IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Lexington National Insurance : CASES CONSOLIDATED

Company, :

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 1078 C.D. 2020

:

Delaware County :

In Re: International Fidelity Insurance:

Company :

: No. 1079 C.D. 2020

Appeal of: International Fidelity :

Insurance Company : Argued: March 9, 2022

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge 

HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE CEISLER FILED: May 10, 2022

Lexington National Insurance Company (Lexington) and International 

Fidelity Insurance Company (International Fidelity) (together, Insurers) appeal from 

two September 25, 2020 Orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County 

(Trial Court) denying their Petitions to Refund Bail Deposits (Petitions). The issue 

before this Court is whether Delaware County Local Criminal Rule 531(e)(3)(d)

(Local Rule 531(e)(3)(d)), which requires corporate sureties to post financial 

security with Delaware County (County) as a condition of conducting bail bond 

business in the County, is preempted by the Act of July 2, 2015, P.L. 110, No. 16, 
2

42 Pa. C.S. §§ 5741-50 (commonly known as Act 16), or The Insurance Department 

Act of 1921 (Insurance Act), Act of May 17, 1921, P.L. 789, as amended, 40 P.S. 

§§ 1-326.7. 

For the reasons that follow, we conclude that: (1) Local Rule 531(e)(3)(d) is 

not preempted by either Act 16 or the Insurance Act; and (2) the County has express 

authority to require corporate sureties conducting bail bond business in the County 

to post financial security pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure

531(A)(3) (Rule 531(A)(3)). Accordingly, we affirm the Trial Court’s Orders.

Background

In July 2015, the General Assembly enacted Act 16 to eliminate the varying 

rules governing bail bonds in Pennsylvania and to establish a statewide, uniform 

system of regulation of the bail bond industry. As a result of Act 16, bail bondsmen 

now must be licensed by the Pennsylvania Insurance Department (Insurance 

Department) and may conduct bail bond business only if they are affiliated with an 

insurance company and their bonds are underwritten by an insurance company 

pursuant to a qualified power of attorney.1 Act 16 became effective on October 30, 

2015.

1 Section 2 of Act 16 states: “No person shall engage in, or continue to engage in, the 

business of a bail bondsman unless the person has been licensed by the [Insurance D]epartment 

as an insurance producer under Article VI-A of [the Insurance Act, added by the Act of December 

6, 2002, P.L. 1183,] and possesses a casualty line of authority.” 42 Pa. C.S. § 5742 (emphasis 

added). Section 4 of Act 16 states:

A bail bondsman shall only be authorized to conduct business in a county when the 

bail bondsman provides all of the following documents to the office of the clerk:

(1) A copy of the license issued to the bail bondsman by the 

[Insurance D]epartment.

(Footnote continued on next page...)
3

In March 2016, the County adopted Local Rule 531(e)(3)(d),2 which states:

3. Requirements for Approval. To become qualified to act as a 

corporate surety, or agent thereof, with respect to the posting of bail 

bonds in the [County], a corporate surety and its agents must:

d) Post with the [County’s] Office of Judicial Support as 

security the minimum sum of $50,000 in United States 

currency or unencumbered securities of the United States

Government, which will entitle the corporate surety to post 

bond in the aggregate sum of $500,000 or post $75,000 in 

US currency or unencumbered securities of the US 

Government, which will entitle the corporate surety to post 

bond in the amount of $1,000,000, and by further posting 

the sum required for each individual bond or undertaking 

with the bail authority.

Del. Cnty. Local Crim. R. 531(e)(3)(d) (emphasis added). In compliance with Local 

Rule 531(e)(3)(d), Lexington deposited a total of $325,000 and International Fidelity 

deposited a total of $100,000 with the County’s Office of Judicial Support.

(2) A statement identifying an office address for service of legal 

process.

(3) A qualifying power of attorney issued by an insurer authorizing 

the bail bondsman as a producer on behalf of the insurer. The 

qualifying power of attorney must set forth, in clear and 

unambiguous terms, the maximum monetary authority of the bail 

bondsman per bond.

Id. § 5743.1 (emphasis added).

2 Local Rule 531(e)(3)(d) “applies to any corporate surety and its agents seeking to post a 

bond in satisfaction of the full amount of the monetary condition of a defendant’s release on bail.” 

Del. Cnty. Local Crim. R. 531(e)(1) (emphasis added). The rule defines “corporate surety” as 

“any corporation or partnership which engages in the business of providing bail, providing or 

soliciting bail undertakings, or providing or soliciting indemnity or court indemnity to others on 

bail undertakings.” Id. 531(e)(2).
4

On July 15, 2021, Insurers filed their Petitions in the Trial Court, seeking 

refunds of their bail deposits and asserting that Local Rule 531(e)(3)(d) is preempted 

by state law. In particular, Insurers asserted that Act 16 eliminated the need for bail 

bondsmen to post collateral, because they are now licensed and regulated by the 

Insurance Department; the Insurance Department has the exclusive right to regulate 

the financial and security requirements of surety companies; and the Insurance Act 

preempts local rules requiring security deposits for licensed bail bond insurers. 

Thus, Insurers argued that Local Rule 531(e)(3)(d) is preempted by Act 16 and the 

Insurance Act.

The County filed Answers to the Petitions, asserting that Act 16 does not 

preempt Local Rule 531(e)(3)(d) and that Rule 531(A)(3) expressly authorizes the 

County to impose additional requirements on corporate sureties. Rule 531(A)(3) 

provides in relevant part: “Subject to any additional requirements prescribed by 

local rule of court, the following shall be qualified to act as sureties: . . . surety 

companies approved by the court and authorized to do business in the 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 531(A)(3) (emphasis added).

