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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

JOEL DORFMAN and S. DENNIS ROGERS 

TRUST,

Plaintiffs/Counter -Defendants,

and

180 PIERCE STREET CONDOMINIUM 

ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiff/Counter-DefendantAppellant,

UNPUBLISHED

September 26, 2017

v No. 333428

Oakland Circuit Court

PIERCE MARTIN LLC and TOWNHOUSE 

KITCHEN AND BAR LLC,

LC No. 2011-118450-CH

Defendants/CounterPlaintiffs/Third-Party PlaintiffsAppellees.

and

MARC SCAGLIONE and S. DENNIS ROGERS,

Third-Party Defendants-Appellants,

and

LAITH HANNA, IVANNA HANNA, MELISSA 

S. DORFMAN, SETH ROGERS, ANNA SACK, 

SHAINA STARK and LESLIE ROGERS,

Third-Party Defendants.

Before: BECKERING, P.J., and MARKEY and RIORDAN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.
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This appeal arises from a dispute between co-owners of a six-unit condominium project 

located at 180 Pierce Street in downtown Birmingham, Michigan. Four of the units are 

residential units and two are commercial units. The primary issue in this case is whether 

defendant Pierce Martin, LLC (hereafter “Pierce Martin”), which owned both of the commercial 

units, obtained the approval necessary to occupy and use part of the outdoor general common 

element space adjacent to one of its units for a commercial project it was developing. Appellants 

180 Pierce Street Condominium Association (hereafter, “the Association”), Marc Scaglione, and 

Dennis Rogers appeal from the May 26, 2016 final order dismissing defendants’ counterclaims 

and third-party claims. Appellants challenge two prior orders, one granting defendants’ joint 

motion for a directed verdict, and the other granting defendants’ joint motion for summary 

disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10)(no genuine issue of material fact, and moving party 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law). We affirm.

I. PERTINENT FACTS

The condominium building consists of two street-level commercial units of 

approximately 350 square feet each (Units 5 and 6), and four luxury residential units (Units 1 

through 4), each occupying its own floor above the commercial units. Administration, operation, 

and maintenance of the building falls to the Association, which is a non-profit corporation 

comprised of all the condominium’s co-owners with a Board of Directors (“the Board”) that is 

granted broad authority by the condominium documents1 to act on behalf of the Association. In 

July 2010, when events underlying this dispute began, Kousay (Casey) Askar owned Unit 1, but 

the unit was in foreclosure and an entity controlled by Enriko (Henry) Sasson had purchased the 

sheriff’s deed. Dennis Rogers owned Unit 2, Laith Hanna owned Unit 3, and Marc Scaglione 

owned Unit 4. Pierce Martin owned Units 5 and 6. At all times relevant to this appeal, 

Scaglione was president of the Board, and Hanna was its vice-president.

According to evidence presented at trial, Jeremy Sasson, his brother, Jordan, and his 

father, Henry (collectively “the Sassons”), met with Rogers in July 2010, and Scaglione and 

Hanna in August 2010 to discuss their plans for the two commercial units. The Sassons 

proposed exterior improvements to the units that included the expansion of Unit 5 to enclose a 

portion of general common element2 space that was at the time being used as a flowerbed. The 

 1 Pursuant to Michigan’s Condominium Act, MCL 559.101 et seq., the administration of a 

condominium project is governed by the condominium bylaws. MCL 559.153. “Bylaws are 

attached to the master deed and, along with the other condominium documents, the bylaws 

dictate the rights and obligations of a co-owner in the condominium. See MCL 559.103(9) and 

(10); MCL 559.108.” Tuscany Grove Ass’n v Peraino, 311 Mich App 389, 393; 875 NW2d 234 

(2015). In the instant case, “condominium documents” refers to the master deed, as amended, 

and the bylaws.

2 In addition to the residential and commercial units, the condominium project also consists of 

“common elements.” The master deed classifies common elements as limited (e.g., an owner’s 

balcony, an owner’s designated parking spaces), or general (e.g., the perimeter land, the parking

structure, the utilities used in common areas of the building). Each co-owner has an undivided 
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Sassons showed Rogers, Scaglione, and Hanna the same two sets of two sketches. Each set was 

comprised of a daytime and nighttime rendering; one set showed a red slanted awning covering 

the proposed expansion, and the other showed the same expansion with a black box-style 

awning. Rogers testified that the Sassons told him they were going to open a coffee shop, and he 

understood them to want to put up an awning under which their customers and the buildings’

residents could sit.

On August 19, 2010, the Sassons met with Hanna and Scaglione and showed them the 

renderings. Scaglione testified that he thought the Sassons were asking him whether he liked the 

black awning or the red one, and that he did not believe the Sassons were asking him to consider 

the expansion of Unit 5 onto a common element. Scaglione recalled there being no discussion of 

the Sassons seeking formal or informal approval from the Association to exclusively use and 

occupy the common element area, and that they did not offer to compensate him or any of the 

Association co-owners for their ownership interest in the common elements. Scaglione 

acknowledged on cross-examination that his memory of the meeting was “hazy” or “foggy”; in 

fact, he said that he did not have an independent memory of the month in which the meeting took 

place, and testified, “I’ve come to learn that it was August, memorized the date . . . .” He also 

acknowledged that he had not retained in his files any of the early e-mails exchanged regarding 

the Sassons’ proposal, stating that he had deleted them after receiving them and that it had not 

seemed important to him at the time to keep them. Scaglione further acknowledged that the 

meeting took place during “the depths of the great recession,” at a time when vacancies in the 

neighborhood were up, real estate values were down by upwards of 50%, the two commercial 

spaces were empty, and Unit 5 was papered over.

The day after meeting with Hanna and Scaglione, Jeremy Sasson sent Rogers, Scaglione, 

and Hanna separate e-mails thanking them for the meeting and stating that he looked forward to 

working together “to accomplish this beautiful and dramatic building enhancement.” Attached 

to each e-mail were the four renderings. Later that same day, Hanna sent Scaglione and Rogers a 

short e-mail message comprised in part of a list of nine items. Included on the list was the 

observation that they would be losing approximately 300 square feet of landscaping “owned by 

the association.” Other items on the list included the need to provide a separate water meter for 

the retail spaces, what affect increasing the retail area would have on the common air 

conditioning usage, the need for an additional garbage pickup, landscaping, maintenance, snow 

removal, no service of alcohol unless approved by the Association, and the enterprises’ hours of 

operation. Hanna testified that the items on the list were things that he and Scaglione had 

discussed, and that Hanna thought he, Scaglione, and Rogers needed to discuss in a conference 

call. Scaglione characterized the list as “how the association would interact with the restaurant if 

this were to happen, the coffee shop, what’s become a restaurant now.” Rogers said he 

“probably” received the e-mail and thought it represented conditions to defendants’ use of Unit 

5. Rogers said that, to his knowledge, the Association never agreed to allow the sale and 

consumption of alcohol on the common element, and there had been no resolution of the nine 

items. Scaglione also testified that the Sassons did not “agree to give any of the items on the 

share in the general common elements determined by the percentage of value assigned to that coowner’s unit, and owns the general common elements as tenants in common with the other coowners.
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[August 20] list to the [A]ssociation in exchange for their approval.” He conceded on crossexamination that the Sassons fulfilled seven of the nine items on the list.

After receiving Hanna’s e-mail with the list, Rogers responded with his own email, 

stating,” “LAITH [HANNA], I WILL GO ALONG WITH WHATEVER YOU AND MARC 

AGREE ON.”

3

 Rogers acknowledged at trial that, based on this e-mail, if Hanna and Scaglione 

had agreed to anything, he would be “stuck with it.” He admitted that he took this position 

knowing that Hanna supported the project, and that it involved the loss of some landscaping and 

the potential sale of alcohol. He insisted, however, that Hanna and Scaglione did not reach an 

agreement with the Sassons on anything. Scaglione testified that he understood Rogers’ e-mail 

to give him and Hanna the authority to negotiate a deal with the Sassons “regarding the awning 

and the outdoor seating.” Hanna affirmed that when he received Rogers’ e-mail, he interpreted it 

as indicating that Rogers “didn’t have any problems. Whatever we decided, I decided. He gave 

me concession, go ahead.” Hanna further testified that, in addition to receiving Rogers’ e-mail, 

he ran into Rogers and his wife in the condominium’s garage and Rogers confirmed his support 

of the proposed improvements. 

Hanna testified that subsequent to his August 20, 2010 e-mail to Rogers and Scaglione, 

the three engaged in a 20- to 25-minute telephone conference call where they discussed the items 

on the list as well as noise, garbage, and an increase in the association fees paid by the 

commercial units. Neither Scaglione nor Rogers testified about this alleged conference call. 

Hanna said he did not recall much discussion about the list during the call, that Scaglione and 

Rogers were mainly concerned about lowering the Association’s expenses, and that they 

discussed increasing the fee assessments for the commercial units. He said that alcohol was 

mentioned, but no one pushed, focusing instead on increasing the commercial units’ association 

fees. According to Hanna, neither Scaglione nor Rogers objected to expansion of Unit 5. Hanna 

testified, “We verbally agreed about it right on the phone.”

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 3 Shortly thereafter, Rogers replied to an earlier e-mail sent by Jordan Sasson asking if Rogers, 

Hanna, and Scaglione had had their conference call and, if so, how it went. Rogers responded:

i just got a e-mail from laith [Hanna]. he wants to discuss. i told him I 

dont need to talk. i will agree to their position. if they say ok we are done. If 

they say no, my vote to approve is meaning.less [sic]. you need 48%. i have only 

24%. 

4 Hanna said that when Rogers later asserted that he had not approved the expansion, Hanna 

“was upset with [Rogers] calling me, telling me that I never approved this when here I’m talking 

to the man, conference with him, seeing him in the garage, approving it. And I was just thinking, 

what are you talking about? After all these months you told me yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, and I 

have no problem. So it just made me feel so bad. Why he’s saying totally something different of 

which you agreed with me.”
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On September 12, 2010, Hanna signed a document in his capacity as vice-president of the 

Association’s Board that stated:

180 Pierce Street Condominium Association hereby approves the 

improvements to Units 5 and 6 of the 180 Pierce Street Condominium Project to 

be constructed by Pierce Martin LLC substantially in accordance with the sketch 

and floor plan attached hereto as Exhibit A.

The Association has obtained all necessary approvals and consents of the 

Owners of the Units (and mortgagees if applicable) in the Condominium Project 

in accordance with the Master Deed dated July 15, 1999 and recorded on 

November 4, 1999 in Liber 20759, Page 480, Oakland County Records, as 

amended.

Attached as exhibit A were one of the renderings the Sassons had shown the co-owners and a 

schematic of the first floor showing the proposed expansion onto the common elements; Hanna 

initialed both attachments. Hanna said that Sasson provided him with color copies of all of the 

pages—the letter, the rendering, and the schematic—and he put copies in each owner’s mailbox 

both before and after he signed the letter and initialed the rendering and schematic. He said that 

when he called Scaglione before he signed the letter, he didn’t have any problem with it and that 

it was his understanding that Rogers didn’t have a problem either. Hanna said he read the letter 

to Scaglione and “[h]e says okay with me.” Hanna explained that when he signed the letter, he 

understood that defendants were going to improve Units 5 and 6 with a three-foot expansion and 

some canopies, and that the expansion was the one depicted on the attached rendering. Hanna 

testified that he signed the document because he understood that he had “a hundred percent 

approval from everyone.” Although Scaglione testified that he did not “authorize” Hanna to sign 

the September 12, 2010 letter and recommended that he have a lawyer look at it, he did not 

testify that he told Hanna not to sign it because he did not approve its contents. He affirmed that 

at his deposition he testified that he could not recall the conversation and would not refute 

Hanna’s account of it. Rogers was out of the county when Hanna signed the document.

Soon after obtaining the September 12, 2010 document, Pierce Martin applied to the City 

of Birmingham for a building permit. The City mailed notices of four public hearings held 

between October 6, 2010 and February 14, 2011 to all of the property owners and occupants 

located near the condominium address as well as to Rogers’ Florida address.5 The notice cards 

announced the subjects of the hearings as proposed exterior changes to the condominium 

building and review of the final site plan and special use permit “for 356 sq. ft. addition and 

outdoor seating.”

6

 According to their own testimony, neither Rogers,7 nor Scaglione, nor Joel 

Dorfman, who had purchased Unit 1 in November 2010, attended any of the meetings.

 5 Apart from two weeks in October 2011, Rogers lived primarily in Florida and rented his unit to 

a grandson. In 2012, Rogers began using the unit regularly as a summer home.

6 It is not clear whether the area actually measured 356 sq. ft., or whether the notice transposed 

the last two numbers. With the exception of Hanna’s approximation of 300 sq. ft. in his August 
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In January 2011, Rogers learned from a newspaper article that Jeremy Sasson planned to 

open and operate a restaurant and bar in the two commercial units. Subsequently, Rogers 

asserted in a series of e-mail messages that he did not approve of and would not support Sasson’s 

plan, and insinuated that Sasson had misled him regarding the nature of his project. On the day 

after the City of Birmingham approved Pierce Martin’s site plan on February 14, 2011, Rogers 

sent Hanna an e-mail stating that the City’s approval had “no bearing on our ownership”

expressing certainty that the City could not proceed without the co-owners’ approval and that the 

co-owners had not given their approval. Seeking to clarify the situation, Hanna responded with 

two e-mails indicating that all of the voting co-owners had consented to the outside expansion 

and seating for the bistro, and that the City had approved use of the space. In one email he stated 

specifically, “The expansion/addition was approved and signed by the Condominium 

Association on September 2nd [sic] after receiving consent from voting co-owners of the 

Association, which included you.” 

In April 2011, Dorfman and Rogers, through their attorney, demanded that Pierce Martin 

stop construction and restore the condominium to its former condition. When Pierce Martin did 

not respond, Dorfman and Rogers8 filed the underlying complaint and an emergency motion 

seeking a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction.9 They amended their 

complaint in September 2011 to add Townhouse Kitchen and Bar, LLC, as a defendant. The 

complaint alleged violations of Michigan’s Condominium Act, MCL 559.101 et seq. (Count I), 

violations of the condominium’s master deed and bylaws (Count II), and nuisance (Count III), 

and requested declaratory relief (Count IV). With respect to the latter, Dorfman and Rogers 

sought a ruling affirming their rights under the Condominium Act and the condominium 

documents, and stating that the co-owners had not approved defendants’ construction activity on 

the common elements or their intent to open a restaurant and bar in the commercial units.

20, 2010 e-mail, the parties consistently refer to the common elements at issue as measuring 365 

sq. ft.

7 Notwithstanding evidence presented at trial that Rogers’ Florida address was on the mailing list 

to receive notification of the public hearings, Rogers said that he did not receive any such 

notices. He also testified that he did not actively monitor developments while he was in Florida, 

but people would send him articles when they knew he was involved in a situation.

8 Rogers later executed a warranty deed conveying his interest in Unit 2 to the Revocable InterVivos Trust of Stephen D. Rogers, and in the spring of 2012 he successfully moved to substitute 

the trust as plaintiff in the action.

9 In their emergency motion, Dorfman and Rogers argued that defendants had misrepresented to 

the city that they had all the necessary approvals when in fact they did not because the co-owners 

had never formally discussed and voted on the project, as required by the condominium 

documents. Dorfman and Rogers observed that not only had they not approved the project, they 

had “repeatedly – and vehemently – opposed it.” Subsequent to a hearing on the matter, the trial 

court denied the motion without prejudice.
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Defendants’ occupation and use of the common elements at issue was a topic central to 

the Association’s next two annual meetings. At the Association’s 2011 annual meeting, Rogers 

proposed that the Association add a provision to the bylaws that would prohibit any owners, 

occupants, or “users” of Units 5 and 6 from selling, serving, or consuming alcohol “anywhere on 

the Condominium Premises.” Rogers and Dorfman voted in favor of the proposal, Scaglione and 

Hanna voted against it, and Sasson abstained; consequently, the proposal failed. Not long after 

the 2011 meeting, Rogers filed a complaint in a separate cause of action against the Association.

During the Association’s 2012 annual meeting, the Board unanimously approved and 

adopted four consent resolutions proposed by the Board president, Scaglione.

10 Of particular 

relevance is the second proposal, which purported to “immediately revoke[] any approval or 

permission claimed to have been given by the Corporation for the use of the General Common 

Elements South of the building (a formerly landscaped area) by the occupants of Units 5 & 6[.]” 

The proposal also demanded an immediate halt to “any commercial use, including but not 

limited to exclusive use and operation of a bar and restaurant[.]” In addition to this resolution, a 

motion was proposed to amend Article VI of the bylaws to prohibit the owners, tenants, 

occupants or other users of Unit 5 and 6 from selling, serving, or consuming alcohol “anywhere 

on the Condominium Common Elements South of Unit 5 (the formerly landscaped area).” This 

motion passed by a vote of four in favor and one (Sasson) opposed. The parties refer to this as 

the “second amendment.”

11 Shortly after this meeting, the Association and Rogers entered into a 

consent judgment that resolved Rogers’ suit against the Association. The Association then 

successfully moved to intervene in the instant case as a party plaintiff, adopting the allegations 

and requests for equitable relief that Dorfman and Rogers set forth in their first amended 

complaint, and adding a count for trespass and fraud/fraud in the inducement. Along with their 

answer and affirmative defenses, defendants filed a joint 15-count counterclaim and third-party 

complaint against Dorfman, Rogers, and several other individuals who were co-owners or related 

to co-owners of the condominium.

Over the next several months, the parties continued to engage in discovery and a vigorous 

motion practice. On April 4, 2013, plaintiffs moved to bifurcate the trial and for an immediate 

trial on the following issue: 

What approval, if any, were Defendants given to exclusively use and occupy 365 

square feet of real property located south of Unit 5 and was that approval

consistent with the Master Deed and Bylaws, as recorded in the Oakland County 

Records, as well as the Michigan Condominium Act.

 10 The record shows that at the 2012 annual meeting, in addition to returning Scaglione and 

Hanna to the Board as president and vice-president respectively, they elected Rogers as 

secretary-treasurer.

11 The first amendment of the bylaws is irrelevant to the instant appeal.
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The trial court granted the motion, and a six-day trial limited to the issue of “what approval, if 

any, was given for defendants’ use of the three hundred and sixty-five square feet of common 

area” began on June 17, 2013.

In addition to the foregoing testimony about certain key documents, Scaglione testified at 

trial that he expected to receive compensation and protection from liability for the Association’s 

approval of the awning and outdoor seating. He denied that he, Hanna, and the Sassons had 

agreed on anything that would have elicited his approval of the project, and stressed that the 

Sassons had not followed the procedures required to obtain the approval they sought. Scaglione 

stressed that he had never attended a meeting where he had voted to approve defendants’

exclusive use and occupation of the common elements. He further stated that Henry Sasson has 

not asked the Association for “an amendment to the master deed granting Pierce Martin the right 

to use the common elements,” and that even if one had been proposed, Scaglione would not have 

approved it because he “didn’t want to give [his] property away for free.” Rogers also denied 

that the Board or the co-owners approved defendants’ exclusive use of the common elements. 

He stressed that he never gave approval for the Sassons to operate a restaurant and bar on the 

common elements, and repeatedly denied that the Board or the co-owners approved defendants’

use of the space to operate a bar and restaurant.12

After the close of plaintiffs’ case-in-chief, defendants moved for a directed verdict. 

