### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs D ec em be r 15, 200 4
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. LY LE V AN UL Z EN AN D B ILLY J. C OFF ELT

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty No. 2002-A- 583 J. Randall Wyatt, Jr ., Judge

No. M2003- 02066-CCA -R3-C D - F iled April 29, 2005

The de fenda nts, inmates at Riverbend Penitentiary , succe ssfully temporarily

esca ped from custody while being transporte d to a court appea ranc e. At trial, Def

endant Van Ulzen was convic ted of two counts of ag g ravated robbery (Class B f elony ), two counts of a g g ravated assault (Class C felony ), fo ur c ou nts of fa lse imp ri so nme nt (m isd e me a no r) , one c ou nt o f the ft (m isd e me a no r) , a ndple d g uil ty to one count of f

elony esca pe (Class E fe lony ). De fenda nt Coffelt was c onv i cted of one count of
a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult (C la ss C fe lon y ), thr e e c ou nts of the ft (m isd e me a no r) , f

our cou nts of

fa lse imp ri so nme nt ( mis de me a no r) , a ndon e c ou nt o f f e lon y e sc ape (C la ss Efe lo ny ). O n a pp e a l, Def endant Van Ulzen appea ls his convictions and sentence . Def endant Coff

elt appea ls a spects of his convictions. Upon revie w of De fenda nt Van Ulzen’s appe al, we r ever se and dismiss one count of a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult a s v iol a tiv e of

do ub le je op ard y . All o the r c on vic tio ns a ndjud g me nts a s to bo th de fe nd a nts are a ff

ir me d. We r e ma ndfo r c or re c tio n o f j ud g me nts a s to De fe nd a nt C of fe lt.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nts of

the Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed in Par t; Reve rsed and Dismissed in Par t; Re m anded f or Entry of Corre cte d Jud gm ents

J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which J ER R Y L. S MI TH and N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J J ., joined.
Cy nthia F. B urnes, Na shville, Tennessee , for the a ppellant, Ly le Van U lzen.

L arry B . H oo ve r, Na sh vil le , T e nn e sse e , f or the app e lla nt, B ill y

J. Cof fe lt.

P au l G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral a nd Reporter ; Richard H. Duna vant, Assistant Attorney Gene ral; Victor S. (Torry ) Johns on, I I I , District Attorney Gene ral; and K athy

Morante, A ssistant District Attorney

Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.T he defendan t addres s ed t he enh anc ement f act ors i n t wo i s s ues wh i ch we c ons ol i dat ed for r evi ew. 1

-2- OP IN ION

De fe nd a nt L

y le Va n U lze n wa s c on vic te d o f t wo c ou nts of a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult , tw o c ou nts of ag g ravated robbery , four counts of false imprisonment, one c ount of theft, and ple d g uiltyto one
co u n t o f felony

esca pe. De fenda nt Van Ulzen was se ntence d as a Rang e I I I offe nder on the two
a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t s a n d a s a R a n g e II o f f e n d e r o n t h e r e m a i n d e r , f

o r a n e f f e c t i v e s e n t e n c e o f

e i g h t yfour y ear s. This c onsisted of ten y ear s on eac h ag g ravated assault, thirty y ear s on eac h ag g ravated
r o b b e r y, a n d f

o u r ye ar s f o r e s c ap e

. T h e f

i v e m i s d e m e a n o r s w e r e s e ta te l e v e n m o n t h s a n d t w e n t ynine day s on eac h, to run conc urre ntly with the felony

counts.

Def endant B illyJ

. Coffelt was convicted of one c ount of ag g ravated assault, thre e counts of theft, four c ounts of false imprisonment, and one count of fe lony esca pe. He rec eived a n eff

ective sentenc e of a

pproxi mately

twenty -one y ear s as a Range I I I , persistent off ender . He wa s sentence d to ten y ear s for ag g ravated assault and four y ear s for e scape . The seve n misdemeanor c onvictions
we re e a c h f

or e le ve n mo nth s a ndtw e nty -n ine da y s, to r un c on se c uti ve ly

to the oth e r c ou nts

. On appe al, Def

endant Van Ulzen raises six issues: 1) sufficiency of the e vidence to support convictions for f

alse imprisonment, 2) t he convictions for escape and false i mprisonment violate due pr oc e ss und e r An tho ny , 3) the c on vic tio ns fo r ag g ra vate d rob be ry a nd a g g ra vate d a ssa ult c on sti tut e d o u b l e je o p ar d y , 4 ) t h e ch ai n o f c u s t o d y wa s n o tes t ab l i s h ed as t o t h e k n i v es an d gu ar d s ’ c l o t h i n g, 5) er ror in conse cutive sente n ci n g, and 6) e rror in application of e nhance ment fac tors during
s en t en ci n g. 1

Def endant Coff

elt appea ls on the following issues: 1) sufficie ncy of the evidenc e to support a convic tion for ag g ravated assault, 2) the convictions for e scape and false imprisonment violate due pr oc e ss u nd e r An tho ny , an d 3) the c ha in of c us tod y wa s not es ta bli sh e d a s to the kn ive s a ndg ua rd s’ cl o t h i n g. On September

28, 2001, the two def

endants we re transported fr om Riverbend Penitentiary to the Davidson County Courthouse. Three unarme d transportation officer s, Wi lliam Enge l, Kare n Wev, a n d Ch ar le s A b b o tt , w e r e e s c o r ti n g th e d e f e n d a n ts th r o u g h th e tu n n e l a r e a le a d in g to the Criminal J ustice C enter when Defe ndant Van Ulzen display ed two handmade knives (sha nks), ea ch six to eig ht inches long

