inss.dodlive.mil dh No. 78 1 

Public-public and public-private and partnerships (P4s) are time-proven 

effective solutions for delivering public services at reasonable costs when 

deployed and managed properly. Various U.S. agencies1 and international organizations all have longstanding successful P4 initiatives and projects. Recently, Department of Defense (DOD) leaders have expressed increased interest 

in implementing P4s throughout their organizations.2 As DOD is faced with 

evolving roles and missions in an “unpredictable and complex world amid fiscal 

constraints, the expertise and involvement of the private sector and other public 

organizations will be essential.”3 P4s could be ideal tools intended to “further 

policy objectives, enhance U.S. operational capabilities, reduce costs, gain access 

to nonmilitary expertise or assets, or build greater capacity in partners.”4

While the need for P4s is fairly well articulated, there are still serious 

hurdles to their implementation, with a general lack of explicit guidance, best 

practices, and frameworks for implementing P4s consistently, optimally, or at an 

enterprise level within and across DOD. P4s can be extremely diverse from one 

another in terms of formality, structure, objective, complexity, stakeholders, and 

scope of activity—elements that make enterprise-level consistency difficult. This 

leaves P4 practitioners and organizations in a unique situation, one in which 

creativity, collaboration, and alternate approaches are expressly encouraged to 

achieve a variety of project objectives, while bound by legal, political, mission, 

and financial frameworks that have not yet been established, approved, or tested 

on an enterprise scale. 

While P4 is not a new concept, it has never received as much attention 

as it does today as a tool or technique to accomplish DOD missions. More 

Defense Partnerships:

Documenting Trends and

Emerging Topics for Action 

by Samuel Bendett

Defense Horizons

National Defense University

Center for 

T

e

chnology and 

National Se

curity Poli

c

y

About the Author

Samuel Bendett is an Assistant 

Research Fellow in the Center for 

Technology and National Security 

Policy, Institute for National Strategic 

Studies, at the National Defense 

University.

Key Points

◆ Further integration along with a 

shared forum for common procedures, roadblocks, and solution 

sets will help inform and address 

public-private, public-public (P4) 

functional stovepiping and specialized P4 success in the Department 

of Defense (DOD).

◆ There is a need for formal capture 

of enterprise-wide best practices 

and lessons observed.

◆ DOD personnel have significant 

training and competency in their 

specific career field, but there appears to be a need to either integrate or identify P4 subspecialties 

to develop P4 through the ranks.

◆ Cross-Service collaboration and interagency planning, tiger-teaming, 

and convening non-DOD stakeholders with DOD counterparts 

will support P4s both at a project 

level and an enterprise level.

March 2015
2 dh No. 78 inss.dodlive.mil

practitioners are now being exposed to P4s, and it is 

expected they will consider them equal to or in lieu of 

traditional procurements. 

Lacking centralized instruction for conceiving, designing, and implementing a P4, project initiators are 

each developing separate standards and processes. Many 

organizations within DOD are embracing P4s for their 

discretionary funding to try and “do more with less.” One 

major benefit from the push for P4s appears to be a greater 

understanding at the tactical level of capabilities possessed 

by partners that complement the missions of DOD units. 

Purpose and Methodology

This paper is intended to promote and further P4 

dialogue by documenting and summarizing major themes, 

trends, and emerging issues facing DOD partnerships, 

building off a paper titled Public-Private Cooperation in 

the Department of Defense: A Framework for Analysis and 

Recommendations for Action.

5

 DOD P4 project successes 

and best practices do exist but tend to be anecdotal in nature or functionally stovepiped. After a review of existing 

research, P4 projects and programs, interviews with DOD 

stakeholders including combatant commands (CCMDs), 

as well as participation in P4-centric military conferences, 

summits, and workshops (for example, the Public-Private 

Partnership Working Group convened by the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense/Special Operations and LowIntensity Conflict and the Association of Defense Communities Forums and Summits), this paper intends to 

share the “common themes” and project examples derived 

from that research. Across these multiple sources of research it became apparent that trends, best practices, issues, 

and emerging topics for defense partnerships would most 

appropriately be categorized within four core areas: understanding partnership fundamentals; partnering frameworks and conditions; policy and legislative opportunities; 

and organization, coordination, training, and education.

Understanding Fundamentals

The nature of P4 projects often brings together the 

profit-maximizing and service-maximizing mentalities 

of the private and public sectors, and leverages efficiencies of scale.6

 The differences in perspective are not impossible to reconcile, but it is in the appropriate structuring and implementation of P4s that lead to optimization 

of these fundamentals. There are several concepts that 

are important both to understand and to create successful partnerships: partnerships create mutual value that 

is greater than what the partners could achieve on their 

own, partnerships leverage resources, partnerships address common issues, and partnerships share risk.7

Put another way, P4s must be based on “shared visions, 

principles, goals, objectives, and standards—and these 

must be measured and assessed across all project stages. 

In sum, there needs to be a sense of community around 

a common purpose.” P4 stakeholders, regardless of the 

project application, must appreciate these fundamentals 

and understand how their interplay affects the process, 

establishment, and outcomes of any particular P4. 

Beyond traditional military operations, this “common purpose” underlying P4 models can be used to 

Fundamentals Demonstratrated

Yuma Desert Proving Ground partnered 

with General Motors (GM) in a 50-year 

enhanced-use lease on Department of Defense land to finance, build, and maintain 

a hot weather testing complex, providing 

GM with a secure test location with restricted air space and over $100 million U.S. 

Army estimated cost savings. Keys to success included aligned goals, early engagement of subject matter experts from each 

of the partners, detailed business planning 

and a contract that specifically stated each 

partner’s role/assumed risks, and effective 

stakeholder engagement.
inss.dodlive.mil dh No. 78 3 

achieve and support military missions, incentivize development, and spur local economies.

Leveraging an understanding of these fundamentals from seemingly nonmilitary-related P4 examples 

can inform DOD partnerships. For example, with their 

largest ammonia-based fertilizer facility located in 

Trinidad and Tobago, transcontinental fertilizer firm 

PotashCorp built a 75-acre educational farm in the 

country using a P4 structure. Through this arrangement, the corporation benefits from greater outreach 

and collaboration with farmers. In return, the workforce receives modern training on the use of fertilizer 

technology and application strategies.8 This project example highlights common purpose of the private sector 

and international community that may not otherwise 

have been readily apparent.

Through interviews with CCMDs, it is clear that 

these fundamentals are increasingly being applied to today’s military needs and requirements, where long-term, 

low-intensity operations such as intelligence, cyber, or 

humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HADR) demand 

resources with a much different profile than traditional 

major combat operations. 

While P4s are most often associated with sharing 

of resources on military installations, with an increasing 

number of humanitarian missions, counterinsurgency 

operations, and limited special operations forces actions, military operations other than war are particularly suited for P4.

Partnering and Conditions

Throughout this research, P4 project structuring was 

cited as a critical component both to understand how 

to implement P4s as well as to ensure the right amount 

of formality with flexibility, allowing definition and tangible results alongside creativity and room for adaptation as requirements evolve. Public-Private Cooperation 

in the Department of Defense classifies P4 structures along 

a “continuum of formality,” which features four categories of partnering frameworks that recognize how levels of partnership cooperation evolve organically while 

enabling systemic identification of associated advantages 

and disadvantages. These four broad categories include 

those P4s with contractual arrangements, well-defined 

standards and protocols, broad frameworks for interaction, and emergent/undefined situations.9

 Despite formal structuring as a Category (1) P4, the Bethesda Hospitals’ Emergency Preparedness Partnership reiterates 

that despite structure, the “devil is in the details.” 

Not all scenarios warrant or support a P4 solution. This highlights both the importance of effective 

screening techniques and the use of discretion when analyzing potential P4 projects and determining their ideal 

structure. Martha Amram and Tabitha Crawford10 list 

four conditions that must be met for a P4 arrangement 

to be successful:

The “Devil Is in the Details”

The Bethesda Hospitals’ Emergency Preparedness Partnership between the U.S. 

Navy, private sector, and National Institutes 

of Health medical/healthcare organizations 

was driven primarily by the need for adequate institutional preparedness for a major event, the vision/champion role of the 

base commander, and the partners’ complementary core competencies and resources. 

Despite formal structuring, the P4 faced 

serious obstacles with divergent organizational cultures, different electronic medical 

information/IT systems, and financial/staffing limitations.

SeeBeth Lachman, presentation, RAND Corporation, 

“Installation Public-to-Public Partnerships (PuPs) in the Department of Defense: A Research Perspective,” Association 

of Defense Communities 2013 National Summit, June 12, 

2013; also see D.K. Henderson et al., “Bethesda Hospitals’ 

Emergency Preparedness Partnership: A Model for Transinstitutional Collaboration of Emergency Responses,” Disaster 

Medicine and Public Health Preparedness 3, no. 3 (October 

2009), 168–173.
4 dh No. 78 inss.dodlive.mil

◆ private sector involvement has the potential to add 

value through access to capital and efficiency gains

◆ term of the P4 (contract or otherwise) is of appropriate length to provide private recoupment of funds 

and/or adequate return on investment

◆ revenue streams are stable and sufficient 

◆ cost of capital for the private partner is sufficiently low.

