SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1666-20

MTGLQ INVESTORS, L.P.,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

EILEEN BRYLINSKI and

FRANK BRYLINSKI,

Defendants-Appellants,

and

MR. BRYLINSKI, unknown

spouse of EILEEN BRYLINSKI,

Defendant.

____________________________

Submitted October 5, 2021 – Decided October 14, 2021

Before Judges Fisher and Smith.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. 

F-007226-17.

Eileen Brylinski and Frank Brylinski, appellants pro se.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Akerman, LLP, attorneys for respondent (Scott B. 

Brenner and Erica R. S. Goldman, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

In 2016, plaintiff MTGLQ Investors, L.P., received from Bank of 

America, N.A., the assignment of a thirty-year mortgage executed by defendants

Eileen and Frank Brylinski in 2007 against their Metuchen home. In 2017, 

MTGLQ commenced this foreclosure action and moved for summary judgment 

when defendants filed an answer. In moving for summary judgment, MTGLQ 

asserted that a notice of intent to foreclose was sent by Bank of America to 

defendants in accordance with the Fair Foreclosure Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56. The 

trial judge determined that MTGLQ submitted sufficient evidence to show the 

notice of intent was sent and granted MTGLQ's summary judgment motion. 

Final judgment of foreclosure was later entered and the property sold to MTGLQ 

at a sheriff's sale.

Defendants appealed, arguing there was a lack of competent proof that

Bank of America sent the notice of intent prior to MTGLQ's filing of the 

foreclosure complaint. For reasons expressed in an unpublished opinion, we 

found a genuine question of fact about the notice of intent. To be specific, we 

held that the issue was not whether the notice of intent failed to conform to the 

Fair Foreclosure Act but "whether [it] was sent," explaining that if someone "can 
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lay an adequate foundation" on this question, "then the judgment need not be 

disturbed." MTGLQ Investors, LP v. Brylinski, No. A-2409-18 (App. Div. July 

14, 2020) (slip op. at 17).

Following our decision, the chancery judge conducted an evidentiary 

hearing. MTGLQ called a witness who testified about whether Bank of America 

sent a notice of intent to defendants. Defendant Frank Brylinski cross-examined 

the witness but neither he nor his wife testified and they did not call any 

witnesses to rebut the testimony of MTGLQ's witness. At the end of the hearing, 

the judge rendered oral findings in support of his conclusion that the witness 

was credible and that the notice of intent was sent. Two orders were entered on 

February 9, 2021. One order memorialized the factual determination about the 

notice of intent and concluded there was no basis to disturb the final judgment 

of foreclosure.

1

 The other order memorialized the judge's denial of defendants' 

motion to compel MTGLQ to compensate them for the full value of the 

foreclosed property.

Defendants appeal, arguing:

I. THE REVERSAL AND REMAND OF THE 

FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS NO LONGER AN 

1 This order appended a written opinion that further amplified the judge's oral 

decision.
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OPTION WITHOUT SETTING ASIDE THE 

SHERIFF'S SALE.

II. PLAINTIFF FAILED TO LAY A SUFFICIENT 

FOUNDATION TO ESTABLISH THE [NOTICE OF 

INTENT'S] ADMISSIBILITY UNDER THE 

BUSINESS RECORD EXCEPTION TO THE 

HEARSAY RULE, N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6).

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED, AND ABUSED ITS 

DISCRETION, DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION 

FOR COMPENSATION.

Because our standard of review requires that we defer to judge-made findings 

when supported, as here, by credible evidence in the record, see Rova Farms 

Resort, Inc. v. Inv. Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974), and because defendants 

could not conceivably be entitled to any relief as argued in Point III absent an 

outright reversal of the judgment of foreclosure and dismissal of the complaint, 

we find insufficient merit in defendants' arguments to warrant further discussion 

in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.