The U.S. “Rebalance” and Europe: Convergent

Strategies Open Doors to Improved Cooperation

by Leo G. Michel and James J. Przystup

Strategic Perspectives 16

Center for Strategic Research

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University
Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is National 

Defense University’s (NDU’s) dedicated research arm. INSS includes 

the Center for Strategic Research, Center for Complex Operations, 

Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Center for 

Technology and National Security Policy, and Conflict Records 

Research Center. The military and civilian analysts and staff who 

comprise INSS and its subcomponents execute their mission by 

conducting research and analysis, publishing, and participating in 

conferences, policy support, and outreach.

The mission of INSS is to conduct strategic studies for the Secretary 

of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the unified combatant commands in support of the academic programs at NDU and to 

perform outreach to other U.S. Government agencies and the broader 

national security community. 

Cover: German Chancellor Angela Merkel, left, shakes hands with Chinese 

Premier Wen Jiabao after joint press conference at Great Hall of the

People in Beijing, August 30, 2012

(AP Photo/Ng Han Guan)
The U.S. “Rebalance” and Europe

Institute for National Strategic Studies

Strategic Perspectives, No. 16

Series Editor: Nicholas Rostow

National Defense University Press

Washington, D.C.

June 2014

By Leo G. Michel and James J. Przystup

The U.S. “Rebalance” and Europe:

Convergent Strategies Open Doors

to Improved Cooperation
For current publications of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, please visit the NDU Press Web site at:

ndupress.ndu.edu.

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those 

of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department or any 

other agency of the Federal Government. Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited.

Portions of this work may be quoted or reprinted without permission, provided that a 

standard source credit line is included. NDU Press would appreciate a courtesy copy of reprints 

or reviews.

First printing, June 2014
v

Contents

Executive Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Europeans and the Rebalance: Improved Understanding after a

Rocky Start. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

German Perspectives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

View from Paris. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

UK Perspectives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Other European Views. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

NATO Perspectives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

EU Perspectives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Options for Improved U.S.-European Cooperation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Notes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

About the Authors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

1

The U.S. “Rebalance” and Europe

Executive Summary

The U.S. strategic “rebalance” to the Asia-Pacific region has captured the attention of our 

European allies and partners. When the strategy (initially described as a “pivot to Asia”) was 

articulated in late 2011 and early 2012, European reactions were diverse. Some governmental 

officials, nongovernmental experts, and media commentators voiced concern that the strategy 

signaled at best a diminishing U.S. interest in European security affairs, or at worst a deliberate 

U.S. policy of disengagement from Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East.

European concerns regarding U.S. disengagement have dissipated but not entirely disappeared over the past 2 years. Still, U.S. readiness to lead politically and militarily in Europe—

for example, in response to the ongoing crisis involving Russia and Ukraine—and adjoining 

regions remains under close scrutiny. Furthermore, while many Europeans agree in principle 

that renewed American focus on Asia-Pacific issues should encourage Europeans to assume a 

greater share of security-related responsibilities in their neighborhood, there is little evidence 

to date of a sea change in European attitudes toward defense spending and overseas military 

deployments.

Meanwhile, many European governments are engaged in an Asia-Pacific “rebalance” of 

their own, albeit without using that term. They are working together, mainly under the auspices of the European Union (EU), to set agreed international norms and standards, particularly in areas related to trade and investment. But they are also competing with each other and 

with the United States for economic markets, including defense-related sales. France and the 

United Kingdom are less reluctant than other Europeans to become involved in Asia-Pacific 

strategic affairs.

European officials and nongovernmental experts are interested in improving transatlantic 

cooperation in several areas related to the U.S. rebalance. For example:

■ Senior German, French, and British officials would welcome more regular high-level 

consultations with American counterparts on Asia-Pacific issues. Coordinated “strategic 

messaging” could play a useful role in security-related confidence-building and risk reduction measures in the region.

■ French defense officials seek enhanced military-to-military cooperation with the 

United States in the Asia-Pacific region. In particular, the French are interested in improved interoperability with U.S. forces.
2 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 16

■ Senior EU officials would like to rejuvenate work on the common agenda agreed by 

EU High Representative Catherine Ashton and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in their 

July 2012 Phnom Penh statement. And successful U.S.-EU negotiations on a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership would go a long way toward setting international 

norms and standards that would positively influence trade, diplomatic, and security-related behavior involving Asia-Pacific nations.
3

The U.S. “Rebalance” and Europe

Europeans and the Rebalance: Improved Understanding after a

Rocky Start

The U.S. strategic rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region has captured the attention of our 

European allies and partners. When the strategy (initially described as a “pivot to Asia”) was 

articulated in late 2011 and early 2012, European reactions were diverse.1

 Some governmental 

officials, nongovernmental experts, and media commentators voiced concern that the strategy 

signaled at best a diminishing U.S. interest in European security affairs, or at worst a deliberate 

U.S. policy of disengagement from Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East. Among them, 

some worried that aspects of rebalance—in particular the announced deployments of additional U.S. forces to the Pacific—might heighten the risks of a military confrontation involving 

China, its neighbors, and the United States.

According to senior European officials, such reactions were attributable in part to what 

they viewed as insufficient efforts by U.S. officials to consult with their European counterparts 

in advance of the public rollout of the new strategy.2

 European think-tank experts, including 

some who appear to be influential opinion shapers for colleagues in government, were particularly critical of what they considered to be a dismissive U.S. attitude. Washington “did not invite 

the EU to join the pivot,” one expert complained in mid-2012, reflecting a broad perception that 

Americans did not view Europe as a “relevant actor” in the Asia-Pacific region.3

Over the past 2 years, European concerns regarding U.S. disengagement have diminished 

but not disappeared. For example, some European officials assessed in late September 2013 that 

President Barack Obama’s decision earlier that month not to carry out anticipated military strikes 

against the Syrian regime suggested a U.S. disengagement from the region motivated in part by 

the rebalance strategy. Today, the prevailing view in Europe accepts rebalance as a natural and 

nonthreatening evolution of long-term American economic, political, diplomatic, and security 

interests. Repeated public and private declarations by senior U.S. officials of the enduring American commitment to European security and their hope to rebalance with Europe toward the AsiaPacific have helped to reassure European officials. The U.S. diplomatic, military, and economic 

response (as of early May 2014) to Russian actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, as well as continuing U.S. diplomatic and military engagement in a range of security issues affecting the broader 

Middle East and northern Africa, also have dampened some European concerns.

Nevertheless, U.S. readiness to exercise its traditional leadership politically and militarily in 

Europe and adjoining regions remains under close scrutiny. Moreover, for some European analysts, the sustainability of the rebalance itself is open to question, especially its military aspects. In 
4 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 16

their view, the new U.S. military deployments to the region—for example, the U.S. Marine Rotational Force in Darwin, Australia, and forward-basing of Littoral Combat Ships in Singapore—risk 

sending the wrong signal to China and U.S. allies and partners in the region. These analysts argue 

that Chinese officials will likely see those U.S. moves as “relatively modest” and as an “admission 

of American weakness,” even as Beijing publicly asserts that the rebalance represents a “containment” strategy aimed at China. Some European analysts also worry that certain U.S. Asia-Pacific 

allies and partners might misinterpret the rebalance as an indication of U.S. willingness to back a 

more assertive, if not confrontational, stance on their part in response to Chinese territorial and 

jurisdictional claims in the South and East China Seas.

