Report to Congress on

Assigned Credit Ratings

As Required by Section 939F of the

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and

Consumer Protection Act

This is a study by the Staff of the Division of Trading and Markets of the U.S. Securities 

and Exchange Commission. The Commission has expressed no view regarding the 

analysis, findings or conclusions contained herein.

December 2012
Table of Contents

I. INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................................................1

II. NRSRO REGISTRATION AND OVERSIGHT ..................................................................................................4

III. THE CREDIT RATING PROCESS FOR STRUCTURED FINANCE PRODUCTS AND THE CONFLICTS 

OF INTEREST ASSOCIATED WITH THE ISSUER-PAY AND THE SUBSCRIBER-PAY MODELS...................6

A. Overview of the Market for Structured Finance Products................................................................................6

B. The Credit Rating Process................................................................................................................................9

C. Conflicts of Interest ........................................................................................................................................12

1. Issuer-Pay Model.......................................................................................................................................12

a. Overview...............................................................................................................................................12

b. Comments on the Issuer-Pay Model.....................................................................................................13

2. Subscriber-Pay Model ...............................................................................................................................16

a. Overview...............................................................................................................................................16

b. Comments on the Subscriber-Pay Model .............................................................................................16

D. Measures to Mitigate Conflicts of Interest .....................................................................................................17

1. Statutes and Commission Rules.................................................................................................................17

a. Overview of Requirements Designed to Address NRSRO Conflicts...................................................17

b. Comments on Requirements Designed to Address NRSRO Conflicts.................................................20

c. Other Structured Finance Initiatives.....................................................................................................21

2. Reducing Reliance on Credit Ratings........................................................................................................23

a. Overview...............................................................................................................................................23

b. Comments on Reducing Reliance on Credit Ratings............................................................................25

3. Reputational Risk.......................................................................................................................................25

a. Overview...............................................................................................................................................25

b. Comments on Reputational Risk ..........................................................................................................26

4. Internal Controls........................................................................................................................................27

E. Benefits of the Current Rating System...........................................................................................................27

IV. FEASIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING AN ASSIGNMENT SYSTEM FOR CREDIT RATINGS....................28

A. Mechanics of the Section 15E(w) System......................................................................................................28

B. Statutory Factors.............................................................................................................................................30

1. Fee Determination .....................................................................................................................................30

2. Method of Payment....................................................................................................................................31

3. Moral Hazard .............................................................................................................................................31

4. Constitutional and Other Issues Concerning the Establishment of the Section 15E(w) System...............33

a. Operational Feasibility..........................................................................................................................33

b. Legal Feasibility ...................................................................................................................................34

C. GAO Framework ............................................................................................................................................35

1. Independence .............................................................................................................................................35

2. Accountability............................................................................................................................................39

3. Competition ...............................................................................................................................................41

4. Transparency..............................................................................................................................................44

5. Feasibility ..................................................................................................................................................45
ii

6. Market Acceptance and Choice .................................................................................................................48

7. Oversight....................................................................................................................................................51

V. METRICS FOR DETERMINING THE ACCURACY OF CREDIT RATINGS ..............................................52

VI. ALTERNATIVE MEANS FOR COMPENSATING NRSROS ........................................................................53

A. Rule 17g-5 Program .......................................................................................................................................54

1. Mechanics of the Rule 17g-5 Program ......................................................................................................54

2. Comparing the Rule 17g-5 Program to the Section 15E(w) System.........................................................55

3. Use of the Rule 17g-5 Program .................................................................................................................57

4. Potential Modifications to the Rule 17g-5 Program..................................................................................59

B. Investor-Owned Credit Rating Agency Model...............................................................................................62

1. Mechanics of the IOCRA Model...............................................................................................................62

2. Commenters’ Reactions to the IOCRA Model..........................................................................................63

C. Stand-Alone Model ........................................................................................................................................64

1. Mechanics of the Stand-Alone Model .......................................................................................................64

2. Commenters’ Reactions to the Stand-Alone Model ..................................................................................64

D. Designation Model .........................................................................................................................................66

1. Mechanics of the Designation Model........................................................................................................66

2. Commenters’ Reactions to the Designation Model...................................................................................66

E. User-Pay Model..............................................................................................................................................68

1. Mechanics of the User-Pay Model ............................................................................................................68

2. Commenters’ Reactions to the User-Pay Model .......................................................................................68

F. Other Alternative Models...............................................................................................................................69

1. Issuer and Investor-Pays Model.................................................................................................................69

2. Alternative User-Pays Model ....................................................................................................................70

3. Investor Owned Rating Agency Model .....................................................................................................71

4. Additional Suggestions From Commenters...............................................................................................72

VII. FINDINGS .....................................................................................................................................................72

A. Section 15E(w) System ..................................................................................................................................73

1. Potential Benefits.......................................................................................................................................73

2. Potential Concerns.....................................................................................................................................74

3. Potential Considerations............................................................................................................................77

B. Rule 17g-5 Program .......................................................................................................................................77

1. Potential Benefits.......................................................................................................................................77

2. Potential Concerns.....................................................................................................................................78

3. Potential Considerations............................................................................................................................79

C. Other Alternative Compensation Models.......................................................................................................79

1. Potential Benefits.......................................................................................................................................80

2. Potential Concerns.....................................................................................................................................81

3. Potential Considerations............................................................................................................................82

APPENDIX...................................................................................................................................................................83
I. INTRODUCTION 

On July 21, 2010, President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 

Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act”) into law.

1

 Title IX, Subtitle C of the DoddFrank Act (“Title IX, Subtitle C”), “Improvements to the Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies,”

among other things, established new self-executing requirements applicable to nationally 

recognized statistical rating organizations (“NRSROs”), required certain studies, and required 

that the Commission adopt rules applicable to NRSROs in a number of areas.2 Under section 

939F of Title IX, Subtitle C (“section 939F”), the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 

(“Commission”) must submit to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the 

Senate and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives, not later than 

24 months after the date of enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, a report containing: (1) the 

findings of a study on matters related to assigning credit ratings for structured finance products; 

and (2) any recommendations for regulatory or statutory changes that the Commission 

determines should be made to implement the findings of the study.3 In particular, section 939F 

provides that the Commission shall carry out a study of the following: 

(1) The credit rating process for structured finance products and the conflicts of interest 

associated with the issuer-pay and the subscriber-pay models;4

(2) The feasibility of establishing a system in which a public or private utility or a selfregulatory organization (“SRO”) assigns NRSROs to determine the credit ratings for 

structured finance products, including: 

(a) An assessment of potential mechanisms for determining fees for NRSROs for 

rating structured finance products; 

(b) Appropriate methods for paying fees to NRSROs to rate structured finance 

products; 

(c) The extent to which the creation of such a system would be viewed as the 

creation of moral hazard by the Federal Government; and 

 1 Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).

2 See Pub. L. No. 111-203 §§ 939, 939D - 939F. 

3 See Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 939F. Section 939F(a) provides that, for purposes of section 939F, the term 

“structured finance product” means an “asset-backed security,” as defined in section 3(a)(77) of the 

Exchange Act, as added by section 941 of the Dodd-Frank Act (15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(77)), and any structured 

product based on an asset-backed security, as determined by the Commission, by rule. See Pub. L. No. 

111-203 § 939F(a). For the purposes of this study, the term “structured finance product” means an “assetbacked security” as defined in section 3(a)(77) of the Exchange Act and, to the extent not included in that 

definition, any security or money market instrument issued by an asset pool or as part of any asset-backed 

or mortgage-backed securities transaction. See, e.g., 17 CFR 240.17g-2(a)(2)(iii), (a)(7), and (b)(9); 17 

CFR 240.17g-3(a)(6); 17 CFR 240.17g-5(a)(3) and (b)(9); 17 CFR 240.17g-6(a)(4). See also Amendments 

to Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 61050

(Nov. 23, 2009), 74 Federal Register (“FR”) 63832, n. 3 (Dec. 4, 2009).

4 See Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 939F(b)(1).
2

(d) Any constitutional or other issues concerning the establishment of such a 

system;5

(3) The range of metrics that could be used to determine the accuracy of credit ratings for 

structured finance products;6 and 

(4) Alternative means for compensating NRSROs that would create incentives for 

accurate credit ratings for structured finance products.7

Section 939F also provides that, after submission of the report to Congress containing the 

findings of the study, the Commission shall, by rule, as the Commission determines is necessary 

or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors, establish a system for the 

assignment of NRSROs to determine the initial credit ratings of structured finance products, in a 

manner that prevents the issuer, sponsor, or underwriter of the structured finance product from 

selecting the NRSRO that will determine the initial credit ratings and monitor such credit 

ratings.8 In issuing any rule pursuant to section 939F, the Commission is directed to give 

thorough consideration to the provisions of section 15E(w) of the Exchange Act, as that 

provision would have been added by section 939D of H.R. 4173 (111th Congress), as passed by 

the Senate on May 20, 2010 (the “Section 15E(w) Provisions”), and shall implement the system 

described in section 939D of H.R. 4173 (the “Section 15E(w) System”) unless the Commission 

determines that an alternative system would better serve the public interest and the protection of 

investors.9

The Commission requested public comment to assist the staff in carrying out this study.10 

The Commission received thirty-two comment letters in response to its solicitation for comment. 

Six of the comment letters were submitted by NRSROs.11 The remaining twenty-six comment 

letters were submitted by other interested parties, including organizations representing investors, 

trade organizations, non-profit organizations, brokerage and financial services firms, academics 

 5 See Pub. L. No. 111-203 §§ 939F(b)(2)(A) through (B).

6 See Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 939F(b)(3).

7 See Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 939F(b)(4).

8 See Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 939F(d).

9 See Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 939F(d). Section 939D of H.R. 4173 (111th Congress) was passed by the 

Senate on May 20, 2010. However, this amendment was not included in the final version of the DoddFrank Act. The text of the amendment is attached as an appendix to this study.

10 See Solicitation of Comment to Assist in Study on Assigned Credit Ratings, Exchange Act Release No. 

64456 (May 10, 2011), 76 FR 28265 (May 16, 2011).

11 See letter from Daniel Curry, DBRS Limited, dated Sep. 13, 2011 (“DBRS Letter”); letter from Charles D. 

Brown, Fitch Ratings, dated Sep. 9, 2011 (“Fitch Letter”); letter from James Nadler, Kroll Bond Rating 

Agency, Inc., dated Sep. 13, 2011 (“Kroll Letter”); letter from Michel Madelain, Moody’s Investor Service, 

dated Sep. 13, 2011 (“Moody’s Letter”); letter from Robert Dobilas, Morningstar Credit Ratings, LLC, 

dated Sep. 13, 2011 (“Morningstar Letter”); and letter from Patrick Milano, Standard and Poor’s Ratings 

Services, dated Sep. 13, 2011 (“S&P Letter”).
3

and individuals.12 The staff reviewed each comment letter. The comment letters helped to

inform the staff and raise complex issues for consideration. The staff also gathered information 

about the credit rating process for structured finance products, conflicts of interest in the issuerpay and subscriber-pay systems and alternative models for compensating NRSROs through: (1) a 

review of certain studies, articles, and testimony;13 (2) meetings with proponents of alternative 

models; and (3) meetings with NRSROs.14

 12 See letter from Gerald W. McEntee, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, 

dated Sep. 12, 2011 (“AFSCME Letter”); letter from Tom Deutsch, American Securitization Forum, dated 

Sep. 12, 2011 (“ASF”); letter from Americans for Financial Reform dated Sep. 13, 2011 (“AFR Letter”); 

letter from Richard Hopkin, Association for Financial Markets in Europe, dated Sep. 13, 2011 (“AFME

Letter”); letter from Dennis Kelleher, Wallace C. Turbeville, and Stephen W. Hall, Better Markets, Inc., 

dated Sep. 13, 2011 (“Better Markets Letter”); letter from Adrian Burridge, CanadianInvestors.com, dated 

May 10, 2011 (“CI.com Letter”); letter from Laurel Leitner, Council of Institutional Investors, dated Sep. 

13, 2011 (“CII Letter”); letter from Stephen M. Renna, CRE Finance Council, dated Sep. 13, 2011 (“CRE

Letter”); letter from William Michael Cunningham, Creative Investment Research, Inc., dated Jul. 4, 2011

(“CIR”); letter from Richard M. Whiting, The Financial Services Roundtable, dated Sep. 13, 2011 (“FSR

Letter”); letter from the Honorable Al Franken, U.S. Senate, dated Nov. 17, 2011 (“Franken Letter”); letter 

from the Honorable Al Franken and the Honorable Roger F. Wicker, U.S. Senate, dated Sep. 14, 2011

(“Franken/Wicker Letter”); letter from Jeffrey Manns, George Washington University Law School, dated 

Sep. 13, 2011 (“Manns Letter”); letter from Donald C. Huffaker dated May 10, 2011(“Huffaker Letter”); 

letter from Karrie McMillan, Investment Company Institute, dated Sep. 13, 2011 (“ICI Letter”); letter from 

Valerie Kay, Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC, dated Sep. 13, 2011 (“MS Letter”); letter from David H. 

Stevens, Mortgage Bankers Association, dated Sep. 13, 2011 (“MBA Letter”), letter from Jason Parsont

dated Sep. 13, 2011 (“Parsont Letter”); second letter from Jason Parsont dated Jun. 20, 2011 (“Parsont 

Letter II, with attached article, NRSRO Nullification: Why Ratings Reform may be in Peril, 77 BROOK. L.

REV. 3, 1015 (Spring 2012) (“Parsont Article”); letter from Karen Polege dated May 11, 2011 (“Polege

Letter”); letter from Anthony Randazzo, Reason Foundation, date Sep. 13, 2011 (“Reason Letter”); letter 

from Martin S. Hughes, Redwood Trust, Inc., dated Jun. 11, 2012 (“Redwood Letter”); letter from Richard 

A. Dorfman and Christopher B. Killian, Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, dated Sep. 

13, 2011 (“SIFMA Letter”); letter from Ja Sto dated May 10, 2011 (“Sto Letter”); letter from Claire A. 

Hill, University of Minnesota Law School, dated Sep. 13, 2011 (“Hill Letter”); and letter from Robert 

Grunzinger, Wheelhouse Securities Corp., dated May 12, 2011 (“Wheelhouse Letter”). These comment 

letters are available on the Commission’s Internet website at the following address: 

http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-629/4-629.shtml. See also letter from the Honorable Carl Levin, U.S. 

Senate, dated Aug. 8, 2011 (“Levin Letter”) (commenting on Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized 

Statistical Rating Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 64514 (May 18, 2011), 76 FR 33420 (Jun. 8, 

2011) and section 939F of the Dodd-Frank Act).

13 See Nan S. Ellis, Lisa M. Fairchild, & Frank D’Souza, Rating the Regulation of Rating Agencies: Credit 

Rating Agency Reform in the Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (2011), available at

http://works.bepress.com/nan_ellis/2; Professor John C. Coffee, Jr., Turmoil in the U.S. Credit Markets: 

The Role of the Credit Rating Agencies, testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing 

and Urban Affairs (April 22, 2008), available at

http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/OpgStmtCoffeeSenateTestimonyTurmoilintheUSCreditMarkets.pdf; 

John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid (Jul. 2002), available at

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=325240; Jess Cornaggia, Kimberly Rodgers Cornaggia, 

& John Hund, Credit Ratings Across Asset Classes: A = A?, Working Paper Series (2011), available at

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1909091; Sulette Lombard, Credit Rating Agencies as 

Gatekeepers: What Went Wrong (2009), available at

http://www.clta.edu.au/professional/papers/conference2009/LombardCLTA09.pdf; Frank Partnoy, How 

and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other Gatekeepers (2006), available at

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=900257; Bo Becker & Todd Milbourn, How Did 

Increased Competition Affect Credit Ratings? Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(3), pages 

493-514; Efraim Benmelech & Jennifer Dlugosz, The Credit Rating Crisis, the National Bureau of 
4

The staff’s study focused on the Section 15E(w) System and potential alternatives to that 

system, including an existing rule (Rule 17g-5) under the Exchange Act that is designed to 

mitigate the issuer-pay conflict with respect to structured finance products.15 This report – which 

was prepared by Commission staff and approved for release by the Commission – is being 

submitted to Congress pursuant to section 939F. The views expressed in this report are those of 

the Commission staff and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or the 

individual Commissioners. The report identifies potential benefits and concerns with respect to 

the Section 15E(w) System and potential alternatives to that system. The report also identifies 

potential regulatory or statutory changes the Commission could consider if the Commission 

determined to implement the Section 15E(w) System or one or more of the potential alternatives.

II. NRSRO REGISTRATION AND OVERSIGHT

The Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 (the “Rating Agency Act of 2006”) 

established a registration and oversight program for credit rating agencies registered with the 

Commission as NRSROs through self-executing provisions added to the Exchange Act and 

implementing rules adopted by the Commission under the Exchange Act as amended by the 

Rating Agency Act of 2006.16 The Rating Agency Act of 2006, among other things: (1) 

amended section 3 of the Exchange Act to add definitions; (2) added section 15E to the 

Exchange Act to establish self-executing requirements on NRSROs and provide the Commission 

with the authority to implement a registration and oversight program for NRSROs; (3) amended 

section 17 of the Exchange Act to provide the Commission with recordkeeping, reporting, and 

examination authority over NRSROs; and (4) amended section 21B(a) of the Exchange Act to 

 Economic Research (2010), available at

http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/benmelech/files/MacroAnnual.pdf; Patrick Bolton, Xavier 

Freixas, & Joel Shapiro, The Credit Ratings Game, Journal of Finance, Volume 67, Issue 1, pages 85-112; 

Jerome Mathis, James McAndrews, & Jean-Charles Rochet, Rating the Raters: Are Reputation Concerns 

Powerful Enough to Discipline Rating Agencies?, 56(5) J. Monetary Econ. 657 (2009); Parsont Article; 

Amadou N.R. Sy, The Systemic Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies and Rated Markets, International 

Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/09/029 (2009), available at

http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp09129.pdf; See Jie (Jack) He, Jun ‘QJ’ Qian & Philip E. 

Strahan, Are All Ratings Created Equal? The Impact of Issuer Size on the Pricing of Mortgage-Backed 

Securities, Journal of Finance (forthcoming); Vasiliki Skreta & Laura Veldkamp, Ratings Shopping and 

Asset Complexity: A Theory of Ratings Inflation, Journal of Monetary Economics (2009); and Heski BarIsaac & Joel Shapiro, Ratings Quality over the Business Cycle, Journal of Financial Economics 

(forthcoming 2012).

14 Documentation of the staff’s meetings with proponents of the alternative models and the NRSROs is 

available on the Commission’s Internet website at the following address: http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-

629/4-629.shtml.

15 See 17 CFR 240.17g-5.

16 See Pub. L. No. 109-291 (2006). The following ten credit rating agencies currently are registered with the 

Commission as NRSROs: A.M. Best Company, Inc. (“A.M. Best”), DBRS, Inc. (“DBRS”), Egan-Jones 

Ratings Co. (“EJR”), Fitch, Inc. (“Fitch”), Japan Credit Rating Agency, Ltd. (“JCR”), HR Ratings de 

México, S.A. de C.V. (“HR”), Kroll Bond Rating Agency, Inc. (“KBRA”), Moody's Investors Service, Inc. 

(“Moody’s”), Morningstar Credit Ratings, LLC (“Morningstar”), and Standard & Poor's Ratings Services 

(“S&P”).
5

provide the Commission with the authority to assess penalties in administrative proceedings 

instituted under section 15E of the Exchange Act.17

The Commission adopted rules to implement a registration and oversight program for 

NRSROs in June 2007.18 The implementing rules adopted in 2007 were Form NRSRO, Rule 

17g-1, Rule 17g-2, Rule 17g-3, Rule 17g-4, Rule 17g-5, and Rule 17g-6.19 Among other things, 

the rules require NRSROs to publish information about their activities, make and maintain 

certain records, file annual reports with the Commission, establish and enforce procedures to 

protect material nonpublic information, and establish and enforce procedures to manage conflicts 

of interest. The rules also prohibit NRSROs from having certain conflicts of interest and from 

engaging in unfair, coercive, and abusive practices. The Commission twice has adopted 

amendments to certain of these rules.

20 

The Dodd-Frank Act, among other things, established new self-executing requirements 

applicable to NRSROs and requires that the Commission adopt rules applicable to NRSROs in a 

number of areas.21 The Commission has adopted one new rule and proposed other new rules and 

amendments to existing rules in accordance with the Dodd-Frank Act.22 The Dodd-Frank Act 

also amended the Exchange Act to require the Commission staff to examine each NRSRO 

annually.23 Further, the Commission is required to make available to the public, in an easily 

understandable format, an annual report summarizing: (1) the essential findings of the 

examinations as deemed appropriate by the Commission; (2) the responses by the NRSROs to 

any material regulatory deficiencies identified by the Commission in those findings; and (3) 

whether the NRSROs have appropriately addressed the recommendations of the Commission 

contained in previous reports.24 The Commission published the first annual report in September 

201125 and a second annual report in November 2012.26

 17 See Pub. L. No. 109-291 §§ 3 and 4; see also 15 U.S.C. 78c, 78o-7, 78q, and 78u-2.

18 See Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies Registered as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 

Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 55857 (Jun. 5, 2007), 72 FR 33564 (Jun. 18, 2007).

19 Id. See also 17 CFR 240.17g-1 (“Rule 17g-1”), 17 CFR 240.17g-2 (“Rule 17g-2”), 17 CFR 240.17g-3 

(“Rule 17g-3”), 17 CFR 240.17g-5 (“Rule 17g-5”), 17 CFR 240.17g-6 (“Rule 17g-6”), and 17 CFR 

249b.300 (“Form NRSRO”).

20 See Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 74 FR 6456; see 

also Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 74 FR 63832.

21 See Pub. L. No. 111-203 §§ 931-939H and § 943.

22 See Disclosure for Asset-Backed Securities Required by Section 943 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 

Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”) Release No. 9175 (Jan. 20, 

2011), 76 FR 4489 (Jan. 26, 2011) (adopting Rule 17g-7 (17 CFR 240.17g-7)) and Nationally Recognized 

Statistical Rating Organizations, 76 FR 33420.

23 See Pub. L. No. 111-203 §932 and 15 U.S.C. 78o-7(p)(3).

24 See 15 U.S.C. 78o-7(p)(3)(C).

25 See 2011 Summary Report of Commission Staff’s Examinations of Each Nationally Recognized Statistical 

Rating Organization, Commission staff (Sep. 2011), available at

http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/2011_nrsro_section15e_examinations_summary_report.pdf. 
6

III. THE CREDIT RATING PROCESS FOR STRUCTURED FINANCE PRODUCTS 

AND THE CONFLICTS OF INTEREST ASSOCIATED WITH THE ISSUERPAY AND THE SUBSCRIBER-PAY MODELS

Section 939F(b)(1) provides that the Commission shall carry out a study of the credit 

rating process for structured finance products and the conflicts of interest associated with the 

issuer-pay and the subscriber-pay models.27 The Commission’s solicitation of comment for the 

section 939F study asked about these matters.28 The discussion below provides an overview of 

the credit rating process for structured finance products and a description of the conflicts of 

interest associated with the issuer-pay and the subscriber-pay models. 

A. Overview of the Market for Structured Finance Products

The term “structured finance product” as used throughout this study refers broadly to any 

security or money market instrument backed by an asset pool or as part of any asset-backed or 

mortgage-backed securities transaction. This broad category of financial instruments includes, 

but is not limited to: (1) asset-backed securities (“ABS”) backed by pools of student loans, credit 

card receivables, consumer loans and leases, auto loans and leases, auto floor plans, and/or

equipment loans and leases; (2) residential mortgage-backed securities (“RMBS”); (3) 

commercial mortgage-backed securities (“CMBS”); (4) collateralized loan obligations (“CLOs”); 

and (5) other types of structured debt instruments such as collateralized debt obligations 

(“CDOs”), including synthetic and hybrid CDOs.

The number of structured finance products sold in the U.S. market has fluctuated greatly 

in recent years. For example, one source estimates (as reflected in Figure 1) that issuance of 

certain types of structured finance products peaked in 2006 at $906.6 billion, representing a 

228% increase from 2000, and then dropped off sharply in 2007 and 2008 and that issuance has 

remained low since that time.

29

 26 See 2012 Summary Report of Commission Staff’s Examinations of Each Nationally Recognized Statistical 

Rating Organization, Commission staff (Nov. 2012), available at

http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/nrsro-summary-report-2012.pdf

27 See Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 939F(b)(1). Under the issuer-pay model, the NRSRO receives compensation 

from issuers and obligors for rating the securities of the issuer or the obligor as an entity. NRSROs 

operating under this business model generally make their credit ratings publicly available for free. Under 

the subscriber-pay model, subscribers (e.g., investors) pay the NRSRO for access to the NRSRO’s ratings. 

NRSROs operating under this business model charge subscribers a fee for access to their credit ratings.

28 See Solicitation of Comment to Assist in Study on Assigned Credit Ratings, 76 FR at 28268-70.

29 Source: Asset-Backed Alert (http://www.abalert.com). The types of structured finance products reflected

in the statistics in Figure 1 are rated by at least one major rating agency, under the control of a trustee, and 

collateralized by assets of some kind. Synthetic collateralized debt obligations and catastrophe bonds are 

also included. The statistics do not include CMBS, Federal National Mortgage Association and Federal 

Home Loan Mortgage Corporation issuances, municipal issuances, tax-exempt issuances, issuances that are 

fully retained by an affiliate of the deal sponsor or sold to a commercial-paper conduit operated by an 

affiliate of the sponsor, and commercial paper and other continuously offered securities such as mediumterm notes.
7

Eight of the ten NRSROs are registered in the class of credit rating for structured finance

products.30 Based on information disclosed by these eight NRSROs in their most recently filed 

Forms NRSRO for the year ended December 31, 2011, the number of outstanding credit ratings 

in this class has similarly declined in recent years (see Figure 2).

31

 30 JCR and HR are the only NRSROs not registered in the asset-backed securities class. The classes of credit 

ratings for which an NRSRO can be registered are enumerated in the definition of “nationally recognized 

statistical rating organization” in section 3(a)(62) of the Exchange Act: (1) financial institutions, brokers, or 

dealers; (2) insurance companies; (3) corporate issuers; (4) issuers of asset-backed securities (as that term is 

defined in section 1101(c) of Part 229 of Title 17, Code of Federal Regulations, as in effect on the date of 

enactment of section 3(a)(62) of the Exchange Act); and (5) issuers of government securities, municipal 

securities, or securities issued by a foreign government. 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(62).

31 Rule 17g-1 prescribes, among other things, how an NRSRO must apply to be registered with the 

Commission, keep its registration up-to-date, and comply with a statutory requirement to furnish the 

Commission with an annual certification. See 17 CFR 240.17g-1. Specifically, all of these actions must be 

accomplished by filing a Form NRSRO with the Commission. An NRSRO is required to make its current 

Form NRSRO and information and documents in Exhibits 1 through 9 publicly available. See 17 CFR 
8

The staff estimates that, as of December 31, 2011, approximately 91% of the outstanding credit 

ratings for structured finance products were determined by the three largest NRSROs (Fitch, 

Moody’s and S&P) (see Figure 3). This difference in the market share between the largest three 

and the remaining NRSROs, however, has been declining since the Commission began collecting 

this data in 2007 (see Figure 4). 

 240.17g-1(i). Items 6 and 7 of Form NRSRO require an NRSRO to provide the approximate number of 

credit ratings outstanding in each class of credit rating for which the NRSRO is registered.
9

B. The Credit Rating Process

The credit rating process for structured finance products used by NRSROs generally is 

similar, at least with respect to the more common types of products such as RMBS. The 

following summarizes the general process for rating a non-synthetic structured finance product.

32

The issuer of the securities to be rated is a bankruptcy remote entity (typically a trust or a 

limited liability company) that is created solely to hold a pool of assets that generates cash flows, 

which are used to pay principal and interest on securities issued by the issuing entity. The 

securities typically are issued in “tranches” that are assigned priorities in terms of receiving 

interest and principal payments from the cash flows generated by the asset pool and incurring 

losses resulting from the failure of the assets in the pool to perform (e.g., because of defaults). 

