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i 

89–514 2015

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–121] 

ADAPTING U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE FOR 

FUTURE THREATS: RUSSIA, CHINA 

AND MODERNIZING THE NATIONAL 

MISSILE DEFENSE ACT 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JULY 23, 2014 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

TIM MORRISON, Counsel 

LEONOR TOMERO, Counsel 

ERIC SMITH, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2014 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, July 23, 2014, Adapting U.S. Missile Defense for Future Threats: 

Russia, China and Modernizing the National Missile Defense Act ................. 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, July 23, 2014 ....................................................................................... 27 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 23, 2014 

ADAPTING U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE FOR FUTURE THREATS: RUSSIA, 

CHINA AND MODERNIZING THE NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE ACT 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces ............................................................................ 2 

Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Strategic Forces ............................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Coyle, Philip E., Senior Science Fellow, Center for Arms Control and NonProliferation .......................................................................................................... 5 

Joseph, Ambassador Robert G., Former Under Secretary of State for Arms 

Control and International Security .................................................................... 3 

Woolsey, Ambassador R. James, Jr., Chairman, Foundation for Defense of 

Democracies .......................................................................................................... 2 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Cooper, Hon. Jim .............................................................................................. 33 

Coyle, Philip E. ................................................................................................. 55 

Joseph, Ambassador Robert G. ........................................................................ 44 

Rogers, Hon. Mike ............................................................................................ 31 

Woolsey, Ambassador R. James, Jr. ............................................................... 35 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

CBO letter of July 21, 2014, on Ground-Based Midcourse Defense program budgets ................................................................................................. 71 

Chinese ministry of defense news release announcing land-based antimissile test ..................................................................................................... 74 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Cooper ........................................................................................................ 82 

Mr. Garamendi ................................................................................................. 83 

Mr. Rogers ......................................................................................................... 77 

(1) 

ADAPTING U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE FOR FUTURE 

THREATS: RUSSIA, CHINA AND MODERNIZING THE 

NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE ACT 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, 

Washington, DC, Wednesday, July 23, 2014. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:49 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. ROGERS. Good afternoon. I call this hearing of the Strategic 

Forces Subcommittee to order. We are here today to discuss an 

issue of rising importance to the United States. According to the 

Missile Defense Agency, quote, ‘‘there has been an increase of over 

1,200 additional ballistic missiles over the last 5 years. The total 

of ballistic missiles outside the United States, the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization, Russia and China has risen over 5,900. Hundreds of launchers and missiles are currently within the range of 

our deployed forces today,’’ close quote. And as we know, Russia 

and China are both engaged in aggressive modernization programs 

pointing hundreds of missiles of all sizes and ranges at the U.S., 

its allies, and our deployed forces. That is why we are here today 

for this hearing titled, ‘‘Adapting U.S. Missile Defense for Future 

Threats: Russia, China and Modernizing the NMD Act.’’ 

We have another of our panel of distinguished witnesses joining 

us today. First, we have Ambassador James Woolsey, Jr., Chairman, Foundation for Defense of Democracies; Ambassador Robert 

Joseph, former Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and 

International Security; and Mr. Philip Coyle, Senior Science Fellow, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. 

As usual, I will introduce my own statement for the record, and 

without objection, that is so ordered, and I will recognize the distinguished gentleman from Tennessee, who is going to take us all 

out for Memphis barbecue after Alabama wins the SEC [Southeastern Conference] this year. I yield to the ranking member. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the Appendix on page 31.] 
2 

STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

TENNESSEE, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Nearly everything you 

say is accurate except for that last part. Nashville barbecue is way 

better than Memphis anyway. 

I am honored that the witnesses are here. I apologize for the 

delay. I look forward to the testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper can be found in the Appendix on page 33.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Cooper. 

I now recognize our distinguished panel of witnesses. If you 

would please summarize your prepared statements for not more 

than 5 minutes, and your full statement will be made a part of the 

record. 

First, we will start with you, Ambassador Woolsey. Thank you 

for being here with us. 

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR R. JAMES WOOLSEY, JR., 

CHAIRMAN, FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES 

Ambassador WOOLSEY. Thank you. It is an honor to be with you. 

Mr. Chairman, I wanted to say just a few words about electromagnetic pulse because it is a threat that is not really debated in 

the public much. It is known to specialists, but it has been highly 

classified until relatively recently. It is essentially the vulnerability 

of our infrastructure, and particularly our electric grid, to pulses 

that either could come from the sun, for example, Quebec’s electric 

grid was nearly completely wiped out back in 1989 by a solar generation. But it can also occur as a result of a detonation of a relatively simple nuclear weapon up at low Earth orbit level a few 

tens of miles, and that detonation, by utilizing the fireball and 

gamma rays from a nuclear detonation, can be extremely destructive to our electric grid. 

We have a lot of remarks by Chinese and Russian specialists 

talking about the utilization of electromagnetic pulse. The Russians 

have bragged to us in private that they have been helping the 

North Koreans figure out how to use a simple nuclear weapon and 

a simple ballistic missile to attack the grid of the United States, 

and this possibility is not just theoretical. It is something that is 

well understood by physicists because the earth has been receiving 

shocks of this kind from the sun for hundreds of millions of years. 

So one of the things that we really need to do is move quickly 

to build resilience into our electric grid, and here we are talking 

really about a few dollars per person in cost. And at the same time, 

we need to figure out how to deal with the threat of utilization of 

nuclear weapons in very limited numbers by not only Russia or 

China, but a rogue state, such as North Korea or, after, I am 

afraid, probably just a few more months, Iran. This deserves the 

kind of attention that only this committee and its Senate counterpart, I think, could bring to this type of debate because there is a 

strong desire to avoid trouble and avoid needing to deal with something that might cost some money on the part of much of industry. 

My friend, who was the chairman of the ARPA–E, Eric Toone, 

the Advanced Research Project Agency for the Energy Department, 
3 

2 years ago moved the numbers himself and reviewed them, and 

he said there is more R&D [research and development] annually by 

the American dog food industry than there is by those who are 

seeking to build resilience into our electric grid. Now I guess it is 

a good thing for us to have healthy dogs, but in any kind of balance 

of proportion of where R&D money ought to go, I would urge 

strongly the review of the threat to our electric grid from electromagnetic pulse, how easily that can be put together and what types 

of work on material and devices at modest cost could build the sort 

of things we need in order to avoid this, I think, extremely serious 

threat. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Woolsey can be found in 

the Appendix on page 35.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

Ambassador Joseph. 

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR ROBERT G. JOSEPH, FORMER 

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ARMS CONTROL AND 

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 

Ambassador JOSEPH. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the invitation 

to testify today. I have submitted a prepared statement for the 

record, and in that statement, I address the questions that are before the committee. I contrast the fundamentally different approaches of the Bush and Obama administrations to the development and deployment of a limited missile defense system. 

At the program level, the Obama administration from the outset 

substantially reduced the funding for missile defense and particularly for those capabilities that were to provide for the protection 

of the American territory and population centers. Programs intended to keep pace with the threat were cancelled, such as work 

on fast interceptors, including boost phase capabilities, as well as 

the airborne laser that had destroyed both solid and liquid missiles 

in flight. The multiple kill vehicle designed to provide a counter to 

the anticipated deployment of countermeasures was ended without 

replacement, and even critical sensors were mothballed, including 

initially the Sea-Based X-Band Radar that provided the most effective precision tracking. 

At the policy level and again in very stark contrast to his predecessor, President Obama has repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to cut back on missile defenses in seeking other objectives, 

such as enticing Russia to negotiate offensive arms reductions. This 

was reflected in the 2009 decision to cancel a third site in Europe 

and again last year with the termination of the SM3–IIB [Standard 

Missile 3]. While U.S. strategic defenses have been reduced in 

numbers and capabilities for the future have been abandoned, the 

threat to the U.S. homeland has grown, not just from North Korea 

and Iran, but from Putin’s Russia, which has embarked on a strategic build-up of offensive and missile defense capabilities reminiscent of the Soviet days. 

The consequences of downgrading U.S. defenses, the increase in 

the threats that we face, and the policy failures to deal with these 

threats have major implications for U.S. missile defenses. I will 

summarize very briefly six conclusions. 
4 

One, we must restore the priority of homeland missile defense to 

keep pace with the qualitative and quantitative nature of the rogue 

state missile threat. Major budget cuts and multiple program cancellations have left us with an inadequate and obsolescing defense 

against missile attacks from states like North Korea. 

Two, current problems with the GMD [Ground-Based Midcourse 

Defense] system and, in particular, the kill vehicle, must be fixed. 

Last month’s successful test marked progress in this area, but improved reliability of the system must be demonstrated through active testing and spiral improvements. The number of interceptors 

must be increased beyond the 14 announced last March. These are 

interceptors that would already have been deployed under the 

Bush plan. Cancellation of the SM3–IIB program intended to field 

in Europe a counter to Iranian long-range missiles in the future 

makes additional GBI [Ground Based Interceptor] deployments at 

a third site in the United States essential. 

Three, the GMD system must also evolve with improved sensors, 

as well as with capabilities that can defeat countermeasures and 

provide greater cost efficiency for intercepting larger numbers of 

missiles. At-sea capabilities that can contribute to the defense of 

the U.S. homeland should be supported, recognizing the mobility 

and the cost advantages offered by Aegis-class ships. 

Four, the United States must reassess the role of missile defenses with Russia and China. Past calls for fielding a capability 

against accidental or unauthorized launches such as that proposed 

earlier by Senator Nunn are even more relevant today given the 

state of U.S. relations with Russia and China. We also should examine how defenses might contribute to deterrence of Russia and 

China. This is not a new concept but one that has been incorporated in past Presidential guidance of both Democrat and Republican administrations. While today’s security setting is much different from that of the Cold War, Russia’s increased reliance on its 

nuclear forces, and the greater prospect for a miscalculation with 

both Moscow and Beijing argue for a review of past strategic thinking. 

Five, we cannot defend against larger-scale missile attacks from 

Russia, or potentially China, in the same manner that we are defending against rogue states. What we can do is explore how nonkinetic approaches, such as directed energy, can be integrated into 

our BMD architecture. We should also explore the full potential of 

space for the deployment of sensors and as well as interceptors to 

meet future defense requirements by taking full advantage of advances in critically important areas, such as computing and lightweight materials. 

And, six, the way forward I have described will require additional funding in a time of budget austerity. The amount likely will 

be far less than the cuts imposed over the past 6 years. Funding 

could also come from shifting resources back from theater programs 

to strategic defenses. The current imbalance with about $4 out of 

every $5 going to theater programs is simply out of sync with our 

defense requirements. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Joseph can be found in 

the Appendix on page 44.] 
5 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

And, Mr. Coyle, you are recognized. 

STATEMENT OF PHILIP E. COYLE, SENIOR SCIENCE FELLOW, 

CENTER FOR ARMS CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION 

Mr. COYLE. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and distinguished members of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, I very 

much appreciate your invitation to appear before you today to support your study of adapting U.S. missile defense for future threats. 

In my opening remarks, I want to describe why it would be unwise 

for the United States to pursue a missile defense against the intercontinental ballistic missile forces of Russia and China. There are 

basically three important reasons. 

First, U.S. missile defenses, especially U.S. defenses against 

ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles], can at best deal only 

with limited attacks, and even that goal remains a major technological challenge. All missile defense systems can be overwhelmed. 

