cruise industry is governed by an extremely 

extensive framework of safety regulations. Every aspect of the cruise industry is 

heavily regulated and monitored under United States, European Union, and international maritime law to protect the safety of passengers and crewmembers. Regulations start with the design and construction of the ship and extend to the operation of the vessel, the emergency equipment on board, and scenarios for emergency 

situations, including the evacuation of a ship. Cruise ships are also subject to multiple layers of enforcement at the international, flag State and port State level. 

The Panel played an active role and provided many new and innovative ideas and 

recommendations that were incorporated into the final policies and other initiatives, 

in addition to providing independent, expert analysis of proposed policies. As the 

Panel gained more experience working together, our commitment to the process 

grew and the value of our role became even clearer over time, as our engagement 

in the issues and policy development began to produce tangible results. It is without 

question that we are working with a talented and deeply committed group of cruise 

industry professionals that share the Panel’s values toward maritime safety. If I did 

not believe this to be the case, I would most certainly not be associated with these 

efforts, nor would any of my colleagues that serve on the Panel. 

During the course of the Review, my fellow panelists and I examined safety-related shipboard systems and observed safety drills aboard one of the world’s largest 

cruise ships. We visited the state-of-the-art full bridge simulator at the Resolve 

Maritime Academy to see how technology can strengthen safety and supplement 

training on cruise ships. We held a session with officials at Airbus to draw from 

their efforts related to Crew Resource Management, Simulation Training, and Safety Culture. We met with leaders of the Review multiple times to review, analyze, 

and discuss recommended changes to cruise industry safety practices and offered 

our own ideas based on our individual and collective experiences. 

As a member of the Panel of Experts during last year’s Review, my role was to 

provide an impartial assessment of the recommendations developed by the established Task Force of cruise line experts, before they were ultimately implemented 

and then submitted for formal consideration to the IMO. Additionally, as Panel 

members we shared numerous, wide-ranging recommendations and suggestions that 

were incorporated into the industry’s policies, as well as into other important ongoing efforts that have not specifically resulted in published industry-wide policies. 

All ten policies that resulted from the Review were incorporated into IMO standards. Those ten policies, in the order in which they were introduced, are as follows: 

The Passenger Muster Policy requires musters for embarking passengers prior to 

departure from port and was launched with immediate effect on February 9, 2012. 

On occasions when guests arrive after the muster has been completed, the policy 

dictates that they are promptly provided with individual or group safety briefings. 

This practice exceeds existing legal requirements—which require that musters occur 

within 24 hours of passenger embarkation. 

Under the Passage Planning Policy, each passage plan is to be thoroughly briefed 

to all bridge team members who will be involved in execution of the plan well in 

advance of its implementation. The passage plan will be drafted by the designated 

officer and approved by the master. This policy was effective upon its announcement 

on April 24, 2012. 

To minimize unnecessary disruptions and distractions on the bridge, the Bridge 

Access Policy requires bridge access be limited to those with operationally related 

functions during any period of restricted maneuvering or when increased vigilance 

is required such as arrival/departure from port, heavy traffic, or poor visibility. Further, member lines are to take steps to prevent distractions to watchkeeping during 

these periods. This policy was effective upon its announcement on April 24, 2012. 

The Excess Lifejackets Policy ensures that the number of lifejackets carried is far 

in excess of the number of persons actually onboard a ship. In addition to the statutory requirements of carriage of lifejackets for each person onboard and certain specified extras, the cruise industry adopted a policy of carrying additional adult lifejackets onboard each cruise ship in excess of current legal requirements. As a result, 

the number of additional adult lifejackets provided must not be less than the total 

number of persons berthed within the ship’s most populated main vertical fire zone. 

All of the additional lifejackets addressed in this policy are to be stored in public 

spaces, at the muster stations, on deck or in lifeboats, and in such a manner as to 

be readily accessible to crewmembers for distribution as may be necessary in the 

96 

event of an emergency. This policy was effective upon its announcement on 

April 24, 2012. 

The Nationality of Passengers Policy was developed in response to the request of 

governments at the May 2012 meeting of the IMO Maritime Safety Committee 

meeting. This policy prescribes that the nationality of each passenger onboard is to 

be recorded, kept ashore and made readily available to search and rescue personnel 

as appropriate. This policy was effective upon its announcement on June 26, 2012. 

Under the Common Elements of Musters and Emergency Instructions Policy, mem- ber cruise lines have specified 12 common elements that are to be communicated 

to passengers in musters and emergency instructions. In addition to current legal 

requirements, this policy specifically requires that musters and emergency instructions are to include the following common elements: 

1. When and how to don a lifejacket 

2. Description of emergency signals and appropriate responses in the event of 

an emergency 

3. Location of lifejackets 

4. Where to muster when the emergency signal is sounded 

5. Method of accounting for passenger attendance at musters both for training 

and in the event of an actual emergency 

6. How information will be provided in an emergency 

7. What to expect if the Master orders an evacuation of the ship 

8. What additional safety information is available 

9. Instructions on whether passengers should return to cabins prior to mustering, including specifics regarding medications, clothing, and lifejackets 

10. Description of key safety systems and features 

11. Emergency routing systems and recognizing emergency exits 

12. Who to seek out for additional information 

This policy was effective upon its announcement on June 26, 2012. 

To facilitate training for lifeboat operations, the Lifeboat Loading for Training 

Purposes Policy requires that at least one lifeboat on each ship is to be filled with 

crewmembers equal in number to its certified number of occupants at least every 

six months. Under this policy, for safety considerations, the loading of lifeboats for 

training purposes is to be performed only while the boat is waterborne and the boat 

should be lowered and raised with only the lifeboat crew onboard essential for safe 

operation. All lifeboat crew and embarkation/boarding station crew are to be required to attend the lifeboat loading drill. If not participating inside the lifeboat, 

crew members are to observe the loading of the lifeboat to its certified number of 

people and its operation. Taking into account safety consideration, the policy also 

includes specific provisions for ships with crew sizes less than three hundred. This 

policy was effective upon its announcement on September 20, 2012. 

Operational safety can be enhanced by achieving substantive consistency in bridge 

operating procedures among commonly owned ships, for example by providing that 

bridge personnel who may rotate among such ships can be familiarized with a common set of procedures. The Harmonization of Bridge Procedures Policy requires that 

bridge operating procedures are to be harmonized as much as possible, both within 

individual companies and among brands within a commonly owned and operated 

fleet. Under this policy, each member operating multiple ships and each cruise line 

brand that is commonly owned and operated with another brand is to harmonize 

their respective procedures for bridge operations. This policy was announced on November 15, 2012 and its implementation has been completed. 

The Location of Lifejacket Stowage Policy complements the Excess Lifejackets policy under which oceangoing cruise ships carry additional adult lifejackets onboard 

far exceeding the number of persons actually onboard the ship. Under this new policy lifejackets equal to or greater than the number required by international regulations and the ship’s flag State are to be stowed in close proximity to either muster 

stations or lifeboat embarkations points on newly-constructed ships. Consequently, 

lifejackets will be readily accessible by crewmembers for distribution to passengers 

in the event of an emergency. This policy further enhances shipboard safety as passengers will have even greater access to lifejackets in the event of an emergency. 

This policy was announced on November 15, 2012 and goes into effect with newlyconstructed cruise ships for which the building contract is placed on or after July 1, 

2013. 

The Securing Heavy Objects policy requires that oceangoing members include procedures in their Safety Management Systems to secure heavy objects either permaVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:32 May 14, 2015 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00100 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\94526.TXT JACKIE
97 

nently, when not in use, or during severe weather. This policy was announced on 

November 15, 2012 and its implementation is now complete. 

When I was Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board, I closely 

monitored trends in safety across every sector of transportation. I’ve been able to 

apply my experiences and knowledge of transportation safety to the panel as we 

evaluated the suggested policy and best practice improvements. Each of the individual Panel members brings unique and in-depth strengths to the Panel as a 

whole; one of my greatest strengths is a broad view of transportation safety that 

includes but reaches far beyond the maritime sector. 

I can say unequivocally that the cruise industry has been very receptive to our 

input. I’ve also been impressed with the level of collaboration of this industry with 

its regulators and other key stakeholders to enhance safety practices and procedures. The cruise industry works continually with the IMO, other global maritime 

authorities, classification societies, and shipbuilders to implement and enhance 

what are already stringent safety standards. My involvement on this panel has 

given me confidence that the industry is engaged in proactive and responsible relationships with regulators across the globe. 

Along with the other members of the Panel of Experts, I’ve been extremely impressed with the speed with which the industry adopted the ten policies developed 

by the Review, all of which exceed current regulatory requirements. Further, I believe that CLIA’s initiative to combine these ten policies related to the Review with 

an additional ten new and existing industry-wide policies is a very positive and aggressive step for a trade association to take. We specifically advised CLIA as they 

considered this initiative, including with relation to developing a comprehensive 

Compendium of Policies; their methods of CEO-level verification of policy implementation; and their use of Safety Management Systems to ensure the sixteen policies 

related to safety and environmental protection were subject to a regulatory internal 

and external auditing scheme. These are exactly the types of proactive and innovative actions that I, and my fellow Panel members, have encouraged this industry 

to take. As an avid cruiser, I also feel it is important that consumers understand 

that cruise vacations are extremely safe. This industry is highly regulated that is 

continuously subjected to tremendous oversight, wherever they operate. 

As members of the Panel of Experts, our work isn’t done because the Operational 

Safety Review is completed. We continue to advise and assist the cruise industry 

in providing ideas, guidance and impartial analysis as it continues to review and 

seek improvements to shipboard operations and safety. We remain actively engaged 

by providing our advice through CLIA’s Board of Directors, Executive Committee 

and other Advisory Committees. This has ensured that while the formal structure 

of the Operational Safety Review wound down, the cruise industry could still benefit 

from our active input and expertise. 

So thank you again for the opportunity to testify today and I look forward to your 

questions. 

98 

APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS

MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE 

90TH Session, Agenda Item 27 

(MSC 90/27/1) 

MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE 

90TH Session, Agenda Item 27 

(MSC 90/27/2) 

MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE 

90TH Session, Agenda Item 27 

(MSC 90/27/11) 

MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE 

90TH Session, Agenda Item 27 

(MSC 90/27/12) 

MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE 

90TH Session, Agenda Item 27 

(MSC 91/7/1) 

MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE 

90TH Session, Agenda Item 27 

(MSC 92/6/1) 

MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE 

90TH Session, Agenda Item 27 

(MSC 92/6/9) 

MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE 

90TH Session, Agenda Item 27 

(MSC 92/6/10) 

MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE 

90TH Session 

Agenda Item 27 

MSC/90/27/1 

February 29, 2012 

Original: English 

PASSENGER SHIP SAFETY 

Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review 

Submitted by Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA) 

SUMMARY 

Executive summary: This document describes the work undertaken immediately following the Concordia incident, under the leadership of the Cruise 

Lines International Association, to address operational safety. 

This work will continue and recommendations will be provided to 

the industry, IMO, and governments on an ongoing basis. 

Strategic direction: 5.1 

High-level action: 5.1.1 

Planned output: None 

Action to be taken: Paragraph 16 

Related document: MSC 90/1/Rev.1; MSC 90/27 

Background 

1. In response to the Concordia incident, and as part of the industry’s continuous 

efforts to review and improve safety measures, the Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA), speaking on behalf of the global cruise lines industry, announced the 

launch of a Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review on 27 January 2012, although it had begun prior to that date. 

2. As best practices are identified via this Review, they will be shared on an ongoing basis among CLIA members and any appropriate recommendations will be 

shared with the IMO. 

99 

Support for the Secretary-General’s Efforts 

3. In expressing his condolences to the families of those lost in the Concordia incident, the Secretary-General stated his determination to work with others to ensure 

that such an accident could be prevented in the future and has pledged that the 

Organization will consider seriously the lessons to be learned and will take action, 

as appropriate, in the light of those findings. 

4. CLIA specifically supports the views expressed by the Secretary-General in his 

30 January 2012 press statement on this subject. 

5. The Secretary-General indicated in that statement that he had opened a channel of communication with passenger ship operators—through the Cruise Lines 

International Association (CLIA)—and that he welcomed the response to his request 

to hold meetings with him to discuss the safety of cruise passenger ships in general 

and, in particular, any findings and recommendations from their own internal review of current—practices and safety procedures in the operation of passenger ships. 

6. This Review is intended to complement the efforts and goals of the Organization and to also be completely consistent with the Secretary-General’s description 

of the on-going communications and operational safety initiatives of the global 

cruise industry. 

Description of the Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review 

7. The Review will include a comprehensive assessment of the critical human factors and operational aspects of maritime safety. 

8. Key components of the Review include: 

.1 An internal review by CLIA members of their own operational safety practices and procedures concerning issues of navigation, evacuation, emergency 

training, and related practices and procedures. 

.2 Consultation with independent external experts. 

.3 Identification and sharing of industry best practices and policies, as well as 

possible recommendations to the IMO for substantive regulatory changes to further improve the industry’s operational safety. 

.4 Collaboration with the IMO, governments and regulatory bodies to implement 

any necessary regulatory changes. 

9. More specifically, an example of how one major cruise line intends to proceed 

with their internal review in three distinct phases might be useful for the Committee: 

• First Phase: Bridge operating procedures; Emergency response procedures; and 

Abandon ship 

• Second Phase: Lessons learned; Communications shoreside and with local authorities; Remote monitoring of voyages and status of ship; and Newbuild implications 

• Third Phase: Emergency responses to fire, flooding, collision, and grounding; 

Damage control equipment; Training; Safety Management System; Audit procedures; and Corporate emergency response 

10. Each cruise line will conduct their internal review in accordance with their 

own Safety Management System. 

Outputs of the Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review 

11. The first output of the Review was the cruise industry’s Passenger Muster Policy, announced on 9 February 2012 and made immediately effective, serves as an 

example of the type of best practices and procedures that may be expected as outputs from the Review. 

12. That Passenger Muster Policy is offered to this Committee for them to consider and reads as follows: 

‘‘Current legal requirements for conducting a muster of passengers are found 

in the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and mandate that a muster for embarking passengers occur within 24 hours of their embarkation. Notwithstanding the legal requirement, CLIA’s member cruise lines 

have identified a best practice effective immediately that calls for conducting 

the mandatory muster for embarking passengers prior to departure from port. 

On occasions when guests arrive after the muster has been completed, CLIA’s 

policy is that they be promptly provided with individual or group safety briefings that meet the requirements for musters applicable under SOLAS. This 

practice exceeds existing legal requirements and has been adopted by CLIA’s 

membership as a formal policy to help ensure that any mandatory musters or 

100 

briefings are conducted for the benefit of all newly embarked passengers at the 

earliest practical opportunity.’’ 

13. Additional outputs from the Review will be provided as appropriate to the Organization via its relevant Committees and Sub-committees. 

Conclusion 

14. CLIA is fully committed to understanding the factors that contributed to the 

Concordia incident and is proactively responding to all maritime safety issues. 

15. The Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review will enable the industry to do 

so in a meaningful and expedited manner. 

Action requested of the Committee 

16. The Committee is invited to consider the information provided in this submission and take action as appropriate. 

MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE 

90th session 

Agenda item 27 

MSC 90/27/2 

13 March 2012 

Original: ENGLISH 

PASSENGER SHIP SAFETY 

Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review 

Submitted by the Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA) 

SUMMARY 

Executive summary: This document describes certain specific initial outputs from the 

Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review, which was undertaken immediately following the Concordia incident, under the 

leadership of the Cruise Lines International Association, to address operational safety. This work will continue and recommendations will be provided to the industry, IMO, and governments on an ongoing basis. 

Strategic direction: 5.1 

High-level action: 5.1.1 

Planned output: None 

Action to be taken: Paragraph 9 

Related document: MSC 90/1/Rev.1; MSC 90/27; MSC 90/27/1; MSC–MEPC.3/Circ.3; 

and Res. MSC255(84) 

Background 

1. In response to the Concordia incident, and as part of the industry’s continuous 

efforts to review and improve safety measures, the Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA), speaking on behalf of the global cruise lines industry, announced the 

launch of a Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review on 27 January 2012, although it had begun prior to that date. 

2. As best practices are identified via this Review, they will be shared on an ongoing basis among CLIA members and any appropriate recommendations will be 

shared with the IMO. 

3. In CLIA’s previous submission, MSC 90/27/1 we described the basic framework 

for the Review and reported on the first output, which was our Passenger Muster 

Policy. 

Outputs of the Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review 

4. The first output of the Review was the cruise industry’s Passenger Muster Policy, announced on 9 February 2012 and made immediately effective, serves as an 

example of the type of best practices and procedures that may be expected as outputs from the Review. 

5. In the interim, the cruise industry has developed three additional outputs 

which CLIA wishes to share with this Committee: 

i. The cruise industry is of the view that we, along with the rest of the maritime 

community, would benefit from increased reliability and transparency with regard to marine casualty information. Specifically, we believed the relevant information contained in the IMO database would benefit from some additional 

101 

verification. Accordingly, CLIA recently undertook an effort with the IMO Secretariat to harmonize the information in Annex I of the GISIS Marine Casualties and Incidents module to ensure that no recent and known ‘‘very serious 

casualties,’’ alternatively referred to as ‘‘very serious marine casualties,’’ involving one or more fatalities on a cruise passenger ship were inadvertently 

omitted. This action resulted in adding and verifying basic information on a 

total of fifteen marine casualties in the database, but did not result in the removal of any existing marine casualties or associated data. 

ii. Consistent with the above actions regarding Annex I of the GISIS Marine Casualties and Incidents module, CLIA is of the view that a mandatory obligation 

to provide information on the occurrence of very serious casualties is beneficial 

to Member States, the maritime industry, and the public at large. As we 

worked through reconciling existing IMO casualty data with the best data 

presently available to our industry, we found substantial inconsistency in reporting. Thus, to assist Member States in their ongoing efforts to consider improvements to maritime safety through examination of casualties, we respectfully wish to draw attention to the existing provisions in the mandatory IMO 

Casualty Investigation Code (Res. MSC.255(84)) and those in MSC–MEPC.3/ 

Circ.3. 

iii. Thus, recognizing that it is not procedurally appropriate for CLIA to propose 

an amendment to a mandatory instrument, we request that Member States 

consider revising SOLAS Chapter XI–1, Regulation 6 to expressly and more 

clearly emphasize the mandatory reporting requirements regarding ‘‘very serious casualties.’’ We believe that Member States would find this to improve the 

breadth and depth of reporting, providing them a better foundation for prevention of future casualties. 

6. Additional outputs from the Review will be provided as appropriate to the Organization via its relevant Committees and Sub-committees. 

Conclusion 

7. CLIA is fully committed to understanding the factors that contributed to the 

Concordia incident and is proactively responding to all maritime safety issues. 

8. The Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review will enable the industry to do 

so in a meaningful and expedited manner. 

Action requested of the Committee 

9. The Committee is invited to consider the information provided in this submission and take action as appropriate. 

MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE 

90th session 

Agenda item 27 

MSC 90/27/11 

10 April 2012 

Original: ENGLISH 

PASSENGER SHIP SAFETY 

Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review 

Submitted by the Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA) 

SUMMARY 

Executive summary: This document describes a specific additional output from the 

Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review, which was undertaken immediately following the Concordia incident, under the 

leadership of the Cruise Lines International Association, to address operational safety. This particular output relates to the 

subject of Carriage of Additional Lifejackets onboard. This work 

will continue and recommendations will be provided to the industry, IMO, and governments on an ongoing basis. 

Strategic direction: 5.1 

High-level action: 5.1.1 

Planned output: None 

Action to be taken: Paragraph 10 

Related document: MSC 90/1/Rev.1; MSC 90/27; MSC 90/27/1; MSC 90/27/2; and 

MSC 90/27/12 

102 

Background 

1. In response to the Concordia incident, and as part of the industry’s continuous 

efforts to review and improve safety measures, the Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA), speaking on behalf of the global cruise lines industry, announced the 

launch of a Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review on 27 January 2012, although it had begun prior to that date. 

2. As best practices are identified via this Review, they will be shared on an ongoing basis among CLIA members and any appropriate recommendations will be 

shared with the IMO. 

3. In the first of CLIA’s previous submissions, MSC 90/27/1, we described the 

basic framework for the Review and reported on the first output, which was our 

Passenger Muster Policy. 

4. In MSC 90/27/2 and 90/27/XX, CLIA reported upon a series of additional outputs of the Review. 

Outputs of the Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review 

5. The first outputs of the Review, as mentioned above, were reported in MSC 90/ 

27/1, 90/27/2, and 90/27/12. 

6. The cruise industry has developed an additional output of the Review, applicable to all of the oceangoing ships we represent, which CLIA wishes to share with 

this Committee: 

Carriage of Additional Lifejackets Onboard: 

.1 The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), as well 

as flag State regulations, require that passenger ships on international voyages 

carry an approved lifejacket (Personal Flotation Device–PFD) for every person 

onboard the ship. 

.2 SOLAS requires that lifejackets suitable for children must also be carried in 

a number equal to 10 percent of the number of passengers onboard, provided 

that the number of children’s lifejackets carried must not be less than the number of children onboard. 

.3 Lifejackets must also be carried for the persons on watch and must be stored 

on the bridge, in the engine control room and at any other manned watch station. 

.4 An additional number of lifejackets equal to 5 percent of the persons onboard 

must also be carried and stored in conspicuous places on deck or at muster stations. 

.5 Under certain circumstances, additional lifejackets must also be carried, and 

stored at muster stations or in public spaces, when it is likely that persons may 

not be able to return to their staterooms to retrieve the lifejacket stored there. 

.6 Some flag states have similar requirements for domestic or non-international 

voyages. 

.7 CLIA’s members have adopted a policy of carrying additional adult lifejackets 

onboard each cruise ship in excess of these legal requirements. 

.8 Under this policy the number of additional adult lifejackets to be provided 

must not be less than the total number of persons berthed within the ship’s 

most populated main vertical fire zone. 

.9 Implementation of this policy ensures should result in spare lifejackets being 

carried are far in excess of the number required by SOLAS. 

.10 Some smaller cruise ships may be constructed with only one main vertical 

fire zone that is utilized for accommodation spaces. 

.11 For these vessels, CLIA’s policy is that the maximum number of excess lifejackets provided need not exceed fifty percent of the total number of persons 

carried by the vessel. 

.12 Extra lifejackets for children in excess of legal requirements, in a number 

equal to 10 percent of the number of passengers berthed within the most populated main vertical zone, must also be carried on international voyages under 

this policy. 

.13 All of the additional lifejackets addressed in this policy are to be stored in 

public spaces, at the muster stations, on deck or in lifeboats, and in such a 

manner as to be readily accessible to crewmembers for distribution as may be 

necessary in the event of an emergency. 

.14 Lifejackets carried for persons on watch, and at remotely located survival 

craft stations, are to be carried in accordance with SOLAS and other applicable 

flag State regulations. 

103 

7. Additional outputs from the Review will be provided as appropriate to the Organization via its relevant Committees and Sub-committees. 

Conclusion 

8. CLIA is fully committed to understanding the factors that contributed to the 

Concordia incident and is proactively responding to all maritime safety issues. 

9. The Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review will enable the industry to do 

so in a meaningful and expedited manner. 

Action requested of the Committee 

10. The Committee is invited to consider the information provided in this submission and take action as appropriate. 

MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE 

90th session 

Agenda item 27 

MSC 90/27/12 

10 April 2012 

Original: ENGLISH 

PASSENGER SHIP SAFETY 

Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review 

Submitted by the Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA) 

SUMMARY 

Executive summary: This document describes certain specific additional outputs from 

the Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review, which was undertaken immediately following the Concordia incident, under 

the leadership of the Cruise Lines International Association, to 

address operational safety. These particular outputs relate to the 

subjects of Passage Planning and Personnel Access to the Bridge. 

This work will continue and recommendations will be provided to 

the industry, IMO, and governments on an ongoing basis. 

Strategic direction: 5.1 

High-level action: 5.1.1 

Planned output: None 

Action to be taken: Paragraph 10 

Related document: MSC 90/1/Rev.1; MSC 90/27; MSC 90/27/1; and MSC 90/27/2 

Background 

1. In response to the Concordia incident, and as part of the industry’s continuous 

efforts to review and improve safety measures, the Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA), speaking on behalf of the global cruise lines industry, announced the 

launch of a Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review on 27 January 2012, although it had begun prior to that date. 

2. As best practices are identified via this Review, they will be shared on an ongoing basis among CLIA members and any appropriate recommendations will be 

shared with the IMO. 

3. In the first of CLIA’s previous submissions, MSC 90/27/1, we described the 

basic framework for the Review and reported on the first output, which was our 

Passenger Muster Policy. 

4. In MSC 90/27/2, CLIA reported upon a series of additional outputs of the Review, which were all related to reporting of marine casualties. 

Outputs of the Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review 

5. The first outputs of the Review, as mentioned above, were reported in MSC 90/ 

27/1 and 90/27/2. 

6. The cruise industry has developed two additional outputs of the Review, applicable to all of the oceangoing ships we represent, which CLIA wishes to share with 

this Committee: 

Passage Planning: 

.1 Since 1999, CLIA’s member lines have been subject to international guidance 

concerning passage planning in accordance with IMO Resolution A.893(21), 

Guidelines for Voyage Planning, adopted on 25 November 1999. 

104 

.2 CLIA has adopted a policy that the guidance elements set forth in this resolution are deemed to be the mandatory minimum requirements in the development of passage plans by all member lines. 

.3 In addition, CLIA’s policy recognizes the Bridge Procedures Guide published 

by the International Chamber of Shipping as a compilation of best practices valuable resource that should are to be utilized by all ship operators, either as a 

component of their Safety Management Systems or Bridge Resource Management procedures. 

.4 Under this policy each passage plan is to be thoroughly briefed to all bridge 

team members who will be involved in execution of the plan well in advance 

of its implementation. 

.5 The passage plan will be drafted by the designated officer and approved by 

the master. 

.6 CLIA’s policy is that all members are to take steps to help ensure bridge 

team members are asked and encouraged to raise any operational concerns 

without fear of retribution or retaliation. 

Personnel Access to the Bridge: 

.7 To minimize unnecessary disruptions and distractions to bridge team members in accomplishing their direct and indirect duties during any period of restricted maneuvering, or while maneuvering in conditions that the master or 

company bridge procedures/policy deems to require increased vigilance (e.g., arrival/departure from port, heavy traffic, poor visibility), CLIA’s members have 

adopted a policy that bridge access is to be strictly limited to those with operational functions only during these periods. 

