IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Daryl Yingling, :

Petitioner :

: No. 127 C.D. 2019

v. :

: Argued: December 10, 2019

Unemployment Compensation :

Board of Review, :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

OPINION BY

JUDGE McCULLOUGH FILED: February 28, 2020

Daryl Yingling (Claimant) petitions for review of the order of the 

Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) dated January 8, 2019,

affirming the decision of a referee denying him benefits under Section 402(b) of the 

Unemployment Compensation Law (Law).1 The Board concluded that Claimant 

failed to establish a necessitous and compelling reason to voluntarily terminate his 

employment. Upon review, we reverse.

 

1 Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. 

§802(b) (relating to voluntary separation from employment without cause of a necessitous and 

compelling nature).
2

Background

Claimant, a resident of the Commonwealth, worked for Blinn College

(Employer), located in Austin, Texas, from October 23, 2017, until June 29, 2018, as 

a full-time apartment manager. (Certified Record (C.R.) at Item Nos. 1, 2, 9,

Findings of Fact (F.F.) No. 1.) Claimant voluntarily resigned from his employment, 

and thereafter filed for unemployment compensation benefits. (C.R. at Item Nos. 2, 9, 

Notes of Testimony (N.T.) at 10; F.F. No. 27.) The local service center determined 

that Claimant was ineligible for benefits under Section 402(b) of the Law, 43 P.S. 

§802(b). (C.R. at Item No. 5.) Claimant timely appealed the local service center’s 

determination and a hearing was subsequently held by a referee on October 5, 2018,

to consider whether Claimant had a necessitous and compelling reason for 

terminating his employment. (C.R. at Item Nos. 8, 9.) 

Claimant and Tiffany Jenkins (Ms. Jenkins), Employer’s Director of 

Human Resources, testified at the hearing. Claimant testified that when he accepted 

the job he was told that he was expected to work Monday through Friday, 8:00 a.m. 

to 5:00 p.m., and that an assistant apartment manager (Assistant Manager) would 

work Sunday through Thursday from 3:00 p.m. to 12:00 a.m. (N.T. at 10; F.F. No. 

2.) Claimant explained that he was responsible for managing seven apartment 

buildings, which totaled 338 rooms and housed 338 students. (N.T. at 11; F.F. No. 

4.) Further, Claimant explained that he was also in charge of seven student staff 

members (resident assistants). (N.T. at 10; F.F. Nos. 3, 4.) Claimant was also 

responsible for managing the student population within each of the buildings, 

checking students in and out, replacing lost keys, responding to emergencies and 

crises, being on-call, mediating conflicts with residents, responding to complaints, 

managing violations, preparing biweekly supervisory reports and weekly 
3

maintenance reports, completing daily walk-throughs, working with custodial staff, 

and helping students. (N.T. at 11; F.F. Nos. 6, 8.) 

Claimant testified that he understood that the Assistant Manager would 

split the duties with him and would be responsible for helping with any excess 

workload, maintenance requests, weekly meetings with staff members, and managing 

staff members. (N.T. at 13-14.) Claimant testified that he was told at the beginning 

of his employment that a full-time Assistant Manager would be hired. (N.T. at 13.) 

Claimant also explained that he asked his supervisor, Kayla Batterton (Ms. 

Batterton), when the Assistant Manager would be hired both before he arrived for his 

first day of work and on his first day of employment, and several more times in 

October, November, and December of 2017. Id. Claimant testified, however, that an 

Assistant Manager was never hired. (N.T. at 13; F.F. No. 5.) Claimant stated that he

asked Ms. Batterton for assistance in performing his responsibilities, but that he was 

not given assistance as she believed that he did not need help performing his job 

duties. (N.T. at 14-15; F.F. No. 7.) Claimant stated that he felt that the lack of help 

was negatively affecting him. Id. 

Claimant explained that during the 2018 spring break he asked Ms. 

Batterton to discuss his situation. Id. Claimant testified that Ms. Batterton was not 

willing to do anything to remedy the situation. Id. Claimant testified that he then

complained to Human Resources, and was referred to Ms. Jenkins and spoke to her 

on April 18, 2018. (N.T. at 17; F.F. No. 14.) He testified that he told Ms. Jenkins 

about his concerns regarding his troublesome working conditions, health-related 
4

issues, and problems arising from the fact that an Assistant Manager was not hired. 

(N.T. at 17, 27.) 2 

Claimant explained that Ms. Jenkins told him that she would address the 

issues with Ms. Batterton and Peter Rivera (Mr. Rivera), the Director of Residence 

Life. (N.T. at 17; F.F. No. 17.) Claimant explained that as of May 3, 2018, his 

situation was improving. (N.T. at 18; F.F. No. 18.) However, Claimant testified that

the improvement did not last, and shortly thereafter his working conditions 

deteriorated because he was not given any help after two staff members quit. (N.T. at 

18; F.F. No. 20.) He explained that he complained again to Ms. Batterton, who told 

him that there was plenty of help and that he did not need any more assistance. Id. 

