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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE
In the Matter ofthe Detention of P.C. No. 70256-4-1

UNPUBLISHED OPINION FILED: June 16, 2014 Verellen, A.C.J. — P.C. seeks reversal of a 14-day involuntary treatment order. He contends that the trial court erred in summarily denying his request to represent himselfinthe proceedings and challenges the sufficiency ofthe evidence supporting the court's finding that because of a mental disorder, he presented a likelihood of serious harm to property ofothers. Finding no error, we affirm. FACTS Alex had been sharing an apartment with his younger brother P.C. for a couple of months in March 2013, when he began to notice changes in P.C.'s behavior. P.C.
was sleeping very little and exhibiting abnormally energetic and erratic behavior. Around the middle ofthe month, Alex received a call from P.C, who was on a 

### trip to Oregon. P.C. acknowledged that things did not seem "quite right."1 He described "seeing things inthe cornerof his eye," mentioned "waterturning to wine," 

### and admitted that he might need "help."2 P.C. later drove backto Seattle in the

1Report ofProceedings (RP) (Apr. 2, 2013) at 9. 2 Id.No. 70256-4-1/2
middle ofthe night, without his wallet or cell phone. Back in Seattle, P.C. told Alex 

### that while in Oregon he had "found a cure for depression."3 One night shortly after, P.C. stayed up afterAlexwent to bed. During the night, Alex continually woke up to sounds ofbanging. Alex checked on P.C. at some point and found him banging pocket knives on a table. P.C. was convinced thatthe 

### Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was controlling his playlistand monitoring him. Alex checked on P.C. again and found that he had smashed a chair. P.C. then threw


### some items off the fifth floor balcony of the apartment and leftthe apartmentwearing a shirt and boxer shorts, and no shoes. P.C. informed Alexthat he was going to confront the CIA, which he believed was conducting surveillance from a truck across the street. 

### Alex found P.C. a shorttime later surrounded by law enforcement officers, who were there to investigate another matter. The officers told Alex that P.C. had 

### tried to climb into a fire truck. P.C. then scaled andjumped over a six to seven foot gate, ran around the secured parking area behind the gate for a minute, thenjumped back over. Alex told the police that his motherwas on herway and they were going to take P.C. to a hospital. The police let P.C. go with Alex. As Alex led P.C. backto the apartment, P.C. tried to get into moving vehicles


### as they drove by. When they passed a steel-framed parking garage gate with wire mesh grilles, P.C. punched through three ofthe grilles and knocked them out. P.C. also punched a truck and was hopping around on one foot, clapping above his head,

3 Id. at 11.No. 70256-4-1/3 sticking his tongue out, making weird noises, and chewing on a cigar as if itwere chewing tobacco. Back inthe apartment, P.C. took a showerwhile continuing to throw things and carry on one-sided conversations with the CIA. When their mother arrived, P.C. 

### refused to take the elevatordownstairs. Inthe stairwell, he created a "huge hole in the drywall" by slamming a door intothe wall.4 Enroute to the hospital, P.C. would not wear a seatbelt, insisted on having the music turned up to full volume, and was screaming loudly. When they arrived at the emergency room, P.C. tried to introduce himselfto the people there by trying to 

### shake hands and saying, "Email me."5 Then, in the waiting room, he picked up a wheelchair and threw it. P.C. then threw a small table, stormed off, and punched at the sliding glass doors. On April 2, 2013, mental health treatment providers of Fairfax Hospital filed a 14-day involuntary treatment petition under chapter71.05 RCW alleging that P.C. suffered from a mental disorder and that, as a result, he presented a likelihood of 

### serious harm to others and/orthe property ofothers.6 After hearing the testimony of Alex, a clinical psychologist, and P.C. at the commitment hearing, the court determined that P.C. had a mental disorder and as a result, he presented a substantial risk to the property ofothers. The court also found 

