J-A17032-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

NAZARIO JUAREZ-ATONAL AND 

ELENA JIMENEZ-HERNANDEZ

v.

EDWARD W. FRAME 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2749 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment Entered October 5, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Civil Division at No(s): 200301555

BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED OCTOBER 2, 2024

Edward W. Frame (“Appellant”) appeals the entry of judgment against 

him in favor of Plaintiffs Nazario Juarez-Atonal (“Juarez-Atonal”) and Elena 

Jimenez-Hernandez (“Jimenez-Hernandez,” collectively “Appellees”).

1

 We 

affirm.

The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history of the case 

as follows:

On December 14, 2019, [Appellees] and [Appellant] were 

involved in a motor vehicle collision on I[nterstate]-95. 

[Appellant] rear-ended the car being driven by [Appellee] JuarezAtonal in which [Appellee] Jimenez was a passenger. On the day 

of the collision, [Appellees] had been car shopping and ultimately 

purchased the car they were in at the time of the collision. See

N.T. 4/17/23 at 61. It was a rainy day[,] and [Appellees] were 

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1 Appellant purports to appeal from the order denying his post-trial motions. 

An appeal does not lie from the denial of post-trial motions. See Jackson v. 

Kassab, 812 A.2d 1233, 1233 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2002). We have accordingly 

corrected the caption. 
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sitting in stop-and-start traffic when[,] without warning[,] they

were struck from behind. See id. at 62. Both [Appellees] were 

wearing their seatbelts at the time of the impact. See id.

Following the collision, [Appellees] began to feel pain. 

[Appellee] Juarez-Atonal testified that he had pain in his back and 

spine. See N.T., 4/17/23, at 65. He treated the pain by taking 

Tylenol but that did not alleviate the pain. Two days following the 

collision, [Appellee] Juarez-Atonal went to Temple Hospital 

emergency room to seek treatment for the ongoing pain. See id.

He was prescribed medication to relieve the pain, but he still 

experienced pain over the next three to four weeks. At times, the

pain was so bad that [Appellee] Juarez-Atonal [] was unable to 

eat. See id. at 66. [Appellee] Juarez-Atonal began to attend 

physical therapy twice a week to help with his pain but stopped 

attending when the Covid-19 pandemic began. See id. at 68. 

[Appellee] Juarez-Atonal was unable to return to his job in 

construction due to the pain. See id. at 71. [Appellee] Jimenez 

suffered from shoulder, neck, and back pain stemming from this 

collision. See id. at 43. She also went to the hospital two days 

after the accident and was too prescribed pain killers. See id. 

She continued to experience the pain and had restricted 

movement in her arms that prevented her from returning to her 

housekeeping job. See id. at 44. Beginning approximately a 

month after the accident, [Appellee] Jimenez attended physical 

therapy about two times a week. See id. at 45. This therapy was 

reduced following the onset of the pandemic. See id. [Appellee] 

Jimenez has been able to return to work in a limited capacity, 

working around half as much as she used to prior to the collision. 

See id. 

Trial Court Opinion, 1/3/24, at 1-2 (citation format corrected, capitalization 

standardized).

Appellees filed their complaint in 2021. At a trial in April 2023, a jury 

found for Appellees and assessed damages at $62,500 for each. The court 

molded the amount of damages to $50,000 for each Appellee pursuant to 

Pa.R.Civ.P. 1311.1(a) (relating to appeal of awards from compulsory 

arbitration). Appellees filed a motion for delay damages. Appellant filed a 
J-A17032-24

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post-trial weight of the evidence challenge to the excessiveness of the verdict. 

The trial court denied Appellant’s post-trial motion and granted Appellees’

motion. Appellant timely appealed and he and the trial court complied with 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant presents two claims on appeal:

1. Whether the trial court committed an error or law and/or an 

abuse of discretion in denying [Appellant’s] post-trial motion 

seeking a new trial or in the alternative, a remittitur of the . . . 

verdict . . . as to [Appellee] Jimenez-Hernandez . . . [where] 

said relief was appropriate as the verdict should have shocked 

the judicial consciousness [sic] considering the limited 

treatment, an ER visit two days after the accident with a 

diagnosis [of] cervical and lumbar sprain, followed by 23 visits 

at MRCP for cervical/thoracic, bilateral shoulder sprain and 

strain, the absence of objective evidence of injury per MRI, 

[and] when no wage loss or economic damages were claimed, 

and the matter had been filed initially as an arbitration matter 

. . . [?]

2. Whether the trial court committed an error or law and/or an 

abuse of discretion in denying [Appellant’s] post-trial motion 

seeking a new trial or in the alternative, a remittitur of the . . . 

verdict . . . as to [Appellee] Juarez-Antonal considering the 

limited treatment, an ER visit two days after the accident with 

a diagnosis [of] cervical and lumbar sprain, the absence of 

objective evidence of injury per MRI, [and] when no wage loss 

or economic damages were claimed[,] and the matter had been 

filed initially as an arbitration matter . . . [?]

Appellant’s Brief at 3 (capitalization standardized).
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Appellant claims address the trial court’s denial of his post-trial motion 

for relief challenging the weight of the evidence supporting the jury’s award 

of damages to both of the appellees.

2

Pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.1, Post-Trial Relief, the court may, inter alia, 

(1) order a new trial as to all or any of the issues; or

(2) direct the entry of judgment in favor of any party; or

* * * * *

(4) affirm, modify or change the decision; or

(5) enter any other appropriate order. . ..

Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.1.

A post-verdict weight claim asks the trial court to conclude the verdict 

is so contrary to what it heard and observed as to constitute a miscarriage of 

justice. See Criswell v. King, 834 A.2d 505, 512 (Pa. 2003). A jury is free 

to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to determine the credibility of 

witnesses. See Fisher v. American International Industries, 313 A.3d 

1140, 1149 (Pa. Super. 2024).

Where, as here, a challenge to the denial of a new trial is based on an 

assertion that the fact-finder’s award of damages was excessive, this Court 

reviews the trial court’s action for an abuse of discretion, see Gbur v. Golio, 

932 A.2d 203, 212 (Pa. Super. 2007), and assesses whether the trial court 

erred in finding the verdict did not shock its conscience, not whether the 

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2 Appellant does not challenge the jury’s finding of liability as to both 

Appellees.
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verdict shocks this Court’s conscience. See Getting v. Mark Sales & 

Leasing, Inc., 274 A.3d 1251, 1260 (Pa. Super. 2022).

A verdict is not excessive simply because it is large; each case is 

dependent on its own special circumstances. See Gbur, 932 A.2d at 212. 

The following factors are relevant to an excessiveness challenge:

(1) the severity of the injury; (2) whether the plaintiff’s injury is 

manifested by objective physical evidence or whether it is only 

revealed by the subjective testimony of the plaintiff . . . ; (3) 

whether the injury will affect the plaintiff permanently; (4) 

whether the plaintiff can continue with his or her employment; (5) 

the size of the plaintiff’s out-of-pocket expenses; and (6) the 

amount plaintiff demanded in the original complaint.

Mecca v. Lukasik, 530 A.2d 1334, 1340 (Pa. Super. 1987) (citation omitted).

Appellant’s weight claim asserts the jury awarded excessive damages to 

Jimenez-Hernandez because she treated only twenty-three times for 

cervical/thoracic, bilateral shoulder sprain and strain, returned to her doctor 

only once annually for the next two years, worked three days per week as a 

housekeeper after the accident, and a radiologist found no evidence of 

herniation, fracture or spinal instability. Appellant further asserts JimenezHernandez’s injury was neither severe nor suggestive of a permanent injury, 

did not cause wage loss or out-of-pocket expenses, and the case was originally 

filed as an arbitration matter. See Appellant’s Brief at 8-15.

The trial court determined the jury’s verdict did not shock its conscience. 

The court noted Jimenez-Hernandez testified, inter alia, she had worked five 

to six days weekly before the accident and could only work three days per 
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week afterward, suffered pain for some period after the accident, and only 

reduced therapy treatments because of Covid-19. It determined the verdict 

did not shock its conscience. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/3/24, at 2, 4; N.T., 

4/17/23, at 45-47.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Appellant’s weight 

claim as to Jimenez-Hernandez. The record shows Jimenez-Hernandez was 

only able to work half as many days after the accident as she did before. She 

introduced medical evidence that more than one and one-half years after the 

accident she still had persistent cervical spine and bilateral shoulder pain and 

strain, and the doctor wrote at that time that “her prognosis for a full recovery 

is poor, and her injuries are permanent.” See N.T., 4/17/23, at 91-93. 

Further, Jimenez-Hernandez testified that more than three years after the 

injury there are still many things – like lifting – she cannot do, and her work 

is harder to do than before the accident. See id. at 49, 52. Finally, that she 

originally sought an award of $50,000 or less pursuant to the jurisdictional 

limitations of arbitration does not demonstrate excessiveness where the 

molded jury award is $50,000. See Mecca, 530 A.3d at 1340. Appellant’s 

assertion lacks merit.

Appellant also advances a weight claim concerning the award to JuarezAtonal. He asserts that although Juarez-Atonal had a decreased lumbar range 

of motion nine months after the accident, he had normal strength and 

sensation, had only twenty-two chiropractic visits, made no economic loss 
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claim, was bound by the limited tort option, and had a pre-existing lumbar 

condition. See Appellant’s Brief at 16-18.

The trial court stated that Juarez-Atonal’s pain was so unbearable in the 

first three or four weeks after the accident it prevented him from eating at 

times, he had physical therapy until the pandemic forced him to stop 

attending, he was unable to return to his construction work due to the pain 

he experienced, has difficulty sleeping, and can no longer drive long distances. 

See Trial Court Opinion, 1/3/24; N.T., 4/17/23, at 66-72. Medical evidence 

established Juarez-Atonal had a decreased range of motion in the lumbar 

paraspinals more than one and one-half years after the accident, and the 

doctor found at that time that “his prognosis for a full recovery is poor, and 

[his] injuries are permanent.” See N.T., 4/17/12, at 94-98.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to grant 

Appellant’s weight claim as to Juarez-Atonal, who was unable to work due to 

pain from the accident, had a poor prognosis for full recovery, and experienced 

other disturbances to normal daily activity. Finally, the $50,000 molded award 

does not demonstrate excessiveness. Given those circumstances, the 

damages award to Juarez-Atonal was not excessive and Appellant failed to 

prove an abuse of discretion. See Mecca, 530 A.3d at 1340.

Judgment affirmed.
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Date: 10/02/2024