~ J.R. SIMPLOT COMPANY ONE CAPITAL CENTER 999 MAIN STREET SUITE 1300 

P.O. BOX 27 BOISE. IDAHO 83707 (208) 336-2110 FAX (208) 389-7515 

CORPORATE HEADQU4RTERS 

October 29, 2014 

Submitted electronically to: http://www.regulations.gov 

Paper copy submitted to: 

OSWER Docket 

EPA Docket Center 

Mail Code 2822-1T, 

Environmental Protection Agency 

1200 Pennsylvania Avenue NW 

Washington, DC 20460 

Attention Docket ID lVo. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328 

RE: EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328 

Stafiernent ®f Interest 

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), in response to Executive Order 13650, 

has requested comments (see Federal Register, Voi. 79 (147) p.44604) related to 

potential revisions to its Risk IVianagement Program (RMP) regulations and related 

programs. The J.R. Simplot Company (Simplot) is a privately held agribusiness 

corporation based in Boise, Idaho. The corporation is engaged in a number of 

businesses including food processing, farming, fertilizer manufacturing, beef cattle 

feedlots, mining, ranching and other enterprises related to agriculture. Simplot has 

operations throughout the United States and the Worid; the majority of the operations in 

the United States are located in the upper Nlidwest and the West. We have a number of 

facilities that are subject to EPA RIVIP requirements (described below), and as such, as 

a company, have considerable experience with process safety management, 

environmental health and safety risks. Any changes in the EPA RMProgram 

requirements may have a significant effect on our operations. 

J.R. Simplot Company Operations: 

Frozen Food Processing (NAICS 311411) 

Six facilities with anhydrous ammonia inventories ranging from 35,000 pounds to 

80,000 pounds; beginning operations vary from —1960 to 2013; —2100 

Employees 

Fertilizer Manufacturing (NAiCS 32531) 

Four facilities that manufacture various fertilizer products; anhydrous ammonia 

inventories ranges from 330,000 pounds to 940,000 pounds; 98% nitric acid 

inventory of 200,000 pounds; butane inventory of 250,000 pounds; facilities 

either began operation or were purchased by J. R. Simplot beginning in —1944; 
-800 employees 

Storage Terminal (NA9CS 4246) 

Receiving, storage and shipping of anhydrous ammonia; inventory capacity 

50,000 tons; purchased by J. R. Simplot in 2001; —24 employees 

Agricultural Retail (NAICS 4249) 

Twenty eight locations with onsite storage; nine sites with no onsite storage but 

these nine locations handie rail cars of anhydrous ammonia; beginning 

operai:ions in —1944; —400 employee. 

C. ITEMS IN OSHA'S RFI RELEVANT TO EPA'S RMP REGULATION 

1. Update the list of Regulated Substances 

a. Adding Other Toxic or Flammable Substances 

What chemicals, if any, should EPA add to the RIVIP list of regulated toxic and 

flammable substances? Please provide references to the acute toxicity studies, 

sources of flammability information or summary results of such studies, information 

showing that the chemical meets the listing criteria or examples of incidents related 

to the hazards associated with the chemicals. 

RESPONSE 

J. R. Simplot Company has no further chemicals that EPA should add to the list 

of regulated toxic and flammable substances. 

b. Adding High anc]/or Low Explosives 

Should EPA reconsider listing explosives on the RIViP list? What are the safety gaps 

in current regulations and practice (e.g., EPCRA, other federal programs, state 

programs, and industry efforts) that can best be filled by expansion of the RNiP? Are 

there other approaches for filling any such safety gaps? What type of explosive 

materials should be covered and why? How many facilities manufacture, store or 

use explosives and what are the typical quantities stored on-site by type of facility or 

industry? What TQs should be established, and what should be the basis for the 

TQs? If EPA were to list explosives and establish a TQ at 5000 pounds (the same 

TQ that was established for explosives in the 1994 list rule), how many facilities 

would exceed that TQ and potentially be regulated? 
RESPONSE 

J. R. Simplot Company is not aware of any safety gaps in the current regulations 

and practice (e.g. EPCRA, other federal programs, state programs and industry 

efforts). The J. R. Simplot Company believes there are adequate regulations 

related to explosives. 

iii. Should the RIVIP regulation apply to manufacturers of explosives, end users, and/or 

explosive recyciers? 

RESPONSE 

The J.R. Simplot Company believes A.TF, OSHA and local authorities have 

adequate oversight and there is no benefit for the RNiP regulation to be 

expanded. 

iv. If the RMP regulation is amended to cover explosives, should EPA consider 

establishing requirements for safe separation distances between explosive materials 

and public receptors similar to those required by ATF and OSHA (see section II.®.4 

of this RFI for additional discussion of stationary source location requirements)? 

What other requirements should EPA consider? Which if any of these requirements 

could have prevented or minimized the impacts of specific historical accidents? 

M707l~lC`T~ 

The J. R. Simplot Company believes ATF, OSHA and local authorities have 

adequate oversight and no additional regulations are necessary. 

vi. As an alternative to expanding the scope of the RMP, would expanded use of 

EPCRA information (such as better integration of information on explosive hazards 

into iocal ernergency plans) and other governmentai and industry programs 

(including voluntary programs) be able to address safety gaps? What are the 

advantages and disadvantages of such an approach relative to expansion of the 

RN1P? 

RESPONSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company believes adequate information and regulations exist 

and there is no reason to expand EPA. regulations. 
c. Adding Ammonium Nitrate 

Are there safety gaps in the current regulations for AN that could be addressed 

using regulations under CAA section 112(r)? Should EPA regulate AN under CAA 

section 112(r) authority to improve chemical safety practices at facilities handling 

AN? What types of AN and AN facilities should be subject to the RNIP reguiations to 

prevent chemical accidents involving AN that could have adverse effects, such as 

blast overpressure, on the public, environment and off-site property? Should EPA 

consider safety regulations to cover the storage and handling of AN fertilizer only 

and continue to rely on ATF regulations and OSHA standards to cover AN in 

explosives and biasting agents? What role should vofuntary industry programs 

(such as the one undertaken by IIVIE for high explosives) have in a decision on 

whether safety gaps exist that warrant reguiation under the RMP? Please discuss 

the economic impacts associated with the potentia( regulation of AN under CAA 

section 112(r), including any special circumstances involving small entities that EPA 

should consider. 

RESPONSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company believes ATF and OSHA are the appropriate 

agencies to be responsible for regulations related to AN and that it is not 

necessary for EPA to expand CAA section 112(r) to include AN. 

Should EPA amend the RMP requirements to address the hazard posed by AN? If 

so, what specific requirements would be appropriate for AN? Alternatively, should 

EPA use its regulatory authority under CAA 112(r)(7)(A) to require more tailored 

safety steps for facilities handling AN and list AN at a high threshold to better focus 

these requirements on fewer holders of large quantities that pose the greatest risk? 

What would be the benefits of regulating AN under the R1VIP regulations as opposed 

to only maintaining the current SDS and hazardous chemical inventory reporting 

already required under EPCRA? 

RESPOIVSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company believes ATF and OSHA are the appropriate 

agencies to be responsible for regulations related to AN and that it is not 

necessary for EPA to expand CAA section 112(r) to include AN. 

iii. If EPA were to regulate AN under 40 CFR part 68, what quantity of AN poses a 

sufficient hazard to be covered? What would be the basis for establishing this TO? 

4 
RESPONSEE 

The J. R. Simplot Company believes ATF and OSHA are the appropriate 

agencies to be responsible for regulations related to AN and that it is not 

necessary for EPA to expand CAA section 112(r) to include AN. 

d.Adding Reactive Substances and Reactiwity Hazards 

What are the best criteria to use in classifying reactive hazards? How do you 

identify a reactive chemical or a reactive mixture? 

RESPONSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company does not believe that EPA has been provided the 

authority to identify "categories of hazards" such as "reactivity". Consequently 

the J. R. Simplot Company does not believe that EPAs has authority to create a 

specii- ic "lis-t" of chemicals under section 112 (r) that would extend to the creation 

of brcad criteria for "reactivity" or "functional groups". 

Should EPA add reactive chemicals to the list of RfVIP-covered chemicais in 40 CFR 

68.130? If so, which chemicals? What criteria should EPA consider using to 

establish TQs for reactive chemicals? Should EPA add only specific chemicals, or 

groups o-f chemicals defined by particular chemical characteristics? 

RESPONSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company does not believe that EPA has been provided the 

authority to identify "categories of hazards" such as "reactivity". Consequently 

the J. R. Simplot Company does not believe that EPA has authority to create a 

specific "list" of chemicals under section 112 (r) that would extend to the creation 

of broad criteria for "reactivity" or "functional groups". 

vi. Does your facility follow NFPA 400 for reactive hazards? If so, please describe the 

economic impacts associated with following NFPA 400 (e.g., cost of additional 

equipment, cost of additional training, benefits of quality management, special 

circumstances involving small entities, etc.). Is following NFPA 400 an effective way 

of protecting human health and the environment from reactive hazards? Please 

explain. 

RESPONSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company is of the understanding that at this time OSHA is 

considering adopting NFPA 400; further the J. R. Simplot Company does not 

believe there is any need to EPA to take action on this subject. 
e.Ad_ding Other Cateqories of Substances 

Should EPA consider adding organic peroxides, oxidizers, combustible dusts, 

flammable solids, or other additional types of chemicals to the RMP list? Are there 

any particuiar chemicals belonging to these or other classes which present a high 

hazard that could cause adverse effects beyond a facility's fence line in the event of 

an accidental release? 

RESPONSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company believes, with respect to "combustible dusts" that 

OSHA has devefoped detailed publications, and a compliance directive which 

provicies industry guidance materials addressing dusts within industry. (OSHA 

has issued these in advance of actually defining "combustib9e dust"). 

Consequently adding "combustible dusts" to RMP-based regulations would be 

repetitious and is not necessary. 

iii. If EPA were to add combustible dusts to the lists of covered chemicals, are there 

categories of dusts, such as agricultural dusts (e.g., grain dust, pesticide dust, etc.), 

that shouid be excluded? What factors, such as existing handling practices, 

accident history, and potential risk to surrounding communities should EPA consider 

in evafuating potentiaE exclusions? 

RESPONSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company believes, with respect to `combustible dusts" testing 

criteria is adequately defined and as stated above it is not necessary for EPA to 

include within RMP requirements for "combustible dust". The J. R. Simplot 

Company uses for guidance in managing combustible ,dust NFPA (e.g., NFPA 

70E, 9VFPA 61, IVFPA 654, NFPA 780) 

f.Removing Certain Substances from the List or Raisinq their Threshold 

Quantity 

iv. Are there other listed substances that should have a higher TQ? If so, which ones, 

what are the appropriate TQs, and why? 

0 
RESPONSE 

The J. R. Simplot believes EPA should adopt the OSHA PSM Appendix A 

1910.119 listing of substances as well as TQ. The J. R. Simplot Company 

believes the current TQs included in the OSHA PSM Appendix A 1910.119 are 

adequate to protect human health and the environment. 

g. Lovvering the Thresholc! Qaantity for Substances Currently on the List 

Are the current TQs protective of human health and the environment, or are there 

certain substances for which the TQ is too high? If so, which substances? For such 

substances, what TQ should EPA establish and what would it be based on? 

RESPONSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company believes the current TQs are adequate to protect 

human health and the environment. The J. R. Simplot believes EPA should 

adopt the OSHA PSM Appendix A 1910.119 listing of substances as well as TQ. 

The J. R. Simplot Company believes the current TQs included in the OSHA PSM 

Appendix A 1910.119 are adequate to protect human health and the environment 

and has no evidence that a lower TQ would have provided additional protection 

on human health and the environment. 

ii. What would be the economic impacts of any lowering of the TQ which might be 

warranted? Are there any special circumstances involving srnall entities that EP.A 

should consider with respect to lowering of a TQ? 

RESPORISE 

The J. R. Simplot Company believes a lower TQ could have a significant 

economic impact; regardless of the TQ, small entities still need to meet the 

General Duty of EPA's RMP for listed substances. 

2. Adclitional Risk IVlanagement Program Elements 

a. Does your facility follow any management-system elements not required under Part 

68 for RMP-regulated operations? If so, please describe the additional 

management-system elements, the safety benefits, any economic impacts 

associated with following the elements, and any special circumstances involving 

small entities. 
RESPONSE 

March 2014 J. R. Simplot OSHA PSM RFI Comments: 

The J. R. Simplot Company facilities have a number of management 

systems that are not specifically required under PSM. These management 

systems include pro-active systems that drive the identification and 

correction of at-risk behaviors and conditions; a formally developed safety 

philosophy to drive safety culture; companywide communications that 

include internal safety alerts, which includes best practices, as well as 

reguiatory alerts. Companywide communications are used to ensure all 

facilities have current information related to best practices, identified 

hazards and regu9atory activities. 

PSM is an element of our safety management system; our safety 

management system is not an element of PSM. The J. R. Simplot 

Company safety management system encompasses ali of our processes, 

not just those processes covered under PSM. Every company culture is 

different in the manner in which they address safety management, but the 

safety management system must include leading indicators for accident 

prevention. 

The J. R. Simplot Company does not believe there is a need for additional 

program elements. 

b. Would expanding the scope of the RMP regulation to require additional 

management-system elements, or expanding the scope of existing RMP 

management-system elements, improve the protection of human health and the 

environment? Should EPA require safety culture assessments, job safety analyses, 

or any of the other new management system elements described above? If so, 

please describe the elements, the safety benefits, any economic impacts associated 

with expanding the scope of the RMP regulation in this way, and any special 

circumstances involving small entities that EPA should consider. VVould current staff 

at a facility be able to implement these additional elements or would new staff need 

to be hired? 

RESPONSE 

March 2014 J. R. Simalot OSHA PSM RFI Comments: 

The J. R. Simplot Company does not believe expanding the scope of the 

PSM standard to include additional management-system elements or 

expanding the scope of existing PSIVI management-system elements will 

prevent worker injuries and fatalities. The existing elements are believed 

to be adequate if strictly adhered to; additional regulations will not 

increase compliance. 
The J. R. Simplot Company has no evidence that additional management system 

elements such as safety culture assessments, job safety analyses or other new 

management system elements would improve the protection of human health 

and the environment; additionally small entities would, in most cases be required 

to add staff to implement additional management system efements. 

J.R. Simplot believes system elements should be managed by OSHA not EPA. 

c. In systems using managernent and metrics, how do facilities develop useful leading 

indicators? Do you track the frequency of events such as process upsets, accidental 

releases, and "near miss" incidents? Does tracking such events ailow managers 

and empioyees to make changes that prevent accidental releases? What other 

metrics and indicators do you use, and how do they help prevent releases? 

RESPONSE 

March 2014 J. R. Simplot OSHA PSM RFI Comments : 

The J. R. Simplot Company would suggest enhancement of the near-miss 

reporting requirements could help the development of leading indicators; 

however a new element would not be necessary to capture near-misses 

as near-miss incidents should be included in the incidents captured in the 

Incident Investigation element. The current PSfVI standard requires 

employee participation in all elements, which includes sharing of 

information; the J. R. Simpfot Company would view sharing leading 

indicators as part of the existing employee participation eEement of PSM. 

The J. R. Simpiot Company does follow up on process upsets, accidental 

releases and near miss incidents; full review of these events allow for 

determination of root cause(s) and relevant corrective actions to be implemented. 

d. Would requiring RMP facilities to conduct periodic safety culture assessments 

meaningfu[ly strengthen the safety culture incentives that already exist, such as 

avoidance of deaths, injuries, property and environmentaE damage, production loss, 

community impacts, damage to company reputation, etc., that may result from 

accidents? 

RE"SPOIVSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company believes a requirement for RMP facilities to conduct 

periodic safety culture assessments would not meaningfully strengthen existing 

programs at a facility. It is also the belief of the J. R. Simplot Company that this 

would be an extremefy difficult requirement for EPA to audit compliance since 

such a requirement is subjective in nature. The J. R. Simplot Company also 

believes that this would be an overreach; it is within EPAs scope to regulate 
environmental impacts however not to prescribe methods by which a facility 

manages the safety culture. . 

e. Would expansion of the RMP employee participation provision to include 

requirements such as the SEMS II stop-work authority, or other efforts to involve 

employees in all management-system elements, enhance protection of human 

health and the environment? 

I:~Y;Z~l►~1~`l~ 

March 2014 J. R. Simqlot OSHA PSM RFI Comments: 

The J. R. Simplot Company believes it would be beneficial to include in 

the employee participation element provisions such as stop-work authority 

since stop-work authority is a fundamental part of a safety system. 

The J. R. Simplot Company believes stop-work authority should fall under OSHA 

regulations. 

Are there any other management-system elements in the existing RMP regufation 

that EPA should expand or clarify (e.g., a new requirement that facifities perform a 

roo`.-cause ana[ysis for incidents under § 68.81, clarify PHA and hazard review 

requirements, require more frequent PHA and hazard review updates, strengthen 

contractor requirements, or require pre-startup reviews prior to all process startups)? 

If so, please describe the additional requirements, the safety benefits, any economic 

impacts associated with expanding the RMP regulation in this way, and any special 

circumstances involving small entities that EPA should ccnsider. 

RESPOIVSE 

March 2014 J. R. Simplot OSHA PSM RFI Comments: 

The J. R. Simplot Company does believe a requirement that employers 

perform root-cause analysis for incidents under Sec. 1910.119(m) would 

be beneficial. Identifying the root-cause is the only true way to identify 

appropriate corrective actions and prevent recurrence. It would be 

beneficial if, within the PSM standard, OSHA provided a clear definition for 

what a root-cause would encompass. 

g. Are there any data or information on accidents, near misses, or other safety-related 

incidents that the facility could have prevented by following management-system 

elements not currently required under the RMP regulation? 

10 
RESPOPJSE 

The J. R. Simpiot Company is not aware of any data or information on accidents, 

near rnisses or other safety-related incidents that could have been prevented by 

following management-system elements not currentiy required. 

h. What would be the paperwork burden associated with the revisions to managementsystem elements discussed above? What special skills or training vvould employees 

need to implement these elements, including associated reporting and recordkeeping requirements? What would be the costs of additional reporting and recordkeeping i-equirements, including costs for worker training and any required data 

managernent system upgrades? 

RESPOPJSE 

The J. R. Simpfot Company believes there could be a paperwork burden 

associated with the revisions to management-system elements as discussed. 

3. Define and Require Evaluation of Updates to Applicable Recognizer9 and 

Generally A ccepted Good Enqineerinq Practices 

a. What does your facility use as a definition for RAGAGEP? Would adding a definition 

for RAGAGEP to the RMP rule improve understanding of RMP requirements and 

prevent accidental releases? If so, what specific definition for RAGAGEP should 

EPA add to the RMP rule? What would be the economic impacts of adding such a 

definition? 

RESPONSE 

March 2014 J. R. Simolot OSHA PSM RFI Comments: 

The J. R. Simplot Company uses consensus codes and standards as well 

as manufacturer recommendations relevant to the specific industry and 

equipment as a definition for RAGAGEP (e.g. IIAR for ammonia 

refrigeration) 

The J. R. Simplot Company has no evidence that adding a definition for 

RAGAGEP will improve the understanding of PSM requirements and 

prevent worker injuries and fatalities. However we would suggest that 

OSHA consider adopting a definition similar to that of Center for Chemical 

Process Safety (CCPS) Guideline for fVlechanical Integrity Systems: 

"RAGAGEP are the basis for engineering, operation, or 

maintenance activities and are themselves based on established 

codes, standards, published technical reports or recommendation 

11 
practices or similar docurnents. RAGAGEPs detail generally 

approved ways to perform specific engineering, inspecfiion or 

mechanical integrity activities, such as fabricating a vessel, 

inspecting a storage tank or servicing a relief valve." 

The J. R. Simplot Company recognizes the PSM standard covers a large 

range of industries and there are many standards that cover different 

industries. Listing all RAGAGEPs that are required for all types of 

industries and requiring different industries to cletermine which apply can 

create confusion as to the specific application. The J. R. Simplot Company 

beiieves it may be helpful if OSHA were to deveiop an appendix to the 

PSM standard listing the potentiai codes and sstandards that could be used 

to develop a facility RAGAGEP program. Small entities would likely not 

have the resources to adequately determine which are relevant codes and 

standards for their specific operation wNch would put these srnali entities 

in a position to seek outside consultation to make such determinations, 

creating an economic impact the scale of which is currently unknown. 

The J. R. Simplot Company believes OSHA should be the regulatory agency to 

manage any RAGAGEP requirements. 

b. From what sources (e.g., codes, standards, published technical reports, guidelines, 

etc.) does your facility select applicable RAGAGEP for operations covered under the 

PSM standard? 

RESPONSE 

March 2014 J. R. Simplot OSHA PSM RFI Com 

The J. R. Simplot Company uses the following sources to select 

applicable RAGAGEP for operations covered under PSM (not an allinclusive list): 

® American National Standards Institute 

• International Institute of Ammonia Refrigeration 

• American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and A¢r Conditioning 

Engineers 

® National Fire Protection Association 

• International Fire Code 

• Uniform Fire Code 

• Manufacturer Recommendations 

c. Does your facility evaluate updates to its selected RAGAGEP? If so, how does your 

facility monitor any updates, and how often do you evaluate them? 

12 
RESPOIV SE 

March 2014 J. R. Simplot OSHA PSM RFI Comments: 

The J. R. Simplot Company uses third party auditors, group memberships 

and subscriptions to monitor updates to selected RAGAGEPs. 

d. Please provide any data or information on accidents, near misses, or other safetyrelated incidents involving failure to evaluate and/or implement updates to applicable 

RAGAGEP for RMP-covered processes. Wouid requiring employers to evaluate 

and/or implement updates to applicable RAGAGEP prevent such accidental 

releases? 

RESPOnJSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company is not aware of any data or information on accidents, 

near misses or other safety-related incidents that could have been prevented by 

having in pface a requirement to update RAGAGEPs for RMP covered 

processes. 

e. Should owners or operators covered by the applicable provisions of the RMP 

regulation be required to evaluate updates to applicable RAGAGEP? Should 

owners and operators be required to comply with new RAGAGEP requirements ?hat 

occur after the owner or operator's initial compliance with the appficable provision of 

the RMP regulation? How would such updates or new requirements be identified? 

What would be an appropriate time period in which to conduct this evaluation and/or 

to comphy with updated RAGAGEP? What would be the economic impacts of this 

change? 

RESPON'SE 

March 2014 J. R. Simplot OSHA PSM RFI Comments: 

The J. R. Simplot Company would consider an evaluation time period of 

five years for updates to RAGAGEPs. Update revalidation could be 

incorporated into the Management of Change standard and/or the 

Mechanical lntegrity Standard. By incorporating this into the Management 

of Change standard facilities would be requirecl to evaluate updates to 

codes and standards as part of any changes being made. Incorporation of 

an update revalidation process into the Mechanical Integrity Standard 

woufd ensure Inspection, Testing and Preventative Maintenance 

procedures in place were utilizing information f :om the most current ~ consensus standard recommendations. 

13 
f. Would a requirement to evaluate updates to applicable RAGAGEP be more 

appropriate in another paragraph of the RMP rule? For example, should such a 

requirement become part of the Process Hazard Analysis revaiidation requirements 

at § 68.67(f), or the management of change requirements at § 68.75? How would 

EPA incorporate such a requirement for Program 2 processes? 

RESPONSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company utilizes the ASMARK on-line maintenance and 

manufacturer specification plan to maintain Program 2 equipment. 

4. Extend Mechanical Integrity Requirements to Cover Any Safety-Critical 

Equipment 

a. Should EPA amend the mechanical integrity provisions oi-the RMP rule to explicitly 

cover all safety critical process equipment? If so, what type(s) of equipment? Did 

you identify safety-criticai equipment not explicitly covered under § 68.73? If so, 

how did your facility determine that the equipment was safety-critical, and does your 

facility treat the equipment as if it were RMP-covered for safety or other reasons? 

Did you identify the equipment as safety-critical through an RMP process hazard 

analysis? 

RESPONSE 

March 2014 J. R. Simplot OSHA PSM RFI Comments: 

The J. R. Simplot Company facilities include cr tical safety equipment 

identified through the Process Hazard Analysis. This equipment is treated 

as PSM covered equipment to include Inspection, Testing and 

Preventative Maintenance as recognized to be appropriate either by 

consensus standards or manufacturer recommendations. 

The J. R. Simplot Company can see no reason for EPA to amend the mechanical 

integrity provisions of the RMP rule to explicitly cover all safety critical process 

equipment. 

b. Please provide any data or information on accidental releases, near misses, or other 

safety-reiated incidents related to the mechanical integrity of safety-critical 

equipment not explicitly covered under § 68.73. 

RESPONSE 

14 
The J. R. Simplot Company is not aware of any data or information on accidents, 

near misses or other safety-related incidents related to mechanical integrity of 

safety-critical equipment not explicitly covered under § 68.73. 

c. Would expanding the scope of § 68.73 to explicitly cover the integrity of all 

equipment critical to process safety make it more likely to prevent accidental 

releases? 

RESPOIVSE 

March 2014 J. R. Simplot OSHA PSM RFI Comments: 

The J. R. Simplot Company takes the stand that if equipment is listed, 

within the PHA, as being used as a safeguard that equipment has been 

identified as critical safety equipment and therefore must be maintained 

per consensus standards or manufacturer recommendations. 

The J. R. Simplot Company has no evidence that expanding the scope of § 68.73 

to explicitly cover specific equipment would make it more likely to prevent 

accidental releases. 

d. Should EPA add additional requirements to the mechanical integrity provisions, or 

clarify ary existing provisions? For example, should the Agency require that certain 

types of covered facilities install emergency shutdown systems, such as redundant 

power supplies, emergency flares, vents, or scrubbers, etc., in order to prevent 

accidental releases resulting from uncontrolled emergency shutdowns? 

RESPONSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company does not believe EPA should add additional 

requirement to the mechanical integrity provisions such as emergency shutdown 

systems, emergency flares, etc. The examples provided by EPA are covered by 

design engineering standards. Safety systems are also covered during Process 

Hazard Analysis, a process that would reveal if additional safety / emergency 

equipment should be included. 

e. Are there any other provisions of this section that should be enhanced or clarified? 

Does labeling § 68.73 as "Mechanical Integrity" cause owners and operators to 

disregard or neglect the maintenance, functionality, or integrity of process 

components that would not typically be considered "mechanical" components, such 

as electrical and computer systems? 

15 
RESPONSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company does not believe labeling § 68.73 as "Mechanical 

Integrity" causes owners and operators to disregard or neglect the maintenance, 

functionality or integrity of process components that are not topically considered 

"mechanical" components such as electrical and computer systems. It is aiso 

worth noting that these components and their functionality are considered during 

the Process Hazard Analysis. 

What would be the economic impacts of revising the mechanical integrity provisions 

as discussed above? Are there any special circumstances involving small entities 

that EPA should consider with respect to revising the mechanical integrity provisions 

of the RMP? 

RESPONSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company is of the opinion that for small entities making 

changes as discussed above could be extensive and not improve the safety to 

employees, the general pubfic or the environment. 

5. Reguire Owners and Operators to Manage Organizational Chanqes 

a. What do you consider to be an organizational change within the context of process 

safety management practices? For example, would you consider the following, or 

similar, changes to be organizationai changes: reducing the number of operators in 

a shift; changing from 5-day to 7-day operations; changing from 8-hour to 12-hour 

operator shifts; replacing a unit manager; reducing the facility operations or 

maintenance budget; relocating a technical group to a remote corporate location; 

changing a supervisory or compensation structure; or hiring contractors to do work 

formerly performed by empioyees of the regulated facility? Are there other 

examples of organizational changes that may be relevant to safety management 

practices? 

RESPONSE 

March 2014 J. R. Simplot OSHA PSM RFI Comments: 

The J. R. Simplot Company would consider reduction in staffing level, 

changing from 8-hour to 12-hour operator shifts and the assignment of a 

new process manager under the Management of Change standard. 

The J. R. Simplot Company believes that based on the diversity of size, structure 

and functions within the company it would not be beneficiaf for a regulation to 

define how organizational changes are managed. Currently within the 

RMProgram there is a requirement to assign responsibilities for the RMProgram. 

[to 
This requirement, aiready in the regulation, would seem to be adequate rather 

than adding an additional requirement. 

b. If your facility has estabBished and implemented written procedures for management 

of organizational changes, please describe any economic impacts associated with 

the procedures. Please note any implementation challenges that may be associated 

with requiring that such procedures be developed and followed. 

RESPONSE 

Nlarch 2014 J. R. Simplot OSHA PSM RFI Comments: 

The J. R. Simplot Company financial impacts include the time (resources) 

to make appropriate reviews under the M0C, changes to processes to 

accommodate staffing level or shift changes including associated training, 

and training costs for new process manager(s). 

c. Would clarifying § 68.75 with an explicit requirement that employers manage 

organizational changes prevent accidental releases? What would be the economic 

impact of such a clarification? Are there any special circumstances involving small 

entities that 1=PA should consider with respect to this option? 

RESPOIVSE 

March 2014 J. R. Simplot OSHA PSV! RFI Comments: 

The J. R. Simplot Company has no evidence that an explicit requirement 

for employers to manage organizational changes would prevent worker 

injuries or fatalities. The J. R. Simplot Company believes it would be 

beneficial for OSHA to clarify that organizational changes must be 

handled under MOC. Small facilities will go through the same process to 

make changes however the effort will be relative related to time and size. 

A small facility may have some additional training costs when a process 

manager is changed as they may not have the internal training resources. 

d. Please describe any organizational changes made in your facility that have had the 

potential to affect process operations. Were management-of-change procedures 

followed before making the changes? 

RESPONSE 

March 2014 J. R. Simalot OSHA PSM RFI Comments: 

The J. R. Simplot Company facilities have some procedures that are 

written to be completed twice per shift meaning the change from an 8-hour 

17 
shift to 12-hours shifts would reduce the frequency; evaluation of each 

procedure that is shift specific must be completed to ensure adequate 

timeframes are being maintained. Management of change procedures 

were, in some cases, completed before the change and in other cases 

after the change. Clarification in the standard as to expectation for 

organizational changes may have eliminated confusion and prevented the 

shift change from being implemented prior to initiating the change through 

the MOC process. 

e. What do you consider to be the best safety practices concerning management of 

organizational change? 

RESPO/V'SE 

March 2014 J. R. Simalot OSHA PSM RFI Comments: 

The J. R. Simplot Company contends the best safety practices concerning 

management of organizational change include those that affect staffing 

levels, shift lengths, changes to persons responsible for the various PSM 

elements, overall PSM and include effective training. 

The J. R. Simplot Company believes OSHA should be the regulatory agency to 

manage best safety practices concerning management of organizational change. 

f. Please provide any data or information on accidents, near misses, or other safetyrelated ir:cidents invoBving the failure to manage organizational change. Wou9d 

following management-of-change procedures under § 68.75 have prevented these 

incidents? 

RESPONSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company is not aware of any data or information on accidents, 

near misses or other safety-related incidents involving failure to manage 

organizational change not explicitly covered under § 68.73. 

6.Require Third-Party Compliance Audits 

a. Does your facility use a third-party for conducting compliance audits under § 68.58 

and § 68.79 for safety or other reasons? What was the basis for that decision? How 

has it affected the overall safety record of your facility? 