### 4RP(Apr. 2, 2013) at 18. 5id, at 19. 

### 6The petition also alleged that P.C. was gravely disabled, butthe trial court did not find the evidence sufficient to establish that P.C.'s health and safety needs were injeopardy.No. 70256-4-1/4
that a less restrictive alternative to inpatienttreatment was not available. The court entered written findings offact and conclusions of law and ordered P.C. to undergo involuntary treatment for a period notto exceed 14 days. P.C. appeals. ANALYSIS As a preliminary matter, although the 14-day commitment order at issue has long since expired, the State has not argued thatthis case is moot. P.C. contends thatthe case is not moot because a reversal would restore his right to possess a firearm. Inaddition, we note thatthe superiorcourt's order may have adverse consequences on future involuntary treatment determinations.7 Underthese circumstances, we exercise our discretion to decide the appeal on the merits. Right to Self-Representation During the commitment hearing, afterAlex testified on direct examination, P.C.'s attorney said he had no questions for Alex on cross-examination. The following exchange then occurred between P.C. and the court: 

### RESPONDENT: Can Iremove him? Can Irepresent myself? COURT: Well, not at the currenttime. Ifyou have a question you wanted him to ask, why don't you talk to the attorney and maybe he'll ask it for you. RESPONDENT: Okay. Well, I'm going to go to the bathroom first.

COURT: So if you have a question, talk to your attorney. We won't listen. And that willbe fine. 

### 7See InreDet.ofM.K.. 168 Wn. App. 621, 625-30, 279 P.3d 897 (2012).No. 70256-4-1/5 

### [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Ithinkwe're good, Your Honor.!8' 

### P.C. argues that the trial court misadvised him that he had no right to represent himself in the involuntarycommitmentproceeding and unjustifiablydenied his request summarily without considering the relevantfactors when a motion to 

### proceed pro se is made afterthe hearing or trial has commenced.9 

### As Division Two of this court has previously determined, the right to represent 

### oneselfin the criminalcontext equally applies in the context of involuntary 

### commitmentproceedings.10 But, as in the criminal context, the court indulgesin every reasonable presumption againstthe defendant's waiver of right to counsel.11 The right to self-representation is neither absolute nor self-executing.12 A 

### court bears no affirmative duty to inform a defendantthat he has such a right.13 The defendant must personally seekto exercise the right, especially considering that its exercise will almost always be detrimental.14 As such, a requestto proceed pro se must be both timely and unequivocal.15 Where a requestforself-representation is


### 8RP(Apr. 2, 2013) at 21. 

### 9See State v. Fritz. 21 Wn. App. 354, 363, 585 P.2d 173 (1978) (relevant factors include the quality ofdefense counsel's representation, the reasons forthe request, and the potential disruption ofthe proceedings). 

### 10lnreDet.ofJ.S.. 138Wn. App. 882, 890-91, 159 P.3d 435 (2007). 11 InreDet.ofTurav. 139Wn.2d 379, 396, 986 P.2d 790 (1999) (quoting Brewer v. Williams. 430 U.S. 387, 404, 97 S. Ct. 1232, 51 L. Ed. 2d 424 (1977)). 

### 12 State v. Madsen. 168 Wn.2d 496, 504, 229 P.3d 714 (2010); State v. Woods. 143 Wn.2d 561, 586, 23 P.3d 1046 (2001). 

### 13 State v. Garcia. 92 Wn.2d 647, 654-55, 600 P.2d 1010 (1979). 14Id 

### 15 State v. Stenson. 132 Wn.2d 668, 737, 940 P.2d 1239 (1997).No. 70256-4-1/6 untimely, "the right is relinquished and the matter ofthe defendant's representation is 

### left to the discretion ofthe trialjudge."16 "Even when a request is unequivocal, a defendant may stillwaive the right of self-representation by subsequent words or 

### conduct."17 We review the entire record inevaluating the trialcourt's decision for an abuse ofdiscretion.18 

### The trial court did not misadvise P.C. aboutthe right to self-representation, nor unreasonably deny such a request. The trial court reasonably interpreted P.C.'s outburst midway through the briefcommitment hearing as an expression of disagreementwiththe strategy of his counsel at that moment.19 The court appropriately twice offered P.C. the opportunity to consultwith counsel to clarify whether there was an issue ofcontention. P.C. declined to avail himselfofthat opportunity and did not raise the matter again. Underthese circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion indetermining that P.C. was not affirmatively seeking to exercise the right to represent himselfand therefore was not required to undertake a colloquy or otherwise affirmatively advise him of his rights. Sufficiencyofthe Evidence Ingeneral, an individual may be involuntarily committed for mental health treatment if, as a result of a mental disorder, the individual either (1) poses a 

### 16 State v. DeWeese. 117 Wn.2d 369, 377, 816 P.2d 1 (1991). 17 State v. Vermillion, 112 Wn. App. 844, 851, 51 P.3d 188(2002). 18 DeWeese. 117 Wn.2d at 378. 