. The defe ndants eff ecte d a re lease from their r estraints, and thethree office rs wer e handc uffe d to a railing in a room near the elevator. A fourth office r, Ly le B eckjor dan, appe are d on the sce ne and w as also handc uffe d to the railing with the other off icer s. The def

endants, a fter d o n n in g tw o o f

th e o f f ic e r s ’ c lo th e s , ma d e th e ir e s c ap e

. B o thd e f

e n d a n ts w e r e c ap tu r e d tog ether , without incident, that afternoon.
Acc ording to Office r Eng el, De fenda nt Van Ulzen, af ter display ing the shanks, stated that he did n o t want to hurt any one. De fenda nt Van Ulzen then said that if Eng el did not cooper ate,
someone wa s g oing to be “stuck.” Eng el was instruc ted to unlock Defenda nt Coffelt, which he did.-3-

The two de fenda nts then fre ed themselve s of thei r re s t raints. C orpora l Wev was told to handcuff the offic ers to a r ailing. Defe ndant Van U lzen took Enge l’s pants and jac ket and put them on. Eng el
was then told to handc uff himself to the r ailing. A t one point, Defe ndant Van U lzen becameag itated and thre atene d to “stick” somebody if they did not move faster . When Be ckjordan g ot off the el ev at o r, De fe n d an tVa n Ul z en b ro u gh t h i m o v eran d h ad h i mh an d cu ff h i m s el f t o t h e r ai l i n g. Def endant Coff

elt made no state ments during the incident. Eng el’s key s wer e take n but were thrown to the floor. All of the other office rs still had their handcuf f key s, enabling them to f

ree themselves afte r the de fenda nts l ef

t t he sce ne. Eng el first estimated the time e lapsed at eig ht to ten minutes betwee n Def

endant Van Ulzen’s pulling the sha nks until t he off icer s esca ped the r oom. I n Eng el’s debrie fing to the Tennessee Bure au of Investig ation (TB I ) on the date of the e scape , he had e stimated the incident lasted two to thre e minutes and, fina lly , on cross-e x amination, estimated a leng th of four to f ive min ute s.
Offic er K are n Wev testified that afte r De fenda nt Van Ulzen bra ndished the shanks, he
or de re d E ng e l to g ive De fe nd a nt Cof fe lt the ha nd c uf

f k e y s. De fe nd a nt C of

fe lt the n f re e d h ims e lf and De fe n d an t Van Ulzen. Def endant Van Ulzen was instructing Coffelt and ha d him handcuff Abbott and Eng el to the rail and hand Wev leg ir o n s t o handcuf f her self to the ra il. After the de fe nd a nts pu t on the g ua

rd un if orms, De fe nd a nt Va n Ul zen we nt o ut t o s umm on the e le vator wh ile Def endant Coff

elt stay ed in the room. Of fice r Wev then saw Defe ndant Van Ulzen pushing Of fice r B e c kjo rd a n in to the ro om andho ldi ng a shank at Beckjo rd a n’ s si de . D e fe nd a nt V a n U lze n to ld Def endant Coffelt to handcuff Be ckjorda n to the railing . The de fenda nts took Enge l’s and Abbott’s radios and left. Wev estimated first that the entire incident l asted fifteen to twenty minutes but later said she could not be c erta in.

Offic er Ch ar l es Ab b o t t

t es t i fi ed h e w as b eh i n d De fe n d an tC o ff el twhen De fenda

nt Van Ulzen pulled the shanks. De fenda nt Coffelt took Abbott by the arm and p u l l ed him, say ing, “ g et on up there man.” Abbott shoved him bac k but then obey ed the order s. Abbott’s and Eng el’s pants a nd jacke ts were taken b y t he def endants. De fenda nt Coffelt handc uffe d Abbott to the rail. When Be ckjorda n arrived, he wa s broug ht into the room by Def endant Va n Ul zen with the shank at B e c kjo rd a n’ s si de . A bb ott e sti ma te d th e e nti re inc ide nt l a ste d l ess than th re e min ute s. On c ro sse xami natio n, he state d th a t D e fe nd a nt Va n Ul zen wa s “ c a lli ng the sh ots ” a ndthat D e fe nd a nt C of fe lt appea red a fra id to go throug h with the esca pe.
Offic er L y le B eckjor dan stated that when he arrived he was met by the defendant who pushe d him up ag ainst the elevator and told him not to m ove or he would “stick” him. He said Def endant Van Ulzen was holding a shank at B eckjor dan’s lowe r rib ca g e. B eckjor dan wa s taken to the room with the other g uards a nd handcuf fed to the railing by Def

endant Coffelt. Def

endant Coffelt took B e c kjo rd a n’ s r a dio whe n th e de fe nd a nts le ft . B e c kjo rd a n e sti ma te d th a t th e inc ide nt o f h is
c on fr on ta tio n w ith De fe nd a nt V a n U lze n u nti l he wa s f re e la ste d a

pp ro xima te ly

fi ve min ute s.-4- Suf fi ciency

Def endant Coff

elt makes the bla nket assertion that the evidenc e wa s insufficient to support any of Defenda nt Coffelt’s convictions, but his arg ument is limit ed to t he convic tion for ag g ravated
as s au l t

. W e will there fore limit our re view of suf ficienc y to the defe ndant’s convic tion for
a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult on Cor po ra l Will ia m E ng e l.

