* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

September 19, 2007

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-11003

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

RICHARD BOULDIN, also known as Waco

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:05-CR-11-1

Before JOLLY, DENNIS, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Richard Bouldin appeals the sentence imposed following his guilty-plea

conviction for possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. First,

he asserts that the district court clearly erred in calculating the quantity of

drugs attributable to him. The district court heard testimony from witnesses

that supported its finding that between 500-1500 grams of cocaine were sold as

part of the jointly undertaken criminal activity that included Bouldin. As the
No. 05-11003

2

court’s finding is plausible in light of the record as a whole, it is not clearly

erroneous. See United States v. Caldwell, 448 F.3d 287, 290 (5th Cir. 2006).

Bouldin also argues that because the drug quantity for sentencing greatly

exceeded the amount involved in the offense for which he was convicted, the

district court should have used a higher standard of proof than the customary

preponderance-of-the-evidence standard to determine his base offense level.

Although Bouldin is correct that we have previously suggested that there may

be circumstances when relevant conduct has so greatly increased the sentence

that a higher standard of proof must apply, this is not such a case. See United

States v. Carreon, 11 F.3d 1225, 1240 (5th Cir. 1994) .

Next, Bouldin contends that the two-level enhancement he received for

possessing a firearm was unreasonable. The court’s finding that Bouldin

possessed a firearm in connection with the sale of controlled substances is

plausible in light of the record, and the application of the enhancement was not

clearly erroneous. See Caldwell, 448 F.3d at 290; United States v. Sotelo,

97 F.3d 782, 799 (5th Cir.1996); U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) . 

Bouldin asserts that the district court erred in concluding that he failed

to clearly demonstrate his acceptance of responsibility. Bouldin frivolously

asserted during the sentencing hearing that he was responsible for only nine

grams of crack cocaine. As there was a foundation for the district court’s

determination that Bouldin failed to demonstrate his acceptance of

responsibility, its finding to that effect is not clearly erroneous. See United

States v. Medina-Anicacio, 325 F.3d 638, 648 (5th Cir.2003); United States v.

Washington, 340 F.3d 222, 227-28 (5th Cir.2003).

Finally, Bouldin argues that, for a variety of reasons, his sentence was

unreasonable. Because Bouldin was sentenced within the properly calculated

guidelines range, his sentence is presumptively reasonable. See Rita v. United

States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462-66 (2007); United States v. Alonzo, 435 F.3d 551,

554 (5th Cir. 2006). Moreover, because the sentence was within the properly
No. 05-11003

3

calculated guidelines range, it is inferred that the district court considered the

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519-20

(5th Cir. 2005). Bouldin's sentence is AFFIRMED.