The tranche that is the last to incur losses has the highest level of “credit enhancement.” This 

tranche receives the highest credit rating and, generally, the arranger of the transaction seeks to 

obtain a credit rating that is in the highest category of credit rating the NRSRO issues (e.g., 

“AAA”).33 Usually, the arranger seeks to design a capital structure for the issuer that will result 

in securities at given tranches receiving specific credit ratings that are demanded by the potential 

investors in the securities (e.g., the arranger will seek to design a capital structure that results in a 

“AAA” rating for securities in the most senior tranche). The investors may require specific 

 32 See Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 

57967 (Jun. 16, 2008), 73 FR 36212, 36213-16 (Jun. 25, 2008) (describing the process for creating and 

rating certain structured finance products). See also Summary Report of Issues Identified in the 

Commission Staff’s Examinations of Select Credit Rating Agencies, at 6-10; The Role of Credit Rating 

Agencies in Structured Finance Markets, International Organization of Securities Commission (May 2008) 

at 3-7.

33 Frequently, the arranger will not obtain credit ratings for all the tranches, particularly the lowest tranches.
10

credit ratings to obtain benefits or relief under statutes and regulations using the term NRSRO.

34 

They also may require specific credit ratings to meet investment guidelines or contractual 

requirements.

The arranger initiates the rating process by sending the NRSRO data on the assets to be 

held by the issuing entity (e.g., mortgages, student loans, credit card receivables or, in the case of 

CDOs and CLOs, the underlying RBMS or ABS), the proposed capital structure of the trust, and 

the proposed level of credit enhancement for each tranche of security to be issued by the issuing 

entity. The NRSRO assigns a lead analyst, who is responsible for analyzing the information and, 

ultimately, for formulating a ratings recommendation that will be submitted to a rating

committee.

35

The lead analyst uses quantitative expected loss models and qualitative analysis to 

develop predictions as to how the assets in the pool held by the issuing entity likely will perform

under market stresses of varying severity. These predictions include assumptions regarding the 

amount of principal likely to be recovered in the event of default when the asset is secured by 

collateral. The analyst typically reviews different characteristics of each asset in the pool. For 

example, in the case of an RMBS (which holds a pool of residential mortgages), the analyst 

reviews the value of the property relative to the amount of the loan, the amount of equity the 

borrower has in the property, the geographic location of the property, the credit score of the 

borrower, the income and net worth of the borrower, and the amount of documentation provided 

by the borrower to verify the borrower’s financial condition. The analyst also may consider 

other factors, such as the quality of the loan servicer or the actual performance of similar pools of 

assets. The purpose of this loss analysis is to determine how much credit enhancement a given 

tranche would need for a security in that tranche to receive a particular category of credit rating

(e.g., a “AAA” rating).

The analyst next evaluates the proposed capital structure of the issuer. Generally, the 

arranger proposes a capital structure with credit enhancement levels to obtain desired credit 

ratings for securities in each tranche. The analyst reviews the proposed credit enhancement 

levels against the predictions as to how the assets in the pool will perform to determine whether 

the amount of credit enhancement at each tranche is sufficient to support the desired credit 

rating. If the analyst concludes that the capital structure of the issuer will not support the desired 

rating for a security in a particular tranche, the analyst typically conveys this preliminary 

conclusion to the arranger. The arranger requests this preliminary view from the analyst because 

– as noted above – the potential investors who will purchase the securities generally demand 

specific credit ratings. Consequently, if the securities will not receive the credit rating sought by 

the potential investors, the arranger may not be able to sell them. In the case where the analyst’s 

preliminary view differs from the expectation of the arranger, the arranger can accept the lower 

credit ratings or take steps to obtain the desired credit ratings. These steps can include changing 

 34 See Stocktaking on the use of credit ratings, Joint Forum (June 2009), available at

http://www.bis.org/publ/joint22.pdf?noframes=1 (describing how various jurisdictions use credit ratings in 

laws and regulations).

35 See the S&P Letter.
11

the composition of the asset pool so that it yields better expected loss measures or adjusting the 

capital structure of the issuer to increase the level of credit enhancement at a given tranche.

The next step in the process is to perform a cash flow analysis on the interest and 

principal expected to be received by the issuing entity from the asset pool to determine whether 

these cash flows will be sufficient to pay the interest and principal due on each security, as well 

as to cover the administrative expenses of the issuing entity. The analyst uses a quantitative 

model often developed by the NRSRO that analyzes the amount of principal and interest

payments from the assets over the terms of the securities under various stress scenarios. The 

outputs of this model are compared against the required payments on the securities specified in 

the transaction’s legal documents. 

In addition to the expected loss and cash flow analysis, the analyst reviews the legal 

documentation of the issuing entity to evaluate whether it is bankruptcy remote (i.e., isolated 

from the effects of any potential bankruptcy or insolvency of the arranger). The analyst also 

reviews operational and administrative risk associated with the issuing entity, using the results of 

periodic examinations of the principal parties involved in the issuance of the security, including 

the asset originators, the servicer of the assets, and the trustee. In assessing the servicer, for 

example, an NRSRO might review its past performance with respect to loan collections, billing, 

recordkeeping, and the treatment of delinquent loans.

Following these steps, the analyst develops a rating recommendation for the securities in 

each tranche. The recommendation is presented to a rating committee, which may be comprised 

of a lead analyst, a senior analyst, and a chairperson, among others.

36 An analyst is not allowed 

to participate on a committee if he or she has a conflict of interest. Potential conflicts of interest 

may be monitored throughout the rating process. Conflicts of interest also are controlled by 

internal procedures, such as requiring credit ratings to be determined by a committee rather than 

individual analysts, requiring rating committees to act by majority vote, and physically or 

substantively segregating rating committees from business functions.

Generally, the rating committee votes on the rating for the securities in each tranche and 

usually notifies the issuer privately of the rating decision. An issuer may be able to appeal a 

rating decision, although the appeal is not always granted, and, if granted, may not necessarily 

result in any change in the rating decision. In those cases where appeals are granted, the issuer 

may be entitled to a decision by a second rating committee, but the standards for changing a 

rating are generally very stringent (e.g., missing or materially misinterpreting critical 

information). Final rating decisions are published and subsequently monitored and maintained 

through surveillance processes.

37

Generally, the analyst who monitors the rating after it is issued is different than the 

analyst who performed the initial rating. The surveillance process generally includes a periodic 

review of the performance of the assets in the pool, including delinquency and loss trends. If it is 

 36 Generally, the arranger does not know the identities of the members of the rating committee. 

37 An issuer may disregard the final rating outcome and withdraw its rating request for a rating. Following 

this, an NRSRO may choose not to issue and publish the ratings on the securities. 
12

determined that the asset pool is performing differently than predicted, the surveillance analyst 

may recommend taking a rating action by presenting the recommendation to a rating committee.

An NRSRO that operates under an issuer-pay model typically is paid only if the credit 

rating is issued, though sometimes it receives a partial fee for the analytic work undertaken if the 

credit rating is not issued. The issuer will pay an initial rating fee to the NRSRO when the 

transaction is sold. A surveillance fee for maintaining the rating also may be paid at closing or 

over the life of the securities. 

C. Conflicts of Interest

1. Issuer-Pay Model

a. Overview

Under the issuer-pay model, the NRSRO is paid by the arranger to rate a proposed 

structured finance product. As discussed above, investors may not purchase a structured finance 

product if it is not rated at a specific level because, for example, they are subject to laws or 

regulations that provide benefits or relief based on credit ratings. Investors also may be subject 

to investment guidelines that require the instruments they hold to be rated at or above a certain 

category in a rating scale (e.g., the four highest categories). Arrangers also desire higher credit 

ratings to lower financing costs of the products they structure as lower ratings generally result in 

higher interest rates. For these reasons, this payment model presents an inherent conflict of 

interest because the arranger has an economic interest in obtaining credit ratings that are 

demanded by investors and that lower the issuer’s financing costs and the NRSRO has an 

economic interest in having the arranger hire it in the future.

38 This creates the potential that the 

NRSRO will be influenced to issue the credit ratings desired by the arranger. 

There are several aspects of the credit rating process for structured finance products that 

may heighten the effects of the conflicts of interest inherent in the issuer-pay model. For 

example, an arranger may have multiple NRSROs analyze a proposed structured finance product 

and select the one or two NRSROs that provide the desired credit ratings (i.e., engage in “rating 

shopping”). When this occurs, the arranger provides information about a proposed structured 

finance product (e.g., a CMBS) to multiple NRSROs that rate the type of product being offered. 

The NRSROs will provide preliminary estimations of the credit enhancement levels necessary to 

support a credit rating in the highest credit rating category. The arranger then selects the 

NRSRO or NRSROs that provide it with the preliminary credit enhancement level it desires. 

This creates an incentive for the NRSRO or NRSROs to provide preliminary estimations desired 

by the arranger in order to be hired to produce a final credit rating for the transaction.

In addition to the “rating shopping” dynamic, the issuer-pay conflict may be more acute 

for structured finance products (as compared to other types of debt instruments) because certain 

 38 See Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 73 FR 36218. 
13

arrangers of these products bring substantial ratings business to the NRSROs.39 As sources of 

repeat business, arrangers of structured finance products may exert greater undue influence on an

NRSRO than personnel involved in obtaining credit ratings for other types of issuers.

40 

Furthermore, in the case of certain structured finance products, there are only a few major 

investment banks that assemble and sell these products.

41 Losing the business of one of these 

banks could have a substantial impact on an NRSRO’s revenues.42 Conversely, an arranger 

potentially could bring repeat rating business to a credit rating agency because the arranger’s 

own credit rating was determined by the credit rating agency and, therefore, wants to curry favor 

with that credit rating agency.

b. Comments on the Issuer-Pay Model

Several commenters stated that the issuer-pay model is flawed because issuers, who 

benefit from higher ratings and delays in downgrades, provide the credit rating agencies’ 

revenues, while the purchasers of structured finance products, who use credit ratings as 

indicators of risk, neither play a role in the ratings process nor have a way of holding credit 

rating agencies accountable for inaccuracies.43 One commenter cites a working paper testing

whether credit ratings contain the same information across asset classes.

44 One finding in that

working paper is that – compared to traditional corporate bonds – structured finance products 

receive more generous ratings, and “ratings standards are inversely correlated with revenue 

generation among the asset classes” (i.e., the more revenue a product brings in, the lower the 

ratings standards are for that product).45 The authors of this working paper attribute this finding 

to the conflicts of interest in the issuer-pay model.

46

Several commenters note that another aspect of structured finance products that 

exacerbates the conflicts of interest associated with the issuer-pay model is the complexity of the 

models used to rate structured finance products as compared to other products.

47 One 

commenter argues that this complexity heightens the risk that the rating process will be 

corrupted.48 Another commenter suggests that since the process is more opaque to outside 

 39 See Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 74 FR at 63844; 

Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 73 FR at 36219. See also Ellis, 

Fairchild, & D’Souza at 42 (“[P]ressures to ‘over-rate’ the issue are more intense in the case of structured 

products.”); Coffee, Turmoil in the U.S. Credit Markets: The Role of the Credit Rating Agencies at 7 (“No 

individual corporate issuer accounts for a significant share of the revenues of any rating agency.”).

40 See He, Qian & Strahan.

41 See Ellis, Fairchild, & D’Souza at 42.

42 Id.

43 See, e.g., the Franken/Wicker Letter and the Manns Letter.

44 See the Franken Letter (citing Cornaggia, Cornaggia, & Hund).

45 See Cornaggia, Cornaggia, & Hund.

46 Id.

47 See the AFR Letter and the Franken/Wicker Letter.

48 See the AFR Letter.
14

observers, it is easier for credit rating agencies to conceal illegitimate adjustments to the 

ratings.49 One study suggests that the more complex a product is, the greater the chance that 

different credit rating agencies may determine different credit ratings for the product, which 

increases the opportunity for the issuer to engage in “rating shopping.”50

Comparing the issuer-pay model to the subscriber-pay model, one NRSRO – which

historically has operated mainly under the subscriber-pay model but initiated an issuer-pay 

ratings service in 2010 – argues that the issuer-pay model is more susceptible to undue influence 

and manipulation.51 This NRSRO estimates that revenues from a one-year surveillance 

subscription are between 1%-20% of the revenues an NRSRO receives for issuing an initial 

rating for a structured finance product (initial ratings primarily are produced under the issuer-pay 

model).

52 Additionally, the commenter states that there are significantly fewer arrangers than 

there are potential subscribers.53 The NRSRO concludes that NRSROs are more susceptible to 

the undue influence of a single arranger under the issuer-pay model than they are to the influence 

of a single subscriber under the subscriber-pay model because a single arranger can have a much 

greater effect on the NRSRO’s revenues than any single subscriber.

54

The Commission requested empirical data, studies, or other information that would 

indicate conflicts of interest associated with the issuer-pay model influenced credit ratings.

55

Several commenters cited sources for the proposition that the conflict of interest inherent in the 

issuer-pay model leads to inflated credit ratings for structured finance products.

56 For example, 

two commenters cite a study that indicates that the downgrades of structured finance products 

during the 2007-2008 credit crisis were much more severe than downgrades of corporate bonds 

during the 2001-2002 recession.

57 The authors of this study state:

Our regression analysis shows that tranches with one rater only were 

more likely to be downgraded—a finding consistent with issuers 

shopping for the highest ratings available from the rating agencies. 

Consistent with claims made in the news media, we find evidence that 

Standard & Poor’s (S&P’s) ratings were somewhat inflated. Our 

regressions show that tranches rated by S&P only were more likely 

than tranches rated by either Moody’s or Fitch to be downgraded 

subsequently. While some “rating shopping” probably took place, 

more than 80% of all tranches were rated by either two or three 

 49 See the Franken/Wicker Letter.

50 See Skreta & Veldkamp.

51 See the Morningstar Letter.

52 Id.

53 Id.

54 Id.

55 See Solicitation of Comment to Assist in Study on Assigned Credit Ratings, 76 FR at 28269.

56 See the AFR Letter, the AFSCME Letter, and the Franken/Wicker Letter.

57 See the Franken/Wicker Letter (citing Benmelech & Dlugosz). 
15

agencies and were less prone to rating shopping. We also provide 

anecdotal evidence that one of the main causes of the credit rating 

disaster was overreliance on statistical models that failed to account 

for default correlation at a macroeconomic level.58 

Several commenters also cite an investigation by the Permanent Subcommittee on 

Investigations of the U.S. Senate.59 The report resulting from this investigation concluded that 

“a host of factors [were] responsible for the inaccurate credit ratings issued by Moody’s and 

S&P” in the lead up to the 2008 financial crisis, but that “one significant cause was the inherent 

conflict of interest arising from the system used to pay for credit ratings.”60 Additional factors 

responsible for the inaccurate ratings cited in the report include rating models that failed to 

include relevant mortgage performance data, unclear and subjective criteria used to produce 

ratings, a failure to apply updated rating models to existing rated transactions, and a failure to

provide adequate staffing to perform rating and surveillance services, despite record revenues.61

A commenter also cites a paper that indicates that competition from a new entrant in the 

credit rating industry results in lower quality credit ratings from incumbents.62 This paper, 

however, also concluded that it “appears unlikely that ratings shopping or growth in overall 

market share can explain these patterns.”

63

One NRSRO cited a 2003 paper that found that reputation-related incentives, not issuerpays conflicts, influenced rating decisions.

64 The same NRSRO also cites a December 2003 

paper studying whether issuer-pay conflicts influenced ratings decisions, noting that its findings 

are consistent with the paper.65 The authors of the paper used a data set of about 2,000 credit 

rating migrations and found that reputation-related incentives – not issuer-pay conflicts –

influenced rating decisions.66 Specifically, the authors did not find any evidence consistent with 

rating agencies acting in the interests of issuers due to a conflict of interest but instead, found 

 58 See Benmelech and Dlugosz at 162.

59 See the AFR Letter, the AFSCME Letter, and the Franken/Wicker Letter (citing Wall Street and the 

Financial Crisis: Anatomy of a Financial Collapse, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, U.S. Senate 

(Apr. 13, 2011)).

60 See Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: Anatomy of a Financial Collapse, U.S. Senate at 7.

61 Id.

62 See the AFR Letter (citing Becker & Milbourn).

63 See Becker & Milbourn at 30.

64 See the Moody’s Letter (citing Measuring the Performance of Corporate Bond Ratings, Moody’s (Apr. 

2003)). Moody’s states that internal “research demonstrates that the issuer-pay era is actually associated 

with higher accuracy ratios, lower investment-grade loss rates, and higher downgrade rates.” 

65 See the Moody’s Letter (citing Daniel M. Covitz & Paul Harrison, Testing Conflicts of Interest at Bond 

Ratings Agencies with Market Anticipation: Evidence that Reputation Incentives Dominate, Board of 

Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2003), available at

http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2003/200368/200368pap.pdf).

66 See Covitz & Harrison.
16

evidence suggesting that rating agencies are relatively responsive to reputation concerns.

67 

Another NRSRO reports that it has conducted similar studies and states that it “has been utilizing 

an issuer-pays model for over 30 years and default and transition studies have clearly 

demonstrated strong correlations between ratings levels and the likelihood of default.”

68 

2. Subscriber-Pay Model

a. Overview

As with the issuer-pay model, the subscriber-pay model also presents certain conflicts of 

interest. These conflicts result because subscribers – the source of the NRSRO’s revenues –

could have an interest in specific credit ratings and, consequently, could exert pressure on the 

NRSRO to determine or maintain credit ratings that will result in outcomes that favor the 

subscriber.

69 For instance, subscribers may use the credit ratings of the NRSRO to comply with, 

and obtain benefits or relief under, statutes and regulations using the term “NRSRO,” or 

subscribers may own investments or have entered into transactions that could be favorably or 

adversely impacted by a credit rating issued by the NRSRO. In other words, a subscriber (like 

an issuer) may have an interest in the NRSRO determining or maintaining a particular credit 

rating. In cases where the interests of a substantial number of subscribers are aligned, this 

potential conflict may be heightened. 

b. Comments on the Subscriber-Pay Model 

The Commission requested comments regarding the conflicts of interest inherent in the 

subscriber-pay model.

70 Several commenters note that subscribers have their own interests in 

credit ratings.

71 One NRSRO states that a subscriber that is an investor seeking a higher risk 

premium might prefer a lower credit rating, while a subscriber that is a broker-dealer subject to 

net capital rules or a money market fund subject to investment quality requirements might prefer 

a higher credit rating.

72 Additionally, the NRSRO highlights that the subscriber-pay model 

generally does not allow for broad market scrutiny of credit ratings because – unlike the issuerpay model – the credit ratings are not widely disseminated to the public.73 The NRSRO argues 

that widespread public dissemination of issuer-paid credit ratings provides quality control.74 

 67 See id.

68 See the S&P Letter (citing S&P’s Global Structured Finance Default Study – 1978-2010, S&P (Mar. 28, 

2011)).

69 See 2011 Summary Report of Commission Staff’s Examinations of Each Nationally Recognized Statistical 

Rating Organization, Commission staff.

70 See Solicitation of Comment to Assist in Study on Assigned Credit Ratings, 76 FR at 28269.

71 See the AFR Letter, the AFSCME Letter, and the CRE Letter.

72 See the S&P Letter.

73 Id.

74 Id.
17

Commenters did not provide empirical data, studies, or other information that the 

conflicts of interest associated with the subscriber-pay model influenced credit ratings. This may 

be because of the relatively small number of structured finance products that have been rated by 

NRSROs using the subscriber-pay model.

D. Measures to Mitigate Conflicts of Interest

The sections below discuss measures that help to mitigate the conflicts of interests 

inherent in the credit rating industry.

1. Statutes and Commission Rules

a. Overview of Requirements Designed to Address NRSRO 

Conflicts

As discussed above in section I.C, the Rating Agency Act of 2006 and the Commission’s 

rules thereunder established a registration and oversight program for NRSROs. Under this 

program, NRSROs are subject to a number of requirements designed to address conflicts of 

interest. For example, NRSROs are required to publicly disclose certain information in Form 

NRSRO.75 This information includes: (1) a list describing, in general terms, the types of 

conflicts of interest that arise from the NRSRO’s business activities;76 and (2) a copy of the 

written policies and procedures the NRSRO establishes, maintains, and enforces to address and 

manage conflicts of interest.

77 Section 15E(h)(1) of the Exchange Act requires an NRSRO to 

establish, maintain, and enforce policies and procedures reasonably designed, taking into 

consideration the nature of its business, to address and manage conflicts of interest.78 

Section 15E(h)(2) of the Exchange Act requires the Commission to adopt rules to 

prohibit or require the management and disclosure of conflicts of interest relating to the issuance 

of credit ratings.79 The statute also identifies certain types of conflicts relating to the issuance of 

credit ratings that the Commission may address in its rules.80 Furthermore, it contains a catchall 

provision for any other potential conflict of interest that the Commission deems is necessary or 

appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors to address in its rules.81 The 

Commission implemented these statutory provisions through the adoption of Rule 17g-5 under 

the Exchange Act.

82 This rule prohibits certain types of conflicts if the NRSRO has not 

 75 See Form NRSRO and the instructions to Form NRSRO (17 CFR 240.249b.300).

76 See Form NRSRO, Exhibit 6. 

77 See Form NRSRO, Exhibit 7.

78 15 U.S.C. 78o-7(h)(1).

79 15 U.S.C. 78o-7(h)(2).

80 See 15 U.S.C. 78o-7(h)(2)(A) through (D).

81 See 15 U.S.C. 78o-7(h)(2)(E).

82 See 17 CFR 240.17g-5.
18

disclosed the conflicts and established policies and procedures to manage the conflicts.

83 The 

rule also prohibits certain types of conflicts outright.84 Consequently, an NRSRO would violate 

 83 See 17 CFR 240.17g-5(a) and (b). Paragraph (a) of Rule 17g-5 prohibits a person within an NRSRO from 

having a conflict of interest relating to the issuance of a credit rating that is identified in paragraph (b) of 

the rule unless the NRSRO has disclosed the type of conflict of interest in Exhibit 6 to Form NRSRO and 

has implemented policies and procedures to address and manage the type of conflict of interest in 

accordance with Section 15E(h)(1) of the Exchange Act. The following conflicts are identified in 

paragraph (b) of Rule 17g-5 and, therefore, subject to the provisions of paragraph (a):

 Being paid by issuers or underwriters to determine credit ratings with respect to securities or money 

market instruments they issue or underwrite; 

 Being paid by obligors to determine credit ratings with respect to the obligors;

 Being paid for services in addition to determining credit ratings by issuers, underwriters, or obligors that 

have paid the NRSRO to determine a credit rating;

 Being paid by persons for subscriptions to receive or access the credit ratings of the NRSRO and/or for 

other services offered by the NRSRO where such persons may use the credit ratings of the NRSRO to 

comply with, and obtain benefits or relief under, statutes and regulations using the term “NRSRO;”

 Being paid by persons for subscriptions to receive or access the credit ratings of the NRSRO and/or for 

other services offered by the NRSRO where such persons also may own investments or have entered into 

transactions that could be favorably or adversely impacted by a credit rating issued by the NRSRO;

 Allowing persons within the NRSRO to directly own securities or money market instruments of, or 

having other direct ownership interests in, issuers or obligors subject to a credit rating determined by the 

NRSRO;

 Allowing persons within the NRSRO to have a business relationship that is more than an arms length 

ordinary course of business relationship with issuers or obligors subject to a credit rating determined by 

the NRSRO;

 Having a person associated with the NRSRO that is a broker or dealer engaged in the business of 

underwriting securities or money market instruments;

 Issuing or maintaining a credit rating for a security or money market instrument issued by an asset pool 

or as part of any asset-backed or mortgage-backed securities transaction that was paid for by the issuer, 

sponsor, or underwriter of the security or money market instrument; and

 Any other type of conflict of interest relating to the issuance of credit ratings by the NRSRO that is 

material to the NRSRO and that is identified by the NRSRO in Exhibit 6 to Form NRSRO.

84 See 17 CFR 240.17g-5(c). Paragraph (c) of Rule 17g-5 specifically prohibits outright the following seven 

types of conflicts of interest: 

 The NRSRO issues or maintains a credit rating solicited by a person that, in the most recently ended 

fiscal year, provided the NRSRO with net revenue (as reported under Rule 17g-3) equalling or exceeding 

10% of the total net revenue of the NRSRO for the fiscal year;

 The NRSRO issues or maintains a credit rating with respect to a person (excluding a sovereign nation or 

an agency of a sovereign nation) where the NRSRO, a credit analyst that participated in determining the 

credit rating, or a person responsible for approving the credit rating, directly owns securities of, or has 

any other direct ownership interest in, the person that is subject to the credit rating;

 The NRSRO issues or maintains a credit rating with respect to a person associated with the NRSRO; 

 The NRSRO issues or maintains a credit rating where a credit analyst who participated in determining 

the credit rating, or a person responsible for approving the credit rating, is an officer or director of the 

person that is subject to the credit rating;
19

the rule if it issues or maintains a credit rating while having these conflicts regardless of whether 

it had disclosed the conflicts and established procedures to address them.85 Furthermore, as 

discussed in more detail in section V below, Rule 17g-5 has provisions designed to address the 

issuer-pay conflict as it relates to structured finance products by providing a mechanism for 

NRSROs to determine unsolicited credit ratings for these instruments.86

The Dodd-Frank Act established additional requirements with respect to conflicts of 

interest. For example, section 932(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act added new paragraph (4) to section 

15E(h) of the Exchange Act.87 Sections 15E(h)(4)(A)(i) and (ii) of the Exchange Act require an 

NRSRO to establish, maintain, and enforce policies and procedures reasonably designed to 

ensure that, in any case in which an employee of a person subject to a credit rating of the 

NRSRO or the issuer, underwriter, or sponsor of a security or money market instrument subject

to a credit rating of the NRSRO, was employed by the NRSRO and participated in any capacity 

in determining credit ratings for the person or the securities or money market instruments during 

the 1-year period preceding the date an action was taken with respect to the credit rating, the 

NRSRO shall: (1) conduct a review to determine whether any conflicts of interest of the 

employee influenced the credit rating (a “look-back review”); and (2) take action to revise the 

rating if appropriate, in accordance with such rules as the Commission shall prescribe.88 

Consequently, section 15E(h)(4)(A)(i) of the Exchange Act contains a self-executing provision 

requiring an NRSRO to establish, maintain, and enforce policies and procedures to conduct lookback reviews, and section 15E(h)(4)(ii) contains a provision mandating Commission rulemaking 

with respect to requirements for an NRSRO to revise a credit rating in certain circumstances.89 

The Commission has proposed a new rule to implement the rulemaking required in section 

15E(h)(4)(A)(ii) of the Exchange Act.90

 

 The NRSRO issues or maintains a credit rating with respect to an obligor or security where the NRSRO 

or a person associated with the nationally recognized statistical rating organization made 

recommendations to the obligor or the issuer, underwriter, or sponsor of the security about the corporate 

or legal structure, assets, liabilities, or activities of the obligor or issuer of the security;

 The NRSRO issues or maintains a credit rating where the fee paid for the rating was negotiated, 

discussed, or arranged by a person within the NRSRO who has responsibility for participating in 

determining credit ratings or for developing or approving procedures or methodologies used for 

determining credit ratings, including qualitative and quantitative models; and

 The NRSRO issues or maintains a credit rating where a credit analyst who participated in determining or 

monitoring the credit rating, or a person responsible for approving the credit rating received gifts, 

including entertainment, from the obligor being rated, or from the issuer, underwriter, or sponsor of the 

securities being rated, other than items provided in the context of normal business activities such as 

meetings that have an aggregate value of no more than $25.

85 Id.

86 See 17 CFR 240.17g-5(a)(3) and (b)(9).

87 Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 932(a) and 15 U.S.C. 78o-7(h)(4).

88 See 15 U.S.C. 78o-7(h)(4)(A)(i) and (ii) (emphasis added).

89 Id.

90 See Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 76 FR at 33429-31 (the 

new rule would require that the policies and procedures the NRSRO establishes, maintains, and enforces 

pursuant to Section 15E(h)(4)(A) of the Exchange Act must address instances in which a review conducted 
20

In addition, section 932(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act added new paragraph (5) to section 

15E(h) of the Exchange Act.91 Section 15E(h)(5)(A) of the Exchange Act requires each NRSRO 

to report to the Commission any case the NRSRO knows or can reasonably be expected to know 

where a person associated with the NRSRO within the previous five years obtains employment 

with any obligor, issuer, underwriter, or sponsor of a security or money market instrument for 

which the NRSRO issued a credit rating during the 12-month period prior to such employment, if 

such employee was: (1) a senior officer of such NRSRO, (2) participated in any capacity in 

determining credit ratings for the covered company, or (3) supervised an employee who 

participated in any capacity in determining credit ratings for the covered company.92 Section 

15E(h)(5)(B) of the Exchange Act requires that upon receiving such a report, the Commission 

must make such information publicly available.93 In order to facilitate implementation of these 

requirements, the Commission established a means for NRSROs to submit these reports

electronically via the Commission’s Internet website for NRSRO related matters.94 In addition, a 

link to the reports submitted by NRSROs is publicly available on the same Internet web page.

Section 932(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act also added new paragraph (3) to section 15E(h) of 

the Exchange Act.95 Section 15E(h)(3)(A) of the Exchange Act provides that the Commission 

shall issue rules to prevent the sales and marketing considerations of an NRSRO from 

influencing the production of credit ratings by the NRSRO.96 The Commission has proposed 

amendments to Rule 17g-5 to implement the rulemaking required in section 15E(h)(3)(A) of the 

Exchange Act by establishing a new outright prohibition on conflicts of interest relating to sales 

and marketing activities.

97

b. Comments on Requirements Designed to Address NRSRO 

Conflicts

 

pursuant to those policies and procedures determines that a conflict of interest influenced a credit rating 

assigned to an obligor, security, or money market instrument by including, at a minimum, procedures that 

are reasonably designed to ensure the NRSRO will: (1) immediately place the credit rating on credit watch; 

(2) promptly determine whether the credit rating must be revised so it no longer is influenced by a conflict 

of interest and is solely the product of the NRSRO’s documented procedures and methodologies for 

determining credit ratings; and (3) promptly publish a revised credit rating, if appropriate, or affirm the 

credit rating if appropriate).

91 Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 932(a) and 15 U.S.C. 78o-7(h)(5).

92 See 15 U.S.C. 78o-7(h)(5)(A).

93 See 15 U.S.C. 78o-7(h)(5)(B). 

94 See http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/ratingagency.htm.

95 Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 932(a) and 15 U.S.C. 78o-7(h)(3).

96 15 U.S.C. 78o-7(h)(3)(A).

97 See Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 76 FR at 33425-26 (the 

proposed rule would prohibit an NRSRO from issuing or maintaining a credit rating where a person within 

the NRSRO who participates in the sales or marketing of a product or service of the NRSRO or a product 

or service of a person associated with the NRSRO also participates in determining or monitoring the credit 

rating, or developing or approving procedures or methodologies used for determining the credit rating, 

including qualitative or quantitative models).
21

The Commission requested comments on whether there were empirical data, studies, or 

other information that the statutory and regulatory requirements designed to address conflicts of 

interest have not mitigated the conflicts of interest in rating structured finance products.

98 In 

requesting comment, the Commission noted that much of the NRSRO activity in rating RMBS 

and CDOs linked to subprime mortgages occurred prior to the effectiveness of these 

requirements.

99 

One commenter claims that section 932 of the Dodd-Frank Act sufficiently addresses 

conflicts of interests, and “obviates the need for an assignment system by a ‘Credit Rating 

Agency.’”100 The commenter argues that the rules promulgated by the SEC pursuant to the 

Dodd-Frank Act, unlike the proposed Section 15E(w) System, address conflicts of interest 

without endangering the viability of the credit rating process.101 Another commenter states that 

the Commission has made significant efforts with respect to managing conflicts of interest in the 

industry, but notes that eliminating conflicts in their entirety would be impossible.

102 The 

commenter also emphasizes that, in addition to the NRSRO oversight and registration program in 

the U.S., the International Organization of Securities Commissions has promulgated a code of 

conduct for rating agencies, which most, if not all, NRSROs follow.

103 The code includes 

measures to ensure the quality and integrity of the ratings process which the credit rating 

industry is pursuing. Another commenter opines that the Commission’s current regulations, with 

some modifications, coupled with the many other reforms required under the Dodd-Frank Act 

will better serve the public interest and the protection of investors than implementation of the 

Section 15E(w) System.

104

c. Other Structured Finance Initiatives

The Commission has undertaken a number of initiatives with respect to structured finance 

(the “structured finance initiatives”). For example, in April 2010, the Commission proposed 

certain revisions to the existing rules applicable to certain structured finance transactions.105 The 

proposals, among other things, would require issuers of structured finance products, including

RMBS and other ABS, to disclose additional information about the assets underlying the 

products.106 For example, the issuer would be required to file with the Commission tagged, 

 98 See Solicitation of Comment to Assist in Study on Assigned Credit Ratings, 76 FR at 28269.

99 Id. See also Summary Report of Issues Identified in the Commission Staff’s Examinations of Select Credit 

Rating Agencies, Commission staff (July 2008), available at

http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/craexamination070808.pdf.

100 See the Redwood Letter. 

101 Id.

102 See the SIFMA Letter (citing the following regulations issued by the Commission under the Exchange: 17 

CFR 240.17g-2; 17 CFR 240.17g-5; 17 CFR 240.17g-6; and 17 CFR 240.17g-7). 

103 Id.

104 See the ASF Letter.

105 See Asset-Backed Securities, Securities Act Release No. 9117 (Apr. 7, 2010), 75 FR 23328 (May 3, 2010).

106 Id.
22

computer-readable, standardized information about the specific assets, or loans, in the pool. The 

issuer also would be required to file a computer program that provides investors with a tool to 

analyze information about specific loans within the pool of assets. These proposals are intended 

to provide investors with timely and sufficient information that they can access and review 

independently and thereby reduce the likelihood of undue reliance on credit ratings. 

The Dodd-Frank Act also imposes other requirements on structured finance products. 

For example, section 942(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act amended section 7(c) of the Securities Act to 

require the Commission to implement regulations requiring an issuer of an ABS to disclose, for 

each tranche or class of security, certain loan-level information regarding the assets backing the 

security.

107 In light of section 942(b), the Commission requested comment on certain portions of 

the April 2010 proposal to require asset-level information to assist it in considering whether that 

requirement appropriately implements section 942(b) and whether additional information may be 

required. The staff expects to make recommendations to the Commission on these proposals in 

the coming months. 

Section 941 of the Dodd-Frank Act amended the Exchange Act to add section 15G.108 

Section 15G requires the Commission, the Federal banking agencies, and, with respect to 

residential mortgages, the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development and the Federal 

Housing Finance Agency, to prescribe rules to require that a securitizer retain an economic 

interest in a material portion of the credit risk for any asset that it transfers, sells, or conveys to a 

third party.109 The chairperson of the Financial Stability Oversight Council is tasked with 

coordinating this regulatory effort.110 In March 2011, the Commission proposed rules (jointly 

with the other agencies) to implement the risk retention provisions in section 941.111

Section 943 of the Dodd-Frank Act required the Commission to issue rules on the use of 

representations and warranties in the market for ABS. In January 2011, the Commission adopted 

final rules implementing section 943.112 The final rules require securitizers to file with the 

Commission, in tabular format, information about the history of repurchase requests they 

received and repurchases they made relating to their outstanding ABS. The final rules also 

require NRSROs to provide a description of the representations, warranties and enforcement 

mechanisms available to investors in an ABS offering. 

Section 945 of the Dodd-Frank Act amended section 7 of the Securities Act to require the 

Commission to issue rules requiring certain structured finance issuers in a Securities Act 

 107 See Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 942(b) and 15 U.S.C. 78o(d).

108 See Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 941 and 15 U.S.C. 78o-11.

109 See 15 U.S.C. 78o-11.

110 Id.

111 See Credit Risk Retention, Exchange Act Release No. 64148 (Mar. 31, 2011), 76 FR 24090 (Apr. 29, 

2011).

112 See Disclosure for Asset-Backed Securities Required by Section 943 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 

Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Securities Act Release No. 9175 (Jan. 20, 2011), 76 FR 4489 (Jan. 

26, 2011). 
23

registered transaction to perform a review of the assets underlying the structured finance product, 

and disclose the nature of such review.113 In January 2011, the Commission adopted final rules 

implementing section 945.114 These final rules also require issuers to disclose: 

 Information about how the loans in the pool differ from the loan underwriting criteria 

disclosed in the prospectus; 

 Information about loans that did not meet the disclosed underwriting criteria but were 

nonetheless included in the pool; and

 Information about the entity that made the determination that such loans should be 

included in the pool, despite not having met the disclosed underwriting standards. 

Section 621 of the Dodd-Frank Act added section 27B to the Securities Act.115 Section 

27B of the Securities Act prohibits an underwriter, placement agent, initial purchaser, sponsor, or 

any affiliate or subsidiary of any such entity, of ABS from engaging in any transaction that 

would involve or result in any material conflict of interest with respect to any investor in a 

transaction arising out of such activity for a period of one year after the date of the first closing 

of the sale of the ABS.

116 In September 2011, the Commission proposed rules to implement 

section 27B.117

2. Reducing Reliance on Credit Ratings

a. Overview

Reducing reliance on credit ratings could mitigate conflicts of interest to the extent that 

it causes investors to use factors other than credit ratings to make investment decisions. If credit 

ratings are no longer used in statutes and regulations to confer benefits or relief, the incentive to 

obtain credit ratings that meet these requirements should be eliminated. However, credit ratings 

also are used in investment guidelines and private contracts such as collateral agreements. 

Similar to statutory and regulatory uses of credit ratings, investment guidelines and private 

contract use of credit ratings create incentives for issuers to obtain credit ratings at certain 

levels. 

With respect to statutory and regulatory use of credit ratings, section 939A of the DoddFrank Act requires Federal agencies to “review any regulation issued by such agency that 

requires the use of an assessment of the credit-worthiness of a security or money market 

 113 See Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 945 and 15 U.S.C. 77g(d).

114 See Issuer Review of Assets in Offerings of Asset-Backed Securities, Securities Act Release No. 9176 (Jan. 

20, 2011), 76 FR 4231 (Jan. 25, 2011).

115 See Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 621 and 15 U.S.C. 77z-2a.

116 See 15 U.S.C. 77z-2a.

117 See Prohibition Against Conflicts of Interest in Certain Securitizations, Exchange Act Release No. 65355 

(Sep. 19, 2011), 76 FR 60320 (Sep. 28, 2011). 
24

instrument and any references to or requirements in such regulations regarding credit 

ratings.”118 Once the agency has completed that review, the statute provides that the agency

“remove any reference to or requirement of reliance on credit ratings, and to substitute in such 

regulations such standard of credit-worthiness” as the agency determines to be appropriate.119 

In addition, sections 939(c) and 939(e) of the Dodd-Frank Act deleted references to credit 

ratings in Federal statutes.120

The Commission began to remove references to credit ratings in its rules prior to the 

enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act. Specifically, in July 2008, the Commission proposed 

removing references to NRSROs in its rules.121 In 2009, the Commission adopted some of the 

proposals and reopened others for comment.122 In 2010, as part of the proposal discussed above,

the Commission proposed to remove references to NRSROs in the context of registered assetbacked offerings.123 Also in 2010, the Commission amended Rule 2a-7 under the Investment 

Company Act, which governs the operation of money market funds, to eliminate a requirement 

that an asset-backed security may be rated by at least one NRSRO in order to be an eligible 

security that a money market fund may acquire.124

In response to the Dodd-Frank Act, the Commission again proposed amendments to 

remove remaining references to NRSROs in its rules.

125 In July 2011, the Commission adopted 

 118 See Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 939A(a)(1)-(2). 

119 See Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 939A(b). 

120 Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 939(e). The Commission issued interpretative guidance and a request for comment 

on the definitions of the terms “mortgage related security” and “small business related security” in sections 

3(a)(41) and 3(a)(53)(A) of the Exchange Act, respectively, in light of section 939(e) of the Dodd-Frank 

Act. See Exchange Act Release No. 67448 (Jul. 17, 2012), 77 FR 42980 (Jul. 23, 2012). The Commission 

also adopted new Rule 6a-5 under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (“Investment Company Act”) to 

establish a standard of creditworthiness in place of a statutory reference to credit ratings in section 

6(a)(5)(A)(iv)(I), which was removed by section 939(c) of the Dodd-Frank Act. See Purchase of Certain 

Debt Securities by Business and Industrial Development Companies Relying on an Investment Company 

Act Exemption, Investment Company Act Release No. 30268 (Nov. 19, 2012), 77 FR 70117 (Nov. 23, 

2012). This rule has an effective date of December 24, 2012. 

121 See References to Ratings of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Exchange Act 

Release No. 58070 (Jul. 1, 2008), 73 FR 40088 (Jul. 11, 2008); Security Ratings, Securities Act Release 

No. 8940 (Jul. 1, 2008), 73 FR 40106; References to Ratings of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 

Organizations, Investment Company Act Release No. 28327 (Jul. 1, 2008), 73 FR 40124 (Jul. 11, 2008). 

122 See References to Ratings of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Exchange Act 

Release No. 60789 (Oct. 5, 2009), 74 FR 52358 (Oct. 9, 2009). On the same day, in a companion release, 

the Commission also re-opened comment for rules under the Exchange Act, Investment Company Act and 

Investment Advisers Act. See References to Ratings of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 

Organizations, Securities Act Release No. 9069 (Oct. 5, 2009), 74 FR 52374 (Oct. 9, 2011).

123 See Asset-Backed Securities, Securities Act Release No. 9117 (Apr. 7, 2010), 75 FR 23328 (May 3, 2010).

124 See Money Market Fund Reform, Investment Company Act Release No. 29132 (Feb. 23, 2012), 75 FR 

10060 (Mar. 4, 2010) at section II.A.3.

125 See Removal of Certain References to Credit Ratings under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 

Exchange Act Release No. 64352 (Apr. 27, 2011), 76 FR 26550 (May 6, 2011). See References to Credit 

Ratings in Certain Investment Company Act Rules and Forms, Securities Act Release No. 9193 (Mar. 3, 
25

amendments removing references to credit ratings from the eligibility criteria for Form S-3 and 

Form F-3 and replacing those references with alternative criteria. The Commission amended 

Rules 138, 139 and 168 under the Securities Act to reflect the new criteria in form S-3 and Form 

F-3. The Commission rescinded Form F-9 because regulatory changes rendered the form 

unnecessary. The Commission also removed paragraph (a)(17) of Securities Act Rule 134, 

because the Commission did not believe that this provision was consistent with section 939A of 

the Dodd-Frank Act.

126 

b. Comments on Reducing Reliance on Credit Ratings

The Commission requested comments on the effectiveness that removing references to 

credit ratings in statutes and regulations would have on mitigating conflicts of interest.

127 One 

NRSRO asserts that removing references to credit ratings from rules and regulations removes 

one of the incentives for issuers to engage in “rating shopping.”

128 The NRSRO argues that 

investors will not be as motivated to conduct their own credit analysis if the regulations permit 

them to use an officially recognized rating without independently assessing the quality and 

usefulness of the rating, and reliance on officially recognized ratings (as opposed to independent 

analysis) could encourage issuers to shop for the officially recognized credit rating agency that 

will assign the highest possible rating.129 However, another NRSRO disagrees and states that it 

does not see any “basis for concluding that the removal of ratings from rules and regulations 

would mitigate conflicts of interest.”130 

3. Reputational Risk

a. Overview

Reputational risk could potentially mitigate the conflicts of interest inherent in the credit 

rating industry. Because investors and other users of the credit ratings value quality ratings, 

credit rating agencies operating under the issuer-pay model could attract business from issuers if 

they have a reputation among investors for producing quality credit ratings. Similarly, credit 

rating agencies operating under the subscriber-pay model could attract business from subscribers 

(i.e., investors and other users of credit ratings) if they have a reputation for producing quality 

credit ratings. This could motivate credit rating agencies to address conflicts of interest that 

could result in biased credit ratings if not managed.

 2011), 76 FR 12896 (Mar. 9, 2011) and Security Ratings, Securities Act Release No. 63874 (Feb. 9, 2011), 

76 FR 8946 (Feb. 16, 2011). 

126 See Security Ratings, Securities Act Release No. 9245 (Jul. 27, 2011), 76 FR 46603 (Aug. 3, 2011).

127 See Solicitation of Comment to Assist in Study on Assigned Credit Ratings, 76 FR at 28269.

128 See the Moody’s Letter.

129 Id. Moody’s states that: “[t]his is particularly an issue in the structured finance market, where regulatory 

use is overwhelmingly skewed toward holding securities that have been rated Aaa by at least one NRSRO 

(but that need not hold a high rating from any other [credit rating agency]).”

130 See the S&P Letter.
26

However, some observers have argued that credit rating agencies – as opposed to other 

“gatekeepers” – may be less motivated by concerns about reputational risk.

131 These observers 

argue that credit rating agencies are different from other gatekeepers due to certain 

characteristics of the credit rating industry, which include a lack of competition (or oligopolistic 

market), immunity from liability, and the conflicts of interest associated with the issuer-pay 

model.132

The level of complexity of the instrument being rated also has been cited as a factor 

affecting the influence of reputational risk on credit rating agencies.

133 Specifically, the authors 

of one study argue that the opacity of the instrument diminishes the effectiveness of reputational 

concern on maintaining ratings quality.134 The authors contend that concerns about reputation 

only work when a sufficiently large fraction of the rating agency income results from sources 

other than rating complex products.135 They cite empirical results to support this conclusion.

136

Another study has found that competition in the credit rating industry diminishes the role 

of reputational concerns on the ratings quality.

137 It uses the entrance of Fitch into the credit 

ratings market as a unique experiment to examine how increased competition affects the 

market.138 The paper finds that competition resulted in an increase in credit rating levels, a 

decline in the correlation between credit ratings and market-implied yields, and a decrease in the 

ability of ratings to predict default.

139 Another study suggests that the disciplining role of 

reputational concerns diminishes during economic “boom” times and that for this reason ratings 

quality is countercyclical.140 Consequently, the study finds that credit rating agencies are more 

likely to issue lower quality ratings when their income from fees is high, the competition in the 

labor market for analysts is strong, and the default probabilities for the rated securities are low.

b. Comments on Reputational Risk

The Commission sought comment on how reputation concerns may mitigate conflicts of 

interest.

141 Two commenters cite reputational risk as an important mitigant to the issuer-pay 

conflict of interest.142 One commenter opines that when rating agencies produce ratings that turn 

 131 See Lombard; see also Partnoy.

132 Id.

133 See Mathis, McAndrews & Rochet.

134 Id.

135 Id.

136 Id.

137 See Becker & Milbourn.

138 Id. 

139 Id. 

140 See Bar-Isaac & Shapiro.

141 See Solicitation of Comment to Assist in Study on Assigned Credit Ratings, 76 FR at 28269.

142 See the SIFMA Letter and the S&P Letter.
27

out to be inaccurate, investors are likely to give less weight to that agency’s ratings in the future 

and may even refuse to invest in transactions that are rated by that agency alone.143 The 

commenter claims that this, in turn, influences issuers to use different rating agencies in the 

future.144 Similarly, another commenter argues that if a significant number of market 

participants lose faith in a credit rating agency’s ability to accurately rate structured finance 

products, then that credit rating agency would not be able to succeed in the market.145 

Accordingly, the commenter concludes that rating agencies are incentivized to protect their 

reputations by putting procedures and controls in place to guard against potential conflicts of 

interest.146

4. Internal Controls

The Commission requested comment on the types of actions that NRSROs could take or 

have taken, or internal controls they could put in place or have put in place to mitigate conflicts 

of interest.

147 One NRSRO states that market and regulatory forces have encouraged and are 

continuing to encourage NRSROs to improve the way they manage conflicts of interest 

internally and to enhance the disclosures made available to investors regarding the NRSRO 

selection process.

148 Another commenter cites the oversight provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act, 

which include stricter internal and external oversight of conflicts of interest, and suggests that 

any evaluation of the current system should involve waiting a reasonable period of time to assess 

the efficacy of these new oversight provisions at mitigating the conflicts of interest in the current 

system.149

E. Benefits of the Current Rating System

The Commission solicited comment on the benefits of the current system for determining 

credit ratings for structured finance products.150 

A number of commenters identify potential benefits of the current system.

151 Some 

commenters state that the issuer-pay model gives investors free access to credit ratings, helping 

to mitigate the information asymmetry between investors and issuers.

152 For example, one 

commenter asserts that the issuer-pay model allows for broad market dissemination of credit 

 143 See the SIFMA Letter.

144 Id.

145 See the S&P Letter.

146 Id.

147 See Solicitation of Comment to Assist in Study on Assigned Credit Ratings, 76 FR at 28269.

148 See the Fitch Letter.

149 See the CRE Letter.

150 See Solicitation of Comment to Assist in Study on Assigned Credit Ratings, 76 FR at 28269.

151 See, e.g., the SIFMA Letter, the Moody’s Letter, the S&P Letter, the Morningstar Letter, and the FSR 

Letter.

152 See, e.g., the Moody’s Letter. 
28

ratings because the issuers fund the activities of the credit rating agencies.153 Similarly, other 

commenters highlight that under the issuer-pay system, the investing public can view the ratings 

simultaneously and for free.154 A third commenter asserts that this free flow of information 

creates a common basis for analyzing risk.155 A fourth commenter, an NRSRO, highlights the 

efficiency of the current system in bringing transactions to market.156 Another commenter 

argues that the current system gives issuers the autonomy to choose a credit rating agency 

acceptable to investors.157 The commenter states that frequently, investors require a credit rating 

from a certain agency as a condition to buying the securities, and the current system allows 

issuers to cater to these requests.158

IV. FEASIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING AN ASSIGNMENT SYSTEM FOR CREDIT 

RATINGS

Section 939F(b)(2) provides that the Commission shall carry out a study of the feasibility 

of establishing a system in which a public or private utility or an SRO assigns NRSROs to 

determine the credit ratings of structured finance products.159 In conducting the study, the 

Commission is required to consider four factors.

160 The Section 15E(w) System would establish 

an assignment system by creating a board to assign qualified NRSROs to rate structured finance 

products. The sections below describe the mechanics of the Section 15E(w) System and 

summarize comments received about the system in response to questions about the four factors 

specified section 939F(b)(2) and a framework developed by the U.S. Government Accountability 

Office (the “GAO”) to analyze alternative compensation models for NRSROs.

161 

A. Mechanics of the Section 15E(w) System

The Section 15E(w) System, among other things, would require the Commission to: (1) 

establish a board (“CRA Board”), which would be an SRO; (2) select the initial members of the 

CRA Board; and (3) establish a schedule to ensure that the CRA Board begins assigning 

“Qualified NRSROs” to provide initial ratings not later than one year after the selection of the 

members of the CRA Board.162 A “Qualified NRSRO” would be an NRSRO that the CRA 

 153 See the SIFMA Letter.

154 See the Moody’s Letter; see also the S&P Letter.

155 See the S&P Letter.

156 See the Morningstar Letter.

157 See the FSR Letter.

158 Id.

159 See Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 939F(b)(2).

160 See Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 939F(b)(2)(A) through (D). 

161 See Securities and Exchange Commission Action Needed to Improve Rating Agency Registration Program 

and Performance-Related Disclosures, GAO Report 10-782 (Sep. 2010) (“GAO Report”).

162 See subparagraph (2)(A) of the Section 15E(w) Provisions. The CRA Board initially would be composed 

of an odd number of members selected from the industry, with the total numerical membership of the CRA 

Board to be determined by the Commission. See subparagraph (2)(C)(i) of the Section 15E(w) Provisions. 

Of the members initially selected to serve on the CRA Board: (1) not less than a majority of the members 
29

Board determines is qualified to issue initial credit ratings with respect to one or more categories 

of structured finance products.163 

An issuer that seeks an initial credit rating for a structured finance product would be 

prohibited from requesting such a rating from an NRSRO and, instead, would be required to 

submit a request for the initial credit rating to the CRA Board.164 The CRA Board would select a 

Qualified NRSRO to provide the initial credit rating to the issuer.165 A Qualified NRSRO 

selected to determine an initial credit rating could refuse to accept a particular request by 

notifying the CRA Board of such refusal and submitting to the CRA Board a written explanation 

of the refusal.166 The CRA Board then would select a different Qualified NRSRO to determine 

the initial credit rating.167 Qualified NRSROs would be able to determine fees unless the CRA 

Board determines it is necessary to issue rules on fees.168 If rules are deemed necessary, a 

 would need to be representatives of the investor industry who do not represent issuers; (2) not less than one 

member would need to be a representative of the issuer industry; (3) not less than one member would need 

to be a representative of the credit rating agency industry; and (4) not less than one member would need to 

be an independent member. See subparagraphs (2)(C)(ii)(I) through (IV) of the Section 15E(w) Provisions. 

The initial members of the CRA Board would be appointed to terms of four years. See subparagraph 

(2)(C)(i) of the Section 15E(w) Provisions. Prior to the expiration of the terms of office of the initial CRA 

Board members, the Commission would be required to establish fair procedures for the nomination and 

election of future members of the Board. See subparagraph (2)(C)(iv) of the Section 15E(w) Provisions.

163 See subparagraphs (1)(B) and (3) of the Section 15E(w) Provisions. An NRSRO seeking to become a 

Qualified NRSRO with respect to a category of structured finance products would need to submit an 

application to the CRA Board. See subparagraphs (3)(A) and (B) of the Section 15E(w) Provisions. The 

application would need to contain: (1) information about the institutional and technical capacity of the 

NRSRO to issue credit ratings; (2) information on whether the NRSRO has been exempted by the 

Commission from any requirements under Section 15E of the Exchange Act; and (3) any additional 

information the Board may require. See subparagraphs (3)(A)(ii)(I) through (III) of the Section 15E(w) 

Provisions.

164 See subparagraph (4) of the Section 15E(w) Provisions. An issuer would be permitted to request or receive 

additional credit ratings for the structured finance product if the initial credit rating is provided using the 

CRA Board assignment process. See subparagraph (9) of the Section 15E(w) Provisions.

165 See subparagraph (5)(A) of the Section 15E(w) Provisions. The method of selecting the Qualified NRSRO 

would be based on an evaluation by the CRA Board of a number of alternatives designed to reduce the 

conflicts of interest that exist under the issuer-pays model, including a lottery or rotating assignment 

system. See subparagraph (5)(B) of the Section 15E(w) Provisions. In addition, in evaluating the selection 

method, the CRA Board would be required to consider: (1) the information submitted by the Qualified 

NRSRO in its application to become a Qualified NRSRO regarding the institutional and technical capacity 

of the Qualified NRSRO to issue credit ratings; (2) an, at least, annual evaluation of the performance of 

each Qualified NRSRO; (3) formal feedback from institutional investors; and (4) information from items 

(1) and (2) to implement a mechanism which increases or decreases assignments based on past 

performance. See subparagraph (5)(B)(ii) of the Section 15E(w) Provisions. The CRA Board, in choosing 

a selection method, would not be able to use a method that allows for the solicitation or consideration of the 

preferred NRSRO of the issuer. See subparagraph (5)(B)(iii) of the Section 15E(w) Provisions.

166 See subparagraph (5)(C)(i) of the Section 15E(w) Provisions.

167 See subparagraph (5)(C)(ii) of the Section 15E(w) Provisions.

168 See subparagraph (8)(B) of the Section 15E(w) Provisions.
30

Qualified NRSRO would be required to charge an issuer a reasonable fee as determined by the 

Commission.169 

The CRA Board would be required to prescribe rules by which it evaluates the 

performance of each Qualified NRSRO, including rules that require, at a minimum, an annual 

evaluation of each Qualified NRSRO.170 The CRA Board, in conducting the annual evaluation,

would be required to consider: (1) the results of an annual examination of the Qualified NRSRO; 

(2) surveillance of credit ratings conducted by the Qualified NRSRO after the credit ratings are 

issued, including, how the rated instruments perform, the accuracy of the ratings as compared to 

the other NRSROs, and the effectiveness of the methodologies used by the Qualified NRSRO; 

and (3) any additional factors the CRA Board determines to be relevant.171

B. Statutory Factors

Section 939F(b)(2) specifies four specific factors the Commission should consider in 

studying the feasibility of establishing a system in which a public or private utility or an SRO 

assigns NRSROs to determine the credit ratings of structured finance products.

172 Those four 

factors are: (1) an assessment of potential mechanisms for determining fees for the NRSROs; (2) 

appropriate methods for paying fees to the NRSROs; (3) the extent to which the creation of such 

a system would be viewed as the creation of moral hazard by the Federal Government; and (4) 

any constitutional or other issues concerning the establishment of such a system.

173 Each of the 

four factors is discussed below in the context of the Section 15E(w) System, focusing on the 

comments received by the Commission on these issues.

1. Fee Determination

The first factor specified in section 939F(b)(2) is an assessment of potential mechanisms 

for determining fees for the NRSROs.

174 The Commission requested comments on this topic.175 

Commenters generally believe that market forces should set the fees, and that the CRA Board 

could intervene or provide oversight if there is disagreement among parties about the rating 

fees.176 Specifically, one commenter states that “[t]he market, not the Commission, should 

decide whether such fees are reasonable and commensurate with the services provided.”177 A 

 169 See subparagraph (8)(A) of the Section 15E(w) Provisions.

170 See subparagraph (7)(A) of the Section 15E(w) Provisions.

171 See subparagraph (7)(B) of the Section 15E(w) Provisions. While the evaluation contemplates an annual 

examination of the Qualified NRSRO, the Section 15E(w) Provisions do not contain an explicit 

requirement for the CRA Board to conduct an annual examination of each Qualified NRSRO. 

172 See Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 939F(b)(2)(A) through (D).

173 Id.

174 See Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 939F(b)(2)(A).

175 See Solicitation of Comment to Assist in Study on Assigned Credit Ratings, 76 FR at 28272.

176 See the S&P Letter, the Morningstar Letter, and the Franken/Wicker Letter.

177 See the S&P Letter.
31

second commenter adds that the CRA Board could monitor the market rates for services and 

provide guidance on those rates if fee discussions break down.178 Additionally, the commenter 

states that since issuers would still hire NRSROs directly to provide ratings in some instances, 

NRSROs would be incentivized to maintain competitive pricing and contract terms.179 A third 

commenter states that the system “contemplates minimal involvement of the ... board in the 

setting or collection of fees” and notes that the CRA Board would only intervene if rating 

agencies were charging unreasonable fees (as compared to fees charged for similar products not 

subject to the assignment system).180

2. Method of Payment

The second factor specified in section 939F(b)(2) is the appropriate methods for paying 

fees to the NRSROs.

181 The Commission requested comments on this topic.182 One commenter

notes that the Section 15E(w) System “does not prescribe a structure in which the board serves as 

an intermediary for the collection and distribution of fees.”183 Another commenter, an NRSRO,

states that board involvement in the collection and distribution of fees “would add significant 

expense.”

184

Related to this topic, the Commission also asked for comments on whether credit rating 

fees should be paid over time, based on the performance of the rated security.185 One NRSRO 

responded, indicating that it would not be “appropriate to withhold fees...[or] ‘return’ ratings 

fees to investors...[if] a rated security defaults [because] credit ratings are forward-looking 

expressions of opinion and not a guaranty of payment or other form or insurance.”186 

3. Moral Hazard

The third factor specified in section 939F(b)(2) is whether the creation of a board 

assignment system would be viewed as the creation of moral hazard by the Federal 

Government.

187 The Commission requested comments on this topic.188 A number of 

commenters expressed concerns that the system would signal that the government endorses 

 178 See the Morningstar Letter.

179 Id.

180 See the Franken/Wicker Letter.

181 See Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 939F(b)(2)(B).

182 See Solicitation of Comment to Assist in Study on Assigned Credit Ratings, 76 FR at 28272-73.

183 See the Franken/Wicker Letter.

184 See the S&P Letter.

185 See Solicitation of Comment to Assist in Study on Assigned Credit Ratings, 76 FR at 28273.

186 See the S&P Letter.

187 See Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 939F(b)(2)(C).

188 See Solicitation of Comment to Assist in Study on Assigned Credit Ratings, 76 FR at 28273.
32

reliance on credit ratings, and in particular, ratings from NRSROs that are deemed qualified by 

the CRA Board.189 

Commenters generally are concerned that the Section 15E(w) System is contrary to 

government efforts to reduce investor reliance on credit ratings and that investors would rely too 

heavily on ratings if they were deemed vetted by the CRA Board.190 One commenter argues that 

the system would further entrench certain NRSROs “by creating a government-sanctioned 

special category of NRSROs that are the only NRSROs that are permitted to issue initial credit 

ratings to issuers.”191 Another commenter argues that the system is inconsistent with 

government efforts to reduce reliance on ratings because investors might view the assigned 

NRSRO producing a rating as a government appointed and regulated entity.192 Similarly, other 

commenters argue that the ratings produced by the system could be viewed as having a 

government seal of approval, running counter to the goal of reducing reliance on ratings

generally.

193 Other commenters believe that investors would be less likely to perform 

appropriate analysis and due diligence if the ratings were seen as indirectly sanctioned by the 

government through the CRA Board or because the rating produced by the assigned NRSRO is 

the “right” or “government-sanctioned” rating.

194 Finally, multiple commenters argue that any 

disclaimer language would not be sufficient to counteract the impression that credit ratings are 

government sanctioned and the potential for moral hazard.195

Similarly, some commenters feel that investors could view the Section 15E(w) System as 

an implicit guarantee by the government.196 One commenter states that “investors may interpret 

government regulation of the rating agency selection process as an implicit guarantee of the 

ratings by the U.S. government, which would be inconsistent with policymakers’ efforts to 

eliminate perceptions that credit ratings have any government imprimatur.”197 Another 

commenter states that “greater government involvement in the [credit rating agency] industry 

 189 See the ASF Letter, the FSR Letter, the S&P Letter, the Kroll Letter, the Fitch Letter, the ICI Letter, the 

DBRS Letter, the SIFMA Letter, the CRE Letter, the Moody’s Letter, the Redwood Letter, and the MBA 

Letter. MBA commented that “a highly regulated prescriptive assignment process for credit ratings appears 

to be at odds with concerted government efforts to eliminate reliance on credit ratings in federal 

regulations.”

190 See the ASF Letter, the FSR Letter, the S&P Letter, the Kroll Letter, the Fitch Letter, the ICI Letter, the 

DBRS Letter, and the MBA Letter. 

191 See the ASF Letter.

192 See the FSR Letter.

193 See the S&P Letter, the Kroll Letter, the Fitch Letter, and the ICI Letter. Fitch stated that a “government 

sanctioned NRSRO selection system...fosters the very government sanctioning of rating agencies that 

Dodd-Frank seeks to end.” 

194 See the Moody’s Letter; see also the ASF Letter. 

195 See the ICI Letter, the DBRS Letter, the FSR Letter, and the Kroll Letter.

196 See the CRE Letter, the Moody’s Letter, and the Redwood Letter.

197 See the CRE Letter.
33

could create the perception that the ratings produced are ‘more than opinions,’ and are instead 

statements of fact or performance guarantees.”198 

Finally, one commenter expresses concerns with the level of government control over a 

private financial market that the Section 15E(w) System could engender.199 The commenter 

states that the CRA Board “will set the rules of the game, determine who is allowed to play, and 

decide how much the players are paid” and opines that these are not “appropriate roles for the 

government in private-market financial transactions.”200 

4. Constitutional and Other Issues Concerning the Establishment of the

Section 15E(w) System

The fourth factor specified in section 939F(b)(2) is whether there are any constitutional 

or other issues concerning the establishment of the Section 15E(w) System.

201 The Commission 

requested comment on the operational and legal feasibility of the system.

202

a. Operational Feasibility

Commenters raise operational issues concerning the establishment of the Section 15E(w) 

System.203 One commenter observes that there would be thousands of structured finance 

products that would need to be rated at any given time, and that the CRA Board would need to 

have a detailed understanding of each NRSRO’s qualities in order to assign an NRSRO to rate 

each of those products.204 The commenter concludes that this could lead to delays in 

assignments, preventing issuers’ timely access to capital and imposing additional costs on the 

market.205 Additionally, the commenter expresses concern that the new assignment system could 

create uncertainty in the market, causing originators to shy away from structured finance 

products as a means of financing and investors to be reluctant to invest in such products, 

ultimately leading to a decline in securitizations.206 A second commenter expands on this 

argument, stating that “some degree of continuity in the use of [a] particular NRSRO by an 

issuer results in economic and operational efficiencies in transactions,” and the process would be 

more time consuming if the NRSRO did not rate a previous transaction.207 Another commenter 

believes there is a lack of clarity as to how the CRA Board members and staff would be 

compensated, noting both that the level of compensation available would determine the quality 

 198 See the Moody’s Letter.

199 See the SIFMA Letter.

200 Id.

201 See Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 939F(b)(2)(D).

202 See Solicitation of Comment to Assist in Study on Assigned Credit Ratings, 76 FR at 28273-74.

203 See the S&P Letter and the SIFMA Letter.

204 See the S&P Letter.

205 Id.

206 Id.

207 See the Redwood Letter.
34

of employees the board would be able to attract and that the current budgetary and spending 

environment makes it unlikely that there would be large amount of funds available for

compensation.208

b. Legal Feasibility

Commenters raise concerns regarding the legal feasibility of the Section 15E(w) 

System.

209 One commenter argues that the Section 15E(w) System would conflict with section 

15E(c)(2) of the Exchange Act, which prohibits the Commission from regulating the substance 

of credit ratings or the procedures and methodologies by which an NRSRO determines credit 

ratings.

210 The commenter believes that the CRA Board’s role of evaluating and making rating 

assignments based on the accuracy of a Qualified NRSRO’s ratings and the effectiveness of its 

methodologies would be inconsistent with this provision.211 This sentiment is echoed by other 

commenters, one of whom states that “[a]ny system aimed at defining ‘quality’ ratings” would 

be problematic under section 15E(c)(2).212 

One commenter argues that, in addition to being unprecedented in forcing “one private 

party to deal with another private party of the government’s choosing in a private business 

transaction,” the Section 15E(w) System would raise Fifth Amendment issues.213 The 

commenter opines that the system could violate the Fifth Amendment “to the extent that 

interference with issuers’ or NRSROs’ contract rights rises to the level of a taking without just 

compensation or to the extent that this provision is so arbitrary and irrational as to violate the 

Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.”214

Two commenters believe there are potential First Amendment issues with the Section 

15E(w) System.215 One states that “government intervention into the selection of who can or 

cannot render an opinion about the creditworthiness of assets could attract litigation on First 

Amendment grounds.”216 Additionally, the commenter states that government actions penalizing 

rating agencies for stating their views on creditworthiness could impede the flow of information 

 208 See the SIFMA Letter.

209 See, e.g., the DBRS Letter, the S&P Letter, and the SIFMA Letter.

210 See the DBRS Letter.

211 Id.

212 See the S&P Letter. See also the SIFMA Letter (stating that “given that the Board would set performance 

standards and allocate business based on achievement of those standards, it would also put the Board in a 

position very close to regulating the form and content of credit rating methodologies, which we do not 

believe is appropriate – it is important that rating agencies are able to independently develop methodologies 

and analysis techniques which they believe will produce the most accurate ratings without undue pressure 

from issuers, investors, or policymakers.”).

213 See the DBRS Letter.

214 Id.

215 See the Reason Letter and the S&P Letter.

216 See the Reason Letter.
35

in investment markets and prevent investors from making fully informed investment decisions.217 

Another commenter states that a Commission decision that “an NRSRO’s ratings (and, by 

extension, the criteria and methodologies by which those ratings were formed) lack ‘quality’ and 

therefore must be changed in order to maintain participation in the proposed system, could well 

violate [the First Amendment].”218

Lastly, one commenter suggests that the mere recognition by Congress that the 

Commission study the “possibility of a constitutional law challenge” evidences awareness that 

the Section 15E(w) System may not be feasible or constitutionally sound.219 Furthermore, even 

the possibility of a constitutional law challenge could “delay or derail implementation of the 

rule.”220

C. GAO Framework

Section 7 of the Rating Agency Act of 2006 required the GAO to conduct a study: (1) on 

the impact of the Act; (2) to identify problems that have resulted from the implementation of the 

Act; and (3) to recommend solutions, including any legislative or regulatory solutions, to the 

problems identified.221 The GAO also was required to submit a report to Congress on the results 

of the study.222 In response, the GAO submitted a report to Congress in September 2010.223 The 

report included a framework for evaluating alternative models for compensating NRSROs (the 

“GAO Framework”).

224 The report states that in carrying out the study required by section 939F, 

the Commission could use the GAO Framework to evaluate current proposals for compensating 

NRSROs, develop new proposals, and identify trade-offs among proposals.

225 The GAO 

Framework consists of seven factors that can be used to evaluate alternative compensation 

models for NRSROs: (1) independence; (2) accountability; (3) competition; (4) transparency; (5) 

feasibility; (6) market acceptance and choice; and (7) oversight.226 The Commission requested 

that commenters use the GAO Framework to evaluate the Section 15E(w) System. The 

following sections summarize the comments.

1. Independence

 217 Id. 

218 See the S&P Letter. The staff takes no position on the merits of the First and Fifth Amendment issues 

regarding the CRA Board raised by commenters.

219 See the Redwood Letter.

220 Id.

221 See Pub. L. No. 109-291 § 7.

222 Id.

223 See the GAO Report.

224 See id. at 85-93.

225 See id. at 92-93.

226 Id.
36

The first factor in the GAO Framework is “independence.”227 The GAO describes this 

factor as the ability for the compensation model to mitigate conflicts of interest inherent between 

the entity paying for the rating and the NRSRO.228 Key questions with respect to this factor 

include: what potential conflicts of interest exist in the alternative compensation model and what 

controls, if any, would need to be implemented to mitigate these conflicts.229 

Some commenters argue that the Section 15E(w) System will enhance independence.230 

For example, two commenters note that the Section 15E(w) System would increase 

independence because issuers would no longer have the ability to select the rating agency 

determining the initial rating.231 One of those commenters, an NRSRO, states that credit rating 

agency independence would increase since agencies would no longer secure business by 

providing preliminary ratings.232 The NRSRO acknowledges that the members of the CRA 

Board could be subject to certain conflicts of interest but suggests that these conflicts could be 

mitigated through various procedural protections, including requiring majority action by the 

board, publishing the board’s selection criteria and results, and automating the selection process 

so that the board is not actively involved in individual selection decisions.

233

The second commenter also believes the Section 15E(w) System would improve 

independence because a neutral party (namely a government agency or its representatives) would 

be assigning NRSROs to rate structured finance transactions.

234 The commenter opines that the

Section 15E(w) System would separate issuer payment for ratings on structured finance products 

from issuer selection of an NRSRO and thereby eliminate “rating shopping.”

235 The commenter 

explains that, as a result, the system would alleviate the economic pressures that have led 

NRSROs to cater to issuer demands in the past.236 Another commenter adds that the Section 

15E(w) System could not only limit the effects of the conflicts of interest currently faced by 

NRSROs but could also change the mindset NRSROs have of working with their issuer clients to 

achieve the rating the issuers desire.237

The majority of commenters, however, argue that the Section 15E(w) System would not 

lead to a substantial improvement in the independence of rating agencies.238 Commenters argue 

 227 See id. at 85.

228 Id.

229 Id.

230 See the AFSCME Letter and the Morningstar Letter. 

231 Id.

232 See the Morningstar Letter.

233 Id.

234 See the AFSCME Letter.

235 Id.

236 Id.

237 See the Hill Letter.

238 See the FSR Letter, the Moody’s Letter, the S&P Letter, the Kroll Letter, the SIFMA Letter, the ASF 

Letter, and the DBRS Letter.
37

that the ratings assignment system would have conflicts of its own and would not fully mitigate 

the conflicts of interest associated with the issuer-pay system.

239 Many believe that the Section 

15E(w) System would simply replace one set of conflicts of interest with another.240 As one 

commenter states, the “Section 15E(w) [System] fails entirely because its method of addressing 

the conflict creates more problems than it solves.”241

A number of commenters argue that potential conflicts of interest could be created 

because the CRA Board would be affiliated with the U.S. government.

242 For example, one 

commenter argues that government issuers benefit from higher ratings because they lower the 

cost of borrowing and that, therefore, although the Section 15E(w) System could reduce issuers’ 

incentives to maximize proceeds via higher ratings, it could instead result in “political pressure 

on rating agencies due to the direct impact of ratings on the cost of capital for both governments 

and their taxpayers.”

243 Another commenter argues that governments may have competing 

financial market and social policy objectives and could “seek to have ratings ‘protect’ nationally 

or systemically important issuers such as large industrial employers or banks, or to protect 

ratings of government entities.”

244 This commenter states that any government-selected NRSRO 

would need to adopt measures designed to prevent the government from influencing its ratings 

because of these types of conflicts that could exist in any system in which the government has 

significant involvement in the substance of the rating determination.245 Another commenter 

argues that the government’s involvement in the compensation of the CRA Board members 

would contribute to the conflict.246 It comments that if the CRA Board were paid by the 

government, this would create a strong incentive for the board to select NRSROs that met the 

government’s objectives, for instance by issuing relatively high ratings on U.S. sovereign and 

other government debt.

247

Additionally, one NRSRO states that the government’s involvement in the credit rating 

process could increase the liability of the government for ratings published by NRSROs selected 

by the CRA Board and cause the board to assume the liabilities of a rating agency.

248 The 

NRSRO argues that this will harm the independence of rating agencies and the perception of 

 239 See, e.g., the FSR Letter, the Moody’s Letter, the S&P Letter, the Kroll Letter, the SIFMA Letter, the ASF 

Letter, and the DBRS Letter.

240 See, e.g., the FSR Letter, the Moody’s Letter, the S&P Letter, the Kroll Letter, the SIFMA Letter, and the 

ASF Letter.

241 See the ASF Letter. 

242 See the FSR Letter, the Moody’s Letter, the S&P Letter, and the Kroll Letter.

243 See the FSR Letter.

244 See the Moody’s Letter.

245 Id.

246 See the S&P Letter.

247 Id.

248 See the Kroll Letter.
38

ratings published by NRSROs and the Commission's ability to conduct independent regulatory 

oversight.249

Some of the commenters also note that the individual members of the CRA Board could 

have potential conflicts of interest.

250 One commenter states that any potential member of the 

CRA Board with enough expertise and insight into the ratings industry to contribute to the 

selection process would most likely have some conflict of interest because that potential member 

either is or was affiliated with the financial services industry in some way.

251 An NRSRO 

echoes this sentiment, questioning how the Commission would ensure that potential members of 

the CRA Board both have sufficient expertise and are not conflicted.252 A third commenter

states that there is a potential for members of the CRA Board to develop significant conflicts of 

interest because of the incentives under the Section 15E(w) System for rating agencies to attempt 

to curry favor with particular board members in order to obtain more business.253 This

commenter also argues that board members could have existing personal interests in firms 

subject to the authority of the CRA Board and these conflicts would need to be managed through 

policies and procedures just as in the current issuer-pay system.254 Another commenter focuses 

on the power of the CRA Board and its potential to create conflicts, noting that “by creating a 

board with the authority to determine the performance measurement and the method by which 

NRSROs would be selected to provide initial credit ratings, [the] Section 15E(w) [System] 

would create a risk of a more pernicious manipulation than the issuer-pay compensation 

model.”255 The commenter explains that the board could be pressured by various interest groups 

to adjust its methodology to achieve a particular agenda.256 

Finally, several commenters believe that the Section 15E(w) System would not be able to 

effectively mitigate the issuer-pay conflict of interest since NRSROs would still have incentives 

to cater to issuers.257 One commenter states that in addition to the rating from the selected 

NRSRO, issuers could still seek ratings from other NRSROs or non-NRSRO credit rating 

agencies that are not subject to that payment system.258 Another commenter argues that, as a 

result, NRSROs would still seek business from issuers of structured finance products, and 

NRSROs might also seek to curry favor with these issuers in order to obtain business in the 

secondary market for other transactions.259

 249 See id.

250 See the FSR Letter, the Moody’s Letter, the SIFMA Letter, and the ASF Letter.

251 See the FSR Letter.

252 See the Moody’s Letter.

253 See the SIFMA Letter.

254 Id.

255 See the ASF Letter.

256 Id.

257 See the DBRS Letter and the S&P Letter.

258 See the S&P Letter.

259 See the DBRS Letter.
39

2. Accountability

The second factor in the GAO Framework is “accountability.”260 The GAO describes 

this factor as the ability of the compensation model to promote NRSROs’ responsibility for the 

accuracy and timeliness of their ratings.261 Key questions with respect to this factor include: how 

does the compensation model create economic incentives for NRSROs to produce quality ratings 

over the bond’s life and how is NRSRO performance to be evaluated and by whom.262

Some commenters believe that the Section 15E(w) System will lead to improved 

accountability.263 One NRSRO who commented believes accountability can be increased under 

the Section 15E(w) System through the qualification process.264 The NRSRO states that the 

Commission’s examination process and the enhanced ratings performance disclosures could 

provide a basis to evaluate ratings under the Section 15E(w) System, and NRSROs would be 

selected to rate transactions based on past performance.265 The NRSRO believes that as a result, 

NRSROs would be held accountable for the accuracy and timeliness of their ratings.266 

Another commenter indicates that the system would “prevent cherry picking and 

potentially prevent misguided opinions [by eliminating] the fear of removal over 

disagreements.”267 Another commenter states that rating quality could be improved since the 

CRA Board could create incentives for the rating agencies to produce higher ratings by 

maintaining minimum quality standards for the pool of NRSROs eligible to receive an 

assignment.268 Similarly, a third commenter mentions that the system could improve

accountability because NRSRO performance would be evaluated by the CRA Board, creating 

competition over accuracy among the agencies since NRSROs that performed well would be 

rewarded with future assignments.

269

One commenter suggests further increasing the accountability of credit rating agencies 

under the Section 15E(w) System by adding a gross negligence liability standard for credit rating 

agencies.270 The commenter explains that debt purchasers would have the ability to enforce the 

 260 See the GAO Report at 85-86.

261 Id.

262 Id.

263 See the AFSCME Letter, the AFR Letter, the Huffaker Letter, the Manns Letter, the Morningstar Letter, 

and the Parsont Letter. 

264 See the Morningstar Letter.

265 Id.

266 Id.

267 See the Huffaker Letter.

268 See the AFR Letter.

269 See Parsont Letter; see also the Parsont Article.

270 See the Manns Letter.
40

standard, and rating agencies would be financially liable for their ratings failures, to the extent a 

failure constitutes a gross deviation from a reasonable person’s standard of care.271

Conversely, a number of commenters raise several potential issues with accountability in 

the Section 15E(w) System.272 One commenter observes that political pressure could influence 

the CRA Board’s initial determination of which NRSROs are qualified to issue ratings and the 

frequency of assignments to NRSROs in the future (the implication is that this would remove 

competition in the industry and prevent NRSROs from being held accountable for the accuracy 

of the ratings they produce.).

273 Continuing on this theme, another commenter states that the 

number of NRSROs that currently rate structured finance products is already limited, and under 

the Section 15E(w) System, this number may remain static or even shrink depending on the 

qualifications the CRA Board puts in place, further restricting competition in the market.274 The

commenter explains that this problem could be exacerbated by the fact that if there are a limited 

number of “qualified NRSROs,” it may be difficult for the CRA Board to remove any one from 

the pool if its ratings prove to be frequently inaccurate without diminishing the credibility of the 

assignment system.

275

Other commenters expand on this theme of a lack of competition in the Section 15E(w) 

System and express concern that the system would reduce innovation in the industry.276 One 

commenter states that under the current system, rating agencies sometimes compete by 

publishing rating methodology papers that they hope will attract sophisticated investors.277 

Another commenter explains that the assignment system could stifle rating agency innovation by 

removing this financial incentive for rating agencies to improve their methodologies, which 

could, in turn, result in rating agency methodologies falling behind innovations in structured 

securities.278 Similarly, other commenters argue that credit rating agencies would have limited 

incentives to develop special skills with respect to particular products and would stop investing 

in the research necessary to improve their methodologies.279 One commenter states that some 

credit rating agencies could lose interest in any improvement or innovation unless they deemed it 

necessary to retain the minimum standard necessary for designation under the Section 15E(w) 

System.

280 The commenter explains that this lack of innovation could ultimately lead to more 

 271 Id. at 66, n.260 (proposing various definitions of gross negligence from the common law).

272 See the ASF Letter, the Reason Letter, the MBA Letter, the ICI Letter, the S&P Letter, and the Kroll Letter.

273 See the ASF Letter.

274 See the ICI Letter.

275 Id.

276 See the ASF Letter, the MBA Letter, and the S&P Letter. The issue of competition is discussed below in 

more detail in section III.C.3.

277 See the ASF Letter.

278 See the MBA Letter.

279 See the ASF Letter and the S&P Letter. S&P also states that, under the Section 15E(w) System, “NRSROs 

would have little incentive to engage in thought leadership, investor outreach and other important 

educational activities, again, to the ultimate detriment of the market.”

280 See the S&P Letter.
41

homogenized rating opinions.

281 Other commenters argue that with the CRA Board evaluating 

the credit rating agencies’ methodologies and accuracy, the CRA Board, in effect, would be 

dictating how to determine credit ratings, as Qualified NRSROs would tailor their methodologies

to meet the requirements of the board, rather than basing them on the qualities of the security.

282

In relation to rating agency accountability, the Commission also asked for comments on 

how the NRSROs’ performance would be evaluated and how poor performance would be 

handled under the Section 15E(w) System.283 Most commenters raise concerns regarding the 

measurement and evaluation of performance.284 Several commenters argue that measuring the 

accuracy of ratings is a problematic way to evaluate performance because the accuracy of the 

initial ratings for many structured finance products cannot be measured for many years, in some 

cases after the securities have already been retired.285 Additionally, two commenters state that in 

order to measure credit rating accuracy, the CRA Board essentially would be required to do its 

own analysis of the relevant transaction, and that type of determination would be costly and 

complicated for the board to undertake given the highly skilled staff and resources that would be 

required.286 One commenter observes that the CRA Board’s creation of performance measures 

would prevent rating agencies from developing new methodologies, as the agencies migrate to 

methodologies that are in line with the board’s performance measures.287 Furthermore, that 

commenter argues that if the performance measures developed by the CRA Board rely on 

downgrades alone to evaluate performance, credit rating agencies could be incentivized to 

produce overly conservative initial ratings to protect against the need for future downgrades 

and/or to avoid downgrading securities when it may be necessary to take such action.

288

3. Competition

The third factor in the GAO Framework is “competition.”289 The GAO describes this 

factor as the extent to which the compensation model creates an environment in which NRSROs 

compete for customers by producing higher-quality ratings at competitive prices.290 Key 

questions include: to what extent does the compensation model encourage competition around 

the quality of credit ratings, credit rating fees, and product innovation and to what extent does it 

allow for flexibility in the differing sizes, resources, and specialties of NRSROs.291 

 281 Id.

282 See the ASF Letter and the Kroll Letter.

283 See Solicitation of Comment to Assist in Study on Assigned Credit Ratings, 76 FR at 28271. The issue of 

measuring accuracy is discussed below in more detail in section IV.

284 See, e.g., the AFR Letter, the SIFMA Letter, and the ASF Letter. 

285 See the AFR Letter and the SIFMA Letter. 

286 See the ASF Letter and the SIFMA Letter.

287 See the ASF Letter. 

288 Id.

289 See the GAO Report at 86-87.

290 Id.

291 Id.
42

Some commenters believe the Section 15E(w) System would enhance competition in the 

credit rating agency industry.292 Some commenters note that the Section 15E(w) System would 

help to make the credit rating agency industry more competitive because new entrants would be 

given a chance to build their reputations.

293 One commenter states that there “is considerable 

‘stickiness’ in the practice of market participants,” leading to concentration of business in the 

hands of the largest NRSROs and limiting entry into the market.294 This commenter suggests 

that under the Section 15E(w) System, smaller NRSROs “would presumably sometimes (and 

perhaps often) be selected, helping market participants become accustomed to the use of such 

agencies.”295 A second commenter believes that since the Section 15E(w) System would require 

the CRA Board to examine credit rating accuracy and timeliness as it makes assignments of 

future credit rating engagements, the system will foster competition to secure future business by 

providing the most accurate and timely ratings.296 Similarly, a third commenter echoes this idea 

and opines that smaller credit rating agencies would be given “an opportunity to compete by 

producing a track record of quality ratings.”297 A fourth commenter argues that the Section 

15E(w) System creates “a level playing field for lesser established NRSROs to compete” 

because smaller NRSROs could be hired to issue second ratings and could also issue unsolicited 

ratings.298

However, the majority of commenters addressing this factor argue that the Section 

15E(w) System would hinder competition within the credit rating industry.299 One commenter 

uses the example of CMBS to illustrate the difficulty of entering the credit rating market for 

structured finance products under the Section 15E(w) System.300 The commenter states that a 

rating agency must have a significant amount of resources and expertise in order to conduct “the 

intensive, specialized review” necessary to rate commercial real estate assets.301 The commenter 

explains that credit rating agencies that do not already possess these resources will be reluctant to 

make the kind of investment required to enter the market without more concrete prospects for a 

financial return than a system where assignments are made randomly and prices are regulated.302 

This commenter also believes that there may be disincentives for innovation inherent in the 

 292 See the Hill Letter, the Franken/Wicker Letter, the Morningstar Letter, and the Parsont Letter. 

293 See the Hill Letter, the Morningstar Letter, and the AFSCME Letter.

294 See the Hill Letter.

295 Id.

296 See the Morningstar Letter.

297 See the Franken/Wicker Letter. 

298 See the Parsont Letter. 

299 See the ASF Letter, the CRE Letter, the Kroll Letter, the Moody’s Letter, the DBRS Letter, the ICI Letter, 

the MBA Letter, and the S&P Letter.

300 See the CRE Letter.

301 Id.

302 Id.
43

Section 15E(w) System due to the random selection process as discussed above in section 

IV.C.2.303

Several commenters also express concern that the Section 15E(w) System “may further 

entrench the largest incumbents.”304 One commenter observes that the Section 15E(w) System 

may make it more difficult for small or new NRSROs to enter the market or increase their 

market share because incumbents would be able to offer lower credit rating fees since the 

allocation method under the Section 15E(w) System would take past performance into 

account.

305 The commenter concludes that it could be difficult for NRSROs with little or no 

track record for rating structured finance securities to break into the market.306 Another 

commenter similarly argues that, because the CRA Board’s assignment system will require an 

established track record for NRSROs to qualify, the ability of newer NRSROs to compete will be 

limited.307 Another explains that this problem will worsen as time passes since “it will be 

difficult [for newer NRSROs] to become ‘qualified’ to rate a structured finance product if the 

NRSRO does not have the opportunity to rate such structured finance products because it is not 

‘qualified’ to do so.”308 A third argues that characterizing certain NRSROs as “qualified” 

suggests that other NRSROs are “unqualified” to rate structured finance products, and this 

stigma could make it hard for an NRSRO to gain market acceptance for its ratings.

309

Two commenters argue that the increased regulatory burden associated with becoming a 

“Qualified NRSRO” under the Section 15E(w) System could deter NRSROs from entering the 

structured finance ratings market.310 One NRSRO believes that the regulatory burdens have 

negatively impacted the willingness of credit rating agencies to engage in NRSRO credit rating 

activities.311 It states that: “[s]ince the 2006 [Rating Agency Reform] Act was implemented, 

regulatory burdens have caused two NRSROs to withdraw their registrations in the class of credit 

ratings for issuers of asset-backed securities; one NRSRO to curtail plans to expand its rating 

activities; and at least one rating agency to forego NRSRO registration altogether.”312

Additionally, some commenters suggest that the Section 15E(w) System would

negatively impact competition, credit rating quality, and industry innovation because credit 

rating agencies would be guaranteed business rather than competing for the business, as 

discussed above in section IV.C.2.

313 One commenter asserts that NRSROs would be 

 303 Id.

304 See the Kroll Letter; see also the Moody’s Letter and the DBRS Letter.

305 See the ASF Letter.

306 Id.

307 See the Kroll Letter.

308 See the Moody’s Letter.

309 See the DBRS Letter.

310 See the ICI letter and the DBRS Letter.

311 See the DBRS Letter.

312 Id.

313 See the Moody’s Letter and the MBA Letter.
44

incentivized “to simply wait their turn” to be assigned business, rather than competing to 

produce the highest quality analysis and credit ratings.314 The commenter explains that if credit 

rating agencies are guaranteed fees, the incentive for them to innovate and improve their 

methodologies may be removed, and instead, they may be motivated to do the least amount of 

work possible to remain a Qualified NRSRO eligible to receive assignments under the Section

15E(w) System.315 Another commenter argues that the expense of staying current on all the 

necessary information “in order to be in a position to provide a credit rating under an assignment 

system would be prohibitive, not only to the NRSROs,” but also to the issuers tasked to provide 

the information.316 Keeping every NRSRO current on information so it stands ready for an 

assignment could be “paralyzing” to issuers.317

Finally, one commenter urges the Commission not to be overly influenced by concerns 

regarding competition among NRSROs. The commenter states that it is often assumed that more 

competition among firms leads to higher quality output, but that this only works if firms are 

competing on the basis of quality, and that evidence suggests greater competition among credit 

rating agencies does not lead to higher quality output under the issuer-pay system.318 The 

commenter cites a 2010 paper that found that the growth in market share enjoyed by Fitch, which 

emerged shortly after 2000 as a “credible competitor” to Moody’s and S&P, coincided with 

lower quality ratings, as measured by the correlation between ratings and market-implied 

yields.319 The authors of this paper concluded that increased competition among ratings agencies 

“likely weakens reputational incentives for providing quality in the ratings industry, and thereby 

undermines quality.”320 Accordingly, the commenter believes that relying on greater 

competition among NRSROs using an issuer-pay model may produce lower quality ratings than 

a system using a different business model in which fewer NRSROs participate.321 

4. Transparency

The fourth factor in the GAO Framework is “transparency.”322 The GAO describes this 

factor as the accessibility, usability, and clarity of the compensation model and the dissemination 

of information on the model to market participants.323 Key questions with respect to this factor 

include: how transparent are the model’s processes and procedures for determining credit ratings 

fees and compensating NRSROs and how would NRSROs obtain ratings business.324 

 314 See the Moody’s Letter.

315 Id.

316 See the Redwood Letter.

317 Id.

318 See the AFSCME Letter.

319 See id. (citing Becker & Milbourn).

320 Id.

321 See the AFSCME Letter.

322 See the GAO Report at 88.

323 Id.

324 Id.
45

One commenter believes that a requirement for the CRA Board to publish its NRSRO 

assignment methodology would aid in the transparency of the system.

325 Otherwise, the 

response from commenters was mainly negative. One NRSRO states that the system “could be 

as transparent as necessary” but should not “require the public disclosure of fees.”

326 Several 

other commenters either do not believe the system would be transparent or think transparency is 

irrelevant to the value of the system.327 One commenter believes that the proposed system “has 

the potential to confuse market participants,” and does “not believe that any amount of 

transparency regarding the proposed Section 15E(w) System can remedy these concerns.”

328 

Another commenter expresses concern that “there may be insufficient transparency regarding 

who truly pays the cost of the additional rating (e.g. investors or issuers?).”

329 Another

commenter argues that transparency in credit rating performance would not mitigate the 

replacement of market selection by a “government-established board” determination.330

5. Feasibility

The fifth factor in the GAO Framework is “feasibility.”331 The GAO describes this factor 

as the simplicity and ease with which the compensation model can be implemented in the 

securities market.332 Key questions with respect to this factor include: what are the costs to 

implement the compensation model and who would fund them, who would administer the 

compensation model, and what, if any, infrastructure would be needed to implement the 

model.

333 

Comments with respect to this factor centered on: (1) staffing, funding, and costs of the 

CRA Board; (2) credit rating fees and contract terms; and (3) the selection criteria for assigning 

the NRSRO to produce a credit rating. One commenter, an NRSRO, believes that the Section 

15E(w) System “is administratively feasible” and that the authority to establish it has been 

“clearly set forth” under the Dodd-Frank Act.334

However, several commenters believe the Section 15E(w) System is not feasible.335 For 

example, several commenters express concern about the feasibility of sufficiently staffing the 

 325 See the Franken/Wicker Letter.

326 See the Morningstar Letter.

327 See the S&P Letter, the CRE Letter, and the ASF Letter.

328 See the S&P Letter.

329 See the CRE Letter.

330 See the ASF Letter.

331 See the GAO Report at 88-90.

332 Id.

333 Id.

334 See Morningstar Letter. 

335 See the ASF Letter, the Better Markets Letter, the CRE Letter, the DBRS Letter, the FSR Letter, the ICI 

Letter, the Moody’s Letter, the S&P Letter, and the SIFMA Letter.
46

CRA Board with highly skilled personnel.336 One commenter expresses similar concerns about 

staff sufficiency and expertise and states that the CRA Board “will be required to do tasks it 

simply will not have the expertise to perform [such as to] be able to fully understand, compare 

and contrast the merits of one agency’s MBS criteria ... and modeling versus another rating 

agency’s [criteria and modeling].”337 Commenters also express concern about the qualifications 

of the CRA Board members and potential conflicts of interest.338

Some commenters believe it would be very costly to create and maintain the CRA 

Board.339 For example, one NRSRO states that although the Section 15E(w) Provisions 

authorize the CRA Board to levy fees on Qualified NRSROs and applicants, no provision is 

made to defray the CRA Board’s “considerable start-up expenses,” and opines that any start-up 

funding mechanism would not be “sustainable” for the CRA Board’s continued operation.340 As 

an example of such costs, the commenter notes that the CRA Board would need to be supported 

by a “highly skilled” staff capable of evaluating the credit rating process for each type of existing 

and future structured finance product, and be able to assess the methodologies and performance 

metrics of each rating agency that chooses to participate in the Section 15E(w) System, and that 

the CRA Board staff will need to take a number of steps before the first application from a 

prospective qualified NRSRO is even submitted. 341 The commenter further opines that the high 

cost of funding the CRA Board’s operations would be “divided among only four or five rating 

agencies” and be “so high that it would discourage all but the largest rating agencies” from 

participating.342 

Another commenter states that “the costs to the market would be significant, both the cost 

to create and operate the board and the cost in the form of decreased market efficiency.”343

Another commenter argues that in addition to the substantial start-up time and expense that 

would be required to create the CRA Board and the ongoing administrative costs of maintaining 

it, transactions in structured finance products would likely become more expensive and time 

consuming as a result of the imposition of this new layer of bureaucracy in the credit rating 

 336 See, e.g., the ASF Letter, the DBRS Letter, and the SIFMA Letter. 

337 See the SIFMA Letter (stating that “rating agency stuff [sic] must consider a broad range of issues, 

alternately analytical, conceptual, and legal, when calibrating models and determining credit ratings 

criteria, and apply that wide variety of factors to specific transactions when producing ratings. This 

includes but is not limited to: knowledge of a broad array of asset classes; the wide structural variety of 

securitization design; a wide variety of underlying assets; appreciation for the macro asset environment 

(e.g., the housing market or auto purchase market); issuer strength, transaction counterparty qualifications 

(e.g., servicer ratings); the value or weaknesses in specific representation and warranty provisions, 

compliance with applicable law.”).

338 See, e.g., the CRE Letter and the Moody’s Letter. Moody’s asked “[H]ow would the Commission ensure 

that Board members have both sufficient expertise and are not conflicted?”

339 See the ASF Letter, the MS Letter, and the FSR Letter.

340 See the DBRS Letter. 

341 Id.

342 Id.

343 See the ASF Letter.
47

process.344 A third commenter argues that the costs of creating the CRA Board would not be 

insubstantial and would ultimately be passed on to consumers.345 

However, some commenters disagree that cost would be an issue.346 One commenter, an 

NRSRO, observes that transaction fees based on the size of the transaction and funded by the 

proceeds could be used to cover the costs of the CRA Board, similar to the Financial Industry 

Regulatory Authority’s system of determining transaction-based fees. 347 The commenter also 

states that the Section 15E(w) System might be operated without the CRA Board (or with 

substantially reduced operations for the CRA Board) if rotation criteria and technology could be 

established to manage the assignments.348 The commenter explains that an automated process 

would decrease costs and avoid unnecessary delays.349 As an additional cost-saving measure, the 

commenter suggests that the Section 15E(w) System should leave in place the current payment 

system (whereby payments are made directly by the issuer to the NRSRO).350 

Some commenters also question the CRA Board’s ability to set rating fees and contract 

terms.351 One commenter observes that the Section 15E(w) System would require the creation of 

a complex new regulatory structure dictating contract terms between issuers and rating agencies 

and setting price controls.352 The commenter believes that this would prevent issuers from 

coming up with unique and heterogeneous collateral pools and innovative asset classes, and 

questions what would happen if an issuer and its assigned credit rating agency could not agree on 

a rating fee.353 Continuing on this theme, another commenter argues that under the Section 

15E(w) System, issuers would have no leverage in contract negotiations and could be forced by 

the CRA Board to accept terms and conditions they would ordinarily reject.354

Finally, two commenters express concern regarding the CRA Board’s ability to determine 

selection criteria for the assignment system and evaluate the accuracy of credit ratings provided 

under the system.355 One commenter questions how the CRA Board would come up with the 

criteria to determine how assignments are made and how it would define the success or failure of 

the selected credit rating agency once the credit rating was produced.356 The commenter states

 344 See the MS Letter.

345 See the FSR Letter.

346 See the Morningstar Letter, the AFR Letter, and the AFSCME Letter.

347 See the Morningstar Letter.

348 Id.

349 Id.

350 Id.

351 See the CRE Letter and the FSR Letter.

352 See the CRE Letter.

353 Id.

354 See the FSR Letter.

355 See the ICI Letter and the S&P Letter.

356 See the ICI Letter.
48

that gauging success would be difficult because of the “complexity, diversity and novelty” of 

structured finance products.357 Another commenter observes that in order to make assignments,

the CRA Board would need to have a detailed understanding of each NRSRO’s areas of 

expertise among the thousands of securities to be rated and predicts that this would cause 

significant delays in assignments for new issuances.358

6. Market Acceptance and Choice

The sixth factor in the GAO Framework is “market acceptance and choice.”359 The GAO 

describes this factor as the willingness of the securities market to accept the compensation 

model, the credit ratings produced under that model, and any new market players established by 

the compensation model.360 Key questions with respect to this factor include: what role do 

market participants have in selecting NRSROs to produce ratings, assessing the quality of 

ratings, and determining NRSRO compensation.361

One commenter believes that the Section 15E(w) System could gain market 

acceptance.362 Specifically, the commenter argues that the Section 15E(w) System “represents 

an opportunity to promote competition among NRSROs by encouraging investors to review 

[their investment] policies and consider other NRSROs,” thereby expanding the number of 

acceptable NRSROs in the market.

363

However, many commenters raised concerns about issuers’ inabilities to choose an

NRSRO under the proposed Section 15E(w) System and the potential effect this reduced 

influence could have on the quality of credit ratings, demand for and pricing of securities, and 

issuance costs.364 For example, one commenter lists a number of potential problems associated 

with eliminating the issuer’s ability to choose an NRSRO.365 First, the commenter argues that 

issuers need the freedom to choose an NRSRO that is acceptable to investors because some 

investors could be prohibited by private contract or investment guidelines from buying a 

structured finance product rated by the assigned NRSRO.366 Second, the commenter states that if 

the assigned NRSRO is disfavored by investors (or investors are prohibited from purchasing a 

product rated by that NRSRO), then it will hurt the issuer’s ability to execute the transaction, 

 357 Id.

358 See the S&P Letter.

359 See the GAO Report at 90-91.

360 Id.

361 Id.

362 See the Morningstar Letter.

363 Id.

364 See the ASF Letter, the Better Markets Letter, the MS Letter, the CRE Letter, the S&P Letter, the SIFMA 

Letter, the ICI Letter, the MBA Letter, and the Hill Letter.

365 See the ASF Letter.

366 Id.; see also the Redwood Letter (stating that “Selection by the [CRA] board of a rating agency that is not 

on the investment guidelines list would preclude these investors from participating in an offering.”).
49

resulting in uncertainty in the market that “could effectively remove securitization as a viable 

source of financing for sponsors” and lead to a higher cost of funding for originators.

367 Third, 

the commenter explains that the issuer’s loss of choice could increase the cost of capital because 

the identity of the NRSRO rating the structured finance product affects the price investors are 

willing to pay for the product.368 Another commenter states that investors tend to be more 

comfortable with, and more fluent in, the “procedures and methodologies” of a particular 

NRSRO such that the assignment of a different NRSRO to a transaction could have an impact on 

investor interest, thereby causing disinterest in the security altogether.

369

Other commenters focus on how the pricing of structured finance products would be 

affected by the Section 15E(w) System.

370 One commenter argues that issuers sometimes choose 

a particular NRSRO because investors will put a premium on products rated by that NRSRO, and 

that the Section 15E(w) System, by eliminating this choice, would increase costs and burden the 

credit rating process.371 Others commenters state that security prices might be discounted if 

either the assigned “NRSRO does not have an established track record for the category of 

securitization”

372 or the assignment process is flawed or not transparent.373

Two commenters note that the Section 15E(w) System could increase costs by forcing 

issuers to seek a second credit rating if investors are not satisfied with the credit rating by the 

assigned NRSRO.374 One commenter states that if investors are unsatisfied with a credit rating, 

underwriters or investors “may be induced to procure additional ratings from NRSROs who are 

thought to provide greater value” and, therefore, the “the value received from the selection 

process might be disproportionately low compared with the cost.”375 Another commenter argues

that if the credit rating from the assigned NRSRO is not accepted, issuers would need to get a 

second credit rating, adding significant cost to the transaction that either the investors (through 

reduced yield) or the borrowers on the collateral that secures the structured finance product 

would be forced to incur.

376

Other commenters express concern that under the Section 15E(w) System, the assigned 

NRSRO might not have the requisite expertise to rate the structured finance product.377 One 

commenter highlights “the uniquely complex requirements that the credit rating process entails 

for certain structured finance products, particularly commercial mortgage-backed securities..., 

 367 Id.

368 Id.

369 See the Redwood Letter. 

370 See the MS Letter, the ICI Letter, and the MBA Letter.

371 See the MS Letter.

372 See the MBA Letter

373 See the ICI Letter.

374 See the Better Markets Letter and the SIFMA Letter.

375 See the Better Markets Letter.

376 See the SIFMA Letter.

377 See the CRE Letter, the MS Letter, and the S&P Letter.
50

which are composed of pools of heterogeneous assets,” making it likely that an inexperienced 

NRSRO could be assigned a transaction in an asset class in which it does not have expertise.378

The commenter also argues that this possibility could increase uncertainty for issuers who will be 

unsure as to whether their issuances will be fairly and accurately rated, leading to a potential 

decrease in issuers’ appetite for these types of transactions.379 Similarly, a second commenter 

states that “many NRSROs cannot possibly have the expertise to rate all types of structured 

finance products” 380 and that sometimes investors will not accept credit ratings from an NRSRO 

without a certain level of expertise.

381 Continuing with these themes, a third commenter takes

issue with the Section 15E(w) System because it may potentially force issuers and arrangers to 

accept credit ratings from NRSROs that lack the requisite expertise to rate a particular structured 

finance product.

382

Several commenters worry that the Section 15E(w) System would slow down the speed 

at which structured finance transactions are rated and negatively affect deal volume.383 One 

commenter observes that each NRSRO has different criteria for rating a transaction and unless 

the assigned NRSRO happens to have worked with the issuer in the past, the Section 15E(w) 

System will slow the speed at which a transaction can come to market because it will take time 

for the assigned NRSRO to gather all the information it needs from the issuer.384 The 

commenter also states that this impediment to an issuer’s timely access to the capital markets 

will impose costs on the issuer that will “simply be passed onto the consumer in the form of 

higher rates and fees, with little if any corresponding benefit to the consumer.”385 Another 

commenter observes that in “the case of commercial and residential mortgage backed securities 

(CMBS and RMBS), the uncertainty of transitioning to a new rating regiment could potentially 

slow new issuance.”386 Similarly, another commenter argues that markets may have difficulty 

adjusting to the Section 15E(w) System, and as a result, deal volume could decrease (at least in 

the short term).387

Other commenters note that the Section 15E(w) System may not take into account 

investor preferences.388 One commenter states that “investors clearly do not consider all NRSRO 

 378 See the CRE Letter (stating “[t]he degree of specialized expertise and effort that is required to rate such 

products makes it likely that a system of assigned credit ratings, such as that being studied by the 

Commission in this proceeding, would actually lead to lower quality ratings, and less competition and 

innovation in the credit rating industry.”).

379 See the CRE Letter.

380 See the MS Letter.

381 See the CRE Letter.

382 See the S&P Letter.

383 See the ASF Letter, the Hill Letter, and the MBA Letter.

384 See the ASF Letter.

385 Id.

386 See the MBA Letter.

387 See the Hill Letter.

388 See the MS Letter and the S&P Letter.
51

ratings to be equally valuable, and we believe that investors themselves are in the best position to 

determine whether an NRSRO’s opinion is an effective classification tool for their 

investments.”389 As a result, the commenter states that “the Section 15E(w) System, or any other 

system that involves the random or arbitrary selection of NRSROs to rate structured finance 

products, would harm investors by preventing their preferences from being taken into 

account.”390 Another commenter also expresses the belief that issuers and investors have a 

superior understanding of each NRSRO’s qualities and experience and argues that by taking 

choice out of their hands, the Section 15E(w) System could lessen the quality of credit ratings.391

7. Oversight

The seventh factor in the GAO Framework is “oversight.”392 The GAO describes this 

factor as evaluation of the model to ensure it works as intended.393 Key questions with respect to 

this factor include: does the model provide for an independent internal control function and what 

external oversight does the compensation model provide to ensure it is working as intended.394

One commenter suggests establishing a creditor committee to oversee the system, foster 

accountability and mitigate the ability of “regulated parties to ... influence regulators.”

395 

Another commenter suggests that oversight of the CRA Board could be accomplished through 

“an annual public disclosure process of the criteria and formula used in selecting the 

NRSROs.”

396

On the other hand, one commenter questions how the Section 15E(w) System could be 

evaluated and how any problems identified with the assignment process could be corrected.397 

Another commenter suggests that “at a minimum, internal and external auditors would be 

necessary,” and “[g]iven the vast number of ratings that would need to be assigned on a prompt 

and regular basis, the resources necessary to implement such oversight would likely be 

exorbitant.”398 Another commenter raises concerns about the CRA Board’s evaluations of an 

NRSRO in determining a method of assigning NRSROs to a transaction.399 The commenter 

argues that an NRSRO may employ criteria closely aligned with the criteria in the board’s 

evaluation.400 In addition, an NRSRO could apply overly “conservative criteria to try to ensure 

 389 See the MS Letter.

390 Id.

391 See the S&P Letter.

392 See the GAO Report at 92-93.

393 Id.

394 Id.

395 See the Manns Letter.

396 See the Morningstar Letter.

397 See the ASF Letter.

398 See the S&P Letter.

399 See the Redwood Letter. 

400 Id.
52

positive evaluations,” which among other things, could lead to higher costs for issuers, lenders 

and borrowers.401

V. METRICS FOR DETERMINING THE ACCURACY OF CREDIT RATINGS

Section 939F(b)(3) provides that the Commission shall carry out a study of the range of 

metrics that could be used to determine the accuracy of credit ratings.402 The Commission 

solicited comments on this topic.

403 While some commenters simply note that measuring ratings 

accuracy could be difficult, others suggest a few ideas as to how it could be accomplished. 

The NRSROs that commented on this topic generally argue that measuring rating 

accuracy is difficult.404 One NRSRO rejects “the notion that credit ratings can be ‘accurate’ or 

‘inaccurate,’” noting that ratings are not statements of fact but forward-looking opinions.405 The 

NRSRO states that the creditworthiness of a security can change over time based on a variety of 

factors, including events that could not be foreseen at the time of the original rating.406 Another 

NRSRO highlights that different rating systems often have different objectives, making it 

extremely difficult to compare accuracy across systems since rating systems should be evaluated 

against their objectives.407

Some commenters offer suggestions as to how accuracy could be measured.408 One 

commenter recommends that ratings quality be defined “using input from investors and other 

users of ratings.”409 Another suggests using a proposal made by Professor John Coffee under 

which the Commission could “define ‘default’ and ‘impaired’, calculate the rates of default and 

impaired over five year periods for each credit rating agency, and . . . subsequently publish 

them.”410 The same commenter also suggests that the CRA Board “could compile a total metric 

based on standards that Professor Lynn Bai has identified for gauging accuracy - the default 

ratio, ‘fallen angels’ ratio, rating change ratio, and large rating change ratio.”411 Professor Bai 

describes these four standards as follows:

The default ratio is the ratio of the total number of defaults to the 

total number of ratings that a rating agency has assigned during a 

 401 Id.

402 See Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 939F(b)(3).

403 See Solicitation of Comment to Assist in Study on Assigned Credit Ratings, 76 FR at 28274-75.

404 See the S&P Letter and the Moody’s Letter.

405 See the S&P Letter.

406 Id.

407 See the Moody’s Letter.

408 See the AFSCME Letter and the Franken/Wicker Letter.

409 See the AFSCME Letter.

410 See the Franken/Wicker Letter.

411 Id. See also Lin (Lynn) Bai, The Performance Disclosures of Credit Rating Agencies: Are They Effective 

Reputational Sanctions?, 7-1 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. (2010).
53

specified time period. The "fallen angels" ratio is the total number 

of ratings that were of investment grade at the start of the period but 

migrated to a non-investment grade or a default rating by the end of 

the period, divided by the total number of investment grade ratings 

that the rating agency has assigned during the period. The rating 

change ratio is the total number of rating changes divided by the 

total number of ratings assigned during a specified period. The

large rating change ratio is the total number of large rating changes 

divided by the total number of ratings assigned during a specified 

period. In this regard, the number of large rating changes is defined 

as the number of ratings that have experienced changes of three or 

more notches during an annual period.412

VI. ALTERNATIVE MEANS FOR COMPENSATING NRSROS

Section 939F(b)(4) provides that the Commission shall carry out a study of alternative 

means for compensating NRSROs that would create incentives for accurate credit ratings.413 To 

facilitate this aspect of the study, the Commission solicited comment on the requirements in 

Exchange Act Rule 17g-5 that are designed to allow a non-hired NRSRO to provide an initial 

rating for a structured finance product and on four unique alternative compensation models for 

NRSROs identified in the GAO Report.414 The four models are: (1) the investor-owned credit 

rating agency model; (2) the stand-alone model; (3) the designation model; and (4) the user-pay 

model.415 Commenters’ views regarding the models identified above and their proposals for

alternative models are described below. In addition to the models identified in the original GAO 

Report, three other alternative models are discussed below: (1) the issuer and investor-pays 

model, (2) the alternative user-pays model, and (3) the investor owned rating agency model.416 

The Commission also met with the authors of these models, and their feedback is incorporated 

into the descriptions below.417

 412 Id.

413 Id.

414 See Solicitation of Comment to Assist in Study on Assigned Credit Ratings, 76 FR at 28275-78. See also

the GAO Report at 79-84 (describing the four unique alternative compensation models). These models also 

were discussed at an April 2009 roundtable sponsored by the Commission to examine oversight of credit 

rating agencies. Information regarding the roundtable, including a webcast and unofficial transcript, is 

available on the Commission’s Internet website at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/cra-oversightroundtable.htm. 

415 See the GAO Report at 79-84.

416 The first of these two models (the issuer and investor-pays model and the alternative user-pays model) were 

included in a second GAO report, published in January 2012, subsequent to the Commission’s publication 

of its Request for Comment. See Credit Rating Agencies: Alternative Compensation Models for Nationally 

Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, GAO Report 12-240 (2012) (“GAO 2012 Report”). The third 

(the investor owned rating agency model) was proposed to the Commission in a comment letter for the 

April 2009 roundtable but was not included in the Request for Comment because it is substantially similar 

to the investor-owned credit rating agency model.

417 Documentation of these meetings with model authors is available on the Commission’s Internet website at: 

http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-629/4-629.shtml.
54

A. Rule 17g-5 Program

1. Mechanics of the Rule 17g-5 Program

The Commission has adopted requirements codified in Rule 17g-5 under the Exchange 

Act designed to create a mechanism for an NRSRO that is not hired to determine a credit rating 

for a structured finance product to nonetheless obtain the same information the hired NRSRO 

receives from the arranger to determine the initial credit rating at the same time such information 

is provided to the hired NRSRO (the “Rule 17g-5 Program”).418 The Rule 17g-5 Program is 

intended to create a means for an NRSRO not hired to rate the structured finance product to 

nonetheless determine an initial credit rating at the same time the hired NRSRO determines an 

initial credit rating and to conduct surveillance on that credit rating along with the hired 

NRSRO.419 In other words, similar to the goal of section 939F, the Rule 17g-5 Program is 

intended to prevent the arranger of the structured finance product from selecting the NRSRO or 

NRSROs that exclusively can determine initial credit ratings for the structured finance product.420 

When adopting the Rule 17g-5 Program, the Commission stated that the program was designed 

to make it more difficult for arrangers to exert influence over the NRSROs they hire because any 

inappropriate rating could be exposed to the market through the unsolicited ratings issued by 

 418 17 CFR §§ 240.17g-5(a)(3) and (b)(9). The Commission has granted a conditional exemption to NRSROs 

from Rule 17g-5(a)(3) with respect to credit ratings where: (1) the issuer of the structured finance product 

is a non-U.S. person; and (2) the NRSRO has a reasonable basis to conclude that the structured finance 

product will be offered and sold upon issuance, and that any arranger linked to the structured finance 

product will effect transactions in the structured finance product after issuance, only in transactions that 

occur outside the U.S. These conditions are designed to confine the exemption’s application to credit 

ratings of structured finance products issued in, and linked to, financial markets outside the U.S. See Order 

Granting Temporary Conditional Exemption for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations 

from Requirements of Rule 17g-5 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Request for Comment, 

Exchange Act Release No. 62120 (Feb. 11, 2008), 75 FR 28825 (May 24, 2010); Order Extending 

Temporary Conditional Exemption for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations from 

Requirements of Rule 17g-5 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Request for Comment, 

Exchange Act Release No. 63363 (Nov. 23, 2010), 75 FR 73137 (Nov. 29, 2010); Order Extending 

Temporary Conditional Exemption for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations from 

Requirements of Rule 17g-5 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Request for Comment, 

Exchange Act Release No. 65765 (Nov. 16, 2011), 76 FR 72227 (Nov. 22, 2011).

419 The Commission noted, when adopting the Rule 17g-5 Program, that “when an NRSRO is hired to rate a

structured finance product, some of the information it relies on to determine the rating is generally not 

made public. As a result, structured finance products frequently are issued with ratings from only one or 

two NRSROs that have been hired by the arranger, with the attendant conflict of interest. The [Rule 17g-5 

Program is] designed to increase the number of credit ratings extant for a given structured finance product 

and, in particular, to promote the issuance of credit ratings by NRSROs that are not hired by the arranger.” 

See Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 74 FR at 63844.

420 See Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 939F(d) (“After submission of the report under subsection (c), the Commission 

shall, by rule, as the Commission determines is necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the 

protection of investors, establish a system for the assignment of [NRSROs] to determine the initial credit 

ratings of structured finance products, in a manner that prevents the issuer, sponsor, or underwriter of the 

structured finance product from selecting the [NRSRO] that will determine the initial credit ratings and 

monitor such credit ratings.”).
55

NRSROs not hired to rate the structured finance product.421 Also, investors seeking a credit 

rating from an NRSRO not hired to rate the structured finance product can pay an NRSRO of 

their choosing to rate the structured finance product using the Rule 17g-5 Program. Thus, it 

provides a mechanism for investors to select an NRSRO to rate a structured finance product they 

are considering purchasing or have purchased. In other words, investors can use the Rule 17g-5 

Program to obtain credit ratings from NRSROs other than those hired by the issuer.

The Rule 17g-5 Program operates by requiring an NRSRO hired to determine initial 

credit ratings for structured finance products to maintain a password-protected Internet website 

containing a list of each such structured finance product for which it currently is in the process of 

determining an initial credit rating.422 The list must be in chronological order and must identify 

the type of security or money market instrument, the name of the issuer of the structured finance 

product, the date the credit rating process was initiated, and the Internet website address where 

the arranger of the structured finance product represents that information provided to the hired 

NRSRO can be accessed by other NRSROs.

423 The hired NRSRO must provide free and 

unlimited access to the Internet website to any other NRSRO that provides it with a copy of a 

certification stating, among other things, that it is accessing the Internet website solely for the 

purpose of determining or monitoring credit ratings.424 

In addition, the hired NRSRO must obtain a written representation from the arranger of 

the structured finance product that the NRSRO can reasonably rely on.425 The arranger must 

represent, among other things, that it will maintain a password-protected Internet website that 

other NRSROs can access.426 Further, the arranger must represent that it will post on this 

Internet website all information the arranger provides to the hired NRSRO, or contracts with a 

third party to provide to the hired NRSRO, for the purpose of determining the initial credit rating 

and undertaking credit rating surveillance.427 The arranger also must represent that this 

information will be posted to the Internet website at the same time such information is provided 

to the hired NRSRO.428

2. Comparing the Rule 17g-5 Program to the Section 15E(w) System

The Commission asked commenters to provide a comparative evaluation of the Section 

15E(w) System and the Rule 17g-5 Program.

429 Two commenters favor the Section 15E(w) 

System over the Rule 17g-5 Program, stating that the Section 15E(w) System would create 

 421 See Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 74 FR at 63844.

422 See 17 CFR 240.17g-5(a)(3)(i).

423 Id.

424 See 17 CFR 240.17g-5(a)(3)(ii).

425 See 17 CFR 240.17g-5(a)(3)(iii).

426 See 17 CFR 240.17g-5(a)(3)(iii).

427 Id.

428 Id.

429 See Solicitation of Comment to Assist in Study on Assigned Credit Ratings, 76 FR at 28275-76.
56

competition over accuracy among credit rating agencies.

430 Certain other commenters who 

opined on the Rule 17g-5 Program, however, favor the Rule 17g-5 Program over the Section 

15E(w) System,431 although, as discussed below, many commenters believe additional 

modifications to the Program are needed to sufficiently address concerns with the current system. 

Some commenters said that the Rule 17g-5 Program – which creates an established framework 

for issuing unsolicited ratings – has the potential to better reduce conflicts of interest because 

unsolicited credit ratings provide a check against biased credit ratings.432 One commenter states

that “the realistic prospect of a non-hired NRSRO rating or issuing a comment on a transaction 

will serve to impose more transparency and discipline on both the issuer and the hired 

NRSRO.”433 Another commenter believes that the simultaneous access to information provided 

by the Rule 17g-5 Program pressures hired NRSROs to provide quality ratings.434 A third

commenter believes that “Rule 17g-5 offers investors a superior means to address potential 

conflicts of interest inherent in the ‘issuer-pay’ rating agency business model” because it 

provides market participants with tools to protect themselves from the risks of rating agencies’ 

potential conflicting interests.435

In comparing the two systems, many commenters argue that the Rule 17g-5 Program 

better encourages competition and that it makes information needed to rate a transaction 

simultaneously available to all NRSROs.436 One commenter believes that the Rule 17g-5 

Program “significantly promotes competition by allowing any NRSRO access to the information 

required to rate a transaction.”

437 Similarly, another commenter states that in contrast to the

Section 15E(w) System, “the Rule 17g-5 Program seeks to encourage multiple ratings ... by 

providing non-hired NRSROs access to arranger websites.”

438 Some NRSROs praise the fact 

that the Rule 17g-5 Program ensures that the same information is provided to all NRSROs, even 

those hired to rate a transaction.439 Other NRSROs believe the Section 15E(w) System would be 

anti-competitive and costly.

440 Specifically, one NRSRO states that the Section 15E(w) System 

would create “a closed, non-competitive environment where NRSROs have little or no incentive 

to improve their ratings processes, criteria and methodology.”

441 Another NRSRO expresses

 430 See the Parsont Letter and the Franken/Wicker Letter.

431 See, e.g., the ASF Letter, the CRE Letter, the Fitch Letter, the FSR Letter, the ICI Letter, the MBA Letter, 

the Moody’s Letter, the MS Letter, the S&P Letter, and the SIFMA Letter. 

432 See the MS Letter, the ICI Letter, and the FSR Letter.

433 See the MS Letter.

434 See the ICI Letter.

435 See the FSR Letter.

436 See the SIFMA Letter, the ASF Letter, the S&P Letter, and the Fitch Letter.

437 See the SIFMA Letter.

438 See the ASF Letter (emphasis in the original).

439 See the Moody’s Letter.

440 See the S&P Letter and the Fitch Letter.

441 See the S&P Letter.
57

concern that the system could result in “securitization market disruption, greater transaction 

expenses and, ultimately, an increase in the fiscal burden faced by taxpayers.”442

Some commenters believe that the Rule 17g-5 Program promotes accountability in a way 

that the Section 15E(w) System could not.443 One commenter – who believes that the Section 

15E(w) System is “unworkable” – argues that, under the Rule 17g-5 Program, NRSROs would 

be held accountable for their ratings via multiple checks: issuer selection; investor influence on 

issuer selection; and investors’ ability to obtain unsolicited ratings from non-hired NRSROs.444 

Another commenter believes that the Rule 17g-5 Program makes NRSROs accountable for their 

ratings.445 A third commenter opines that the assigned ratings under the Section 15E(w) System 

“would not significantly improve the accuracy of the ratings process” and that instead, they 

could hurt the ratings process because “assigned credit ratings could stifle NRSRO innovation by 

eliminating the financial incentive to refine and improve rating models.”

446

Commenters also specifically identify existing and pending rules already are designed to 

address conflicts of interest in the credit rating process.447 One commenter believes that the 

recent reforms under the Dodd-Frank Act will aid the market in holding NRSROs accountable 

for their ratings and that the Rule 17g-5 Program will be more effective at mitigating the risk of

the issuer-pay model than the Section 15E(w) System.448 Another commenter argues that the 

Rule 17g-5 Program is cost-effective, builds on existing regulatory initiatives, and (particularly if 

strengthened) makes alternative selection and compensation models for NRSROs unnecessary.449

One commenter states that the Rule 17g-5 Program, unlike the Section 15E(w) System, 

would be compatible with other alternative compensation models.

450 It states that the Rule 17g-5 

Program “could facilitate the creation of a user-paid, or an investor-owned NRSRO by providing 

it with the information it needs to rate transactions.” 451 The commenter also believes that the 

Rule 17g-5 Program currently allows investors who are not comfortable with an issuer-selected 

NRSRO to hire an NRSRO of their choice to provide additional ratings since the investor-hired 

NRSRO can now obtain the requisite information to produce the rating.452

3. Use of the Rule 17g-5 Program

 442 See the Fitch Letter.

443 See the ASF Letter, the SIFMA Letter, and the MBA Letter.

444 See the ASF Letter. 

445 See the SIFMA Letter.

446 See the MBA Letter.

447 See the ASF Letter and the Fitch Letter.

448 See the ASF Letter.

449 See the Fitch Letter.

450 See the SIFMA Letter.

451 Id.

452 Id.
58

The Commission also requested comments on how the Rule 17g-5 Program currently is 

being used to determine credit ratings for structured finance products.453 In general, commenters 

stated that, as of the date of their letters, the Rule 17g-5 Program has not been used to produce an 

unsolicited credit rating, although some analytical commentary has been issued by non-hired 

NRSROs.

454 A few commenters state that the program, in its current form, is not effective.455

Others commenters suggest that the program’s efficacy needs to be tested over a longer period of 

time before looking for other ways to reduce conflicts of interest and improve the integrity and 

quality of credit ratings.456 One commenter observes that the Rule 17g-5 Program has not been 

utilized because NRSROs are unlikely to be in a position to offer free credit ratings due to the 

high cost and labor required to issue a rating.457 Another commenter echoes these thoughts, 

pointing to the uncompensated costs of unsolicited credit ratings and arrangers’ and investors’ 

lack of interest in these credit ratings.458 The commenter believes that most investors are 

unwilling to pay NRSROs for unsolicited credit ratings because the arranger usually obtains

ratings from at least two NRSROs.

459 The commenter explains that this makes it difficult for 

smaller NRSROs to take advantage of the Rule 17g-5 Program.

460 The commenter also contends

that NRSROs do not receive information under the Rule 17g-5 Program in time to market 

unsolicited ratings to investors.461

Some commenters criticize issuers for being overbroad in marking information posted to 

their Rule 17g-5 websites as confidential.462 One NRSRO states that “issuers often ... 

designat[e] all information as confidential, without distinguishing information that is already 

public ... or will become public when the hired NRSRO publishes its reports.”

463 Additionally, 

the NRSRO expresses concern that in complying with the Rule 17g-5 Program, issuers could 

simply include all their communications with hired NRSROs on the website, which “could cause 

issuers and NRSRO analysts to be more inhibited and less open and transparent in their 

communications.”

464 The NRSRO also alleges that the Rule 17g-5 Program is causing some 

issuers to direct trustees to restrict the information they share with NRSROs for fear of violating 

Rule 17g-5.465

 453 See Solicitation of Comment to Assist in Study on Assigned Credit Ratings, 76 FR at 28275-76.

454 See, e.g., the CRE Letter, the Morningstar Letter, and the Fitch Letter. Subsequent to the solicitation of 

comment and the comments received on the solicitation, one NRSRO has informed the staff that it has used 

the Rule 17g-5 Program on a limited basis to produce unsolicited credit ratings. 

455 See the Morningstar Letter and the CRE Letter.

456 See the Fitch Letter and the ICI Letter.

457 See the CRE Letter.

458 See the Morningstar Letter.

459 Id.

460 Id.

461 See the Morningstar Letter.

462 See, e.g., the S&P Letter.

463 See the S&P Letter.

464 Id.

465 Id.
59

Some NRSROs suggest that the Rule 17g-5 Program website may not always have all the 

information a non-hired NRSRO would require for its analytical process.466 This lack of 

information may prevent the non-hired NRSRO from providing an unsolicited rating.467 Another 

concern raised by NRSROs is the slower credit rating process.

468 To ensure that all NRSROs 

have access to the same information and at the same time, arrangers are posting formal, written 

responses to NRSROs’ inquiries on the arrangers’ websites. This process can cause delays in the 

initial credit rating process and in the surveillance of outstanding credit ratings.

One NRSRO has a more positive view on the current use of the Rule 17g-5 Program.469 

It observes that the program has increased both the amount of unsolicited commentary available 

from NRSROs and the level of disclosure provided by issuers and underwriters regarding the 

process through which they select NRSROs.470 It states that “over the past 12 months ...

transaction prospectuses have described which NRSROs were shown the transaction, which were 

selected and why.”

471

4. Potential Modifications to the Rule 17g-5 Program

The Commission solicited comment on how the Rule 17g-5 Program could be 

modified.

472 Several of the commenters suggest that enhancements to the Rule 17g-5 Program 

would make this program a stronger alternative to the Section 15E(w) System.473 As discussed 

below, suggested improvements include: issuer disclosure of preliminary credit ratings and 

enhancement levels from NRSROs that were “shopped” but where the issuer did not accept the 

credit rating; increasing the information available to investors; modifying the requirement that 

non-hired NRSROs rate at least 10% of the transactions they view on an arrangers’ website (the 

“10% requirement”); and addressing confidentiality constraints imposed by arrangers.

Some commenters recommend that issuers be required to disclose details regarding 

whether they “shopped” for preliminary ratings or enhancement levels from NRSROs for a 

 466 The Commission held meetings and received input from NRSROs, which are documented on the 

Commission’s Internet website at: http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-629/4-629.shtml#meetings

(“Commission Meetings with NRSROs”).

467 Id.

468 Id.

469 See the Fitch Letter.

470 Id.

471 See id. Fitch provided the following example of increased disclosure in a prospectus, noting that the 

sample language was typical of the type of language used: “[i]n the case of Class A and Class B 

Certificates, Fitch indicated preliminarily that it would require significantly higher subordination in order to 

assign a ratings of “AAA” and “A” to the classes respectively. If Fitch elects to assign ratings to these 

Classes such ratings may be significantly lower than the ratings assigned by XYZ rating agency.”

472 See Solicitation of Comment to Assist in Study on Assigned Credit Ratings, 76 FR at 28276.

473 See, e.g., the ASF Letter, the SIFMA Letter, and the Fitch Letter.
60

particular transaction.474 One commenter proposes that issuers disclose this information in their 

offering documents.475 Another commenter suggests that issuers could identify the credit rating 

agencies that were initially contracted but not ultimately selected to rate a transaction.476 A third

commenter offers that all NRSROs should be required to “list publicly on their websites the 

[Rule] 17g-5 related transactions for which they have been engaged, regardless of whether they 

provide final ratings.”477 The commenter suggests that publicly disclosing the NRSROs asked to 

review a transaction and the NRSROs that ultimately rated the transaction would expose whether 

“rating shopping” occurred on the transaction.478

One NRSRO believes that if the Commission decides to require that NRSROs disclose 

preliminary ratings, then the NRSROs should be compensated for providing them to cover the 

costs of providing an analysis that will be publicly available.479 The NRSRO also suggests that 

if such disclosure is required, the arrangers could disclose their reasons for selecting certain 

credit rating agencies to provide preliminary credit ratings and any reasons for differences 

between the preliminary and final credit ratings.

480

Some commenters suggest that issuers should be required to provide transaction 

information to investors and not just NRSROs, so that investors can make their own conclusions 

about the credit risk of a transaction.481 One commenter suggests that the Rule 17g-5 Program 

be enhanced by requiring arrangers to make transaction data available to all investors, credit 

rating agencies, and issuers by posting the data on the trustee’s website.482 Another commenter 

believes that if the Commission increases the direct flow of information from issuers to the 

broader market (and investors in particular) by requiring issuers to disclose enhanced 

information about structured finance products and the assets underlying them in the offering 

prospectus, it will discourage issuers from engaging in “rating shopping.”

483 The commenter 

believes that when investors can more easily “look under the hood” of structured finance 

products, they can form their own views of credit risk and knowledgably assess the credibility of 

credit rating agencies on a rating-by-rating basis.484 A third commenter suggests making the 

Rule 17g-5 Program available to all market participants and not just NRSROs, noting that this

would increase “the market’s ability to compare the rating issued with the NRSRO's published 

rating standards.”485

 474 See the ASF Letter, the SIFMA Letter, and the Fitch Letter.

475 See the ASF Letter.

476 See the SIFMA Letter.

477 See the Fitch Letter.

478 Id.

479 See the Morningstar Letter.

480 Id.

481 See the CRE Letter, the Moody’s Letter, and the Kroll Letter.

482 See the CRE Letter.

483 See the Moody’s Letter.

484 Id.

485 See the Kroll Letter.
61

Alternatively, one commenter suggests that the Rule 17g-5 Program be enhanced by 

instituting an assignment system to select an NRSRO to provide an unsolicited rating for each 

transaction using the information provided under Rule 17g-5.486 The commenter states that this 

system could “address some of the criticisms of the Section 15E(w) System, while still ensuring 

that NRSROs are being compensated.”

487 The commenter states that NRSROs could be eligible 

to participate in the assignment system following “a confirmation that the NRSROs are prepared 

to rate the particular class of securities through the publication and release of adequate 

criteria.”

488 Under the commenter’s proposed assignment system, NRSROs would be selected 

on a rotational basis.489 The commenter states that arrangers would still hire an NRSRO of their 

choosing, but the unsolicited rating provided by the assigned NRSRO “would act as an 

alternative, independent voice for investors to consider.”

490 The commenter explains that 

oversight of the assignment system would be accomplished through the Commission’s existing 

NRSRO examination process.491

Several commenters believe that the 10% requirement in Rule 17g-5 should be modified

or eliminated.

492 One commenter believes that eliminating the 10% requirement would “enable 

non-hired NRSROs to survey more deals in an effort to identify transactions on which their 

views diverge from the hired NRSROs.”

493 The commenter suggests that NRSROs should be 

able to count any transaction for which it provides commentary (but not necessarily a credit 

rating) towards its 10% ratings requirement.494 The commenter argues that commentary is useful 

in allowing NRSROs to give their independent views on a transaction.495 The commenter also 

argues that smaller or new NRSROs could gain exposure and credibility through a track record 

of providing commentary, which would be easier for them to undertake than producing 

unsolicited credit ratings.496 Similarly, another commenter agrees that unsolicited commentary 

should count towards the credit ratings requirement but also suggests that the 10% requirement 

be reduced to 5%.

497 The commenter states that this would relieve “NRSROs from some of the 

cost and liability burden of issuance of formal ratings (such as the cost of surveillance, and 

liability associated with that).”

498 A third commenter suggests increasing the number of times 

 486 See the Morningstar Letter.

487 Id.

488 Id.

489 Id.

490 Id.

491 Id.

492 See the ASF Letter, the SIFMA Letter, the ICI Letter, and the Kroll Letter.

493 See the ASF Letter.

494 Id.

495 Id.

496 Id.

497 See the SIFMA Letter.

498 Id.
62

that an NRSRO would be permitted to access information under the rule before a credit rating 

would need to be produced.

499 Finally, a fourth commenter believes that the 10% requirement

should be eliminated.

500 The commenter states that removing the limits around the information 

NRSROs can view through the Rule 17g-5 Program would encourage NRSROs to access the 

data because NRSROs would no longer be forced to invest resources in providing a credit rating 

for which they will not be compensated.501 The commenter suggests that this wider access 

would in turn lead to improved methodologies and more accurate ratings.

502

Finally, one commenter suggests that the Commission should evaluate the confidentiality 

requirements that are required of NRSROs accessing information through the Rule 17g-5 

Program.

503 The commenter states that there has been criticism that arrangers are holding nonhired NRSROs to a higher standard for confidentiality.

504 The commenter explains that this 

prevents some NRSROs from issuing unsolicited credit ratings or being able to include certain 

information in their credit rating rationales.

505 NRSROs believe that these higher standards 

would prohibit them from publishing meaningful analytical commentary with unsolicited credit 

ratings produced through the Rule 17g-5 Program.

506

B. Investor-Owned Credit Rating Agency Model

1. Mechanics of the IOCRA Model

Under the investor-owned credit rating agency (“IOCRA”) model, sophisticated investors 

– referred to as highly sophisticated institutional purchasers (“HSIP”) – would create and operate

NRSROs that would produce ratings.507 Issuers would be required to obtain two ratings, one 

from an IOCRA and the second from their choice of NRSRO. More specifically, an NRSRO 

would be prohibited from publicly releasing a rating that was paid for by the issuer or sponsor, 

unless the NRSRO received written notification that the issuer had made arrangements and paid 

an IOCRA to publicly release its rating. The IOCRA and the hired NRSRO would publish their

ratings simultaneously.

An institutional investor would have to qualify as an HSIP before forming an IOCRA or 

joining an existing IOCRA. To qualify as an HSIP, an institutional investor would have to 

demonstrate that it was large and sophisticated, managed billions of dollars in assets, and could 

be relied upon to represent the buy-side interest in accurately rating debt market instruments. 

 499 See the ICI Letter.

500 See the Kroll Letter.

501 Id.

502 Id.

503 See the ICI Letter.

504 Id.

505 Id.

506 See Commission Meetings with NRSROs.

507 The description of this model is derived from the GAO Report at 82; see also GAO 2012 Report at 9-10. 
63

HSIPs would hold majority voting and operational control over the IOCRA. The model 

contemplates that IOCRAs could be for-profit or not-for-profit entities. There would be no 

regulatory limit on the number of IOCRAs that could be formed.

Under the IOCRA model, market forces would set IOCRA fees. The credit rating 

released by the IOCRA and the underlying research would be free to the public. According to 

the GAO, proponents of this model believe it would improve the rating process by changing the 

incentive structure of the NRSRO’s business.508 They said the IOCRA model would affect 

competition and ratings quality by introducing new competition to the industry, and the 

investors’ interest would be counter-balanced against the interest of the issuers.509

2. Commenters’ Reactions to the IOCRA Model

Some commenters question the feasibility of implementing the IOCRA model.

510 For 

example, one NRSRO questions how an IOCRA “would accumulate the extensive resources 

necessary to form quality rating opinions on all or virtually all asset-backed securitizations, as 

the proposal anticipates.”511 Another commenter is concerned that the IOCRA model is

unrealistic because of its reliance on investor cooperation, given the competition among

institutional investors and investors’ unwillingness to pay for research services in the past.512

Additionally, some commenters argue that, while the IOCRA model may help to manage the 

issuer-pay conflict of interest, it could create new conflicts of interest.

513 Commenters are

concerned that investors have as much interest in a security’s rating as issuers do and therefore,

an IOCRA rating would not be free of conflicts.514 One NRSRO states that IOCRAs “could face 

pressure to issue lower ratings, generally benefiting investors by increasing the risk premium that 

investors can demand from issuers.”

515 Similarly, another commenter argues that just as issuers 

want to obtain high credit ratings, investors can have incentives to have credit ratings issued or 

maintained at a certain level.516 The commenter states that investment guidelines have certain 

credit rating requirements and offers the example of investors wanting “cheap” assets to receive 

high credit ratings so that the investors can purchase these assets, which can produce high yields 

for their funds.517 The commenter explains that the cheap price of the security could compensate 

for any decrease in performance.518 The commenter also offers a second example where 

 508 See the GAO Report at 82. 

509 Id.

510 See the S&P Letter and the AFR Letter.

511 See the S&P Letter.

512 See the AFR Letter.

513 See the S&P Letter and the SIFMA Letter.

514 See id.

515 See the S&P Letter.

516 See the SIFMA Letter.

517 Id.

518 Id.
64

investors might want to avoid downgrades for a troubled security as long as possible so that the 

security would not need to be marked down on the investor’s books or sold at a loss.519

Finally, one commenter questions whether the IOCRA model would address the issuerpay conflict of interest since financial institutions (who would be the HSIPs controlling the 

IOCRAs) may have many different roles in the securitization market.520 It states that “there is 

often no clear distinction between investors and issuers. There are instances where the 

‘investor’, the ‘issuer’ and the ‘government’ are either the same entity or a group of tightly 

interconnected entities.”

521

C. Stand-Alone Model

1. Mechanics of the Stand-Alone Model

Under the stand-alone model, the issuer would continue to select the NRSRO, and 

NRSROs would continue to interact with the issuer.522 However, the issuer would not provide 

payment for the NRSRO’s credit rating services. Instead, the NRSROs would be compensated 

through transaction fees imposed on original issuance and on secondary market transactions. 

Part of the fee would be paid by the issuer or secondary-market seller, and the other portion of 

the fee would be paid by the investor purchasing the security in either the primary or secondary 

market. The NRSRO would be compensated over the life of the security based on these 

transaction fees. The credit rating provided by the NRSRO would be free to the public.

According to the GAO, proponents of this model believe that by creating a funding source that is 

beyond the influence of both issuers and investors, the NRSROs’ focus will be on producing the 

most accurate and timely credit analysis rather than on satisfying the desires of any other vested 

interest.523

2. Commenters’ Reactions to the Stand-Alone Model

Several commenters believe that the stand-alone model would not eliminate the conflicts 

of interest associated with the issuer-pay system or deter “rating shopping.”

524 For example, one 

commenter states that “if the issuer selects the NRSRO to provide the initial ratings, NRSROs 

would remain incentivized to court the favor of issuers.”525 Similarly, another commenter adds

“this model does not address concerns that flow from having an entity with an interest in the 

rating, such as an issuer or subscriber, select the credit rating agency.”526 A third commenter 

 519 Id.

520 See the Moody’s Letter.

521 Id.

522 The description of this model is derived from the GAO Report at 82-83; see also GAO 2012 Report at 10. 

523 GAO Report at 82-83.

524 See the ASF Letter, the CRE Letter, and the S&P Letter.

525 See the ASF Letter.

526 See the CRE Letter.
65

observes that conflicts of interest associated with the issuer-pay system would not necessarily be 

reduced simply because a portion of the NRSRO’s fees would be paid by investors in the future 

when the rated security is purchased in the secondary market.

527

A number of commenters also question the feasibility of implementing the stand-alone 

model.

528 Several commenters note that the payment system would create implementation 

problems.529 One NRSRO highlights the complexity of the payment system under the standalone model and questions how it would function and who would manage it.530 The NRSRO

feels that the payment system would require extensive resources to implement and would likely 

impose significant burdens on the market.