Meanwhile, the U.S. rebalance has had the positive and perhaps unintended effect of promoting European nations’ attention to their national and multilateral interests and strategies 

in the Asia-Pacific region. References to the rebalance have become commonplace in Europe’s 

strategic discourse—for example, in defense white papers, think-tank and press articles, and 

speeches and reports by government, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and EU 

officials. Often described as a major new development in the geostrategic environment, the 

rebalance has been invoked by many European officials and experts as an additional incentive 

for increased European defense efforts and “responsibility-sharing” with the United States in 

Europe and its neighborhood.

The rebalance has also been invoked to support Europe’s increased attention on a national 

and EU-wide basis to expanding trade, investment, diplomatic, and cultural ties with the AsiaPacific region. In truth, however, many European governments have undertaken their own rebalance to the region since the 1990s without labeling their efforts as such. Their focus has been 

and likely will remain on expanding trade, investment, and diplomatic relations, especially with 

China. And while EU member states defer to the European Commission to negotiate trade 

agreements with Asia-Pacific partners, consistent with the EU’s treaty obligations, the members 

are also vying for sales, including defense-related systems, to the region and investment from it.

Americans and Europeans have shared strategic objectives in the Asia-Pacific including 

liberal trade regimes, freedom of navigation, maritime security, and peaceful resolution of disputes while also promoting respect for human rights and democratic values. In 2003, seven 

European allies joined the United States as “core” states to launch the Proliferation Security 

Initiative, which has helped strengthen international efforts to stop proliferation of weapons 

of mass destruction by North Korea.4

 In some areas, however, their approaches differ and may 

compete. In the following sections, this assessment surveys the varied perspectives regarding 

the rebalance among key European actors. It concludes with policy options that might be useful 
5

The U.S. “Rebalance” and Europe

in improving U.S. coordination and cooperation with European allies and partners in ways that 

will serve our shared strategic objectives. 

German Perspectives

China plays a central role in German policy in the Asia-Pacific region. Berlin, like Washington, wants to encourage Beijing to become a “responsible stakeholder” in the international community, according to senior German officials. Chancellor Angela Merkel’s six visits to 

China since her election in 2005 are a clear indication of the priority accorded to the bilateral 

trade relationship. Germany is by far China’s leading trading partner in Europe and ranks sixth 

among Chinese trading partners worldwide.5 Their two-way trade nearly doubled—from $107 

billion to $194 billion—between 2006 and 2013.6

 Germany and China have agreed to a “strategic relationship” that includes more than 60 “dialogue mechanisms” for senior governmentlevel contacts on issues such as intellectual property rights, cyber security, Afghanistan, rule of 

law, and human rights.

A successful outcome in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations now taking place between the United States and EU would have a significantly positive 

impact on China, according to senior German officials. In their view, a TTIP agreement would 

set international norms and standards for trade, investment, and intellectual property rights in 

the Asia-Pacific region that, beyond their positive commercial effects, would help steer China’s 

evolving society and institutions toward greater openness and “Western values.”

German officials do not accept the Chinese argument that the U.S rebalance is essentially 

a containment strategy. Officials and parliamentarians have noted, however, that U.S.-China 

relations turning sour or sliding into open conflict—for example, over Taiwan or freedom of 

navigation in the South China Sea—could present huge problems for Germany given its extensive economic ties with China.7

Beyond China, Germany has established bilateral “strategic relationships” with Japan and 

the Republic of Korea, and similar agreements are envisioned with India, Indonesia, Vietnam, 

and Mongolia. (The legacy of commercial and cultural ties established between former East 

Germany and Vietnam and Mongolia has proved useful to Berlin’s recent efforts to upgrade 

relations.) These provide a framework for high-level official visits in both directions, expanded 

commercial contacts, and in some cases development assistance programs through the German 

Agency for International Cooperation.

In recent years, military sales have become an increasingly important factor in Germany’s relations with Asia-Pacific partners. Germany has sold conventional submarines to the Republic of 
6 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 16

Korea, India, and Singapore. Airbus Defence and Space, a multinational consortium with important German participation, reportedly has sought to sell Eurofighter combat aircraft to India, the 

Republic of Korea, and Malaysia. And according to press reports, Berlin has discussed unspecified 

defense cooperation with Vietnam and Indonesia.

 Germany’s Asia-Pacific policies have an important EU dimension. Through the EU, Germany provides a range of institution-building assistance to the Association of Southeast Asian 

Nations (ASEAN)—for example, by training ASEAN management, legal, and public affairs personnel. Berlin is actively supporting EU free trade negotiations with Japan, which also have an 

important political dimension. In addition, Germany participates in EU sanctions on North 

Korea related to the latter’s nuclear weapons program. (During a period of heightened tensions 

on the Korean Peninsula in April 2013, then–Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle also publicly 

reassured Japan that it can “count on [German] solidarity.”8

) Moreover, German policies toward 

the Asia-Pacific are part of a broader strategy of strengthening ties with emerging powers such 

as Brazil and South Africa through both the EU and bilateral channels.

The U.S. rebalance has strengthened the hand of German officials who favor a whole-ofgovernment approach. Interministerial coordination on regional issues—and, in some cases, coordination between federal and state (Länder) authorities—has expanded appreciably. Meanwhile, 

the foreign office has shifted additional personnel to Asia-Pacific embassies and consulates and increased language training, especially in Chinese and Japanese. According to foreign office experts, 

many German diplomats now believe that their background in Asia-Pacific affairs eventually must 

be on a par with their knowledge of U.S. affairs in order to be considered for top posts.

While Germany is in many respects leaning forward in its approach to the Asia-Pacific, 

there are limits as well. Officials understand American expectations that as the United States 

rebalances, Europeans should assume a greater share of security responsibilities in regions close 

to Europe. Others emphasize that NATO’s focus should be closer to home, especially in the wake 

of its drawdown in Afghanistan during 2014. Nevertheless, well-placed interlocutors within and 

outside the German government insist that Washington should not expect Germany to become 

a strategic player in Asia-Pacific security matters—either on a national basis or through NATO. 

Some prominent defense experts attribute this in part to pacifist sentiments among the public. 

View from Paris

The French have actively pursued broader and deeper trade, investment, and diplomatic 

relations with Asia-Pacific nations for decades. On occasion they have been controversial trail-
7

The U.S. “Rebalance” and Europe

blazers in that regard—for example, when President Charles de Gaulle established diplomatic 

relations with China in 1964.

With the loss of Indochina in 1954, France ended its nearly 70-year domination of a 

large swath of Southeast Asia. However, it retained sovereign control over the islands of New 

Caledonia, French Polynesia, and Wallis and Fatuna in the South Pacific, and La Reunion and 

Mayotte in the Indian Ocean. Although the total area and population (some 1.56 million) 

of these territories are relatively small, they belong to the “first circle” of French strategic 

priorities, which is to “protect the national territory and citizens.”9

 Moreover, they represent 

86 percent of France’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which covers 11 million square kilometers of the world’s ocean surface—second in expanse only to that of the United States. The 

EEZ encompasses fishing, mineral, and energy resources that are deemed “very important” 

for the French economy.10

Following his election in May 2012, President François Hollande named two Asian specialists to top positions in his presidential staff.11 In June 2012, his newly appointed defense minister, Yves Le Drian, traveled to the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore where he underscored 

that the Asia-Pacific region, especially Southeast Asia, “is for the French and for Europeans an 

integral part of our security environment.”12 According to a knowledgeable nongovernmental 

expert, Le Drian’s background as the mayor of the port city of Lorient gives him a special appreciation of the strategic importance of maritime questions. Since then, the Hollande government 

has stepped up its high-level engagement with Asian counterparts.

Economic issues loom large in French policy regarding China, given the asymmetric 

relationship between the two countries. In 2013, France’s commercial trade deficit with China 

reached $36 billion (or 40 percent of France’s total trade deficit), and its share of the Chinese 

market—estimated at 1.2 percent—was about one-quarter the size of Germany’s.13 Former 

Socialist Party leader Martine Aubry serves as Hollande’s Special Representative for Economic Diplomacy with China and has focused on expanding the French market share in 

the health, food processing, and sustainable development sectors. Substantial French sales to 

China in the aeronautics and civilian nuclear energy sectors are handled in government-togovernment discussions. Following a pattern set by his predecessors, Hollande signed a letter 

of intent for the sale of 60 Airbus airliners, worth an estimated $7.7 billion, during his visit 

to China in April 2013. And during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to France in March 

2014, the sides signed contracts and investment agreements worth an estimated $25 billion.

In recent years China’s growing technological prowess, alleged violations of intellectual 

property rights, and reported use of cyber vulnerabilities to conduct industrial espionage against 
8 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 16

French interests have apparently injected an element of caution into France’s efforts to enhance 

its “strategic partnership” with China and, in particular, to achieve a more balanced economic 

relationship. Some French officials and nongovernmental experts express concern that Chinese 

research and development capabilities will challenge those of major Western nations, including 

France’s important aerospace industry, within the next decade. Over time, such concern might 

translate into stricter French controls on technology transfers to Chinese firms.

According to French nongovernmental experts, this concern might be one reason why 

Paris quietly shelved previous efforts to convince other EU member states to lift the “interruption . . . of military cooperation and . . . embargo on trade in arms with China” adopted in June 

1989, following Beijing’s crackdown on pro-democracy protests.14 Nevertheless, because the EU 

leaves it to member states to define the “arms” subject to the embargo, France has sold “nonlethal” military materials to China. According to a July 2013 French defense ministry report to 

parliament, French military equipment delivered to China from 2008 to 2012 totaled slightly 

more than $467 million (in current value), while Chinese orders totaled $671 million during 

the same period.15 Military-to-military cooperation between the two countries consists mainly 

of periodic high-level visits and faculty and student exchanges between military educational 

institutions, although the French have welcomed China’s participation in the United Nations 

peacekeeping operation in Mali (following France’s intervention there in January 2013) and in 

multinational counterpiracy operations off the coast of East Africa.

France signed a “strategic partnership” with India in 1998 and has advocated a reform 

of the United Nations Security Council that would include a permanent seat for India. Twoway trade expanded fivefold over the last decade, reaching $10 billion in 2012. India’s defense 

market is of particular interest to the French; from 2003 to 2012, India was France’s second 

most important arms purchaser (after Saudi Arabia). Currently, French firms are building six 

Scorpène-class conventional submarines in India (apparently with technology transfer arrangements that will help India to build additional submarines) and upgrading India’s Mirage 2000 

combat aircraft purchased from France in 1980.16 Moreover, according to press reports, France 

and India are expected to conclude contracts this year for India’s purchase of 126 Rafale combat 

aircraft (worth an estimated $15 billion), and French officials are pursuing additional joint projects ranging from short-range missiles to light helicopters and artillery. During his July 2013 

visit to India, Le Drian noted that the two militaries already conduct regular ground, naval, and 

air exercises, as well as officer exchanges. He proposed a large aeronaval exercise in the Indian 

Ocean involving the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle and Indian naval units.17
9

The U.S. “Rebalance” and Europe

The French are active in other parts of Asia as well. Paris maintains “strategic partnerships” 

or “strategic dialogues” with Japan, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, and most recently Vietnam. Japan and Singapore are France’s largest trading partners in 

the region after China. Malaysia, the Republic of Korea, Australia, and Singapore ranked 6th, 

8th, 10th, and 16th, respectively, among the top purchasers of French military equipment from 

2003 to 2012. France’s relations with Australia have improved steadily since the French halted 

their nuclear weapons testing at Mururoa in 1996, and the two countries have authorized their 

respective navies to conduct surveillance and enforcement actions in the other’s EEZ.

The U.S. rebalance has prompted the French strategic affairs community to pay increasing 

attention to Asia-Pacific security questions. Indeed, among European allies and partners, the 

French defense ministry is the only one that has published a comprehensive report on its national interests and strategy in the region.18 Maritime security and freedom of navigation issues 

in the Asia-Pacific are a priority, given their vital importance for French and broader European 

economic interests. State-to-state conflict remains a possibility in the Asia-Pacific region, according to France’s White Book on Defense and National Security.19 Hence, as a permanent 

member of the United Nations Security Council and signatory of the 1976 Treaty of Amity and 

Cooperation in Southeast Asia, France “alongside its allies would, in the event of an open crisis, 

contribute politically and militarily at an appropriate level.”20 French officials have made it clear 

that, in this context, “allies” means first and foremost the United States.

Nuclear weapons proliferation also ranks high among French concerns in the Asia-Pacific 

region. Although North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capabilities do not pose 

a direct threat to France, prominent French strategists worry that Pyongyang’s behavior poses 

risks of proliferation of nuclear weapons technologies and/or materials to other state or nonstate actors and could prompt some in Japan and the Republic of Korea to reconsider their 

nuclear options. These strategists also see benefits to engaging China in a dialogue regarding the 

dangers of a nuclear confrontation between India and Pakistan.21

The joint communiqué issued by the French and Japanese foreign and defense ministers 

following their meeting in Paris in January 2014 reflects the French government’s growing attention to, and desire to influence, Asia-Pacific security affairs.22 After reaffirming their governments’ respect for international law, support for peaceful resolution of disputes, and opposition 

to the use of force, the ministers noted that security in Europe and Asia is closely intertwined, 

and they stressed the need to calm tensions in the East China Sea. They also expressed grave 

concerns over North Korea’s nuclear, missile, and uranium enrichment programs. Regarding 

Southeast Asia, the ministers reaffirmed their support for ASEAN integration and freedom of 
10 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 16

navigation. The communiqué underscored the two countries’ shared interests further afield, 

including a negotiated solution to guarantee that Iranian nuclear activities are “exclusively for 

peaceful uses,” continued development assistance to Afghanistan, and enlarged cooperation to 

promote peace and stability in Africa. It also pledged to deepen bilateral cooperation ranging 

from defense equipment, export controls, and technology transfer to maritime security off the 

coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.

French officials and nongovernmental experts appear confident that the United States intends to follow through on its planned improvements of military capabilities and access arrangements in the Asia-Pacific even if the pace of implementation is slowed by U.S. defense budget 

constraints. French officials acknowledge that their military assets based in the South Pacific and 

space assets are modest in comparison with those of the United States.23 However, according to 

these officials, France could deploy additional aerial and naval forces, thanks in part to access arrangements with Singapore and Australia. They are thus interested in improved bilateral military 

cooperation with U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific region, especially in areas related to interoperability, maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, enhanced information exchanges, and contingency planning for noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs.)