All missile defense systems have limitations, and those limitations 

can be exploited by the offense. By definition, it is only if the attack 

is limited that the defense can have a hope of not being overwhelmed. If the enemy also employs countermeasures, such as 

stealth, radar jamming, decoys, and chaff, as Russia and China do, 

U.S. defenses are even more vulnerable. The technology is simply 

not in hand to deal with an all-out Russian or Chinese ICBM attack. The U.S. has experimented with many different ideas for decades hoping to find a way. A few examples are the nuclear-bomb 

pumped x-ray laser; Brilliant Pebbles, a constellation of perhaps as 

many as 1,000 orbiting interceptors; and the Safeguard ABM [antiballistic missile] system deployed in North Dakota that the U.S. 

Congress cancelled because Russian ICBMs could overwhelm it. 

These and other systems were cancelled as unworkable, ineffective, 

or too costly, as when Secretary of Defense Robert Gates ended the 

Airborne Laser program. 

The second reason is cost. In 2002, the Congressional Budget Office [CBO] estimated the cost of several different DOD [Department 

of Defense] missile defense programs, assuming they all would continue through 2025, as part of a layered missile defense system. 

The CBO estimated that a system of Ground-Based Interceptors, 

analogous to the current Ground-Based Midcourse system, would 

cost between $26 billion and $74 billion. A system of interceptors 

launched from ships, similar to the Navy Aegis system would cost 

$50 billion to $64 billion, and a space-based laser system would 

cost $80 billion to $100 billion. In today’s dollars, the 2002 CBO estimate for the space-based laser could be as high as $132 billion. 

CBO cautioned against adding all these numbers together because 

the systems might share some common elements such as earlywarning satellite systems, and CBO did not estimate the cost of a 

full, layered system. Of course, the GMD system and the Navy 

Aegis system are ongoing today. The space-based laser program office was shut down in 2002 and its research transferred to the 

MDA [Missile Defense Agency] Laser Technologies Directorate. All 

of these systems were for a limited defense. CBO didn’t estimate 

the cost of a massive system designed to stop all of Russia and China’s ICBMs, as there was no such program in 2002. 
6 

The third reason is strategic stability. If the U.S. had missile defenses that could handle ICBMs, the ICBM arsenals of Russia and 

China, a kind of Maginot Line against ICBMs, and if, unlike the 

Maginot Line, those defenses could not be defeated, it would be 

strategically destabilizing. Russia and China would need to respond with all manner of new forces, perhaps even more attacking 

missiles, perhaps extensive deployment of cruise missiles against 

which our ballistic missile defense systems are useless, or perhaps 

the deployment of large numbers of troops in regions that are currently stable and peaceful. Then our missile defenses would have 

upset the strategic balance and provoked new military responses 

from Russia and China. 

Of course, under such conditions, Russia would certainly not 

agree to further reductions in their strategic nuclear arsenals, as 

the U.S. and Russia have been doing under START [Strategic Arms 

Reduction Treaty], the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, and 

New START. Russia might consider aggressive new U.S. missile 

defense programs as justification to withdraw from the agreements 

that have significantly reduced the threat from nuclear weapons. 

In a May 28 talk at the Atlantic Council, Vice Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral James Winnefeld, summarized why 

limited defenses are in the best U.S. interests. As you know, he 

said, ‘‘we have told Russia and the world that we will not rely on 

missile defense for strategic deterrence of Russia because it would 

simply be too hard and too expensive and too strategically destabilizing to even try.’’ Later, the Admiral reiterated this point saying, ‘‘And let me be clear once again: It is not the policy of the 

United States to build a ballistic missile defense system to counter 

Russian ballistic missiles.’’ 

Mr. Chairman, that completes my opening remarks. I am happy 

to take your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Coyle can be found in the Appendix on page 55.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. I thank all of you for those statements. I 

thank you for your preparation to be here. I know it takes a lot of 

effort to prepare for these hearings, and I do appreciate it. 

I will start with my questions. First, I would say, Mr. Joseph, 

you just heard Mr. Coyle’s comments. I would love to hear your 

thoughts about those observations. 

Ambassador JOSEPH. Mr Chairman, I have heard the same talking points from missile defense critics for really the past 30 years. 

Missile defense won’t work. Missile defense is too expensive. Missile defense will start an arms race. Missile defense is destabilizing. These are the same arguments that were used to support 

adherence to the ABM Treaty for three decades, and this left us, 

they left the United States defenseless against not just missile 

threats from the Soviet Union, but also from emerging threats like 

North Korea. When the U.S. withdrew from the ABM Treaty, the 

sky didn’t fall. There was no arms race. But what happened was 

missile defense critics refocused the same talking points on the 

Bush administration’s missile defense plans. And, in fact, those 

talking points have been used against every missile defense undertaking that I am aware of. 
7 

Last night, in preparation for this hearing, I Googled ‘‘Iron 

Dome’’ and Mr. Coyle’s name, and up pops an article from the New 

York Times from last March, entitled ‘‘Weapons Experts Raise 

Doubts about Israel’s Antimissile System.’’ You guessed it. It is too 

expensive. It won’t work, and it is a rush to failure. The talking 

points of the critics are not only sort of repetitive. They are also 

wrong. And in particular, the talking points that are often used 

that the Bush administration rushed to failure, that there wasn’t 

adequate testing, in fact, and I have the statistics here, when 

President Bush made the decision to deploy in late 2002, seven 

intercept tests had been conducted, five of which were successful. 

Three additional successful flight tests had taken place of the 

booster to be deployed. During the Bush years, 7 of 10 intercept 

tests were successful, and the reasons for the failures of the other 

3 were identified and corrected. 

It is true that the initial approach to GMD did not follow the 

standard acquisition practices. This was a deliberate policy choice. 

It was deliberate because we had no defenses against the North 

Korean threat, and we needed to move forward, but we did so in 

a very deliberate and measured way, including with testing of the 

program. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. We deploy missile defense systems for 

anti-ship ballistic missiles from China. How do we explain or do 

you think it is reasonable for us to expect the American people to 

find that acceptable that we go to that extent for 5,500 sailors, but 

yet we aren’t willing to spend money to protect 5 million Americans 

in either Seattle or Los Angeles with missile defense capability? Do 

any of you understand why we are unwilling as a nation from a 

policy standpoint to deal with that risk? I open that to any one of 

you. Mr. Joseph. 

Ambassador JOSEPH. I have always found it difficult to explain 

things that don’t make sense, and I don’t think it makes sense to 

the American people. 

Mr. ROGERS. And I would argue I don’t think the American people even realize that we have the ICBM and SLBM [submarinelaunched ballistic missile] threats that are there and without adequate resources to protect us. This is another question for all the 

witnesses. We are deploying a cruise missile defense capability to 

protect the National Capital Region from cruise missiles, including, 

according to the commander of NORTHCOM [U.S. Northern Command], Russian cruise missiles. Does it make sense that we deploy 

cruise missile defenses to protect the Capital from Russian cruise 

missiles, but we do not deploy missile defenses to protect the American people against a Russian ballistic missile? Ambassador Woolsey. 

Ambassador WOOLSEY. Mr. Chairman, I don’t think it makes any 

sense, and I think it makes even less sense given the devastating 

nature of what could be an electromagnetic pulse attack. A launch 

from a freighter off the coast of a simple Scud missile with a very 

primitive nuclear weapon on it to up 30, 40, 50 miles above the 

East Coast would detonate, make possible a single detonation that 

could effectively destroy the East Coast grid. And if the electric 

grid is destroyed, the EMP Commission says that within 12 months 

of an EMP event, approximately two-thirds of the American popu-
8 

lation would likely perish from starvation, disease, and societal 

breakdown. Other experts estimate the likely loss to be closer to 90 

percent. We would be back, not in the 1980s pre-Web, but back in 

the 1880s, pre-electric grid, and very few of us have enough plow 

horses and water pump handles to live in the 19th century. 

It seems stunning that something like this can happen, but the 

electronics we have today are approximately a million times more 

sensitive to electromagnetic pulse than the electronics that were 

taken out in 1962 by the very last atmospheric tests before the Atmospheric Test Ban Treaty cut in, in 1962. Both the Soviets and 

we were stunned by the degree of destruction many hundreds of 

miles away of even the primitive electronics of the time. But now 

at a million times more sensitive and a million times more vulnerable, the control systems of our electric grid are vulnerable to destruction by a single nuclear detonation up 40, 50, 60 miles into 

the atmosphere. It can occur by a, as I said, a Scud missile being 

launched from a freighter off the coast. It could take place by what 

the Soviets call a fractional orbital bombardment system, a FOBS, 

which essentially means a satellite, in this case containing a nuclear weapon, that is launched to the south, instead of to the north. 

To the south, we have virtually no observation, virtually no radars, 

virtually no sensors, essentially nothing. If they launch to the 

south and the satellite comes around the earth over the south pole 

and then up into the Northern Hemisphere and detonates, it could 

have the effect of exactly what was described by the EMP Commission report that I just read. 

Mr. ROGERS. And does that commission report indicate that our 

public utilities have not taken appropriate steps to harden their 

grid? 

Ambassador WOOLSEY. They are—Mr. Chairman, I’ve got to be 

careful how I phrase this. They are as ineffective and as uncommitted to making those improvements as any action by any American 

industrial or business group that I have ever been acquainted with 

or seen. They will not admit that this is a problem. They invent 

numbers. It is a trade association. NERC [North American Electric 

Reliability Corporation], the National Electrical Resources Corporation, North American Electric Resilience—not Resilience. I will get 

the acronym right in a second, but it is essentially the trade association for industry. And they have had people in NERC, including 

one who was head of NERC at one point, who has taken these 

issues responsibly and tried to work on them. But generally speaking, they do not do anything that would help the country deal with 

this problem. And if you look at how much it would cost, you are 

talking from the commission report, about $7 per American to build 

resilience into the grid. That is one really, really nice cup of coffee 

in the morning. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you very much. 

My time is expired. 

I now recognize the ranking member for any questions he may 

have. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I was just wondering sitting here listening to the testimony if we 

need to have another hearing to allow some of these folks to give 

the counterarguments because some pretty serious charges have 
9 

been made here, including inventing numbers and things like that. 

So, I think that might be a fair hearing to consider. I was also wondering if Mr. Coyle would like a chance to respond to Ambassador 

Joseph, because he made some pretty serious charges against you. 

If you would like to respond, I want to give you that opportunity 

at least. 

Mr. COYLE. Well, I don’t know what Ambassador Joseph found 

when he was Googling me, so I am not sure what he was referring 

to. We also talked for a minute there about cruise missiles as a 

threat, and I could just add to that, that the effort we are putting 

into cruise missile defenses is currently way, way less and more 

primitive than what we are doing for ballistic missiles. And some 

analysts regard a cruise missile threat as more likely because, as 

was referred earlier, a nation with not a lot of sophistication could 

put a cruise missile on some kind of a vessel and get close to our 

shores and launch that way. So the balance between the effort we 

put into cruise missile defenses and ballistic missile defenses, I 

think is a legitimate thing to be looked at. 

Mr. COOPER. Ambassador Woolsey made some very interesting 

points about electromagnetic pulse. We used to have a colleague 

here, Roscoe Bartlett, who rode this hobby-horse for some time, and 

I do not want to in any way underestimate the threat, but I do suggest that it is probably better to build coalitions than to champion 

causes individually. I know Ambassador Woolsey has been on the 

Board of Trustees of Stanford University, of many other distinguished places, think tank for Booz Hamilton. Have you had any 

success persuading your colleagues on those boards about the EMP 

threat? 

Ambassador WOOLSEY. I was on the Stanford board back some 

years ago, Congressman. I have been interested in this issue really 

for the last couple of years and have been doing a good deal of 

reading and work on it in that amount of time, but if we go back 

to either the time I was at Booz Allen, which began shortly after 

9/11 for a few years, or way back when I was a Stanford trustee, 

I was not involved in this particular set of issues, EMP, at those 

times, but I would be delighted to work with anybody who wants 

to work with me on this. I think it is an extremely important issue. 

Mr. COOPER. I was just thinking in terms of persuading people 

that it is a genuine threat, you are a relative newcomer to the 

issue. You served in and out of government for many, many years. 

Did you just suddenly become aware of this? 

Ambassador WOOLSEY. Not suddenly. I suppose 2 to 3 years ago, 

I began to develop a serious interest in it, having done some reading that piqued my interest. 

Mr. COOPER. And the chief barrier to persuasion with other people is? 

Ambassador WOOLSEY. I think a lot of it is that people have a 

very hard time admitting to themselves that it could be as awful 

as what I have described. We all like to have manageable problems. There is a sense of success in being able to see something 

that is difficult to do and then succeeding against it. Electromagnetic pulse is very, very challenging. It makes most of our 

other dilemmas in the world I think look comparatively straightforward by comparison. And I think that we need to step up to the 
10 

fact that although defending against the ballistic missiles that 

would set off EMP is extremely difficult, we might well be able to 

build resilience into our electric grid relatively quickly and relatively affordably if we could get our country organized to deal 

with it. 

Part of the problem is that the electric grid has FERC [Federal 

Energy Regulatory Commission]. It has NERC. It has Department 

of Energy. It has electricity commissions in the individual States. 

It is a situation where there are lots and lots of people dashing off 

in all different directions in terms of managing the grid. And to 

pull together and have a coherent approach is technically possible, 

I think, but organizationally, it is a really stunning challenge. 

Mr. COOPER. It is my understanding that our former colleague, 

Roscoe Bartlett, is living largely off the grid and has hardened his 

network so that he is prepared. Are you prepared for this threat? 

Ambassador WOOLSEY. Not completely, but I do have solar panels on my house, and I have various improvements like that, geothermal heat pump and so forth, that would make me partially 

grid-resilient I guess. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I see a number of our colleagues are here. 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The chair now recognizes my friend and colleague from Alabama, 

Mr. Brooks, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

This question is for all the witnesses. In 2009, the administration 

sent Poland a Patriot battery with no missile interceptors. The 

Poles called this deployment a potted plant. Presumably this was 

done to attempt to mitigate Russian concerns. What is the damage 

done to our alliances when we make such nondeployment deployments? 

Mr. COYLE. I don’t know why that decision was made the way 

it was made. I just can’t comment. 

Ambassador JOSEPH. Sir, I think there is a pattern of these types 

of decisions, at least that I have discerned in our foreign policy over 

the last few years. We don’t back up what we say. We don’t impose 

consequences for red lines that are established and then crossed, 

and I think the consequence is an erosion of the confidence of our 

allies in the United States and a view on the part of our adversaries that they have little to fear from the United States. 

Mr. BROOKS. Ambassador Woolsey, do you have anything to add? 

You don’t have to. 

Ambassador WOOLSEY. I think Bob summed it up very well. 

Mr. BROOKS. This one is also to all witnesses. Last week this 

subcommittee held a hearing on Russia’s violation of the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty. What are the implications of the administration’s refusal to provide the annually required report and to finally, years overdue, confirm that Russia is 

in violation of that treaty? What do our allies take away from this 

meekness, and how about Russia and Putin? 

Ambassador WOOLSEY. Congressman, I have not spent much 

time on the INF Treaty, but I was the head of delegation and chief 

negotiator for the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, which Mr. 
11 

Putin has also walked away from. It is a treaty that, among other 

things, not only locked in the deployments country by country that 

ended the Cold War, but when it was negotiated in 1989, 1990, 

1991, it had a provision that prohibited any country from placing 

troops on the land of another without formal written permission, 

so what Mr. Putin has done in Georgia and what he has done in 

Ukraine and what he may well be doing in other parts of Central 

and Eastern Europe are clearly in violation of that treaty, and that 

is why he walked away from it, just as he walked away from the 

INF Treaty. He will basically walk away from whatever treaty limits Russia in any way that he doesn’t want. 

Ambassador JOSEPH. I think President Obama said it best: ‘‘All 

arms control commitments must be scrupulously observed, and if 

they are not, there must be consequences.’’ The fact that it appears 

that Russia is in clear material breach, I would argue, of this INF 

Treaty and that there are no consequences, I think undermines not 

just the confidence in the United States, but the whole arms control process. Because if you can’t depend on other countries observing and if they don’t observe that there are consequences, what 

good is the process? What good are arms control agreements? They 

are certainly not going to be something that you want to pin your 

security on. 

Mr. COYLE. Mr. Brooks, I am aware that there is a debate about 

whether or not this is a violation. I have looked at it enough myself 

to know that it certainly is getting close, if it is not. But I think 

part of the issue here has been whether or not the administration 

wants to treat it as a violation, and that involves statecraft and 

other things that I am not an expert about. 

Mr. BROOKS. Well, just quickly, one last question. In view of the 

issues associated with Russia and the United States and the treaties that we have with Russia and particularly the INF and apparent violation of that treaty by Russia, what weight do you give to 

any treaties between the United States and Russia? 

Ambassador WOOLSEY. I think only treaties that the Russian 

leader, particularly this Russian leader, thinks are in Russia’s interests at any one point of time are going to be binding on Russia. 

He does not have a sense at all of the rule of law, of the standards 

to which he is sometimes held by statements at the United Nations 

and the rest. He is a KGB officer, and not to put too fine a point 

on it, as far as I am concerned, he is a thug. He has no interest 

in, no sense of obligation to treaties and the rule of law. He will 

observe one or more for some time if he thinks that it is in his interest and he is not ready to violate them in order to move Russia’s 

interest as he perceives it forward by some other means. But he 

simply lacks, as far as I am concerned, the sense of obligation that 

most Western leaders and certainly American leaders have toward 

a treaty that one has signed and has been approved by our Senate, 

and therefore, is something we should observe. He doesn’t think 

that way as far as I am concerned. 

Mr. ROGERS. Gentleman’s time is expired. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Johnson, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. Ambassador Joseph, you just mentioned about consequences for Russia’s violation of which treaty? 
12 

Ambassador JOSEPH. The INF Treaty from 1987. 

Mr. JOHNSON. And what consequences would you recommend 

and for what violations of that treaty? 

Ambassador JOSEPH. Well, the violation that has been I know 

the subject of consideration by this subcommittee has been the development of a ground-launched cruise missile that has a range 

that is banned by this treaty, a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. This is the one treaty that outlawed an entire class of missiles, of ballistic missiles and cruise missiles within that range. It 

applies only to the United States and to Russia, which is what the 

Russians are arguing: Why should we live with this restriction 

when other countries, such as China, don’t have this same restriction? But it, I think, shows the cynicism of Russia’s attitude toward 

arms control in the sense that, instead of legally withdrawing from 

this treaty, as we did under the ABM Treaty, we did it according 

to the provisions of the treaty, they simply violate it because they 

don’t want to pay the political price or what they see may be a political price. It shows the contempt that they have for the rule of 

law, as Jim just mentioned in this context. 

What should we do about it? Well, if you go back to the history 

of INF, the reason we were deploying INF missiles was that the 

Soviet Union had been deploying SS–20 missiles by the hundreds. 

We deployed 464, were on course of deploying 464. The agreement 

was made that we would eliminate all of these weapons. The question was, how do we ensure a credible deterrent with our European 

partners in the context of the Soviet Union and the Red Army and 

the Cold War? That is not the security environment today. I don’t 

believe we are living in the Cold War today, even though some of 

the actions that Russia have taken and particularly their buildup 

of nuclear forces is reminiscent of those days. So what do we do? 

Well, I think we have to think about sanctions, sanctions with Europeans. I think we have to think about—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. Do you think Europeans are going to respond to 

sanctions like they have with respect to the Ukraine? 

Ambassador JOSEPH. I hope not, but I think it is going to depend 

on American leadership. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I tell you. What—if America—assuming that 

what you say is correct and the Russians are developing this class 

of banned cruise missiles, is there a way that those missiles gain 

an advantage over our defenses right now? 

Ambassador JOSEPH. Absolutely. Absolutely. 

Mr. JOHNSON. So then what you would recommend then would 

be that we go into another arms race and try to counter what they 

have done? 

Ambassador JOSEPH. Of course not. I am not recommending an 

arms race. But again, if you go back to the context in which this 

treaty was negotiated, the Soviet Union had deployed SS–20s in 

order to cut the link between the United States and our European 

allies, to de-link the Europeans from the United States. This was 

about deterrence. This was about deterrence in the context of the 

Cold War. 

Things have changed, but the Europeans still, I would argue, feel 

a need for a strong nuclear deterrent. At the last NATO summit, 

they talked about that need. So this may require, this may require 
13 

more capabilities. It certainly requires us, I believe, not to withdraw the remaining dual-capable aircraft and B61 bombs that are 

our only remaining theater nuclear deterrent in Europe. I think we 

need to look at what those options are, but we need to have consequences, as President Obama said. 

Mr. JOHNSON. All right. Thank you. With my last question, I 

would like to ask Ambassador Woolsey, an EMP assault, who 

would be the likely perpetrator? Is it a state or non-state actor, and 

what do you see their end game being, having been successful at 

creating a successful attack? What would happen? What do they 

expect to gain out of it? 

Ambassador WOOLSEY. Well, this would be undertaken only by 

someone or a country or group that wanted to absolutely destroy 

the United States because the consequences, as the commission 

mentioned, the range of debate is between those who think twothirds of the American population would die and those who think 

90 percent of the American population would die. 

Mr. JOHNSON. The cause of death being? 

Ambassador WOOLSEY. The cause of death being starvation, disease, societal breakdown. We have 18 critical infrastructures, and 

17 of them depend upon electricity. So without electricity, you have 

no food, you have no water, you have no finances, you have no communications. You are back in the 19th century without the ability 

to support the U.S. population. I think that that is something that 

even at its worst, China and Russia are unlikely to want to bring 

about, but we had several incidents, including one very dramatic 

one during the Cuban Missile Crisis during the Cold War in which 

we came very, very close to nuclear war. In one case, the Cuban 

portion of the confrontation in the Cuban missile crisis, in one case, 

one Soviet navy admiral—or, rather, navy captain turning a key as 

his two colleagues had turned it—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Excuse me, Ambassador. We are way over time. I 

am going to have to go to the next Member. 

Gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Bridenstine, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador Woolsey, question for you regarding EMP. If we did 

have an event, such as an EMP, the electric grid, of course, would 

be at stake. Would all of our electronic gadgets as well be at stake? 

Ambassador WOOLSEY. As I understand it, and you realize you 

are getting this from a lawyer/history major, Congressman, not 

from a double E. As I understand it, there are three types of pulses 

that would come from an electromagnetic pulse detonation of, say, 

a nuclear weapon. One is rather similar to lightning, and we can 

discount it because we have dealt with seeing to it that our buildings and electronics can operate even when there is lightning. One 

has very short wavelengths and operates generally at line of sight, 

so if it were detonated up at a particular altitude, it would more 

or less travel to the horizon in all directions and would knock out 

everybody’s computers, whether it is in your car or in your refrigerator at home or in this voice-magnifying box. 

The really terrible one is the third kind, which has very long 

wavelengths, and the waves ride along transmission lines and destroy transformers as they go. The transformers are the heart of 
14 

our electrical grid. They are what step up the voltage so it can be 

moved, step it down again so we can use it in our homes and businesses and industry. That situation is one in which the transmission lines run so far and the electromagnetic pulse with the 

long wavelength carries so far, that the effect could be devastating 

over very large areas. It could be possible, although everything 

would have to work just right for it, for the entire continental grid 

of the United States to be taken out by one detonation. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. So if we were to harden the grid, is that sufficient, or would the calamity that you speak of happen as computers 

and systems are fried across the country? Like is the grid enough? 

