Andrew Mara and Lynn McGrath 

Center for Technology and National Security Policy 

National Defense University 

September 2009 

Defending the Military Food Supply

Acquisition, Preparation, and Protection 

 of Food at U.S. Military Installations 
ii

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official 

policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense or the 

U.S. Government. All information and sources for this paper were drawn from 

unclassified materials. 

Dr. Andrew Mara is the 2008-09 AAAS Science and Technology Policy Fellow at the 

Center for Technology and National Security Policy based at the National Defense 

University. Andrew earned his PhD in Molecular, Cellular and Developmental Biology 

from Yale University. He also holds dual undergraduate degrees in Molecular Biology 

and Economics from the University of California at San Diego. 

Lynn McGrath is a Research Assistant at the Center for Technology and National 

Security Policy based at the National Defense University. 

Defense & Technology Papers are published by the National Defense University Center for Technology 

and National Security Policy, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC. CTNSP publications are available 

at http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/publications.html. 
iii

Contents 

Introduction......................................................................................................................................1 

Likelihood of an Attack ...................................................................................................................3 

Threats to the Food Supply..............................................................................................................5 

Current Food Defense Measures......................................................................................................9 

Enhancing Food Defense Capabilities...........................................................................................14 

Conclusions and Recommendations ..............................................................................................22

Appendix 1: List of Abbreviations ................................................................................................24 
iv
1

Introduction 

As the world becomes smaller, the presence of U.S. military forces in foreign countries is 

likely to continue. The ongoing military engagements in both Iraq and Afghanistan have 

taught us that U.S. troops stationed abroad are attractive targets for hostile governments, 

organizations, and individuals. A safe food supply is a core capability required for 

sustaining a military presence in a foreign country. While there are limited examples of 

attempts to poison the military food supply,1,2 one cannot ignore the fact that 

contaminated food could rapidly and effectively reduce the combat readiness of 

American forces. 

Most Americans assume that the United States food supply is both safe and secure. 

However, in January 2009, 31 million pounds of peanut butter and peanut paste produced 

by the Peanut Corporation of America (PCA) were recalled due to over 600 confirmed 

cases of Salmonella.3

 Not surprisingly, PCA filed for bankruptcy shortly thereafter. This 

incident, in addition to other recent outbreaks of pathogenic Escherichia coli and 

Salmonella has raised doubts about food safety. Moreover, these epidemics have 

highlighted the fact that food produced domestically (as was the case with PCA and with 

E. coli tainted spinach from California in the fall of 2006)4

 and imported from abroad 

(Salmonella contaminated Serrano peppers from Mexico in the summer of 2008)5 can be 

an effective vector for illness. 

The cases mentioned above are due to lapses in food safety, so what exactly is food 

defense? In the context of this report, food defense deals with the prevention of 

intentional contamination of food with any substance that can cause harm. Food safety, 

on the other hand, is defined as the prevention of accidental contamination of food. Since 

both food safety and food defense deal with the prevention of contamination, it follows 

that measures for enhancing food safety and food defense often go hand in hand. 

Throughout this report we will examine current measures in place to defend the military 

food supply. Where current efforts could be expanded we provide a series of 

recommendations that will enhance food defense and often provide ancillary benefits to 

the military. 

 

1Associated Press, “Insurgent suspected of mass poisoning of Iraq police,” The Australian, October 11, 

2006, available at <www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,20560653-2703,00.html>. 2

 James Risen and Don van Natta, “Plot to Poison Food of British Troops is Suspected,” The New York 

Times, January 24, 2003, available at <query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res= 9F01E0DC 

1639F937A15752C0A9659C8B63>. 

3

 FDA, “Recall of Peanut Containing Products: Salmonella Typhimurium,” April 10, 2009, available at 

<www.fda.gov/oc/opacom/hottopics/Salmonellatyph.html>. 

4

 California Department of Health Services, “Investigation of an Escherichia coli O157:H7 Outbreak 

Associated with Dole Pre-Packaged Spinach,” March 2007, available at 

<www.dhs.ca.gov/fdb/HTML/Food/EnvInvRpt.htm>. 

5

 CDC, “Investigation of Outbreak of Infections Caused by Salmonella Saintpaul,” August 28, 2008, 

available at <www.cdc.gov/Salmonella/saintpaul/>. 
2

Scope of this Report 

As described later, the military food supply chain is long and complex, making a 

comprehensive examination of military food defense extremely difficult. We have limited 

the scope of this report to the most vulnerable sections of the military food supply. 

Specifically, we will discuss food defense for troops stationed outside the United States. 

While domestic contamination of food is a possibility, the foreign supply chain is longer 

and ultimately more vulnerable. Furthermore, we will not deal with the defense of meals, 

ready-to-eat (MREs). The individually sealed packaging of MREs makes mass 

contamination difficult, rendering MREs a less than ideal target. Furthermore, MREs are 

produced exclusively in the United States and under strict regulation, further decreasing 

their attractiveness as a target.6

 For these very reasons, MREs and Unitized Group 

Rations (UGRs) are often designated as emergency food sources should a food defense 

breach occur. Finally, we will assume that food delivered from the United States is free 

from contamination when it leaves the production facility. For a number of reasons, it 

would be extremely difficult to specifically target food destined for the military this early 

in the supply chain. 

 

6

 Interview with Dr. Ana Sanders, Chief, Quality Audits and Food Defense Branch at Defense Supply 

Center Philadelphia, October 17, 2008. 
3

Likelihood of an Attack 

The importance of the U.S. food supply was recently highlighted when the agricultural 

system was identified as a critical infrastructure.7

 Despite the apparent vulnerability of 

the food supply, there are limited examples of intentional contamination of food. In fact, 

a recent study of all food defense breaches worldwide from 1950 on concluded that only 

391 fatalities and 4,355 injuries have resulted from intentional contamination. The most 

successful of these attacks occurred in 1984, when a cult in The Dalles, Oregon, 

contaminated restaurant salad bars with Salmonella typhphimurium. The attack, which 

made 751 people ill, appears to be the only publicly confirmed case of food terrorism in 

the United States. Several other instances of deliberate contamination have occurred, 

though they have been relatively minor, often affecting fewer than ten individuals.8

Further, we could identify only two recent attempts to specifically poison military food 

supplies. In January 2003, several “Islamic militants” were arrested for plotting to poison 

food at a British military base, though no such attack ever took place.9 In October 2006, 

approximately 400 Iraqi police officers succumbed to food poisoning. There were few if 

any fatalities and it remains unclear if they were intentionally poisoned or simply were 

served spoiled food.10

The low number of attacks on the food supply and their relative ineffectiveness call into 

question the idea that food is an attractive target. In fact, a number of logistical problems 

may make food a difficult target. First, food is often washed, cooked, or prepared in ways 

that may render many contaminants inactive. Thus, in order to effectively compromise 

the food, it must be adulterated late in the supply chain, when mass contamination 

becomes more difficult. Supporting this idea, one study has indicated that 98 percent of 

food attacks occur at retail outlets, in homes, or at the workplace.11 It may also be 

difficult to contaminate food specifically destined for the military. Many food items used 

by the U.S. military are also consumed by the general public. In order to direct an attack 

at military personnel, contamination would need to occur after food was designated for 

military use, decreasing the number of opportunities for attack. Furthermore, any 

contaminant added early in the food production cycle will likely become diluted (from 

the addition of more ingredients) or inactivated (by cooking), such that it may be reduced 

to ineffective levels or eliminated entirely. In addition, food contamination will likely not 

generate the same amount of publicity as a more radical attack, such as a bombing, would 

and may not even be recognized as an intentional attack. In the case of the Oregon cult, 

described above, the contamination was not recognized as intentional until a year after 

 

7

 “Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7”, December 17, 2003 and “Homeland Security Presidential 

Directive 9”, January 30, 2004. 