Relevant to the instant appeal, they argued that the bylaws permit structural changes to the 

exterior of units with the Association’s consent, and authorize the Board to act on behalf of the 

Association in this matter. They observed that, not only did the Board, i.e., Scaglione and 

Hanna, approve of the expansion, but with Rogers agreeing to follow the lead of these two, all 

the co-owners of the Association agreed to the expansion of Unit 5 onto the common elements. 

Dorfman and Rogers opposed the motion with essentially the same legal arguments that 

appellants advance on appeal. They contended that the Condominium Act prohibits the 

expansion of Unit 5 onto the common elements, that only the Association’s co-owners could 

approve such expansion, and then only after following procedures that no one disputes were not 

followed in this case, and that defendants’ use of the common elements violated certain other 

provisions of the condominium’s governing statutes and documents. Dorfman and Rogers

further contended that none of the co-owners approved defendants’ operation of a restaurant and 

 12 In addition to Scaglione, Rogers, and Hanna, the trial court also heard testimony from 

Dorfman, who acknowledged that, because he was not a co-owner in September 2010, he had no 

right to be consulted in connection with the September 12, 2010 document and was not involved 

with it in any way. Dorfman testified that a discussion of the matter with his real estate attorney 

convinced him that the condominium documents had to be amended if defendants were to 

exclusively occupy the common element at issue. Consequently, he emailed Rogers and Hanna 

in March 2011 suggesting that they obtain a legal opinion regarding whether the Association had 

agreed to defendants’ use of the common element at issue. Rogers agreed with his suggestion, 

but Hanna and Scaglione did not. Dorfman recalled that he spoke with Jeremy Sasson and asked 

him not to proceed until he had the approval and support of all the residents, or he was setting 

himself up for protracted litigation, but Sasson did not take his advice.
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bar on the common elements. Ruling from the bench, the trial court identified the key factual 

question as whether the Association consented to defendants’ expansion of Unit 5 and use of the 

common element as a coffee shop or café. The trial court concluded that the evidence clearly 

showed that defendants obtained the necessary approval to “modify or alter unit five and to 

expand upon the common elements[,]” but left the legal effect of that approval to a later 

determination. The trial court entered a corresponding order, which it later amended twice for 

reasons without bearing on the instant appeal.

On January 10, 2014, defendants and the Association filed competing motions for 

summary disposition of Dorfman and Rogers’ complaint and the Association’s intervening 

complaint.13 The Association reiterated the legal arguments it had made against defendants’

motion for a directed verdict, and further asserted that it was unreasonable to rely on the 

September 12, 2010 letter because it was unsupported by written authorization from the coowners and it violated the statute of frauds. Defendants asserted that in directing a verdict for 

them, the trial court had rejected the premise underlying all of plaintiffs’ complaints, which was 

that defendants had not received the necessary approval to occupy and use the common elements 

at issue.

Subsequent to a hearing, the trial court issued a written opinion and order granting 

defendants’ joint summary disposition motion pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), and denying the 

Association’s counter-motion for summary disposition; the trial court also denied without 

prejudice the Association’s request to dismiss defendants’ counterclaims. The trial court 

acknowledged that defendants did not obtain approval according to the procedures set forth in 

the bylaws, but noted that evidence submitted at trial established that the Association did not 

conduct formal business at the time. The trial court further observed that it was clear that “the 

majority of the co-owners in the condominium unit gave their express permission, or, at a 

minimum, acquiesced in the others’ decisions.” Moreover, the approval was in keeping with the 

Association’s authority under the Condominium Act and the condominium documents to 

approve additions, alterations, and modification of the common elements. Finally, the trial court 

rejected the Association’s characterization of the approval as tantamount to an illegal 

conveyance, ruling, “[t]he common area at issue is still common area, albeit modified for 

Defendants’ use.”

 13 The trial court’s order granting defendants’ a directed verdict also dismissed Dorfman from the 

case. Not only did Dorfman not own a unit at the time defendants sought and obtained approval 

to expand Unit 5, but the agreement under which he purchased the unit insulated him from 

fluctuations in the market price of the unit by giving him the option to require Askar to purchase 

the unit back at a fixed price. Therefore, Dorfman did not lose any rights in the common element 

at issue because he came to the unit after approval of defendants’ expansion, and he would be 

unaffected by any decrease in his unit’s value attributable to the operation of defendants’ 

restaurant and bar because of the buy-back price agreement. Rogers did not join in the 

Association’s motion or file a separate motion.
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Subsequent to this order, litigation of defendants’ counterclaims continued until, in a 

settlement agreement dated May 26, 2016, the parties stipulated to dismissal of those 

counterclaims and third-party complaints not previously dismissed, and the trial court entered a 

corresponding, final order. Of note, plaintiffs Dorfman and Rogers’ trust are not the appellants 

in this Court. Rather, the Association and third-party defendants Scaglione and Rogers in his 

personal capacity filed the instant appeal. 

II. ANALYSIS

A. JURISDICTIONAL CHALLENGE

Before turning to the merits of the appeal, we first address challenges to appellants’

standing to bring this appeal. Defendants contend that the Association lacks standing to appeal 

because it did not follow its own bylaws and obtain an affirmative vote of a supermajority of its 

co-owners before commencing litigation. Defendants further contend that Scaglione and Rogers 

lack standing because they are not “aggrieved parties” for purposes of MCR 7.203(A). For the 

reasons stated below, we conclude that the Association has standing to appeal, but Scaglione and 

Rogers are not aggrieved parties.

As indicated elsewhere in this opinion, the administration of a condominium project is 

governed by the condominium bylaws. MCL 559.153. The bylaws of the 180 Pierce Street

condominium require the Association’s board of directors to obtain an affirmative vote of 75% 

of the co-owners in certain situations, including prior to hiring an attorney to evaluate a claim, to 

incurring the expense of further investigations of the claim, and to incurring “any expense or 

legal fees with respect to any litigation.” Bylaws, Art XIII, § 6; Bylaws, Art II, § 2(c). 

Defendants argue that, because the Association did not obtain the prior approval of at least 75% 

of the co-owners, it lacked authority to file this claim of appeal. Defendants base their argument 

on their reasoning that an appeal is “new proceeding” because “[i]t requires new filings, new 

appearances, and new filing fees in a new court,” and because the Association’s attorney was 

under no obligation to file an appeal after dismissal in the trial court.

We are unpersuaded that a claim of appeal is a “new proceeding” of the type that required 

the Board in the instant case to adhere to the pre-litigation procedures set forth in the bylaws. 

This appeal is the continuation of a civil action begun by the filing of a complaint by Dorfman 

and Rogers in the trial court. MCR 2.101. Inherent in a civil action is the right to timely appeal 

the trial court’s final order in this Court. MCR 7.203(A)(1); MCR 7.202(6)(a); MCR 7.204(A). 

The fact that an aggrieved party may decide not to appeal, and that an appeal in this Court 

requires new filings, appearances, and fees, and may involve a new attorney, does not make it a 

“new proceeding.” Nothing in the bylaws indicates that procedures put in place to limit the 

board’s authority to commence litigation were intended to restrict the board’s ability to see the 

litigation through where completion called for a timely appeal.14

 14 Defendants’ reliance on the holding in Tuscany Grove Ass’n v Peraino, 311 Mich App 389; 

875 NW2d 234 (2015), is unavailing. The unauthorized lawsuit at issue in Tuscany was not an 
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We also reject defendants’ contention that a claim of appeal is a “[m]odified 

undertaking[] involving material cost increases and ultimate commencement of formal 

proceedings for assertion of claims.” Bylaws, Art XIII, § 6. Read in context, the phrase 

“modified undertakings” arguably refers to additional or modified evaluative or investigatory 

undertakings leading up to filing the initial claim. An appeal is not the “commencement of 

formal proceedings,” but as already indicated, the continuation of proceedings initiated with the 

filing of a complaint. Therefore, because a claim of appeal is not a “new proceeding” or a 

“modification of the original matter” requiring adherence to the pre-litigation procedures set 

forth in the bylaws, defendants’ argument that the Association lacks standing to bring this appeal 

necessarily fails.

Defendants next contend that Scaglione and Rogers lack standing because they were not 

individual plaintiffs below and are not “aggrieved parties” for purposes of MCR 7.203(A).15 We 

agree.

This Court has jurisdiction of an appeal of right filed by an aggrieved party from a final 

judgment. MCR 7.203(A). “An aggrieved party is not one who is merely disappointed over a 

certain result. Rather, to have standing on appeal, a litigant must have suffered a concrete and 

particularized injury, as would a party plaintiff initially invoking the court’s power.” Federated 

Ins Co v Oakland Co Rd Comm, 475 Mich 286, 291-292; 715 NW2d 846 (2006). There is a 

significant difference between a litigant with standing in the trial court and an aggrieved party 

for purposes of an appeal. “[A] litigant on appeal must demonstrate an injury arising from either 

the actions of the trial court or the appellate court judgment rather than an injury arising from 

the underlying facts of the case.” Id., 475 Mich at 292 (Emphasis added). Thus, even a litigant 

who was not a party in the trial court proceedings may be an “aggrieved party” if the trial court’s 

judgment injures the litigant in a way other than by an adverse decision on the underlying facts 

of the case.16

appeal from an already commenced lawsuit, and the defendant sought summary disposition of 

the plaintiff condominium association’s complaint in the trial court, apparently before the parties 

engaged in substantial litigation.

15 Appellants did not address this issue in their primary appellate brief, and they did not file a 

reply brief. However, in a brief in opposition to defendants’ motion to dismiss filed with this 

Court, appellants relied on Federated Ins Co v Oakland Co Rd Comm, 475 Mich 286; 715 NW2d 

846 (2006), to argue that Scaglione and Rogers did not have to be plaintiffs in the underlying suit 

to be aggrieved parties with the right to bring this appeal.

16 See, e.g., Martin v Secretary of State, 482 Mich 956; 755 NW2d 153 (Mem) (2008) (holding 

that two non-party elected officials were aggrieved parties for the purposes of appellate standing 

where the circuit court’s decision extending the filing deadline for the plaintiff in a suit against 

the Secretary of State meant they had to compete against someone potentially improperly placed 

on the ballot); Mathew R Abel, PC v Grossman Investments Co, 302 Mich App 232; 838 NW2d 

204 (2013) (holding that an attorney who had an attorney-fee request partially denied was an 

aggrieved party with appellate standing).
-12-

Apart from Federated Ins Co, Scaglione and Rogers provide no argument or authority in 

support of their implication that they have standing to bring this claim of appeal simply because 

they were third-party defendants in Pierce Martin and Townhouse’s counterclaim. Scaglione and 

Rogers were dismissed as third-party defendants, and thus, they cannot be aggrieved by the trial 

court’s act of dismissing them from being sued. To the extent that they identify their 

“particularized harm” as arising from their status as individuals with rights or interests that the 

Association has the legal authority to pursue, they merely link their “aggrieved party” status to 

the Association’s authority to pursue an appeal. Scaglione and Rogers rely on property rights 

derived from the Master Deed, and assert that they “are pursing remedies on appeal that they had 

when the litigation commenced and that they would have the right to recover, individually, if the 

appeal is successful.” However, none of these assertions demonstrates an injury arising from the 

actions of the trial court. What they demonstrate is disappointment with the trial court’s 

resolution of the underlying issues raised by the parties. Also telling is the fact that neither 

Scaglione nor Rogers raises any issues or arguments distinguishable from those of the 

Association, which suggests that, like the Association, they are disappointed and aggrieved by 

the trial court’s decision on the underlying facts. Because Scaglione and Rogers fail to show an 

“injury arising from either the actions of the trial court or the appellate court judgment rather 

than an injury arising from the underlying facts of the case,” id., they are not aggrieved parties 

for purposes of MCR 7.203(A). But because the Association is an appellant with standing to 

appeal, we will address the issues it has raised, which are the same as those raised by Scaglione 

and Rogers. 

B. DIRECTED VERDICT

The Association first contends that the trial court erred in directing a verdict for 

defendants on the question of whether Pierce Martin received the requisite approval to occupy 

and use the common elements at issue because the evidence showed that no such approval was 

given. We disagree.

We review do novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for a directed verdict. Krohn v 

Home Owners Ins Co, 490 Mich 145, 155; 802 NW2d 281 (2011). We review all of the 

evidence presented up to the time of the motion to determine whether a question of fact existed. 

Silberstein v Pro-Golf of America, Inc, 278 Mich App 446, 455; 750 NW2d 615 (2008), lv den 

483 Mich 886 (2009). The Court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party, granting the nonmoving party every reasonable inference and resolving any 

conflicts in the evidence in the nonmoving party’s favor. Krohn, 490 Mich at 155. “If 

reasonable jurors could honestly have reached different conclusions, this Court may not 

substitute its judgment for that of the jury.” Silberstein, 278 Mich App at 455 (quotation marks 

and citation omitted).

Viewed in the light most favorable to appellants, reasonable jurors could not disagree that 

the Association, through both its Board and the voting condominium co-owners, approved 

defendants’ proposal to build upon and use the common elements at issue. The September 12, 

2010 letter states that the Association approves the proposed improvements and that it “obtained 

all necessary approvals and consents of the Owners of the Units (and mortgagees if applicable) 

in the Condominium Project in accordance with the Master Deed . . . .” The letter is signed by 

Hanna in his capacity as vice-president of the Association, and is accompanied by a floor plan 
-13-

and sketch showing the expansion of Unit 5 onto the common elements. Hanna testified 

unequivocally that he signed the letter with the firm understanding that Scaglione and Rogers 

approved of the proposed improvements during a conference call held prior to September 12, 

2010. He testified that he understood Rogers’ August 20, 2010 e-mail to leave the decision to 

him and Scaglione, and that he confirmed Rogers’ support for the proposal in a chance 

conversation with Rogers in the condominium’s garage.

Scaglione’s testimony does not directly refute Hanna’s account. Scaglione believed at 

the time that the proposal would be an enhancement to the building. He acknowledged that the 

August meeting with the Sassons took place during “the depths of the great recession,” at a time 

when neighborhood vacancies were up, real estate values were down, the two commercial spaces 

in the condominium had been foreclosed on, and Unit 5 was papered over. He affirmed that he 

told Hanna that they needed “to do something with the old retail space,” and that it would be “the 

kiss of death” if they did not.

Further, nothing in the record indicates that Scaglione had any concerns about approving 

defendants’ proposal. Although he stated that he and Hanna engaged in negotiations with the 

Sassons without reaching an agreement, he conceded that Pierce Martin accomplished seven of 

the items on Hanna’s list from August 20, 2010. Scaglione’s assertion that no agreement was 

reached seems more properly to characterize the period after late 2010 or early 2011, when the 

Association attempted without success to extract concessions, including a license agreement, 

from Pierce Martin. Plaintiffs present no evidence indicating that, prior to 2011, any of the coowners desired compensation for defendants’ use of 365 square feet of the common elements at 

issue beyond the items on Hanna’s list and an increase in the Association fees paid by the 

commercial units. Likewise, they present no evidence indicating that liability protection was a 

concern of the co-owners prior to their discovery that Pierce Martin planned to open a restaurant 

and bar in the units.

Although Scaglione testified that he did not “authorize” Hanna to sign the September 12, 

2010 letter and recommended that he have a lawyer look at it, he did not testify that he told 

Hanna not to sign it because he did not approve its contents. In fact, he affirmed that at his 

deposition he testified that he could not recall the conversation and would not refute Hanna’s 

account of it. Further, Scaglione did not contradict Hanna’s January 2011 emails informing 

Rogers that the Association had given its approval for the expansion, and he opposed Dorfman’s 

suggestion to seek a legal opinion as to whether the Association had given approval. These facts 

could reasonably be inferred as indicating that he was aware that the September 12, 2010 letter 

permitted defendants’ improvements and was supported by approval of the members of the 

Association.

In addition, evidence indicates that in August and September 2010, Scaglione did not 

view defendants’ proposed improvements, which he knew included occupation and use of 365 

square feet of common element, as the threat to his property interests that he later came to view 

them. Scaglione acknowledged on cross-examination that his memory of the meeting with the 

Sassons and their proposal for the building was “hazy” or “foggy,” and that his attention was 

elsewhere at the time, and implied that he did not have an independent memory of the event. 

Asked if it were true that he was not paying close attention at the meeting, Scaglione responded, 

“Why should I have.” He also acknowledged that he had not retained in his files any of the early 
-14-

e-mails regarding the proposal. Whatever his later position, the evidence from August and 

September of 2010 suggests that Scaglione supported the Sassons’ proposal to modify and 

occupy the condominium’s commercial units.

Similarly, Rogers’ testimony does not directly refute that of Hanna. He did not contest 

Hanna’s testimony that Rogers agreed to defendants’ expansion of Unit 5 onto and use of the 

common elements during a conference call with Hanna and Scaglione and during a chance 

encounter with Hanna in the condominium’s garage. He admitted telling Scaglione and Hanna 

that he would follow their lead, knowing that Hanna supported the project and that it involved 

the loss of common elements space, and testified that he would be “stuck with” whatever they 

decided. After his August 30, 2010 e-mail to Hanna asking about progress with the Sassons and 

informing him that he was leaving the country for two weeks, nothing in the record indicates that 

Rogers questioned the proposed expansion onto the common elements until early 2011, when he 

learned that Jeremy Sasson was going to put in a restaurant and bar. However, the record shows 

that Dorfman, Rogers, and the Association agreed on the first day of trial that whether they 

required defendants to obtain separate approval to serve alcohol was not part of the issue 

presented to the jury in the trial. Nevertheless, Rogers consistently confused these two issues 

throughout the trial, stating that defendants never gave him any proposed plans for Townhouse 

Kitchen and Bar. He further asserted that he could not have approved of defendants’ plan 

because Hanna and Scaglione never reached an agreement with the Sassons, and that, to his 

knowledge, the Sassons had fulfilled none of the items on Hanna’s list from August 20, 2010.

Based on our review of the evidence, we conclude that if Hanna and Scaglione agreed to 

approve defendants’ project, whether Rogers was aware that the Sassons had accomplished the 

items on Hanna’s list was irrelevant. Rogers’s testimony that he did not read the list carefully 

and that some of the items were Hanna’s opinion suggests that he did not tie his proxy to 

completion of the items on the list. Further, even when he learned that Jeremy Sasson was 

planning a restaurant and bar for the space, Rogers appeared to object only to the particular 

commercial use of the space, not to defendants’ expansion onto and use of the common 

elements. The record indicates that it was not until Dorfman became involved and this lawsuit 

was pending that Rogers informed Scaglione in an April 7, 2011 e-mail that neither he nor 

Hanna had “the legal right to give exclusive use to anyone of my share of a common area of our 

condo.” In the same e-mail, Rogers withdrew permission for Hanna and Scaglione, i.e., the 

Board, to negotiate with the Sassons on his behalf, stating that he thought they had “failed in 

[their] responsibility to the state of Michigan and to the condo owners.”

Viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the evidence does not reasonably support 

the conclusion that the Association did not approve defendants’ proposed occupancy and use of 

the common elements adjacent to Unit 5 in the fall of 2010. Hanna was unwavering in his 

support of the project, and the evidence shows that, as much as Scaglione may have come to rue 

his support of the project, and Rogers his acquiescence to Hanna and Scaglione, both supported 

the structural improvements proposed by defendants in the summer of 2010. Events later 

transpired that may have caused them to regret communicating their approval without asking 

more questions or extracting more concessions, but this does not change the fact that the 

evidence shows that the approval conveyed by the September 12, 2010 letter represented the 

approval of the Board—Hanna and Scaglione—and the acquiescence of Rogers. Even if, for the 

sake of argument, one were to factor in Rogers’ disapproval and Hanna’s inability to contact 
-15-

Askar, defendants’ proposed use of the common elements still had the approval of the Board and 

four of six, or two-thirds, of the co-owners.

17 For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s grant 

of defendants’ motion for a directed verdict on the question of whether Pierce Martin obtained 

the requisite approval to occupy and use the common elements at issue.

C. SUMMARY DISPOSITION

The Association next argues that, even if Pierce Martin did obtain approval for its 

proposed occupation and use of the common elements, the approval was invalid because it 

violated various provisions of the Condominium Act, MCL 559.101 et seq., and the 

condominium documents. Again, we disagree.

We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo. Auto 

Club Group Ins Co v. Burchell, 249 Mich App 468, 479; 642 NW2d 406 (2002). Defendants 

brought their motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). A motion for summary 

disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of a claim. Smith v Globe Life 

Ins Co, 460 Mich 446, 454; 597 NW2d 28 (1999). “In reviewing a motion for summary 

disposition brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10), a trial court considers affidavits, pleadings, 

depositions, admissions, and documentary evidence filed in the action or submitted by the 

parties, MCR 2.116(G)(5), in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Quinto 

v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362; 547 NW2d 314 (1996). If the documentary evidence 

shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law, the trial court may grant the motion. Id. MCR 2.116(C)(10), (G)(4).

Characterization of the legal effect of the Association and co-owners’ approval is critical 

to a determination of whether the approval violates Michigan’s Condominium Act and the 

condominium documents. The Association contends that the approval constituted a conveyance 

to defendants of 365 square feet of formerly common element space. However, the trial court’s 

summary disposition ruling rejects the notion that a conveyance has occurred. Even at trial, the 

trial court resisted characterizations of the approval as conveying the property or changing 

ownership, at one point reminding the litigants, “We’re dealing with use, not conveyance, not 

ownership. The question is use.” Accordingly, the trial court stated in its order granting 

defendants summary disposition, “[t]he common area at issue is still common area, albeit 

modified for Defendants’ use.” The trial court’s conclusion reflects the nature of defendants’

request and of the approval given in the September 12, 2010 letter. Defendants did not seek, the 

co-owners and the Association did not agree to, and the trial court did not find evidence of a

change in the ownership of the common elements that would affect the material rights of the 

other co-owners. It is with this characterization of the legal effects of the Association’s and coowners’ approval in mind that we turn to the merits of the Association’s argument.

The Association first contends that any approval was void because it violated MCL 

559.136, which authorizes a condominium master deed to “provide that undivided interests in 

 17 Bylaws, Art X, § 1 provides that each co-owner gets one vote per unit owned, which means 

that Pierce Martin had two votes, and Hanna and Scaglione had one vote each.
-16-

land may be added to the condominium project as common elements” in which the co-owners 

share tenancy, but prohibits situating a condominium unit on the lands. We find this assertion 

unpersuasive.

The primary goal of judicial interpretation of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the 

intent of the Legislature. Mich Ed Ass’n v Secretary of State (On Rehearing), 489 Mich 194, 

217; 801 NW2d 35 (2011). The first criterion in determining intent is the specific language of 

the statute. United States Fidelity Ins & Guaranty Co v Mich Catastrophic Claims Ass’n (On 

Rehearing), 484 Mich 1, 13; 795 NW2d 101 (2009). The plain language of MCL 559.136

suggests that it authorizes a provision in a master deed describing how one could add land to the 

project, not necessarily restricting the use of land already a part of the condominium project. For 

example, there is a provision reserving to the developer of the project the right to add amenities 

as limited or general common elements, and to modify or delete units and common elements for 

six years from the recordation date of the master deed. Master deed, Art VII, § 2. However, 

there is no such analogous provision for the addition of land to the condominium in the master 

deed for 180 Pierce Street Association. Therefore, because the common elements at issue were 

part of the original condominium project rather than lands later added, MCL 559.136 does not 

operate in the instant case to render void the approval given to defendants to occupy and use a 

portion of the common elements adjacent to Unit 5.

The Association also contends that any approval given violates MCL 559.137(5), which

generally renders void any alteration of “the undivided interest in the common elements 

allocated to any condominium unit” by “any purported transfer, encumbrance, or other 

disposition of that interest without the condominium unit to which it appertains.” However, this 

argument fails because, as the trial court indicated in its summary disposition opinion and order,

there was no alteration, transference, encumbrance, or other disposition of interests in the 

common elements. The common elements remain common elements, and the co-owners remain 

tenants in common, with defendants enjoying a right to occupy and use for their requested

purposes that portion of the common elements at issue.

The Association next contends that the approval was void because neither the Board nor 

the Association’s co-owners can change the restrictions in the condominium documents relative 

to use of the common elements. To the extent that the Association argues that constructing a 

restaurant and bar in the space at issue violates those provisions in the condominium documents 

prohibiting activities that are “immoral, improper, unlawful, or offensive” and that annoy or are a 

nuisance to the co-owners, Bylaws, Art VI, § 4, its argument goes beyond the narrow question 

presented in the bifurcated trial. The argument blends the question of whether defendants 

obtained approval to occupy and use the common elements with whether they obtained approval 

to use the expanded area in operation of a restaurant and bar. As indicated elsewhere in this 

opinion, the plaintiffs in the trial court action agreed that the latter issue was not part of the 

bifurcated trial. 

Moreover, evidence at trial indicates that, at the time defendants’ sought and obtained 

approval, they had not finalized their plans for the space. Although Rogers testified that the 

Sassons told him they were opening a coffee shop, he also admitted that he saw “many different 

versions” of defendants’ plans, and the testimony of Scaglione and Hanna indicated that no final 

decisions had been reached. This is further support by Jeremy Sasson’s admission in a January 
-17-

2011 e-mail to Rogers that, “[w]hen we first met back in July [2010], I had no clue about what 

would be the final result of this retail project.” Finally, in opposing defendants’ motion for a 

directed verdict, counsel for Dorfman and Rogers argued that plaintiffs could not have approved 

of defendants’ plan on September 12, 2010, because defendants’ use of the space to operate a 

restaurant and bar was not clear until the City of Birmingham approved their plan on May 4, 

2011. However, the question before the trial court was “what approval, if any, was given for 

defendants’ use of the three hundred and sixty-five square feet of common area.” Therefore, 

whether approval violated restrictions in the condominium documents that might be associated 

with a bar exceeds the scope of the issue tried.

