F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

MAR 4 2005

PATRICK FISHER

Clerk

PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

In re: C. RABON MARTIN,

Appellant. No. 03-5204

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

(D.C. No. 00-AP-1-K)

Submitted on appellant’s brief:

C. Rabon Martin, Pro Se, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Appellant.

Before TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge, HENRY, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.

TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge.

Appellant C. Rabon Martin, an attorney appearing pro se, appeals the order

entered by the district court on November 25, 2003 denying his supplemented

application for reinstatement to the bar of the United States District Court for the
* After examining appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has

determined unanimously to grant appellant’s request for a decision without oral

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore

ordered submitted without oral argument. 

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Northern District of Oklahoma. Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

We affirm. *

I.

In September 1997, this court suspended Mr. Martin from practicing before

it for one year and one day. See Aplt. App., Tab 1 at 1. In February 1999, as a

result of the suspension by this court, the district court suspended Mr. Martin

from practicing in the Northern District of Oklahoma. See Aplt. App., Tab 2 

at 1-2; N.D. LR 83.3(G) (providing that “[a]ny member of the bar of [the district

court] . . . suspended from practice in any court of competent jurisdiction, shall be

suspended automatically from practice in [the district court]”).

In April 1999, the district court entered an order reinstating Mr. Martin “to

practice in the . . . Northern District of Oklahoma, on probationary status for one

year.” Aplt. App., Tab 2 at 3. At that time, Mr. Martin had already served his

suspension in this court, and he had been reinstated to practice in this court with a

one year probationary period. Id., Tab 1 at 4. 

Subsequently, Mr. Martin once again ran into problems with regard to his

activities in this court. As a result, on July 6, 1999, this court entered an order
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directing Mr. Martin to show cause why he should not be suspended from

practicing in this court “for his failure to abide by the rules of this court.” Id.,

Tab 3 at 2. In the response that he filed to the show cause order, Mr. Martin did

not attempt to show cause why he should not be suspended from practicing in this

court. Instead, Mr. Martin “acknowledge[d] that, once again, he ha[d] overlooked

one or more applicable rules of this [court],” id., Tab 4 at 1, and he requested that

he be allowed to resign from the bar of this court, id. On July 30, 1999, this court

accepted Mr. Martin’s resignation from its bar. Id., Tab 5 at 2.

After Mr. Martin resigned from the bar of this court, the district court

entered an order disbarring him from practicing before it. Id., Tab 6. The

disbarment order was entered pursuant to N.D. LR 83.3(H), which provides that

“an attorney of [the district court’s] bar who is under investigation for misconduct

. . . in any court of competent jurisdiction, who resigns from the bar of the

investigating jurisdiction, . . . shall forthwith be disbarred from practicing in [the

district court].” On January 12, 2000, in response to a motion to reconsider that

was filed by Mr. Martin, the district court entered an order rescinding the

disbarment order, and the court instead ordered that “Mr. Martin is suspended,

rather than disbarred, from practice before the . . . Northern District of

Oklahoma.” Aplt. App., Tab 8 at 2. The court further ordered that “Mr. Martin
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may apply for reinstatement . . . no sooner than two years from December 10,

1999.” Id.

On April 18, 2002, Mr. Martin filed an application to be reinstated to the

bar of the Northern District of Oklahoma. Id., Tab 9. On July 12, 2002, the

district court entered an order denying Mr. Martin’s application for reinstatement. 

The court denied the application because it found that Mr. Martin had violated the

January 12, 2000 suspension order by continuing to represent clients in cases

pending in the Northern District of Oklahoma. Id., Tab 10 at 2-7. Mr. Martin did

not file an appeal in this court regarding the July 12, 2002 order. 

On December 18, 2002, Mr. Martin filed a pleading in the district court

entitled “Resubmission Of Supplemented Application For Reinstatement”

(supplemented application). Id., Tab 11. As summarized by the district court, in

his supplemented application, Mr. Martin argued that “the activities which he has

undertaken during his suspension do not require admission to the bar of the

Northern District of Oklahoma, e.g., he has neither personally appeared in court

nor signed pleadings . . . . Rather, he has only performed tasks which a legal

assistant could have performed.” Id., Tab 14 at 3. 

The district court subsequently set Mr. Martin’s supplemented application

for a hearing before a three-judge panel. In response to the hearing setting,

Mr. Martin filed a pleading in the district court entitled “Request For
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Clarification And, As Appropriate, Notice” (request for clarification), requesting

that 

he be afforded due process, consisting of written notification, in

advance of the “hearing,” apprizing [him] of any and all allegations

which might be brought against him, and which will be litigated at

such hearing, in order to afford [him] a fair opportunity to prepare to

meet said allegations, and to garner witnesses and/or exhibits to

present in opposition to any such allegations.

Id., Tab 13 at 1. Although the district court did not formally rule on Mr. Martin’s

request for clarification, the court implicitly denied the request because it did not

provide Mr. Martin with any further notice regarding the hearing on the

supplemented application. 

The hearing on Mr. Martin’s supplemented application took place on

August 27, 2003 before the Honorable Terence C. Kern (the Chief Judge of the

Northern District of Oklahoma at the time), the Honorable Clair V. Eagan, and the

Honorable James H. Payne (the panel). See Supplemental R., Vol. II. During the

hearing, the panel questioned Mr. Martin regarding the work that he had

performed in cases pending in the Northern District of Oklahoma since his

suspension in January 2000. As summarized by the panel during the hearing,

Mr. Martin’s global response to the panel’s questioning was that he believed “that

[he was] allowed to do anything that a legal assistant could do which basically

allowed [him] to participate in fees and help with the work as long as [he] didn’t

make an actual appearance in federal court or sign a pleading.” Id. at 23. But
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Mr. Martin also testified that: (1) while he referred all Northern District of

Oklahoma cases to supervising attorneys who were admitted to practice in that

court, he nonetheless shared or split the attorney’s fees that were paid to those

attorneys, id. at 4-5, 15-16; and (2) he participated in client interviews, id. at 3-4.

On November 25, 2003, the panel entered an order denying Mr. Martin’s

supplemented application, concluding that he had violated the January 12, 2000

suspension order by “continu[ing] to perform tasks that constituted the practice of

law in matters that he knew would, or currently did, fall within the jurisdiction of

the Northern District.” Aplt. App., Tab 14 at 6. The panel also found that, “[i]n

a number of cases, Mr. Martin took monies in exchange for his work in the form

of an attorney fee. The fees that he received were not allocated on an hourly

basis but on a percentage or proportionate basis wherein he received a share of

the fee from the attorney to whom he referred the matter.” Id. (citations omitted). 

Consequently, according to the panel, “Mr. Martin, in the capacity of attorney ,

continued to profit from cases in the Northern District.” Id. at 7. 

Mr. Martin is now appealing the November 25, 2003 order, arguing: (1)

that the district court deprived him of procedural due process; (2) that the

constraints imposed by his suspension cannot exceed the scope of the privileges

conferred by his initial admission to the bar of the Northern District of Oklahoma;

and (3) that the district court erred by failing to consider his good faith. For the
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reasons set forth below, we reject each of Mr. Martin’s arguments, and we affirm

the district court’s denial of his supplemented application.

II.

1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Standard of Review.

In Mattox v. Disciplinary Panel of the United States Dist. Court for the

Dist. of Colorado , 758 F.2d 1362 (10th Cir. 1985), this court reversed an order of

a district court that denied a suspended attorney’s application for readmission to

the bar of the district court, concluding that the district court had violated the

attorney’s right to procedural due process by failing to “give notice and the

reasons for its view before its decision [was] final, and [by failing to] give the

[attorney] an opportunity to respond.” Id. at 1369. Based on Mattox , it would

appear that this court has subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal. We note,

however, that Mattox did not specifically address the issue of whether this court

has subject matter jurisdiction to review district court readmission orders in cases

involving suspended attorneys. As a result, before proceeding to the merits of

Mr. Martin’s appeal, we need to address the issue of subject matter jurisdiction.

The Ninth Circuit has recently stated that “[o]rdinarily, appellate

jurisdiction to review an order by the District Court denying admission to practice

generally before it is lacking because the denial of a petition for admission to a

district court bar is neither a final order appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . . .
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nor an interlocutory order appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292.” In re North , 383

F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted). In this case, however, we do

not need to decide whether this court has subject matter jurisdiction to review “an

order by the district court denying admission to practice.” Id. Rather, this case

involves the much easier issue of whether we have jurisdiction to review the

denial of a suspended attorney’s application to be readmitted to the bar of a

district court where the denial is based on a finding that the attorney had violated

the terms of the suspension. In effect, this case thus involves a suspension order,

or, more precisely, an order continuing a suspension. Accordingly, we hold that

this case falls within the well-established rule that the federal circuit courts have

subject matter jurisdiction “to review orders suspending or disbarring attorneys

from practicing before the bars of federal district courts.” Id.; accord In re

Surrick , 338 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that a district court order

suspending an attorney from the district court’s bar was a final order for purposes

of 28 U.S.C. § 1291); In re Calvo , 88 F.3d 962, 964-66 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding

that an appeal from a district court disbarment order presented a justiciable case

or controversy); In re Palmisano , 70 F.3d 483, 484-85 (7th Cir. 1995) (same); In

re Jacobs , 44 F.3d 84, 87-88 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that circuit court had

jurisdiction to review order of federal grievance committee that suspended an

attorney from practicing in a district court); see also In re Snyder , 472 U.S. 634,
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643 n.4 (1985) (noting that a district court suspension order “would be subject to

review by the Court of Appeals”). 

As for the standard of review, we review the district court’s decision to

continue Mr. Martin’s suspension for an abuse of discretion. See Surrick, 338

F.3d at 229; Jacobs , 44 F.3d at 88; cf. Butler v. Biocore Med. Techs., Inc. , 348

F.3d 1163, 1169 (10th Cir. 2003) (stating that “[w]e review for abuse of

discretion all aspects of a trial court’s imposition of sanctions for rules

violations,” and that “[t]he trial court’s factual findings regarding the conduct of

attorneys will not be disturbed unless there is no reasonable basis to support those

conclusions”) (quotation omitted). But our review is not constrained with respect

to legal issues, and “our review of the District Court’s interpretation of legal

precepts is plenary.” Surrick , 338 F.3d at 229.

2. Procedural Due Process Claim.

As noted above, in Mattox , we held that a federal district court violated a

suspended attorney’s right to procedural due process when it denied her

application for readmission to the bar of the court without giving her prior notice

of the reasons for the denial and an opportunity to respond. See Mattox , 758 F.2d

at 1368-69; cf. G.J.B. & Assocs., Inc. v. Singleton , 913 F.2d 824, 830 (10th Cir.

1990) (“The due process clause of the fifth amendment . . . requires that an

attorney facing sanctions in federal court be given notice and an opportunity to be
1 Although “[a]n appeal from a final judgment usually draws into question all

prior non final orders and all rulings which produced the judgment,” McBride v.

CITCO Petroleum Corp., 281 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir. 2002) (quotation

omitted), this rule does not apply to the district court’s July 12, 2002 order

because that order was itself a final judgment.

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heard before final judgment.”). In light of Mattox , we believe the district court

may have violated Mr. Martin’s right to procedural due process when it entered

the July 12, 2002 order denying his initial application for reinstatement, as the

court did not give Mr. Martin any prior notice of the reasons for the denial or an

opportunity to respond. Mr. Martin did not appeal the July 12, 2002 order,

however, and the only order at issue in this appeal is the order entered by the

panel on November 25, 2003 denying the supplemented application for

reinstatement. Consequently, Mr. Martin’s procedural due process claim is

limited to the November 25, 2003 order. 1

Prior to entering the November 25, 2003 order, the panel did not explicitly

provide Mr. Martin with notice of the reasons for the decision to deny his

supplemented application. Nonetheless, we conclude that Mr. Martin had

sufficient prior notice and an opportunity to respond before the panel entered its

order. As a result, the panel did not violate Mr. Martin’s right to procedural due

process when it denied his supplemented application.
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To begin with, by Mr. Martin’s own admission, 

[u]pon receiving the [July 12, 2002] order denying readmission, Appellant reviewed each of the accusations, prepared his

defense and responded thereto. A “Supplemented and Resubmitted”

Application for Reinstatement was used as the vehicle for presenting

Appellant’s defense[.]

The “Supplemented and Resubmitted” Application for

Reinstatement responded to each of the accusations inherent in the

findings set forth in the initial order denying reinstatement, showing

each to be without merit.

Aplt. Br. at 11. Thus, by filing the supplemented application, Mr. Martin had an

opportunity to respond to all of the charges in the July 12, 2002 order.

In addition, as set forth above, after Mr. Martin submitted his supplemented

application, a hearing was held before the panel. The hearing provided Mr.

Martin with yet another opportunity to explain why he had not violated the

January 12, 2000 suspension order. Based on the questions that were posed by

the panel during the hearing, it was also unmistakably clear that the panel’s

concern with regard to the supplemented application was that Mr. Martin had

engaged in post-suspension conduct in cases pending in the Northern District of

Oklahoma that was inconsistent with his claim that he had acted only as a legal

assistant or law clerk. See Supplemental R., Vol. II at 3-23. As a result,

Mr. Martin’s claim that he did not have sufficient prior notice of the reasons for

the panel’s decision to deny the supplemented application is without merit. To

the contrary, the panel’s concerns were amply revealed at the hearing, and Mr.
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Martin had a full and fair opportunity to respond to those concerns during the

hearing. Id. at 23-27. 

We also note that, despite the request for clarification that he had filed

before the hearing, Mr. Martin did not assert a single objection at the hearing to

the effect that he was unprepared or unable to respond to the panel’s questions

due to a lack of prior notice regarding the topics that were to be explored at the

hearing. We therefore conclude that Mr. Martin’s right to procedural due process

was not violated.

3. Mr. Martin’s Conduct While Under Suspension.

This case raises the issue of whether an attorney who is suspended from

practicing in a district court may assist another attorney in a case pending in that

court, so long as the suspended attorney functions only as a legal assistant or a

law clerk. This is an issue of first impression in this circuit. In the November 25,

2003 order, the panel relied on the Third Circuit’s decision in In re Mitchell , 901

F.2d 1179 (3d Cir. 1990) to support its finding that Mr. Martin had violated the

January 12, 2000 suspension order by continuing to practice law in the Northern

District of Oklahoma. See Aplt. App., Tab 14 at 4-5. Like the panel, we also

adopt the reasoning of Mitchell for purposes of resolving the attorney suspension

issues that are raised by this case.
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Mitchell involved an attorney who had been suspended by the Third Circuit

from practicing before it, and the case raised “the question of to what extent, if

any, an attorney suspended from practice before [a circuit court] may assist

another attorney in a case before [that court], effectively functioning as a law

clerk or paralegal.” Mitchell , 901 F.2d at 1185. Mitchell is equally instructive

for purposes of analyzing a district court suspension, however, and it has been

followed in that context by at least one other circuit court. See Cooper v. Texaco,

Inc. , 961 F.2d 71, 72-73 (5th Cir. 1992). 

In Mitchell , the court began its analysis by noting that “a number of

jurisdictions permit suspended attorneys to act as law clerks, on condition that

they have no contact with clients or courts.” Mitchell , 901 F.2d at 1185. Relying

on a decision of the Florida Supreme Court, the court pointed out that the

rationale for this practice is that the “[e]mployment of [the suspended attorney] in

a supervised status within the profession [is] . . . an almost ideal manner in which

he may demonstrate during his suspension his potential for rehabilitation and

maintain his competency to practice law upon reinstatement.” Id. (quoting The

Florida Bar v. Thomson , 310 So. 2d 300, 302 (Fla. 1975)). The court then

proceeded to adopt the approach of the majority of jurisdictions, concluding as

follows: 

We will follow the majority of jurisdictions, and will permit a

suspended attorney to work as a law clerk, with respect to matters in
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this court with no contact with clients or the court, under the close

supervision of an attorney who is admitted to practice before us. We

agree with the Florida Supreme Court that this process would

contribute to the rehabilitation of the suspended attorney, and we are

satisfied that both the public and the court will be adequately

protected by the restrictions on the suspended attorney’s activities,

and the fact that the attorney in good standing will be responsible for

close supervision. . . . Of course, the admitted attorney cannot share

his or her fee with the suspended attorney, any more than he or she

could share the fee with a layman .

Id. at 1185-86 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 

Applying Mitchell to the circumstances in this case, we conclude that the

panel did not abuse its discretion when it found that Mr. Martin had continued to

practice law in the Northern District of Oklahoma despite his suspension, and we

reach this conclusion for two reasons. First, Mr. Martin testified at the hearing

before the panel that, while he referred all Northern District of Oklahoma cases to

supervising attorneys who were admitted to practice in that court, he nonetheless

shared or split the attorney’s fees that were paid to those attorneys. See

Supplemental R., Vol. II at 4-5. In fact, in some of the cases he may have

received one half of the total fee. Id. at 15-16. Second, Mr. Martin testified that

he participated in client interviews. Id. at 3-4. As noted by the panel, “[c]lient

contact was specifically prohibited by the Mitchell court,” Aplt. App., 

Tab 14 at 7 n.5, and we agree with the Third Circuit that a suspended attorney

should not be permitted to have contact with clients. Moreover, even if we were

to conclude that there may be special circumstances when a suspended attorney
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should be permitted to have limited contact with clients, Mr. Martin has failed to

advance any convincing reasons for allowing client contact with regard to his

suspension.

Finally, we reject Mr. Martin’s argument that the panel erred by failing to

consider his good faith efforts to reconfigure his practice to comply with the

“parameters” set forth by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Taylor v. Chubb Group

of Ins. Cos. , 874 P.2d 806 (Okla. 1994). See Aplt. Br. at 24. Taylor addressed

the issue of whether a reference in an Oklahoma statute to “attorneys fees”

included fees for services performed by legal assistants. Id. at 807. Although

tangentially relevant, Taylor provides no meaningful guidance with regard to the

suspension issues in this case. As a result, to the extent Mr. Martin was relying

on Taylor , his reliance was misplaced. 

We AFFIRM the district court’s November 25, 2003 order. We also

GRANT the “Application for Leave to Supplement Briefing” that Mr. Martin filed

on February 14, 2005.