Similarly, Fundamental Concepts of Regional Partnering states that partnerships should only be established 

when the following threshold conditions are met:

◆ There is a definite need felt by multiple organizations that is not met by other means.

◆ An already existing partnership cannot be changed 

to meet the need.

◆ The potential partners each have something to 

contribute to meeting the need.

◆ The potential partners are each willing to make a 

commitment of time and resources to the partnership.

◆ The potential partners can clearly define and communicate both the benefits they will receive individually 

from the partnership, and the common vision and goals 

of the partnership.

For HADR, recent successful operations point to 

formalized relationships such as memoranda of agreement/understanding with the organizations involved. 

CCMD interviewees highlighted two key elements for 

successful P4 HADR operations: a formal relationship 

between organizations and detailed plans to execute to 

respond during a crisis. 

DOD P4 practitioners—such as a J9 staff, privatesector contractorrs employed by the U.S. military, Reserve 

officers in the Army and Air Force, as well as military staff 

at U.S. bases and installations—frequently cited important 

challenges associated with establishing a framework and 

structure to their P4 endeavors, primarily: 

◆ balancing the need to “formalize” the agreement 

with flexibility (that is, ensuring basic requirements are 

identified and codified but leaving room for changing 

needs due to mission, objectives, or operating environment, as already discussed)

◆ working within the frameworks and legal authorities available to the Federal Government to allow such 

partnerships (see Policy and Legislative Opportunity 

below)

◆ dealing with resistance from either partner to “formalize” requirements or certain elements of a P4 due to 

its untested and individualized nature.

With this understanding of the fundamentals 

of P4 considerations for structuring and integration into planning, we can begin to consider P4 for a 

portfolio and deliver the right services and solutions 

to enable continued operations in a constrained yet 

dynamic world. 

Formalized Agreements and 

Plans Result in Effective, TimeSensitive P4 Operations

In response to Hurricane Sandy, for instance, U.S. Northern Command had already brokered an arrangement with U.S. 

Transportation Command and electric 

power companies to provide lift support to 

repair the electrical grid. After Sandy hit, 

power companies loaded their personnel 

and supplies on Air Force C5s on the West 

Coast to repair damage from the hurricane 

in the mid-Atlantic and Northeast. While 

there were some challenges during the 

operation, a preexisting memorandum of 

understanding between the power companies and DOD, as well as electrical infrastructure repair plans, allowed the operation to be a success.
inss.dodlive.mil dh No. 78 5 

Engaging the Private Sector

The most productive partnerships are founded on 

sound principles and the concepts of communication 

and cooperation.

There are several actions that public agencies may 

take to communicate and cooperate with private partners—ultimately attracting them to implement successful P4 projects. In one study, both public and private 

respondents ranked centralized management and communication as the most important traits for a P4 consortium to possess.11 Furthermore, multiple examples indicate standardization (in process and structure, among 

others) and targeted strategic communications as critical 

best practices to engage and attract the private sector in 

a meaningful and productive way. 

The principles and best practices presented in a recent DOD conference session on attracting Foreign Direct Investment in DOD Base Redevelopment12 appear 

to ring true for broader application of P4: know your potential private sector partner; appeal to their motivations; 

address their perceptions; and integrate your communications and outreach with broader efforts. 

Another great example of the flexibility and coordination inherent within the P4 model involves the city 

of Los Angeles, which, in partnership with the nonprofit RAND Corporation, developed quicker, more 

targeted responses to emergencies based on community-level engagement and networks.13 Engaging existing 

organizations and nonprofits allowed the city to efficiently gather data from childcare, religious, assistedliving, and other community-support facilities to better understand where at-risk populations existed so 

response efforts could be better coordinated. This effort 

has resulted in the creation of interconnected community agencies to improve disaster resilience and coordinate disaster response. In this instance, communication, 

engagement, and coordination resulted not just in more 

willing partners but also in enhancement of the operations of the actual P4 opportunity.

Policy and Legislative 

Opportunity 

DOD has multiple existing partnership authorities 

as well as new P4-promoting legislation, just codified 

through 10 USC 2336 (Section 331 of the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act), which authorizes the 

Services to enter into intergovernmental service agreements.14 With the legal authorities, regulations, and legislation that can be used to foster DOD partnerships in 

place, it now takes knowledge and skill to apply these 

authorities effectively. While this research suggests that 

DOD has enabling legislation and policies, it is also clear 

that there still remains confusion among DOD P4 practitioners and programs. The question turns to why existing policy is not implemented optimally.