UK Perspectives

Although a number of British officials and nongovernmental experts were disappointed by 

the rollout of the U.S. rebalance strategy in late 2011—and complained privately about the level 

of Washington’s advance consultation with London—most were not surprised by the renewed 

U.S. attention to the Asia-Pacific region. For the most part, United Kingdom (UK) strategists 

seem less concerned than other Europeans that the rebalance signals a U.S. disengagement from 

Europe or neglect of pressing security issues in the broader Middle East and North Africa. As 

defense minister Philip Hammond told a Washington audience in January 2012, shortly after 

the release of the U.S. Defense Strategic Guidance, “However pressing the growing importance 

of the Asia-Pacific region is to the United States, the alliance [with] Europe is, and will remain, 

of vital interest to both continents.”24

Still, the rebalance has had the positive effect of prompting the United Kingdom, in 

the words of a senior defense analyst, to “take a second look at Asia and to face the 21st century.” Like their German and French counterparts, the British are pursuing a multifaceted 

and multidirectional effort to increase trade, investment, and diplomatic relations across the 

region. As one official put it: “[Our] rebalance will rely more on diplomacy than aircraft carrier groups.”25 Indeed, in recent years, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has increased 
11

The U.S. “Rebalance” and Europe

its expertise regarding Asia-Pacific matters, established some 100 new positions there, and 

stepped up high-level visits in both directions. 

China ranks high on the list of countries where the United Kingdom is pushing to expand 

already substantial economic relations. China was the United Kingdom’s seventh largest goods 

export market in 2012, and it was China’s third largest source of goods imports in the EU (after 

Germany and France). Two-way trade between the countries grew by approximately a third between 2006 and 2012.26 The United Kingdom became the most popular destination for Chinese 

investment in the EU in 2012, reaching nearly $9 billion. It was also the second largest EU investor in China by the end of 2012 (after Germany), with a cumulative direct investment value of 

over $18 billion.27 During his visit to China in December 2013, Prime Minister David Cameron 

contrasted British advocacy of an EU-China trade deal with “some in Europe and elsewhere 

[who] want to shut China off behind a bamboo curtain of trade barriers.”28 Trade and investment deals totaling over $9.3 billion were signed during the visit, which included the largest 

trade delegation led by a UK prime minister to China.29

Elsewhere, the United Kingdom maintains strong economic partnerships with several major countries, especially Japan, India, and Singapore. UK two-way trade with those three totaled 

some $41 billion in 2012.30 Japanese investment in the United Kingdom is substantial, particularly in the automobile sector. According to nongovernmental experts, the British defense 

industry has been very active in promoting increased government attention to the Asia-Pacific 

region, particularly regarding sales to Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia, and India.

In the security realm, London’s overall objective, according to British defense analysts, is 

twofold: “to be seen in,” and to improve its “situational awareness” of, the Asia-Pacific region.31

Although focused work on the government’s next Strategic Defence and Security Review will 

begin after the spring 2015 parliamentary elections, knowledgeable defense analysts predict 

that the review will pay close attention to the effects of rising Chinese power, including longterm risks posed by problems such as corruption, violation of intellectual property, and cyber 

espionage. Nevertheless, respected British defense experts assess that the United States “is likely 

to remain the world’s only superpower in 2040.”32 British policy will aim at remaining “close” to 

U.S. policy, one official noted, while still remaining “distinct.”33

Since their withdrawal from Hong Kong in 1997, the British have maintained a small 

military presence in the Asia-Pacific region, consisting of a battalion-size garrison in Brunei 

and a maritime support facility in Singapore. According to British defense analysts, London 

is unlikely to increase its permanent military presence over the next few years due to the “tyranny of distance” and other operational and defense budget priorities.34 But the Royal Navy 
12 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 16

is expected to continue periodic ship visits to demonstrate its interest in protecting freedom 

of navigation, strengthen bilateral defense ties with Australia, and participate in at least one 

U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) exercise annually. In addition, the Royal Air Force may 

continue occasional deployments of small numbers of Typhoon (Eurofighter) combat aircraft—for example, to Malaysia—but nongovernmental experts attribute these to London’s 

interest in aircraft sales. 

The British have pursued a variety of additional paths to enhance security-related relations 

with Asia-Pacific partners. For example:

■ British officials have expressed interest in reinvigorating the Five Power Defense Arrangements established in 1971 involving the United Kingdom, Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, 

and Singapore. According to the officials, the forum has proved useful to keeping Singapore 

and Malaysia “on speaking terms” and to promoting regional cooperation on maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and military medicine.

■ In April 2012, the United Kingdom and Japan issued a joint statement that pledged enhanced cooperation on defense-related issues (in areas such as peace support operations, 

cyber security, and counterpiracy), as well as a foreign minister–led “strategic dialogue” 

to complement their annual political-military talks. In 2013, the two governments signed 

agreements for joint research, development, and production of defense equipment and 

sharing classified information. The visit of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to the United Kingdom in May 2014 further strengthened economic and defense ties. As a result of the visit, 

Prime Ministers Abe and Cameron agreed to begin negotiations toward the conclusion of 

an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement, to establish a two-plus-two framework for 

security consultations between foreign and defense ministers, and to accelerate defense 

industry cooperation. The prime ministers also agreed to work toward free trade negotiations between Japan and the European Union.

■ Top-tier British professional military education institutions—the Defence Academy 

of the United Kingdom and Royal College of Defence Studies—have devoted important 

resources to expanding course participation by senior officers from the Asia-Pacific region including China. British defense attachés have been added in Vietnam, Myanmar, 

and Thailand.
13

The U.S. “Rebalance” and Europe

Other European Views

Germany, France, and the United Kingdom are not the only European allies and partners 

who demonstrate growing interest in the Asia-Pacific region. As is the case with the “big three,” 

it is difficult if not impossible to correlate any specific initiatives by smaller European countries 

to their various perceptions of the U.S. rebalance. However, a number of indicators—including 

public and off-the-record statements by officials, think-tank articles, and media reports—point 

to a broad trend among European governments to cite the rebalance as one reason to step up 

their game in that region as well as closer to home.

Norway is a case in point. Defense minister Ine Eriksen Søreide acknowledges that European 

“fears [of U.S. abandonment] have been accentuated” by the rebalance, even if Norway sees it as 

a “natural response to the changes in global power structures.”35 She also argues that U.S. engagement in the Asia-Pacific region represents “one of the most important contributions to global security,” citing the dangers posed by North Korea and, in other parts of East Asia, by a combustible 

mix of nationalism and unresolved territorial issues. Given this context, U.S. allies in Europe, in 

her view, need to demonstrate that they care about Asia-Pacific security and will support the United States in addressing security concerns there. Hence, Norway will participate in USPACOM’s 

Rim of the Pacific exercise during June–July 2014.

In addition, Søreide argues that Europe should increase defense investment and assume a 

“greater share of (transatlantic) political burdens.” The recent Norwegian and Danish contributions to removing chemical weapons agents from Syria show how a new transatlantic approach 

to burden sharing can be put into practice. Moreover, suggests Søreide, NATO should consider 

holding more exercises in North America. Such steps would “demonstrate that [the allies] are 

not only net importers of security, but in fact can be export[er]s of security, as well.” Conducting 

more NATO exercises in the United States could also serve to improve allied military interoperability at lower cost to participating U.S. forces.