8

 W. Seth Carus, “Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological Agents Since 1900,” February 

2001, available at <www.ndu.edu/centercounter/Full_Doc.pdf>.

9

 James Risen and Don van Natta, “Plot to Poison Food of British Troops is Suspected, ” The New York 

Times, January 24, 2003, available at <query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F01E0DC 

1639F937A15752C0A9659C8B63>. 

10 Associated Press, “Insurgent suspected of mass poisoning of Iraq police,” The Australian, October 11, 

2006, available at <www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,20560653-2703,00.html>.

11 G. R. Dalziel, “Food Defense Incidents 1950–2008,” Manyang Technological University, 2009, available 

at <www.rsis.edu.sg/CENS/publications/reports/RSIS_Food%20Defence_170209.pdf>.
4

the attack, and then only because a defector from the cult revealed the attack. Thus, the 

publicity benefit or “shock value” to a terrorist organization may be minimal. Finally, an 

attack on the food itself (agroterrorism), rather than its human consumers, may have a 

higher impact. For example, a release of avian influenza or foot and mouth disease virus 

(FMDV) could have catastrophic impacts on the U.S. economy that would dwarf the 

damage caused by targeting consumers.12,13,14

These facts, however, do not support the position that military food defense should be 

ignored. There is no doubt that contamination of the food served to U.S. troops overseas 

is a real possibility that could seriously decrease their combat readiness, both physically 

and psychologically. However, when thinking about food defense, we must be cognizant 

of the cost-benefit ratio of increased capabilities. Thus, when considering methods of 

increasing our food defense capabilities, we should be particularly aware of both the cost 

and the additional benefits of these methods. Fortunately, many of the techniques that can 

be used to defend the military food supply have additional benefits for food safety, 

delivery, and storage. 

 

12 GAO, “Much is Being Done to Protect Agriculture from a Terrorist Attack, but Important Challenges 

Remain,” March 2005, GAO-05-214, available at <www.gao.gov/new.items/d05214.pdf>.

13 Mark Polyak, “The Threat of Agroterrorism: Economics of Bioterrorism,” Business & Finance, 2004, 

available at <www.biodefense.georgetown.edu/publication/economicsofbioterrorism.pdf>. 

14 Jim Monke, CRS Report RL32521, “Agroterrorism: Threats and Preparedness,” August 13, 2004 

available at <www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32521.pdf>.
5

Threats to the Food Supply 

Biological 

The prevalence of accidental contamination of food with dangerous pathogens such as E. 

coli, Listeria, and Salmonella clearly demonstrates the difficulties in preventing 

biological contamination of food. Furthermore, biological agents have a number of 

properties that make them appealing weapons against the military food supply. Perhaps 

most importantly, biological agents are self-propagating. With a small initial sample size 

and rudimentary cell biology training, a motivated group or individual can grow a large 

amount of agent. Obtaining a small sample of the agent may be easier than expected, 

since many potential biological agents are naturally occurring or can be obtained for 

legitimate research purposes. There are certainly technological barriers to mass producing 

biological agents, but the contamination of salad bars in Oregon with Salmonella

demonstrates that these barriers are not insurmountable. 

The epidemiology of a biological attack also makes biological agents attractive food 

contaminants. Many pathogens do not produce symptoms until days or weeks after being 

ingested. Thus, many people may consume the contaminated food before there is any 

sign that contamination occurred. This delay in the onset of symptoms also makes it 

extremely difficult to determine the source of contamination. In the 2006 outbreak of 

pathogenic E. coli in spinach, there was a 6-month delay between the first reported case 

and the issuance of the FDA’s final report that identified the likely source of 

contamination.15 Furthermore, some pathogens are transmissible from person-to-person, 

increasing the effectiveness of the attack by infecting individuals who have not actually 

consumed the tainted food. 

Biological toxins (botulinum, ricin, shiga, etc.) are special cases of biological agents. 

These agents come from biological sources and are chemical or protein based nonliving 

agents. These toxins are not self-propagating and are non-communicable, possibly 

rendering them less attractive as food contaminants. In addition, it may be difficult to 

obtain sufficient quantities of the toxins to effectively contaminate food. Toxins also 

cause symptoms in humans relatively quickly (hours rather than days), so that a toxin 

attack will likely be detected much sooner than a bacterial or viral attack. Nevertheless, 

toxins should also be considered as biological threats to food defense. 

The wide range of biological threats makes it difficult to effectively test the food supply 

for the presence of each possible agent. Thus, preventing contamination of food with 

biological agents should be focused on the agents with the highest probability of use and 

impact of attack. Agents identified by the CDC as category A or B bioterrorism agents16

(see table 1) are of great interest, especially agents in which food is known to be an 

effective vehicle for transmission. Naturally occurring food pathogens such as 

 

15 California Department of Health Services, “Investigation of an Escherichia coli O157:H7 Outbreak 

Associated with Dole Pre-Packaged Spinach,” March 2007, available at 

<www.dhs.ca.gov/fdb/HTML/Food/EnvInvRpt.htm>. 

16 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Bioterrorism Agents/Diseases by Category,” available at 

<www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/agentlist-category.asp>.
6

Salmonella and pathogenic E. coli should be an area of focus. It is important to note that 

Category A agents are not necessarily a larger threat to the food supply than either 

Category B or unlisted agents. For example, given the natural occurrence and known 

food-borne transmission of E. coli and Salmonella, a strong argument can be made that 

these agents may be of higher priority than all of the Category A agents. 

TABLE 1. RELEVANT BIOTERRORISM AGENTS AND DISEASES

CDC CATEGORY A17 CDC CATEGORY B18 SELECT HHS/USDA19

ANTHRAX CHOLERA BRUCELLOSIS

BOTULISM E.COLI EPSILON TOXIN

PLAGUE Q FEVER HENDRA VIRUS

SMALLPOX RICIN TOXIN NIPAH VIRUS

TULAREMIA SALMONELLA RIFT VALLEY FEVER VIRUS

FILOVIRUSES SHIGELLA STAPH ENTEROTOXINS

ARENAVIRUSES VIRAL ENCEPHALITIS T-2 TOXIN

Chemical 

Uncountable numbers of chemicals are toxic if ingested in sufficient quantity (see table 2 

for examples). This fact makes it very unlikely that food can be tested for all potential 

chemical weapons. The 2008 incident of melamine-contaminated milk in China is the 

perfect example of unexpected chemical adulteration. Prior to the discovery of melamine 

(a chemical used primarily in plastics and concrete) in dairy products, this chemical 

would not have even been considered as a potential food contaminant.20 The addition of 

melamine to dairy products appears to have been for economic gain (melamine disguised 

the low nitrogen content of heavily diluted milk). However, more nefarious examples of 

chemical contamination have also occurred. For example, in January 2008, the board 

members of an Iraqi sporting club were poisoned with thallium that had been added to a 

cake. Ten people were poisoned, four of them fatally.21 Again, testing food for thallium 

(a heavy metal used in some manufacturing processes) is extremely unlikely, given the 

low probability of its use as a poison. 