The Association also argues that Pierce Martin violated the condominium documents by 

not obtaining the co-owners’ approval “to enter into a lease with Townhouse.” However, 

although the Bylaws authorize the Association to review a lease for compliance with the 

condominium documents, they do not authorize the Association to reject the lease. If the lease

violates the condominium documents, Bylaws, Art VI, § 2 authorizes the Association to notify 

the leasing co-owner of the violations by certified mail and, if the leasing co-owner has not 

corrected the violations within 15 days, to pursue eviction of the lessee and damages. Nothing in 

the bylaws provides that, under such circumstances, the Association can simply declare the lease 

void.

The Association further argues that use of the space at issue is void because it violates the 

condominium documents’ prohibition against obstructing common elements, including 

landscaped areas, and using them “for purposes other than that for which they are reasonably or 

obviously intended.” However, Bylaws, Art VI, § 3 allows the Association to authorize exterior 

attachments and modifications to units and common elements. “Bylaws are generally construed 

in accordance with the rules used for statutory construction.” Slatterly v Madiol, 257 Mich App 

242, 255; 668 NW2d 154 (2003). A cardinal principle of statutory construction is to save and 

not to destroy. Gora v City of Ferndale, 456 Mich 704, 722; 576 NW2d 141 (1998). Thus, the 

usual rule of statutory construction is that apparently conflicting statutes should be construed, if 

possible, to be read harmoniously, Nowell v Titan Ins Co, 466 Mich 478, 482; 648 NW2d 157 

(2002), and to give each full force and effect, Ziegler v Witherspoon, 331 Mich 337, 358; 49 

NW2d 318 (1951). Applying this rule of statutory construction to interpretation of the bylaws at 

issue suggests that, while a co-owner may not decide unilaterally to use common elements in 

ways prohibited by the bylaws, the Association is empowered to allow modification and 

alterations in the common elements. In the instant case, the September 12, 2010 letter provided

defendants with the “express written approval of the Association” to execute the modifications 

that all of the co-owners approved.

The Association next contends that the approval is void because neither the Board nor the 

co-owners strictly adhered to the procedures set forth in the condominium documents for making 

material changes to the rights of the co-owners. The Association contends that construction of a 

restaurant and bar on the common elements for defendants’ exclusive and economic benefit 

constitutes a material change to the rights of the co-owners and mortgagees that requires 

approval of at least two-thirds of the co-owners and affected mortgagees, and amendment of the 

condominium documents. However, the trial court’s conclusion that defendants received 

permission to use the common elements and that the area remains a common element, albeit

modified for defendants’ use, calls into question the Association’s assumption that defendants’
-18-

use of the common elements constitutes a material change in its members’ rights in the common 

elements. Further, although appellants allege that defendants assert exclusive use over the area, 

they present no evidence that defendants have excluded them from or restricted their use of the 

area. In other words, although appellants assert a diminishment of their rights, they have 

presented no evidence in support of this conclusion. Therefore, appellants have not provided the 

evidence necessary to create a genuine issue of material fact as to any alleged diminishment of 

their rights in the common elements that would require amendment of the master deed.

Finally, the Association contends that any approval given was void because it did not 

result from strict compliance with the procedural requirements set forth in the bylaws. There is 

no dispute that defendants’ proposal was not noticed for discussion at an annual or special 

meeting and a vote taken on the proposal in accordance with the procedures set forth in the 

bylaws. However, the evidence shows that, to accommodate their particular schedules, the coowners had previously adopted discussion through telephone conversations and e-mail as an 

alternate procedure for conducting the Association’s business, and approved or acquiesced in the 

approval of defendants’ use of the space in accordance with the alternate procedure they had 

adopted. The co-owners’ approval was memorialized in the September 12, 2010 document, upon 

which defendants relied to obtain a building permit and begin construction on their project. 

Given these particular circumstances, to declare the approval void because it did not result from 

strict compliance with the bylaws would be to elevate formalities over substance.

The Association next contends that any approval purportedly given by the September 12, 

2010 letter signed by Hanna was void because the letter did not satisfy Michigan’s statute of 

frauds. Michigan’s general real-estate statute of frauds provides:

No estate or interest in lands, other than leases for a term not exceeding 1 

year, nor any trust or power over or concerning lands, or in any manner relating 

thereto, shall hereafter be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared, 

unless by act or operation of law, or by a deed or conveyance in writing, 

subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the 

same, or by some person thereunto by him lawfully authorized by writing.

The Association bases it argument on the premise that the September 12, 2010 letter 

brought about the transfer of a property interest (Plaintiffs’ brief on appeal, p 30-31). The trial 

court did not find this to be so, stating in its summary disposition opinion and order, “The 

Association’s argument that an illegal conveyance of the common area occurred is a 

mischaracterization and conclusory. The common area at issue is still common area, albeit 

modified for Defendants’ use.” As indicated above, that there is no evidence that the Sassons 

asked for, or the Association or co-owners agreed to, a transfer of interests in the common 
-19-

element supports the trial court’s ruling. Therefore, if no estate or interest in land has been 

“created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared,” the statute of frauds is inapplicable.18

Finally, the Association attempts to capitalize on the trial court’s statement in its

summary disposition opinion that “the majority of the co-owners in the condominium unit gave 

their express permission, or, at a minimum, acquiesced in the others’ decisions[,]” by arguing 

that the trial court erred in its application of the doctrine of acquiescence. The Association 

erroneously infers a legal meaning for “acquiescence” where, when read in the context of the 

trial court’s opinion, it is clear that the court intended its more general meaning of “to accept, 

comply, or submit tacitly or passively.” See Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (2003), p 

11. The doctrine of acquiescence is inapplicable in this case, and appellants’ attempts to 

challenge a finding of acquiescence are unnecessary.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, we affirm the trial court’s grant of a directed verdict to 

defendants on the question of whether defendants obtained the required approval or consent to 

modify Unit 5 of the 180 Pierce Street condominium building to occupy and use a portion of the 

common elements adjacent to the unit. We also affirm the trial court’s grant of summary 

disposition to defendants. Given our disposition of this matter, we need not address the 

Association’s claims of relief, nor defendants’ alternative reasons for affirming the trial court’s 

orders.

Affirmed.

/s/ Jane M. Beckering

/s/ Jane E. Markey

/s/ Michael J. Riordan

 18 Defendants’ statement in their brief to this Court that the trial court “rejected the Association’s 

statute of frauds argument,” while plausible, gives the impression that the trial court considered it 

and then rejected it. In fact, the trial court’s ruling made it irrelevant.