Complementing Søreide’s policy approach, her ministry is seeking new opportunities 

for the Norwegian defense industry in Asia. In December 2013, Norway and India convened 

their first defense industry seminar in New Delhi, where the ministry’s number two, State 

Secretary Øystein Bø, noted that India’s military modernization effort has made it the world’s 

largest importer of defense-related equipment.36 He offered a range of possible cooperation 

to Indian officials and industry representatives, emphasizing Norwegian experience in producing subcomponents (for example, command, control, and communications systems) for 

bigger systems, enhanced capabilities for U.S. air-to-air missiles, and components for the 
14 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 16

American F-35 combat aircraft program. Moreover, according to Bø, Norway’s strengths in 

integrating its components into highly complex systems and success in penetrating the U.S. 

defense market would make it an ideal partner for Indian defense industries looking to expand their overseas markets.37

Polish officials are generally guarded in their public statements on the U.S. rebalance, but 

prominent nongovernmental analysts of security affairs frequently asserted during 2011–2013 

that Warsaw was seriously concerned by the perceived diminished U.S. strategic interest in the 

Central and Eastern European region. Given Russia’s increasingly assertive foreign and security 

policies, exemplified in its recent annexation of Crimea and continuing pressure on Ukraine 

and its large-scale Zapad military exercises near Poland in the fall of 2013, Poland has sought 

and received additional assurances regarding American defense commitments to Poland and 

other NATO allies. Warsaw also has stepped up its own defense modernization plans.38

But Polish officials also are looking to expand their country’s profile in the Asia-Pacific 

region and are working with nongovernmental security experts to draft guidelines for a regional 

strategy going beyond economic relations. In response to the upsurge of territorial and maritime disputes in the region, some of these experts are recommending more EU involvement 

in the form of enhanced political ties, military exchanges, and the promotion of Organization 

for Security and Co-operation in Europe–like multilateral structures for cooperative security.39

Meanwhile, Poland is energizing its multilateral and bilateral relations with Asia-Pacific 

partners. China is Poland’s largest trading partner market in Asia (followed by the Republic of 

Korea, Japan, and India), and Poland-China relations were upgraded to a “strategic partnership” 

in 2011. Polish nongovernmental experts are advocating increased outreach to the ASEAN countries, especially in military sales, where they believe Poland may have a competitive advantage in 

furnishing less than cutting-edge equipment to governments with modest defense budgets.40

NATO Perspectives

NATO as a whole has not come to grips with the U.S. rebalance, according to several 

members of its International Staff. Several Central and Eastern European allies, plus a few on 

the Alliance’s southern flank, remain worried that the rebalance might translate into decreased 

U.S. attention to NATO and concomitant U.S. pressures for allies to do more in terms of capabilities development and crisis management operations in the European neighborhood. It is unclear whether such concerns have been significantly eased by the U.S. response (as of early May 

2014) to events in Ukraine. On the other hand, according to NATO experts, France, the United 

Kingdom, and Canada are said to take a strategic view of the Asia-Pacific security environment 
15

The U.S. “Rebalance” and Europe

that aligns more closely with Washington’s. For example, they have reportedly been particularly 

strong proponents of NATO’s firm statements on the North Korean nuclear issue.

These differing national outlooks result in a lack of consensus on what role, if any, NATO 

should play in the region beyond its current political declarations and “Individual Partner 

Cooperation Programs” with those countries, notably Australia and Japan, willing to contribute to NATO operations and/or trust funds for postcrisis stabilization in Afghanistan and/or 

Libya. (Australia is also a participating partner in NATO’s Special Operations Headquarters.) 

Moreover, while some allied officials and nongovernmental experts have suggested in general 

terms that NATO should “export” its democratic values, interoperability standards, and training and operational experience to further stability and security in the Asia-Pacific region, 

practical approaches have proved difficult to nail down. As some International Staff officials 

point out, several NATO allies have recoiled from the high costs of sending NATO experts 

to the Asia-Pacific region, especially when the same allies are having difficulty manning and 

resourcing the new Alliance command structure. Moreover, the organization’s two “Partners 

Across the Globe” in Northeast Asia, Japan and the Republic of Korea, experience periodic 

strains in their bilateral relationship.

Notwithstanding hesitations on the NATO side, there are signs of interest in improved 

relations with the Alliance from Asia-Pacific governments. For example:

■ In a speech to the North Atlantic Council (the Alliance’s top decisionmaking body) in 

January 2012, Australian Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd called for increased NATO (and 

EU) engagement in Asia—for example, in maritime security matters—since “our region’s 

future will directly affect both sides of the Atlantic.”41 According to a NATO official, Australian interlocutors were interested in NATO’s work on “smart energy” as well.

■ The joint NATO-Japan declaration signed in April 2013, during Secretary General 

Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s visit to Tokyo, envisages closer cooperation in areas such 

as crisis management, peace support operations, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, cyber security, and counterpiracy. According to one NATO official, this declaration 

reflects Japan’s interest in expanding multilateral support for its security interests to 

complement its reliance on the U.S. treaty commitment.

■ China’s need to conduct a NEO during the 2011 Libyan crisis prompted Chinese 

interest in NATO’s multilateral cooperation for such operations. Chinese officers now 
16 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 16

participate in unclassified familiarization courses at the NATO Defense College, and 

Chinese officials have participated in NATO’s discussions with partners on counterpiracy and counterdrug issues held in the “28+19” format at the level of NATO’s Deputy 

Permanent Representatives. 

■ Republic of Korea officials are reportedly very interested in “political dialogue” and 

“practical cooperation” with NATO—for example, regarding cyber defense, response to 

terrorism, and multilateral cooperation in peace support operations—under the auspices 

of their September 2012 Individual Partnership Cooperation Program. The Republic of 

Korea, Singapore, and Malaysia have reportedly expressed interest, in principle, in participating in NATO’s post-2014 Operation Resolute Support in Afghanistan.

EU Perspectives

The U.S. rebalance has stimulated greater discussion of Asia-Pacific issues within the European Union, according to officials of its European External Action Service, but how the EU will 

respond is still not clear. The EU has a longstanding “strategic partnership” with China, its largest 

trading partner in Asia, and is negotiating a Free Trade Agreement with Japan, its second largest 

Asian trading partner. The EU is a “dialogue partner” of ASEAN and member of the association’s 

Regional Forum, as well as the Asia-Europe Meeting, and it remains ASEAN’s third largest trading 

partner and continues to be its biggest source of foreign direct investment.

In practice, economic issues have dominated EU interests in the Asia-Pacific region, although in recent years political dialogue and cooperation on nontraditional security interests 

such as climate change and environmental protection have moved higher on the EU’s agenda. 

In some areas, internal differences among EU member states inhibit the formulation and/or effective implementation of a common EU approach. As one nongovernmental observer points 

out, “[W]hile Chinese diplomacy sometimes divides the Europeans, they also do a good job of 

dividing themselves. The southern Europeans are the most reluctant to make human rights an 

important part of the EU-China relationship. And the northerners are the most willing to support protectionism against Chinese imports. The ‘big three’—Britain, France, and Germany—

dominate EU foreign policy, but are inclined to do their own thing on China.”42

Like NATO, the 28 EU member states (22 of which also belong to the Alliance) do not have 

a shared assessment of the security challenges and/or opportunities in the region, and some are 

not convinced that the rebalance, in practice, will fundamentally change the transatlantic relationship. Moreover, while EU member states and officials believe the United States expects its 
17

The U.S. “Rebalance” and Europe

transatlantic partners to take on a greater share of the security burden in and around Europe—

as evidenced in the frequent references to the rebalance in EU documents and in speeches by 

its officials dealing with the organization’s Common Security and Defense Policy—EU officials 

acknowledge that their ability to deliver is relatively constrained by political differences and low 

(and in several cases declining) defense spending. Indeed, the December 2013 European Council meeting of heads of state and government produced only modest advances in the member 

states’ commitments to improve their defense capabilities. And there appears to be little if any 

correlation between the U.S. rebalance and the EU decisions over the past year to undertake 

limited military missions to train the armed forces of Mali and to assist African peacekeepers in 

the Central African Republic. 

