IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

August 20, 2013 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. TAMMY KAY SCOTT, ALIAS 

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Knox County

No. 96100 Jon Kerry Blackwood, Judge

No. E2012-02734-CCA-R3-CD - Filed December 16, 2013

The defendant, Tammy Kay Scott, alias, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court

jury of possession of less than 200 grams of a Schedule II controlled substance with intent

to sell and possession of less than 200 grams of a Schedule II controlled substance with intent

to deliver, Class C felonies. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the

defendant to five years of probation after service of thirty days. On appeal, the defendant

argues that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress her statement as it was

obtained in violation of her right to counsel. After review, we affirm the judgment of the

trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

ALAN E. GLENN,J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which JOSEPH M. TIPTON, P.J., and

ROGER A. PAGE, J., joined.

A. Philip Lomonaco, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Tammy Kay Scott, alias.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Lacy Wilber, Assistant Attorney

General; Randall E. Nichols, District Attorney General; and Kenneth F. Irvine, Jr., Assistant

District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

FACTS

Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress her statement to the police,

arguing that police officers continued to question her after she requested a lawyer; thus, her

statement was obtained in violation of her right to counsel.
At the suppression hearing, the defendant testified that she worked at Smurfit-Stone

for six and a half years before she was injured on the job. After her injury, she was

prescribed Roxicodone and Oxycodone. The defendant recalled that on January 27, 2010,

she and her live-in boyfriend of many years, Arlie Sherlin, were at home when she “heard

someone hit the house” and thought they were being robbed. What turned out to be several

police officers executing a search warrant burst their way into the defendant’s home,

shouting expletives at her and Sherlin. One of the officers, Officer Ramsey, used “vulgar

language” and told her that she had to help them or she was “going down.” The defendant

“gave [Officer Ramsey] names,” but when he explained that she would have to wear a wire

and go into people’s homes, she said, “That’s risking my life. I’d rather not do that.” The

defendant claimed that she said to Officer Ramsey, “I think I need an attorney,” and he

responded, “Oh. You said the magic word.” She said that another officer entered the room

and asked if she had said “the magic word,” and Officer Ramsey said that she had.

The defendant testified that she told Officer Ramsey that she did not want to go to jail,

and he responded, using profanity, that they would help her if she helped them. She said that

these conversations, including when she mentioned an attorney, all happened prior to the tape

recorder being turned on. She stated that Officer Ramsey turned on the tape recorder for her

statement, in which she gave names of other people. She also told the officers that she had

sold a couple of her pills.

Arlie Sherlin testified to the events of January 27, 2010, when the police entered his

and the defendant’s home. He recalled that when he and the defendant were in the living

room talking to the officers, the defendant said, “I think I need a lawyer,” and Officer

Ramsey said, “Well, you said the magic word[.]” Sherlin recalled that another officer

entered the room and asked whether the defendant had said “the magic word,” and Officer

Ramsey replied that she had.

Officer James Ramsey with the Knox County Sheriff’s Office testified that he and

approximately ten other officers executed a search warrant at the defendant’s residence on

January 27, 2010. Officer Ramsey denied that the defendant ever said, “I might need a

lawyer,” or asked for a lawyer in any other manner. Officer Ramsey also denied making the

statement that the defendant had “said the magic words.” He denied knowing what the

phrase “magic words” meant.

In its order denying the defendant’s motion to suppress, the trial court did not accredit

Officer Ramsey’s testimony and noted that the officer’s “appearance and demeanor [o]n the

witness stand was one of mockery and disdain.” The court accredited the defendant’s

testimony and found that she had said, “I think I need a lawyer,” prior to making

incriminating statements on the audio recording. Even though the court determined that the

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defendant made the statement, it found that the statement was not “an unequivocal and

unambiguous assertion of her right to counsel” and for that reason denied the defendant’s

motion to suppress.

ANALYSIS

The defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress.

Relying on State v. Turner, 305 S.W.3d 508 (Tenn. 2010), the defendant asserts that once she

made a request for an attorney, albeit an equivocal request, prior to being advised of her

Miranda rights, Officer Ramsey was required to limit his questioning to clarifying whether

she actually wished to invoke her right to counsel.

On appeal, a trial court’s findings of fact regarding a motion to suppress are

conclusive unless the evidence preponderates against them. State v. Reid, 213 S.W.3d 792,

825 (Tenn. 2006) (citing State v. Ross, 49 S.W.3d 833, 839 (Tenn. 2001)). Any question

about the “credibility of witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, and a resolution of

conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of fact.” State v.

Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996). The party prevailing at the suppression hearing is

afforded the “strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable and legitimate

inferences that may be drawn from that evidence.” State v. Keith, 978 S.W.2d 861, 864

(Tenn. 1998). Thus, unless the defendant demonstrates that “the evidence preponderates

against the judgment of the trial court, this court must defer to the ruling of the trial court.”

Reid, 213 S.W.3d at 825 (citing State v. Cribbs, 967 S.W.2d 773, 795 (Tenn. 1998)).

However, the application of the law to the facts found by the trial court is a question of law

and is reviewed de novo. See State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tenn. 1997). Whether

a suspect’s request for counsel is equivocal or unequivocal is a mixed question of law and

fact that is ultimately subject to de novo review. State v. Climer, 400 S.W.3d 537, 556

(Tenn. 2013).

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[n]o person

. . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const.

amend. V. The corresponding provision of the Tennessee Constitution states “[t]hat in all

criminal prosecutions, the accused . . . shall not be compelled to give evidence against

himself.” Tenn. Const. art. I, § 9. Thus, to be admissible at trial, a confession made while

under custodial interrogation must be shown to have been freely and voluntarily given, after

the defendant’s knowing waiver of his constitutional right to remain silent and to have an

attorney present during questioning. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).

When a suspect makes an unequivocal request for an attorney, all interrogation must

cease unless the suspect himself initiates further conversation with the police. See Edwards

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v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981). However, an invocation of the right to counsel

“requires, at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an

expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney.” Davis v. United States, 512 U.S.

452, 459 (1994) (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178 (1991)). In other words,

the suspect’s request for an attorney must be stated “sufficiently clearly that a reasonable

police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an

attorney.” Id. “[I]f a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal

in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the

suspect might be invoking the right to counsel,” questioning need not cease nor must an

officer clarify the suspect’s intention regarding invocation of the right to counsel. Id.

Lessthan two weeks before the defendantsubmitted his brief in this case, oursupreme

court released its decision in Climer, 400 S.W.3d 537, overruling its decision in Turner, 305

S.W.3d 508, which was the entire basis for the defendant’s argument. In Turner, the court

distinguished pre- and post-Miranda equivocal requests for counsel and held, “Where . . . a

suspect makes an equivocal request for counsel prior to waiving Miranda rights, the police

are limited to questions intended to clarify the request until the suspect either clearly invokes

his right to counsel or waives it.” Id. at 519. However, in Climer, the court extinguished the

distinction between pre- and post-Miranda requests for counsel in light of the United States

Supreme Court’s decision in Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010), and held that an

officer was not limited to asking only clarifying questions when a suspect made an equivocal

invocation of his right to counsel. 400 S.W.3d at 561-62. The court stated, “[W]hen

determining whether a suspect has invoked the right to counsel . . ., Tennessee courts must

apply the Davis standard, regardless of the timing of the suspect’s alleged invocation of the

right. The pre-waiver/post-waiver distinction drawn in Turner has been abrogated by

Berghuis.” Id. at 562 (footnote omitted).

The defendant appears to concede that her statement about counsel was an equivocal

request for an attorney. Moreover, numerous decisions of our courts indicate that the

defendant’s request was equivocal. See, e.g., State v. Saylor, 117 S.W.3d 239, 243-44 (Tenn.

2003) (“I’m supposed to have a lawyer though, don’t I?” and “I might need a lawyer”); State

v. Michael James Bell, No. E2008-01499-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 3612751, at *24 (Tenn.

Crim. App. Sept. 17, 2010) (“I think I need to talk to a lawyer,” “I think I need a lawyer,” and

“I might need a lawyer”), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 16, 2011); State v. Adam Sanders,

No. M2005-02185-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 3516210, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 6, 2006)

(“I guess I need a lawyer, don’t I?”); see also Davis, 512 U.S. at 462 (“Maybe I should talk

to a lawyer”). Because the defendant made an equivocal request for counsel when she said,

“I think I need an attorney,” and officers were not required to cease questioning or limit

questions to clarifying the defendant’s intent, the trial court properly denied the defendant’s

motion to suppress.

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CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing authorities and reasoning, we affirm the judgment of the trial

court.

_________________________________

ALAN E. GLENN, JUDGE

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