under NRS 125.150(7), the court could not grant respondent a new form of 

relief by awarding alimony for school expenses under NRS 125.150(9). See 

NRS 125.150(1), (7); see generally NRCP 8 (explaining that claims for 

relief should be set forward in a pleading); Five Star Capital Corp. v. 

Ruby, 124 Nev. 1048, 1054-55, 194 P.3d 709, 713 (2008) (providing that 

claim preclusion applies to all grounds of recovery that were or could have 

been brought in the first case) Thus, because the district court lacked 

authority to grant respondent a new form of alimony under NRS 

125.150(9), we reverse the alimony award set forth in paragraphs 33-36 of 

the district court Order After Evidentiary Hearing.' 

The increase in periodic alimony set forth in paragraph 39 of 

the Order After Evidentiary Hearing, however, was not an abuse of 

discretion. Because periodic alimony was awarded in the divorce decree, 

the district court retained jurisdiction to modify that award upon changed 

circumstances. NRS 125.150(7). We conclude that the district court did 

not abuse its discretion when it found changed circumstances and 

modified respondent's periodic alimony. Gilman v. Gilman, 114 Nev. 416, 

422, 956 P.2d 761, 764 (1998) (providing that this court reviews a 

modification of spousal support award for an abuse of discretion). 

Although the decree states that pay-down or satisfaction of the parties' 

IRS debt may not be grounds to modify alimony, the changed 

circumstances the district court relied on were independent of any paydown or satisfaction of the IRS debt. 

'Because we find that the award of rehabilitative alimony was 

improper, we do not address appellant's alternative argument that the 

district court relied on an incorrect theory of indemnification regarding 

the $10,000 tuition award. 

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Appellant next argues that the district court abused its 

discretion when it increased the duration of the alimony award by adding 

nine-and-a-half years of alimony at $1.00 per year, for the purpose of 

retaining jurisdiction over alimony to protect respondent from liability 

arising from appellant's future noncompliance with the divorce decree. 

Because respondent's alimony award contemplated appellant's assumption 

of the IRS debt, retaining jurisdiction over alimony in light of the future 

uncertainty of any IRS enforcement action was not an abuse of discretion. 

See Holstein v. Holstein, 412 S.E.2d 786, 789-90 (W. Va. 1991) (upholding 

a nominal alimony award made to retain jurisdiction when the wife's 

health and ability to obtain health insurance was uncertain), overruled on 

other grounds by Banker v. Banker, 474 S.E.2d 465 (W. Va. 1996); see also 

Bird v. Bird, 312 P.2d 773, 774 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957) ("[The] question of 

making a nominal award for the purpose of retaining jurisdiction to deal 

with future possibilities is one which ... is committed to the sound judicial 

discretion of the trial judge."). 

Appellant additionally contends that the district court abused 

its discretion when it required him to maintain a life insurance death 

benefit sufficient to cover the parties' total IRS debt. This mandate was 

not provided in the divorce decree and neither was such relief properly 

requested by respondent. 2A district court order may be modified under 

2The divorce decree provides: "[appellant] shall maintain 

[respondent] as a beneficiary of the death benefit of such policy in an 

amount sufficient to pay off his total child support and spousal support 

obligations. . . . Moreover, [appellant] shall not designate any remaining 

death benefit to any other beneficiary other than his own estate up to the 

amount of the parties' joint obligation to the [IRS]." (emphasis added). 

Although this language contemplates any remaining death benefit after 

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NRCP 59 or NRCP 60(b), however here, no appropriate motion was made 

and no such relief was requested. Accordingly, the portion of the district 

court order requiring the life insurance policy death benefit to fully cover 

the IRS debt was an abuse of discretion to the extent that it deviated from 

the terms in the divorce decree. Fuller v. Fuller, 106 Nev. 404, 406, 793 

P.2d 1334, 1336 (1990) ("The district court does not have jurisdiction to 

modify a decree of divorce unless a rule or statute so provides."); see also 

Wolff v. Wolff, 112 Nev. 1355,1360, 929 P.2d 916, 919 (1996) (noting that 

unlike spousal support, an interest in community property is not subject to 

modification) . 3 

Finally, appellant challenges the district court's modification 

of his child support obligation arguing that the district court failed to 

make a finding that the children's needs were not being met by the 

presumptive statutory maximum amount. The district court, however, 

found that there was "good cause to deviate from the [child support] cap in 

this case," and made findings regarding the appropriate factors under 

NRS 125B.080(9). Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion 

when it increased appellant's child support obligation. Herz v. GablerHerz, 107 Nev. 117, 118-19, 808 P.2d 1, 1 (1991) (holding that a district 

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the support obligations are satisfied being available for the IRS debt, it 

does not require the death benefit to fully cover the IRS debt. 

3Because the parties' divorce decree states that appellant will 

maintain respondent as a beneficiary in the amount of his alimony and 

child support obligation, the district court did not abuse its discretion 

when it enforced this provision of the decree and ordered appellant to 

provide documentation that respondent would be maintained as a 

beneficiary before she signed the documents in question. 

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court did not abuse its discretion in ordering an upward departure from 

the statutory formula based on a factor other than increased need); Love 

v. Love, 114 Nev. 572, 579-80, 959 P.2d 523,528 (1998). 

For the reasons discussed above, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED IN 

PART AND REVERSED IN PART AND REMAND this matter to the 

district court to enter a new order consistent with our decision. 

Gibbons 

cc: Hon. Jennifer Elliott, District Judge, Family Court Division 

Robert E. Gaston, Settlement Judge 

Radford J. Smith, Chtd. D/B/A Smith & Taylor 

Sterling Law, LLC 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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