NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

JOSEPH OTONEL MANZANARES, JR., Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 15-0753

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County

No. S8015CR201400420

The Honorable Billy K. Sipe, Judge Pro Tempore

REVERSED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Jana Zinman

Counsel for Appellee

Law Office of Daniel De Rienzo PLLC, Prescott Valley

By Daniel J. DeRienzo

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. MANZANARES

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Andrew W. Gould delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Peter B. Swann and Judge Patricia A. Orozco (Retired) joined.

G O U L D, Judge:

¶1 Appellant Joseph Manzanares appeals the superior court’s 

denial of his motion to suppress. For the reasons discussed below, we 

reverse the court’s order denying the motion to suppress. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

¶2 Officers were dispatched to an apartment in response to a 

report that two male subjects, one of them armed with a gun, had entered 

the apartment. The report stated the men had chased an individual from 

the apartment; they were still armed and pursuing the individual in the 

area.

¶3 Officers arrived at the apartment at approximately 4:00 a.m.;

Manzanares and Jiana Chambers were sitting outside. Manzanares told the 

officers he was spending the night at the apartment and had been sleeping 

in a back bedroom when he heard a knock at the front door. In response to 

the knock Christopher Bowen, who lived at the apartment, answered the 

door. After hearing a scuffle, Manzanares got up and saw Bowen running 

past him being chased by two men. One of the men pointed a gun at 

Manzanares and threatened to kill him.

¶4 Chambers stated that she was in the bathroom when two men

with guns kicked in the door. One of the men pointed a gun at her, told her 

he was looking for Bowen, and stated he was going to kill Bowen. 

¶5 Both Manzanares and Chambers told the officers that Bowen 

had fled from the apartment by jumping off the rear balcony, and that the 

gunmen had run out the front door chasing him. 

 

1 “In reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we view 

the facts in the light most favorable to upholding its ruling.” State v. Moreno, 

236 Ariz. 347, 349, ¶ 2 (App. 2014) (citation omitted).
STATE v. MANZANARES

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3

¶6 The officers performed a protective sweep of the apartment to 

determine if Bowen or the gunmen were still inside; the apartment, 

however, was empty. While several officers started canvassing the area 

looking for Bowen and the gunmen, three officers began searching the 

apartment; the officers were looking for “any form of evidence to link us to 

the gunmen or just anything; any form of evidence what-so-ever (sic) to 

find out who these people were.”

¶7 The officers searched the apartment for approximately fortyfive minutes to an hour. Manzanares and Chambers were not allowed 

inside the apartment during the search.

¶8 While the officers were conducting their search, they heard a 

cell phone vibrating on the floor behind the front door. One of the officers 

asked Manzanares to call Bowen’s cell number to determine whether the 

phone belonged to Bowen. However, when Manzanares called Bowen’s 

number, the phone did not ring.

¶9 During the search, the officers found a cell phone box on the 

floor under the kitchen table; the box appeared to be for the same make and 

model cell phone as the cell phone they found behind the door. Searching 

for identifying information regarding the cell phone, one of the officers

opened the box.2 When he looked inside, he observed heroin, 

methamphetamine, and several items of drug paraphernalia.3

¶10 The search of the apartment ended when Bowen called 

dispatch, advising the police he was safe. The officers then obtained a

search warrant for the apartment; they based their probable cause for the 

warrant solely on the illegal drugs found in the cell phone box. During this 

subsequent warrant search, officers found illegal drugs and drug 

paraphernalia in a laptop case in a bedroom. Based on the contents of the 

laptop case, Manzanares was charged with four counts of possession of 

narcotic drugs for sale, one count of possession of dangerous drugs for sale, 

 

2 The officer testified that while he was in the apartment, he 

determined the phone on the floor belonged to Bowen. He made this 

determination when Manzanares called Bowen’s number a second time, 

and the phone rang. However, the officer could not recall if this occurred 

before or after he opened the cell phone box. 

3 At trial, Bowen testified that the cell phone box and its contents were 

his.
STATE v. MANZANARES

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and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. Bowen was charged as 

a co-defendant on four of the counts.

¶11 Manzanares filed a motion to suppress the cell phone box, its 

contents, and the items seized from the laptop during the execution of the 

search warrant, arguing these items were obtained pursuant to an illegal 

search. The superior court denied the motion on the grounds (1)

Manzanares lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in the cell phone 

box, and (2) exigent circumstances justified the search of the apartment and 

cell phone box.

4

¶12 Following a jury trial, Manzanares was convicted of 

possession of narcotic drugs for sale, possession of dangerous drugs for 

sale, possession of drug paraphernalia, and three (lesser-included) counts 

of possession of narcotic drugs. Manzanares timely appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶13 Manzanares argues the superior court erred in denying his 

motion to suppress because (1) as an overnight guest he had a legitimate 

expectation of privacy in the apartment, which extended to the cell phone 

box, and (2) the officers’ search of the apartment, including the box, was not 

justified on the grounds of exigent circumstances. Moreover, Manzanares 

contends that regardless of his lack of possessory interest in the box and its 

contents, the items obtained pursuant to the search warrant should be 

suppressed because they are “fruit of the poisonous tree.”

¶14 We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress for 

an abuse of discretion. State v. Peterson, 228 Ariz. 405, 408, ¶ 6 (App. 2011) 

(citations omitted). We consider only the evidence before the court at the 

suppression hearing, and defer to the court’s factual findings that are 

supported by the record and are not clearly erroneous. State v. Estrada, 209 

Ariz. 287, 288, ¶ 2 (App. 2004). However, we review the trial court’s legal 

conclusions de novo, including whether there was a Fourth Amendment 

violation. Id. 

 

4 The superior court noted, in passing, that by calling 9-1-1, 

Manzanares and Chambers impliedly consented to a search of the 

apartment. However, the State did not argue that the search was justified 

based on implied consent, and it has not raised this issue on appeal. We 

therefore do not reach this issue. 
STATE v. MANZANARES

Decision of the Court

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I. Expectation of Privacy 

¶15 The Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable 

searches is personal, and can be invoked only by a defendant with a 

“legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.” State v. Peoples, 

240 Ariz. 245, 248, ¶ 8 (2016) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978)); 

see also U.S. Const. amend. IV. In Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990), the 

United States Supreme Court held that “an overnight guest has a legitimate 

expectation of privacy in his host’s home,” and that a defendant’s “status 

as an overnight guest is alone enough to show that he had an expectation 

of privacy.” Id. at 96-98; see Peoples, 240 Ariz. at 250, ¶ 18 (holding that an 

overnight guest has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the host’s home). 

¶16 The State concedes that Manzanares was an overnight guest. 

The record also shows that Manzanares was an overnight guest. Officers 

located Manzanares at Bowen’s apartment at 4:00 a.m., and Manzanares 

told the officers that he was spending the night in a back bedroom.

¶17 Therefore, based on his status as an overnight guest, 

Manzanares had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment. The 

State argues, however, that even as an overnight guest, Manzanares had no 

legitimate expectation of privacy in the cell phone box.

¶18 We conclude the superior court erred in focusing on 

Manzanares’ expectation of privacy in the box, as opposed to the 

apartment. Here, the dispositive issue is whether the officers were lawfully 

present in the apartment to conduct a search. If the officers did not have 

the right to be in the apartment, they did not have the right to search the 

box—or any other place or container in the apartment. Accordingly, 

Manzanares had a legitimate expectation of privacy to challenge the 

search.5 

 

5 Although it is not the dispositive issue in this case, we note that 

Manzanares did not possess a privacy interest in every box and container 

in the apartment based solely on his status as an overnight guest. Indeed, 

an overnight guest’s expectation of privacy generally extends only to those 

areas over which he has control. Cf. State v. Apelt, 176 Ariz. 349, 363-64 

(1993) (stating that although the defendant, who stayed at the victim’s 

apartment, had a privacy interest in the apartment as a whole, he had no 

standing to challenge the search of a third party’s bag and camera inside 

the apartment); see also United States v. Davis, 332 F.3d 1163, 1169-70 (9th Cir. 
STATE v. MANZANARES

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II. Exigent Circumstances

¶19 Manzanares concedes that the officers’ initial entry and 

protective sweep of the apartment was justified. However, Manzanares

argues that the officers’ search of the apartment after the protective sweep 

was finished was not “strictly circumscribed” to the exigent circumstance 

justifying their entry into the apartment. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 

393 (1978). We agree. 

¶20 A warrantless search of a home is presumptively 

unreasonable. Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (citation 

omitted). However, a warrantless entry is permissible based on exigent 

circumstances. See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459-60 (2011) (citations 

omitted); State v. Aguilar, 228 Ariz. 401, 403, ¶ 16 (App. 2011) (citation 

omitted) (stating warrantless entry into a dwelling is permissible based on 

probable cause and exigent circumstances).

¶21 “Arizona courts have explicitly enumerated the following 

circumstances as exigent within the spirit of the Fourth Amendment: (1) 

response to an emergency, (2) hot pursuit, (3) probability of destruction of 

evidence, (4) possibility of violence, or (5) knowledge that a suspect is 

fleeing or attempting to flee.” Aguilar, 228 Ariz. at 404, ¶ 16; see King, 563 

U.S. at 460 (stating that exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless 

search of a home include rendering emergency assistance to an injured 

occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent physical injury, hot 

pursuit of a fleeing suspect, and preventing the imminent destruction of 

evidence) (citations omitted). Police may seize any evidence that is in plain 

view during the course of the emergency entry. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 393; see 

State v. Hicks, 146 Ariz. 533, 534 (App. 1985) (stating officers entering home 

for exigent circumstances may only seize items in plain view). 

 

2003) (stating that apartment tenant lacked actual or apparent authority to 

consent to a search of an overnight guest’s gym bag located under the bed 

in the bedroom where the guest was staying); United States v. Haqq, 278 F. 

3d 44, 49-50 (2nd Cir. 2002) (holding that defendant, who was staying at his 

girlfriend’s apartment with four other people, had no expectation of 

privacy in a suitcase discovered during a protective sweep, where the 

bedroom was used by another person and the suitcase belonged to third 

party); United States v. Wilson, 536 F.2d 883, 885 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that 

a defendant, who was an overnight guest, lacked standing to challenge 

search of another person’s suitcase in the apartment).
STATE v. MANZANARES

Decision of the Court

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¶22 When officers enter a dwelling in response to exigent 

circumstances, the search must be “strictly circumscribed by the exigencies 

which justify its initiation.” Mincey, 437 U.S. at 393 (citation omitted) 

(holding warrantless search of defendant’s apartment where officer was 

shot was not justified because all of the occupants in the apartment at the 

time of the shooting had been located and, as a result, there was no longer 

an emergency); see also Murdock v. Stout, 54 F.3d 1437, 1442 (9th Cir. 1995) 

(abrogated on other grounds) (holding officers did not exceed scope of the 

exigency when they entered a house to check on possible unresponsive 

occupants; court held the search was justified because the police 

“conducted a brief search . . . to locate any occupant” who might have been 

in danger, and “immediately left the premises” when they identified the 

occupant); State v. Fisher, 141 Ariz. 227, 239 (1984) (abrogated on other 

grounds) (holding police actions were properly limited to the exigency 

when responding to possible homicide because they walked through the 

rooms of the house for no more than two minutes to make sure there was 

not another body, and then left). 

¶23 Here, the exigent circumstances justifying the initial entry had 

dissipated by the time the drugs in the cell phone were located. Specifically, 

after the officers conducted the protective sweep and determined that 

neither Bowen nor the gunmen were in the apartment, they continued to 

search the apartment for 45 minutes to an hour. It was during this extended 

search that the officers located the box and the drugs. This extended search 

was not “strictly circumscribed” to the exigent circumstance justifying the 

officers’ entry into the apartment. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 393; see State v. 

Siqueiros, 121 Ariz. 465, 467 (App. 1978) (holding officer was justified in 

entering apartment to render aid, but warrantless search of apartment to 

investigate possible homicide was not strictly circumscribed to the exigency 

because there was no longer an emergency in the apartment).

¶24 As a result, the superior court erred in determining the search 

was justified by exigent circumstances. 

¶25 Additionally, the search warrant obtained by the officers did 

not remove the taint of the illegal search. Generally, “evidence derived 

from an illegal search or seizure is ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ and should 

be suppressed.” State v. Richcreek, 187 Ariz. 501, 506 (1997) (citing Wong Sun 

v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)). Here, the information used to establish 

probable cause for the warrant was based solely on the contents of the cell 

phone box that were obtained during the illegal search. As a result, the 

evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant must also be suppressed. See 

State v. Gulbrandson, 184 Ariz. 46, 58 (1995) (citation omitted) (stating when 
STATE v. MANZANARES

Decision of the Court

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there is an illegal entry into a home followed by a search pursuant to a valid 

search warrant, evidence obtained by the search warrant “may be admitted 

at trial, provided the warrant was based on information legally obtained.”). 

CONCLUSION

¶26 Because Manzanares had a legitimate expectation of privacy 

in the apartment, and the officers’ search of the apartment was not justified 

by exigent circumstances, we reverse the superior court’s order denying his

motion to suppress.