[J-12-2017]

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.

IN THE INTEREST OF: D.C.D., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: COMMONWEALTH OF 

PENNSYLVANIA

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No. 34 MAP 2016

Appeal from the Order of the Superior 

Court at No. 999 MDA 2014 dated 

September 11, 2015 Affirming the Order 

of the York County Court of Common 

Pleas at No(s). CP-67-JV-0000720-

2012 and CP-67-DP-0000166-2013 

dated May 12, 2014.

ARGUED: March 8, 2017

OPINION

JUSTICE BAER DECIDED: October 18, 2017

We granted review in this case to consider what constitutes a “compelling 

reason” for early termination of delinquency supervision under Pennsylvania Rule of 

Juvenile Court Procedure 632.1 After review, we conclude that the Superior Court 

properly determined that the juvenile court acted within its discretion in granting early 

termination to the juvenile in this case to allow him to obtain necessary and immediate 

treatment, after properly taking into account the three aspects of balanced and 

restorative justice (BARJ) embodied in the Juvenile Act and incorporated into the Rules 

of Juvenile Court Procedure: “the protection of the community, the imposition of 

accountability for offenses committed[,] and the development of competencies to enable 

 

1

The text of Rule 632, entitled “Early Termination of Court Supervision by Motion,” is 

set forth in full infra at 6 n.8. 
[J-12-2017] - 2

children to become responsible and productive members of the community.” 42 

Pa.C.S. §§ 6301(b)(2) (“Short title and purposes of chapter”), 6352(a) (“Disposition of 

delinquent child”); see also Pa.R.J.C.P. 101 (C) (“These rules shall be interpreted and 

construed to effectuate the purposes stated in the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301(b).”). 

Accordingly, we affirm the Superior Court’s judgment, which affirmed the grant of early 

termination of delinquency. 

At the time of the May 2014 delinquency termination hearing at issue herein, 

D.C.D. was an intellectually low-functioning and socially immature twelve-year-old boy 

who was a victim of sexual abuse. To understand the factors at play in the delinquency 

termination hearing, we first consider D.C.D.’s history in the delinquency system. He 

originally entered the delinquency system in the fall of 2012, at age ten, due to 

allegations that he committed indecent assault2against his five-year-old sister.3 Rather 

than formally adjudicating him delinquent at that time, the juvenile court entered a 

consent decree pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 6340, which allows for the suspension of 

delinquency proceedings prior to formal adjudication, and placed D.C.D. in a specialized 

foster care program administered by Pressley Ridge.

4

 

 

2

 18 Pa.C.S § 3126(a)(7).

3 D.C.D. was also accused of having committed indecent assault against his three-yearold cousin, but those charges were withdrawn by the Commonwealth in January 2014.

4

The Juvenile Act defines a delinquent child as “[a] child ten years of age or older 

whom the court has found to have committed a delinquent act and is in need of 

treatment, supervision or rehabilitation.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302. As noted, D.C.D. was ten 

years old at the time of the initial placement. 

Prior to a formal adjudication of delinquency, the juvenile court and the parties 

may consider the less formal option of a “consent decree” which the Juvenile Act 

explains as follows:

(continued...)
[J-12-2017] - 3

In the spring of 2013, a few months after being placed in his first foster care

home, D.C.D. was alleged to have left notes of a sexual nature for his foster care 

home’s neighbor in regard to the neighbor’s young daughter, which led to a charge of 

harassment by communication, an act of delinquency which also constituted a violation 

of his consent decree.

5

 The parties agreed to allow D.C.D. to continue on the original 

consent decree but transferred him to a second foster home. 

While on a home visit to his biological family in July 2013, D.C.D. allegedly 

attempted to start a fire in his room, which constituted another violation of the consent 

decree. Soon thereafter, in August of 2013, D.C.D. was found to be dependent due to 

his parents’ inability to provide necessary care or control for reasons not directly related 

to the issues before this Court. In accord with the finding of dependency, the juvenile

court transferred legal and physical custody to the York County Office of Children, 

 

(...continued)

(a) General rule. - At any time after the filing of a petition and 

before the entry of an adjudication order, the court may, on 

motion of the district attorney or of counsel for the child, 

suspend the proceedings, and continue the child under 

supervision in his own home, under terms and conditions 

negotiated with the probation services and agreed to by all 

parties affected. The order of the court continuing the child 

under supervision shall be known as a consent decree.

42 Pa.C.S. § 6340(a). If the child fails to satisfy the terms of the consent decree, the 

original delinquency petition can be reinstated, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6340(d). 

In this case, it appears that all parties agreed that the consent decree could not 

allow D.C.D. to remain in his own home given that his victim, who was his sister, also 

resided in that home. Accordingly, he was placed in specialized foster care through 

Pressley Ridge. Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 4/22/13, at 3.

5

18 Pa.C.S. § 2709(a)(4). Charges of stalking, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2709.1, loitering and 

prowling at night time, 18 Pa.C.S. § 5506, and summary harassment, 18 Pa.C.S. 

§ 2709(a), were initially filed but later withdrawn. 
[J-12-2017] - 4

Youth, and Families (CYF), which would serve as the lead agency, while Juvenile 

Probation continued to maintain concurrent supervision of D.C.D. pursuant to the 

consent decree.

In September 2013, following new allegations of inappropriate behavior while 

living in his second foster home, D.C.D. was removed from that home and temporarily 

placed in a respite foster care home and subsequently in the shelter care unit at the 

York County Youth Development Center. At the time, Pressley Ridge, D.C.D.’s foster 

care provider, indicated that it was unable to provide another foster care placement for 

him due to his history. Order of 9/11/13. Although the parties agreed that a residential 

treatment facility (RTF) was necessary for D.C.D., CYF had difficulty finding a bed for 

him in a RTF given that most of the providers offering services for juvenile sexual 

offenders and fire-starters did not treat children under twelve. Notes of Testimony 

(N.T.), 9/25/13, at 5. Indeed, D.C.D. remained in shelter care at the youth development 

center for nearly a month before being accepted and moved into the Sarah Reed 

Residential Treatment Facility. D.C.D. initially adjusted well to Sarah Reed and 

observed proper behavioral boundaries, other than a few incidents of not respecting 

other patients’ personal space. 

Nevertheless, given that the prior incidents involving the harassment and firestarting constituted violations of his consent decree, CYF sought a combined placement 

review and dispositional review hearing, which was held in January 2014. At the 

hearing, D.C.D. was adjudicated delinquent as he admitted to the acts charged and 

because the court determined that he was in need of treatment and supervision

pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 6341. Specifically referencing the BARJ factors, the court 

concluded that continued residential treatment at the Sarah Reed facility was 

appropriate, as it would provide for community protection, while allowing D.C.D. to 
[J-12-2017] - 5

develop competencies. Order of 1/28/14 at 4-6. The court also addressed 

accountability, the third prong of BARJ, by assessing various fees on D.C.D. Id. at 5.

In March 2014, the juvenile court held a hearing to address D.C.D.’s placement 

following a new allegation of a sexual incident involving a younger resident at Sarah 

Reed.6 At that time, the parties recognized that more residential facilities were available 

to treat D.C.D. as he had turned twelve. However, some of the facilities were unwilling 

to accept children who had incidents of fire-starting, and others could not provide 

services for his level of intellectual functioning. Given the available options, the parties 

agreed that he should be moved to the Southwood Psychiatric Hospital - Choices 

Program (Southwood), a RTF which had a bed immediately available and which 

focused specifically upon his cohort: intellectually low-functioning, sexual offenders. 

Despite the parties’ agreement to place D.C.D. at Southwood, Southwood 

informed them that it could not accept him due to his adjudication of delinquency for a 

sexual offense. According to testimony from the Southwood director, Southwood had 

an agreement with the township in which it was located not to accept juveniles currently 

adjudicated delinquent for a sexual offense, but the director stated that they could 

accept D.C.D. if the delinquency supervision was terminated.7 

 

6 As of a subsequent hearing in May 2014, the parties indicated to the juvenile court that 

the Department of Public Welfare had investigated the incident but had not filed any 

charges as of the date of that hearing. See Order of 5/12/14 at 5-6. 

7 At a subsequent hearing, the parties disputed the exact nature and extent of 

Southwood’s prohibition against juveniles who are adjudicated delinquent for sexual 

offenses. Based upon the Commonwealth’s assertions during the hearing, the 

restriction at Southwood arose from an agreement between Southwood and North 

Strabane Township during the permitting process. N.T., 5/12/14, at 28. It was 

seemingly aimed at preventing Southwood from housing violent or drug-addicted 

juveniles. Id. at 29. The details of the agreement were not the focus of the hearing in 

this case; rather, the relevant uncontested fact was that Southwood agreed to take 

(continued...)
[J-12-2017] - 6

As a result, D.C.D.’s counsel filed a motion for early termination of delinquency

supervision under Pa.R.J.C.P. 632,

8

to which the York County District Attorney objected 

 

(...continued)

D.C.D. only if he was not currently under delinquency supervision for a sexual offense. 

Order of 5/12/14 at 7. 

8

In full, Pa.R.J.C.P. 632, entitled “Early Termination of Court Supervision by Motion” 

provides:

A. Motion. Any party may move for early termination of court 

supervision. The motion shall state with specificity why early 

termination is sought and why the requirements of Rule 

631(A) [, see infra at 21 n.17 for full text,] have not been met.

B. Notice.

(1) In addition to the service requirements of Rule 

345, any party moving for early termination shall 

serve the motion on the juvenile probation officer.

(2) The victim shall be provided notice of the motion 

for early termination of court supervision.

C. Objection.

(1) A party or the juvenile probation officer may object 

to the motion under paragraph (A) and request a 

hearing.

(2) Such objection shall be made within thirty days of 

the date of the motion; otherwise, objections are 

deemed waived.

D. Court’s determination. The court shall:

(1) rule on the motion and any objections without a 

hearing; or

(2) schedule a hearing.

(continued...)
[J-12-2017] - 7

and requested a hearing. The court scheduled a two-day hearing in May 2014 to 

address D.C.D.’s dependency placement as well as the motion to terminate delinquency 

supervision. Prior to the hearing, the parties contacted at least nine potential facilities to 

attempt to find a suitable treatment facility for D.C.D, which would accept him while he 

remained “dual adjudicated”, i.e., both dependent and delinquent. 

At the hearing, all participants other than the District Attorney and Juvenile 

Probation officer favored termination of delinquency supervision to allow D.C.D. to be 

transferred to Southwood. In support of termination, D.C.D.’s CYF case manager 

detailed the various reasons why CYF had determined that Southwood was the only 

appropriate facility for D.C.D. 9 N.T., 5/9/14, 46-52, 75-76. The case manager revealed 

that a few of the facilities contacted refused to accept D.C.D. due to his fire-starting 

incident or his low IQ level, some facilities were geared toward older adolescent 

offenders who could prey upon D.C.D., and others did not have any available beds or 

did not provide the necessary level of supervision. One provider, Valley Youth House, 

 

(...continued)

E. Hearing. If objections have been made pursuant to 

paragraph (C) and/or the court has determined a hearing is 

necessary, the court shall hold a hearing and give each 

party, the victim, and the juvenile probation officer an 

opportunity to be heard before the court enters its final order.

F. Termination. When the requirements of paragraphs (A) 

through (E) have been met and the court is satisfied that 

there are compelling reasons to discharge the juvenile prior 

to the completion of the requirements of Rule 631(A), the 

court may order an early discharge of the juvenile from its 

supervision.

9 Additionally, D.C.D.’s former neighbor, who received the sexual notes regarding her 

daughter, testified telephonically during the hearing, indicating that she did not favor 

termination of delinquency but emphasized that she wanted D.C.D. to obtain the help 

that he needed. N.T., 5/12/14, at 27.
[J-12-2017] - 8

had a bed available but did not have a contract with York County. The CYF case 

manager testified that placing a child at a facility that did not currently have a contract 

with the county could take weeks or months because an agreement had to be

negotiated between the county and the provider before D.C.D. could be placed. N.T.,

5/9/14, at 80. 

In contrast to these unacceptable facilities, the case manager explained the 

benefits of Southwood. She observed that it specialized in providing treatment to low 

functioning children with sexual abuse offending issues. N.T., 5/9/14, at 53. 

Southwood additionally provided treatment on campus which would mitigate the 

problems that arose at Sarah Reed where D.C.D. received only three sessions of sex 

offender treatment during the approximately six months he was there. N.T., 5/9/14, at 

53, 60. She further emphasized that not all residential treatment programs can provide 

therapy to lower-functioning children, which she viewed as critical to D.C.D. who did not 

“even understand what he is doing is wrong” and did not “fully understand what was 

going on [with his body].” N.T., 5/9/14, at 75-76. She testified that she was not aware 

of any other program that focused on low-functioning juvenile sexual offenders like 

D.C.D. N.T., 5/9/14, at 78-79. 

Testimony by the director of Southwood further supported D.C.D.’s placement at 

Southwood:

We focus our program to deal specifically with sexually 

reactive youth in the age range that [D.C.D.] is in, who have 

experienced some form of trauma history, whether that be 

reactive attachment or something more severe along those 

lines, as far as trauma is concerned, and at the same time 

target youth with an IQ between 60 and 110, so everything 

I've read about [D.C.D.] qualifies him for the program.

N.T., 5/9/14, at 113.
[J-12-2017] - 9

D.C.D.’s juvenile probation officer testified in opposition to termination of 

delinquency, despite acknowledging that Southwood would be an appropriate 

placement. N.T., 5/12/14, at 31. As an alternative, he proposed the Abraxas Youth and 

Family Services Program (also referred to as South Mountain), which had two 

programs. One program was a secure residential facility for twelve to twenty-year-old 

residents, while the second program was an open (non-secure) residential program for 

twelve to fifteen-year-old juveniles. N.T., 5/9/14, at 90. He admitted that Abraxas only 

had a bed available immediately in the secure program aimed at older juveniles, and 

that the program appropriate for D.C.D. would not have a bed available for at least three 

months.

10

 N.T., 5/9/14, at 90-91. 

In closing, the Commonwealth urged the court not to terminate delinquency 

supervision. It contended that D.C.D.’s behavior had not improved since his 

delinquency adjudication such that termination of delinquency was unsupported. 

Instead, it argued that his inappropriate behavior was increasing, observing that he was 

being removed from Sarah Reed because of yet another incident. N.T., 5/12/14, at 32. 

The Commonwealth argued in favor of D.C.D.’s placement at Abraxas, asserting it

could offer appropriate treatment services without requiring termination of delinquency 

supervision and was in closer proximity to D.C.D.’s family than Southwood, allowing for 

more family visits as well as other support services such as continued contact with his 

guardian ad litem, his probation officer, and CYF caseworkers. It further contended that 

Sarah Reed was an “appropriate” placement where he could remain until a bed became 

 

10 The CYF case manager had previously testified not only to her concern due to the 

lack of an immediate opening in the non-secure program at Abraxas, but also to her 

reservations regarding whether Abraxas would be appropriate for D.C.D. given that he 

would be a low-functioning twelve-year-old in a facility where twelve was the minimum 

age. N.T., 5/12/14, at 51.
[J-12-2017] - 10

available in the non-secure Abraxas program aimed at younger juveniles.

11

 N.T.,

5/12/14, at 35-36. The Commonwealth also averred that Southwood was a relatively 

unknown facility, with a cloud hanging over whether it would actually admit D.C.D. even 

if delinquency were terminated. N.T., 5/12/14, at 34. It further emphasized that if the 

court terminated delinquency supervision by Juvenile Probation, then it could not be 

reinstated absent D.C.D.’s commission of another act of delinquency. N.T., 5/12/14, at 

34. 

Counsel for D.C.D., in contrast, emphasized that all parties had agreed that 

Southwood was the best facility for D.C.D. a few weeks before the hearing. N.T.,

5/12/14, at 36. She observed that CYF, rather than Juvenile Probation had been the 

lead agency in the case, meaning that termination of delinquency supervision would 

have minimal effect on the supervision of D.C.D. and the services offered to him, given 

that Juvenile Probation was not providing any services to him. Counsel also asserted 

that she doubted Abraxas’ ability to care for a low-functioning juvenile offender at the 

younger end of the facility’s age range. Additionally, counsel for D.C.D.’s mother, his 

guardian ad litem, and counsel for Children, Youth, and Families all argued in support of 

terminating delinquency supervision to allow D.C.D. to be placed at Southwood. 

The juvenile court provided its decision at the close of the second day of 

hearings. The court recognized that the critical inquiry in the case was whether 

“compelling reasons” existed for early termination of delinquency for purposes of 

Pa.R.J.C.P. 632. The court observed that the term is not defined in Juvenile Court 

Rules or the Juvenile Act. Nevertheless, it reasoned that “[a] compelling argument or 

 

11 Notably, the Commonwealth was not suggesting placing D.C.D. in the older secure 

Abraxas program as it now proposes in its briefing to this Court.
[J-12-2017] - 11

reason is one that convinces someone that something is true or should be done.” Order 

of 5/12/14 at 4. 

The court then synthesized the difficulties of finding a proper placement for 

D.C.D. considering his treatment needs. The court observed that he was “undeniably in 

need of specialized care [because] he has been both a victim and perpetrator of sexual 

abuse; he functions at a low level and is socially immature; [and] he has exhibited firesetting behaviors.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion at 3. The court emphasized the 

deficiencies in D.C.D.’s prior treatment. Specifically, it recognized that while Sarah 

Reed was the only facility able to treat D.C.D. in the fall of 2013 due to his age and 

treatment needs, it failed to provide the necessary treatment services. Order of 5/12/14

at 5. Indeed, the court found that “his immediate removal from Sarah Reed was 

imperative.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion at 3. 

The court reviewed the testimony regarding the referrals made to other treatment 

facilities, observing that most were overtly inappropriate for D.C.D. or would not accept 

him due to his history or their lack of space. The court narrowed the options to three 

facilities. It first observed that Valley Youth House had accepted D.C.D., but the county 

did not have a contract with that facility. Order of 5/12/14 at 7. Although not specifically 

noted in the decision, testimony at the hearing suggested that the absence of a contract 

could delay placement of D.C.D. while the parties negotiated an agreement. N.T., 

5/9/14, at 80. It is apparent from other portions of the juvenile court’s decision that 

delayed treatment was unacceptable to the court given the paucity of proper treatment 

provided to D.C.D. up to the date of the hearing. 

Next, the court considered Abraxas Sexual Offender Open Program. The court 

observed that the program aimed at younger offenders would not have a bed available 

for D.C.D. until at least July or August. Order of 5/12/14 at 7. As the court later 
[J-12-2017] - 12

explained in its 1925(a) opinion, it concluded that the three-month delay in treatment 

would be contrary to D.C.D.’s best interest. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion at 4 n.1. 

The court recognized that Southwood’s director testified that D.C.D. would be 

unacceptable to the program so long as he was actively supervised as a delinquent 

child, but would be acceptable if he was only a dependent child. Order of 5/12/14 at 8. 

Considering all the factors, the court concluded that no compelling reason to terminate 

delinquency supervision would have existed if a bed had been available in the 

appropriate program at Abraxas. However, because there was no bed available until 

August, the court concluded that the only alternatives were to transfer him to 

Southwood or permit him to remain at Sarah Reed. The court had no hesitation in 

rejecting continued placement at Sarah Reed. Emphasizing that he had received only 

three sessions of outpatient sex offender therapy during his time at Sarah Reed, the 

court concluded that the facility could not provide effective treatment for D.C.D. and 

emphasized that it was “of grave concern to the [c]ourt that he remains in that facility 

despite the [c]ourt’s ruling [in March] that it is not appropriate for his care.” Id. at 9. 

The court opined that its decision to terminate delinquency supervision was 

consistent with the purposes of the Juvenile Act, which provides for “balanced attention 

to the protection of the community, the imposition of accountability for offenses 

committed[,] and the development of competencies to enable children to become 

responsible and productive members of the community.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301. Although 

the court did not specifically categorize its reasons for delinquency termination using the 

BARJ terminology identified in Section 6301, its reasoning on each factor can be 

discerned nonetheless. Indeed, the court recognized that competency development in 

the near term leads to community protection in the future as it observed that its 

“paramount concern” was to provide D.C.D. with the treatment needed to enable him to 
[J-12-2017] - 13

become a responsible, law-abiding citizen upon completion of treatment. See 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion at 4-5.

Similarly, the court addressed both community protection and competency 

development goals when it emphasized that D.C.D. would continue to be supervised by 

CYF, which had been acting as the lead agency in his care and supervision. Moreover, 

the court emphasized that it would continue to review the case on a regular basis to 

determine if placement was appropriate, a review which would again serve both 

protection and competency development functions. Order of 5/12/14 at 10-11. 

Moreover, the court directed D.C.D. to pay restitution, which it had previously imposed 

to satisfy the accountability prong of BARJ. Order of 5/12/14 at 11; see also Order of 

1/28/12 at 5. 

The court emphasized its concerns regarding the delay in providing D.C.D. 

needed treatment and indicated that the determination of compelling reasons for early 

termination hinged on the ability of D.C.D. to be transferred to Southwood within days of 

the order. The court directed that if D.C.D. were not transferred into the facility that 

same week, the court would reconsider its determination within the 30 days allowed for 

appeal. The court further indicated that if D.C.D. was not able to be placed at

Southwood, then he should be transferred to Abraxas as soon as a bed became 

available.12

 

12

 Although not relevant to our review of the juvenile court’s decision to terminate 

delinquency early, we observe that the final entry in the record provided to this Court 

indicates that D.C.D. was placed at Southwood pursuant to the court’s order, where he

was adjusting and progressing moderately as of July 2014. N.T., 7/7/14, at 28-29. 

Additionally, D.C.D.’s public defender in its brief to this Court states without record 

evidence that D.C.D. has been “returned home and removed from dependency 

supervision.” D.C.D. Brief at 13 n.6. 
[J-12-2017] - 14

The Commonwealth appealed the termination of delinquency to the Superior 

Court, raising the single assertion that the Juvenile Court erred in granting D.C.D early 

termination of delinquency supervision. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement. The Superior

Court summarized the Commonwealth’s arguments as asserting that “the juvenile court 

abused its discretion in granting D.C.D.'s motion when (1) other treatment options were 

available under delinquency supervision, and (2) the court failed to adequately consider 

the protection of the community” by focusing exclusively on D.C.D.’s rehabilitation. See 

In the Interest of D.C.D., 124 A.3d 736, 737 (Pa. Super. 2015). 

In considering the Commonwealth’s argument, the Superior Court recognized 

that Rule 632 allows for early termination of delinquency for “compelling reasons,”

despite the juvenile’s failure to meet the usual requirements for termination of 

delinquency supervision under Rule 631, which include the juvenile completing the 

terms of his or her disposition order, paying restitution in full, and not committing any 

new offenses. Pa.R.J.C.P. 631, infra at 21 n.17. It observed, however, the neither the 

juvenile court rules nor caselaw have explained what constitutes “compelling reasons” 

for early termination. In re D.C.D., 124 A.3d at 740. 

After reviewing the testimony set forth above, the Superior Court opined that 

compelling reasons existed to warrant the early termination of D.C.D.’s delinquency 

supervision, given the limited placement options. The Superior Court rejected the 

Commonwealth’s argument that the juvenile court insufficiently weighed the significance 

of the community protection and accountability factors of BARJ. Instead, it concluded 

that the juvenile court “considered all of the relevant factors before concluding that 

D.C.D.'s need for the specialized treatment offered at Southwood outweighed the need 

for his supervision by juvenile probation.” Id. at 744. 
[J-12-2017] - 15

The Superior Court additionally accepted D.C.D.’s argument that transferring him 

to Southwood to enable him to obtain appropriate treatment in fact benefitted the 

community in contrast to letting him “languish for months waiting for a bed in a facility 

that was not capable of treating his specialized issues.” Id. at 744 (quoting D.C.D. Brief 

to the Superior Court at 12). Apparently addressing the consideration of community 

protection, the Superior Court further observed that D.C.D. would continue to be 

monitored by CYF and the juvenile court. The court, therefore, concluded that the 

juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in granting early termination of delinquency 

supervision because the court “adequately considered all the goals of the Juvenile Act, 

including the protection of the community.”

13

 Id. at 744. 

Upon the Commonwealth’s petition for allowance of appeal, this Court granted 

review to consider whether the Superior Court erred by concluding that the juvenile 

court did not abuse its discretion in granting early termination of delinquency 

supervision under Rule 632.14 Essentially, the Commonwealth maintains that the

 

13 The Superior Court cited long-standing precedent of that court holding that juvenile 

courts are afforded “broad discretion in determining the appropriate disposition for a 

delinquent child, which [appellate courts] will not disturb absent a manifest abuse of 

discretion.” In re D.C.D., 124 A.3d at 739 (internal citations omitted). The parties do not 

contest this standard of review, although they observe that appellate courts apply a de 

novo standard of review in construing and interpreting the language of the Juvenile Act 

and the Rules of Juvenile Court Procedure. See, e.g., In the Interest of M.W., 39 A.3d 

958, 962 (Pa. 2012).

14 We granted review of the following issue as stated by the Commonwealth:

In interpreting Juvenile Court Rules 631 and 632; does a 

Juvenile Court abuse its discretion when it terminates 

delinquency supervision of a Juvenile Sex Offender early, 

despite also making a contemporaneous finding that the 

juvenile has a need for continued supervision and treatment 

requiring placement at a residential treatment facility based 

(continued...)
[J-12-2017] - 16

juvenile court’s finding of “compelling reasons” for delinquency termination did not 

appropriately balance the three factors of BARJ - accountability, community protection, 

and rehabilitation - which are incorporated into the Juvenile Act and the Juvenile Rules, 

as detailed in our analysis below. The Commonwealth contends that the lower courts 

weighed the rehabilitation factor too heavily and ignored the need for accountability and 

community protection. 

Moreover, the Commonwealth maintains that the juvenile court should have 

considered the compelling reason for early termination in light of the factors relevant to 

standard delinquency termination set forth in Rule 631(a), which require satisfaction of 

the delinquency disposition order, payment of restitution, and no new offenses. 

Commonwealth Brief at 16. As applied to D.C.D., the Commonwealth emphasizes that 

D.C.D. had not met his treatment goals under the delinquency adjudication but instead 

was in need of increasingly intensive residential treatment to protect other patients and 

the community. Additionally, it observes that D.C.D. had not satisfied any of the 

restitution costs imposed on him. Rather than having no new offenses as required by 

Rule 631(a), the Commonwealth maintains that his progression of new offenses

necessitated continued delinquency supervision rather than early termination. The 

Commonwealth emphasizes that terminating delinquency removed the District 

Attorney’s Office and the Juvenile Probation Department from their role supervising 

D.C.D., which had the effect of eliminating the voices advocating for community 

protection and accountability. Id. at 12.

 

(...continued)

upon the escalating violations of sexually offending other 

patients while in a different Residential Treatment Facility[?]

In the Interest of D.C.D., 134 A.3d 50 (Pa. 2016).
[J-12-2017] - 17

In contrast, D.C.D. argues that the juvenile court acted within its discretion in 

granting D.C.D. early termination of delinquency supervision. He contends that the 

Juvenile Act’s provision for “balanced attention” to the three BARJ factors does not 

require equal attention to each of the factors but instead grants the juvenile court 

discretion to fashion the appropriate disposition “to enable children to become 

responsible and productive members of the community.” D.C.D. Brief at 35 (quoting 42 

Pa.C.S. § 6301). He further recognizes that the three factors often overlap as the 

development of a juvenile’s competencies through rehabilitation allows for their 

development into law-abiding citizens benefitting community protection. 

As applied to this case, he emphasizes that community protection would be 

served by providing D.C.D. treatment for his special needs at Southwood, rather than 

leaving him to languish untreated at Sarah Reed or transferring him to Abraxas, which is

geared to an older population. D.C.D. Brief at 16. D.C.D. further emphasizes that initial 

placement at the secure facility of Abraxas would have violated another purpose 

identified in Section 6301 of the Juvenile Act, which as noted below, requires courts to 

place delinquent children in the least restrictive facility. D.C.D. Brief at 39 (quoting 42 

Pa.C.S. § 6301(b)(3)). He posits that, in granting termination of delinquency

supervision to allow the transfer to Southwood, the juvenile court gave balanced 

attention to the protection of the community, accountability, and rehabilitation and 

honored the other purposes of the Juvenile Act.

15

 

15 The Defender Association of Philadelphia and the Juvenile Law Center file an amici

curiae brief in support of D.C.D. in which they recognize that rehabilitation and 

community protection are not competing goals. They observe that allowing delinquent 

children to develop competencies enables them “to become responsible and productive 

members of the community, which in turn helps to protect the community from recurring 

criminal behavior.” Amici Brief at 10 (internal quotation marks omitted).
[J-12-2017] - 18

In considering the issue presented by the Commonwealth, we first explore the 

structure of the delinquency provisions of the Juvenile Act and the related Rules of 

Juvenile Court Procedure. To begin, the General Assembly instructed that the Juvenile 

Act “shall be interpreted and construed as to effectuate” several purposes. 42 Pa.C.S 

§ 6301. As relevant to the issues presented in this case, the Juvenile Act should be 

construed: 

Consistent with the protection of the public interest, to 

provide for children committing delinquent acts programs of 

supervision, care and rehabilitation which provide balanced 

attention to [1] the protection of the community, [2] the 

imposition of accountability for offenses committed and [3] 

the development of competencies to enable children to 

become responsible and productive members of the 

community.

Id. at (b)(2). The General Assembly also directed that courts use the least restrictive 

intervention consistent with community protection. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301(b)(3)(i). 

As these two Juvenile Act purposes demonstrate, the General Assembly 

incorporated “balanced and restorative justice”, or BARJ, into the Juvenile Act via Act 

33 of 1995 to achieve these articulated goals. 42 Pa.C.S. §6301(b)(2), (3). Historically, 

BARJ stemmed from the clashing methodologies of the retributive justice theory, which 

prioritizes punishment, and an individual treatment philosophy, which focuses on the 

rehabilitation of offenders. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and 

Delinquency Prevention, Guide for Implementing the Balanced and Restorative Justice 

Model 1 (1998), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/167887.pdf (hereinafter Guide); Gordon 

Bazemore & Mark Umbreit, Rethinking the Sanctioning Function in Juvenile Court: 

Retributive or Restorative Responses to Youth Crime, 41 Crime & Delinq. 296, 297-98

(1995). BARJ was a compromise in this long debate which brought together aspects of 

both systems by requiring consideration of community protection, accountability, and 

competency development. Guide at 1-2. 
[J-12-2017] - 19

First, community protection focuses on decreasing the risk to communities and 

providing communities with tools to manage the behaviors of juvenile offenders. Id. at

27; see Patricia Torbet, Nat’l Ctr. for Juvenile Justice, Advancing Community Protection: 

A White Paper for Pennsylvania 4 (2008),

http://www.ncjj.org/PDF/whitepaper_commprotection.pdf. BARJ aims to maintain 

community safety through developing short-term and long-term goals of changing and 

controlling juvenile offender behavior while developing mutual respect of citizens within 

the community. Guide at 27. Next, accountability recognizes that a combination of 

adhering to the rules of the legal system and accepting full responsibility for offensive 

behavior facilitates positive moral development. Id. at 9; Valerie Bender et. al., Nat’l Ctr.

for Juvenile Justice, Advancing Accountability: Moving Toward Victim Restoration 4

(2006), http://www.ncjj.org/PDF/whitepaper_victimrestoration.pdf. The accountability 

factor helps juvenile offenders to reduce their likelihood of re-offense through 

acknowledging that their behavior affects other people and creating opportunities for 

offenders to repair the harm. Id. Finally, competency development allows for juvenile 

offenders to forge skills that will allow them to contribute positively to the well-being of a 

community and ultimately allow offenders to gain a sense of belonging in a community. 

Guide at 19; see Patricia Torbet & Douglas Thomas, Nat’l Ctr. for Juvenile Justice,

Advancing Competency Development: A White Paper for Pennsylvania 3 (2005), 

http://www.ncjj.org/PDF/whitepaperfinal.pdf.

With these overarching goals of BARJ in mind, we consider the applicable 

provisions of the Act in regard to delinquency supervision. We first observe that a

juvenile must be older than ten years old to be subject to a delinquency adjudication 

and that the juvenile court must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile

committed a delinquent act. 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6302 (definition of “delinquent child” and 
[J-12-2017] - 20

“delinquent act”); 6341(b). Additionally, an adjudication of delinquency is appropriate

only if the court concludes that the child is in “need of treatment, supervision or 

rehabilitation.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6341. See In the Interest of M.W., 39 A.3d 958 (Pa. 2012)

(providing extensive discussion of the requirements of delinquency adjudication). 

Disposition of a delinquent child is governed by Section 6352 of the Juvenile Act, 

which provides that a court’s disposition should be “consistent with the protection of the 

public interest and best suited to the child's treatment, supervision, rehabilitation and 

welfare.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6352. Moreover, reiterating the incorporation of BARJ into the 

Juvenile Act, Section 6352 additionally provides that the “disposition shall, as 

appropriate to the individual circumstances of the child’s case, provide balanced 

attention to the protection of the community, the imposition of accountability for offenses 

committed and the development of competencies to enable the child to become a 

responsible and productive member of the community.” Id.

A juvenile court has a variety of options available for placement of a delinquent 

child ranging from permitting the child to remain with his or her parents to committing 

the child to an institution.16 42 Pa.C.S. § 6352(a). However, “when confinement is 

necessary, the court shall impose the minimum amount of confinement that is 

consistent with the protection of the public and the rehabilitation needs of the child.” Id.

Additionally, the court may impose “fines, costs, fees or restitution” upon the child. 42 

Pa.C.S. § 6352(a)(5).

 

16 In contrast, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351 provides for the disposition of a dependent child. As 

emphasized by the Commonwealth, this provision does not allow dependent children to 

be “committed to or confined in an institution or other facility designed or operated for 

the benefit of delinquent children,” unless the child is also found to be delinquent. 42 

Pa.C.S. § 6351(c).
[J-12-2017] - 21

The Pennsylvania Rules of Juvenile Court Procedure, in turn, implement the 

Juvenile Act and are “intended to provide for the just determination of every delinquency 

proceeding.” Pa.R.J.C.P. 101. Moreover, the rules “shall be interpreted and construed 

to effectuate the purposes stated in the Juvenile Act,” which as noted above, 

incorporates the three goals of BARJ: community protection, accountability, and 

rehabilitation. Id. 

As relevant to the issues at bar, the Rules of Juvenile Court Procedure provide 

for termination of delinquency supervision in Rule 631.

17

 Rule 631 obligates the 

 

17 Pa.R.J.C.P. 631 entitled “Termination of Court Supervision” provides:

A. Notice. The juvenile probation officer shall promptly notify 

the court when the conditions of probation have been 

satisfied. The court shall decide if supervision should be 

terminated. The notice shall set forth:

(1) The juvenile has completed the terms of the 

court's dispositional order;

(2) Restitution, fines, and costs have been paid in full; 

and

(3) The juvenile has not committed any new offenses 

in which a criminal proceeding or proceeding 

governed by the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301 et 

seq., may be commenced.

B. Objection. Any party may object to the notice under 

paragraph (A) and request a hearing. Such objection shall 

be made within thirty days of receipt of the notice; otherwise, 

objections are deemed waived.

C. Hearing. If objections have been made under paragraph 

(B), the court shall hold a hearing and give each party an 

opportunity to be heard before the court enters its final order.

(continued...)
[J-12-2017] - 22

juvenile’s probation officer to notify the court when a “juvenile has completed the terms 

of the court’s dispositional order;” has paid restitution, fines and costs in full, and “has 

not committed any new offenses.” Pa.R.J.C.P. 631. The court may then terminate 

delinquency supervision if “the court is satisfied that the juvenile has carried out the 

terms of the dispositional order.” Id.

As critical to the issues before this Court, however, the Juvenile Rules also 

provide for early termination without meeting the requirements of Rule 631. Rule 632 

instructs that any “party may move for early termination of court supervision” but must 

“state with specificity why early termination is sought and why the requirements of Rule 

631(A) have not been met.” Pa.R.J.C.P. 632, supra at 6 n.8. Upon satisfaction of 

procedural requirements relating to notice and hearings, the court may order early 

termination of delinquency supervision if “the court is satisfied that there are compelling 

reasons to discharge the juvenile prior to the completion of the requirements of Rule 

631(A).” Pa.R.J.C.P. 632(F). The comments to Rule 632 additionally reference Rule 

515 which provides “procedures on the dispositional order.” Extending the theme 

present in the Juvenile Act, Rule 515 again integrates BARJ by instructing that “the 

court shall issue a written order, which provides balanced attention to the protection of 

the community, accountability for the offenses committed, and development of the 

juvenile's competencies to enable the juvenile to become a responsible and productive 

member of the community.” Pa.R.J.C.P. 515. 

 

(...continued)

D. Termination. When the requirements of paragraphs (A) 

through (C) have been met and the court is satisfied that the 

juvenile has carried out the terms of the dispositional order, 

the court may discharge the juvenile from its supervision.
[J-12-2017] - 23

With these directives from the Juvenile Act and the Rules of Juvenile Court 

Procedure in mind, we turn to the question at hand regarding whether the juvenile court 

abused its discretion in granting D.C.D. early termination of his delinquency supervision.

As noted, the Commonwealth’s overarching argument is that the juvenile court “failed to 

balance” the three factors of BARJ by granting excessive weight to D.C.D.’s 

rehabilitation without properly considering the protection of the community or D.C.D.’s 

accountability. Commonwealth’s Brief at 11. 

In its first sub-argument, the Commonwealth faults the juvenile court for “failing to

weigh the ‘compelling reason’ [of Rule 632] against the factors implicated in Rule 

631(a),” which the Commonwealth argues provide community protection by requiring 

the juvenile to complete the terms of the dispositional order and accountability by 

obligating the satisfaction of restitution. Commonwealth’s Brief at 16. We respectfully 

disagree with this aspect of the Commonwealth’s argument based upon the plain 

language of Rule 632. While a party’s motion for early termination must state “why the 

requirements of Rule 631(A) have not been met,” the Rule specifically provides that the 

court may “discharge the juvenile prior to the completion of the requirements of Rule 

631(A).” Pa.R.J.C.P. 632(A), (F). Therefore, we reject the Commonwealth’s suggestion 

to the extent it would necessitate a juvenile’s compliance with Rule 631 when seeking 

early termination under Rule 632, which is applicable only when a juvenile has not met 

the requirements for standard termination under Rule 631. 

The Commonwealth additionally argues that a juvenile court should not grant 

early termination of delinquency when the juvenile is still in need of “treatment, 

supervision or rehabilitation,” which is the standard provided in the Juvenile Act for the 

initial adjudication of delinquency, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6341. We additionally decline to adopt 

this standard for early termination as it imposes restrictions that are not included in Rule 
[J-12-2017] - 24

632, which is intentionally broad in that it requires only “compelling reasons to discharge 

the juvenile prior to completion of the requirements of Rule 631(A),” as discussed 

below. 

The Rules, however, do not define “compelling reasons.” We conclude that the 

absence of a definition serves the purpose of Rule 632, which provides the proverbial 

“safety-valve” necessary to allow juvenile courts to grant termination of delinquency for 

juveniles who do not meet the requirements of Rule 631. Thus, leaving the term 

“compelling reasons” undefined provides juvenile courts needed flexibility to address the 

varied and unanticipated needs of juveniles and the community. Nevertheless, we 

agree with the Commonwealth that “compelling reasons” should be viewed as 

encompassing the three goals of BARJ given the repeated invocations in the Juvenile 

Rules and the Juvenile Act of a balanced attention to community protection, 

accountability, and rehabilitation, as detailed supra. Accordingly, we view it incumbent 

upon this Commonwealth’s juvenile court judges to consider specifically the three 

factors of BARJ when determining whether compelling reasons exist in the context of a

motion for early termination of delinquency supervision, as with all other dispositions

under the Juvenile Act. 

Balanced attention to the three factors, however, does not require that the factors 

themselves be equally weighted in the ultimate decision. Instead, balanced attention 

merely requires the court to consider each factor. It may determine after consideration 

that one factor predominates in regard to the disposition of a particular juvenile. See 

Torbet, Advancing Community Protection: A White Paper for Pennsylvania at 2 

(observing that “equal consideration is to be given to each goal at the beginning of [the 

court’s] investigation,” but acknowledging “that as fact-finding and assessment proceed, 
[J-12-2017] - 25

the weight given to each goal will be balanced so that responses can be

individualized.”)

Indeed, as convincingly observed by Amici, the Juvenile Act itself notes a 

distinction in the weight attributable to the factors in Section 6352, which requires that a 

juvenile’s delinquency disposition be “best suited to the child’s treatment, supervision, 

rehabilitation and welfare” but merely “consistent with the protection of the public

interest.” Amici Brief at 9 (quoting 42 Pa.C.S. § 6352). Additionally, Section 6352 

provides that the “disposition shall, as appropriate to the individual circumstances of the 

child’s case, provide balanced attention” to the three BARJ factors. Therefore, we 

emphasize that juvenile courts are granted broad discretion in weighing the BARJ 

factors as appropriate to the individual child. See generally Commonwealth v. Cotto, 

753 A.2d 217, 222–23 (Pa. 2000) (finding constitutional the Juvenile Act’s provision of 

“flexibility and discretion” rather than requiring “the rigid assignment of a specific weight 

to each of the factors to be considered” by courts faced with a motion to transfer a 

juvenile from adult court to juvenile court).

In the case at bar, we conclude that the juvenile court properly considered the 

relevant factors for early termination. It is clear that the juvenile court primarily focused 

upon the rehabilitation needs of D.C.D., given the failure of the “system” to provide 

D.C.D. necessary sexual offender treatment in his first eighteen months in the 

delinquency system. It is also apparent, however, that the court considered the need 

for community protection as the court considered only those facilities which could 

provide proper supervision, which would both protect D.C.D. from other patients as well 

as protecting other patients and the community from D.C.D. Indeed, the court rejected 

continued placement in the Sarah Reed facility because it “failed to appropriately 

supervise him or appropriately provide for his care to address his needs 
[J-12-2017] - 26

therapeutically.” Order of 5/12/14 at 9. We note that the two concepts are interrelated 

as proper treatment not only provides for rehabilitation but also affords protection for the 

community as it reduces the likelihood of re-offense. The juvenile court, additionally,

addressed the accountability prong by not absolving D.C.D. of the previously imposed 

restitution requirements, which the court in its prior decisions had overtly imposed in 

regard to accountability. 

As succinctly stated by Amici, compelling reasons for early termination of 

delinquency existed in this case because “D.C.D. needed a new placement immediately 

that could meet his therapeutic needs, and the only placement available required 

discharge of delinquency supervision.” Amici Brief at 12. Indeed, the juvenile court

emphasized that “[h]ad there been appropriate placement available at Abraxas ... for 

immediate placement, there would be no compelling reason to consider.” Order of 

5/12/14 at 8. We conclude that the Superior Court properly determined that the juvenile 

court did not abuse its discretion in finding that compelling reasons existed to terminate 

delinquency supervision of D.C.D. to allow him to obtain immediate treatment given the 

absence of other facilities that could serve his needs. As time was of the essence in the 

treatment of D.C.D., we affirm the Superior Court’s judgment. 

Chief Justice Saylor and Justices Todd, Donohue, Dougherty and Wecht join the 

opinion.

Justice Mundy files a dissenting opinion.