RESPOIVSE 

18 
March 2014 J. R. Simplot OSHA PSM RFI Comments: 

The J. R. Simplot Company has utilized third party auditors. Utilization of 

third party auditors was primarily done to determine the effectiveness of 

the second party audits, which is the normal process. A member from our 

second party audit team observed the actions of the third party auditors. It 

was determined that the quality of the third party audits was no different 

that the quality of the normally completed second party audits. 

b. Please provide any data or information on accidents, near misses, or other safetyrelated incidents that could have been prevented by conducting more effective 

compliance audits for operations covered under § 68.58 and § 68.79. What were 

the deficiencies in those audits? Were the audits in question conducted by in-house 

staff or a third party? 

RESPOIV SE 

The J. R. Simplot Company has no data or information related to safety incidents 

that could have been prevented by conduction compliance audits differently. 

c. Would revising § 68.58 and § 68.79 to require owners and operators of RMPregulated facilities to use a third-party for compliance audits help prevent accidental 

releases? What would be the economic impacts of revising § 68.58 and § 68.79 in 

this way (e.g., typical consultant fees, additional work hours required, special 

circumstances involving small entities, etc.)? 

RESPOIVSE 

March 2014 J. R. Simplot OSHA PSM RFI Comments: 

Based on our extensive experience auditing PSM covered facilities, the J. 

R. Simplot Company does not think requiring companies to use third party 

auditors would prevent worker injuries. There would be economic impacts 

associated with a requirement for third party audits; the actual economic 

impact is difficult to determine at this time, but we have received two 

quotes for third party compliance audits; one was for $36.000 and the 

other was $40,000. These quotes were for our larger facilities, of which we 

have eleven. We operate thirty-seven smaller, less complex facilities and 

would anticipate a cost of approximately $20,000 per compliance audit for 

each of these facilities. Consequently, if all Simplot facilities described in 

Response 1 had to have a 3ra-party audit, based on received quotes we 

could anticipate a cost of approximately $1,158,000.00 (11 facilities at 

$38,000 and 37 facilities at $20,000). 

19 
The J. R. Simplot Company has no evidence that the use of a third-party auditor 

would assure a higher quality or more consistent audit process. 

d. Should EPA revise § 68.58 and § 68.79 to require owners and operators to use 

compliance auditors (internal or third-party) with certain minimum credentials or 

certifications? If so, what minimum credentials or certifications should the Agency 

req u i re? 

RESPOIVSE 

March 2014 J. R. Simplot OSHA PSM RFI Comments: 

The J. R. Simplot Company would agree that OSHA could require 

employers to use compliance auditors with a certain specific skill set to be 

determined appropriate for the type of faciiity for which the audit is being 

performed. It would be difficult to determine specific minimum credentials 

or certifications that would be relevant for the large variety of PSM 

covered facilities. Small businesses would potentially incur additional 

costs to ensure an appropriate skill set was established for internal 

auditors. If utilizing third party auditors, the burden would be the cost of 

outside consultants (auditors). 

e. How should owners/operators of RMP-regulated facilities address the findings of the 

third-party auditor? Should EPA amend the RMP rule to require owners/operators to 

document how they addressed each of the findings of the third-party auditor? Should 

a timeframe for addressing those findings be included in the RMP regulation? 

Should EPA include a procedure for how an owner/operator may appeal the findings 

of the third-party auditor? 

RESPOIV SE 

March 2014 J. R. Simplot OSHA PSM RFI Comments: 

The J. R. Simplot Company has no evidence that requiring deficiencies to 

be completed within specific timeframes would prevent worker injuries and 

fatalities. It would seem reasonable that for audit identified program 

deficiencies (e.g. operating procedures, hot work, contractor safety, etc.) a 

6 month time frame could be required for completion. Correcting audit 

identified deficiencies that require engineering and equipment acquisition 

may take longer than 6 months. 

Should EPA require facilities that have incidents or near misses to conduct a full 

compliance audit under § 68.58 or § 68.79, as appropriate? Would such a 

requirement create a perverse incentive to underreport incidents or near misses? 

20 
RESPONSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company has no evidence that a requirement to complete a 

full compliance audit under § 68.58 or § 68.79 following an incident or near miss 

would prevent employee injuries, off site incidents or damage to the environment. 

Further the J. R. Simplot Company has no reason to believe such a requirement 

would present an incentive to underreport incidents or near misses. 

g. During compliance inspections at multiple-process sources, EPA inspectors have 

noted that some owners or operators have audited only a subset of covered 

processes at the source. Should EPA clarify § 68.58 and § 68.79 to explicitly 

indicate that all covered processes must receive a full compliance audit at least 

every three years? 

RESPONSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company audits the programs which cover any (all) process 

sources at least every three years as required. 

Does the identity of the auditor (e.g., in-house, contractor, professionally-certified, 

party licensed by EPA) affect the credibility of the audit for potentially impacted 

communities? 

RESPONSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company believes that the requirement within the PSM 

Standard which requires compliance audits to be completed by one person 

knowledge in the process is adequate. 

7. Effects of OSHA PSM Coverage on RMP Applicability 

a. Do you currently operate a facility with Program 2 covered processes? Please 

indicate what type of Program 2 process your facility operates. Do you implement 

accident prevention measures that go beyond RMP Program 2 for this process? If 

so, why? What additional prevention elements do you use? Do you believe 

Program 2 requirements are necessary for the safe operation of this process? Do 

you have any Program 2 processes that may be adequately managed under 

Program 1? Please explain the basis for your views. 

21 
RESPOIVSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company operates Program Level 2 Anhydrous Ammonia 

processes; as with many of our program we believed that there are elements that 

go beyond minimum compliance. Good practices are not the practices that need 

regulated; more regulation is not the answer. The answer is consistent 

enforcement of the current regulation. Under the current RMP rules there are 

few facilities that could meet the Program Level 1 

d. If OSHA restricts its retail exemption to facilities seiling regulated substances in 

small containers, should EPA eliminate RMP Program level 2 entirely or 

alternatively, modify Program 2 prevention elements or otherwise change the 

eligibility criteria for Program 2? If so, why? 

RESPONSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company has witnessed the retail interpretation and definitions 

change over the years, to the point now that it is not clear to anyone what the 

term retail means. Retail trade is not limited by container size but by how it is 

bought and sold; this has been convoluted over time to make a regulatory 

application fit where other options would work better. Program Level 2 elements 

are a good fit for those facilities to which they apply, which are no-PSM 

operations with potential off-site consequences. 

e. Would eliminating Program level 2 simplify rule compliance for the regulated 

universe and improve human and environmental health and safety, or does the 

current three-tiered prevention program framework under the RMP provide an 

appropriate level of protection? 

RESPONSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company does not believe that eliminating Program level 2 

would simplify rule compliance for the regulated universe and improve human 

and environmental health and safety. The J. R. Simplot Company believes the 

current three-tiered prevention program under the RMP provide an appropriate 

level of protection. 

What would be the economic impacts of modifying or eliminating Program level 2? 

Are there any special circumstances involving small entities that EPA should 

consider with respect to modifying or eliminating Program 2? 

22 
RESP0IVSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company believes that the economic impacts of modifying or 

eliminating Program Level 2 would be high, it is not possibie to determine how 

high. Small facilities would likely experience the greatest impact yet it is our 

opinicn this change would not improve human and environmental health and 

safety. 

D.ADDITIOIVAL ITEMS FOR VVHICH EPA REQUESTS INFORMATIOfV 

1.Safer Technology and Alternatives Anaiysis 

a. Shouid EPA require a safer alternatives options analysis either as a new prevention 

program element, as part of the existing PHA/Hazard Review element, or as a 

separate new requirement under CAA section 112(r)? 

RESPONSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company does not believe EPA should require a safer 

alternative option analysis either as a new program element or as part of the 

existing PHA/Hazard Review element. The process of PHA/ Hazard Review 

already takes into consideration if there are safer alternatives that a facility 

should take. 

If RfVIP facilities are required to perform safer alternative options analyses and 

implementation plans, should EPA require that the analyses and/or implementation 

plans be submitted to the Agency? Should EPA have any role in approving such 

analyses or plans? In lieu of an approval, can EPA promote safer alternatives 

through reporting and the dissemination of information on potentially applicable 

practices? 

RESPONSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company does not believe EPA should be put in a position to 

approve analysis and plans. It is not EPA's role or within their authority to 

determine how a facility meets requirement of the rule. 

2.Emergency Drills to Test a Source's Emerqency Response Pro_yram or Plan 

b. What should be the scope of an exercise/drill program? Should the exercise/drill 

program include internal (emergency response, notifications, and evacuation) and 

external elements (invo!ving community and federal and state responders, as 

23 
appropriate)? What elements should be exercised as part of the drill/exercise 

program? For example, shoufd the program include communications, coordination, 

logistics, and evacuations/accounting for personnel, etc? What response scenarios 

should be considered for the exercise/drill program? 

f:~C`77OUT1C`M 

The J. R. Simplot Company believes if exercises / drills are required they should 

be managed under OSHA's regulation 29 CFR 1910.120 (p)(8)(iv)(C). If EPA 

were to create a regulation which requires additional drills or emergency 

exercises there is the potential for such requirements to be burdensome to not 

only facilities but aiso first responders. It would be difficult, if not impossible, for 

EPA to develop response scenarios that wouid be applicable to the variety types 

of facilities that are covered under EPA's RMP rule. 

c. How frequen -tly should drills/exercises be performed? 

RESP0NSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company believes frequency of exercises / drilis should be 

managed under OSHA's regulation 29 CFR 1910.120 (p)(8)(iv)(C). It woufd be 

difficult, if not impossible for EPA to develop a frequency for exercises and drills 

that vvould be appropriate to the variety types of facilities that are covered under 

EPA's RMP rule. 

d. Who should be involved in the exercise program? How should the management 

team be engaged as part of the drills/exercises? How should contractors be 

included in the exercise/drill planning and when conducting exercises/drills? Who 

should be the designated official responsible for coordinating the exercises and drills 

conducted at the RNIP facility? How should other federal, state and local agencies 

be included in the exercise/drilf program? 

RESPONSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company believes those to be involved in a drill should be 

identified by a facility emergency action or emergency response plan as defined 

by OSHA. The facility written plan would identify responders (on-site or off-site) 

as well as agencies that would potential{y be involved. We do not believe EPA 

needs to add an additional requirement related to drills and / or exercises. 

e. Should all RMP facilities be required to participate in some type of exercise/drill 

program or only those who are required to develop an emergency response 

program? Shouid Program 1 facilities (and Program 2/Program 3 facilities that do 

24 
not respond to accidental reieases with their own employees) be required to conduct 

external exercises with community responders and test notification procedures? 

Should Program 2 and Program 3 facilities whose employees respond to accidental 

releases conduct both internal and external exercises? 

RESPOIVSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company believes these requirements are already addressed 

by OSHA once a facility is identified to have either an emergency action or 

emergency response plan. 

What would be the economic impacts and paperwork burden of requiring an 

exercise/drill program for all or a subset of RiVIP facilities? Would such a 

requirement substantially improve preparedness for deafing with emergency 

situations? Are there any special circumstances involving small entities that EPA 

should consider with respect to an exercise/drill program? 

RESPONSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company beiieves economic impacts and paperwork burdens 

would vary depending on the size of the facility. The J. R. Simplot Company has 

no evidence that such requirements would improve preparedness for deal with 

emergency situations. 

3.Automated ®etection and Monitorinq for Releases of Regulated Substances 

a. Shouid facilities be required to install monitoring equipment or sensors to detect 

releases of RNIP regulated substances, or the conditions that could lead to such a 

release? Should the systems provide for continuous detection and monitoring? 

How should any such requirements be crafted to provide appropriate site-specific 

flexibility? 

RESPONSE 

The J. R. Simp@ot Company believes the installation of monitoring equipment or 

sensors to detect the releases of RIVIP regulated substances or conditions that 

could lead to such a release are identified during the design phase as well as 

during OSHA's PSM PHA and / or IVianagement of Change. We do not believe 

an additional EPA requirement would bring value and an additional requirement 

could be burdensome to facilities. 

25 
c. Should an automated mechanism to notify, alert and warn the local responders and 

surrounding public of an incident be considered as part of any detection and 

monitoring system requirement? If so, how should the potential for false alarms be 

addressed within such a requirement? 

RESPONSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company believes a decision to automatically notify, alert and 

warn local responders and surrounding public should be a decisions better made 

by facilities working with local responders rather and mandated by regulation. 

e. How would a requirement for appropriate detection thresholds be best established 

for activating alarms and/or alerts? 

RESPONSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company believes the installation of monitoring equipment or 

sensors to detect the releases of RMP regulated substances or conditions that 

could lead to such a release are identified during the design phase as well as 

during OSHA's PSM PHA and / or Management of Change. We do not believe 

an additional EPA requirement would bring value and could be burdensome to 

facilities. 

g. What involvement should LEPCs and SERCs have in the development of the 

emergency response plan, particularly with respecct to what actions are to be taken in 

the event of an incident where and alarm/alert is activated? 

RESPONSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company believes the current process to provide LEPC and 

SERCs with emergency plans along with site visits by response agencies is 

sufficient and no additional involvement by LEPC and SERCs would be 

necessary. 

h. How frequently should monitoring equipment or sensors to detect releases of RMP 

regulated substances be tested? How should these tests be documented? How 

long should records of such tests be maintained? Should' automated monitoring 

records for periods of normal operations be maintained, so that past records may 

serve as an aid in determining what may have gone wrong prior to an accident (e.g., 

a gradual increase in emissions)? Should EPA specify requirements in this area, or 

are these aspects of program implementation best left to -the facility? 

?0 
RESPONSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company believes testing of monitoring equipment or sensors 

to detect the release of an RNIP regulated substance should be determined by 

industry standards and manufactures recommendations. Detecting and 

alarming equipment testing documentation should be rnanaged by OSHA's PSM 

Mechanical Integrity elernent; J. R. Simplot does not believe it is necessary for 

EPA to specify requirements in this area. 

Leak detection and repair programs are common under the CAA's routine emission 

programs. Can these programs be integrated with the accidental release prevention 

program to reduce accidental releases and to simplify requirements for stationary 

sources subject to both the RIVIP and these other prograrns? Are there jurisdictional 

issues that prevent integration? 

RESPONSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company believes EPA should continue to utifize OSHA's PSNi 

Mechanical Integrity element and IVlaintenance Program elements required under 

RMP Program Level 2. 

4. Additional Stationary Source Location Requirements 

a. Would additional specifics on stationary source siting and occupancy siting under 

the RMP minimize the impacts of chemical accidents to local communities? How 

should RMP stationary source siting requirements relate to OSHA PSfVi and other 

industry standards? 

RESPONS,E 

The J. R. Simplot Company beiieves stationary source siting and occupancy 

siting should be regulated under OSHA's PSM regufation. If EPA were to impose 

additional rules or rules inconsistent with OSHA's PSN7 regulation there could be 

adverse impacts to existing facilities. OSHA's facility siting is determined by risk 

and likelihood based on the environment in which they are located. 

b. What guidance shouid EPA consider in the development of stationary source siting 

requirements? 

RESPONSF 

The J. R. Simplot Company believes stationary source siting and occupancy 

siting should be regulated under OSHA's PSNi reguiation. OSHA's facility siting 

27 
is determined by risk and likelihood based on the environment in which they are 

located. 

c. What information should EPA consider in the development of stationary source 

buffer or setback zones for different risks? How should EPA address siting when 

limyted space is available? 

RESPONSE 

As stated above, the J. R. Simplot Company believes stationary source siting 

and occupancy siting should be regulated under OSHA's PSM regulation. 

OSHA's facility siting is determined by risk and likelihood based on the 

environment in which they are located. 

d. What administrative processes and controls should be incorporated into stationary 

source siting requirements? 

RESPOIVSE 

As stated above, the J. R. Simplot Company believes stationary source siting 

and occupancy siting should be regulated under OSHA's PSNI regulation. 