There are signs, however, of a growing EU inclination to play a role in political and security issues involving Asia-Pacific partners. For example, the scope of EU-Japan relations has 

expanded steadily since their 1991 Joint Declaration. While economic issues remain crucial, 

the two sides have raised their relations to a “higher, more strategic plane,” which now encompasses cooperation on “global issues” from gender equality, Millennium Development goals, 

and climate change to nonproliferation, maritime security, and outer space.43 In addition, the 

EU’s High Representative, Catherine Ashton, has issued formal statements on behalf of the organization criticizing North Korean nuclear weapons and ballistic missile activities, expressing 

concern over China’s decision to establish an “East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone,” 

and deploring the violence in Thailand and urging political dialogue among all parties.

At the same time, some EU officials see opportunities to expand practical cooperation with 

China. Chinese representatives reportedly surprised Ashton at the June 2013 Shangri-La Dialogue when they expressed interest in cooperation with the EU in security-related areas. Chinese participation in counterpiracy operations off the coast of Somalia (where Chinese naval 

units have become familiar with the EU’s Operation Atalanta) has reportedly piqued Chinese 

interest in exploring a coordinated effort with the EU in the Gulf of Guinea, where Chinese 

nationals face terrorist and piracy threats. In addition, Chinese officials have shown growing 

interest in EU stabilization and capacity-building operations in Africa, particularly following 

China’s decision to contribute military personnel to the UN peacekeeping force in Mali.

EU officials would welcome improved cooperation and coordination with the United 

States in areas related to the rebalance. The framework for such efforts already exists under the 

common agenda agreed to by Ashton and then–Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in their July 

2012 Phnom Penh statement, which “welcomed the central role played by ASEAN” and “an 

active and constructive role for China” in the Asia-Pacific region. It also committed the United 
18 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 16

States and EU to strengthening cooperation in areas such as maritime security, peaceful resolution of territorial and maritime disputes, nonproliferation, and sustainable development.44

However, according to European officials, there has been little practical follow-up. EU officials 

also stress that a successful conclusion of the TTIP negotiations would significantly benefit U.S.-

EU cooperation since it would help strengthen international norms and standards relevant to 

separate U.S. and EU trade negotiations with the region. 

Options for Improved U.S.-European Cooperation

Since 2012, European officials have welcomed assurances by high-level U.S. officials that, 

as stated by then-Secretary Clinton, “We want Europe to engage more in Asia along with us, to 

see the region not only as a market, but as a focus of common strategic engagement.”45 Indeed, 

“common strategic engagement” makes sense for several reasons. For example:

■ A top strategic challenge for the United States and its allies and partners in Europe and 

Asia is to sustain a rules-based international order founded on open markets, freedom of 

navigation, respect for the rule of law, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. European 

support for an open, liberal international order serves to reassure U.S. allies and partners 

in Asia—who share the same values—of broad backing within the Euro-Atlantic community. Underscoring this point could tend to dampen any fears among our Asia-Pacific 

allies and partners of isolation or abandonment in the face of increasing Chinese assertiveness and challenges to the existing order in the region. The Japanese media’s extensive 

coverage of the January 2014 joint Japanese and French foreign and defense declaration is 

evidence that expressions of international solidarity matter.

■ A collective defense alliance in the Asia-Pacific region that would resemble NATO’s 

role in the transatlantic relationship is an unlikely prospect for the foreseeable future. 

However, the demonstrated strength and resilience of NATO is a critical factor in the 

strategic calculus of Japan and the Republic of Korea. Tokyo and Seoul pay close attention 

to how the Alliance develops its common strategy and capabilities, and how it decides on 

and conducts its operational engagements. Of particular interest to U.S. Asian allies is the 

manner in which NATO manages its nuclear weapons declaratory policy, consultations, 

and posture—and more recently its decision to deploy missile defenses. As nonnuclear 

weapons states, their national security is closely tied to the extended deterrence assured 
19

The U.S. “Rebalance” and Europe

by Washington. Hence, any perceived disunity within the Alliance on nuclear and missile 

defense questions that would call U.S. extended deterrence in Europe into question would 

reverberate badly in Asia.46 Similarly, any prospect of a NATO deal with Russia on nonstrategic nuclear weapons that would have the effect of sanctioning a transfer of Russian 

nonstrategic weapons east of the Urals would be very worrisome to Seoul and Tokyo.47

■ During recent discussions in Seoul and Tokyo, political leaders and former senior government officials expressed concerns about the implications of Russia’s annexation of 

Crimea and the unfolding crisis in Ukraine for security in Asia. In particular, U.S. leadership in fashioning an effective response to Russia’s use of coercion to alter the status quo 

is viewed as critical to enhancing deterrence against a recrudescence of a similar assertiveness in Asia. The April 10 editorial in Japan’s Nihon Keizai Shimbun noted: “A certain 

major power has changed Ukraine’s border by force. A strong U.S. military presence is 

essential to prevent a similar situation from appearing in Asia.”48 In an April 5 editorial in 

The Japan Times, former Minister of Defense and present member of the Lower House of 

Japan’s Diet Yoriko Koike criticized China for its abstention in the United Nations Security Council vote against Russia’s action in Crimea and added: “Every country in Asia is 

bound to draw only one conclusion from China’s tacit approval of Putin’s Crimean land 

grab: China too thinks that might makes right, and if it believes it can get away with invading disputed territories . . . it will do so.”49

However, absent demonstrated and sustained U.S. efforts to engage Europeans both bilaterally and in multilateral forums in “rebalancing together,” their past (or in some cases lingering) concerns regarding U.S. “disengagement” from Europe and its regional security concerns 

are likely to resurface. Such engagement efforts could take different forms. For example:

■ Senior European officials at the governmental level, NATO, and the EU have stressed 

the importance of high-level, regular, and substantive consultations with U.S. officials 

on diplomatic, economic, and security aspects of the rebalance. To optimize their effectiveness, such consultations should go beyond U.S. and European informational 

briefings of ongoing activities. They should also cover priorities and options for future 

strategies. Such consultations would help prevent possible European and U.S. misperceptions regarding their respective strategies and improve chances of coordinating (or 
20 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 16

at a minimum deconflicting) their policies toward Asia-Pacific partners in ways that 

reinforce common transatlantic interests.

■ Such consultations could be complemented by specific bilateral and/or multilateral arrangements with European allies who have special expertise regarding major Asia-Pacific 

partners. For example, U.S. and European officials could usefully discuss indicators of 

whether China’s or North Korea’s behavior is becoming less or more assertive. Others 

might discuss how best to ensure convergent “strategic messaging” among the transatlantic allies regarding sensitive issues such as nuclear risk reduction measures involving India 

and Pakistan or territorial disputes between Japan and China.

■ Expanded military-to-military relations between USPACOM and the commander of 

French maritime forces in the Pacific could improve their interoperability and mutual 

situational awareness. British officials would also be interested in elevating the status of 

their representative to USPACOM. These expanded relationships would underscore the 

shared U.S., French, and British interests in freedom of navigation, and facilitate cooperative planning for a range of contingencies including humanitarian assistance, disaster 

relief, and NEOs. These expanded contacts could be harmonized with the command’s 

already close relation with the Australian military. 

■ The United States could propose that NATO consider expanding its maritime security 

activities (including counterpiracy, counterterrorism, and humanitarian assistance and 

disaster relief) to intersect with those of U.S. Central Command in the Indian Ocean. The 

success of EU’s counterpiracy Operation Atalanta off the coast of Somalia could also free 

up assets for a wider regional mission in coordination with NATO. Such a mission could 

involve other navies interested in ensuring the security of sea lines of communication 

linking Europe, Gulf energy producers, and Asia-Pacific trading partners—for example, 

India, Australia, New Zealand, China, and possibly Pakistan. 

■ Reinvigorating the U.S.-EU cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region envisaged by the 

2012 Clinton-Ashton Joint Declaration would be well received by EU member states. 

Some European officials would also like to see more visible U.S. support for EU participation in the East Asia Summit forum.
21

The U.S. “Rebalance” and Europe

If implemented, such options would address one important challenge: improving transatlantic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region in ways that advance our shared strategic interests 

there. However, they would not fundamentally alter the other major challenge: reversing the 

political and economic trends that prevent more equitable responsibility and burden-sharing 

among NATO allies and partners in Europe and its nearby regions. That many European leaders 

now understand the two challenges are inextricably related is a positive result of the announced 

U.S. rebalance. But their ability to deal with the second issue might prove more difficult than 

the first.
22 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 16

Notes 1 See Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, October 2011, available at 

<www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century>; President Barack Obama, 

remarks to the Australian Parliament, November 17, 2011, available at <www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament>; Department of Defense 

(DOD), Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 5, 2012, available at <www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf>; Phillip C. Saunders, Institute 

for National Strategic Studies, Strategic Forum 281, The Rebalance to Asia: U.S.-China Relations and 

Regional Security (Washington, DC: NDU Press, August 2013), available at <http://inss.dodlive.mil/

files/2013/10/SF-281.pdf>.

2 The authors interviewed some 40 senior European officials on a nonattribution basis (including policymakers and senior advisors) in Berlin, Paris, and London, as well as North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) and European Union (EU) officials in Brussels, in September 2013. They also 

met with U.S. Embassy officials and several groups of European nongovernmental experts. Additional 

insights were drawn from their nonattribution discussions with senior European officials who visited 

Washington in late 2013 to early 2014. 

3 “Framing the Transatlantic Security Discussion,” Annual Report, the German Marshall Fund 

of the United States meeting in Paris, July 19–20, 2012, 4. Some of the criticism of the administration’s 

rollout of “rebalance” might be explained by a selective reading by European analysts of key U.S. source 

documents, such as the January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance. Some analysts appeared unfamiliar 

with the language of the guidance, which states in part that Europe remains “our principal partner” in 

seeking global security. As the guidance further states: “The United States has enduring interests in supporting peace and prosperity in Europe as well as bolstering the strength and vitality of NATO, which is 

critical to the security of Europe and beyond.”

4 Since 2003, membership in the initiative has grown to include all 28 NATO allies.

5 German Missions Abroad: “China,” Federal Foreign Office, Berlin, November 2013, available 

at <www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/01-Nodes/China_node.html>.

6 Statistisches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden, 2014, provided by Embassy of Germany, Washington, 

DC. Includes trade with Mainland China and Hong Kong. The 2013 figure is cited by the Federal Foreign Office, available at <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/01-

Nodes/China_node.html>.

7 According to Rolf Mutzenich, Social Democratic Party member of the German Bundestag, 

“We have a major interest in ensuring that a confrontation between the U.S. and China does not take 

shape.” See Spiegel Online, November 7, 2012.

8 “Germany Gives Japan Its Backing as N. Korea Tensions Rise,” Agence France-Presse (North 

European Service), April 9, 2013.

9 Livre blanc: Défense et Sécurité Nationale [White Book: Defense and National Security] (Paris, 

May 2013), available at <www.gouvernement.fr/sites/default/files/fichiers_joints/livre-blanc-sur-ladefense-et-la-securite-nationale_2013.pdf>. Population figures drawn from <www.collectivites-locales.

gouv.fr/files/files/chapitre_2.pdf>.
23

The U.S. “Rebalance” and Europe

10 Ibid. Note that Exclusive Economic Zone is defined under United Nations Convention on the 

Law of the Sea, which has not been ratified by the United States.

11 Diplomatic counselor Jean-Paul Ortiz and Strategic Affairs advisor Christian Lechervy.

12 Speech by French Defense Minister Yves Le Drian at Shangri-La Dialogue, June 2, 2012, 

available at <www.defense.gouv.fr/ministre/prises-de-parole-du-ministre/prises-de-parole-de-m.-

jean-yves-le-drian/intervention-de-m.-le-drian-a-l-occasion-du-xie-sommet-sur-la-securite-en-asiedialogue-shangri-la-singapour>.

13 Ministère des affaires étrangères, France and China, “Economic Relations,” France Diplomatie, April 25, 2014, available at <www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/dossiers-pays/chine/la-france-et-la-chine/>.

14 European Union, “Restrictive Measure (sanctions) in Force,” Article 215 TFEU, January 29, 

2014, available at <http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/docs/measures_en.pdf>.

15 Ministère de la Défense, “Publication du rapport au parlement sur les exportations d’armement 2013,” July 23, 2013, available at <www.defense.gouv.fr/actualites/articles/publication-du-rapport-au-parlement-sur-les-exportations-d-armement-2013>. 

16 Speech by French Defense Minister Yves Le Drian at the Institute for Defence Studies and 

Analyses (India), July 26, 2013, available at <www.defense.gouv.fr/ministre/prises-de-parole-du-ministre/prises-de-parole-de-m.-jean-yves-le-drian/lecture-on-indo-french-defence-partnership-the-choiceof-strategic-autonomy-friday-26th-july-2013>.

17 Ibid. In his speech Le Drian expressed French concerns about Pakistan in ways that could 

only please his audience: “Everyone knows that terrorists continue to be present in Pakistan and that 

international terrorist networks take advantage of certain relays. The alleged handlers of the Mumbai 

attacks still roam free. This concentration of terrorist elements is all the more worrisome as this is in 

a country armed with nuclear weapons. India’s dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir sometimes serves 

as a pretext excuse for destabilizing actions against you. In this context, France encourages dialogue 

between India and Pakistan as this is the only way to resolve these disputes.”

18 See “France and Security in the Asia-Pacific,” Ministry of Defense, available at <http://data.

over-blog-kiwi.com/0/54/74/56/20140414/ob_927d44_plaquetteasiepacifique2014-en.pdf>.

19 White Book: Defense and National Security 2013.

20 Ibid. 

21 See “CSIS European Trilateral Track II Nuclear Dialogue 2013 Consensus Statement,” available at <https://csis.org/files/publication/2014_1_30%20FINAL%20Consensus%20Statement.pdf>.

22 See Joint Communique of the Foreign and Defense Ministers of the French Republic and 

Japan, January 9, 2014 (French text only), available at <www.fr.emb-japan.go.jp/actualite/2014/communique_conjoint.html>.

23 French forces based in French Polynesia and New Caledonia include 2,000–2,500 uniformed 

personnel, two frigates, three patrol vessels, four maritime surveillance, and four tactical transport aircraft. 