On September 25, 2020, after a hearing, the Trial Court denied Insurers’ 

Petitions, concluding that Act 16, by its plain language, applies only to bail 

bondsmen, not to corporate sureties. The Trial Court also concluded that Rule

531(A)(3) expressly authorizes the County to impose additional requirements on 

sureties such as Insurers. In its subsequent Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, the Trial 

Court explained its reasoning as follows:

Act 16 . . . specifically states that the requirements included within 

apply to bail bondsmen. Should the legislature have intended to impose 

the same uniform statewide regulations on both bail bondsmen and 

sureties, it is most logical that both terms would have been included in 

the relevant section upon which [Insurers] center[] [their] argument[s]. 
5

In contrast, only the term “bail bondsmen” appears in the section [of 

Act 16] at issue. 

[Rule] 531([A])[(3)], Qualifications of a Surety, states that 

additional requirements may be imposed upon corporate securities by 

way of local rules of court. . . .

As the licensing requirements for bail bondsmen in Act 16 . . . 

have no effect upon corporate sureties, [Rule] 531([A])[(3)] expressly 

permits the County to impose additional requirements upon corporate 

sureties in bail matters. Pursuant to that ability, the County, by way of 

Local Rule 531(e)(3)(d), lawfully imposed the requirement of a 

corporate surety to post a deposit with the [County] in order to issue 

bail bonds within its jurisdiction.

Trial Ct. Op., 6/28/21, at 5-6 (emphasis added).3 Insurers now appeal to this Court.

4

Analysis

On appeal, Insurers assert that the Trial Court erred in denying their Petitions 

because Local Rule 531(e)(3)(d), which requires corporate sureties to post financial 

security with the County in order to conduct bail bond business in the County, is 

preempted by Act 16 and the Insurance Act.

Act 16 requires that all bail bondsmen in the Commonwealth be licensed 

insurance agents with a casualty line of authority. 42 Pa. C.S. § 5743.1. Under Act 

16, bail bondsmen can issue bonds only as an appointed representative of a licensed 

insurance company. Id. The Insurance Department issues a license to the bondsman, 

who acts pursuant to a power of attorney issued by a licensed surety. Id. According 

to Insurers, that is all that is required for a bondsman or surety to conduct bail bond 

business in the Commonwealth; the County cannot require additional security.

3 The Trial Court issued identical Orders and Opinions in both consolidated cases.

4 Because the issue on appeal is purely a question of law, our standard of review is de novo, 

and our scope of review is plenary. Dooner v. DiDonato, 971 A.2d 1187, 1193 (Pa. 2009); Pa. 

Physical Therapy Ass’n v. Oleksiak, 265 A.3d 849, 856 n.7 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021).
6

Act 16, however, clearly distinguishes between bail bondsmen and sureties. 

Act 16 appears in Subchapter B of Chapter 57 of the Judicial Code, which is titled 

“Bail Bondsmen.” Section 1 of Act 16 defines “bail bondsman” as “a person who 

engages in the business of giving bail as a surety for compensation.” 42 Pa. C.S. § 

5741. Section 2 of Act 16 defines “surety” as “a person who pledges security, 

whether or not for compensation, in exchange for the release from custody of a 

person charged with a crime prior to adjudication.” Id. § 5742. Section 4 of Act 16

then sets forth the requirements for bail bondsmen to conduct business in a county 

of the Commonwealth as follows:

A bail bondsman shall only be authorized to conduct business in a 

county when the bail bondsman provides all of the following documents 

to the office of the clerk:

(1) A copy of the license issued to the bail bondsman by 

the [Insurance D]epartment.

(2) A statement identifying an office address for service of 

legal process.

(3) A qualifying power of attorney issued by an insurer 

authorizing the bail bondsman as a producer on behalf of 

the insurer. The qualifying power of attorney must set 

forth, in clear and unambiguous terms, the maximum 

monetary authority of the bail bondsman per bond.

Id. § 5743.1 (emphasis added). 

Based on the statute’s plain language, it is evident that Act 16 applies only to 

bail bondsmen, not to corporate sureties. The licensing requirements for bail 

bondsmen created by Act 16 do not preclude the County from imposing additional 

security requirements on corporate sureties. Importantly, Act 16 contains no 

language prohibiting a county from requiring corporate sureties to post additional
7

security. Therefore, we conclude that Act 16 does not preempt Local Rule 

531(e)(3)(d).

Next, Insurers assert that the Insurance Act preempts Local Rule 531(e)(3)(d)

because the General Assembly intended to fully occupy the field of insurance law. 

Insurers point out that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized field 

preemption in the state-regulated areas of alcohol, banking, medical marijuana, and 

anthracite mining. Thus, Insurers contend that “[i]nsurance regulation is so 

comparable to banking regulation that the logic of finding field preemption there 

applies equally to insurance.” Insurers’ Br. at 23.

Our Supreme Court has explained the concept of field preemption as follows:

The state is not presumed to have preempted a field merely by 

legislating in it. The General Assembly must clearly show its intent to 

preempt a field in which it has legislated. The test for preemption in 

this Commonwealth is well established. Either the statute must state 

on its face that local legislation is forbidden, or “indicate[] an intention 

on the part of the legislature that it should not be supplemented by 

municipal bodies.” If the General Assembly has preempted a field, the 

state has retained all regulatory and legislative power for itself and no 

local legislation is permitted. 