Whe n r e vie wi ng the tr ia l cou rt ’s jud g me nt, thi s Co urt w ill no t di stu rb a ve rd ic t of g uil t un le ss the fa cts of the r ecor d and infe renc es which ma y be drawn from it are insufficient as a matter of law for a rational trier

of fa ct to find the def

endant g u iltybey ond a re asonable doubt. J ackson v. Virg inia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L

. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); Te nn. R. App. P. 13(e); Sta te v. El kin s, 10 2 S. W.3 d 5 78 , 5 81 (T e nn . 2 00 3) . I n o the r w or ds , th is C ou rt wi ll n ot r e e va luate
or re we ig h th e e vid e nc e br ou g ht o ut at tria l. I t is p re su me d th a t th e jury ha s r e so lve d a ll c on fl ic ts in the te sti mon y

a nddr a wn a ll re a so na

ble inf e re nc e s f ro m th e e vid e nc e in f

a vo r o f the Sta te . St a te v. Har ris, 839 S.W .2d 54, 75 (Tenn. 1992); State v. Cabbag e, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). Since a ve rdict of g uilt removes t he presumption of a de fenda nt’s innocenc e and r eplac es it with a presumption of g uilt, the de fendant ha s the burden of proof on the sufficie ncy of the e vidence at the appellate level. State v. Gr ace , 493 S.W .2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1973)

. Cou nt o ne of th e indic tme nt c ha rg e d th a t th e de fe nd a nts we re g uil ty of a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult by the us e or dis play of a de a dly we apo n, c a us ing the vic tim , Wil lia m E ng e l, to fe ar immi ne nt b od ily injury in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated se ction 39-13-102.

Def endant Coff

elt corr ectly

points out t hat during this e ntire incident, he never possessed the homemade knive s used to threaten the victim. The re cord a lso refle cts that Def endant Coff

elt never spoke to Eng el during this incident. The State contends that t h e ev i d ence supports Defe ndant Coffelt’s c onviction for ag g ravated assault under the l aw of criminal re sponsibili ty . Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 39-11-402( 2) cr eate s criminal responsibility for an offe nse committed by another person whe n: [a]c tin g wi th i nte nt t o p ro mot e or a ssi st the c omm iss ion of the of fe ns e , o r t o b e ne fi t in the pr oc e e ds or

re su lts of the of fe ns e , the pe rs on so lic its , d ir e c ts, a ids , o r atte mpt s to aid another

person to commit the offe nse . . .
Cr imi na l r e sp on sib ili ty

is a me a ns by wh ic h the pr os e c uti on ma y pr ov e a de fe nd a nt’ s g uil t of the a lleg ed offe nse based upon the conduct of another person. State v. L emac ks, 996 S.W .2d 166, 170 (Tenn. 1999) . The Sentenc ing Commission Com ments to Tennessee Code Annotated se ction 39-11-402( 2) provides that it encompasses the c onduct of defenda nts formerly known as a cce ssories be fo re the fa c t a nda ide rs a ndabe tto rs

. The mer e pre sence at the sce ne of a crime is insuffic ient to support a conviction. See F lippen v. State, 211 Tenn. 507, 365 S.W.2d 895, 899 (Tenn. 1963); Ang lin v. State, 553 S.W .2d 616, 619 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977) . Presenc e and c ompanionship with the perpetr ator of a felony befor e and afte r the c ommissi on of the c rime ar e cir cumstance s from which a n individual’s pa rticipation may-5-

be infe rre d. See State v. B all, 973 S.W .2d 288, 293 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) . No particular a ct nee d be sh ow n, a nd the de fe nd a nt ne e d not ha ve take n a phy sic a l part in th e c ri me . Se e id. To e sta bli sh
c ri min a l r e sp on s i b i l i ty

f or a no the r’ s a c tio ns , th e de fe nd a nt mus t “ in s ome way a sso c ia te him se lf

wi th the venture , act with knowledg e that an of fense is to be committed, and share in the criminal attempt of the princ ipal in the first deg ree .” State v. Maxey , 898 S.W .2d 756, 757 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (q uo t i n g H e m b r e e v

. S t a t e , 5 4 6 S

. W

. 2 d 2 3 5 , 2 3 9 ( T e n n

. C r i m

. A p p

. 1 9 7 6 ) )

. T h e a c c u s e d mu st “knowing ly , voluntarily

and with common intent unite with the princi p al offender s in the
c omm iss ion of

the c ri me .” Sta te v. F os te r, 75 5 S. W.2 d 8 46 , 8 48 (T e nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 88 ), pe rm

. to appea l denied (Te nn. 1988).

I n his ag g ravated assault ag ainst Offic er Eng el and his subsequent threats to “stick” any one not cooper ating , Def

endant Van Ulzen’s use of the handmade knives ma de it p o s s ible for the defe ndants to overc ome the unarmed g uards a nd make a n esca pe. At the tim e o f De fenda nt Van Ulzen’s assault, Def

endant Coff

elt pull ed Of

fi cer Abbott forwa

rd towar d Def

endant Van Ulzen’s location. Def

endant Coff

elt then took part in handc uffing the offic ers, taking clothing and a ra dio, and esc ap in g f

r o m c u s to d y

. T h e ju r y w a s in s tr u c te d o n th e la w o f c r im in a l r e s p o n s ib il it yand returne d a convic tion f

or ag g ravated assault. I t is clear that Defe ndant Coffe lt benefitted fr om the ag g ravated assault and was a willing participa nt in its intended re sult, to effec t an esc ape. T here was sufficie nt evidence to show that Def en d an t C o ffe lt’s conduct display ed a know ing and voluntary intent to unite with D efe ndant Van U lzen’s actions of ag g ravated assault on Of fice Eng el. We aff

irm De fe nd a nt C of

fe lt’ s c on vic tio n f

or a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult

.
We next will consider De fenda nt V an Ulzen’s challeng e to the suff iciency of the e vidence to convict him for the thre e counts of false imprisonment. The def endant doe s not deny

handcuf fing the of fi c e rs to the raili ng bu t arg ue s th a t th e br e vit y of the vic tim ’s re str a int didno t “ su bs ta nti a lly i n t e r f e r e ” w i t h t h e i r

l i b e r t y. A p e r s o n c o mm it s th e o f

f e n s e o f f a ls e imp r is o n me n t w h o k n o w in g ly r e mo v e s o r

confine s another unlawfully

so as to interfe re substantially with the other’s liberty

. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13- 302(a)

.
I n t h i s ca s e, the offic ers we re ha ndcuff ed to a r ailing and then locked in the r oom. The office rs’ ra dios were taken to d ep ri v e t h em of communication. The period of restraint was admittedly

brief in that the offic ers r etained the ir key s for the ha ndcuff s and we re a

ble to forc e open the l ocked door. Neve rtheless, in our vi ew, there was substantial interfer ence in their liberty . The purpose of remova l or conf inement is the g uiding principle to determine substantial interfer ence , not the distance o f removal or the duration of restra int. St ate v. Dixon, 957 S.W .2d 532, 535 (Tenn. 19 97 ). We c on c lud e the re wa s su ff ic ie nt e vid e nc e of

su bs ta nti a l in te rf

e re nc e of the vic tim s’ lib e rt y a ndwo uldsu pp ort th e c on vic tio ns fo r f a lse imp ri so nme nt.-6- Anthony Is sues
Both De fenda nt Coffelt and De fenda nt Van Ulzen contend that their due proce ss rights we re v i olated by

the convictions for

false imprisonment, in that the conf inement was me rely

incidental to the underlying f

elony of esc ape. This claim is based on State v. Anthony , 817 S.W .2d 299 (Tenn. 1 9 9 1 ). T h er ein, our
su pr e me c ou rt

a dd re sse d th e pr op ri e ty of a kid na pp ing c on vic tio n w he re the de te nti on of the vic tim is m e re ly inc ide nta l to the c omm iss ion of a no the r fe lon y

. I d. a t 30 0. Th e c ou rt de te rm ine d th a t it
was nece ssary , in e ach case , to analy ze w hether the confine ment, movement, or deten t i o n was signific ant enoug h, in itself, to support a conviction for kidna pping a s op p o s ed t o m erely being incidental to the underly ing f elony . I d.

This issue was addr essed late r in State v. Dix on, 957 S.W .2d 532 (Tenn. 1997) . The c ourt there in emphasized that “any restra int in addition t o that which is nece ssary to consummate [the
acc ompany ing f

elony ] m ay

support a sepa

rate conviction for kidna pping. I d. at 535. I f such
a dd iti on a l r e str a int

is p re se nt, “ the ne xt inq uiry is wh e the r the a dd iti on a l mo ve me nt o r c on fi ne me nt: (1) preve nted the victim f

rom summoning help; (2) lessened the defe ndant’s risk of de tection; or (3)
cre ated a signific ant dang er or

incre ased the victim’s risk of harm.”

We are g uided by

an ea rlier c ase involving like circ umstances, a prison esca pe with simi lar issues and identica l defe ndants to the ca se at ha nd. State v. Billy J

. Coffelt and Ly le I . Van Ulzen, No. M2002-01214-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 Te nn. Crim. App. LEXI S 789, *12 (T en n

. C ri m. App., at Nashville, S ept. 11, 2003) . There in, this Court observe d that an escape , unlike robbery or ra pe, does
no t in he re ntl y

re qu ir e re str a int . The re fo re , s e pa rate c on vic tio ns fo r kidn app ing wi ll p a ss d ue pr oc e ss scrutiny if the restra int pr evente d the victim from summoning he lp, lessened the risk of detention, or incre ased the risk of harm to a victim. I d.

I n this case, the r estraints applied to the vic tims, the confine ment behind the locked door , the taking of the sec ure door key car d and the radios all combined to pre vent the victims from summoning help and lessened the defe ndants’ im mediate detection. Although the victims may not have be en plac ed in g reater risk of ha rm, it is not necessary , as the other elements a re pr esent. The
c ri te ri a a s se t fo rth in Di xon, 95 7 S.W. 2d a t 53 5, that jus tif y se pa rate pr os e c uti on fo r false imprisonment, are pr esent in this case . The c onvictions for fa lse imprisonment are a ffirme d.

Do uble Je opa r dy

We next cons i d er Defe ndant Van U lzen’s contention that his convictions for ag g ravated
ro bb e ry in C ou nt tw o a nd a g g ra vate d a ssa ult in Cou nt on e pr e se nt a do ub le je op ard y vio la tio n. B oth
ou r f e de ra l a nd state c on sti tut ion s pr ote c t pe rs on s f ro m be ing “ tw ic e pu t in je op ard y ” fo r the sa me offe nse. See U .S. Const . amend. V; Te nn. Const., art. I , § 10; State v. L ewis, 958 S.W.2d 736, 738 (Tenn. 1997) . The prohibition ag ainst “double jeopardy ” provides protec tion from three evils: (1)-7-

a se c on d pro secution a ft e r a c qu itt a l; ( 2) a se c on d p ro se c uti on a ft e r a c on vic tio n; and(3 ) mult ipl e punishments for the same offe nse. See L ewis, 958 S.W.2d at 738.