The commander is dual-hatted as commander of the Maritime Zones of French Polynesia and commander of Maritime Forces in the Pacific Ocean. Forces in the southern Indian Ocean (La Reunion-Mayotte) 

include some 1,900 uniformed personnel, two frigates, several patrol vessels, and two tactical transport 

aircraft. Additional French land and air forces could be deployed to the Asia-Pacific region from bases in 

Djibouti and the United Arab Emirates. 
24 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 16

24 UK Defense Minister Philip Hammond, speech to the Atlantic Council, January 5, 2012, 

available at <www.atlanticcouncil.org/news/transcripts/transcript-nato-the-case-for-collective-defensein-the-21st-century>. Note that senior UK officials reaffirmed this view in interviews with the authors 

in September 2013.

25 Interview with authors, September 2013.

26 Includes trade with Mainland China and Hong Kong. See International Monetary Fund, 

Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 2013.

27 British Embassy Beijing, “UK-China 5th Economic and Financial Dialogue: Factsheet,” 

October 15, 2013, available at <www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/

file/251619/UK-China_5th_Economic_and_Financial_Dialogue_Factsheet.pdf>.

28 Prime Minister David Cameron, speech on the UK trade mission to China, December 3, 

2013, available at <www.gov.uk/government/speeches/uk-and-chinas-long-term-relationship-primeministers-speech>.

29 “£5.6 billion worth of deals signed in China,” press release, UK Trade and Investment and 

Prime Minister’s Office, December 3, 2013, available at <www.gov.uk/government/news/56-billionworth-of-deals-signed-in-china>.

30 International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 2013.

31 Interview with authors, September 2013.

32 Concepts and Doctrine Centre, Strategic Trends Program, “Regional Survey—South Asia out 

to 2040,” Ministry of Defence Development.

33 Interview with authors, September 2013.

34 Ibid.

35 Ine Eriksen Søreide, “NATO, the EU and the Rise of East Asia,” speech at Leangkollenkonferansen, February 4, 2014, Ministry of Defence, available at <www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fd/whats-new/

Speeches-and-articles/minister/taler-og-artikler-av-forsvarsminister-in/2014/nato-the-eu-and-the-riseof-east-asia.html?id=750385>.

36 Øystein Bø, “Indian-Norwegian Defence Industry Seminar in New Delhi,” speech, December 

12, 2013, Ministry of Defence, available at <www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fd/whats-new/Speeches-andarticles/Speeches-and-articles-by-other-apolitica/taler-og-artikler-av-statssekretar-oyste/2013/indiannorwegian-defence-industry-semina.html?id=747844>. In a nod to Indian interest in the High North 

(Arctic region), Bø noted Norway’s support for Indian permanent observer status in the Arctic Council 

and establishment of an Indian research station in Svalbard, Norway.

37 Norway signed a friendship and cooperation treaty with the Association of Southeast Asian 

Nations (ASEAN) in July 2013.

38 Tomasz Szatkowski, “Polish Defense Modernization in the Era of U.S. Strategic Rebalancing,” 

Washington, DC, Center for European Policy Analysis, March 1, 2013, available at <www.cepa.org/content/polish-defense-modernization-era-us-strategic-rebalancing>.

39 “China’s Recent Worrisome Moves in East Asia: Rising Regional Tensions,” Bulletin of the 

Polish Institute of International Affairs, No. 13, January 31, 2014.

40 “Poland and the ASEAN Countries: Exploring New Markets in Asia,” Bulletin of the Polish 

Institute of International Affairs, No. 2, January 8, 2014.
25

The U.S. “Rebalance” and Europe

41 Rudd stated in part, “Australia is committed to taking its partnership with NATO to the next 

level. We see a future for collaboration with NATO where our common values and strategic interests intersect. Both sides could gain from closer collaboration in areas such as interoperability, an exchange in 

defence education, training, defence sector reform, and in high-level political consultations,” available at 

<http://foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2012/kr_sp_120120.html#sthash.ae0XeOQc.dpuf>.

42 Charles Grant, Centre for European Reform (CER), CER blog, January 7, 2013.

43 See Joint Statement, 21st Japan-EU Summit, November 19, 2013, available at <www.euinjapan.jp/en/media/news/news2013/20131119/192042/>.

44 Catherine Ashton and Hillary Clinton, “Joint EU-U.S. Statement on the Asia-Pacific Region,” 

European Union @ United Nations, July 12, 2012, available at <www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_12417_en.htm>. 

45 “The Transatlantic Partnership: A Statesman’s Forum with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton,” 

Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, November 29, 2013, available at <www.brookings.edu/~/

media/events/2012/11/29%20clinton/20121129_transatlantic_clinton.pdf>.

46 For an expert view of the relationship between extended deterrence in Europe and Northeast 

Asia, see Brad Roberts, “Extended Deterrence and Strategic Stability in Northeast Asia,” The National Institute for Defense Studies (Tokyo), available at <www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/visiting/index.html>. 

47 During the U.S.-Soviet negotiations over intermediate nuclear forces (INF) in the 1980s, 

Japanese and Republic of Korea (ROK) strategists expressed similar worries that the Soviets would be 

permitted to transfer their INF forces east of the Urals, thereby solving a U.S. and European arms control problem “on the back of ” our Asian allies. In the end, Japanese and ROK concerns were mollified 

by the “zero option” in the 1987 INF Treaty, resulting in the elimination of the entire class of missiles 

covered by the treaty.

48 “Greater U.S. military presence in Asia essential,” Nihon Keizai Shimbun, April 10, 2014, 2.

49 “Japan’s Russian dilemma,” The Japan Times, April 4, 2014, available at: <www.japantimes.

co.jp/opinion/2014/04/04./com>.

27

The U.S. “Rebalance” and Europe

About the Authors

Mr. Leo G. Michel is a Distinguished Research Fellow in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University. Mr. Michel 

concentrates on transatlantic defense relations. He served previously in the Office of the Secretary of Defense as Director for North Atlantic Treaty Organization Policy, Director for NonNuclear Arms Control, and Deputy U.S. Representative to the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Consultative 

Commission. Before joining the Department of Defense, Mr. Michel worked in the Central Intelligence Agency’s Directorate for Intelligence. He was promoted to the Senior Executive Service in 2000. Mr. Michel holds an M.A. degree from The Johns Hopkins School for Advanced 

International Studies and a B.A. degree from Princeton University.

Dr. James J. Przystup is a Senior Research Fellow in the Center for Strategic Research, 

Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University. Dr. Przystup has 

worked on issues related to East Asia for close to 30 years on Capitol Hill, on the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, as the Deputy Director of the Presidential Commission on U.S.-Japan Relations, in the private sector at IBM, on the Policy Planning 

Staff of the Department of State, in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and as Director of the 

Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation. He holds a B.A. Summa Cum Laude from the 

University of Detroit and an M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of Chicago. 

Center for Strategic Research Senior Fellows

Col kris bauman, USAF

Senior Military Fellow

Mr. John A. Cope

Senior Research Fellow

Dr. T.X. Hammes

Distinguished Research Fellow

Mr. Frank G. Hoffman

Senior Research Fellow

Dr. Christopher J. Lamb

Distinguished Research Fellow

Dr. Andre Le Sage

Senior Research Fellow

Dr. Thomas F. Lynch III

Distinguished Research Fellow

Mr. Leo G. Michel

Distinguished Research Fellow

Dr. denise natali

Senior Research Fellow

COL richard outzen, usa

Senior Military Fellow

Dr. James J. Przystup

Senior Research Fellow

Dr. Nicholas Rostow

Senior Director

Dr. Phillip C. Saunders

Distinguished Research Fellow

Dr. Christopher Yung

Senior Research Fellow

For a complete list of INSS researchers and staff, please visit http://inss.dodlive.mil.