531 Another commenter also argues that the payment 

system under the stand-alone model would be difficult to set up and administer.532 The 

commenter states that some entity would need to be formed to “administer, monitor, and audit 

the payment system and it is unclear what entity would be in a position to handle such tasks, 

particularly for secondary market transactions.”533 The same commenter also expresses concerns

about how the stand-alone model would affect the competitiveness of the industry.534 It 

questions how many credit rating agencies the stand-alone model could support, noting that the 

model could lead to consolidation and reduced competition in the industry.535

Additionally, commenters raise some feasibility concerns with tying credit rating agency 

fees to secondary market trading.536 One commenter states that “structured finance securities are 

more thinly traded than corporate securities, and it would seem difficult, if not impossible, to 

compensate NRSROs on any meaningful basis through secondary market trading, unless the per 

transaction fee was prohibitively high or the bulk of the fee was borne by issuers.”537 Another 

commenter echoes these concerns, noting that due to the comparatively small amount of trading 

in securitized products and the correspondingly low revenue generated from such trading, the fee

paid to NRSROs at issuance would have to be quite high relative to the transactional fee.538 A 

third commenter worries that NRSROs would not be adequately compensated under the standalone model, stating that “it is difficult to see how such contingent fees could be factored into 

 527 See the S&P Letter.

528 See the S&P Letter, the CRE Letter, the ASF Letter, and the SIFMA Letter.

529 See the S&P Letter and the CRE Letter.

530 See the S&P Letter.

531 Id.

532 See the CRE Letter.

533 Id.

534 Id.

535 Id.

536 See the ASF Letter, the SIFMA Letter, and the S&P Letter.

537 See the ASF Letter.

538 See the SIFMA Letter.
66

pricing decisions in a way that provides adequate assurances that the NRSRO will earn an 

appropriate return for its work.”539

D. Designation Model

1. Mechanics of the Designation Model

Under the designation model, all NRSROs would have the option of rating a new 

issuance, and investors would direct, or designate, fees to the NRSROs of their choice, based on 

the proportion of securities that the investors owned.540 The issuer would be required to provide 

all interested NRSROs with the information necessary to rate the structured finance product and 

would pay the rating fees to a third-party administrator, which would manage the designation 

process. The model suggests that the issuer’s transfer agent (who is currently responsible for 

maintaining investor ownership records) could perform the responsibilities of the third-party 

administrator. When the security was issued, the investors would designate which of the 

NRSROs that rated the security should receive fees, based on the investors’ perception of the 

research underlying the credit ratings. The investors could designate one or several NRSROs. 

The third-party administrator would be responsible for disbursing the fees to the NRSROs in 

accordance with the investors’ designations. After the initial rating, the issuer would continue to 

pay maintenance rating fees to the third-party administrator, which bond holders also would 

allocate through the designation process every quarter over the life of the security. When the 

debt was repaid (or repurchased by the issuer), a final rating fee would be paid in conjunction 

with the retirement of the security. The credit rating would be free to the public, while the 

research underlying it would be distributed to investors and (at the discretion of the relevant 

NRSROs) to potential investors. 

According to the GAO, the proponents of the designation model believe it would 

eliminate the conflict of interest between the issuer paying for the rating and the NRSRO.

541

They also believe it would increase competition by encouraging NRSROs to prepare unsolicited 

ratings because each NRSRO would be assured of receiving compensation for its rating,

provided that some group of investors or other users of ratings found the NRSRO’s credit rating

useful enough to allocate to the NRSRO a portion of the fees.

542

2. Commenters’ Reactions to the Designation Model

All of the comments the Commission received regarding the designation model were 

negative. Several commenters are concerned with the uncertainty as to whether an NRSRO 

would be compensated under the designation model.543 One commenter highlights that NRSROs 

 539 See the S&P Letter.

540 The description of this model is derived from the GAO Report at 83-84; see also GAO 2012 Report at 10. 

541 See the GAO Report at 83-84.

542 Id.

543 See the SIFMA Letter, the CRE Letter, and the S&P Letter.
67

would be forced to rate transactions without any guaranty of payment.544 The commenter states

that the NRSRO “might receive its full customary fee, or it might receive part of it, or it might 

receive nothing.”

545 The commenter also argues that NRSROs would then have to maintain the 

credit rating through surveillance without any guarantee of additional compensation.546 The 

commenter concludes that “[n]ot only it is unclear how rating agencies would be able to operate 

broadly focused businesses on these uncertain terms, but also whether rating agencies would 

continue to rate asset-backed securities at all.”547 Another commenter observes that the uncertain 

revenue stream for NRSROs under the designation model would cause ratings quality, 

competition and innovation in the industry to suffer because NRSROs would be incentivized to 

invest the fewest possible resources in their ratings.548 The commenter states that “NRSROs 

cannot be expected to invest the resources that would be necessary to perform labor-intensive 

ratings and develop specialized expertise in exchange for a mere hope that they will be 

compensated for their efforts.”

549 Another commenter echoes this sentiment, asking “would any 

rating agency want to invest the resources to rate a transaction if it might not be selected?”550

An additional concern commenters raised relates to the feasibility of implementing the 

compensation system.551 Three commenters highlight the complexity of the payment system and 

question how it would function and who would be responsible for managing it.552 One 

commenter questions how investors would know to which NRSROs to designate fees since the 

investors would not purchase the security until after it was rated.553 This commenter also 

questions how issuers could budget for a transaction if they could not predict how much the 

surveillance fees would be.554

Several commenters raised similar feasibility or practicality concerns with respect to the 

designation model.555 One commenter argues that the model “raises many concerns, not the least 

of which is the complexity of attempting to administer such a system.”556 Another commenter 

worries that the uncertainty surrounding which NRSROs would ultimately be hired to provide 

ratings would decrease efficiencies at each stage of the securitization process.557 Finally, one 

 544 See the SIFMA Letter.

545 Id.

546 Id. 

547 Id.

548 See the CRE Letter.

549 Id.

550 See the ASF Letter.

551 See the S&P Letter and the CRE Letter.

552 See the S&P Letter, the ASF Letter, and the CRE Letter.

553 See the CRE Letter.

554 Id.

555 See the CRE Letter, the ASF Letter, and the SIFMA Letter.

556 See the CRE Letter.

557 See the ASF Letter.
68

commenter highlights the burden that the designation model would place on the issuer, noting 

that if a large number of NRSROs were interested in rating the transaction, the issuer could end 

up responding to numerous requests for information.558

Commenters also note that the designation model raises additional conflicts of 

interests.559 One commenter argues that the model would “create incentives for rating agencies 

to curry the favor of particular investors in transactions.”560 Similarly, another commenter

argues that NRSROs could face pressure to issue lower ratings (which may benefit investors 

because of the increased risk premium they can demand) since it would be up to the investors to 

decide which NRSROs would receive fees.561

E. User-Pay Model

1. Mechanics of the User-Pay Model

Under the user-pay model, issuers would not pay for ratings.562 The model specifies that 

all users of ratings would be required to enter into a contract with the NRSRO and pay for its 

rating services. The proposal defines “user” as any entity that included a rated security, loan, or 

contract as an element of its assets or liabilities as recorded in an audited financial statement. 

Users of ratings would include holders of long or short positions in a fixed-income instrument, as 

well as parties that refer to a credit rating in contractual commitments or that are parties to 

derivative products that rely on rated securities or entities. A user would be required to pay for 

ratings services supplied during each period in which it booked the related asset or liability.

The model relies on third-party auditors to ensure that NRSROs receive payment from 

users of ratings for their services. Any entity required to obtain audited financial statements in 

which the rated instrument or covenant was included would be required to demonstrate to the 

auditors that the holder had paid for the rating services. No audit opinion would be issued until 

the auditor was satisfied that the rating agencies had been properly compensated. The model 

would require the close cooperation of the auditing community and the Public Company 

Auditing Oversight Board. According to the GAO, the proponents of this model believe that, 

while more cumbersome, the model attempts to capture “free riders” – users of ratings that do 

not compensate NRSROs for the credit ratings they produce.

563

2. Commenters’ Reactions to the User-Pay Model

 558 See the SIFMA Letter.

559 See the SIFMA Letter and the S&P Letter.

560 See the SIFMA Letter.

561 See the S&P Letter.

562 The description of this model is derived from the GAO Report at 84-85; see also GAO 2012 Report at 11.

563 See the GAO Report at 84-85.
69

Commenters question the feasibility of the user-pay model.564 One commenter states that

“[t]his model represents perhaps the most insurmountable operational challenge of any of the 

alternatives because it will be difficult, if not impossible, to figure out who the ‘user’ is in every 

case.”565 The commenter cites the example of investors who hold securities under the name of 

their broker-dealer.566 Another commenter questions “how a user could be compelled to pay for 

a credit rating.”567

Other commenters are concerned with the conflicts of interest created by the user-pay 

model.568 One commenter argues that just as issuers have incentives to obtain high credit 

ratings, investors and other users have incentives to obtain credit ratings at a certain level as 

well.569 The commenter states that “[u]ser-paid models do not eliminate all conflicts of interest, 

just some conflicts of interest, and introduce others.”570 Continuing with this theme, another 

commenter argues that investors who are short a bond may be motivated to encourage a negative 

rating action and that investors who are long a bond also may prefer lower ratings to obtain 

higher yields.571

F. Other Alternative Models

1. Issuer and Investor-Pays Model

The issuer and investor-pays model incorporates characteristics from a number of the 

models described above and leverages an existing structure as the basis for collecting and 

distributing ratings fees.572 Under this model, accredited NRSROs would be assigned to rate 

new issuances. Initially, all NRSROs would be placed in a continuous queue and would receive 

rating assignments when their respective numbers came up, unless they were unable or unwilling 

to rate a particular issue. In the future, credit ratings would be assigned based on the 

performances of the NRSROs, with those agencies that produced superior performance receiving 

more assignments. Performance would be measured as the correlation between an NRSRO’s 

credit ratings and default and recovery rates on issues rated, and tracked using “a common, 

transparent, and defensible methodology.”

573 Under this model, at least two and possibly three 

NRSROs would be assigned to rate each issuance “to help ensure rigor and fairness.”

574

 564 See the CRE Letter and the SIFMA Letter.

565 See the CRE Letter.

566 Id.

567 See the SIFMA Letter.

568 See the SIFMA Letter and the Moody’s Letter.

569 See the SIFMA Letter.

570 Id.

571 See the Moody’s Letter.

572 The description of this model is derived from the GAO 2012 Report at 13-14.

573 Id.

574 Id.
70

Payments for ratings would come from a fee levied on issuers of new debt issues and 

investors as parties to secondary market trades. These fees would be deposited in a dedicated 

fund—the U.S. Ratings Fund—and would be determined and reset periodically. The periodic 

review would consider the historic and projected volumes of primary issuances and of secondary 

market trading to determine a fee that would in the aggregate allow the ratings business to attract 

and retain qualified individuals. The U.S. Ratings Fund would be modeled after the Municipal 

Securities Rulemaking Board, which is authorized to collect fees on new and secondary market 

municipal issues to fund its activities. It would be overseen by a governing board representing 

issuers, investors, rating agencies, intermediaries, and independent directors. The fees collected 

would be used to pay the selected accredited NRSROs for issuing each solicited rating and other 

necessary administrative activities such as tracking NRSROs’ performance and tracking deals to 

be rated. The model authors note that these other activities could be outsourced or performed by 

the U.S. Ratings Fund.575 The fund also would advise the Commission on the eligibility and 

accreditation of the NRSROs. All ratings and related research reports paid for through the U.S. 

Ratings Fund would be freely available to the public.

According to the GAO, the authors of this model believe NRSROs would have incentives 

to provide accurate ratings and be objective because ratings would be monitored by a regulator 

and the accreditation of NRSROs would be subject to periodic renewal.576 The authors also note 

that legislation likely would be required to establish the system contemplated by the model.577 

Specifically, the authors said that legislation would need to enumerate the functions and the 

governance structure of the U.S. Ratings Fund, provide its mandate and methodology for 

determining the fees to be charged for ratings, and elaborate on how the new rating model would 

be introduced.578

2. Alternative User-Pays Model

The alternative user-pays model would pool creditors’ resources to obtain credit ratings 

before debt was issued.579 A government agency or independent board would administer a userfee system financed by debt purchasers, which would fund a competitive bidding process for the 

selection of credit rating agencies. The agency or board would solicit credit ratings before the 

debt issuance and then pay for the expense and related administrative costs through the user fee. 

The user fee could be assessed through a flat fraction or a percentage fee on the initial purchasers 

of the rated debt offerings. The user fee would allow the agency or board to finance initial credit 

ratings on a rolling basis, with the ratings for a given debt issuance being secured before the 

issuance of the debt.

NRSROs would bid on the right to issue ratings, with the agency or board determining 

how best to judge the bids and award the right to rate the issuance. For example, the agency or 

 575 Id.

576 Id.

577 Id.

578 Id. 

579 The description of this model is derived from the GAO 2012 Report at 12-13.
71

board could weigh factors such as price, extent of diligence the NRSRO proposed to undertake, 

and the disclosures the NRSRO would demand from issuers as a condition for the rating. The 

author of this model believes the bidding process would serve to contain the costs for credit 

ratings through price competition, level the playing field for smaller competitors and new 

entrants, and balance the desire for market-based assessments of risk with a greater role for the 

government agency, such as the Commission, or an independent board in defining credit rating 

agencies’ responsibilities.580

This model contemplates the establishment of additional accountability mechanisms. 

Specifically, users of credit ratings would be given enforceable rights and would require 

NRSROs to assume certification and mandatory reporting duties to creditors. The system would 

set up creditor committees that would serve as a channel for creditors to monitor ratings and 

assert limited rights against NRSROs. If an NRSRO breached duties owed to the creditors, the 

committee would serve as the representative in any potential actions and preempt actions brought 

by individual creditors. The model would require that all contracts with NRSROs detail duties 

owed to their creditors, to delineate the potential liability exposure for breach of these duties, and 

channel adjudication of any disputes to a Commission administrative process. For example, 

NRSROs could be required to certify on a quarterly basis that they exercised reasonable care in 

conducting due diligence of issuers’ financial and nonfinancial disclosures to make accurate 

assessments of risk exposure. To provide NRSROs with incentives for compliance without 

jeopardizing their financial viability, the model would limit NRSRO financial liability to cases of 

gross negligence, coupled with an earnings-based cap on liability and other safeguards.

While acknowledging the large volume of transactions that the administrator of the userfee system would have to manage, comparing the system to the Section 15E(w) System, the 

author of the model states that the “SEC may be far better positioned to select low bidders and to 

set floors for rating agency diligence than to engage in more difficult and subjective choices of 

what rating agency approaches are preferable.”581

3. Investor Owned Rating Agency Model

Under the investor owned rating agency model, investor owned rating agencies 

(“IORAs”) would be formed with a majority of their boards consisting of the largest fixed 

income investors (“FIIs”) that use credit ratings and whose economic interests in the IORAs

would be minimal.582 The extent of the FIIs’ economic interest in the IORAs would be a 

function of the type of shares they own. Moreover, the priorities of accuracy and transparency 

would be provided for in the IORAs’ charters, bylaws and shareholder agreements. 

 580 Id.

581 See the Manns Letter.

582 A description of this model is set forth in a comment letter provided to the Commission for the April 2009 

roundtable examining oversight of credit rating agencies. See letter from Neil Baron dated May 3, 2009 

(“Baron Letter”). The letter is available on the Commission’s Internet website at: 

http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-579/4-579.shtml. The staff also met with the commenter.
72

The author of this model believes that FIIs would ask issuers to obtain a rating from an 

IORA.583 The “buying power” of the FIIs with respect to instruments that are rated would be 

sufficient to require that issuers obtain a rating from an IORA in order to market their securities. 

As a result, the ability of an issuer to ratings shop would be minimized and, at the same time, the 

issuer-pay model – which the proponent believes is necessary to funding a rating agency’s 

operations – would be preserved. There also would be an oversight board with full-time 

employees whose sole responsibility would be to challenge credit rating methodologies. The 

oversight board or designees of the board would publish critiques of the methodologies.

4. Additional Suggestions From Commenters

In addition to the models discussed above, three commenters provide suggestions 

regarding alternative models.584 Instead of developing a new model, one commenter 

recommends that the Commission “explore changes to current rules, including creating 

mechanisms that defer payment of a portion of an initial rating fee over the life of a transaction, 

or other measures that help to ensure that a rating agency has ‘skin in the game’ along with other 

securitization transaction participants.”585 Similarly, another commenter “supports a 

compensation system in which fees earned by NRSROs are required to vest: (1) over a period of 

time equal to the average duration of the bonds; and (2) based on the performance of the original 

ratings and changes to those ratings over time relative to the credit performance of the bonds.”586 

The third commenter suggested a “term limit” under which an NRSRO that has rated three 

consecutive securitization transactions of an issuer or one of its affiliates within a specific asset 

class would be precluded from rating the next securitization transaction of the issuer or one of its 

affiliates within that asset class.587

VII. FINDINGS

Section 939F provides that the Commission must submit to the Committee on Banking, 

Housing and Urban Affairs of the Senate, and the Committee on Financial Services of the House 

of Representatives, not later than 24 months after the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, a report 

that contains: (1) the findings of the study, and (2) any recommendations for regulatory or 

 583 Id. 

584 See the SIFMA Letter, the CII Letter, and the Redwood Letter. 

585 See the SIFMA Letter.

586 See the CII Letter.

587 See the Redwood Letter. In 2011, the European Commission proposed amendments to European Union 

regulations applicable to credit rating agencies. See A Regulation Of The European Parliament And Of 

The Council Amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 On Credit Rating Agencies, 2011/0361 (COD) 

(Nov. 15, 2011), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0747:FIN:EN:PDF. This proposal included a 

requirement that credit rating agencies be rotated. See id. On June 19, 2012, the Economic and Monetary 

Committee of the European Parliament voted on the proposal that would modify it in certain respects. See

Press Service, Credit rating agency reform: sovereign debt ratings to be regulated (Jun. 19, 2012), available 

at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/pressroom/content/20120619IPR47242/html/Credit-ratingagency-reform-sovereign-debt-ratings-to-be-regulated.
73

statutory changes that the Commission determines should be made to implement the findings of 

the study.588 The sections below analyze the potential benefits and concerns of three potential 

courses of action: (1) implementation of the Section 15E(w) System; (2) implementation of 

enhancements to the Rule 17g-5 Program; and (3) implementation of one or more of the 

alternative compensation models discussed in section VI. The sections also identify for 

consideration by the Commission potential regulatory and statutory changes that could be 

undertaken with respect to each course of action. The staff recognizes that further action to 

implement any of these courses of action through Commission rulemaking would require 

additional study of relevant information, including information, as applicable, related to the costs 

and benefits of the course of action and the consideration, as applicable, of public comment. The 

staff recommends that the Commission, as a next step, convene a roundtable at which proponents 

and critics of the three courses of action are invited to discuss the study and its findings.

A. Section 15E(w) System

1. Potential Benefits

There are several potential benefits associated with the Section 15E(w) System. The 

primary potential benefit is that it could mitigate the issuer-pay conflict, which creates the 

potential that an NRSRO will be influenced to produce credit ratings desired by issuer clients to 

the detriment of the objectivity and quality of its credit ratings. Having the CRA Board assign a 

Qualified NRSRO to provide an initial credit rating would remove issuers from the NRSRO 

selection process with respect to the initial credit rating. This could result in less pressure on 

NRSROs to cater to the clients from whom they routinely seek business.

A second potential benefit of the Section 15E(w) System is that it could reward Qualified 

NRSROs for good performance and punish poor performance. Under one of the selection 

criteria, Qualified NRSROs producing credit ratings that prove to be accurate over time could 

receive more rating assignments in the future. Thus, their performance in determining accurate 

ratings could directly affect the volume of ratings business assigned to them. This could 

encourage NRSROs to compete based more heavily on the accuracy of their credit ratings. 

A third potential benefit of the Section 15E(w) System is that the CRA Board’s 

assignment system could provide smaller NRSROs with the opportunity to develop a reputation 

for producing quality credit ratings and potentially increase their market share. Smaller 

NRSROs that meet the CRA Board’s criteria for becoming a Qualified NRSRO could be 

assigned to provide initial credit ratings for issuers that might not otherwise have hired them. 

This would give the smaller NRSROs the opportunity to develop a positive track record with 

issuers and investors, potentially leading to more business for those NRSROs in the future, thus 

fostering greater competition among NRSROs.

A fourth potential benefit of the Section 15E(w) System is that the majority of the CRA 

Board would represent the investor community. Investors should have an incentive to develop a 

system that best promotes quality ratings. As discussed in section III.C.2, investors, like issuers, 

 588 Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
74

may have their own conflicts of interest and could seek to influence NRSROs to provide 

particular credit ratings. However, members of the CRA Board acting as representatives of the 

investor community at large would arguably focus on the promotion of quality ratings more than 

any other group, instead of seeking a credit rating for a particular investment.

2. Potential Concerns

There are several potential concerns associated with the Section 15E(w) System. One 

concern is that it may not substantially mitigate the issuer-pay conflict because issuers could 

continue to engage in “rating shopping” as they would be permitted to hire NRSROs to provide 

credit ratings to supplement the initial credit rating published by the assigned Qualified NRSRO. 

Furthermore, the NRSRO that is assigned to be the Qualified NRSRO in a particular transaction 

could be motivated to issue a favorable credit rating with the goal of being hired by the issuer at 

a later date and on an unrelated transaction when the Qualified NRSRO is not assigned by the 

CRA Board to perform an initial credit rating. 

A second potential concern is the risk that some NRSROs may choose not to apply to 

become Qualified NRSROs and thereby not participate in the Section 15E(w) System. For 

example, an NRSRO may choose not to rely on the Section 15E(w) System to obtain rating 

business and instead continue to solicit business directly from the issuers to perform 

supplemental credit ratings. Issuers ultimately may need to hire the NRSRO because investors 

or investment guidelines often require a product to be rated by more than one NRSRO or by a 

particular NRSRO. Thus, the business models of NRSROs that currently are hired to rate 

structured finance products may not be significantly affected if they do not participate in the 

Section 15E(w) System. Their lack of participation could undermine the potential benefits of the 

Section 15E(w) System and adversely affect the market for structured finance products. For 

example, the NRSROs that become Qualified NRSROs may not have the capacity or expertise to 

produce an initial credit rating for each structured finance product brought to market. This could

stall or significantly delay the issuance of new securitizations.

A related concern is that even if most NRSROs were to participate in the Section 15E(w) 

System, there is a risk that it would not change the current dynamics of the market for rating 

structured finance products. As noted above, investors and investment guidelines often require 

that a debt instrument be rated by specific NRSROs. As a result, if a Qualified NRSRO not 

accepted by investors or investment guidelines is assigned to perform an initial credit rating, the 

issuer may still need to solicit ratings from the NRSROs that have traditionally rated structured 

finance products in order to complete the issuance. This would raise costs to issuers, which 

could be passed on to investors. Alternatively, the CRA Board could factor investor acceptance 

into its selection criteria. However, this could result in initial ratings being assigned largely to 

the same NRSROs that currently are hired by issuers to rate structured finance products, which 

could undermine the objective of the Section 15E(w) System to broaden the pool of NRSROs 

rating these products. 

Another concern is that the Section 15E(w) System may be costly to implement and 

administer. Substantial funding may be necessary to hire CRA Board members and staff with 

the requisite expertise to efficiently assign Qualified NRSROs to produce initial credit ratings 

(given the volume of new issuances) and to assess the performance of Qualified NRSROs’ credit 
75

ratings. The Section 15E(w) Provisions specify that the CRA Board would have authority to 

levy fees from Qualified NRSROs to fund its operations. This approach raises the issue of how 

the cost of establishing the CRA Board would be funded as the board would need to be 

operational before Qualified NRSROs are approved and begin paying fees.589 It also raises a 

question of whether there would be sufficient Qualified NRSROs to fund the operations of the 

CRA Board on an ongoing basis. For example, there currently are nine NRSROs and they range 

in size. This pool could be too small to fund the operations of the CRA Board without imposing 

substantial fee burdens on each Qualified NRSRO. Moreover, the requirement to pay the fees 

could operate as a disincentive for some NRSROs to seek to become Qualified NRSROs, thereby 

further increasing the fee burden on the Qualified NRSROs. The fee costs to the Qualified 

NRSROs also likely would be passed on to the issuers, raising the costs of securitizations, which, 

in turn, would likely be passed on to investors.

Another concern is the operational complexity of the Section 15E(w) System and the 

impact this may have on the quality of credit ratings and the functioning of the structured finance 

markets. The ability of a given Qualified NRSRO to produce a quality credit rating for a 

particular structured finance product will depend on its capacity and expertise. The selection 

process utilized by the CRA Board would need to take these factors into account. Consequently, 

it would need to exercise a degree of judgment as to which Qualified NRSRO should undertake a 

particular initial ratings assignment. Thus, a completely random selection process (which would 

be the easiest to administer) probably would not be workable. Assessing the capacity and 

expertise of each Qualified NRSRO on an ongoing basis could be a fairly complex process. If 

not done properly, the selection process could misallocate initial ratings assignments to Qualified 

NRSROs that do not have sufficient resources to handle the volume of assignments or the inhouse expertise to rate a type of transaction. This could result in lower quality credit ratings or 

cause delays in bringing structured finance products to market. 

The Section 15E(w) System – by linking ratings assignments to the past performance of a 

Qualified NRSRO’s credit ratings – has the potential to create incentives that run contrary to the 

goal of ratings quality. For example, these incentives could lead NRSROs to be overly 

conservative in determining the initial credit rating in order to avoid having to downgrade the 

credit ratings in the future and have those downgrades negatively impact their performance 

statistics. They also could cause an NRSRO to be reluctant to downgrade a credit rating. These 

outcomes would run contrary to the goal of credit rating quality. Furthermore, the CRA Board’s 

evaluation of the performance of Qualified NRSROs could have unintended negative 

consequences. For example, if the metric for measuring ratings accuracy is not calibrated to 

account for legitimate differences in approach across the Qualified NRSROs and for economic 

cycles, certain NRSROs could be unfairly punished (or rewarded) for rating performance. Using 

a metric to measure accuracy and hold NRSROs accountable also could discourage innovation 

by NRSROs and lead to homogeneity of credit ratings to satisfy the particular metrics chosen by 

the CRA Board.

 589 See, e.g., section 109(k) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (providing for start-up expenses for the Public 

Company Accounting Oversight Board). 15 U.S.C. 7231(k).
76

Moreover, a flawed metric could result in the misallocation of initial ratings assignments 

to Qualified NRSROs that are not necessarily producing quality credit ratings. Moreover, if the 

metric assesses a large Qualified NRSRO as not performing well, the CRA Board could be faced 

with the decision of either reducing that firm’s assignments, even though the remaining Qualified 

NRSROs do not have the capacity or expertise to take on the additional initial credit ratings 

(thereby slowing new issuance in the structured finance market), or continuing to assign the 

Qualified NRSRO initial credit ratings in order to keep the market functioning, notwithstanding 

the assessed poor performance (thereby raising questions about the credibility of the system to 

make NRSROs accountable).

The CRA Board’s role as an evaluator of NRSRO performance raises other potential 

concerns. In particular, assessing performance could be viewed as interfering with the substance 

of the credit ratings or the procedures and methodologies by which the NRSROs determine credit 

ratings and, consequently, be contrary to section 15E(c)(2) of the Exchange Act. Different rating 

methodologies may produce different outcomes. For example, one credit rating agency may 

seek to produce credit ratings that remain stable through market cycles; whereas another credit 

rating agency may seek to produce credit ratings that are sensitive to changes in market factors 

and, thereby, are more volatile. In addition, one credit rating agency may issue credit ratings that 

assess the relative likelihood that an issuer or obligation will default regardless of any recovery 

after default; whereas another credit rating agency may issue credit ratings that include 

assessments of loss given default. A metric for measuring the accuracy of credit ratings could

inadvertently favor one credit rating approach over another and thereby prevent certain NRSROs 

from seeking to become Qualified NRSROs or force them to change their approach to producing 

credit ratings in order to accommodate the metric. In addition, commenters have raised concerns 

that ratings are opinions that are protected under the First Amendment, and therefore, any 

attempt to influence these opinions, such as by evaluating performance and punishing bad 

performance, may be a violation of the NRSROs’ First Amendment rights.590 Additionally, 

commenters have raised concerns that requiring issuers to hire the assigned Qualified NRSRO 

regardless of issuer or market preference or terms of engagement could raise Fifth Amendment 

issues.591 

A further concern is that the Section 15E(w) System could create new conflicts of 

interest. Individuals serving on the CRA Board or employed as staff may have their own 

interests in mind, and NRSROs could seek to influence these board members and staff members 

in a bid to receive more business. For example, an NRSRO could construct its ratings on 

government-issued debt in an effort to increase the likelihood that the CRA Board, which would 

be overseen by the government, would designate that NRSRO as a Qualified NRSRO. While 

some of these conflicts of interest could potentially be managed through CRA Board governance 

policies, such as requiring recusals where appropriate, some are inherent to the 15E(w) System 

and cannot be completely eliminated. Moreover, they add an extra layer of complexity and 

would have to be monitored and managed in the same manner as conflicts impacting the issuerpay model.

 590 The staff takes no position on the merits of these legal arguments.

591 The staff takes no position on the merits of these legal arguments.
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Finally, the Section 15E(w) System may conflict with the Congress’ goal in the DoddFrank Act of reducing reliance on credit ratings. The CRA Board’s approval of NRSROs to 

operate as Qualified NRSROs and its ongoing monitoring and assessment of their performance 

could be perceived as a seal of approval on the Qualified NRSROs and the credit ratings issued 

by Qualified NRSROs. This could lead investors to believe that these ratings are governmentsanctioned and encourage them to forego additional due diligence on the structured finance 

product.

3. Potential Considerations

The Commission – if it determines to implement the Section 15E(w) System – might 

consider the following actions:

 Seeking start-up funding from Congress to finance the initial establishment of the 

CRA Board and authority from Congress to permit the CRA Board to assess fees on 

issuers and other users of credit ratings to fund the on-going operations of the CRA 

Board.

 Requesting that Congress modify section 15E(c)(2) of the Exchange Act to make 

explicit that section 15E(c)(2) permits the CRA Board to link ratings assignments to 

the past performance of a Qualified NRSRO’s credit ratings.

B. Rule 17g-5 Program

1. Potential Benefits

There are several potential benefits associated with the Rule 17g-5 Program. One 

potential benefit is that it can mitigate conflicts of interest associated with the issuer-pay 

compensation model if it is used to produce unsolicited credit ratings. The Rule 17g-5 Program

is designed to create a mechanism for non-hired NRSROs to obtain information from the 

arranger at the same time as the hired NRSROs to allow the non-hired NRSROs to determine and 

monitor an unsolicited credit rating. Thus, it is designed to make it more difficult for arrangers 

of structured finance products to exert influence over the NRSROs they hire because any 

inappropriate credit rating could be exposed to the market through the unsolicited credit ratings 

issued by the non-hired NRSROs. Thus, the program is intended to mitigate the issuer-pay 

conflict by encouraging hired NRSROs to provide more accurate, unbiased credit ratings because 

of the possibility that a biased rating could be exposed by a non-hired NRSRO through an 

unsolicited credit rating.

The Rule 17g-5 Program also can address the issuer-pay conflict by providing investors 

with potential alternatives to structured finance credit ratings issued by hired NRSROs. 

Unsolicited credit ratings provide investors with additional, independent evaluations of 

creditworthiness. In addition, investors seeking a credit rating from an NRSRO not hired to rate 

the structured finance product can pay an NRSRO of their choosing to rate the structured finance 

product using the Rule 17g-5 Program. Thus, it provides a mechanism for investors to select an 

NRSRO to rate a structured finance product they are considering purchasing or have purchased. 
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In other words, investors can use the Rule 17g-5 Program to obtain credit ratings from NRSROs 

other than those hired by the issuer.

Another potential benefit of the Rule 17g-5 Program is that it could possibly promote 

competition and mitigate barriers to entry naturally arising in the credit rating industry by 

allowing smaller NRSROs to compete for market share by developing a track record through the 

publication of unsolicited ratings. Issuers and investors may eventually choose to hire a 

particular NRSRO after observing the quality of its unsolicited credit ratings. This could lead to 

less concentration and greater competition in the credit rating industry.

The Rule 17g-5 Program also can be a means to improve accountability in the credit 

rating process for structured finance products because it requires issuers to post the information 

provided to the hired NRSRO on their internet websites. This transparency may make it more 

difficult for issuers to exert influence over NRSROs, given that all communications and 

information shared between the issuer and the hired NRSRO must also be provided to the nonhired NRSROs. 

Another potential benefit of the Rule 17g-5 Program is that NRSROs and issuers already 

have established the systems and infrastructures necessary to comply with the requirements in 

Rule 17g-5. NRSROs and issuers are familiar with the rule and have developed industry 

practices with respect to complying with the rule (e.g., data rooms to facilitate the required 

sharing of information have been deployed and refined). Consequently, enhancements to the 

Rule 17g-5 Program to improve its efficacy could be less burdensome and costly to implement 

than other alternatives.

2. Potential Concerns 

There are several potential concerns associated with the Rule 17g-5 Program. The 

foremost concern is that most NRSROs have not been using it to produce unsolicited credit 

ratings. The requirement that a non-hired NRSRO rate at least 10% of the transactions it views 

on arrangers’ websites (the “10% requirement”) is cited as a reason for why the Rule 17g-5 

Program is not being used as designed. 

Another concern is that NRSROs, particularly smaller ones, have stated that structured 

finance credit ratings are too costly to produce for free. Smaller NRSROs also have argued that 

if they issue ratings for free, there is no incentive for an issuer to hire them. Further, although 

investors have the ability to solicit ratings from non-hired NRSROs, they may not be willing to 

pay for credit ratings when they can receive them from the hired NRSROs for free. 

The provision of free credit ratings raises other ancillary concerns. NRSROs are 

concerned about the potential liability connected to unsolicited ratings where there are no rating 

fees to offset the liability. In addition, there is a concern that NRSROs may not devote adequate 

resources to produce unsolicited credit ratings if they are not compensated, which could 

negatively impact credit rating quality. 

Another potential concern associated with the Rule 17g-5 Program cited by NRSROs is 

that arrangers may classify all the information on their websites as confidential. Because this 
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information may need to be used to explain the rationale for a credit rating in a companion report 

released with a credit rating, the confidentiality provisions may frustrate the issuance of 

unsolicited credit ratings to the extent an NRSRO believes that a report should accompany a 

credit rating. Additionally, an NRSRO may view the information posted on the websites as 

insufficient to perform a credit rating analysis. As a result, the Rule 17g-5 websites may not 

always contain all the information a non-hired NRSRO would need to produce a credit rating, 

given its particular methodologies.

3. Potential Considerations 

The Commission – if it determines to enhance the Rule 17g-5 Program – might consider 

the following actions:

 Modifying the 10% requirement to permit non-hired NRSROs to publish unsolicited 

commentary in lieu of unsolicited ratings. NRSROs recently have published 

unsolicited commentary about new structured finance issuances in which they explain 

why they would not have issued credit ratings at the same levels as the hired 

NRSROs. This provides investors with alternative credit assessments and could serve 

as a template for enhancing Rule 17g-5. Unsolicited commentary would be less 

costly than issuing and maintaining a credit rating. In addition, it would provide the 

non-hired NRSROs with an opportunity to develop a track record for performing 

credit analysis that could lead to greater investor acceptance of their credit ratings.

 Eliminating the 10% requirement or, alternatively, lessening the requirement by, for 

example, making it a 5% or 2% requirement.

 Providing in the rule that hired and un-hired NRSROs must be treated the same with 

respect to the terms of any confidentiality agreements required by an arranger.

 Evaluating whether it would be appropriate to seek to address concerns expressed by 

some NRSROs about liability in connection with issuing unsolicited ratings through 

the establishment of statutory or regulatory safe harbors.

 Establishing a hybrid model that combines the Rule 17g-5 Program with elements of 

the Section 15E(w) System or another model. For example, the Commission could 

implement a selection or rotation process that assigns the right to issue initial credit 

ratings to NRSROs that participate in the Rule 17g-5 Program or that requires an 

issuer that is seeking more than one rating to have at least one rating issued by an 

NRSRO that is participating in the program. Additional statutory authority may be 

necessary to implement a hybrid model depending on the form of the model.

C. Other Alternative Compensation Models

In addition to the Section 15E(w) System and the Rule 17g-5 Program, the study outlines 

four alternative compensation models for NRSROs that were identified in the GAO Report and 
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proposed at the 2009 Commission roundtable, as well as three other alternative compensation 

models, and additional suggestions from commenters. 

1. Potential Benefits

There are several potential benefits associated with the alternative compensation models. 

One common potential benefit of many of the alternative models is that they could help to

mitigate the conflicts of interest inherent in the issuer-pay model and, as a result, make NRSROs 

more accountable to the investors using their ratings. For example, several of the alternative 

compensation models would require users of credit ratings (e.g., investors) to contribute to the 

compensation of NRSROs. In addition, several of the alternative compensation models would 

require an entity other than the issuer to determine which NRSROs are hired to rate a given 

transaction or are compensated for rating the transaction. Similar to the Section 15E(w) System, 

these measures could mitigate the potential for issuers to exert influence over NRSROs. 

A second potential benefit provided by several of the alternative compensation models is 

that they seek to improve the quality of credit ratings by aligning the interests of NRSROs and 

investors. For example, one of the alternative compensation models could improve the quality of 

ratings because investors would own and control an NRSRO and, consequently, that NRSRO 

may be less likely to respond to pressure from issuers to produce favorable ratings. Because an 

investor-owned NRSRO could have an interest in assuring the high quality of credit ratings, it

could likely have a stronger interest in maintaining controls at the NRSRO to keep the ratings 

process independent from the issuers seeking the ratings. 

Additionally, the alternative compensation models could help to promote competition 

among the NRSROs and increase market choice for users of credit ratings. For example, several 

of the alternative compensation models suggest the establishment of a third-party to assign which 

NRSROs are hired to rate a given transaction. This would provide an opportunity for NRSROs 

that currently are not hired to rate a large number of transactions to obtain more ratings business, 

increasing both their market share and their exposure to various issuers and investors. Going 

forward, these NRSROs may be selected by a greater number of issuers and investors to rate 

transactions thereby increasing competition among NRSROs. Furthermore, the formation of one 

or more investor-owned NRSROs as contemplated by one of the models would necessarily 

increase the number of NRSROs and give investors a greater choice in terms of the credit ratings 

for structured finance products. It also would create greater diversity among the types of 

NRSROs that provide ratings for structured finance products. Investors may gain greater 

confidence in the quality of credit ratings if ratings are available from NRSROs with different 

ownership and governance structures. This difference in operating models for NRSROs could 

provide a greater comparison among the credit ratings for structured finance products. For 

example, investors could compare the ratings produced from traditional NRSROs against those 

from an investor-owned NRSRO to evaluate whether the ownership structure produces different 

ratings. In addition, investors could, over time, determine the efficacy of each of the different 

models by comparing the historical ratings produced by each type of NRSRO.
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2. Potential Concerns

There are several potential concerns associated with the alternative compensation models. 

One concern with some of the alternative compensation models is that the conflicts associated 

with the issuer-pay model likely could not be eliminated altogether, even if an alternative 

compensation model is implemented. For example, under some of the alternative compensation 

models, the issuers of structured finance products could still exert influence over an NRSRO 

because of the volume of ratings business the issuers bring to the NRSRO. Even if the issuers do

not pay fees directly to the NRSRO or control how the fees are paid to the NRSRO, they may

still exert influence on the NRSRO. In addition, under one of the alternative compensation 

models, the distinction between investors and issuers may be blurred or, in some cases, issuers 

and investors may be the same entity or a group of interconnected entities, potentially 

exacerbating the issuer-pay conflict of interest. 

A second concern associated with the alternative compensation models is that, even if the 

conflicts associated with the issuer-pay model are substantially mitigated, implementation of the 

alternative compensation models could create new conflicts of interest. The presumption 

underlying many of the models is that investors are interested solely in high quality ratings and 

have no other motivations that would cause them to seek a credit rating that is higher or lower 

than warranted. However, investors, or groups of investors, may have conflicts of interest of 

their own that could affect the quality of ratings. For example, if a rating or rating adjustment 

will impact the value of an investment, the investor could seek to influence an NRSRO to 

provide or maintain an artificially high rating if the investor owns the rated security or an 

artificially low rating if the investor has a short position. In other instances, NRSROs could be 

pressured to issue ratings that favor investors, since the investors would decide which NRSROs 

would receive fees. 

The feasibility of administering some of the alternative compensation models presents a 

third concern. These difficulties could hinder the effective implementation of several models. 

For example, payment systems under some models are complex and could be difficult to 

implement and carry out in practice. It may be difficult to find a third party that is qualified to 

assign ratings work to NRSROs based on their performance, particularly because there is no 

universally accepted metric for measuring the accuracy of credit ratings. Such a third party 

could also be subject to influence and pressure from the NRSROs, which would be in 

competition for ratings assignments from the third party. As a result, the third party may itself 

have to be monitored in order to assure it is performing its obligations fairly and objectively. 

Another issue associated with some models is that an imbalance in the regulatory burdens could 

affect the competitiveness of the industry. Specifically, implementing one of the models could 

create a competitive disadvantage for those NRSROs rating structured finance products and also 

could cause such NRSROs to cease rating structured finance products. This could hinder 

competition for structured finance products ratings. In addition, NRSROs may feel pressure to 

meet the performance metrics, or even follow the same practices used by the third party 

assigning issues to NRSROs, thereby discouraging innovation in the credit ratings process. 

Similarly, implementation of one model could reduce competitiveness in the industry because of 

concerns over how many credit rating agencies that model could actually support, potentially 

leading to consolidation and reduced competition in the industry. Furthermore, the Commission 

may need authority to implement certain aspects of the alternative compensation models. 
82

Consequently, absent Congressional action, the Commission may not be able to fully and 

successfully implement a given alternative compensation model. 

Adequately compensating NRSROs is a fourth concern associated with the alternative 

compensation models. Specifically, under some of the models, there is no assurance that 

NRSROs will be compensated for their work. NRSROs would be required to rate transactions, 

and then maintain the credit rating through surveillance, without any guarantee of initial payment 

or additional compensation. This could cause NRSROs to not participate in the alternative 

compensation models.

3. Potential Considerations 

The Commission – if it determines to implement one or more of the other models – might 

consider the following actions:

 Seeking authority from Congress to establish the selected model by rule, particularly 

if the model requires the establishment of a third-party entity to participate in the 

process and the collection of fees from users of credit ratings.
83

APPENDIX
19 SEC. 939D. INITIAL CREDIT RATING ASSIGNMENTS. 

20 Section 15E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1.934 

21 (15 U.S.a. 780-7), as amended by this Act, is amended by 

22 adding at the end the following: 

23 "(w) INITIAL CREDIT RATING ASSIGNMENTS.­

24 "(1) DEFINI1'IONS.-In this subsection the fol25 lowing definitions shall apply: 

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1039 

"(A) BOARD.-The term 'Board' means the 

Credit Rating Agency Board established under 

paragraph (2). 

"(B) QUALIFIED NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED 

STATISTICAL RATING ORGANIZATION.-The term 

'qualified nationally recognized statistical rating 

organization', with respect to a category of structured finance products, means a nationally recognized statistical rating organization that the 

Board determines, under paragraph (3)(B), to be 

qualified to issue initial cr'edit ratings with respect to such category. 

"(C) REGULATIONS.­

"(i) CATEGORY OF STRUCTURED FINANCE PRODUCTS.­

"(1) IN GENERAL.-The term 'category of stnlctured finance products'­

(((aa) shall include any asset 

backed security and any structured product based on an assetbacked security; and 

"(bb) shall be further defined 

and expanded by the Commission, 

by rule, as necessary. 

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"(II) CONSIDERATIONS.-In 

issuing the regulations required under 

subclause (I), the Commission shall 

consider­

"(aa) the types of issuers 

that issue structured finance products; 

"(bb) the types of investors 

who purchase structured finance 

products; 

(((cc) the different categories. 

of structured finance products according to-­

"(AA) the types of capital flow and legal structure 

used; 

(((BB) the types of underlying products used; and 

(((CC) the types of terms 

used in debt securities;· 

(((dd) the different values of 

debt securities; and 

(((ee) the different numbers of 

units of debt securities that are 

issued together. 

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"(ii) REASONABLE FEE.-The Board 

shall issue regulations to define the term 

'reasonable fee). 

"(2) CREDIT RATING AGENCY BOARD.­

"(A) IN GENERAL.-Not later than 180 

days after the date of enactment of the Restoring 

American Financial Stability Act of 2010) the 

Commission shall­

"(i) establish the Credit Rating Agency 

Board) which shall be a self-regulatory organization; 

"(ii) subject to subparagraph (C)) select the initial members of the Board; and 

"(iii) establish a schedule to ensure 

that the Board begins assigning qualified 

nationally recognized statistical rating organizations to provide initial ratings not 

later than 1 year after the selection of the 

members of the Board. 

"(B) SCHEDULE.-The schedule established 

under subparagraph (A)(iii) shall prescribe 

when­

"(i) the Board will conduct a study of 

the securitization and ratings process and 

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1042 

provide recommendations to the Commisswn; 

"(ii) the Commission will issue rules 

and regulations under this section; 

"(iii) the Board may issue rules under 

this subsection; and 

"(iv) the Board will­

"(1) begin accepting applications 

to select qualified national recognized 

statistical rating organizations; and 

(((11) begin assigning qualified 

national recognized statistical. rating 

organizations to pTovide initial rat­

~ngs.

"(C) MEMBERSHIP.­

"(i) IN GENERAL.-The BoaTd shall 

initially be composed of an odd number of 

members selected from the industry, with 

the total numerical membership of the 

Board to be determined by the Commission. 

(((ii) SPECIFICATIONS.-Of the membeTS initially selected to serve on the 

Board­

(((I) not less than a majority of 

the members shall be repTesentatives of 

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1043 

the investor industry who do not represent issuers; 

"(II) not less than 1 member 

should be a representative of the issuer 

industry; 

"(III) not less than 1 member 

should be a representative of the credit 

rating agency industry; and 

"(IV) not less than 1 member 

should be an independent member. 

"(iii) TERMs.-Initial members shall 

be appointed by the Commission for a term 

of 4 years. 

"(iv) NOMINATION riND ELECTION OF 

MEMBERS.­

"(I) IiV' GENERAL.-Prior to the 

expiration of the terms of office of the 

initial members) the Commission shall 

establish fair procedures for the nomination and election of future members 

of the Board. 

"(II) MODIFICATIONS OF THE 

BOARD.-Prior to the expiration of the 

terms of office of the initial members) 

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"(aa) may ~ncrease the s~ze

of the board to a larger odd number and adjust the length offuture 

terms; and 

"(bb) shall retain the composition of members described in 

clause (ii). 

"(v) RESPONSIBILITIES OF J.l1ElYJBERs.-Members shall perform, at a minimum, the d1,dies described in this subsection. 

"(vi) RULElJ1AIUNG AUTHORITY-The 

Com,mission shall, if it determines necessary 

and appropriate, issue ftlrther rules and 

regulations on the composition of the membership of the Board and the responsibilities 

of the members. 

"(D) OTHER AUTHORITIES OF THE 

BOARD.-The Board shall have the authority to 

levy fees from qualified nationally recognized 

statistical rating organization applicants, and 

periodically from qualified nationally recognized 

statistical rating organizations as necessary to 

fund expenses of the Board. 

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"(E) REGULATION.-The Commission has 

the authority to regulate the activities of the 

Board, and issue any further regulations of the 

Board it deems necessary, not in contravention 

with the intent of this section. 

"(3) BOARD SELECTION OF QUALIFIED NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED STATISTICAL RATING ORGANIZATION.­

"(A) APPLICATION.­

"(i) IN GENERAL.-A nationally recognized statistical rating organization may 

submit an application to the Board, in such 

form and manner as the Board may require, to become a qualified nationally recognized statistical rating organization with 

respect to a category of structured finance 

products. 

"(ii) CONTENTS.-An application submitted under clause (i) shall contain­

"(I) information regarding the institutional and technical capacity of 

the nationally recognized statistical 

rating organization to issue credit rat­

~ng~

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1046 

"(II) information on whether the 

nationally recognized statistical rating 

organization has been exempted by the 

Commission from any requirements 

under any other provision of this section; and 

"(III) any additional information 

the Board may require. 

"(iii) REJECTION OF APPLICATIONS.­

The Board may reject an application submitted under this paragraph if the nationally recognized statistical rating organization has been exempted by the Commission 

from any requirements under any otlwr 

provision of this section. 

"(B) SELECTION.-The Board shall select 

qualified national recognized statistical rctting 

organizations with respect to each category of 

structured finance products from among nationally recognized statistical rating organizations 

that submit applications under subparagraph 

(A). 

"(C) RETENTION OF STATUS AND OBLIGATIONS AFTER SELECTION.-An entity selected as 

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1047 

ing orgcmization shall retain its status and obligations under the law as a nationally recognized 

statistical rating organization, and nothing in 

this subsection grants authority to the Commission or the Board to exempt qualified nationally 

recognized statistical rating organizations from 

obligations or requirements otherwise imposed by 

Federal law on nationally recognized statistical 

rating organizations. 

"(4) REQUESTING AN INITIAL CREDIT RATING.­

An issuer that seeks an initial credit rating for a 

structured finance product­

"(A) may not request an initial credit rating from a nationally recognized statistical rating organization; and 

"(B) shall submit a request for an initial 

credit rating to the Board, in such form and 

manner as the Board may prescribe. 

"(5) ASSIGNMENT OF RATING DUTIES.­

"(A) IN GENERilL.-For each request received by the Board under paragraph (4)(B), the 

Board shall select a qualified nationally recognized statistical rating organization to provide 

the initial credit rating to the issuer. 

"(B) METHOD OF SELECTION.­

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1048 

"(i) IN GENERAL.-The Board shall­

"(I) evaluate a number of selection methods, including a lottery or rotating assignment system, ~ncorporating the factors described in clause 

(ii), to reduce the conflicts of interest 

that exist under the issuer-pays model; 

and 

"(II) prescribe and publish the selection method to be used unde?" subpctragraph (A). 

(((ii) CONSIDERATION.-In evaluahng 

a selection method described in clause (i)(I), 

the Board shall consider­

"(1) the information submitted by 

the qualified nationally recognized statistical rating organization under 

paragraph (3)(A)(ii) regarding the institutional and technical capacity of 

the qualified nationally recognized statistical rating organization to issue 

credit ratings; 

"(11) evaluations conducted under 

paragraph (7); 

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1049 

"(111) formal feedback from institutional investors; and 

"(IV) information from subclauses 

(1) and (11) to implement a mechanism which increases or decreases assignments based on past performance. 

"(iii) PROHIBITION.-The Board, in 

choosing a selection method, may not use a 

method that would allow for the solicitation 

or consideration of the preferred national 

recognized statistical rating organizations 

of the issuer. 

"(iv) ADJUSTMENT OF PROCES8.-The 

Board shall issue rules descTibing the pmcess by which it can modify the assignment 

process described in clause (i). 

"(C) RIGHT OF REFUSAL.­

"(i) REFUSAL.-A qualified nationally 

recognized statistical rating organization 

selected under subparagTaph (A) may refuse 

to accept a selection fOT a parlicular Tequest 

by­

"(I) notifying the Board of such 

Tefusal; and 

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1050 

"(II) submitting to the Board a 

written explanation of the refusal. 

"(ii) SELECTION.-UpOn receipt of a 

notification under clause (i), the Board 

shall make an additional selection under 

subparagraph (A). 

"(iii) INSPECTION REPORTS.-The 

Board shall annually submit any explanations of refusals received under clause 

(i)(II) to the Commission, and such explanatory submissions shall be published in the 

annual inspection reports required under 

subsection (p)(3)(C). 

"(6) DISCLAJjJtlER REQUIRED.-Each initial 

credit rating issued under this subsection shall include, in writing, the following disclaimer: ''This initial rating has not been evaluated, approved, or certifted by the Government of the United States or by 

aFederal agency. '. 

"(7) EVALUATION OF PERFORll1ANCE.­

"(A) IN GENERAL.-'The Board shall prescribe rules by which the Board will evaluate the 

performance of each qualified nationally recognized statistical rating organization, including 

rules that require, at a minimum, an annual 

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evaluation of each qualified nationally recognized statistical rating organization. 

"(B) CONSIDERATIONS.-The Board, m 

conducting an evaluation under subparagraph 

(A), shall consider­

"(i) the results of the annual examination conducted under subsection (p)(3); 

"(ii) surveillance of credit ratings conducted by the qualified nationally recognized statistical rating organization after 

the credit ratings are issued, including­

"(I) how the rated instruments 

perform; 

"(II) the accuracy of the ratings 

provided by the qualified nationally 

recognized statistical rating organization as compared to the other nationally recognized statistical rating organizations; and 

"(III) the effectiveness of the 

methodologies used by the qualified nationally recognized statistical rating 

organization; and 

"(iii) any additional factors the Board 

determines to be relevant. 

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"(C) REQUEST FOR REEVALUATION.-Subjeet to rules prescribed by the Board, and not less 

frequently than once a yea1~ a qualified nationally recognized statistical rating organization 

may request that the Board conduct an evaluation under this paragraph. 

"(D) DISCLOSURE.-l~e Board shall make 

the evaluations conducted under this paragraph 

available to Congress. 

"(8) RATING FEES CHARGED TO ISSUERS.­

(((A) LIMITED TO REASONABLE FEES.-A 

qualified nationally 1"ecognized statistical rating 

organization shall charge an issuer a reasonable 

fee, as determined by the Commission, for an 

initial credit rating pr-ovided under this section. 

"(B) FEES.-Fees may be determined by 

the qualified national recognized statistical rating organizations unless the Board determines it 

is necessary to issue rules on fees. 

"(9) No PROHIBITION ON ADDITIONAL RATINGS.-Nothing in this section shall prohibit an 

issuer from requesting or receiving additional credit 

ratings with respect to a debt security, if the initial 

credit rating is provided in accordance with this section.· 

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"(10) No PROHIBITION ON INDEPENDENT RATINGS OFFERED BY NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED Sl'ATISTICAL RATING ORGANIZATIONS.­

"(A) IN GENERAL.-Nothing in this section 

shall prohibit a nationally recognized statistical 

rating organization from independently providing a credit rating with respect to a debt secUTity, if­

"(i) the nationally recognized statistical rating organization does not enter into 

a contTact with the issuer of the debt secuTity to pTOvide the initial credit Tating; and 

"(ii) the nationally Tecognized statistical rating organization is not paid by the 

issuer of the debt security to provide the initial credit Tating. 

"(B) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.-FoT pUTposes of this section, a credit rating described in 

subpaTagraph (A) may not be construed to be an 

initial credit rating. 

"(11) PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS.-Any communications made with the public by an issuer with respect to the credit rating of a debt security shall 

cleaTly specify whether the credit Tating was made 

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"(A) a qualified nationally recognized statistical rating organization selected under paragraph (5)(A) to provide the initial credit rating 

for such debt security; or 

(((B) a nationally recognized statistical rat­

~ng organization not selected under paragraph 

(5)(A). 

(((12) PROHIBITION ON lVIISREPRESENTATION.­

With respect to a debt security, it shall be unlawful 

for any person to misrepresent any subsequent credit 

rating provided for such debt security as an initial 

credit rating provided for such debt security by a 

qualified nationally recognized statistical rating organization selected under paragraph (5) (A). 

(((13) INITIAL CREDIT RATING REVISION AFTER 

lYJATERIAL CHANGE IN CIRCDvlSTANCE.-If the Board 

determines that it is necessary or appropriate in the 

public interest or for· the protection of investors, the 

Board may issue regulations requiring that an issuer 

that has received an initial credit rating under this 

subsection request a revised initial credit rating, 

using the same method as provided under paragraph 

(4), each time the issuer experiences a material 

change in circumstances, as defined by the Board. 

"(14) CONFLICTS.­

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"(A) MEMBERS OR EMPLOYEES OF THE 

BOARD.­

"(i) LO.fLV OF MONEY OR SECURITIES 

PROHIBITED.­

"(I) IN GENERAL.-A member or 

employee of the Board shall not accept 

any loan of money or securities, or 

anything above nominal value, from 

any nationally recognized statistical 

rating organization, issuer, or investor. 

"(11) EXCEPTION.-The prohibition in subclause (1) does not apply to 

a loan made in the context of disclosed, 

routine banking and brokerage agreements, or a loan that is clearly motivated by a personal or family relationship. 

"(ii) EMPLOYMENT NEGOTIATIONS 

PROHIBITION.-A member or employee of 

the Board shall not engage in employment 

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"(1) discloses the negotiations immediately upon initiation of the negotiations; and 

"(II) recuses himself from all proceedings concerning the entity involved 

in the negotiations until termination 

of negotiations or until termination of 

his employment by the Board, if an 

offer of employment is accepted. 

"(B) CREDIT ANALYSTS.­

"(i) IN GENERAL.-A credit analyst of 

a qualified nationally recognized statistical 

rating organization shall not accept any 

loan of money or securities, or anything 

above nominal value, from any issuer or investor. 

"(ii) EXCEPTION.-The prohibition described in clause (i) does not apply to a 

loan made in the context of disclosed, routine banking and brokerage agreements, or 

a loan that is clearly motivated by a personal or family relationship. 

"(15) EVALUATION OF CREDIT RATINa AGENCY 

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nized statistical rating organizations to provide initial ratings, the Commission shall submit to Congress 

a report that provides recommendations of­

"(A) the continuation of the Board; 

"(B) any modification to the proced1,tres of 

the Board; and 

"(C) modifications to the provisions in this 

subsection. ".