UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 20-2087

CARRIE D. RANDA,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at 

Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan, District Judge. (5:18-cv-00019-FL)

Submitted: March 26, 2021 Decided: April 9, 2021

Before MOTZ, AGEE, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

John P. O’Hale, LAW OFFICE OF JOHN P. O’HALE, P.A., Smithfield, North Carolina;

Joseph E. Zeszotarski, Jr., GAMMON, HOWARD, & ZESZOTARSKI, PLLC, Raleigh, 

North Carolina, for Appellant. G. Zachary Terwilliger, United States Attorney, 

Alexandria, Virginia, Daniel P. Shean, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE 

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Carrie D. Randa appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment to 

Merrick B. Garland, the Attorney General, on her employment discrimination and 

retaliation claims raised pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 2000e to 2000e-17.1

 Finding no error, we affirm.

We “review[] de novo the district court’s order granting summary judgment.” 

Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Off. of the Cts., 780 F.3d 562, 565 n.1 (4th Cir. 2015). “A district 

court ‘shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute 

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. at 

568 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). “A dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could return 

a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In determining 

whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, “we view the facts and all justifiable 

inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to . . . the nonmoving party.” Id.

at 565 n.1 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, “the nonmoving party must rely 

on more than conclusory allegations, mere speculation, the building of one inference upon 

another, or the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.” Humphreys & Partners 

Architects, L.P. v. Lessard Design, Inc., 790 F.3d 532, 540 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

1 Although Garland is the appropriate defendant pursuant to Title VII, Randa was 

formerly employed as an Assistant United States Attorney (“AUSA”) with the United 

States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of North Carolina (“USAO”).
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Randa proceeded under the familiar burden-shifting framework of McDonnell 

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973). Under McDonnell Douglas, Randa 

was first required to:

demonstrate[] a prima facie case of [sex or pregnancy] discrimination by 

showing that (1) [s]he is a member of a protected class; (2) [s]he suffered 

[an] adverse employment action; (3) [s]he was performing h[er] job duties at 

a level that met h[er] employer’s legitimate expectations at the time of the 

adverse employment action; and (4) the position remained open or was filled 

by similarly qualified applicants outside the protected class.

Holland v. Wash. Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 214 (4th Cir. 2007). To establish a prima 

facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff is required to “show (1) that she engaged in protected 

activity; (2) that her employer took an adverse action against her; and (3) that a causal 

connection existed between the adverse activity and the protected action.” Jacobs, 780 

F.3d at 578 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). The USAO then must proffer 

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory reason for Randa’s termination. Id.; 

Holland, 487 F.3d at 214. Finally, Randa had the burden to show that the USAO’s 

legitimate reason was, in fact, a pretext for intentional discrimination or retaliation. Jacobs, 

780 F.3d at 578; Holland, 487 F.3d at 214.

The district court correctly concluded that Randa was not meeting the USAO’s 

legitimate performance expectations. To establish the third prong of the prima facie case, 

“a plaintiff must show only that [s]he was qualified for the job and that [s]he was meeting 

h[er] employer’s legitimate expectations.” Haynes v. Waste Connections, Inc., 922 F.3d 

219, 225 (4th Cir. 2019). In considering whether an employee was meeting her employer’s 

legitimate performance expectations, “it is the perception of the decision maker which is 
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relevant, not the self-assessment of the plaintiff.” Hawkins v. PepsiCo, Inc., 203 F.3d 274, 

280 (4th Cir. 2000) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, an 

employee’s own testimony about her job performance does not create a genuine issue of 

material fact as to whether she was meeting her employer’s legitimate expectations. See 

King v. Rumsfeld, 328 F.3d 145, 149 (4th Cir. 2003).

Although Randa received a successful performance rating, Dennis Duffy, Randa’s 

second-line supervisor, identified several errors in Randa’s work and instructed her to 

correct these mistakes. Despite receiving such instruction, Randa repeated the errors. And 

the errors that Duffy identified were significant and could have affected the outcome of 

cases she prosecuted. Thus, despite Randa’s successes in other cases, the USAO expressed 

reasonable concern about her failure to learn from these mistakes, her ability to be an 

effective advocate for the Government, and the lack of professionalism exhibited by her 

social media posts.

Although Randa points to her immediate supervisor Jane Jackson’s testimony to 

support her claims, Jackson’s statements do not call into question her termination. While 

Jackson believed that Duffy’s comments were harsh, she also testified that they were 

accurate. Additionally, Jackson herself noted in her comments that Randa needed to 

proofread her work before submitting it to management for approval. Finally, while one 

of Randa’s coworkers submitted a declaration attesting that Randa was a competent 

prosecutor, this does not call into question the USAO’s conclusion that she was not. See 
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King, 328 F.3d at 149-50, 153-54. Thus, the district court did not err in rejecting Randa’s 

discrimination claim.2

We likewise conclude that Randa failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation.

As [we have] held, no causal connection can exist between an employee’s 

protected activity and an employer’s adverse action if the employer was 

unaware of the activity. An employer is aware of an employee’s protected 

activity when he learns of an employee action that he understood or should 

have understood to be opposition against a Title VII violation. When 

determining whether the employer should have understood the nature of the 

employee’s action, courts examine not just the employee’s complaint but also 

the factual context that is known to the employer.

Strothers v. City of Laurel, 895 F.3d 317, 336 (4th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted).

Randa does not dispute that neither John Bruce nor Duffy had knowledge of her

discrimination complaint to Jackson, and her generalized complaints about her evaluation 

did not alert them that she thought they discriminated against her in violation of Title VII. 

While Randa cites to our prior decision in Carter v. Ball, 33 F.3d 450, 460 (4th Cir. 1994), 

for the proposition that her complaint to Jackson establishes the USAO’s knowledge of her 

protected activity, we have since clarified that the focus must be on whether the relevant 

decision makers were aware of an employee’s protected activity. See, e.g., Holland, 487 

F.3d at 218; Tinsley v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 155 F.3d 435, 444 (4th Cir. 1998), overruled 

on other grounds by Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002); Dowe v. 

2 Because Randa failed to establish she was meeting the USAO’s legitimate 

performance expectations, we need not address the district court’s alternative holding that 

she failed to establish pretext.
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Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 657 (4th Cir. 1998). 

Jackson was not the relevant decision maker in this case.

Therefore, we affirm the district court’s order. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED