[Cite as In re I.K., 2018-Ohio-3644.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

ASHLAND COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

IN THE MATTER OF: I.K. 

 

 

JUDGES: 

: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. 

: Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. 

: Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J. 

: 

: 

: Case No. 18-COA-004 

: 

: 

: OPINION 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Ashland County Court of 

Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, Case 

No. 20173045 

JUDGMENT: September 10, 2018 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: 

APPEARANCES: 

For: Ashland County JFS For: Appellant 

CHRISTOPHER R. TUNNELL ROBERT GOLDBERGER 

Ashland County Prosecutor 10 W. Newlon Place 

110 Cottage Street, Third Floor Mansfield, OH 44902 

Ashland, OH 44805 

JOSHUA T. ASPIN 

Assistant Prosecutor 

110 Cottage Street, Third Floor 

Ashland, OH 44805 
[Cite as In re I.K., 2018-Ohio-3644.]

Gwin, P.J. 

{¶1} Appellant-mother appeals the December 29, 2017 Judgment Entry of the 

Ashland County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, which terminated her parental 

rights with respect to her minor child, I.K. (b. May 1, 2008) and granted permanent 

custody of the child to appellee, Ashland County Department of Jobs and Family Services 

(hereinafter “ACJFS”). 

Facts and Procedural History

{¶2} On April 4, 2016, I.K. was removed from his parent's home. A shelter care 

hearing was held in Ashland County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, and I.K. 

was placed in the temporary custody of ACJFS. 

{¶3} On April 5, 2016, ACJFS filed a Complaint alleging I.K. to be an abused and 

dependent child. The Complaint sought temporary custody of I.K. be granted to ACJFS. 

On April 6, 2016 Appellant, entered an admission to the Complaint. 

{¶4} By Judgment Entry filed April 13, 2016, the Court found I.K. to be an abused 

and dependent child with respect to Appellant. On July 6, 2016, the Court conducted a 

disposition hearing. By Judgment Entry filed July 19, 2016, the Court found it in the best 

interest of I.K. to be placed in the temporary custody of ACJFS. 

{¶5} On June 8, 2017, ACJFS filed a motion seeking Permanent Custody of I.K. 

Hearings were held on August 30, 2017 and September 18, 2017. 

The Permanent Custody Trial. 

{¶6} H.K. and her sibling I.K. were removed from their parent's home due to 

allegations the father, E.K., physically abused I.K.1 The father was subsequently convicted 

 1 Appellant has filed a separate appeal with respect to the minor H.K. See, In re I.K., 5th Dist. 

Ashland No. 18-COA-003. 
Ashland County, Case No. 18-COA-004 3 

of Endangering Children, a felony of the third degree and Domestic Violence, a felony of the 

fourth degree. He was sentenced to thirty-six months in prison with an expected release 

date of March 18, 2019. Appellant was convicted of Complicity (Endangering Children), a 

felony of the third degree. She was sentenced to 180 days jail-time followed by six 

months in a halfway house and four years of probation. As a condition of her felony 

probation Appellant is not allowed contact with her children I.K. and H.K. 

{¶7} On October 3, 2016, an Amended Case Plan was filed with the Court. The 

Amended Case Plan removed both of I.K.'s parents from the Case Plan as both were 

incarcerated at the time. On February 6, 2017, an Amended Case Plan was filed with 

the Court that added Appellant as a participant for Case Plan services on the basis that 

she had been released from incarceration. 

{¶8} Upon her release from the halfway house, Appellant took up residence 

with K. C. Appellant was living at a trailer house with K.C., his mother and a grandson. 

At that time, there were concerns of recent drug use in that residence and a recent drug 

investigation by the Sherriff s Office recovered drug paraphernalia from K.C.’s bedroom. 

On June 20, 2017, K.C. was administered a drug screen at the jail following his arrest. 

He tested positive for amphetamine, methamphetamine, THC, and cocaine. In July 

2017, Appellant voiced her intention to move from K.C.’s trailer within a month. 

However, as of the August 30, 2017 hearing Appellant was continuing to reside at that 

residence. 

{¶9} Prior to the August 30, 2017 hearing additional allegations surfaced 

regarding the father sexually abusing H.K. When questioned by the caseworker Appellant 

stated that she did not believe that her children had been sexually abused. Appellant 
Ashland County, Case No. 18-COA-004 4 

gave a lengthy recorded interview to Detective Kim Mager. There is no evidence that 

Appellant was involved with any sexual abuse of H.K. However, during the interview 

Appellant did admit to observing odd circumstances over the years between H.K. and her 

Father. Appellant walked in on H.K. and her Father naked under the covers on several 

occasions. Appellant would remove H.K. from the room and confront Father. Appellant 

did not report the incidents because she was afraid the Father would hurt her or the 

children. 

{¶10} The evidence established that Appellant completed parent education. The 

evidence further established that Appellant participated regularly in mental health 

services at Appleseed Community Mental Health Center, that she attended regularly, and 

that the services were designed to address the identified issues. The evidence further 

indicated, however, that little to no progress was made. Specifically, although her 

participation was acknowledged, i.e., that she attended the sessions, she was never able 

to articulate or demonstrate that she could interpret and understand what was being 

presented. No one had ever observed her actually parenting the children because she 

was not permitted to have contact with the children pursuant to the terms of her probation. 

When asked what she would do in a domestic violence situation, her only response was 

that she just would not be in such a relationship. 

{¶11} The evidence established that Appellant was deceptive with the ACJFS 

caseworker about her living arrangements. The caseworker began looking for Appellant 

in order to have regular contact with her sometime around April 2017, and Appellant did 

not report that she was residing with K.C. She did say she was living with a friend, but 

did not provide a name. Ultimately, at a home visit in July 2017, Appellant acknowledged 
Ashland County, Case No. 18-COA-004 5 

K. C. was her boyfriend and resided in the home. Also residing in the home was B.C., K. 

C.’s mother, and a grandson. The caseworker was able to observe the home and 

described it as an older trailer that was cluttered, dirty and ridden with fleas. There was 

insufficient space for children and too many people were residing in the home for it to be 

appropriate as a placement for the children. 

{¶12} I.K. has been identified as having a disability. He has suffered great trauma, 

including as a victim of physical abuse. He exhibits violent behaviors. Any change in 

routine is very upsetting to him. He defecates, urinates, and smears feces. While he can 

recognize his bad behaviors, he will not stop himself from engaging in those behaviors. 

He repeated the first grade and was considered to be held back yet again but was not, 

based largely on his age. He has a special education teacher. He struggles in all areas 

of his life, including at school. He has an IEP that provides for one-on-one instruction. 

He has a special education teacher. His progress has been extremely slow. Initially, the 

foster mother had to go to the school with him each day and remain for the entire school 

day. He has made minimal progress in counseling. He needs ongoing therapy and 

continued assistance with managing his behaviors. 

{¶13} Counselor’s testified that I.K. initially provided little information and his 

diagnosis with Adjustment Disorder and later Post Traumatic Stress Disorder was added. 

He has a mild intellectual disability. His lQ falls within such a range. PTSD resulted in 

numerous symptoms that he exhibits on a regular basis. He has a low ability to process 

information. He is very concrete and present oriented. He has a short attention span. 

He needs boundaries set. He can be aggressive. He does not have social boundaries. 

He can get very anxious, resulting in inappropriate behaviors such as eating non-food 
Ashland County, Case No. 18-COA-004 6 

items, defecating and urinating. He has a treatment plan pursuant to which he is 

attempting to learn to relate to other people, be proactive regarding boundaries, and be 

able to verbalize his thoughts and opinions. The counselor was of the opinion that he has 

come to the point where he has now begun to make substantial progress. He is now able 

to function at home and in school. His foster parents have played a significant role in his 

improvement by providing strict boundaries, by being consistent, by providing a routine 

and providing loving care and attention. It is the opinion of I.K.'s counselor that he will 

always need mental health services. It is further her opinion that being reintroduced to 

his parents would be confusing and would likely result in regression in his behaviors. 

{¶14} Evidence was presented that established that Appellant after her release 

from the halfway house did actually participate in the Case Plan and worked on Case 

Plan provisions. She successfully completed parent education at Ashland Parenting Plus. 

In addition, she completed numerous programs and classes while at the halfway house, 

including drug and alcohol services, an emotional healing group, co-dependency 

program, financial management program, employment readiness training, domestic 

violence program and a trauma program. She had been released from the halfway house 

only five months prior to the filing of the Permanent Custody Motion. 

{¶15} Appellant has been cooperative with ACJFS since her release and has 

shown interest in the children. However, she has not taken any actions to attempt to 

remove the No Contact Order. 

{¶16} The children's Guardian Ad Litem has thoroughly investigated these cases, 

participated in all proceedings in these cases and filed several detailed written reports 

with the Court. 
Ashland County, Case No. 18-COA-004 7 

{¶17} On December 29, 2017, the Court filed a Judgment Entry granting Children 

Services permanent custody of I.K. The trial court found that I.K. was in the custody of 

ACJFS for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period. The Court 

further found that it was in the best interest of I.K. that the motion for permanent custody 

be granted. 

Assignment of Error 

{¶18} Appellant raises one assignment of error, 

{¶19} “I. THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PERMANENT CUSTODY TO THE 

AGENCY WHEN NOT HAVING CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT IT WAS 

IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD.” 

Law and Analysis 

Burden of Proof. 

{¶20} “[T]he right to raise a child is an ‘essential’ and ‘basic’ civil right.” In re 

Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157, 556 N.E.2d 1169(1990), quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 

U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551(1972). A parent’s interest in the care, custody 

and management of his or her child is “fundamental.” Id.; Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 

745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599(1982). The permanent termination of a parent’s 

rights has been described as, “* * * the family law equivalent to the death penalty in a 

criminal case.” In re Smith, 77 Ohio App.3d 1, 16, 601 N.E.2d 45(6th Dist. 1991). 

Therefore, parents “must be afforded every procedural and substantive protection the law 

allows.” Id. 

{¶21} An award of permanent custody must be based upon clear and convincing 

evidence. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1). The Ohio Supreme Court has defined “clear and 
Ashland County, Case No. 18-COA-004 8 

convincing evidence” as “[t]he measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind 

of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations sought to be established. 

It is intermediate, being more than a mere preponderance, but not to the extent of such 

certainty as required beyond a reasonable doubt as in criminal cases. It does not mean 

clear and unequivocal.” In re Estate of Haynes, 25 Ohio St.3d 101, 103-104, 495 N.E.2d 

23 (1986). 

Standard of Review.

{¶22} The Ohio Supreme Court has delineated our standard of review as follows, 

 Where the degree of proof required to sustain an issue must be clear 

and convincing, a reviewing court will examine the record to determine 

whether the trier of facts had sufficient evidence before it to satisfy the 

requisite degree of proof. See Ford v. Osborne, 45 Ohio St. 1, 12 N.E. 526, 

Cole v. McClure, 88 Ohio St. 1, 102 N.E. 264, and Frate v. Rimenik, 115 

Ohio St. 11, 152 N.E. 14. 

Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 477, 120 N.E. 2d 118 (1954). A court of appeals will 

affirm the trial court's findings “if the record contains competent, credible evidence by 

which the court could have formed a firm belief or conviction that the essential statutory 

elements for a termination of parental rights have been established.” In re Adkins, 5th 

Dist. Nos. 2005AP06–0044 and 2005AP07–0049, 2006-Ohio-431, 2006 WL 242557, ¶17. 

{¶23} In Cross, the Supreme Court further cautioned, 

 The mere number of witnesses, who may support a claim of one or 

the other of the parties to an action, is not to be taken as a basis for resolving 

disputed facts. The degree of proof required is determined by the 
Ashland County, Case No. 18-COA-004 9 

impression which the testimony of the witnesses makes upon the trier of 

facts, and the character of the testimony itself. Credibility, intelligence, 

freedom from bias or prejudice, opportunity to be informed, the disposition 

to tell the truth or otherwise, and the probability or improbability of the 

statements made, are all tests of testimonial value. Where the evidence is 

in conflict, the trier of facts may determine what should be accepted as the 

truth and what should be rejected as false. See Rice v. City of Cleveland, 

114 Ohio St. 299, 58 N.E.2d 768. 

161 Ohio St. at 477-478. (Emphasis added). 

Requirements for Permanent Custody Awards. 

{¶24} R.C. 2151.414 sets forth the guidelines a trial court must follow when 

deciding a motion for permanent custody. R.C. 2151.414(A)(1) mandates the trial court 

schedule a hearing and provide notice upon filing of a motion for permanent custody of a 

child by a public children services agency or private child placing agency that has 

temporary custody of the child or has placed the child in long-term foster care. 

{¶25} Following the hearing, R.C. 2151.414(B) authorizes the juvenile court to 

grant permanent custody of the child to the public or private agency if the court 

determines, by clear and convincing evidence, it is in the best interest of the child to grant 

permanent custody to the agency, and that any of the following apply: 

 (a) The child is not abandoned or orphaned, has not been in the 

temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or 

private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive 

twenty-two-month period, or has not been in the temporary custody of one 
Ashland County, Case No. 18-COA-004 10 

or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies 

for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period if, as 

described in division (D)(1) of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the 

child was previously in the temporary custody of an equivalent agency in 

another state, and the child cannot be placed with either of the child's 

parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child's 

parents; 

 (b) the child is abandoned; 

 (c) the child is orphaned and there are no relatives of the child who 

are able to take permanent custody; or 

 (d) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public 

children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or 

more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, or the child has 

been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services 

agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a 

consecutive twenty-two-month period and, as described in division (D)(1) of 

section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was previously in the 

temporary custody of an equivalent agency in another state. 

{¶26} Therefore, R.C. 2151.414(B) establishes a two-pronged analysis the trial 

court must apply when ruling on a motion for permanent custody. In practice, the trial 

court will usually determine whether one of the four circumstances delineated in R.C. 

2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (d) is present before proceeding to a determination regarding 

the best interest of the child. 
Ashland County, Case No. 18-COA-004 11 

A. Temporary Custody for at least 12 out of a consecutive 24 month period-R.C. 

2151.414(B) (1) (d).g2 

{¶27} The “12 of 22” provisions set forth in R.C. 2151.413(D)(1) and R.C. 

2151.414(B)(1)(d) balance the importance of reuniting a child with the child’s parents 

against the importance of a speedy resolution of the custody of a child. In re C.W., 104 

Ohio St.3d 163, 2004–Ohio–6411, 818 N.E.2d 1176, ¶22. Through the “12 of 22” 

provisions in the permanent-custody statutes, the legislature provides parents with 12 

months to work toward reunification before an agency can institute a permanent-custody 

action asserting R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) grounds. Id. 

{¶28} “Before a public children-services agency or private child-placing agency 

can move for permanent custody of a child on R.C. 2151.414(B) (1) (d) grounds, the child 

must have been in the temporary custody of an agency for at least 12 months of a 

consecutive 22-month period.” In re: C.W., 104 Ohio St.3d 163, 2004-Ohio-6411, 818 

N.E.2d 1176 at paragraph one of the syllabus. When calculating this time period, the 

Court in C.W. cautioned, “the time that passes between the filing of a motion for 

permanent custody and the permanent-custody hearing does not count toward the 12-

month period set forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d).” Id. at 167, 2004-Ohio-6411, 818 

N.E.2d at 1180, ¶26. 

{¶29} R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(e) states that, “[f]or the purposes of division (B)(1) of 

this section, a child shall be considered to have entered the temporary custody of an 

agency on the earlier of the date the child is adjudicated pursuant to section 2151.28 of 

the Revised Code or the date that is sixty days after the removal of the child from home.” 
Ashland County, Case No. 18-COA-004 12 

{¶30} In the case at bar, I.K. was removed from the Appellant’s home on April 4, 

2016. Sixty day from April 4, 2016 would be June 3, 2016. The trial court adjudicated 

I.K. an abused and dependent child by Judgment Entry filed April 13, 2016. Accordingly, 

the “earlier date” that I.K. will be deemed to have enter the temporary custody of ACJFS 

for purposes of R.C. 2151.414(B) (1) (d) is April 13, 2016. ACJFS filed the Motion for 

Permanent custody on June 8, 2017, 1 year, 1 month and 26 days after I.K. is deemed to 

have entered the temporary custody of ACJFS. 

{¶31} Accordingly, the trial court correctly found that I.K. had been in the 

temporary custody of the ACJFS for over twelve months. Appellant has not challenged 

this finding on appeal. 

{¶32} If the court finds that R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) applies, then it need not also 

find that the child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable 

time. In re C.W., 104 Ohio St.3d 163, 2004-Ohio-6411, 818 N.E.2d 1176, ¶ 21; In re 

A.M.1, 4th Dist. Athens Nos. 10CA21 through 10CA31, 2010-Ohio-5837, 2010 WL 

4890433, ¶ 31; In re J.R., 5th Dist. Stark No. 2016CA00018, 2016-Ohio-2703, ¶ 38 (citing 

In re Calhoun, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2008CA00118, 2008-Ohio-5458); In re Williams, 10th 

Dist. Franklin No. 02AP-924, 2002-Ohio-7205; In re J.F., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105504, 

2018-Ohio-96, 2018 WL 386668, ¶ 51; In re K.W., 4th Dist. Highland No. 17CA7 & 17CA8, 

2018-Ohio-1933, ¶63. 

{¶33} As findings under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) are 

alternative findings, each is independently sufficient to use as a basis to grant the motion 

for permanent custody. In re Daltoni, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No.2007 AP 0041, 2007–

Ohio–5805. This finding alone, in conjunction with a best interest finding, is sufficient to 
Ashland County, Case No. 18-COA-004 13 

support the grant of permanent custody. In re Calhoun, 5th Dist. Stark No.2008CA00118, 

2008–Ohio–5458. 

Best Interest of the Child, R.C. 2151.414(D). 

{¶34} In determining the best interest of the child at a permanent custody hearing, 

R.C. 2151.414(D) mandates the trial court must consider all relevant factors, including, 

but not limited to, the following: (1) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with 

the child’s parents, siblings, relatives, foster parents and out-of-home providers, and any 

other person who may significantly affect the child; (2) the wishes of the child as 

expressed directly by the child or through the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard 

for the maturity of the child; (3) the custodial history of the child; and (4) the child’s need 

for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be 

achieved without a grant of permanent custody. 

{¶35} The focus of the “best interest” determination is upon the child, not the 

parent, as R.C. 2151.414(C) specifically prohibits the court from considering the effect a 

grant of permanent custody would have upon the parents. In re: Awkal, 95 Ohio App.3d 

309, 315, 642 N.E.2d 424(8th Dist. 1994). A finding that it is in the best interest of a child 

to terminate the parental rights of one parent is not dependent upon the court making a 

similar finding with respect to the other parent. The trial court would necessarily make a 

separate determination concerning the best interest of the child with respect to the rights 

of the mother and the rights of the father. 

{¶36} This Court has held that a trial court is not required to specifically enumerate 

each factor under R.C. 2151.414(D) in its decision. In re: Turner, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas 

No. 2006-CA045, 2006-Ohio-6793, ¶34; In the Matter of the Franklin Children, 5th Dist.
Ashland County, Case No. 18-COA-004 14 

Tuscarawas No. 2001 AP 03 0023, 2001 WL 1772921(Jan. 28, 2001); In Re: Parker, 5th 

Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2000AP120096, 2000AP120097, 2001 WL 1782603(Apr. 25, 

2001); In the Matter of the Schupbach Children, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 

2000AP010005, 2000 WL 964981(May 6, 2000). See also, In re: Hershberger, 3rd Dist. 

Allen Nos. 01-04-55, 01-04-61, 2005-Ohio-429; In re Heyman, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 

96APF02-194, 1996 WL 465238 (Aug. 13, 1996). Nevertheless, there must be some 

indication on the record that all of the necessary factors were considered. 

{¶37} In the case at bar, the trial court made findings of fact regarding the child’s 

best interest. It is well-established that “[t]he discretion which the juvenile court enjoys in 

determining whether an order of permanent custody is in the best interest of a child should 

be accorded the utmost respect, given the nature of the proceeding and the impact the 

court’s determination will have on the lives of the parties concerned.” In re: Mauzy 

Children, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2000CA00244, 2000 WL 1700073(Nov. 13, 2000), quoting 

In re Awkal, 95 Ohio App.3d 309, 316, 642 N.E.2d 424(8th Dist. 1994). 

{¶38} As an appellate court, we neither weigh the evidence nor judge the 

credibility of witnesses. Our role is to determine whether there is relevant, competent and 

credible evidence, upon which the fact finder could base its judgment. Cross Truck v. 

Jeffries, 5th Dist. Stark No. CA–5758, 1981 WL 6321 (Feb. 10, 1982). “Reviewing courts 

should accord deference to the trial court’s decision because the trial court has had the 

opportunity to observe the witnesses’ demeanor, gestures, and voice inflections that 

cannot be conveyed to us through the written record, Miller v. Miller, 37 Ohio St.3d 71, 

523 N.E.2d 846 (1988). 
Ashland County, Case No. 18-COA-004 15 

{¶39} In the present case, the trial court’s decision indicates it considered the best 

interest factors. Upon review of the record, it is clear that the record supports the trial 

court’s finding that granting the motion for permanent custody is in I.K.’s best interest. 

The trial court concluded the child’s need for legally secure placement could not be 

achieved without awarding permanent custody to ACJFS. In the case at bar, in addition 

to the testimony, the trial court considered the reports of the GAL. 

{¶40} The court found that I.K. has not seen Appellant since being removed from 

the home on April 4, 2016 and there is no present evidence of a bonded, loving 

relationship. The Court further found that I.K. has expressed an interest in being returned 

to Appellant’s custody. 

{¶41} The trial court further found H.K. and I.K. are in separate foster homes but 

do have a relationship with each other, are able to see each other on a regular basis and 

for the most part interact well. The evidence would indicate that this contact would likely 

continue. 

{¶42} The Court found that both of the children have excellent bonded 

relationships with their respective foster parents and all persons in their foster homes. 

Each child feels loved, protected, and secure in its present environment; all of their needs 

are met; and each has made progress under the most difficult of circumstances. All 

interactions and interrelationships between the children and all persons in their' 

respective foster homes are positive and those relationships significantly improved the 

well-being of each of the children. 

{¶43} Concerning Appellant, the Court found that although Appellant is not 

presently incarcerated, she does not have stable, i.e., suitable, housing for the children 
Ashland County, Case No. 18-COA-004 16 

and her living arrangements would not be in I.K.’s best interest. Further Appellant has 

not addressed her issues that contributed to the reasons these cases were filed in the 

first place and the children will continue to be at risk if they resided with her. In addition, 

both these children have numerous special needs. Those needs require specialized 

placements and specialized services, which neither parent had ever provided to the 

children. The evidence would indicate that neither is in a position to provide for those 

needs in the future. 

{¶44} The evidence did demonstrate that Appellant successfully completed some 

aspect of her case plan. On that point, the evidence demonstrates that any improvement 

that Appellant has made in his life is tentative and, perhaps, temporary, and that she is at 

risk of relapse. The trial court found that Appellant was not able to be a successful parent 

I.K. 

{¶45} As already noted, Appellant failed to remedy the problems that initially 

caused the removal of the child from the home. Very little if anything, has changed with 

respect to Appellant’s life choices since this case began. She does not understand the 

problems with her behavior, or her lifestyle. Appellant displays poor judgment and poor 

coping skills. Appellant has been unable to demonstrate any meaningful change in her 

lifestyle during the pendency of the case. 

{¶46} In the case at bar, upon review of the record on appeal and the findings and 

conclusions of the trial court, we conclude the grant of permanent custody of I.K. to 

ACJFS was made in the consideration of the child's best interest and did not constitute 

an error or an abuse of discretion under the circumstances presented. 

Conclusion. 
Ashland County, Case No. 18-COA-004 17 

{¶47} For these reasons, we find that the trial court's decision that permanent 

custody to ACJFS was in the child's best interest was based upon competent, credible 

evidence and is not against the manifest weight or sufficiency of the evidence. 

{¶48} Because the evidence in the record supports the trial court's judgment, we 

overrule Appellant's sole assignment of error, and affirm the decision of the Ashland 

County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division. 

{¶49} Appellant’s sole assignment of error is overruled. 

By Gwin, P, J., 

Delaney, J., and 

Baldwin, J., concur