To highlight the prevalence of this paradox beyond 

just DOD, we turn to state-based P4 research. In the 

United States, 33 states and Puerto Rico have infrastructure-related P4-enabling legislation;15 however, only 7 

Programmatically Recognizing 

the Need for Proactive PrivateSector Engagement

The United Kingdom initiated a secondgeneration P4 program called PF2 in late 

2012, founded with a key objective to 

improve P4 attraction to the private sector. This PF2 program mandated standard 

contract documentation and processes in 

order to facilitate faster transaction times. 

Through greater outreach to institutional 

investors, public sector co-investment, and 

alternative financing sources, PF2 also facilitated P4 access to capital markets and 

helped reduce the debt to equity ratio requirements associated with earlier financing structures. See Jared G. Smith, “A New 

Approach to Public Private Partnerships,” 

thesis citation, HM Treasury Report, United 

Kingdom, 2012.
6 dh No. 78 inss.dodlive.mil

states operate dedicated P4 units, mostly falling under 

the Department of Transportation in each state. 

Furthermoe, DOD stakeholders have indicated 

that DOD general counsel and legal opinion varies 

widely (both across and within the branches of DOD) 

in its interpretation of the legal authorities and their 

application to P4. A perception of legal difficulty remains, causing some potential initiators to abandon P4 

solutions for simpler but potentially more costly strategies. In the experience of CCMD representatives, legal 

challenges rest primarily in the interpretation of P4 efforts, especially regarding solicitation for partnerships 

and gifting regulations. CCMD interviewees indicated 

that greater than the issue of offering too narrow a solicitation is the possibility of becoming inundated with 

too many partners all wishing to engage on a particular issue. Many P4 regulations currently require—or 

are interpreted to mean—that an organization take a 

“partner with one, partner with all” approach, which 

may not be feasible given an organization’s constraints 

and objectives. Some DOD P4 practitioners thus are 

seeking guidance on how to target partners in a fair and 

nonexclusive manner.

Additional specific common challenges relating to 

ambiguity in implementation and interpretation of P4 

policy include perception of conflicting initiatives or 

missions; competition and Federal Acquisition Regulations versus new Section 331, utilization of Small Business and 8A Contracts; Budget versus Cost Accounting; 

Costing Calculations/Methodology; Capital Purchases 

in excess of 5 years;16 and the Office of Management and 

Budget (OMB) Scoring implications.

Based on this research, the answer to the policy 

and legislative issue likely lies in an array of reasons 

including lack of understanding of fundamentals or 

how authorities work, lack of resources, lack of communications, and/or lack of organizational structure to 

promote or support a P4. Many of these reasons can 

be summed up as either “inadequate interpretation” of 

existing policy or legislation or as “cultural inertia that 

resists change and new ideas.”17 Participants of a Tinker 

Air Force Base P4 suggested that the obstacles to P4s 

must be overcome by “changing the status quo, not just 

challenging it.”

Proactive policy/legislative alignment and support 

to promote P4s is clearly needed within the ranks of 

DOD P4 approvers. What this appears to mean is a fundamental change to a culture of embracing and learning 

about the current legal and policy “constraints” and turning them into opportunities. Through better education 

and systematic training (see Organization, Coordination, 

Training, and Education) as well as purposeful, explicit 

alignment of mission to enabling policy, this interpretive 

gap and cultural hesitancy can be overcome to promote 

widespread use of the P4 model. 

Land conservation provides one such example of a 

successful venue for P4 projects that is heavily dependent 

on U.S. Government policies, such as the North American Wetlands Conservation Act.18  These partnerships, 

formed through land trusts, state governments, nonprofit 

groups, and private landholders, use techniques such as 

beneficial tax structures to preserve vital ecosystem services and habitats to endangered species. As these business models often rely on government incentives, they 

Aligning Policy to Project

A European Commission–sponsored initiative connects Web-enabled innovation 

through a P4 structure, intended to develop a single technology platform supported 

by targeted policy, legal, regulatory, and 

political frameworks. Projects within the 

Future Internet P4 are designed to promote 

Future Internet technologies in Europe, advance smart infrastructure, and increase 

business productivity through the Internet. 

By keeping policy aligned with technology 

and services, this structure delivers a forward-thinking approach to uses of P4.
inss.dodlive.mil dh No. 78 7 

are more vulnerable to policy changes than private sector 

fluctuations.19

However, other legislation and policy interpretation is 

beyond the direct control of DOD—two issues are of particular importance to the future effective implementation 

of P4s: 1) Revisiting OMB “A-76” Privatization Process—

this has been used over the past few decades to outsource 

many Federal jobs, saving the taxpayers millions of dollars, 

but it has also been heavily criticized both by Federal organizations and by the private sector as being cumbersome, 

slow, and in some cases unfair;20 and 2) Reformation of 

Budget Scoring—this involves OMB “scoring” the effects 

of major Federal actions and decisions on the Federal budget in relation to predicted streams of tax revenue, which 

is generally perceived by the private and public sectors as 

problematic, with the potential for impeding successful 

partnerships. Scoring needs to be reformed in relation to 

partnerships, especially in cases where the benefits to the 

Federal agency (or agencies) involved make clear fiscal and 

budgetary sense.21

Measuring Success

There is recognition that more study and rigorous documentation are needed to truly benchmark and 

measure what P4 success means. Combatant command 

interviewees indicated a sense that while senior leaders 

are encouraging P4s through the budget process, which 

drives much of DOD’s day-to-day priorities, P4s are not 

necessarily being encouraged as a cost-saving measure, 

an optic that instead encourages projects to proceed with 

the full cost burdened by the Federal Government. In an 

environment of shrinking budgets, senior leaders within 

DOD have sent a clear message that budgets should be 

trimmed. However, there is no mechanism that compels 

the establishment of a P4 versus a project wholly funded 

by DOD when there is sufficient funding for a DODonly project. Project cost estimates—with some exceptions—are performed with the expectation that DOD 

shoulder the entire cost, which is then appropriated. If, 

for instance, a 25 percent cost savings could be realized 

with the added burden of a P4, there is no incentive for 

a project initiator to pursue this savings since the initiator would likely be unable to use those saved funds elsewhere. This setup may actually discourage cost savings 

because a P4 injects some complexity and risk with no 

perceived benefit for the project initiator.

Because different types of P4s support different 

types of objectives, specific objectives need to be clarified 

early in the process and used as initial measures of success. The structure, complexity, scale, and variation of P4 

results and the multiple objectives of P4s within DOD 

may discourage many from attempting to formalize assessment methods at an enterprise level. 

One challenge, recognized through research into 

the implementation of several emerging P4 programs, is 

their ongoing maturation. The very nature of P4 maturity 

within the United States and within DOD lends itself 

to an evolving set of metrics, especially as P4 concepts 

and programs mature through defense organizations. For 

example, early on, as with one of the Service’s Enhanced 

Use Lease and other P4 programs, metrics might center 

on quick wins and the number of partners or projects 

or interested parties. However, as projects and programs 

mature, quality becomes more paramount and accountability takes center stage, leading to metrics in return on 

investment, risk/return, or even portfolio-level management concerns. This all-important evolution of P4 maturity further complicates the measurement of P4 success. 

Policy Clarification

Recent ambiguity on application of 10 USC 

§ 2922a has led DOD to clarify its interpretation to allow for 30-year energy service 

contracts, promoting optimum financing 

terms and payback periods for energy P4s. 

Capitalizing on this clarification, the Army 

has utilized a Metropolitan Area Transportation Operations Coordination program 

to screen and streamline developer selection as partners in energy projects.
8 dh No. 78 inss.dodlive.mil

Beyond the maturity challenge, a presentation during a P4 Summit in 2013 by the U.S. Air Force highlighted a definitional challenge. In this presentation 

the Air Force indicated that it sought a P4 to achieve 

“high-performance project delivery: at a fair cost . . . 

at the right quality . . . and on time.” The words fair

and right accurately portray the definitional challenges 

and subjectivity associated with measuring success of a 

P4. Additionally, the tradeoffs required to achieve these 

qualitative fair and right measures of success are not 

necessarily simple to derive, nor are they straightforward to balance. 

Quantifiable P4 benefits are well known (cost savings, additional resources, provision of research and development [R&D] space, intellectual capital or strategic 

intelligence, and new infrastructure, among others), but 

P4 often involves lesser known and less quantifiable, intangible benefits. 

These challenges are further compounded by the 

multiple objectives or purposes of P4s within the DOD 

enterprise, including cost reduction/savings, revenuegeneration, enhancing security or intelligence, educating 

workforces, augmenting humanitarian relief, promoting R&D, and improving community relations—all of 

which drive the need for a multifaceted approach to 

“valuing” a P4 and establishing a common framework to 

measuring success.

Absent this common enterprise framework, best 

practices (for example, accounting approaches, metrics/key performance indicators, rigorous post-closing management, auditability, lifecycle cost accounting) from a variety of disparate programs do exist. 

Examples from more mature P4 programs abroad 

offer lessons for the United States in measuring success, improving transparency, and ensuring “value for 

money” through P4 strategies.22 One example comes 

from the PF2 (Private Funding) program, which 

launched the Operational Savings Programme to address cost effectiveness, value for money, and transparency issues, and now publishes the “Whole of 

Government Accounts,” accounting for debt held in 

Public-Private Partnerships and increasing transparency. In 2002, the Swiss nonprofit Global Infrastructure Basel designed an assessment scoring system for 

water P4 projects, which now applies to 14 categories 

of infrastructure. The system offers project sponsors 

the incentive to participate in a global investment 

forum to self-evaluate their project in terms of 10 

sustainability criteria: customer focus, poverty alleviation, accountability, transparency, balanced partnership, result orientation, resource protection, shared 

incentives, proactive risk management, and sound 

financing mechanisms. Projects that undertook this 

rigorous self-assessment gained credibility for investors because they were seen as less likely to encounter 

policy challenges or unforeseen risks. 

Effectively and consistently measuring P4 success 

is important to justify future and past projects to current and potential stakeholders. DOD should want 

to know whether it is implementing these innovative 

structures appropriately and for the right reasons. “P4 

is not a silver bullet. . . . It is a way for the public 

and private sectors to work together to support the 

common good and produce returns on investment that 

transcend mere monetary rewards.”23

Measuring Intangible Benefits

The P4 between the Air Force Research Lab 

and Antelope Valley College (AVC) results 

in increases in number of scientists, engineers, and technicians from which to draw 

employees for the base; joint research/

access to AVC facilities; faculty gains and 

help in lab research projects; improvement 

to enrollment, teachers, and skills in the region; and enhanced research opportunities 

and courses. Success in this case is “measured” in job creation, new students, and 

improved curriculum. 
inss.dodlive.mil dh No. 78 9 

Organization, Coordination, 

Training, and Education

Organizations undertaking significant P4 projects 

have been shown to benefit from a centralized public 

agency or office to facilitate cooperation and procedures 

between and within public and private sector agents.

The lack of a central point of contact is one of the 

primary complaints of many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and private sector organizations that want 

to work with the U.S. Government. The Marcus Ahadzi 

and Graeme Bowles24 study on organizational structures 

found that private sector partners value the existence of 

a P4 expertise center within a public partner’s organization, suggesting a powerful institutional solution to 

maximize private sector involvement. The Brookings Institution also advocates for a central P4 unit.25 As stated 

by Jared G. Smith in a study on delivering sustainable 

infrastructure, “in the U.S., national and international 

companies must wade through myriad state and local 

policies and priorities, making private participation difficult. Furthermore, expertise remains housed in agency 

silos, hardly capable of delivering the integrated infrastructure necessary for sustainable development.”26

Many national P4 expertise centers currently operate internationally, which could serve as models for 

the United States and DOD. Examples range from the 

European Public Private Partnership Expertise Center 

(EPEC) to Infrastructure UK to the Canadian Council 

for Public Private Partnerships. Smith argues that Europe benefits from established centralized financial and 

technical institutions, namely the European Investment 

Bank and the EPEC, supporting investment systems and 

methods across asset classes and political boundaries.

A single centralized DOD public office to facilitate cooperation and procedures between public and 

private sector agents, regardless of functional objective, 

may therefore be critical to successful P4s. Such an office could be designed to standardize required documentation, provide portfolio analysis of P4 opportunities 

across all defense operations, monitor projects, analyze 

trends and support benchmarking, capture best practices and success stories, and provide education, training, and technical expertise. Furthermore, establishment 

of a prominent office could serve as a strong indicator 

to potential private and public sector partners of DOD’s 

commitment to the P4 type of business model. 

Already, initial work has been done to capture and 

document existing P4 projects for DOD informationsharing. In its examination of government, NGOs, 

and private-sector project databases, National Defense 

University researchers have identified 124 examples of 

effective P4s across a wide spectrum of industries and 

governmental agencies. Data were collected on the brief 

histories of the partnerships, their overall intent, and 

the partners involved.  In effect, this research (and an 

initial project list) provides a snapshot of current initiatives around the world, organized by location and targeted industry.  But this is just a start—CCMDs and 

other DOD practitioners are seeking more. 

