[Cite as Jackson v. Coker, 2014-Ohio-5114.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT ) 

JEWELL JACKSON 

 Appellee 

 v. 

NATHANIEL COKER 

 Appellant 

C.A. No. 27123 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO 

CASE No. CV-2011-08-4585 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: November 19, 2014 

 

MOORE, Judge. 

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Nathaniel Coker, appeals from the September 24, 2013 

judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. This Court affirms. 

I. 

{¶2} This matter stems from a dispute over the ownership of real property known as 

161 Lake Street, Akron, Ohio (“161 Lake Street”). In 2010, Plaintiff-Appellee, Jewell Jackson, 

allegedly gave Mr. Coker, her boyfriend, the funds to purchase 161 Lake Street after she and Mr. 

Coker agreed on the following terms: if Ms. Jackson gave Mr. Coker money to purchase the 

property and allowed him to place title in his name in order to improve his credit, Mr. Coker 

would live in the property while it was being renovated, and convey title back to Ms. Jackson 

after the renovations were complete. According to the record, Ms. Jackson spent approximately 

$4,000 on the purchase of the property, and approximately $11,000 on labor and materials for the 

renovations. Once the property was habitable, Ms. Jackson, without Mr. Coker’s knowledge, 
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agreed that Darwin Spencer could rent one of the rooms in the house. Mr. Coker became angry, 

removed Ms. Jackson, Mr. Spencer, and Mr. Spencer’s property from 161 Lake Street, and 

verbally threatened Ms. Jackson. After this incident, Ms. Jackson demanded that 161 Lake 

Street be deeded back to her, and Mr. Coker refused. 

{¶3} In August of 2013, Ms. Jackson filed a complaint against Mr. Coker, which, as 

amended, alleged (1) fraud, (2) unjust enrichment/constructive trust, (3) conversion/replevin, and 

(4) defamation/intentional interference with employee relationships. Mr. Coker filed an answer 

and counterclaim. The counterclaim was subsequently dismissed, and the matter proceeded to a 

bench trial. A magistrate of the trial court found that Ms. Jackson was entitled to relief on her 

claims for fraud, defamation, and constructive trust, and entered judgment in favor of Ms. 

Jackson in the amount of $54,500. Mr. Coker filed objections, and the trial court adopted the 

magistrate’s decision, in part, and modified it, in part, reducing the judgment to $33,500. Mr. 

Coker also filed a motion to stay the proceedings and a notice of appeal/motion for 

reconsideration in the trial court, which were also denied. 

{¶4} The trial court submitted Mr. Coker’s “notice of appeal,” to this Court and we 

dismissed it in a journal entry for failure to comply with App.R. 3(D). (“The notice of appeal 

shall specify the party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment, order or part 

thereof appealed from; and shall name the court to which the appeal is taken.”). See Jackson v. 

Coker, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27017 (Aug. 5, 2013). Mr. Coker then filed two motions to stay the 

proceedings, and two Civ.R. 60(B) motions for relief from judgment. The trial court denied all 

of Mr. Coker’s motions. 

{¶5} It is from the trial court’s denial of his Civ.R. 60(B) motions that Mr. Coker now 

appeals, raising one assignment of error for our consideration. 
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II. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 

DETERMINING THAT [MR. COKER] DID NOT PROVIDE OPERATIVE 

FACTS IN HIS 60(B) MOTIONS WARRANTING RELIEF FROM 

JUDGMENT. 

{¶6} In his sole assignment of error, Mr. Coker argues that the trial court erred in 

denying his Civ.R. 60(B) motions because, in his first motion, he “clearly alleged [f]raud and 

newly discovered evidence” and attached the affidavit of Tommy Tanner, a “material witness,” 

and, in his second motion, he alleged that Mr. Tanner was unavailable at the time of trial. 

{¶7} In response, Ms. Jackson argues that Mr. Coker failed to allege any operative 

facts regarding: (1) fraud, (2) Mr. Tanner’s unavailability at the time of trial, or (3) what Mr. 

Tanner’s testimony would reveal about Ms. Jackson’s expenses. 

{¶8} “The decision to grant or deny a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to 

Civ.R. 60(B) lies in the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an 

abuse of discretion.” State v. Hulgin, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26719, 2013-Ohio-2794, ¶ 7, citing 

Strack v. Pelton, 70 Ohio St.3d 172, 174 (1994). An abuse of discretion indicates that the trial 

court’s decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 

Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). 

{¶9} Civ.R. 60(B) allows a court to relieve a party from a final judgment, order, or 

proceeding under certain circumstances. Such circumstances include: “(1) mistake, 

inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due 

diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial * * *; (3) fraud * * *; 

(4) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged * * *; or (5) any other reason 

justifying relief from the judgment.” Civ.R. 60(B). 
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To prevail on a motion brought under Civ.R. 60(B), the movant must demonstrate 

that: (1) the party has a meritorious defense or claim to present if relief is granted; 

(2) the party is entitled to relief under one of the grounds stated in Civ.R. 60(B)(1) 

through (5); and (3) the motion is made within a reasonable time, and, where the 

grounds of relief are Civ.R. 60(B)(1), (2) or (3), not more than one year after the 

judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken. 

GTE Automatic Elec., Inc. v. ARC Industries, Inc., 47 Ohio St.2d 146 (1976), paragraph two of 

the syllabus. “Civ.R. 60(B) relief is improper if any one of the foregoing requirements is not 

satisfied.” State ex rel. Richard v. Seidner, 76 Ohio St.3d 149, 151 (1996). Additionally, “if the 

Civ.R. 60(B) motion contains allegations of operative facts which would warrant relief from 

judgment, the trial court should grant a hearing to take evidence to verify those facts before it 

rules on the motion.” Id., citing Kay v. Marc Glassman, Inc., 76 Ohio St.3d 18 (1996); Coulson 

v. Coulson, 5 Ohio St.3d 12, 16 (1983). “Conversely, an evidentiary hearing is not required 

where the motion and attached evidentiary material do not contain allegations of operative facts 

which would warrant relief under Civ.R. 60(B).” Seidner at 151, citing S. Ohio Coal Co. v. 

Kidney, 100 Ohio App.3d 661, 667 (4th Dist.1995). 

{¶10} “Under the GTE test, we must first determine if [Mr. Coker] had a ‘meritorious 

defense or claim’ to assert if relief were granted.” Akron Gen. Med. Ctr. v. Med. Mut. of Ohio, 

9th Dist. Summit No. 24484, 2009-Ohio-2679, ¶ 8. “A movant should be cautious and hesitate 

to ‘rely[ ] on filing a motion for relief from judgment with little or no facts and conclusions of 

law.’” Id. quoting Adomeit v. Baltimore, 39 Ohio App.2d 97, 103-04 (8th Dist.1974). 

{¶11} Here, in his first Civ.R. 60(B) motion, Mr. Coker claimed that Ms. Jackson 

“committed a fraud on the courts by using fraudulent checks and receipts” to prove the amount 

she spent on renovating 161 Lake Street. In support, Mr. Coker attached the affidavit of Mr. 

Tanner, several pages of Ms. Jackson’s checks written to Mr. Tanner and Andre Jackson, several 
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pages of Ms. Jackson’s receipts from Home Depot, parts of the transcript from trial, and several 

pages of product descriptions printed from Home Depot’s website. 

{¶12} Mr. Tanner’s affidavit lists all of the “jobs” he remembered doing for Ms. Jackson 

at her various properties, including 161 Lake Street, between April and July of 2011. In his 

affidavit, Mr. Tanner states that at 161 Lake Street, he (1) rewired the basement and first floor, 

(2) plumbed the entire house, (3) replaced drywall and repaired every room, (4) repaired or 

replaced the windows in most of the house, (5) performed miscellaneous carpentry jobs, (6) 

repaired an old door, (7) installed a new door, (8) repaired the gas line, (9) repaired the roof, (10) 

installed a sink, and (11) installed a tub surround. However, Mr. Tanner’s affidavit does not 

speak at all to the issue of fraud, and arguably supports the fact that he did substantial work at the 

161 Lake Street property. Further, the other attached documents do not demonstrate that Ms. 

Jackson committed fraud. 

{¶13} In his second Civ.R. 60(B) motion, Mr. Coker claimed that Mr. Tanner was 

unavailable as a witness at the time of trial and that he had information to “rebut and disprove the 

expenses presented by [Ms. Jackson].” He also claimed that Mr. Tanner had direct evidence 

proving that Ms. Jackson committed fraud. Mr. Coker did not attach any evidentiary materials to 

his second motion, nor did he set forth any facts in support of these allegations. 

{¶14} In denying Mr. Coker’s Civ.R. 60(B) motions without a hearing, the trial court 

stated that: 

* * * 

Upon review and consideration, this [c]ourt finds that [Mr. Coker] has failed to 

allege operative facts that warrant relief pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B). 

[Mr. Coker] alleges that a witness was unavailable at the time of trial, but fails to 

provide any evidence of the witness being unavailable. 
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Furthermore, this [c]ourt has reviewed the entire transcript of the two-part trial of 

this matter and at no time during the first or second part of this trial was a motion 

made to reconvene to locate the alleged unavailable witness, [Mr.] Tanner. 

* * * 

{¶15} Based upon the record before us, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its 

discretion in denying Mr. Coker’s motions without a hearing. Neither the motions, nor their 

attachments, if any, demonstrate operative facts in support of Mr. Coker being entitled to relief 

from judgment due to fraud or the unavailability of a witness. As such, because no operative 

facts were presented in support of Mr. Coker’s motions, the trial court did not err in denying 

them without a hearing. 

{¶16} Accordingly, Mr. Coker’s assignment of error is overruled. 

III. 

{¶17} In overruling Mr. Coker’s sole assignment of error, the judgment of the Summit 

County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy 

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the 

period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is 
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instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the 

mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 

 Costs taxed to Appellant. 

 

 CARLA MOORE 

 FOR THE COURT 

HENSAL, P. J. 

WHITMORE, J. 

CONCUR.

APPEARANCES:

CHRISTINE D. FINAN, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. 

DEAN S. HOOVER, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.