Ambassador WOOLSEY. The grid is not enough, but it helps a lot. 

If one could harden the grid against the long wavelength and the 

destruction of the transformers via the transmission lines carrying 

the long pulse, it would make it possible for us to come back, and 

it would not destroy the whole infrastructure. We would still have 

a lot of losses of local computers and automobiles and so forth, but 

those, once we started manufacturing again, could be redesigned in 

such a way that the computer in your car would not be knocked 

out any more than it is by lightning. So the thing that is a huge 

problem is this knocking out of the transmission lines and the 

transformers because the transformers are the heart of our electrical system. If they go down, everything goes down. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Got it. Ambassador Joseph, question for you 

regarding Ground-Based, Midcourse Defense. We have had tests in 

the past that have been very successful. We have had tests in the 

past that have not been successful. It seems like every time there 

is an unsuccessful test, some people use that as evidence that, look, 

it can’t be done. We need to stop. When we have successful tests, 

the same people aren’t saying, hey, look, we just accomplished 

something mighty. Let’s continue to advance this capability. 

In your opinion, Ambassador Joseph, how important is it for the 

United States of America to have a very robust R&D capability for 

missile defense and on top of that, the infrastructure to do not just 

testing but validation and operational, how is it going to be used 

operationally? Can you talk about that for a second and also just 

for us as legislators, we have got to make sure that we are funding 

these kind of capabilities, but we don’t want to be funding them if 

they are going to be used to say, oh, look this one test failed. 

Therefore, we need to scrap the whole system. 

Ambassador JOSEPH. Thank you. Yes, I think it is essential that 

we have a robust research and development program. We do need, 

as I said in my prepared statement, to fix the problems with GMD, 

and I think we are on course to do that. I think that we need to 

increase the number of interceptors. We need to do research and 

development, and I would argue, deploy capabilities like fast interceptors and multiple kill vehicles that will keep pace with the 

threat, because the threat is dynamic. The North Koreans are improving their capabilities. The Iranians will be doing the same 

thing. There is just no question about that. So this is dynamic. You 

can’t just stop with GMD in place. You have to develop for the future. 

Also I think we need a robust R&D to take us beyond a limited 

missile defense. We need to explore those capabilities that will 
15 

allow us to use missile defense as part of our deterrent with regard 

to Russia and I think probably China in the future, which means 

that we are going to have to have capabilities beyond the terrestrial-based type interceptors. We are going to have to have strong 

directed research in the field of directed energy for example. 

And I think space is very important. We need to explore the full 

potential of space because I think if we are going to have an option 

for dealing with larger-scale Russian-type threats, it will only come 

if we are able to deploy effectively in space. We need to find out 

what our options are, and to do that, we need to have a very robust 

R&D capability, and we have to maintain an infrastructure that 

can provide us with the capabilities that we need in the future to 

keep up with the multiple nature of the threats that we face. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank the gentleman. 

Gentleman’s time is expired. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. 

Franks, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all of you for 

being here. 

Director Woolsey, I can call you, Ambassador, Director. There is 

a lot of things I can call you. You have got a pretty amazing curriculum vitae. And I won’t try to pretend my attitude toward you 

is somehow neutral. I consider you a friend, and I am a fan and 

especially was grateful for your testimony here today. You know 

the privilege I have of chairing the EMP caucus gives me a special 

interest in some of the comments that you made. And I guess it 

is important, I would like to point out that, you know, we talked 

a lot about the EMP Commission which is the gold standard study, 

but there are 11 studies, 11 major studies all the way from NASA 

[National Aeronautics and Space Administration] to the Academy 

of Sciences to the Department of Defense to FERC, to all of these, 

and they all come to very similar conclusions. It is not as if this 

somehow, that this was some anomaly. And, again, I just appreciate your courage to be able to articulate this. 

Over time, sometimes it seems like things happen. I would like 

to say one thing before I ask you a question that I hope would be 

some encouragement to you. I have the privilege of chairing the 

World Summit on Electric Infrastructure Security, and we did our 

fifth year in London, and for the first time, I saw the industry, the 

major leaders, not NERC—NERC is still that trade association that 

you mentioned—but some of the major players now have come 180 

degrees and are on board, and it is really very, very encouraging, 

so I look forward to some significant advances here. 

But you raise a few interesting points in your testimony about 

the potential Scud in the tub scenario, and you essentially answered my question and you kind of got ahead of me. But let me 

ask you, do you think and to what extent is not having a protected 

grid an invitation to certain opponents of America to exploit that 

vulnerability? 

Ambassador WOOLSEY. Congressman, I think it is a really open 

invitation if we don’t have a resilient grid. The two countries I am 

the most worried about would be North Korea and Iran. North 

Korea already has nuclear weapons. It already has ballistic missiles, and it has launched toward the south in the sort of FOBS 
16 

configuration, fractional orbit bombardment system, so that something that was launched on that trajectory into orbit would come 

around at us from the south where we have no radars, or effectively none, and no ability to perceive what is coming. So I think 

they have demonstrated something that they have, and we know 

from the Russians that the Russians have helped them. The Russians have told us this. And North Korea is ruled by a madman 

as far as we can tell. This is not someone who is just as stolid and 

someone who has great challenges for us in figuring out how to negotiate with him and deal with Kim Jong Un. Iran presents a different kind of problem because although they have not tested a nuclear weapon yet, they have tested ballistic missiles of course. They 

have tested ballistic missiles launched from platforms in the water. 

They have tested ballistic missiles firing toward the south. And 

moreover, the leaders, Khamenei and the others are, at least if you 

listen to what they say and take them seriously, they have very 

strong religious views that it is their mission in eternity to destroy 

us. It is not just hostility. It is a religious commitment that we 

should be gotten rid of. 

Mr. FRANKS. I think, for me, that is one of my greatest concerns. 

When someone feels transcendentally justified, it becomes a different equation and some of the traditional deterrents is of little 

impact. Let me ask you one more quick question. As you know, the 

Defense Department over the years has spent literally billions now 

over the last four or five decades hardening many of our defense 

critical assets against EMP. We are very aware of it on the military 

side of it, and we don’t have difficulty convincing generals, but the 

civilian grid issue, we remain completely vulnerable. If Iran were 

to, say, gain a nuclear weapons capability today that they might 

delegate to some nonstate actor, what do you think would be our 

reaction toward hardening our grid at that point? 

Ambassador WOOLSEY. I would hope our interests would pick up 

quickly because it takes very little sophistication to launch something like this. The books by Peter Pry talk for example, about the 

possibility of launching a nuclear weapon up to low Earth orbit altitude with a weather balloon. One is not necessarily talking even 

about a ballistic missile. So anything that can get a simple nuclear 

weapon weighing a few tens of pounds up to 30 miles could create 

this EMP effect. And for the Iranians to make it possible for 

Hezbollah to have a nuclear weapon in a weather balloon is not beyond the reach of imagination. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, let me just suggest to you, I am very grateful 

to you for your courage, and I have said once here just a few days 

ago that perhaps former Vice President Dick Cheney was one of the 

most articulate spokesmen on this issue, but I may have to change 

my mind here. 

Ambassador Joseph, there is a great deal of respect on my part 

for you, too, sir. They say that one of the most encouraging things 

in the world is to hear your own convictions fall from another’s lips, 

and that is certainly what has happened here today, and I appreciate you. 

President Obama said, in 2001, that I, ‘‘don’t agree with missile 

defense systems.’’ In 2008, as a candidate, he stated, ‘‘I will cut 

tens of billions of dollars in wasteful spending. I will cut invest-
17 

ments in unproven missile defense systems.’’ Now he has implemented these what I think are radical political ideologies rather 

than defense principles, and how would you describe the impacts 

of these campaign speeches on our national defense? 

And Mr. Chairman, before I ask you to make that question, could 

I ask that the Congressional Budget Office letter of July 21 be 

placed in the record that would show how this administration has 

affected missile defense? 

Mr. ROGERS. Without objection, so ordered. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 71.] 

Mr. FRANKS. And if you still remember the question here. 

Ambassador JOSEPH. First of all, I think you characterized the 

position of Senator Obama correctly. I mean, he was a missile defense critic. He used the same talking points: It won’t work, it is 

too expensive, it will be destabilizing. He in 2008 ran against basically missile defense, pledging that he would cut tens of billions of 

dollars. He certainly has cut billions of dollars from the budget, but 

it is interesting to point out that in 2010, the DOD Ballistic Missile 

Defense Review, President Obama’s administration made the statement that we are now, we, the United States, are now protected 

against—against threats from North Korea and other rogue states 

because we have a limited missile defense, and that capability is 

due to the investments that had been made in prior years in GMD. 

So apparently the policy has—has evolved since—since 2001, and 

certainly since 2008. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will stop there, but I 

would—— 

Mr. ROGERS. We will do another round. 

Mr. FRANKS. Okay. 

Mr. ROGERS. I appreciate it. Our clocks are screwed up, so I am 

trying to make sure to give everybody plenty of time going over, 

but let’s go to our friend and colleague from California, Mr. 

Garamendi, for 5 minutes or thereabouts. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I am sure you will let me know when thereabout arrives. 

Ambassador Joseph, you were discussing the success of the limited missile defense system. Do you still hold the view that it 

should be a limited missile defense system against North Korea, 

Iran, and an unintended missile from Russia or China, or should 

we go to a full-out missile defense system against the Chinese and 

Russian numerous missiles that they have? 

Ambassador JOSEPH. So that is a—a very important question. 

Clearly I think, and I believe that there is a consensus, or a general consensus, that we need to have a defense against rogue state 

threats that would provide a limited capability against a limited 

threat. On that, there is consensus. 

I believe that there is greater cogency to the argument that we 

need a capability for accidental and unauthorized launch, which 

may not be the limited defense that you need for a North Koreatype threat. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Describe. What did you just say and why did 

you just say that? 
18 

Ambassador JOSEPH. Well, if you look at the missile defense plan 

for the Bush 41 administration, it was a global protection against 

accidental launches—or limited strikes, GPALS, Global Protection 

Against Limited Strikes, and the defining requirement was to protect the United States against, if I remember correctly, about 200 

warheads, which would be one Soviet, one Russian boat that had 

been taken by, you know, by a rogue commander. So you had, you 

know, an accidental and limited capability, but it was much more 

than the limited capability that you can get through terrestrialbased GMD-type interceptors, which, you know, are—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I got the difference. Do you—should we then go 

to the 1990—excuse me, 1991 policy or stay with the 1999 policy? 

Ambassador JOSEPH. Well, I think given the change in our relationship with Russia, which has certainly not been a change for the 

positive, given that there is a huge—I would argue, a huge prospect 

for miscalculation—I don’t think this is first strike, second strike, 

this is not cold war, but I think we are in a situation where miscalculation can take place very easily. It could have taken place in 

Georgia. I have been told by Russian sources that in the context 

of Georgia, the Russians were preparing, not—not—they didn’t 

have their finger on the trigger; they were preparing and they had 

plans for a nuclear exchange with the United States, because they 

didn’t know how this would escalate. 

And they think about nuclear weapons a lot differently than we 

think about nuclear weapons. My sense is that of the hundreds if 

not thousands of analysts on our side who were following Georgia, 

not one was thinking about a nuclear exchange. That is a very dangerous situation. That is a situation in which miscalculation can 

occur, and I think we need to protect against that. What are our 

options? I think we need to explore what those options are. That 

is why we need to invest in research and development—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. If we need to explore, why don’t you help us explore. 

