### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE A pr il 6, 200 5 S es sio n BARBARA C. WATTS, ET AL 

### . v. RANDALL LOVE TT, ET AL 

### .

Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Scott County No. 6085 Conrad Troutm an, Jud ge

No. E2004-0783-COA- R3-CV - F ILED MAY 10, 2005

I n this appeal, the de fendants arg ue that the trial court erre d in the amount of m oney it awar ded the plaintiffs for damag es i ncurr ed by the pl aintiffs when a truck owned by the def endants a nd operated by the def endants’ e mploy ee struc k the plaintiffs’ g ara g e. The sole issue at trial wa s the proper amount of dama g es the plaintiffs should re ceive for injuries to their pr operty . The plai n t i ffs introduced e vidence showing that the mar k et v alue of their prope rty

as a w hole - their r esidenc e, g ara g e and a cre ag e - de prec iated as a result of the f

act that the c olor of bric k nece ssary to restore the g ara g e to its origina l condition is no longe r available

. Considering this evidence , the trial court awa rded the plaintiffs a judgment i n the amount of $8,000.00. The defenda nts contend that the trial court e rre d in its award a nd that the proper measure of damag es should have be en solely the cost of
r e p a irin g th e g ar a g e , w h ic h th e d e f endant s ’ e xp e r t e s ti mate d to b e ap p r o xim a te ly $ 2 , 0 0 0

. 0 0

. We aff irm the judg ment of the trial c ourt and re mand.


### Tenn . R . A pp. P. 3 Ap peal as of Right ; Judgm ent of the Cir cuit C ourt

Af firm ed; Cause R em anded

S HAR ON G. LEE , J ., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which H ER SCH EL P. F RAN KS , P.J . and D. M I CH A EL S WI NEY , J ., joined. Max E. Huff, Oneida , Tenne ssee, f or the Appe llants, Fer

rellg as, LP, and Fe rre llga s, I nc.
C. Patr ic k Se xton, On e ida , T e nn e sse e , f or the Ap pe lle e s, B arb ara

C. Watts a ndAd a le a n Cr os s

OP IN ION

T h e p l a i n t i f

f, B ar b ar a C

. W a t t s , i s t h e o w n e r

o f c e r t a i n r e a l p r o p e r t y l o c at e d i n S c o t tC o u n t y, Te nn e sse e , s ub

je c t to the lif

e est ate of he r m oth e r andc o- plaint if f, Ad a le e n Cr os s. Th e pr op e rt y consists of 1.35 acr es of land i mproved with a house in which Ms. Watts resides and an unattached g ara g e. The defe ndants, Fe rre llga s, L .P. and Fe rre llga s, I nc., ar e in t h e b u s i ness of selling and de liv e ri ng pr op a ne g a s. Durin g t he c ou rs e of makin g a

de liv e ry of pr op a ne g a s to Ms. Watts'-2-

re sid e nc e , Rand a ll L ov e tt, a n e mpl oy e e of the de fe nd a nts , in a dv e rt e ntl y back ed the de fe nd a nts ’ de li v e ry tr

u c k in to th e f

r o n t w a ll o f M s
. Watt s ' g ar a g e , th e r e b y c au s in g g e n e r a l d amag e to that str uc tur e . O n N ov e mbe r 1 , 2 00 2, Ms. Watts andMs. Cr os s f ile d a c omp la int

in the Sc ott

Cou nty C i rc u i t Court alleg ing that the defe ndants are neg lige nt and re questing a judg ment in the amount of $15,000.00 for

damag es incurr ed.
The c ase w as tried without a jury . After hearing the testimonyof witnesses a nd arg ument of counsel, the tria l court dismissed the plaintiffs complaint as to Randall L ovett an d r e n dere d judgme nt a g a ins t th e de fe nd a nt i n th e a mou nt o f $ 8, 00 0. 00 . T he de fe nd a nts no w a pp e a l th a t ju dg me nt.
I t appea rs from the r ecor d that the defendants concede that their neg lige nce r esulted in injury to the plaintiffs’ g ara g e and the sole issue addre ssed by the trial court and this Court is t he
app ro pria te a mou nt o f d a ma g e s to be a wa rd e d th e plaint if

fs

. I n a non-jury

case such as this one, we revie w the re cord de novo with a pre sumption of
c or re c tne ss a s to the tr ia l cou rt ’s det e rm inatio n o f f a c ts andwe mus t ho no r tho se fi nd ing s u nle ss the re is e vid e nc e wh ic h p re po nd e rate s to the c on tr ary . T e nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( d) ; Union Carbide v. Huddleston , 8 54 S.W. 2d87 , 9 1 ( Te nn . 1 99 3) . Wh en a tr ia l c ou rt

ha s se e n a ndhe ardwi tne sse s, e sp e c ia lly wh e re iss ue s o f c re dib ili ty andwe ig ht o f o ra l te sti mon y a re inv olv e d, c on sid e ra

ble defe renc e must be ac corde d to the trial court’ s fac tual finding s. Se a ls v
. E n gla nd /Co rsa ir U

ph ols te ry Mfg. Co., Inc., 984 S.W .2d 912, 915 (Tenn. 1999)

. The trial c ourt’s conc lusions of law are acc orded no presumption of cor

rec tness. Campbell v. Florida Steel Corp., 919 S.W .2d 26, 35 (Tenn. 1996) ; Pre sle y v . B e nn e tt , 860 S.W .2d 857, 859 (Tenn. 1993)

. The de fendants arg ue that the tria l court er red in its assessment of damag es and that the trial court’s a war d of $8,000.00 is ex ce s s i v e. I n s upport of its arg ument, the def endants note that an expert witness called on its beha lf testified that the ga rag e could be repaired at an estimated c ost of $2,240.94.

I t appea rs from the r ecor d in this ca s e t h at at som e time in the mid-ninetee n eig hties the exterior of the plaintiffs’ house and g ara g e we re c overe d with brick of matc hing c olor. The r ecor d further shows that, as a c onsequenc e of the impact of t h e defenda nts’ truck, the f ront wall of the g ara g e wa s displaced a nd the brick e x terior of the front a nd side of the g ara ge was c rac ked and broken. The defe ndants’ own witness, pr operty appraiser Todd Cook, a g ree s that “ther e was a ctual da ma g e to the bri ck. ” P lai nt if f A da le e n Cr os s, te sti fi e d th a t th e bric k w hic h w ou ld b e ne e de d to restore the g ara g e to its condition be fore the acc ident is no longe r manufa cture d in the orig inal color. Ms. Cross’ s son, Gary Cross, a lso testified that the brick ne cessa ry for r epar ation of the g ara g e is no longer av ai l able. F inally , while ce rtified re al estate appraiser, Micha el Sext on, testified that the g ara g e could be repaired, he further testified that the bric k that was incor porate d into the construction of the re sid e nc e a ndg ara g e is m a tc hin g “ a g e d b ri c k” a ndthat th e re pa ir of the g ara g e wo uldc re a te a “ mis ma tc h inbric k” wh ic h w ou ld affect th e “ c ur b a pp e a l” of the plaint if

fs ’ w ho le pr op e rt y resulting in an over all economic de prec iation in its valu e. M r. Sext on assessed the value of the plaintiffs’ prope rty

as a w hole - the a cre ag e improved with the re sidence and g ara g e - at $75,700.00-3-

prior to the acc ident. Mr. Sex ton te stified that, beca use of the damag e inflicted upon the g ara g e and the loss of curb a

ppeal a s a conse quence of the una vailability of matching brick, the e conomic value of the prope rty

as a w hole was diminished by $12,000.00, resulting in a total post-acc ident value of $63,700.00.

I t appea rs that the plaintiffs a nd the def endants a re in ag ree ment with r espec t to the g ener al rule g overning the proper measure of damag es for injury to rea l property , as re -stated by this Court in Fuller v. Ork in Exterminating Company, Inc ., 545 S.W .2d 103,108 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975):
Our a ppellate c ourts have uniformly held that the mea sure of

damag es for

injury to r eal estate is the differ ence betwee n the re asonable marke t value of the premises immediately

prior to and immedi at el y af t er injury but if the rea sonable c ost of repairing the injury is less than t he deprec iation in value, the cost of re pair is the la wf ul m e a su re of

da ma g e s. Of

c ou rs e , t he trie r o f f

a c t c a n a lso take int o consideration the rea sonable c ost of restoring the property to its former c ondition in arriving at the diffe renc e in value immediate ly befor e and afte r the injury to the premises. (Citations omitted.)

The de fend an ts arg ue that dama g es in the ca se sub judice sh ou ld h a ve be e n li mit e d to $2,240.94, which its e x pert, Todd Cook, te stified to be the cost of r eplac ing brick on the fr ont of the g ara g e, jac king and shoring the building to repla ce a damag ed column, and r efilling cra cked mortar.
Ho we ve r, thi s a

rg ume nt that dama g e s sh ou ld b e de te rm in ed by the a lle g e d c os t of re pa ir ignor es the a

bove noted e videncethat the brick w hich would be ne eded to r eplac e the c rac ked and br ok e n b ri c k is no lon g e r a va ila ble . T his e vid e nc e is s up po rt iv e of the tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing that if new brick wer e to be use d in repa iring the gar ag e it would not match. Other evidenc e in the re cord does not preponde rate ag ainst this finding.
As noted by

our Supreme Court in Col e ma n v . B e nn e tt , 69 S.W

. 734 (Tenn. 1902) , an injury t o re al t y i s co n s i d er ed p er m an en t i f i ti s “p ra ct i ca l l y i rr em ed i ab l e” an d , as s t at ed b y t h e C o u rt atp age 736, the measur e of damag es for such an injury

is “the depr eciati o n i n t h e mar ket value of

the property by rea son of the def

endant’ s wrong .” In the more r ece nt case of Citi z en s Real Estate & Loan Co., Inc . v. Mountain States Dev elopment Corp. , 633 S.W .2d 763, 766 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981),
we r eiterated this r

ule, stating, “[W ]hen the injury is pe rmane nt, any depre ciation in the value of the property will be an ele ment of dama g es, ac cording to ext ent and dur ation of plaintiff’s e s t at e.” Given the impossibilit y o f re s t o ri ng the g ara g e to its origina l condition as a re sult of the unavailability

of matching brick, we believe that it was reasona ble t hat the trial c ourt consider the perma nent ec onomic impact of the fac t that the g ara g e as r epair ed would no long er match the color of t he plainti ffs’ house. As we have noted, evidenc e was prese nted that, as a result of the va

riation in c o lo r b e tw e e n th e h o u s e a n d th e g ar a g e , th e p lain ti f f s ’ p r o p e r ty

a s a w h o le w o u lds u f

f e r an estimated depr eciation in market value in the amount of twelve thousand dollars. Our r eview of the
re c or d d oe s n ot r e ve a l e vid e nc e wh ic h p re po nd e rate s a g a ins t th e c on c lus ionthat th is e sti ma te is-4-

acc urate . Acc epting this a s a ceiling for the amount of damag es supported by the evidenc e, we do not find that the trial court’s aw ar d o f d am age s in the amount of $8,000.00 was e x cessive or otherwise e rrone ous. Next, we note the def

endants’ obse rvation that the plaintiffs f ailed to pre s ent any

proof
re g ard ing the c os t of

re pa ir ing the ir

g ara g e . A ssu min g that th is f a c t is br ou g ht t o o ur

a tte nti on in support of the a

rg ument that the plaintiffs we re oblig ated to off er pr oof as to both the cost of r epair s and diminution in m arke t value in orde r re cover damag es attributable to e ither, it is our determination that such arg ument is without m erit. This Court has indicated on prior occ asion that in a ca se involving damag e to re al prope rty the plaintiff does not ha ve the bur den of of fering alternative measure s of damag es and this burde n is, rather , upon the def endant if the defe ndant see ks to arg ue that the m easur e of damag es advanced by the plaintiff is unrea sonable. Con ats e r v . B all , No. M1999-00583-COA- R3- C V, 2 0 0 1 WL 873457, at *12, 2001 Tenn. A pp. LEXI S 569, at *35 (Tenn. Ct. App M.S., filed Aug . 3, 2001). Finally , we a cknowled ge t h e p laintiffs’ re quest that we awar d damag es upon g rounds that the def endants’ a

ppeal is frivolous. W e do not find that such a n awa rd is war rante d in this case and such re quest is denied.

F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns , th e jud g me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt is affi rme d a ndthe c aus e is
re ma nd e d for c oll e c tio n of co sts . Co sts of app e a l are a dju dg e d a g a ins t th e de fe nd a nts , F e rr e llg a s, L

. P

. a n d F e rr e l l g a s , In c
. , a n d t h e i r s u r e t y.

_________________________________________

SHARON G. LEE, J UDGE