Claimant testified that he then complained to Ms. Jenkins again on May 21, 2018,

about the difficult working conditions and that he felt like a slave, had no free time, 

and had continuing health issues. Id. Ms. Jenkins suggested that he raise the issues 

with his supervisors directly, and if that did not resolve the situation to bring his 

concerns to the executive leadership of his department. (N.T. at 19, 34; F.F. No. 21.) 

Claimant testified that he spoke to Mr. Rivera about his working 

conditions, but Mr. Rivera did not address his concerns. Id. Claimant explained that 

the lack of help and unsuccessful meetings made him feel like he did not have a 

 

2 As an aside, Claimant testified that the working conditions were affecting his health. 

Specifically, he testified that he had severe asthma and that the humidity was affecting him. (N.T. 

at 15.) He also testified that he was experiencing gastrointestinal issues. (N.T. at 16.) Despite 

Claimant’s complaints to Employer about his medical conditions, he testified that he never provided 

any documentation, nor filled out any Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§12101-

12213, accommodation paper work when he requested the golf cart from Ms. Batterton. (N.T. at 

22.) Ms. Jenkins testified that Claimant did not make her aware of his health issues nor did he 

provide any medical documentation. (N.T. at 30-31; F.F. Nos. 11, 13, 16.) However, Ms. Jenkins 

explained that Employer had in place a specific process by which Claimant could have requested an 

accommodation. (N.T. at 38-39.)
5

chance to address his concerns and that nothing would change. (N.T. at 19-21.) 

Claimant explained that by that time, he estimated he was working 70-80 hours a 

week. (N.T. at 21.) In Claimant’s last meeting with Mr. Rivera, on June 25, 2018, 

Claimant was again upset, but was told “you better work your butt off or this is not 

the right job for you.” (N.T. at 22; F.F. No. 22.) Claimant was subsequently advised 

by Ms. Batterton that he was required to work on Sunday July 3, 2018, in order to 

check students in and out, and would not be provided additional help. (N.T. at 24;

F.F. No. 24.) Claimant explained that because he was required to work on July 3 and 

was not getting any assistance or relief from his supervisors or Human Resources, he

decided to quit. (N.T. at 25.) Before he resigned, Claimant attempted to contact Ms. 

Jenkins; however, because she was not in the office, he spoke with another human 

resources employee, Margaret Hoaty (Ms. Hoaty), who advised him to write a 

resignation letter. (N.T. at 24; F.F. Nos. 25, 26.) On June 29, 2018, Claimant 

resigned from his position. (N.T. at 24.) He explained that, although he intended to 

tell Ms. Jenkins why he was resigning, she was not in the office and so he resigned 

without telling her. Id. 

Ms. Jenkins testified that Claimant complained to her about his working 

conditions. (N.T. at 31.) With respect to the Assistant Manager not being hired, Ms. 

Jenkins stated that Claimant told her he felt misled because he was told that an

Assistant Manager would be hired, however, one had not been hired. Id. Ms. Jenkins 

testified that Employer had attempted to hire an Assistant Manager and actually 

started the process of interviewing candidates. (N.T. at 31.) She explained, however,

that in early October 2017, Employer determined that its search had failed and 

decided to repurpose the position. (N.T. at 32.) She testified that she was unaware if 

anyone told Claimant the position would not be filled. Id. 
6

Regarding Claimant’s other complaints, Ms. Jenkins testified that most 

of Claimant’s complaints revolved around his claims of lack of support and lack of 

appreciation. (N.T. at 32.) She stated that after her meeting with Claimant on April 

18, 2018, she spoke with the vice chancellor of student services, who then spoke with 

Mr. Rivera. Id. She testified that she subsequently spoke with Claimant on May 3, 

2018, and he told her that he had noticed some improvement. (N.T. at 33.) However, 

she explained that Claimant contacted her again on May 21, 2018, and told her that 

his situation had worsened. (N.T. at 34.) Ms. Jenkins stated that she told him to 

speak to his supervisors directly. Id. Ms. Jenkins explained that Claimant attempted 

to contact her before he resigned, but that she was out of the office so she did not 

respond. Id.

The referee made the following, pertinent, findings of fact: 

2. When [] Claimant accepted the position, he understood that 

he would be working Monday through Friday, 8[a.m.] to 

5[p.m.] and an [Assistant Manager] would be hired to work 

Sunday through Thursday, 3[p.m.] to 12[a.m.].

3. Claimant was also advised that he would have college staff, 

[and] resident assistants [that] he would be supervising. 

4. There were seven apartment buildings with a total of 338 

rooms and 338 students. 

5. Employer did not hire an [Assistant Manager] and []

Claimant questioned his supervisor, [Ms. Batterton], 

regarding the position.

6. Claimant was responsible at the winter break to close down 

each apartment and get the key from each student and to 

review the rooms while the students were between terms. 
7

7. When [] Claimant asked his supervisor for help, he was 

advised [that] he did not need help. 

