Order Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 

June 27, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

134545 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman,

 Justices 

v SC: 134545 

 COA: 277844 

Wayne CC: 06-000728-01 

JOHN CHARLES RANSOM,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 12, 2007 order 

of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of 

granting leave to appeal, we VACATE that portion of the sentence of the Wayne Circuit 

Court that ordered the defendant to pay attorney fees and we REMAND this case to the 

trial court for a decision on attorney fees that considers the defendant’s ability to pay now 

and in the future. See People v Dunbar, 264 Mich App 240 (2004), lv den 473 Mich 881 

(2005). At the trial court’s discretion, the decision may be made based on the record 

without the need for a formal evidentiary hearing. If the court decides to order attorney 

fees, it shall do so in a separate order which indicates that the court considered the 

defendant's ability to pay. Id. In all other respects, the application for leave to appeal is 

DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the remaining question presented should be 

reviewed by this Court. 

We do not retain jurisdiction. 

CORRIGAN, J., dissents and states as follows: 

I dissent from the order remanding the case to the trial court to consider 

defendant’s ability to repay his attorney fees under People v Dunbar, 264 Mich App 240 

(2004). For the reasons set out in my dissenting statements in People v Carter, 480 Mich 

1063 (2008), and People v Willey, 481 Mich ___ (Docket No. 134368, entered May 23, 

2008), neither the Sixth Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment compels a 

sentencing court to state that it considered a defendant’s ability to pay before ordering 

him to repay the cost of his court appointed-attorney when the defendant does not timely 

object to the repayment order. When the court decides to enforce collection or sanction 

the defendant for nonpayment, it must consider the defendant’s ability to pay. In this 

case, although the judgment of sentence states that overdue payments are subject to a 20 

percent late penalty, the court has not enforced the repayment order or the late penalty. 

Therefore, the court was not required to state either on the record or in the court file that 

it had considered defendant’s ability to pay. Accordingly, I would deny leave to appeal. 
 

2 

I. Facts and Procedural Posture 

Defendant pleaded guilty of second-degree murder and possession of a firearm 

during the commission of a felony in connection with the beating and shooting death of a 

man at a Detroit house. The day before sentencing, defendant filed a request for 

appointment of appellate counsel, which included a financial schedule listing all of 

defendant’s income, assets, and financial obligations. Additionally, defendant’s 

presentence investigation report (PSIR) listed his employment history, education, 

vocational training, health status, income, assets, and financial liabilities. At sentencing, 

the trial court stated, “the Court is going to enter a final order for reimbursement of 

attorney fees” of $940. Defendant did not object. The court entered an “Order of 

Conviction and Sentence” and a separate “Final Order for Reimbursement of Attorney 

Fees,” both of which ordered defendant to repay $940 in attorney fees. The “Final Order 

for Reimbursement of Attorney Fees” states that if the attorney fees are not paid within 

56 days of the final order,1

 they are subject to a 20 percent late fee on any outstanding 

balance. 

On appeal, defendant challenged the reimbursement order for the first time, 

arguing that the trial court erred in failing to hold a hearing or consider defendant’s 

ability to pay as required by Dunbar. The Court of Appeals denied defendant’s 

application for leave to appeal for lack of merit. 

II. Standard of Review 

Defendant did not object at sentencing to the attorney-fee reimbursement order. 

This Court reviews this unpreserved issue for plain error affecting substantial rights. 

People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 774 (1999); Dunbar, supra at 251. 

III. Analysis 

 The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides: “In all criminal 

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for 

his defence.” US Const, Am VI.2

 This right is made applicable to the states through the 

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335, 

342 (1963). This right requires the states to provide counsel for indigent defendants in 

criminal cases. Id. at 344. Michigan indisputably accorded defendant his Sixth 

Amendment rights, as he had the benefit of court-appointed counsel. 

1

 The order was entered on May 5, 2006. 

2

 The Michigan Constitution contains a similar provision: “In every criminal 

prosecution, the accused shall have the right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for his 

or her defense . . . .” Const 1963, art 1, § 20. 
 

3 

Under a recoupment scheme, an indigent defendant is provided counsel regardless 

of his ability to pay, but might be ordered to repay the cost of counsel at a later date. In 

James v Strange, 407 US 128, 134 (1972), the United States Supreme Court, discussing 

an attorney-fee recoupment scheme requiring defendants to repay the cost of courtappointed counsel, held, “[t]here is certainly no denial of the right to counsel in the 

strictest sense.” Further, in Fuller v Oregon, 417 US 40, 51-52 (1974), the United States 

Supreme Court held that an attorney-fee recoupment scheme did not “chill” the 

defendants’ constitutional right to counsel. “The fact that an indigent who accepts stateappointed legal representation knows that he might someday be required to repay the 

costs of these services in no way affects his eligibility to obtain counsel.” Id. at 53. The 

Court held that Oregon’s recoupment scheme, which was designed to impose an 

obligation to pay only on those with a foreseeable ability to meet it, and to enforce that 

obligation only against those who actually become able to meet it without hardship, did 

not violate the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 54. 

Attorney-fee recoupment schemes have also been challenged under the Equal 

Protection and Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Due process and 

equal protection principles converge in this area of the law. Bearden v Georgia, 461 US 

660, 665-666 (1983). In James v Strange, 407 US 128 (1972), the United States Supreme 

Court held that Kansas’s recoupment scheme violated the Equal Protection Clause 

because it did not accord indigent defendants the same statutory protections accorded to 

other judgment debtors. In Bearden, supra at 672-673, the Court held that the Fourteenth 

Amendment prohibits a state from revoking an indigent defendant’s probation for failure 

to pay a fine or restitution if the defendant has demonstrated bona fide efforts to pay. 

When defendant committed this offense, Michigan had no statutory scheme 

governing court orders requiring criminal defendants to reimburse the costs of courtappointed counsel. See Dunbar, supra at 254.3 Nonetheless, the court had the authority 

3

 Effective January 1, 2006, the Legislature enacted MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii), which allows 

the court to impose the expense of providing legal assistance on the defendant: 

(1) If a defendant enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendre or if the court 

determines after a hearing or trial that the defendant is guilty, both of the 

following apply at the time of the sentencing or at the time entry of 

judgment of guilt is deferred pursuant to statute or sentencing is delayed 

pursuant to statute: 

* * * 

(b) The court may impose any or all of the following: 

* * * 
 

4 

to order a criminal defendant to reimburse the government for the cost of court-appointed 

counsel unless prohibited by statute or the United States or Michigan constitutions. See 

Davis v Oakland Circuit Judge, 383 Mich 717, 720 (1970) (the trial court has the 

discretionary power to order that a defendant’s assets be used to repay the cost of courtappointed attorney); People v Nowicki, 213 Mich App 383, 388 (1995) (“We conclude 

that the trial court had authority to order defendant to reimburse the county for costs paid 

for his representation.”). In Dunbar, our Court of Appeals articulated a test to determine 

whether a trial court’s attorney-fee recoupment procedure is constitutionally sound under 

this United States Supreme Court precedent. In my dissenting statement in Willey, I 

described the holding in Dunbar as follows: 

In Dunbar, supra at 252, the issue was whether a sentencing court 

may constitutionally require a defendant to contribute to the cost of his 

court-appointed attorney without first assessing his ability to pay. The 

Dunbar panel adopted the test from Alexander v Johnson, 742 F2d 117, 124 

(CA 4, 1984), to determine whether a sentencing court’s procedure passes 

constitutional muster. In Alexander, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 

discussed James v Strange, 407 US 128 (1972), Fuller v Oregon, 417 US 

40 (1974), and Bearden v Georgia, 461 US 660 (1983),[4] which all 

involved challenges to the constitutionality of statutory attorney-fee 

recoupment schemes. The Fourth Circuit held that the following 

constitutional principles emerged from those cases: 

“From the Supreme Court’s pronouncements in James, Fuller, and 

Bearden, five basic features of a constitutionally acceptable attorney’s fees 

reimbursement program emerge. First, the program under all 

circumstances must guarantee the indigent defendant’s fundamental right to 

counsel without cumbersome procedural obstacles designed to determine 

whether he is entitled to court-appointed representation. Second, the state’s 

decision to impose the burden of repayment must not be made without 

providing him notice of the contemplated action and a meaningful 

opportunity to be heard. Third, the entity deciding whether to require 

repayment must take cognizance of the individual’s resources, the other 

demands on his own and family’s finances, and the hardships he or his 

family will endure if repayment is required. The purpose of this inquiry is 

to assure repayment is not required as long as he remains indigent. Fourth, 

the defendant accepting court-appointed counsel cannot be exposed to more 

(iii) The expenses of providing legal assistance to the defendant. 

Defendant committed the offenses before MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii) went into effect. 

4

 See Carter, supra at 1068-1070, for a summary of the holdings in James, Fuller, and 

Bearden. 
5 

severe collection practices than the ordinary civil debtor. Fifth, the indigent 

defendant ordered to repay his attorney’s fees as a condition of workrelease, parole, or probation cannot be imprisoned for failing to extinguish 

his debt as long as his default is attributable to his poverty, not his 

contumacy. [Alexander, supra at 124 (emphasis added).]” 

After the Dunbar panel quoted these factors, it held that a sentencing court 

may order reimbursement of a court-appointed attorney’s fees without 

specific findings on the record regarding the defendant’s ability to pay, 

unless the defendant objects to the reimbursement amount at the time it is 

ordered. Dunbar, supra at 254. The panel held, however, that even if the 

defendant does not object, “the court does need to provide some indication 

of consideration, such as noting that it reviewed the financial and 

employment sections of the defendant’s presentence investigation report or, 

even more generally, a statement that it considered the defendant’s ability 

to pay.” Id. at 254-255. [Willey, supra (Corrigan, J., dissenting).]

 This case, like Willey, involves the second and third factors of the Dunbar test. 

First, the trial court satisfied the second Dunbar factor; defendant had notice of the fees 

and an opportunity to object, but failed to do so. At sentencing, the trial court 

specifically told defendant that he would be required to repay $940 in attorney fees. 

Defendant had an opportunity to object to this order and assert his indigency at 

sentencing, but did not do so. Thus, defendant had notice of the fees and a meaningful 

opportunity to object to those fees. Dunbar, supra at 254. 

As I explained in Carter and Willey, I think that Dunbar misinterpreted Supreme 

Court precedent when it followed Alexander in regard to the third factor necessary for a 

constitutionally sufficient recoupment scheme. As I explained in my dissent in Carter, 

supra at 1068-1071, nothing in James, Fuller, or Bearden requires a sentencing court to 

indicate that it considered a defendant’s ability to pay when a defendant has not timely 

objected on indigency grounds to the reimbursement order: 

. . . Supreme Court precedents compel a sentencing court to inquire 

into a defendant’s financial status and make findings on the record when the 

court decides to enforce collection or sanction the defendant for failure to 

pay the ordered amount. . . . The Alaska Supreme Court correctly 

explained that “James and Fuller do not require a prior determination of 

ability to pay in a recoupment system which treats recoupment judgment 

debtors like other civil judgment debtors . . . .” State v Albert, 899 P2d 103, 

109 (Alas, 1995). See also the Washington Supreme Court’s interpretation 

of James, Fuller, and Bearden: 

“[C]ommon sense dictates that a determination of ability to pay and 

an inquiry into defendant’s finances is not required before a recoupment 

order may be entered against an indigent defendant as it is nearly 
 

 

 

6 

impossible to predict ability to pay over a period of 10 years or longer. 

However, we hold that before enforced collection or any sanction is 

imposed for nonpayment, there must be an inquiry into ability to pay. 

[State v Blank, 131 Wash 2d 230, 242; 930 P2d 1213 (1997).]” [Carter, 

supra at 1070-1071 (Corrigan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added to Blank).] 

As I stated previously in Carter (Corrigan, J., dissenting), I would overrule Dunbar’s 

contrary holding. 

Applying this conclusion to the facts of this case, I would hold that the court 

satisfied its constitutional duties. First, defendant was not denied his right to counsel. He 

was provided court-appointed counsel despite his inability to pay for an attorney at the 

time. He was not required to repay the cost of counsel as a condition of representation. 

In any case, before ordering reimbursement, the trial court clearly considered defendant’s 

ability to pay, as defendant filed his financial schedule with the court the day before the 

court ordered the repayment of attorney fees. Additionally, the PSIR, which was 

available when the court ordered the reimbursement, described defendant’s financial 

situation. 

Second, the federal constitution does not require the court to inquire into a 

defendant’s indigency before imposing the repayment obligation. Although the 

recoupment order stated that defendant would be subject to a 20 percent late fee on any 

outstanding balance, the circuit court has not enforced this provision. The 20 percent late 

fee arises from MCL 600.4803(1), which provides: 

A person who fails to pay a penalty, fee, or costs[5] in full within 56 

days after that amount is due and owing is subject to a late penalty equal to 

20% of the amount owed. The court shall inform a person subject to a 

penalty, fee, or costs that the late penalty will be applied to any amount that 

continues to be unpaid 56 days after the amount is due and owing. 

Penalties, fees, and costs are due and owing at the time they are ordered 

unless the court directs otherwise. The court shall order a specific date on 

which the penalties, fees, and costs are due and owing. If the court 

authorizes delayed or installment payments of a penalty, fee, or costs, the 

court shall inform the person of the date on which, or time schedule under 

which, the penalty, fee, or costs, or portion of the penalty, fee, or costs, will 

be due and owing. A late penalty may be waived by the court upon the 

request of the person subject to the late penalty. [Emphasis added.] 

5

 “Costs” are defined, in part, as “the cost of providing court-ordered legal assistance to 

the defendant.” MCL 600.4801(a). 
 _________________________________________ 

 

7 

As discussed, the trial court is required to consider the defendant’s financial situation 

only when it enforces the repayment order by sanctioning the defendant for nonpayment. 

Including a 20 percent late-fee provision in the recoupment order is not the same as 

actually enforcing the late fee. MCL 600.4803(1) specifically contemplates that the trial 

court retains the discretion to waive the late fee (i.e., decline to enforce it) even when a 

defendant has failed to pay his attorney fees within 56 days of the due date. In other 

words, the inclusion of a late-fee provision in the recoupment order is not equivalent to 

enforcing the recoupment order or the late fee. A sanction is not imposed until the court 

requires the defendant to pay the attorney fees (with the 20 percent late penalty) or 

sanctions him in some other way for nonpayment. Because the court has not yet enforced 

collection by sanctioning defendant for nonpayment, defendant’s challenge to the 

reimbursement order is premature. See Dunbar, supra at 256 (“in most cases, challenges 

to the reimbursement order will be premature if the defendant has not been required to 

commence repayment”); see also Blank, supra at 242. Therefore, the trial court did not 

err in failing to indicate its consideration of defendant’s ability to pay, and the Court of 

Appeals did not err in denying leave to appeal. For these reasons, I would deny leave to 

appeal. 

s0624 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

June 27, 2008 

Clerk