[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 

Musto v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Revision, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-8058.] 

NOTICE 

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2016-OHIO-8058

MUSTO, APPELLANT, v. LORAIN COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION ET AL.,

APPELLEES.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as Musto v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Revision, Slip Opinion No. 

2016-Ohio-8058.] 

Taxation—Real-property-valuation—Board of Tax Appeals did not abuse 

discretion in denying property owner’s motion for continuance or motion 

to disqualify counsel for county and Board of Revision, and BTA acted 

reasonably and lawfully in retaining auditor’s valuation in absence of clear 

evidence negating it—BTA’s decision affirmed. 

(No. 2014-1771—Submitted August 30, 2016—Decided December 13, 2016.) 

APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 2013-4191. 

_______________________ 

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} In this real-property-valuation case, appellant, Cynthia M. Musto, 

challenges a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”) that affirmed the 
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decision of the Lorain County Board of Revision (“BOR”) to retain the county 

auditor’s valuation of her property for tax year 2012. 

{¶ 2} Musto argues that the BTA’s decision was unlawful and unreasonable 

in three respects. First, she contends that the BTA should have granted a 

continuance when her only scheduled witness, a certified appraiser who conducted 

an appraisal of the property in 2014, did not show up for the BTA hearing. Second, 

she challenges the BTA’s valuation decision, arguing that the evidence that she 

produced made it unreasonable for the BTA to retain the auditor’s valuation and 

that the BTA had a legal duty to independently determine a value based on the 

evidence that she presented. Finally, Musto argues that the BTA should have 

disqualified counsel for the BOR and the auditor because he was also a member of 

the BOR hearing panel. 

{¶ 3} For the reasons explained below, we reject Musto’s claims and affirm 

the BTA’s decision. 

FACTS 

{¶ 4} Musto owns and occupies the subject property, which is located at 

16449 Boone Road in Lorain County. It spans 10.01 acres and has been improved 

with a 4,094 square-foot single-family home, a pole barn, and an indoor horse 

arena. 

{¶ 5} In tax year 2012, a sexennial reappraisal year in Lorain County, the 

county auditor valued the property at $547,260. Musto filed a complaint with the 

BOR requesting a reduction in value to $405,000. 

BOR proceedings 

{¶ 6} A two-member BOR hearing panel, consisting of the county treasurer 

and Jack Kilroy, a representative of the county auditor, heard Musto’s complaint. 

Musto’s husband testified about the subject property and nearby properties that had 

recently been sold, and he responded to questions from the BOR panel. He opined 

that the property’s value was $405,000 as of the tax-lien date. And Musto’s 
January Term, 2016 

3

attorney submitted a document providing information about the property and 

identifying two recent “[n]eighborhood [s]ales” and two current “[n]eighborhood 

[l]istings.” 

{¶ 7} Finally, Musto introduced an appraisal report that had been prepared 

for financing purposes in 2009. James A. Malloy, a certified Ohio-licensed 

appraiser, evaluated the property for Third Federal Bank. He relied on the salescomparison approach, identifying three comparable sales. After making 

adjustments, Malloy opined a value of $405,000 as of January 30, 2009. The report 

was certified by the appraiser, but Malloy did not testify before the BOR panel. 

{¶ 8} On August 7, 2013, the BOR issued a decision retaining the auditor’s 

valuation for tax year 2012. The BOR concluded that Musto had presented 

insufficient evidence to support a reduction in value. 

BTA proceedings 

{¶ 9} Musto appealed to the BTA, which scheduled a hearing for 9:00 a.m. 

on March 4, 2014. 

Preliminary matters 

{¶ 10} Musto planned to present the testimony of Elizabeth Caldwell at the 

BTA hearing. Caldwell is an Ohio-licensed appraiser of residential real estate, who 

had appraised the property on February 13, 2014. At the beginning of the March 4 

hearing, Musto’s counsel informed the BTA examiner that Caldwell was “running 

behind” and moved to “continue th[e] hearing to a later date and time.” He also 

asked the hearing examiner to keep the record open for ten days so that he could 

introduce any future evidence of good cause for Caldwell’s absence. Alternatively, 

Musto’s counsel sought permission for Caldwell to participate by telephone. 

{¶ 11} Counsel for the auditor and the BOR opposed all three requests, and 

the hearing examiner denied them, emphasizing that the parties had had almost six 

months’ advance notice of the hearing date. The examiner also explained that the 
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BTA permits telephonic hearings only for matters on its small-claims track, which 

did not apply to Musto’s case. 

{¶ 12} Musto next objected to “Mr. Kilroy’s attendance in representation of 

the Board of Revision[,] County Auditor[,] and the County Appellees in general at 

this hearing as he was a neutral member of the BOR tribunal in the decision below.” 

Musto’s counsel stated that he was not asking the hearing officer to disqualify Kilroy 

but was only “noting an objection [for] the record.” 

{¶ 13} In response, Kilroy argued that his representation was consistent with 

his role on the BOR panel. Under R.C. 5715.02, three individuals serve on a county 

board of revision: the county treasurer, the county auditor, and a member of the board 

of county commissioners. In Musto’s case, the county auditor exercised his statutory 

authority to appoint a qualified employee—Kilroy—“to serve in [his] place and stead 

on” the board of revision. Id.

{¶ 14} Kilroy then explained that although he is employed by the auditor, 

he is also an assistant prosecutor for Lorain County, for the limited purpose of 

representing the county auditor and the BOR. The county prosecutor is the legal 

adviser of all county officers and boards, including the BOR, and therefore has a 

statutory duty to “prosecute and defend all suits and actions” to which the BOR is 

a party. R.C. 309.09(A) (noting exceptions established in R.C. 305.14); see also 

State ex rel. Trumbull Cty. Bd. of Elections v. Trumbull Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 11th 

Dist. Trumbull No. 2009 TR 85, 2010-Ohio-2281, ¶ 19. 

{¶ 15} The BTA overruled Musto’s objection, and Kilroy represented the 

auditor and the BOR at the hearing. Eight days after the hearing, Musto filed a 

written motion to disqualify Kilroy. She requested a new merits hearing and, 

alternatively, asked the BTA to remand the matter to the BOR. The BTA denied the 

motion on September 24, 2014. 

 
January Term, 2016 

5

Evidence of value 

{¶ 16} Musto did not present any witnesses at the BTA hearing. She asked 

the BTA to consider the statutory transcript from the BOR proceedings, which 

included Malloy’s appraisal report. 

{¶ 17} Musto also introduced Caldwell’s certified appraisal report without 

accompanying testimony. The report indicated that Caldwell had inspected the 

property, identified its highest and best use, and analyzed market conditions. In the 

report, she identified four sales of comparable properties (two of which had barns 

and an indoor riding arena), made adjustments, and arrived at a valuation of 

$450,000 as of the tax-lien date. 

{¶ 18} The auditor and the BOR did not introduce any evidence, but their 

counsel indicated that he would have liked to question Malloy and Caldwell about 

their methodologies. Musto’s counsel said that Caldwell could be there in less than 

two hours and would be available to answer any questions then. But the auditor 

and the BOR did not want to prolong the hearing, and the hearing examiner noted 

that she had already denied Musto’s requests regarding Caldwell at the outset of 

the hearing. 

The BTA’s decision 

{¶ 19} On September 24, 2014, the BTA issued a decision affirming the 

BOR’s valuation. The BTA explained that although Musto had submitted 

Caldwell’s appraisal report, it “was not attested to by the author.” And it found that 

Malloy’s appraisal was of limited value because it “was done for financial 

purposes” and “contains an effective date prior to the tax lien date at issue.” Thus, 

the BTA declined to rely on either appraisal report and concluded that Musto had 

presented insufficient evidence to support the requested adjustment. The BTA 

affirmed the BOR’s decision adopting the auditor’s valuation. 

ANALYSIS 

{¶ 20} On appeal, Musto asserts three propositions of law: 
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Proposition of Law No. 1: The decisions of the Board of Tax 

Appeals to deny the motions to continue the hearing were 

unreasonable, unlawful, and/or an abuse of discretion, since the 

BTA failed to properly apply and/or consider this Court’s legal 

standard in State v. Unger, 67 Ohio St.2d 65, 423 N.E.2d 1078 

(1981). 

Proposition of Law No. 2: The Board of Tax Appeals’ 

decision is unreasonable, unlawful, and/or an abuse of discretion, 

since the BTA failed to exclude and/or disqualify counsel for the 

Appellees. 

Proposition of Law No. 3: The Board of Tax Appeals’ 

decision is unreasonable, unlawful, and/or an abuse of discretion, 

since the BTA reverted to the Auditor’s value despite competent 

evidence that negated the validity and reliability of the Auditor’s 

value. 

 

Motion for continuance 

{¶ 21} Musto first argues that the BTA erred by denying her motion to 

continue the BTA hearing.

{¶ 22} The decision to grant or deny a continuance lies within the BTA’s 

sound discretion. Coats v. Limbach, 47 Ohio St.3d 114, 116, 548 N.E.2d 917 (1989); 

Ohio Adm.Code 5717-1-16(B). This court will affirm a BTA decision granting or 

denying a continuance absent a showing that “the BTA’s attitude was unreasonable, 

arbitrary, or unconscionable.” EOP-BP Tower, L.L.C. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of 

Revision, 106 Ohio St.3d 1, 2005-Ohio-3096, 829 N.E.2d 686, ¶ 14.

{¶ 23} According to Musto, the BTA applied the wrong standard in 

considering her motion for a continuance. In support, she cites Unger, 67 Ohio St.2d 
January Term, 2016 

7

65, 423 N.E.2d 1078, which identified various factors relevant to deciding whether 

to grant a continuance:

In evaluating a motion for a continuance, a court should note, 

inter alia: the length of the delay requested; whether other 

continuances have been requested and received; the inconvenience to 

litigants, witnesses, opposing counsel and the court; whether the 

requested delay is for legitimate reasons or whether it is dilatory, 

purposeful, or contrived; whether the defendant contributed to the 

circumstance which gives rise to the request for a continuance; and 

other relevant factors, depending on the unique facts of each case. 

Id. at 67-68. But Unger does not suggest that information will always be available 

about each of these factors or require a court to assign particular weight to any one 

factor. Furthermore, Unger was a criminal appeal, not an administrative one; it is not 

clear that the same factors are equally important in both contexts. 

{¶ 24} In the specific context of BTA appeals, we have considered a number 

of factors when reviewing the decision to grant or deny a continuance. Relevant 

considerations may include, inter alia, the requester’s compliance with the BTA’s 

procedural rules, the requester’s diligence and good faith, and opposition from other 

parties. See LTC Properties, Inc. v. Licking Cty. Bd. of Revision, 133 Ohio St.3d 111, 

2012-Ohio-3930, 976 N.E.2d 852, ¶ 14-17. And when the basis for a continuance 

request is a witness’s absence, this court has evaluated the reason for the absence 

(and whether it is supported by the record), the importance of the witness’s testimony 

to the requester’s case, and whether the witness would likely be able to attend if the 

hearing were continued. Id. at ¶ 17; Coats at 116-117; Strongsville Bd. of Edn. v. 

Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 53 Ohio St.3d 254, 256, 559 N.E.2d 1351 (1990). 
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8

{¶ 25} Here, the parties received nearly six months’ notice of the BTA 

hearing date, time, and location. As explained above, Musto intended to present 

expert testimony from Elizabeth Caldwell, but Caldwell had yet to arrive when the 

hearing began—for reasons then unknown to Musto’s counsel. Musto’s counsel 

sought a continuance (to an unspecified time) or, alternatively, asked the BTA to let 

Caldwell participate via telephone. The auditor and the BOR opposed the requests, 

and the hearing examiner denied the motion. 

{¶ 26} There is no question that Caldwell’s testimony was important to 

Musto’s appeal. Caldwell had performed a new appraisal of the property, and she 

would have been Musto’s only witness at the BTA hearing. Musto introduced 

Caldwell’s appraisal report, but Caldwell was not available to explain her 

methodology or to answer questions. This absence was significant: opposing 

counsel specifically noted his desire to cross-examine Caldwell about her selection 

of comparable sales. And, ultimately, the BTA rejected Musto’s requested 

adjustment based on insufficient evidence. 

{¶ 27} But even so, other factors support the BTA’s decision to deny the 

requested continuance. As an initial matter, no procedural rule expressly permits a 

last-minute request for a continuance. See Ohio Adm.Code 5717-1-16 (formerly 

Ohio Adm.Code 5717-1-15). And, more important, the record does not show that 

Musto established good cause at the time of her request. At that point, Musto’s 

counsel had no explanation for the delay: 

THE EXAMINER: Mr. Nowak, do you know why the 

appraiser is running late? 

MR. NOWAK: At this point in time, I do not know for sure 

why she’s running late. 
January Term, 2016 

9

Nor did counsel indicate at that time that Caldwell was en route to the hearing. 

Compare King v. Kelly, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 02CA42, 2003-Ohio-4412, ¶ 9-14 

(brief continuance should have been granted when the court knew that the appellants 

were en route and the record showed that their absence was not due to neglect or 

disregard). 

{¶ 28} Further, Musto’s counsel did not make any statements on the record 

about his diligence in ensuring the witness’s presence at the hearing, his efforts to 

locate her that morning, or when she would be available. It was not until the parties 

were making concluding statements that he asked the BTA “to wait for an hour and 

45 minutes” so that Caldwell could “answer any cross-examination that the County 

Appellees’ attorney might have, or the Board for that matter.” But even then Musto’s 

counsel did not offer a reason for Caldwell’s delay.1

 And when opposing counsel 

challenged the estimated arrival time as speculative, Musto’s counsel did not 

respond. 

{¶ 29} Under these circumstances, we defer to the judgment of the hearing 

examiner, who was in the best position to evaluate the facts and circumstances of 

the continuance request. Thus, Musto can neither establish an abuse of discretion 

nor prevail on her related claims that the denial of her motion for a continuance 

violated due process and prompted an unconstitutional taking. 

{¶ 30} For these reasons, we reject Musto’s first proposition of law. 

The BTA’s valuation determination 

{¶ 31} Musto also challenges the BTA’s decision to retain the auditor’s 

valuation of her property, arguing that she introduced “competent evidence that 

negated the validity and reliability of the Auditor’s value.” Thus, she claims that the 

BTA had a “statutory duty to determine value from the record.” 

 

 

1

 In her brief to this court, Musto asserts that Caldwell “mistakenly went to the wrong location on 

the day of the hearing.” 
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Standard of review and burden of proof 

{¶ 32} “In reviewing a decision of the BTA, we do not sit as ‘a super BTA 

or a trier of fact de novo.’ ” RNG Properties, Ltd. v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Revision, 

140 Ohio St.3d 455, 2014-Ohio-4036, 19 N.E.3d 906, ¶ 18, quoting EOP-BP 

Tower, 106 Ohio St.3d 1, 2005-Ohio-3096, 829 N.E.2d 686, at ¶ 17. We “will not 

hesitate to reverse a BTA decision that is based on an incorrect legal conclusion.” 

Gahanna-Jefferson Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Zaino, 93 Ohio St.3d 231, 

232, 754 N.E.2d 789 (2001). However, the BTA’s factual findings are entitled to 

deference as long as they are supported by “ ‘reliable and probative’ ” evidence in 

the record. Satullo v. Wilkins, 111 Ohio St.3d 399, 2006-Ohio-5856, 856 N.E.2d 

954, ¶ 14, quoting Am. Natl. Can Co. v. Tracy, 72 Ohio St.3d 150, 152, 648 N.E.2d 

483 (1995). 

{¶ 33} We “will not disturb” a valuation determination by the BTA “unless 

it affirmatively appears from the record that such decision is unreasonable or 

unlawful.” Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision v. Fodor, 15 Ohio St.2d 52, 239 N.E.2d 

25 (1968), syllabus. Perhaps most significant in this context is our recognition of the 

BTA’s “wide discretion in determining the weight to be given to the evidence and 

the credibility of the witnesses that come before it.” EOP-BP Tower at ¶ 9. Indeed, 

we will not reverse such determinations by the BTA “[a]bsent a showing of an abuse 

of discretion,” meaning that “the BTA’s attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary or 

unconscionable.” Id. at ¶ 14. 

{¶ 34} “When cases are appealed from a board of revision to the BTA, the 

burden of proof is on the appellant, whether it be a taxpayer or a board of education, 

to prove its right to an increase or decrease from the value determined by the board 

of revision.” Columbus City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 

90 Ohio St.3d 564, 566, 740 N.E.2d 276 (2001). In order to prevail, the appellant 

“must present competent and probative evidence * * *; it is not entitled to a reduction 
January Term, 2016 

11 

or an increase in valuation merely because no evidence is presented against its claim.” 

Id. 

{¶ 35} In the usual course, the BTA is “justified in retaining the county’s 

valuation of [a] property when an appellant ‘fails to sustain its burden of proof at 

the BTA.’ ” Copley-Fairlawn City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Summit Cty. Bd. of 

Revision, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2016-Ohio-1485, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 17, quoting Colonial 

Village, Ltd. v. Washington Cty. Bd. of Revision, 123 Ohio St.3d 268, 2009-Ohio4975, 915 N.E.2d 1196, ¶ 23. However, we have recognized a “ ‘narrow exception’ 

” to this rule, id., quoting Colonial Village at ¶ 24, which applies in “a category of 

cases in which ‘the evidence presented to the board of revision or the BTA 

contradicts the auditor’s determination in whole or in part,’ ” id., quoting DaytonMontgomery Cty. Port Auth. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Revision, 113 Ohio St.3d 

281, 2007-Ohio-1948, 865 N.E.2d 22, ¶ 27. When “confronted with clear [ ] 

evidence negating the auditor’s valuation,” it is unreasonable and unlawful for the 

BTA to “adopt[ ] the auditor’s valuation rather than determin[e] the taxable value 

of the property” based on the record as developed by the parties. Dublin City 

Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 139 Ohio St.3d 193, 2013-

Ohio-4543, 11 N.E.3d 206, ¶ 26.

The BTA reasonably and lawfully retained the auditor’s valuation because Musto 

did not present clear evidence negating it

{¶ 36} Citing Dublin City Schools at ¶ 26, Musto asserts that the BTA could 

not “revert[ ] to” the auditor’s valuation, because she presented “competent” evidence 

“affirmatively negat[ing]” it. But Musto’s evidence did not negate the auditor’s 

valuation of the property, for the reasons explained below.

Caldwell’s appraisal report

{¶ 37} At the BTA, Musto introduced a new appraisal report prepared by 

Elizabeth Caldwell, a certified Ohio appraiser. Caldwell identified four comparable 

sales, made the necessary adjustments, and opined a value of $450,000 as of the tax-
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lien date. The report was certified, but Caldwell did not testify at the hearing. The 

BTA declined to rely on the report because Caldwell was “unavailable to authenticate 

[it], provide professional credentials, discuss methodologies utilized, or be crossexamined/questioned by the opposing party’s attorney or [the BTA’s] attorney 

examiner.” According to the BTA, Caldwell’s opinion of value was of little help 

since the basis for her opinion was not explained.

{¶ 38} Musto argues that Caldwell’s report was relevant evidence and that 

the BTA should have considered its contents as evidence of value. In support, she 

cites Plain Local Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 130 Ohio St.3d 

230, 2011-Ohio-3362, 957 N.E.2d 268, ¶ 29. In Plain Local Schools, a school board 

argued that an appraisal report was not reliable and probative evidence of value, 

because the appraiser who had prepared it did not testify. Id. at ¶ 18. But the school 

board had not raised a hearsay objection below, id. at ¶ 19, and this court held that 

the BTA did not plainly err by considering the report as evidence. Instead, we 

explained that the “record contain[ed] indicia of reliability of the content of the 

appraisal report,” including testimony about the preparation and purpose of the 

appraisal. Id. at ¶ 21.

{¶ 39} Plain Local Schools is not dispositive here. That decision held only 

that no plain error occurs when the BTA chooses to consider an appraisal report in 

the absence of the testimony of the appraiser who prepared it. But Plain Local 

Schools does not hold that the BTA must consider such evidence. Indeed, such a 

holding would contradict the court’s consistent recognition that the BTA has “wide 

discretion to determine the weight given to evidence,” including appraisal evidence,

R.R.Z. Assocs. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 38 Ohio St.3d 198, 201, 527 N.E.2d 

874 (1988); accord Plain Local Schools at ¶ 17. “The BTA may accept all, part, or 

none of the testimony presented to it by an expert.” Freshwater v. Belmont Cty. Bd. 

of Revision, 80 Ohio St.3d 26, 30, 684 N.E.2d 304 (1997).

 
January Term, 2016 

13 

Malloy’s appraisal report

{¶ 40} Musto also relied on an appraisal report prepared by James A. Malloy, 

a certified Ohio appraiser. Malloy had performed an appraisal of the subject property 

for financing purposes in 2009. In his report, Malloy identified three comparable 

sales, made adjustments, and opined a value of $405,000 as of January 30, 2009. The 

appraisal was certified, but Malloy did not testify before the BOR or the BTA. The 

BTA held that it could not rely on Malloy’s report both because he did not testify and 

because his opinion of value preceded the tax-lien date.

{¶ 41} The BTA reasonably declined to rely on Malloy’s appraisal report as 

evidence of value. Malloy had opined a value for the property almost three years 

prior to the tax-lien date. But “[t]he essence of an assessment is that it fixes the value 

based upon facts as they exist at a certain point in time.” Freshwater at 30; see also 

Olmsted Falls Village Assn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 75 Ohio St.3d 552, 

555, 664 N.E.2d 922 (1996). And Musto did not introduce testimony alongside the 

appraisal to explain its application to the tax-lien date. Compare Plain Local Schools, 

130 Ohio St.3d 230, 2011-Ohio-3362, 957 N.E.2d 268, at ¶ 27; AP Hotels of Illinois, 

Inc. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 118 Ohio St.3d 343, 2008-Ohio-2565, 889 

N.E.2d 115, ¶ 16-17. 

{¶ 42} Moreover, “[a]ppraisals for financing purposes are not necessarily a 

complete and thorough evaluation of the property.” Metzler v. Pickaway Cty. Bd. 

of Revision, BTA No. 2004-R-481, 2005 WL 2911447, *3 (Oct. 21, 2005). “[T]he 

purpose, the focus, and the considerations” of these types of appraisals “can be very 

different,” id., “which may frame/impact the scope of the appraiser’s work 

product,” Akron City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Revision, BTA 

No. 2010-Y-3389, 2013 WL 4508915, *3 (Aug. 8, 2013). Thus, unless the 

appraiser offers “explanatory testimony” and there is an opportunity for crossexamination, it is very difficult to assess the value of a financing appraisal for ad 

valorem taxation purposes. Metzler at *3. As a result, the BTA has been 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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“particularly wary of financing appraisals where the appraiser has not been present, 

either at the BOR or at this board, to testify to the facts and methodology underlying 

the appraisal report.” Patterson v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Revision, BTA No. 

2007-N-827, 2008 WL 2072372, *3 (May 6, 2008). In the absence of direct 

testimony about the preparation and actual use of Malloy’s appraisal, the BTA was 

reasonably wary of relying on a financing appraisal. Compare Copley-Fairlawn City 

School Dist., __ Ohio St.3d __, 2016-Ohio-1485, __ N.E.3d __, at ¶ 23-25 (owner 

testified about the origin and use of a financing appraisal alongside the appraisal, 

showing the reliance that both he and the bank placed upon it).

Owner’s opinion of value

{¶ 43} Musto’s husband, Michael Musto, testified at the BOR hearing. He 

described the subject property as unique and opined that its value had decreased since 

2009. Mr. Musto compared the property to two nearby comparable sales (for 

$585,000 and $975,000) and two nearby active listings (for $650,000 and $599,900). 

He opined that the four nearby properties were not actually comparable, because they 

had more extensive improvements and were not horse facilities. Mr. Musto 

explained that Malloy’s appraisal was conducted in 2009 when the property was 

refinanced; Mr. Musto noted that he and his wife still owe approximately $195,000 

on the property and that the outbuildings need frequent repair.

{¶ 44} Musto’s counsel also submitted at the BOR hearing a memorandum 

from him to the BOR dated July 2, 2013. The memo described the subject property 

and its condition, identified two “[n]eighborhood [s]ales” and two “[n]eighborhood 

[l]istings”—the four comparable properties discussed at the BOR hearing—and 

stated Musto’s opinion that the property’s value was $405,000 on the tax-lien date. 

Several documents were attached to the memo, including a location diagram and a 

map, photographs, information from the county auditor’s website, and a news article 

about declining home values in the Cleveland area. The memo also referred to an 

affidavit from Musto, which does not appear to be in the record.
January Term, 2016 

15 

Critique of the auditor’s methodology

{¶ 45} Finally, in an effort to “affirmatively negat[e] the validity of the 

county’s valuation of the property,” Colonial Village, 123 Ohio St.3d 268, 2009-

Ohio-4975, 915 N.E.2d 1196, at ¶ 24, Musto argues that the county auditor used the 

wrong method to value the property.

{¶ 46} The property-record card indicates that the auditor relied exclusively 

on the cost approach to valuation. “The cost method of valuing improvements seeks 

to determine what a potential buyer would expect to pay in constructing a 

replacement for the existing building.” Dayton-Montgomery Port Auth., 113 Ohio 

St.3d 281, 2007-Ohio-1948, 865 N.E.2d 22, at ¶ 12. When using this method, the 

auditor first estimates the replacement cost new, then makes deductions “for 

depreciation including physical deterioration” and “functional and economic 

obsolescence” to ultimately “arrive at the value of the improvements in their present 

condition.” Ohio Adm.Code 5703-25-12(A).

{¶ 47} We have recognized that the cost approach is important when 

“ ‘estimating the market value of new or relatively new construction.’ ” Colonial 

Village at ¶ 21, quoting Appraisal Institute, The Appraisal of Real Estate 354 (12th 

Ed.2001). Here, the subject property had been constructed more than 12 years prior 

to the tax-lien date, which undoubtedly made it more difficult to calculate 

depreciation than it would have been if the improvements had occurred in the last 

year or two. But the age of these improvements does not render the cost approach 

per se inapplicable. Compare Upchurch v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, BTA No. 

2014-630, 2015 WL 1406154, *2 (Mar. 19, 2015) (“We * * * question the utilization 

of the cost approach on a structure that [ ] is over 100 years old. Even with an 

effective age of 45 years, the calculation of depreciation becomes more difficult and 

less accurate”). And here, Musto does not identify any point of dispute with the 

figures yielded by the auditor’s cost approach.

 
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Conclusion as to value

{¶ 48} Having considered Musto’s evidence as well as her critique of the 

auditor’s valuation method, we cannot conclude that this is a case in which the 

taxpayer’s evidence clearly negated the auditor’s valuation of the property. Here, the 

BTA reasonably acted within its broad discretion by assigning minimal weight to 

Musto’s evidence. See EOP-BP Tower, 106 Ohio St.3d 1, 2005-Ohio-3096, 829 

N.E.2d 686, at ¶ 9. Thus, because Musto failed to negate the auditor’s valuation, the 

BTA acted reasonably and lawfully when it retained that valuation of the property. 

{¶ 49} Musto also suggests that the BTA acted unreasonably and unlawfully 

because the auditor and the BOR “presented no affirmative market evidence in 

support of [the] Auditor’s valuation.” This argument invokes what we have referred 

to as “the Bedford rule,” which bars the BTA’s reliance on an auditor’s valuation 

under a limited set of circumstances. See Copley-Fairlawn City School Dist., __ 

Ohio St.3d __, 2016-Ohio-1485, __ N.E.3d __, at ¶ 19, citing Bedford Bd. of Edn. 

v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 115 Ohio St.3d 449, 2007-Ohio-5237, 875 N.E.2d 

913. Namely, if a board of revision reduces the auditor’s property valuation based 

on the owner’s evidence of value, then the board of education and the BTA cannot 

rely on the auditor’s valuation as a default valuation. Id. Instead, the board of 

education must shoulder its burden by going forward with new evidence at the BTA. 

Id. But here, the Bedford rule does not apply, because the BOR retained the auditor’s 

valuation; it follows that the BTA could adopt the auditor’s valuation as a default 

even without hearing additional evidence in support. 

{¶ 50} For these reasons, we reject proposition of law No. 3. 

Motion to disqualify

{¶ 51} Musto also claims that the BTA erred by denying her motion to 

disqualify Jack Kilroy as counsel for the county auditor and the BOR. In the context 

of asking the court to reverse the BTA’s decision and remand the cause to the BTA, 

Musto requests that Kilroy “be disqualified as counsel for the Appellees.” 
January Term, 2016 

17 

{¶ 52} We review a decision not to disqualify counsel for an abuse of 

discretion. See Sarbey v. Natl. City Bank, Akron, 66 Ohio App.3d 18, 23, 583 N.E.2d 

392 (9th Dist.1990); Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co., 440 F.Supp. 193, 196 

(N.D.Ohio 1976). Here, Musto claims that an abuse of discretion occurred because 

Kilroy’s representation allegedly violated:

 Prof.Cond.R. 1.12(a), which prohibits a lawyer from “represent[ing] anyone in 

connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and 

substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer or law clerk to such a person 

or as an arbitrator, mediator, or other third-party neutral, unless all parties to the 

proceeding give informed consent, confirmed in writing”;

 R.C. 102.03, a provision of Ohio ethics law known as the “revolving door” 

statute, see, e.g., State v. Nipps, 66 Ohio App.2d 17, 419 N.E.2d 1128 (10th 

Dist.1979), paragraph one of the syllabus, which prohibits a current public 

official or employee from “represent[ing] a client * * * on any matter in which 

the public official or employee personally participated as a public official or 

employee through decision, approval, disapproval, recommendation, the 

rendering of advice, investigation, or other substantial exercise of 

administrative discretion,” R.C. 102.03(A)(1); and

 the Due Process Clauses and Takings Clauses of the United States and Ohio 

Constitutions.

{¶ 53} We are troubled by Kilroy’s dual role in this case: he was both a 

member of the BOR hearing panel and is counsel for the auditor and the BOR. But 

even so, Musto is not entitled to the relief that she seeks in this context. 

{¶ 54} As the preamble to the Rules of Professional Conduct explains, 

“violation of a rule does not necessarily warrant any other nondisciplinary remedy, 

such as disqualification of a lawyer in pending litigation.” Prof.Cond.R., Preamble 

[20]. Here, Musto has failed to establish that she was injured or aggrieved by 

Kilroy’s dual role. To the contrary, it appears that Kilroy’s interests were identical 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

18 

both as the county auditor’s representative on the BOR panel and as the assistant 

prosecutor representing the county auditor and the BOR panel (after Musto named 

them as appellees at the BTA). And there is no evidence that Kilroy in any way 

benefited from his dual role or that it was detrimental to Musto or anyone else. 

Under these circumstances, we do not find that the BTA abused its discretion by 

denying Musto’s disqualification motion.

{¶ 55} Likewise, even if Musto could prove a violation of the revolving-door 

statute, relief is not available on direct appeal from a BTA decision. “ ‘[R]eversal or 

vacation of an administrative decision is not the remedy for a violation of R.C. 

102.03; the remedy is to notify the Ethics Commission, who conducts an 

investigation. If the investigation reveals that there is probable cause to believe that 

a violation occurred, the Ethics Commission refers the matter to the County 

Prosecutor.’ ” Mather v. Springfield Twp., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-94-196, 1995 WL 

302307, *3 (May 19, 1995), quoting lower court’s decision and citing R.C. 102.06; 

see also State ex rel. Powers v. Curtis, 12th Dist. Clinton No. CA2002-10-039, 

2003-Ohio-6104, ¶ 25-26. 

{¶ 56} Last, Musto claims that “Kilroy’s unlawful representation of the 

Appellees demonstrates that the Appellant was denied her constitutional rights to due 

process as she failed to receive a fair and impartial hearing before the BOR and the 

BTA, which also resulted in an unlawful taking of her property.” But on the record 

before us, there is no basis for concluding that Musto was denied a fair and impartial 

hearing or that she suffered an unlawful taking.

{¶ 57} We therefore reject Musto’s second proposition of law.

CONCLUSION 

{¶ 58} For these reasons, we affirm the BTA’s decision. 

Judgment accordingly. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and FRENCH, JJ., concur. 

KENNEDY, J., concurs in judgment only. 
January Term, 2016 

19 

O’NEILL, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by PFEIFER, J. 

_________________ 

O’NEILL, J., dissenting.

{¶ 59} I must dissent. The Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”) acted totally 

unreasonably in denying the request to continue the hearing so that the appraiser 

who submitted the report introduced by appellant, Cynthia M. Musto, could testify 

either in person or by another method. This is an informal hearing, and in this day 

of advanced cell-phone technology, the government agency had a duty to 

accommodate the witness in a reasonable fashion. I would reverse the decision of 

the BTA on appellant’s first proposition of law. 

 PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 

_________________ 

Karen H. Bauernschmidt Co., L.P.A., Karen H. Bauernschmidt, Charles J. 

Bauernschmidt, Glen E. Littlejohn, and Stephen M. Nowak, for appellant. 

 Dennis P. Will, Lorain County Prosecuting Attorney, and John P. Kilroy 

and Gerald A. Innes, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellees Lorain County 

Board of Revision and Lorain County Auditor. 

_________________