Ambassador JOSEPH. Well, I think we need to emphasize directed 

energy in our research and development and we need to emphasize 

space. We need to consider a space testbed, which was proposed 

earlier in the Bush administration, to find out what our options are 

and whether those options are for an unauthorized or accidental 

launch of the type I have described, or whether we have options for 

larger-scale attacks on the part of Russia or China. We should 

know what those options are, because we do know that we are 

going to be surprised in the future and that miscalculation with 

Beijing and with—and with Moscow can happen. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I want you to put—the three of you to put yourself in China and Russia’s shoes with the same questions. How do 

they perceive us? You said that we don’t have one analyst. Have 

we ever gone to a situation in which we are preparing, in recent 

times, for a nuclear exchange? 

Ambassador WOOLSEY. I think Russia is more of a problem than 

China. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. No. You are in their shoes. 

Ambassador WOOLSEY. In—I think if I were—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. How do look at the United States? 
19 

Ambassador WOOLSEY. In my old job, but in Russia rather than 

in the United States, I could be tempted to think that I couldn’t 

accomplish my country’s objectives of dominating Europe and as 

much of Eurasia as possible without being rather aggressive; and 

that Putin, as KGB officer and with his history and the KGB’s history of what they call disinformation, dezinformatsia, essentially 

adopting as their own, their propaganda. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. So do you want to have your own missile defense system because the United States has so many offensive 

weapons? 

Ambassador WOOLSEY. Oh, I want as much as I can get if I am 

the head of the KGB. I want—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. So are you building those? Does Russia build 

missile defense systems? 

Ambassador WOOLSEY. I am—yes, I think I am building missile 

defense systems, I am building offensive systems, I am working on 

electromagnetic pulse, all of the above. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Ambassador Joseph. 

Ambassador JOSEPH. Well, first of all, Putin has declared the 

United States—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. No, no. You are—— 

Ambassador JOSEPH [continuing]. Is the largest adversary. So 

from a Russian perspective, we are the adversary. Putin has undertaken a large-scale modernization of their offensive nuclear forces, 

all three legs of the triad. I understand from open Russian sources, 

I don’t have access to the intelligence, that Russia plans by 2020 

to spend more on missile defense than the United States. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Sufficient to overwhelm our strategic weapons? 

Ambassador JOSEPH. Well, I think that as—you know, as—you 

know, looking at it from Putin’s perspective, that would be exactly 

what he would want. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Do you have the money—— 

Ambassador JOSEPH. Look, this notion of destabilizing—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Do you have the money to do it? 

Ambassador JOSEPH. This notion of destabilization and an arms 

race, this is a western concept. It is—it was at the core of the ABM 

treaty. The Russians never bought that. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Mr. Coyle, I don’t have much time; in fact, I am 

well over time, so—assuming the clock is half accurate. 

Mr. COYLE. Well, Congressman Garamendi, just to quote Admiral Winnefeld again, ‘‘it is not the policy of the United States to 

build a ballistic missile defense system to counter Russian ballistic 

missiles.’’ 

I believe he is correct when he says that. And so if I put myself 

in the Russians’ shoes and we suddenly declare that we are going 

to do that, we are going to build a defense like that, I think they 

will use it as an excuse to build more offensive systems, perhaps 

more cruise missiles, perhaps all kinds of things that they don’t 

have an excuse for now. 

Mr. ROGERS. Gentleman’s time has expired. I thank the gentleman. 

And we will start round two now, and I believe everybody had 

had a first round, so I will start off. And before I ask my first question, I do want to point out that, you know, you made the comment 
20 

about Admiral Winnefeld in your opening statement. He is the vice 

chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and I think he has to espouse the position of the administration. I think that that policy is really a policy of the Obama administration. I am not sure that he is espousing that as his best military judgment, but that is just an observation on my part. 

Let me ask this: China and Russia seem to want to do—and they 

seem to be openly doing things for their own benefit in that they 

are modernizing and building up their nuclear forces, but at the 

same time openly developing missile defense capabilities to neutralize the American strategic forces. In fact, China’s ministry of 

defense announced this morning that he conducted another test 

today. 

So given that we know openly China’s doing this, Russia’s doing 

it, why do you think that it is America’s policy to go along with this 

and get along and not be more aggressive in trying to face and 

push back against those trends for those two countries? Start with 

Mr. Coyle. 

Mr. COYLE. Well, I think the main reason, just speaking from a 

technological point of view, is we don’t know how to do it, we don’t 

know how to build a missile defense system that would stop all of 

Russia’s or China’s intercontinental ballistic missiles. And there is 

the question, well, if we did know how, what would that cost? CBO 

has never been able to estimate it, because nobody’s been able to 

describe what that system would look like. And then there is this 

argument, which you have been hearing today, about whether or 

not it would be destabilizing. But I think the first thing is we just 

don’t know how to do it right now, and—and so that is the first 

step and that is the first problem. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Joseph. 

Ambassador JOSEPH. Well, I think there is a strong ideological 

dimension to it, and I think that is there is a sense that there is 

an arm—on our part, there is an arms control solution to every 

problem. 

I think that there clearly isn’t in this case. The Russians have 

no interest, and they have said so explicitly, no interest in arms 

control, whether it is for offensive, strategic forces, or for their theater forces, in large part, because we have already made concession 

after concession, we have very little to give and they have, at least 

in the theater category, an 8-to-1 or 10-to-1 advantage. Why would 

they? 

So there is this—there is this notion that we should be going to 

global zero; we should be—we should be negotiating with the Russians; the Russians object to our missile defenses, therefore, we 

make concessions on missile defenses. We have seen this pattern 

of behavior over and over, and it doesn’t work. 

We did get the Russians to the negotiation table—to the negotiating table for New START, we did do that, and we did that 

through a missile defense concession, and we did get an agreement, 

but if you look at the agreement, we are the ones that go down. 

The Russians go up. 

So if you are into, my view, unilateral disarmament, you pursue 

these issues like we are pursuing them. 

Mr. ROGERS. Ambassador Woolsey. 
21 

Ambassador WOOLSEY. I was an advisor, a delegate at large and 

then ambassador and chief negotiator for four different arms control negotiations from 1969 through 1991, and the one that I negotiated as chief negotiator covered all the countries of Europe and 

all of their conventional weapons in six languages, 101 pages, we 

did it in about a year, and I thought it was a real achievement. It 

turned out that Putin junked it as soon as it was inconvenient for 

him. 

And I think that the United States has been, on the whole, really 

quite naive about thinking that arms control agreements are in 

fact going to limit the likes of Mr. Putin. It is, I think, just not in 

the cards. 

Fouad Ajami, who sadly died a month or two ago, a marvelous 

scholar of the Near East, American journalist and scholar, said 

that President Obama is a constitutional scholar lost in a world of 

thugs, and I am afraid there is some truth to that. We are in a 

world of thugs, and one of them is Putin in spades. And it is important that we realize that, and that that is what we are dealing 

with, not a group of collegial, law-abiding countries that will kind 

of go along with whatever we sign and treat it with the same degree of respect that we treat things we sign. It is just not who we 

are dealing with. I wish it were otherwise. 

I felt a real sense of achievement in negotiating that treaty. It 

lasted only as long as Putin didn’t need to get rid of it. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, let me ask this: We have heard observations 

today about Russian policy, China policy, North Korea, and our responses thereto. We haven’t heard anything about Iran. I would 

love to hear your thoughts about what we should be doing with regard to the threat from Iran. And each one of you, just whichever 

order you want to go in. Start with you, Ambassador Woolsey. 

Ambassador WOOLSEY. Bernard Lewis, a great scholar at Princeton of the Middle East, says that during the Cold War, mutual assured destruction was a deterrent. Unfortunately now, with respect 

to the leaders of Iran, it is an inducement. And what he means by 

that, I believe, is that the set of beliefs I described earlier in which 

the Iranian leadership really believes there is a theological case to 

be made and that should really dominate their thinking for destroying, particularly the United States and Israel and our civilizations, not just one government, that is, I am afraid, something that 

drives a lot of the decisionmaking at the top level of the Iranian 

government. 

Mr. ROGERS. And what should we do about it from a policy 

standpoint? 

Ambassador WOOLSEY. First—first thing is to recognize it and 

not to get bogged down in wishful thinking. The Persians invented 

chess, and they are good at it. And the way I think of it is that 

they have one pawn that they are moving down along the side of 

the board down to the King’s row to turn him into the most lethal 

piece, the Queen, which for—in the real world would be the nuclear 

weapon. In the meantime, they are distracting their opponent by 

doing other things on other parts of the chessboard, but the objective is to get that nuclear weapon. 

I think they will do anything they can to see to it that they are 

able to turn this situation with a limited number of devices and the 
22 

rest into a relatively quick nuclear weapon as soon as they want 

it and need it, and I think that is their objective. 

Mr. ROGERS. Ambassador Joseph. 

Ambassador JOSEPH. Let me focus on the negotiations. We, of 

course, don’t know whether there will be an agreement with Iran 

reached by the time of the latest deadline. If there is an agreement, 

we don’t know whether there will be ex-—how many centrifuges 

will be allowed, what will be the restrictions on R&D, how long 

the—you know, the restrictions will last, what will be the 

verification procedures. There are many, many things that we don’t 

know, but we do know what won’t be in that agreement right now. 

We do know that there will be no limits on Iran’s ballistic missile 

program. And the supreme leader has recently said that, we need 

to redouble our efforts in this area. And we know from our own 

sources that, in fact, they are doing just that. They already have 

the largest ballistic missile defense force in the region, and it is improving, including capabilities that will provide them with continental range missiles. We also know that there will be no ban on 

enrichment. 

So the two things we know combined means that Iran will be a 

nuclear weapons threshold state with an expanding ballistic missile capability. We know that. 

Secretary Kerry has stated that the goal of the negotiations is no 

longer to deny Iran a nuclear capability, but it is to extend the 

time for breakout from 2 months to 6 months or 12 months. I think 

this is a fundamental mistake. I think other countries in the region 

will want the same capability, and it will lead to further proliferation. I think it will undercut decades-old U.S. policy to discourage 

enrichment by other countries. And we have been discouraging our 

friends for many, many years, but once we say yes to Iran, how do 

we say no to the Australians? How do we say no to—you know, to 

the South Koreans? How do we say no to others? 

And I come at this from a non-proliferation perspective, and I am 

very concerned about that. It will put—you know, this type of 

agreement will put Israel behind the eight ball, make it more difficult for them to use force, because Iran will be allowed to continue its nuclear program, something that the Israelis have said is 

unacceptable. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Coyle, how would you suggest our policy respond to the growing concerns with Iran’s nuclear capability? 

Mr. COYLE. Well, it is—Mr. Chairman, it is obvious that the negotiations between the P5 and Germany and Iran have been very 

difficult, now being extended for another 4 months, I guess it is. 

And I am hopeful, of course, that those negotiations will be successful. So far, they have halted the growth in Iran’s nuclear program 

for 10 months. I hope it is much longer than that, but anything 

that can be done to limit the growth and the size of Iran’s nuclear 

program, I think is in our national interest. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. Thank the gentlemen. 

I now recognize the gentleman from Tennessee for any questions 

he may have. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would just like to reiterate my call for a more balanced witness panel. I think we have 

heard a number of bold, sometimes almost wild and intemperate 
23 

statements. So if we do want to pursue them, they should be 

fleshed out with a more balanced approach so that this committee 

and the Congress could have more sources of information, but I 

have no further questions at this time. 

Mr. ROGERS. The chair recognizes the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Bridenstine, if he has any additional questions. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Ambassador Joseph, just out of curiosity, if the United States of America has a $17 trillion GDP and Russia has 

a $2 trillion GDP, if our economy is that much larger than theirs, 

is there any reason why we should seek parity with them as it relates to our defenses? 

Ambassador JOSEPH. Well, I don’t think our defenses should be 

focused or should be sized to that of Russia, because we have a different set of threats than Russia faces. Russia is, of course, developing and modernizing its strategic defenses, particularly of the 

Moscow region, which is a region that is large enough to incorporate ballistic missile fields, offensive fields, but we have—we 

have interests that are much different than the Russians, we have 

adversaries that are different than the Russians, and so we need 

to size and scale our ballistic missile defense according to our 

needs, not according to some concept of parity. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. And I just—I appreciate that testimony. It 

seems to me that if we are economically in a stronger position, then 

it would make sense that militarily we should be in a stronger position, and to constrain ourselves because Russia is constrained by 

their GDP, I think that leads us down a path of instability. I think 

a strong America is a safe world, and that when we try to constrain 

ourselves, we get what is happening right now where Vladimir 

Putin has invaded Georgia and he still occupies South Ossetia and 

Abkhazia. 

He has threatened nuclear war in Poland; he has threatened the 

Baltic States, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia. He has cut off energy, 

and people have suffered and died. When you talk about, you know, 

the aggression in Crimea and in eastern Ukraine, you know, these 

things don’t just happen because—because, you know—I guess, because, the United States of America is doing the right thing. These 

things happen because people perceive right now that we are not 

going to do what is necessary to protect free countries and countries that are fighting for their independence. 

When you look at Syria, I mean, the Russians are helping the 

Assad regime in Syria, and the mullahs in Iran are going around 

sanctions and building nuclear centrifuges, and, of course, those 

are built by the Russians. It seems like wherever you go in the 

world, the Russians are on the wrong side, and it overwhelmingly 

appears to me that there is no balance to this, and that if we constrain ourselves because the Russians are constrained, and, of 

course, they are constrained because their economy is weak, and 

their economy is weak because it is run by organized crime and 

they can’t attract investment. 

We have a very different system here in the United States, and 

it has resulted in us being economically and militarily very powerful. And for us to turn around and use those gifts—or to constrain 

ourselves when those gifts are bequeathed upon us, it would seem 

that we would be turning our backs on our obligations. 
24 

I am a strong advocate that the United States needs to remain 

the superpower that it is. And to constrain ourselves because a 

country run by organized crime is constrained naturally, I think 

that is a bad direction for our Nation. 

Thank you. Thank you all for your testimony. 

Mr. ROGERS. The chair recognizes the gentleman from Arizona to 

bat cleanup. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador Joseph, let me begin here again with you. First of 

all, again, I appreciate your testimony so much. I don’t usually ask 

metaphysical questions, but sometimes it is a rather challenging 

thing for me to understand why our friends on the left seem to be 

so antithetical toward missile defense. You and I know that—that 

the limited capability that we have at least affords us the opportunity to defend ourselves against an early attack, whether it is an 

accident or whatever it might be a limited attack, so that then we 

have the opportunity, not to have to respond overwhelmingly. We 

know that a Russian Federation strike would overwhelm our system immediately, we understand that. And for those that say, you 

know, we can’t protect against all of them, that it doesn’t—it 

doesn’t matter at all. We know that the situation in Israel has been 

borne out where Iron Dome has afforded them the opportunity to 

hold off some offensive attacks and then allows them the time to 

go in and take out and dismantle those offensive capabilities. We 

understand all that. 

And yet, in all loving deference to my friend, Mr. Coyle, just a 

few years back, you know, the argument, and I don’t want to put 

the words in his mouth, but as I understood them were to suggest 

that, you know, the bullet hitting bullets technology is fantasy. And 

at that time, of course, we were beginning to hit a dot on the side 

of a bullet with a bullet consistently, in the words of General 

Obering. 

So what is it—there was this notion that you tried to articulate 

that GMD was rushed into development without adequate testing. 

You addressed that. What is it that makes our friends on the left 

seem so antithetical to this capability, when all through history, 

the paradigm of warfare has been a new capability offensively is 

met with a defensive capability, and we just keep going till we— 

and now we face the most dangerous weapons in the world, an incoming nuclear missile that could ruin your whole day if it lands. 

Why is there this hesitation to have some sort of defensive capability? 

Ambassador JOSEPH. Sir, I don’t know the answer—— 

Mr. FRANKS. You don’t answer metaphysical questions. Is that 

what you are saying? 

Ambassador JOSEPH. Well, I am—I am always willing to throw 

out an answer, or a guess, in this case. And my sense is that there 

is still a hangover from the ABM Treaty days. There is a legacy 

of thought from the ABM Treaty days where defenses were considered to be bad by the United States. Okay. Soviet Union went 

along with the ABM Treaty, but they cheated on that treaty, just 

like they cheat on INF and other agreements. But we had sort of 

ingrained in our strategic thought this notion that mutual assured 

destruction is the best means of protecting the United States. 
25 

These are not people who don’t want to defend the United States, 

but these are people who believe that by being defenseless against 

large-scale attack, against the destruction of our society by ballistic 

missiles with nuclear warheads, we will actually be safer, because 

that will be stabilizing, because if both sides can destroy the other, 

et cetera, you know, you—— 

Mr. FRANKS. Yeah. 

Ambassador JOSEPH. You know the logic. And I think this, to 

me—and I have an academic background. This, to me, proves the 

staying power of bad ideas. I think it has been a bad idea for a long 

time. You can certainly differ, I am open to other arguments, but 

this bad idea just doesn’t go away, and it didn’t go away when the 

ABM treaty went away. We still have that legacy. 

And the second factor is that we very much long for the day in 

which we can all just get along, and the means to get there is another arms control agreement. 

Mr. FRANKS. Yeah. 

Ambassador JOSEPH. That is how we approach this stuff. 

Mr. FRANKS. Yeah. All right. 

Ambassador JOSEPH. And our adversaries don’t. They don’t. They 

see the world differently. They see the world in power terms. 

Mr. FRANKS. Obviously I couldn’t agree with you more. 

Ambassador Woolsey, let me save the last question here for you. 

First of all, like you, I consider the potential of an offensive EMP 

attack against us to be one of the more dangerous short-term national security threats that we have. And so my question to you is, 

given the consequences of a massive EMP attack, or GMD event, 

as you have laid out in your testimony, what practical steps do you 

give us to address this step? Is legislation necessary or to get industry to move? And what practical ideas do you propose that we 

can move toward protecting the electric grid and taking away the 

incentive of a potential enemy to exploit this vulnerability? 

Ambassador WOOLSEY. Congressman Franks, that is a great 

question. I have thought about this. And I believe that although 

they will not want it, there is only one institution in the U.S. Government that could take charge and get something done and do it 

quickly, and that is the Department of Defense. I would charge the 

Secretary of Defense with whatever support he needed from other 

agencies, FERC would be one that would be very helpful to him, 

by the way, I think, put him in charge, give him the job of protecting the grid now, and the resources that he needs. 

I think you also need a Presidential commitment, but without 

someone in charge, including officials at the State level, this is an 

emergency, I think without someone in charge, this will fail. The 

electric grid is just too diverse in the influences on it and the people who have some kind of control over parts of it. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you all. And thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank all of you. And that brings us to—yes, sir, 

Mr. Coyle. You had something to say? 

Mr. COYLE. I just wanted to make a comment, if that would be 

okay. 

Mr. ROGERS. Certainly. Certainly. 
26 

Mr. COYLE. Just in my own defense, I have never said that you 

can’t hit a bullet with a bullet, and we know from the tests that 

we have done it many times now. 

Mr. FRANKS. That was a long time ago. 

Mr. COYLE. I would point out that there is common ground in my 

testimony and in Ambassador Joseph’s testimony. We both want 

the Ground-Based Midcourse system to work. And in my testimony, 

I call for both sides of the aisle to work together to fix some of the 

problems that have been plaguing that system. It will involve new 

investment and new ideas. I think the best science and technology 

should be put towards missile defense just as we put it towards everything else that we do in life, American—the best of American 

science and technology. And so I think there is some common 

ground there. 

Mr. ROGERS. And one piece of good news on that front is that, 

I think it is 168 million new dollars over and above what had been 

requested has been put into GMD in this coming year. So the folks 

seem to recognize just what you said, that it needs a little more 

attention, love and attention. 

I would like to offer for the record the release that I mentioned 

earlier from the Chinese minister of defense about their test today. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 74.] 

Mr. ROGERS. And thank you all for being here. We are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:21 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

JULY 23, 2014 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

JULY 23, 2014 

(77) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS 

Mr. ROGERS. Russia is developing new missile defenses (for example, the S–500 

and the nuclear tipped Gazelle system, which it tested in its recent March 2014 nuclear force exercise) and China has also recently tested missile defenses. In a report 

provided to the committee last year by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

he stated that, 

‘‘Russia’s objective with its ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities is to ensure 

defense of critical political and military targets in the Moscow area from a ballistic 

missile attack either by the United States or any other nation with nuclear or conventional ballistic or cruise missile capabilities.’’ 

a. We have spent years trying to convince Russia that our missile defenses aren’t 

about them, yet Russia and China are openly developing missile defenses against 

us. Why do we continue to take this position? Does it continue to make sense (to 

the extent it ever did)? 

b. We adopted the policy of ‘‘limited national missile defenses’’ in 1999. How has 

the world changed since then in terms of proliferation of ballistic missile technology, 

proliferation and modernization of WMD capability, and Chinese and Russia relations with the U.S. and our allies? 

c. What are your recommendations to this committee on updating the NMD Act? 

Ambassador WOOLSEY. a.1 There is no good reason any more. 

a.2 No. 

b. Ballistic missile technology is coming to be highly proliferated and modernized 

as has WMD capability. Relations with Russia and China are cool to cold. 

c. The act should be thoroughly restructured to account for the above changes. 

Mr. ROGERS. China and Russia seem to want to have their cake and eat it too: 

they are both modernizing and growing their nuclear forces (China and Russia are 

both developing and fielding a modernized TRIAD of nuclear forces, and Russia has 

undertaken a material breach of the INF treaty and is cheating on the CTBT) while 

developing missile defenses to neutralize American strategic deterrent forces. 

a. Why do we play along with their notion of ‘‘strategic stability’’? Doesn’t this current situation prove what former Defense Secretary Harold Brown once summed up 

as ‘‘when we build, they build; when we cut, they build’’? 

b. At what point does it pose an unacceptable threat? 

c. Does Putin feel assured, because of his nuclear forces, that he has a certain 

freedom of action? Have we seen that play out recently? 

Ambassador WOOLSEY. a.1 We should not. 

a.2 Yes. 

b. Now. 

c.1 Yes. 

c.2 Yes. 

Mr. ROGERS. We deploy missile defenses to deal with Chinese anti-ship ballistic 

missile capabilities, don’t we? How do we explain to the American people that we 

are willing to defend the 5,500 sailors on an aircraft carrier, but not the 5 million 

residents of (the greater Seattle area or LA) who are threatened by Chinese ICBMs 

and SLBMs? 

Ambassador WOOLSEY. a. Yes. 

b. We cannot do so persuasively. 

Mr. ROGERS. We are deploying a cruise missile defense capability to protect the 

National Capital Region from cruise missiles, including, according to the CDR of 

NORTHCOM, Russian cruise missiles. Does it make sense that we deploy cruise 

missile defenses to protect the Capital from Russian cruise missiles, but we will not 

develop and deploy missile defenses to protect the American people against Russian 

ballistic missiles? 

Ambassador WOOLSEY. No. 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you believe the United States needs a layered missile defense capability? So, boost, mid course, and terminal missile defenses? 

a. What is the impact, then, of the Obama administration terminating all of our 

boost phase missile defense programs in 2009? 
78 

Ambassador WOOLSEY. Yes, and immediate attention to the vulnerability of our 

electric grid to an orbited nuclear weapon. 

a. Dangerous. 