.8 Further, member lines are to take steps to prevent distractions to 

watchkeeping during these periods. 

.9 Any deviation from this policy requires prior approval of senior management 

ashore. 

7. Additional outputs from the Review will be provided as appropriate to the Organization via its relevant Committees and Sub-committees. 

Conclusion 

8. CLIA is fully committed to understanding the factors that contributed to the 

Concordia incident and is proactively responding to all maritime safety issues. 

9. The Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review will enable the industry to do 

so in a meaningful and expedited manner. 

Action requested of the Committee 

10. The Committee is invited to consider the information provided in this submission and take action as appropriate. 

MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE 

91st session 

Agenda item 7 

MSC 91/7/1 

24 September 2012 

Original: ENGLISH 

PASSENGER SHIP SAFETY 

Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review 

Submitted by Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA) 

SUMMARY 

Executive summary: This document provides additional outputs from the Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review and proposes a revision to include these additional outputs in the annex to MSC.1/Circ.1446. 

Strategic direction: 5.1 

High-level action: 5.1.1 

Planned output: None. 

Action to be taken: Paragraph 14 

Related documents: MSC 90/27 

105 

*The terms ‘‘muster’’ and ‘‘assembly’’ are used interchangeably and therefore are synonymous 

for this purpose. 

Background 

1 In response to the Concordia incident, and as part of the industry’s ongoing 

efforts to review and improve safety measures, the Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA), speaking on behalf of the global cruise lines industry, announced the 

launch of a Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review (hereinafter ‘‘Review’’) on 27 

January 2012, although it had begun prior to that date. As best practices are identified via this Review, they will be shared on an on-going basis among CLIA members 

and as appropriate to the Organization. 

2 In the first paper on this subject (MSC 90/27/1), CLIA provided the Committee 

with an overview of the basic framework of the Review and also reported on the 

first output, a CLIA policy on passenger muster prior to departure from port. Since 

then, we have provided the Committee with additional outputs, including: 

.1 The need for consistent reporting and additional verifying of marine casualties and incidents, in particular very serious casualties, with a concomitant recommendation that Member States consider revising SOLAS regulation XI–1/6 

to emphasize the mandatory reporting requirements of very serious casualties 

(MSC 90/27/2); 

.2 CLIA policies on passage planning and personnel access to the bridge (MSC 

90/27/12); and 

.3 CLIA policy on carriage of additional lifejackets on board (MSC 90/27/11). 

3 The Committee, having considered the information provided in the Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review, invited Member Governments to recommend that 

passenger ship companies conduct a review of operational safety measures with the 

aim to enhance the safety of passenger ships, taking into consideration the recommended interim measures of an operational character listed in the Recommended 

interim measures for passenger ship companies to enhance the safety of passenger 

ships (MSC.1/Circ.1446), on ships flying their flag, on a voluntary basis and with 

all possible urgency and efficiency (Resolution MSC.336(90)). 

Outputs of the Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review 

4 As part of the ongoing Review, the cruise industry has developed three additional outputs as laid out below in paragraphs 5–9. 

Common Elements of Musters and Emergency Instructions 

5 Regulations 8 and 19 of SOLAS Chapter III require musters and emergency 

instructions to be provided for passengers. In addition to the legal requirements, 

CLIA oceangoing members have adopted a policy that musters and emergency instructions are to include the following common elements: 

.1 When and how to don a lifejacket. 

.2 Description of emergency signals and appropriate responses in the event of 

an emergency. 

.3 Location of lifejackets. 

.4 Where to muster * when the emergency signal is sounded. 

.5 Method of accounting for passenger attendance at musters both for training 

and in the event of an actual emergency. 

.6 How information will be provided in an emergency. 

.7 What to expect if the Master orders an evacuation of the ship. 

.8 What additional safety information is available. 

.9 Instructions on whether passengers should return to cabins prior to mustering, including specifics regarding medications, clothing, and lifejackets. 

.10 Description of key safety systems and features. 

.11 Emergency routing systems and recognizing emergency exits. 

.12 Who to seek out for additional information. 

Recording the Nationality of Passengers 

6 Regulation 27 of SOLAS Chapter III requires that all persons on board be 

counted prior to departure; details of those who have declared a need for special 

care or assistance in an emergency be recorded and communicated to the Master 

prior to departure; names and gender of all persons on board, distinguishing between adults, children and infants be recorded for search and rescue purposes; and 

106 

that all of this information be kept ashore and made readily available to search and 

rescue services when needed. 

7 To further facilitate the effective and immediate availability of key information 

in the event of an emergency situation, CLIA oceangoing members have adopted a 

policy that, in addition to the information required by SOLAS, the nationality of 

each passenger onboard is also to be recorded, kept ashore and made readily available to search and rescue services when needed. 

Life Boat Loading for Training Purposes 

8 To facilitate training for lifeboat operations, CLIA oceangoing members have 

adopted a policy that at least one lifeboat on each ship is to be filled with crewmembers equal in number to its certified number of occupants at least every six 

months. Under this policy: 

.1 for safety considerations, the loading of lifeboats for training purposes is to 

be performed only while the boat is waterborne and the boat should be lowered 

and raised with only the lifeboat crew onboard; 

.2 lifejackets should be worn; 

.3 all lifeboat crew and embarkation/boarding station crew are to be required 

to attend the lifeboat loading drill; and 

.4 if not placed inside the lifeboat, those crew members are to observe the filling 

of the lifeboat to its certified number of people. 

9 This policy applies to ships with crew sizes of three hundred or greater, with 

lifeboats installed. Ships with crew sizes of less than three hundred are to conduct 

similar and equivalent training evolutions, at appropriate intervals, that are consistent with operational and safety considerations. 

Proposed revision to MSC.1/Circ.1446 

10 CLIA recommends the Committee consider revising MSC.1/Circ.1446 such 

that these three additional outputs (paragraphs 5–9) would be included among the 

other recommended interim measures contained in the annex to that circular. 

Conclusion 

11 CLIA is fully committed to understanding the factors that contributed to the 

Concordia incident and is proactively responding to all maritime safety issues. The 

Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review has enabled the industry to do so in a 

meaningful and expedited manner. 

12 Since the Review began, CLIA has provided the Committee with several outputs, including 7 new policies regarding passenger muster prior to departure from 

port; passage planning; personnel access to the bridge; carriage of additional lifejackets on board; common elements of musters and emergency instructions; recording the nationality of passengers; and life boat loading for training purposes. In addition, CLIA has provided the Committee with an output of the Review regarding 

marine casualty reporting. 

13 Additional outputs from the Review will be provided as appropriate to the Organization via relevant Committees and Sub-Committees. 

Action requested of the Committee 

14 The Committee is invited to: 

.1 consider the information provided in this document; 

.2 consider revising the annex to MSC.1/Circ.1446 (paragraph 10); and 

.3 take action as appropriate. 

107 

MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE 

92nd session 

Agenda item 6 

MSC 92/6/1 

13 February 2013 

Original: ENGLISH 

PASSENGER SHIP SAFETY 

Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review 

Submitted by Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA) 

SUMMARY 

Executive summary: This document provides additional outputs from the Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review and proposes a further revision to include these additional outputs in the annex to MSC.1/ 

Circ.1446/Rev.1. 

Strategic direction: 5.1 

High-level action: 5.1.1 

Planned output: None. 

Action to be taken: Paragraph 17 

Related documents: None. 

Background 

15 In response to the Concordia incident, the global cruise industry launched a 

comprehensive Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review (hereinafter ‘‘Review’’) 

and identified a number of best practices, which have been shared among CLIA 

members and with the Organization. 

16 In the first paper on this subject (MSC 90/27/1), CLIA provided the Committee with an overview of the basic framework of the Review and also reported on 

the first output, a CLIA policy on passenger muster prior to departure from port. 

Since then, we have provided the Committee with additional outputs, including: 

.1 The need for consistent reporting and additional verifying of marine casualties and incidents, in particular very serious casualties, with a concomitant recommendation that Member States consider revising SOLAS regulation XI–1/6 

to emphasize the mandatory reporting requirements of very serious casualties 

(MSC 90/27/2); 

.2 CLIA policies on passage planning and personnel access to the bridge (MSC 

90/27/12); 

.3 CLIA policy on carriage of additional lifejackets on board (MSC 90/27/11); 

.4 CLIA policies on musters and emergency instructions (MSC 91/7/1); 

.5 CLIA policy on recording the nationality of passengers (MSC 91/7/1); and 

.6 CLIA policy on life boat loading for training purposes (MSC 91/7/1). 

17 The Committee, having considered the information provided, invited Member 

Governments to recommend that passenger ship companies conduct a review of 

operational safety measures with the aim to enhance the safety of passenger ships, 

taking into consideration the recommended interim measures of an operational 

character listed in the Recommended interim measures for passenger ship companies 

to enhance the safety of passenger ships (MSC.1/Circ.1446/Rev.1), on ships flying 

their flag, on a voluntary basis and with all possible urgency and efficiency (Resolution MSC.[. . .](91)). 

Outputs of the Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review 

18 As part of the Review, the cruise industry has developed three additional outputs as laid out below in paragraphs 5–13. 

Securing Heavy Objects 

19 CLIA’s oceangoing members have adopted a policy to incorporate procedures 

into their Safety Management Systems (SMS) to help ensure the securing of heavy 

objects either permanently, when not in use, or during heavy/severe weather, as appropriate. Under this policy, a person or persons are to oversee a deck by deck inspection to identify unsecured and potentially hazardous heavy objects. Integral to 

the procedures is a list of identified objects which have a significant potential to 

cause injury. 

108 

*The terms ‘‘muster’’ and ‘‘assembly’’ are used interchangeably and therefore are synonymous 

for this purpose. * And giving due regard to any relevant flag State requirements. 

†The terms ‘‘muster’’ and ‘‘assembly’’ are used interchangeably and therefore are synonymous 

for this purpose. 

20 Shipboard personnel should apply good seamanship in identifying additional 

items to be secured. Attention should be given to muster * stations, evacuation 

routes, and lifeboat embarkation stations as a ship emergency could give rise to conditions that differ from ship motions caused by heavy/severe weather. 

21 Consideration should also be given to development of a guidance document 

to assist in the identification of heavy objects and the most adequate methods for 

securing them. An example of this guidance document is attached in the annex. This 

annex is only intended to provide an example for one method of implementing this 

policy. 

22 Practices and procedures for securing heavy objects should be monitored by 

each Head of Department and/or as otherwise specified by the ship’s command 

structure, and during routine shipboard inspections and audits. 

23 Heavy/severe weather should be clearly defined under the company policy 

taking into account the size of the ship, operational profiles, and other information. 

In defining heavy/severe weather, appropriate deference should be given to the judgment of the Captain. 

Harmonization of Bridge Procedures 

24 Operational safety can be enhanced by achieving substantive consistency in 

bridge operating procedures among commonly owned ships, for example by providing that bridge personnel who may rotate among such ships can be familiarized 

with a common set of procedures. 

25 CLIA’s oceangoing members have adopted a policy that bridge operating procedures are to be harmonized as much as possible, both within individual companies 

and among brands within a commonly owned and operated fleet. Under this policy 

and best practice, each CLIA member operating multiple ships and each cruise line 

brand that is commonly owned and operated with another brand is to harmonize 

their respective procedures for bridge operations, taking into account any unique operating characteristics of specialty ships (e.g., expedition ships; sail powered ships; 

etc.) *

Location of Lifejacket Stowage 

26 In addition to CLIA’s policy on excess lifejackets (MSC 90/27/11), CLIA’s 

oceangoing members have adopted an additional policy to reflect best practices for 

the stowage of lifejackets onboard newly-constructed cruise ships (e.g., cruise ships 

for which the building contract is placed on or after 1 July 2013). Under this policy, 

a number of lifejackets equal to or greater than the number required onboard under 

the relevant international and flag State regulations, are to be stowed in close proximity to either muster † stations or lifeboat embarkation points, and be readily available for use in case of emergency. 

27 Implementation of this policy will continue to result in spare lifejackets being 

carried in excess of the number required by the International Convention for the 

Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). 

Proposed revision to MSC.1/Circ.1446/Rev.1 

28 CLIA recommends the Committee consider revising MSC.1/Circ.1446/Rev.1 

such that these three additional outputs (paragraphs 5–13, annex) would be included among the other recommended interim measures contained in the annex to 

that circular. 

Conclusion 

29 Since the Review began, CLIA has provided the Committee with several outputs, including 10 new policies regarding various operational safety matters. In addition, CLIA has provided the Committee with an output of the Review regarding 

marine casualty reporting. 

30 CLIA is fully committed to understanding the factors that contributed to the 

Concordia incident. Ongoing innovation in safety has been a hallmark of our industry for decades and we are fully committed to continuous improvement of shipboard 

operations and safety. The global cruise industry continuously reviews operational 

safety and works closely with the Organization as well as flag States, Recognized 

Organizations and others to enhance maritime safety. 

109 

Action requested of the Committee 

31 The Committee is invited to: 

.1 consider the information provided in this document; 

.2 consider revising the annex to MSC.1/Circ.1446/Rev.1 (paragraph 14); and 

.3 take action as appropriate. 

ANNEX 

SAMPLE STRUCTURE OF A GUIDANCE DOCUMENT 

TO ASSIST IN THE IDENTIFICATION OF HEAVY OBJECTS 

AND THE MOST ADEQUATE METHOD FOR SECURING THEM 

Guidance document(s) should consider the following three elements, in addition 

to any other relevant information. 

1 Heavy Objects. The following list is an example of some heavy objects that may 

be identified and secured in accordance with company policy. In this sample listing, 

the objects are grouped by those that should be permanently secured, always secured when not in use, and those to be secured in heavy weather. Heavy objects 

that have been identified include, but are not limited to, the following: 

1.1 Heavy objects that should be permanently secured. 

1.1.1 Heavy plant pots, sculptures, TVs, cash machines, laundromat equipment, slot machines, and game machines such as in teen recreation areas. 

1.1.2 Display stands and racks. 

1.1.3 Treatment tables, heavy standalone product displays, treadmills, exercise weight racks, and weight lifting machines. 

1.1.4 Pianos, lounge speakers, and back-stage scenery equipment. 

1.2 Heavy objects that should be secured at all times when not in use. 

1.2.1 Trolleys and forklift trucks. 

1.2.2 Paint rafts, gangways, and deck trash containers. 

1.2.3 X-ray scanners. 

1.2.4 Cylinder heads, pistons, charge air coolers, heavy chemical containers, 

and heavy fan impellers. 

1.2.5 Gas bottles (refrigerant, oxygen, acetylene, CO2, etc.) 

1.3 Heavy objects not otherwise secured that should be secured for heavy 

weather. 

1.3.1 Loose objects on display. 

1.3.2 Temporary decorations. 

1.3.3 Items brought aboard temporarily as part of shows. 

1.3.4 Materials/equipment onboard as part of repairs/refurbishment. 

2 Securing Methods. 

2.1 Consideration should be given to the strength and appropriateness of each 

point of attachment to which the heavy objects are secured. 

2.2 Consideration should be given to the following list of securing methods. Additional securing methods appropriate to the objects to be secured should be 

identified and used as necessary. Examples are as follows; however, additional 

methods should be identified and included as appropriate. 

A—Latch type gate hook and eye bracket mounted on bulkhead or vertical 

surface. 

B—Ratchet strap and eye brackets mounted on bulkhead or vertical surface. 

C—Rope secured to object and adjacent suitable securing surface. 

D—Contained in metal rack-type shelving system. 

E—Suction cup and bracket, ratchet strap, chain, etc. 

F—Permanent securing such as bolting to bulkhead or deck. 

3 Various. A list of specific heavy objects that have been identified by the company during surveys and inspections and that require particular attention. 

110 

5See MSC 92/6/1; MSC 91/7/1; MSC 90/27/1; MSC 90/27/2; MSC 90/27/11; and MSC 90/27/12 

(CLIA). 

MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE 

92nd session 

Agenda item 6 

MSC 92/6/9 

24 May 2013 

Original: ENGLISH 

PASSENGER SHIP SAFETY 

Comments relating to the Costa Concordia incident: 

The importance of shoreside management to maintaining shipboard safety 

Submitted by Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA) 

SUMMARY 

Executive summary: This document provides comments relating to the Costa 

Concordia incident. 

Strategic direction: 5.1, 5.2, 5.4 

High-level action: 5.1.1, 5.1.2, 5.1.3, 5.2.1, 5.2.2, 5.4.1 

Planned output: None 

Action to be taken: Paragraph 25 

Related documents: MSC 92/6/1; MSC 92/6/3; MSC 91/7/1; MSC 90/27/1; MSC 90/27/ 

2; MSC 90/27/11; MSC 90/27/12 

Background 

1 This document is submitted in accordance with paragraph 6.14 of the Guidelines on the organization and method of work of the Maritime Safety Committee and 

the Marine Environment Protection Committee and their subsidiary bodies (MSC– 

MEPC.1/Circ.4/Rev.2), and provides comments relating to the Concordia incident 

and in particular the importance of shoreside management to maintaining shipboard safety. 

2 Comments related to Italy’s report on the safety technical investigation regarding the Concordia marine casualty investigation are in document MSC 92/6/10. 

Discussion 

3 The role of shoreside management is critical to the proper development and 

function of an effective Safety Management System. An integrated approach is used 

by the cruise industry to maintain shipboard safety; one that recognizes an essential 

connection with senior shoreside officials. 

4 Notwithstanding substantive progress made to date, the cruise industry continues to establish and implement operational and management measures that are 

robust enough to minimize the potential for a recurrence of the type of navigational 

incident recounted in document MSC 92/6/3. For example, the cruise industry takes 

very seriously its responsibility to address issues surrounding the authority of the 

Master with regard to maneuvering a large cruise ship and the naturally related 

responsibility in management of the company to ensure safety. These efforts are ongoing and take the form of both industry-wide cooperation and company-specific actions. 

5 Some specific elements that have already been addressed and will continue to 

be evaluated on an ongoing basis via the cruise industry’s efforts include: 

.1 senior management level of engagement in safety-related matters; 

.2 senior management commitment to a company-wide culture of safety; 

.3 integration of shoreside management responsibilities into the company’s Safety Management System; and 

.4 CEO-level direct engagement in CLIA’s Member Policy Verification Program. 

6 Recall the prior CLIA submissions to the Committee on various outputs from 

the Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review.5 As part of the cruise industry’s ongoing efforts to continually improve operational safety, a wide range of additional 

items were also considered but have not to this point resulted in industry-wide policies. Instead, with regard to these items, information and best practices have been 

111 

shared among our members and incorporated into their own relevant policies and 

procedures as appropriate. 

7 Efforts to evaluate and improve in these areas remain ongoing within our 

standing committee structure and other appropriate mechanisms within our industry. Examples of areas, closely related to the role of shoreside management, that 

continue to be under consideration include: 

.1 discretion of the Master with regard to non-safety related voyage modifications; 

.2 bridge procedures during maneuvering and shipboard emergencies; 

.3 voyage plan change and general bridge procedure review practices and policies; 

.4 hiring, evaluation, and training practices for Masters; and 

.5 expectations and policies on when a Master may personally abandon their 

ship. 

8 It is the cruise industry’s approach that these types of issues are very much 

the responsibility of shoreside management to develop and successfully implement 

via effective shipboard practices and procedures. For a Safety Management System 

to be genuinely effective and within the true spirit of the ISM Code, it must carefully integrate the roles carried out by both professional shipboard staff and the 

shoreside management that both lead and support them. The cruise industry continues to fully embrace such an approach and commits to continuous improvement 

in this regard. 

Conclusion 

9 The cruise industry looks forward to working with all engaged stakeholders to 

identify and prioritize areas where additional improvements can be made and to develop any necessary standards that will further the shared goal of continuous improvement of maritime safety. 

Action requested of the Committee 

10 The Committee is invited to consider the comments provided in this document and take action as appropriate. 

MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE 

92nd session 

Agenda item 6 

MSC 92/6/10 

24 May 2013 

Original: ENGLISH 

PASSENGER SHIP SAFETY 

Comments relating to the Costa Concordia incident: 

Specific comments on Italy’s recommendations 

Submitted by Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA) 

SUMMARY 

Executive summary: This document provides comments relating to the Costa 

Concordia incident. 

Strategic direction: 5.1, 5.2, 5.4 

High-level action: 5.1.1, 5.1.2, 5.1.3, 5.2.1, 5.2.2, 5.4.1 

Planned output: None 

Action to be taken: Paragraph 25 

Related documents: MSC 92/6/1; MSC 92/6/3; MSC 91/7/1; MSC 90/27/1; MSC 90/27/ 

2; MSC 90/27/11; MSC 90/27/12 

Background 

1 This document is submitted in accordance with paragraph 6.14 of the Guidelines on the organization and method of work of the Maritime Safety Committee and 

the Marine Environment Protection Committee and their subsidiary bodies (MSC– 

MEPC.1/Circ.4/Rev.2), and provides comments relating to the Concordia incident 

and in particular Italy’s Report on the safety technical investigation regarding the 

Concordia marine casualty investigation, as presented in the Marine Casualty and 

112 

Incident Module of GISIS under Incident Reference No. C0008482 (hereafter ‘‘the 

Report’’). 

2 Comments related to the importance of shoreside management to maintaining 

shipboard safety are in document MSC 92/6/9 (CLIA). 

Discussion 

3 The Report contains 20 recommendations grouped into 6 functional areas covering stability; vital equipment & electrical distribution; emergency power generation; operational matters; evacuation analysis; and search and rescue. Seven are for 

new ships only, while 11 are for both new and existing ships. The two SAR recommendations, which are external to the ship, will not be discussed in this document. CLIA welcomes the opportunity to discuss the Report, consider the recommendations made by Italy, and develop a comprehensive way forward to further 

improve safety. 

4 Below is a summary of CLIA’s preliminary comments regarding Italy’s recommendations as contained in the Report. 

Stability (Section 6.2.1.) 

5 Double skin. Future discussions regarding the need for double skin to protect 

compartments containing equipment vital for the propulsion and electrical propulsion should also take into consideration requirements and guidance relating to 

SOLAS Safe Return to Port and Probabilistic Damage Stability, as appropriate. 

6 Limiting down flooding points. If this recommendation is aimed at mitigating 

progressive flooding, CLIA is of the view that it may need to be clarified. CLIA 

notes that the Report indicates the water reached the bulkhead deck in the aft area 

after about 40 minutes following the incident. 

7 Computerized stability. 

.1 In the discussion of computerized stability support for the master in case of 

flooding, it is important to distinguish between systems having static inputs 

(manual, by crew) from those having dynamic inputs (automated, in near real 

time). 

.2 Many cruise ships currently have computerized stability support systems on 

board that are based primarily on static inputs. Such systems require manual 

intervention and input by ship’s crew in order to display damage stability information. 

.3 Dynamic simulation would likely entail inter alia fitting and interfacing of 

flooding sensors on existing ships. CLIA believes that such a proposal needs an 

in-depth discussion among subject matter experts. To our knowledge, such systems are currently not available to handle dynamic inputs, in near real time, 

displaying predictive dynamic damage simulation. 

8 Interface between flooding detection and stability computer. See paragraph 7. 

Vital equipment and electrical distribution (Section 6.2.2.) 

9 Discontinuity between compartments. This recommendation relates to new 

ships. In addition, CLIA members have initiated a preparedness risk assessment to 

inter alia identify ways to preserve functional integrity of essential systems for existing ships. 

10 Bilge pumps. The recommendation regarding bilge pumps is far too vague 

e.g., ‘‘huge quantities of water’’ cannot be defined. Also, there may be additional aspects to consider when discussing this proposal such as power source and requirements to feed additional pumps. 

11 Relocation of main switchboard. CLIA notes that there are existing regulatory constraints regarding location of main switchboards in relation to other 

spaces/equipment. Such requirements may affect aspects of this recommendation regarding relocation of main switchboards. Any future development of new/revised requirements would need to be discussed by experts and carefully considered. 

12 Relocation of UHF radio switchboard. CLIA agrees in principle that the preservation adequate communications in an emergency is required. CLIA is of the view 

that the basis of the Italy proposal to relocate the UHF switchboard above the bulkhead deck is not clear. Therefore, CLIA believes that other more effective and efficient options may exist to accomplish the intended goal. A number of different solutions should be discussed and evaluated by experts. 

Emergency power generation (Section 6.2.3.) 

13 Increasing EDG capacity. It should be clarified whether increasing EDG capacity would apply to existing certified emergency diesel generators or to the ‘‘second emergency diesel generators’’ mentioned in paragraph 14. 

113 

14 Second EDG. CLIA agrees in principle with providing increased emergency 

power supply to support additional selected services. However, the recommendation 

regarding a second EDG is not clear whether the intent is to apply existing regulations (statutory EDG) to the second EDG or to allow for flexibility in the requirements applicable to the second EDG. When establishing new requirements for the 

‘‘second emergency diesel generator,’’ this proposal should be carefully considered in 

relation to the multiple technical and operational aspects involved. Therefore, CLIA 

recommends that any further consideration of this item be made by the relevant 

technical sub-committee(s). 

15 EDG functional tests. Italy proposes that both emergency diesel generators be 

tested weekly for at least two hours under a load of at least 50 percent. While generally in favor of enhancing functional testing aimed at improving reliability of 

EDGs during emergencies, the basis for Italy’s proposal is not clear and therefore 

further consideration is needed in the relevant technical sub-committee(s), including 

input from engine manufacturer(s). 

16 Emergency light in cabins. Italy’s proposal regarding emergency light in cabins suggests that these lights should be fed by both UPS and emergency power. Although cruise ships are provided with such emergency lights in cabins, CLIA would 

like to inform the Committee that not all of the lights are fed by the emergency 

source of power. In some installations, a light is powered by stand-alone battery. 

CLIA is of the view that as long as the goal is achieved (e.g., lighting the exit) and 

that a process is in place to ensure that lights work in an emergency, that a requirement for feeding from emergency power is not necessary. 

Operational matters (Section 6.3.4.) 

17 Bridge management. CLIA supports consideration of development of training 

requirements that reflect established principles such as function-based bridge management and collective decision making. CLIA is looking forward to considering this 

matter, perhaps in the STW sub-committee. 

18 Bridge team management certification. Italy’s recommendation regarding 

bridge team management certification is unclear. 

19 Principles of minimum safety manning. CLIA notes there is a lack of details 

in Italy’s recommendation. Nevertheless, CLIA agrees that the current principles of 

Minimum Safe Manning do not adequately reflect reality on passenger ships and 

therefore supports in principle the need for further consideration on this matter. 

20 Muster list. CLIA does not support the Italy proposal to show certification requirements in muster lists. CLIA notes that under the ISM Code, the Company is 

already required to ensure crewmembers are duly certified according to the duties 

and responsibilities assigned onboard. Cruise ships already have procedures/processes in place that ensure compliance with such requirements. In addition, robust 

systems are in place to ensure that those responsible for assigning emergency duties 

to the crew can easily verify the certifications required to cover such duties. CLIA 

believes that this proposal could result in the addition of unnecessary and redundant information to an already ‘‘over-populated’’ document. 

21 Inclusion of inclinometer data in VDR. CLIA agrees in principle with the 

Italy proposal to include inclinometer data in the VDR. 

Evacuation analysis (Section 6.3.4.) 

22 Evacuation analysis at early stage of project. CLIA notes that evacuation 

analysis is currently not on any sub-committee agenda, and that MSC 92 may consider whether to send a new work item to FP. CLIA looks forward to participating 

in the discussion at the relevant sub-committee, should the Committee decide to 

place this on the work programme. 

23 Embarkation ladders. CLIA supports in principle consideration for additional 

embarkation ladders. However, CLIA believes that in this regard careful consideration should be given to a number of important aspects, such as: 

.1 the positioning of additional ladders that could impact other LSA; 

.2 the difficulties for un-trained persons to utilize the ladders in conditions 

other than Concordia high-side, etc.; and 

.3 ‘‘blanket’’ requirements may be difficult to meet. 

CLIA suggests that other individual means of evacuation should also be included 

in the discussion on how to achieve the goal, with the focus of identifying improvement in their design and functions, if needed. 

Conclusion 

24 The cruise industry looks forward to working with all engaged stakeholders 

to identify and prioritize areas where additional improvements can be made and to 

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develop any necessary standards that will further the shared goal of continuous improvement of maritime safety. 

Action requested of the Committee 

25 The Committee is invited to consider the comments provided in this document and take action as appropriate. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

And we will now turn to Gerald Cahill, who is the President and 

Chief Executive Officer of Carnival Cruise Lines. 

Welcome. 

STATEMENT OF GERALD CAHILL, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF 

EXECUTIVE OFFICER, CARNIVAL CRUISE LINES 

Mr. CAHILL. Good afternoon, Chairman Rockefeller and Ranking 

Member Thune and members of the Committee. 

My name is Gerry Cahill, and I am President and Chief Executive Officer of Carnival Cruise Lines. I have been with Carnival 

Cruise Lines and its parent corporation, Carnival Corporation, in 

various roles for almost 19 years; the last 6 years, I’ve been with 

Carnival Cruise Lines in my current capacity. 

I have submitted written testimony, for the record, which includes information on the various initiatives and investments that 

Carnival Cruise Lines has undertaken in the area of safety and 

passenger comfort. I will, therefore, keep my remarks today very 

brief. 

Carnival Cruise Lines has a fleet of 24 ships, and we operate approximately 1,500 cruises per year, carrying nearly four and a half 

million guests per year. Our business is built on offering a safe, 

comfortable, and affordable cruising experience to middle—to millions of middle-class American families each year. The safety and 

security of our guests is not only important to us, but our very success relies upon it. 

In our over forty-one history, we’ve provided over 60 million vacations and maintained an excellent safety record. We are proud of 

our record of providing our guests with safe and memorable vacation experiences, and we appreciate the continued confidence that 

our guests have shown in us. We will continue to strive to exceed 

the regulatory requirements of our industry and ensure that our 

guests enjoy their cruise vacations. 

I welcome the opportunity to participate in this hearing, and I 

look forward to discussing with you ways in which we can further 

improve and deliver an even better experience to the millions of 

middle-class American families who sail with us each year. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cahill follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GERALD CAHILL, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE

OFFICER, CARNIVAL CRUISE LINES

Good afternoon Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Thune, and Members of 

the Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Committee to discuss Carnival Cruise Lines’ (‘‘Carnival’’) commitment to the safety and security of 

our guests. It is Carnival’s number one priority. 

Carnival operates 1500 cruises per year, carrying nearly 4.5 million guests. Our 

parent company Carnival Corp & plc serves nearly 10 million guests annually. Our 

business is built on being able to offer a safe, enjoyable, and affordable cruising exVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:32 May 14, 2015 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00118 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\94526.TXT JACKIE
115 

perience to millions of middle-class American families each year. Safety, security, 

and guest satisfaction not only is important to us, but our success relies upon it. 

Over our forty-one year history, Carnival has an excellent safety record. We work 

hard to provide our guests with safe and memorable vacation experiences. Our goal 

is to exceed the regulatory requirements of our industry to ensure that our guests 

are confident that they will enjoy a fun cruise vacation. To that end, I will focus 

my testimony on some of the steps that we take with respect to safety and security. 

Regulation of the Cruise Industry 

Because of the international nature of the cruise industry, there are several layers 

of oversight and regulation designed to insure the safe and reliable operation of 

cruise ships around the world. At the global level, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), which is part of the UN, is responsible for creating standards for 

all ships operating around the world. 

IMO has adopted several conventions that address and regulate various areas of 

vessel operations, which in turn, are ratified and enforced by Flag and Port States. 

These conventions address, among other things: all aspects of safety; ship design 

and equipment; fire protection, training and watch keeping; communications; search 

and rescue; navigation; and, environmental protection. 

The Flag State of each vessel is primarily responsible for enforcing international 

requirements, as well as additional regulations imposed by the Flag State. All Port 

States the vessel calls upon also ensure the vessel is in compliance, which further 

strengthens what the IMO and Flag State provide. Cruise ships, like other vessels, 

are subject to regular inspections and audits from both the Flag and Port States. 

In the U.S, the Coast Guard is both the primary regulator and the principal enforcement agency of the laws, regulations, and international treaties applicable to 

cruise ships. The U.S. is a party to IMO and has adopted the conventions described 

above. The Coast Guard conducts announced and unannounced inspections of cruise 

ships that operate out of U.S. ports in order to ensure compliance by ships operating 

in U.S. waters. Therefore, cruise ships operating in the U.S. are subject to numerous 

local, state, and Federal laws and regulations, including those related to safety. 

Safety and Security 

Carnival takes our compliance with all laws and regulations very seriously. Carnival has safety management systems in place that meet or exceed all regulatory 

requirements. Further, our parent company in 2006 established at the Board-level, 

a Health, Environmental, Safety & Security (‘‘HESS’’) Committee to assist the 

Board in fulfilling their responsibility to supervise and monitor HESS policies, programs, initiatives at sea and onshore, and compliance with HESS legal and regulatory requirements. In addition, the HESS Committee oversees audits of each of 

our ships annually to ensure compliance. Our HESS policy includes our commitments to: 

• Protecting the health, safety and security of our passengers, guests, employees 

and all others working on behalf of Carnival; 

• Protecting the environment, including the marine environment in which our 

vessels sail and the communities in which we operate; 

• Fully complying with or exceeding all legal and statutory requirements related 

to health, environment, safety and security throughout our business activities; 

and 

• Assigning health, environment, safety and security matters the same priority 

as other critical business matters. 

Carnival engages in regular training to ensure compliance as well. As an example, 

all officers and crewmembers on Carnival’s ships undergo regular safety and emergency training, which meets or exceeds all regulatory requirements. Carnival Corporation and Carnival plc also operate their own Center for Simulator Maritime 

Training (CSMART), in Almere, Netherlands, which features a broad portfolio of 

maritime training courses, including courses dedicated to bridge resource management, in which Carnival participates. The facility is one of the most advanced of 

its kind in the maritime industry and has been praised by the U.S. Coast Guard. 

Carnival has a professional Shoreside Security Department that provides training 

and support to shipboard security staff on each vessel. The Security Department 

consists of former law enforcement professionals. Training includes week-long annual shoreside training sessions for all shipboard Senior Security Officers, with curriculum based on the CVSSA model course 11–01 designed by the FBI and U.S. 

Coast Guard. Support includes pre-employment evaluation and incident response assistance and guidance. In addition, the Security Department serves as liaison to the 

116 

FBI, U.S. Coast Guard, and local law enforcement agencies for reporting and investigation of incidents. 

Global Operational Safety Review Implementation 

The cruise industry, through the Cruise Lines International Association (‘‘CLIA’’), 

initiated a comprehensive Global Operations Safety Review with the purpose of 

identifying additional practices that could strengthen the cruise industry’s already 

exceptional safety record. CLIA received input and guidance from an independent 

panel of experts with extensive experience in the maritime, regulatory and accident 

investigation fields. As a result, ten new industry-wide policies that exceed current 

international regulatory requirements were developed. Carnival has approved and 

has implemented these policies, which have also been submitted to IMO for consideration. 

The new policy recommendations that exceed current international regulatory 

standards are: 

• Passenger Muster policy; 

• Passage Planning policy; 

• Personnel Access to the Bridge policy; 

• Excess Lifejackets policy 

• Recording the Nationality of Passengers policy; 

• Lifeboat Loading for Training Purposes policy; 

• Harmonization of Bridge Procedures policy; 

• Location of Lifejacket Stowage policy; and 

• Securing Heavy Objects policy. 

Operating Reliability and Guest Comfort Enhancements 

Immediately after the Carnival Triumph incident, Carnival announced a comprehensive review of its entire fleet, which was overseen by our parent company. 

While no one was injured as a result of the incident, our guests clearly went 

through an uncomfortable experience. As part of that review, Carnival is implementing a $300 million program to significantly enhance emergency power capabilities, take advantage of new fire safety technology, and improve the level of operating redundancies across its entire fleet. Carnival’s ships have been and are safe. 

The changes made as a result of the review are primarily to improve comfort and 

guest convenience. 

All of Carnival’s ships have strong systems in place to respond to emergency situations. We meet or exceed all regulatory requirements. However, as we do on an 

on-going basis, we are applying lessons learned through our operational review after 

the Triumph fire, and by taking advantage of new technologies, we identified multiple areas for enhancement across our operations. These enhancements reinforce 

our commitment to safe and reliable operations and to provide an enjoyable cruise 

experience for the nearly 4.5 million guests who sail with us each year. 

The actions by Carnival will expand the availability of hotel services for the comfort of our guests in the rare instance of a shipboard event that involves the loss 

of main power. In addition, the plan will reinforce key shipboard operating systems 

to further prevent a potential loss of primary power. 

Increased Emergency Generator Power 

The initial increase in emergency generator power across Carnival’s fleet of 24 

ships is projected to be completed by November. An additional emergency generator 

will be installed on each vessel to provide for 100 percent of stateroom and public 

toilets, fresh water and elevators in the unlikely event of a loss of main power. Upon 

completion of the initial phase, the line will install a second permanent back-up 

power system on each ship to provide an even greater level of hotel and guest services if main power is lost. These additional services will include expanded cooking 

facilities and cold food storage, as well as Internet and telephone communications. 

Increased Fire Prevention, Detection and Suppression Systems 

The company will also make additional investments in the newest and most technically advanced fire prevention, detection and suppression systems. This includes 

upgrading the existing water mist fire suppression systems already in place on Carnival vessels to the newest generation. When triggered, this high-pressure water 

mist system instantly creates a larger and thicker blanket of water droplets than 

the present system. As the water droplets evaporate, the system also rapidly cools 

any hot areas to prevent the possibility of a fire restarting. 

117 

Enhanced Operating Redundancies 

All of Carnival’s ships have two separate, redundant engine rooms. The company’s 

operational review has identified modifications to further decrease the likelihood of 

losing propulsion or primary power, as happened on Carnival Triumph in February. 

The modifications will include a reconfiguration of certain engine-related electrical 

components to improve and enhance operational redundancies. 

New Safety & Reliability Review Board 

Carnival also announced the formation of a Safety & Reliability Review Board 

comprised of outside experts with significant expertise in marine and occupational 

safety, reliability and maintenance, marine regulatory compliance and quality control/assurance. The company already receives oversight and input from outside regulatory authorities and industry experts, as well as the HESS Committee. The new 

Review Board will provide an additional, independent third-party perspective, drawing from deep experience across a number of relevant fields and organizations. 

Carnival’s review board will include five external members with specific expertise 

in the areas of marine and occupational safety, reliability and maintenance, marine 

regulatory compliance and quality control/assurance. Four highly esteemed maritime and transportation industry experts, including two former U.S. Navy Flag Officers, already have been appointed. These experts will help us drive continuous improvement and further ensure the safe and reliable operation of our fleet. 

Passenger Bill of Rights 

Carnival, along with 25 other CLIA North American member cruise lines, has formally adopted the Cruise Industry Passenger Bill of Rights, which details our industry’s commitment to the safety, comfort and care of our guests. The voluntary implementation of the Bill of Rights formalizes many longstanding industry practices and 

is currently in effect for all U.S. passengers who purchase their cruise in North 

America, regardless of itinerary. 

We expect the impact of the Bill to be a positive one for Carnival because we have 

already taken great strides to deliver across all areas described in the Bill throughout our fleet. The Bill serves to underscore our already-existing commitment to our 

guests. 

The Bill covers the following set of passenger rights: 

• The right to disembark a docked ship if essential provisions such as food, water, 

restroom facilities and access to medical care cannot adequately be provided onboard, subject only to the Master’s concern for passenger safety and security 

and customs and immigration requirements of the port. 

• The right to a full refund for a trip that is canceled due to mechanical failures, 

or a partial refund for voyages that are terminated early due to those failures. 

• The right to have available on board ships operating beyond rivers or coastal 

waters full-time, professional emergency medical attention, as needed until 

shore side medical care becomes available. 

• The right to timely information updates as to any adjustments in the itinerary 

of the ship in the event of a mechanical failure or emergency, as well as timely 

updates of the status of efforts to address mechanical failures. 

• The right to a ship crew that is properly trained in emergency and evacuation 

procedures. 

• The right to an emergency power source in the case of a main generator failure. 

• The right to transportation to the ship’s scheduled port of disembarkation or the 

passenger’s home city in the event a cruise is terminated early due to mechanical failures. 

• The right to lodging if disembarkation and an overnight stay in an unscheduled 

port are required when a cruise is terminated early due to mechanical failures. 

• The right to have included on each cruise line’s website a toll-free phone line 

that can be used for questions or information concerning any aspect of shipboard operations. 

• The right to have this Cruise Line Passenger Bill of Rights published on each 

line’s website. 

Conclusion 

Nothing is more important than the safety and comfort of our guests, and we will 

devote the full resources of our company to meet that commitment. As I have said, 

our continued success depends on our ability to offer a safe, comfortable, and affordable cruising experience to millions of middle-class American families each year. We 

118 

strive every day to improve our performance in all areas so that our guests have 

confidence in their choice of Carnival, and we will continue to do so. 

The CHAIRMAN. All right, I thank you for that very brief statement. 

Mr. Adam Goldstein, President and Chief Executive Officer, 

Royal Caribbean International. 

Welcome to you, sir. 

STATEMENT OF ADAM M. GOLDSTEIN, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF 

EXECUTIVE OFFICER, ROYAL CARIBBEAN INTERNATIONAL 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Thune, distinguished members of the Committee. 

My name is Adam Goldstein, and I am President and Chief Executive Officer of Royal Caribbean International, which operates 21 

cruise ships around the world, with four new ships on order. Royal 

Caribbean International is one of six brands owned by Royal Caribbean Cruises, Limited, the world’s second-largest cruise company. 

Our company operates a total of 41 ships, globally. Last year, we 

carried nearly 5 million guests, visiting approximately 425 different 

destinations throughout the world. 

Last week, members of this committee’s staff visited one of our 

ships, Grandeur of the Seas, for which I thank all of you who were 

there. The ship was docked in Baltimore, Maryland, while the staff 

toured the engine rooms, the bridge, the medical facility, and observed firsthand some of the important safety features, such as 

backup power generation and fire-suppression systems. They were 

also briefed by the U.S. Coast Guard on the agency’s role in inspecting cruise ships to further ensure the safety of all guests and 

crew. 

In addition, the staff were briefed on our extensive environmental programs and observed our advanced wastewater purification system, or AWP, in which we have invested about $150 million. As a result of the AWP systems, the wastewater that we discharge into the ocean is purified to a standard that exceeds leading 

municipal, Federal, and international standards. 

With regard to air emissions, Royal Caribbean began working 

with manufacturers several years ago to develop advanced emissions purification, or AEP, systems to clean or scrub the sulfur 

from fuel emissions before they are emitted from the ship. While 

we have had some success with the two scrubbers in which we 

have invested, we are now pleased to be expanding this research 

project to additional vendors and to additional ships within our 

fleet, including Grandeur of the Seas. 

A new initiative, which I’m sure we’ll be discussing today, is the 

decision of Royal Caribbean, together with our industry colleagues 

from Carnival and Norwegian, to post on our websites a compilation of allegations of crime that occur onboard our ships around the 

world on all itineraries by all guests and crew. 

In 2010, Congress passed the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety 

Act, or CVSSA, which required the U.S. Coast Guard to maintain 

a public website disclosing the allegations of crime onboard U.S.- 

based cruises, provided those allegations were the subject of a 

closed FBI investigation. As this committee is aware, there are 

those who have taken issue with this limitation. So, in the spirit 

119 

of transparency, the three largest cruise companies, making up 

over 85 percent of the cruise industry, have voluntarily agreed to 

expand that reporting by posting all allegations in each of the 

CVSSA categories on our websites, regardless of whether an investigation was opened or closed. We will have this reporting posted 

on our websites by August 1, and it will date back to the last quarter of 2010, when the CVSSA was passed. 

Mr. Chairman, as you know, there was a recent fire onboard 

Royal Caribbean’s Grandeur of the Seas. Grandeur of the Seas set 

sail from Baltimore, Maryland, on Friday, May 24, for a 7-night 

Bahamas cruise. Unfortunately, just before 3 o’clock in the morning 

on Monday, May 27, the ship experienced a fire, requiring us to 

cancel the remainder of the cruise as well as six subsequent 

sailings. The cause of that fire remains under investigation. 

This incident was the first to occur subsequent to the cruise industry’s adoption of a Passenger Bill of Rights. As I believe the 

Committee knows, your colleague, Senator Charles Schumer, recommended that the industry adopt a 6-point Bill of Rights to protect those guests whose vacations are disrupted by mechanical 

issues on a cruise ship. Our industry trade association, CLIA, welcomed this recommendation, expanded the Bill of Rights to 10 

points, and its member cruise lines adopted it within a number of 

weeks. 

In the wake of the fire aboard Grandeur of the Seas, Royal Caribbean exceeded our obligations under that Bill of Rights, in terms 

of both compensating and accommodating our guests. 

While compensating our guests for the stress and inconvenience 

caused by such a serious incident is important, clearly our immediate onboard response is of far greater importance. First and foremost, we must address and successfully resolve any immediate 

threat, such as the fire itself. As required by international regulations, our crew members conduct extensive training and drills to 

address emergency situations, and are well prepared to act quickly 

and decisively in the event of a real emergency. Once the threat is 

eliminated, crew members can and should ensure the comfort of 

the guests. In the case of Grandeur, fortunately, none of the guests 

or crew members were seriously injured, and the ship never lost 

power. 

In addition to the emergency response drills and predeparture 

muster drill, each ship in our fleet is equipped with emergency 

backup systems that activate in the event there is an interruption 

in the main power systems. Each ship in our fleet is equipped with 

multiple high-capacity pumps that are capable of removing large 

amounts of water that may enter the ship. Each ship in our fleet 

has two or more propellers, each operated by a separate propulsion 

motor. Each ship in our fleet has three or more generators, and 

each generator has its own separate power cable. 

At Royal Caribbean, we recognize that there is no such thing as 

perfect safety. But, there is perfect commitment to safety, and that 

is our goal every minute of every day. 

I appreciate the opportunity to testify before the Committee this 

afternoon, and look forward to working with you and your staff, 

now and in the future. I’m happy to respond to any questions you 

may have. 

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[The prepared statement of Mr. Goldstein follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ADAM M. GOLDSTEIN, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE

OFFICER, ROYAL CARIBBEAN INTERNATIONAL

Good Afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Senator Thune and Members of the Committee. 

My name is Adam Goldstein and I am President and Chief Executive Officer of 

Royal Caribbean International which operates 21 cruise ships around the world 

with four new ships on order. 

Royal Caribbean International is one of six brands owned by Royal Caribbean 

Cruises Ltd., (‘‘Royal Caribbean’’) the world’s second largest cruise company. Our 

company operates a total of 41 ships globally. Last year, our brands carried nearly 

5 million guests, visiting approximately 425 different destinations throughout the 

world. Approximately 50 percent of our worldwide revenue is currently generated 

by cruises in and out of the United States—down from 76 percent in 2006. We believe that this trend will continue as rapidly growing foreign markets offer significant growth and profitability. 

Last week, members of this Committee’s staff visited one of our ships, Grandeur 

of the Seas, while she was docked in Baltimore, Maryland. The staff toured the engine rooms, the bridge, the medical facility, and observed firsthand some of the important safety features such as back-up power generation and fire suppression systems. At the Committee’s request, the U.S. Coast Guard also participated in the 

ship tour and explained its role in inspecting cruise ships to further ensure the safety of all guests and crew. 

The Committee staff were also briefed on our extensive environmental programs 

and observed our Advanced Wastewater Purification, or AWP, system. Royal Caribbean has invested over $150 million in our AWP systems. As a result, the wastewater that we discharge into the ocean is purified to a standard that exceeds leading municipal, Federal and international standards. 

With regard to air emissions, Royal Caribbean began working with manufacturers 

several years ago to develop Advanced Emissions Purification, or AEP, systems to 

clean or ‘‘scrub’’ the sulfur from fuel emissions before they are emitted from the 

ship. While we have had some success with the two scrubbers in which we have invested, we are now pleased to be expanding this research project to additional vendors and to additional ships within our fleet, including Grandeur of the Seas. 

With the extraordinary support and cooperation of the United States Environmental Protection Agency and the United States Coast Guard, as well as the Canadian Government, Royal Caribbean has been able to develop an approach designed 

to benefit the broader maritime industry. We anticipate that successful development 

of this AEP technology will allow marine engines to achieve sulfur reductions below 

that required by regulatory standards. 

Mr. Chairman, the cruise industry has been at the forefront of not only maritime 

wastewater treatment and emissions reduction technology, but other environmentally responsible initiatives. Royal Caribbean, and the cruise industry as a 

whole, has adopted practices and procedures that are substantially more protective 

of the environment than are required by regulation. On our website, we post our 

annual Stewardship Report which provides the public with updates on our performance in nine key areas of stewardship, including safety and security, energy and air 

emissions, water and wastewater, and medical operations. 

Also on our website—and on those of my colleagues from Carnival and Norwegian—the public will find a compilation of allegations of crime that occur onboard 

our ships around the world, on all itineraries, by all guests and crew. In 2010, Congress passed the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act, or CVSSA, which required 

the U.S. Coast Guard to maintain a public website disclosing the allegations of 

crime onboard U.S.-based cruises, provided those allegations were the subject of a 

closed FBI investigation. 

As you know, Mr. Chairman, there are those who have taken issue with this limitation so, in the spirit of transparency, the three largest cruise lines—making up 

over 85 percent of the cruise industry—voluntarily agreed to expand that reporting 

by posting all allegations in each of the CVSSA categories on our websites, regardless of whether an investigation was opened or closed. We will have this reporting 

posted on our websites by August 1st and it will date back to the last quarter of 

2010 when the CVSSA was passed. 

We are proud of this initiative and believe that it addresses many of the concerns 

raised with the limited public reporting required by the CVSSA. By providing these 

statistics, as well as the land-based rates of crime, consumers will be able to see 

121 

for themselves that cruise ships are among the safest venues when compared to any 

landside communities or destinations. 

At Royal Caribbean, we recognize that there is no such thing as perfect safety— 

but there is perfect commitment to safety and that is our goal every minute of every 

day. While we are proud of our safety record and of our high rate of guest satisfaction, we understand that incidents do happen, such as the recent fire onboard Royal 

Caribbean International’s Grandeur of the Seas. 

Grandeur of the Seas set sail from Baltimore, Maryland on Friday, May 24 of this 

year for a 7-night Bahamas cruise. On Sunday morning, May 26, the ship made its 

scheduled port call in Port Canaveral, Florida then set sail again that evening, 

bound for the Bahamas. Unfortunately, just before 3 o’clock in the morning on Monday, May 27, the ship experienced a fire, requiring us to cancel the remainder of 

the cruise as well as six subsequent sailings. The cause of the fire remains under 

investigation. 

This incident was the first to occur subsequent to the cruise industry’s adoption 

of a ‘‘Passenger Bill of Rights.’’ As the Committee may know, your colleague Senator 

Charles Schumer recommended that the industry adopt a 6-point Bill of Rights to 

protect those guests whose vacations are disrupted by mechanical issues on a cruise 

ship. Our industry trade association, the Cruise Lines International Association, or 

CLIA, welcomed this recommendation, expanded the Bill of Rights to 10-points, and 

its member cruise lines adopted it within weeks. In the wake of the fire onboard 

Grandeur of the Seas, Royal Caribbean exceeded our obligations under the Bill of 

Rights in terms of compensating and accommodating our guests. 

While compensating our guests for the stress and inconvenience caused by such 

an incident is important, clearly, our immediate onboard response is of far greater 

importance. First and foremost, we must address and successfully resolve any immediate threat such as a fire. As required by international regulations, our crew 

members conduct extensive training and drills to address emergency situations and 

are well-prepared to act quickly and decisively in the event of a real emergency. 

Once the threat is eliminated, crew members can and should ensure the comfort of 

the guests. In the case of Grandeur, none of the guests or crew members were seriously injured and the ship never lost power. While I am certain the fire caused 

stress and fear among guests, I am pleased that many guests took the time to write 

to Royal Caribbean to commend the crew’s response to both the fire and the comfort 

and care of the guests. 

