The U.S. Army Campaigns of the Civil War

The

Civil W r Ends

1865
CMH Pub 75–17

Cover: The Grand Review, by Frank Wright

(Frank Wright)
by

Mark L. Bradley

Center of Military History

United States Army

Washington, D.C., 2015

The

Civil W r Ends

1865

5

Introduction

Although over one hundred fifty years have passed since the 

start of the American Civil War, that titanic conflict continues to 

matter. The forces unleashed by that war were immensely destructive because of the significant issues involved: the existence of the 

Union, the end of slavery, and the very future of the nation. The 

war remains our most contentious, and our bloodiest, with over 

six hundred thousand killed in the course of the four-year struggle. 

Most civil wars do not spring up overnight, and the American 

Civil War was no exception. The seeds of the conflict were sown 

in the earliest days of the republic’s founding, primarily over the 

existence of slavery and the slave trade. Although no conflict can 

begin without the conscious decisions of those engaged in the 

debates at that moment, in the end, there was simply no way to 

paper over the division of the country into two camps: one that 

was dominated by slavery and the other that sought first to limit 

its spread and then to abolish it. Our nation was indeed “half slave 

and half free,” and that could not stand. 

Regardless of the factors tearing the nation asunder, the 

soldiers on each side of the struggle went to war for personal 

reasons: looking for adventure, being caught up in the passions 

and emotions of their peers, believing in the Union, favoring 

states’ rights, or even justifying the simple schoolyard dynamic 

of being convinced that they were “worth” three of the soldiers 

on the other side. Nor can we overlook the factor that some went 

to war to prove their manhood. This has been, and continues 

to be, a key dynamic in understanding combat and the profession of arms. Soldiers join for many reasons but often stay in the 

fight because of their comrades and because they do not want to 

seem like cowards. Sometimes issues of national impact shrink 

to nothing in the intensely personal world of cannon shell and 

minié ball.

Whatever the reasons, the struggle was long and costly and 

only culminated with the conquest of the rebellious Confederacy, 
6

the preservation of the Union, and the end of slavery. These 

campaign pamphlets on the American Civil War, prepared in 

commemoration of our national sacrifices, seek to remember 

that war and honor those in the United States Army who died to 

preserve the Union and free the slaves as well as to tell the story of 

those American soldiers who fought for the Confederacy despite 

the inherently flawed nature of their cause. The Civil War was our 

greatest struggle and continues to deserve our deep study and 

contemplation.

 RICHARD W. STEWART, PH.D.

 Chief of Military History
The Civil War Ends

1865

The year 1864 ended triumphantly for the Union armies 

of the Western Theater. On 16 December, Maj. Gen. George H. 

Thomas’ Army of the Cumberland routed Confederate General 

John Bell Hood’s Army of Tennessee at Nashville, Tennessee. 

Five days later, Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman’s army group 

concluded the “March to the Sea” by capturing Savannah, Georgia. 

In contrast, the Union war effort in the east appeared less than 

impressive. On Christmas Day, a Federal joint expeditionary force 

failed to capture Fort Fisher, a massive earthen fort that guarded 

Wilmington, North Carolina, the Confederacy’s last open seaport. 

In Virginia, the armies led by Union General in Chief Lt. Gen. 

Ulysses S. Grant and his Confederate adversary, General Robert 

E. Lee, remained deadlocked around Richmond—the capital of 

the Confederacy—and Petersburg. Despite the apparent stalemate 

in the east, Grant and Sherman, the senior Union general in the 

West, were confident that their strategy to defeat the Confederacy 

was working. While Grant’s Army of the Potomac and Army of 

the James kept Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia pinned down in 

its fortifications, Sherman had torn a swath of devastation across 

Georgia from Atlanta to Savannah, and Thomas had crushed the 

Confederacy’s second-largest field army.

7
8 

The Union military strategy for ending the war in 1865 

remained much as it had been the previous year, with Grant 

seeking to annihilate Lee’s army and Sherman destroying the 

Confederacy’s ability to wage war. With Hood’s army virtually eliminated, Thomas’ forces would be available for combat 

operations in Alabama, Georgia, and North Carolina, including 

far-reaching cavalry raids designed to wreck Confederate war 

resources that had thus far managed to escape “the hard hand of 

war.” The intent of the raids was not only to deprive the Confederate 

Army of precious resources, but also to ensure that Southern guerrillas would be unable to mount an effective resistance following 

the collapse of the Confederacy. 

Many people mistakenly believe that the American Civil 

War ended when Lee’s army evacuated Richmond and Petersburg 

after a long siege and surrendered to Grant at Appomattox Court 

House, Virginia, on 9 April 1865. Although the capitulation of 

the South’s premier field army foreshadowed the Confederacy’s 

ultimate demise, important operations took place concurrent with 

the struggle between Grant and Lee—operations which continued 

into May 1865. This brochure examines some of these events. The 

first half deals with the most important operation aside from the 

Petersburg-Appomattox Campaign in driving the Confederacy to 

its knees, the conquest of the Carolinas by General Sherman. The 

rest of the brochure describes how Federal commanders across the 

South compelled the Confederacy’s remaining organized military 

forces to lay down their arms in the spring of 1865.

Strategic Setting

Having concluded his March to the Sea by presenting the city 

of Savannah to President Abraham Lincoln as a Christmas gift, 

Sherman considered his next step. He contemplated advancing 

northward through the Carolinas to Richmond, but General Grant 

had other plans for Sherman’s army. For the past eight months, 

the forces under Grant’s immediate command had failed to defeat 

Lee’s army. Believing that Sherman’s veteran soldiers would tip 

the balance in his favor, Grant directed that they board ships at 

Savannah and sail to Virginia as soon as possible.

Sherman objected to Grant’s plan, arguing that his army on 

the march would cut Lee’s supply lines to the Deep South and cause 
9

thousands of Confederate 

troops from that region to 

desert. He also noted that a long 

ocean voyage would damage 

the morale and conditioning 

of his men. In the end, Grant 

gave his approval only after 

he learned that the transfer of 

Sherman’s army by sea would 

take at least two months, 

about the time required to 

march that distance. Sherman 

received Grant’s revised orders 

on Christmas Eve and sent an 

immediate reply to the general 

in chief. “I feel no doubt 

whatever as to our future 

plans,” he assured Grant. “I 

have thought them over so 

long and well that they appear 

as clear as daylight.” 

As he had done on the March to the Sea, Sherman would 

divide his army group into two wings. Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard’s 

Army of the Tennessee was the Right Wing, while Maj. Gen. Henry 

W. Slocum’s Army of Georgia was the Left Wing. Sherman’s army 

group consisted of four infantry corps and one cavalry division: 

Maj. Gen. John A. Logan’s XV Corps and Maj. Gen. Frank P. Blair’s 

XVII Corps in Howard’s wing, Brig. Gen. Jefferson C. Davis’ XIV 

Corps and Brig. Gen. Alpheus S. Williams’ XX Corps in Slocum’s 

wing, and Brig. Gen. Judson Kilpatrick’s Third Cavalry Division.

At the start of the Carolinas campaign, Sherman’s army 

group numbered 60,079 officers and enlisted men. Most of the 

soldiers were veteran volunteers who had enlisted during the 

first two years of the war and then reenlisted after their two- and 

three-year terms had expired. These battle-toughened veterans 

were the survivors of what one soldier described as “a rigorous 

weeding-out process” effected by rebel bullets, hardship, and 

disease. Moreover, prior to both the Savannah and the Carolinas 

campaigns, Sherman ordered the Medical Department to 

examine all soldiers with health problems and ship out those 

deemed unfit for battle. As a result, the army group that Sherman 

General Sherman

(Library of Congress)
10 

led into South Carolina was a seasoned fighting force that in the 

closing months of the war had no equal.

Sherman based his campaign plan on the use of deception 

to keep the Confederates divided. He would begin the drive by 

feinting toward Augusta, Georgia, and its gunpowder works to the 

west, and toward Charleston, South Carolina—the so-called Cradle 

of Secession—to the east. This would compel the Confederates to 

split their forces to defend the two important towns. Sherman 

would then advance via Columbia, the capital of the Palmetto 

State, to Wilmington, North Carolina, or some other point on the 

coast. At that time, he would rest and resupply his army before 

resuming the march to Raleigh, the North Carolina state capital, 

in early spring. “The game is then up with Lee,” Sherman wrote, 

“unless he comes out of Richmond, avoids you and fights me, in 

which case I should reckon on your being on his heels.”

On 2 January 1865, Sherman instructed Howard and 

Slocum to advance their forces into South Carolina. In midJanuary, Howard’s wing established a lodgment at Pocotaligo, 

South Carolina, while Slocum’s wing and Kilpatrick’s cavalry 

began traversing the Savannah River at Sister’s Ferry, Georgia. 

Before Slocum could finish crossing, heavy winter rains carried 

off a portion of the Army of Georgia’s pontoon bridge and transformed the roads into quagmires. The flooding of the Savannah 

River compelled Sherman to postpone his campaign for almost 

a month.

While Sherman waited for the floodwater to subside, Fort 

Fisher fell to a second Federal expeditionary force on 15 January 

1865, thereby closing Wilmington, the Confederacy’s last major 

blockade-running port. Grant was doubly pleased with the result, 

knowing that Sherman had selected the city as a potential target. 

As the Union general in chief studied his map of North Carolina, 

he found an even more advantageous objective from Sherman’s 

standpoint: the town of Goldsboro. Located about 450 miles 

north of Savannah, it was the inland junction of two coastal railroads—the Atlantic and North Carolina and the Wilmington and 

Weldon—providing rail connections with both Wilmington and 

Morehead City. Goldsboro thus made an excellent location for 

Sherman to resupply his army group.

Grant therefore directed General Thomas at Nashville to transfer 

Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield’s XXIII Corps to North Carolina, where 

it would combine with Maj. Gen. Alfred H. Terry’s Provisional Corps, 
11

which had captured Fort Fisher. As commander of the newly reestablished Department of North Carolina, Schofield was to advance 

on Goldsboro—either from Wilmington, once it had fallen, or from 

Union-held New Bern—and secure the rail junction for Sherman. 

When he received Grant’s letter explaining these dispositions, 

Sherman designated Goldsboro as his ultimate destination.

Before starting the march north, Sherman stripped his army 

group down to fighting trim. He reduced the number of wagons to 

2,500 and the ambulances to 600, and while the ordnance trains 

carried an ample supply of ammunition, the commissary wagons 

hauled just seven days’ forage and twenty days’ provisions. As on 

the March to the Sea, the Federals would have to live off the land, 

relying on foragers, or “bummers,” to feed the army. Sherman also 

held the number of cannons to sixty-eight, or roughly one gun per 

thousand men.

Opposing the Federal invasion of South Carolina was a 

motley array of Confederate forces led by General Pierre G. T. 

Beauregard, the commander of the Military Division of the West. 

The Confederate commander claimed to have 33,450 troops, but he 

based this number on reinforcements he expected to receive as well 

as soldiers on hand. The actual number of officers and men present 

amounted to about half of Beauregard’s inflated estimate. Rather 

than risk his heavily outnumbered command by offering battle to 

Sherman at the start of the campaign, Beauregard chose to hold 

Charleston and Augusta “for as long as it was humanly possible” in 

order to negotiate from a position of strength. The “pending negotiations for peace” on which Beauregard based his strategy proved 

to be the Hampton Roads Conference. Held on 3 February 1865, 

the conference at Hampton Roads, Virginia, between President 

Lincoln and Confederate Vice President Alexander H. Stephens 

was amicable but failed to end the war. Beauregard’s decision to 

divide his forces thus played into Sherman’s hands, for it enabled 

the Federals to march virtually unopposed through the interior of 

the Palmetto State (Map 1). 

As Sherman’s army group entered South Carolina, the scattered Confederates attempted to unite and give battle. Following its 

crushing defeat in the Battle of Nashville, the Army of Tennessee 

had fled into eastern Mississippi and made winter camp at Tupelo. 

“If not in the strict sense of the word, a disorganized mob, it was no 

longer an army,” reported inspection officer Col. Alfred Roman. In 

January 1865, Confederate President Jefferson Davis had ordered 
H O WA R D

S L O C U M

X X I I I

10 Mar

17 Feb

11 Mar

13 Apr

26 Apr

23 Mar

MONROE’S

CROSSROADS 10 Mar

AVERASBORO

16 Mar

BENTONVILLE 19–21 Mar

WILMINGTON 22 Feb

FORT FISHER 15 Jan

WISE’S FORKS 8–10 Mar

Savannah R

Cape Fear R

A T L ANTI C

OCEAN

Sister’s Ferry

Durham’s Station

Bennett Place

Pocotaligo

Fort Sumter

North Carolina RR

Wilmington and Manchester RR

Wilmington and Weldon RR

Atlantic and Nor th Carolina RR

Salisbury

Charlotte

Chester Cheraw

Lincolnton

Florence

Manchester

Brunswick

Beaufort

Greensboro

Danville

Goldsboro

Clinton

Weldon

Smitheld

Hillsborough

Kinston

Morehead

City

Fayetteville

Charleston

Augusta

Savannah

New Bern

RALEIGH

COLUMBIA

GEORGI A

NORT H

CAROLIN A

SOUTH

CAROLIN A

VIRGINI A

Union Axis of Advance

Cavalry Axis of Advance

Battle

2 January–26 April 1865

CAROLINAS CAMPAIGN

0 25 100

Miles

Map 1
13

Beauregard to send most of the remnant to South Carolina to 

oppose Sherman’s army group. The Confederate soldiers covered 

the 500 miles from Tupelo to Augusta on foot, by boat, and by 

train. Discipline was uncertain at best. Beauregard’s quartermaster, Capt. John M. Goodman, called the Army of Tennessee “a 

complete mob. I have never witnessed so much demoralization in 

my life. I have feared for my life in contending with our own troops 

and in the attempt to keep them in some kind of discipline.”

Operations

Sherman opened the Carolinas campaign on 1 February under 

less than ideal circumstances. Indeed, Beauregard had assumed 

that heavy winter rains, combined with swampy terrain, would 

force Sherman to abort the drive. General Joseph E. Johnston, who 

lived in Columbia at the time, later related how Lt. Gen. William 

J. Hardee, the Confederate commander at Charleston, had assured 

him that Sherman’s army group could never pass through the 

swamps bordering the Salkehatchie River in the southern part 

of the state. But Hardee was mistaken. “When I learned that 

Sherman’s army was marching through the Salkehatchie swamps, 

making its own corduroy road at the rate of a dozen miles a day 

or more, and bringing its artillery and wagons with it,” Johnston 

admitted, “I made up my mind that there had been no such army 

in existence since the days of Julius Caesar.”

Sherman’s modern-day legions captured Columbia on 17 

February after encountering only token opposition from a small 

Confederate force. By the next morning, much of the South 

Carolina capital lay in ashes as a result of a conflagration caused 

by burning cotton—initially set afire by Southern cavalry—spread 

by high winds and drunken Federal soldiers. In the meantime, 

Hardee’s command evacuated Charleston under orders from 

Beauregard, who realized that the fall of Columbia had rendered 

the port city untenable.

On 19 February, Sherman resumed his northward advance, 

and Beauregard once again misjudged his adversary’s intentions. 

Believing that Sherman was en route to Petersburg, Virginia, via 

Charlotte and Greensboro, North Carolina, Beauregard ordered 

Hardee to board his troops on trains at Wilmington and to send 

them to Greensboro. There was just one problem: Schofield’s 
14 

much larger Union force was about to capture Wilmington. On 

21 February, General Braxton Bragg, the commander of the 

Confederate Department of North Carolina, warned Hardee 

that the Federals had cut the Wilmington and Manchester 

Railroad, requiring a change of route to Cheraw, South Carolina. 

Wilmington fell to Schofield on the following day, while Sherman’s 

army group abruptly shifted its advance in a more easterly direction and threatened to beat Hardee to Cheraw.

By now the Confederacy’s newly appointed general in chief, 

General Lee, had concluded that Beauregard could not stop 

Sherman. A subsequent message from Beauregard outlining a 

grandiose scheme in which the Confederate army would defeat 

Sherman and Grant separately and then “march on Washington 

to dictate a peace,” convinced both Lee and Confederate President 

Davis that Beauregard could not come to grips with military reality.

Lee wished to replace 

Beauregard with General 

Johnston, but Davis had 

dismissed Johnston from 

command of the Army of 

Tennessee the previous July and 

had since kept him in virtual 

retirement. Nevertheless, Lee 

obtained Secretary of War 

John C. Breckinridge’s permission—and by implication 

Davis’ grudging consent—to 

restore Johnston to duty. 

On 22 February, Lee wired 

Johnston: “Assume command 

of the Army of Tennessee and 

all troops in the Department 

of South Carolina, Georgia, 

and Florida. Assign General 

Beauregard to duty under you, 

as you may select. Concentrate 

all available forces and drive 

back Sherman.” 

Like many other refugees from Columbia, Johnston had 

fled to Lincolnton, North Carolina, in late February, hoping that 

Sherman would bypass that backwater of the Confederacy. But 

General Johnston

(National Archives)
15

Lee’s order thrust Johnston back into the thick of it. “It is too late to 

expect me to concentrate troops capable of driving back Sherman,” 

Johnston replied. “The remnant of the Army of Tennessee is much 

divided. So are other troops.” He assumed command believing that 

the most the Confederacy could achieve by prolonging the war 

was “fair terms of peace.”

On 23 February, Johnston traveled to Charlotte to begin 

concentrating his scattered forces. After meeting with Beauregard 

and appointing him second-in-command, Johnston assessed the 

remnants of his old Army of Tennessee. As the commanding 

general passed each brigade on review, “three cheers were given 

in a joyful tone and manner expressive of great satisfaction,” wrote 

an Alabama soldier. “The old general looks as usual hearty and 

soldier like. He is the most soldierly looking general I have ever 

seen. He is as well loved in this army among the men, as an officer 

can be. They have every confidence in him, and that alone will 

benefit the army and the service.”

Though Johnston was grateful for the enthusiastic welcome 

from the Army of Tennessee veterans, the reviews merely 

confirmed what he had suspected about his army’s condition. On 

25 February, Johnston informed Lee that his small army was “too 

weak to cope with Sherman.” Altogether, the Army of Tennessee 

contingent, Hardee’s command, and the Confederate cavalry led 

by Lt. Gen. Wade Hampton totaled fewer than 25,000 troops. In 

the words of Hampton, “it would scarcely have been possible to 

disperse a force more effectually.”

While the Army of Tennessee concentrated at Charlotte, 

Hardee’s corps evacuated Charleston and then raced Sherman’s 

army group to Cheraw. According to Hardee’s chief of staff, Lt. Col. 

Thomas B. Roy, a “great many desertions” occurred on the march 

from Charleston, with some units being “almost disbanded by 

desertion.” A South Carolinian in Hardee’s command believed that 

“the most influential cause of desertion was the news that reached 

the men of the great suffering of their wives and children, caused 

by the devastations of Sherman’s army.” On 22 February, Hardee 

consolidated his three divisions into two, having lost one-fourth 

of his troops since the fall of Charleston. The attrition resulted 

from straggling and desertion as well as South Carolina Governor 

Andrew Magrath’s recall of several state militia units.

At first Hardee doubted that all of his command could reach 

Cheraw ahead of Sherman. “This [rail]road, like all others in the 
16 

Confederacy, is wretchedly managed,” Hardee complained on 28 

February. “With proper management I ought to have had everything here by this time. . . . A rapid march of the enemy will bring 

him here tomorrow.” Hardee’s luck soon improved, however, as 

the rest of his troops began arriving that afternoon, and torrential winter rains had finally stalled Sherman’s army group. With 

the Federals occupied for almost a week in crossing the flooded 

Catawba River and Lynch’s Creek, Hardee’s corps succeeded in 

reaching Cheraw before the Union Right Wing.

While Sherman chafed at the delay, he learned that Johnston 

was back in command. Sherman later admitted, “I then knew that 

my special antagonist, General Jos. Johnston, was back with part 

of his old army; that he would not be misled by feints and false 

reports, and would somehow compel me to exercise more caution 

than I had hitherto done.” Sherman was right; Johnston would not 

be as easily deceived as Beauregard had been.

 On 3 March, Hardee’s corps evacuated Cheraw just ahead of 

Howard’s wing and marched toward Fayetteville, North Carolina. 

When it became apparent that Sherman would enter the Old North 

State, Lee assigned Bragg’s Confederate Department of North 

Carolina troops to Johnston’s command. Bragg’s force consisted 

mainly of Maj. Gen. Robert F. Hoke’s division—a veteran unit 

from the Army of Northern Virginia—and the North Carolina 

Junior Reserves brigade, whose ranks were filled with teenage 

boys. Johnston, meanwhile, traveled from Charlotte to Fayetteville 

to be nearer Sherman’s line of march. Encouraged by the Federals’ 

difficult South Carolina river crossings, he planned to unite the 

Army of Tennessee contingent with Hardee’s corps in time to 

attack a part of Sherman’s army group as it traversed the Cape Fear 

River at Fayetteville. But Bragg, whose small force had retreated 

to Kinston, North Carolina, about eighty miles to the east, saw a 

better opportunity on his front and asked Johnston to send the 

Army of Tennessee troops to him.

The Battle of Wise’s Forks

In early March, Schofield sent the Union XXIII Corps under 

Maj. Gen. Jacob D. Cox, about 12,000-strong, inland from New 

Bern to secure Goldsboro for Sherman. But Bragg intended 

to defeat Cox and prevent the junction of the XXIII Corps and 

Sherman’s army group. Abandoning his plan of attacking Sherman 

at Fayetteville, Johnston granted Bragg’s request but directed him to 
17

send the Army of Tennessee troops to Smithfield, North Carolina, 

as soon as possible for use against Sherman. The troop transfer 

led to an uneasy alliance between Bragg and Maj. Gen. Daniel H. 

Hill, the commander of the Army of Tennessee contingent. The 

two men had been bitter enemies since Bragg had dismissed Hill 

eighteen months earlier. Johnston closed his message ordering Hill 

to join Bragg with a plea “to forget the past for this emergency.” 

Hill swallowed his pride and reported to Bragg as ordered. The 

addition of the Army of Tennessee contingent gave Bragg a total of 

about 8,500 troops.

On 8 March, Cox’s Federals collided with Bragg’s Confederates 

at Wise’s Forks, about four miles east of Kinston. At the start of 

the battle, the Southerners routed a portion of the Union force, 

capturing 1 cannon and 800 men. The remainder of Cox’s troops 

dug in that night, and the two sides skirmished the following day. 

On 10 March, the Confederates renewed the offensive, but the wellentrenched Federals inflicted heavy casualties on the Southern 

attackers. Learning that Cox had been reinforced, Bragg withdrew 

to Kinston that night. Once again, the hapless Bragg had seen an 

apparent victory end in retreat. In the Battle of Wise’s Forks, the 

Confederates sustained about 1,500 casualties compared to the 

Federals’ 1,100.

While Bragg fell back toward Goldsboro, Johnston resumed 

his efforts to field an army against Sherman by means of the North 

Carolina Railroad, which formed a 220-mile arc from Charlotte in 

the western part of the state to Goldsboro in the east. Unfortunately 

for the Confederates, a 120-car backlog of troops, artillery, and 

supplies had accumulated at Salisbury, North Carolina, while 

another 65 carloads waited at Chester, South Carolina. The 

bottlenecks had formed because the width of the track narrowed 

at Salisbury, and most of the narrow-gauge rolling stock sent to 

Bragg at Kinston had not yet returned from the front. Although 

Bragg’s monopolization of the railroad had caused the backlog, 

Johnston’s failure to intervene only exacerbated the problem. At 

stake was the Confederate chieftain’s ability to strike Sherman with 

every available soldier. When the moment of truth arrived, many 

of Johnston’s men would still be stranded at Salisbury.

With the Federals advancing in superior force on two fronts, 

the concentration of his own army impeded by delays on the 

railroad, and that army dependent on a sparsely settled region for 

subsistence, prospects appeared bleak for Johnston. “I will not give 
18 

battle with Sherman’s united army,” he informed Lee on 11 March, 

“but will if I can find it divided.” Johnston, meanwhile, attempted 

to gather his own scattered army in the desperate hope that he 

could defeat either Sherman or Schofield before the two Union 

forces could combine.

The Battle of Monroe’s Crossroads

As Sherman’s army group swept into North Carolina 

during the first week of March, Kilpatrick’s cavalry division 

led the way, clashing repeatedly with Hampton’s Confederate 

cavalry, which served as the rear guard for Hardee’s corps 

during the march to Fayetteville. On 7 March, Hampton discovered that Kilpatrick had slipped around his flank and gotten 

between him and Hardee. “As soon as my command can be 

concentrated,” Hampton informed Hardee, “I shall move round 

the left flank of the enemy to his front.” This maneuver proved 

more difficult to execute than Hampton had anticipated, and 

Kilpatrick continued to obstruct his progress. But the Union 

cavalry commander remained unaware of his advantage until 

the afternoon of 9 March, when some captured Confederates 

revealed that a large force of Yankee cavalry had driven a wedge 

between Hampton and Hardee. Despite a recent order from 

Sherman to avoid battle for the present, Kilpatrick decided 

to block the roads to Fayetteville in an attempt to prevent 

Hampton from rejoining Hardee. In doing so, Kilpatrick recklessly divided his command, which contained about the same 

number of horsemen as Hampton’s cavalry. Kilpatrick was 

inviting Hampton to defeat him in detail, and the latter eagerly 

accepted his invitation.

On the evening of 9 March, Kilpatrick and two of his four 

brigades—numbering about 1,500 troopers—made camp at 

Monroe’s Crossroads. A torrential downpour and the presence of 

Confederate cavalry prevented his remaining two brigades from 

taking up their assigned positions, leaving the Union cavalry 

commander’s bivouac isolated and vulnerable to attack—which 

was precisely what Hampton had in mind. During the cold, rainy 

night, Confederate troopers deployed for an assault on Kilpatrick’s 

camp. Hopes ran high among the Southerners that they would deal 

the Federals a stunning blow at Monroe’s Crossroads and perhaps 

bag “Little Kil” in the process. Hampton’s force consisted of Maj. 

Gen. Joseph Wheeler’s cavalry corps and Maj. Gen. Matthew C. 
19

Butler’s cavalry division from the Army of Northern Virginia, 

roughly 4,000 horse soldiers in all.

As dawn broke on the morning of 10 March, Butler’s cavalry 

burst out of the woods from the north and Wheeler’s horsemen 

from the west. Shrieking the rebel yell, they overran the lightly 

guarded Federal camp. Kilpatrick witnessed the onslaught from the 

porch of the Monroe house, which served as his headquarters. His 

first thought was, “My God, here’s a Major General’s commission 

after four years’ hard fighting gone up with an infernal surprise.” 

Wearing only his shirt, pants, and slippers, Kilpatrick fled into a 

nearby swamp along with a large number of his men, but many of 

them had the presence of mind to carry their weapons with them. 

This enabled the Union troopers to launch a counterattack when 

the initial Confederate charge lost momentum.

After a furious close-quarters struggle that lasted for over an 

hour, the Federals drove off the Confederates and regained their 

camp. But the Southerners had opened the road to Fayetteville 

and freed all of their captured comrades. The Battle of Monroe’s 

Crossroads was a moral victory for the Confederates, who had 

demonstrated that they still posed a substantial threat to the 

Federals. It was also something of an embarrassment for Sherman’s 

cavalry commander—after all, waggish Union infantrymen 

dubbed the rebel surprise attack “Kilpatrick’s Shirttail Skedaddle.”

Casualty figures for Monroe’s Crossroads are sketchy at best. 

Although Kilpatrick reported a total of 190 killed, wounded, and 

missing, one of his two brigade commanders reported roughly the 

same losses for his unit alone. The Confederate casualty figures 

are likewise incomplete, amounting to fewer than 90, while 

Kilpatrick reported that his men buried about 80 Southern dead 

and captured 30 prisoners. Regardless of the Confederates’ total 

casualties, the battle cost Hampton’s cavalry dearly, resulting in 

the loss of one regimental commander killed and six division and 

brigade commanders with wounds of varying severity.

The Battle of Averasboro

Sherman’s army group entered Fayetteville on 11 March 

and remained there for four days. While most of the men rested, 

the 1st Michigan Engineers and Mechanics demolished the 

Confederate arsenal there on orders from the commanding 

general. Sherman, meanwhile, plotted the final leg of his 450-mile 

march to Goldsboro. As usual, the plan included a feint—this time 
20 

due north toward Raleigh with Kilpatrick’s cavalry and four divisions of Slocum’s wing in light marching order. The remaining 

two divisions would escort all nonessential wagons in the rear 

of Howard’s wing. Slocum would advance up the Plank Road to 

within four miles of Averasboro, North Carolina, and then head 

east on the Goldsboro Road via Bentonville, North Carolina. In 

the meantime, Kilpatrick’s cavalry and one infantry division would 

continue feinting on Raleigh before veering off toward Goldsboro. 

Of Slocum’s march toward Bentonville, Sherman wrote, “I do 

think it is Johnston’s only chance to meet this army before an easy 

junction with Schofield can be effected.”

While Sherman’s army group rested at Fayetteville, Hardee’s 

corps halted at Smithville, North Carolina (not to be confused 

with Smithfield), about five miles south of Averasboro. Since evacuating Charleston in mid-February, Hardee had lost one-half of 

his 13,000 troops to straggling, desertion, and Governor Magrath’s 

militia recalls. The general decided that he had better fight or 

perhaps face the final disintegration of his demoralized command. 

He also hoped to buy time for the concentration of Johnston’s 

army. Hardee deployed his corps in three lines, placing the relatively inexperienced soldiers of Brig. Gen. William B. Taliaferro’s 

division on the first two lines and entrusting the third and main 

line to the more seasoned troops of Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws’ 

division.

Sherman’s army group resumed the advance on 15 March, 

with Kilpatrick’s cavalry preceding Slocum’s wing up the Plank 

Road. About midafternoon, Kilpatrick’s lead regiment collided 

with Confederates from Hardee’s command, and the two sides 

skirmished for several hours. While working their way through 

no-man’s-land, three Union cavalry scouts captured one of 

Taliaferro’s brigade commanders, Col. Alfred M. Rhett, who was 

riding between the lines with just one staff officer. Before being 

turned over to the provost marshal, Rhett spent the evening with 

some old acquaintances—namely Generals Sherman, Slocum, and 

Davis, who had been stationed at Charleston, Rhett’s hometown, 

before the war. At nightfall, the fighting ceased, and the two sides 

frantically dug fieldworks in preparation for a battle the next day. 

“Hardee is ahead of me and shows fight,” Sherman wrote early on 

16 March. “I will go at him in the morning with four divisions 

and push him as far as Averasborough before turning toward 

Bentonville and [Goldsboro].”
21

The Battle of Averasboro began at dawn on 16 March, amid a 

steady rain that fell for most of the day. Throughout the morning, 

Kilpatrick’s cavalry and the Federal XX Corps probed Hardee’s 

first line for weaknesses. About noon, Sherman directed Slocum to 

send a brigade around the Confederate right flank. Slocum chose 

Col. Henry Case’s XX Corps brigade, whose surprise flank attack 

routed the Confederates of Rhett’s brigade manning the first line. 

“I was never so pleased in my life as I was to see the rebs get up and 

try to get out of the way,” wrote an Illinois soldier who participated 

in the assault. Soon afterward, the Federals drove back the second 

line held by Brig. Gen. Stephen Elliott’s brigade. As Brig. Gen. 

James D. Morgan’s division of the Union XIV Corps attacked on 

the left in an effort to outflank Hardee’s third line, two small divisions of Wheeler’s Confederate cavalry arrived just in time to plug 

the gap. With Hardee’s line now extending from the Cape Fear 

River on his right to the swamps bordering the Black River on the 

left, Sherman decided to postpone making a general assault until 

the next morning. At nightfall, however, Hardee began to evacuate 

his position. When Federal skirmishers advanced at dawn on 17 

March, they discovered that the Confederates had withdrawn.

Hardee’s delaying action at Averasboro had succeeded in 

checking Sherman’s movement for one day, buying Johnston 

invaluable time to concentrate his forces. In doing so, Hardee also 

had given his green troops their first taste of field combat and 

boosted their sagging morale. For his part, Sherman had driven 

Hardee toward Smithfield, thereby opening the road to Goldsboro. 

The Confederates suffered 500 casualties, most of them coming 

from Rhett’s brigade, while the Federal losses amounted to 682. 

Of that number, 533 were wounded and had to be transported 

with the column, hence Sherman’s decision to press Hardee on 16 

March rather than risk a full-scale assault because he knew that 

each additional wounded man would further slow his progress.

Setting a Trap for Sherman

On the eve of the Battle of Averasboro, Johnston had traveled 

to Smithfield, where his army was converging. He chose that town 

as his point of concentration because it stood midway between 

Raleigh and Goldsboro, Sherman’s two most likely objectives. 

Arriving at Smithfield were Hoke’s division under Bragg and 

the remnant of the Army of Tennessee, which the Confederate 

commander placed under Lt. Gen. Alexander P. Stewart. Johnston 
22 

formed the Army of the South from the four distinct forces under 

his command: Hardee’s corps, Hoke’s division (which now included 

the Junior Reserves brigade), the Army of Tennessee contingent, 

and Hampton’s cavalry. By mid-March, Johnston could field about 

20,000 troops against Sherman’s 60,000-man army group.

After the Battle of Averasboro, Hardee marched toward 

Smithfield to join Johnston’s army. He told the Confederate chieftain that he believed Sherman was heading to Goldsboro. On the 

evening of 17 March, Johnston notified Hardee that it was time 

to act. “Something must be done to-morrow morning,” Johnston 

wrote, “and yet I have no satisfactory information as to the enemy’s 

movements. Can you give me any certain information of the force 

you engaged yesterday?” Hardee’s reply is lost, but it probably 

indicated that Hampton was better informed as to the Federals’ 

current status. Johnston ordered Bragg and Stewart to prepare to 

march at dawn. He then sent a message to Hampton instructing 

him to send all the information he had regarding the position and 

strength of the Federal columns, their distance from Goldsboro, 

and whether Hampton thought it possible to intercept one of the 

columns before it could reach its destination.

Hampton replied that the two Federal wings were indeed 

advancing toward Goldsboro and were widely separated. He noted 

that the nearest Union column—Slocum’s wing—marching up 

the road from Averasboro was more than a day’s march from his 

headquarters at the Willis Cole plantation south of Bentonville. 

The cavalry commander suggested that the plantation would 

make an excellent site for a surprise attack and assured Johnston 

that he could delay the Federal drive long enough to enable the 

Confederate army to arrive from Smithfield.

Johnston received Hampton’s reply at dawn on 18 March. 

A glance at the map indicated that the two Federal wings were a 

dozen miles apart and separated by a day’s march. He therefore 

decided to attack Slocum’s wing as it moved up the Goldsboro 

Road. “We will go to the place at which your dispatch was written,” 

Johnston informed Hampton. “The scheme mentioned in my 

note, which you pronounce practicable, will be attempted.” But 

the Confederates were unaware that the maps were wildly inaccurate, leading Johnston to underestimate Hardee’s distance 

from Bentonville while exaggerating the distance separating the 

Union columns. Although Bragg and Stewart reached Bentonville 
23

at nightfall, Hardee’s corps was still six miles north of the village 

when it halted at 2100.

The Federals, meanwhile, advanced to within five miles of the 

Cole plantation on the afternoon of 18 March. Sherman remained 

cautious as his army group approached Bentonville, the two Union 

wings only a few miles apart. “I think it probable that Joe Johnston 

will try to prevent our getting Goldsboro,” he wrote Howard about 

1400. A few hours later, Sherman received two messages that caused 

him to drop his guard. First, Kilpatrick informed him that Hardee 

was retreating toward Smithfield and Johnston was gathering his 

army a few miles south of Raleigh. (Apparently, the Union cavalry 

commander had already forgotten the Confederates’ audacity at 

Monroe’s Crossroads.) Second, XIV Corps skirmishers reported 

that the rebels had burned the bridge across Mill Creek on the 

Smithfield-Clinton Road. According to Sherman’s faulty map, the 

Confederates had just cut their only approach route to Bentonville, 

indicating a retreat toward Raleigh. Unknown to the Federals, 

Sherman’s map omitted the Smithfield-Bentonville Road—or the 

“Devil’s Race Path”—that Bragg and Stewart were using. Sherman 

now believed that Johnston had conceded Goldsboro to him. 

Although several Union foraging details returned to camp that 

night reporting stiff resistance from Confederate cavalry, Union 

senior leaders ignored their warnings. On the evening of 18 

March, the Federals’ weak point was not the distance separating 

their columns but their growing overconfidence.

While Sherman camped several miles to the southwest, 

Johnston conferred with Hampton at his headquarters in 

Bentonville. Having arrived too late to reconnoiter the proposed 

battlefield, Johnston relied on Hampton to devise a plan of attack 

based on his own study of the ground. The plan exploited the densely 

wooded terrain surrounding the Cole house, where Hampton 

recommended launching the assault. The Confederate cavalry 

commander suggested that Johnston deploy Hoke’s division across 

the Goldsboro Road to block the Federals’ advance and conceal 

Hardee’s corps and Stewart’s Army of Tennessee contingent in the 

thick woods north of the road. At a designated time, Hardee and 

Stewart would burst out of the woods and rout the Union column 

before it could deploy into line of battle. Although he regretted 

that Hardee’s corps stood farther than the Federal advance from 

the battlefield, Johnston approved Hampton’s plan and directed the 
24 

deployment to begin at dawn, bearing in mind that this might be 

his final opportunity to strike Sherman with any hope of success.

The Battle of Bentonville

Sunrise on Sunday, 19 March, revealed a beautiful spring day. 

The awakening Union soldiers enjoyed the mild early morning air 

and the sight of budding apple and peach trees. Their thoughts 

were far removed from battle and focused instead on reaching 

Goldsboro, where new shoes, clean clothes, and mail from home 

awaited them. “We feel in excellent spirits,” Lt. John M. Branum 

of Morgan’s XIV Corps division jotted in his diary. “Everything 

promises for a smooth entry into Goldsboro.” This entry was 

Branum’s last, for within a few hours, he would be killed in action.

Believing that the danger of a Confederate attack had passed, 

Sherman prepared to rejoin Howard’s wing at dawn on 19 March 

in order to communicate with Schofield. Before his departure, 

Sherman conferred with Slocum and other Union generals at the 

crossroads leading to Howard’s column. During the conversation, 

General Davis said that he thought his XIV Corps would have to 

face more than the usual cavalry opposition. “No, Jeff,” Sherman 

replied. “There is nothing there but [Col. George G.] Dibrell’s 

cavalry. Brush them out of the way. . . . I’ll meet you tomorrow 

morning at Cox’s Bridge.” With that, Sherman led his staff and 

escort down the road toward Howard’s column, unaware that 

Slocum’s wing would not reach Cox’s Bridge for another four days.

At first the Federal advance, consisting of Brig. Gen. William 

P. Carlin’s XIV Corps division, easily drove back Dibrell’s small 

cavalry division. But the Southerners’ resistance stiffened at the 

Cole plantation, where Carlin collided with a force far larger than 

Dibrell’s cavalry. Carlin deployed all three of his brigades and still 

met with fierce opposition. Ignoring Carlin’s plight, Slocum sent 

word to Sherman that he was merely skirmishing with stubborn 

rebel cavalry and needed no assistance from Howard. Growing 

impatient, Slocum then ordered Carlin to launch an attack to 

develop the enemy’s position and strength. About noon, Carlin 

assaulted the Confederate line at several points, only to meet with 

a bloody repulse.

Undaunted, Slocum brought up Morgan’s XIV Corps division 

on Carlin’s right and was preparing to deploy the XX Corps on 

the same line in a more determined effort to outflank Johnston’s 

position. But a Union prisoner of war who had made his escape 
25

during Carlin’s attack brought Slocum some startling intelligence: 

Johnston’s entire army was on the field, and Joe Johnston himself 

had ridden among his troops, telling them that they would crush 

one wing of Sherman’s army at Bentonville and then attack the other 

wing and destroy it as well. If Slocum required additional evidence 

of his predicament, he received it from a XIV Corps staff officer 

who reported, “Well, General, I have found something more than 

Dibrell’s cavalry—I find [Confederate] infantry intrenched along 

our whole front, and enough of them to give us all the amusement 

we shall want for the rest of the day.”

Slocum received the staff officer’s report about 1330 and 

immediately shifted to the defensive. The left wing commander 

kept his two XIV Corps divisions at the front to absorb the shock 

of the expected Confederate onslaught while deploying his two XX 

Corps divisions on more defensible ground at the Reddick Morris 

farm a mile to the rear. Slocum also sent Sherman a far more 

accurate assessment of the situation. As the afternoon wore on, 

Slocum’s messages to the commanding general became increasingly urgent and were invariably accompanied by appeals for reinforcements from Howard’s wing.

For Johnston, the afternoon of 19 March was filled with aggravating delays. With only one approach route from Bentonville to 

the battlefield, the Confederates’ deployment “consumed a weary 

time.” When Carlin launched his noontime strike, only Hoke’s 

division and Stewart’s Army of Tennessee contingent were in 

position, while Hardee’s corps was just arriving on the field. Worse 

yet for the Confederates, Carlin’s probing attack delayed Johnston’s 

own assault and led Bragg, the commander of Hoke’s division, to 

call for reinforcements. In response, Johnston sent him McLaws’ 

division of Hardee’s corps. This proved to be the Confederate 

chieftain’s worst blunder of the day. By the time McLaws reached 

Bragg’s position, Hoke’s division had already repulsed the Federal 

attack. Bragg then held the 4,000-man division for much of the 

afternoon, depriving Johnston of one-fourth of his infantry when 

he needed it most.

Johnston finally launched his assault at 1445. Hardee led 

the right wing of Johnston’s army, consisting of the Army of 

Tennessee contingent and Taliaferro’s division of Hardee’s corps. 

An onlooker thought that the Confederate advance “looked like 

a picture and was truly beautiful.” He also found it “painful to see 

how close their battle flags were together, regiments being scarcely 
26

larger than companies.” Despite its depleted ranks, Hardee’s wing 

overran Carlin’s position north of the Goldsboro Road. “[We] 

stood as long as man can stand,” wrote a Michigan soldier in 

Carlin’s division, “& when that was no longer a possibility [we] run 

like the duce.” During the rout, Hardee’s men captured two Union 

cannons and drove off Carlin’s troops south of the road. Thus far, 

the Confederate assault was an unqualified success (Map 2). 

The Confederates’ accomplishment might have been greater 

still had Bragg’s wing, consisting of Hoke’s and McLaws’ divisions, 

attacked when ordered. Instead, Bragg waited until 1600, more 

than an hour after the time Johnston had designated. Bragg may 

have delayed his assault pending the outcome of Hardee’s charge, 

but such a course is indefensible, since it would have been in 

defiance of Johnston’s orders. In any event, Bragg gave the Federals 

of Morgan’s division a precious extra hour to strengthen their field 

fortifications.

Morgan’s stand south of the Goldsboro Road proved to be 

the turning point of the 19 March battle at Bentonville. Attacked 

in quick succession by Hoke’s division along their front and left 

flank and by several brigades of the Army of Tennessee from 

their rear, Morgan’s Federals stubbornly clung to their swampy 

salient. In the course of the struggle, the soldiers in blue fought on 

both sides of their log works. Aided by the timely arrival of Col. 

William Cogswell’s XX Corps brigade, Morgan’s troops repulsed 

the Confederates and turned the tide in the Federals’ favor.

The Southerners’ final assaults of the day were launched 

against the XX Corps’ position on the Morris farm. Spearheaded 

by troops from Taliaferro’s division and Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. 

Cheatham’s corps of the Army of Tennessee, the attacks constituted the Confederate army’s high-water mark at Bentonville. 

Advancing several times to within point-blank range of the Union 

line, the Southerners braved a blistering small-arms and artillery 

fire before Johnston called off the offensive and ordered his army 

to return to its jump-off point. After some anxious moments, the 

Union line at Bentonville had held, and the 19 March fight ended 

in a draw.

Sherman, meanwhile, received Slocum’s appeals for reinforcements and ordered Howard’s column to march to the Left Wing’s 

support. Early on the morning of 20 March, the Union Right Wing 

headed west on the Goldsboro Road toward the Confederate rear. 

While using his cavalry to delay the Federals’ advance, Johnston 
M c L AW S

H O K E

S T E W A R T

TALIAFERRO

H A R D E E

B

R

A G G

WILLIAMS ( XX ) D AV I S

(XIV )

M O R G AN

C A R L I N

G O L D S B O R O R OA D

Cole

Morris

Harper

Bentonville

0 1

Mile

Confederate Position

Confederate Attack

Confederate Movement

Confederate Entrenchments

Union Position

Union Movement

19 March 1865

B AT TLE OF BENT ONVILLE

AFTERNOON

Map 2
28 

swung back Hoke’s and McLaws’ divisions on a new left flank that 

slanted northeast toward Bentonville. Howard’s vanguard reached 

the vicinity of Bentonville around noon. Johnston now faced a 

Union force three times the size of his own army. The Confederates 

occupied a tenuous, four-mile-long bastion that defended their 

sole line of retreat across a flooded Mill Creek at Bentonville.

Sherman was surprised that Johnston—contrary to his usual 

cautious nature—held his ground. “I cannot see why he remains,” 

Sherman wrote Slocum, “and still think he will avail himself of 

night to get back to Smithfield. I would rather avoid a general battle 

if possible, but if he insists on it, we must accommodate him.” Why 

did Johnston stay at Bentonville? Having failed to defeat one wing 

of Sherman’s army group, did he expect to fare better against both 

wings? Johnston provided two reasons for remaining. First, he 

intended to evacuate his wounded before retreating, and second, he 

hoped that Sherman might attempt a costly frontal assault against 

his well-entrenched line. Perhaps Johnston had a third reason—

his army’s morale. By standing toe to toe with Sherman’s larger 

army while evacuating his wounded, Johnston would achieve a 

moral victory, whereas if he abandoned the field on the night of 

19–20 March, he would admit defeat. Johnston doubtless believed 

that his army’s morale was worth the risk of staying at Bentonville.

The Confederate commander’s decision to remain nearly 

proved to be his undoing. On the morning of 21 March, the First 

Division of the XVII Corps deployed on the extreme right of the 

Union line. Commanding the division was Sherman’s most aggressive general, Maj. Gen. Joseph A. “Fighting Joe” Mower. Although 

under orders to avoid a general engagement, Fighting Joe intended 

to assail the Confederates, perhaps hoping to draw Sherman into 

the pitched battle he did not want. Facing Mower’s division was 

Hampton’s cavalry, spread out in a futile attempt to cover the 

Confederates’ vulnerable left flank.

Mower began his assault about noon in a driving rain. His 

two attacking brigades struggled through the briar-infested 

swamp that separated them from Hampton’s position and then 

drove back the heavily outnumbered Confederates. Hampton, 

meanwhile, reported the breakthrough to Johnston, who assigned 

Hardee the task of repulsing the assault. At stake was Johnston’s 

only avenue of retreat across Mill Creek, which could not be 

forded in its flooded state. Fortunately for the Confederates, 

Mower halted his main line even as his skirmishers overran 
29

Johnston’s headquarters at Bentonville, enabling Hardee to counterattack with a hastily assembled force. One of the regiments 

was the 8th Texas Cavalry—or “Terry’s Texas Rangers”—whose 

newest recruit was General Hardee’s only son, sixteen-year-old 

Pvt. Willie Hardee. The youth was mortally wounded while 

charging in the Rangers’ front rank. The Confederates managed 

to repulse Mower’s charge, but Fighting Joe was preparing to 

attack again when Sherman sent him orders to halt. Johnston’s 

army had survived to fight another day. 

On the night of 21–22 March, the Confederates retreated 

across the Mill Creek bridge and marched toward Smithfield. Aside 

from some skirmishing the next morning, the Battle of Bentonville 

was over. The Confederates sustained about 2,600 casualties while 

the Federals lost roughly 1,500 killed, wounded, and captured. Most 

of the losses occurred on 19 March, by far the bloodiest day of the 

battle. The culminating event of Sherman’s Carolinas campaign, 

the Battle of Bentonville, nevertheless proved indecisive. Although 

the Federals had opened the road to Goldsboro, they had failed 

to crush Johnston’s army, and, while the Confederates had won 

a moral victory, the Southerners had been unable to defeat even 

Slocum’s wing. 

General Mower’s charge, by James E. Taylor 

(Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper)
30 

Closing Operations

After the battle, Sherman’s army group resumed the march 

to Goldsboro and began arriving there on 23 March. Schofield’s 

XXIII Corps had occupied the town a few days earlier, and the 

men found the procession of Sherman’s tatterdemalion army a 

comic spectacle. Schofield’s troops “lined the road as spectators, 

cheered uproariously and laughed till the tears ran down their 

faces whenever the panorama of raggedness became unusually 

ludicrous,” recalled one of Sherman’s veterans. “It was as good 

as a picnic and three circuses,” quipped a soldier in Schofield’s 

command.

With his army group united and ensconced around 

Goldsboro, Sherman traveled north to Grant’s headquarters 

at City Point, Virginia, hoping to persuade the Union general 

in chief to postpone his upcoming campaign long enough to 

enable Sherman’s army group to participate in the defeat of 

Lee’s army. Much to Sherman’s dismay, Grant refused to delay 

the operation for even one day. While at City Point, Sherman 

had an opportunity to confer with President Lincoln aboard the 

steamship River Queen. Although they briefly discussed the end 

of the war, Lincoln gave no indication of the precise terms he 

would offer the defeated South. Sherman nonetheless left City 

Point convinced that Lincoln “contemplated no revenge—no 

harsh measures, but quite the contrary. . . . I know, when I left 

him, that I was more than ever impressed by his kindly nature, 

his deep and earnest sympathy with the afflictions of the whole 

people, resulting from the war.”

When Sherman returned to Goldsboro, he was pleased to find 

“all things working well.” As supplies rolled in from the coast, his 

force began to look like an army once more. On 6 April, momentous news arrived from Virginia: Richmond had fallen, and Grant’s 

forces were pursuing Lee’s army as it fled toward Danville, Virginia, 

and the North Carolina border in a desperate bid to link up with 

Johnston’s army. “Great rejoicing among us tonight—Victory! 

Victory!” Union staff officer Lt. C. C. Platter scribbled in his diary. 

In response, Sherman shifted his destination from Richmond to 

Raleigh, and he ordered the campaign to begin on 10 April. With 

the addition of Schofield’s command—which Sherman designated 

the Army of the Ohio—Sherman’s army group numbered roughly 

90,000 soldiers. The Army of the Ohio consisted of Terry’s X Corps 

(formerly the Provisional Corps) and Cox’s XXIII Corps.
31

While the Federals celebrated the news of the Confederate 

capital’s fall, morale plummeted in Johnston’s army, which was 

camped around Smithfield. “The shades of sorrow are gathering 

upon us—horrible rumors!” wrote Confederate staff officer Capt. 

Bromfield Ridley. “We, today, have heard of the distressing news 

that the fall of Richmond took place the [second] day of the month. 

. . . Heavens, the gloom and how terrible our feelings!” Johnston, 

meanwhile, renamed his force the Army of Tennessee and reorganized it into three corps commanded by Hardee, Stewart, and 

Lt. Gen. Stephen D. Lee, with Hampton retaining command of 

the cavalry. On 7 April, Johnston’s army numbered around 31,000 

soldiers, making it larger by half than the command that he had 

led at Bentonville, and yet it remained just one-third the size of 

Sherman’s army group.

The Federals broke camp early on 10 April and began the 

sixty-mile trek from Goldsboro to Raleigh. In the meantime, 

the Confederate infantry at Smithfield fell back toward the state 

capital about a day’s march ahead of the Union advance, which 

skirmished with Hampton’s cavalry for much of the way. Sherman 

reached Smithfield on the afternoon of 11 April and made his 

headquarters in the courthouse square. About 0500 on 12 April, 

two riders arrived at the commanding general’s tent and delivered a dispatch from General Grant announcing Lee’s surrender 

at Appomattox Court House on 9 April. “I hardly know how to 

express my feelings, but you can imagine them,” Sherman wrote 

Grant. “The terms you have given Lee are magnanimous and 

liberal. Should Johnston follow Lee’s example I shall of course 

grant the same.” The news spread like wildfire through Sherman’s 

army group. As an excited courier galloped down the XXIII Corps’ 

marching column shouting, “Lee has surrendered! Lee has surrendered!” one wag yelled back at him, “Great God! You’re the man 

I’ve been looking for these last four years.” 

That evening, Sherman met with a deputation from North 

Carolina Governor Zebulon B. Vance requesting a suspension of 

hostilities in order to open peace negotiations with the U.S. government. While Sherman informed the peace commissioners that 

an immediate suspension of hostilities was unlikely, the general 

also told them that he intended to let Vance remain in office. He 

assured the governor, “I will aid you all in my power to contribute 

to the end you aim to reach, the termination of the existing war.” 

The peace delegation returned to Raleigh the next morning.
32 

While Sherman’s army group converged on the state capital, 

Johnston was trying to convince President Davis that the war was 

lost. After the fall of Richmond, Davis and his cabinet had fled 

by train to Danville. While there, the Confederate president had 

received an unofficial report of Lee’s surrender and had passed 

it on to Johnston. Continuing south to Greensboro, Davis met 

with Johnston and Beauregard on 12 April. Instead of inviting the 

generals to brief him on the military situation, Davis launched into 

a scheme to raise a large field army in a few weeks by recalling 

the thousands of men who had deserted or evaded conscription. 

Johnston argued that it would be impossible to persuade deserters 

and shirkers to rejoin or enter the army “upon mere invitation” 

when the cause appeared lost. At that point, Davis abruptly 

adjourned the meeting with the announcement that Secretary of 

War Breckinridge was expected to arrive that evening with news 

of Lee’s army.

Breckinridge arrived as anticipated, confirming that Lee had 

indeed surrendered. Johnston told Breckinridge that the president 

had “but one power of government left in his hands—that of terminating hostilities.” He offered to so advise Davis if the secretary of 

war provided him with the opportunity, and Breckinridge said that 

he would arrange a conference for the next day.

Johnston and Beauregard met for a second time with Davis 

on the morning of 13 April. Despite Lee’s surrender, the president remained confident that the Confederacy could prevail “if 

our people will turn out.” When Johnston had his opportunity to 

speak, he described a Confederacy on the verge of collapse and 

argued that “it would be the greatest of human crimes to continue 

the war.” The general then urged Davis to “exercise at once the only 

function of government still in his possession, and open negotiations for peace.” The president asked Beauregard and his cabinet 

for their opinions, and with one exception, they agreed with 

Johnston. Davis yielded to the majority and dictated a letter to 

Sherman requesting a suspension of hostilities “to permit the civil 

authorities to enter into the needful arrangements to terminate the 

existing war.” Johnston then signed the letter and ordered it sent at 

once to General Hampton for delivery to the Federals.

The Union army, meanwhile, entered Raleigh on the morning 

of 13 April. A lone Confederate cavalryman fired on Kilpatrick’s 

advance as it rode into town—a futile gesture that defied Mayor 

William H. Harrison’s formal surrender of the state capital. The 
33

Federals captured the Southern horseman and hanged him for 

violating the city’s surrender. Soon afterward, Sherman established 

his headquarters at the Governor’s Palace and discovered that 

Vance had fled with Johnston’s army after receiving a report that 

his peace commissioners had been captured.

At midnight on 15 April, Johnston’s letter proposing an armistice reached Sherman’s headquarters. The Union chieftain dashed 

off a reply accepting his Confederate counterpart’s proposal. “That 

a basis of action may be had,” Sherman wrote, “I undertake to 

abide by the same terms and conditions as were made by Generals 

Grant and Lee at Appomattox Court-House.” Sherman sent his 

message to Kilpatrick at Durham’s Station, North Carolina, with 

instructions to forward it immediately to Hampton’s headquarters 

near Hillsborough. Instead, the Federal cavalry commander held 

Sherman’s dispatch at his forward outpost for one day to make 

it appear that the Confederates, who continued marching west 

toward Greensboro, were willfully violating Johnston’s proposed 

cease-fire. Sherman refused to be taken in by Kilpatrick’s subterfuge, however, and, after receiving Hampton’s message proposing 

a conference midway between the opposing picket lines on the 

Hillsborough Road, the Union commander wired his acceptance 

to Kilpatrick with a pointed order to forward it without delay.

The Bennett Place Negotiations

On the morning of 17 April, as Sherman prepared to board a 

train for his meeting with Johnston, a coded message from Secretary 

of War Edwin M. Stanton arrived at the railroad depot. The dispatch 

informed Sherman that an assassin had shot President Lincoln on 

the evening of 14 April and that he had died the next morning. “Of 

course it fell on me with terrific force,” Sherman later wrote of the 

dispatch, “but I had dealt with death in so many familiar forms 

that no one with me, from my words or bearing, dreamed of the 

contents.” After ordering the telegraph operator to say nothing to 

anyone about the contents of the message, Sherman rode the train 

to Durham’s Station, where he was met by Kilpatrick. The generals 

and their escort of Federal cavalry headed west on the Hillsborough 

Road until the Union flag-of-truce bearer met his Confederate 

counterpart about four miles west of Durham’s Station. Sherman 

and Johnston saluted, shook hands, and introduced their respective 

subordinates. The two commanders then entered the James Bennett 

farmhouse and began their conference. 
34 

Sherman opened the meeting by showing Johnston the 

telegram announcing Lincoln’s assassination. The Confederate 

commander reportedly said that “the event was the greatest 

possible calamity to the South.” The Union chieftain then stated 

that he had not yet announced the news to his army and dreaded 

the reaction of his troops. Johnston agreed that Sherman’s situation was “extremely delicate” indeed. Speaking in a tone that 

Johnston believed “carried conviction of sincerity,” Sherman 

said that he wanted to spare the South further devastation. 

Observing that Johnston’s army was hopelessly outnumbered, 

Sherman offered his Confederate counterpart the same terms 

that Grant had given Lee at Appomattox Court House. While 

acknowledging that those terms were generous, Johnston also 

noted that Lee’s army had been surrounded, whereas he and 

Sherman were a four days’ march apart, with the Federals camped 

around Raleigh and the Confederates around Greensboro. The 

Confederate commander then played his trump card, proposing 

that they “make one job of it” by negotiating the surrender of 

all remaining Confederate forces. When Sherman asked how he 

intended to arrange such a capitulation, Johnston replied that 

he would obtain President Davis’ authorization.

The Bennett Place, by Theodore R. Davis

(Harper’s Weekly)
35

The two generals discussed the terms of the proposed 

surrender. Sherman related Lincoln’s wish to end the war without 

further bloodshed, and he indicated that the late president’s first 

priority had been to preserve the Union. Johnston inferred that 

all else—with the possible exception of emancipation—was negotiable. The Confederate chieftain recalled that he and Sherman 

agreed to terms with one important exception—the Union 

commander’s refusal to include Davis and his cabinet in a general 

amnesty. Sherman, however, remembered that his sole concern 

was whether Johnston could secure Davis’ approval of the terms. 

The two men ended their conference at 1430 to give Johnston 

time to communicate with Davis and to enable Sherman to reach 

Raleigh before word of Lincoln’s assassination could spread. They 

agreed to meet at the Bennett house at noon the next day.

When Sherman arrived at Raleigh, he discovered that the 

news had already spread throughout the capital. A crowd of 

angry soldiers met him at the depot, shouting, “Don’t let Johnston 

surrender! Don’t let the Rebels surrender!” An Illinois soldier 

wrote in his diary: “The army is crazy for vengeance. If we make 

another campaign it will be an awful one.” After writing the order 

announcing Lincoln’s assassination, Sherman strengthened the 

guard patrolling Raleigh, posted pickets on the roads into town, 

and ordered all unauthorized soldiers in Raleigh arrested and 

jailed. He also spent the night riding through the surrounding 

camps, attempting to calm his men. Despite these precautions, a 

mob of several thousand soldiers from the XV Corps advanced on 

the capital amid shouts that Raleigh was “a Rebel hole and ought 

to be cleaned out.” General Logan, the XV Corps commander, 

confronted the mob on the outskirts of town and tried to reason 

with the men. When that failed, he brought forward an artillery 

battery and warned the troops that if they did not disperse, he 

would order the cannons to open fire. The men returned to their 

camps. After an anxious night, dawn revealed that the North 

Carolina capital had been spared the fate of Columbia.

While Sherman attempted to save Raleigh, Johnston spent 

the early morning hours of 18 April at Hampton’s headquarters 

discussing the proposed terms with two Confederate cabinet 

officials: Secretary of War Breckinridge and Postmaster General 

John H. Reagan. Johnston related the details of his meeting with 

Sherman, noting that the Union commander had refused to grant 

amnesty to Davis and his cabinet—a matter of obvious concern 
36 

to Breckinridge and Reagan. When Johnston had finished his 

briefing, Reagan offered to write down the surrender terms. Later 

that morning, as Reagan made a clean copy of the terms, Johnston 

announced that he was going to his second meeting with Sherman. 

Leaving Reagan to complete his memorandum, Johnston and 

Breckinridge rode off for the Bennett farm at 1000.

The flags of truce met before the Bennett house at noon 

on 18 April. Sherman and Johnston entered the dwelling, and 

the Confederate chieftain said that he now had the authority 

to surrender all remaining Confederate forces. Johnston also 

requested that Breckinridge be allowed to participate in the negotiations, since he was responsible for the comprehensive surrender. 

Sherman initially refused because the former U.S. vice president 

was a member of Davis’ cabinet but relented when Johnston stated 

that the Kentuckian was also a major general in the Confederate 

Army. The commanders repeated the main points of their discussion for Breckinridge. The two Southerners conceded that slavery 

was dead, but they stated that the Confederate soldiers desired 

some guarantees concerning their political status.

During the conversation, Reagan’s memorandum arrived 

from Hampton’s headquarters. Johnston read the document aloud, 

noting that it differed from the terms discussed only insofar as it 

guaranteed universal amnesty. Sherman was unimpressed, finding 

Reagan’s memorandum “so general and verbose” that he deemed 

it “inadmissible.” Johnston nevertheless handed him the paper 

to study. Breckinridge then gave a short speech in favor of the 

Reagan document. At the conclusion, Sherman took out pen and 

paper and wrote his “Memorandum or Basis of Agreement,” while 

bearing in mind his conversations with Lincoln at City Point.

Having dismissed Reagan’s terms as too verbose, Sherman’s 

own memorandum proved to run twice the length of the Texan’s, 

and it offered the Confederates a good deal more. There were four 

key items. First, the units composing the remaining Confederate 

armies were to proceed to their respective state arsenals and 

deposit their arms there for use in maintaining law and order. 

Second, the president of the United States would recognize the 

Southern state governments, provided their officials and legislatures took the oaths prescribed by the U.S. Constitution. Cases 

involving conflicting state governments established during the 

war (such as the newly formed state of West Virginia) would be 

decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. Third, the president would 
37

guarantee the Southern people their personal, political, and 

property rights as defined by the U.S. and state constitutions. 

As a courtesy to Johnston and Breckinridge, who conceded that 

slavery was dead, Sherman omitted any mention of its demise in 

this clause. Fourth, the president would grant a general amnesty to 

the Southern people for their part in the war if they lived in peace 

and obeyed the laws in force in their respective states. Although he 

had not consciously intended to, Sherman was thus granting a full 

pardon to all Southerners, including Davis and his cabinet officers. 

Realizing that he had delved into political matters beyond his 

authority as a military commander, Sherman inserted a clause at 

the end of his memorandum stating that he and Johnston pledged 

to obtain the prompt approval of their respective civilian leaders 

before carrying the terms into effect.

After the two commanders had signed the agreement, 

Sherman returned to Raleigh with his copy. Late that night, he sent 

a staff officer to Washington, D.C., with the surrender document 

and a letter to Grant. “I inclose herewith a copy of an agreement 

made this day between General Joseph E. Johnston and myself,” 

Sherman wrote, “which, if approved by the President of the United 

States, will produce peace from the Potomac to the Rio Grande.” 

Supremely confident that his agreement would meet with no 

opposition, Sherman asked Grant to “get the President to simply 

indorse the copy and commission me to carry out the terms.”

Grant received Sherman’s papers late on Friday afternoon, 21 

April. Reading the terms with growing concern, the Union general 

in chief realized that he must notify Secretary of War Stanton at 

once. Stanton read Sherman’s agreement and then called a special 

cabinet meeting for 2000 at President Andrew Johnson’s temporary 

residence. An outraged Stanton voiced his objections to the terms, 

calling it “a practical acknowledgement of the Rebel government” 

that would enable “the Rebels to renew their efforts to overthrow 

the U.S. government at a later time.” He also contended that the 

agreement relieved the rebels of all “pains and penalties” for their 

crimes and would enable them to reestablish slavery. The president and his cabinet unanimously rejected Sherman’s agreement. 

Stanton then ordered Grant to “proceed immediately” to Sherman’s 

headquarters “and direct operations against the enemy.”

Grant’s appearance at the Governor’s Palace in Raleigh on 24 

April, both “surprised and pleased” Sherman, but he was neither 

surprised nor pleased to learn that the president had rejected his 
38 

terms and ordered him to resume hostilities. Since penning his 

agreement, Sherman had come to realize that the mood in the U.S. 

capital following Lincoln’s assassination was hardly conciliatory. 

As instructed, Sherman notified Johnston that the truce would end 

in forty-eight hours as agreed on, that there could be no civil negotiations, and that the troops affected would be limited to Johnston’s 

immediate command. “I therefore demand the surrender of your 

army on the same terms as were given General Lee at Appomattox 

. . . purely and simply,” Sherman wrote. Pleased with Sherman’s 

handling of the situation, Grant disregarded Stanton’s order to 

“direct operations.”

At 1700 on 24 April, Johnston received President Davis’ 

approval of Sherman’s terms. (Davis and his entourage had since 

moved to Charlotte.) One hour later, Sherman’s dispatches arrived 

ending the truce, rejecting the agreement, and demanding the 

Confederates’ surrender in accordance with the Appomattox terms. 

Johnston immediately wired Breckinridge for instructions, but the 

Confederate commander was at no loss for a course of action: “We 

had better disband this small force to prevent devastation to the 

country.” This was the last piece of advice that Davis wanted from 

his ranking field commander. The Confederate president expected 

Johnston to maintain his army as long as the Federals refused to 

offer acceptable terms. Breckinridge adroitly couched Davis’ order 

as a suggestion to disband the infantry and artillery while sending 

a mounted force to the Trans-Mississippi. In response, Johnston 

summoned Beauregard and his corps and division commanders 

to a conference at 1000 on 25 April. This meeting proved to be 

the Army of Tennessee’s final council of war. Johnston asked his 

subordinates to assess Breckinridge’s proposal and the condition 

of their forces. The consensus was that the troops would no longer 

fight and the secretary of war’s plan was impractical. Johnston 

notified Breckinridge and suggested, “We ought to make terms for 

our troops and give an escort of cavalry to the President.” In the 

meantime, Johnston replied to Sherman’s dispatches, proposing 

another armistice to resume negotiations.

Due to a railroad accident, Johnston arrived at the Bennett 

farm at 1400 on 26 April, two hours behind schedule. Although 

Grant had remained in Raleigh, Sherman brought several highranking subordinates with him, including General Schofield. The 

two commanders shook hands and entered the Bennett house. 

Their third conference began inauspiciously. Sherman offered 
39

the Appomattox terms, but Johnston called them inadequate and 

insisted on additional guarantees for his men. While he conceded 

the need for supplementary terms, Sherman doubted that they 

would be approved in Washington. After further discussion 

proved fruitless, the Union commander summoned Schofield to 

resolve their impasse.

Schofield suggested drafting a surrender document almost 

identical to the Appomattox agreement and a second document 

listing the additional terms that Johnston sought for his men. “I 

think General Schofield can fix it,” Johnston said. Sherman directed 

his lieutenant to put the “new” terms in writing. Schofield’s “Terms 

of a Military Convention” strongly resembled the terms Grant had 

offered Lee at Appomattox Court House. The crucial fifth provision ensured that all officers and men in Johnston’s command 

could return to their homes, not to be disturbed by the U.S. 

government as long as they observed their paroles and the laws 

in force where they resided. On 27 April, Johnston would draft a 

list of eight “Supplementary Terms” based on his discussion with 

Sherman and Schofield at the Bennett house. Schofield would then 

write a revised version consisting of six “Supplemental Terms” that 

permitted each brigade or independent unit to retain one-seventh 

of its small arms, that enabled the soldiers to keep their horses and 

other personal property, and that provided water-borne transportation for troops from the Trans-Mississippi. A few days later, he 

would offer rail transportation to Johnston’s troops as well. The 

Bennett Place surrender was the largest of the war, embracing 

almost 90,000 Confederates stationed in North Carolina, South 

Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. Both Sherman and Johnston 

would announce the momentous news to their troops on 27 April. 

On the evening of 26 April, Sherman returned to Raleigh 

and submitted the surrender agreement to Grant, who approved 

the terms and complied with Sherman’s request to sign the 

document. The general in chief then carried the document 

back to Washington. Sherman now believed that the troublesome matter “was surely at an end.” He could not have been 

more mistaken.

Johnston, meanwhile, traveled to Greensboro. In compliance 

with the surrender agreement, he ordered his corps commanders to 

make out their muster rolls in duplicate and to collect all cannons, 

artillery equipment, and draft animals, as well as four-fifths of the 

soldiers’ small arms, ammunition, and accoutrements. (He did not 
40 

receive Schofield’s stipulation to collect six-sevenths of the arms 

until 30 April.) For the final time, the Army of Tennessee lurched 

into action, as long lines of troops stacked arms and headquarters 

staffs filled out rolls. To maintain a semblance of cohesion during 

the journey home, the men would remain with their units for as 

long as possible and receive their paroles only when they neared 

their homes.

Now that the war in North Carolina was over, Sherman 

directed Schofield’s Army of the Ohio and Kilpatrick’s cavalry 

to remain in the state as an occupation force while Howard’s 

Army of the Tennessee and Slocum’s Army of Georgia marched 

to Washington, D.C., to be mustered out of the service. In the 

meantime, Sherman would conduct an inspection tour of his 

command that would take him to Wilmington, Savannah, and 

Hilton Head, South Carolina.

Just before his departure on 28 April, he received a copy of the 

23 April New York Times that contained the following headlines: 

“Sherman’s Action Promptly Repudiated. The President and All 

His Cabinet Rebuke Him. Gen. Grant Gone to North Carolina to 

Direct Our Armies. Possible Escape of Jeff. Davis with His Gold.” 

Among the items contained in the news bulletin were Sherman’s 

“Memorandum or Basis of Agreement” and Stanton’s list of nine 

reasons for rejecting it. The eighth reason asserted that Sherman’s 

terms were more generous “than the rebels had asked in their most 

prosperous condition,” which ignored the Confederates’ insistence 

on Southern independence as a prerequisite for peace negotiations. Stanton’s artfully edited bulletin ensured the unanimity of 

the Northern press in condemning Sherman’s first agreement. 

Although the furor over the terms soon subsided, Sherman later 

admitted that he was “outraged beyond measure, and was resolved 

to resent the insult, cost what it might.” As peace returned to the 

land, Sherman declared war on Secretary Stanton.

Stoneman’s Last Raid

In March and April 1865, while Sherman conducted operations and negotiated for the surrender of Johnston’s army, Maj. 

Gen. George Stoneman led his 4,000-man cavalry division on 

a raid through western North Carolina and southern Virginia 

from Knoxville, Tennessee. The long-deferred strikes occurred at 

General Grant’s urging. The objective was to support Sherman’s 

and Grant’s campaigns by destroying facilities, equipment, 
41

and supplies in North Carolina and Virginia that could aid the 

Confederate Army. Grant directed that, “As this expedition goes to 

destroy and not to fight battles, but to avoid them when practicable 

. . ., it should go as light as possible.”

Stoneman was fortunate to be leading the cavalry operation. 

He enjoyed the dubious distinction of having been the highestranking Union prisoner of war, following his capture near Macon, 

Georgia, during the disastrous raid in July 1864 by him and Brig. 

Gen. Edward M. McCook. Secretary of War Stanton was no admirer, 

calling Stoneman “one of the most worthless officers in the service.” 

But he had a staunch supporter in General Schofield. In September 

1864, after Stoneman’s release 

from captivity, Schofield, then 

commanding the Department 

of the Ohio, had appointed 

the cavalryman as his second 

in command. Stoneman had 

repaid Schofield’s unwavering faith in him by leading 

a successful strike into 

southwestern Virginia in 

December 1864. Two months 

later, Stoneman was named 

commander of the District of 

East Tennessee. He had been 

eager to launch a raid into 

South Carolina in support of 

Sherman’s march, but several 

delays had forced him to 

abandon that undertaking 

and shift his focus to North 

Carolina and Virginia. 

Stoneman’s raiders struck first in western North Carolina. 

As he would do throughout the operation, Stoneman divided his 

force to maximize its destructive potential. On 28 March, one 

Union mounted column rode into Boone, where the bluecoats 

routed a home guard unit and burned the town’s jail. That evening, 

a second Federal column headed south and torched Patterson’s 

Factory, a large cotton mill in Caldwell County. The raiders next 

headed east to Wilkesboro and then swung north in early April, 

making a brief detour into southern Virginia. On 8 April, one 

General Stoneman

(Library of Congress)
42

of Stoneman’s columns pushed as far north as Lynchburg, just 

twenty miles west of Appomattox Court House, putting the 

Federal raiders in an excellent position to cut off Lee’s retreat 

had such a maneuver been necessary. The next day, a second 

Union column briefly clashed with the 6th Tennessee Cavalry at 

Henry Court House, about thirty miles west of Danville, where 

President Jefferson Davis and his cabinet had halted following 

their flight from Richmond. On the same day as Lee’s surrender 

to Grant, Stoneman’s cavalry reentered North Carolina. The 

timing was fortuitous, for Lee’s surrender had made Johnston’s 

army the main target of Stoneman’s raid (Map 3). 

In late March, as Stoneman headed east, Johnston had 

entrusted General Beauregard, his second in command, with the 

task of stopping the Federal raiders. He also had directed General 

Bragg—left without a command since the Battle of Bentonville—

to assist Beauregard. Together, Beauregard and Bragg assembled a 

patchwork defensive force consisting of various infantry, cavalry, 

and artillery units, which they deployed at several key points along 

the railroad from Chester northward to Danville.

Unaware of these dispositions, Stoneman once again 

divided his force. At Germanton, North Carolina, he directed 

Col. William J. Palmer’s brigade to strike Salem, twelve miles 

to the south, and then proceed twenty-five miles east to 

Greensboro, destroying railroad bridges and supply depots on 

his route. Stoneman, meanwhile, led his other two brigades 

toward Salisbury, his main geographic objective. Colonel 

Palmer reached Salem on the afternoon of 10 April and burned 

7,000 bales of cotton. That night, he sent out several detachments to the south and east. At noon the following day, the first 

detachment destroyed the Piedmont Railroad bridge spanning 

Reedy Creek, ten miles north of Greensboro. Unknown to the 

Federal raiders, the train carrying President Davis and his 

cabinet had crossed that bridge just an hour beforehand. When 

informed of his close call at Reedy Creek, Davis had remarked, 

“A miss is as good as a mile.” But the destruction wrought by 

other detachments of Stoneman’s cavalry would prevent the 

Davis party from traveling beyond Greensboro by rail.

Palmer’s second detachment made a bold feint on Greensboro. 

After routing the 3d South Carolina Cavalry in a surprise assault, 

the Federals rode to within a few miles of Greensboro, where they 

cut a telegraph line and burned the North Carolina Railroad bridge 
4 Apr

5 Apr

5 Apr

8 Apr

8 Apr

10 Apr

26 Apr

SALISBURY

12 Apr

MOCKSVILLE

11 Apr

SHALLOW FORD

11 Apr

GREENSBORO

11 Apr

HENRY

COURT HOUSE

8 Apr

MORGANTON

17 Apr

HOWARD’S GAP

22 Apr

BOONE

28 Mar

WILKESBORO

29 Mar

YADKIN RIVER

BRIDGE

12 Apr

Roanoke R

N

we R

Yadkin

R

Cl ni ch R

Pat terson’s Fac to ry

Durham’s Station

High Poi nt

Jamestown

Wes tern Nor th Carolina RR

North Carolina RR

South Side RR

Charlotte

Chester

Cheraw

Lincolnton

Salem

Lenior

Rutherfordton

Hendersonville

Asheville

Jonesboro

Danville

Christiansburg

Salem

Appomattox Court House

Hillsville

Taylorsville

Jacksonsville

Germanton

Wytheville

Saltville

Goldsboro

Hillsborough

Spartanburg

Fayetteville

Lynchburg

Knoxville

RALEIGH

NORT H

CAROLIN A

SOUTH

CAROLIN A

GEORGIA

VIRGINIA

W EST

VIRGINIA

TENNESSE E

KENTUCKY

Cavalry MovementEngagement

28 March–26 April 1865

S T ONEMAN’S RAID

0 100 25

Miles

Map 3
44 

across Buffalo Creek. The third detachment attacked Florence and 

Jamestown, about fifteen miles southwest of Greensboro, burning 

a gun factory, some Confederate cotton and commissary stores, 

and the North Carolina Railroad bridge over Deep River. A few 

miles south of Jamestown, Palmer’s fourth detachment hit High 

Point, burning 1,700 bales of cotton and 2 trains loaded with 

medical and commissary supplies. Having completed its work of 

destruction, Palmer’s brigade rejoined Stoneman’s main column 

on the evening of 12 April. Palmer’s multipronged strike wreaked 

untold havoc on the enemy, but Stoneman could not judge his raid 

a success until he had captured Salisbury. 

Salisbury had both strategic and symbolic importance. The 

town was the junction of two railroads—the North Carolina 

and the Western North Carolina. It also boasted a foundry, an 

arsenal, and numerous warehouses filled with supplies, and it 

was the site of a notorious military prison. Stoneman hoped to 

redeem his reputation by liberating the Union prisoners incarcerated there.

After a few brushes with Confederate home guard units at 

Shallow Ford and Mocksville on 11 April, Stoneman reached 

Salisbury early on the morning of the twelfth. The town was 

defended by a scratch force consisting of 3 veteran artillery 

batteries, a few hundred prison guards, several companies of 

home guards and reserves, 400 state employees, a handful of 

civilian volunteers, and some “galvanized Yankees”—foreignborn Union captives who had agreed to serve in the Confederate 

Army rather than rot in Southern prisons. Oddly enough, most 

of the regular Salisbury garrison and its commander, Brig. 

Gen. Bradley T. Johnson, were at Greensboro because General 

Beauregard believed the latter town was Stoneman’s main target.

Brig. Gen. William M. Gardner, a journeyman officer, 

commanded the motley crew protecting Salisbury. Gardner established his defensive position along Grant’s Creek north and west 

of town, deploying his 1,000-man force on a tenuous two-mile line 

to cover the incoming roads. At dawn, Stoneman divided his two 

available brigades into five columns and launched a general assault. 

Deploying into line of battle, the Union horsemen easily turned 

Gardner’s right flank, capturing most of the defenders in that sector, 

including a contingent of galvanized Yankees who threw down their 

weapons when the blue-clad riders approached. The Confederates on 

the left proved more stubborn. The Southern batteries repulsed the 
45

initial Union charge by firing double-shotted canister, but the Federal 

cavalrymen rallied, forded the creek beyond range of the cannons, 

and then attacked from the rear. The Northerners’ sudden appearance panicked the Confederates, who abandoned their guns and fled. 

Stoneman then ordered a general charge, and the Federals routed the 

entire Southern line. According to Stoneman’s second in command, 

Brig. Gen. Alvan C. Gillem, “The pursuit was kept up as long as the 

enemy retained a semblance of organization and until those who 

escaped capture had scattered and concealed themselves in the 

woods.” By noon on 12 April, Salisbury was firmly in Union hands. 

The Battle of Salisbury cost the Federals about 40 casualties, while the 

Confederates lost 1 killed, 6 wounded, and roughly 1,300 captured.

Stoneman was chagrined to discover that the thousands of 

Union prisoners he hoped to liberate had been transferred elsewhere in March and that the handful of inmates who remained 

were either too lame or too sick to travel. He was further disappointed to learn that a detachment sent to destroy the 660-foot 

Yadkin River bridge north of town had been repulsed by a 

Confederate force under Brig. Gen. Zebulon York. But Stoneman 

was unaware that Colonel Palmer’s detachments had already shut 

down rail traffic in central North Carolina by destroying three 

railroad bridges and several miles of track to the north.

In addition to intercepting several trains attempting to escape, 

Stoneman’s troopers seized an enormous quantity of supplies at 

Salisbury, including 1 million rounds of small-arms ammunition, 

250,000 army blankets, 35,000 pounds of cornmeal, and 7,000 

bales of cotton. The raiders piled the goods in the streets and took 

what they wanted. The civilians then helped themselves to the 

remainder. About 2000 on 12 April, the Federals set fire to the last 

of the supplies and to the prison, the arsenal, the foundry, several 

hospitals, and four cotton factories. That night, the red skies above 

Salisbury could be seen for miles, and the resulting explosions 

sometimes reached the volume of a pitched battle.

On the morning of 13 April, as Sherman’s army group entered 

Raleigh, Stoneman’s horse soldiers headed west in a driving rainstorm. Four days later, Stoneman left the main column at Lenoir, 

North Carolina, and returned to Knoxville, having fulfilled his 

mission. He turned over command to General Gillem, whose 

brigades once more separated and then headed west toward 

Morganton, North Carolina, or south toward Charlotte. The 

raiders continued their destructive work in the Old North State 
46 

for two more weeks. While crossing the Blue Ridge Mountains, 

the Federals skirmished with the Confederates at Howard’s Gap 

(22 April) and several other rugged passes. On the same day, 

captured rebels informed them of Lee’s surrender and Lincoln’s 

assassination. “The one [event] so sad, filling our hearts with the 

greatest sorrow,” recalled one Union cavalryman, “left little room 

for the joy that otherwise would have filled our hearts” with the 

news that the war was almost over. On 27 April, the raid underwent a surprising twist: Stoneman received instructions to capture 

Confederate President Jefferson Davis. In the meantime, the Union 

mounted columns ranged through western North Carolina, so it 

took several days for the order to reach Stoneman’s subordinates. 

As a result, the Federals did not embark on their new mission until 

30 April—four days after Davis had headed south from Charlotte 

with a large cavalry escort. The chase was on.

Potter’s South Carolina Raid

In mid-March, while en route to Goldsboro, Sherman had 

written Maj. Gen. Quincy A. Gillmore, the commander of the 

Department of the South, informing him of “a vast amount of 

rolling stock” on the Wilmington and Manchester Railroad in 

eastern South Carolina, which 

had somehow eluded his army 

group. Determined that the 

railroad cars be destroyed, 

Sherman had urged Gillmore 

to do so at once, even “if to do 

it costs you 500 men.” Sherman 

directed Gillmore to have the 

expedition travel light and to 

subsist as much as possible by 

foraging. On 5 April, Gillmore 

sent a 2,700-man expeditionary 

force under Brig. Gen. Edward 

E. Potter from Georgetown 

on the South Carolina coast. 

Potter’s command consisted 

of two infantry brigades—one 

composed of four white regiments under Col. Philip P. 

Brown, the other of three black 

General Potter

(North Carolina Office of 

Archives and History)
47

regiments led by Col. Edward N. Hallowell, including the famed 

54th Massachusetts Infantry. The foot soldiers were augmented by 

a two-gun section of artillery, a cavalry squadron, and an engineer 

detachment.

On the first day of the raid, Potter’s troops destroyed some 

cotton gins and bales of cotton, and they occasionally skirmished 

with South Carolina militia. Over the next few days, the Federals 

passed through a region that Lt. Edward L. Stevens, a white officer 

in the 54th Massachusetts Infantry, described as the “most desolate 

imaginable.” As a result, the men were unable to live off the land and 

instead had to draw supplies from Union naval vessels plying the 

Santee River. The troops nevertheless pillaged many of the homes in 

the sparsely settled region while their officers looked the other way. 

The Federals continued to skirmish with small militia detachments, 

resulting in several wounded Union soldiers (Map 4). 

On 8 April, Potter’s column reached the town of Manning, 

where the Federals found a mile-long causeway interspersed 

with six bridges over the Pocotaligo River, each span more or 

less burned. By midnight Hallowell’s soldiers had made the 

bridges passable for foot traffic and then crossed. The artillery 

and cavalry followed later, after the engineers had completed the 

repairs. Following a brief rest, Potter’s raiders advanced on the 

morning of 9 April and collided with an enemy force at Dingle’s 

Mill, about three miles south of Sumterville on the Wilmington 

and Manchester Railroad. Though numbering fewer than 1,000 

men, the Confederate force was by far the largest that Potter’s 

command had faced. The troops consisted of about 500 South 

Carolina militia, a handful of Confederate cavalry, and a detachment of the famed “Orphan Brigade”—so called because it hailed 

from Kentucky, which remained loyal to the Union, leaving its 

members “orphans.” The veteran foot soldiers were now operating as mounted infantry.

The Southerners were dug in on the opposite side of the 

millpond, which proved too wide and marshy to ford. Potter sent 

Brown’s brigade forward to carry the bridge over the pond, but 

the Kentuckians’ steady fire stopped them cold. Meanwhile, the 

two Union guns roared into action, firing fifty-five rounds. One 

well-aimed projectile disabled a Confederate cannon and killed 

the officer in command of the piece. While Brown’s troops kept 

the Southern defenders occupied, Potter sent Hallowell’s brigade 

on a path that supposedly wound around the Confederate left 
48 

flank, but the guide became lost, and Hallowell had to retrace his 

steps. Brown’s brigade was more fortunate, however. Two of the 

regiments succeeded in turning the Southerners’ right flank and 

routed them toward Sumterville. According to Lieutenant Stevens, 

some of the captured militia “were old men, some little boys, 

the cradle & grave.” The Union casualties at Dingle’s Mill totaled 

twenty-six compared with the Confederates’ sixteen losses.

After the fight, Potter’s force resumed marching and occupied 

Sumterville that evening. The next morning, Potter sent several 

20 Apr

17 Apr

8 Apr

Boykin’s Mill 18 Apr

Dinkins’ Mill 19 Apr

Dingle’s Mill 9 Apr

Santee R

Edisto R

Black R

Pee Dee R

Pocotaligo R

A T L ANTIC

OCEAN

Middleton Depot

Wi l m i n g to n a nd M a n cheste r R R

South Carolina RR

Camden

Florence

Darlington

Marion

Manning

Kingstree

Sumterville

Maysville

Wateree

Georgetown

Manchester

Orangeburg

Charleston

COLUMBIA

SOUTH

CAROLIN A

NORT H

CAROLIN A

Union Movement

Battle

5–21 April 1865

P O T TER’S RAID

0 25 50

Miles

Map 4
49

detachments into Maysville to the east and Manchester to the west. 

Over the next two days, the details destroyed 11 locomotives, 74 

cars, 200 bales of cotton, 2 bridges, and a machine shop. On 12 

April, the raiders headed north toward Camden, the northern 

terminus of the South Carolina Railroad, and they found their 

foraging prospects much improved. “We are living splendidly 

with no expense to us,” Lieutenant Stevens wrote. “Poultry, Honey, 

Potatoes, Corn Bread[,] Molasses, &c.”

On 17 April, Potter’s raiders entered Camden, where they 

learned that all the locomotives and rolling stock had been moved 

eight miles south to Boykin’s Mill. The Federals arrived there on 

18 April and found the Confederates occupying a strong position 

similar to the one at Dingle’s Mill. Once again, Potter attempted to 

turn the Southerners’ flanks. Lieutenant Stevens was shot and killed 

while leading a detachment of the 54th Massachusetts Infantry 

around the Confederate left. He died on the day that Sherman and 

Johnston signed the first surrender agreement at the Bennett house. 

Soon afterward, the Union soldiers drove off the heavily 

outnumbered Confederates, only to discover that the elusive 

rolling stock had been moved to Middleton Depot. The Federals 

and Confederates clashed yet again, this time at Dinkins’ Mill on 

19 April, with the same result as in the previous two skirmishes. On 

the morning of 20 April, Potter’s column pressed on to Middleton 

Depot and destroyed the locomotives and rolling stock collected 

there. On 21 April, a courier brought news of the ShermanJohnston armistice and orders to cease all military operations.

The Union raiders turned east and marched back to Georgetown, 

arriving there on 25 April. They had destroyed 32 locomotives, 250 

railroad cars, 100 cotton gins, and 5,000 bales of cotton. Throughout 

the operation, former slaves had flocked to Potter’s column, and the 

general estimated that about 3,000 of them had accompanied the 

Federals to Georgetown. Potter’s raid proved to be the last significant military operation in South Carolina.

 

Wilson’s Raid: Alabama

While Sherman’s Carolinas campaign was drawing to a close, 

Union Brig. Gen. James H. Wilson was launching a mounted 

raid through Alabama. A former engineer and staff officer under 

Grant and Sherman, the 27-year-old Wilson had briefly headed the 

Cavalry Bureau of the War Department before he was assigned to 

command a cavalry division in the Army of the Potomac, where he 
50

soon displayed a talent for combat command. Transferred to the 

Western Theater in October 1864, Wilson led the Federal cavalry in 

the battles of Franklin and Nashville, both Union victories.

On 22 March 1865, Wilson’s 13,480-man cavalry corps—the 

largest and best-equipped mounted force of the war—broke camp 

at Gravelly Springs in northwestern Alabama and headed south 

toward Selma and other industrial centers in the heart of the 

state. After crossing the rain-swollen Tennessee River, Wilson led 

his three divisions to Elyton (present-day Birmingham), arriving 

there on 29 March. The Federals destroyed several ironworks in the 

area, while Brig. Gen. John T. Croxton’s brigade rode southwest to 

Tuscaloosa, where they burned a cotton factory, several ironworks, 

and most of the University of Alabama “military school” (Map 5).

Continuing south toward Selma, Wilson clashed with a force 

of roughly 2,000 Confederate cavalry and state militia led by Lt. 

Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest at Montevallo on 31 March. Not 

even the famed “Wizard of the Saddle” could overcome such odds. 

Worse yet, in addition to being heavily outnumbered, Forrest was 

outgunned by Wilson’s troopers, who wielded seven-shot Spencer 

repeating carbines. After routing the Southerners, the Federals 

General Forrest

(Library of Congress)

General Wilson

(Library of Congress)
20 Apr

12 Apr

4 Apr

29 Mar

MONTEVALLO

31 Mar

EBENEZER CHURCH

1 Apr

WEST POINT

16 Apr

COLUMBUS

16–17 Apr SELMA

2 Apr

Coosa R Flint R

Tennessee R

Alabama R

hC at at hoochee R

Savannah R

Bridgeport

Guntersville

Tuscaloosa

Demopolis

Rome

Dalton

Gravelly Springs

Elyton Talladega

Atlanta

Marietta

Macon

Huntsville

Florence

Tuscumbia

MONTGOMERY

MILLEDGEVILLE

GEORGIA

SOUTH

CAROLINA

ALABAMA

MISSISSIPPI Cavalry Movement Engagement

WILSON’S RAID

22 March–20 April 1865

0 75 50 25

Miles

Map 5
52 

destroyed the area’s ironworks and other factories. They also 

captured an enemy courier carrying messages that revealed the 

strength and location of Forrest’s forces. This enabled Wilson to 

prevent the scattered Confederates from uniting before he could 

reach Selma. On the following day, Wilson collided with Forrest 

a second time at Ebenezer Church, about twenty miles north of 

Selma, and routed him again. During the fight, a Union captain 

slashed Forrest with his saber before the latter shot him to death. 

Union casualties at Ebenezer Church were 12 killed and 40 

wounded, while the Confederates lost roughly 300 captured. 

Withdrawing to Selma on the afternoon of 1 April, Forrest 

deployed his troops in a semicircular ring of fortifications that 

guarded the town, anchoring both of his flanks on the Alabama 

River to the south. Selma was a tempting military target. Situated 

in the heart of the state, the town’s relatively secure location, 

combined with its proximity to rail and river transportation, 

had drawn a wide variety of war industries there. By 1865, Selma 

boasted a large arsenal, a munitions plant, a powder mill, a naval 

foundry, eleven ironworks, and several factories that manufactured 

uniforms and equipment. Two years earlier, Confederate officials 

had used slave labor to construct an elaborate system of defenses, 

and, while formidable, the earthworks required a much larger 

force than Forrest had at his disposal. The defenders consisted of 

about 4,000 men and boys, including Confederate cavalry, state 

troops under one-eyed Brig. Gen. Daniel W. Adams, and a sizable 

contingent of local citizens pressed into service for the emergency. 

Even with the civilians, the Southerners manning the trenches 

were ten feet apart.

Wilson’s cavalry reached the outskirts of Selma about 1400 

on 2 April, with Brig. Gen. Eli Long’s division leading the way, 

followed by Brig. Gen. Emory Upton’s division. Wilson deployed 

Upton’s troopers across the Range Line Road, north of town, 

and Long’s men astride the Summerfield Road on Upton’s right. 

The two Federal divisions numbered roughly 9,000 men. After 

making a reconnaissance of the Confederate defenses, the Union 

commander decided to launch a general assault after nightfall, 

spearheaded by Upton’s division.

At 1630, however, Wilson’s plan suddenly flew out the 

window, as Long had his troopers dismount and commence a 

frontal assault without first notifying Wilson. Long ordered the 

attack in response to a strike on his wagon train by Confederate 
53

cavalry, believing it the best way to counter the threat to his rear. 

“The entire line started up with a bound, yelling, shooting, and all 

pushing forward under a most terrific cannonade and through a 

perfect shower of bullets,” recalled a Union officer. Supported by 

their artillery, the Federal troopers raced across the 600 yards of 

open ground along Summerfield Road and then struggled through 

rows of sharpened logs and other obstructions fronting the 

Confederate works. Firing as rapidly as they could, the defenders 

briefly held their ground, but the sheer number of attackers in blue 

soon overwhelmed them. The militia and local defense personnel 

were the first to flee, with Forrest’s veteran cavalrymen giving 

ground more stubbornly. During the assault, General Long was 

severely wounded in the head—his sixth combat wound of the 

war. Several Union regimental commanders were also injured.

Hearing the small-arms and artillery fire on Long’s front, the 

men of Upton’s division did not wait for orders but immediately broke 

for the enemy fortifications, working their way through underbrush 

and across a swamp as they advanced along the Range Line Road. 

On nearing the earthworks, Upton’s men “expected a deadly volley,” 

one officer noted, but when the Federals scaled the works, they were 

relieved to see the rebels “skedaddling in all directions.”

Noticing that some Confederates were attempting to rally, 

Wilson led his escort—the 4th U.S. Cavalry—in a charge to break 

the enemy’s developing line. As the Federals attacked, Wilson’s 

horse suddenly plunged to the ground. Though shot in the chest, 

the animal quickly regained its feet, and Wilson resumed the 

charge. Reinforced by two other regiments, the regulars broke the 

Confederate line and sent the soldiers in gray racing to the rear.

Union cavalry swept into Selma from the north and northwest, moving through streets choked with fleeing Confederates 

and panicked civilians. In the chaos that followed, fires broke out 

all over town, and many of Wilson’s men broke ranks to plunder 

homes and stores. Skirmishing also continued long after nightfall. 

As a result, it took Wilson and his subordinates most of the night 

to restore order.

The capture of Selma had cost the Federals about 350 killed, 

wounded, and missing, while the Confederates lost roughly 

2,700 captured and an unknown number of killed and wounded. 

Forrest did not know it, but he had fought his last battle, and his 

demoralized command had ceased to pose a threat to Wilson’s 

raid. While awaiting the return of several detachments, Wilson’s 
54 

men destroyed Selma’s arsenal, iron foundries, workshops, and 

railroad facilities. Amid the demolition work, his pontoniers built 

an 870-foot pontoon bridge across the Alabama River.

On 9–10 April, Wilson’s raiders crossed the bridge en 

route to their next destination—Montgomery—the Alabama 

state capital and the first capital of the Confederacy. The town 

was also a manufacturing and transportation center, boasting 

an arsenal and a rifle factory. Encountering only scattered 

opposition, the Federals reached the vicinity of Montgomery 

on the evening of 11 April. A small force consisting mainly 

of General Adams’ militia defended the town, but Adams 

received orders to evacuate Montgomery at once and escort 

Governor Thomas H. Watts and other Alabama state officials to 

Columbus, Georgia. Before his departure, Adams threw open 

the doors of the commissary to the public, and he directed the 

burning of 85,000 bales of cotton in order to leave behind as 

little as possible for the Yankees. During the night, firefighters 

and other concerned citizens managed to prevent the fires from 

spreading to their homes and stores.

As Wilson approached Montgomery on the morning of 12 

April, he could see thick columns of smoke rising from the smoldering cotton bales. He was met on the outskirts by Mayor Walter 

L. Coleman and other civic officials, who surrendered the town to 

him. Instead of fighting their way into Montgomery, the Federals 

would make a triumphal entry, with flags flying, bands playing, and 

mounted soldiers advancing in perfect order. An Illinois trooper 

described the scene as “truly a fine display.” Wilson’s raiders remained 

in Montgomery for two days, destroying the arsenal and other facilities. On Good Friday, 14 April—the day of Lincoln’s assassination—

they were back in the saddle and headed for Columbus, Georgia. 

Wilson, meanwhile, had learned of the fall of Richmond and had 

decided to continue his raid into the Carolinas.

Assault on Mobile: Spanish Fort and Fort Blakely

In mid-March 1865, while Sherman and Johnston fought in 

eastern North Carolina, Union Maj. Gen. Edward R. S. Canby, the 

commander of the Military Division of West Mississippi, prepared 

to attack the Confederate defenses at Mobile on Alabama’s Gulf 

coast. The city had ceased to function as a port on 5 August 1864, 

when R. Adm. David G. Farragut’s West Gulf Blockading Squadron 

defeated a Confederate naval force in the Battle of Mobile Bay. But 
55

Mobile had remained in Southern hands because it was situated thirty 

miles up the bay and was protected by a lethal array of underwater 

mines called torpedoes. Although General Grant deemed Selma and 

Montgomery—two of Wilson’s main targets—as more important 

military objectives, Canby did not want to advance into the interior of 

the state until he had eliminated the Confederate force at Mobile. He 

also wanted the port city as a base for future operations. 

Canby’s Army of West 

Mississippi numbered about 

45,000 troops. It consisted of 

the XIII Corps commanded 

by Maj. Gen. Gordon Granger; 

the XVI Corps led by Maj. Gen. 

Andrew J. Smith; a 13,000-

man expeditionary force from 

Pensacola, Florida, under Maj. 

Gen. Frederick Steele; and a 

cavalry corps headed by Brig. 

Gen. Benjamin Grierson (Map 

6). Canby focused his attention 

on the two Confederate forts 

that guarded the eastern shore of 

Mobile Bay because he deemed 

the defenses on the western shore 

too strong to carry by direct 

assault. As its name suggested, 

Spanish Fort was built on the site 

of an eighteenth-century Spanish 

presidio, while three miles to 

the north, Fort Blakely stood 

just east of the village for which 

it was named and about ten 

miles northeast of Mobile. The 

commander of the Confederate 

forces defending Mobile was Maj. 

Gen. Dabney H. Maury, whose 

geographic command was the 

District of the Gulf. 

The Mobile campaign began on 18 March—the eve of the 

Battle of Bentonville—when Union warships opened fire on 

Spanish Fort. One week later, the XIII and XVI Corps commenced 

General Canby

(Library of Congress)

General Maury

(Library of Congress)
56 

siege operations against it. After feinting on Montgomery, Steele’s 

troops approached Fort Blakely from the northeast on 1 April. The 

Union cavalry screen collided with a small Confederate force and 

routed it, capturing seventy enemy soldiers and driving the rest 

into Fort Blakely. Steele’s division of U.S. Colored Infantry (USCI) 

led by Brig. Gen. John P. Hawkins pursued the Confederates and 

FORT BLAKELY 9 Apr

SPANISH FORT

8 Apr

S T E E L E

C A N B Y

S T E E L E

Mobile R Tensaw R

Escambia R

Perdido R

Mobile Bay

Gulf of Mexic o

Fort Morgan

Fort Pickens

Fort Gaines

Mobile

Pensacola

Citronelle

Stockton

Weatherford

Pollard

ALABAMA

F L O RID A

Union Movement

Battle

18 March–12 April 1865

ASSA U LT ON MOBILE

0 25

Miles

Map 6
57

began to surround the fort. By nightfall on 2 April—as Wilson’s 

cavalry entered Selma—Steele’s troops had cut off all land 

approaches to Blakely. For the next five days, the Federals worked 

around the clock, bombarding the two forts and converging on 

them by means of hastily dug siege works. The Confederates countered with artillery fire from the forts and three gunboats, and they 

launched several sorties in the early morning darkness in a futile 

effort to dislodge the Federal skirmishers from their rifle pits.

Canby ordered the assault on Spanish Fort for 8 April, 

preceded by an artillery barrage at 1730. The commander of the 

Confederate garrison, Brig. Gen. Randall L. Gibson, suspecting 

that a Union attack was imminent, opened his own bombardment 

moments before Canby’s began, but it was soon overwhelmed by 

the continual roar of the Federals’ ninety pieces of artillery. On 

the Union right, skirmishers of the 8th Iowa Infantry of Brig. Gen. 

Eugene A. Carr’s division advanced through a swamp under a 

heavy fire and succeeded in turning the Confederate left flank. The 

Iowans were soon heavily reinforced, and they managed to repulse 

two enemy counterattacks. Seeing that the Federals threatened 

his only line of retreat, Gibson ordered his troops to evacuate the 

fort under cover of darkness. According to a Southern officer, the 

garrison retreated through four miles of “mud & water and a dense 

thicket of marsh canes.” The exhausted Confederates reached Fort 

Blakely at sunrise and then traveled by steamer to Mobile. In 

capturing Spanish Fort, the Federals took more than 600 prisoners 

while sustaining 657 killed, wounded, and missing. 

On receiving word of the fall of Spanish Fort, Canby 

ordered an assault on Fort Blakely for 9 April, the day that Lee 

surrendered to Grant at Appomattox Court House. The Union 

commander believed that capturing the fort would be no easy 

task. He noted that Blakely’s fortifications stretched across high 

ground for 21⁄2 miles, with a swamp covering each flank. Along 

the approaches to the fort, the Confederates had buried dozens 

of deadly torpedoes and placed abatis—a series of obstructions 

consisting of felled trees, sharpened stakes, and telegraph wire 

strung at knee height. Canby therefore decided to strike with 

overwhelming strength—four divisions totaling 16,000 troops. 

General Steele would command the assault force. As the Federals 

deployed for the attack, the commander of the Blakely garrison, 

Brig. Gen. St. John R. Liddell, ordered his roughly 4,000 foot 

soldiers and gunners to their stations. The defenders ranged 
58 

from battle-hardened veterans to teenage reserves who had not 

yet received their baptism of fire.

At first, the Federals inferred from the steamer traffic running 

between Fort Blakely and Mobile that the Confederates were 

evacuating. On the Union right, skirmishers from Hawkins’ USCI 

division swept forward around 1600 to reconnoiter. They immediately came under fire, indicating that the defenders had not 

abandoned the fort. The Federals drove the Southern skirmishers 

from their rifle pits, but the Confederates shot down those bluecoats who attempted to storm the fort. Though repulsed, Hawkins’ 

skirmishers quickly rallied, and, at 1730, the Federals advanced 

on Fort Blakely with a strong skirmish line, closely followed by an 

even heavier line of battle. In addition to Hawkins’ nine regiments 

of black troops, three divisions of white soldiers from the XIII and 

XVI Corps participated in the assault.

The Federal skirmishers worked their way through the abatis 

while under a heavy small-arms and artillery fire, their movement 

punctuated by an occasional explosion as an unfortunate Union 

soldier tripped a torpedo. “Many brave men fell,” recalled an Iowa 

soldier, “but still we pressed forward as fast as we could run, and 

without firing a shot.” A short distance to the rear, the main line 

of battle advanced “in most gallant style,” noted a Federal officer, 

“on the full run, in the face of a heavy fire, falling at every jump.” A 

Northern artilleryman called the 16,000-man assault “the greatest 

sight I ever saw.” As the Federals overran the fort, many of the 

defenders either fled or surrendered, but others fought to the last, 

including a contingent of teenage reserves. The final struggle was 

hand-to-hand with bayonets and clubbed muskets. As resistance 

inside the fort collapsed, some Confederates threw down their 

weapons and begged for their lives, fearing that the black troops 

would butcher them. But according to Col. Hiram Scofield, a 

brigade commander in Hawkins’ division, his men treated the 

Southern prisoners in their charge “with kindness and courtesy.”

Rounding up the garrison probably took longer than the main 

assault, which lasted about twenty minutes. The Federals captured 

some 3,700 Confederates, including General Liddell, while the 

Union losses numbered 571 killed, wounded, and missing. With 

Spanish Fort and Fort Blakely fallen, General Maury decided 

to evacuate Mobile. For the next two days, Confederate troops 

boarded steamers that took them up the Tombigbee River while a 

few remaining detachments destroyed supplies that could not be 
59

carried off. Maury left Mobile early on the morning of 12 April, 

one of the last Confederates to do so. A few hours later, Canby 

sent two divisions to occupy the city, and Mayor Robert H. Slough 

surrendered to the advance guard at noon. Mobile was now in 

Union hands.

Wilson’s Raid: Georgia

With Mobile under Federal control and the industrial 

core of Alabama in ruins, Wilson pushed on to the overflowing 

Chattahoochee River, which formed the Alabama-Georgia 

border. To save time, he planned to seize an intact bridge at either 

Columbus or West Point, Georgia. To that end, he sent Col. Oscar 

H. LaGrange’s brigade of Brig. Gen. Edward M. McCook’s division 

on the West Point mission while leading the rest of his command 

toward Columbus, thirty-five miles to the south.

The Confederate defenses at West Point consisted of a thirtyfive-foot square redoubt on the Alabama side of the river dubbed 

Fort Tyler in honor of the commander, Brig. Gen. Robert C. Tyler. 

A former brigade commander in the Army of Tennessee, the 

thrice-wounded Tyler moved about on crutches, having lost a leg 

in the Battle of Missionary Ridge. The fort’s armament consisted 

of a 32-pound siege gun and two 12-pound fieldpieces. On the 

morning of Easter Sunday, 16 April, LaGrange’s artillery and the 

bulk of the cavalry—which was fighting dismounted—maintained 

a steady fire on Fort Tyler to occupy the defenders, while the 

mounted 4th Indiana Cavalry charged the bridge and captured it. 

With the crossing in Union hands, LaGrange’s troopers focused 

their efforts on capturing the fort. They dismantled several nearby 

houses to fashion gangways across the steep trench that fronted 

the redoubt. Union sharpshooters posted within the houses picked 

off several Confederates, including Tyler, who was the last general 

officer killed in action during the Civil War.

The Union assault began about dusk. The bluecoats swept 

into the ditch or across the gangplanks and then clambered up 

the embankment. After the Union artillery had silenced the 

Confederate guns, the Federals “sprang to the top of the embankment like a swarm of bees,” noted one Union officer. “Up goes the 

white flag, [the rebels] have surrendered!” Fort Tyler and the West 

Point bridge were now in Union hands. During the operation, 

the Federals lost 36 killed or wounded. The Confederate casualties numbered 18 killed, 28 wounded, and 218 captured. With the 
60 

seizure of West Point, an important Confederate railroad hub fell 

into the Federals’ hands. LaGrange’s men destroyed 19 locomotives 

and 245 cars there—many of them loaded with supplies that the 

Confederates had attempted to move beyond the Yankees’ grasp.

While the fighting at Fort Tyler wound down, the battle for 

the Columbus crossing was just beginning. Like Selma, Columbus 

was a major transportation and manufacturing hub, with an 

arsenal, a weapons factory, a naval ironworks, several mills, and a 

Confederate quartermaster depot. When Wilson’s raiders reached 

the vicinity of Columbus on the afternoon of 16 April, they found 

a mixed force of Confederate soldiers, Alabama and Georgia state 

militia, and local defense units awaiting them. They occupied 

fortifications on the west bank of the Chattahoochee in the town of 

Girard (present-day Phenix City), Alabama, opposite Columbus, 

which stood on the east bank. The Confederates defended two 

bridges, with the strongest works protecting the upper bridge 

located a few blocks north of the lower bridge. The Federals accordingly rushed the lower bridge, only to discover that most of the 

planking had been removed. Before the bluecoats could attempt 

a crossing, the Southerners put the lower span to the torch, and it 

was soon wrapped in flames.

Wilson then shifted his 

attention to the upper bridge. 

He had planned to seize it before 

nightfall, but his strike force 

from Upton’s division was still 

moving into position as the sun 

went down. Faced with making 

a night assault or waiting until 

morning, Upton urged Wilson 

to let him attack at once. “As we 

had already become pretty well 

accustomed to night fighting 

and its advantages,” Wilson 

later noted, “it occurred to me 

that an attack after dark would 

be accompanied by less loss 

and greater success than one in 

full daylight.” Wilson therefore 

authorized Upton to proceed 

with the night assault. This was 

General Upton

(Library of Congress)
61

the sort of assignment that appealed to the 25-year-old Upton, 

enabling him to apply an innovative solution to a knotty tactical 

problem. In this instance, he decided on an attack employing a 

one-two punch: he would lead with a dismounted charge to break 

open the Confederate line and then follow with a mounted dash 

through the gap to seize the bridge before the enemy could burn it. 

Col. Edward F. Winslow’s brigade drew the assignment of 

capturing the bridge. The assault began at 2000 on 16 April, as 

300 dismounted Union cavalrymen rushed forward, following 

the Summerville Road amid a heavy—albeit mostly inaccurate—

small-arms and artillery fire. The Federals soon overran the enemy 

position, leading Upton and Wilson to believe that they had 

broken through the main Confederate line. Upton accordingly 

sent in the mounted force to seize the bridge. In fact, the Federals 

had merely carried one of the Southerners’ outer works, and the 

main fortifications still loomed ahead. As the Union horsemen 

rode toward the Confederate line, “There was a shot, another, and 

in a second 10,000 more,” recalled a Union officer. “The whole 

country seemed to be alive with demons.” In the darkness, many 

Southern defenders mistook the charging Federals for fleeing 

rebels or missed them altogether. The Union troopers also became 

disoriented, and some units “got tangled up” in trying to find the 

bridge. While the veteran bluecoats soon restored order, the largely 

untrained and untested Confederates panicked and broke for the 

rear. The enemy’s confusion enabled the Federals to seize the 

bridge and prevent it from being burned, even though the wooden 

frame reeked with turpentine. Wilson crossed the Chattahoochee 

at 2300, and, by the following morning, Columbus was in Union 

hands.

The casualty figures for the Battle of Columbus are sketchy at 

best. Wilson reported that his command sustained about 25 casualties and captured roughly 1,000 Confederate prisoners. Wilson’s 

raiders had fought their last battle. On 17 April, the Federals 

wrecked the arsenal, the naval ironworks, the quartermaster 

depot, the weapons factory, a paper mill, several textile and flour 

mills, and the ironclad CSS Jackson, along with 15 locomotives and 

over 200 cars.

His destructive work at Columbus finished, Wilson was 

eager to press on to Macon, the temporary capital of Georgia, 

about a hundred miles to the northeast. Leaving Columbus on 

the morning of 18 April, the Union raiders set a blistering pace, 
62 

reaching the vicinity of Macon just two days later. After brushing 

aside a small force of Confederate cavalry, Wilson’s lead division 

under Col. Robert H. G. Minty (replacing the wounded General 

Long) was met by a Confederate flag of truce thirteen miles west 

of Macon. The officer in charge of the flag bore a message from 

Maj. Gen. Howell Cobb, the commander at Macon, indicating 

that Generals Sherman and Johnston had agreed to a cease-fire 

and that the Federals should immediately halt their advance. 

Minty flatly refused to do so, informing Cobb’s representative that 

his party had five minutes to clear the road. Soon after resuming 

the march, Minty’s lead brigade encountered the Confederate 

flag of truce, which apparently was dragging its feet to impede 

the Federals’ progress. Minty ordered a charge and pushed all 

the way into Macon. Faced with the inevitable, Cobb surrendered the town under protest. When Wilson arrived, he upheld 

Minty’s actions and informed Cobb that he would heed only a 

direct order from General Sherman. On the evening of 21 April, 

Wilson received a coded message from Sherman instructing 

him to “desist from further acts of war and devastation until you 

hear that hostilities are resumed.” In the words of historian Noah 

Andre Trudeau, “The greatest cavalry raid of the Civil War had 

come to an end.” 

 

Capture of Jefferson Davis

On 26 April, Confederate President Davis received a 

telegram from Johnston stating that he was on his way to confer 

with Sherman. Assuming that his ranking field commander 

intended to surrender, Davis decided to leave Charlotte at once, 

rejoin his family in South Carolina, and push on to the TransMississippi, where he would continue the war. At noon on the 

twenty-sixth, Davis and his entourage resumed their flight on 

horseback, Stoneman’s raiders having done extensive damage to 

the railroad. The presidential escort consisted of five brigades of 

Confederate cavalry, whose morale was doubtful at best (Map 7). 

The Davis party reached Abbeville, South Carolina, on 2 

May, where the rebel president held what is often referred to as 

the Confederacy’s final council of war. After making a rousing 

speech in which he urged his generals to fight on, he received a 

terrible shock: to a man, the cavalry commanders informed him 

that their sole purpose for accompanying him was to see him to 

safety. Shaken to the core, Davis at last realized that the war was 
63

lost. On 3 May, he and his entourage crossed the Savannah River 

into Georgia. Later that day, Secretary of War Breckinridge—

fearing an outright mutiny—authorized the cavalry escort to be 

paid from the gold and silver specie in the Confederate treasury. 

On the seventh, Davis was reunited with his wife and children. 

12 Apr

3 Apr

2 May

10 May

19 Apr

Savann ah R

Cape Fear R

S antee R

A T L ANTI C

OCEAN

Durham’s Station

Fort Sumter

Fort Fisher

North Carolina RR

Salisbury

Asheville

Abbeville

Greenville

Yorkville

Union

Irwinville

Sandersville

Washington

Warrenton

Charlotte

Fort Mill

Chester

Cheraw

Lincolnton

Florence

Manchester

Greensboro

Danville

Lynchburg

Covington

Goldsboro

Weldon

Fayetteville

Petersburg

Charleston

Augusta

Savannah

Macon

Wilmington

RALEIGH

RICHMOND

COLUMBIA

MILLEDGEVILLE

GEORGI A

NORT H

CAROLIN A

SOUTH

CAROLIN A

VIRGINIA

W EST

VIRGINIA

T ENNESSEE

KENTUCKY Route of Escape

2 April–10 May 1865

FLIGHT OF JEFFERSON D AVIS

0 25 100

Miles

Map 7
64 

Two days later, the Davis party made camp near Irwinville, 

Georgia, confident that they remained a step ahead of their 

Federal pursuers.

They were greatly mistaken. Thus far, the Confederate 

president had managed to elude Palmer’s division of Stoneman’s 

cavalry, but avoiding Wilson’s cavalry, which was patrolling 

the roads into Georgia, was another matter. With the collapse 

of organized resistance in the 

Peach State, capturing Jefferson 

Davis had become Wilson’s top 

priority. He accordingly offered 

a reward of $500,000 for Davis’ 

capture, calculating that the 

Confederate treasury would 

supply the funds. Unknown to 

Wilson and his men, on 2 May, 

President Johnson had issued 

a proclamation accusing Davis 

of complicity in Lincoln’s 

assassination and placing a 

$100,000 bounty on his head.

After several close calls, 

two of Wilson’s best regiments, the 1st Wisconsin 

Cavalry and the 4th Michigan 

Cavalry, picked up Davis’ trail 

in southern Georgia. Early on 

the morning of 10 May, the 

two Federal mounted units 

converged on Davis’ camp a mile and a half north of Irwinville. 

The Davis entourage was whittled down to his family, three 

aides, a seventeen-man cavalry escort, and just one cabinet 

official—Postmaster General Reagan.

In the darkness, the two Union regiments collided and 

opened fire on each other, thinking they had struck Davis’ 

escort. Soon realizing their mistake, the Michigan and 

Wisconsin troopers stopped shooting, but only after friendly 

fire had killed two Union soldiers and wounded four others. As 

it developed, the Confederates were utterly surprised and never 

fired a shot. The Federals captured Davis as he tried to escape 

with his wife’s shawl wrapped about his shoulders. His captors 

Confederate President Davis 

(National Archives)
65

embellished this fact to absurd proportions, and word soon 

spread that Davis had been caught while wearing one of his 

wife’s dresses. Northern journalists and artists had a field day 

portraying Davis fleeing in a hoopskirt and riding boots. The 

Federals took Davis and his entourage to Wilson’s headquarters 

at Macon. From there, Davis was sent north, ultimately serving 

two years’ imprisonment at Fort Monroe, Virginia, for treason. 

Wilson’s troopers arrested numerous other Confederate officials, ranging from Alexander H. Stephens, Davis’ archrival and 

the former vice president of the Confederacy, to Capt. Henry 

Wirz, the notorious commandant of Andersonville prison who 

was later executed for war crimes.

Surrender at Citronelle

By late April 1865, news of the first Sherman-Johnston 

armistice had reached both General Canby at Mobile and his 

Confederate counterpart, Lt. Gen. Richard Taylor, at Meridian, 

Mississippi. As the commander 

of the Department of Alabama, 

Mississippi, and East Louisiana, 

Taylor commanded roughly 

12,000 troops, including 

Forrest’s cavalry and Maury’s 

infantry. The generals agreed 

to arrange a truce under the 

terms of the Sherman-Johnston 

agreement. They met on 29 

April at the Jacob Magee farmhouse, about twenty miles 

north of Mobile. The two men 

presented a striking contrast. 

Clad in a faded and threadbare 

gray uniform, Taylor arrived 

at the conference on a railroad 

handcar, accompanied by just 

one staff officer, while Canby 

and his staff appeared in splendid dress uniforms at the head of a 

brass band and a brigade of soldiers. Within minutes, Canby and 

Taylor worked out a truce behind closed doors. Their business 

concluded, the officers then enjoyed “a bountiful luncheon,” Taylor 

recalled, “with joyous poppings of champagne corks for accompaGeneral Taylor (Library of Congress)
66 

niment, the first agreeable explosive sounds I had heard in years.” 

The band, meanwhile, serenaded the officers with “Hail Columbia” 

and “Dixie”—the unofficial national anthems of the Union and the 

Confederacy. 

On the next day, Canby received word from Secretary of War 

Stanton that the president had rejected Sherman’s terms and had 

ordered him to resume hostilities. Canby had no choice but to 

notify Taylor that, in accordance with their truce, the cease-fire 

would end in forty-eight hours. He also proposed that Taylor 

accept the terms Lee had received at Appomattox Court House. 

On 2 May, the two men agreed to meet at Citronelle, Alabama, 

about thirty-five miles north of Mobile. In notifying his subordinates of his decision to surrender, Taylor urged them to keep their 

commands “in an organized state, faithfully respecting public and 

private property.” He warned that failure to surrender as an intact 

organization would subject the men to being “hunted down like 

beasts of prey” and their families to persecution, bringing ruin 

“upon thousands of defenseless women and children.”

Canby and Taylor met at Citronelle on 4 May. Their agreement bore many similarities to the Appomattox and Bennett Place 

surrender documents. The officers and men paroled under the 

agreement could return to their homes, “with the assurance that 

they will not be disturbed by the authorities of the United States 

so long as they continue to observe the conditions of their paroles 

and the laws in force where they reside.” Officers could keep their 

sidearms and personal baggage, and officers and men alike could 

retain their horses. The U.S. government would provide transportation and rations for all parolees in Taylor’s command. With the 

surrender at Citronelle, the last organized body of Confederate 

troops east of the Mississippi River had ceased to exist.

Surrender in the Trans-Mississippi

In early May 1865, General Edmund Kirby Smith, the 

commander of the Confederate Trans-Mississippi Department, 

pondered his next move. As word of Lee’s surrender spread 

throughout his command—which embraced Missouri, Arkansas, 

Indian Territory (present-day Oklahoma), Texas, and Louisiana 

west of the Mississippi River—morale plummeted and troops in 

his 36,000-man force deserted in droves. He had also just received 

a message from Union Maj. Gen. John Pope offering terms of 

surrender (Map 8).
67

While Smith considered Pope’s offer at his headquarters 

in Shreveport, Louisiana, a 500-man Union force led by Col. 

Theodore H. Barrett embarked on what he later referred to as 

“a foraging expedition” from his coastal base at Brazos Santiago, 

Texas. The raid began on the evening of 8 May. One critic maintained that Barrett simply wanted “to establish for himself some 

notoriety before the war closed.” On 12–13 May, Barrett’s Federals 

clashed with a few hundred Confederates under Col. John S. “Rip” 

PALMITO RANCH 12–13 May

Mississippi R

Mississippi R

Rio Grande

Gulf of Mexico

B razos Santiago

Fort Leavenworth

Camp Ringgold

El Paso

Galveston

Doaksville

Shreveport

Sante Fe

Lawrence

San Antonio

Houston

New

 Orleans

St. Louis

INDIA N

TERRI T O R Y

NEBRASKA

TERRIT O R Y

NEW MEXIC O

TERRI T O R Y

U TA H

TERRI T OR Y

UNORGANIZE D

T ERRIT O R Y

TEXA S

L O U I S I A N A

M I S S I S S I P P I

I O W A

WISCONSIN

ILLINOIS

MISSOUR I

ARKANSA S

KANSAS

MEXIC O

Engagement

Trans-Mississippi Department

May–June 1865

TRANS-MISSISSIPPI C ONFEDER A C Y

0 100 200 300 400

Miles

Map 8
68 

Ford at Palmito Ranch near the Southerners’ base at Brownsville, 

Texas. By the end of the engagement, Ford’s Confederates had 

driven Barrett’s Federals back into Brazos Santiago. The Union 

force suffered about 120 casualties, most of them captured during 

the retreat, while the Confederate losses totaled fewer than 10 

wounded and missing. The fight at Palmito Ranch is widely 

regarded as the last land battle of the Civil War.

In the Trans-Mississippi, the Confederate victory at Palmito 

Ranch was scarcely noticed amid the furor over Lee’s surrender, 

closely followed by the news of Johnston’s surrender in North 

Carolina and Taylor’s surrender 

in Alabama. Kirby Smith, 

however, refused to capitulate 

to Pope, deeming his terms 

too harsh. Instead, he decided 

to transfer his headquarters 

to Houston, Texas, to rally his 

troops in that state. Before his 

departure on 20 May, Smith 

appointed Lt. Gen. Simon 

Bolivar Buckner as his chief 

of staff and left him in charge 

at Shreveport. During the 

250-mile stagecoach journey, 

Smith received reports from 

subordinates at Galveston, 

Texas, and Houston that their 

forces were rioting and plundering government stores. By 

the time he reached Houston 

on 27 May, Smith realized that he commanded an army in name 

only. Soon afterward, he learned that his chief of staff had surrendered the Trans-Mississippi Department behind his back.

On 26 May, General Buckner had met with Canby at the St. 

Charles Hotel in New Orleans, Louisiana, and the two men had 

agreed to terms of surrender. During the negotiations, Buckner 

had informed Canby that the convention was subject to the department commander’s approval. On 2 June, Kirby Smith boarded a 

Union steamer anchored off Galveston and signed the surrender 

agreement, formally terminating the last military department of 

the Confederacy. Nevertheless, a few thousand Trans-Mississippi 

General Smith

(Library of Congress)
69

Confederates refused to accept defeat and crossed the border into 

Mexico. Perhaps the largest such group was Brig. Gen. Joseph 

O. “Jo” Shelby’s thousand-man contingent, which included four 

Southern governors and Kirby Smith. 

The surrender of the Trans-Mississippi Department did not 

include the tribes located in the Indian Territory that were loyal 

to the Confederacy. On 10 June, they held a Grand Council of 

the United Indian Nations and decided that each tribe should 

surrender individually. Nine days later, the Choctaw nation was 

the first to capitulate to a commission headed by Lt. Col. Asa C. 

Matthews of the 99th Illinois Infantry. On 23 June, Brig. Gen. 

Stand Watie rode into the Indian Territory settlement of Doaksville 

and surrendered his battalion of Cherokee, Creek, Seminole, and 

Osage warriors to Matthews. The 58-year-old Cherokee chieftain was the last Confederate general to lay down his arms. The 

last Confederate-affiliated tribe to surrender was the Chickasaw 

nation, which capitulated on 14 July.

The Grand Review

On 17 May 1865, Secretary of War Stanton announced that 

a formal review of the Union armies gathering about Washington 

would be held over two days in the coming week. The Army of 

the Potomac, Maj. Gen. George G. Meade commanding, would 

march on the first day, followed by General Sherman’s Army of the 

Tennessee and Army of Georgia on the second. Since their arrival 

in the nation’s capital, Sherman’s western troops and Meade’s easterners had tangled in countless street fights and barroom brawls 

in an effort to prove their preeminence. In the soldiers’ eyes, the 

Grand Review was a golden opportunity to demonstrate that superiority to the nation at large.

At 0900 on Tuesday, 23 May, cannon fire signaled the start 

of the Grand Review of the Army of the Potomac. Meade and his 

staff led the army’s roughly 80,000 infantry, artillery, and cavalry 

down Pennsylvania Avenue before thousands of onlookers lining 

both sides of the street. The parade route stretched for about a 

mile and a half, from the Capitol to the reviewing stand in front 

of the White House, where President Johnson, General Grant, and 

numerous other senior military leaders and high-ranking government officials watched. On reaching the reviewing stand, Meade 

dismounted and joined the dignitaries. The victors of Appomattox 

marched past for more than six hours, impressing the crowd with 
70 

their smart appearance and parade-ground precision. “The buildings were all draped in national colors,” recalled one soldier. “The 

sidewalks were packed with spectators . . . the bands all played the 

national airs; the people cheered until they were hoarse; banners 

waved and handkerchiefs fluttered.”

Wednesday, 24 May, dawned clear and pleasant. Once again, 

cannon fire signaled the Grand Review to begin at 0900, as Sherman 

led his 60,000-man army group onto Pennsylvania Avenue. 

Following him was the rough-and-tumble XV Corps, better known 

for its fighting qualities than its spit-and-polish appearance. As he 

approached the Treasury building, Sherman could not resist the 

temptation to look back. What he saw filled him with pride. “The 

sight was simply magnificent,” he later recalled. “The column was 

compact, and the glittering muskets looked like a solid mass of steel, 

moving with the regularity of a pendulum.” 

Following each division were symbols of the army’s marches 

through Georgia and the Carolinas. First in line were the ambulances advancing two or three abreast, each with a bloodstained 

stretcher hanging from either side. Next came a motley procession 

of bummers on rawboned horses and mules; black cooks leading 

The Army of Georgia marching in the Grand Review, 24 May 1865

(Library of Congress)
71

pack animals loaded down with kitchen utensils; brawny black 

pioneers carrying axes, picks, and shovels at right shoulder shift; 

and crowds of black women and their children. Each regiment 

seemed to have at least one mascot, ranging from dogs and squirrels to raccoons and gamecocks. Last of all was a herd of livestock, 

including cattle, hogs, goats, chickens, and sheep. The bystanders 

greeted the exotic spectacle with laughter and loud applause.

By the time Sherman had reached the reviewing stand, he and 

his horse were covered with floral wreaths. As he walked up the 

steps, the applause became deafening. Among those who greeted 

him were his wife and eldest son, his father-in-law, and his brother, 

Ohio Senator John Sherman, along with President Johnson, Grant, 

and Stanton. As thousands of spectators looked on, the secretary 

of war extended his hand but hastily withdrew it when Sherman 

snubbed him and shook hands with Grant instead. Sherman thus 

gained his revenge for Stanton’s rough handling of him following 

the rejection of his first agreement with Johnston.

After the Grand Review, the laborious process of demobilizing the million-man Union Army began. While some units 

remained in the South on occupation duty, the rest started the long 

journey north. Several hundred thousand Confederate veterans 

also made their way home—most carrying little more than their 

paroles—to begin rebuilding a region devastated by four years of 

war. Commanders in blue and gray alike issued farewell orders 

to their troops, expressing gratitude for their years of service and 

sacrifice and wishing them well in their civilian pursuits. Union 

General Wilson’s farewell message ranks among the best. In the 

conclusion, he adopted the language of Lincoln’s Second Inaugural 

Address: “Having discharged every military duty honestly and 

faithfully,” Wilson wrote, “return to your homes with the noble 

sentiment of your martyr President deeply impressed on every 

heart, ‘With malice against none, and charity for all, strive to do 

the right as God gives you to see the right.’” 

Analysis

The Civil War did not end with Lee’s surrender at Appomattox 

Court House on 9 April 1865. The fighting raged on, from the 

Carolinas to Texas, for another month. Nevertheless, Confederate 

commanders Johnston, Taylor, and Buckner could read the 

handwriting on the wall, and they wasted little time in obtaining 
72 

generous terms from their Union counterparts. High-ranking 

Southern diehards such as Jefferson Davis and Kirby Smith soon 

discovered that their forces had disintegrated around them, leaving 

just two alternatives: either flee the country or fall into the hands of 

the Union Army. The systematic destruction of the South’s transportation, manufacturing, and industrial facilities during the closing 

months of the war had ensured the futility of further armed resistance, but it also made a swift economic recovery next to impossible, leaving ex-Confederates destitute and bitter over their harsh 

fate. The bloodiest war in U.S. history—final death toll estimates 

range from 600,000 to over 800,000 fighting men—had settled the 

critical issues of secession and slavery but left much else unresolved, 

above all the former slaves’ civil, political, and economic status in 

the postwar South. The U.S. Army’s occupation force in the former 

Confederate states faced the daunting task of keeping the peace and 

implementing Federal policy. Although the soldiers in blue would 

find their new mission less dangerous than fighting the Civil War 

had been, they would find it no less challenging.
73

The Author

Mark Bradley is a historian at the U.S. Army Center of 

Military History in Washington, D.C. He received his bachelor’s 

degree in history from North Carolina State University, and his 

master’s and Ph.D. degrees in history from the University of North 

Carolina at Chapel Hill. His publications include Last Stand in the 

Carolinas: The Battle of Bentonville, This Astounding Close: The 

Road to Bennett Place, and Bluecoats and Tar Heels: Soldiers and 

Civilians in Reconstruction North Carolina.

75

Further Readings

Ballard, Michael B. A Long Shadow: Jefferson Davis and the Final 

Days of the Confederacy. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 

1997.

Barrett, John G. Sherman’s March Through the Carolinas. Chapel 

Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1956.

Bradley, Mark L. Last Stand in the Carolinas: The Battle of 

Bentonville. Campbell, Calif.: Savas Woodbury, 1996.

———. This Astounding Close: The Road to Bennett Place. Chapel 

Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000.

Dobak, William A. Freedom by the Sword: The U.S. Colored Troops, 

1862–1867. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military 

History, 2011.

Hartley, Chris J. Stoneman’s Raid, 1865. Winston-Salem, N.C.: 

John F. Blair, 2010.

Jones, James Pickett. Yankee Blitzkrieg: Wilson’s Raid Through 

Alabama and Georgia. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 

2000.

Trudeau, Noah Andre. Out of the Storm: The End of the Civil War, 

April–June 1865. Boston: Little, Brown, 1994. 

For more information on the U.S. Army in the Civil War, please 

read other titles in the U.S. Army Campaigns of the Civil War 

series published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History 

(www.history.army.mil).
PIN : 104654–000

The

Civil

War Sesquicentennial