### 19 SeeWoods, 143 Wn.2d at 587 (pro se request made inthe context of expressing displeasure with one's counsel often indicates that the request is equivocal); see also State v. Luvene, 127 Wn.2d 690, 698-99, 903 P.2d 960 (1995) (accord).No. 70256-4-1/7


### substantial risk of harm to him or herself, others, or the property ofothers, or (2) is 

### gravelydisabled.20 In this case, the commitment order was based upon afinding that P.C. presented a substantial risk of harm to the property ofothers. P.C. challenges the sufficiency ofthe evidence supporting this finding. To orderthe involuntary commitment, the court had to find, by a 

### preponderance of the evidence, that P.C. posed a substantial risk to the property of others "as evidenced bybehaviorwhich has caused substantialloss ordamage to 

### the property ofothers."21 Where the trial court has weighed the evidence, ourreview is generally "limited to determining whether substantial evidence supports the findings and, if so, whetherthe findings in turn supportthe trial court's conclusions of 

### lawandjudgment."22 P.C. does not dispute the evidence that he caused damage to the property of others as a result of a mental disorder. He claims, however, that no evidence supports the court's determination that his behavior caused "substantial" loss or 

### damage. He argues that according to Alex's testimony, the only property damage he caused was a hole inthe drywall ofthe apartment stairwell and knocking out some 

### grilles in a metal gate. He points out that there was no testimony to establish the value ofthe property or cost ofthe damage from which the court could have determined there was substantial loss or damage. P.C. admits thatthe statute does not assign any particular monetary value, but suggests that loss of$100,000 might 

### 20 RCW71.05.240(3); In re Detention of LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d 196, 201-02, 728 P.2d 138(1986). 

### 21 RCW 71.05.020(25)(a)(iii)(emphasis added); RCW 71.05.240(3). 22LaBelle 107 Wn.2d at 209.No. 70256-4-1/8 

### be considered substantial. The authority on which he relies to supportthisfigure, Heqewald v. Neal. involves a partition action and a comparison ofthe value of land if 

### partitioned or keptintact.23 But"substantial pecuniary loss" for the purpose of evaluating partition of land versus a judicially-ordered sale has no application to a commitment order underthe InvoluntaryTreatmentAct and is not helpful. 

### Ifwe look to the dictionarydefinition of "substantial," as P.C. also suggests we might, our Supreme Court has approved ofthe following: "'considerable inamount, 

### value, orworth.'"24 The evidence here reveals a considerable amount of damages. In addition to the damage P.C. acknowledges to the apartment stairwell and the parking garage gate, there was also evidence that he smashed a chairthat did not 

### belong solely to himand punched a car. And although there was no specific testimony about damage to the wheelchair, table and sliding doors, these items were 

### the property of the hospital and a reasonable trier of fact could inferthatthe property 

### sustained some amount of damage.25 Even without an estimate of the costof repair
or a detailed description ofthe exact damage, the record reveals that P.C. inflicted a 

### considerable amount ofdamage to the property ofothers. Accordingly, because the 

### trialcourt's findingthat P.C. presented a likelihood ofserious harm to the property of



### 23 20 Wn. App. 517, 526, 582 P.2d 529 (1978). 

### 24 State v. McKaque, 172 Wn.2d 802, 806, 262 P.3d 1225 (2011) (quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2280 (2002)). 25 P.C. also threw several items out ofthe fifth floor window and some ofthose items shattered. However, P.C. said thatthe things were "primarily" his, and the courtfound that ownership ofthe property was not clearly established. RP (Apr. 2, 2013) at 52.

8No. 70256-4-1/9


### others is supported by substantial evidence inthe record, we affirm the involuntary

treatment order. 

# it

WE CONCUR: