J-S32032-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: L.E.J.P., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: A.T., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 729 MDA 2023

Appeal from the Decree Entered April 17, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): 87-ad-2022

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED: NOVEMBERR 20, 2023

Appellant A.T. (Mother) appeals1from the order granting the petition 

filed by the Dauphin County Social Services for Children and Youth (the 

Agency) to terminate Mother’s parental rights to L.E.J.P. (Child), born in 

September of 2017. On appeal, Mother contends that the Agency failed to 

meet its burden of proof and that the trial court erred when it involuntarily 

terminated Mother’s parental rights. We affirm. 

The trial court set forth an extensive recitation of the factual and 

procedural history of this case. See Trial Ct. Op., 6/16/23, at 1-32. Briefly, 

in June of 2019, Mother agreed to temporarily place Child with a host family 

because she was undergoing a medical procedure and Father was unable to 

____________________________________________

1 We note that the order also terminated B.P.’s (Father’s) parental rights. 

While Father is not a party to the instant appeal, his appeal from the order 

shall be addressed in a separate disposition. See In the Interest of: 

L.E.J.P., a Minor, Appeal of B.P., Father, 728 MDA 2023.
J-S32032-23

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care for Child because he was employed as a long-haul trucker. After Mother 

suffered complications from her medical procedure, she entered into a 

voluntary placement agreement with the Agency, placing Child in the Agency’s 

care and custody. 

Following a hearing on July 24, 2019, the trial court adjudicated Child 

dependent. At that time, the trial court ordered Mother to complete several 

service plan objectives for reunification. Specifically, Mother was directed to 

attend all court hearings, maintain a safe and sanitary home, ensure Child 

receives routine medical and dental care and also attend Child’s scheduled 

appointments, complete parenting classes, meet Child’s basic needs (including 

hygiene, nutrition, housing, clothing, etc.), participate in Parent-Child 

Interactive Therapy (PCIT), attend visitation with Child, maintain regular 

contact with the Agency, and express interest in Child’s well-being. See N.T. 

Hr’g, 2/27/23, at 118-27. Following the adjudication hearing, Child was 

subsequently placed in foster care.

Throughout the course of the instant case, the trial court held ten 

permanency review hearings, with the most recent taking place on June 9, 

2022. Child remained in foster care throughout this entire period. During the 

termination of parental rights hearing, the Agency’s primary caseworker Jillian 

Kaminskie testified that neither Father nor Mother had “substantially complied 

to the extent that the Agency would expect them to [comply] to [reunite with 

Child]” over the course of four years. Id. at 138. Specifically, Ms. Kaminskie 
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testified that she had not seen “any indication that [Father] or [Mother] really, 

really want[ed] to work hard to get their child back”. Id.

On September 28, 2022, Child’s guardian ad litem (GAL), Heather L. 

Paterno, Esq., filed a motion requesting immediate termination of both Father 

and Mother’s visitation. Specifically, the trial court explained the GAL’s 

position that: 

(1) Child resisted visits and often hid whenever Father came to 

pick him up at the foster home and that this has been a consistent 

pattern for more than a year; it often took up to an hour of coaxing 

for Child to come out of hiding; (2) school officials noticed a 

dramatic change in Child’s demeanor when the Parents would pick 

him up including that Child would become withdrawn, silent, and 

would tell teachers he did not want to go, prompting school 

officials (as mandated reporters) to contact the [GAL] and express 

their concerns; (3) the foster family stopped informing Child when 

visits would occur because he would feign illness to avoid visits; 

(4) Father made false promises to persuade Child to visit or 

admonished or reprimanded Child for his reluctance to visit, rather 

than engaging in positive reinforcement; and (5) Mother only 

sporadically attended PCIT sessions, that Child reported during 

visits Mother often did not come out of her room and that the 

Parents sometimes shouted at each other when he is with them.

The [GAL] expressed concern that Child’s extreme reactions 

anticipating visits were traumatizing and that his resistance had 

not diminished in the past year. The [GAL] believed that the 

family should participate in more intensive parenting education 

classes to address Child’s resistance, learn positive parenting 

techniques, and help him better adjust to and develop comfort in 

his Parents’ home. She requested that visits thus be suspended 

pending the [termination of parental rights] hearing, then initially

scheduled just three weeks later (on October 19, 2022). The 

[GAL] also requested that the [trial court] appoint legal counsel 

for Child, who might accurately represent and convey his wishes 

to [the trial court]. On September 29, 2022, [the trial court] 

granted the [GAL’s] motion, suspending the Parents’ visitation and 

appointing Sarah Hoffman[, Esq., legal] counsel for Child.
J-S32032-23

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Trial Ct. Op. at 11-12.

On October 6, 2022, the Agency filed a petition seeking termination of 

Father and Mother’s parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), 

(8), and (b). The trial court explained:

After the [termination of parental rights] petition was filed, Child’s 

attorney, [Attorney] Hoffman, filed a petition statement with the 

[trial] court averring that she had met with Child on multiple 

occasions, had spoken with him in accordance with his age and 

developmental level, and that it was clear to her that Child agreed 

with the termination of parental rights of both [Father and Mother] 

and a goal change to adoption. Hearings on the [termination of 

parental rights] petition and goal change were held before [the 

trial court] on February 27, March 2, [and] April 17, 2023.

Trial Ct. Op. at 13 (citations omitted) (some formatting altered).

Ultimately, the trial court granted the Agency’s petition to terminate 

Mother’s and Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a) (1), 

(2), (5), (8), and (b) and to change Child’s permanency goal to adoption. 

Mother filed a timely notice of appeal and complied with Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a)(2)(i). The trial court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion explaining its 

reasons for terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights.

Mother raises the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and committed an 

error of law when it found, despite a lack of clear and 

convincing evidence, that enough grounds existed for a 

termination of [Mother’s] parental rights under Section 2511(a) 

of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)[?]

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and committed an 

error of law in determining it would be in [Child’s] best interest 

to have [Mother’s] parental rights terminated, when it failed to 

primarily consider [Child’s] developmental, physical, and 
J-S32032-23

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emotional needs and welfare, thus contravening Section 

2511(b) of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b)[?]

3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and committed an 

error of law in ordering that [Mother’s] visitation be suspended 

without affording [Mother] a meaningful opportunity to 

respond to and/or be heard[?]

Mother’s Brief at 4 (some formatting altered).

We begin with our well-settled standard of review:

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse 

of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result. We have previously 

emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand 

observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). “[T]he trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence 

presented, and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and 

resolve conflicts in the evidence.” In re Q.R.D., 214 A.3d 233, 239 (Pa. 

Super. 2019) (citation omitted).

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated analysis.

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for 

termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 
J-S32032-23

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or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We note 

that we need only agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of Section 

2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), to affirm an order terminating parental 

rights. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc).

Section 2511(a)(1)

Mother argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the Agency 

presented clear and convincing evidence to terminate her parental rights 

under Section 2511(a)(1). Mother’s Brief at 10-13. Specifically, Mother 

argues that the trial court failed to properly weigh the evidence demonstrating 

Mother’s progress toward achieving her service plan objectives. Id. at 11. 

Mother further argues that her efforts to establish a “more nurturing 

relationship” with Child “were often thwarted by the limitations resulting from 

her significant medical issues outside of her own control, lack of 

communication and clarity from the Agency, and the difficulties posed because 

of the effects of the global pandemic.” Id. at 12. Mother alleges that at no 

time did she “refuse to be a parent to her son or in any way give up her 

parental claim to him and no evidence was presented by the Agency to 

demonstrate otherwise.” Id.

Section 2511(a)(1) provides as follows:
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§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least 

six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition 

has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental 

claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental 

duties.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1).

When reviewing the involuntary termination of parental rights under 

Section 2511(a)(1), this Court has explained:

Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental duties 

or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights, the court 

must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the parent’s explanation 

for his or her conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact between 

parent and child; and (3) consideration of the effect of termination 

of parental rights on the child pursuant to Section 2511(b).

Further, the trial court must consider the whole history of a given 

case and not mechanically apply the six-month statutory 

provision. The court must examine the individual circumstances 

of each case and consider all explanations offered by the parent 

facing termination of his or her parental rights, to determine if the 

evidence, in light of the totality of the circumstances, clearly 

warrants the involuntary termination.

Our courts have explained that parental duty “is best understood 

in relation to the needs of a child. A child needs love, protection, 

guidance, and support. These needs, physical and emotional, 

cannot be met by a merely passive interest in the development of 

the child. Thus, [our Supreme] Court has held that the parental 

obligation is a positive duty which requires affirmative 

performance. This affirmative duty encompasses more than a 

financial obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and 

a genuine effort to maintain communication and association with 

the child. Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental 

duty requires that a parent exert himself to take and maintain a 

place of importance in the child’s life.
J-S32032-23

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In Interest of: T.J.J.M., 190 A.3d 618, 628 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citations 

omitted).

This Court has long recognized that a parent is required to make 

diligent efforts toward the reasonably prompt assumption of full 

parental responsibilities. A parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long 

period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability 

of services, may properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous.

In Adoption of S.P., our Supreme Court reiterated the standard 

with which a parent must comply in order to avoid a finding that 

[he] abandoned [his] child.

Applying [In re Adoption of McCray, 331 A.2d 652, 655 

(Pa. 1975),] the provision for termination of parental rights 

based upon abandonment, now codified as § 2511(a)(1), we 

noted that a parent “has an affirmative duty to love, protect 

and support his child and to make an effort to maintain

communication and association with that child.” [McCray, 

331 A.2d at 655].

* * *

Where the parent does not exercise reasonable firmness in 

declining to yield to obstacles, his other rights may be 

forfeited.

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 828 (Pa. 2012).

In re J.R.E., 218 A.3d 920, 925 (Pa. Super. 2019) (some citations omitted; 

some formatting altered).

Here, the trial court addressed Section 2511(a)(1) as follows:

The evidence established under [Section 2511](a)(1) that “the 

parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months 

immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has 

evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a 

child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.” Most 

notably, for a period of thirty-nine (39) months—between July 

2019, when Mother voluntary relinquished custody of [] Child to 

the Agency and the filing of the [termination of parental rights]
J-S32032-23

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petition, on October 6, 2022—Mother failed to perform a 

substantial host of parental duties.

At the initial adjudication hearing, Mother was directed to undergo 

a complete psychological evaluation with a parenting component 

and to follow all recommendations. Dr. Rosen[2]thereafter 

completed the evaluation and specifically recommended, at the 

next permanency review hearing on October 24, 2019, that 

Mother undergo a number of programs to address her myriad 

issues borne of her own background of childhood trauma and 

abuse. The recommendations included that Mother get a bonding 

assessment, undergo partial hospitalization, attend programs at 

the Mental Health Association or the YWCA for Advocacy 

Education, become active with adult case management services

[], and attend couples’ counseling with Father. Despite Mother’s 

false claims that Dr. Rosen only gave her a couple of 

recommendations, the record reflects that Mother was present in 

[c]ourt when Dr. Rosen made these recommendations and in fact 

asked a few questions of him at that proceeding. Mother failed to 

complete any of these recommendations and thus squandered this 

opportunity to potentially bolster her ability to fulfill her parental 

duties.

This stage of the case was extremely important in [] Child’s life, 

as Mother was warned by Dr. Rosen, because [] Child would be 

developing caregiver attachment. Dr. [Rosen] conveyed his 

concern of the real possibility that [] Child would be bonding with 

his consistent caregivers (i.e. Foster Parents). Thus, a bonding 

assessment, with recommendations, was particularly critical at 

this stage of [] Child’s life.

The [trial court] further note[d] that the evidence presented 

reflected that couples counseling was also particularly important 

in this case wherein Mother admitted in a number of social media 

posts that she was being abused by Father, including an incident 

where she claimed he had choked her.

As detailed above, Mother failed in multiple ways to visit [] Child 

early in the case when her attachment to [] Child was very much 

in the balance. For example, just a few months into placement, 

in September 2019, Mother missed numerous supervised 

____________________________________________

2 Dr. Howard Rosen was the psychologist who performed Mother’s 

psychological evaluation as part of her court-ordered service plan objectives. 

See Trial Ct. Op. at 14.
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visitation sessions at the Northern Dauphin facility despite being 

offered transportation and despite then living fairly close to that 

facility. A short time later, Mother failed to complete the Pressley 

Ridge parenting program (the first time around), missing five 

appointments between December 2019 and January 2020. As a 

result, Pressley Ridge unsuccessfully discharged her. Similarly, in 

March 2020, Mother was discharged from the YWCA Visitation 

Center for non-compliance after completing only a single visit. 

After COVID restrictions limited in-person visitation, she and 

Father both failed to consistently adhere to the remote visitation 

schedule set up with [] Foster Parents from the early part of 2020 

through the summer of 2020. At this point, [] Child had already 

been in placement for approximately one year and Mother was 

additionally squandering these vital opportunities to establish 

regular visitation and/or complete parenting training to address 

attachment issues, and to seek a bonding assessment, as was 

recommended by Dr. Rosen in order to get a professional 

evaluation and recommendations regarding her relationship with 

[] Child.

In December 2020, [] Parents began supervised visitation with 

Pressley Ridge. This time, Mother was more amenable to the 

program and sustained her attendance. Originally, she was 

permitted only supervised visits with [] Child, later broadened to 

partial[] supervision. The visits were progressing to the point that 

the hearing officer at the July 29, 2021 permanency review 

hearing recommended increased visitation. Mother never 

advanced far enough with Pressley Ridge, however, to obtain 

unsupervised visitation with [] Child despite [the] lengthy duration 

in that program. As noted, she was [] Child’s primary caregiver, 

as between Mother and Father.

Even when a visitation occurred, there were problems noted by 

third parties. For instance, at a November 6, 2020 supervised 

visit at ChildFirst,[3] [] Child turned his back on [] Parents and 

mumbled and whined. When the supervisor asked [] Parents to 

come over to [] Child, Mother refused, a clearly inappropriate 

response to [] Child’s rejection of her. As a result of this incident, 

ChildFirst recommended to the Agency [that] Parents undergo 

parenting education. On July 29, 2021, while in the Agency 

____________________________________________

3 ChildFirst Family Services provided supervision for some of Mother and 

Father’s visits with Child. See e.g. Trial Ct. Op. at 6, 37, 44; Agency’s Pet. 

for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, 10/6/22, at ¶ 41.
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waiting room prior to a permanency review hearing, a caseworker 

observed [] Parents having no interaction with [] Child and that [] 

Parents left without saying goodbye to [] Child. This incident was 

relayed to the [GAL] who requested a bonding assessment, which 

was granted. In addition, there was credible evidence presented 

that daycare personnel and/or [] Foster Parents reported that [] 

Child returned from parental visits without a fresh diaper or that 

he had not eaten properly. Caseworker [Kaminskie] credibly 

testified that she believed from her observations that [] Parents 

never really wanted to visit [] Child and that in Mother’s case, she 

appeared to treat visitation as an inconvenience.

Beginning around August 2021, the tenor of the exchanges 

between [] Parents and [] Child dramatically changed to the point 

they became extremely traumatic and distressing to [] Child[]. 

These emotional transitions, which Agency personnel testified 

were without precedent in their experience, occurred on at least 

nineteen (19) occasions through early January 2022, a period of 

only four months. While Father alone picked up [] Child on 

numerous occasions, Mother was also present for others and there 

is no evidence that her presence had any positive influence.

The bonding assessments, completed on October 26, 2021, 

unequivocally reflected that Mother was failing to perform parental 

duties. [Donna Mae] Fierras[4]found that [] Child had a 

disorganized attachment to Mother and Father and perceived both 

as sources of threat and distress, and that placement of [] Child

with them would be detrimental to [] Child’s physical, emotional 

and mental health. [Ms.] Fierras found that Mother had the 

intellectual capacity to learn new skills and that she and Father 

needed PCIT to smooth any reintegration process as well as play 

therapy for [] Child.

PCIT was later arranged with Dr. Allen,[5] however, Mother failed 

to attend the vast majority of the interactive therapy sessions 

throughout much of 2022, attending only three out of dozens of 

the sessions. PCIT was specifically designed to provide immediate 

feedback to Mother as to parenting skills so that she could care 

____________________________________________

4 Ms. Fierras was the psychologist who conducted the bonding assessment. 

See N.T. Hr’g, 2/27/23, at 21, 23.

5 Dr. Brian Allen conducted PCIT with Child, Mother, and Father. See Trial Ct. 

Op. at 11.
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for [] Child without supervision, which was imperative given her 

primary caregiver status. Mother’s excuse, that she could not get 

to the sessions due to foot surgery, was not credible wherein the 

Agency offered evidence it would transport Mother to the sessions 

as needed and had confirmed that Dr. Allen’s office was wheelchair 

accessible. Mother failed to provide any medical evidence or 

excuse supporting her claim.

Mother also failed to take the initiative to regularly contact [] 

Foster Parents or the Agency over the life of the case to find out 

how Child was doing. What contacts were made were mostly 

initiated by Father. The record further reflected that Mother’s 

parental rights to her older child were terminated in October 2020 

and Mother thus was aware early in this case of the demands that 

would be made upon her to reunify with [] Child.

Finally, the evidence also reflected Mother’s overall compliance 

with Agency objectives remained largely minimal or noncompliant throughout the life of the case. Mother’s primary 

caseworker credibly testified that Mother and Father had not 

worked very hard to reunify with [] Child, that she failed [to] see 

any attachment or a nurturing bond between them, and observed 

nothing beneficial to [] Child from his relationship with either 

parent. The caseworker also credibly testified that she had never 

seen either parent demonstrate an ability to care for [] Child 

independently or together as a couple, nor demonstrate a full 

understanding of what was needed to properly care for a child.

Trial Ct. Op. at 35-39 (some formatting altered).

Following our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion or 

error of law in the trial court’s conclusion that the Agency presented clear and 

convincing evidence to support termination of Mother’s parental rights under 

Section 2511(a)(1). See T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267.

The record reflects that, at the time of the termination hearing, Child 

had been in the Agency’s care for forty-two months. See N.T. Hr’g, 2/27/23, 

at 78. Although Mother has been aware of her service plan objectives 

throughout the life of the case, she has made only minimal progress towards 
J-S32032-23

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reunification. Specifically, over a six-month period, Mother attended two PCIT 

therapy sessions. Id. at 126. Further, the record reflects that Mother’s direct 

communications with the Agency regarding Child’s well-being were limited to 

approximately thirty times over a nearly four-year period. Id. at 127. Ms. 

Kaminskie also testified that the Agency had concerns that Child was not being 

fed appropriately during his visits with Mother and Father. Id. at 125. 

Therefore, we agree with the trial court that, for a period far in excess of the 

six-month statutory minimum, Mother has refused to perform her parental 

duties to Child. J.R.E., 218 A.3d at 925; T.J.J.M., 190 A.3d at 628.

With respect to Mother’s explanation for her conduct, the record reflects 

that Mother denied the Agency’s allegations. Specifically, in response to the 

Agency’s allegation that Child would return from visits with Father and Mother 

with a wet diaper or pullup, Mother testified that she and Father regularly 

changed Child’s diaper as needed. See N.T. Hr’g, 3/2/23, at 21-22. Mother 

also attributed issues with Child returning from visits with a wet diaper or 

pullup to Child’s failure to communicate his needs. Id. at 22. Additionally, 

Mother testified that she had initially attempted to keep in regular contact with 

the Agency, however, Agency employees failed to promptly return her calls 

and Mother alleged that Ms. Kaminskie would get “snippy” with her, so Mother 

would “try to avoid that.” Id. at 16-17. Mother stated that Father would 

communicate with the Agency on her behalf. Id. at 17. With regard to the 

Agency’s allegation that she failed to comply with the recommendations 

following her psychological evaluation, Mother testified that she was never 
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notified of all of the recommendations. Id. at 17-18. Ultimately, the trial 

court credited Ms. Kaminskie’s testimony that Mother “had not worked very 

hard” to unify with Child. See Trial Ct. Op. at 39; N.T. Hr’g, 2/27/23, at 138; 

see also S.P., 47 A.3d at 828 (stating that where a “parent does not exercise 

reasonable firmness in declining to yield to obstacles, [her] other rights may 

be forfeited” (citation omitted)).

For these reasons, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court 

in concluding that termination was appropriate under Section 2511(a)(1).

6

 

See T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 J.R.E., 218 A.3d at 925; T.J.J.M., 190 A.3d at 

628. Accordingly, Mother is not entitled to relief.

Section 2511(b)

Mother also challenges the trial court’s conclusions concerning Section 

2511(b). Specifically, Mother argues that the trial court erroneously “gave 

great weight” to the bonding assessment conducted by Ms. Fierras. Mother’s 

Brief at 15. Mother further argues that the bonding assessment used by Ms. 

Fierras was “designed for children younger than [Child] was at the time, and 

this was only the second assessment that [Ms.] Fierras performed.” Id. 

Additionally, Mother contends that while the trial court heard evidence 

regarding Child’s negative reactions to visitations with Mother and Father, 

“there was evidence of [] Child’s positive and happy reactions during visitation 

____________________________________________

6 We reiterate that we need only agree with the trial court as to one subsection 

of Section 2511(a). B.L.W., 843 A.2d at 384.
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that spanned over a long period of time during the dependency case which 

suggests that [] Child and Mother possess a mother-son bond.” Id. 

Section 2511(b) provides as follows:

(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). 

This Court has explained:

While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major 

aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is 

nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the 

court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally 

emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also consider 

the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability 

the child might have with the foster parent. Additionally, . . . the 

trial court should consider the importance of continuity of 

relationships . . . 

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting 

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011)), abrogated in part on other 

grounds by Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085 (Pa. 2023).

Our Supreme Court has stated that “if the child has any bond with the 

biological parent, the court must conduct an analysis of that bond, which ‘is 
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not always an easy task.’” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. In K.T., our Supreme 

Court explained that “a court conducting the Section 2511(b) needs and 

welfare analysis must consider more than proof of an adverse or detrimental 

impact from severance of the parental bond.” Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d 

1085, 1113 (Pa. 2023). Indeed, the parent-child bond analysis must include 

“a determination of whether the bond is necessary and beneficial to the child, 

i.e., whether maintaining the bond serves the child’s developmental, physical, 

and emotional needs and welfare.” Id.

“Common sense dictates that courts considering termination must also 

consider whether the children are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they 

have a bond with their foster parents.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268 (citation 

omitted). More specifically, courts must consider “the child’s need for 

permanency and length of time in foster care[;] whether the child is in a 

preadoptive home and bonded with foster parents; and whether the foster 

home meets the child’s developmental, physical and emotional needs, 

including intangible needs of love, comfort, security, safety, and stability.” 

K.T., 296 A.3d at 1113.

In weighing the bond considerations pursuant to Section 2511(b), 

“courts must keep the ticking clock of childhood ever in mind.” T.S.M., 71 

A.3d at 269. “Children are young for a scant number of years, and we have 

an obligation to see to their healthy development quickly. When courts fail . 

. . the result, all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id.

In the instant case, the trial court addressed Section 2511(b) as follows:
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The overwhelming bonding evidence presented was that the 

termination of Mother’s parental rights will have no detrimental

effect on [] Child whereas a severance of any bond between [] 

Child and [] Foster Parents would be highly detrimental to [] Child. 

The evidence upon which [Ms.] Fierras based her conclusions was 

further corroborated by numerous other witnesses, including 

evidence of traumatic and highly distressing transitions with the 

Parents and [] Child, and the absence of a perceivable bond 

between them. Contrary to Mother’s argument, there was no 

credible evidence presented that termination of Mother’s 

[parental] rights would have a negative impact upon [] Child’s 

developmental, physical and emotional needs, and the welfare of 

[] Child. As noted, [Ms.] Fierras presented evidence that [] Child 

established predominantly secure and positive attachments or 

bonding with his Foster Parents and that [] Child would suffer 

harm if his bonds with [] Foster Parents were severed.

. . . [T]he record strongly supported that [] Child’s developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare are best served by 

termination of Mother’s parental rights.

Notably, [Ms.] Fierras presented credible evidence that [] Child 

“has a disorganized attachment to [Mother and Father] and 

perceives them as sources of threat and distress and that 

placement with his biological parents would be detrimental 

to [] Child’s physical, emotional and mental health.” With 

regard to Mother in particular, she did not represent a safe 

emotional space for [] Child. The poor attachment and 

attachment style [Ms.] Fierras observed between [Mother, Father, 

and] Child is one typically seen of a child who has experienced 

trauma and does not feel physically or emotionally safe. She 

noted that this attachment style is characterized by fear and a 

sense of mistrust and as such, [] Child did not seek out either 

[Mother or Father] to meet his emotional needs.

Trial Ct. Op. at 41-42 (emphasis in original).

Based on our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion in 

the trial court’s conclusion that termination of Mother’s parental rights would 

best serve Child’s needs and welfare. See K.T., 296 A.3d at 1113; T.S.M., 

71 A.3d at 267. As noted by the trial court, Ms. Fierras testified that she 
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performed a bonding assessment involving Child. N.T. Hr’g, 2/27/23, at 21, 

23. As part of the bonding assessment, Ms. Fierras performed bonding 

assessments for Father, Mother, and Foster Parents. Id. at 23. Ms. Fierras 

concluded that Child had a “secure attachment” with Foster Parents. Id. at 

25-26. Ms. Fierras further testified that removing Child from Foster Parents 

“would not be in his best interests.” Id. at 35.

Relating to Mother and Father, Ms. Fierras testified that Child’s bonding 

was a “resistant disorganized attachment type.” Id. at 49. Ms. Fierras 

specifically stated that such an attachment style “usually stems from poor 

attachment, inconsistently being able to meet a child’s physical and/or 

emotional needs, not being able to console a child for whatever reason, [and] 

low nurturance[.]” Id. at 50. Ms. Fierras further concluded that Child, during 

the bonding assessment, did not seek out Mother or Father to meet his 

emotional or other instrumental needs, and she observed that Child did not 

try to maintain contact with Mother and Father. Id. at 51-52. Ms. Fierras 

opined that such an attachment style is “characterized by fear and mistrust 

toward Mother and Father.” Id. at 52. As noted above, the trial court 

concluded that “the record strongly supported that [] Child’s developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare are best served by termination of 

Mother’s parental rights.” See Trial Ct. Op. at 42. For these reasons, we 

conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it terminated 

Mother’s parental rights. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b); K.T., 296 A.3d at 1113; 

T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267.
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GAL’s Motion

In her final issue on appeal, Mother argues that the trial court abused 

its discretion and committed an error of law by granting the GAL’s motion for 

suspension of visitation without providing Mother with the opportunity to 

respond. Mother’s Brief at 16. 

The Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure require that appellate 

arguments include “discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed 

pertinent.” Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Specifically, we have stated that “[w]e shall 

not develop an argument for an appellant, nor shall we scour the record to 

find evidence to support an argument[,]” as doing so “would place this Court 

in the conflicting roles of advocate and neutral arbiter.” Trust Under Deed 

of Wallace F. Ott, 271 A.3d 409, 421 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citations omitted). 

“Appellate arguments which fail to adhere to these rules may be considered 

waived, and arguments which are not appropriately developed are waived.” 

Coulter v. Ramsden, 94 A.3d 1080, 1088 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation 

omitted).

Here, Mother fails to provide this Court with any discussion of or citation 

to relevant authority pertaining to her final issue on appeal. In fact, aside 

from her general claim of trial court error in her point heading, Mother 

provides no analysis or argument as to how or why the trial court erred when 

it granted the GAL’s motion for suspension of visitation. See Mother’s Brief 

at 16. Rather, Mother’s argument is little more than a recitation of the 

relevant procedural history regarding the GAL’s motion. Id. We find that 
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Mother has not sufficiently developed this issue for appellate review; 

therefore, the issue is waived on appeal. See Trust of Ott, 271 A.3d at 421; 

Coulter, 94 A.3d at 1088. Accordingly, Mother is not entitled to relief. For 

these reasons we affirm the trial court’s order terminating Mother’s parental 

rights to Child, L.E.J.P.

Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/20/2023