TABLE 2. SELECTED POTENTIAL/PREVIOUSLY USED CHEMICALS

ARSENIC ETHYLENE GLYCOL SARIN

BLEACH MELAMINE SODIUM AZIDE

CYANIDE MERCURY THALLIUM

DRANO PARATHION VX 

 

17 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 

19 National Select Agent Registry, “HHS and USDA Select Agents and Toxins,” available at 

<www.selectagents.gov/agentToxinList.htm>. 

20 For more information on melamine see <http://www.fda.gov/oc/opacom/hottopics/melamine.html>. 

21 CDC, “Thallium Poisoning from Eating Contaminated Cake – Iraq, 2008,” Morbidity and Mortality 

Weekly Report, September 19, 2008 available at <www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ 

mm5737a3.htm.> 
7

The large number of readily available chemicals that could be used to poison food should 

cause some concern.22,23 However, a number of factors make the use of chemical poisons 

difficult. Many chemicals will alter the taste, smell, or appearance of food, increasing the 

chance that the contamination is detected. Furthermore, if the chemicals have rapid, acute 

toxicity, few victims are likely to have ingested the food before the contamination is 

noticed and identified. Finally, chemical poisons are not transmissible between people, 

meaning that individuals must actually eat the food to be affected. 

The huge number of potential chemical agents that could be used severely limits the 

effectiveness of testing for the presence of specific chemicals. Food defense measures to 

combat chemical contamination must focus on prevention of contamination rather than 

detection. Accordingly, most food defense plans focus on the secure storage of toxic 

chemicals and limited access to food preparation areas. By the time the chemical has 

been added, there is little chance that it will be detected, because quality control for many 

food ingredients is limited to visual inspections. Unfortunately, many toxic chemicals can 

look very similar to food ingredients.24

Radioactive 

Radioactive contamination has received additional attention since September 2001, 

particularly because of fear of “dirty bombs,” which use conventional explosives to 

disperse radioactive materials. Radioactive materials could be used to contaminate food, 

and the general anxiety about radiation may magnify the disorganization and hysteria 

caused by such an incident. Additionally, radioactive isotopes can be effective poisons, as 

evidenced by the poisoning of Alexander V. Litvinenko, a former KGB official, with 

polonium-210 in 2006.25 However, a number of factors make radiological contamination 

of food unlikely. First, it is difficult to obtain enough radioactive material to sicken a 

large number of people, due to dilution of the radioactive agent in the food. Further 

hampering this sort of attack, most potent sources of radiation are tracked and carefully 

documented, limiting the access of potential terrorists. Of eight identified cases of 

radiological material being added to food, five were conducted by researchers who had 

legitimate access to the radioisotope. Furthermore, all eight cases led to only one fatality 

and 36 injuries.26 Thus, biological and chemical attacks may be much more likely. Given 

the difficulty in obtaining radioactive material, it is more likely that such material would 

be used in a high profile incident, such as a “dirty bomb.” 

 

22 For some examples see Donald Hickman, “A Chemical and Biological Warfare Threat: USAF Water 

Systems at Risk,” September 1999, available at <www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cpc-pubs/hickman.htm>. 23 For a list of household agents that have been used to poison food see G. R. Dalziel, “Food Defense 

Incidents 1950-2008,” Manyang Technological University, 2009, available at 

<www.rsis.edu.sg/CENS/publications/reports/RSIS_Food%20Defence_170209.pdf>.

24 Presentation by Shaun Kennedy, Director of the National Center for Food Protection and Defense. 

25 Alan Cowell, “Radiation Poisoning Killed Ex-Russian Spy,” The New York Times, November 24, 2006, 

available at <www.nytimes.com/2006/11/24/world/europe/25spycnd.html>. 

26 G. R. Dalziel, “Food Defense Incidents 1950-2008,” Manyang Technological University, 2009, available 

at <www.rsis.edu.sg/CENS/publications/reports/RSIS_Food%20Defence_170209.pdf>.
8

The U.S. Military Food Supply Chain: From Domestic Source to Foreign Military 

Base 

The U.S. military receives food through a long and complex system. As noted earlier, this 

report focuses on food delivered to foreign bases, as we believe this supply chain to be 

most vulnerable. Most packaged, non-perishable food is obtained from U.S. 

manufacturers and distributed through the Defense Supply Center Philadelphia (DSCP) 

Prime Vendor program. In fact, most food must be purchased from U.S. sources, as 

required by the Buy American Act and the Berry Amendment.27 Food procurement for 

Iraq and Afghanistan has been excluded from the Berry Amendment due to operational 

considerations. However, most non-perishable food is still acquired from U.S. 

manufacturers.28 Food from the manufacturer is then shipped to a prime vendor 

distribution center, which handles the logistics of packaging the various food items for 

shipment in large shipping containers. Food is loaded into shipping containers and hauled 

by truck to the port of embarkation, where it may sit unattended for up to a week. 

Eventually, the containers are loaded onto a U.S.-flagged ocean vessel. The transit takes 

roughly 40–50 days, after which the container is stored at the port of debarkation for up 

to a week, though longer delays are possible. From the port, containers are moved via 

truck to the foreign-based prime vendor distribution facility, where they are unloaded. 

Depending on the final destination of the container, it may be loaded onto smaller 

watercraft or rail cars. The food is stored at the prime vendor facility until it is ready for 

delivery to the military installation. When an order for food comes into the distribution 

center, the food is packed onto pallets and shipped via truck to the military installation, 

were it is unloaded and stored according to the protocol for each installation.29 

The U.S. Military Food Supply Chain: From Foreign Source to Foreign Military 

Base 

Generally speaking, perishable food items such as fresh produce, dairy products, and 

baked goods are not shipped from U.S. manufacturers. Instead they are procured from 

sources in each country either directly, or through the prime vendor. Prior to supplying a 

U.S. military installation, each facility must first be approved by the U.S. Army 

Veterinary Command (VETCOM) (for the continental United States, Europe, and the 

Pacific) or by a similar unit in Central Command (CENTCOM) (all other areas).30 Goods 

are shipped directly from these local suppliers to the military installation or to the prime 

vendor who then ships them to the military installation. 

The U.S. Military Food Supply Chain: Preparation of Food at Military Bases 

The operation of dining facilities has largely been contracted to civilian companies. Food 

is transported to various dining facilities and then stored and prepared by contractor 

personnel that are often drawn from the local population or other foreign countries.

 

27 Valerie Grasso, “Department of Defense Food Procurement: Background and Status,” CRS Report, 

August 28, 2008, available at <http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs-10644:1>. 28 Interview with Dr. Ana Sanders. 

29 Ibid. 

30 Interview with COL Tim Stevenson, US Army, Deputy Director, DOD Veterinary Service Activity on 

February 20, 2009. 
9

Current Food Defense Measures 

Food defense was not a major concern in the United States prior to the attacks of 

September 11, 2001. In fact, food production facilities were not even required to register 

with the FDA until December 2003 (a requirement of the Public Health Security and 

Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002).31 While this requirement was a 

step forward in food defense, by providing the Government with a list of food producers 

that could be referenced in response to an attack, it offers very little help in the 

prevention of food-based attacks. Domestically, the FDA and USDA are primarily 

responsible for monitoring the safety of food.32 Even so, there are no universal 

government requirements for food defense. For example, no Government agency has the 

authority to institute a mandatory food safety recall. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this 

report, we will assume that the food produced at domestic facilities is safe, and that 

intentional contamination would occur after production (i.e., during transport, storage, or 

preparation). 

While there are no government-wide food defense requirements, the Department of 

Defense (DOD) requires some level of food defense as specified by the Antiterrorism 

Standards set forth in DOD Instruction 2000.16. Depending on the current Force 

Protection Condition (FPCON), certain standards of food defense come into effect. For 

example, at FPCON Bravo, DOD installations must “Initiate food and water risk 

management procedures, brief personnel on food and water security procedures, and 

report any unusual activities.”33 These standards are necessarily vague, given the 

individual needs of different installations. However, food defense is at least a recognized 

and required component of DOD antiterrorism efforts. 

Each military installation is required to have a food defense plan, which the Army has 

provided a framework for developing. All Army installations must have a Food Defense 

Assessment Team (FDAT) that conducts food vulnerability assessments and crafts a 

regularly updated food defense plan. The Army provides a guide to identify 

vulnerabilities and implement additional security measures that limit these vulnerabilities 

based on the potential hazard and likelihood of an attack. Possible security measures 

include additional training for food service personnel, increased physical security of food 

service areas, background checks and ID cards for food service personnel, and 

monitoring of self-service food areas. Obviously, the effectiveness of the food defense 

plan at each installation depends on the quality of the FDAT. 

Widening the view beyond the installation level, all parts of the food chain regulated by 

DSCP are required to have a food defense plan that complies with the DSCP Food 

Defense Checklist. The checklist is detailed and quite comprehensive, including 

provisions dealing with personnel, physical security of the premises, review and 

implementation of the food defense plan, emergency procedures, and recall capability. 

 

31 See <http://www.fda.gov/oc/bioterrorism/Bioact.html> for more info.

32 For more details, see Donna Vogt, CRS report, “Food Safety Issues in the 109th Congress,” February 4, 

2005, available at <digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs-6475>. 

33 DODI 2000.16, available at <www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/200016.htm>.
10

All DSCP food contracts require that the facilities be inspected by DSCP to ensure that 

the proper food defense measures are in place. In general, after the initial inspection, 

facilities are inspected again on a yearly basis. Obviously, the food defense plan for each 

contractor will be specific to their particular operations. Thus, it is difficult to provide a 

comprehensive look at food defense plans in general, though the DSCP Food Defense 

Checklist provides a framework. Still, the requirement of food defense plans in 

subsistence contracts was a valuable step forward in promoting a safe food supply for the 

U.S. military.34

Perishable items, which are generally outside the jurisdiction of DSCP, are acquired 

locally. All facilities from which these items are purchased must be approved by 

VETCOM or CENTCOM, which perform periodic inspections of each facility. 

Traditionally, these inspections were based on food safety and primarily concerned with 

sanitary conditions. However, the inspections have been updated to include measures of 

food defense.35 Generally speaking, facilities are inspected on a yearly basis, though 

some smaller manufacturers or producers of “low-risk” food items may be inspected less 

frequently. “High-risk” producers may be visited more frequently (up to four times per 

year). Visits consist of physical inspection of the facility for compliance with the various 

requirements of the food defense audit report. Microbiologic, chemical, and radiologic 

testing is conducted as part of the facility inspection. While facilities must have an 

employee screening mechanism in place, these mechanisms may not be as rigorous as 

those in comparable U.S. facilities.36

 

34 Interview with Dr. Ana Sanders.

35 Military Handbook 3006C, “Guidelines for Auditing Food Establishments,” June 1, 2008, available at 

<http://assist.daps.dla.mil/quicksearch/basic_profile.cfm?ident_number=208822>. 

36 Interview with COL Tim Stevenson. 
11

Once food is delivered to a military installation, shipments are inspected by VETCOM or 

CENTCOM. These inspections include looking for signs of physical damage, 

inconsistent storage conditions, and food deterioration.37 Food is then stored and prepared 

for serving at dining facilities. Dining facilities undergo periodic inspections for food 

safety and food defense. These inspections are performed by each service’s office of 

preventative medicine. For example, the Army’s Proponency Office for Preventative 

Medicine (POPM) performs safety inspections for Army facilities on anywhere from a 

yearly to bi-weekly basis depending on the perceived risk of the facility.38 These 

inspections are primarily concerned with issues of food safety (sanitation, proper food 

storage, pest control, etc.), though in the last several years, they have been upgraded to 

include measures of food defense (restricted access, secure storage of chemicals, etc). 

POPM also performs physical inspections of some food shipments at each dining facility. 

Oversight of the daily operations of dining facilities falls into the hands of the contracting 

company. The designated “person-in-charge” is required to make daily inspections of the 

facility and document weekly inspections. Again, these inspections focus primarily on 

 

37 Interview with COL Tim Stevenson. 

38 See Technical Bulletin “MED 530: Occupation and Environmental Health Food Sanitation,” available at 

<www.army.mil/usapa/med/index.html 

Figure 1. The Food Defense Checklist 

The Defense Supply Center Philadelphia (DSCP) is a subsidiary of the Defense Logistics 

Agency (DLA) and is tasked with providing the United States armed service members with 

food, clothing, textiles, medicines, medical equipment, and construction supplies and 

equipment. Within DSCP, the Subsistence Directorate serves as the key link between the 

Armed Forces and the U.S. Food Industry. As part of this mission, DSCP requires subsistence 

contractors to address Food Defense concerns using the DSCP Food Defense Checklist. This 

Checklist serves three purposes: 

1) As a communication tool to inform prospective contractors of areas of concern that 

must be addressed and expected to be covered/included in their Documented Food 

Defense Plan submitted to DSCP 

2) As a guideline used by DSCP Auditors to evaluate the adequacy of Documented Food 

Defense Plans 

3) As a guideline (along with a contractor’s approved Food Defense Plan) to verify 

implementation, compliance, and effectiveness of the plan in protecting the type of 

products and facility in question. 

The DSCP Food Defense Checklist delineates the subsistence supply chain, and it is required 

that contractors’ Food Defense Plans outline appropriate preventative measures to protect 

each stage of this supply chain. These stages include: receipt, production, storage, assembly, 

delivery, and shipment. The Food Defense Plan is subsequently submitted to DSCP where it is 

given a rating of acceptable, marginally acceptable, or unacceptable. 

A copy of the DSCP Food Defense Checklist can be found at this web address: 

www.dscp.dla.mil/subs/fs_check.pdf. 
12

food safety but do provide an additional element of food defense.39 The primary 

motivation for food service contractors to ensure food is safe seems to be monetary, 

though pride may be an additional motivator. Incidents of food-borne illness may cause 

individual employees to be fired, or the loss of lucrative contracts at the corporate level. 

The Vulnerabilities 

Transportation 

As the military food chain described earlier shows, food can spend days or even months 

in transport from the United States to a foreign military installation. For much of this 

time, food is stored in locked naval shipping containers that are often not actively 

monitored. A recent report from the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center noted 

that it may be possible to gain access to these containers while remaining undetected. 

Furthermore, shipping containers or the goods contained in them may be clearly marked 

for the U.S. Military, identifying ideal targets for attack. Currently, shipping containers 

are protected with physical seals that must be broken in order to access the cargo. While 

these seals can be effective, shipping containers are often opened for legitimate reasons 

(i.e., customs inspections), requiring that new seals be attached. Then, all new seal 

information must be recorded and tracked to ensure that all seal changes were 

appropriate. In addition, the seals are particularly low tech, and the fabrication of fake 

seals is a distinct possibility. Even if a fake or broken seal is identified, inspectors and 

investigators will be unable to determine when the container was actually breached. The 

close stacking of cargo containers on ships may prevent access to many containers while 

on sea vessels. Unfortunately this same situation does not occur while the containers are 

stored at ports. 

Outside of shipping containers, food is often transported from manufacturers to 

distribution centers and from distribution centers to military installations by truck. In 

 

39 Ibid. 

FDAT 

“Prev. 

Medicine” 

“personin-charge” 

VETCOM 

CENTCOM 

DSCP 

(FDA) 

(USDA) 

Installation Locally Acquired 

Perishable 

Foods 

U.S. produced 

Non-perishable 

Foods 

Figure 2. Food Defense Areas of Operation for a Generic Army Installation
13

hostile areas, these trucks may be guarded by military convoys. Generally, these trucks 

are secured with physical locks, though it is possible that food inside the trucks could be 

compromised. 

The Volpe report suggests that food not be overtly marked for delivery to U.S. forces. 

However, as the report noted, other more subtle factors may identify military bound 

shipments, such that additional measures may be necessary to further protect the food 

supply. 

Storage 

Food is stored outside shipping containers several times throughout the supply chain. For 

example, non-perishable goods from the United States are stored in the warehouses of the 

continental U.S. prime vendor, the foreign prime vendor, and again at the military 

installation. All of these storage facilities could be potential points of food contamination. 

Currently, food defense plans submitted to DSCP or developed by the FDAT should have 

measures in place to ensure that these facilities are secure.40 Beyond the enforcement of 

these plans and regular inspections, it may be difficult to further secure storage areas. 

Storage at the military installation may be an exception. 

Preparation 

As noted earlier, it may be difficult to effectively contaminate military food early in the 

supply chain due to dilution effects and the fact that food preparation may inactivate 

some agents. For this reason, many of the documented cases of effective food 

contamination involve contamination at these late stages. Therefore, adulteration of 

military food during preparation is perhaps the most serious and likely risk. Food 

preparation for U.S. military forces has been increasingly contracted out to private 

companies. Contracting out some aspects of military operations has budgetary 

advantages. However the hiring of foreign nationals (via these contracts) to prepare food 

for the U.S. military may create additional complications for food defense. For example, 

a typical background check for a food service worker may consist solely of a call to the 

local sheriff’s office. Even then, a minor criminal record may not disqualify a worker.41

By definition, these workers have intimate access to military food immediately before it 

is served to troops. In addition, oversight of food workers is often left to the contracting 

“person-in-charge.” As stated by Technical Bulletin MED 530 “Ultimately, the 

responsibility for providing safe sanitary food lies with the person-in-charge of the food 

establishment.”42 While monetary and ethical concerns should ensure that this person 

remains diligent about the safety of food, a similar system of incentives in domestic food 

safety has recently shown a number of cracks, suggesting that an “honor code” system of 

supervision may not be sufficient. 

 

40 Interview with Dr. Ana Sanders. 

41 Interview with COL Tim Stevenson. 

42 See Technical Bulletin “MED 530: Occupation and Environmental Health Food Sanitation,” available at 

<www.army.mil/usapa/med/index.html>. 
14

Enhancing Food Defense Capabilities 

For many reasons, some of which were discussed earlier in this report, it is impossible to 

ensure that food consumed by U.S. troops is 100 percent safe. In fact, there are questions 

about the likelihood of an attack on the military food supply. Keeping these points in 

mind, enhancements to military food defense capabilities should be cost-effective and 

ideally will provide additional benefits that help offset what costs they do have. 

Transportation 

It is impossible to physically monitor food at each stage during transportation, and 

requiring military oversight of the entire supply chain would be both unwieldy and 

extremely expensive. A number of recent technological advancements may allow for 

efficient, remote monitoring of shipments during transport. As discussed earlier, military 

food supplies spend a large amount of time in 40-foot shipping containers. These 

containers spend days or weeks in ports and aboard sea vessels where they are virtually 

unmonitored. However, it will be possible in the short term to monitor the location and 

integrity of these containers in real-time. The Mobile Asset Tag Tracking System 

(MATTS) being developed by iControl Systems and the U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) will allow for real-time GPS tracking of the location of shipping 

containers for up to 70 days, even when they are stored below the deck of a cargo ship. 

Furthermore, MATTS will integrate with container security devices (CSDs), currently 

being developed by the Science Applications International Corporation and the Georgia 

Tech Research Institute. These CSDs can detect any opening of the shipping container 

door beyond two inches and immediately record the date and time of the breach and 

notify a data center that a breach has occurred. 43,44,45 Since most authorized openings of 

shipping containers can be predicted, any unanticipated access can be immediately 

investigated. Obviously, knowing the location and status of cargo at all times during 

shipment will decrease the likelihood of unnoticed contamination. Containers that have 

been subject to unauthorized openings can be further examined for problems before 

continuing delivery to military installations. 

The MATTS/CSD combination has several advantages that make it a good fit for food 

defense. First, the MATTS system has undergone substantial testing and proved effective 

in monitoring the location of cargo through trans-ocean shipping. According to DHS, it 

should be ready for use in 2009. CSDs are also undergoing testing and should be ready 

for use sometime shortly after MATTS. Thus, MATTS/CSD can be deployed in the field 

relatively quickly. Second, MATTS/CSD is not prohibitively expensive. DHS expects the 

cost of MATTS/CSD to be approximately $100 per shipping container per trip.46 Given 

that the value of the cargo far exceeds this amount (for example, one case of 12 MREs 

costs almost $100 on its own) MATTS/CSD appears to be a relative bargain. 

Furthermore, being able to track the location and status of shipping containers has 

 

43 For more information, see the iControl website <www.icontrol-inc.com>. 44 Interview with George Cavage General Manager at iControl Incorporated on November 6, 2008. 

45 Interview with Ken Concepcion, DHS Project Manager on December 17, 2008. 46 Ibid. 
15

multiple benefits for the U.S. military. Knowing the location of shipping containers could 

allow the military to streamline its supply chain, similar to the “just in time” shipping 

methods employed by large retailers around the world. During the run-up to the Iraq war, 

many shipping containers sat in foreign ports waiting for transport to distribution hubs. 

Being able to track the shipments in real-time may allow for better planning to avoid 

these types of problems in the future. In addition, tracking data could promote the 

recovery of stolen military shipments. Together, these two benefits could lead to an 

actual net savings by implementing MATTS/CSD on military food shipments. Finally, 

while the current CSDs monitor only door openings, future CSD could also monitor 

cargo temperature, light levels, and even take periodic photos of the cargo which could be 

analyzed later to detect tampering. 