8. Claimant’s job also involved daily walk[-]arounds. 

* * *

10. Claimant’s request to use the golf cart was denied.

11. Employer was not made aware that [] Claimant was 

requesting to use the golf cart for medical reasons. 

12. Claimant advised [] Employer he wanted to use the golf 

cart due to walking distance. 

13. Claimant did not provide any medical documents to []

Employer listing limitations or restrictions and did not 

notify [] Employer of any health issues. 

* * *

16. When [] Claimant spoke with [Ms. Jenkins] on April 18, 

2018, he did not advise her of any health issues, he said his 

request to use the golf cart due to walking distance was 

denied, he felt misled regarding the Assistant Manager

position and many of his complaints centered around the 

lack of support from [Mr. Rivera].

17. [Ms. Jenkins] spoke with [] Claimant’s supervisor [Ms. 

Batterton] and [Mr. Rivera] regarding [] Claimant. 

18. A few weeks later, [Ms. Jenkins] reached out to []

Claimant and they met in her office on May 3, 2018, at 

which time [] Claimant indicated that things appeared to be 

getting better. 

19. Claimant did the close down for the end of the school year. 

20. On May 21, 2018, [] Claimant sent an email indicating 

[that] things were getting worse. 
8

21. [Ms. Jenkins] advised [] Claimant to speak with [Ms. 

Batterton] and [Mr. Rivera], directly. 

22. On June, 25, 2018, [] Claimant met with [Mr. Rivera] and 

was upset after the conversation. 

* * *

24. Claimant received an email from [Ms. Batterton] advising 

him that he would need to work on July 3, 2018, for 

incoming students and the football team. 

25. On June 29, 2018, [] Claimant attempted to contact [Ms. 

Jenkins] but was advised she was out for the week. 

26. Claimant informed Ms. Hoaty that he wanted to resign and 

she requested that he provide a resignation in writing. 

27. Claimant provided a resignation which stated, in part, “Ms. 

Batterton[,] I need to resign from Blinn College effective 

immediately.”

28. Claimant was asked to complete a written Exit Interview. 

29. Claimant did not list a reason for his decision to leave 

Blinn College on the Exit Interview. 

(F.F. Nos. 2-8, 10-13, 16-22, 24-29.) The referee concluded that Claimant resigned 

due to working conditions. (Referee’s Decision at 3.) The referee determined that 

Employer failed to hire an Assistant Manager, which affected the number of hours 

Claimant worked, but that Claimant worked the entire year without an Assistant 

Manager, and thus, Claimant’s working conditions had not changed by the time that 

he resigned. Id. The referee credited Employer’s testimony that Claimant did not 

provide Employer with medical documentation with regard to his health issues. Id. 

Further, the referee explained that the last incident on July 3 caused Claimant to end 
9

his employment voluntarily. Id. Finally, the referee concluded that Claimant did not 

provide a specific reason for his separation in his resignation nor did he speak to Ms. 

Jenkins before he resigned. (Referee’s Decision at 4.) Thus, the referee determined 

that Claimant did not establish a necessitous and compelling reason for quitting, act 

with ordinary common sense, or make a good faith effort to preserve his employment. 

Id. 

Claimant subsequently appealed to the Board. (C.R. at Item No. 11.) 

The Board incorporated by reference the referee’s findings and conclusions. Id. The 

Board affirmed the referee’s decision, finding that Claimant quit once he was 

informed he had to work on July 3, 2018, and that Claimant failed to request any 

accommodation paperwork to use the golf cart for his medical condition. (C.R. at 

Item No. 14.) Based on this, the Board found that Claimant failed to establish a 

necessitous and compelling reason to voluntarily quit his employment. Id. 

Moreover, the Board rejected Claimant’s argument that he had a necessitous and 

compelling reason due to a substantial and unilateral change in his employment

because Claimant worked the entire school year without the Assistant Manager, and 

thus, there was no change in employment causing him to voluntarily resign. 

Claimant now petitions this Court for review.

Discussion

On appeal,3 Claimant purports to raise numerous issues. However, in 

essence, the sole question before this Court is whether Claimant has successfully 

 

3 Our scope of review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated, 

whether the adjudication is in accordance with the law, and whether findings of fact are supported 

by substantial evidence. Ellis v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 59 A.3d 1159, 

1162 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). “[S]ubstantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
10

proven that he had a necessitous and compelling reason to voluntarily terminate his 

employment. At issue, specifically, is whether Claimant satisfied elements one, 

three, and four of the Brunswick Hotel test for demonstrating that he had a 

necessitous and compelling reason for ending his employment. The Brunswick Hotel

test provides as follows: “(1) circumstances existed which produced real and 

substantial pressure to terminate employment; (2) such circumstances would compel 

a reasonable person to act in the same manner; (3) the claimant acted with ordinary 

common sense; and (4) the claimant made a reasonable effort to preserve [his]

employment.” Brunswick Hotel & Conference Center, LLC v. Unemployment 

Compensation Board of Review, 906 A.2d 657, 660 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). In support 

of his position, Claimant argues that there was a substantial and unilateral change to 

his employment agreement, that Claimant was unaware of the unsuitable working 

conditions when he started the job, that Employer deceived Claimant as to the 

conditions of his employment, and that Claimant acted with common sense and made

reasonable efforts to preserve his employment. He also argues that his medical 

condition constituted a necessitous and compelling reason to quit.