Nutter v. Dougherty, 921 A.2d 44, 56 (Pa. 2007) (emphasis added) (citations 

omitted; brackets in original). Furthermore, “the mere fact that the General 

Assembly has enacted legislation in a field does not lead to the presumption that the 

state has precluded all local enactments in that field; rather, the General Assembly 

must clearly evidence its intent to preempt.” Hoffman Mining Co., Inc. v. Zoning 

Hearing Bd. of Adams Twp., 32 A.3d 587, 609 (Pa. 2011) (emphasis added).

Here, Insurers assert that Section 201 of the Insurance Act, 40 P.S. § 41, which 

“charges” the Insurance Department “with the execution of the laws of this 

Commonwealth in relation to insurance,” is effectively a statement of field 
8

preemption. However, Insurers cite no legal authority to support this proposition, 

nor have we found any case interpreting Section 201 in this manner. Indeed, in the 

100 years since the Insurance Act’s enactment, our appellate courts have not 

recognized field preemption in the area of insurance, which Insurers plainly admit. 

See Insurers’ Br. at 23; see also Hydropress Env’t Servs., Inc. v. Twp. of Upper Mt. 

Bethel, 836 A.2d 912, 918 (Pa. 2003) (“Recognizing the clarity with which an intent 

to preempt must be expressed by the [l]egislature and the significance of such a 

determination, ‘[w]e have found an intent to totally preempt local regulation in only 

three areas: alcoholic beverages, banking and anthracite strip mining.’”) (citation 

omitted). Absent a clear indication by the legislature that it intended to preclude all 

local regulation in the field of insurance, we decline to find field preemption in this 

case. See Council of Middletown Twp. v. Benham, 523 A.2d 311, 315 (Pa. 1987) 

(recognizing that “[t]otal preemption is the exception and not the rule”).

In the alternative, Insurers contend that the doctrine of conflict preemption 

applies here, asserting that Local Rule 531(e)(3)(d) conflicts with the provisions of 

the Insurance Act governing surety agencies. Specifically, the Insurance Act states

that if an insurance company meets the Act’s solvency and financial qualifications, 

the Insurance Commissioner “shall issue to such company[] . . . his certificate that it 

is authorized to become and be accepted as sole surety on all bonds, undertakings, 

and obligations . . . which certificate shall be conclusive proof of the solvency and 

credit of such company for all purposes and of its right to be so accepted as such 

sole surety and its sufficiency as such.” 40 P.S. § 833 (emphasis added). The

Insurance Act also states that public officials, including judges of the courts of 

common pleas, “shall approve the [bond] whenever the conditions of such bond or 

undertaking are guaranteed” by a licensed surety company and that the Insurance 
9

Commissioner’s certificate “shall be conclusive proof of the solvency and credit of 

such company for all purposes, and of its qualifications to be so accepted as such 

sole surety, and its sufficiency as such.” 40 P.S. § 831 (emphasis added).

Insurers argue that these provisions require the courts of common pleas to

accept the bond of any properly certified surety company, including a bail bond, as 

the “sole surety.” Because Local Rule 531(e)(3)(d) requires corporate sureties to 

post additional financial security in order to conduct bail bond business in the 

County, Insurers claim that it is in conflict with, and therefore preempted by, the 

Insurance Act. We disagree.

Our Supreme Court has explained that conflict preemption occurs when “a 

municipal ordinance cannot be sustained to the extent that it is contradictory to, or 

inconsistent with, a state statute.” Hoffman, 32 A.3d at 594. In other words, conflict 

preemption is applicable when the conflict between a local regulation and a state 

statute is irreconcilable – i.e., when it would be impossible to comply with both the 

local regulation and the state law. Id. A court will not invalidate a local regulation 

“unless there is such actual, material conflict between the state and local powers that 

only by striking down the local power can the power of the wider constituency be 

protected.” Id. at 594-95 (emphasis added); see Mars Emergency Med. Servs., Inc. 

v. Twp. of Adams, 740 A.2d 193, 196 (Pa. 1999) (“[A]bsent a clear statement of 

legislative intent to preempt, state legislation will not generally preempt local 

legislation on the same issue.”). Further, municipalities may impose restrictions that 

are in addition to, and not in conflict with, state regulations. Hoffman, 32 A.3d at 

612.

We conclude that Local Rule 531(e)(3)(d) neither interferes with nor alters 

the licensing and certification requirements set forth in the Insurance Act. As
10

explained above, the General Assembly has not evidenced its intent to preempt this 

type of local regulation relating to bail bonds. Although the Insurance Act addresses

other areas of regulation for corporate sureties, it does not contain any specific 

requirements for sureties that post bail bonds in the courts of common pleas. 

Therefore, we conclude that the cash security requirements of Local Rule 

531(e)(3)(d) are merely in addition to, and not in conflict with, the Insurance Act.

Moreover, Rule 531(A)(3) expressly permits the courts of common pleas to 

impose additional requirements on corporate sureties that conduct bail bond 

business. Rule 531(A)(3) provides: “Subject to any additional requirements

prescribed by local rule of court, the following shall be qualified to act as sureties: 

. . . surety companies approved by the court and authorized to do business in the 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 531(A)(3) (emphasis added).

Insurers attempt to disregard the significance of Rule 531(A)(3) by pointing

to Section 5702 of the Judicial Code, which states: “Except as otherwise provided 

by this title and the laws relating to the regulation of surety companies, all matters 

relating to the fixing, posting, forfeiting, exoneration and distribution of bail and 

recognizances shall be governed by general rules.” 42 Pa. C.S. § 5702 (emphasis 

added).5 Insurers argue that this language means that “general rules” of procedure,

such as Rule 531(A)(3), are superseded by state laws regulating surety companies. 

In other words, Insurers contend that although the counties can impose additional 

procedural requirements on sureties, they may not supplant the substantive

requirements established by Act 16 and the Insurance Act. We reject this

interpretation.

5 Section 102 of the Judicial Code defines “general rule” as “[a] rule or order promulgated 

by the governing authority.” 42 Pa. C.S. § 102.
11

Insurers effectively argue that Section 5702 of the Judicial Code excepts 

surety companies from compliance with all “general rules” of procedure governing 

bail. However, the plain language of Rule 531(A)(3), which is a criminal rule of 

procedure, unambiguously applies to “sureties” that are licensed and approved by 

the Insurance Department and expressly allows “local rule[s] of court” to place 

“additional requirements” on their qualifications to do business in the courts of 

common pleas. This rule does not run afoul of Section 5702 of the Judicial Code, 

because, as explained above, the Insurance Act does not contain requirements for 

sureties that post bail bonds in criminal courts. See 42 Pa. C.S. § 5702 (stating that 

general rules shall apply “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by . . . the laws relating to 

the regulation of surety companies”).

Insurers also rely on Commonwealth v. Liberty Bail Bonds, 8 A.3d 1031 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2010), to support their preemption argument. We conclude, however, that 

Insurers’ reliance on Liberty is misplaced.

In Liberty, a surety agency and its agent filed an application to act as a surety 

in Montgomery County. Montgomery County denied the application because the 

agency did not have an office in the county as required by both a Montgomery 

County local rule and the Judicial Code. This Court determined, however, that the 

local office rule applied only to bondsmen and not to surety agencies.

It is undisputed that [the agent] did not have a local office in 

Montgomery County. However, it is also undisputed that [he] is a 

surety agent, not a bondsman, and therefore exempt from the [local 

rule]. The exemption resides in the initial clauses of [Section 5741 of 

the Judicial Code], 42 Pa. C.S. § 5741, [which provides] the statutory 

definition of a professional bondsman.

The [l]egislature defined a professional bondsman and the class of 

persons that must maintain a local office. The [l]egislature explicitly 
12

excluded surety companies and their agents from the definition of 

professional bondsmen and thus, the local office requirements. The 

conditions that a surety company/agent must comply with prior to 

engaging in a surety business in Pennsylvania are set forth in 40 P.S. § 

832 . . . . A surety must be licensed by the [Insurance] Department, 

carry a statewide license, must pass certain testing, must be backed by 

an insurance company and must abide by the specific financing and 

solvency conditions set forth in 40 P.S. § 832. . . .

. . . .

The [l]ocal [r]ules provide different sections and rules for sureties and 

professional bail bondsmen. Neither the corporate surety[] nor the 

surety agent is required to have a local office operating within 

Montgomery County. Only the professional bail bondsman is required 

to have such [an] office.

Id. at 1033-35 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Therefore, we concluded that 

because the surety agent was not a professional bondsman, he was not required to 

maintain an office in Montgomery County.

Although the Liberty Court referenced the Insurance Act’s requirements for a 

surety to conduct business in the Commonwealth, those provisions were not germane

to our decision in that case. Rather, we premised our holding on the statutory 

definition of “professional bondsman” and the legislature’s clear intent to distinguish 

between bondsmen and surety agencies with regard to their office requirements. 

This Court did not conclude, as Insurers suggest, that the Insurance Act preempted 

Montgomery County’s local rule. Therefore, Insurers’ reliance on Liberty is 

inapposite.6

6 Since Liberty was decided, the General Assembly amended Section 5741 of the Judicial 

Code. Former Section 5741 defined “professional bondsman,” in pertinent part, as “[a]ny person, 

other than a fidelity or surety company or any of its officers, agents, attorneys, or employees, 

authorized to execute bail bonds or to solicit business on its behalf . . . .” Formerly 42 Pa. C.S. § 

5741 (emphasis added), amended by the Act of July 2, 2015, P.L. 110. “Professional bondsman”

(Footnote continued on next page...)
13

Conclusion

In sum, we conclude that Rule 531(A)(3) explicitly permits a local county to 

impose additional security requirements on corporate sureties that conduct bail bond 

business in that county. Neither the Insurance Act nor Act 16 addresses the financial

security requirements for corporate sureties that post bail bonds in the courts of 

common pleas. Rule 531(A)(3) leaves that decision to the local counties. Therefore, 

the Trial Court properly concluded that: (1) Local Rule 531(e)(3)(d) is not 

preempted by state law; and (2) the County was expressly authorized to impose 

additional security requirements on Insurers pursuant to Rule 531(A)(3). 

Accordingly, we affirm the Trial Court’s Orders.

________________________________

ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

has now been replaced with “bail bondsman,” which is defined as “[a] person who engages in the 

business of giving bail as a surety for compensation.” 42 Pa. C.S. § 5741.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Lexington National Insurance : CASES CONSOLIDATED

Company, :

Appellant :

:

v. :

:

Delaware County : No. 1078 C.D. 2020

In Re: International Fidelity Insurance:

Company :

:

Appeal of: International Fidelity :

Insurance Company : No. 1079 C.D. 2020

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 10th day of May, 2022, the Orders of the Court of Common 

Pleas of Delaware County, entered on September 25, 2020, are hereby AFFIRMED.

__________________________________

ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Lexington National Insurance : CASES CONSOLIDATED

Company, :

Appellant :

:

v. :

:

Delaware County : No. 1078 C.D. 2020

In Re: International Fidelity Insurance :

Company :

:

Appeal of: International Fidelity : No. 1079 C.D. 2020

Insurance Company : Argued: March 9, 2022

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

DISSENTING OPINION

BY JUDGE COVEY FILED: May 10, 2022

Respectfully, I disagree with the Majority’s affirmance of the Delaware 

County (County) Common Pleas Court’s (trial court) September 25, 2020 orders. 

Because the Pennsylvania Insurance Department (Insurance Department) has the 

exclusive right to determine Lexington National Insurance Company’s(Lexington) and 

International Fidelity Insurance Company’s (Fidelity) (collectively, Insurance 

Companies) qualifications to conduct business in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

(Commonwealth), I would reverse the trial court’s orders. 
AEC - 2

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained:

The General Assembly, in recognition of the specialized 

complexities involved in insurance generally, and in the

regulation of this industry in particular, assigned the task of 

overseeing the management of that industry, in this

Commonwealth, to the Insurance Department, the agency 

having expertise in that field. [See Section 201 of The 

Insurance Department Act of 1921 (The Insurance 

Department Act),

1

] 40 P.S. § 41[.] 

Aetna Cas. Surety Co. v. Ins. Dep’t, 638 A.2d 194, 200 (Pa. 1994) (quoting Foster v. 

Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co., 614 A.2d 1086, 1091 (Pa. 1992)); see also 

Ciamaichelo v. Indep. Blue Cross, 909 A.2d 1211, 1216 (Pa. 2006) (“Under [Section 

201 of The Insurance Department Act], the [Insurance] Department is charged with 

executing the insurance laws of the Commonwealth.”).

Section 661 of the The Insurance Company Law of 1921 (The Insurance 

Company Law)2specifically sets forth the necessary qualifications for a surety 

company to execute bonds:

Conditions for doing business

Every surety company, to be qualified to so act as surety 

or guarantor, must be authorized, under the laws of the 

[s]tate or country where incorporated and its charter, to 

guarantee the fidelity of persons holding places of public 

or private trust, and to guarantee the performance of 

contracts other than insurance policies, and to execute 

bonds and undertakings required or permitted in action

or proceedings or by law allowed, must: (a) [c]omply with 

the requirements of the laws of this [s]tate applicable to such 

company in doing business therein; (b) must have at least one 

hundred thousand dollars ($100,000[.00]) invested in 

securities created by the laws of the United States, or by or 

under the laws of the [s]tate or country wherein it is 

incorporated, or in other safe, marketable, and interestbearing stocks and securities, the value of which shall be at 

1 Act of May 17, 1921, P.L. 789, as amended, 40 P.S. §§ 1-326.7.

2 Act of May 17, 1921, P.L. 682, as amended, 40 P.S. § 832.
AEC - 3

or above par and deposited with or held by the Insurance 

Commissioner or other corresponding officer of the [s]tate or 

country in which it is authorized to transact business, in trust 

for the benefit of the holders of the obligations of such 

company; (c) its liabilities must not exceed its available 

assets, which said liabilities, however, shall be taken to be--

(I) its capital stock, (II) its outstanding debts, and (III) a 

premium reserved equal to fifty per centum of the annual 

premium on all outstanding risks in force; and (d) such 

company shall also, before transacting business in this [s]tate 

under this act, file with the Insurance Commissioner a 

certified copy of its charter or act of incorporation, (e) a 

written application to be authorized to do business under this 

act, and (f) a statement, signed and sworn to by its president 

or one of its vice presidents and its secretary, or one of its 

assistant secretaries, stating--(I) the amount of its paid up 

cash capital, (II) particularly each item of investment, (III) 

the amount of premium on existing bonds upon which it is 

surety, (IV) the amount of liability for unearned portion 

thereof, estimated at fifty per centum of the annual premium 

on all outstanding premiums for one year or less, and pro rata 

for terms of more than one year, and (V) the amount of its 

outstanding debts of all kinds.

Any surety company which is authorized to do business 

in this Commonwealth shall not expose itself to any loss 

or hazard on any one fidelity or surety risk in an amount 

exceeding ten per centum of its capital and surplus unless 

it shall be protected in excess of that amount . . . .

. . . .

No such corporation shall, anything to the contrary in this 

section notwithstanding, execute suretyship obligations 

guaranteeing the deposits of any single financial institution 

in an aggregate amount in excess of ten per centum of the 

capital and surplus of such corporate surety, unless it shall be 

protected in excess of that amount by credits in accordance 

with subdivisions (a), (b), (c), or (d) of this section.

Upon satisfactory evidence of the violation of this section 

by any insurance company, association, or exchange, its 

members, officers, directors, or attorney-in-fact, the 

Insurance Commissioner shall, in his discretion, take, 

against the offending party, any one or more of the 
AEC - 4

following courses of action: (1) [r]evoke the certificate of 

authority of such offending company, association, or 

exchange; (2) refuse, for a period of not to exceed one year 

thereafter, to issue a new license to such offending 

company, association, or exchange; (3) impose a fine of not 

more than one thousand dollars for each act of violation 

of said section. Any insurance company, or the officers, 

directors, members, or attorney-in-fact of any insurance 

company, association, or exchange, or any other person, 

violating any of the provisions of this section, shall be guilty 

of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be 

sentenced to pay a fine of not more than five hundred dollars 

($500.00) for each and every violation, or to imprisonment 

in the jail of the county in which the offense is committed for 

a period of not more than six (6) months or both.

40 P.S. § 832 (text bold and underline emphasis added).

In 2015, the General Assembly passed Act 16,3effective October 30, 

2015, to modernize and regulate the bail industry. Act 16’s purpose as described by 

the senate co-sponsors thereof is to 

provide a uniform collection of rules to regulate this serious 

profession.

This legislation will provide accountability, professionalism 

and transparency for the practice of providing bail for those 

awaiting trial. . . . 

This legislation will promote a clean industry where all of 

the rules are the same for every corner of the 

Commonwealth. 

Senate Co-Sponsorship Memoranda, Senate of Pennsylvania, Session 2015-2016 

Regular Session (emphasis added).4

3 Act of July 2, 2015, P.L. 110, No. 16, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 5741-50 (commonly known as Act 16).

4

https://www.legis. state.pa.us//cfdocs/Legis/CSM/showMemoPublic.cfm?chamber=S&SPi

ck=20150&cosponld=15846 (last visited May 9, 2022).
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Importantly, Section 2 of Act 16 mandates: “No person shall engage in,

or continue to engage in, the business of a bail bondsman unless the person has 

been licensed by the [Insurance D]epartment as an insurance producer under . . . 

The Insurance Department Act . . . , and possesses a casualty line of authority.” 42 

Pa.C.S. § 5742 (emphasis added). Section 2 of Act 16 defines a “[b]ail bondsman[]”

as “[a] person who engages in the business of giving bail as a surety for compensation.” 

42 Pa.C.S. § 5741. Section 4 of Act 16 sets forth the following requirements for a bail 

bondsman to conduct business within each of the Commonwealth’s 67 counties:

A bail bondsman shall only be authorized to conduct 

business in a county when the bail bondsman provides all of 

the following documents to the office of the clerk:[5]

(1) A copy of the license issued to the bail bondsman by 

the [Insurance D]epartment.

(2) A statement identifying an office address for service of 

legal process.

(3) A qualifying power of attorney issued by an insurer 

authorizing the bail bondsman as a producer on behalf of 

the insurer. The qualifying power of attorney must set 

forth, in clear and unambiguous terms, the maximum 

monetary authority of the bail bondsman per bond.

42 Pa.C.S. § 5743.1 (emphasis added).

In March 2016, the County passed amended Local Criminal Rule (Local 

Rule) 531(e)(3)(d), which mandates corporate sureties to post security with the County 

as a requirement to act as a corporate surety. Specifically, Local Rule 531(e) provides, 

in relevant part:

New Rule 531(e). Corporate Surety. Pennsylvania Rule 

of Criminal Procedure [(Rule)] 528(D)(5) recognizes the 

5 Section 2 of Act 16 defines “office of the clerk” as “[t]he office of the clerk of the court of 

common pleas of each judicial district in which a person engages in the business of a bail bondsman.” 

42 Pa.C.S. § 5741. 
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surety bond of a surety company authorized to do business in 

the Commonwealth . . . as an acceptable form of security to 

satisfy the full amount of the monetary condition of a 

defendant’s release on bail. Rule 531 of the Pennsylvania 

Rules of Criminal Procedure permits, by local rule of [c]ourt, 

additional requirement to be imposed on surety companies 

approved by the [c]ourt. This Regulation sets forth the 

additional requirement imposed by this Judicial District on 

corporate sureties and their agents.

l. Applicability. This Regulation applies to any corporate 

surety and its agents seeking to post a bond in satisfaction of 

the full amount of the monetary condition of a defendant’s 

release on bail.

. . . .

3. Requirements for Approval. To become qualified to act as 

a corporate surety, or agent thereof, with respect to the posting 

of bail bonds in the Thirty Second Judicial District of 

Pennsylvania, a corporate surety and its agents must:

. . . .

d) Post with the Office of Judicial Support as security the 

minimum sum of $50,000[.00] in United States currency 

or unencumbered securities of the United States 

Government, which will entitle the corporate surety to 

post bond in the aggregate sum of $500,000[.00] or post 

$75,000[.00] in [United States] currency or 

unencumbered securities of the [United States] 

Government, which will entitle the corporate surety to 

post bond in the amount of $1,000,000[.00], and by 

further posting the sum required for each individual bond 

or undertaking with the bail authority. Provided, 

however, that the corporate surety must post additional 

security with the Office of Judicial Support in the event 

the corporate surety intends to post bond in excess of 

$1,000,000[.00]. The additional security to be posted 

with the Office of Judicial Support must be in units of 

$50,000[.00] which will entitle the corporate surety to 

post bond in the additional sum of $1,000,000[.00] per 

unit. No interest will be paid on any deposits[.]
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Del.Co.R.Crim.P. 531(e).6

On August 5, 2016, Lexington and Fidelity deposited $325,000.00 and 

$100,000.00 with the County, respectively, in accordance with Local Rule 

531(e)(3)(d). On July 5, 2020, Insurance Companies filed Petitions to Refund Bail 

Deposits Held by the County as Collateral/Security for Bail Bonds (Bail Refund 

Petitions) asserting that Local Rule 531(e) is preempted by Act 16 and The Insurance 

Department Act. The trial court heard oral argument on September 16, 2020. On 

September 25, 2020, the trial court denied the Bail Refund Petitions reasoning that 

because Act 16 separately defined bail bondsmen and sureties, and Insurance 

Companies are sureties under Act 16, and “[Rule] 531(a) . . . states that additional 

requirements may be imposed upon corporate sureties by way of local rules of court[,]” 

the County was permitted to enact Local Rule 531(e). Trial Ct. Op. at 6. 

Rule 531(A) provides, in relevant part:

Qualifications of Surety

Subject to any additional requirements prescribed by 

local rule of court, the following shall be qualified to act as 

sureties:

(1) owners of cash or securities as provided in Rule 528;

(2) owners of realty located in the Commonwealth as 

provided in Rule 528(D)(3), or owners of realty located 

outside the Commonwealth but within the United States as 

provided in Rule 528(D)(4), provided that satisfactory 

evidence of ownership or special approval of the court is 

obtained;

(3) surety companies approved by the court and authorized 

to do business in the Commonwealth [];

(4) professional bondsmen licensed under the Judicial 

Code, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 5741- 5750[.]

Pa.R.Crim.P. 531(A) (text emphasis added). 

6

See delcopa.gov/courts/localrules/CriminalRules.pdf (last visited May 9, 2022). 
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The Majority similarly concludes that, because Act 16 separately defines 

bail bondsmen and sureties, and Section 4 of Act 16 applies only to bail bondsmen, not 

sureties, those requirements “do not preclude the County from imposing additional 

security requirements on corporate sureties. . . . Act 16 contains no language 

prohibiting a county from requiring corporate sureties to post additional security.” 

Lexington Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Del. Cnty. (Pa. Cmwlth. Nos. 1078, 1079 C.D. 2020, filed 

May 10, 2022), slip op. at 6-7. The Dissent disagrees.

Initially,

[the Pennsylvania Supreme Court] . . . observe[s] that, in all 

matters of statutory interpretation, [the Court] appl[ies] the 

Statutory Construction Act [of 19727], which directs [the 

Court] to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the General 

Assembly. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). Generally, a statute’s plain 

language provides the best indication of legislative intent. 

Pa. Fin. Resp[.] Assigned Claims Plan v. English, . . . 664 

A.2d 84, 87 ([Pa.] 1995) (“Where the words of a statute are 

clear and free from ambiguity the legislative intent is to be 

gleaned from those very words.”). Only when the words of 

a statute are ambiguous will we resort to other considerations 

to discern legislative intent. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c).

Johnson v. Phelan Hallinan & Schmieg, LLP, 235 A.3d 1092, 1097 (Pa. 2020). 

“In determining legislative intent, we must read all sections of a statute 

‘together and in conjunction with each other,’ construing them ‘with reference to the 

entire statute’ and giving effect to all the statutory provisions.” Ins. Fed’n of Pa., Inc. 

v. Ins. Dep’t, 970 A.2d 1108, 1114 (Pa. 2009) (quoting Hous. Auth. of the Cnty. of 

Chester v. Pa. State Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 730 A.2d 935, 945 (Pa. 1999)). “Where 

ambiguity or inexplicitness exists, the Court may afford weight to other considerations, 

including the object to be attained by the statute under consideration, the consequences 

7

1 Pa.C.S. §§ 1501-1991.
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of a particular interpretation, and contextual considerations.” Gas v. 52nd Jud. Dist.,

Lebanon Cnty., 232 A.3d 706, 712 (Pa. 2020).

Here, Section 2 of Act 16 defines a “[s]urety” as “[a] person who pledges 

security, whether or not for compensation, in exchange for the release from custody of 

a person charged with a crime prior to adjudication.” Id. However, Section 2 of Act 

16 also defines an insurer “as defined in [S]ection 601-A of [The Insurance Department 

Act,]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 5741, which definition includes “an insurance company.” 40 P.S. 

§ 310.1.8 Because Insurance Companies are both sureties and insurers, deciding the 

issue on the basis of the definition of bail bondsman versus surety ignores Act 16’s 

mandate that no person shall engage in the business of a bail bondsman unless the 

person has been licensed by the Insurance Department. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5742. 

Clearly, Insurance Companies, as insurers, are licensed by the Insurance Department.

Local Rule 531(e)(2) defines a “corporate surety” as “any corporation, 

limited liability corporation or partnership which engages in the business of providing 

bail, providing or soliciting bail undertakings, or providing or soliciting indemnity or 

court indemnity to others on bail undertakings.” Del.Co.R.Crim.P. 531(e)(2). The fact 

that Insurance Companies may be corporate sureties under Local Rule 531(e) does not 

change the fact that they are insurers under Act 16. 

Because under Section 2 of Act 16 all bail bondsmen in the 

Commonwealth are licensed insurance producers for certificated insurance companies, 

and the Insurance Department determines the insurance companies’ qualifications to 

conduct business in the Commonwealth, there is no dispute that Act 16 prohibits a 

county from requiring bail bondsmen to post additional security. 

In Commonwealth v. Liberty Bail Bonds, 8 A.3d 1031 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010), 

this Court addressed whether a surety agent was required to have an office in a county 

8 Added by Section 2 of the Act of Dec. 6, 2002, P.L. 1183.
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where the county’s local rule and the Judicial Code so required. The Liberty Court 

concluded that the local office rule applied only to bail bondsmen and not to surety 

agencies. The Liberty Court explained:

The conditions that a surety company/agent must comply 

with prior to engaging in a surety business in 

Pennsylvania are set forth in [Section 661 of The 

Insurance Company Law] . . . . A surety must be licensed 

by the [Insurance] Department, carry a statewide license, 

must pass certain testing, must be backed by an insurance 

company and must abide by the specific financing and 

solvency conditions set forth in [Section 661 of The 

Insurance Company Law]. A professional bail bondsm[a]n 

is not subject to these conditions. Moreover, a professional 

bail bondsm[a]n is solely in the business of posting bail for 

incarcerated individuals.

Liberty, 8 A.3d at 1033-34 (emphasis added). 

The Majority maintains that because the Liberty Court “premised [its] 

holding on the statutory definition of “professional bondsman”[9]and the legislature’s 

clear intent to distinguish between bondsmen and surety agencies with regard to their 

office requirements[,]” The Insurance Company Law’s “provisions were not germane 

to the case.” Lexington Nat’l Ins. Co., slip op. at 12. However, that fact does not 

9 Liberty was decided before Act 16’s enactment. At that time, Section 5741 of the Judicial 

Code defined a “[p]rofessional bondsman” as 

Any person, other than a fidelity or surety company or any of its 

officers, agents, attorneys, or employees, authorized to execute bail 

bonds or to solicit business on its behalf, who:

(1) engages in the business of giving bail, giving or soliciting 

undertakings, or giving or soliciting indemnity or counter-indemnity to 

sureties on undertakings; or

(2) within a period of 30 days has become a surety, or has indemnified 

a surety, for the release on bail of a person, with or without a fee or 

compensation, or promise thereof, in three or more matters not arising 

out of the same transaction.

Liberty, 8 A.3d at 1033 (emphasis omitted) (quoting former 42 Pa.C.S. § 5741).
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discount the Liberty Court’s recognition that surety companies are regulated by the 

Insurance Department, not the county or the courts.

Section 5702 of the Judicial Code expressly provides: “Except as 

otherwise provided by this title and the laws relating to the regulation of surety 

companies, all matters relating to the fixing, posting, forfeiting, exoneration and 

distribution of bail and recognizances shall be governed by general rules.” 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 5702 (emphasis added). Thus, the General Assembly explicitly provided that the

general rules (including Rule 531) are superseded by the laws relating to the regulation 

of surety companies. “The conditions that a surety company . . . must comply with 

prior to engaging in a surety business in Pennsylvania are set forth in [Section 661 of 

The Insurance Company Law.]” Liberty, 8 A.3d at 1033-34. Accordingly, the general 

rules, which are the rules of criminal procedure promulgated by the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court,10 do not control. 

Moreover, The Insurance Company Law includes Section 1 of the Act of 

1923,

11 which expressly instructs:

Whenever any person individually, or in any public or private 

trust, who is now or hereafter may be required or permitted 

by law to make or execute or give a bond, or undertaking 

with security, conditioned for the faithful performance of any 

duty, or for the doing or not doing of anything in said bond 

or undertaking specified, any head of a department, judge 

of the Supreme Court or prothonotary thereof, judge of 

the court of common pleas or prothonotary thereof, judge 

of the orphans’ court, register of wills,sheriff, magistrate,

or any other officer who is now or shall be hereafter 

required to approve the sufficiency of any such bond or 

undertaking, shall approve the same whenever the 

conditions of such bond or undertaking are guaranteed 

by a company duly authorized by the Insurance 

Department of this [s]tate to do business in this [s]tate 

10 Section 102 of the Judicial Code defines “[g]eneral rule” as “[a] rule or order promulgated 

by the governing authority.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 102.

11 Act of June 29, 1923, P.L. 943, as amended, 40 P.S. §§ 831-838.
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and authorized to guarantee the fidelity of persons 

holding positions of public or private trust, and whenever 

such company has filed, in the office of the prothonotary 

of the county in which the said bond is to be approved, a 

certificate issued by the Insurance Commissioner of the 

[s]tate authorizing it to become surety on all bonds, 

obligations, and undertakings, and until such certificate has 

been revoked by the Insurance Commissioner.

Such certificate shall be conclusive proof of the solvency and 

credit of such company for all purposes, and of its 

qualifications to be so accepted as such sole surety, and its 

sufficiency as such.

40 P.S. § 831 (emphasis added).

The Insurance Department’s issuance of a license authorizes a surety 

company to issue bonds up to the maximum amount without further requirements, and 

for its bond to be universally accepted as sole surety. The insurer’s general assets and 

the state-mandated deposit ensure the risk; there is no requirement of dedicated assets 

for a particular risk. Any other construction makes the statutory maximum bond 

amount meaningless. The Majority improperly attempts to distinguish bail bond surety 

companies, such as Insurance Companies, from any other licensed insurance company, 

and erroneously concludes that the local common pleas courts have authority to 

regulate certificated insurers and producers and establish county-by-county financial 

qualifications. The Majority’s conclusions are plainly contrary to the General 

Assembly’s unambiguous and comprehensive legislative scheme. Accordingly, 

because Section 5702 of the Judicial Code specifically excepts sureties’ regulation 

from the courts’ general rulemaking authority, I believe that Local Rule 531(e)(3)(d)

does not control herein.

Because Insurance Companies are insurers under Act 16, and corporate 

sureties under The Insurance Company Law, I would conclude that the Insurance 

Department has the exclusive right to determine their qualifications to conduct business 

in the Commonwealth, and neither the courts nor the counties may override the 
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Insurance Department’s regulations and authorizations. Accordingly, I would reverse 

the trial court’s orders. 

_______________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge