SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA

November 2, 2022

The Honorable Supreme Court met pursuant to adjournment. 

The following order was passed:

Upon consideration, the Court has revised the deadline for 

motions for reconsideration in this matter. It is ordered that a 

motion for reconsideration, if any, including motions submitted via 

the Court’s electronic filing system, must be received in the 

Clerk’s Office by 2 p.m. on Wednesday, November 9, 2022.

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta

I certify that the above is a true extract from the

minutes of the Supreme Court of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto

affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk
1

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: November 2, 2022

S22A0425. JONES v. THE STATE.

 BOGGS, Chief Justice.

Appellant Deon Jones challenges his convictions for felony 

murder and influencing a witness in connection with the shooting 

death of Scott Corwin.1 He contends that the statute of limitation

barred his prosecution for influencing a witness; that the trial court

made several erroneous evidentiary rulings; that he was denied 

 1 The crimes occurred on May 29 and 31, 2004. On December 27, 2017, a 

Chatham County grand jury indicted Appellant for malice murder, felony 

murder based on aggravated assault, felony murder based on possession of a 

firearm by a convicted felon, felony murder based on attempted armed robbery, 

and influencing a witness. At a trial from April 16 to 23, 2018, the jury 

acquitted Appellant of malice murder but found him guilty of the remaining 

charges. The trial court sentenced Appellant to serve life in prison for one count 

of felony murder and ten years consecutive for influencing a witness; the other

felony murder convictions were vacated by operation of law. On April 24, 2018, 

Appellant filed a motion for new trial, which he amended on June 12, 2019,

and October 22, 2020. After an evidentiary hearing on July 6, 2021, the court

denied the motion on September 20, 2021. Appellant then filed a timely notice 

of appeal. The case was docketed in this Court to the April 2022 term and 

submitted for a decision on the briefs.
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effective assistance of counsel; and that the combined effect of the 

trial court’s multiple erroneous evidentiary rulings and his trial 

counsel’s deficient performance deprived him of a fair trial. For the 

reasons that follow, we reverse Appellant’s conviction and sentence 

for influencing a witness, but we otherwise affirm the trial court’s 

judgment.

1. Sometime in May 2004, Appellant, a convicted felon, bought

on credit a stolen .38-caliber revolver from 16-year-old Kelly

Bigham. In the early morning hours of May 29, Bigham drove

Appellant to the Monterey Square area of downtown Savannah, 

looking for someone to rob. Scott Corwin was walking with his 

girlfriend, Mindy Davis, and Appellant attempted to rob him. When 

Corwin resisted, Appellant shot Corwin through the chest before 

fleeing the scene. Corwin later died from the gunshot wound at a 

nearby hospital.

Late on the night of May 31, 2004, Bigham asked Appellant for

the money he owed her for the gun. Appellant said that he would go 

get some money, borrowed a car, and had Bigham drive him
3

downtown. Along the way, Appellant pulled out his gun and 

threatened to kill Bigham if she told anyone that he had killed 

Corwin, and Bigham noticed that Appellant had a fresh tattoo of a 

teardrop by his eye. Bigham took the teardrop to mean that 

Appellant had killed someone, although she thought the tattoo could 

also represent that Appellant had spent time in prison. Shortly 

before 2:00 a.m. on June 1, approximately one block from where 

Appellant shot Corwin, Appellant shot Charles Buskirk once from 

behind during another attempted robbery. Buskirk was on his front 

porch when he was shot, returning inside his home after

investigating a noise that startled his cat. Buskirk called 911, and 

at the hospital, doctors removed a .38-caliber bullet from his small 

intestine.

Within the next few weeks, Novell Bryant, a confidential 

informant for the FBI, relayed to his handler a recent conversation

that he had with Appellant. According to Bryant, Appellant said 

that he and Bigham went to downtown Savannah, where Appellant 

used a .38-caliber revolver that he got from Bigham to shoot and kill 
4

a man during a robbery. On June 18, law enforcement officers

searched Appellant’s residence, where they found a box of .38-caliber 

bullets that were similar to the bullet removed from Buskirk. On 

June 22, Bryant reported that Appellant had given the gun to a

“partner” and provided the police with a phone number that the 

police traced to a cellphone used by Walter Moon, a convicted felon. 

The next day, a detective interviewed Bigham, who confirmed she 

had been with Appellant when he shot someone during a robbery in 

downtown Savannah. 

Appellant then was tried in federal court for possession of 

bullets and a firearm as a convicted felon in connection with 

Buskirk’s shooting. During that trial, a boyfriend of Appellant’s 

sister wore to court a t-shirt bearing the words “he was a snitch” and 

depicting a murder scene surrounded by crime-scene tape; the 

boyfriend was ordered to change his shirt, but not before he had 

driven one of the witnesses to court and sat next to him in court that 

morning. Nonetheless, Appellant was convicted on all counts. 

Appellant was never otherwise prosecuted for Buskirk’s shooting. 
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The Corwin murder case also went cold at that point, but the record 

does not reveal why.

Years later, when Appellant was serving time in federal prison,

his cellmate, Gregory Seabrook, jokingly challenged him about the 

teardrop tattoo on his face, saying it was “fake.” Appellant said that 

it was real, which Seabrook took to mean that Appellant had killed 

someone, although he thought it could also mean that someone close 

to Appellant had died. Later, Appellant bragged about using a .38-

caliber revolver to shoot two men in downtown Savannah during 

attempted armed robberies. Appellant said that he shot one man 

who had resisted a robbery, after which Bigham went through the 

man’s pockets, and had shot another man on the man’s front porch. 

Appellant also said that he threw the gun that he used in the 

shootings into a sewage drain near his mother’s house. 

Appellant told federal inmate Christopher Jackmon a similar 

story, saying that he had shot a man in downtown Savannah and 

that Bigham then went through the man’s pockets. Appellant said 

that he threw the gun in the sewer after the shooting but forgot to 
6

hide the bullets. Appellant told another federal inmate, Jamaal 

McIntyre, that a woman drove him to a robbery during which the 

victim “tried him, so he popped” him, adding that McIntyre could 

find the story on Google. Appellant told McIntyre that he could rely 

on the woman not to talk. Based on the information from Seabrook, 

Jackmon, and McIntyre, the police restarted the investigation into 

Corwin’s death and swept the sewage drains near the home of 

Appellant’s mother, but no gun was recovered. Bigham was also 

reinterviewed on January 31, 2012, and she stated for the first time 

that Appellant had threatened her. The record does not reveal what 

precipitated Appellant’s eventual indictment in 2017 for Corwin’s 

murder. 

At trial, Appellant elected not to testify in his own defense. The 

defense theory was that all the evidence in the case was about the 

Buskirk shooting but had been reshaped by the State and its 

criminal informants into seeming like it was evidence of the Corwin 

shooting. Appellant recalled one of the State’s witnesses; called one 

witness; and introduced one exhibit with a list of six names, 
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including both Corwin and Buskirk, which a detective had 

previously shown to McIntyre.

2. Appellant first contends that the statute of limitation barred 

his prosecution from starting in 2017 for allegedly influencing a 

witness in 2004. We agree.

The statute of limitation for influencing a witness ordinarily is

four years. See OCGA § 17-3-1 (c) (“[P]rosecution[s] for felonies . . . 

shall be commenced within four years after commission of the 

crime . . . .”). However, because Bigham was under the age of 18 at 

the time of the alleged crime, the statute of limitation was seven 

years. See id. (“[P]rosecution[s] for felonies committed against 

victims who are at the time of the commission of the offense under 

the age of 18 years shall be commenced within seven years after the

commission of the crime.”). The indictment alleged that on or about 

June 1, 2004, Appellant knowingly threatened Bigham with the 

intent to prevent her from communicating to a Georgia law 

enforcement officer information relating to the commission of a 

crime, i.e., the shooting of Corwin. See OCGA § 16-10-93 (b) (1) (C). 
8

The State had until June 1, 2011, to indict Appellant for influencing 

a witness. But the State did not indict Appellant until December 27, 

2017. Thus, the statute of limitation expired more than six years 

before the State started its prosecution of Appellant for that offense.

The State argues that the statute of limitation was tolled for

more than seven-and-a-half of the years between the alleged threat 

on June 1, 2004, and Appellant’s indictment on December 27, 2017,

because until Bigham revealed Appellant’s threat to a law 

enforcement official on January 31, 2012, the crime was unknown. 

See OCGA § 17-3-2 (2) (“The period within which a prosecution must 

be commenced under Code Section 17-3-1 or other applicable statute 

does not include any period in which . . . the crime is 

unknown . . . .”). The State does not argue that any other tolling 

provision applies. The fatal flaw in the State’s argument is that it is 

well established that “the actual knowledge of a crime victim about 

the crime is imputed to the State for purposes of applying the tolling 

provision of OCGA § 17-3-2 (2).” Harper v. State, 292 Ga. 557, 559 

(738 SE2d 584) (2013). See also id. at 563 (“[T]he correct date to 
9

apply in analyzing the statute of limitation is the date that the crime 

became known to the victim of the crime.”); Womack v. State, 260 

Ga. 21, 22 (389 SE2d 240) (1990) (“It seems to be well settled that . . . 

the knowledge of the victim is the knowledge of the State . . . .” 

(Citation omitted.)).

Contrary to the trial court’s understanding, our recent decision 

in Riley v. State, 305 Ga. 163 (824 SE2d 249) (2019), does not 

undermine this well-established rule. In Riley, the trial court ruled 

that the statute of limitation for burglary and possession of a knife 

tolled when investigators had a single fingerprint tying someone to 

a murder scene, but no idea to which of the “12 to 15 possible 

suspects” it belonged. Id. at 165 (1). Because the trial court did not 

consider whether the State had sufficient information to establish 

probable cause to arrest Riley on the nonmurder charges – thus 

making Riley known to the State – we remanded the case for the 

trial court’s consideration of that issue. Id. at 170 (3). Here, by 

contrast, Bigham knew about the crime the moment it was 

committed, so her knowledge is imputed to the State. Thus, OCGA 
10

§ 17-3-2 (2) did not toll the statute of limitation.

Accordingly, we reverse Appellant’s conviction and sentence for

influencing a witness.

3. Appellant also contends that the trial court erred by allowing 

the State to introduce: (a) irrelevant evidence of a t-shirt with a 

threatening message worn by the boyfriend of Appellant’s sister at 

Appellant’s federal trial; and (b) irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial 

testimony by witness Gregory Seabrook that the teardrop tattoo on 

Appellant’s face meant Appellant had killed someone. We disagree 

with both contentions.

Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the 

existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of 

the action more probable or less probable than it would be without 

the evidence.” OCGA § 24-4-401. Generally, “[a]ll relevant evidence 

[is] admissible, except as limited by constitutional requirements” 

that do not apply here. OCGA § 24-4-402. However, OCGA § 24-4-

403 (“Rule 403”) provides that “relevant evidence may be excluded if 

its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
11

unfair prejudice.” Although sometimes required, “the exclusion of 

evidence under Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy which should 

be used only sparingly.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Flowers, 307 Ga. 

618, 622 (2) (837 SE2d 824) (2020). Therefore, “in reviewing 

[evidentiary] issues under Rule 403, we look at the evidence in a 

light most favorable to its admission, maximizing its probative value 

and minimizing its undue prejudicial impact.” (Citation omitted.) 

Anglin v. State, 302 Ga. 333, 337 (3) (806 SE2d 573) (2017). We will 

not disturb a trial court’s determination as to the admissibility of 

evidence “absent a clear abuse of discretion.” Harris v. State, 313 

Ga. 225, 231 (3) (869 SE2d 461) (2022).

(a) Appellant first argues that evidence of a t-shirt with a 

threatening message worn by the boyfriend of Appellant’s sister at 

Appellant’s federal trial and ruled by the trial judge in this case to 

be intrinsic to the influencing-a-witness count was not relevant

because, according to Appellant, “the State introduced no evidence 

to establish that [the boyfriend’s] alleged attempt to influence 

Bigham’s . . . testimony was made with the authorization of 
12

[Appellant],” as required by Dukes v. State, 290 Ga. 486 (722 SE2d 

701) (2012) (decided under the old Evidence Code). However, 

Appellant concedes that Christopher Jackmon stated at trial that 

“[Appellant] said that he had his family member wear a t-shirt to 

stop snitching.” This testimony did not directly conflict with 

Seabrook’s testimony that Appellant never told him that Appellant 

ordered the boyfriend to wear the shirt. And even if Jackmon’s 

testimony were in direct conflict with Seabrook’s testimony, as 

Appellant claims, “it is the role of the jury to resolve conflicts in the 

evidence.” Hopwood v. State, 307 Ga. 305, 305 (835 SE2d 627) 

(2019). Appellant’s assertion about the evidence the State 

introduced is factually incorrect and his argument fails. Thus, the 

trial judge did not abuse his discretion in concluding otherwise.

(b) Appellant next argues that Seabrook’s testimony about the 

teardrop tattoo was not relevant because Seabrook admitted that 

the teardrop tattoo could alternatively mean that someone close to 

Appellant had died. However, Seabrook’s testimony corroborated 

Bigham’s statement in her January 2012 interview that the 
13

teardrop tattoo could mean that Appellant had killed someone. And 

the timing of when Bigham first observed the teardrop tattoo – just 

a few days after Corwin’s shooting – further supported that 

Appellant had killed Corwin. Thus, Seabrook’s testimony clearly 

was relevant.

Appellant then argues based on Belmar v. State, 279 Ga. 795 

(621 SE2d 441) (2005), that admission of Seabrook’s testimony about 

the teardrop tattoo was an abuse of discretion under Rule 403. In 

Belmar, a case decided under the old Evidence Code, a trial court 

allowed evidence of a tattoo reading “12 gauge” in a case in which 

Belmar was accused of murdering a man with a 12-gauge shotgun. 

Id. at 798 (3). This Court held that the trial court had abused its 

discretion because the tattoo evidence was being used to show that 

Belmar “had a propensity to use a 12-gauge shotgun,” rather than

being used for a permissible purpose, such as proving identity. Id. at 

799-800 (3). Here, unlike in Belmar, Appellant did not suffer any 

unfair prejudice. The tattoo was not used for impermissible 

propensity purposes because Bigham’s testimony indicated that 
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Appellant’s teardrop tattoo commemorated one of the crimes with 

which he was charged, shooting Corwin, rather than showing that 

Appellant had a propensity to murder. Appellant’s reliance on 

Belmar is misplaced.

The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting 

Seabrook’s testimony about the teardrop tattoo.

4. Appellant further contends that the trial court erred by 

allowing the state to introduce: (a) evidence of witness Walter 

Moon’s “six prior convictions”2 for the purpose of attacking Moon’s 

character for truthfulness; (b) photographs from a search of Moon’s 

residence in 2012; and (c) a post and photographs from Bigham’s 

Facebook page. Pretermitting whether these evidentiary rulings 

were in error, it is highly probable that the admission of this 

evidence did not affect the jury’s verdict.

Erroneous evidentiary rulings are subject to a harmless-error 

 2 At trial, defense counsel inaccurately described the convictions at issue 

as “six felony convictions,” and both Appellant and Appellees also use this

characterization in their briefs. However, the convictions at issue are seven 

sets of convictions composed of forty-seven total counts and include both 

misdemeanors and felonies ranging from gun possession to murder.
15

test. See Allen v. State, 310 Ga. 411, 415 (2) (851 SE2d 541) (2020). 

A nonconstitutional error is harmless “if the State shows that it is 

highly probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict, an 

inquiry that involves consideration of the other evidence heard by 

the jury.” (Punctuation and citation omitted.) Smith v. State, 313 

Ga. 584, 587 (872 SE2d 262) (2022). In determining whether the 

error was harmless, “we review the record de novo, and we weigh 

the evidence as we would expect reasonable jurors to have done so 

as opposed to viewing it all in the light most favorable to the jury’s 

verdict.” Finney v. State, 311 Ga. 1, 13 (3) (a) (855 SE2d 578) (2021).

Here, the evidence of Appellant’s guilt was strong. Four 

different informants testified that Appellant told them that he had 

shot and killed a man during a robbery in downtown Savannah. 

Three of the informants stated that Bigham was with Appellant 

during the robbery, despite two of them never having met Bigham. 

And one of the informants, Bryant, revealed this information only 

weeks after the Corwin shooting took place. Likewise, Bigham 

stated in June 2004 that Appellant had shot a man walking in the 
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middle of the street during an attempted robbery. Further, Bigham 

said in January 2012 that, while en route to the Buskirk shooting,

Appellant had a fresh teardrop tattoo and told her that he had killed 

a man a few days prior. Appellant is the only apparent link between 

the four informants and Bigham, and he provides no explanation of 

how the informants and Bigham independently could come to such 

similar testimony.

(a) The evidence of Moon’s convictions likely had little effect on 

the jury’s evaluation of whether Appellant was guilty of the crimes 

charged. Appellant argues his case was prejudiced by “guilt by 

association,” suggesting that the jury might have concluded based 

on Appellant’s association with Moon that Appellant also might be 

guilty of serious crimes like murder. In support of this argument, 

Appellant points to the State’s repeated references to Moon in 

closing argument and Bryant’s testimony that Moon was a “partner” 

of Appellant.

However, the evidence in this record showed that Appellant 

and Moon had only an incidental relationship. Despite Bryant’s 
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testimony, the record provides little evidence that Moon was 

Appellant’s “partner” or that they were anything more than 

acquaintances. Of the nearly 1,700 calls appearing on Appellant’s 

call log from May 28 to June 18, 2004, only five, minute-long calls 

appear between Appellant and Moon. Moon himself testified that he 

merely knew Appellant through a mutual acquaintance, not that the 

pair were “partners” or even friends. This evidence indicates that 

even if Appellant called Moon to get rid of the gun that he used to 

shoot Corwin, such an interaction did not necessarily signify any 

closer relationship between Appellant and Moon.

Thus, because the evidence in the record does not establish 

that there was a strong association between Appellant and Moon –

either personal or professional – but does point strongly to

Appellant’s guilt, it is highly probable that the admission of the 

evidence of Moon’s convictions did not affect the verdict. 

(b) The photographs from a search of Moon’s residence in 2012 

also likely had little effect on the jury’s verdict. The photographs in 

question depict the exterior of the house, a shed in Moon’s backyard, 
18

Moon’s driver’s license, two cell phones, and guns and ammunition 

that were found during the search, including two AK-47 rifles and a 

pistol. As Appellant points out, none of the guns pictured were 

alleged to have been used by Appellant in the Corwin shooting. 

Further, testimony about the photographs explained that they were 

taken at Moon’s residence in 2012. Therefore, there was no risk that 

the jury might mistakenly think that the pictured guns belonged to 

Appellant or were used by Appellant. And because, as noted above,

the relationship between Appellant and Moon was incidental and 

the evidence of Appellant’s guilt was strong, it is highly probable 

that admission of these photographs did not affect the jury’s verdict.

(c) The post and photographs from Bigham’s Facebook page 

also were unlikely to affect the jury’s verdict. The post, which the 

State introduced during its direct examination of Bigham, was two 

photographs from 2017 of Bigham leaning against a brick wall with 

a caption that included the following words interspersed with 

various emojis: “Murder Terrorizing Dats all dey UndA_Stand 

Enemies Memories iGot some Bl00dy handZ”; Bigham testified that 
19

the words were lyrics from a rap song. The other photographs, which 

the State introduced after Bigham testified on cross-examination 

that “if you look at the rest of the pictures on my [Facebook] page, 

they’re all captions from songs,” were three uncaptioned pictures

from 2015 of Bigham posing with a man standing behind her, 

covering her mouth, and pointing a gun and staring at the camera.

Appellant’s argument against admission of the post and 

photographs is based on a case decided under the old Evidence Code, 

Boring v. State, 289 Ga. 429 (711 SE2d 634) (2011), and rests on the 

observation that the State portrayed Bigham at trial as an 

unindicted co-conspirator of Appellant, so “the improper evidence 

was as harmful to [Appellant] as it would have been to Bigham if 

she were on trial for the same crimes.” But Appellant cites no 

authority to support his transitive theory of unfair prejudice under 

Rule 403. 

Moreover, even though Appellant and Bigham were portrayed 

as unindicted co-conspirators, it is highly probable that admission of 

the post and photographs did not affect the jury’s verdict. Appellant 
20

does not appear in either the post or photographs, both of which 

were from more than a decade after Corwin’s shooting, nor does the 

post’s caption reference Appellant in any way. And the photographs 

depict a different man than Appellant covering Bigham’s mouth. 

Particularly in light of the strong evidence of Appellant’s guilt, 

including Bigham’s own testimony, the post and photographs were 

unlikely to affect the jury’s verdict.

5. Appellant additionally contends that he was denied the 

effective assistance of counsel because of defense counsel’s failure to 

object when the State repeatedly insisted during its closing 

argument that, based on his convictions, Moon was a murderer and 

gun runner. Again, we disagree.

To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 

Appellant must show both that “his counsel’s performance was 

professionally deficient and that he suffered prejudice as a result.” 

Washington v. State, 313 Ga. 771, 773 (3) (873 SE2d 132) (2022) 

(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687 (104 SCt 2052, 

80 LE2d 674) (1984)). To prove that his lawyer’s performance was 
21

professionally deficient, “Appellant must demonstrate that the 

lawyer performed his duties in an objectively unreasonable way, 

considering all the circumstances in light of the prevailing 

professional norms.” Davis v. State, 299 Ga. 180, 182-183 (2) (787 

SE2d 221) (2016). To prove prejudice, Appellant must show “a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, 

the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 183

(2) (citing Strickland, 466 U. S. at 694). A reasonable probability is 

one that is “sufficient to undermine confidence in the [trial’s] 

outcome.” (Citation omitted.) Neal v. State, 313 Ga. 746, 751 (3) (873 

SE2d 209) (2022). However, “[i]f Appellant fails to make a sufficient 

showing on one part of the Strickland test, we need not address the 

other part.” Washington, 313 Ga. at 773 (3).

Here, Appellant fails to show prejudice. As discussed in 

Division 4 above, the evidence of Appellant’s guilt was strong; the 

evidence at trial showed only an incidental relationship between 

Appellant and Moon; and admission of the evidence of Moon’s 

convictions likely had little effect on the jury’s verdict. Although the 
22

State repeatedly mentioned Moon’s convictions in closing argument, 

Appellant has not explained why these mentions were “sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the trial’s outcome,” Neal, 313 Ga. at 751 

(3), especially when testimony by four informants and Bigham 

connected Appellant to the Corwin murder. Thus, Appellant has not 

carried his burden to prove that he suffered prejudice as a result of 

his trial counsel’s performance, and Appellant’s claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel fails. See Walker v. State, 312 Ga. 232, 242 (862 

SE2d 285) (2021) (“[E]ven assuming we were to conclude that the 

remark was improper and that trial counsel’s failure to object was 

objectively unreasonable, we cannot say that, had trial counsel 

objected, there is a reasonable probability that the result of 

Appellant’s trial would have been different.”); Richardson v. State, 

304 Ga. 900, 903 (823 SE2d 321) (2019) (“[E]ven assuming that trial 

counsel was deficient for failing to object [to a ‘troubling’ statement 

in closing argument], Appellant has failed to demonstrate 

prejudice.”). 

6. Appellant finally contends that he is entitled to a new trial 
23

based on cumulative error. However, even assuming, without 

deciding, that the trial judge erred in each of the evidentiary rulings 

discussed in Division 4 and that trial counsel was deficient in not 

objecting during the State’s closing argument, Appellant has failed 

to demonstrate that the “combined prejudicial effect” of these 

individually harmless errors “requires a new trial.” State v. Lane, 

308 Ga. 10, 21 (4) (838 SE2d 808) (2020). Appellant did not rebut the 

testimony of five witnesses that he had confessed to shooting 

someone under circumstances matching those of Corwin’s shooting, 

so errors on tangential matters were highly unlikely to “so infect[] 

the jury’s deliberation that they denied the petitioner a 

fundamentally fair trial.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id.

Thus, Appellant has not carried his burden to show cumulative error 

requiring the granting of a new trial. See Jones v. State, ___ Ga. ___ 

(___ SE2d ___) (Sept. 20, 2022) (slip op. at 25-27).

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction for felony 

murder and reverse the judgment of conviction for influencing a 

witness.
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Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. All the 

Justices concur.