Claimant explains that he agreed to work full-time Monday through 

Friday from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. He argues that he was told before he was hired 

that he would have help from an Assistant Manager who would work Sunday through 

Thursday from 3:00 p.m. until 12:00 a.m. Claimant argues that the Assistant 

Manager was never hired, and he was therefore required to work over 70 hours a 

 

(continued...)

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Chartiers Community Mental Health and 

Retardation Center v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 134 A.3d 1165, 1170 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2016).
11

week including weekends. Claimant maintains that the failure to hire an Assistant 

Manager and the excess workload constituted a substantial unilateral change in his 

employment. Claimant also argues that the working conditions caused him to 

experience problems with his health.4 

Claimant argues that where an employee is unaware of unsuitable 

working conditions upon hire, good cause to terminate employment exists. Claimant 

maintains that he had a necessitous and compelling reason to quit because he was 

unaware of the conditions of his employment when he accepted the job. Specifically, 

although he was told an Assistant Manager would be hired to assist him in his 

 

4

Initially, we resolve whether Claimant’s alleged medical problems constituted a 

necessitous and compelling reason to quit. With regard to medical conditions, we have stated:

In general, a medical condition that limits an employee’s ability to 

perform work duties can provide a necessitous and compelling reason 

to quit one’s employment. Genetin v. Unemployment Compensation 

Board of Review, [] 451 A.2d 1353, 1355 ([Pa.] 1982). In such 

situations, the employee is obliged to communicate his or her medical 

problem to the employer, but is not required to attempt “to initiate or 

effectuate the transfer to more suitable work.” Id. at 1356. Thus, to 

establish that a medical condition is a necessitous and compelling 

reason for the voluntary termination of one’s employment, a claimant 

must: (1) establish, through competent evidence, the existence of a 

medical condition; (2) inform the employer of the condition; and (3) 

be able and available to work if a reasonable accommodation can be 

made. Id. 

St. Clair Hospital v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 154 A.3d 401, 405 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2017). In finding Employer’s testimony more credible, the Board found that Claimant did 

not communicate his medical condition to the employer. On appeal, we are precluded from 

disturbing this finding. See Cambria County Transit Authority (“CamTran”) v. Unemployment 

Compensation Board of Review, 201 A.3d 941, 947 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019). Thus, we are left to 

review the other circumstances that Claimant alleges constituted a necessitous and compelling 

reason to quit.
12

responsibilities, he was not given the help nor working the hours he was promised. 

Relatedly, Claimant argues that because he was told an Assistant Manager would be 

hired, and one was never hired, Employer deceived him as to the basic conditions of 

his employment.

Finally, Claimant argues he used common sense and took reasonable 

efforts to preserve his employment by repeatedly complaining about his working 

conditions and discussing his employment problems with his supervisors. He argues 

that throughout the eight-month time period he made an acceptable effort to preserve

his employment because he lodged a continual protest against his working conditions. 

In response, the Board argues that there was no evidence that a 

substantial and unilateral change to Claimant’s employment agreement occurred 

because, for the entire time Claimant was employed, he did not work with an

Assistant Manager. Moreover, the Board argues that Claimant did not take 

reasonable steps to preserve his employment because he did not speak with Ms. 

Jenkins, or the vice chancellor, before he resigned. Lastly, the Board argues that 

Claimant did not prove that his efforts would have been futile in bringing further 

complaints to Employer. 

Terminating Employment for Necessitous and Compelling Reasons

We begin with a brief overview of the general principles of what 

constitutes a necessitous and compelling reason for terminating one’s employment

under the Law. Section 402(b) of the Law provides that an employee shall be 

ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits for any week in which he or she 

voluntarily left his or her employment without a necessitous and compelling reason.

43 P.S. §802(b). “Whether an employee has a necessitous and compelling reason to 
13

voluntarily quit employment is a question of law fully reviewable by this Court.” 

Brunswick Hotel, 906 A.2d at 661. A claimant who voluntarily terminates his or her 

employment bears the burden of proving that a necessitous and compelling cause 

existed. Petrill v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 883 A.2d 714, 716 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2005).

As noted, an employee who claims to have left employment for a 

necessitous and compelling reason must prove that “(1) circumstances existed which 

produced real and substantial pressure to terminate employment; (2) such 

circumstances would compel a reasonable person to act in the same manner; (3) the 

claimant acted with ordinary common sense; and (4) the claimant made a reasonable 

effort to preserve her employment.” Brunswick Hotel, 906 A.2d at 660. 