Mr. ROGERS. In 2009, the administration sent Poland a PATRIOT battery, with 

no missile interceptors. The Poles called this deployment a ‘‘potted plant.’’ Presumably, this was done to attempt to mitigate Russian concerns. 

a. What is the damage down to our alliances when we make such silly-looking 

deployments? 

Ambassador WOOLSEY. a. Substantial. 

Mr. ROGERS. What should the future of missile defense look like? 

Ambassador WOOLSEY. Boost-phase, including space-based. EMP attacks from orbiting nuclear weapons appear impervious to BMD unless all launches of any kind 

from a particular country are destroyed on the pad or early in boost phase (as advocated several years ago by William Perry and Ashton Carter). 

Mr. ROGERS. President Obama said in 2001 that ‘‘I don’t agree with a missile defense system.’’ In 2008, as a candidate, he stated, ‘‘I will cut tens of billions of dollars in wasteful spending. I will cut investments in unproven missile defense systems.’’ Has he implemented these political ideologies? How would you describe the 

impacts of these campaign speeches on our national defense? 

Ambassador WOOLSEY. a. Yes. 

b. Highly damaging. 

Mr. ROGERS. In 2009, President Obama slashed our deployment of GBIs from 44 

to 30 and cut our GMD budget in half, and terminated kill vehicle modernization 

programs like the MKV. 

a. Is it any wonder our only national missile defense system has encountered difficulty? 

Ambassador WOOLSEY. No. 

Mr. ROGERS. Some on the Left say we need to make concessions on U.S. missile 

defense or they fear we won’t be able to obtain further nuclear reductions. Would 

you care to comment on whether that is true and if so, what recommendations 

would you offer the subcommittee? 

Ambassador WOOLSEY. Since Russia cheats on its treaty obligations most reductions disproportionately affect us and are therefore not worth bargaining for. 

Mr. ROGERS. The administration is refusing to brief this committee, including its 

chairman, on the facts of its proposals to Russia to make agreements on our missile 

defense deployments. 

a. Do you believe the administration owes it to the people’s representatives in 

Congress to keep it informed on these matters? 

b. What should the Congress do if the administration continues to hide these matters from it? Would you support efforts to fence or limit funding until Congress’ 

oversight responsibility is respected? 

Ambassador WOOLSEY. a. Absolutely. 

b. Limit funding desired by the administration, not the small amounts going to 

BMD. 

Mr. ROGERS. It has been reported that Ukraine has asked for the deployment of 

a PATRIOT battery to defend its territory. Is there any good reason not to deploy 

it? 

Ambassador WOOLSEY. No. 

Mr. ROGERS. A week prior to this hearing, this subcommittee held a hearing on 

Russia’s violation of the INF treaty. 

a. What are the implications of the administration’s refusal to provide that annually required report and to finally, years overdue, confirm that Russia is in violation 

of that treaty? What do our allies take away from this meekness? How about Russia 

and Putin? 

b. How should the U.S. and our NATO and Asian allies respond? 

c. Is further arms control possible when one party to treaties decides it does not 

have to comply with them? 

Ambassador WOOLSEY. a. 1, 2 and 3. Demonstrates excessive willingness to accommodate Russia, dangerously so. 

b. Deploy BMD ourselves while chronicling Russia’s violations. Withdrawing from 

treaty is one strong possibility. 

c. No. 

Mr. ROGERS. What should Congress prioritize in terms of future investments to 

our missile defense system? 

Ambassador WOOLSEY. Space-based boost phase and defenses against EMP attacks, including making electric grid far more resilient. 

Mr. ROGERS. In 2010, Vice President Biden offered that one of the reasons the 

Senate should ratify the New START treaty was to strengthen the hand of then 
79 

President Medvedev versus Mr. Putin? Did that theory work out any better for us 

that any of the Vice President’s other foreign policy recommendations in his almost 

40-year Federal Government experience? 

Ambassador WOOLSEY. No. 

Mr. ROGERS. Russian nuclear doctrine, according to Russian press reports, envisions the use of nuclear weapons in a conventional conflict. Can the U.S. or its allies 

afford not to defend itself from such a escalatory use of nuclear weapons? 

Ambassador WOOLSEY. No. 

Mr. ROGERS. Russia is developing new missile defenses (for example, the S–500 

and the nuclear tipped Gazelle system, which it tested in its recent March 2014 nuclear force exercise) and China has also recently tested missile defenses. In a report 

provided to the committee last year by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

he stated that, 

‘‘Russia’s objective with its ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities is to ensure 

defense of critical political and military targets in the Moscow area from a ballistic 

missile attack either by the United States or any other nation with nuclear or conventional ballistic or cruise missile capabilities.’’ 

a. We have spent years trying to convince Russia that our missile defenses aren’t 

about them, yet Russia and China are openly developing missile defenses against 

us. Why do we continue to take this position? Does it continue to make sense (to 

the extent it ever did)? 

b. We adopted the policy of ‘‘limited national missile defenses’’ in 1999. How has 

the world changed since then in terms of proliferation of ballistic missile technology, 

proliferation and modernization of WMD capability, and Chinese and Russia relations with the U.S. and our allies? 

c. What are your recommendations to this committee on updating the NMD Act? 

Ambassador JOSEPH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ROGERS. China and Russia seem to want to have their cake and eat it too: 

they are both modernizing and growing their nuclear forces (China and Russia are 

both developing and fielding a modernized TRIAD of nuclear forces, and Russia has 

undertaken a material breach of the INF treaty and is cheating on the CTBT) while 

developing missile defenses to neutralize American strategic deterrent forces. 

a. Why do we play along with their notion of ‘‘strategic stability’’? Doesn’t this current situation prove what former Defense Secretary Harold Brown once summed up 

as ‘‘when we build, they build; when we cut, they build’’? 

b. At what point does it pose an unacceptable threat? 

c. Does Putin feel assured, because of his nuclear forces, that he has a certain 

freedom of action? Have we seen that play out recently? 

Ambassador JOSEPH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ROGERS. We deploy missile defenses to deal with Chinese anti-ship ballistic 

missile capabilities, don’t we? How do we explain to the American people that we 

are willing to defend the 5,500 sailors on an aircraft carrier, but not the 5 million 

residents of (the greater Seattle area or LA) who are threatened by Chinese ICBMs 

and SLBMs? 

Ambassador JOSEPH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ROGERS. We are deploying a cruise missile defense capability to protect the 

National Capital Region from cruise missiles, including, according to the CDR of 

NORTHCOM, Russian cruise missiles. Does it make sense that we deploy cruise 

missile defenses to protect the Capital from Russian cruise missiles, but we will not 

develop and deploy missile defenses to protect the American people against Russian 

ballistic missiles? 

Ambassador JOSEPH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you believe the United States needs a layered missile defense capability? So, boost, mid course, and terminal missile defenses? 

a. What is the impact, then, of the Obama administration terminating all of our 

boost phase missile defense programs in 2009? 

Ambassador JOSEPH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ROGERS. In 2009, the administration sent Poland a PATRIOT battery, with 

no missile interceptors. The Poles called this deployment a ‘‘potted plant.’’ Presumably, this was done to attempt to mitigate Russian concerns. 

a. What is the damage down to our alliances when we make such silly-looking 

deployments? 

Ambassador JOSEPH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ROGERS. What should the future of missile defense look like? 

Ambassador JOSEPH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ROGERS. President Obama said in 2001 that ‘‘I don’t agree with a missile defense system.’’ In 2008, as a candidate, he stated, ‘‘I will cut tens of billions of dollars in wasteful spending. I will cut investments in unproven missile defense sys-
80 

tems.’’ Has he implemented these political ideologies? How would you describe the 

impacts of these campaign speeches on our national defense? 

Ambassador JOSEPH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ROGERS. In 2009, President Obama slashed our deployment of GBIs from 44 

to 30 and cut our GMD budget in half, and terminated kill vehicle modernization 

programs like the MKV. 

a. Is it any wonder our only national missile defense system has encountered difficulty? 

Ambassador JOSEPH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ROGERS. You served in the previous administration. It has been suggested by 

some witnesses, including Mr Coyle, that GMD was rushed into deployment without 

adequate testing, etc. Would you care to provide the facts as you know them? 

Ambassador JOSEPH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Some on the Left say we need to make concessions on U.S. missile 

defense or they fear we won’t be able to obtain further nuclear reductions. Would 

you care to comment on whether that is true and if so, what recommendations 

would you offer the subcommittee? 

Ambassador JOSEPH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ROGERS. The administration is refusing to brief this committee, including its 

chairman, on the facts of its proposals to Russia to make agreements on our missile 

defense deployments. 

a. Do you believe the administration owes it to the people’s representatives in 

Congress to keep it informed on these matters? 

b. What should the Congress do if the administration continues to hide these matters from it? Would you support efforts to fence or limit funding until Congress’ 

oversight responsibility is respected? 

Ambassador JOSEPH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ROGERS. It has been reported that Ukraine has asked for the deployment of 

a PATRIOT battery to defend its territory. Is there any good reason not to deploy 

it? 

Ambassador JOSEPH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ROGERS. A week prior to this hearing, this subcommittee held a hearing on 

Russia’s violation of the INF treaty. 

a. What are the implications of the administration’s refusal to provide that annually required report and to finally, years overdue, confirm that Russia is in violation 

of that treaty? What do our allies take away from this meekness? How about Russia 

and Putin? 

b. How should the U.S. and our NATO and Asian allies respond? 

c. Is further arms control possible when one party to treaties decides it does not 

have to comply with them? 

Ambassador JOSEPH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ROGERS. What should Congress prioritize in terms of future investments to 

our missile defense system? 

Ambassador JOSEPH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ROGERS. In 2010, Vice President Biden offered that one of the reasons the 

Senate should ratify the New START treaty was to strengthen the hand of then 

President Medvedev versus Mr. Putin? Did that theory work out any better for us 

that any of the Vice President’s other foreign policy recommendations in his almost 

40-year Federal Government experience? 

Ambassador JOSEPH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Russian nuclear doctrine, according to Russian press reports, envisions the use of nuclear weapons in a conventional conflict. Can the U.S. or its allies 

afford not to defend itself from such a escalatory use of nuclear weapons? 

Ambassador JOSEPH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. ROGERS. You have mentioned several times the report by the National Academy of Sciences. Do you endorse its recommendation that the U.S. develop and deploy an East Coast site? 

Mr. COYLE. The National Academy committee emphasized that an East Coast site 

should not be built unless and until several other actions were completed first. 

These are the development of a new two-stage booster for the GMD interceptor, and 

a new larger and more capable kill vehicle. The Committee also pointed out that 

the Missile Defense Agency does not have the sensors required to support an East 

Coast site, and without which an East Coast site would be unable to achieve its intended purpose. I agree with the Committee. 

Mr. ROGERS. What is your assessment of the success of the Iron Dome system deployed by Israel? How has your assessment shifted, if at all, during the recent 

Hamas-instigated violence in Gaza? 
81 

Mr. COYLE. The successes that Iron Dome reportedly has had in battle are so far 

more evidence of the possibilities of Iron Dome than a demonstration of an operationally effective system. As we saw with Patriot in the first Gulf War, it is very 

difficult to get information in battle with real ‘‘ground truth’’. During my time in 

the Pentagon I saw this also in military exercises that were not instrumented. However, when military exercises were instrumented a very different picture emerged 

as to what actually had happened. Accordingly I am skeptical of the claims of 90 

or 95% effectiveness made for Iron Dome. News reports show that Iron Dome often 

misses, and Prime Minister Netanyahu reported this also on ‘‘Meet the Press.’’ From 

these reports it appears the Israeli civil defense system deserves at least as much 

credit for saving lives as Iron Dome, if not more. Reports from the recent violence 

in Gaza reinforce these conclusions. 

From the publicly available evidence, it appears that Iron Dome is not working 

nearly as well as what is being claimed. Considering the millions of dollars that the 

Congress has authorized for Iron Dome, the Congress should request data on the 

performance of Iron Dome from Israel. This data could be provided to an appropriate U.S. national laboratory that has the in-house technical expertise to analyze 

it. Without such data there is no way to know if the system is working at the high 

levels of performance claimed. 

Mr. ROGERS. You have suggested that the threat data has changed and Iran is 

now not expected to be able to flight test an ICBM in 2015. 

a. Are you aware of the comments of Gen Flynn, ‘‘as stated by the chairman in 

his opening statement where he talked about our assessment being in the 2015 

timeframe, you know, given—given the development that we see that’s accurate; so 

by about 2015.’’ 

b. Have you read the classified appendix to the 2014 Iran Mil Power Rept? Well, 

I have. You should be careful about referring to the conclusions of a report when 

you have not seen them, sir. People who do that run the risk of looking uninformed 

and foolish. 

Mr. COYLE. a. Yes, I am familiar with the Senate Armed Services Committee 

hearing held on February 11, 2014, in which General Flynn made that comment. 

However, General Flynn misspoke. It was not Chairman Levin who brought up Iranian missile capabilities in his opening statement, it was Ranking Member Inhofe. 

b. No, I have not read the classified appendix. In my testimony I was not referring 

to the conclusions in that report. I was making my own assessment. 

Mr. ROGERS. The administration is refusing to brief this committee, including its 

chairman, on the facts of its proposals to Russia to make agreements on our missile 

defense deployments. 

a. Do you believe the administration owes it to the people’s representatives in 

Congress to keep it informed on these matters? 

b. What should the Congress do if the administration continues to hide these matters from it? Would you support efforts to fence or limit funding until Congress’ 

oversight responsibility is respected? 

Mr. COYLE. a. Yes. 

b. The Congress should be informed when in the course of negotiations the administration believes it can reach an agreement which both parties are likely to honor. 

The Congress always has the authority to express its opinions with respect to funding for executive branch activities but needs to be thoughtful and prudent about establishing precedents that might impact future international negotiations. In the instant case, no, I would not support efforts to fence or limit funding as such efforts 

would be counterproductive. 

Mr. ROGERS. It has been reported that Ukraine has asked for the deployment of 

a PATRIOT battery to defend its territory. Is there any good reason not to deploy 

it? 

Mr. COYLE. A single PATRIOT battery could not defend the Ukraine. 

Mr. ROGERS. In 2010, Vice President Biden offered that one of the reasons the 

Senate should ratify the New START treaty was to strengthen the hand of then 

President Medvedev versus Mr. Putin? Did that theory work out any better for us 

that any of the Vice President’s other foreign policy recommendations in his almost 

40-year Federal Government experience? 

Mr. COYLE. The New START Treaty was ratified in the U.S. Senate by a vote of 

71 to 26 with 13 Republican Senators voting for it. America’s NATO allies also 

strongly supported the treaty. In Russia President Medvedev introduced the treaty 

for consideration by the Duma, and signed the ratification resolution passed unanimously by the Russian Federal Assembly, demonstrating a strong hand throughout. 

Mr. ROGERS. Russian nuclear doctrine, according to Russian press reports, envisions the use of nuclear weapons in a conventional conflict. Can the U.S. or its allies 

afford not to defend itself from such a escalatory use of nuclear weapons? 
82 

Mr. COYLE. During the Cold War, the United States had an analogous nuclear 

doctrine to counter what were seen at the time as superior Soviet conventional 

forces if the Soviet Union were to attack West Germany through the Fulda Gap. 

This included atomic demolition mines, the Davy Crockett recoilless rifle for firing 

small nuclear projectiles, and A–10 ground attack aircraft. Then as now missile defenses are not capable of defending against such battlefield tactical nuclear weapons 

systems. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER 

Mr. COOPER. What was the cost of phase 1 and phase 2 of Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)? 

What would the cost be of a system that could defend against Chinese and Russian warheads today? 

Ambassador WOOLSEY. I don’t know. 

a. I don’t know. 

Mr. COOPER. What was the cost of phase 1 and phase 2 of Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)? 

What would the cost be of a system that could defend against Chinese and Russian warheads today? 

Ambassador JOSEPH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. COOPER. What was the cost of phase 1 and phase 2 of Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)? 

Mr. COYLE. According to James A. Abrahamson and Henry F. Cooper, about $30 

billion were spent on SDI between 1985 and 1993 when it was cancelled. See ‘‘What 

Did We Get for Our $30-Billion Investment in SDI/BMD? September 1993. 

Cost estimates for the Strategic Defense Initiative vary widely. In a 1987 paper 

the Heritage Foundation wrote, ‘‘While it is unlikely that SDI will be as cheap as 

the 40 billion claimed by some SDI backers, the price tag probably will be in the 

range of $115 billion to $120 billion spread out over ten years.’’ 

Other estimates are much higher, up to $1 trillion attributed to former Secretary 

of Defense Harold Brown. See Heritage Backgrounder #607, Strategic Defense: 

‘‘How Much Will It Really Cost?’’ October 2, 1987 

Mr. COOPER. What would the cost be of a system that could defend against Chinese and Russian warheads today? 

Mr. COYLE. A complete system has never been designed or costed. A 1982 Defense 

Department report said that a system of space-based lasers, not including all the 

associated systems for detection, coordination, and command and control that a complete SDI system would need to have, might cost up to $500 billion (see ‘‘Strategic 

Defense and Anti-Satellite Weapons,’’ Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, April 25,1984, p. 67). 

Mr. COOPER. What are your views on the value and feasibility of boost-phase missile defense? 

Mr. COYLE. I agree with the conclusion of the Defense Science Board report of 

September 2011 that because the timelines for boost-phase missile defense are so 

short, early intercept is not itself ‘‘a useful objective for missile defense in general 

or for any particular missile defense system.’’ See Defense Science Board Task Force 

Report on ‘‘Science and Technology Issues of Early Intercept Ballistic Missile Defense Feasibility,’’ September 2011. 

Mr. COOPER. Do you agree with the National Academy of Sciences conclusion that 

the ‘‘DOD should not invest any more money or resources in systems for boost-phase 

missile defense’’ and that ‘‘boost-phase defense is not practical or cost effective 

under real world conditions for the foreseeable future’’? 

Mr. COYLE. For all practical purposes, yes. The NRC committee wrote, ‘‘All boostphase intercept (BPI) systems suffer from severe reach-versus-time-available constraints.’’ There are specialized systems that might work in the boost phase against 

relatively small country such as North Korea. But those systems would not be effective against larger countries such as Iran, Russia or China. 

Mr. COOPER. Why was the multiple kill vehicle program canceled? 

Mr. COYLE. Defense Secretary Robert Gates made the decision to cancel the Multiple Kill Vehicle in the spring of 2009. According to the GAO, ‘‘MDA terminated 

the Multiple Kill Vehicle element because of feasibility issues raised about this technology, which was still in its early stages of development, as well as a decision to 

refocus MDA’s resources on new technologies aimed at early intercept of ballistic 

missiles.’’ See GAO–10–311. 
83 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI 

Mr. GARAMENDI. In 2009, just 5 years ago, the Nuclear Posture Review Commission, supported the conclusion that ‘‘For more than a decade the development of 

U.S. ballistic missile defenses has been guided by the principles of (1) protecting 

against limited strikes while (2) taking into account the legitimate concerns of Russia and China about strategic stability.’’ Do you now disagree with this conclusion? 

Did you agree at the time? 

Ambassador WOOLSEY. I disagree with the proposition that these should be guiding principles, but I acknowledge that five years ago and today these principles influence many and in fact provide the underlying assumptions of much of our government’s actions with regard to BMD programs. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. What kind of missile defense system(s) would be needed and 

would be feasible to counter Russian and Chinese nuclear weapons? 

Ambassador WOOLSEY. Space-based boost phase. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. What actions might China and Russia take in response to a U.S. 

missile defense against their capabilities? Would it affect the number and type of 

their offensive systems? What are the cost of offensive versus defense systems? 

Would Russia or China be more likely to perceive the need to strike first? 

Ambassador WOOLSEY. a. More emphasis on both offense and defense—blaming 

U.S. for the size of their programs. 

b. Probably little. 

c. I don’t know. 

d. It would depend highly on the circumstances. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. What kind of missile defense system(s) would be needed and 

would be feasible to counter Russian and Chinese nuclear weapons? 

Ambassador JOSEPH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. GARAMENDI. What might the impacts to strategic stability be of expanding 

missile defense systems to counter Russian and Chinese warheads? Why would this 

action not result in an arms race? 

Ambassador JOSEPH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. GARAMENDI. What actions might China and Russia take in response to a U.S. 

missile defense against their capabilities? Would it affect the number and type of 

their offensive systems? What are the cost of offensive versus defense systems? 

Would Russia or China be more likely to perceive the need to strike first? 

Ambassador JOSEPH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. GARAMENDI. What might the impacts to strategic stability be of expanding 

missile defense systems to counter Russian and Chinese warheads? Why would this 

action not result in an arms race? 

Mr. COYLE. Expanded missile defense systems to counter Russian and Chinese 

ICBMs would be strategically destabilizing because—if Russia and China believed 

those systems were effective—those nations would need to respond to counter what 

they would see as a new threat. Their responses could include new tactical and strategic forces, perhaps even more attacking missiles to overcome those new U.S. defenses, perhaps extensive deployment of cruise missiles against which our ballistic 

missile defense systems are useless, or perhaps deployment of large numbers of 

troops in regions that are currently stable and peaceful. Then our missile defenses 

would have upset the strategic balance and provoked new military responses from 

Russia and China. 

Of course, under such conditions, Russia would certainly not agree to further reductions in their strategic nuclear arsenals, as the U.S. and Russia have been doing 

under START, the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, and New START. Russia 

might consider aggressive new U.S. missile defense programs as justification to 

withdraw from New START and other agreements that have significantly reduced 

the threat from nuclear weapons. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. What actions might China and Russia take in response to a U.S. 

missile defense against their capabilities? Would it affect the number and type of 

their offensive systems? What are the cost of offensive versus defense systems? 

Would Russia or China be more likely to perceive the need to strike first? 

Mr. COYLE. China and Russia might launch new offensive missile programs to 

overwhelm new U.S. missile defenses against their capabilities. China and Russia 

also might initiate new military actions in its regions against which U.S. missile defenses would be useless. For example, they might choose to increase their land-, sea- 

, or air-based offensive systems and to deploy those systems in new regions. 

With respect to the cost of offensive versus defensive systems, during the Reagan 

years, Paul Nitze, the highly regarded scholar and statesman, presented three criteria that any missile defense system must meet before being considered for deploy-
84 

ment. Nitze’s criteria were formally adopted as National Security Directive No. 172 

on May 30, 1985. 

The Nitze criteria were: 

1. The system should be effective; 

2. Be able to survive against direct attack; and 

3. Be cost effective at the margin—that is, be less costly to increase your defense 

than it is for your opponent to increase their offense against it. 

So far U.S. missile defenses do not meet the Nitze criteria. 

By definition, First Strike is a preemptive surprise attack using overwhelming 

force. A missile defense system capable of continental coverage and also of defending 

against most or all attacking ICBMs, is considered by nuclear strategy analysts as 

enabling First Strike because it would allow for a nuclear strike to be launched with 

reduced fear of retaliatory destruction. No such missile defense system exists, but 

if the U.S. had such a system China and Russia would worry about the U.S. being 

the one to strike first. Similarly, if Russia or China had such a system, America 

would worry about Russia or China striking first. 

Æ