Implementation of the MATTS/CSD system on all military food shipments would 

provide valuable tracking and status information that would significantly enhance our 

food defense capabilities. The cost to implement this system seems minor compared to 

the cost of the cargo itself. Additionally, the benefits of real-time tracking and status 

updates may lead to additional capabilities and cost savings that would outweigh the cost 

of MATTS/CSD itself. The considerations make MATTS/CSD a viable option to 

increase our military food defense. 

In addition to transporting food in large shipping containers, food is often transported to 

or from distribution centers via cargo trucks. Whiles these trucks can not currently be 

outfitted with a MATTS/CSD device, DHS has helped develop another technology, 

called an M-Lock which provides many of the benefits of MATTS/CSD in a simple 

compact device. M-Lock is basically a large padlock with integrated GPS systems. This 

lock also records all openings. Similar to MATTS/CSD the M-Lock would enhance 

security of food shipments and provide additional cost saving benefits by combating theft 

of military cargo. Costs for M-Locks are predicted to be in the $400-600 range in 

addition to any costs to develop the monitoring infrastructure.47,48 At this price point, MLocks may be an appropriate addition to military food defense. 

Decontamination of Foreign Produce 

Perishable food such as produce, milk, and baked goods are often acquired from foreign 

markets that are located close to the military installation. While these facilities must be 

approved by VETCOM, the foreign food safety systems may not be as robust as those in 

the United States. In addition, this food may be accessible to the general public and more 

susceptible to contamination. Finally, since these products are consumed raw or without 

further processing, contaminants are likely to remain active and undiluted. 

Washing produce can help to physically remove contaminants from produce. Adding an 

anti-microbial agent to the wash water increases the effectiveness of washing by orders of 

magnitude.49 Ozonated water washes could enhance the safety of produce served at 

 

47 Interview with George Cavage. 

48 Interview with Ken Concepcion.

49 Reviewed in M.A. Kadre et al, “Microbiological Aspects of Ozone Applications in Food: A Review,” 

Journal of Food Science, 66, no. 9, 2001. 
16

military installations. Compared to antimicrobial chemicals, ozone has several 

advantages. First, ozone naturally degrades into oxygen, leaving no dangerous or toxic 

chemicals in discarded wash water.50 In addition, ozone is a general oxidizing agent, 

meaning that it can destroy both biological and chemical agents with varying efficacy.51

Ozonated wash water has been tested against a number of naturally occurring food 

pathogens and was shown to quickly reduce the levels of many bacteria by several orders 

of magnitude.52 Installing an ozone wash station in military facilities could greatly 

enhance the safety of foreign produce by reducing both accidental and intentional 

contamination. These wash stations do not require large amounts of equipment (just a 

basin, spray bar, and ozone generator) and could be installed for approximately 

$60,000.53 While ozone treatment is a promising technology, DOD would have to test the 

efficacy of these wash systems on the range of concentration, contaminants, and food 

items that are the most likely threat to the military food supply. It is possible that 

intentional contamination would lead to such high levels of agent that contamination 

reduced 100- or 1,000-fold would still cause significant casualties. In addition, some 

foods or agents may be resistant to ozonated washes. A research program to test the 

effectiveness of ozone washes on fresh produce would determine if the benefits of such a 

system outweighs its costs. 

Reduced Contracting of Military Food Preparation 

A number of budgetary concerns have led to the increased use of contractors in the U.S. 

military.54 Conventional wisdom states that some activities, such as food preparation, that 

are not “inherently governmental” should be outsourced to minimize their costs.55 There 

is certainly some logic behind this wisdom. By hiring contractors only when services are 

actually necessary, the government can decrease the number of troops in our “standing 

army.” More contracts can be awarded when a “surge” in capacity is necessary so that the 

government pays for this capacity only when it is used. 

On the surface, preparation of food seems to be a function that could easily be outsourced 

to contractors. Food preparation is not “inherently governmental” and can be performed 

cheaply by unskilled labor. Furthermore, within the United States, food workers can be 

extensively screened with background checks, limiting the chances that they will attempt 

to compromise military food. Unfortunately, this situation changes drastically in foreign 

countries. Here, food workers are often drawn from the local population, where proper 

background checks and screening may be extremely difficult. For extended foreign 

 

50 J.G. Kim et al, “Application of Ozone for Enhancing the Microbiological Safety and Quality of Foods: A 

Review,” Journal of Food Processing, 62, no. 9, 1999. 51 For example, destruction of cyanide, J.M. Monteagudo et al., “Advanced oxidation processes for 

destruction of cyanide from thermoelectric power station waste waters,” Journal of Chemical Technology 

and Biotechnology, 79, no. 2, 2004. 52 Reviewed in M.A. Kadre et al, “Microbiological Aspects of Ozone Applications in Food: A Review” 

Journal of Food Science, 66, no. 9, 2001. 53 Interview with Andy Smith VP of Products, PurFresh Inc on November 6, 2008. 

54 GAO report “DOD’s Extensive Use of Logistics Support Contracts Requires Strengthened Oversight,” 

July 2004, available at <www.gao.gov/new.items/d04854.pdf>.

55 Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76, May 29, 2003, available at 

<www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a076/a76_incl_tech_correction.html>. 
17

engagements (such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq) or for extremely high-risk facilities, 

the military could benefit from “in-sourcing” the preparation of food. While this option is 

certainly more expensive, there is no doubt that the security of military food could be 

greatly enhanced by keeping it within the control of military personnel. We recommend 

that a cost-benefit analysis be performed specifically examining the additional cost of 

maintaining an enlisted group of personnel designated for food preparation in high-risk 

areas of foreign countries. Alternatively, enhanced oversight of contractors at dining 

facilities might serve the same function at a reduced cost. Along these lines, the 

assignment of just a few military personnel per facility who are specifically charged with 

supervising workers to ensure food safety and defense may effectively limit food defense 

vulnerabilities and enhance food safety. 

Increased Use of Pathogen Detection Systems 

As noted earlier, the most effective food attacks will likely occur late in the supply chain. 

Agents added early in the supply chain could be diluted or deactivated due to preparation 

steps. Testing for pathogens should occur late in the food chain, since testing at this point 

will detect agents that have been added at any time prior to the test. 

Unfortunately, current testing technologies are generally slow, expensive, and limited in 

the scope of threats that they can detect. Indeed, the range of toxic chemicals that could 

be added to food is so vast that it is virtually impossible to list them, let alone design a 

test for them. On the other hand, the list of biological agents or toxins likely to be used 

for food contamination is substantially lower, such that effective testing methodologies 

may exist. That is not to say that testing for biological agents is a simple task. Many tests 

require an enrichment period of up to 24 hours to amplify the agent to a testable level.56

In the world of food preparation, this testing period may be far too long. However, such 

testing capabilities could be applicable for DSCP/VETCOM/POPM inspections or as a 

suggestion for manufacturers in food defense audits. Here we provide the few examples 

of commercially available, or nearly available technologies that could be used to test for 

food contamination. These detectors are by no means the only technologies being 

developed. However, a recent review of sensor technology demonstrates that many 

technologies have not been tested on complex, food-based samples.57,58 While they may 

provide sensitive and accurate results with pure biological samples, the presence of the 

food (e.g., ground meat) can inhibit testing reactions. We recommend that DOD provide 

funding for the testing of these technologies on food samples (see box “Breaking the 

Barriers between Food Safety and Food Defense). 

There are currently only two detectors available that allow for the rapid detection of a 

wide spectrum of biological agents and toxins: the RAZOR EX developed by Idaho 

Technologies59 and the RAPTOR by Research International.60 While these detectors have 

 

56 For example, Idaho Technologies RAPID LT Food Security System. For more information see 

<www.idahotech.com/RAPIDLT/RAPIDLT-FSS.html>.

57 AK Bhunia, “Biosensors and Bio-Based Methods for the Separation and Detection of Foodborne 

Pathogens,” Advances in Food Nutrition and Research, 54, 2008. 58 Communication with Dr Arun Bhunia, Professor at Purdue University, December 2008. 

59 For more information see <www.idahotech.com/RAZOREX/index.html>. 

60 For more information see <www.resrchintl.com/raptor-detection-system.html>. 
18

their relative merits, they also suffer from a number of problems that lessen their 

usefulness. 

The RAZOR EX is a portable, automated system that detects a wide range of bioagents 

and naturally occurring food pathogens from samples that are collected using a swab. The 

RAZOR detects the DNA of pathogens using polymerase chain reaction (PCR) 

chemistry. One run tests for eight likely biological food contaminants in less than 30 

minutes. Unfortunately, each test can process only one sample, and the test kits are 

expensive (approximately $200 per test). In order to rapidly screen a number of food 

items in a dining facility, testing personnel would require several machines (at ~$40,000 

apiece) and many testing kits.61 Obviously a thorough testing regime would be extremely 

expensive. In addition, the RAZOR is a “quick and dirty” type testing device and is 

capable of detecting only gross contamination. For example, current detection thresholds 

for bacteria are around 2,000 colony forming units per milliliter (CFU/ml),62 whereas the 

infective dose of pathogenic E. coli can be as little as 10 bacteria total.63 To put this 

measure into further perspective, the EPA considers just 235 CFU/ml of any type of E. 

coli to be unacceptable in water for recreation (swimming, etc.) let alone for 

consumption.64 The fact that the RAZOR operates so quickly precludes it from detecting 

low levels of bacteria. In terms of terrorism, this high detection level is considered 

acceptable, since terrorist attacks are likely to involve very high levels of bioagents. In a 

more diluted food setting, it remains to be seen if the same circumstances will hold. Due 

to the low level of detection, use of the RAZOR would be limited to detection of 

intentional contamination only. Unintentional contamination, such as that often seen in 

commercial recalls, would likely remain undetected, such that there are likely few 

collateral benefits to employing a device such as the RAZOR. Moreover, a negative test 

result may provide a false sense of security, since a “negative” sample may still contain 

enough agent to sicken military personnel. 

 

61 Interview with Christina Flowers, Eastern Sales Manager-Biodefense, Idaho Technologies on January 27, 

2009. 

62 Ibid. 

63 H. Petridis et al, “E. coli O157:H7 A Potential Health Concern,” University of Florida, October 2002, 

available at <edis.ifas.ufl.edu/SS197>. 

64 EPA, “Ambient Water Quality for Bacteria-1986,” January 1986, available at 

<www.epa.gov/waterscience/beaches/files/1986crit.pdf>.
19

Furthermore, the RAZOR was not specifically designed to test food samples. Thus, it has 

not been extensively tested on a wide range of food products. Idaho Technology claims 

that is has been used to test some food items, though it is limited to sample swabbing 

techniques that test the surface of the food. Therefore, the tester could swab an area of 

food that is not highly contaminated (for example, the underside of a piece of lettuce) and 

obtain a false-negative test result. In addition, it is not clear how food that is collected on 

the swab (like ground beef) will affect test results. While representatives at Idaho 

Technology claim that these problems should be relatively minor, more thorough testing 

on food samples is necessary.65

Research International has developed a competing detector, the RAPTOR, which 

operates on fluorescent antibody detection, rather than PCR.66 The RAPTOR is extremely 

similar to the RAZOR, despite these technological differences. For this reason, many of 

the potential problems discussed above also apply to the RAZOR. The systems are 

similar in cost, although each test kit for the RAPTOR can test up to 30 samples as long 

as it does not sense a positive result (positive tests must be discarded while negative tests 

can be reused). Thus, the incremental costs for the RAPTOR will be lower. The 

RAPTOR can currently test for only four contaminants at a time, although a new version 

(the BioHawk) can test for eight. Similar to the RAZOR, the RAPTOR was not designed 

 

65 Interview with Christina Flowers. 

66 For more information see <www.resrchintl.com/raptor-detection-system.html>.

Breaking the Barriers between Food Safety and Food Defense 

It is clear that the military does not have the funding or resources to perform routine 

microbiological testing of the 20,000+ military food suppliers. The military can encourage 

routine testing by the suppliers themselves through DSCP/VETCOM food defense 

checklists, however suppliers may still not have an economic incentive to institute such 

testing. 

All food suppliers however, have a large incentive to ensure that their food remains safe 

from natural food contaminants. As was the case with Salmonella contamination and the 

Peanut Corporation of America, a massive safety recall often leads to bankruptcy. Thus, if 

easy to use food defense tests can be combined with food safety tests, food manufacturers 

may voluntarily conduct their own testing for both naturally occurring food pathogens and 

biological warfare agents. 

Currently, an invisible wall separates biological warfare agents and natural occurring 

pathogens in terms of research and development funding and policy decisions. Given that 

the detection of both categories relies on the same testing principles there is no reason that 

testing devices/regimens should be separated for food safety and food defense. In fact, 

combining testing in these two areas may provide the economies of scale to make widescale microbiological testing a reality. 
20

for food defense, and has not been extensively tested on food samples.67 One academic 

lab has tested the RAPTOR on various food matrices with encouraging results.68 The 

RAPTOR is a “quick and dirty” type detector and will most likely be unable to detect 

unintentional contamination. 

In summary, the commercially available, broad spectrum, rapid biodetectors may not be 

particularly well suited for routine testing of military food supplies. Of the instruments 

available, the RAPTOR has the lowest cost per test if a positive result is unlikely. The 

vast majority of tests conducted on military food are likely to be negative, thus the 

RAPTOR (or its successor the BioHawk) may be the preferable detector for food defense. 

The relatively low marginal cost of RAPTOR operation (~$10 per test)69 may make 

weekly or even daily testing of a small set of food samples an effective way to enhance 

the military’s food defense capabilities. If nothing else, it could provide a valuable 

deterrent effect. Alternatively, use of a device like the RAPTOR could be limited to 

instances when contamination is suspected. For example, processing several samples 

from a shipping container that has been subject to an unauthorized breach may build 

confidence that the food in that container has not been contaminated. 

Testing and Development of New Contamination Sensors 

There are relatively few commercially available, broad spectrum detectors for potential 

food contaminants. However, there is no shortage of potentially high-impact new 

technologies that allow for rapid detection of food pathogens at low levels. Advances in 

piezoelectric sensors, immunomagnetic separation, surface plasmon resonance, and other 

technologies show promising results in pathogen detection.70 Unfortunately, most of the 

technologies have been tested on a limited number of pathogens and may not have been 

tested at all on food samples. Some of these technologies are being developed for 

commercialization. For example, Creativ Microtech and Hanson Technologies have both 

licensed sensor technologies from the Naval Research Lab to develop high sensitivity 

biodectectors. Creativ Microtech has developed an extremely sensitive fluorometer which 

they believe will be able to detect bacteria in the 50-100 CFU/ml range, roughly 10X 

more sensitive than the RAPTOR or RAZOR. The testing protocols for the fluorometer 

are still under development, and Creativ has indicated that while they would like to 

develop a wide range of testing protocols for various food samples, they are currently 

unable to obtain funding to produce test kits including biowarfare agents. As such, they 

are focusing exclusively on natural food pathogens in their current product 

development.71

Another intriguing technology involves using color-changing labels on food packaging. 

These labels can detect pathogens in the food inside the packaging and undergo a 

chemical color change reaction when the pathogen is present. This change in color 

 

67 Interview with David McRae, Vice President, Research International on January 30, 2009. 

68 For example, Brian Tims and Daniel Lim, "Confirmation of viable E. coli O157:H7 by enrichment and 

PCR after rapid biosensor detection," Journal of Microbiological Methods, 55, 2003. 69 Interview with David McRae. 

70 AK Bhunia, “Biosensors and Bio-Based Methods for the Separation and Detection of Foodborne 

Pathogens,” Advances in Food Nutrition and Research, 54, 2008. 71 Interview with Pete Amstutz, CFO, and Cha-Mei Tang, CSO, Creatv Microtech on February 2, 2008.
21

reveals a word or symbol indicating that the food is not safe for consumption. Several 

different groups are working on these types of labels, though none are ready for 

commercial use.72 In addition, these stickers will initially detect only natural food 

pathogens. While this technology is not ready for military food defense, further 

development of pathogen sensitive labeling may yield an easily-identifiable, cost 

effective way of protecting the military food supply. 

There are substantial numbers of new biodetectors that may be able to enhance food 

defense. Unfortunately, many of these sensors have not been thoroughly tested on a large 

number of bioagents or have not been tested in food-based applications. We recommend 

that DOD provide funding to test promising technologies on pathogen-contaminated 

food, especially fresh produce, which may be particularly vulnerable. While some 

funding of this type has certainly been provided, food defense is often an afterthought of 

companies developing biodetectors. By providing funding targeted specifically at 

detecting agents in food, DOD can promote the production of biosensors that enhance the 

security of the military food supply. 

 

72 For example see <www.toxinalert.com>. 
22

Conclusion and Recommendations 

The size and scope of the military food supply leave it vulnerable to attack. Terrorists and 

insurgents are aware of this vulnerability and have been attacking supply lines from 

Pakistan into Afghanistan.73 Despite this vulnerability, there are a number of mitigating 

factors that may reduce the effectiveness and likelihood of an attack. Thus, measures 

used to increase military food defense should undergo a rigorous cost benefit analysis. 

We have made several recommendations that we feel could provide short term, high 

impact gains in military food defense. These recommendations often provide additional 

benefits to the military, helping mitigate their substantial costs. 

Recommendation 1: Install Mobile Asset Tag Tracking System (MATTS)/Container 

Security Devices (CSD) or similar systems on all shipments of military food. These 

devices will provide continuous, real-time data on the location and status of all food 

shipments. In addition to their role as a “virtual watchdog” for military shipments, they 

will provide valuable tracking data that military logistics can use for supply chain 

streaming. MATTS/CSD or a similar asset tracking system should also act as a powerful 

deterrent for the theft of military goods. The projected cost of $100/trip/shipping 

container is low when compared to these benefits. 

Recommendation 2: Field test ozonated wash stations for the decontamination of 

fresh produce. Since produce is acquired directly from foreign sources and often 

consumed raw or with little processing, it is especially vulnerable to contamination. 

Washing produce with ozonated water has been shown to quickly reduce the amount of 

contaminating bacteria by several orders of magnitude. In addition, ozone can degrade 

some chemical agents. The military should investigate the feasibility, cost, and 

effectiveness of ozone washes for food defense. 

Recommendation 3: Investigate the feasibility of manning foreign dining facilities 

with military personnel or placing designated food safety/defense personnel at each 

dining facility. Food that is contaminated late in the supply chain is likely to have the 

largest effect on military troops. Currently, most food preparation is performed by 

contractors who often draw workers from the local population. It can be extremely 

difficult to perform sufficient checks on these workers’ backgrounds. Thus, the extra cost 

incurred by manning foreign dining facilities with enlisted soldiers may be justifiable. 

The military should examine the additional costs of this strategy. An alternative plan 

could involve increased oversight of contractor personnel with assigned food safety/food 

defense personnel from the military. 

Recommendation 4: Institute increased testing of military food with biosensors.

Given the large number of potential bioagents and the short detection time necessary for 

food defense, any biodetector will need to be both versatile and agile. Unfortunately, 

these two qualifications often come with a substantial cost. For routine testing of food to 

 

73 Salman Masood, “Bridge Attack Halts NATO Supplies to Afghanistan,” The New York Times, February 

3, 2009, available at <www.nytimes.com/2009/02/04/world/asia/04pstan.html?partner=rss&emc=rss>.
23

be cost-effective, the cost per test must be quite low. The ability to reuse some of the 

reagents in the RAPTOR drives the cost per test to below $10. At this price point, use of 

the RAPTOR, or its successor the BioHawk, becomes feasible. Alternatively, devices like 

the RAPTOR could be used to test only suspicious samples, such as food from a 

container that has been subjected to an unauthorized breach. DOD could also strongly 

encourage the use of microbiological testing for both naturally occurring and biowarfare 

pathogens in facilities that wish to provide food to the U.S. military. 

Recommendation 5: Increase funding dedicated to the testing and development of 

chemical and biological detectors for food-based samples. Many exciting detector 

technologies are being developed by academic, government, and commercial 

laboratories. However, the use of these detectors in food is often an afterthought. The few 

groups attempting to develop detectors for food applications are usually focusing their 

efforts on naturally occurring food pathogens. Given the military’s somewhat unique 

need to detect both naturally occurring and intentionally added agents, DOD needs to 

provide a funding incentive to develop technologies that test for a wide spectrum of 

agents in food samples. These types of detectors are unlikely to be developed 

independently by industry. Recently increased attention on food safety may provide 

additional political willpower to fund this type of research. 
24

Appendix 1: List of Abbreviations 

Centers for Disease Control CDC 

Central Command CENTCOM 

Colony forming units CFU 

Congressional Research Service CRS 

Container Security Device CSD 

Defense Logistics Agency DLA 

Defense Supply Center Philadelphia DSCP 

Department of Defense DOD 

Department of Health and Human Services HHS 

Department of Homeland Security DHS 

Food and Drug Administration FDA 

Food Defense Assessment Team FDAT 

Foot and Mouth Disease Virus FMDV 

Force Protection Condition FPCON 

Government Accountability Office GAO 

Meal, ready-to-eat MRE 

Milliliter ml 

Mobile Asset Tag Tracking System MATTS 

Peanut Corporation of America PCA 

Polymerase Chain Reaction PCR 

Proponency Office for Preventative Medicine POPM 

Unified Group Ration UGR 

United States Department of Agriculture USDA 

Veterinary Command VETCOM