The logical next step is to make the P4 project list a usable resource for DOD P4 stakeholders as one element of 

Evidence of Greater 

Understanding of P4

There is evidence of greater understanding 

of P4 in “pockets” formed around the critical mission areas for individual U.S. combatant commands. Therefore, while U.S. 

Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) focuses on humanitarian assistance/disaster 

relief (HADR) and builds P4s that support 

this type of mission, U.S. Southern Command is forming relationships to counter 

narcotics and human-trafficking threats, 

and U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) specializes in P4s for training and educating 

Pacific partners. There has been some overlap, such as USNORTHCOM leveraging its 

HADR-focused partnership with Walmart 

in support of USPACOM during Operation 

Tomodachi.
10 dh No. 78 inss.dodlive.mil

the services offered by a centralized DOD P4 office. Potential end users are eager to receive P4 implementation guidance from Office ofo the Secretary of Defense and Joint 

Staff, but they note that it has to be sufficiently specific as 

to support the needs of all echelons yet not so specific as to 

constrain creative applications. DOD centralization to serve 

as a coordinating, rather than directive, office will further facilitate information-sharing and advocacy. Supporting the 

unique missions of each CCMD, component, Service, and 

Installation through P4 requires a level of flexibility that a 

centralized “directive” office could not be able to provide, 

but a “coordinating” office would.

Since many DOD staff and leaders with responsibilities across the range of doctrine, organization, 

training materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, as 

well as those with specific joint professional military 

education responsibilities, do not have a comprehensive understanding of P4, a centralized office would 

comprehensively address the clear needs for culture 

change that promotes P4: increased policy alignment 

with adequate interpretation, creation of common 

business practices, and education/training. It is incumbent on the modern warfighter and defense leader to 

understand that a P4 model can be part of his strategic 

and operational resource and capability toolkit. Education and training are necessary at all levels including 

senior Service schools. Especially at the CCMD level, 

where uniformed personnel rotate their roles constantly, continuity of practice and direction is a critical 

asset for P4s. 

Ideally, project initiators would like a checklisttype policy document that identifies the step-by-step 

process for designing and implementing a P4, but 

since arrangements can span such a wide area of operations, from intelligence-gathering to moving materiel, they recognize the limitations of higher level 

guidance. CCMDs suggest that focusing on addressing issues that have thwarted some projects might be 

the most useful to translate individual lessons learned 

into time-tested application. For instance, a guiding 

document, tool, or resource should address best practices for project valuation, what types of formalized 

arrangements are acceptable, and legal precedents that 

allow such arrangements to proceed.

The “P4 Project List” or some iteration thereof 

could be a fundamental starting point for a centralized 

office to turn the practiced into the practical. A meaningful data set with relevant, usable P4 information for 

cross-DOD promulgation could provide the desired 

resources identified above to the DOD community. 

To achieve this, any P4 Project List would need to be 

robust enough to derive specific challenges, pitfalls, 

best practices, sample structures, and potential willing 

partners to any given future P4 initiative. The initial P4 

Project List could be enhanced to include several additional metrics to quantify partnerships, identify critical 

deal/agreement terms, compare them to standard government procurement data, and show the overall costs 

and benefits of each partnership. In this way, the value 

of certain types of partnerships may be better recognized by future government decisionmakers who may 

then work to identify an optimal point of returns and 

scale. Finally, an analyzed set of critical challenges to 

each partnership and mitigation approaches used would 

prove invaluable to DOD project leaders looking for a 

benchmark, the education, and a guide to developing 

new initiatives.

Examples of Progress

Consider the Global Partnership Initiative at the Department of State, Office of 

Public-Private Cooperation at U.S. Southern Command, the new office within the 

Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

the Air Force for Installations to study and 

prototype a partnering program with local 

communities, the DOD’s Renewable Energy Siting Clearinghouse, and the Army’s 

Energy Initiative Task Force.
inss.dodlive.mil dh No. 78 11 

Conclusion

To meet current fiscal challenges, DOD must explore all financing alternatives including P4s. A P4 model 

will not always fit a project’s needs; it is not a “silver bullet.” Rather, a P4 is a way to bring a variety of tools, resources, capabilities, and capacities to bear on common 

issues to support the common good.

27 Before developing 

this capability, however, DOD must allocate appropriate 

resources now to clarify authorities and establish robust 

procedures and analysis methodologies to appropriately 

promote P4s. 

The following observations should inform DOD’s 

ongoing momentum in organizing around P4s:

◆ CCMD, Service-specific, and task force entities are 

the current/emerging DOD mechanism for propelling 

P4 initiatives.

◆ Further integration along with a shared forum for 

common procedures, roadblocks, and solution sets will 

help inform and address P4 functional stovepiping and 

specialized P4 success.

◆ There is a need for formal capture of enterprisewide best practices and lessons observed.

◆ DOD personnel do not have significant training 

and competency in identifying and developing P4s.

◆ Cross-Service collaboration and interagency 

planning, tiger-teaming, and convening non-DOD 

stakeholders with DOD counterparts will support P4s 

both at a project level and an enterprise level.

◆ With anecdotal best practices and project success 

stories, a regular forum would spur and motivate ongoing 

dialogue and learning on P4s throughout DOD. 

Incremental changes may bring incremental benefits 

now, but systemic solutions such as an established DOD 

P4 expertise center will be needed to achieve the scale 

required to meet the evolving demands placed on DOD 

in the new strategic environment. 

Notes

1 A review of multiple databases, case studies, and concept papers 

has identified over 4,000 examples of public-public and public-private 

partnerships (P4s). Valuable resources include the State Department’s Global Partnership Initiative Office, with special thanks to Jim 

Thompson, Deputy Special Representative for Global Partnerships; 

RAND Corporation’s Arroyo Center; National Council for PublicPrivate Partnerships; U.S. Agency for International Development; and 

Global Development Alliance.

2 Department of Defense (DOD) Policy Memorandum, “PublicPrivate Partnerships Supporting the DOD Mission,” April 25, 2013.

3 Linton Wells II and Samuel Bendett, Public-Private Cooperation 

in the Department of Defense: A Framework for Analysis and Recommendations for Action, Defense Horizons 74 (Washington, DC: NDU 

Press, January 2012).

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 Jared G. Smith, “A New Approach to Public Private Partnerships,” HM Treasury Report 2012 (United Kingdom).

7 Steve Bonner, “Fundamental Concepts of Regional Partnering,” 

SONRI, Inc., 2010.

8 Farming First, “Innovation and Incentives for Farmers Needed 

to Protect World’s Biodiversity,” press release, May 21, 2010, available 

at <http://farmingfirst.org/tag/public-private-partnership/>.

9 Wells and Bendett.

10 Martha Amram and Tabitha Crawford, “Unleashing Local 

Green Jobs Through Energy Savings,” Encyclopedia of Energy Engineering and Technology, 2011.

11 Marcus Ahadzi and Graeme Bowles, “Public–Private Partnerships and Contract Negotiations: An Empirical Study,” Construction 

Management and Economics 22 (November 2004), 967–978.

12 Janine Cary, “Attracting Foreign Direct Investment,” Association of Defense Communities (ADC) Base Redevelopment Forum, 

Portland, Maine, September 24–26, 2013.

13 Lauren Katims, “LA Build Resilience Through Wide-Reaching 

Relationships,” Emergency Management, November 4, 2013, available at 

<www.emergencymgmt.com/disaster/LA-Resilience-Wide-ReachingRelationships.html?page=1&>.

14 Glenn Seitchek and Steve Bonner, “Helping Defense Communities Save Money: New Authority Allows Military Installations 

to Enter into Inter-Governmental Support Agreements with State 

and Local Governments to Mutually Share Services,” The Military 

Engineer, September–October 2013; Jaime Rall, “Public-Private 

Partnerships for Transportation: A Toolkit for Legislators,” National 

Conference of State Legislatures, January 2013; Tim Lyon, presentation, ADC National Summit, Washington, DC, June 6–16, 2013; and 

Fred Meurer et al., “Installation-Community Partnerships: A New 

Acknowledgments

The author appreciates the support of 

Oscar De Soto, Aubris Pfeiffer, and Jared 

Smith of Booz Allen Hamilton in preparing 

this paper. He also thanks Dr. Linton 

Wells II, former Director of the Center for 

Technology and National Security Policy.
12 dh No. 78 inss.dodlive.mil

Paradigm for Collaborating in the 21st Century,” Journal of Defense 

Communities 1 (February 20, 2013), 8.

18 Eve Endicott, ed., “Land Conservation Through Public Private 

Partnership,” Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 1993.

19 Ibid.

20 Meurer et al., 8

21 Ibid.

22 Smith. 

23 Meurer et al., 6.

24 Ahadzi and Bowles.

25 Emilia Istrate and Robert Puentes, “Moving Forward on 

Public-Private Partnerships: U.S. and International Experience with 

PPP Units,” Brookings-Rockefeller Project on State and Metropolitan 

Innovation, December 2011.

26 Smith. 

27 Meurer et al., 6.

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