Ou r s up re me c ou rt in Sta te v. De nto n, 93 8 S. W.2 d 3 73 (T e nn . 1 99 6) , c on sid e re d d ou ble jeopar dy principles and illustrated that Article I , section 10 of t he Tennessee Constit ution provides broade r protections ag ainst double jeopar dy than the fe dera l constituti on. The a naly sis under Denton, in or der to r esolve a double jeopar dy punishment issue under the Tenne ssee Constitution, resulted in a f

our-point test: (1) a comparison of t he st atutes giving rise to t he convic tions under the Bloc kburg er te st; (2) an analy sis of t he evidence used to prove the offe nses; (3) a consideration of whether there wer e multiple v i ct i m s o r d i s crete ac ts; and (4) a comparison of the purposes of the
r e s p e c t i v e s t a t u t e s

. Id

. a t3 8 1 ( d i s c u s s i n g B l o c k b u r g e r v

. U

. S

. , 2 8 4 U

. S

. 2 9 9 , 5 2 S

. C t

. 1 8 0 , 7 6 L. Ed. 2d 237 (1973); see State v. Winni ng ham, 958 S.W .2d 740, 743 (Tenn. 1997); State v. Hall, 947 S.W .2d 181, 183 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997)

. Under the B lockburg er te st, two of fense s are not the “same ” for double jeopar dy

purposes if ea ch re quires proof

of an additional fac t w hich the other doe s not. Blockbur g er, 284 U .S. at 304. A lesser included offe nse, one that is encompasse d in total within another offe nse, is considere d the
sa me of fe ns e a ndis b arr e d b y

do ub le je op ard y

. Se e Sta te v. Hay e s, 7 S. W.3 d 5 2, 55 -5 6 ( Te nn . Crim. App. 1999). Ag g ravated a ssault is a lesser include d offe nse of a g g ravated robbe ry . See State v. Fr anklin, 130 S.W .3d 789, 798 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003); State v. J ason C. Carter, No

. M 1 9 9 8- 00798-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 Tenn. Crim

. App. L EXI S 340, at *24 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Apr. 27, 2000).
Ag g ravated robbe ry

is the intentional or knowing t heft of property from the pe rson of a nother by violence or by putting the person in fea r, accomplished wit h a deadly wea pon. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13-402( a)( 1). Ag g ravated assault, as c harg ed and proven in this case , is intentionally or knowing ly

causing another

to fea r imminent bodily injury acc omplished with a deadly wea pon. See id. § 39-13-102( a)( 1)(B ). Be cause the offe nse of a g g ravated assault is wholly encompa ssed by

the offe nse of a g g ravated robbe ry , the offe nses ar e the “ same” under B lockburg er.
The De nton court stated that no sing le s tep of the four-step t est is determinative but that the results of each must be weighe d. Denton, 938 S.W.2d at 381. However , if the off enses e x amined
are the “sa me” unde r B lockburg er, the n the fede ral constitutional double jeopardy protec tions have been violate d and no further a naly sis is required. See Hay es, 7 S.W.3d at 55.

Ne ve rthe le ss, we ob se rv e that c omp le tin g the De nton fo ur -s te p a na ly sis on ly c on fi rm s a vio la tio n o f d ou ble je op ard y un de r b oth the fe de ra l and Te nn e sse e c on sti tut ion s. Vi rtua lly the sa me evidenc e wa s used to prove the offe nse of ag g ravated assault in Count one and of ag g ravated robbe ry in C ou nt t wo ; th a t th e de fe nd a nt b rand ish e d th e kn ive s a t O ff ic e r E ng e l and too k his cl oth ing . T he se actions we re not discr ete a cts, but both were in f urtherance of

the def endant’ s purpose, to ef

fec t an
e sc ape . A ndfi na lly , th e pu rp os e of bo th s ta tut e s is to p re ve nt a ssa ult ive be ha vio r w ith de a dly
wea pons. The we i gh i n g and conside ring of these f actor s reinfor ces the conclusion that the
c o n v i c t i o n s ar e v i o l a t i v e o f d o u b l e j e o p ar d y.-8-

We fee l this conclusion is in harmony with a g uiding principle of re solving double je opardy issues as quoted in Denton: “eve n if it be conce ded that two convictions and two punishments may be had in a ny case upon separ ate counts, the pra ctice is not appr oved, and, c erta inly it must be cle ar that the offe nses ar e wholly separ ate a nd distinct. . . .”
The powe r of e lection re sts with the state, not the criminal, and the state should not sp lit the tr a ns a c tio n so as to sub je c t the a c c us e d to cum ulativ e se nte nc e s for the sa me offe nse or f

or diffe rent offen s es i nvolving the sa me ac t as a mea ns of py ramiding pu nis hme nt f

or tw o o r m or e c og nate of

fe ns e s. Denton, 938 S.W.2d at 380 (citations omitt ed).

Ac c or din g ly , D e fe nd a nt V a n U lze n’ s c on vic tio n f or a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult in Cou nt o ne is
reve rsed a nd dismiss ed.

Cha in o f Cus to dy

I n th e ne xt i ssu e , bo th de fe nd a nts a sse rt that the ph y sic a l e vid e nc e , c on sis tin g of the g ua rd s’ clothing and th e h o m em ad e knives, wa s improperly admitted into evidence due to the lac k of a p r o p e r l y e s t ab l i s h e d c h a i n o f c u s t o d y.

I n order to admit phy sical evidence, the party offe ring the evidence must either introduc e a wi tne ss w ho is a

ble to ide nti fy the e vid e nc e or mus t est abli sh a n unb ro ke n ch a in of c us tod y . St a te
v. Holbrooks, 983 S.W .2d 697, 700 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). Whether the require d chain of custody has bee n sufficie ntly

established to justify

the admission of evidenc e is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and the court’s determination will not be overturne d in the absenc e of a clea rly mistaken exercise of that discretion. I d. at 701. The identity of tang ible evidenc e nee d not be proven bey ond all possibili ty of doubt, and a ll possibi lityof tampering ne ed not be e x cluded. Sta te v. Sc ott , 3 3 S. W.3 d 7 46 , 7 60 (T e nn

. 20 00). Th e c ir c ums ta nc e s mu st e sta bli sh a re a so na ble
assura nce of

the identity

of t he evidence. State v. Kilburn, 782 S.W .2d 199, 203 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989). The r equire ment that a party establish a chain of custody befor e introducing such evide nce is “to demonst rate that there has been no tampering , loss, substi tution, or mist ake w ith respec t to the evidenc e.” Scott, 33 S.W .3d at 760 (c iting State v. B rade n, 867 S.W .2d 750, 759 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993)).

Ea c h o f t h e t w o o f

f i c e r s , w h o s e c l o t h i n g i t e m s w e r e t ak e n , i d e n t i f i e d t h e i r c l o t h i ng ite ms, and the r espec tive items were marke d for identific ation. L ater , J ason W oodall, an investig ator for the Te nn e sse e De pa

rt me nt o f C or

re c tio n, te sti fi e d a s to re c e ivi ng a ndse a lin g th e se ite ms i n th e ir
res pect ive ba g s. At thi s po int , the e xhibi ts we re int ro du c e d int o e vid e nc e wi tho ut a contempora neous objec tion.

Offic er Eng el was shown the handmade knives and testified they rese mbled those used in the
esca pe. Jason W oodall later te stified that he re ceive d the knives from an unidentified office r who-9-

was invol ved in t he ca

pture of the defe ndants. Woodall had delivere d the knives to the TB I lab for te sti ng a ndla te r r e tr ie ve d th e m.
Cou ns e l f or De fe nd a nt Cof

fe lt mad e no ob

je c tio n to the int

ro du c tio n o f any

of the se ite ms i n t o e v i d e n c e

. D e f

e n d a n tC o f

f e l t ’ s c o u n s e l d i d c r o s s

- e x a m i n e W o o d a l l c o n c e r n i n g c h a i n o f c u s t o d y. At the c los e of

the Sta te ’s pr oo f, De fe nd a nt C of fe lt’ s c ou ns e l ma de a

mot ion to e xclu de the of

fi c e rs ’ jacke ts based on an ina dequate chain of custody . No objection wa s ever raised a s to the introduction of the kn ive s in to e vid e nc e

. F urthe rm or e , c ou ns e l fo r De fe nd a nt Va n Ul zen ma de no ob je c tio n to either the clothing or

knives being introduced.

A trial court is not obl igated to exclude evidenc e or to provide a limiting instruction in the absenc e of a

timely objection, and a

party may consent t o i n admi ssible evidence so long a s the proce eding s are not rende red so f undamentally

unfair as to violate due proc ess. State v. Smith, 24 S.W .3d 274, 279 (Tenn. 2000) . This prec ed en t i s also ref lected in Te nnessee Rule of Evidenc e 10 3( a )( 1) , w hic h r e qu ir e s a tim e ly ob je c tio n to pr e se rv e e rr or , a ndin T e nn e sse e Rul e of Ap pe llate Procedur e 36(a ), which r equire s a par ty to take ac tion to prevent an e rror or mitigate harm.

I n this case, the two of

fice rs identified their r espec tive clothing ta ken fr om them by

the defe ndants. This was suff icient for a dmissibi lity . See Holbrooks , 9 8 3 S.W .2d at 700. Cumulatively , the chain of custody was also established. Offic er Enge l testified that the two knives
rese mbled those used by Def endant Van Ulzen. Furthe r testimony from Jason W oodall reve aled that he r e c e iv e d th e k n iv e s f

r o m a n u n id e n ti f

ie d o f f ic e r a t th e s c e n e o f th e d e f e n d a n ts ’ c apture. The knives rema ined in his custody except for a period of analy sis at t he TBI lab. Reasona ble assura nce, rathe r tha n a

bs olu te a ssu ranc e , o f ide nti fi c a tio n is the sta nd ard fo r a dmi ssi bil ity of ta ng ibl e ob je c ts. Sta te v. Ki lpatr ic k, 52 S.W. 3d81 , 8 6 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 20 00 ). F urthe rm or e , the la c k of a t ime ly objection waive d any

issue of admissibilit y

conce rning these items. W e conclude that the t rial court didno t a bu se its dis c re tio n in a dmi tti ng the se ite ms.
Consecutive Sente nces

De fe nd a nt V a n U lze n c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in impo sin g c on se c uti ve se nte nc e s. The de fenda nt alleg es that the trial c ourt made no specific finding of fac t and, there fore , aver s that the re cord doe s not contain fac ts supporting the f indings a nd conclusions of the tria l judge

.
T h e t ri al court imposed conse cutive sente nces on the basis that the def endant possesse d a
rec ord of e x tensive criminal activity . The trial c ourt stated, “Eve ry one [si c] of these sente nces a re ru nn ing c on se c uti ve . A ndthe re a so n th e c ou rt is doi ng that is be c a us e of the fa c t th a t I

be lie ve bo th of these me n are offe nders whose criminal activity is extensive.” The pre sentenc e re port was, a long with some certified copies of past convictions, introduce d at the sente ncing hearing. This evidence showed D e f

e n dant Van U lzen had been c onvicted pre viouslyof two counts of se cond deg ree murder, two counts of ar son and misdemeanor theft, esc ape, thr ee counts of ag g ravated kidnapping , and two
c ou nts of a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult

.-10-

Def endant Van Ulzen’s counsel d i d n o t co n test the fac t of the existence of a n extensive criminal history

and at se ntencing , in ref

ere nce to consec utive sentenc ing, stated, “I would ag ree that [Defenda nt Van Ulzen] has a re cord of criminal ac tivitythat’s extensive.”

A trial court may

order sent ences to run conse cutively if the court finds proof of a n e nu me rate d f

a c tor by a pr e po nd e ranc e of

the e vid e nc e . T e nn . Co de An n. § 40- 35 -1 15 . One of the se fac tors is that “the def

endant is an of

fende r whose r ecor d of criminal activity is ex tensive.” I d. at 40-35-115( b)(2)

. The re cord in this cause ref lects the def

endant’ s ext ensive c riminal history , as we ll as the trial court’s f inding of such. The de fenda nt’s consec utive sentenc es ar e af firmed.

Enh ancem ent F actor s

De fe nd a nt V a n U lze n’ s la st t wo iss ue s a lle g e the mis app lic a tio n o f e nh a nc e me nt f a c tor s in sentenc ing. We will consider the two issues jointly

. Th is Cou rt ’s re vie w o f the se nte nc e imp os e d b y the tr ia l c ou rt

is de novo with a pre sumption of cor rec tness. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-401(d) . This presumption is conditioned upon an
a ff ir ma tiv e sh ow ing in the re c or d th a t th e tr ia l ju dg e c on sid e re d th e sent e nc ing princ ipl e s a nda ll
re le v a n t f a c ts a n d c ir c u ms tan c e s

. St a te v

. Pe ttu s , 9 8 6 S. W. 2 d 5 4 0 , 5 4 3 ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 9 )

. I f the trial court fails t o co m p ly

with the statutory

direc tives, there is no pre sumption of corre ctness and our
re vie w i s de novo . State v. Poole, 945 S.W .2d 93, 96 (Tenn. 1997)

. The burde n is upon the appea ling pa rty to show that the sentenc e is improper. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401( d), Sentenc ing C o m mission C omments. I n conducting our re view, we are require d , p u r s u an t t o T e n n e s s e eCode Annotated se ction 40-35-210, to conside r the following fac tors i n s en t en ci n g: (1) [t] he evide nce, if

any , re ce i v ed at the trial and the se ntencing hearing; ( 2) [t] he prese ntence report; (3) [t] he princ iples of sentenc ing and arg uments as to sentenc ing alternatives; (4) [ t] he nature and char acte ristics of t he criminal conduct involved; (5) [e] vidence and information offer ed by the parties on the enha nceme nt and mitigating fac tors in §§ 40-35-113 and 40-35-114; and (6) [a]nystatement the de fenda nt wishes to make in the def

endant’ s own beha lf about sentenc ing.

I f no mitiga ting or

enhanc ement fa ctors for sentenc ing a

re pr esent, T en nessee Code Annotated se ction 40-35-210( c) provides that the presumptive sentenc e for most offe nses shall be the minimum s entenc e within the applica ble rang e. State v. L avende r, 967 S.W.2d 803, 806 (Tenn. 1998); State v. Fletc her, 805 S.W.2d 785, 788 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). How ever , if such fa ctors do exis t, a t ri al court should enhance the minimum sentenc e within the ra ng e for enhanc ement fac tors and then reduc e the sentenc e within the rang e for the mitigating fac tors. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210( e); State v. Arnett, 49 S.W .3d 250, 257 (Tenn. 2001) . No particular we igh t for each fac tor is prescribed by

the statute, as the w eig ht give n to eac h fac tor is left to the discre tion of the-11-

trial court a s long as the trial court complies with the purposes a nd principles of the sentenc ing a ct
a nd i t s f i n d i n g s ar e s u p p o r t e d b y t h e r e c o r d

. S t a t e v

. M a d d e n , 9 9 S

. W

. 3 d 1 2 7 , 1 3 8 (T e nn . Cr im. Ap p. 20 02 ); se e Te nn . Co de An n. § 40 -3 5- 21 0, Se nte nc ing Com mis sio n Co mme nts . N e ve rthe le ss, should the re be no mitigating fac tors, but enhanc ement fa ctors ar e pre sent, a trial c ourt may set the sentenc e above the minimum wit hin the rang e. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210( d); State v. I mfeld, 70 S.W .3d 698, 704 (Tenn. 2002)

.
I f our r eview r efle ct s th at the trial court f ollowed the statutory

sentenc ing pr ocedur e, imposed a lawf ul sentence afte r g iving due consideration and proper weig ht to the fac tors and princ iples set out under sente ncing law, and the trial court’ s findi n gs o f fa ct are ade quately supported by

the
re c ord, the n w e ma y

no t mo dif

y the se nte nc e e ve n if

we wo uldha ve pr e fe rr e d a dif fe re nt r e su lt. State v. Hooper , 29 S.W .3d 1, 5 (Tenn. 2000)

. The trial c ourt found the f ollowing e nhance ment fac tors from Te nnessee C o d e Annotate d section 40-35- 1414 applicable : (2) the def

endant ha s a pre vious historyof criminal conv i ct i o ns or criminal behavior in addition to thos e nec essary to establish the appropriate ra ng e; (4 ) the of

fe ns e inv olv e d mo re than o ne vic tim ; (1 0 ) the def

endant po s s es s ed o r e m p l o y ed a d ea d l y we ap o n d u ri n g t h e c o m m i ssion of the off ense; (1 1) the de fe nd a nt had no hesi ta tio n abo ut c omm itt ing a c ri me wh e n the ri sk to human life wa s high; a nd (17) the crime was committed under circ umstances under which the potential for bodily injury to a victim was g reat. No mitigating fac tors wer e found.

Ho we ve r, the tr ia l c ou rt

didno t di sti ng uis h w hic h e nh a nc e m e n t f a c t o r s app lie d to the sp e c if ic of fe ns e s, a s r e qu ir e d b y

Te nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d s e c tio n 4 0- 35 -2 10 (f ). Se e Sta te v. Mc Kn ig ht, 900 S.W .2d 36, 54 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) . Acc ord i n gl y , o u r re view will be de novo without statutory presumption of cor

rec tness. State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 169.

Due to our r ever sal of one c onviction for ag g ravated assault, Defendant Va n Ulzen stands convicted of two counts of ag g ravated robbery , one count of ag g ravated assault, one c ount of esca pe, a ndfi ve mis de me a no r c on vic tio ns . All m isd e me a no r c on vic tio ns we re or de re d to ru n c on c ur re ntl y a ndare no t c ha lle ng e d. L ik ewise , th e de fe nd a nt d oe s n ot a rg ue a g a ins t th e e nh a nc e me nt f a c tor s’ applicability

to the offe nse of e scape

. Th e de fe nd a nt c on te nd s th a t th e us e of mul tip le vic tim s a s e nh a nc e me nt is i na pp ro pria te in that the def

endant wa s convicted se parately for e ach vic tim. W e ag ree that thi s fa ctor wa s not applicab l e as to the a g g ravated robbe ry convictions. See State v. L ambert, 741 S.W .2d 127, 134 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987)

.-12-

F ina lly , th e de fe nd a nt c ha lle ng e s th e us e of e nh ance me nt f

a c tor s ( 10 ), us e of

a de a dly
wea pon; (11), risk to human life; and (17) gr eat potential f or bodily injury . Tenn. Crim. App. § 40- 35-114(10) , (11), ( 17). The de fenda nt contends that these f actor s are inhere n t t o t h e offense of ag g ravated robbe ry . We ag ree that use of a deadly wea pon and potential for bodily injury are inhere nt to the offe nse of ag g ravated robbery and would be inappropriate to u s e a s enhanc ement fac tors. State v. Nix , 922 S.W .2d 894, 903 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998)

.
In r e g ar d t o f

a c t o r ( 1 1 ) , r i s k

t o h u m a n l i f

e i s n e c e s s a r i l y e n t a i l e d i n a g g r a v a t e d r o b b e r y. Howeve r, it may

be applied w here the defendant creates a high risk to the l ife of a per son other than the victim. State v. Reid, 91 S.W .3d 247, 312 (Tenn. 2002)

. There was abundant proof that other g ua rd s, no t vi c tim ize d by ro bb e ry , we re sh a c kle d an d pre se nt during the a g g ra vate d r ob be ri e s. Th us , those g uards we re pla ced in hig h risk, and this fac tor would apply as to them.

Of the e nhance ment fac tors enumer ated by the t rial court, we ar e lef t with two: (2), previous history of criminal be havior, a nd (11), risk to human life. Our re view indicate s that one additional
e nh a nc e me nt f

a c tor wo uldbe app lic able , (15 ), the fe lon y wa s com mit te d on esc ape status or wh ile incar cer ated f

or a f elony conviction. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-114(15) . Wit h three enhanc ement fac tors prese nt and no mitigating fac tors, we c onclude that the ma x imum sente nce f or the re maining convictions was a

ppropriate . See, e.g ., State v. Hall, 947 S.W.2d 181, 186 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1997).

Conclusion

Def endant Van Ulzen’s conviction of a g g ravated assault in C ount one is reve rsed a nd dismiss ed.

We note an error on the judg ments for De fenda nt Coffelt on Counts four and nine. O n Count four, the conviction i s listed as false imprisonment. The transcript i ndicates the conviction was f or the ft

. Th e jud g me nt fo rm fo r De fe nd a nt Cof fe lt on Cou nt nin e re fl e c ts a c on vic tio n o ff

e ns e of the ft , while the tra nscript indicates the conviction was for fa lse imprisonment. W e re mand for c orre ction of jud g me nts

. The trial c ourt judg ments are otherwise a ffirme d.

___________________________________ J OHN EV ERETT WI LL I AMS, J UDGE