In addition to the emergency response drills and the pre-departure muster drill, 

each ship in our fleet is equipped with emergency backup systems that activate in 

the event there is an interruption in the main power systems. Each ship in our fleet 

is equipped with multiple high capacity pumps that are capable of removing large 

amounts of water that may enter the ship. Each ship in our fleet has two or more 

propellers, each operated by a separate propulsion motor. Each ship in our fleet has 

three or more generators and each generator has its own separate power cable. 

I believe it is important to note that, in addition to what our individual companies 

are doing, many of these ‘‘best practices’’ have been set forth by the industry’s trade 

association, CLIA, for adoption by its diverse and global membership. As the second 

largest cruise company, Royal Caribbean plays a significant role in CLIA and I 

would like to briefly advise the Committee of recent developments at CLIA. 

CLIA represents the interests of 26 cruise lines, as well as 16,000 travel agencies, 

and hundreds of port authorities, destinations, and various industry business partners. Over the course of the past year, CLIA has successfully globalized its membership so that the policies developed for its members operating in North America will 

extend to CLIA members operating worldwide. CLIA now provides the single platform for a unified approach to industry policy and advocacy with representation in 

North America, South America, Europe, Asia, and Australia. Prior to December 

2012, nine separate trade associations represented the global cruise industry. 

As a result of CLIA’s aggressive efforts, our industry around the world is more 

focused on higher standards of safety and security than ever before. Last year, CLIA 

directed an industry-wide Operational Safety Review, a comprehensive assessment 

of the critical human factors and operational aspects of maritime safety. As a result 

of that review, the global cruise industry introduced ten new safety policies—each 

of which exceeded current international regulatory requirements upon their announcement and each of which have now been included in formal standards for Passenger Ship Safety promulgated by the International Maritime Organization, or 

IMO. 

For example, passenger ships were required to conduct muster drills within 24 

hours of guests embarking on a ship; CLIA identified as a ‘best practice’ conducting 

the muster drills prior to departure from port. CLIA’s membership adopted this as 

a formal policy and IMO has now adopted it as an international regulation. 

122 

Royal Caribbean is proud to play a leadership role in CLIA and has been supportive of its relentless efforts towards continuous improvement for the global industry. CLIA’s commitment to Safety, Security, Environmental Stewardship, Medical 

Care, and Public Heath makes for a stronger, more consistent and more unified 

cruise industry in these critical areas of our operations. I am sure my colleagues 

from Carnival and from other member cruise lines will join me in saying that we 

are proud of all that CLIA has accomplished and we will continue to support its 

efforts to develop global policies, to address international issues, and to provide strategic communications for its worldwide audience. 

I appreciate the opportunity to testify before the Committee this afternoon and 

look forward to working with you and your staff in the future. 

I am happy to respond to any questions you may have. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

I’ll start off. And this would be to the Coast Guard Admiral 

Servidio. 

The Carnival Triumph is now a household name—probably 

doesn’t welcome that—and not in a good way. The ship became famous in February, when it drifted for 4 days in the Gulf of Mexico 

after an engine knocked out the ship’s power and propulsion. Four 

months later, the Coast Guard boarded the Triumph, in Galveston, 

Texas, to conduct a safety inspection, and found a number of problems. As a result, the Coast Guard detained the Triumph in port 

and prohibited passengers from boarding the ship. 

Admiral, the Coast Guard only uses its, quote, ‘‘detention authority’’ in serious cases. Can you please explain why the Coast Guard 

detained the Triumph in Galveston last month? 

Admiral SERVIDIO. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

We inspected the vessel. We look at the firefighting systems, we 

look at the lifesaving systems, and we examine the drills. Onboard 

the Triumph, there were problems with the drills, specifically with 

regard to the lifeboats, sir, and we also found problems with the 

fire detection system. Basically, just like you have in your house, 

there are fire detectors around the vessel. In some segments of the 

vessel, there were a number of the fire detectors that weren’t working the way they should have been working. And there were also 

some problems with the fire sprinkler system in certain parts of 

the vessel. Again, it’s the sprinkler system that’s designed, if there 

is a fire, to automatically activate to put out that fire. Those are 

significant problems. And, as such, we detained the vessel until 

they were rectified. And they were rectified the next day, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. And you found, as I understand it, 28 deficiencies. 

Admiral SERVIDIO. Yes, sir. The—there were a number of minor 

deficiencies, but those were the substantial deficiencies, sir, that 

caused us to take the actions to not allow the vessel to embark passengers until they were corrected. 

The CHAIRMAN. Understood. 

Mr. Cahill, after the Carnival Splendor engine room fire left the 

ship disabled and stranded, in November of 2010, you told the 

media that this was, ‘‘a very surprising incident.’’ You later said 

Carnival spent millions of dollars on, quote, ‘‘lessons learned from 

the Splendor fire.’’ 

After the Carnival Triumph engine-room fire left the ship disabled and stranded, in February 2013, you told the media that, 

‘‘Something like this is a very rare incident.’’ Carnival also has said 

123 

that it was spending millions of dollars on ships in the aftermath 

of the incident. 

And on June 12, 2013, while the Triumph was being detained by 

the Coast Guard in Galveston for failing a safety inspection, Carnival posted a video, claiming that the ship was—before it had 

been cleared, that—you said, in the video, the ship was repaired, 

enhanced, and back in service. 

Mr. Cahill, you’ve been—you have a speaking role, yourself, in 

this video, in which you say that Carnival has completed it—an 

operational review of the ship, and that it was ready to go. 

In light of this record, why should the American public now believe that Carnival has a meaningful commitment to promoting its 

ships? It’s easy to say things happen infrequently, but, when they 

happen, they affect an awful lot of people, and they’re happening, 

even to the extent that the public knows about it, more frequently 

than necessary. How would you answer, sir? 

Mr. CAHILL. Mr. Chairman, first off, I take it very seriously, myself. After the Carnival Splendor fire, we did form a Safety—a Fire 

Safety Task Force, and that Fire Safety Task Force consisted of 15 

people who came up with 25 recommendations, at a very significant 

cost. They were all—I approved them all, they were all implemented. And, in fact, they were very helpful in extinguishing the 

fire on the Carnival Triumph. The Coast Guard noted that the 

crew performed very well in extinguish the fire, containing the fire, 

and putting it out quickly. 

What happened with respect to the Triumph was that the cabling that ran over the engine room was damaged, and we lost propulsion in the main—in the forward engine room. We were able to 

put the fire out. No one was injured. In either case, no one was injured. We were able to fulfill our obligation of keeping everyone 

safe. 

What we did do, very unfortunately, was, we really, seriously put 

our guests in an uncomfortable position. And that bothers us a 

great deal. And, as a result of that, we then performed an operational review. We announced, in—we consulted with the Coast 

Guard, actually, before we announced it. We came out and announced that we were going to invest over $300 million across our 

fleet, concentrating first that—this problem, where we lost both engine rooms, which is not supposed to happen, to rewire the engine 

rooms so that that would not happen in the future. We’re also investing in additional auxiliary diesel generators, so, in the rare 

case you do lose main propulsion power, we have backup power to 

provide better hotel facilities. And then, lastly, we are also investing in an upgraded fire safety and detection system, a higher-quality, more—I guess, more advanced technology has come out in recent years—water mist system. 

So, we take our obligations very seriously, Mr. Chairman, and we 

are working very hard. We’ve also just recently announced that 

we’ve formed an External Safety and Reliability Review Board. 

There are two former Navy admirals who are on that board, as well 

as people who are—one gentleman from the NTSB and another 

person who comes with a very significant airline maintenance 

background. 

124 

So, we take all of these things—we consider them very important, and we are working to improve. 

The CHAIRMAN. I’m beyond my time, already, but I was fascinated by your opening statement. It couldn’t have been more than 

a minute and a half to 2 minutes, and it had no content whatsoever. I don’t ask you to answer that or pass judgment on it, but 

I was kind of stunned. Everybody else was talking substance, and 

you were kind of walking away from things, was my impression. 

Senator Thune. 

Senator THUNE. I’d like to—oh, sorry—I’d like to direct this to 

Admiral Servidio. Could you explain to the Committee how the 

Coast Guard coordinates with industry and with enforcement agencies in other countries to enforce vessel safety regulations? 

Admiral SERVIDIO. Yes, Ranking Member. 

Basically, the way the oversight of a foreign-flagged vessel works 

is that the crew, the owner, and the operator are responsible, primarily, for ensuring that the vessel complies with all the international requirements. That’s sort of the first rung of the safety 

net. 

The next rung is the flag state, which is the flag that the vessel 

flies, be it Bahamas, Panama, Malta. And the flag state has a requirement to ensure that, again, vessels that fly their flag comply 

with this. 

The next rung in that safety net is the class societies, who perform an oversight function, for insurance purposes. 

And the last rung is the Coast Guard, which does port state control, sir. So, when a foreign-flagged vessel comes to the U.S., we enforce both U.S. laws and the international laws on that vessel. 

So, that’s the way—there’s an international set of requirements. 

Each flag has their own set of requirements, sir. Class society has 

rules that also need to be implemented. And then, here in the U.S., 

sir, when the vessel comes in, if it’s foreign-flagged, we conduct 

oversight to ensure the vessel is in compliance. 

Senator THUNE. So, just to be specific on that, it’s accurate to say 

that, even if a vessel is foreign-flagged, it is responsible for complying with all relevant U.S. safety standards. 

Admiral SERVIDIO. Yes, sir. The vessel is required to comply with 

the international standards; and, likewise, they’re required to comply with the U.S. standards that are in addition on cruise ships 

that we have, sir. 

Senator THUNE. OK. 

Mr. Cahill, as you know, the Coast Guard, last week, issued its 

final report on the 2010 Carnival Splendor incident involving the 

engine fire and the complete loss of power. You’ve talked about 

some of the steps that Carnival is taking—it sounds like, sort of, 

proactively—to correspond with some of the recommendations 

made in that report. I’m wondering if there are recommendations 

that were made that Carnival disagrees with. 

Mr. CAHILL. In thinking, no—no, Senator, I think we agree with 

their recommendations. Most of the recommendations that the 

Coast Guard came up with, we had already implemented. We had 

our own fire safety experts who came in. We had four or five independent experts that we hired who worked at the same time as the 

125 

Coast Guard. They primarily noticed the same things. We went 

right ahead and implemented them. So—— 

And, basically, as I mentioned before, those things were very 

helpful. They were effective in putting out the fire on the Carnival 

Triumph. 

Senator THUNE. Mr. Rosenker, you serve on CLIA’s Panel of Experts that makes safety recommendations to the cruise ship industry. Can you tell me what major recommendations you’ve made recently, and what the reaction has been of the cruise lines to those 

recommendations? 

Mr. ROSENKER. Yes, sir. 

We took a look, after the operational safety review that was 

going on, at a number of recommendations that we believe would 

go a long way to raise the bar of safety within this industry. And 

what we did was make these recommendations back to the industry; and they questioned a few of them, but immediately said, ‘‘This 

is the right thing to do.’’ And I found, having had experience in 

making recommendations to industries beyond the cruise industry—the rail, aviation, highway, pipeline—that, many times when 

I made recommendations, it took a while for those industries either 

to act or to finally implement what we had asked. This one was 

done very quickly. 

The 10 policies, which I submitted in my testimony, ultimately 

were put forth to the IMO, and they, too, had been accepted for implementation. 

So, I was—and along with my colleagues at the Independent 

Panel of Experts—we were impressed with the expeditious manner 

in which the industry accepted our advice and adopted the policies. 

Senator THUNE. We have other members who want to ask questions, Mr. Chairman, so I’d—my time’s expired, so I’ll pass and 

allow them to do so. Thanks. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you gave them an extra second. 

Senator Schatz. 

STATEMENT OF HON. BRIAN SCHATZ, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM HAWAII 

Senator SCHATZ. Thank you, Chairman, and thank you, Ranking 

Member. 

I have a question for the Admiral. 

First of all, thank you, Admiral, for appearing before the Committee. And let me say how grateful we all are, to you and your 

colleagues in the United States Coast Guard, for your service and 

providing a first-responder service to ensure that Americans at sea 

enjoy the same level of safety and security that they do on land. 

As we’ve heard today and in previous hearings, the Coast Guard 

plays a critical role in the safety and security of cruise ship passengers, from ensuring that cruise ships make—that make a port 

of call in the United States are in compliance with safety and environmental regulations to responding to accidents at sea. And I 

know you have 11 statutory missions, and you’re having to balance, 

as all Federal agencies are, all of those missions under the constraints of the sequester. 

126 

So, my question is, Can you speak to the resource constraints 

that you have, in terms of your emergency response capability and 

also your inspection regime? 

Admiral SERVIDIO. Thank you, Mr.—thank you, Senator. 

We believe—we conduct our marine safety missions, risk-based; 

so, we put the most resources we have to those vessels that pose 

the greatest risk. We do believe we have the resources, at present, 

that we need to continue to conduct our oversight of what other 

flags are doing, what the class societies are doing, as part of our 

port state control, as well as with our U.S. vessels. 

Senator SCHATZ. Could you just divide your answer to the emergency response side, as well as the, sort of, inspection regime? You 

believe that you have the resources on, sort of, both sides of that 

equation? 

Admiral SERVIDIO. Well, sir, I think the Commandant has gone 

on record as saying there is great concern with the age and the 

numbers of some of our fleet. So, I obviously agree with everything 

our Commandant has said, sir. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator SCHATZ. Of course you do. 

I have a question for Mr. Goldstein. 

We’ve heard, today, about the so-called Passengers Bill of Rights. 

I think it’s an important first step. But, bills of rights are generally 

enforceable and there is an accountability mechanism. So, I’m wondering if you could articulate what kinds of metrics you’re going to 

be putting forward to hold yourselves accountable to consumers 

and to the Committee, to the Coast Guard, to all of the various constituencies to which you are responsible. I think it’s an important 

first step, to articulate what you want to accomplish on behalf of 

passengers, but we sort of need to know how you’re going to measure your success and hold ourselves accountable, collectively. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Thank you, Senator. 

The first thing I would say, because the question was raised 

about this earlier on in the comments, to the extent that there was 

a question as to, ‘‘What is the relationship between the passenger 

ticket contract and the Passenger Bill of Rights?’’—we would not, 

as an industry, have agreed to issue the Passenger Bill of Rights 

if we didn’t expect that it would apply in all the relevant situations 

that the 10 points call for. 

We wanted to be fast in getting it out, and we didn’t want to 

wait until however many cruise lines who choose to do this would 

go through whatever process they might need to go through to harmonize the passenger ticket contract with the Bill of Rights. 

I am aware that, for at least a good number of cruise lines, 

they’re now in the process of trying to eliminate any perceived inconsistencies. 

The point is that it’s supposed to apply. It creates a contractual 

right, between the customers and the cruise lines, on which they 

can take legal action if they feel they’ve been denied any of those 

rights. 

Senator SCHATZ. And, in plain language, and up front, in a sufficiently large font, in a—— 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. In—— 

Senator SCHATZ. No, it’s a serious question, because—— 

127 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Yes. In whatever font is required for the purpose. And in the case of all 26 cruise lines, on their websites, adjacent to the passenger ticket contract so that the two are there, side 

by side, to be viewed, the 10 rights are stated publicly at all times. 

And it’s a good question about the metrics. This is very new. The 

main metric, I would say, is, Do the passengers actually have the 

right, and are they able to exercise the right, to take action? Are 

they actually able to receive the refunds that are meant to be automatically due to them under the Passenger Bill of Rights? Whereas, in the past, they would have only had the remedy of suing 

under the passenger ticket contract provisions. Are these things actually happening? Is there real relief involved as different incidents 

occur? 

As I mentioned, with respect to Grandeur of the Seas and the fire 

there, our goal was to go far enough beyond all of the relevant provisions of the Passenger Bill of Rights so that nobody would seek 

action. 

Senator SCHATZ. Mr. Cahill, anything to add? Mr. Cahill? 

Mr. CAHILL. Yes, Senator? 

Senator SCHATZ. Do you have anything to add? I have 9 seconds. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator SCHATZ. If not, I’ll yield back. 

Thank you very much. 

Dr. KLEIN. May I make a comment to what he just said? 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Begich is not yet seated. 

I’m sorry? 

Dr. KLEIN. May I make a comment in relation to the last question? 

The CHAIRMAN. Of course. 

Dr. KLEIN. Just—I’ll just make it very brief. I mean, I guess, in 

my written testimony, I go in detail with regard to either inconsistencies or problems, and I’m not going to take the time to do that, 

since you can read it. But, I do want to point out two things: 

The Bill of Rights says there’s a right to a refund. The practice 

of the industry is, those refunds are onboard credits. I don’t think 

an onboard credit is a refund. It doesn’t say how refunds are—onboard credits are computed. There’s no way in which that can be 

audited. 

Finally, the Passenger Bill of Rights is—states, is that it’s obligatory on all members of CLIA, and if they don’t do it, it’s—they can’t 

be members of CLIA. When I went through websites last week, 

preparing my testimony—I went to 26 cruise lines’ websites—I 

found that 13 of them do not have obviously displayed anywhere 

on their website the Passenger of Rights. I could not find it. So, 50 

percent of the members of CLIA are out of compliance in the Bill 

of Rights, which is obligatory for membership in the association. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Begich. 

128 

STATEMENT OF HON. MARK BEGICH, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA 

Senator BEGICH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I apologize, I had to leave here for about a half hour. I was chairing a 

meeting upstairs with veterans folks. 

Let me—I want to follow that up to the industry folks, and 

maybe Mr. Goldstein, or whoever would like to answer this. 

What is the follow-up for members to ensure that they are adhering to the Bill of Rights? What—how do you process that? I don’t 

know who would like to answer that, but—— 

Either one. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. I’m sorry, Senator. By ‘‘members’’—— 

Senator BEGICH. CLIA’s members. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. OK. 

Senator BEGICH. Like, if you didn’t—— 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Yes. 

Senator BEGICH.—adhere to the Bill of Rights, what—how does 

that work? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Right. So, every CEO of a member line needed 

to attest, in writing, to the fact that the Passenger Bill of Rights 

was in effect, that it was displayed on all 26 websites. And it is 

a condition of membership now. So, if we are found to be out of 

compliance with the Passenger Bill of Rights, we would have to relinquish our membership in the organization. 

Senator BEGICH. Let me—in your—the Bill of Rights you’ve put 

into place in the last 6 months, 8 months—is that a fair statement? 

Do you think, in order to really understand its effectiveness or its 

use by the different cruise lines—how much time do you think you 

need that—is—I mean, you’ve gone through it—from Alaska’s perspective, you’re in a season right now. But, I know, in Florida, the 

season starts later. I mean, everyone has a different season. So, 

how would you measure your success—or, when would you be able 

to measure your success, I guess is a better way to put it? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Sure. So, while fully admitting that there have 

been more incidents in the cruise industry this year than any of 

us would like to have seen, they are rare, as a matter of historical 

record, and I would think it would take more than—it’s actually 

been only 2 months—— 

Senator BEGICH. Two months. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN.—almost to the day—— 

Senator BEGICH. Right. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN.—since the Passenger Bill of Rights went into effect. So, it will take—I don’t know; I’m making up a number—1 or 

2 years, probably, to see exactly what that means, in practice. 

Senator BEGICH. OK. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. And, hopefully, it will show that the passengers 

are well protected. 

Senator BEGICH. How many—just so I know. From Alaska’s perspective, we had 3.5-or-so-million passenger visits. Approximately 

65 percent of our port-of-call cruise passengers visit U.S. ports. Direct expenditure, in our economy, is about a billion dollars and 

22,000-plus employees. So, a lot of impact to our state. You know, 

not like—maybe Hawaii, to a certain extent, but—not, clearly, like 

Florida, but, you know, a lot. 

129 

And tell me, in the overall industry of U.S. port touch, how many 

visits does the industry have—or, how many passengers, over a 

year, would they have? How big is it? And either one could answer 

this. I’m—— 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Yes, I’ll just start. With the worldwide industry, 

there will be about 21 million cruises taken this year. North Americans will take approximately 11- or 12 million. The great majority 

of those, plus some taken by others, will occur in and out of U.S. 

ports. So, the number of cruises being taken in or out of the U.S. 

is somewhere in the 10- to 12-million-person range. 

Senator BEGICH. OK. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I was quickly trying to grab the report and 

look through it. Like you, I’m having to my put glasses on, because 

I’m looking at the data points. But, I’m—— 

If I read this right—this is the FBI report, and it talks—January 

1, 2011, through December 31, 2011, Cruise Line Incident Reporting Statistics Incidents Report; it includes ‘‘Other,’’ which some industry folks don’t have to report it, but they do—a lot of them do. 

The number is 655. 

And I guess—and I don’t know what the total incident numbers 

are, because there’s, like, three or four different charts in there, so 

I didn’t have time to go through it, but let me just put that aside 

for a second. 

We don’t—and I’m sure you are of the same view—‘‘no incidents’’ 

is great. Right? That’s the goal. Right? Is that a fair statement? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. That would be a fair statement. 

Senator BEGICH. In proportional to other industries, when I look 

at the millions of passengers and the incidents, then, compared to 

it—and ‘‘no incident’’ is a good incident—I mean, we don’t want any 

incidences—but, in comparison, it’s a small number. Am I missing 

that? And again, I know there are lots of other data points in here. 

I’m just quickly grabbing what I was able to pull out of this report, 

here. I don’t know if you’ve seen the report at all. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. We haven’t had a lot of time, but the Chairman 

wrote letters to three cruise lines, about two and a half months 

ago. We answered in late May and provided a good amount of data, 

as I’m sure the other two cruise companies did, as well. As we 

move forward and as we begin to report out, as of August 1 on our 

website, all allegations of crime, irrespective of whether—— 

Senator BEGICH. Right. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN.—cases have been opened or closed or some of 

the issues that have been prevalent up until now, we will be able 

to compare to the uniform crime reporting that applies nationally 

in the country—— 

Senator BEGICH. For the FBI crime reporting statistics—— 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Right. 

Senator BEGICH. Yup. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN.—there will be, for the first time, the ability to 

compare, on an apples-to-apples basis, what the crime rates are for 

the principal CVSSA categories to what happens on land. And we 

are very confident that the comparative will be beneficial for the 

cruise industry, because crime is relatively rare on our ships. 

Senator BEGICH. Very good. 

130 

I know my time’s up, but I—just a quick answer from either one 

of you on regards to—I know, in Alaska, you guys are called on, 

off and on, by the Coast Guard to assist in situations. Is that just 

an Alaska incident type of situation, or—maybe both of you could 

respond to that. 

Mr. CAHILL. Thanks, Senator. 

It’s a time-honored tradition that, in the maritime industry, we 

all respond to help another vessel that’s in need. And the Coast 

Guard will often call on us in the—since March, the Coast Guard 

called on Carnival ships at least three times to assist in distressed 

vessels. Two times, they were relatively small vessels, and the people—we actually took the people onboard our ships—that is, to assist the Coast Guard. And then, the last time was to assist—to 

stand by for another cruise ship that was in distress. So, we do appreciate Coast Guard helping so much, and we try to return the 

same thing. 

Senator BEGICH. Thank you very much. 

I’ll end there with—I don’t know if we’ll have a second round, but 

I thank the Chairman for the opportunity. 

Dr. KLEIN. If we can—if I can offer just a couple of quick comments. 

I think one is that, in comparing the Cruise Vessel Security and 

Safety Act, when it was initially proposed and what was passed, 

there were two crime categories that were dropped off. And I think 

it’s dangerous for them to be left off. That is: simple assaults and 

thefts below $10,000. As Judge Thomas Dickerson, in New York, 

said—suggested in what—in a lecture he gave to a seminar of 

judges, that he felt the issue of thefts, dropping those off, was a 

serious problem, because it basically gives permission for those 

kinds of crimes to go on. 

I think the other issue—and I’m not too sure what the—what’s 

going to be reported, but—I don’t want to get into rates. What I’d 

like to identify is—— 

Senator BEGICH. Can I—I hate to interrupt you, and I—— 

Dr. KLEIN. That’s OK. 

Senator BEGICH.—my time is expired, but—you’re saying, because it’s not reported, that then says to everyone, ‘‘Go and commit 

crimes under $10,000’’? 

Dr. KLEIN. Well, the understanding that I have is, a crime of value of less than $10,000 is known that it will not be prosecuted, 

and it doesn’t get reported. That—you know, and I’m not too sure 

how they’re handled, but it doesn’t go to the FBI. So, you know, 

the—I guess it’s handled internally, if it’s handled. 

Senator BEGICH. I don’t know if the industry folks want to respond—— 

Dr. KLEIN. Yes. Let me just make my other one comment. And 

that is, the data we—last comprehensive data we have was— 

through a Freedom of Information Request, was dated for 2007– 

2008. And what that data demonstrated, which is similar to data 

from discovery in legal cases between 2003 and 2005—this is in an 

appendix in my testimony—found that close to 18 percent of the 

victims of sexual assault on cruise ships are children. 

I don’t want to get tied up in debates. I don’t want to get tied 

up into the incidents. My concern is that, when people—when famiVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:32 May 14, 2015 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00134 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\94526.TXT JACKIE
131 

lies bring their children on a cruise, and they’re told that it’s a safe 

vacation, I think any number of children who are being victimized 

is unacceptable. 

We have two children, an 11-year-old girl and a 12-year-old girl, 

both of whom were—one was molested—or, one was sexually assaulted, the other was groped on cruise ships within the past 4 to 

6 weeks. To me, I don’t care about the total numbers, I care about 

that those young children are going to live with that for the rest 

of their lives. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Thank you, Senator. 

With respect to the latter comment, obviously none of us accept 

anything of that sort, and we all want to work together to prevent 

any allegations or crimes of that nature from taking place. 

With regard to crime reporting, since 1996 it has been a legal requirement for us in the United States to report all felonies. That 

remains in place, irrespective of the CVSSA categories or what 

have you. So, we report thefts, for example, of $1,000 or more, 

which are felonies, to the FBI. It doesn’t matter that the CVSSA 

did not address that. So, in terms of categories of crime, we report 

much more to the FBI than the CVSSA required of us. 

Also, the CVSSA is written with respect to ships going in and out 

of the United States. On our websites, as of August 1, we will report all allegations of crime, wherever they may occur on any of our 

ships anywhere in the world, and to any citizen of any country, not 

restricted to U.S. 

Senator BEGICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your patience. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Blumenthal. 

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you. Thank you for this hearing, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, to the members of the panel who are here today. All 

of you have an expertise and knowledge in this area that’s very 

valuable to this committee. 

And I want to thank, particularly, Mr. Cahill and Mr. Goldstein, 

for being here. I know that this is not one of the great treats or 

glamorous occasions of your professional lives, so—— 

We have tough questions, which we have an obligation to ask, in 

my view, because the information coming to me—I think, to many 

of us—is that there is inadequate protection for travelers on cruise 

ships. The issues and problems may be more exceptional than the 

rule, but my impression is that consumers and travelers deserve to 

know better what the rights and protections are. And, in some 

cases, with many cruise ship lines, they are more illusory than 

real. And that’s why I’ve become a cosponsor of Senator Rockefeller’s bill, the Cruise Passenger Protection Act, which would address many of these concerns in the areas of enforceability and disclosure, transparency, accountability. 

For example, Professor Klein mentioned—and I think it’s true— 

that the Bill of Rights that CLIA has issued are essentially unenforceable, as a matter of contractual law, unless I’m mistaken. Correct me if I’m wrong, Mr. Cahill and Mr. Goldstein. Are those guarVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:32 May 14, 2015 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00135 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\94526.TXT JACKIE
132 

antees, every one of them, that you regard as a contractual right 

of a cruise ship traveler? 

Mr. CAHILL. Senator, yes, we do. We would never have published 

it on our website as a list of passenger rights unless we intended 

it to be enforceable. I have been advised by our counsel that it is, 

in fact, enforceable. Now we are in the process of going through 

and changing our contract so that it corresponds to the Passenger 

Bill of Rights. So, we—— 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And clearly you would not contest jurisdiction in any United States District Court, or oppose provisions that 

would grant jurisdiction in District Courts of the passenger’s choosing. 

Mr. CAHILL. I’m not a lawyer, Senator, but we would not contest 

the Bill of Rights. In fact, for all—— 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Well, I’m asking about the forum where 

it’s enforced, because a right without a forum, without a court, 

without an enforcer, is illusory. So, they’re not—you—I would be 

more than happy to give you the benefit of consulting with your attorney before you ask. I’m not trying to put you on the spot, here. 

But, may I simply suggest—and you can answer at greater length 

in writing—that you can do consumers and travelers a great service by allowing them to take action as a matter of contract against 

you in the forum of their choosing. Would you agree to do so? 

Mr. CAHILL. I think it’s pretty normal practice for a company to 

specify the forum on which it can be sued. In our case, it’s Miami 

courts. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Well, it may be the normal practice in 

your industry, but not necessarily in all industries. And—— 

Let’s move on, because I have a number of other points to make 

about the reality of these rights. Let’s talk, for example, about 

CLIA right number 3—talks about medical attention. In fact, it 

guarantees—and I’m quoting—‘‘full-time professional emergency 

medical attention, as needed, until shoreside medical care becomes 

available.’’ Do your lines charge for that medical care? Are passengers charged? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Thank you, Senator. 

So, in the normal course, yes, there are charges for using the 

medical center, depending on what the situation is. And then there 

are incidents and accidents, depending on what the situation is, 

where we may waive charges. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. You may waive, but there are fees and 

charges, which—— 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. There are normally fees—— 

Senator BLUMENTHAL.—which are not indicated—— 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN.—and charges—which are normally subjected to 

insurance. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And with respect to your line, Mr. Cahill? 

Mr. CAHILL. Senator, it would be the same. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. I might cite from Carnival’s ticket language—and I’m quoting—‘‘Carnival, in arranging for the services 

called for by the physician or nurse, does so only as a convenience 

for the guest. Guest agrees that Carnival assumes no responsibility, does not guarantee performance, and in no event shall be liable for any negligent or intentional acts of omissions, loss, damage, 

133 

injury, or delay to guests. Guests use the services of all independent contractors as the guest’s sole risk.’’ 

My time is rapidly coming to an end, but would you agree with 

me that, in effect, your cruise lines are disclaiming any and all 

legal responsibility for the quality of care that’s provided? 

Mr. CAHILL. Senator, we have an obligation to research and hire 

qualified physicians. We are not a hospital, but we are required to 

make sure that the physicians that we hire are properly accredited, 

properly trained. And we do that. So, we are legally liable to do 

that. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Mr. Goldstein? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Yes, we are in the same position. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. So, you would not dispute legal liability 

for medical malpractice by one of those doctors performing services 

during one of your trips. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. My understanding is that—to the point that Mr. 

Cahill was just making—if we make a poor choice, if we choose 

somebody who is unqualified to provide that medical service, we 

are liable and subject to a lawsuit for failure to do so. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. But, apart from the credentials—— 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Apart from the—— 

Senator BLUMENTHAL.—you would disclaim any responsibility. 

Your—the limits—— 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Yes. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL.—of your acceptance of liability is—if 

there—if that person has a diploma or a credential, that’s where 

your liability ends. Is that correct? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. The appropriate diploma or credential, yes. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Same with you, Mr. Cahill? 

Mr. CAHILL. Yes, sir. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you. 

My time has expired. I apologize for running over, and I’ll follow 

up in second round of inquiry. 

Dr. KLEIN. One quick—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. 

Dr. KLEIN. Just want to mention, real quickly, that the—this 

issue of liability was handled both by the Florida State Supreme 

Court and by the U.S. Supreme Court. It was the case Carnival 

Corporation versus Darce Carlisle. And that would have been in 

2007. The legal opinion in that case with the—which the cruise industry argued for and was able to get—was that they are not liable 

for the behavior of a physician conducting malpractice on one of 

their cruise ships. 

The CHAIRMAN. I’ll absorb that as best as I can. 

Senator Markey. 

STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MARKEY, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Did you want me to make a speech welcoming 

you once again to the Committee? 

[Laughter.] 

Senator MARKEY. I feel welcomed. And I’m glad that you’ve introduced legislation in this area. And I would like to, as one of the 

134 

first things I do, is to ask to be added as a cosponsor to your legislation. So—— 

The CHAIRMAN. With pleasure. 

Senator MARKEY. And I thank you. This hearing has been highly 

illuminating. 

May I ask you, Admiral Servidio—I know there has been some 

reference to this accident off the coast of Louisiana, and there is, 

right now, from the Coast Guard, an update saying that there is 

significant risk of losing the blowout preventer. Could you tell us 

what are the consequences of losing the blowout preventer in a situation like this? What would the impact be upon the Gulf of Mexico? 

Admiral SERVIDIO. Thank you, Senator. 

From what I understand, the Hercules 265, which is the—an oil 

rig that was drilling—I believe it’s about 40 miles off the Louisiana 

coast—suffered a well kickback; and, as such, gas came up, and 

there was an explosion last night. And, as a result of that explosion 

and the fire, the cantilever, which is pretty much the derrick—the 

floor of—on which the derrick was drilling, has collapsed. And, 

with that—I understand that the crew was interviewed before they 

evacuated; everyone evacuated safely from the mobile offshore 

drilling unit—that they said they actuated the blowout preventer, 

but, for whatever reason, it seems like it did not work. I don’t 

know, at this point in time, sir, on why that might have happened 

or whether the rams actually, which are, basically, two hydraulic 

presses that squeeze together—I don’t know whether they actually 

actuated or whether they didn’t, sir. 

If there is no blowout preventer, then there might be a number 

of options that I know the Unified Command is looking at. I don’t 

know whether capping, in a capping stack, would be a potential. 

The—due to the sand that might be in the formation, it might plug 

itself. There are a number of different things that could happen, 

sir. We’re working with BSEE, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, and the Unified Command is looking at what 

those potential options are and what might be. I can’t—— 

Senator MARKEY. Is there—— 

Admiral SERVIDIO.—speculate, sir. 

Senator MARKEY. Is there a chance that the rig could sink if they 

cannot get close enough to fight the fire? 

Admiral SERVIDIO. There is a chance, sir, that, if the—if we can’t 

fight the fire and it continues to burn, that there will be metal fatigue, and that will infect the vessel, sir. 

Senator MARKEY. And what would that mean for the Coast 

Guard or for the industry, in terms of capping the well, if the rig 

actually sank? 

Admiral SERVIDIO. Again, sir, I don’t know specifically on what 

that would do. I think a lot would depend upon what happens with 

the rig and how it would end up—if it does have a failure, how it 

would end up failing. And I don’t know the pressures of the formation or anything else, sir, so I really can’t speculate, Senator. 

Senator MARKEY. But, it could take upwards of 20 or 25 days to 

have a relief well that is actually drilled, if this rig sinks, if there 

is an inability to deal with it. 

135 

Admiral SERVIDIO. Senator, I believe both the Coast Guard and 

BSEE issued, or are issuing, a joint order to start the process of 

drilling a relief well. I’m not sure whether there are other contingencies, but I think they’re starting to get that process in place, 

should that happen. 

Senator MARKEY. Yes. You know, there was another event like 

this, just 2 weeks ago, where there was a loss of well control. And 

this is just a second incident in 2 weeks. So, again, it’s just something that we have to learn, that when we don’t put in the proper 

policies that ensure that these events are preventable, that they 

become inevitable, and they recur. And we’re seeing it, now, twice 

in just 2 weeks. 

Admiral SERVIDIO. As you’re aware, Senator, the Coast Guard 

has responsibility for the safety systems onboard that mobile drilling unit. The Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement 

looks at the drilling systems, the BOP and other types. 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you. 

Admiral SERVIDIO. But, we share. We work together. 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you. Thank you, sir. Thank you for your 

service, and thank you for the Coast Guard’s work in this instance. 

Mr. Chairman, for the past three Congresses, I have actually introduced the Travelers International Bill of Rights in the House of 

Representatives. And this relates to a similar, but not identical, 

issue, here, that we’re talking about, which is a consumer who purchases international vacation travel online. My bill would require 

travel website operators to prominently post information regarding 

the health and safety conditions at overseas travel destinations, 

such as the availability of lifeguards, medical personnel, as well as 

information from the Department of State on crime statistics and 

travel warnings related to their destination. So, this would actually 

relate to passengers on ships that disembark when they go into 

these vacation destinations. 

So, I’ll tell you why. Maureen Webster, she was a constituent of 

mine in Woburn, Massachusetts—she educated me about the potentially deadly consequences that can result from lower safety 

standards and medical response capabilities at some overseas travel destinations. Her son, Nolan, died at a resort in Mexico, when 

he did not receive the medical treatment that may have been able 

to safe his life. 

So, I’m planning on introducing that legislation in the Senate, as 

well, because, by having easy access to health and safety information, Americans can actually make more informed decisions about 

where to travel and where to stay when they are overseas. 

We’ve recently heard a number of serious incidents that compromised the safety of cruise ship passengers, including serious 

mechanical failures that left thousands of passengers stranded for 

days, navigational mistakes that led to passenger deaths, et cetera, 

violent crimes that were committed onboard. But, the same thing 

happens when passengers disembark in individual countries. And 

that information, in my opinion, as well, should be made available. 

So, Dr. Klein, what do you think about that, in terms of that 

next step in giving protection to consumers? 

Dr. KLEIN. Well, I very much agree with what you’re saying and 

the need for that for international travelers, but also for cruise pasVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:32 May 14, 2015 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00139 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\94526.TXT JACKIE
136 

sengers. For example, there are cases—I mean, not frequent, but 

there are enough—of people going on shore excursions and being 

robbed, or going on shore excursions and dying. In my testimony, 

I give a list of the number of deaths onshore for people who have 

taken a cruise. 

And I think, as long as your legislation would extend to including 

what happens ashore to cruise passengers, not just people who 

have flown to stay in that location, I think it would be a wonderful 

and a very positive move. 

Senator MARKEY. Mr. Cahill, what would you think about that— 

giving that information to passengers on cruise ships or to anyone 

just going into a country, flying in, as well? 

Mr. CAHILL. Senator, we actually try to do that now when we 

have concerns about a particular area. We have a security group. 

We review ports before we go. We have actually canceled calls in 

a number of ports—we’ve stopped going to ports—when we’ve had 

concerns about it. But, our security team reviews for—is there potential with terrorism in that particular part of the world? We look 

to see, Is there civil unrest? If there’s civil unrest, we’re probably 

going to pass on that port. 

But, we also look at local crime. We work with local authorities. 

And we will give notices to our guests. I mean, to some extent, it’s 

common sense, just like when I’m home, there are certain parts of 

town you may not want to go to at night. We will tell the same 

things to our guests there. So, we try and do that, today, Senator. 

Senator MARKEY. But, would you support requirements that 

travel website operators who sell cruise vacations must prominently post this information for consumers shopping for a cruise so 

that they can understand what the dangers, what the health conditions might be in these individual ports? Would you support that 

being posted, as well, on the websites of the travel—— 

Mr. CAHILL. I think I have to look at it, first, Senator. 

Senator MARKEY. Mr. Goldstein, what would you think about 

that? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. That sounds like something that the industry 

would be definitely open to dialogue about. We want our guests to 

be informed. Both our companies and, I think, other cruise companies have very experienced people. In our case, our head of Security, Safety and Environment was a very senior long-term ranking 

official at the FBI. I believe Carnival’s person had a long and distinguished career at the Coast Guard. 

So, we are constantly evaluating. And it seems like an eminently 

sensible idea. But, I just want to stress that things change all the 

time. So, for example, with the recent unrest in Turkey, cruise 

ships are obviously going in and out of Turkey, land-stay vacationers are going in and out of Turkey. We’re monitoring that situation literally hour by hour to make sure that—it is still okay for 

the ships to go there, and so forth. So, it’s a very important subject 

for us. 

Senator MARKEY. I appreciate that. But, it turns out that 

Maureen Webster, in talking to me about her son, basically 

learned, as I learned in helping her, that all of this information 

was knowable, that she learned so much about where her son was 

going after the fact that, if there had been a conversation beforeVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:32 May 14, 2015 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00140 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\94526.TXT JACKIE
137 

hand, might have prevented him ever going there. So, that was a 

destination in Mexico, but it could have been in many other countries in the world. So, I would like to work with you on that, just 

so that information is made public. 

So, I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Markey, thank you very much. That was 

a substantial input of 10 minutes and 13 seconds. 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. But, of course, very interesting. 

Senator MARKEY. I was playing under American League rules. 

I’m over here in the National League. So, I’m just learning the 

rules—— 

[Laughter.] 

Senator MARKEY.—you know, designated hitter, you know—— 

Senator THUNE. Mr. Chairman—— 

Senator MARKEY.—proxies, all different rules over here. So, 

I’m—— 

[Laughter.] 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you, Mr.—— 

Senator THUNE. Having served with the Senator from Massachusetts in the House, I know there’s a real pent-up demand to talk 

for long periods of time when you get to the Senate. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator MARKEY. When you move from a 1-minute rule—— 

[Laughter.] 

Senator MARKEY.—right, it’s liberating. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And maybe in the Grapefruit League. 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me make a comment and read something 

controversial. 

My impression of this hearing is that there’s a bit of a Kabuki 

dance. I mean, my mind is not neutral on this. And I come from 

a state where we have a lot of coal mines. And although it may be 

very odd to compare coal mines to cruise ships, the psychology focused within the management of coal mines and what we’re talking 

about here seems to be somewhat parallel. 

There is danger every day in the coal mines. People understand 

that. But, since coal mines, like cruise ships are located beyond the 

borders of 3 miles, nobody really knows what’s going on. There’s no 

911 reporting system. And so, you have to depend on whatever the 

rules are of management on that cruise ship. 

In the coal mines, that can be very deadly. When we do have accidents, they sort of stop the world, at least the coal-mining part 

of the world, and parts of the Congress. And Republicans and 

Democrats come together, and they pass mine safety legislation, 

because there’s a shock factor, where, in fact, there should not have 

been a shock factor, because the elements leading up to that were 

there all the time for those of us who’ve dealt with coal mines and 

miners for years and years—and coal operators, in particular. 

I have a feeling that those who operate here are showing the 

good side, emphasizing how infrequent these matters are. I think 

I’ve heard it mentioned a couple of times, of passengers, but not 

very much. And I think there are some people who want to see 

138 

good done. And that, after all, is the purpose of an oversight committee. We take that extremely seriously. 

So, Mr. Rosenker, I will just highlight in my statement, yes, 

you’re the former chairman of the National Transportation Safety 

Board, and yes, you are also the CLIA-appointed Panel of Experts—you belong to that. But, you see, that doesn’t make you a 

free actor. That makes you a part of the system. You can answer, 

at the proper time. 

Mr. ROSENKER. Thank you, Chairman—— 

The CHAIRMAN. I—at the proper time. 

Mr. ROSENKER. Oh, I’m sorry. 

The CHAIRMAN. I want to read to you—a predecessor of yours, 

Jim Hall, who I’ve known for 30 years, and who had some part of, 

in fact, saving my life, at one point, in Tennessee, which doesn’t 

bias me toward him, because this is a different subject. But, this 

is what he had to say. And I didn’t see this until last night, until— 

we just got it last night. As you know, he was head of NTSB from 

1994 to 2001. He recently made some comments about the cruise 

industry that I will share with you. 

He said that the IMO—in other words, the International Maritime Organization—and other cruise regulators are ‘‘paper tigers’’—his words—that haven’t been able to get, quote, ‘‘bad actors 

out of the industry.’’ He said that the maritime industry is, quote, 

‘‘a culture that has never been broken, as the aviation industry 

was’’—and you see evidence of that in the Costa Concordia accident—by which I mean we had a lot of trouble with getting aviation to take seriously the problems of the amount of sleep that 

their pilots got, and the propeller people, who had to travel over 

the country and could get hardly any sleep, as opposed to those 

who flew international flights pretty much on automatic control 

and made a lot more money. And he even said that, though cruise 

ships may seem and feel American, they flag in countries like the 

Bahamas and operate outside of reasonable and safety standards. 

I think there was a discussion earlier which I felt I disagreed 

with, and that is that if it was—that, you know, safety standards 

applied, no matter where you were. I think that’s not true. American standards of safety apply within the 3 miles. Outside of that, 

it’s your world, your ball game. 

And he said that people who book cruises should be aware of all 

of this, operating outside of reasonable safety standards. And he 

says that the industry is, and has been, an outlaw industry. Those 

are strong words from a moderate Southern person, who I greatly 

respect. 

Frankly, that introduces the kind of controversy that I want in 

this hearing. You, on the one hand; him, on the other hand. What 

they say, I expect. What you say, I don’t expect, except as I understand not breaking the culture. 

So, what are your comments on Jim Hall’s statement? 

Mr. ROSENKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I, too, along with you, respect former Chairman Hall. He 

was an excellent head of this board that I had the privilege to chair 

for 6 and a half years. 

139 

Let me put a little perspective in. And I think you will appreciate 

this, sir, because of being Chairman of—this oversight committee 

goes across all modes of transportation. 

When I served and got confirmed by this committee, in March of 

2003, until I left, in August of 2009, 2000—and this is approximate—210,000 people died on our Nation’s highways; 36 million accidents, 18 million injuries. During that same period, 210 commercial airline accidents and incidents, resulting in 10 fatal accidents, 

for 138 fatalities. In the rail, without including the 180 people that 

committed suicide during that six and a half years, 317 people died 

in operational fatalities. In that same period, in the cruise ship 

area—and this is according to G.P. Wilde, who is the authoritative 

statistician that covers this industry—18 people died, three of 

which were passengers and 15 were crew. 

None of those are acceptable fatalities, but I’m just asking for a 

perspective to understand where we need to be really looking to 

raise the bar of safety, not just in our cruise ship area, but clearly 

in others, as well. 

The CHAIRMAN. Sir, you do this committee an injustice, and one 

which offends me, because we do that—you’re unaware of it, 

but—— 

Mr. ROSENKER. Oh, no, sir, I’m quite aware of it. 

The CHAIRMAN.—we do it on a constant basis. 

Mr. ROSENKER. I do—I know that—— 

The CHAIRMAN. We do not accept—— 

Mr. ROSENKER.—and I applaud the work that you’re—been 

doing. But—— 

The CHAIRMAN.—in any—— 

Mr. ROSENKER.—I just wanted to put it—— 

The CHAIRMAN.—in any way, shape—— 

Mr. ROSENKER.—in perspective. 

The CHAIRMAN.—or form—— 

Mr. ROSENKER. Yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN.—a comparison between the number of deaths in 

one industry, as compared to the number of deaths in another industry. In that case, the coal industry might look quite good. That’s 

not my view, generally, of the coal industry. And, in fact, I even 

worked it out so that they had to pay—anytime they had to—an 

accident of any sort, they had to post it on the SEC website. And 

I did the same with—since we do some cybersecurity, with hacking. 

That now is law. If you’re hacked into, you have to post it on the 

website. Now, that’s aimed at the shareholder, not the passenger. 

But, I’m—I think I’m—I think we’re talking past each other. I’m 

not sure what we’re accomplishing here. I think it’s helpful, in that 

it sort of sets up who’s on what side of which, and therefore, ‘‘How 

can you measure what they say?’’ But, it has not been as successful, from my point of view, a hearing as I would like. 

And I will leave it there and turn to Senator Blumenthal. 

Dr. KLEIN. May I make a comment? 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. 

Dr. KLEIN. If I may, just want to make a very quick comment. 

We had a variation of this conversation at the last hearing, 16 

months ago. And I had asserted that I think one of the problems 

with the industry is an issue of—they listen to the insiders, but 

140 

they don’t listen to the outsiders. And anybody who’s not part of 

the industry who has an opinion is, basically, ignored, somehow 

marginalized. 

And I recall—to Senator Rockefeller’s comment—that the CEO of 

CLIA suggested that perhaps CLIA should have a conversation 

with me. Now, I don’t take this personally. And the CEO turned 

to me and says, ‘‘Oh, yes, we will be talking to him, because he 

may have some valuable insights.’’ That’s 16 months ago, and I’ve 

received no call. Again, I’m not hurt. This is—it’s not an ego. But, 

I think it reflects that, ‘‘If you’re not one of us, you have nothing 

to offer to us that can help us.’’ 

The CHAIRMAN. Point taken. 

Actually, Senator Begich—— 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. I’m—with apologies, Mr. Chairman, I will 

have to leave to preside—— 

Senator BEGICH. Let him do that, then. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL.—but—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Can you put in one final question? 

Senator BEGICH. No, go ahead. I’ll follow him. I’ll follow him. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Let me ask you—— 

The CHAIRMAN. You mean to preside over the Senate? What a 

miserable task. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. No comment. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Mr. Cahill and Mr. Goldstein, we were 

talking, a little bit earlier, about limits on liability, limits on where 

remedies can be enforced—with those limits, I’ve looked and read 

carefully at CLIA, and I don’t see any indication of what those limits on liability are. Wouldn’t you agree? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. I’m sorry, I didn’t follow. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Well, for example, the limits on what 

standards are enforced when the guarantee—and it’s a guarantee, 

in CLIA, that medical care would be provided—nowhere is there 

any indication that fees are going to be charged. That’s correct? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Right. As you noted, the Passenger Bill of Rights 

does not comment on that aspect of the requirement to provide the 

necessary medical care. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And there’s no indication as to the limits 

on what passengers can seek, by way of recourse, if there’s negligence in the provision of medical care. You simply guarantee that 

a doctor has a diploma; you don’t guarantee the doctor’s going to 

provide adequate medical care. That’s—is that correct? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Yes. But, I will note—— 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And there’s no indication, in CLIA, of that 

limitation on your obligation. Is that correct? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. That is correct. But, I—if I may—— 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Wouldn’t it be clearer if—and more transparent—if, as to that right—and, by the way, many other rights— 

and I’m going to be following, with the Chairman’s permission, 

with some more detailed questions in writing, not only about what 

your lines guarantee, but what others do, as well, because you may 

be the leaders in the industry; you may be the good guys. But, 

wouldn’t it be preferable if more of those limits, more of the nonVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:32 May 14, 2015 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00144 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\94526.TXT JACKIE
141 

transparent restrictions or fees or charges were provided in CLIA 

instead of in the fine print of contractual disclaimers of obligations? 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. It may be, Senator. I just would emphasize two 

things. 

First, we wanted to be able to issue a Passenger Bill of Rights 

faster rather than slower. And—— 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. But, a Passenger Bill of Rights can be 

misleading. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Our intention was—— 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. To put it very bluntly, it can do more 

harm than good. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. It certainly—— 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. It would seem to a guarantee a right that, 

in fact, is illusory. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. OK. I can tell you that we do not believe, nor 

does our counsel, who has advised us, believe, that any of those 

rights are illusory. We believe that it has gone beyond the standard 

ticket contract, over time, in meaningful ways. 

And then, the second thing is that we’re trying—— 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Well, that may be part of the problem, 

that the standard ticket contract limits your obligations and CLIA 

seems to expand them, but, when the rubber meets the road, you 

go back to the contract and insist on what I’m calling ‘‘the fine 

print’’ in the contract, that, in effect, narrowly constricts and limits 

the rights of the passenger. 

And when I say ‘‘you,’’ I’m not necessarily talking about your 

line; I’m talking—— 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. Yes. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL.—about ‘‘you,’’ other lines, as well. I’m not 

here to sort of cross-examine you or put you on the spot. This is 

not about your line or Mr. Cahill’s; it’s really about the industry. 

Mr. GOLDSTEIN. No, I understand. I just want to emphasize—I 

believe Mr. Cahill noted this, in passing, earlier—for at least a 

good number of cruise lines—I can’t say for the whole industry, but 

for at least a good number of cruise lines right now—there is a 

process in place where the ticket contract is being modified and 

harmonized to accord with the intent of the Passenger Bill of 

Rights so that this potential dilemma doesn’t exist. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Well, that is a welcome development. I 

hope it will be accelerated and enhanced, and enlarged by proposed 

legislation like the Chairman’s, which Senator Markey and I have 

joined, and that the good guys in the industry will join in educating 

us as to how the potential abuses can be reduced, and the whole 

industry made more transparent and accountable. 

And I apologize, Mr. Chairman, for taking more than 3 minutes, 

here. 

And, to my colleague, Senator Begich, thank you for letting me 

have this additional time. 

And really appreciate all of you being here. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Begich. 

Senator BEGICH. Thank you. 

And, Senator Blumenthal, it’s okay, because you get to preside 

and I don’t have to. 

142 

[Laughter.] 

Senator BEGICH. So, that’s a plus. 

Let me—you know, I was listening to the Chairman’s comment. 

And, all due respect, I think it’s important to know the data comparison—I think that’s what you were trying to do—not to question 

the Committee’s—because we have done a lot on airlines, I’ll tell 

you that. And, you know, we’ve clamped down, based on some disasters. But, I’m going to give you a whole different data point that 

I want to make sure is part of the record, and I want to submit 

this for the record. It’s crime-rate calculations for the three top 

cruise ship industry folks which accumulate 90 percent of the traffic, basically. 

[The information referred to is retained in Senator Begich’s files.] 

Senator BEGICH. And when you take rates, like assaults with serious bodily injury, it’s 3.8 per 100,000. But, when you compare it 

to cities—and I was a mayor, so I can legitimately say this—it’s 

27.1 per 100,000. It’s nine times worse in a city. 

Now, again, we believe, as a mayor—former mayor—and, I’m 

sure, you also—zero is the goal. No one questions that. Am I correct on that? That is the target. But, when you look at others—and, 

you know, the horrendous crime of rape on cruise ships, so the 90 

percent, the three top, is 5.9 per 100,000; but, when you compare 

it, again, around 27 percent per—for the cities. Sexual assaults, 8.7 

per 100,000, 97.2 per 100,000 in cities. I just want to, you know— 

data is data. We can argue over data. But, it’s data. 

But, here, I guess I have a question. Is there any data—you 

know, I just took a ferry from the Cape over to Cape Cod—or, over 

to Martha’s Vineyard. I didn’t get any Bill of Rights. I didn’t get 

a ticket. I got a little piece of stub. It didn’t tell me anything of 

my rights. And I can guarantee there have been incidences on ferries—theft, other incidences—crashes, disabled—I can go through 

the list. I don’t use a lot of them, because, on the East Coast, 

they’re more apparent, because of the way they move through the 

islands. We have some in the—southeast Alaska, run by the State 

of Alaska. But, I’m not familiar with—when I went and paid my 

$8, that I got some long explanation of all the issues. 

The other thing I’ll put on the record, because, I think, Mr. 

Chairman, you’re right, there is some differences. You know, I 

come from a state that understands the cruise ship industry. We’ve 

hammered on you on certain areas around—especially our environmental. We have folks that—Ocean Rangers that are on your ships, 

when you come into our waters, to make sure you provide the environmental safety standard we require. We have onshore requirements of waste disposal, for example, that is very unique to our 

state. 

But, at the same time, there’s a balance. For example, I—you 

know, Senator Markey, in all due respect, I’d be interested in his 

legislation, to look at it, but are we now going to do hotel packages, 

airline packages? I can tell you, on limited liability that Senator 

Blumenthal brought up, every federally-funded healthcare clinic 

has limited liability set up by the Federal Government so the Federal Government doesn’t have to—responsible for those doctors. It’s 

very interesting that we have tort reform for us, so we don’t get 

sued—because these clinics are all out there, and we’re not sure— 

143 

but, they’re contractors, and we assume, because they are 

diploma’d they’ve done internships, and other things, that they 

have the experience. I’m assuming that’s the same way you do it. 

I may be wrong about that. But, I’m assuming you’re not just getting a ‘‘doc in a box’’ with a certificate and hope to God they work 

out okay. I’m guessing that. 

And, you know, honestly, Dr. Klein, your comment that onshore 

crime occurs—is somehow the cruise ship’s fault—now, you didn’t 

say that, that exact way, but you implied it. Does that mean, when 

I fly to a community that I get mugged or my money is taken, the 

airline is at fault? No. Absolutely not. 

So, I’m all for—because you all remember last year on the Coast 

Guard reauthorization, that we worked, and I made sure some new 

rules were put in play on safety standards and other things that 

you were required to do. So, I’m all for it. Guaranteed. But, we 

have to be careful of how far we expand the government regulation 

component when we need to have safety on these ships—there’s no 

question about it—and, you know, again, you remember the conversations we had last year, and continue to have these conversations. But, I want to be careful of the broad statements that are 

made, at times. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I have not looked at your bill, but I have 

one major concern, I will tell you. DOT is not—I understand the 

reason why, but DOT, to write standards and to manage an issue 

like this would make me very nervous. Consumer Protection, I 

think, is an important agency. DOT has a hard enough time figuring out which roads they’re building, what bridges they should 

do, what airports they should manage. I get very nervous about 

DOT. I’m caught talking as a mayor who had to deal with DOT on 

a national and a local level. But, I think, if there is an agency— 

I don’t know if the Consumer Protection Agency is the right one, 

but I just want to give my two bits. 

I have not reviewed your bill in detail, other than that piece of 

it, and I—I just know my headache with DOT is large, and increasing on an annual basis. I thought I’d ended when I was done being 

mayor, to be frank with you, but coming here and listening to the 

Federal DOT is even worse. But, I would give that cautionary note 

as a bill is being put together. 

But, I just—you know, in all due respect, I think it’s important 

that we look at this and—the incidents that have occurred have 

been very visible. No question about it. And the families and individuals that have been harmed have had impact—not only to us in 

our policy decisions and discussion, but to them, personally, obviously. But, let’s be careful and cautious of how we approach this. 

And I’ll leave it on this one note. I didn’t realize we were going 

to talk about oil and gas industry when Senator Markey was here, 

but let me give you an example. When we were drilling, this last— 

Arctic—last summer in the Arctic—Shell was drilling in the Arctic 

Ocean. But, their incident that occurred was not in the Arctic 

Ocean, it was 800 miles away, because of a transportation issue. 

We heard about it all over, everywhere. They never spilled a drop 

of oil, no incident and injury. 

144 

Now, saying that, we’ve had a fishing vessel spewing oil out for 

some period, here. Most in this room have no idea that has occurred, because it didn’t have an oil company name attached to it. 

We had a military ship run aground, probably 2 years ago—you 

may remember this, as a Coast Guard—run aground because it 

was trying to help a village move because of a climate-change 

issue—ran aground, spilled tons of diesel. We never heard about 

that, because it didn’t have the word, you know, X Oil Company 

on there. 

So, we’ve got to be careful, here. We—you know, if we’re going 

to look at cruise ships, then we’d better add ferries in this, because 

they have more passenger movement, and some of those ferries are 

held together by duct tape. And I didn’t—you know, I like getting 

on them, because they’re fun, they’re enjoyable. But, you know, I’ve 

got to question, sometimes, how they’re operated, because they’re 

usually operated by local governments or State governments that 

have no money to maintain them. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, is it your view, therefore, that we 

should not proceed in looking at the cruise line industry until we’ve 

properly done ferries? 

Senator BEGICH. No. I—what I’m saying is, as I did last year, in 

the Coast Guard reauthorization bill, we absolutely looked at them, 

and made some adjustments in there. But, at the same time, I 

would say, 2 months on the Bill of Rights—you know, we can barely—I mean, DOT—it will take them 2 years to write the regulations, and then they’ll get stuck, as you know, on some OMB sanitation department. 

So, I would say that I think we have an obligation, as a committee, as whatever that seasons are done, that this industry do report to us on what is happening with their Bill of Rights, and are 

they employing them correctly? Is there penalties if someone does 

not respond to them? 

But, 2 months on a new rule that they jumped on—and I give 

them credit. Now, it’s not perfect, and I think you guys have acknowledged that, and there’s some more room, here. But, we 

should spend the time to allow some improvement to occur, rather 

than, 2 months after it, suddenly decide we have new rules. Because I guarantee you, DOT will take—it will take us a—it—you 

know, 3 years from now, we will have new rules, if we started 

today and had a bill, just based on the way this place operates and 

DOT operates, in the sense of regulation-writing. 

So, I would say, Mr. Chairman, that I would aggressively work 

with them on these Bill of Rights, see how—and if there are 

some—like Mr. Blumenthal brought up, if there are some issues of 

disconnect between the rules that are on the ticket, the detail of 

it, and what they’re claiming to give to the public, then we should 

help make those aligned, because we don’t want false advertising; 

we want correct advertising. So, if someone sees this Bill of Rights, 

they know the detail is wherever it is. That’s kind of my view on 

it. 

But, 2 months is not enough time, I will tell you that, just from 

my own experience. But, no, we should continue to work everywhere we can to increase safety, but I would include, you know— 

I’m just telling you, Mr. Chairman, I—after riding a couple of ferVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:32 May 14, 2015 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00148 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\94526.TXT JACKIE
145 

ries, you know, we love duct tape in Alaska, but I’m not sure I’d 

wrap a boat in it. That’s all. 

I’ll end there. There was my question, which—you really had no 

question. More of a commentary. 

Dr. KLEIN. Can I respond to the—— 

Senator BEGICH. I guess it was a question, then. 

[Laughter.] 

Dr. KLEIN. I just want to respond to two points. 

First of all, in terms of the issue of crime onshore, I would distinguish between general crime and crime when they occur on a shore 

excursion. And what I was referring to in the larger part is that, 

when one goes on a shore excursion and they are robbed, when 

there’s an accident that results in physical injury or death, I think 

the cruise line does have responsibility. But, if you read the cruise 

contract, they have no liability for that, because those are independent contractors. 

So, I think there are two issues there. One is liability, one is— 

it is something that they are selling to passengers and endorsing 

as an activity. 

The other issue is—I can’t argue with the statistics you gave. 

However, as an academic, when I give numbers, I’ve got to be 

transparent about the methodology. And my work has to be subject 

to peer review. So, without my knowing the methodology of 

where—what those numbers—how they’re constructed, the data 

from which they’re drawn, the definitions that are used for those 

categories, it’s hard for me to make any comment, other than—— 

Senator BEGICH. That’s fair. 

Dr. KLEIN.—they’re numbers. OK? 

So, it’s just—you know, again, I’m not judging, I’m not asking—— 

Senator BEGICH. Understood. 

Dr. KLEIN.—questioning the integrity; just that, without that information, without peer review, it’s difficult to make any statement. 

Senator BEGICH. Fair. 

The CHAIRMAN. I want to—we’re going to start voting in about 

5 minutes—make a closing statement, here. 

One issue that we have not spent time talking about today, but 

we’ve spent a lot of time talking about it as a committee, or committee staff, is how the cruise industry uses a loophole in our tax 

code to avoid paying its fair share of corporate income taxes. 

Mr. Cahill and Mr. Goldstein, my staff reviewed your 10k financial reports for the past 7 years. They found that, in this period, 

your company—your two companies have made over $17 billion in 

profit, while managing to pay only $218 million in corporate income 

taxes. Your collective corporate income tax rate, therefore, comes to 

about 1.3 percent. 

I’m not asking for your comment, I’m just saying what I’m saying. 

Your companies are headquartered in the United States. Most of 

your passengers are U.S. citizens. You use our ports, our courts, 

and the services of the Coast Guard and many other government 

agencies, but, because you flag your ships in other countries and 

maintain the fiction that you earn most of your income outside of 

146 

U.S. territory, you do not pay your fair share of taxes in this country. 

I would just like you to know that I’m working on legislation to 

close this loophole. My staff has been working with the Finance 

Committee and with the Joint Committee on Taxation to develop 

legislation that would require your industry to pay your fair share 

of taxes. I will be introducing this legislation later this week. 

I thank you all for your attendance, and I thank you for your patience. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(147) 

A P P E N D I X 

WORCESTER POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE

Worcester, MA, August 19, 2013 

Senator JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, 

Chairman, 

U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. 

Dear Senator Rockefeller, 

I am writing to provide you and the Committee with my thoughts on the U.S. 

Coast Guard post-accident investigation report on the Carnival Splendor fire which 

occurred in the Pacific Ocean on November 8, 2010. I was asked to read this report 

and to provide my thoughts to the Committee on ‘‘your insight on the incident, the 

quality of the investigative report, and how anything in your research could help 

add value to the report.’’ I note here two important facts: Firstly, this was a short 

turn around request (2 days), therefore, my comments are at the 20,000 foot level 

and are based solely on reading the report, i.e., no further investigation was conducted and Secondly, the content of this letter represents my own professional opinion and has not been endorsed by WPI. 

I find the investigation and report on this incident to be very thorough, professional, and comprehensive. As a result of reading the full report, I have some 

thoughts on the incident and in this letter I point out some areas where further 

probing would be beneficial. I also suggest some additional recommendations that 

I deem of value. I have organized my thoughts and recommendations into six important areas: alarm culture; fireproofing and protection of cable trays; maintenance of 

the emergency diesel generator/system maintenance philosophy; an engineering cascade analysis of CO2 systems, recommendations for more comprehensive and effective fire-fighter training, and important areas of fire research and development. 

Probing of the Alarm Culture on the Ship 

Two of the major factors resulting in the negative outcomes of this incident were 

the significant delay in agent delivery caused by the manual alarm reset and the 

subsequent ignition of the cable trays. The report states that suppression agent delivery was delayed 15 minutes and that ‘‘this delay was the result of a bridge 

watchstander resetting the fire alarm panel on the bridge.’’ The report goes on to 

acknowledge that ‘‘this was a critical error which allowed the fire to spread to the 

overhead cables and eventually caused the loss of power.’’ What we don’t know is 

why this alarm was reset. I recommend probing the alarm culture on the ship. What 

operational and maintenance issues may be uncovered that would explain why the 

operator’s first reaction was to reset the alarm? How often do they have false 

alarms? What’s causing these and what changes to the installation, operation, and 

maintenance of the fire alarms would result in less false alarms? While there is an 

alarm log given in the report, there is no analysis or further probing associated with 

it. Recommendation 1. Calls for the removal of the 40-second time delay in the automatic activation sequence for the Hi-Fog system. This recommendation correctly 

notes that ‘‘the seconds and minutes following the ignition of a fire are crucial to 

the firefighting response. As such, failure to take quick and prompt action to extinguish a fire can lead to major, negative downstream effects.’’ I agree with this recommendation, however, I feel the delay caused by the alarm reset and the fact that 

alarms are reset is even more significant. 

Fireproofing of Cable Trays 

To ensure safety and prevent casualties such as fire, loss of a prime system, etc, 

ship design focuses on both the hardening of critical systems and on providing redundancy in those systems. It appears that in this installation, the electrical cable 

trays represent a single-point failure mode, if the cables cannot deliver electricity, 

most major ships systems are rendered inoperable, yet there was neither redundancy nor hardening of the cable trays. I would recommend fireproofing and/or other 

148 

modes of protection for these trays. The optimum way to provide this would need 

to be evaluated but may take the form of passive protection such as wrappings or 

coatings, or may take the form of active protection such as a suppression system. 

The potential to re-route the cable trays so they do not pass directly overhead of 

major hazard should also be evaluated. This is already common practice in very 

similar land-based facilities. Recommendation 2f does call for addressing the susceptibility of all Dream class vessels to a complete loss of power; however, it falls short 

of making a recommendation for cable tray protection. 

Maintenance philosophy and Maintenance of Emergency Generators 

The emergency diesel generator (EDG) stopped running several times during this 

incident but we don’t know why. I would probe both the maintenance philosophy 

for the ship and the actual maintenance logs for specific essential equipment. Maintenance philosophies range from fixing something when it breaks down to performing routine maintenance/testing at scheduled intervals. There are also predictive maintenance philosophies and reliability-centered maintenance philosophies. 

What is the maintenance philosophy employed on this ship? How was maintenance 

for the EDG conducted? Was it tested under load? Was it periodically exercised? 

Engineering cascade analysis of CO2 systems 

The report recognizes that ‘‘The CO2 system is a crucial line of defense in extinguishing an engine room fire, and must be installed and maintained properly so 

that it operates when needed.’’ I would suggest broadening this to a full engineering 

cascade analysis of the CO2 system. A cascade analysis would start with system design. What standards were the system designed to? Is the design adequate? The CO2

system on this ship exhibited multiple system failures and leaky valves. Thus, the 

cascade analysis should continue from design to installation, maintenance and testing. 

Firefighting Procedures and Firefighter Training 

The report states that ‘‘approximately five hours into the firefighting effort, the 

Captain evacuated the engine room and attempted to activate the installed CO2 system.’’ The report also states that it took approximately two hours to locate the fire 

in the cable runs. The math suggests that fire teams attempted to extinguish the 

fire with portable extinguishers for three hours. These point again to a need for reliable, location specific detection and better defined and practice firefighting tactics. 

Fire Research and Development 

In any fire event, quick reliable detection and automatic suppression are key. A 

study of new detection and suppression options for cruise ships should be conducted. 

Two hours to locate the fire along the cable tray is not acceptable, and options beyond CO2 should be evaluated. 

Respectfully submitted, 

KATHY A. NOTARIANNI, PH.D., P.E., 

Head, Department of Fire Protection Engineering, 

Associate Professor, Fire Protection Engineering and 

Associate Professor, Mechanical Engineering and Chemical Engineering, 

Worcester Polytechnic Institute. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV 

TO REAR ADMIRAL JOSEPH SERVIDIO

Question 1. During the week of July 15, 2013, the Coast Guard released its investigative report on the November 2010 engine room fire that disabled the Carnival 

Splendor. The report found that the Splendor fire-fighting crew did not appear to 

be familiar with the engine room, and the fire-fighting team made errors in decisions critical to preventing the spread of fire. Would you say it is important for firefighting crews on cruise ships to conduct drills in the engine room space so they 

can move quickly and effectively in the event of a real fire? 

Answer. Yes, this is important. As a result of this event, the Coast Guard published policy in July 2013, directing Coast Guard vessel inspectors to witness a fire 

drill in the engine room space on all foreign cruise ships at the next scheduled examination, and subsequently, at least once during a foreign cruise ship’s annual examination cycle. 

Question 2. Admiral Servidio, the Coast Guard report recommends that Carnival 

address firefighting training deficiencies by revising its safety management system. 

149 

Please explain why the report asks Carnival to implement this recommendation not 

just for the Splendor, but across the entire fleet. 

Answer. An effective means to ensure consistency within a fleet of vessels is 

through the company’s Safety Management System (SMS) since an SMS applies to 

each vessel in the company’s fleet, vice just to one vessel. 

For instance, changes made to Carnival Cruise Lines SMS, to improve firefighting 

training, would therefore apply to each Carnival Cruise Line vessel. This will ensure 

that ensure that fire fighting training improvements will be implemented companywide, fleet-wide, and to all crew operating throughout the cruise line’s fleet of vessels. 

Question 3. The Coast Guard report on the Splendor fire found that the ship’s CO2

firefighting equipment was not installed properly and had other flaws that prevented it from working properly during the fire. The report also said these flaws 

should have been spotted by multiple parties including the shipbuilder, Carnival, 

and the flag country of Panama, or the classification society operating on behalf of 

the flag country. 

Clearly there are multiple parties involved with review of ship equipment installation and inspection. But at the end of the day, doesn’t the ship owner bear the 

primary responsibility for making sure equipment on the ship doesn’t present safety 

risks? 

Answer. Ultimately, yes. The owner/operator of the vessel has primary responsibility for the operation of the vessel’s equipment, while the Flag State, Class Societies and Port States verify compliance with established regulations and standards. 

Question 4. After the Carnival Triumph engine room fire left that ship disabled 

and stranded in February 2013, Mr. Cahill emphasized to the press that ‘‘everyone 

was safe,’’ and ‘‘what we’re talking about is the convenience of the guests.’’ 

I am concerned that such comments minimize the potential dangers of onboard 

fires and other cruise accidents. 

The Triumph was stranded in the Gulf of Mexico for four days before rescue was 

complete. If that event had occurred during hurricane season, could we have seen 

different results? 

Answer. It is difficult to speculate what could have happened had this event occurred during hurricane season. The wide range of possible outcomes would likely 

have been influenced by alternate actions/decisions that could have been taken by 

the U.S. Government or the TRIUMPH’s owner/operator, and any number of other 

variables which might arise had heavy weather threatened. 

That being said, the Coast Guard recognizes this incident’s potential for much 

more catastrophic consequences, and as one that needs to be closely examined and 

learned from by all stakeholders so that risks of future occurrences can be reduced. 

Question 5. While no passengers were harmed by the recent fire aboard the Royal 

Caribbean’s Grandeur of the Seas, if the fire occurred further out to sea and required passengers to be evacuated, could we have seen different results? 

Answer. The investigation into this casualty is ongoing. From publically available 

information, the vessel’s structural fire protection appeared to ultimately largely 

contain the fire; this result would likely not have changed had the fire occurred further out to sea. 

A different scenario requiring an at-sea passenger evacuation or abandon ship 

would be complex but the Coast Guard cannot speculate on whether that would 

have occurred based on the vessel’s distance out to sea. 

Question 6. As part of the lessons learned analysis, do you think it is important 

for cruise lines to examine potential risks highlighted by accidents in addition to 

reviewing what actually happened? 

Answer. Yes. It is important for any operator/owner of a vessel to examine risks 

identified as causal factors in marine casualties and where possible incorporate lessons learned as a part of their Safety Management System (SMS). 

Question 7. The Coast Guard has the authority to charge user fees for the inspection and other marine safety services it provides for vessels and mariners. As originally conceived in the 1980s, the user fees were expected to pay for the costs to the 

Coast Guard and the Federal Government of providing the services. Do the user fees 

the Coast Guard charges under section 2110 of title 46 pay the full cost of the services for which they are charged? 

Answer. No. The Coast Guard estimates that user fees currently cover only 40 

percent of the cost of providing the services. 

Question 8. Almost two decades ago, Congress enacted the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1996. That law removed language that prevented the Coast Guard 

from charging user fees for safety examination services provided to foreign cruise 

150 

ships in U.S. ports. Does the Coast Guard charge user fees for the examinations it 

performs on foreign cruise ships in U.S. ports? If not, are there any plans to do so? 

Answer. The Coast Guard does not currently charge user fees for examinations 

conducted on foreign cruise ships in U.S. ports. The Coast Guard is studying the 

feasibility of updating all user fees and as part of that effort, a user fee for foreign 

cruise ships is being considered. 

Question 9. Does the U.S. Coast Guard inspect Passenger Ferry Vessels, including 

state run ferries? 

Answer. All ferries, including state run ferries, carrying more than six passengers 

on a navigable waterway in the U.S. are inspected by the Coast Guard. Specifically, 

in 2006, the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2006 amended 

Title 46 United States Code Chapters 21 and 33 by defining ‘‘ferry,’’ ‘‘passenger,’’ 

and ‘‘small passenger vessel’’ such that some previously uninspected ferry vessels, 

including state owned ferries that did not carry ‘passengers for hire’, became subject 

to Coast Guard Inspection for Certification. 

Prior to this legislation, ferry vessels were not subject to Inspection for Certification if they did not carry passengers for hire (charged a fee for carriage). The new 

definitions of ‘‘passenger’’ and ‘‘small passenger vessel’’ include ferries that carry at 

least one passenger for a vessel of 100 gross tons and over and that carry more than 

six passengers for vessels of less than 100 gross tons, regardless if a fee is paid by 

the passenger. 

If a vessel meets the definition of ‘‘ferry,’’ the fee is no longer a determining factor 

in the application of marine inspection laws and regulations. 

The total number of ferry vessels affected by this change was estimated to be 71, 

which brought the total number of Coast Guard inspected ferry vessels up from approximately 384 to 455. 

Question 10. What is the scope of the Coast Guard’s inspection for a Passenger 

Ferry Vessel and how often are these inspections/exams required? 

Answer. Ferry Vessel inspections are regulated by 46 CFR Subchapters T & K for 

vessels less than 100 gross tons; and regulated under 46 CFR Subchapter H for vessels over 100 gross tons. Inspections are required at least annually on vessels inspected under Subchapters T & K, and annually with periodic re-inspections for vessels inspected under Subchapter H. 

The scope of an inspection includes but is not limited to the Hull, Firefighting, 

Electrical, Pollution Prevention, Lifesaving, Navigation, and Machinery equipment. 

Additionally, inspections include witnessing drills and assessing crew proficiency in 

handling shipboard emergencies, as well as witnessing the operation of a vessel’s 

machinery and other equipment including underway tests such as man-overboard 

drills. Ferry Vessels are also required to undergo periodic dry-dock examinations 

Of the 455 ferries inspected by the Coast Guard: 

109 are over 100 gross tons and are inspected under 46 CFR Subchapter H. 

The remaining 346 are less than 100 GRT, and inspected under 46 CFR Subchapter T (235) and 46 CFR Subchapter K (111). 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. BARBARA BOXER TO

REAR ADMIRAL JOSEPH SERVIDIO

Question 1. The International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) currently requires muster drills to be performed within 24 hours of a cruise ship’s departure. However, last month the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO’s) 

Maritime Safety Committee adopted an amendment to SOLAS that would require 

muster drills to happen ‘‘prior to or immediately upon departure.’’ These rules will 

go into effect in January 2015. Can you please clarify the phrase ‘‘immediately upon 

departure?’’ 

Answer. Additional guidance has not been developed at IMO on the text updates, 

including ‘‘immediately upon departure,’’ related to amendments to regulation 19.2.2 

of chapter III of the SOLAS Annex. The Coast Guard will work as necessary to provide clarification of this language prior to implementation. 

In February 2012, the Coast Guard published policy to its field units that requires 

inspectors to observe completion of passenger muster drills aboard cruise ships during the course of required cruise ship examinations in U.S. ports where passengers 

have embarked the vessel. Under this policy, passenger muster drills must occur before the Coast Guard will consider the examination complete. 

In the course of these examinations, the expectation is and the Coast Guard’s experience has been that passenger muster drills are overwhelmingly conducted prior 

to vessel’s departure. Additionally, the industries voluntarily adopted standard outVerDate Nov 24 2008 12:32 May 14, 2015 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00154 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\94526.TXT JACKIE
151 

lines that a cruise ship’s passenger muster drill should occur prior to vessel’s departure after embarking passengers. 

Question 2. While much of the cruise industry changed its policies in February 

2012 to require muster drills upon departure, I understand that the IMO rule will 

not go into effect until January 2015. Why is the effective date of the policy January 

2015, which is nearly a year and a half from now? 

Answer. While it may seem a very slow process, in fact this new mandatory requirement for muster drills ‘‘prior to or immediately upon departure’’ will formally 

enter into force as quickly as can practicably be done under the amendment process 

timelines specified in Article VIII of the SOLAS Convention. The Contracting Governments to SOLAS adopted the amendments at IMO by means of Resolution 

MSC.350 (92) on June 21, 2013. After adoption, Article VIII provides that the 

amendment must be accepted by Contracting Governments, which is facilitated 

through a process whereby acceptance is deemed to occur on a certain date if a critical mass of Contracting Governments has not objected by that time. This acceptance period, two years by default, was reduced to essentially the minimum of one 

year permitted by Article VIII (until July 1, 2014). Finally, as specified in Article 

VIII, the amendments enter into force six months after they are deemed to have 

been accepted, which would mean entry into force on January 1, 2015. In the interim, the recommendatory guidance developed at IMO and promulgated in MSC.1/ 

Circ. 1446 (as revised) remains in effect. 

Although the new IMO requirements for passenger musters will not formally 

enter into force until January 2015, the Coast Guard is already witnessing passenger musters as part of its foreign cruise ship examination program. The Coast 

Guard began doing this as a matter of policy beginning in February 2012. 

Question 3. What is the Coast Guard’s timeline for adopting the new muster drill 

standard? Will the Coast Guard wait until 2015 to adopt these new standards, despite the fact that the Cruise Line Industry Association has already adopted such 

standards? If the Coast Guard plans to wait until 2015, why? 

Answer. The Coast Guard has not waited to adopt this standard. Prior to the action at IMO action with respect to passenger musters, the Coast Guard adopted this 

muster drill standard as a matter of a policy change that was promulgated in February 2012. Coast Guard field personnel are already witnessing this muster during 

cruise vessel examinations conducted in U.S. ports where passengers have embarked the vessel. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV 

TO GERALD CAHILL

Fire Safety 

Question 1. Based on your company’s review of the Splendor incident, what explains the failure of multiple inspections to uncover CO2 System flaws? 

Answer. Before any ships are delivered, the CO2 system is inspected, tested and 

approved by the shipyard and the ship’s classification society. RINA, the classification society responsible during shipbuilding, conducted the initial testing and approved the CO2 system prior to the Splendor’s delivery. 

Ship engineers do not have the specialized training and experience needed to 

properly maintain or uncover defects in these critical systems, so vessel operators 

hire industry specialists to service and maintain CO2 systems. Carnival hired 

Wilhelmsen Ship Service to perform the annual inspection and testing of the CO2

system, and all system maintenance as the service provider approved by both the 

Flag state and Classification Society. Since Wilhelmsen had more than 40 years of 

experience in the provision of inspection, reporting, maintenance and repair for fire 

and safety systems and equipment for the maritime industry, Carnival relied on 

Wilhelmsen to have the expertise to perform this service properly. 

After the Splendor incident, Carnival’s investigation revealed problems with the 

CO2 system that should have been identified by specialists earlier, including a significant design fault in the CO2 system release sequence that increased the likelihood that a valve might not operate properly. Carnival remedied that flaw with a 

major redesign of the CO2 systems on several ships to change the sequence and 

achieve improved system reliability. Carnival has revised the test procedure to ensure that system operation is tested at full pressure. We have also replaced our 

service provider. 

While Carnival will need to continue to rely on the expertise of the maintenance 

service providers, these changes to the system operation sequence will enhance reliability and full pressure testing should identify any future defects in the system. 

152 

Question 2. Can you explain why Splendor fire-fighting crews did not train in the 

engine room? 

Answer. Carnival conducts firefighting training in the engineering spaces, which 

includes the engine rooms, incinerator room, and other spaces. Fire drills were conducted in various locations around the ship, including similar machinery areas to 

the engine room where fires might occur. Although we kept records of the fire drills, 

we did not keep specific records of the locations of the fire drills. 

While more emphasis will be placed on training to fight engine room fires, including secondary fires that spread to the overhead cable runs, we do not agree with 

the U.S. Coast Guard’s conclusion that a lack of familiarization with the engine 

room itself hampered efforts to locate and extinguish the fire, or allowed for further 

spread of fire and smoke. (U.S. Coast Guard Report at p. 44). The Splendor’s firefighting crews were fully familiar with the engine room layout and equipment. The 

firefighting timeline included in the U.S. Coast Guard report reveals that the engine 

crew, who are intimately familiar with the engine room, were either part of, or accompanied the fire teams during firefighting operations. For instance, the Staff 

Chief Engineer and the Second Engineer accompanied Fire Team Charlie into the 

engine room and helped identify the location of the secondary fire in the cables 

above DG5. 

It was not a lack of familiarity with the engine room layout, but rather the nature 

of the secondary fire in the overhead cable runs, that made firefighting difficult on 

the Splendor. For most of the time, no flames were visible in the hot, smoke-filled 

engine room without any lighting or power. The smoldering cable runs were located 

high above the firefighters. Even the ship’s engineers were challenged by these difficult circumstances. 

Crime Reporting 

Question 3. While the Chairman understands some alleged crimes might not be 

prosecuted, do you support publicly reporting the number of all crimes on cruise 

ships that are reported to the FBI? 

Answer. To our knowledge, no land-based vacation options have any duty to report crimes to law enforcement, let alone to publicly report crime allegations as statistics. At the same time the incidents of alleged crimes in the cruise industry are 

far below those which are reported on land in the general population. Furthermore, 

it is difficult to prevent the media from publishing this information out of context, 

which becomes even more misleading to the consumer and unfairly damaging to the 

cruise industry. Consequently, we do not support publicly reporting the number of 

all alleged crimes on cruise ships—nonetheless, Carnival has voluntarily posted on 

its website a listing of all the alleged crimes reported to the FBI for our North 

American lines (Carnival Cruise Lines, Princess Cruises, Holland America Line and 

Seabourn). 

Question 4. Given that many parents and children take vacations on your cruise 

ships, do you support publicly reporting the number of alleged crimes that occur 

against minors? 

Answer. We believe the numbers show that cruising is a very safe vacation alternative especially when compared to the crin1e statistics on land. Those land statistics are reported in the Uniform Crime Reporting system (‘‘UCR’’) published by the 

FBI. The statistics do not separately categorize or track alleged crimes against minors. Therefore, the UCR will not offer any context or perspective to a consumer 

who is provided cruise lines statistics regarding alleged crimes against minors. We 

believe providing information on alleged crimes without such context would be misleading and will merely confuse the consumer. The information would also be 

skewed by the fact that different companies have different passenger demographics 

and correlations would therefore be unfair. 

Question 5. The crime data appears to be compiled by the overarching Carnival 

parent company rather than by individual line. What is the rationale for posting the 

crime data in this manner? Please provide the Committee with this information broken down by individual line in the same format that you posted the information on 

your website. 

Answer. Carnival believes that the statistics viewed as presented provide more insight into cruise safety than when the data is broken out into individual lines. Specifically, one can compare the total number of passengers and crew we carry to the 

number of crimes which occur for that population and then compare it to the land 

based statistics in the UCR. This comparison clearly and easily shows that crime 

statistics on cruise ships are much lower than on land for similar size populations. 

Furthermore, even if all the incidents were allocated to just one of our lines, the 

number would still be below UCR crime reporting for similar populations on land. 

We feel strongly that providing data at a brand level would encourage meaningless 

153 

and misleading comparisons, providing the potential for users to take the information out of context. The fact is that our incidents of crime are very low. 

Question 6. Many crimes that occur on cruise ships are classified as ‘‘other’’ meaning they don’t meet the threshold categories required under current law. What types 

of crimes are included in the ‘‘other’’ category? 

Answer. The ‘‘other’’ category includes alleged unlawful acts that are not designated in the CVSSA but are otherwise reported, such as thefts under $10,000.00 

and crimes against our passengers which take place in countries outside the U.S. 

or for crimes not covered by the CVSSA. 

Question 7. Current law requires that only thefts greater than $10,000 be reported publicly. How many thefts of $1,000–$10,000 were reported for each of the 

last three years? 

Answer. During the relevant period, the North American lines carried approximately 25,876,189 guests and the following thefts of $1,000–$10,000 were alleged: 

July–December 2010: 58 

2011: 82 

2012: 91 

January–May 2013: 52 

Question 8. The posted crime data details the number of missing U.S. nationals. 

How many additional non-US nationals went missing for each of the last three 

years? Please indicate whether they were passengers or crew. 

Answer. The total number of non-US nationals missing from the North American 

lines is: 

2011: 1 (non-US crewmember) 

2013: 2 (passengers onboard the Carnival Spirit while in 

Australia) 

Bill of Rights 

Question 9. According to Professor Klein’s written testimony, cruise line contracts 

include ‘‘extreme limits’’ on the company’s liability, including requirements about 

where a passenger must file a suit and how quickly they must bring the suit. Explain to me why this makes sense for a consumer. Does this seem fair to you? 

Answer. Our cruise ships call on thousands of destinations, as well as carry passengers from all fifty states and from countries all over the world. Without the contract provisions that specify where, when and how a passenger should bring an action, cruise lines would be forced to defend litigation all over the country and the 

world and possibly many years after a cruise when evidence and witnesses are no 

longer available. The courts have agreed that cruise lines, like a myriad of other 

businesses, should have some measure of predictability regarding the forum, the 

timing of claims, and exposure to damages. This predictability is achieved through 

the ticket contract provisions governing the forum and manner of claims (including 

forum selection, choice of law, time limitations, arbitration and class action waiver 

provisions). Such ticket provisions have been found to be legal if reasonably communicated to the passengers and these provisions do not limit the substantive rights 

afforded under the passenger ticket contract or the Bill of Rights in any way. 

Arbitration provisions, class action waivers and forum selection clauses are common in not only other transportation industries but other consumer industries (Disney World, Water-Zoo Indoor Water Park, Hilton HHonors loyalty programs, 

Starwood Preferred Guest Programs, AT&T service agreements, Four Seasons Private Jet Tours and Southwest Airlines). We believe the fact that these provisions 

have been routinely adopted by other industries and supported by the courts, evidences the fair balancing by these provisions of the interests of businesses and consumers. 

Question 10. What recourse does the Bill of Rights provide to passengers when 

one of these rights is violated? Please provide specific examples of how a passenger 

could enforce the rights. 

Answer. The Bill of Rights is a legally enforceable promise and thus a contractual 

obligation which forms part of the agreement between cruise lines and their guests 

who now have a private right of action to enforce the rights. The contractual recourse to enforce the passenger rights is in addition to remedies available under 

state consumer protection laws available in virtually every port state where cruise 

lines base their businesses or ships, including Florida, California, Hawaii, New 

York, Texas, Alaska and Washington. These laws typically provide for recovery of 

damages, injunctive relief, attorneys’ fees, and in some cases, double or treble damages for misleading or false advertising. 

154 

Well established law protects the right of passengers to assert legal claims against 

cruise lines arising out of the maritime contract of passage, such as the Bill of 

Rights. For example, a cruise line is prohibited from abrogating the right to a trial 

in court for any claims involving injury or death or providing less than one year 

to commence suit based on such claims. The general maritime law of the U.S. will 

typically apply although state law can sometimes supplement the remedies afforded 

under U.S. maritime law where not inconsistent. Many claims arising out of the Bill 

of Rights (e.g., over costs of transportation, lodging, and reimbursement), will qualify for small claims court jurisdiction which provides the passenger with a cost effective method to enforce their rights without having to hire an attorney. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTION SUBMITTED BY HON. BARBARA BOXER TO

GERALD CAHILL

Question. A recent report was issued by the U.S. Coast Guard regarding the Carnival Splendor incident in November 2010. The report made a series of recommendations to Carnival to improve safety in the future. What specific steps has 

Carnival taken to address the concerns and recommendations in the U.S. Coast 

Guard’s report? 

Answer. We have implemented actions to address and improve in the areas of 

maintenance log management, additional firefighting training, as well as increased 

fire prevention, detection and suppression systems. We have implemented new procedures for logging of technical parameters, checking the condition of the plant, precautionary measures before startup of engines, and new robust engine watch 

handover policies. 

Additionally, we have taken steps to strengthen the depth and frequency of all 

critical system inspections and formed a new Department of Marine Safety staffed 

with technical experts in the areas of fire prevention, detection, and suppression. 

During the last two years the shoreside technical management has been expanded 

and strengthened with dedicated diesel engine and maintenance and repair experts. 

This team includes more than 140 members and has grown significantly in the past 

couple of years as we continue to invest in talent across our company. 

Following the Splendor fire, several new operational management personnel have 

been hired at Carnival including a new SVP of Marine Operations. Earlier this 

month Carnival announced the first 4 members of its new Safety & Reliability Review Board including Rear Admiral Mark H. Buzby, Rear Admiral Joseph F. Campbell, Ray Valeika and Dr. John K. Lauber who have collectively very deep experience in the marine and air transportation and maintenance fields. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. MARIA CANTWELL TO

GERALD CAHILL

Natural Gas Vessels 

Question 1. As I’m sure you’re aware, advances in technology, reduced emissions, 

and high oil prices have led the transportation industry to look to natural gas as 

an alternative source of fuel. Natural gas trucking has increased in current years, 

and the Energy Information Agency (EIA) recently projected that for the heavy-duty 

industry ‘‘Natural gas, as compressed natural gas (CNG) and liquefied natural gas 

(LNG), is the fastest-growing fuel in the transportation sector, with an average annual growth rate of 11.9 percent from 2011 to 2040.’’ And a company based in my 

home state has ordered the LNG conversion of two diesel ships currently in use for 

Alaska trade, as well as the construction of two new first-of-their-kind LNG-powered 

containerships for use on the Puerto Rico-Florida trade route. The fuel is also being 

evaluated for use on our public Washington State Ferry system. 

Do you believe natural gas-fueled vessels have a future within the cruise ship industry? To that end, to what extent has your company evaluated using natural gas 

as a fuel source for either converted/renovated or new vessels? 

Answer. Carnival has three projects related to LNG use on cruise ships. 

a. Carnival is installing a dual fuel engine on one ship currently under construction, so that LNG can be used in port as well as conventional liquid fuel. 

b. Carnival is developing a power barge supplied with LNG that could connect 

directly to a ship in port, substituting LNG-generated electricity for utility 

shorepower (Cold-Ironing). 

155 

c. Carnival is examining the feasibility of installing limited LNG tank capacity 

on one ship that would supply one dual-fuel engine that could operate on LNG 

while the vessel is at sea or in port, as an alternative to shorepower. 

Question 1a. What challenges or barriers exist to deploying natural gas technology 

safely within the cruise ship industry? Do you believe that any of the challenges 

or barriers is unique to your industry? 

Answer. LNG is not available in numerous ports in which our ships currently 

bunker fuel, even where a natural gas supply is available near the pier. Infrastructure for storage and delivery of LNG would need to be developed to ensure reliable 

supply. Storage of LNG onboard requires greater tank capacity than liquid fuel. 

This is not a significant challenge for some cargo ships, with ample space both 

above and below deck. Cruise ships have very little available space either above 

deck or in engine spaces below deck. 

Safety issues related to switching from liquid fuel oil to LNG are a consideration, 

but can be managed. U.S. Coast Guard policy guidance for refueling passenger ships 

with LNG is being developed now and the resultant controls and operational restrictions could have a major impact on the potential future use by the cruise industry. 

Also, in the past public perception in North America has often been that LNG is 

not as safe as liquid fuel or natural gas. This is not scientifically valid, but it has 

been a significant issue with development of LNG facilities in many ports and coastal areas. Today, the environmental advantages of LNG may override such concerns, 

but cruising is a discretionary leisure activity and concern over the safety of LNGpowered cruise ships may need to be addressed. 

Question 1b. Can you speak to your company’s long-term strategy with regards 

to natural gas vessels? 

Answer. LNG may be an option over the mid to long term if the challenges described above can be resolved. This could be accomplished by adding limited LNG 

tank capacity, or by supplying LNG to the ship while at berth from trucks or a 

barge. 

Cold-Ironing 

Question 2. As you know, Cold-Ironing is the practice of providing cruise, container, and other vessels with shore-side electrical power for the operation of equipment while in port, thereby allowing main and auxiliary engines to be shut down. 

This can reduce or eliminate many airborne emissions and improve nearby air quality. How many of your vessels are equipped to use Cold-Ironing infrastructure/ 

equipment while in port? 

Answer. Carnival Corporation has 24 ships that are equipped to connect in seven 

West Coast Ports, including Juneau, AK; Vancouver, BC; Seattle, WA; San Francisco, CA; Los Angeles, CA; Long Beach, CA; and San Diego, CA. East Coast Ports 

pending development in include Brooklyn Red Hook, NY, Halifax, NS, and Quebec 

City. 

Ships currently equipped to connect to shorepower by Operating Company are: 

Princess Cruises 14 

Holland America Line 6 (plus 2 partially converted) 

Carnival Cruise Lines 3 

Cunard Line 1 

Question 2a. Does Cold-Ironing have any negative impacts on cruise ship operation? 

Answer. There is no negative impact on the technical operations of the ship, if 

the shoreside system is properly installed, and if the supply of electricity is adequate and reliable. Shorepower installations have been very well received in port 

communities. 

Question 2b. What are the barriers to further deployment of Cold-Ironing infrastructure/equipment on your vessels? Are certain ports more/less feasible for ColdIroning? 

Answer. The primary barriers are the cost to the utility company to make the necessary improvements to deploy Cold-Ironing, the cost to the cruise industry to convert its ships to tie into the electricity and the availability of electricity. Some utilities do not have excess capacity, or rates for interruptible service. As a result, ports 

with limited cruise ship activity may not be able to economically justify the investment in shoreside infrastructure. 

Question 2c. Please describe your company’s long-term strategy with regards to 

Cold-Ironing. 

Answer. Shorepower will be part of the mix of technology to address air emissions 

from cruise ships. This will include use of scrubbers or other technology, low sulfur 

156 

fuel, now required in all U.S. Ports under the Emission Control Area regulations 

of IMO MARPOL Annex VI and potential use of LNG in Ports. 

Carnival has been the leader in developing shorepower for the cruise industry and 

plans to utilize shorepower for a significant number of vessels calling regularly in 

Ports on the Pacific Coast of North America, as well as select Ports in the North 

Atlantic. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV 

TO ADAM M. GOLDSTEIN

Crime Reporting 

Question 1. At the hearing, Chairman Rockefeller entered into the record a Commerce Committee staff report showing that the number of crimes onboard cruise 

ships reported to the FBI is much higher than the number that is publicly reported. 

It also shows that in a significant percentage of sexual assaults reported to the FBI, 

children are the alleged victims. 

The Chairman also introduced legislation that would require public reporting of 

all alleged crimes on cruise ships, including those against children. 

While the Chairman understands some alleged crimes might not be prosecuted, 

do you support publicly reporting the number of all crimes on cruise ships that are 

reported to the FBI? 

Answer. As the Committee is aware, just over three years ago, Congress passed 

the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act (CVSSA) of 2010. In that legislation, Congress set forth the categories of serious crimes that cruise lines were required to 

report to the FBI. The legislation also required the U.S. Coast Guard to maintain 

a public website that lists, by cruise line, a quarterly accounting of every crime and 

missing person case that has been reported to law enforcement in any of the listed 

CVSSA categories where the matter is ‘‘no longer under investigation by the FBI.’’ 

While we had long been reporting all crime allegations to Federal authorities, this 

legislation was the first of its kind to single out a commercial industry and require 

public disclosure of its allegations of crime. Although crime statistics on land are 

published under the FBI’s longstanding Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) system for 

states, cities and municipalities, they are not aggregated by type of venue (hotels, 

resorts, theme parks), let alone by individual company. 

Even so, we supported the legislation as we believed that publicly reporting crime 

allegations would enable consumers to see for themselves that cruise ships are 

among the safest venues when compared to any landside community or destination. 

We were unaware until the legislation was passed that Congress was limiting the 

public disclosure of the crime data to only those allegations ‘‘no longer under investigation by the FBI.’’ 

Because of this provision in the new law, the numbers provided to the public by 

the Federal Government did not reflect the actual number of allegations we were 

reporting to the FBI. Royal Caribbean, and our colleagues at Carnival Corporation 

and Norwegian Cruise Lines, took it upon ourselves—well in advance of any announced Congressional hearing—to rectify the limitation imposed by Congress by 

agreeing to voluntarily disclose on our websites all allegations of crime in the 

CVSSA categories, on all itineraries worldwide, committed by passengers or crew 

members, regardless of whether an FBI investigation had been opened or closed. 

We believe that the current reporting protocol—providing the number of all allegations in each of the CVSSA categories—allows the consumer to compare the minimal number of allegations of serious crimes onboard cruise ships with those reported for land-based communities and make informed vacation decisions. We do not 

believe that any further expansion of this reporting is warranted or reasonable. 

Question 2. Given that many parents and children take vacations on your cruise 

ships, do you support publicly reporting the number of alleged crimes that occur 

against children? 

Answer. As explained above, we believe the value of publicly reporting allegations 

of crimes is in providing consumers with an opportunity to compare/contrast crime 

on land with crime at sea. Crime against minors is not a category reported by the 

UCR for land-based communities and, thus, such disclosures by the cruise lines 

would not allow consumers to draw meaningful comparisons. 

Question 3. Royal Caribbean, along with the other major cruise lines, agreed to 

voluntarily post crime data on its website. 

The crime data appears to be compiled by the overarching Royal Caribbean parent 

company rather than by individual line. What is the rational for posting the crime 

data in this manner? Please provide the Committee with this information broken 

157 

down by individual line in the same format that you posted the information on your 

website. 

Answer. The premise of this question is incorrect. As of August 1, 2013, Royal 

Caribbean posted its crime data by individual cruise line, not by parent company. 

The data may be found here: 

For Royal Caribbean International: 

http://www.royalcaribbean.com/contentPage.do?pagename=royallcaribbeanl cruiselshiplcrimelallegationlstatistics 

For Celebrity Cruises: 

http://celebritycruises.com/genericHtmlTemplate.do?icid=spelbtltwdybrl 1306ldtbellkl921032&pagename=celebritylcrimelallegationlstatistics 

For Azamara Club Cruises: 

http://www.azamaraclubcruises.com/azamara-club-cruises-crime-allegation-statistics 

Question 4. Many crimes that occur on cruise ships are classified as ‘‘other’’ meaning they don’t meet the threshold categories required under current law. What types 

of crimes are included in the ‘‘other’’ category? 

Answer. The CVSSA identified eight categories of serious crimes that cruise lines 

are required to report to the FBI. The ‘‘other’’ category is used to capture allegations 

not designated by the CVSSA, such as thefts between $1,000 and $10,000. 

Question 5. Current law requires that only thefts greater than $10,000 be reported publicly. How many thefts of $1,000–$10,000 were reported for each of the 

last three years? 

Answer. For the three-year period, 2010 through 2012, Royal Caribbean International, Celebrity Cruises and Azamara Club Cruises carried more than 13 million 

guests. During this time period, the reports of alleged property thefts valued between $1,000 and $10,000 were as follows: 

2010—84 reports 

2011—103 reports 

2012—116 reports 

Additionally, during this three-year period, RCL received a total of 97 reports alleging the theft of property valued between $1,000 and $10,000 from luggage. These 

alleged thefts from luggage, however, may have occurred prior to the luggage arriving at the ship (e.g., airline, hotel, taxi, bus). 

Question 6. The posted crime data details the number of missing U.S. nationals. 

How many additional non-U.S. nationals went missing for each of the last three 

years? Please indicate whether they were passengers or crew. 

Answer. For the three-year period, 2010 through 2012, the reports of missing nonUS nationals were as follows: 

2010—3 missing non-US nationals (all crew members) 

2011—4 missing non-US nationals (all crew members) 

2012—4 missing non-US nationals (1 guest, 3 crew members) 

Bill of Rights 

Question 7. According to Professor Klein’s written testimony, cruise line contracts 

include ‘‘extreme limits’’ on the company’s liability, including requirements about 

where a passenger must file a suit and how quickly they must bring the suit. Explain to me why this makes sense for a consumer. Does this seem fair to you? 

Answer. With regard to virtually every sailing of ships operated by cruise lines 

based in the U.S.—regardless of itinerary and regardless of whether it embarks or 

debarks in the U.S.—passengers have access to a U.S. forum if they wish to file a 

claim. 

Because the travel industry accommodates customers from around the world, 

forum selection clauses are commonly used across many sectors of the industry. 

These clauses allow hotels, resorts, cruise lines and countless other sellers of goods 

and services to have some level of legal predictability while providing guests with 

the opportunity to have their claims heard. 

In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a 1991 opinion, found that forum selection 

clauses benefit passengers in two important ways: (1) the clauses eliminate confusion about where claims can be filed, saving litigants the time and expense of determining the correct forum; and (2) the passengers benefit from lower fares that travel 

providers can offer as a result of the legal certainty established by forum selection 

clauses. 

158 

With regard to the time period for filing claims, Title 46 U.S.C. § 30508, specifically permits a time limit of no less than one year for suits involving claims of personal injury (including emotional distress) or death. Courts have routinely enforced 

a six-month deadline for contract claims. These limits are not considered ‘‘extreme.’’ 

To the contrary, for any cruise that even touches a U.S. port, § 30509 specifically 

prohibits it from including any provision in a passage contract that either limits 

‘‘the liability of the owner, master, or agent for personal injury or death caused by 

the negligence or fault of the owner or the owner’s employees or agents; or [. . .] 

the right of a claimant for personal injury or death to a trial by court of competent 

jurisdiction.’’ 

Question 8. What recourse does the Bill of Rights provide to passengers when one 

of these rights is violated? Please provide specific examples of how a passenger 

could enforce the rights. 

Answer. The Bill of Rights is a legally enforceable contract. It forms part of the 

contract between cruise lines and our guests who now have a private right of action 

to enforce the rights. 

In addition, state consumer protection laws available in virtually every port state 

where cruise lines base their businesses or ships, including Florida, California, Hawaii, New York, Texas, Alaska and Washington, still apply. Thus, the contractual 

recourse to enforce the passenger Bill of Rights is in addition to these state laws 

which typically provide for recovery of damages, injunctive relief, attorneys’ fees, 

and in some cases, double or treble damages for misleading or false advertising. 

Passengers can generally bring a legal action against cruise lines for any claims 

arising out of the maritime contract of passage, such as the Bill of Rights. The general maritime law of the U.S. will typically apply although state law can sometimes 

supplement the remedies afforded under U.S. maritime law where not inconsistent. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. MARIA CANTWELL TO

ADAM M. GOLDSTEIN

Natural Gas Vessels 

As I’m sure you’re aware, advances in technology, reduced emissions, and high oil 

prices have led the transportation industry to look to natural gas as an alternative 

source of fuel. Natural gas trucking has increased in current years, and the Energy 

Information Agency (EIA) recently projected that for the heavy-duty industry ‘‘Natural gas, as compressed natural gas (CNG) and liquefied natural gas (LNG), is the 

fastest-growing fuel in the transportation sector, with an average annual growth 

rate of 11.9 percent from 2011 to 2040.’’ And a company based in my home state 

has ordered the LNG conversion of two diesel ships currently in use for Alaska 

trade, as well as the construction of two new first-of-their-kind LNG-powered containerships for use on the Puerto Rico-Florida trade route. The fuel is also being 

evaluated for use on our public Washington State Ferry system. 

Question 1. Do you believe natural gas-fueled vessels have a future within the 

cruise ship industry? To that end, to what extent has your company evaluated using 

natural gas as a fuel source for either converted/renovated or new vessels? 

Answer. We believe there is a future for LNG as a major marine fuel, although 

there are a number of challenges that will need to be addressed, as outlined below. 

We have done extensive studies into the current and future feasibility from a technical, operational/safety, and supply availability perspective. We have involved engine manufacturers, shipyards, existing LNG suppliers, and maritime classification 

societies in these reviews. 

We do not believe that CNG will ever be a realistic option given the very low energy density of CNG (i.e., we could not carry enough fuel to get the ship to port). 

Question 1a. What challenges or barriers exist to deploying natural gas technology 

safely within the cruise ship industry? Do you believe that any of the challenges 

or barriers is unique to your industry? 

Answer. There are a number of technical and operational issues with LNG compared to traditional fuels, all of which stem from the physical properties of LNG, 

including: 

• We would have to carry twice as much volume of LNG to achieve the equivalent 

amount of energy of traditional fuels 

• LNG must be maintained at cryogenic temperatures (i.e., –160 degrees F) 

Because of these physical properties, LNG requires specialized storage tanks, piping systems, safety systems and design limitations, loading systems, and engine 

modifications. We do not think there is a high likelihood that existing cruise ships 

159 

could be retrofitted with significant LNG capacity, but believe it is more feasible in 

the context of newbuilds. 

Another major obstacle is the minimal supply infrastructure available. Because of 

the physical properties of LNG, it is very expensive and time consuming to develop 

and build the necessary supply infrastructure. While this issue exists for all ships, 

it is a much larger issue for cruise ships given the amount of LNG required and 

the time frame in which it would have to be loaded (e.g., 25 to 50 truck loads per 

week). The other ‘‘unique’’ issue is that cruise ships tend to travel around the world, 

so a single point supply solution is not sufficient; our vessels would need access to 

reliable supplies around the world. 

Question 1b. Can you speak to your company’s long-term strategy with regards 

to natural gas vessels? 

Answer. Our long term strategy is to continue monitoring the regional and global 

supply development to determine if and when it would be prudent to commit to an 

LNG fueled vessel. We routinely re-evaluate our position when committing to 

newbuild orders. 

Cold Ironing 

Question 2. As you know, cold ironing is the practice of providing cruise, container, and other vessels with shore-side electrical power for the operation of equipment while in port, thereby allowing main and auxiliary engines to be shut down. 

This can reduce or eliminate many airborne emissions and improve nearby air quality. How many of your vessels are equipped to use cold-ironing infrastructure/equipment while in port? 

Answer. We have seven vessels in our fleet that have reserved space in the electrical switchboards for equipment to connect to shore power and all future 

newbuilds will have the space reservation as well. We are also in the process of 

equipping one vessel with shore power capability in order that it may make frequent 

calls on California ports. 

Question 2a. Does cold ironing have any negative impacts on cruise ship operations? 

Answer. There are always challenges when introducing a new technology to marine operations and, of course, we always take handling extremely high voltage 

equipment and connections seriously. The biggest challenges relate to handling the 

switch over from ship power to shore power and back again. 

Question 2b. What are the barriers to further deployment of cold-ironing infrastructure/equipment on your vessels? Are certain ports more/less feasible for cold 

ironing? 

Answer. Cold-ironing is very much a port-by-port evaluation; furthermore, it is a 

day-by-day issue within an existing port. We have found that the availability of 

cold-ironing infrastructure varies by port and even by berths within a port. In addition, the ability of local utilities to scale up to meet one or more large ship’s power 

demand is also an important factor. Of course, the reliability, cost, and environmental benefits of shore power vary by port as well. 

Question 2c. Please describe your company’s long-term strategy with regards to 

coldironing. 

Answer. Although the majority of our energy consumption occurs when we are not 

in port, we continue to evaluate cold-ironing as a component of our energy/environmental strategies. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV 

TO ROSS A. KLEIN, PH.D. 

Crime 

When a crime happens on a cruise ship, passengers can be in for a rude awakening—they can’t just call 911 to get the police to come investigate the crime, they 

can’t go to a U.S. hospital for treatment, and they can’t always just get off the ship. 

To make things more difficult, U.S. laws may not govern if the crime occurs in international waters or at a foreign port. 

Question 1. Given the stark differences in the level of support available to crime 

victims on land versus on cruises, how important is it that passengers have an understanding of the number and types of alleged crimes that occur on cruise ships? 

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1The claim to be the safest mode of commercial transportation has long appeared at the 

website of Cruise Lines International Association, and before that at the International Council 

of Cruise Lines website. It was recently removed because of intense lobbying by the International Cruise Victims Association (ICV), which called on the Coast Guard and members of 

Congress to force the cruise industry to remove the misleading claim. The study to which the 

industry refers was secured by ICV through a freedom of information request; the data was 

based on National Transportation Statistics 1995. 

Answer. The cruise industry promotes itself as ‘‘the safest mode of commercial 

transportation’’—a claim based on a 1996 study done by the U.S. Coast Guard.1 But 

this study only considered three issues of safety: fatalities, injuries requiring treatment beyond first aid, and accidents such as trips and falls. Based on these criteria, 

a cruise ship is safer than U.S. air carriers and motor vehicles; however, the study 

did not look at simple assaults, thefts, sexual assaults or at disappearances under 

mysterious circumstances. The claim by the cruise industry to be the safest mode 

of transportation misleads consumers into a false sense of security. 

In the face of this claim, and in the frequency of certain types of crime, it is important that cruise passengers have access to independently-verified and reliable 

crime statistics for cruise lines and for cruise ships. Particularly relevant are sexrelated crimes (sexual assaults and forcible rapes), which on some cruise ships/ 

cruise lines may be higher than on land, but also property crimes (i.e., thefts), 

crimes against persons (simple assaults and assault with serious bodily injury), and 

persons overboard. 

The importance and value of by-ship data is demonstrated in TABLE 1: RCI ‘‘Reported Sex Related Incidents’’ 2003–2005 Number of Reported Incidents and 

Annualized Rate per 100,000 by Ship of my testimony before the Before the Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety, 

and Security, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Hearings on ‘‘Cruise Ship Safety: Examining Potential Steps for Keeping Americans Safe 

at Sea,’’ Thursday, June 19, 2008. As seen in that table the rate of sexual harassment/sexual assault when viewed by ship ranged from 10.75 per 100,000 to 208.33 

per 100,000 across a fleet of 19; the fleet average was 111.97 per 100,000. This level 

of detailed information is helpful to passengers—both in gaining awareness that 

there are certain problems or risks on cruise ships (as there are on land), and that 

choices can apparently be made that minimize risk. The transparency may also benefit cruise ships and cruise lines in that it will ideally motivate a higher degree of 

vigilance in preventing and effectively dealing with onboard crime in order to avoid 

being ‘‘the worst.’’ 

Having valid and reliable rates of crime is important for the purpose of comparison: comparison between cruise lines/ships and comparison of crime at sea versus 

crime on land. There is a simple illustration that makes this point. Disney Cruise 

Line reports on its website 6 sexual assaults in 2012. This sounds like a small number. However, when converted to a standardized rate it is 32.6 per 100,000—almost 

four times higher than claimed for the industry as a whole in its written testimony 

before the U.S. Senate Commerce Committee. It is tempting to interpret this as indicating that Disney Cruise Line is worse than the rest, but the more likely interpretation is that Disney Cruise Line is being more transparent than the others. 

After all, the numbers reported by Royal Caribbean and Carnival for 2010–2013 are 

so different than what are independently confirmed as numbers for 2007–08, that 

it makes suspect the more recent reports (see www.cruisejunkie.com/crimedat.pdf). 

Crime Data 

Royal Caribbean, Carnival, Norwegian, and Disney recently posted cruise crime 

data on their websites. Some questions have been raised about what data is included and whether it paints a clear picture of the crime onboard vessels. 

Question 2. Professor Klein, what did your review of the crime data show? 

Answer. On surface, the crime statistics appear to be a positive step, however 

upon reflection one has to wonder precisely what are being provided: 

1. What ‘‘crimes’’ are included in the category ‘‘other’’? There is a significant number that can undoubtedly be categorized and reported (e.g., inappropriate 

touch, sexual harassment, simple assault, thefts of less than $10,000). 

2. What incidents are included as ‘‘sexual assaults’’ and ‘‘rape’’ and who decides 

that an incidents falls into one or another (or neither) category. If it is the 

cruise line, is it in an objective position from which to judge the nature of the 

incident and crime? When considering the category ‘‘other,’’ what is the number 

and types of sex-related incidents that do not fall under sexual assault and 

rape. 

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Aside from the problem of data kept invisible through the category ‘‘other,’’ and 

confusion caused by lack of clarity on who makes the determination of a category 

of crime (e.g., simple assault, assault with serious bodily injury, sexual assault and 

rape), the data displayed at the Carnival and Royal Caribbean websites are misleading. Both companies combine cruise lines, which dilutes the rate of crime on 

Carnival Cruise Lines’. For example, Carnival combines four cruise lines in its report—Carnival Cruise Lines, Holland America Line, Princess Cruises, Seabourn 

Cruises—and then computes the crime rate. This produces misleading statistics. 

Carnival Cruise Lines accounts for 46 percent of the passenger population on ships 

belonging to these four brands, however in 2007–08 Carnival Cruise Lines accounted for 87 percent of the sexual assaults and 96 percent of the thefts. The rate 

of crime is significantly lower on the other cruise lines than on Carnival Cruise 

Lines; by averaging across the lines it gives the appearance that Carnival is safer 

than it actually is. The same is the case with Royal Caribbean International, Celebrity Cruises, and Azamara Cruises. 

Review of the data also raised some direct questions. The FBI told the Commerce 

Committee that it had received 40 reports of sexual assault on Carnival ships, but 

Carnival reports on its website a total of 17 for the same period. Similarly, data 

presented by NCL on its website and to the FBI is numerically different than data 

provided in the discovery phase of a lawsuit. 

So, while the idea of publishing the data is excellent, the underlying problem is 

the reliability and integrity of the data being presented. By being done in-house, 

with no independent oversight produces numbers that aren’t particularly informative. The public needs to be protected from erroneous claims. 

Question 3. How will the provisions in the Cruise Passenger Protection Act help 

ensure that all crime data is being reported publicly? 

Answer. The CPPA will improve the reporting of crime data by requiring reporting of all reported crimes, however it doesn’t go as far as I’d like it to go. There 

are crimes that will not be reported (thefts less than $10K, simple assault), and 

crime reports will be amalgamated by cruise line (maybe by cruise corporation?), 

which allows problem ships/lines to remain invisible. 

In an ideal world, all reports to security on a cruise ship would be sent to the 

FBI. The FBI would filter out cases it wishes to pursue, though all cases would go 

to an independent third party for entry into a crime database (including properly 

assigning complaints to a crime category). This database, showing crime by cruise 

ship and cruise line, would then be available online. 

Question 4. In your written testimony, you highlighted that additional crime beyond what’s required by law should be reported publicly. What type of crimes are 

these and how will making this information public help passengers? 

When consumers have complaints about cruise ships—whether it’s unexpected 

fees, lost baggage, or conditions on the vessel—what recourse do they currently have 

beyond lodging a complaint with the company? 

Answer. This question is actually two questions. The types of crimes that should 

be included in reporting include simple assault and theft less than $10,000. There 

might also be consideration to include under sex-related incidents cases involving 

‘‘inappropriate touch’’ and ‘‘sexual harassment’’. These categories were well populated in reports in 2003–2005. That data, when combined with data for sexual assaults and forcible rapes, is illuminating. 

My view is that passengers have a right to know what crimes are being committed on different cruise ships belonging to different cruise lines. They should be 

equipped to make informed shopping decisions when buying a cruise. And they 

should approach a cruise taking the usual precautions families take when traveling 

to a ‘‘strange’’ or new city. 

The second question relates to complaints when something goes wrong. Aside from 

attempting to persuade the cruise line that they owe you something, a passenger 

has very little recourse. They can file a complaint with the Maritime Administration, but that is unlikely to have any impact. Alternatively, a passenger might be 

able to file a claim in a small claims court—this may or may not survive a forum 

selection clause challenge, or in the odd case hire an admiralty lawyer in Miami. 

In the United Kingdom, where there is stronger consumer rights legislation, legal 

cases have a higher chance for success on cases that would be non-starters in the 

U.S. There are cases in both the U.S. and U.K. (more so the latter) where passengers have successfully used the Internet and/or social media to extract settlements for complaints against a cruise line, but these are relatively infrequent. 

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Consumer Complaints 

When consumers have complaints about cruise ships—whether it’s unexpected 

fees, lost baggage, or conditions on the vessel—what recourse do they currently have 

beyond lodging a complaint with the company? 

Question 5. How would giving a Federal agency, such as the Department of Transportation authority to investigate passenger complaints, as it does for the aviation, 

auto, and other industries, help passengers when something goes wrong? 

Answer. I think the issue is one of oversight. The cruise industry operates out of 

U.S. ports, serving largely U.S. passengers, yet unlike the aviation or other transportation industries, has no active oversight by the U.S. Government. There is some 

oversight relating to cruise ship safety (U.S. Coast Guard) and sanitary conditions 

(Centers for Disease Control), however there is absolutely no oversight with regard 

to consumer rights and proper treatment of passengers (not to mention proper treatment of workers). An aggrieved passenger lacks a venue (other than a lawsuit) for 

dealing with a serious complaint against a cruise line (other than the cruise line 

itself). As well, because there is no central agency where passengers can file reports, 

there is no knowledge base about complaints common on cruise ships (even specific 

cruise ships or cruise lines). Such an agency would also be a venue for a passenger 

to express a safety concern that was ignored while onboard a ship. 

Given the size of the cruise industry, and its reliance on passengers in and from 

the U.S., it makes infinite sense to treat the cruise industry like other modes of 

commercial transportation (airlines, trains, buses) and for this oversight to rest in 

the Department of Transportation. At present the industry is largely self-regulating. 

With market domination of three corporations (comprising more than 90 percent of 

the North American market), self-regulation is not in the best interests of the consumer. 

Bill of Rights 

The cruise industry has actively promoted their Cruise Passenger Bill of Rights, 

which includes the right to professional emergency medical attention, the right to 

properly trained crew, the right to timely updates for itinerary changes, etc. 

Question 6. Professor Klein, you reviewed the Bill of Rights in your written testimony, what new rights were passengers provided? 

Answer. In my opinion, the CLIA Cruise Passenger Bill of Rights does not provide 

anything that the cruise industry wouldn’t argue was already being done before the 

bill of rights. What is different is that there is now, they would say, a binding 

pledge that these things will absolutely be done. However CLIA Cruise Passenger 

Bill of Rights does not say what a passenger is due when a right is not fulfilled 

(e.g., having a trained crew, receiving timely information). 

The Bill of Rights is a restatement of industry practices and is used largely as 

a marketing scheme at a time that the industry was attempting to repair its image. 

Question 7. Were there any major areas that were not addressed? 

Answer. There are a number of things not covered in CLIA Cruise Passenger Bill 

of Rights: 

(1) What rights does a passenger have when essential provisions such as food, 

water, restroom facilities, etc cannot be provided and the ship is not docked? 

What rights does a passenger have when a ship is ‘‘dead in the water?’’ 

(2) A passenger’s right to have refunded by the cruise line the cost of airfare to 

get to a cruise when a cruise is canceled because of mechanical or other failure. 

And the following copied from my written testimony: 

• There is no mention of the recourse a passenger has if one of the Rights is not 

fulfilled or realized. 

• There is no indication of how a partial refund will be computed and whether 

that refund is provided in cash or, as common in the industry, as a discount 

on a future cruise or an onboard credit. 

• There is no mention of whether the cruise line is responsible for ancillary costs 

when a cruise is cancelled, including change fees for airline tickets and for the 

costs of the tickets themselves, the cost of lodging required in travel to the passenger’s home city, and support for food and incidentals associated with delays 

in getting from the ship to the passenger’s home city. 

• There is no mention of what rights a passenger has when a port of call is canceled. Some cruise lines refund ‘‘port fees and taxes,’’ however these are given 

as an onboard credit rather than as a cash refund. As well, there is no transparency with regard to the amount refunded. Some cruise lines average the cost 

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2 It is worth mention that Royal Caribbean Cruises Limited, in anticipation of these hearings 

and concern that the facts might paint an unkind picture, sent an e-mail to all employees asking 

them to write their Senator with the following text: Dear Senator, As one of your constituents 

and an employee of ______________________, one of the major cruise lines serving North America, I am contacting you today out of concern regarding the July 24 Senate Commerce Committee hearing regarding the cruise industry. As an individual who is intimately familiar with 

cruising, it is apparent to me that there has been a great deal of misinformation and distortion 

regarding the industry in recent months. As one of your constituents, I am concerned that the 

industry will be unfairly portrayed at this hearing. As someone that works in the cruise line 

industry, I know firsthand that cruising is extremely safe and well regulated at the national 

level, by the U.S. Coast Guard, and by international authorities. Additionally, the cruise industry directly benefits businesses in all 50 states, generating over 355,000 jobs and over $42 billion 

in economic impact. It provides $17.4 billion in wages to American workers each year. I would 

greatly appreciate your support to ensure that the cruise industry receives a fair and balanced 

hearing. Thank you for your time and attention to this matter and your service to our Nation. 

Sincerely, Your Name 

of port fees and taxes so a refund for one port is the same as the other even 

though actual fees can vary widely from one port to another. Also, it isn’t transparent whether costs other than port taxes and fees that are not paid by the 

cruise line because of the canceled port call are also refunded to the passenger. 

There is considerable need for greater clarity and transparency around passenger rights when a port call is canceled. 

• There is no mention of what rights a passenger has when a cruise itinerary is 

changed, such as a cruise sailing the Eastern Caribbean instead of the Western 

Caribbean because of propulsion problems, or a cruise going to Canada instead 

of the Caribbean because of weather. The Passenger Cruise Contract is clear 

that the cruise line has no obligation or responsibility to provide compensation 

in these situations. This absence of rights should be clearly articulated in the 

Passenger Bill of Rights. 

• There is no mention of the rights a passenger has when embarkation is delayed. 

Does a passenger have a Right to meal vouchers or compensation for meals purchased (as is common in airline travel)? Also, after how many hours of waiting 

in a cruise terminal is the cruise line obligated to provide either lodging or a 

comfortable setting to wait? A comprehensive Passenger Bill of Rights would address these situations given the frequency of delayed embarkations. 

• There is no mention of a passenger’s rights when a cruise arrives late in its 

port of disembarkation, causing the passenger to miss transportation arrangements for their trip to their home city. 

In addition there are some rights that should be directly addressed. 

CLIA Cruise Passenger Bill of Rights should clearly articulate the rights of a passenger who is ‘‘bumped’’ from a cruise because of overbooking or other issues. The 

most recent cases involve Carnival Sunshine, which bumped passengers on its June 

7, 2013, cruise because a number of cabins were needed for contractors completing 

work that was not completed while the ship was in dry dock. Similarly, passengers 

in 78 cabins on Grandeur of the Seas were bumped from the July 12, 2013 (and perhaps the July 19th), sailing because cabins were needed for workers who were still 

making repairs following the fire earlier in the year. Some of these bumped passengers had their cruise canceled because the ship had been out of service for repairs, and here they were bumped from their replacement cruise.2

Similarly, the CLIA Cruise Passenger Bill of Rights should discuss a passenger’s 

rights when they are expelled from a cruise ship, often for questionable reasons and 

the result is loss of cruise fare and their having responsibility for transportation 

from the port where they are left. Between January 2009 and June 30, 2013, there 

are eight cases list on my website where a passenger has been evicted or expelled 

(these are only ones reported in the media). These passengers have no right to appeal or recourse. The cruise line Cruise Passenger Contract gives them this unilateral, uncontestable Right to evict or expel, without liability. 

The CLIA Cruise Passenger Bill of Rights does not address a passenger’s rights 

when they miss the ship because of flight delays or because of weather conditions 

(such as Hurricane Sandy in the fall of 2013 when passengers lost their cruise fare 

because they couldn’t get to the ship). The cruise lines generally take the position 

that this type of situation is not their problem. A passenger without trip insurance 

is responsible for lost cruise fares and/or additional travel costs to join the ship at 

a later point. Further, it there are reports that some benefits under trip insurance 

policies offered by the cruise line are more restrictive in the benefits they provide 

than insurance policies offered independent of the cruise line. 

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The CLIA Cruise Passenger Bill of Rights does not address a passenger’s rights 

to have safety concerns taken seriously. Though not the first time I have received 

this sort of information, on June 21, 2013, I received the following from a cruise 

passenger: 

We have just disembarked after a 7-day Alaskan cruise aboard Celebrity Solstice. We frequented the quasar dance club each night. On night two I noticed 

at 2300 (11pm), when the club only allows 18 and over, a crew member used 

a small rope to tie the handles of one of the two exits closed to prevent access. 

Not must looped but tied in a fashion that untying would be impossible is a 

smoke filled environment or panic. This room is required to have two emergency 

exits and this exit was clearly marked ’’ emergency exit’’. This happened three 

nights in a row. I brought my concerns to the attention of guest services requesting to speak to the ships Safety Officer. I was told that another passenger 

had requested to speak with him also but he stated that he was ‘‘too busy with 

paperwork to speak to anyone’’. The guest services person apologized and drafted an e-mail to him explaining my concerns and that I am a 28 year firefighter. 

That night in quasar the doors were once again tied closed. As of this writing 

no staff or crew has contacted me. I would encourage that all passengers be 

aware of their surroundings. It appears Celebrity is not concerned with safety 

and if this blatant example of reckless disregard for its passengers and crew 

in a public space is allowed to exist, then I am wondering what other safety 

issues exist that we did not see. 

It would seem this passenger’s expectations were realistic, but they were ignored. 

Did he have any rights? And what rights were available for this disregard of concern for fire safety? 

Finally, the CLIA Cruise Passenger Bill of Rights does not address the Right to 

be free of sexual assault by crewmembers or cruise ship employees, or the Right to 

be free of other types of crime. This type of assurance seems only natural given the 

rate of sexual assault on cruise ships, but it is obviously one that would be difficult 

to fulfill (although no less difficult than some of the other rights included in the Passenger Bill of Rights). In this line of thought, the Passenger Bill of Rights should 

also contain a Right to contact the FBI directly from the ship when a victim of a 

crime. This Right is accorded by the CVSSA, so it should be provided, however most 

victims will be unaware of what is available to them without it explicitly being stated in something like a Passenger Bill of Rights. Alternatively, a cruise ship may 

be required to provide a crime victim with an information sheet outlining the rights 

and the options available to them, including the telephone numbers for relevant law 

enforcement agencies, and agencies that provide direct services or referral to services that are likely to be needed by the victim. 

Question 8. What recourse does the Bill of Rights provide to passengers have 

when one of these rights is violated? 

Answer. A common theme across all elements in the Passenger Bill of Rights is 

how a passenger deals with a Right that has not been fulfilled or has been directly 

violated. Are these rights ultimately governed by the cruise passenger contract that 

sets clear terms about when and how complaints and legal action must be filed, and 

where law suits must be filed? Forum selection clauses effectively limit a passenger’s rights under the Passenger Bill of Rights given the requirement that legal 

action can only be taken in a court located in the state where the cruise line’s corporate headquarters is located (most frequently Florida). The cruise passenger contract also includes a ‘‘class action waiver,’’ prohibiting a passenger from taking any 

legal action as a member of a class or as a participant in a class action. For many 

passengers these are impediments to taking any action and they often resign to accepting whatever the cruise line offers, if anything. 

The cruise industry’s representatives claimed at the hearings that the CLIA Passenger Bill of Rights is not superseded by the passenger contract, however what this 

actually means remains unclear. It is unclear what recourse a passenger has when 

a right has not been fulfilled, and it is unclear through what forum this recourse 

is sought. Cruise passenger contracts have not yet changed. 

Contract Limitations 

According to your written testimony, cruise line contracts include ‘‘extreme limits’’ 

on the company’s liability, including requirements about where a passenger must 

file a suit and how quickly they must bring the suit. 

Question 9. These ticket contracts generally require that all law suits be filed in 

Florida. Does this mean that even though a passenger might buy a ticket in West 

Virginia and leave from a port in Maryland, they have to go all the way to Florida 

to pursue a lawsuit? 

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Answer. Based on the forum selection clause in the passenger cruise contract any 

lawsuit must be filed in the court where the cruise line is headquartered—for Princess Cruises it is Los Angeles, for Holland America Line Seattle, and for many others Miami. This is a huge disadvantage, if not impediment, to a passenger from out 

of state of the cruise line’s headquarters (e.g., West Virginia, Arizona, Vermont). 

Many will initially contract with a local attorney who needs in turn to be represented by an attorney in Florida. Alternatively, the passenger may contract directly with a Florida-based attorney, but there is a challenge locating and getting 

to know one. In any case, access to court of law is quite difficult (if not costly) for 

the average cruise ship passenger. 

Question 10. What impact do these provisions have on a passenger’s ability to pursue legal recourse? 

Answer. This lack of recourse means that many problems, complaints, and justified claims against cruise lines are never pursued. If legal recourse were more readily available, then cruise passengers feeling wronged may feel like their concerns 

can be heard. Another option (perhaps complimentary) is for an agency within the 

Department of Transportation to deal with consumer complaints regarding the 

cruise industry. 

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