Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

800 South Wells Commercial LLC v. Cadden, 2018 IL App (1st) 162882

Appellate Court 

Caption

800 SOUTH WELLS COMMERCIAL LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. 

JOHN CADDEN, Defendant-Appellee.

District & No. First District, Third Division 

Docket No. 1-16-2882

Rule 23 order filed

Motion to

publish allowed

Opinion filed

March 21, 2018

April 24, 2018

May 9, 2018

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 11-L-2895; the 

Hon. Margaret A. Brennan, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

F. Dean Armstrong, of Armstrong Law Firm, P.C., of Frankfort, for 

appellant.

David M. Jenkins, of The Jenkins Law Group, P.C., of Chicago, for 

appellee.
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Panel JUSTICE FITZGERALD SMITH delivered the judgment of the court, 

with opinion.

Justices Howse and Lavin concurred in the judgment and opinion.

 OPINION 

¶ 1 Upon the filing of the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted 

defendant-appellee John Cadden’s motion for summary judgment and denied 

plaintiff-appellant 800 South Wells Commercial LLC’s motion for summary judgment. 

Plaintiff appeals, contending that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for 

defendant where the evidence raised a question of fact as to whether defendant owed fiduciary 

duties to plaintiff and a question of fact as to whether he breached these duties. Plaintiff asks 

that we reverse the trial court’s order and remand the cause for trial on the merits. For the 

following reasons, we affirm. 

¶ 2 BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 This cause has already been before our court, in some related form, several times. Its 

history, which now spans over a decade, is lengthy and, in many respects, complex. For 

purposes of the instant matter, we present only those facts that are most relevant to our 

determination herein.

¶ 4 In 1997, River City Complex (Complex) was an area that consisted of an apartment 

complex, a commercial space, a surface parking lot, a parking garage, and a marina. A 

development corporation owned by Nicholas Gouletas, known as American Invesco 

Development Corporation (Invesco),1

purchased the Complex in April 1997.

¶ 5 Plaintiff, a manager-managed Illinois limited liability company, was formed in early 2001. 

Its members consisted of Gouletas and a Michigan company known as River City Investors, 

LLC (RCI). Pursuant to its operating agreement (Operating Agreement), plaintiff was formed 

specifically in order to obtain a leasehold interest in the Complex’s commercial space and 

parking garage now held by Invesco. The Operating Agreement stated:

“The purpose of the Company is to acquire the Property and to lease, improve, sell the 

Property, and to engage in any and all activities related or incidental thereto.”

The Operating Agreement defined “the Property” as 

“a leasehold interest in that portion of the property located at 800 South Wells Street, 

Chicago, Illinois, generally consisting of approximately 240,000 square feet of net 

rentable commercial space and approximately 130 indoor parking spaces in the 

building located on the Property.”

The Operating Agreement named Gouletas as plaintiff’s managing member with the “the sole 

and exclusive right to manage plaintiff” and permitted him, as manager, to appoint officers to 

 

1Throughout the record, this corporation is referred to in several different ways, including 

American Invesco Development Corporation, American Invesco Development Corporation, and 

Invsco Management Company, Inc. For purposes of this appeal, we will refer to it as Invesco. 
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assist in plaintiff’s operations. Section 5.9 of the Operating Agreement, entitled “Officers,” 

stated: 

“The Managing Member shall elect officers (“Officers”) to carry out the policies and 

objectives of the Managing Member. Subject to the policies and objectives prescribed 

by the Managing Member, the Officers shall establish operating procedures for, and 

administer and direct, the day to day operations of the Company. The powers of the 

Officers may be broadened or limited from time to time in the discretion of the 

Managing Member and each Officer shall, at a minimum, be empowered to carry out 

(and shall carry out) any activity expressly authorized in a written resolution of the 

Managing Member. *** Each Officer shall serve until removed by the Managing 

Member. The Managing Member may remove any Officer at any time for any reason. 

*** No Officer shall receive any compensation for such Officer’s services to the 

Company.”

Further, the Operating Agreement dictated that plaintiff, as a company 

“shall engage in no other business until such time as [any mortgages] *** have been 

repaid in full, at which time the purpose of the Company shall be expanded to include 

the acquisition(s) of additional properties, and to lease, sell, or improve the additional 

properties, and any and all activities related or incidental thereto.”

¶ 6 On March 1, 2001, Gouletas, as plaintiff’s manager and member, and RCI, as its only other 

member, unanimously issued a certificate of managing member authority (Certificate) on 

behalf of plaintiff. In it, Gouletas appointed defendant to be plaintiff’s vice president “in 

accordance with the provisions of Section 5.9 of the Operating Agreement.” This Certificate 

also authorized plaintiff to acquire the leasehold interest in the commercial space and the 

parking garage, as had been described in its Operating Agreement, pursuant to a leasehold 

purchase and sale by assignment agreement. Originally, the lease included rights to the marina. 

However, the lease was amended to separate out the marina and remove it from the deal, and 

the Certificate ordered and directed defendant to approve the amendment to the lease and 

proceed with the deal on plaintiff’s behalf. Accordingly, at the closing, plaintiff received a 

leasehold interest in only the commercial space and the parking garage, pursuant to the 

amended lease and as had been described in its Operating Agreement and authorized in the 

Certificate.

¶ 7 With respect to the commercial space and the parking garage, these were encumbered by a 

first mortgage plaintiff secured from Parkway Bank and Trust Company and a second 

mortgage it secured from CIB Bank. Eventually, the second mortgage was purchased by 

D.A.N. Joint Venture III, L.P. (DJV). By the end of 2005, plaintiff was in default on both 

mortgages.

¶ 8 WRT-Marc RC, LLC (WRT) became interested in purchasing the commercial space (but 

not necessarily the parking garage) from plaintiff. It sought to purchase the first mortgage from 

Parkway Bank and foreclose upon the commercial space and parking garage. At this time, 

although plaintiff was the lessee of the commercial space and parking garage, another entity 

owned by Gouletas, 800 South Wells Phase I, LLC, also known as River City Commercial 

(RCC), was their fee simple owner and lessor. Thus, WRT sought both plaintiff’s and RCC’s 

consent to a foreclosure, so that WRT could obtain a fee simple interest in these two assets. 
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¶ 9 Defendant, while still vice president of plaintiff, had also by this time become vice 

president of RCC.2 During negotiations with WRT, an agreement arose that neither plaintiff 

nor RCC would contest the foreclosure of the commercial space and parking garage provided 

that WRT grant an option to acquire the parking garage from WRT at WRT’s cost. Defendant 

consulted with plaintiff’s counsel about the potential for this option agreement. 

¶ 10 Thereafter, WRT prepared a document with respect to the option agreement, known as 

Px1. In this document, WRT wrote that:

“[WRT] will grant the borrower (or another group) the option to buy the indoor 133 

parking spaces for the amount of our outstanding loan balance above $10,000,000. The 

borrower will have 30 days after the completion of the foreclosure & pay-off of the new 

condominium loan in #4 to exercise the option to purchase the 133 in-door parking 

spaces.”

Px1 was never signed nor dated by WRT, nor anyone else, and never specified what entities 

were involved in the potential option agreement, other than “the borrower (or another group).”

¶ 11 Eventually, WRT and defendant, in his capacity as RCC’s vice president, executed a 

written and signed option agreement whereby RCC was granted the option to acquire the 

parking garage. RCC then assigned its rights under this option agreement to another entity, 

River City Parking, LLC (River City Parking). In April 2006, WRT, which had by this time 

purchased the first mortgage on the commercial space and the parking garage, filed suit to 

foreclose on that mortgage. Plaintiff did not contest the foreclosure, and a foreclosure 

judgment was entered in favor of WRT in October 2006. WRT went on to purchase the parking 

garage and commercial space at a foreclosure sale.

¶ 12 In November 2006, DJV, which held the second mortgage, took control of plaintiff’s

voting rights. It removed Gouletas as plaintiff’s manager, and defendant’s role as plaintiff’s 

vice president ended.

¶ 13 Plaintiff filed a complaint against Gouletas, RCC, Invesco, River City Parking, its own 

attorneys, and defendant, asserting various counts. With respect to defendant, 3

plaintiff 

alleged he breached fiduciary duties he owed to plaintiff as its vice president. Specifically, 

plaintiff alleged that defendant diverted a corporate opportunity when he failed to obtain the 

option to acquire the parking garage for plaintiff (which WRT eventually granted to RCC), 

improperly transferred an asset when he allowed the transfer of the marina out of the initial 

deal in which plaintiff obtained the commercial space and parking garage without receiving 

valuable consideration for it, and improperly allocated expenses.

¶ 14 As litigation progressed, plaintiff’s counsel, against whom plaintiff asserted claims of 

aiding and abetting Gouletas and defendant in allegedly breaching their fiduciary duties with 

respect to the option to acquire the parking garage, filed a motion to dismiss the counts against 

them. The trial court granted counsel’s motion, and we affirmed counsel’s dismissal from the 

suit on appeal. See 800 South Wells Commercial, LLC v. Horwood Marcus & Berk Chartered, 

2013 IL App (1st) 123660. 

 

2 Defendant was simultaneously vice president for several of Gouletas’s business entities, 

including, for example, Invesco, as well as plaintiff and RCC. 

3

For the record, the operative complaint relevant to the instant cause is plaintiff’s fourth amended 

complaint and its allegations therein against defendant. 
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¶ 15 Similarly, River City Parking, who had acquired the parking garage via the written option 

with WRT and against whom plaintiff also asserted claims of aiding and abetting Gouletas and 

defendant’s alleged breach of fiduciary duties, likewise filed a motion to dismiss the count 

against it. The trial court granted its motion. It held that Px1, which plaintiff insisted was an 

agreement between it and WRT for the option, was not such an agreement but, rather, only a 

“document” embodying “a term sheet that indicates further discussion is necessary, not a final 

offer.” Additionally, and specifically highlighting that document’s express language that WRT 

will grant the option to “the borrower (or another group),” the court further held that, even 

were it a firm agreement (which it was not), the document never granted plaintiff the sole 

option to purchase. Plaintiff did not appeal this holding of the trial court.4 See 800 South Wells 

Commercial, LLC v. Gouletas, No. 11-L-2895 (Cir. Ct. Cook County, July 11, 2014). 

¶ 16 Following all this, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment.5 He stated that, as a 

matter of law, he did not owe plaintiff any fiduciary duties and that, even if he did, he had not 

breached them. In support of his argument, he referenced several portions of plaintiff’s 

Operating Agreement, the Certificate, affidavits, and depositions. Plaintiff filed a cross-motion 

for summary judgment stating that, as a matter of law, defendant did owe fiduciary duties, that 

he exercised managerial control over plaintiff, and that he breached these duties. 

¶ 17 Among the affidavits and depositions presented to the trial court as summary judgment 

evidence were those of defendant, Gouletas, Daniel Cadle, and David May. Briefly, Cadle, 

who controls DJV (plaintiff’s manager following the ouster of Gouletas), stated that, with 

respect to defendant’s control over plaintiff, while it was known that Gouletas was plaintiff’s 

managing member, defendant, as vice president, “acted as and ran most of [Gouletas’s] 

companies.” Cadle, however, was never a manager or member of plaintiff or any Gouletas 

company during defendant’s tenure as vice president. Cadle also testified with respect to the 

parking garage option agreement between WRT and plaintiff, admitting that the Px1 document 

was never signed by anyone and did not specify it was between certain companies. Cadle 

further admitted that Px1 had not been prepared by defendant, Gouletas, or plaintiff, that it was 

WRT’s internal memorandum, and that the phrase “we will grant the borrower (or another 

group) the option” to purchase the parking garage from WRT did not necessarily mean 

plaintiff. 

¶ 18 May was legal counsel and the authorized agent for RCI, which, along with Gouletas, 

comprised plaintiff’s original members. May attested that defendant was appointed plaintiff’s 

vice president by Gouletas in his capacity as plaintiff’s manager, that defendant’s appointment 

was pursuant to section 5.9 of plaintiff’s Operating Agreement, and that he (May) approved 

this on behalf of member RCI. May stated that defendant “was not granted status as a Manager 

 

4We further note for the record that, with respect to Gouletas, against whom plaintiff asserted 

breach of fiduciary duty and mismanagement, he refused to sit for deposition, and a default judgment 

was entered against him. He appealed, and we dismissed his appeal. See 800 South Wells Commercial 

LLC v. Gouletas, No. 1-14-0781 (Nov. 6, 2014). Later, he filed a section 2-1401 petition (735 ILCS 

5/2-1401 (West 2014)) to set aside this default judgment. The trial court denied his petition, he again 

appealed to our court, and we eventually dismissed his appeal for want of prosecution. See 800 South 

Wells Commercial LLC v. Gouletas, No. 1-14-3214 (Apr. 2, 2015). Gouletas failed to pay the amount 

owed under the default judgment; a citation lien was issued, a contempt hearing was initiated, and 

before its conclusion, Gouletas filed for bankruptcy. 

5Defendant later amended his motion for summary judgment. 
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in this appointment” but, rather, he “reported to the Manager (Gouletas)” and could only act 

with the unanimous approval of the members. With respect to the acquisition of the River City 

Complex, May attested that plaintiff was formed in order to obtain a leasehold interest in the 

commercial space and parking garage but not the marina. He confirmed that the Certificate 

directed defendant to amend the initial lease to remove the marina, that this was the decision of 

plaintiff’s members, and that they approved this decision by unanimous vote. And, with 

respect to the option to purchase the parking garage from WRT, May attested that, although 

plaintiff asked defendant to discuss the option on its behalf, plaintiff knew that defendant was 

also discussing it on behalf of RCC (since he was RCC’s vice president as well) and, 

ultimately, plaintiff’s members were not interested in the option and did not instruct defendant 

to obtain it on plaintiff’s behalf.

¶ 19 Gouletas’s affidavit corroborated much of May’s. Gouletas attested that he was plaintiff’s 

manager, as well as a member. He stated that he appointed defendant as vice president of 

plaintiff in his capacity as plaintiff’s manager and pursuant to section 5.9 of plaintiff’s 

Operating Agreement and that defendant “was not granted status as a Manager in this 

appointment” but, rather, was to report to Gouletas, to act on his instructions as manager, and 

to perform actions unanimously approved by plaintiff’s members. With respect to the River 

City Complex deal, Gouletas corroborated that the original lease included the commercial 

space, parking garage, and marina but that the lease was amended at the closing to include only 

the commercial space and parking garage and that this amendment to remove the marina from 

the deal was known to and approved by all of plaintiff’s members. And, with respect to the 

option to purchase the parking garage, Gouletas confirmed that plaintiff asked defendant to 

discuss it with WRT on its behalf, with full knowledge that he was also discussing it on RCC’s 

behalf and, ultimately, plaintiff did not want the option and did not instruct defendant to obtain 

it.

¶ 20 Defendant’s affidavit corroborated those of May and Gouletas, with the additional 

attestations that he only acted as directed by plaintiff’s manager and all of its members and that 

he never derived any direct or indirect benefit, personal or otherwise, from the transactions 

related to the marina or the parking garage option. In his deposition testimony, defendant was 

asked repeatedly if he believed he owed fiduciary duties to plaintiff. He stated that he believed 

his “role as an officer had some fiduciary responsibilities” but that, as far as duties, he had 

“[o]nly the authority that would be granted to [him] by the manager and the members.” When 

pressed further as to what these duties entailed, he again stated that it would be “[w]hatever 

duties were specifically outlined in the certificate of authority” and “[w]hatever the oral and 

written instructions were from the manager.” When asked if he believed he had a duty to do 

anything above and beyond what the manager authorized him to do, he responded, “[n]o.”

¶ 21 With all this evidence and acknowledging that the parties were present on cross-motions 

for summary judgment, the trial court began its analysis by first determining whether 

defendant owed a duty to plaintiff. Citing the Operating Agreement and the Certificate as 

presented in this cause, as well as the Limited Liability Company Act (Act) (805 ILCS 180/1-1 

et seq. (West 2014)) and Katris v. Carroll, 362 Ill. App. 3d 1140 (2005), the court concluded 

that defendant did not owe any fiduciary duty to plaintiff. The court found this was “clear” 

since the Act, as supported by the evidence, specifies that the manager of a manager-managed 

limited liability company has the authority and defendant was not the manager of plaintiff. In 

other words, the court explained, defendant “acted in accordance with the certificates of 
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authority” and “was operating within the operating agreement but not exercising the 

managerial authority such that he would be individually liable for [any] breach of fiduciary 

duty.”

¶ 22 Noting that it would generally end its discussion at this point, the court continued its 

analysis to discuss breach, since it found “important to also point out other areas where [it] 

believe[d] that the evidence overwhelmingly supports again ruling in favor of [defendant].” 

Again “looking at the evidence,” the court found that it “overwhelmingly supports that there 

was not a breach by [defendant].” Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment in favor 

of defendant and against plaintiff and denied plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment. 

¶ 23 ANALYSIS

¶ 24 Plaintiff raises two contentions on appeal. First, it asserts that the trial court erred in 

granting summary judgment for defendant where the evidence raised a question of fact 

regarding whether he exercised a sufficient degree of managerial control over plaintiff’s affairs 

so as to permit a finding that he owed fiduciary duties to plaintiff. Second, it asserts that the 

trial court erred in granting summary judgment for defendant where the evidence raised a 

question of fact regarding whether defendant breached fiduciary duties owed to plaintiff. We 

disagree with both assertions. 

¶ 25 As we have noted, this cause was decided within the context of cross-motions for summary 

judgment. The mere filing of such cross-motions does not mean that there are no issues of 

material fact, nor does it obligate the trial court to enter summary judgment. Pielet v. Pielet, 

2012 IL 112064, ¶ 28. However, in such an instance, the parties agree that only a question of 

law is involved and “invite the court to decide the issues based on the record.” Pielet, 2012 IL 

112064, ¶ 28.

¶ 26 Generally, summary judgment should be granted when the pleadings, affidavits, 

depositions, and admissions of record, construed strictly against the moving party, show that 

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. Pielet, 2012 IL 112064, ¶ 29; Morris v. Margulis, 197 Ill. 2d 28, 

35 (2001). Thus, the moving party has the initial burdens of proof and production to show that 

there is no genuine issue of material fact. Hawkins v. Capital Fitness, Inc., 2015 IL App (1st) 

133716, ¶ 10. Once the moving party has met these burdens, the burden then shifts to the 

nonmoving party. Triple R Development, LLC v. Golfview Apartments I, L.P., 2012 IL App 

(4th) 100956, ¶ 12. While it need not prove its case at this preliminary stage, the nonmoving 

party must, nevertheless, present some factual basis to support its claim, and it is not simply 

entitled to rely on the allegations in its pleading in order to raise a genuine issue of material 

fact. CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Bukowski, 2015 IL App (1st) 140780, ¶ 19; Rucker v. Rucker, 2014 

IL App (1st) 132834, ¶ 49; see also Winnetka Bank v. Mandas, 202 Ill. App. 3d 373, 387-88 

(1990) (nonmoving party must submit affidavits or rely on depositions or other admissions of 

record which counter the facts; it has a duty to present a factual basis which would arguably 

entitled it to judgment in its favor based on the law). This basis must recite facts and not mere 

conclusions or statements based on information and belief. In re E.L., 152 Ill. App. 3d 25, 31 

(1987); Cohen v. Washington Manufacturing Co., 80 Ill. App. 3d 1, 3 (1979); see also 

Morrissey v. Arlington Park Racecourse, LLC, 404 Ill. App. 3d 711, 724 (2010) (“nonmoving 

party must present a bona fide factual issue and not merely general conclusions of law”). 

Ultimately, although summary judgment has been called a “drastic measure,” it is an 
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appropriate tool to employ in the expeditious disposition of a lawsuit in which “ ‘the right of 

the moving party is clear and free from doubt.’ ” Morris, 197 Ill. 2d at 35 (quoting Purtill v. 

Hess, 111 Ill. 2d 229, 240 (1986)). Appellate review of a trial court’s grant of summary 

judgment is de novo (Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 

102 (1992)), and reversal will occur only if we find that a genuine issue of material fact exists 

(Addison v. Whittenberg, 124 Ill. 2d 287, 294 (1988)).6

¶ 27 In the instant cause, we find that summary judgment was properly entered in favor of 

defendant, as there was no genuine issue of material fact. This is because plaintiff failed to 

present any evidence to dispute that defendant was not plaintiff’s manager nor exercised any 

managerial control over it and, as the evidence undoubtedly shows defendant did not owe 

plaintiff any fiduciary duties, he could not have breached any such duties.

¶ 28 I. No Fiduciary Duties Owed 

¶ 29 Plaintiff contends that defendant owed it fiduciary duties for two reasons. First, it claims 

that by virtue of defendant’s title of vice president, he owed such duties. It cites the 

common-law doctrine that an officer of a corporation owes fiduciary duties to that company 

and argues that neither the Act nor any agreement relevant to this cause was intended to 

supplant this consideration. Second, it claims that, even were this not so, defendant owed 

fiduciary duties because he exercised managerial control. For this, it cites certain portions of 

defendant’s deposition, Cadle’s testimony, and select phrases from the Operating Agreement. 

For various reasons and based on the evidence presented, plaintiff is incorrect on both fronts.

¶ 30 With respect to plaintiff’s first claim, whether defendant owed it fiduciary duties as its vice 

president turns on three key documents that are intimately intertwined in this cause: the Act, 

plaintiff’s Operating Agreement, and the Certificate.

¶ 31 It is undisputed that plaintiff was a manager-managed limited liability company, an entity 

formed under the Act and, therefore, statutorily governed. See Katris, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 1144 

(limited liability companies are creatures of statute). In other words, and contrary to plaintiff’s 

insistence, plaintiff is not a regular corporation such that common-law propositions concerning 

officers and their duties dominate this conversation or are even relevant. When dealing with 

limited liability companies and the fiduciary duties owed to them, we must look—first, 

foremost, and primarily—to the Act. See Puleo v. Topel, 368 Ill. App. 3d 63, 66-67 (2006) (we 

look to the provisions of the Act to determine the fiduciary duties owed to a limited liability 

company); accord Katris, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 1144. This is especially true where, as here, the 

Act speaks precisely to the instant issue—duties owed to the company. See Katris, 362 Ill. 

App. 3d at 1144. And, when a statute governs our discussion, it is well established that it is our 

duty to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature via that statute’s language, 

which, when clear, is the best indicator of legislative intent. Puleo, 368 Ill. App. 3d at 67; 

accord Katris, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 1145.

¶ 32 Section 15-1 of the Act differentiates between member-managed and manager-managed 

limited liability companies. In the latter, which describes plaintiff, the manager, alone, is 

responsible for the “management and conduct of the company’s business,” and he, 

 

6De novo review is also appropriate here, as we will discuss later, to the extent that this cause turns 

on the construction of provisions of the Act, a matter which presents a question of law. See Pielet, 2012 

IL 112064, ¶ 30. 
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“exclusively,” decides any matter relating to the company’s business. 805 ILCS 180/15-1(c) 

(West 2014).7 Thus, fiduciary duties owed to the company reside in him. See Katris, 362 Ill. 

App. 3d at 1146. This is not true of the company’s members. Section 15-3(g)(1) makes clear 

that “a member who is not also a manager owes no duties to the company or to the other 

members solely by reason of being a member.” 805 ILCS 180/15-3(g)(1) (West 2014). 

¶ 33 In the instant cause, Gouletas was the sole manager of plaintiff, a manager-managed 

limited liability company. Accordingly, pursuant to section 15-1 of the Act, it is Gouletas who 

owed fiduciary duties to plaintiff, not defendant. Moreover, not only was defendant not 

plaintiff’s manager, but he was not even one of its members. The record is clear that plaintiff’s 

only members were Gouletas and RCI (represented by May). Thus, even under section 

15-3(g)(1), defendant could not owe any fiduciary duties to plaintiff simply by his office as its 

vice president.

¶ 34 In further support, section 15-5 of the Act allows a limited liability company to “enter into 

an operating agreement to regulate the affairs of the company and the conduct of its business 

and to govern relations among the members, managers, and company.” 805 ILCS 180/15-5(a) 

(West 2014) (the Act applies to the extent that the company’s operating agreement does not, to 

fill in any gaps). Such an operating agreement, then, comes to control. See Katris, 362 Ill. App. 

3d at 1146-47. In the instant cause, plaintiff was formed by and operated under its Operating 

Agreement. In line with the Act, its Operating Agreement specified that plaintiff’s manager, 

Gouletas, was empowered with “the sole and exclusive right to manage” plaintiff and 

permitted him to appoint officers. The responsibilities of these officers were detailed in section 

5.9:

“The Managing Member shall elect officers (‘Officers’) to carry out the policies and 

objectives of the Managing Member. Subject to the policies and objectives prescribed 

by the Managing Member, the Officers shall establish operating procedures for, and 

administer and direct, the day to day operations of the Company. The powers of the 

Officers may be broadened or limited from time to time in the discretion of the 

Managing Member and each Officer shall, at a minimum, be empowered to carry out 

(and shall carry out) any activity expressly authorized in a written resolution of the 

Managing Member. *** Each Officer shall serve until removed by the Managing 

Member. The Managing Member may remove any Officer at any time for any reason. 

*** No Officer shall receive any compensation for such Officer’s services to the 

Company.”

Clearly, while the officers were charged with certain duties, including day-to-day operations, 

these were exclusively controlled by the manager, Gouletas. Defendant could do nothing 

without the express consent of the manager and as the manager prescribed. 

¶ 35 This was particularly true with respect to transactions underlying this cause, namely, the 

parking garage option that was eventually granted to RCC and possession of the marina. In 

conjunction with the Act and plaintiff’s Operating Agreement, the Certificate, as executed 

unanimously by plaintiff’s manager and all its members, appointed defendant to be plaintiff’s 

vice president “in accordance with the provisions of Section 5.9 of the Operating Agreement.” 

 

7

Subsection 15-1(d) lists those limited instances in which the manager must obtain the consent of 

all the members, such as when an operating agreement is to be amended or when the company is to sell 

or lease its property, but these are not at issue in this cause. 
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It further ordered him, on behalf of plaintiff, to acquire the leasehold interest in only the 

commercial space and the parking garage, as had been described in its Operating Agreement, 

pursuant to a leasehold purchase and sale by assignment agreement. The Certificate, then, just 

as the Act and the Operating Agreement, clearly dictated defendant’s actions and prohibited 

him from doing anything not unanimously ordered by plaintiff’s manager and members. 

¶ 36 Having provided no valid legal support for its claim, the relationship of these three 

cohesive and governing documents necessarily defeats plaintiff’s insistence that, by mere 

virtue of defendant’s title of vice president, he must have owed it fiduciary duties.

¶ 37 First, plaintiff asserts that the Act was not intended to supplant the common-law concept 

that an officer of a corporation owes a fiduciary duty to that corporation. This could not be 

further from the truth. Undoubtedly, the Act governs here, not any common-law 

considerations, since the Act speaks directly to who, and who does not, owe fiduciary duties in 

the particular and specific context of manager-managed limited liability companies. See 

Katris, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 1144-45. While an officer of a corporation may well be tagged with 

fiduciary duties, our legislature has created limited liability companies and given them the 

power, through the Act and in conjunction with an operating agreement and other documents, 

to direct themselves as they see fit. In the instant cause, plaintiff was formed under the Act and 

governed by its unanimously adopted Operating Agreement, which specifically placed all 

power, and duties owed, in the hands of its manager—not in any members nor in any officers. 

As clarified in the Certificate, defendant was not the manager nor even a member. That he held 

the title of vice president, then, is irrelevant. Pursuant to the Act, the Operating Agreement, and 

the Certificate, defendant owed no fiduciary duties to plaintiff. 

¶ 38 The evidence plaintiff points to in support of its claim that defendant’s title imposed 

fiduciary duties is wholly unavailing. As noted earlier, in order to defeat defendant’s motion 

for summary judgment, although plaintiff was not required to prove its case, it was required to 

present some factual basis to support it. See CitiMortgage, Inc., 2015 IL App (1st) 140780, 

¶ 19; Morrissey, 404 Ill. App. 3d at 724 (“nonmoving party must present a bona fide factual 

issue and not merely general conclusions of law”). The only evidence plaintiff presented was 

defendant’s title as vice president, that portion of the Operating Agreement stating that he was 

in charge of plaintiff’s “day to day operations,” and select snippets of defendant’s deposition. 

However, we have already discussed that defendant’s title is irrelevant here; the Act makes 

clear that the manager of a manager-managed limited liability company, not its officers nor 

even its members, are responsible for any fiduciary duties, and the Operating Agreement 

solidified this with respect to plaintiff in particular in this cause. Moreover, we have also 

already noted that, while plaintiff handily cites that portion of the Operating Agreement stating 

that defendant was charged with the “day to day operations” of plaintiff as an officer, it 

conveniently ignores the remainder of that section, which specifies he does this only “[s]ubject 

to the policies and objectives prescribed by the Managing Member.” Contrary to the picture 

plaintiff attempts to paint, the entirety of section 5.9 of the Operating Agreement certifies that 

defendant had no free rein in any respect as vice president to control plaintiff; the Operating 

Agreement charged him with carrying out exactly, and only, what the manager ordered. 

¶ 39 The same is true with respect to those portions of defendant’s deposition plaintiff 

highlights, of which we feel the need to make special mention here. That is, plaintiff cites a few 

short phrases from defendant’s otherwise lengthy deposition testimony wherein his response to 

a general question of whether he believed he owed fiduciary duties to plaintiff was that he 
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believed his “role as an officer had some fiduciary responsibilities.” Plaintiff essentially hangs 

its hat on this one phrase. However, when defendant’s deposition is read as a whole, plaintiff’s 

presentation of his testimony becomes a prime example of evidentiary cherry-picking. 

¶ 40 The record reveals that, following that general deposition question cited by plaintiff, 

defendant was asked directly about what his precise fiduciary duties were as vice president. 

Defendant expressly responded that he had “[o]nly the authority that would be granted to [him] 

by the manager and the members.” When further pressed, he again stated that his only 

responsibilities were “[w]hatever duties were specifically outlined in the certificate of 

authority” and “[w]hatever the oral and written instructions were from the manager.” And, 

when asked if he believed he had a duty to do anything above and beyond what the manager 

authorized him to do, he expressly responded, “[n]o.” His deposition was clearly in line with 

his affidavit, in which he attested that he acted only as directed by plaintiff’s manager and all of 

its members. These repeated clarifications by defendant in his deposition testimony hardly 

incline us to interpret his cited statement, as plaintiff would otherwise have us, as an admission 

that he owed plaintiff fiduciary duties as its vice president. 

¶ 41 From all this, it is obvious that plaintiff’s claim that defendant owed it fiduciary duties by 

virtue of his title as vice president inherently fails and, thus, summary judgment in favor of 

defendant was appropriate. 

¶ 42 Plaintiff, however, goes on to allege that, apart from his title, defendant also owed it 

fiduciary duties because he exercised managerial control over the company. For this second 

contention, plaintiff relies on section 15-3(g)(3) of the Act, as well as certain portions of the 

record, to insist that, at the very least, its claim raised a question of fact for the trial court. 

However, this assertion is entirely incorrect. 

¶ 43 Before analyzing this second contention, we must note, as defendant does, that 

procedurally, plaintiff is actually prohibited from making this argument on appeal. That is, it is 

axiomatic that summary judgment motions are limited to the issues raised in the complaint, and 

a plaintiff cannot raise new issues not previously pled in its complaint in order to obtain, or 

defeat a motion for, summary judgment. See Filliung v. Adams, 387 Ill. App. 3d 40, 51-52 

(2008) (purpose of complaint is to crystallize issues in controversy; when ruling on motion for 

summary judgment, trial court looks to complaint to determine issues in controversy, and if 

party does not seek to amend with new issues, it cannot raise those issues later); accord 

Steadfast Insurance Co. v. Caremark Rx, Inc., 373 Ill. App. 3d 895, 900 (2007) (“A party 

cannot seek summary judgment on a theory that was never pled in the complaint.”). 

¶ 44 Here, in its operative (fourth amended) complaint, plaintiff never asserted that defendant 

owed it fiduciary duties based on any alleged managerial control he exercised over it. Rather, 

the record is clear that plaintiff only, and exclusively, claimed that defendant owed it fiduciary 

duties because he held the title of vice president. In count I, the sole count directed against 

defendant, plaintiff simply states that defendant “as the vice president of Plaintiff[ ] owed 

fiduciary duties to Plaintiff.” With respect to any allegations of fiduciary duty owed based on 

managerial control, plaintiff did briefly assert these in its complaint—but only against 

Gouletas, when it alleged that Gouletas “as *** control person of Plaintiff[ ] owed fiduciary 

duties to Plaintiff.” Also, like its complaint, plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment 

only argued that defendant owed a fiduciary duty to his employer (plaintiff) because he was a 
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corporate officer (vice president).8Instead, it was not until plaintiff responded to defendant’s 

motion for summary judgment that it first raised this concept of fiduciary duties owed due to 

managerial control specifically as against defendant. Thus, having not properly raised an 

allegation against defendant of his liability based on his alleged managerial control, plaintiff 

cannot argue it now on appeal. See Filliung, 387 Ill. App. 3d at 51-52; Steadfast, 373 Ill. App. 

3d at 900. 

¶ 45 However, even were we to address plaintiff’s alternative theory here, we would find that it 

cannot stand, as the evidence it presents in support of this allegation regarding defendant’s 

alleged managerial control would not have precluded summary judgment. 

¶ 46 In support for its assertion, plaintiff redirects us to section 15-3(g) of the Act. Glossing past 

that subsection we have already discussed, which states that a member who is not also a 

manager does not owe a fiduciary duty to a limited liability company (805 ILCS 

180/15-3(g)(1) (West 2014)), plaintiff cites subsection (g)(3), which states that “a member 

who exercises some or all of the authority of a manager” may be held to owe a fiduciary duty to 

that company. 805 ILCS 180/15-3(g)(3) (West 2014). Then, plaintiff again references the same 

snippets of defendant’s deposition testimony, a statement from its new representative Cadle, 

and the same portion of section 5.9 of the Operating Agreement stating that he was to 

“establish operating procedures for, and administer and direct, the day-to-day operations” of 

plaintiff to argue that it sufficiently demonstrated to the trial court facts supporting that 

defendant exercised managerial control over it under this subsection. However, plaintiff’s 

claim still misses the mark. 

¶ 47 Plaintiff is correct that subsection (g)(3) of section 15-3 of the Act allows, for lack of a 

better term, an exception to the rules that in a manager-managed limited liability company, 

only the manager owes fiduciary duties. Essentially, subsection (g)(3) states that fiduciary 

duties can be imposed on someone else. However, that someone else, as this subsection 

specifies, must be “a member who exercises some or all of the authority of a manager.” 805 

ILCS 180/15-3(g)(3) (West 2014). Accordingly, this person must, first, be a member and, 

second, exercise the same control and authority as the manager. 

¶ 48 While this is an interesting legal concept, it does not apply to the instant cause. Contrary to 

plaintiff’s insistence, before we even get to an examination of whether defendant exercised 

some or all of the same managerial control as plaintiff’s manager, we cannot forget that 

defendant was not, nor ever has been, a member of plaintiff. The record makes this clear, and 

plaintiff never disputes this. Therefore, section 15-3(g)(3) is inapplicable.

¶ 49 Moreover, even were we to somehow, and for whatever unfathomable notion, be able to 

construe him as a member, we cannot say that plaintiff raised a genuine issue of material fact 

demonstrating that he exercised the required managerial control described in section 

15-3(g)(3) so as to hold him responsible for any fiduciary duties. The only evidence plaintiff 

provides in support of this is the same evidence it cited for its former proposition regarding 

defendant’s title as vice president—the same evidence we have already found to be unavailing. 

 

8Although the introductory paragraph of plaintiff’s motion stated that defendant owed it a fiduciary 

duty because he was a vice president “who exercised managerial control over numerous aspects” of the 

company, the actual allegations it argued in the body of that motion center solely on his title, and the 

only count therein claims solely that defendant is liable for breaching his fiduciary duties “as vice 

president.”
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There is no need for us to again go over its same selectively chosen (and partial) quotations 

from defendant’s deposition nor the same conveniently cherry-picked phrases from the 

Operating Agreement which plaintiff presents as its indication of defendant’s managerial 

control. And, its additional citations to statements from Cadle’s deposition do little to turn the 

tide here. Cadle, the representative for plaintiff’s new manager DJV upon Gouletas’s ouster, 

testified that, while it was known that Gouletas was plaintiff’s manager, defendant “acted as 

and ran most of [Gouletas’s] companies.” Yet, we fail to see the impact here. Cadle never 

provided any documentary evidence to support his testimony. Nor was he a manager or 

member of plaintiff, or any Gouletas company, during defendant’s tenure as plaintiff’s vice 

president. Also, the record reveals that it was widely known among all of Gouletas’s 

companies, and specifically among all of plaintiff’s members, that defendant was not only 

plaintiff’s vice president but he held different roles in other companies owned and managed by 

Gouletas; no one ever disputed this. And, most critically, even accepting Cadle’s statement 

that defendant “ran” other Gouletas-related companies, this is no indication that defendant 

“ran,” or in any way exercised managerial control, over plaintiff specifically. To the contrary, 

we have already discussed at length that plaintiff’s own Operating Agreement and Certificate 

directly refute that suggestion. And, in addition to defendant’s own deposition testimony and 

affidavit, there are the affidavits of Gouletas (plaintiff’s manager) and May (plaintiff-member 

RCI’s agent). Both of them stated that defendant was never granted the status of manager in 

any respect and could only act with the unanimous approval of plaintiff’s manager and 

members. They corroborated that defendant had absolutely no managerial authority. 

¶ 50 Accordingly, and just like its initial claim regarding defendant’s title as vice president, it is 

clear that plaintiff’s new and alternative assertion that defendant is liable for fiduciary duties 

stemming from his alleged managerial control over plaintiff was properly disposed of via 

summary judgment. 

¶ 51 Our determination on both these fronts is expressly supported by Katris, a case we find to 

be directly on point, despite some minor factual differences. In Katris, four men—Doherty, 

Szlendak, Hamburg, and Katris—formed a manager-managed limited liability company, like 

plaintiff here, named Viper Execution Systems, L.L.C. (Viper), with the purpose of adopting 

and executing a computer software program Doherty had written. Hamburg and Katris were 

the company’s sole managers, and Doherty and Szlendak were members. They unanimously 

adopted an operating agreement, which stated that the company’s business affairs were to be 

managed exclusively by its managers. The operating agreement also enumerated the rights and 

obligations of its members. No provision of the operating agreement gave the members 

(Doherty and Szlendak) any managerial authority. The four men then elected Hamburg as the 

company’s chief executive officer, Katris as its chief financial officer, Szlendak as its director 

of marketing, and Doherty as its director of technical services. Katris, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 

1142-43. 

¶ 52 Doherty, meanwhile, was working as an independent contractor for another company, 

Ernst & Company (Ernst), also involving computer programming tasks. He was eventually 

hired to work there with employee Patrick Carroll, and as part of his duties for that company, 

he collaborated with a programmer to adapt a software program, which turned out to be very 

similar to the one he had developed for Viper. Katris, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 1143. 

¶ 53 Just as in the instant cause, Katris brought suit against Doherty for breach of fiduciary 

duties and against Doherty, Carroll, and Ernst for collusion. Katris claimed that Doherty had 
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usurped a corporate opportunity belonging to Viper (by effectively “stealing” the software 

program and giving it to Ernst) and that Carroll and Ernst colluded with Doherty to breach his 

fiduciary duties to Viper. Doherty eventually settled with Katris, leaving only the collusion 

claim as against Carroll and Ernst. Carroll and Ernst moved for summary judgment, asserting 

that Katris’s collusion claim must fail because Doherty, as a nonmanager-member of the 

manager-managed Viper, did not owe Katris or Viper a fiduciary duty and, thus, they could not 

have colluded with him to breach it. Katris countered that, by virtue of Doherty’s title as 

director of technology and his work as such, he had the sole managerial responsibility under 

the operating agreement for adapting the software for Viper and thus, under the Act, he was 

subject to the same standards as a manager and owed fiduciary duties. The trial court, just as 

the trial court herein, granted Carroll and Ernst’s motion for summary judgment. Katris, 362 

Ill. App. 3d at 1143-44. 

¶ 54 On appeal, we affirmed. At the outset, we noted that this cause depended upon a finding 

that Doherty owed Katris and Viper a fiduciary duty. Katris, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 1144. To 

determine this, we turned immediately to section 15-3(g) of the Act. Katris, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 

1144 (limited liability companies are creatures of statute and governed by the Act). Katris 

conceded that Doherty did not owe Viper any fiduciary duties solely by reasons of being a 

member of the company; he acknowledged that section 15-3(g)(1) made clear that a member of 

a manager-managed limited liability company owes no such duties in that capacity. Katris, 362 

Ill. App. 3d at 1144. Katris, however, much as plaintiff herein, cited section 15-3(g)(3), 

contending that Doherty exercised some of the authority of a manager in his capacity as 

director of technology for Viper and, thus, qualified as a “ ‘member who pursuant to the 

operating agreement exercises some or all of the authority of a manager in the management and 

conduct of the company’s business’ ” so as to make him liable. Katris, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 

1144-45 (quoting 805 ILCS 180/15-3(g)(3) (West 2002)). 

¶ 55 Looking at the plain language of section 15-3(g)(3), we disagreed. We noted that the Act 

permitted a limited liability company to enter into an operating agreement to regulate the 

company and govern the relations among its members, which Viper had done. Katris, 362 Ill. 

App. 3d at 1145. In that operating agreement, which controlled the matter, it specifically 

provided that Viper’s business and affairs were to be managed solely by its managers 

(Hamburg and Katris), and no provision provided for any managerial authority to extend to its 

members (Szlendak and Doherty). Katris, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 1145. Pursuant to the operating 

agreement, then, Doherty did not exercise any managerial authority. Katris, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 

1145. 

¶ 56 Additionally, we further examined Katris’s assertion that, apart from his title as director of 

technology, Doherty otherwise exercised managerial control which made him liable for 

fiduciary duties owed. For example, we noted that Katris had enumerated in an affidavit all the 

ways he believed Doherty allegedly exercised such managerial authority over Viper. However, 

our court, made clear that, under section 15-3(g), we were bound to the contents of the 

operating agreement. Katris, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 1146-47 (“To look beyond the operating 

agreement to Katris’ affidavit would be to ignore the plain meaning of the statute and to render 

the express words used therein superfluous or meaningless. This we cannot do.”). And, as a 

member who was explicitly not granted any managerial authority under that operating 

agreement, Doherty could owe no fiduciary duties to Viper or Katris, and in turn, Katris’s 

collusion claim against Carroll and Ernst necessarily failed. Katris, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 1147. 
- 15 - 

¶ 57 The instant cause mirrors Katris in several important respects and merits the same result. 

First, defendant’s title as vice president, just as Doherty’s title as director of technology, is 

meaningless with respect to fiduciary duties. This is because, just as Viper, plaintiff was a 

manager-managed limited liability company governed by the Act that adopted an operating 

agreement providing that its manager maintained sole and exclusive authority to manage and 

conduct its business. Just as Doherty, defendant was not that manager. Moreover, and just as 

we additionally found with Doherty, defendant here was not a “member who pursuant to the 

operating agreement exercises some or all of the authority of a manager in the management and 

conduct of the company’s business” so as to make him liable under section 15-3(g)(3) of the 

Act. As we have discussed at length, the evidence presented proves otherwise: section 5.9 of 

the Operating Agreement and the Certificate relegated defendant to perform his assigned tasks 

subject entirely to the behest of plaintiff’s manager and only upon his resolutions, and the 

affidavits of defendant, Gouletas, and May, along with defendant’s deposition testimony that 

he had no managerial authority, remained unrebutted by plaintiff. Interestingly, in Katris, 

Doherty was actually a member of Viper, and yet, our court still found he owed no fiduciary 

duty to the company under section 15-3(g)(3). Here, we are even one step removed; defendant 

was neither the manager nor a member of plaintiff. 

¶ 58 Plaintiff counters the clear applicability of Katris to the instant cause with a citation to 

Tully v. McLean, 409 Ill. App. 3d 659 (2011), a case that is wholly distinguishable. Briefly, in 

Tully, a member of a member-managed limited liability company brought suit for fraud and 

breach of fiduciary duty against the company, the original member-manager, the successor 

member-manager, two other members, and the former property manager. After a bench trial, 

the trial court awarded the plaintiff-member over $4 million in damages, and our court 

affirmed. We did so because, not only did we find that the defendants’ business conduct was 

flagrant and in willful disregard of the plaintiff’s rights as a member but also, and significantly, 

because, based on the facts, the fiduciary relationship between the plaintiff and the defendants 

in this member-managed company could not be denied. Tully, 409 Ill. App. 3d at 682-83. We 

pointed out that, while “[n]ormal trust between contracting parties does not turn a contractual 

relationship into a fiduciary one,” the “trust” between the parties in Tully was “more than 

normal trust.” Tully, 409 Ill. App. 3d at 683 (“The essence of a fiduciary relationship is that one 

party is dominated by another; the presence of a significant degree of dominance and 

superiority.”). Specific to that cause, there was a huge degree of control exercised among the 

parties during their business relationship, as the plaintiff was completely dependent upon the 

defendants to run the company and had given up all control to the defendants, and the 

defendants—the fiduciaries—participated in a complex “web” of schemes that siphoned 

money away from the company and its members for many years. Tully, 409 Ill. App. 3d at 683. 

¶ 59 Tully is inapposite here, and plaintiff’s reliance on it is misplaced. Unlike that case, the 

instant cause does not deal with a member-managed limited liability company nor with a 

member at all. More critically, the dominance and superiority exhibited in Tully are not 

remotely found herein. Unlike those defendants, defendant in the instant cause was simply an 

officer, one who specifically was not in control of any facet of the company. As we have 

discussed, he had no power to do anything without the direction of the manager; by the Act, 

plaintiff’s own Operating Agreement and the Certificate, his hands were tied. And, in direct 

contrast to Tully, plaintiff was not at all dependent on defendant to run the company; that duty 

fell directly, and solely, to its manager who governed the business as well as the contents and 
- 16 - 

duration of defendant’s employment as its officer. Thus, we find no reason to depart from our 

holding in Katris, which, unlike Tully, is completely applicable here. 

¶ 60 Ultimately, the evidence clearly demonstrates that defendant acted within the Act, the 

Operating Agreement, and the Certificate. Accordingly, we find that summary judgment in his 

favor was proper since, because he had no managerial authority, via his title or otherwise, he 

could not have owed any fiduciary duties to plaintiff. 

¶ 61 II. No Breach of Fiduciary Duty 

¶ 62 Although it found that defendant owed no fiduciary duty to plaintiff, the trial court in the 

instant cause extended its holding to state that, even if he did owe such a duty, summary 

judgment in his favor was still warranted because the evidence “overwhelmingly supports that 

there was not a breach.” 

¶ 63 Plaintiff contends that this was incorrect in two respects. First, it claims that defendant 

breached his fiduciary duty by purposely diverting the parking garage option away from 

plaintiff and to RCC, thereby stripping plaintiff of this asset, taking the collateral from its 

second mortgage, and leaving plaintiff owing on this mortgage without any way of repaying it. 

Second, it claims that defendant breached his fiduciary duty by underhandedly trading out the 

marina from the River City Complex deal for no compensation. Plaintiff asserts that the 

evidence it presented in regards to these claims raised a question of fact that the trial court 

should have addressed. 

¶ 64 However, we find, based on the evidence presented, that even if, counter to our finding, 

defendant did owe plaintiff a fiduciary duty (either as its vice president or because he exercised 

managerial control), the evidence does not remotely demonstrate that he breached that duty 

and, thus, summary judgment was proper. 

¶ 65 To state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, a plaintiff must set forth facts showing that a 

fiduciary relationship existed between the parties, that the defendant breached the fiduciary 

duty, and that the breach proximately caused the injury of which the plaintiff complains. Neade 

v. Portes, 193 Ill. 2d 433, 444 (2000). A fiduciary relationship imposes upon the fiduciary a 

general duty not to obtain self-benefits during the relationship. Neade, 193 Ill. 2d at 440. For 

example, and relevant to the instant cause, the fiduciary is obligated to first disclose potential 

opportunities to the company and is prohibited from taking advantage of business 

opportunities that belong to the company. Goldberg v. Michael, 328 Ill. App. 3d 593, 599 

(2002). Such opportunities are ones in which the company has the capacity to engage and are 

reasonably incident to the company’s present or future business prospects. Anest v. Audino, 

332 Ill. App. 3d 468, 478 (2002). 

¶ 66 With respect to the parking garage option, defendant, assuming he owed a fiduciary duty to 

plaintiff, did not breach that duty, for various reasons. First, the parking garage option was not 

an opportunity in which plaintiff had the opportunity to engage. As noted earlier, plaintiff’s 

Operating Agreement stated that it “shall engage in no other business until such time as the 

First Mortgage and Second Mortgage *** have been repaid in full.” At the time WRT became 

interested in purchasing plaintiff’s commercial space but not the parking garage, plaintiff had 

two mortgages—one with Parkway Bank and a second with CIB Bank. When WRT proposed 

the consent foreclosure and the idea of an option to purchase the parking garage, this deal, as 

all the parties agree, was with respect to the first mortgage only. Following the consent 

foreclosure, then, plaintiff was still in debt; the second mortgage it owed to CIB Bank was still 
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alive, and plaintiff was in default on it. Therefore, pursuant to its own Operating Agreement, 

plaintiff could not engage in any business—including obtaining the parking garage option. 

¶ 67 Moreover, defendant did not divert the parking garage option from plaintiff because, 

contrary to plaintiff’s insistence, the option in no way was reasonably incident to its business 

prospects. This rests directly upon the contents and meaning of Px1, the document prepared by 

WRT. In Px1, WRT wrote that it would “grant the borrower (or another group) the option to 

buy the indoor 133 parking spaces.” But Px1 was never signed nor dated by WRT or anyone 

else, and it never specified what entities were involved in the potential option agreement. 

Indeed, when plaintiff sued River City Parking, which eventually acquired the parking garage 

via a written option with WRT, for aiding and abetting defendant’s alleged breach of fiduciary 

duties, the trial court granted River City Parking’s motion to dismiss. The court specifically 

found that Px1 was never a firm agreement between plaintiff and WRT for the option but, 

rather, only “a term sheet that indicates further discussion is necessary” and one that did not 

grant anyone—let alone plaintiff—the sole option to purchase. See 800 South Wells 

Commercial, LLC v. Gouletas, No. 11-L-2895 (Cir. Ct. Cook County, July 11, 2014). Plaintiff 

never appealed this determination. See Perik v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2015 IL App 

(1st) 132245, ¶ 30 (resolution of issue in prior appeal becomes binding and controlling, 

regardless of whether it is question of law or fact). Likewise, in his deposition testimony in the 

instant cause, plaintiff’s own representative Cadle, when specifically asked about the option 

agreement, admitted that Px1 was never signed by anyone, did not specify it was between 

certain companies, and critically, that its phrase “we will grant the borrower or another group 

the option” to purchase did not necessarily mean plaintiff. From all this, it is clear that that the 

parking garage option never even belonged to plaintiff and, thus, defendant could not have 

breached a fiduciary duty with respect to it. 

¶ 68 The same is true regarding the marina. The evidence presented in this cause clearly 

indicates that defendant did not breach any fiduciary duties with respect to the marina because 

there were no business opportunities relative to the marina which defendant could have 

breached. As indicated at the outset of our decision here, the River City Complex, which 

started this all, was an area made up of five components: an apartment complex, the 

commercial space, a surface parking lot, the parking garage, and the marina. Just as the 

apartment complex and the surface parking lot, the marina was not intended to be part of 

plaintiff’s assets. Pursuant to its Operating Agreement, plaintiff was specifically formed with 

the purpose of obtaining a leasehold interest in “the Property.” The Operating Agreement 

explicitly defined “the Property” as “the property located at 800 South Wells Street, Chicago, 

Illinois, generally consisting of approximately 240,000 square feet of net rentable commercial 

space and approximately 130 indoor parking spaces in the building located on the Property.” 

The marina clearly was never intended to be included as part of the property that plaintiff was 

meant to obtain. This is further supported by the Certificate, which was unanimously issued by 

plaintiff’s manager and members to effectuate the Complex deal. The record indicates that, 

originally, the lease negotiated between plaintiff and Invesco (which owned the Complex) 

included rights to the marina. However, that lease was amended by plaintiff’s manager and 

members to separate out the marina and remove it from the deal, thereby creating what the 

parties referred to as an amended lease. The Certificate then specifically ordered and directed 

defendant to approve the amendment to the lease and proceed with the deal—for the 

commercial space and parking garage (“the Property”) and without the inclusion of the marina. 
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Both May and Gouletas attested that defendant was directed to amend the initial lease to 

remove the marina pursuant to the unanimous vote of plaintiff’s manager and members. 

Therefore, and without more on plaintiff’s part here to rebut this evidence, we fail to see how 

defendant could be said to have breached his fiduciary duty with respect to a marina plaintiff 

was never intended to possess in any legal form. 

¶ 69 The fact remains that neither the parking garage option nor the marina were business 

opportunities legitimately available or intended for plaintiff to pursue, such that defendant 

somehow breached a fiduciary duty with respect to them. Even if they were, there is no 

evidence in the record to show that defendant failed to disclose these to plaintiff or that he 

derived personal gain from his alleged diversion of them away from plaintiff. See, e.g., 

Goldberg, 328 Ill. App. 3d at 599; Elward v. Peabody Coal Co., 121 Ill. App. 2d 298, 307 

(1970) (these factors indicate improper usurpation of business opportunities). To the contrary, 

May and Gouletas attested that plaintiff—its manager and all its members—unanimously 

voted to exclude the marina from its dealings and knew that defendant was discussing the 

parking garage option on behalf of both plaintiff, which eventually told defendant not to obtain 

it, and RCC, which eventually did obtain it. Add to this defendant’s testimony that he 

discussed these things with plaintiff’s counsel and never obtained any personal benefit from 

them, along with that section of plaintiff’s Operating Agreement, which prohibited any officer 

from receiving “any compensation” for his services to plaintiff, and we find that there is no 

evidence showing that defendant, if he owed any, breached a fiduciary duty here. 

¶ 70 CONCLUSION 

¶ 71 Having found no evidentiary basis to demonstrate that defendant owed plaintiff any 

fiduciary duty or, alternatively, that he breached such a duty, we hold that summary judgment 

in favor of defendant here was proper. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

¶ 72 Affirmed.