OSHA's facility siting is determined by risk and likelihood based on the 

environment in which they are located. 

e. What safety and process devices, instruments and controls should be incorporated 

into stationary source siting requirements? 

RESPOIVSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company believes safety and process devices, instruments 

and controls are part of the process design and are already considered when 

utilizing OSHA's PSfVI regulation for facility siting and establishing safeguards. 

f. What criteria are appropriate for siting of occupancies (such as offices, control 

rooms, cafeterias, etc.) near an RMP-regulated process? 

RESPOIVSE 

As stated above, the J. R. Simplot Company believes appropriate for siting of 

occupancies (such as offices, control rooms, cafeterias, etc.) near an RMPregulated process should be regulated under OSHA's PSM regulation. OSHA's 

R-i 
facility siting is determined by risk and likelihood based on the environment in 

which they are located. 

g. How often should stationary source siting be evaluated for effectiveness? What 

criteria should be used? 

RESPONSE 

As stated above, the J. R. Simplot Company believes stationary source siting 

should be regulated under OSHA's PSM regulation. OSHA's facility siting is 

determined by risk and likelihood based on the environment in which they are 

located. This activity is done during the initial PHA, PHA revalidation as well as 

when changes are made under the OSHA PSM element Management of 

Change. 

h. What documentation should be required for evaluating stationary source siting 

determinations? 

RESPONSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company believes document requirements as stated in 

OSHA's PSM are appropriate for evaluating stationary source siting. 

Is it appropriate to reflect the environmental burden of the surrounding community in 

siting criteria for either new facilities or expansions within an existing site? Is it 

appropriate to consider chronic burdens or only burdens associated with accidental 

releases? 

RESPONSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company does not believe it is appropriate to refiect the 

environmental burden of the surrounding community in siting criteria for either 

new facilities or expansions within an existing sites under EPA's RMP rule; nor is 

it appropriate to consider chronic burdens but to consider only burdens that could 

reasonably be associated with an accidental release. 

k. If EPA mandated siting criteria, how should EPA account for local zoning codes 

when establishing such criteria? Would setting federal requirements overstep into 

the normal state and local zoning process, or would it act as a supplemental 

measure ensuring minimal safety standards across the country? 

ce 
RESPONSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company believes if EPA were to mandate siting criteria this 

would be an overstep into the normal state and local zoning process. 

5. Compliance with Emerqency Response Program Reguirements in 

Coordination with Local Responders 

a. Do you own or operate an RMP-regulated facility that refies on public authorities to 

respond to accidental releases of regulated substances at the faciiity? What steps 

do you take to ensure that pubiic responders are prepared to properiy respond to 

accidental refeases at your facility? Should EPA clarify what steps RMP facilities 

should take in order to properly coordinate their emergency response pian with the 

community emergency response plan? 

RESPONSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company owns and operates RMP-regulated facilities with 

local emergency response capabilities and coordinate with local emergency 

responders as part of EPCRA, RMP and OSHA Hazardous Waste Operations 

and Emergency Response Standard ("HAZWOPER") requirements. These 

coordination between faciiity personal and local responders is appropriate to 

reinforce awareness of the hazards during an emergency. Changes that would 

duplicate such existing coordination requirements through a redundant 

coordination requirement would not increase worker safety. 

6. Incident Investigation and i4ccident History Reguirements 

a. Are the RMP incident investigation requirements too narrowly focused? Would 

identifying a broader range of incidents requiring investigation (e.g., near misses) 

help prevent additional accidental reieases? Please provide specific exampies 

where possible. EPA requests information on alternative definitions or incident 

classifications that could be included within the rule's incident investigation 

requirements. 

RESPONSE 

The J. R. Simpiot Company has no data or information related to safety incidents 

that could have been prevented by expanding the incident investigation 

requirements as currentiy required by RMP. Changes to EPAs RMP 

Investigation requirements may create contradictory and or dupiicative 

requirements that industry must meet. 

Ell 
b. Are there any data or information on process upsets, near misses or other incidents 

that were not required to be investigated, but where an investigation and resulting 

changes in management systems might prevent accidental releases? 

RESPONSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company has no data or information related to process upsets, 

near misses or other incidents that were not required to be investigated and 

where an investigation may have prevented accidental releases; as stated 

OSHA's PSM investigation element requirement covers all incidents for the 

covered process(es). 

c. Does your faci[ity routinely investigate incidents not required to be investigated 

under part 68? If so, please describe the types of incidents investigated, and the 

effects these investigations have had on facility operations. 

RESPONSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company routinely investigates incidents not required to be 

investigated under part 68; these incident investigation may include near misses 

and process upsets, corrective actions as identified necessary implemented. 

d. Would a specific time frame for incident investigations to be completed benefit 

overall safety? What should be the basis for establishing an appropriate timeframe 

requirement for an incident investigation to be completed? What are the challenges 

and limitations to completing an incident investigation within a specified timeframe? 

RESPONSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company does not believe it is possible to set a specific time 

frame for incident investigation to be completed as all incidents are unique in 

nature and require different resources. There is the potential for quality of 

incident investigations to be compromised if an arbitrary mandatory date for 

completion is assigned. 

e. Are there benefits from requiring that investigations must be performed even in 

cases where the owner/operator elects to decommission the process involved, 

where the process is destroyed in the incident, or where a facility determines there 

were no actual or potential off-site consequences? Would such a requirement 

provide a disincentive to decommission potentially risky processes? 

31 
RESPONSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company does not believe there is benefit from specifically 

requiring investigations to be performed even in cases where the owner/operator 

elects to decommission the process involved, where the process is destroyed in 

the incident or where the facility determines there were no actual or potential offsite consequences. OSHA's PSM standard for incident investigation does not 

exclude incidents as described above, consequently there is already a regulatory 

requirement for incident investigations to be completed. 

f. Would a modification of the definition of "catastrophic release" assist in addressing 

the concerns regarding the appropriate scope of incidents that require investigation? 

RESPOIVSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company does not believe a modification in the definition of 

"catastrophic release" is necessary or would there would be any value added in 

such a change. As mentioned several times EPA's RMP regulation is not the 

only agency that governs over covered process incidents. There is no value in 

creating regulations that are redundant of what already exists within OSHA's 

PSIVI standard. 

g. Would a modification of the accident history reporting requirements to reflect a 

broader range of incidents being investigated assist in disseminating lessons 

learned across industry? 

f:Yl ~lu`IA 

The J. R. Simplot Company does not believe a modification of the accident 

history reporting requirement to reflect a broader range of incidents being 

investigated would assist in disseminating lesson learned across industry. There 

is no evidence that increasing existing regulatory burdens and reporting 

requirements will aid in sharing know(edge across industries. There are already 

a number of trade organizations as well as the CSB and OSHA that coordinate 

efforts with industry. 

h. Should EPA require facilities that have incidents or near misses to conduct a full 

compliance audit under § 68.58 and § 68.79? 

RESPOIV SE 

The J. R. Simplot Company does not believe there is any value in requiring a 

facility that has an incident or near miss to conduct a full compliance audit under 

§ 68.58 and § 68.79. Changing the audit cycle to be triggered by occurrences of 

32 
incidents or near misses would create an unrealistic compliance burden. The 

OSFiA PSM standard required incident investigation for incidents and near 

misses and the investigation completed can identify deficiencies in the program 

as well as necessary corrections. 

7. Worst Case Release Scenario Quantity Reguirements for Processes Involving 

Numerous Small Vessels Stored Together 

a. Should EPA revise § 68.25(b) to require the owner or operator of any regulated 

process involving numerous small containers stored together to consider as the 

worst case release quantity the sum of the quantity of aBl containers in the process, 

or a subset of such containers, or the containers within one storage area of the 

process? 

RESPO(VSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company believes the current threshold determination is 

appropriate. The quantity of small containers is something that can very 

significantly; thus can lead to facilities over reporting and diluting the usefulness of 

the regulations. 

b. Would revising the worst case scenario quantity determination requirement in this 

manner better represent the true worst case scenario for such processes? 

RESPONSP 

The J. R. Simplot Company believes the worst case scenario is already a very 

poor estimate; adding rnore uncertainty only makes it less usefuf. 

e. If EPA were to revise § 68.25(b) to take into account numerous smald vessels being 

stored together, what types/kinds of vessels should be covered? Should there be 

any limits on the size of containers subject to the aggregation requirement? What 

would such limits be based on? Similarly, should there be a specific distance 

between vessels established in order to consider them as grouped together for 

purposes of worst case scenario calculations? What would that distance be based 

on? 

RESPOIVSE 

The J. R. Simp9ot Company does not believe these should be covered. 

33 
Should EPA revise § 68.25 to require the owner or operator of a regulated process 

to consider the potential for worst case release scenarios to invofve adjacent 

facilities or other nearby facilities that are interconnected through pipelines? Would 

this change raise any confidentiality or security issues? How would EPA adjust its 

worst case scenario modeling requirements to account for such a change? 

RESPONSE 

The J. R. Simpfot Company does not believe that it is appropriate to involved 

adjacent facilities or other nearby facilities that are interconnected through 

pipelines. A facility can only report on what is under their control. 

8. Public Disclosure of Information to Promote Regulatory Compliance and 

Improve Community Understanding of Chemical Risks 

a. Should EPA amend the RMP regulation to require RMP-regulated facilities to post 

chemical hazard-related information on their websites (if they have one) such as 

RMP chemical names, chemical quantities, executive summaries, links to LEPCs, 

community emergency plans, Safety Data Sheets (SDS) for hazardous chemicals 

present on site, EPCRA Tier 2 reports, release notification reports, accident history 

and cause and other similar information? What requirements should be considered 

for facilities that do not have a website? 

RESPONSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company believes that it is a security threat to post chemical 

identity, quantities or other related information on websites that are made 

available to anyone other than emergency response personnel. Our ASMARK 

methodology for conducting Site Vulnerability Assessments considers 

advertisement or inclusion of this type of site specific information via accessible 

website a "security liability". 

10. Program 3 NAICS Codes Based on RMP Accident History Data 

a. Should industry sectors represented in RMP data as those with the most accidental 

releases be used to update and replace the existing set of Program 3 NAICS codes 

with a new set? 

34 
RESPONSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company believes this woufd be miss-using the NAICS; 

program determination should be based individual facility performance. 

b. How cari the RMP accident history data best be used to update the current list of 

NAICS codes that trigger Program 3 requirements? Should the agency take into 

account the number of sources in each sector, or the severity of reported accidents, 

or other factors, in selecting updated Program 3 NAICS codes? Is the methodology 

used to develop the SIC/ NAICS code list applicable to the RMP accident history 

database? 

RESPOIVSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company believes NAICS should not be used to update the 

current NAICS codes that trigger Program 3 requirements. The determination 

should be performance based, not sector based. 

c. Would limiting the data analysis or the selection of NAICS codes to only those 

industry sectors represented in the RMP data provide a comp[ete and accurate 

picture of high risk industry sectors? 

RESPOIVSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company believes does not believe limiting the data anafysis 

or the section of NAICS codes to only those industry sectors represented in the 

RMP data provide a complete and accurate picture of high risk industry sectors. 

d. Should an analysis of the RMP data be combined with an analysis of other current 

accident history databases to inform any revisions/updates? If so, what other 

databases should be used? Fiow much weight should be given to the RMP data set 

in comparison to other sources? 

Y107RC~ 

The J. R. Simplot Company is not aware of what other accident history 

databases to which EPA is referencing, beyond the NRC database; consequently 

it is not possible for us to provide an informed response. 

e. Should the original NAICS codes continue to be included? Would not including the 

NAICS oodes historically identified under Program 3 cause increase risks to those 

industry sectors by having them no longer subject to the more stringent measures? . 

35 
RESP0111SE 

The J. R. Simplot Company does not believe it is necessary to continue to 

include NAICS codes; we do not believe there will be an increased risk if NAICS 

codes are eliminated. 

f. Should an analysis of accident history data be limited to a specific time frame? 

RESPONSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company believes analysis of history data should be limited to 

a specific time frame because processes are dynamic as well as the 

management of the process; data should be limited to a specific time frame. 

Currently OSHA's PSM standard limits incident history to five years. 

g. Would it cause confusion within the regulated community to change the list of NAICS 

codes for which Program 3 is required? 

RESPON'SE 

The J. R. Simplot Company is of the opinion that confusion would be caused 

within the regulated community if the NAICS list for Program 3 was changed. 

h. What would be the economic impacts of modifying the list of NAICS codes for which 

Program 3 is required? Are there any special circumstances involving small entities 

that EPA should consider with respect to modifying the list of covered NAICS codes? 

RESPONSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company be9ieves there wou9d most definiteiy be impacts 

caused from confusion and the increased burden imposed on small entities to 

comply with OSHA's PSM Standard, Program Level 3. 

36 
11.The "Safety Case" Regulatory Model 

RESPOnJSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company supports concerns raised in June 2014 by NIOSH 

that there is not adequate scientific basis that attested the Safety Case 

Regulatory Model was more effective that what is currently being done. 

"However, three months later NIOSH Director of Education and 

Information Paul Schulte asked OSHA to remove his agency's comments 

from the public record, "based on a re-evaluation of the scientific 

evidentiary foundation" for the original comments. 

Schulte said concerns from stakeholders about the earfier comments 

prompted a reevaluation of the issue, after which NIOSH determined there 

was a lack of an evidentiary basis for the safety case."' 

'source:http://www.ishn.com/articles/98983-98983-niosh-withdraws-support-forsafetNi-case-a p p roa ch-to-ch em i ca I-faci I ity-safety 

12. Streamlininq RMP Reguirements 

a. Are there steps that EPA could take to simplify the process of determining whether 

the RMP rule applies to particular facilities? Are there other potential revisions to the 

rule that would make it easier for regulated entities to comply with its provisions? 

RESPONSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company is of the opinion that the current process in 

deterrnining applicability of RMP rufe is adequate. We do not believe it is 

appropriate to change the applicability utilizing NAICS codes. 

b. Are there steps that EPA could take to simplify the RMP submission process? For 

example, are there advances in electronic reporting or information technology that 

EPA could use in order to ma4ce RMP submissions easier? 

RESP0IV SE 

The J. R. Simplot Company the registration if functional, however we do find the 

process of registering in the CDX with the Certifying Official to be somewhat 

cumbersome. 

37 
c. Shoufd EPA require that RMP submissions be certified by a senior corporate officiaE, 

such as the Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer, Chief Operations 

Officer, or the equivalent to ensure corporate-wide awareness and accountability in 

the RMP submission? 

RESPOIVSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company believes the appropriate certification process is 

appropriate as it currently is; with the individual responsible for the facility. 

d. Is the three-tiered program level structure of the RMP regulation appropriate, or 

should EPA consider simplifying the rule to make only two program tiers, or only a 

singfe prevention program applicable to al9 facilities? 

RESPOIVSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company believes the current three tier system is appropriate; 

this system was adopted with great consideration identifying it was essential to 

incorporate this flexibility mechanism into EPA's final reguEations. A one size fits 

aIV approach to the RMP regulations would likely impose unreasonable costs on 

the regulated community, to include small facilities. The tiers were originally 

se[eccted by EPA to include flexibility in the accident prevention and EPA should 

not undo this original intent. 

e. Are the accident prevention program elements clearly defined? Should EPA further 

clarify any of the existing elements? 

.73C97O7~1C`N 

The J. R. Simplot Company believes the accident program elements for each 

program level are clearly defined and there is no need for EPA to further clar+fy 

any existing elements. 

m 
Are the regulatory terms and definitions contained in section 68.3 suffic9ently clear? 

Are there additional terms that EPA should define in this section? 

RESPOIVSE 

The J. R. Simplot Company believes the regu9atory terms and definitions are 

clear and adequate. We see no reason to include additional terms defined in this 

section. 

Sincerely, 

, 

- --~ 

Alan L. Prouty 

Vice President, Sustainability & Regulatory Affairs 

O'7