A. Whether Circumstances Existed which Produced a Real 

and Substantial Pressure to Terminate Employment

Our jurisprudence requires a claimant to show that circumstances existed 

which produced real and substantial pressure to terminate employment. Id. “The 

circumstances producing pressure to leave must be both real and substantial.” 

Philadelphia Housing Authority v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 

29 A.3d 99, 101-02 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (emphasis in original) (citing PECO Energy 

Company v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 682 A.2d 49, 51 n.1 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1996)). “It is well-settled that an employer’s imposition of a substantial 

unilateral change in the terms of employment constitutes a necessitous and 

compelling cause for an employee to terminate h[is] employment.” Morgan v. 

Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 108 A.3d 181, 187-88 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2015) (citing A–Positive Electric v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review,

654 A.2d 299, 302 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995)). Whether a change is “so substantial as to 
14

warrant necessitous cause for terminating employment” must be determined on a case 

by case basis. Brunswick Hotel, 906 A.2d at 660. “[S]ubstantiality is measured by 

the impact on the employee, and whether the change involves any real ‘difference’ in 

employment conditions.” McCarthy v. Unemployment Compensation Board of 

Review, 829 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). Our law is clear that “[m]ere 

dissatisfaction with one’s working conditions does not constitute cause of a 

necessitous and compelling nature for terminating one’s employment.” Mazur v. 

Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 193 A.3d 1132, 1135-36 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2018) (emphasis in original) (quoting Brunswick Hotel, 906 A.2d at 660).

The facts of this case demonstrate a substantial and unilateral change in 

the terms of Claimant’s employment that placed a real and substantial pressure on 

him to voluntarily terminate his employment, thus, satisfying the first element of the 

Brunswick Hotel test. The agreed terms of employment between Claimant and 

Employer clearly stated that Claimant was to work Monday to Friday from 8 a.m. to 

5 p.m., with the help of an Assistant Manager. (F.F. No. 1.) However, Employer did 

not hire an Assistant Manager. (F.F. No. 5.) The Assistant Manager was supposed to 

be hired to help Claimant with excess workloads, maintenance requests, weekly 

meetings, and staff management; however, because an Assistant Manager was never 

hired, Claimant was left to perform all of the responsibilities alone. Claimant was left 

to manage 7 buildings, 338 rooms, and 338 students without the help of an Assistant 

Manager. (F.F. Nos. 3-5.) Specifically, Claimant was responsible for managing 

student check-ins and check-outs, responding to routine and emergency situations 

within the building and between students, preparing reports, and managing the 

buildings generally. (N.T. at 11; F.F. Nos. 6, 8.) These working conditions persisted 

for the entire duration of Claimant’s employment. Claimant was required to work 70-
15

80 hours a week, nearly double the time he was hired to work. Being required to 

work nearly double the hours Claimant was hired to work, without assistance

Employer promised him, is a substantial and unilateral change in employment

conditions which occurred after he accepted the job. This case is not one of mere 

dissatisfaction with working conditions, but demonstrates a meaningful departure 

from the stated terms of employment.

5

 

We find our decision in Lewis v. Unemployment Compensation Board of 

Review (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 2065 C.D. 2011, filed October 1, 2012) (unreported) to be 

both persuasive and instructive.6 In Lewis, the claimant worked as a social services 

director for a nursing home. Slip op. at 1. The claimant explained that she performed 

four different roles (admissions coordinator, social worker, discharge planner, and 

case manager), which were typically filled by two or three different employees. Id. at 

2. The claimant had worked with a part-time assistant, but for financial reasons, her 

assistant was terminated. Id. An assistant was not rehired and the claimant assumed 

the workload of her previous assistant, which increased her responsibilities. Id. The 

claimant repeatedly advised her employer about the overwhelming conditions she 

faced because of the increased responsibilities. Id. The employer did not provide the 

claimant with the assistance that she requested and, therefore, she resigned. Id. The 

claimant believed that she did not receive adequate assistance. Id. at 5. The Board 

denied the claimant benefits. Id. at 3. We concluded that the record reflected more 

than “mere dissatisfaction with working conditions,” and that the claimant’s 

 

5 As detailed below, Claimant brought these concerns to Employer on numerous occasions 

and was not offered any relief.

6 Lewis is an unreported opinion. Under section 414(a) of this Court’s Internal Operating 

Procedures, an unreported opinion may be cited for its persuasive value. 210 Pa. Code §69.414(a).
16

increased workload was a substantial and unilateral change in her employment

conditions. Id. at 6. 

This Court’s decision in Broadus v. Unemployment Compensation Board 

of Review, 544 A.2d 1098 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988) also provides guidance. There, the 

claimant was employed at a personal care home, where she worked with a full-time 

supervisor during the day. Id. at 1099. Subsequently, the claimant’s supervisor was 

discharged and the claimant was also asked to perform the supervisor’s duties until a 

new supervisor was hired. Id. Claimant was dissatisfied with her increased 

responsibilities and, specifically, having to do the work of two people. Id. After two 

weeks, the claimant asked why a replacement had not been hired. Id. at 1100. 

Because of her dissatisfaction and because a full-time day supervisor was not hired, 

the claimant resigned. Id. We concluded that the claimant experienced a substantial 

unilateral change in her employment conditions because she was required to run the

personal care home by herself. Id. 

The instant matter is similar to Lewis. Like the claimant in Lewis, 

Claimant faced a dramatically increased workload because of a lack of assistance. 

Because the Assistant Manager was never hired, Claimant was required to perform all 

of the duties alone, which resulted in him working nearly double the hours he was 

hired to work. Similar to Lewis, Claimant requested help and asked when the 

Assistant Manager would be hired. Like the claimant in Lewis, Claimant repeatedly 

advised Employer of the overwhelming conditions. Claimant brought his complaints 

to Ms. Batterton, Mr. Rivera, and Ms. Jenkins on numerous occasions. However, as 

in Lewis, Employer ignored Claimant’s requests for help and refused to provide 

assistance. Thus, like Lewis, we conclude, here, that the dramatic increase in 
17

Claimant’s workload, caused by a lack of assistance, constituted a substantial change 

in his employment and caused a real and substantial pressure to end his employment. 

Moreover, like the claimant in Broadus, Claimant informed Employer of 

his dissatisfaction with his working conditions and asked when a replacement would 

be hired. The claimant in Broadus waited approximately two months before 

resigning because of the unsatisfactory working conditions, while Claimant, over the 

course of eight months, continually asked and attempted to improve his situation. 

Thus, Broadus supports the conclusion that, because Claimant worked without 

assistance for eight months and was overwhelmed by the magnitude of his 

responsibilities, he was justified in terminating his employment.

The Board also concluded that there could not have been a substantial 

unilateral change in Claimant’s employment situation because he worked under the 

same conditions for the entirety of his employment. We disagree. 

Once an employee has accepted the terms of employment, it is assumed 

that the conditions of employment are acceptable. Speck v. Unemployment 

Compensation Board of Review, 680 A.2d 27, 30 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996). “[An] 

[e]mployee may not later assert that dissatisfaction with those terms constitutes a 

necessitous and compelling reason, unless there has been a change in the employment 

conditions[,] the employee was deceived by the employer[,] or the employee was 

reasonably unaware of the unsuitable conditions when he accepted the 

position.” Id. However, the claim of being deceived or being unaware of 

employment conditions can only go so far; “once an employee has accepted new 

employment terms, he has admitted to their suitability[], and therefore any later 

dissatisfaction with those terms,[]would not constitute cause of a necessitous and 
18

compelling nature.” Romao v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 443 

A.2d 1217, 1218 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1982) (citations omitted).

Here, when Claimant accepted his position he was unaware of the 

unsuitable conditions of his employment because he was specifically told by 

Employer, before he was hired, and throughout most of his employment that he 

would receive assistance from an Assistant Manager. However, an Assistant 

Manager was never hired. Clearly, these were not the working conditions to which

Claimant had initially agreed. Moreover, the findings of fact demonstrate that,

throughout the duration of his employment, Claimant lodged a continual protest as to 

his working conditions. Thus, there was a substantial unilateral change to the 

employment agreement by Employer which Claimant did not accept, as evidenced by 

his continual complaints about his working conditions. Based on the foregoing, we 

conclude that circumstances existed which produced real and substantial pressure to 

terminate employment.

B. Whether Claimant acted with Ordinary Common Sense 

and Made a Reasonable Effort to Preserve his Employment

Because we conclude that Claimant has satisfied element one of the 

Brunswick Hotel test, we turn to whether Claimant has met elements three and four. 

Elements three and four of the Brunswick Hotel test require Claimant to prove that he 

(a) acted with ordinary common sense, and (b) made a reasonable effort to preserve 

his employment.7 

 

7 The second element of the Brunswick Hotel test, which requires a claimant to prove that 

the circumstances which created a substantial and real pressure to terminate his employment would 

compel a reasonable person to act in the same manner, is unaddressed by either party. However, to 

the extent analysis is necessary, we conclude that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to 

act in the same manner. 
19

“Claimants have the duty to take all necessary and reasonable steps to 

preserve employment.” Anchor Darling Valve Co. v. Unemployment Compensation 

Board of Review, 598 A.2d 647, 649 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991). A claimant bears the 

burden of proving that he took all necessary and reasonable steps to preserve the 

employment relationship. PECO Energy Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Board

of Review, 682 A.2d 58, 61 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996). A claimant must communicate the 

offending conduct to his employer prior to voluntarily quitting. Moskovitz v. 

Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 635 A.2d 723, 724 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

1993). “If the employer promises to take action to alleviate the problem, good faith 

requires that the employee continue working until or unless the employer’s action 

proves ineffectual.” Craighead-Jenkins v. Unemployment Compensation Board of 

Review, 796 A.2d 1031, 1034 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) (citing Donaldson v. 

Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 434 A.2d 912 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981)). 

When offered a possible solution to the necessitous and compelling condition, a 

claimant may not speculate that the proposed change is unsuitable; he must give the 

arrangement a chance in an attempt to preserve his employment. Monaco v. 

Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 565 A.2d 127, 131 (Pa. 1989) 

(denying benefits where two employees speculated that their new pay structure would 

be unsatisfactory but did not give the new pay structure a chance before terminating 

their employment). Failing to attempt an employer’s new proposed arrangement to 

alleviate the necessitous and compelling condition will not support a finding that the 

employer’s modifications were unreasonable. Unangst v. Unemployment 

Compensation Board of Review, 690 A.2d 1305, 1308 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997) (holding 

that a claimant did not prove the job modifications were unreasonable and rose to the 

level that would compel a reasonable person to terminate her employment where she 
20

did not attempt the new position offered to her and merely speculated that her 

workload would be increased). We conclude, here, that based on the facts that the 

Board found to be credible, Claimant met his burden of proving that he acted with 

ordinary common sense and made reasonable efforts to preserve his employment. 

As explained above, Claimant was faced with real and substantial 

pressure to terminate his employment. In the face of this pressure, Claimant took the 

following steps to preserve his employment. Claimant asked his supervisor, Ms. 

Batterton, when the Assistant Manager would be hired. (F.F. No. 5.) Claimant asked 

Ms. Batterton for help, but she advised him that he did not need any help. (F.F. No. 

7.) Claimant told Ms. Jenkins on April 18, 2018, that he felt misled regarding the 

Assistant Manager position and that he was not getting support from Mr. Rivera. 

(F.F. No. 16.) Ms. Jenkins later spoke with Ms. Batterton and Mr. Rivera regarding 

Claimant. (F.F. No. 17.) A few weeks later, on May 3, 2018, Claimant and Ms. 

Jenkins met in her office, and at that time Claimant indicated that things appeared to 

be getting better. (F.F. No. 18.) However, on May 21, 2018, Claimant sent an email 

indicating that his situation had worsened. (F.F. No. 20.) Ms. Jenkins then advised 

Claimant to speak with Ms. Batterton and Mr. Rivera directly. (F.F. No. 21.) On June 

25, 2018, Claimant spoke with Mr. Rivera and was upset after the conversation. (F.F. 

No. 22.) Claimant received an email from Ms. Batterton advising him that he would 

need to work on July 3, 2018. (F.F. No. 24.) On June 29, 2018, Claimant attempted 

to contact Ms. Jenkins, but was unsuccessful as she was out for the week. (F.F. No. 

25.) Claimant informed Ms. Hoaty that he wanted to resign, and she requested that 

he put his resignation in writing. (F.F. No. 26.) Claimant resigned in writing. (F.F. at 

No. 27.) Thus, we accept, as we must, that these are all facts found by the Board to 

be credible. 
21

Over the course of Claimant’s employment, Employer failed to alleviate 

the issues that Claimant raised regarding his working conditions. Claimant reached 

out to his supervisors and human resources personnel on numerous occasions in an 

attempt to preserve his employment. Yet, instead of being helped, Claimant was told 

that he did not need help, and his conditions did not improve. These facts illustrate 

that Claimant acted with ordinary common sense and acted reasonably in preserving 

his employment; the Board’s conclusion to the contrary is not in accordance with the 

law. 

Our disposition in Brunswick Hotel is similar to the instant matter. In 

Brunswick Hotel, the claimant was employed as a comptroller. 906 A.2d at 659. The 

business changed hands, and the new employer informed the claimant that it would 

make health insurance benefits available and her employment would remain the 

same. Id. Prior to the change of ownership, the claimant was provided with a total 

benefit package completely funded by the employer. Id. The claimant continually 

asked about her health insurance benefits. Id. However, the employer did not 

provide health insurance, and the claimant voluntarily ended her employment because 

of the continued lack of health benefits. Id. at 660. The claimant worked for eight 

months without health insurance. Id. at 663. This Court concluded that the Board 

correctly determined that claimant made a reasonable effort to preserve her 

employment by waiting eight months to receive health benefits. Id. at 662.

Our decision in Mauro v. Unemployment Compensation Board of 

Review, 751 A.2d 276, 278 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000) also provides guidance. In Mauro, 

the claimant worked as a carpenter/foreman. Id. At his job interview the claimant 

told his employer, in essence, that he was a single parent with a child who was at 

daycare during the day, and thus, his work schedule needed to coincide with his 
22

daughter’s daycare schedule. Id. Furthermore, the claimant told the employer that he 

could work at one location, but not “all over.” Id. However, only a few days into the 

claimant’s employment, the employer required him to work longer hours at different 

locations. Id. Before he quit, the claimant asked his employer if “something [] could 

be worked out” between him and the employer because of his daughter’s daycare 

schedule. Id. The Board denied the claimant benefits because the claimant did not 

request a specific change in his work hours when he quit. Id. at 279. This Court 

concluded that the Board erred, and reversed its decision. Id. We explained that, 

based on the facts as found by the Board, the claimant had taken reasonable steps to 

preserve his employment when he asked if something could be worked out between 

him and his employer. Id. 

Here, over the course of eight months, Claimant was even more diligent

than the employee in Brunswick Hotel in attempting to preserve his employment. 

The findings of fact in this case illustrate a more detailed exchange between Claimant 

and Employer than the employee in Brunswick Hotel and her employer. Instead of 

sitting idly for eight months and merely asking questions as to when he would receive 

a benefit, Claimant actively participated in improving his situation by speaking with 

his supervisors and seeking assistance from human resources personnel on multiple 

occasions.

8

 Moreover, Claimant’s effort to preserve his employment was greater than 

the claimant in Mauro. The claimant in Mauro attempted to resolve the situation 

with his employer a single time, whereas, Claimant attempted numerous times to 

remedy the problem situation. Thus, we conclude that the Board’s decision is not in 

 

8 This decision should not be construed as prescribing a requirement that a claimant make a 

specific number of attempts to speak with his or her superiors to preserve his or her employment. 
23

accordance with the law, because Claimant acted with common sense and reason in 

attempting to preserve his employment situation. 

The Board also argues that, although Claimant had concerns about his 

job, he did not express his continued concerns to Ms. Jenkins or to the vice chancellor 

of his department. Moreover, the Board argues that Claimant did not prove that 

speaking to these individuals would have been futile because, when Claimant spoke 

with them before, his situation improved, albeit briefly. We disagree.

Although common sense and reasonable effort include informing a 

supervisor or other management of dissatisfaction, Moskovitz, 635 A.2d at 724, a 

claimant may be excused from reporting problematic work conditions if he or she 

reasonably believed that reporting would have been futile. Martin v. Unemployment 

Compensation Board of Review, 749 A.2d 541, 544 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000); see also 

Devon Preparatory School v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Pa. 

Cmwlth., No. 1298 C.D. 2018, filed July 15, 2019) (unreported) slip op. at 9; Serrano 

v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 149 A.3d 435, 440 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2016).9 We disagree with the Board’s argument, and conclude that it would have 

been futile for Claimant to bring his concerns to the vice chancellor or Ms. Jenkins. 

As the credited facts demonstrate, Claimant complained on numerous occasions over 

an eight-month period to his direct supervisors and nothing changed. When he 

 

9 Mauro is also instructive on the point of futility. In Mauro, when the claimant asked if 

anything could be worked out between him, employer, and his daughter’s daycare, he was told that 

“you got to do what you got do to” by his employer. Mauro, 751 A.2d at 279. We concluded that 

this statement supported the conclusion that the claimant’s efforts in pursuing the matter further 

would have been futile. Id. This supports our conclusion on futility because Claimant spoke to 

Employer numerous times, and received no help, whereas, the claimant in Mauro only spoke to his 

employer once. Moreover, Claimant was told that he had better “work [his] butt off or this is not 

the right job for [him].” (N.T. at 22; F.F. No. 22.)
24

complained to Ms. Jenkins, his situation improved only temporarily, but then 

worsened soon after. He again complained to his direct supervisors, and again, 

nothing changed. Given Employer’s past failure to remedy Claimant’s complaints, 

another complaint would have been a futile exercise, the Board’s argument to the 

contrary is incorrect as a matter of law.

10

 

Conclusion

Claimant has satisfied the Brunswick Hotel test. Summarily, Claimant 

has shown that there was real and substantial pressure to voluntarily terminate his 

employment because of the drastically increased workload and that he acted with 

ordinary common sense and reason in attempting to preserve his employment. 

Accordingly, the order of the Board, dated January 8, 2019, is reversed. 

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

 

10 The Board argues that under Keller v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Pa. 

Cmwlth., Nos. 790 & 791 C.D. 2016, filed March 29, 2017) (unreported), the failure to inform an 

employer that its efforts at improving a work situation have been ineffectual are fatal to a claimant’s 

case. Although we do not question the soundness of our decision in Keller, it is readily 

distinguishable from the present facts. Keller concerned a situation where the claimant complained 

to his employer a single time about allegedly harassing working conditions. Slip op. at 6. 

However, after the harassing behavior allegedly continued, the claimant did not complain to his 

employer again. As explained at length above, this case presents a scenario where Claimant 

complained to Employer on numerous occasions, and thus, it is factually distinguishable.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Daryl Yingling, :

Petitioner :

: No. 127 C.D. 2019

v. :

:

Unemployment Compensation :

Board of Review, :

Respondent :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 28

th day of February, 2020, the order of the 

Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, dated January 8, 2019, is 

reversed. 

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge