UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS

N O . 99-106
RAYMOND G AL L EG OS , A PP EL L ANT ,

V
. H ER SH EL W. G OBER , A C TI NG S EC RE T A RY O F V ET ER A N S A FF A I RS , A PPEL L EE
.

On Ap pe a l f ro m th e B oa

rd of Ve te ra ns ' Ap pe a ls
(De cided August 11, 2000 )

J am es W . S tan le y , J r. , o f N or th L itt le Roc k, Ar

ka ns a s, wa s o n th e br ie f f

or the a pp e lla nt.
L ei g h A. Bradley , G e ne ra l Co un se l; Ro n G arv in , A ssi sta nt G e ne ra l Co un se l; Mary Ann Flynn , Acting Deputy Assistant Gener al Counsel; and Gregory W . Fortsch , all of Washington, D.C., wer e on the br ief for

the appe llee.
Be fore NEB EKER, Chief Judge , and F ARL EY and STEI NB ERG, Judges

. STEI NB ERG, Judge , filed the opinion of the Court. F ARL EY, Judge , filed a dissenting opinion.
STEI NB ERG, Judge : T h e ap p el l an t , Vi et n am v et er an R ay m o n d Ga l l ego s , ap p ea l s t h ro u gh counsel a Dec ember

9, 1998, Boa

rd of Ve tera

ns' Appea ls (BV A or Bo ard) decision that denie d entitlement to an ea

rlier e ffe ctive date for the awa rd of Depa

rtment of Veterans Affa irs (VA) service

connec tion for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Record (R.) at 9. The appellant has filed a brief, a nd the S ec reta

ry has filed a

brief. T his appea l is ti mely and the Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a). F or the re asons set forth below, the Court will rever se the B VA decision and r emand the matter to the B oard f or proc eeding s consistent with this opi nion.

I. Bac kgr ound2

The ve tera

n serve d on active duty from S eptember 1966 to May 1970. R. at 12. I n Marc h 1992, he filed a

claim for V A ser v i ce co n n ec t i o n for diabe tes and c hlorac ne. R. at 95-98. In a state me nt receiv e d b y

a VAre g ion a l of

fi c e (R O) on

Au g us t 31 , 1 99 3, he a me nd e d th e c la im t o i n c l u d e a c l a i m f o r s e r v i c e c o n n e c t i o nf

o r P T S D

. R

. a t1 9 0 a
. A F e b r u ar y 1 9 9 3 s o c i a l h i s t o r

y, prepa red by a private social worke r, conta ined a diag nosis of PTSD. R . at 184. A Nove mber 1993 VA examination failed t o make a diag nosis of PTSD and rec ommended hospital observation and evaluation. R. at 217. An April 1994 discharg e summary , which includ ed a mental status examination and psy cholog ical testing , included a dia g nosis of d ep en d en t persona lity but not of PTSD. R. at 219-20. I n September 1994, the VARO dete rmined that the e vidence of re cord f ailed to show a di ag nosis of P TSD and denied the appellant's claim. R. at 222-24. On October 11, 1994, the appe llant's r epre sentative at the time, the Dis abled America n Veter ans (DA V), submitted a letter , e nti tle d " Me mo t o Ratin g B oa rd " [he re ina ft e r " DA V l e tte r" ], w hic h s ta te d in fu ll: After revie w of thi s v et era

n' s claims file and the curr ent rating de cision, it is our opinion that denial of the ve t er an 's claim for [ PTSD] was a littl e bit premature. F ur the r d e ve lop me nt, i.e ., re vie w of th e Soc ia l Wor ke r' s st a te me nt i n r e g ard s to ref err al to the Environment Support G roup for verific ation of specific incidents for str e sso rs wo uld

pr ov e be ne fi c ia l to fa ir

e va luatio n o f t

his ve te ra n' s c la im. We sugg est car eful g leaning of the information from the Social Worker ' s statement would g ive suffic ient detail without delay to reque st thorough inve stigation.
Please do not for

war d this veteran the standard stre ssor deve lopment letter.
Your a ppropriate attention is apprec iated.
R. at 228. The cla im

la y d o r ma n t u n ti l F e b r u ar y 2 0 , 1 9 9 7 , w h e nth e v e te r an , thr o u g h a tt o r n e y James W. S tanley , J r., filed a

n application to re open the disallowe d service- co n n ec t i on claim for PTSD. R. at 272. I n October

1997, the RO g rante d service connec tion for P T S D an d assig ned a Fe bruar y 20, 1997, eff

ective date. R. at 332- 35. Also in October 1997, the veter an filed a Notice of Disag ree ment (NOD ) as to the assig ned eff ective date. R. at 339. At a Marc h 1998 hear ing, Mr

. Stanley indicated that a

n issue was whether the DAV letter was an NOD as to the September 1994 RO decision. R. at 367.3

I n the Dec ember

1998 BV A dec ision here on appea l, the Boa rd dete rmined that the a

ppellant was not entitled to an e ffe ctive date ear lier than Fe bruar y 20, 1997. R. at 1- 10. The B VA conc luded that, b e c a us e the Se pte mbe r 1 99 4 r a tin g de c isi on ha d b e c ome fi na l w he n th e a pp e lla nt fa ile d to fi le a valid NOD , an ef

fec tive date of

Aug ust 31, 1993, the date of re ce i p t o f t he appe llant's or igina l claim for PTSD ser

vice c onnection, was not wa rra nted. R. at 4. The B oard de cided that the D AV le tte r w a s n ot a

va li d NOD as to t

he Se pte mbe r 1 99 4 RO de c isi on be c a us e , a lth ou g h it

c ou ld

rea sonably

be construe d as disag ree ing w ith the RO decision, it "could not be r easona bly construed to indicate the a

ppellant' s desire f

or appe llate revie w"

. R. at 8. The B VA stated that a note attac hed to the letter re flec ted that the RO had unde rstood it to be a re quest for f urther de v el o p m ent. Ib id

. I n their brief

s, the appe llant and the S ecr etar y both indicate that they are unable to locate this note. Appellant' s Br ief (B r.) at 8; Sec reta ry ' s Br

. at 7. The note is not part of the r ecor d on appea l (ROA) be fo re the Court

.

II. Ana lys is A. Effective

-Date Law Th e de te rm inatio n of the e ff e c tiv e date fo r an or ig ina l c la im is g ov e rn e d by 38 U.S .C. § 5 11 0( a ), wh ic h p ro vid e s: Unless spec ifically provided otherwise i n this chapter, the eff ective da te of a n awa rd based on an orig inal claim, a claim reope ned afte r final a djudication, or a c laim for incre ase, of

compensation, dependenc y and indemnity

compensatio n , or pension, sh a ll b e fi xed

in a c c or da

nc e wi th t he fa c ts f ou nd , b ut s ha ll no t be e arl ie r t ha n th e date of re ceipt of a

pplication there for.
See also 38 C

. F. R . § 3.400(b)( 2) (1999) (providing that eff ective date shall be date of re ceipt of cla i m o r d at e entitlement ar ose, whiche ver is later , unless claim re ceive d within one y ear afte r
se pa ratio n f ro m se rv ic e ); Tuc k

e r v . W est , 1 1 V e t.A

pp . 3 69 , 3 72 (1 99 8) (c on c e rn ingeffect ive date of or ig ina l c la im fo r se rv ic e c on ne c tio n) ; Di ns ay v . B ro wn , 9 Vet.App. 79, 87 (1996). I n his brief, the a pp e lla nt a dv ise s th e Court

th at at is su e he re is " wh e the r o r n ot [the DA V l e tte r] w a s a va lid NOD, ther eby

establishing a

n ear lier ef

fec tive date" for the PTSD service-c onnection award. Br . at 6. I f the a ppellant is corr ect that the DAV letter wa s a valid NOD , his 1993 claim remains ope n and pending , and ther eby

pertinent to the de cision on the proper eff ective date for his PTSD rating

. See4

38 C. F.R

. § 3. 16 0(c) (19 99 ) (a "[ p ] e nd ing c lai m " is a

n "a pplication, formal or informal, which ha s not been f inally adjudicate d")

. Although this law forms the backdrop for this case and shows why the NO D q

ue sti on is c ri tic a l to the ou tc ome of the me ri ts de c isi on

a s to e ff e c tiv e date , th e Court

wi ll addre ss only

the NOD que stion in t his opinion.

B. NOD Statu te and Regulat ion Se c tio n 7 10 5 o f t itl e 38 of the U. S. Co de pr ov ide s a s f oll ow s in pe rt ine nt p art : (a) Appellate review will be init iated by a noti ce of

disag ree ment and completed by

a substantive appe al af

ter a statement of the c ase is fur nished as presc ribed in this se c ti o n . Eac h appellant will be a ccor ded hea ring and re prese ntation r i g h t s p u r s u an tt o t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h i s c h a p t e r an d r e g u l a t i o n s o f

t h e S e c r e t ar

y. (b)( 1) Except in the case of simu l t aneously contested c laims, notice of dis a g re e me nt sha ll be

fi le d wi thin o ne y e ar from the da te of mailing of not ic eof the r es ul t o f in it ia l re v ie w o r

d e te r min a tion
. S u ch n o tice, and a ppeals, must be in writi ng and be filed with the activity which ent ered the de term inati on with whi ch disagreement

is expressed

(her eaf ter re fer re d t o as the " ag ency of orig inal jurisdiction" [(AOJ)] ). A notice of disag ree ment postmarked be fore the expiration of the one -y ear

period will be a cce pted as timely filed. (2) No tic es of

dis ag re e ment, and

ap pe als , must b ein writi

ng and m ay be filed by the c laim ant, th e claiman t's legal gu ardian, or s uch accredited re pr ese nta tiv eatt

or ne y , o r a utho riz e d a

ge nt as may

be sele cted by

the claimant or le g a l g ua rd ian. No t mor e tha

n o ne re c og nize d o rg anizatio n, a tto rn e y , o r a g e nt w ill be re c og nize d at any

on e tim e in t

he pr os e c uti on

of a c la im. (c) I f n o n o t ice of

disag ree ment is filed in acc ordanc e with this chapter within the prescr ibed per iod, the action or de termination shall become final and the claim will not therea fter be reope ned o r al l owed, e x cept a s may otherwise be provided by

regulations not inconsist ent with this ti tle. (d )( 1) Whe re the c la ima

nt, or the c la ima

nt' s r e pr e se ntativ e , w ith in t he tim e specifie d in this chapter, fi l es a notice of disag ree ment with the decision of the ag ency of orig inal jurisdiction, such agency will take su ch deve lopm ent or review ac tio n as it d

e e ms pro pe r und e r the pr ov isions of

re gul ations not

inc ons ist e nt wi th this tit le . I f suc h ac tio n do es not re so lv e the dis ag

re e ment e ithe r b

y grant ing the benefit sought or throu

gh with drawal of t

he notice of disagreement, su ch agency sha ll p re pa re a s tat e ment o f t he c as e
. . . . (Emphasis adde d.)5

The Sec reta

ry has promulg ated the f

ollowing r eg ulation implementing 38 U.S.C. § 7105 that purports to define what constitutes an NO D: A written communication from a claimant or his or her repr esentative ex p ressing dissatisfaction or disag ree ment with an adjudicative deter mination by

the ag ency

of o ri gi n al j urisdiction and a de sire to contest the r esult will constitut e a N otice of Disag ree ment. Whil e specia l w ording is not require d, the Notice o f Disagr eeme nt must be in terms which ca n be reasonably construed as disagr eemen t with that determination and a desire for appellate rev iew

. I f the ag ency o f original jurisdiction ga

ve notice that adjudicative de terminations wer e made on sever al issues a t th e same tim e , the sp e c if ic de te rm inatio ns wi th wh ic h the c la ima nt dis a g re e s mu st be identified. . . . 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 (1999) (empha sis a dded). "' Whether a document is an NOD is a que stion of law for th e C ou rtto det erm in e de n ov o u nd er 38 U.S .C . § 72 61 (a). '" Bu c k le yv . W est , 12 Vet.App. 76, 8 2 (1 9 9 8 ) ( qu o t i n g Be

y rle v . B ro wn , 9 Vet.App. 24, 27- 28 (1996)) . Acc ording ly , deter mining the eff ect of the re g ulatory

lang uag e empha siz ed above is the crux of this case. C. Relation ship B etween Statu te and Regulat ion I n it s D e c e mbe r 1 99 8 d e c isi on , th e B VAde te rm ine d th a t th e DAV le tte r w a s n ot a va lid NO D b e c a

us e , a lth ou gh it may

be re a d a s e xpre ssi ngdis a g re e me nt w iththe Se pte mbe r 1 99 4 RO decision, it "c ould not be rea sonably construed to indicate the appe llant's de sire for appellate revie w" by the Boa rd, as the Boa

rd construed the regulation ( § 20.201) to requir e. The specific require ment that an N OD " mus t be in t e rm s w hic h c an b e re a so nab ly con st rued a s .
. . a de sir e fo r a

pp e llate

re vie w" by the B VA is not state d in sec tio n 710 5 or any wh e re e lse in statut e
. Thus , th e Court mus t consider the validity of this re g ulatory provision. See G ardner v. De rwinski , 1 Vet.App. 584, 586 (1991), aff

'd sub n om . G ar

dn e r v . B ro wn , 5 F.3d 1456 ( Fe d. Cir. 1993), a ff 'd , 513 U.S. 115 (1994). "'The st art in g poi nt in in ter pret in g a st atu te i s i ts l anguage.'" Le e ( Ra y mo nd ) v . W est , 1 3 Ve t

. Ap p
. 3 8 8 , 3 9 4 (2 0 0 0 ) ( qu o t i n g Go od Sa ma rit an Ho sp ita l v . S

ha lal a , 5 0 8 U

. S. 4 02, 209 (1993))

. The " plain meaning [of a statute] must be g iven eff ect unless a ' literal application of [ t h e] statute [or reg ulation] will produce a result demonstrably

at odds with the in ten ti on of i ts draf

ter s. '" Gardner [, su

pra ]; Fagan [ v . W

est ], 13 Vet.App. [48,] 52 [(1 99 9) ]; Cur tis [ v . W

est ], 11 Vet.App. [129,] 133 [(1998)]. "I f the in t en t of Congr ess is clea

r, that is the end of

t he matter ". Sk

inn e r v . B ro wn , 27 F.3d 1571, 1 5 7 2 (F ed

. C i r. 1 9 9 4 ) ( qu o t i n g Che v ro n, U. S. A. , In c
. v . Na tural R eso ur c es D e fe ns e6

Council, Inc. , 467 U.S. 837, 842 . . . (1984)) , aff' ing 4 Vet.App. 141 ( 1993) (mem.)

. Lee ( Raymond) , su

pra . Her e, the statute pr ovides clea rly on its face that appellate revie w is initi ated by a " no tic e of

dis a g re e me nt" . T he statut e sp e c if ie s th e fi ve e le me nts fo r suc h an NO D: Th a t it mus t (1) e x press disag ree ment wi t h a spec ific dete rmination of the ag ency of orig inal jurisdiction (g ener ally a dec ision by

an R O [ here inafter ref

err ed to as "RO decision" ]) (§ 7105(d)(2)); ( 2) be f iled in writing ( § 7105(b)( 1), (b) (2)) ; (3) be filed with the RO (§ 7105(b)( 1)); (4) be filed within one y ear afte r the date of mailing of notice of the RO dec ision (§ 7105(b)(1) ); and (5) be filed by the claimant or the c laimant' s authorized re p resentative (§ 7105(b) (2)) . The only content re quirement is an expression of "disa g ree ment" w ith the decision of the RO. Her e, a pla in r eading of 38 U.S.C. § 7105 shows a statutory scheme wher eby

a docume nt that

s a t i s f i e s t h e f i v e s p e c i f i e d e l e m e n t s i s an N O D an d t h e r e b y init

iat es appellate revie w. The N OD trig g ers a series of sequential steps that may lead to an a

ppeal to th e Board. The first step of the ensuing proce ss initi ated by an NOD under section 7105(d)( 1) is the "de velopment or re view ac tion" taken by the RO to try to resolve the disa g ree ment. Specifica lly , VA re g ulations require that, afte r an NOD is tim ely

filed, the RO " must reexamine the claim and de termine if a dditional review or development is wa

rra nted" . 38 C.F.R. § 19.26 (1999). The rea fter, a nd only "[i]f such action does not resolve the disa g ree ment either by g ranting the bene fi t s oug ht or throug h withdrawa l of the" NO D, the RO iss ue s an SO C ( or a Sup ple me nta l SO C ( SSO C) ). 38 U.S .C

. § 7 10 5( d) (1 ); see 38 C.F.R. § 19.26. The clarity and completeness of the s tatute has be en dete rmined by our opinion in Tomlin v. Br own , 5 Vet.App. 355 ( 1993). In applying § 20.201 in Tom lin , this Court held that "w e construe the re g ulation to impose no technica l f ormal require ments for a

n NOD be y ond the re quirements set b y t h e s t a t u t e , f

o r t o i mp o s e a n y s u c h r e qu i r e m e n tw o u l d e x c e e d t h e S e c r e t ar

y' s [ r e g u l a t o r

y] authority

. . . [under] 38 U.S .C.[ ] § 501". Tom lin , 5 Ve t.A pp . at 35 7; see 38 U.S.C. § 501(a) (" [t ]he Se c re tary ha s a uth or ity to p re sc ri be a ll r

ule s a nd re g ulatio ns wh ic h a

re ne c e ssa

ry or a pp ro pr ia te to

c arr y ou t th e laws a dmi nis te re d b y the De pa

rtmen t and

are c on sis te nt w iththo se laws " ); Lee ( Raymond) , 13 Vet.App. at 397 (" Secre tary ' s authority under section 501(a) is restricted to a ctions that are ' consistent with [ the] laws [ administered by VA] '")

. The Court so held in the conte x t of construing the statutory

require ment that an NO D "m ust be in writing" as beingsatisfied by the7

p r in te d tr an s c r ip t o f an RO hear ing. Ibid. I n s us ta ini ngthat tr ans c ri pt a s an N OD , th e Court in Tom lin made no r e f

e r e n c e t o an y " d e s i r e f

o r a p p e l l a t e r e v i e w " , b u tr a t h e r s t a t e d o n l y: [W ]e find that the oral statement of a ppellant' s acc redited r epre sentative at the May 1988 hear ing, that appellant continued to c l ai m a 20% rating, mee ts the statutory definition of an NO D. I t was t i m el y , it was addre ssed to the AOJ, and it was prese nted by appellant's a ccr edited re prese ntative. When it was transc ribed on Ju ly 2 5 , 1 9 8 8 , it

me t t h e r e ma in in g s tatuto r

y r e qu ir e me n t t

h a t i t b e " in

w r it in g
. " We must conclude that, hav ing met a ll s tat

uto ry re qui re ments , the statement in question was the N OD a s to th e c la im n o w o n a p p e a l. T h e d a te o f c e rti f ic a ti o n o f the t ra n s cr i p tb y

VA i s t h e d at e o f f

i l i n g. Id. at 357-58 (e mphasis added)

. I n other wor ds, Tom lin require d onl y that th e NO D be tim e ly

fi le d w iththe RO and

e xpre ss disag ree ment by

seekinga hig her r ating (there by imply ing dissatisfa ction with the lower r ating assig ned by

the RO), be f

iled by or for the claimant, and be "in wr iting" . I t did not require - - or e ven ref er to -- an expression of a de sire for appellate revie w, or a rea sonable im plication of such a desire, as the reg ulation appea

rs t o call for . I ndeed, w e ca n find no prec edential a ction of this Court that has held that a doc ument that satisfied the five statutory elements was not a valid NOD so le ly be c a us e it did not ex p re ss "a

desire f or appe llate re view"

. Cf. Fe nd e rso n v . W

est , 12 Vet.App. 119, 128 (1999) (NOD sustained that included stateme n t "[ p ] l ease send me a statement of the c ase" , i.e.,

re fe re nc e to a

pp e a l pr oc e ss) ; Buck

ley , 12 Vet.App. at 79 (NOD sustaine d that stated " please acc ept thi s a s a No tic e of Di sa g re e me nt" , i. e ., c a lle d it se lf NO D) ; Be ry le , 9 Vet.App. at 27 (NOD sustained that reque sted " new SSOC be issued and that ther e b e an ' expeditious transfe r of the f ile to the [Board]' ", i.e ., included ref ere nce to a

ppeal proce ss). The Court in Tomlin thus, by implication, read out of the re g ulation a

ny added require ment of an expression of a desire for a ppellate r eview; indee d,

as we noted above , the Court ma de no ref ere nce to that part of the r eg ulation although it quoted the other de cisive portions of it. Tom lin , 5 Vet.App. at 357. The diff iculty with § 20.201 is that it may be read as imply ing that a VA claimant must intend to a pp e a l to the Board at the time that he or she f iles an NOD . I ndeed, this is how our dissenting colleague see ms to int erpr et the re g ulation. Infra at __, s lip op. at 15. Any such construc tion makes no sense unde r the statutory scheme , howeve r. All that an NOD- filing claimant need desire is re view and development by

the ROfo l l o we d

b y i t s i s s u an ce o f a nS OC (o r S S OC ) i f t h e c l ai m an t 's8

disag ree m ent is not resolved by the RO. This is the proce ss require d by section 7105(d) (1). Ultimately , if the claimant is still dissatisfied afte r receiving the SOC (or SSOC), he or she then may purs ue an a

pp e a l t o t h eB VA by

filing a Substantive Appeal, and only then does the c ase g o forwa rd to the Boa

rd for its review. In other wor ds, afte r an NOD is filed, i t is quite possible that it may not become nece ssary

to transmit the case to the BV A. How then c an it be re asonable for the Sec reta ry to require that every d en i ed VA c laimant

mus t, at th e tim e he or

sh e fi le s an N OD , e xpre ss a de sir e fo r B VAre vie w? Th e ans we r i s q uit e simply that it cannot be rea sonable and that, acc ording ly , such a regulatory require ment would not be "c onsistent with" the statutory provisions, a s it must be in or der to be a v al i d re gu l atory require ment promulg ated unde r 38 U.S.C. § 501(a). I ndeed, the Secre t ar y

could promulg ate a regul at i o n only

if the statute lef

t a " g ap" to be filled in by the Secr etar

y , see Chev ron U.S.A. Inc

. , 46 7 U .S. a t 84 3; see also Lee ( Raymond) , 13 Vet.App. at 3 9 5 -96. As we rec ently held in Lee ( Raymond) : Th e de fi c ie nc y

in t he Se c re tary ' s c on te nti on

that th e sta

tut e le a ve s a "g a

p" fo r h im t o fill in be co m es all the more a ppare nt when we apply

the injunction that "whe n interpre ting statutes, the court is r equire d to look at the conte x t and provisions of the law as a w ho le. " De

gm e tic h v . B ro wn , 104 F.3d 1328, 1332 ( Fe d.Cir. 1997). Lee ( Raymond) , 13 Vet.App. at 395. Reg ardingsection 7105, as we have a lrea dy indicated, the Tomlin opinion stands for the proposition that the s t at u t e cr ea t es a f ull and complete pr ocess f or initiating and pe rfe cting a request for "a ppellate review" following the filing of an N OD that initiates the se qu e nti a l ste ps in that re vie w pr oc e ss t hat m ay lead to re view by the B VA on appe al. Henc e,
we c onclude that ther e is no " g ap" in this st atutory scheme and that the S ecr etar y , rathe r than having fi lle d in the g a p c on jur e d u p b y the dis se nti ngop ini on , h a s b y re g ulatio n r a ise d a

ba rr ie r t o a pp e llate revie w wher e none e x ists in s ection 7105. Mo re ov e r, in c on sid e ri ngthe va lid ity of the Se c re tary ' s N OD regul atio n, we mus t be a r i n mind that we are expounding upon an adjudication sy stem deliberately desig ned by Congr ess to be pro-c laimant. Se e He ns le yv . W est , 21 2 F .3 d 12 55 , 12 62 (F e d. Cir . 2 00 0) ; Ha y re v . W est , 188 F.3d 13 27 , 1 33 3 ( F e d. Cir . 1 99 9) ; Ho dg e v . W est , 1 5 5 F

. 3 d 1 3 5 6 , 1 3 6 2

- 6 4 ( F e d

. Ci r. 1998). Consequently , even were we to find some ambig uity in the s tatute, which we do not, we would be compelled to re solve " ' interpre tative doubt . . . in the veter an' s favor ' ". Bo y e r v . W est , 210 F.3d 1351,9

1 3 5 5 (F ed

. C i r. 2 0 0 0 ) ( qu o t i n g Mc Kni gh t v . W est , 131 F.3d 1483, 1485 ( Fe d

. C i r. 1997) (quoting Brown v. Gardner , 51 3 U. S. 11 5, 11 8 ( 19 94 )) ); se e Al le n v . B ro wn , 7 Vet.App. 439, 448 ( en banc ) (ap p l y i n g Gardner

to resolve inter

pretative doubt in vetera

n' s favor ). Finally , we must not lose sight of the fore st as we e x amine the tre es in it. An NOD ope rate s not only as t he li nchpin t o a VA claimant' s obtaining f ull administ rative r eview f rom the Secr etar

y but also as t he indi spensable ticke t to judicial review in this Court. Congre ss specifica lly provided in Veter ans' J udicial Review A ct (VJR A) section 402 that judicial revie w would be available when an NOD "f

iled under se ction [7105] " is submitted o n o r af t er the enac tment of the VJR A. See VJ RA, Pub. L

. No. 100-687 § 402, 102 Stat. 4105, 4122 (1988) ( found at 38 U.S.C. § 7251 note); Barrera v. Gobe r , 122 F .3 d 103 0, 10 31 (F e d. Cir . 1 99 7) ; Gran tha m v . B ro wn , 114 F.3d 1156, 1157 (F ed. Cir. 1997), r e v 'g

8 V e t.A pp . 2 28 (1 99 5) ; Ha mi lto n v . B ro wn , 4 Vet.App. 528, 531 ( 1993) (e n banc) , a ff 'd , 39 F.3d 1574 ( Fe d. Cir. 1994). Wit hout an ef fec tive NOD, the re fo re , a VA c laimant cannot obtain a c c e s s to th is Co u rt. T o p e r mi t t h e Se c r e ta

r y - - b y a d d in g v ia

r e g u lati o nto the statutory require ments for a

n NOD - - to insulate from Court review adjudicative dec isions made on his be ha lf wo uld fl y in t he fa c e of the re me dia l nat ur e of the VJRA in p ro vid ingjud ic ia l r e vie w t o veter ans and othe r VA c laimants. Se e Sm ith (W ill iam ) v . B ro wn , 35 F.3d 1516, 1525 ( Fe d. Cir. 1994) (" cour t s are to construe r emedial statutes liber ally to effe ctuate the ir purposes . . . [and v]eterans be nefits statutes clea rly fall in this categ ory ") . I t would be just as unconsciona ble t o allow the Secr etar

y to ere ct such "a s h i el d ag ainst judicial review " a s it would have bee n for us to have allowed the B VA Chairman to " defe at the rig ht to judicial review at a cr itical juncture in a case by ord eri ng reco ns id erat io n o f a pri or [ BVA] deci si on whi ch i s b ey on d t he re ach o f t hat ri ght. " Sm ith ( Ge or ge ) v . B ro wn , 8 Vet.App. 546, 553 ( 1996) (e n banc) . As J udg e P lag er w rote in Ba rre ra , "w hen

co n s t ru i ng ambig uities in the [VJ RA], we should e rr, if we err at all, on the side of protec t i n g a vet eran 's ri ght t o t he j ud ici al r evi ew C on gress has man dat ed. " Ba rre ra , 122 F.3d at 1040 (Plag er, J ., concur ring ). I n light of the fore g oing a naly sis, there is no basis for a ffor ding the Secre tary even the slighte st latitude to make it more difficult for a claimant to f ile an NOD when VAalre ady has on file a doc ument that satisfies the statutory criter ia for a

n NOD. D. App lic ation o

f L aw t o Fa c ts o f C as e10

I n the instant case , the B oard inter prete d the " ap p el l at e re view" lang uag e in § 20.201 as fo llo ws : The purpose of the Notice of Disag ree ment is to ini ti at e ap pellate r eview by informing VA, within one y ear from the date of VA ' s mailing of the n o t i ce of the re su lt of a de te rm inatio n b y an RO [,] of

the c la ima

nt' s inte nt to ap

pe al t o th eBoa rd

. Tomlin [] , 5 Vet.App. [at] 357. . . .
The B oard f

inds that the October

19 9 4 l et t er can be construe d by a broa d and favor able inter

pretation to indi cate that the appe lla n t was in disag ree ment with the September 1994 r ating decision. The r epre sent ati ve indicate d the dec ision was "pr emature " a

nd asked for further development of t he [ PTSD] stressors, which can be construe d to indicate his dissatisfaction with the denia l of servic e conne ction.
Howeve r, the letter

cannot be rea sonably

construed to indicate the appellant' s desire for a ppellate r eview. The letter subm itted by an ac credited represe ntati ve did not give the V

A notice of intent to appe al to the Board. I t wa s in eve ry wa y a re qu e st that the RO take f

urther a ction i n d eveloping stressor evidenc e. The note attac hed to the l etter r efle cts the RO' s understandingthat it was a re quest for f urther de ve lop me nt a

nd that th e re wa s n o a c tua l no tic e of int e nt t o a

pp e a l.
R. at 7- 8 ( e mph a sis a dd e d) . A s o ur fo re g oin g dis c us sio n d e mon str a te s, the B oa rd wa s mi sta

ke n in its int e rp re ta tio n o f § 20 .2 01 . A lth ou g h s ome pr ior de c isi on s o f t

his C ou rt may hav e , in

dic tum , g iven cr edenc e to similar interpre tations, as has been established above the Court has neve r dire c tly addre ssed this issue. W e do so now, a nd hold t h at § 2 0

. 2 0 1, to the extent that it might be r ead a s requiring that an NOD e x press a desire f or BV A review , runs af

oul of the Tom lin inj un c tio n a g a ins t VA' s adding a " tec h nical for mal require ment[] for a

n NOD be y ond the re quirements set by the statut e " and the re by " e xce e d[s] the Se c re tary ' s a uth or ity " to pr e sc ri be re g ulatio ns un de r 3 8 U .S. C. § 501. Tom lin , 5 Ve t.A pp . at 35 7; se e als o B e rn ie r v . B ro wn , 7 Vet.App. 434, 438 ( 1 9 95) (invalidating VA re g ulation to the ext ent that Secr etar y ' s interpre tation of it is followed). There fore , insofar a s § 20.201 may be interpre ted as a dding a require ment of an e x pression of a de sire for B VA revi ew , we he reby invalidate it. See Lee(

Raymond) , 13 Vet.App. at 397; Be rn ie r and Gardner , both su pra . To the extent that § 20.201 may be re ad as r equ i ri n g only an expression of a desire for further development and revie w action by the R O, i t adds nothing to the statutory lang uag e re quiring an expression of disag ree ment; that is, such a desire is inhere nt in the

su bmi ssi on of an NO D und e r se c tio n 710 5 g ive n the se qu e nti a l ste ps it e sta bli sh e s o nc e an N OD is11

fi le d to " ini tiate [ ]" " [a]p pe llate re vie w" . 3 8 U .S. C. § 71 05 (a ); c f. S tro tt v. De rwinski , 964 F.2d 1124, 1127 (F ed. Cir. 1992) (holdingthat hear ing at RO held after NOD and S ubstantive Appea l are filed " is part of t h e appe llate proc ess" ). In either e vent, the re g ulatory ref ere nce to " a desire for appellate revie w" cannot support f inding invalid as a

n NOD a document that other wise complies with the five sec tion 7105 elements of an N OD. Indeed, to hold other wise would be c ontrary

to the le g isl a tiv e his tor

y a c c omp anyingthe a do pti on in 1 96 2 o f t

he NO D le g isl a tiv e langua g e ; the Se nate

c omm itt e e the n state d that the purp os e of the bil l re g ard ing NO Ds wa s to " pla c e the ve te ra n .
. . in a bet ter po s i ti on to dev elo p n ew ev id ence a vai lab le a ndto ful ly prep are an d p res ent hi s ap peal ". S. Rep. No. 1843 (1962), re pr int e d in U.S.C.C.A.N. 2570, 2577. I t is this ve r

y s a me f u rth e r d e v e lo p me n t a

n d r e v ie w b y

th e RO th a t t

h e D A V le tt e r

was reque sting in this case . Be cause such fur ther pre paration is contemplated by section 7105(d) (1) a fter the submission of an NOD ( i.e., furthe r RO deve lopment and re view), holding that the document at issue here is not an NOD would fr ustrate that leg islative intent beca use, in this case, the veter an specific ally requested further prepa ration. E. DAV Letter Constit uted NOD I t is undisput ed that the DAV letter fulfilled the five section 7105 elements of an NOD: I t (1) expressed disag ree ment with an RO dec ision, (2) was in wr iting, (3) was filed w ith the RO, (4) wa s filed within one y ear afte r the date of mailing of notice of the result of that RO dec ision, and (5) wa s filed by the claimant' s authorized repr esentative. See 38 U.S.C. § 7105; R. at 7-8; Appellant' s Br . at 7; Secre tary ' s Br . at 3, 7. The B oard e x pressly found as f

act tha t t h e DA V l et t er c an " be construed . . . to indicate that the appe llant was in disag ree ment with the Sep t ember 1994 rating decision" . R. at 8. Be cause , as we held above , 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 cannot be re ad as imposing any formal r equire ments bey ond those set by 38 U.S.C. § 7105, se e Tom lin , su pr a , an d , b eca

use the expression of a desire for a ppellate r eview is either such an impermissible a dded re quirement or a n inhe re nt e le me nt o f a

n N OD , th e re qu ir e me nts of the statut e are a ll that th e ve te ra n wa s re qu ir e d to satisfy , and it is undisputed that he did so via the DAV le tter. Ac cording ly , we hold that the vetera n filed a va lid NOD as to the Septembe r 1994 RO dec ision. Theref ore, t h e C ourt will rever se the De c e mb e r

1 9 9 8 B V A d e c is io nto th e c o n tr ar y an d r e ma n d th e c la im

to th e B o ar d

f o r f u rth er12

adjudication as to the eff

ective date of the awa

rd of service connec tion f or the veter an' s PTSD. See 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(1)

.

III. Conclusi on Upon consider ation of the R OA and the plea dings of the par ties, the Court reve rses the D e c e mb e r

9 , 1 9 9 8 , B V A d e c is io nan d r e ma n d s th e matt e r

to th e B V A f

o r p r o c e e d in g s c o n s iste nt with th i s o p i nion. The Court notes that a r emand by this Court and by

the B oard c onfer s on an appellant the r i ght to VA compliance with the terms of the r emand or der a nd imposes on the Secre tary a conc omitant duty

to ensure c o m p l i ance with those terms. Se e Ste ga ll v . W

est , 11 Vet.App. 268, 271 ( 1998). A fina l decision by the Board following the remand he rein orde red will constitut e a ne w dec ision that, if adver se, may be appea led to this Court only upon the filing of

a new Notice of Appea l w ith the Court not later than 120 day s after

the date on w hich notice of the new B oard f

inal decision is mailed to the appe llant. Se e Ma rsh v . W est , 1 1 Ve t.App. 468, 472 (1998). REVERSED AND REMANDED

.

FARL EY, Judge , d is s e n ti n g : I n my v ie w , 3 8 C. F

. R. § 2 0

. 2 0 1 w a s p r o mu lg a te d b y the Se c re tary purs ua nt t o h is l awf

ul a uth or ity and its su bs tanti ve te rm s ar e fu lly c on so na nt wit h th e sp ir it

and the le tte r o f t

he sc heme of ti tl e 38 , U .S. Cod e . T he re fo re , I c ann ot j oin

wi th t he ma jor ity in str iki ngdo wn

that r e g ulatio n. No r c an I a g re e to a reve rsa l of the B VAde c isi on wh ic h p ro pe rl y int e rp re te d th e re g ulatio n a nd a pp lie d it to the fa c ts p re se nte d in thi s matte r. Thus , I

re sp e c tf ull y dis se nt. Se c tio n 7 10 5 o f t itl e 38 , U .S. Cod e , p ro vid e s th a t

[a] ppellate r eview w ill be initi ated by a notice of

disag ree ment . . . [whic h ] s hall be filed w ithin one y ear from the date of mailing of notice of the result of initial re view or deter mination. Such notice

. . . must be in wri t i n g an d be filed w ith the activity which ente red the deter mination with which disag ree ment is expressed. . . . Noti ces of dis a g re e me nt .

. . mus t be in wr iti ng and may be fi le d b y the c la ima

nt, the claimant' s leg al g uardia n, or such a ccr edited re prese ntative a tto rn e y , o r a

uth or ize d a g e nt. I f n o noti c e of dis a g re e me nt is f ile d in13 acc ordanc e with this chapter within the prescr ibed per iod, the action or d ete rm in ati on sh all beco me f in al.

. . ."
The term "notice of di sag ree ment" is not define d further either by section 7105 or by section 101 of ti t l e 3 8 U. S

. Code, which provide s the definitions "[f]or the purposes of this ti tle." H oweve r, pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 501(a),

Th e S ec reta

ry has authority

to prescr ibe all rules a

nd regulations which ar e necessar

y or appropriate to car

ry out the laws administere d by the Depa rtment and a

re c onsistent with thos e laws, inc luding-

- (2) the f orms of application by

claimants under

such laws. . . .

To ensur e t h at hi s ag encie s of orig inal jurisdiction would be able to fa cilitate the Cong ressional mandate that "[a]ppellate re view will be initiated by a notice of

disag ree ment," the Secre tary , in the exercise of

this § 501(a) authority , promulg ated 38 C.F.R. § 20.201. I n defining the term " notice of disag ree ment," the Secre tary deter mined that, "[w]hile spe cial wording is not re quired, the N otice of Di sa g re e me nt m

us t be in t e rm s wh ic h c a n b e r e a s o n a b ly c o n s tr u e d as d i sag ree ment with that deter mination and a d

esir e for ap pe lla te re v ie w. " ( Emphasis supplied.) To my mind, such a require ment is both consistent with the statutory scheme and re asonable as a matter of a dminist rative p recaution for, a s a dec ade of experience with judicial reviewhas demonstrated, an a g ency of

or ig ina l juri sd ic tio n r e c e ive s innume ra ble c omm

un ic a tio ns fr om c la ima

nts and the c la ima

nts '

re pr e se ntativ e s. Th e RO mus t be a ble to re a so na

bly a sc e rt a in a

c la ima nt' s in te nti on

in s e nd inghis or her communication to be able to determine w hat cour se of a ct i o n is require d by law, and suc h de te rm inatio ns have to be c on sis te nt f ro m RO to R O thr ou g ho ut t he natio n. Th e Se c re tary , in pr omu lg a tin g the re g ulatio n, me re ly art ic ulate d that an NO D mus t be c a pa ble of be ing" re a so na

bly

c on str ue d" a s a sk ingfo r a

pp e llate re vie w s o th a t a dju dic a tio n o ff ic e rs wo uld

be on no tic e to i nit ia te the re view proc ess. This provision is consistent with § 7105 and it fulfills t he purpose of an N OD in th e p r o c e s s s e t u

p un d e r ti tl e 3 8 an d a s s e t f o r th in th e s tatute an d it s le g is lati v e h is tor y
. S ee Mee ks , __ F.3d __, __, No. 99-7137, slip op. at 5-6 (F ed. Cir. June 27, 20 0 0 ) ( "[ S] tatutory in ter pret ati on is a ho li st ic e nd eavo r t hat requ ir es co ns id erat io n o f a s tat ut ory sch eme in it s en ti ret y "; when inter

preting a statute the c ourt should "look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy ." ( internal c itations omi tted)).14

As the majority

noted, when r eviewin g a statute, if the Congressional intent is clea r, the

ma tte r i s e nd e d. " I f, ho we ve r, the c ourt de te rm ine s Con g re ss h a s n ot d ir e c tly a dd re sse d th e pr e c ise question at issue . . . if the st atut e is silent or ambig uous with respec t to the specific issue, the question for the court is w hether the ag ency ' s answer is based on a pe rmissible construction of the statut e ." C

h ev r o n U.S.A. Inc . v. Natural Resources De fense Council, Inc

. , 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) ( footnotes omitted). I n a footnote in Chevron , th e Court no te d th a t: the c ourt ne e d no t c on c lud e that the a g e nc y c on str uc tio n wa s the on ly one it permissibly

could have adopted to uphold the construc tion, or e ve n th e re a din g the c ourt

wo uld have re a c he d if

the qu e sti on

ini tia lly h adar i s en i na j u d i ci al p ro ce ed i n g.
Id . at 84 3 n ote 11 . A n a g e nc y ' s a dmi nis tr a tio n o f a pr og ra m c re a te d b y

Con g re ss " ne c e ssa

ri ly

r e qu i r e s t h e f

o r m u l a t i o no f p o l i c y an d

t h e m a k i n g o f

r u l e s t o f i l l an y g a p l e f t , i mp l i c i t l y o r

e x p l i c i t l y, by Co ngres s. " Id

. at 8 4 3 (q u o t i n g Mo rto n v . R uiz , 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)) . Where " Congr ess has expli citly left a g ap for

the ag ency t o fill, there is an e x press de leg ation of authority to the ag ency to elucidate a

specific provision of the statute by regulation." T h es e ty

pes of r eg ulations are

con tr ol li ng "unl ess th ey

are arb it rary , cap ri cio us , or mani fes tl y con tr ary to th e st atu te. " Id . at 843-44. Whe re the " le g isl a tiv e de le g a tio n to an a g e nc y on a pa rt ic ula r q ue sti on is i mpl ic it r a the r t

ha n e xplic it

. . . a c ourt may no t su bs tit ute its ow n c on str

uc tio n o f a

statutory pro vi si on for

a re a so na ble interpre tation" made by

an ag ency
. Id . at 844. I n Chevron , th e Sup re me Court no te d th a t an a g e nc y ' s c on str uc tio n o f a

statutor y sc he me should be g iven "c onsiderable weig ht" and that wher e the mea ning of a statute involves " rec onciling

con fl ict in g p ol ici es, and a ful l un ders tan di ng of th e for ce of th e st atu to ry

po li cy " ( id .), if the " choice

re p re s en t s a re as o n ab l e ac co m m o d at i o n o f co n fl i ct i n g p o l i ci es t h at we re co m m i t t edt o t h e a gen cy 's

car e by the statute, [the Court] should not dist urb it unless it appear s from the statute or its legislative hi st ory th at t he acc om mo dat io n i s n ot on e th at C on gress wou ldhav e san cti on ed. " Id . at 845 (quoting United States v. Shime r , 3 6 7 U. S

. 3 7 4 , 3 8 2 , 3 8 3 (1 9 6 1 ))

. T h e F ed er al C i rc u i t , i n r e v i e w i n g a decision fr om this Court, rec ently noted t hat where the "statute is silent or ambiguous about a matter, the cour t give s defe renc e to interpre tations of the ag ency char g ed with the d u t y t o administer it." Mee ks ,

_ _ F

. 3 d a t

_

_ , s l i p op . a t 4; see also Nationsbank v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co.,15

51 3 U .S. 25 1, 25 6 ( 19 95 ) ( " I t is se ttl e d th a t c ourt s sh ou ld giv e great wei g ht t o a ny re a so na ble construction of a

regulatory

statute adopted by t h e ag ency char g ed with the enf

orce ment of that

s t at u t e. ") (q u o t i n g Clarke v. Se curities Industry Assn. , 479 U.S. 38 8 , 403-04 (1987) (quoting Inve stment Company Institute v. Camp , 401 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1971)) ). Congr ess did not specifi ca l l y addre ss the question this appeal ra ises: what constitutes an NOD? Although it ca

n be conc l u d ed fr o m the lang uag e of § 7105 a nd the term " notice of dis a g re e me nt" its e lf

that an NO D is a

wr itt e n c omm

un ic a tio n e xpre ssi ngdis a g re e me nt w itha n RO decision, no fur

ther guidance of a subs t an t i v e nature has be en off ere d by Congr ess. Wherea s the

m aj o ri t y s ee s t h i s s t at u t o ry

v o i d as s o m e h o w p re v en t i n g t h e S ec re t ary fr o m p ro m u l gat i n g a
su bs tanti ve re g ulatio n, Ibe lie ve it is mor e pr op e rl y vie we d as a g a p whi c h not onl y

c ou ld b ut s ho uld be filled by regulation under the Secre tary ' s authority and re sponsibili ty

to promulgate all rules a

nd

re g ulatio ns tha

t are ne c e ssa

ry fo r c arr y ingou t the laws he a dmi nis te rs . T his de le g a tio n s pe c if ic a lly included the f

orms of applications by

claimants. 38 U.S.C. § 501(a)( 2). J ust like the statutory lang uag e, the leg islative history does not help t o answe r the que stion of what an NOD must contain. The portion of t he leg islative history cited by the majority

does not define an NOD but describe s its purpose, i.e., "to fully prepa re and prese nt [ the veter an' s] appeal." S. Re p. No

. 18 43 , 19 62 U. S. Co de Con g . & Ad min . N e ws 25 70 , 2 57 7; An te at 10. Since nothing in t he statut e or

its le g isl a tiv e his tor

y sp e a ks to w hat sh ou ld b e c on ta ine d in an N OD , th e on ly qu e sti on is w he the r t

he g uid anc e pr ov ide d b y

the Se c re tary

in 3 8 C. F .R. § 2 0. 20 1 is a " re a so na ble interpre tation" of

§ 7105, and if the r eg ulation "r epre sents a re ason ab l e ac comm odation of

con fl ict in g pol ici es t hat were co mm it ted to th e [ S e c r e t a ry 's] care b y [ ti tl e 38 ] ." Chevron , 46 7 U .S. a t 84 5. Ibe lie ve it i s and it d oe s. The majority

purports to find s u p p o rt for its views in Tom lin v . B ro wn , 5 Vet.App. 355 (1993) but its analy sis cannot withstand scrutiny . I n Tom lin the portion of the r eg ulation at issue was that part whic h required t h at an NOD be a " written communication." The Court found that the statements of the a

ppellant' s repr esentative at an RO he aringwhich had be en transcr ibed satisfied the requirement that an NOD be in writi ng . I n my view, Tom lin sta

nd s o nly fo r t he pr op os iti on

that, t o t h e e x t en tt h at 3 8 C

. F. R

. § 2 0

. 2 0 1 m ay b e r ea d t o re qu i re t h e c l a i m an to r t h e c l ai m an t 's repr esentative' s to actually be the one to write the c ommunication expressing disag ree ment, such a16

require ment would be beyond the Secr etar y ' s authority . The issue pre sent ed i n t h i s appea l was neither pr esented n o r discussed in Tom lin . U nd a un te d b y thi s a pp are nt h ur dle , th e ma

jor ity conclude s that "[ t ] h e C o u rt in Tom lin thus, by implication , rea d out of the re g ulation any added

re qu ir e me nt of an e xpre ssi on of a de sir e fo r a pp e llate re vie w." Ante at 7 (e mphasis supplied). I cannot f ind in Tom lin the " implication" the major ity here found, but eve n if Iwer e able to catch a flee ting g limpse of one, I could not attach to it the s ignif icanc e the majority

purports to discer

n. Nor

c an I agr e e wi th t

he ma jor ity ' s f ind ingtha

t Tom lin deter

mined once a

nd fore ver " [t ]he clarity

and completene ss of the statute" or that it can stand f or as lar g e a " proposition" as the majority here attempts to lay

down. Ante at 6. I f the import of the ma jority ' s holding is that the Court, by quoting only a par t of a re g ulation, effe ctively strikes down the omitted sections of that r eg ulation, then throug h the dec isions of this Court larg e seg ments of the VA r eg ulatory scheme must already

have been e viscerated. Th e po rt ion

of the re g ulatio n at is su e he re do e s n ot r un a fo ul o f t

he ma xim set for th in Tom lin , a nd re lie d u po n b y the ma jor ity , th a t the Se c re tary by re g ulatio n c ann ot i mpo se any sp e c if ic technica l require ments not authorized by the statute. Tom lin , 5 Vet.App. at 357. The provision that the terms of the NOD be capa ble of be ing c onstrued as se eking appellate revie w imposes no such te c hn ic a l r e qu ir e me nt. Th e re g ulati on do e s n ot r e qu ir e c e rt a in w or ds or ph ra se s; i n f

a c t, i t

rec og nizes that "spec ial wording is not require d." 38 C.F.R. § 20.201. As the statute make s clea r, the NOD is a

docu m en t filed to initi ate a ppellate r eview a

nd it is t here fore rea sonable for the Se c re tary to r e qu ir e that the c omm un ic a tio n fi le d by the c la ima nt so me ho w i nd ic a te that a pp e llate

re v ie w is w h a t h e o r s h e s e e k s
. T h e ma jo r it y a s k s th e qu e s ti o n h o w " c an it b e r e asonable for the Se c re tary to r e qu ir e that e ve ry

de nie d V A c la ima

nt mus t, a t the tim e he or

sh e fi le s a

n N OD , e xpre ss
a des ir e for BVA revi ew? " An te at 7. The better question, g iven the nature of cla ims adjudication, the my riad piec es of c orre spondence , and the ne ed for national consistency , is "how c o u l d such a require ment be unre asonable ? " T h e an s we r i s : the "de sire for appellate revie w" provision of 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 is not unreasona ble, and there is no basis in statutory or ca se law f or striking that

re gu l at i o nas t h e m aj o ri t y d o es t o d ay
. M i n d fu l o f t h e d ef er en ce t o b e a c c o r d edan age n cy 's construction of a s t at ute, I would find the subject r egulation to be a " rea sonable interpr etation" of 38 U.S.C. § 7105. See Che vron , Mee ks , and Nationsbank , a ll su pra .17

I n its decision, the majority points to the fact that the s y stem of veterans benefits is desig ned to be pro- claimant, invoking J udg e Plag er' s admonition in Ba rre ra that a vete ran' s rig ht to judicial revie w be pr otected. An te at 9. Ther e is nothing in this reg ulation which is anti-claimant or which erect s "a barr ier to app ell ate revi ew whe re no ne ex is ts in sect io n 7 10 5. " An te at 8. Cong ress ha s set forth c erta in proce dures f or obtaining judicial revie w and, a s the majority must and has conc eded, the initial requireme nt is a valid NOD. Sec tion 20.201 is not hing mo re than " the formulation of policy and the making of rules" require d of t he S ecr etar y in order to g ive form to the proc ess leading to the judicial revie w mandate d by Congr ess under

the VJR A. See Chevron , 467 U.S. at 843. Turning to the fac ts, and presuming the co ntinuing vitality of § 20.201, whe n deter

mining

w h e th e r a d o c u me n t c o n s ti tute s an N O D , th e Co u rt l o o k s a t b o th th e a c tu a l w o r d in g an d

th e c o n te xt in which the communication was written. J arv is v . W est , 12 Vet.App. 559, 561 ( 1999). The O ctober 1994 DAV letter

calls the RO dec ision "pre mature," s t ates the belief that " [f] urther de ve lop me nt .

. . wo uld pr ov e be ne fi c ia l to fa ir e va luatio n of thi s vet e ra n' s cla im, " and

" su g g e st[s ]

c are fu l g le anin g of

the inf or ma tio n f ro m the Soc ia l Wor

ke r' s st ate me nt w ou ld g ive su ff ic ie nt d e ta il

w it h o u t d e la y to r e qu e s t th o r o u g h inv e s ti g a ti o n
. " R. a t 2 2 8

. T h e a u th o r o f th is " M e mo to Rating Boa rd" was a

n employ ee of

the Disabl ed Americ an Ve tera ns, a re cog nized vetera

ns service org anization whose repr esentatives are permitted to prosec ute claims under the laws a dminist ere d by VA. See 38 U.S.C. § 5902. That being so, it is re asonable to expect that the DAV is aw are of the re quirements f

o r a v alid NOD a

nd for se eking appellate revie w of a n RO decision under

the pertinent statutes a

nd regulations. The B oard he ld that the DAV letter , while it may be construe d to express disagr eeme nt with the RO decision, cannot be reasonably construed to ex press a desire for a ppellate r eview. B eca

use I find no fac tual or l eg al error in that conclusion, I would aff

irm the B VAde te rm inatio n th a t th e Oc tob e r 19 94 DA V le tte r is no t a va lid NO D. Th e re fo re , Ire sp e c tf ull y dis se nt.