History ofthe Office ofthe Secretary ofDefense

THE McNAMARA ASCENDANCY

1961-1965
HISTORY OF THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Alfred Goldberg, General Editor

Volume I: Steven L. Rearden, The Formative lears, 1947-1950 (1984)

Volume II: Doris M. Condit, The Test ofWar, 1950-1953 (1988)

Volume III: Richard M. Leighton, Strategy, Money, andtheNew Look, 1953-1956

(2001)

Volume IV: Robert]. Watson, Into the Missile Age, 1956-1960 (1997)
HISTORY OF THE OFFICE

OF THE

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Volume V

THE

McNAMARA

ASCENDANCY

1961-1965

Lawrence s. Kaplan

Ronald D. Landa

Edward J. Drea

Historical Office

Office ofthe Secretary of Defense

Washington, D.C. ·2006
Library ofCongress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Includes bibliography and index.

Contents: v. 1. The formative years, 1947-1950/ Steven L. Rearden - v. 2. The

test ofwar, 1950-1953 / Doris M. Condit - v. 3. Strategy, money, and the new look,

1953-1956 / Richard M. Leighton - v. 4. Into the missile age, 1956-1960 / Robert

]. Watson - v. 5. The McNamara ascendancy, 1961-1965/ Lawrence S. Kaplan,

Ronald D. Landa, and Edward]. Drea.

1. United States. Dept. of Defense-History. I. Goldberg, Alfred, 1918-

II. Rearden, Steven L., 1946- . III. Condit, Doris M., 1921- IV. Leighton,

Richard M., 1914-2001. V. Watson, Robert)., 1920- VI. Kaplan, Lawrence

S.,1924- ; Landa, Ronald D., 1940- ; Drea, Edward]., 1944-

VII. United States. Dept. of Defense. Historical Office.

UA23.6.R4 1984 353.6'09 84-60113

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800

Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop IOCC, Washington, OC 20402-0001

ISBN 0-16-075369-4
Foreword

This is the fifth volume in the history of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. It covers the first four and one-half years of Robert S. McNamara's term

as secretary of defense, an exceptionally important and fateful time in the history

of the United States and the Department of Defense (000). These were years of

great international challenges for the United States and of much change in 000.

The volume begins with the efforts by President John F. Kennedy and McNamara

to establish more effective management of the military establishment and ends

with the full commitment of President Lyndon B. Johnson's administration to the

war in Vietnam.

Robert McNamara was the longest-serving secretary of defense, the most controversial, and arguably the most successful in administering the Defense Department. The strong leadership he exerted benefited markedly from his personal relationship with and support from Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. He remained a

prominent and often dominant figure through more than seven years in the two

administrations.

The period from 1961 to mid-I965 witnessed strenuous efforts by McNamara

to establish greater control over the 000 budget and to make the department

function more efficiently and economically. He regarded the budget as central

to conceiving and implementing policy and viewed it in the broader context of

national security, embracing policy in its many aspects-the national economy,

strategic planning, technology, force programming, collective security, military

assistance, and resource allocation. McNamara had a deep understanding of the

relationship between programs and budget and the need to rationalize the process

that linked them. His dynamic approach and aggressive style contributed to problems with the military and Congress, both of which on occasion took exception to

his innovations and practices.

Despite sometimes bitter resistance, McNamara succeeded in effecting large

and important changes in the way 000 did business. He moved the department

toward greater centralized direction, greater cohesion, and greater joint effort

and mutual support by the military services. Progress in this direction was made
11 Foreword

possible by the exercise of personal control and coordination by the secretary,

using powers strengthened by legislative and executive actions. This improved

unification occurred at the expense of growing disaffection by the military.

Like the previous volumes in this series Volume V seeks to present a broad

and analytical account of U.S. national security that necessarily includes in

considerable detail the policymaking roles of the president, National Security

Council, State Department, and Joint Chiefs of Staff. Much of the volume is

devoted to OSD participation in the critical international events of the period.

While the focus is properly on Washington decisionmaking, the international

background offoreign policy decisions is thoroughly explored.

This is a scholarly, readable, and informative account. An exhaustive history

of 000 for these years is not possible in a one-volume study, especially for a

period as eventful as McNamara's first term. Given the scale and purpose of the

book, it was necessary to be selective and discriminating in choosing topics.

Accordingly, such important subjects as intelligence, logistics, and research and

development, though touched on, did not receive the attention they undoubtedly

would have merited in a larger work.

The authors are eminently qualified. Lawrence S. Kaplan holds the Ph.D.

from Yale University. He has been Distinguished Professor of History at Kent

State University, where he was director of the Lyman L. Lemnitzer Center of

NATO Affairs, and is currently adjunct professor at Georgetown University.

He is the author of many historical works, including A Community ofInterests:

NATO and the Military Assistance Program, 1948-1951, and is a former president

of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. Ronald D. Landa,

author of the five budget chapters and contributor to others, received his Ph.D.

in history from Georgetown University, edited volumes of the Foreign Relations

ofthe United States for the State Department, and in the OSD Historical Office

made an invaluable contribution to research and editing of this volume and to

the editing of previous volumes in this series. Edward J. Drea wrote the chapters on military assistance and "The Search for Savings" and helped with other

chapters. A Ph.D. graduate of the University of Kansas, he has had a long and

distinguished career publishing studies of World War II, including MacArthur's

Ultra. He is the author of Volume VI in the OSD series, which will cover the

period 1965-69.

Interested government agencies reviewed Volume V and declassified and cleared

its contents for public release. Although the text has been declassified, some of the

official sources cited may still be classified. The views expressed are those of the

authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Office of the Secretary of

Defense.

ALFRED GOLDBERG

Historian, OSD
Preface

The term "revolution" is often too loosely applied to political or bureaucratic change, but it aptly describes the transformation that Robert S. McNamara

wrought in the Department of Defense. Even before the president of the Ford

Motor Company took office as secretary of defense on 20 January 1961 he set

in motion plans to reshape the management of the department in the way he

had helped restructure the operations of an automobile company in distress after

World War II. McNamara's insistence on examining every aspect of the Defense

establishment in the pursuit of efficiency and economy produced new methods of

linking the budget to programs. His emphasis on eliminating waste and containing costs, at least initially, won over normally resistant constituencies. In his first

years in office he shook up the Pentagon, bringing to it an energy and intelligence

that would make him the most successful manager in the history of the department up to that time as well as its most controversial secretary.

Crises in Cuba, Berlin, Laos, and Vietnam inevitably intruded on the progress of McNamara's plans to reorganize and energize the military establishment.

Rising costs in military assistance to Southeast Asia, the demands of maintaining

troop strength in Europe, and conflict with NATO partners over strategy and the

role of nuclear weapons affected the secretary's efforts to control the direction of

the nation's defense programs. The challenge was compounded by growing opposition inside the Pentagon and friction with Congress over policies that elevated

missiles at the expense of aircraft, increased emphasis on conventional forces

and deemphasized reliance on nuclear weapons, and attempted to synchronize

weapon selection and procurement. Mter four years in office McNamara was

vulnerable to criticism at home and abroad. Difficulties notwithstanding, the

secretary could claim success in coping with the Soviet adversary and in retaining

the loyalty ofthe White House.

The volume covers a wide range ofsubjects in varying degrees. Appropriately,

the first chapters deal with the reorganization of the Defense Department and

the instruments by which it was achieved. The budgets for the Kennedy years,

treated in Chapters III-VI, reflect the changes sought by the McNamara team.
IV Preface

Of the 20 chapters total, 11 deal with the engagement of DoD with the outside

world-the Soviet Union, Southeast Asia, Cuba, and the NATO allies. Among

those, six center on the military crises that developed between 1961 and 1965.

Many chapters are essentially monographs in themselves, requiring research

into topics seemingly distinct from each other and separated by time frame as

well as subject matter. The task of the authors was to weave them together into

a coherent whole that was both narrative and analytical. It is fitting that in an

enterprise of this magnitude the writing of the book was a cooperative effort. I

provided a first draft that subsequently underwent thorough revision and rewriting by others to yield this final version.

In listing the names of collaborators I hardly do justice to the contributions they have made. First is Ronald Landa, whose expertise is manifested in the

budget chapters. He has written the five chapters covering the budget issues for

the period and contributed extensively to the research and writing of other chapters. Edward Drea, author of Volume VI in this series, wrote chapters XVI and

XVII with his typical care and insight and shrewdly reviewed others.

Fellow historians in the OSD Historical Office John Glennon, Max Rosenberg, Roger Trask, and Nancy Berlage read and re-read chapters, contributing

text, making needed corrections, verifYing citations, and adding skillful editorial touches that help to make the book more readable as well as more accurate.

Colleagues in the Office of the Historian, Department of State, Edward Keefer,

Louis Smith, Erin Mahan, and John Carland, offered useful comments on several

chapters. Elaine Everly not only brought order to my disordered files but also

provided an unusually close reading of the chapters and checking of the notes.

The greater part of the typing burden was borne by Ruth Sharma with her usual

superb skill and keen eye. Her contribution through numerous complicated drafts

was invaluable. Floyd Stewart and his talented production staff in OSD Graphics,

notably Colleen Wiatt, worked their usual wonders.

Several archives and libraries were essential to the completion of this project. At the Pentagon Library Yolanda Miller, Debbie Reed, and Barbara Risser

reliably directed us to pertinent materials in its collection. Susan Lemke and

Richard Montgomery were always responsive to requests for documents in the

Lemnitzer and Taylor Papers at the National Defense University Library, as were

Jesse McNeal and Sandra Meagher of the Directives and Records Division, DoDWashington Headquarters Services, in providing materials from the Suitland,

Maryland, Records Center of the National Archives and Records Administration. At Suitland Mike Waesze and Elizabeth Sears were unfailingly helpful.

We also appreciate the courtesies accorded us at the National Archives, College

Park, Maryland, by Will Mahoney, Clifford Snyder, and Jeanine Swift of the

Modern Military Division and by Milton Gustafson, formerly chief ofthe Diplomatic Branch. Kathy Lloyd of the Naval Historical Center, Fred Graboske of the

Marine Corps History and Museum Division, and Daun van Ee of the Library
Preface v

of Congress greatly facilitated research in their respective collections. Finally,

Deborah Shapley shared her insights as well as papers gathered for her biography

of McNamara.

Outside the Washington area the John F. Kennedy Library in Boston and the

Lyndon B. Johnson Library in Austin were indispensable resources. The archivists of both libraries, especially Steve Plotkin and Michelle DeMartino of the

Kennedy Library and John Wilson, Regina Greenwell, and Linda Seelke of the

Johnson Library, not only were hospitable during visits but always responsive to

telephone requests. In the early years of this project Robert T. Colbert and Ruth

Alexander in the Defense Contract Administrative Services office at the Federal

Building in Cleveland were careful custodians of documents sent from the Pentagon for my use as well as gracious hosts during my many visits to their facility.

The Historian and Deputy Historian deserve special mention in this preface.

No matter how thoroughly an editor might parse a text, errors never can be fully

eradicated. To the extent they have been, the endeavor owes a particular debt

to Deputy Historian Stuart Rochester, as gifted an editor as he is a writer, for

shepherding the manuscript through the several redraftings, substantially revising

Chapter xv, and effectively recasting many others. His impressive skills, sound

judgment, and exacting standards markedly improved the final product.

As for the general editor, Alfred Goldberg, head of the OSD Historical

Office, his impact was felt at every stage of this project. He originated the series

of which this volume is a part, critiqued every one of the 1,000 draft pages, and

made significant changes in each of the chapters. His encyclopedic knowledge of

most ofthe issues confronting the McNamara Pentagon served the writing ofthis

book in ways rarely offered by general editors. Were it not for his official position

pride of authorship should be his.

LAWRENCE S. KAPLAN
Contents

I. McNAMARA AND THE NEW FRONTIER 1

The McNamara Appointment. 3

McNamara's Team. 6

On a Fast Track 10

II. SHAKEUP IN THE PENTAGON 16

The Symington Report. 17

The Vtznce Task Force . 19

Defense Intelligence Agency 22

Defense Supply Agency. 24

Civil Defense . 29

Counterinsurgency. 35

The Space Mission. 43

LeMay's Reappointment, Anderson's Departure. 47

A Balance Sheet 49

III. EXPANDING THE FY 1962 BUDGET 52

Eisenhower's FY 1962 Budget. 53

Congress Defers Action. 55

A Quick Look by DoD and BoB 57

28 March Amendment 62

26May Amendment . 64

The Berlin Crisis and the 26July Amendment . 67

IV. THE FY 1963 BUDGET: INTRODUCING THE PPBS. 72

Antecedents 72

OrganizationalFramework: Getting Started 75

BoB's New Approach to the Spring Preview. 78

The Requirements/Planning Phase. 79

The Programming Phase 80
Vlll Contents

The First Draft Presidential Memorandums (DPMs) 83

The Budgeting Phase . 85

White House Decisions 87

A Lasting Impact . 91

V. CONGRESS AND THE FY 1963 BUDGET 96

McNamara at Center Stage 97

Rebellion over the RS-70 100

Vinsons Walk in the Rose Garden 104

Furor overArmy National Guard and Reserve Reorganization 107

The Senate Weighs In . 110

Finessing the Controversies. 112

VI. THE FY 1964 BUDGET 118

White House Expectations. 119

Shrinking the Service Estimates 122

Final Decisions 125

The Ups and Downs ofthe Authorization Bill . 131

Callsfor Substantial Cuts . 135

The House Shaves the Appropriation Bill 136

Averting Deeper Cuts in the Senate. 137

VII. BERLIN: THE WALL 143

Berlin in the Eisenhower Administration 143

Indecision, Spring 1961 144

The Acheson Initiatives 147

The Vienna Summit 150

Toward the Berlin Wall 151

The Wall. 156

"Poodle Blanket" . 162

Confrontation at Checkpoint Charlie 165

Aftermath: Clay vs. Washington 166

Toward a Soviet-GDR Treaty 169

VIII. THE BAY OF PIGS FIASCO • 172

The Eisenhower Legacy 172

Road to "Trinidad" 174

The ]CS Role . 175

The Civilian Leadership Role 180

Invasion 183

The Taylor Report. 186
Contents IX

Recriminations 188

Repercussions . 192

IX. THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 195

Supporting Cuban Exiles 196

Operation Mongoose 198

Contingency Plans. 199

Prologue: September-16 October 203

Act I: 16-21 October. 206

Act II· 22-28 October. 209

Epilogue: 29 October-20 November 214

Impact on Berlin . 218

Withdrawal ofJupiter Missilesfrom Turkey 220

Cuba after the Missile Crisis 223

X. LAos. 228

Responding to the Eisenhower Warning. 231

Divisions within DoD. 239

Geneva: May-]une 1961 243

The Phoumi Burden, 1961-1962 . 247

Geneva Again: June-]uly 1962. 254

XI. VIETNAM: RELUCTANT ENGAGEMENT, 1961-1963. 260

Kennedy and Counterinsurgency, January-April 1961 262

The Gilpatric and Staley Reports 266

The Taylor-Rostow Mission 270

McNamara's Initiatives, December 1961-July 1962 274

The Strategic Hamlet Program 277

Comprehensive Plan for South Vietnam, July 1962-May 1963 . 281

The Buddhist Rebellion and the Fall ofDiem 283

XII. FLEXIBLE RESPONSE 293

Basic National Security Policy (BNSP) . 296

The "Missile Gap". 298

The Acheson Report 303

The Athens andAnn Arbor Addresses 305

Counterforce and Flexible Response. 309

SlOP and Command and Control. 316

Assured Destruction 319
x Contents

XlII. THE LIMITED NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY 323

Initiatives under Eisenhower 324

Establishment ofACDA 325

Proposing a Test Ban Treaty 327

End to the Moratorium 331

Search fOr Compromise, March-November 1962 335

Seizing a Window ofOpportunity . 340

Harriman's Mission to Moscow. 345

Debate over the Treaty. 351

XlV. NATO RELATIONs: TRANSATLANTIC DIFFERENCES 357

NATO Strategy in 1961 358

NATO Force RequirementsfOr the 1960s 362

France and the Force de Frappe 370

Germany: Nuclear Aspirations? 373

Skybolt 375

xv. MLF: A NOTION Too FAR 385

Birth ofa Concept. 386

JFKand the Ottawa Signals 388

Defense Reservations, 1961-1962 390

Athens andAfter . 396

Impact ofNassau . 402

The Merchant Team 405

Slowing the Pace 410

Johnson and the MLF . 412

Demise 415

XVI. THE EMBATTLED MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 421

Adjusting the FY 1962 Budget. 421

Latin America. 426

The Kitchen Steering Group 427

The FY 1963 Program 429

Troubles atAID 431

The Clay Committee . 432

The Shift to Military Sales. 433

The FY 1964 Program 435

The FY 1965 Program 439

Preparing the FY 1966 Request 443
Contents Xl

XVII. THE SEARCH FOR SAVINGS 447

Balance ofPayments 447

The Cost Reduction Program 453

Base Closures . 462

The TFX and Cost Effectiveness 466

XVIII. TIGHTENING THE BUDGET: FYs 1965 AND 1966 . 475

The Kennedy Administration and the FY 1965 Budget. 476

Kennedy's Assassination: Johnson Takes the Reins 479

The FY 1965Authorization Bill 484

The FY 1965 Appropriation Bill 487

Preparation ofthe FY1966Budget 489

XIX. VIETNAM: INTO THE VORTEX . 498

McNamara in Saigon-December 1963 499

The Khanh Coup . 502

Toward Escalation: Spring 1964 504

The Other Players: Laos and Cambodia 515

The Tonkin GulfResolution 517

Crisis in Saigon 524

Back to the Drawing Board 527

"McNamara's W'tzr" 531

xx. CONCLUSION . 535

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 550

NOTES 555

NOTE ON SOURCES AND SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 630

INDEX 650

CHARTS

1. Department of Defense, 9 March 1961

2. Department of Defense, 1August 1964

21

50
Xli Contents

TABLES

1. Eisenhower Proposed FY 1962 Budget (NOA) . 54

2. Eisenhower FY 1962 Budget 55

3. FY 1962 Appropriations (NOA) Enacted . 69

4. Military Services' Program Estimates for FY 1963 and

Secretary of Defense 22 September 1961 Guidance . 83

5. Januaty 1962 Budget Estimates for FY 1963 Progtam . 92

6. TOA and NOA by Program, FY 1962-FY 1964 130

7. Selected Country Programs (MAP), FY 1964 . 438

8. Military Assistance Program Comparison of NOA Request

with Actual Funding, FY 1961-FY 1965. 446

9. Financial Summary by Program, FY 1961-FY 1966 495

10. Comparison ofActive Forces, 1961 and 1965 496

PhotographsfOllow pages 198 and390.
History ofthe Office ofthe Secretary ofDefense

THE McNAMARA ASCENDANCY

1961-1965

CHAPTER I

McNamara and the New Frontier

The New Frontier, like the New Deal, was rarely troubled by efforts to

define it. Suffice to know that it signified youth, vigor, pragmatism, and impatience with the legacy of the previous administration. The new president, John

F. Kennedy, personified these traits in full measure. Of all the New Frontiersmen

brought into his administration after 20 January 1%1, 44-year-old Secretary of

Defense Robert Strange McNamara came closest to the archetype, and he would

become the most influential member of the Kennedy cabinet. As George W

Ball, undersecretary of state in both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations,

observed: "In any group where Robert McNamara was present, he soon emerged

as a dominant voice. I was impressed by his extraordinary self-confidence-based

not on bluster but on a detailed knowledge of objective facts."! His personality

intimidated his colleagues, to the extent that others had difficulty in sustaining

opposing views. 2

Dominance, however, imposed special burdens. When the New Frontiersmen lost their way, as they did in the Bay of Pigs debacle less than three months

after entering office, a leading figure like McNamara assumed a responsibility for

the results, deservedly or not. McNamara had the strength and self-assurance to

accept blame for the misadventure even though he had little to do with the planning or execution of the operation. In an interview 25 years later, he expressed

his deep regret over his acquiescence in the invasion of Cuba.3 This confession

represented less an act of contrition than a form of noblesse oblige-taking

responsibility for errors others had committed but which leaders must acknowledge as their own. For the failures in Vietnam, McNamara would deliver at length

a more personal mea culpa.

The term New Frontier itself was as vague as historian Frederick Jackson

Turner's broad reference to the frontier as the wellspring of American exceptionalism. The inspiration for Kennedy's adoption of the image came at a Cambridge

cocktail party in June 1960, when Walt W Rostow, an economic historian at

1
2 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, suggested to the Massachusetts senator that he call his program "the New Frontier."4 The phrase became part of the

litany of Kennedy's presidential campaign after his moving acceptance speech at

the Democratic convention in Los Angeles in July 1960. "We stand today," the

nominee declared, "on the edge of a new frontier-the frontier of the 1960s, a

frontier of unknown opportunities and paths, a frontier of unfulfilled hopes and

threats." The speech included also a reference to "uncharted areas of science and

space, unsolved problems of peace and war," issues central to the concerns of

McNamara's Pentagon in the years ahead.5

Kennedy filled out the top ranks of his administration with a mix of old

and new. Patriarchal cold warrior Dean Acheson acted as the president's chief

adviser on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), septuagenarian W.

Averell Harriman became an adviser on Laos as well as a general troubleshooter

in the State Department, while members ofthe Republican establishment Arthur

H. Dean and John J. McCloy held key positions in disarmament negotiations.

Commitment and energy mattered as much as experience or pedigree in the

appointment of the cabinet and recruitment of staff. Whether youthful World

War II veterans moving into Washington for the first time or reinvigorated New

Dealers and Fair Dealers returning from eight years in the political wilderness,

perhaps the unifYing element among the new men lay in confidence that their

contributions could make a difference, that accomplishments would be measured

by their performance rather than by ideology. They did not aim at fundamentally

reshaping America as the New Dealers of the 1930s had, nor did they need new

agencies to achieve their objectives. McNamara made clear his efforts to exploit

hitherto untapped powers of his office rather than urge Congress to pass new

legislation reorganizing the Department of Defense.

There was little aura of the impassioned reformism that characterized the

New Deal of the 1930s. Indeed, many in Kennedy's inner circle might have taken

offense at being described as idealists; they considered themselves tough-minded

pragmatists. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., a New Frontiersman and Harvard historian, later wrote that he and his associates never really thought that "the world

was plastic and the future unlimited . . . . At bottom we knew how intractable

the world was . . . . The President knew better than anyone how hard his life

was to be. Though he incited the euphoria, he did so involuntarily, for he did

not share it himself." Recognizing Kennedy's invocation of the New Frontier in

public speeches, Schlesinger noted, "I think he regarded it with some embarrassment as a temporary capitulation to rhetoric."6 Despite such caveats the Kennedy

administration exuded an unusual air of excitement and a willingness to confront

old problems with fresh approaches.

Among the many legacies of the Eisenhower administration that demanded

attention, national security loomed large. The putative inadequacy of the outgoing administration in managing the nation's defenses was a major theme of the
McNamara and the New Frontier 3

Democratic election campaign in 1960. National security policies at the end of

Eisenhower's second term were depicted as mired in uncertainty and disarray.

Nuclear capabilities in particular gave cause for concern as the aftershocks of

Sputnik, the dramatic 1957 Soviet space launch, continued to unsettle the country. Soviet technological achievements invited the charge of a missile gap, made

all the more serious by increasing doubts about the viability of the strategy of

massive retaliation and the reliability ofthe U.S. nuclear commitment to Europe's

defense.

Europe was not the only critical arena in the nation's contest with the Soviet

Union. Closer to home, the increasing hostility of Fidel Castro's Cuba added still

another test. And in Southeast Asia the crisis in Laos raised the possibility of U.S.

military intervention in a distant, unfamiliar place. Innovative approaches to all

of these challenges became a high priority for the new administration; in Secretary McNamara the Defense Department had a leader willing to experiment with

new programs and new techniques.

From one perspective the weighty defense agenda overwhelmed the new

secretary, a self-described political naif, who embarrassed the administration

when he discovered, and then seemingly admitted to the press, that the missile

gap did not exist.? The Castro irritant, which he had to confront immediately on

taking office, still remained when he departed seven years later. Nor did European

allies accept his rationalizations for increasing conventional forces or for limiting

NATO's nuclear options. His management ofthe Pentagon gained initial support

but also won him enemies among some of the military chiefs and their allies on

Capitol Hill. His proposed solutions for resolving conflict in Southeast Asia led

ultimately to a widening ofthe war and his departure from office.

The foregoing, however, is too bleak and one-sided a picture of McNamara's

record, for his long and eventful tenure saw the introduction of a host of pathbreaking institutional changes, including cost containment techniques and a new

planning-programming-budgeting system, that served to make the nation's vast

military machine more efficient. And achieving a better balance between nuclear

and conventional forces, though resisted in NATO, in the eyes ofthe administration increased the credibility ofAmerica's defense posture.

The McNamara Appointment

McNamara came to Washington with a Harvard degree, World War II military experience, and, some would say, a hardheaded approach to problems. A

Californian who graduated from the university at Berkeley with a Phi Beta Kappa

key in 1937, he went on to an MBA degree in 1939 at Harvard Business School,

where he taught from 1940 to 1942. In the Army Air Forces during World War

II he attracted the attention of Robert A. Lovett, then assistant secretary of war,

later secretary of defense under Truman, through his innovative contributions
4 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

to management techniques called "statistical control." After the war a number

of young colleagues from the Army Air Forces, including McNamara and led

by Charles (Tex) Thornton, who had headed statistical control during the war,

promoted themselves as a team to serve industry in the manner they had served

government. These so-called "Whiz Kids" went from Washington to the Ford

Motor Company, then in transition under the inexperienced Henry Ford II,

grandson of the founder. McNamara served as comptroller of Ford from 1949 to

1953, rose to vice president in 1955, and to president on 9 November 1960, one

month before his appointment as secretary ofdefense. 8

With the kind of mind that Kennedy admired-quick, confident, incisiveMcNamara had reason to believe that what he had accomplished in the Army Air

Forces and in industry he could do as well in the higher reaches of government.

He observed from the outset that the "mechanism of decision-making" in DoD

was faulty. "We were too slow to develop the alternatives and the decisions as to

the numbers and types of forces we really needed." But as Roger Hilsman noted

later, McNamara liked "to concentrate on what could be quantified-money,

men, guns, and ammunition." Conceding McNamara's intelligence, Hilsman

doubted mastery of numbers constituted a sufficient entree into the subtleties of

international politics.9

McNamara's previous career was fashioned in the Midwest, not in Washington or Boston. The auto business honed his skills and burnished his reputation.

Robert Lovett, who declined the Defense post when offered him by Kennedy,

was the most prominent of those who brought McNamara's name to the attention of the Kennedys. Lovett remembered the young officer from his World War

II Pentagon days as the brightest of the management group that he had brought

down to Washington from the Harvard Business School. He told Clark Clifford,

another veteran of the Truman administration, that he saw McNamara as "the

prize of the lot, and the Kennedy people ought to consider him for either the

Treasury or Defense." A Republican, McNamara had contributed to Kennedy's

campaign; it does not seem that Kennedy knew this. 10

Early in December 1960 McNamara received phone calls from Washington,

including one from Robert Kennedy, whose name "didn't mean a great deal to me."

He did agree to Kennedy's request to meet with Sargent Shriver, the president's

brother-in-law. Shriver immediately flew to Detroit to offer him either the Treasury or the Defense position. He felt unqualified for Treasury and immediately

declined the offer. Uncertain about his qualifications for Defense, he was in no

hurry to accept. Although he obviously relished the challenge, he pointed out

that only weeks before he had been chosen president of Ford and wondered about

the propriety ofleaving the post so soon after taking it.!! Understandably, he also

expressed concern about the financial sacrifice entailed; he needed to consult with

his wife and children before accepting an annual salary reduction from $410,000
McNamara and the New Frontier 5

to $25,000. As he noted in an interview years later, he was not yet wealthy but

on the way to becoming so.12

McNamara met the president-elect in Washington on 8 December at Kennedy's home on N Street in Georgetown, where each man impressed the other.

Almost every biographer has told the story of McNamara's initial refusal to accept

because of his lack of preparation for the position and Kennedy's response that he

was not aware of any school for either cabinet members or presidents. McNamara

later claimed that his "refusal was based solely on the grounds that I did not feel

qualified to handle the responsibility." These doubts did not last long. Kennedy

recognized the qualities that McNamara would bring to the post and accepted

the terms that he had written down in advance of the interview. The secretarydesignate insisted on appointing whomever he wanted without being subject to

political pressures. 13

McNamara saw himself as a "working" secretary. His secretaryship would be

marked by rigorous probing of problems, getting advice, and then acting. As he

pointed out, the secretary of defense could follow either of two broad philosophies of management: "He could play an essentially passive role-a judicial role.

In this role the Secretary would make the decisions required of him by law by

approving recommendations made to him. On the other hand, the Secretary

of Defense could play an active role providing aggressive leadership-questioning, suggesting alternatives, proposing objectives, and stimulating progress. This

active role represents my own philosophy of management." 14

Aside from initial uncertainty about his readiness for the position,

McNamara had a high regard for his immediate predecessor, Thomas S. Gates,

and his instinct was to suggest that Kennedy keep Gates in office. An active

manager, Gates had worked closely with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and had put to

use the expanded authority of the secretary of defense resulting from the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. There were those who regarded

Gates as "the first of a new breed of secretaries of defense."15 McNamara recognized these qualities when he met the outgoing secretary and came away with

the feeling that Gates should remain in office even though he was a Republican.

Kennedy shared this view for a time, and briefly thought of keeping him on for a

year, with his brother Robert as deputy secretary. But as Arthur Schlesinger later

noted, Kennedy's advisers felt that it would be embarrassing to retain Gates after

having made such an issue of defense inadequacies during the recent campaign. 16

Once McNamara had made up his mind he acted quickly, accepting the

position on 13 December 1960. The press took notice of his hard-driving style

and quickly identified him as a potential strong man in the Kennedy cabinet.

Could the other cabinet members, men of considerable distinction themselves,

stand up to the forceful personality of the secretary of defense? The secretary of

state in particular might have difficulty in holding his own against the aggressive

new defense secretary. Dean Rusk, with long experience in the State Department
6 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

under George Marshall and Dean Acheson, was in many ways a fine choice as the

principal foreign affairs adviser to the president. But he may have been appointed

partly because the president intended to exercise active direction of foreign

affairs himself and to use other foreign policy experts, such as the special assistant for national security affairs, McGeorge Bundy, to provide him with a range

of opinions for decisionmaking. Rusk certainly possessed executive capabilities

but not the force to stand up to McNamara or the president-or so it seemed

in 1961. The president, according to Theodore Sorensen, preferred that Rusk be

more assertive and propose alternatives to Pentagon plans, but this restraint was

the price Kennedy would have to pay for the type of person he had chosen for

State. 17

The contrast between the two secretaries was stark. McNamara demanded

and received freedom to choose his own men. Rusk did not have that option.

Kennedy intended to shape his own foreign policy but left McNamara much

leeway in defense matters. Moreover, Rusk had competition not only from a president who thought of himself as his own foreign minister, but also from White

House intellectuals who often had Kennedy's ear before Rusk could be heard. The

Joint Chiefs never provided such competition for McNamara, who maintained

firm control ofthe relationship. When General Maxwell Taylor served as military

adviser in the White House, he no more upstaged the secretary of defense than

he did as chairman of the JCS when he succeeded General Lyman L. Lemnitzer

in 1962. 18

Still, McNamara's influence had limits. Sorensen's loyalty to the president may have accounted for his claim that Kennedy "was impressed but never

overwhelmed by McNamara's confident, authoritative presentations of concise

conclusions." Kennedy also felt certain that U.S. presidents knew more about

press and congressional relations than did automobile company presidents. 19

McNamara's Team

Whatever the accuracy of Sorensen's judgment, McNamara's freedom, rather

than deference to the chief executive, characterized his actions in Washington in December 1960 and January 1961. From the moment he accepted the

responsibility of office he went right to work. Within a few days of accepting the

position he moved into the Ford suite at the Shoreham Hotel and labored until

he had put his team together: "I just stayed on that damn phone until 1 had the

people 1 wanted."2o Faced with having to hire people he did not know personally, McNamara called on veteran insiders such as Sen. Henry Jackson, chairman

of the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery of the Senate Government

Operations Committee and a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. He also reached out to such institutions as the Rand Corporation and the

Lawrence Livermore Radiation Laboratory in California.21
McNamara and the New Frontier 7

McNamara had his team lined up by 20 January 1961, Inauguration Day.

It turned out to be a group remarkable both for its compatibility with the secretary's leadership style and for the quality of its individual administrative talents.

They were a mixture of experienced officials and pragmatic intellectuals, younger

versions of the band ofWhiz Kids that McNamara himself had been a part of 15

years before. Collectively they infused great energy and broad intelligence into

the department. Their presence, however, caused considerable dismay among

many of the military, especially older hands like General Lemnitzer, chairman of

the JCS, who could not refrain from expressing his annoyance over the brash selfconfidence of youthful civilians moving into areas generally untouched by the

secretary.22 In essence they were an extension of the secretary's own personality

and of his insistence on mastering all aspects of the department, including even

the realm ofthe Joint Chiefs.

Once McNamara found the right person, he would use him in a variety of

offices. Paul H. Nitze, for example, began service in 1961 as assistant secretary of

defense for international security affairs, became secretary of the Navy in 1963,

and finally deputy secretary of defense in 1967. Harold Brown similarly went

from director of defense research and engineering, beginning in May 1961, to

secretary of the Air Force in 1965, while Cyrus R. Vance moved from general

counsel in 1961 to secretary of the Army in 1962 and to deputy secretary of

defense in 1964. Able and versatile, they served McNamara well and went on to

distinguished careers in their own right.23

Chief among his appointees was Deputy Secretary Roswell L. Gilpatric,

a former assistant secretary and under secretary of the Air Force in the Truman

administration who had helped prepare the Rockefeller Brothers report ofJanuary

1958 on shortcomings of U.S. defenses and served on the Symington Committee in December 1960. Ten years McNamara's senior, he was a polished and able

advocate for the secretary's policies, his "alter ego," as both men recognized. They

worked well together; the age differential posed no barrier to their collaboration.

Gilpatric had won a reputation as a perceptive critic during his service with the

Air Force. While his angle of observation was close to McNamara's, his style was

different. As a sophisticated member of the New York establishment his smooth

manners and his long experience with defense contractors and congressmen

could leaven McNamara's abrasiveness. As journalist Clark Mollenhoff judged,

"The 'Bob and Roz' team appeared to be one of the most effective combinations

created by the Kennedy Administration." Gilpatric later judged the relationship

to have been "extremely close" and that they had "become very close friends."24

Other leading appointments looked equally impressive. McNamara sought

out and found people who would stand up to the Pentagon brass. He felt that

in one way or another the JCS had dominated his predecessors. "It was not that

I didn't have respect for the Chiefs," he claimed. "I have a tremendous regard

for them."25 But he perceived them as hidebound by their service traditions. The
8 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

young physicist Harold Brown had been director of the Livermore Laboratory.

Nitze, a Wall Street banker, had succeeded George Kennan as chairman of the

State Department's policy planning staff in the Truman administration. From the

Rand Corporation, McNamara picked Charles]. Hitch to be his comptroller,

and with Hitch came a group of young management analysts. While he did not

know Hitch personally, McNamara knew of his book The Economics ofDefense in

the Nuclear Age and recognized that Hitch's interest in basing budgets on program

planning fitted precisely his demand for a quantitative understanding of how to

match funds with programs.26 This formidable first team boasted strong assistants who revived the sobriquet ofWhiz Kids, most notably represented by Alain

Enthoven, a young economist educated at Stanford and Oxford.

Despite their relative youth the new Defense leaders had more federal

government and national security experience than those who had come in

with Eisenhower eight years before. McNamara, unlike Charles E. Wilson who

retained only two members of his predecessor's staff, intended to keep a half

dozen members of the Gates administration, including Herbert F. York as director of defense research and engineering (until Harold Brown would take office in

May 1961) and Air Force Under Secretary Joseph V. Charyk.27

McNamara determined to be as thorough in his search for appropriate

choices of service secretaries as for his OSD aides. He chose Eugene M. Zuckert,

former assistant secretary of the Air Force in the Truman administration and his

own former colleague at the Harvard Business School, as secretary of the Air

Force, and named Elvis]. Stahr, Jr., president of West Virginia University and

former Rhodes scholar, as secretary of the Army. John B. Connally, Jr., a Texas

lawyer, became secretary of the Navy.

McNamara helped each of the new departmental secretaries select assistants who would go along with the changes he intended to make in DoD. To

Connally and Zuckert he observed that "the Secretaries Offices of the three Military Departments-Army, Navy, and Air Force-have not heretofore followed

a consistent pattern of organization." The Navy had no assistant secretary for

financial management, while the Army had no assistant secretary for research

and development. He urged the departments to establish three assistant secretary

positions: one for financial management, another for materiel, and still another

for research and development.28 To Stahr and Connally he noted that Hitch, the

new comptroller, could help find candidates for the financial management position.29 Gilpatric later commented almost offhandedly that the role of the service

secretary diminished progressively in the McNamara years, "in the sense that they

were primarily supply officers .... They did not get brought into major policy

issues."3o

This reduction of authority ofservice secretaries did not signifY a McNamara

revolution. The ground had been well prepared in the Eisenhower period, particularly with the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, which eliminated the service
McNamara and the New Frontier 9

secretaries from operational channels that ran from the president and secretary of

defense through the Joint Chiefs.3!

On a few occasions McNamara exercised the appointment prerogative that

Kennedy had accorded him. While Kennedy promised McNamara a free hand,

the promise did not preclude presidential advice. Kennedy wanted Franklin D.

Roosevelt, Jr., to serve as secretary of the Navy, partly as a sentimental gesture;

President Roosevelt's rise had begun as an assistant secretary in the Navy Department under Woodrow Wilson. More practically, the appointment would reward

Roosevelt's important political service in West Virginia when Kennedy was struggling early in the presidential primary campaign.

The president-elect had advanced Roosevelt's name before McNamara had

a candidate in place. This information appeared in the New YOrk Times, but

McNamara admitted that he had missed the significance ofthe story when he saw

it. Although willing to meet personally with Roosevelt, he still would not accept

him for the position. "He was a very nice person," McNamara remembered, "but

inexperienced in managing large organizations." Kennedy then conceded gracefully: "I guess I'll have to take care of him some other way."32

The successful candidate, John Connally, a close ally ofVice President Lyndon

B. Johnson, had strong political credentials also. McNamara made this selection

independently, but at Kennedy's advice he spoke with Johnson, who was obviously

delighted to clear the Connally nomination.33

The appointment of an assistant secretary of defense for manpower became

a more public issue than had any of the others. On the morning of 13 December 1960, the day he named his new secretary of defense, the president-elect

had breakfast with AFL-CIO president George Meany, who suggested that the

Defense Department should have a leading labor official as assistant secretary for

manpower because of the importance of labor matters. Meany claimed he left

the breakfast table convinced that the secretary of the International Brotherhood

of Electrical Workers, Joseph Keenan, an AFL-CIO vice president and Kennedy

supporter, would get the position. When McNamara learned of this prospect,

he rejected Keenan's candidacy for lack of qualifications. Kennedy accepted the

veto,34

Inevitably, the rejection of Meany's choice raised a storm of protest, beginning with Meany himself, who felt betrayed. Offering Keenan an ambassadorship

to New Zealand no more appeased Meany than did the intervention of Secretary of Labor-designate Arthur J. Goldberg. Meany felt sure that McNamara had

rejected Keenan solely because of his position as a union chieftain. The matter

didn't end there. At hearings on McNamara's nomination, Sen. Margaret Chase

Smith (R-Maine) pointedly asked about restrictions against the appointment

of labor leaders to Pentagon positions. In denying any such discrimination,

McNamara evaded a direct answer as to why he did not accept Keenan. He

asserted that he did not veto the nomination, but that Keenan's was one of many
10 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

names not chosen: "I do not think it appropriate to say that 1 vetoed the suggestion any more than I vetoed the appointment of 150 other men whose names

I considered for the top posts in the Department." He never did reveal specific

reasons for rejecting Keenan.35

As he prepared to enter office McNamara appeared to have gotten the men

he wanted. Even when facing the formidable Georgian combination of Sen.

Richard Russell, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and Rep.

Carl Vinson, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, he managed

to win. When newspaper rumors surfaced of pressure by Russell and Vinson to

name Georgia Gov. Ernest Vandiver as secretary ofthe Army, McNamara went to

Capitol Hill with an offer to say publicly that neither legislator was importuning

him on this issue. Apparently, Russell and Vinson were pleased with McNamara's

deference and let the matter drop. The legislators understood McNamara's

message and Vandiver remained governor of Georgia.36

On a Fast Track

McNamara had a running start that propelled him into office in high gear.

On 3 January 1961 he moved into an office in the Pentagon near that of Gates,

where he and his deputy-secretary-designate, Gilpatric, gained insights from

Gates and Deputy Secretary James Douglas. Not long intimidated by the challenge of his new position, McNamara intended to shake up the department and

introduce new ways of operating its machinery; inevitably, his presence led to

rumors about his intentions. While the press abounded with stories of his style

and authority, the Pentagon waited uneasily. If the service secretaries had been

gradually losing power during the Eisenhower administration, McNamara's

advent seemed to augur a quickening ofthe pace.

The most immediate question involved the secretary's relationship with

the Joint Chiefs. McNamara painstakingly sought to reassure the JCS and their

supporters that he would maintain a close and respectful working relationship.

He claimed to approve Secretary Gates's practice of meeting regularly with the

Joint Chiefs and expected to follow that precedent. With as much force as he

could muster, McNamara expressed admiration for the abilities of the military

leaders, particularly for the character of their chairman, General Lemnitzer.

While promising not to act before listening to the advice of the JCS, he never

said he would necessarily follow it. On the contrary, he felt that the Joint Chiefs'

unwieldy organization limited their ability to participate in the formulation of

national security policy. Moreover, in retrospect he observed that civilian experts,

such as the "Rand intellectuals," helped keep the secretary from "becoming a

captive ofthe Joint Chiefs and the services."37

At his first meeting with the Joint Chiefs on 9 January, McNamara elicited a

favorable reaction from Chief of Naval Operations Arleigh Burke, who sized him
McNamara and the New Frontier 11

up as "a sharp, decisive individual." Clearly impressed, Burke told his staff that

the secretary-designate "is going to be very decisive and he is going to be very

quick. He catches on very fast. He may be extremely good .... He is alert ....

He is going to get impatient .... You have got to know your stuff." Before Burke

left office on 1 August 1961, this accurate appreciation of McNamara's leadership qualities had given way to a strong negative view ofthe secretary, particularly

because of his often crosswise relationship with the military.38

General Lemnitzer, always correct in his references to the secretary's professions of consultation, at the same time could not conceal that McNamara's

arrival brought a "drastic change" not wholly to his liking. Gates, for example,

did not involve himself in details, but McNamara did. It was not the details that

disturbed the chiefs; it was the secretary's insistence on participating in, even

controlling, strategic planning. As Lemnitzer put it later, "When we would work

long and hard to resolve some of the issues between the services and produce a

final document to get to the Secretary of Defense," it was a disappointment to

find that the secretary would turn over their work to a systems analysis group,

"with no military experience at all," to approve or modify the document.39

Given the aura that surrounded the new secretary it came as no surprise

that the Senate confirmed his nomination with little difficulty. The potential rift

with organized labor barely ruffled the surface. Nor did he have a problem with

Sen. Leverett Saltonstall's queries about possible major changes in the Defense

Department organization. McNamara's categorical response that he proposed "to

make no major changes in the organization of the Department until I have had

an opportunity to study it fully" seemed to satisfy his questioners.4o

The one area of controversy turned on McNamara's personal arrangements

for placing his investments in trust. This should have presented no serious problem; Eisenhower's secretary of defense Charles E. Wilson had been the head of

General Motors when nominated, and he managed to solve the issue. Wilson's

solution should have provided a precedent for McNamara. It did not. While

Wilson had sold his stock in General Motors, McNamara put his financial holClings into a trust. The Senate Armed Services Committee members, however,

objected that his holdings would not be in an irrevocable trust. McNamara then

agreed to have the trustee supply the committee with reports and to deny himself

the right to alter the agreement without notifying the committee in advance.

This arrangement satisfied the committee members.41 The Senate confirmed

McNamara's nomination by voice vote on 20 January 1961.

Some scars remained. More than six months later, in testifying before the

Jackson Subcommittee, McNamara commented on two difficulties he had

encountered in recruiting his Pentagon team. The lesser was the level of salaries for his upper-echelon officials-they were much below those with similar

responsibilities in the private sector. The more important obstacle arose from the

matter of conflict-of-interest. Although he would support the strictest possible
12 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

standards, he found the regulations currently in place unrealistic and not accomplishing their purpose. He proposed not divestment but full disclosure as a far

better protection ofthe public interest.42

Acting on the ideas he had been considering since the president offered

him the position, McNamara had the benefit of the president's special attention

to defense matters outlined in his inaugural address. In that message Kennedy

supplied what seemed an open-ended opportunity for the secretary of defense to

take major initiatives.43 More specifically, in his State of the Union address on

30 January Kennedy instructed the secretary of defense "to reappraise our entire

defense strategy-our ability to fulfill our commitments-the effectiveness,

vulnerability, and dispersal of our strategic bases, forces and warning systemsthe efficiency and economy of our operation and organization-the elimination

of obsolete bases and installations-and the adequacy, modernization and mobility of our present conventional and nuclear forces and weapons systems in the

light of present and future dangers."44 Kennedy wanted preliminary conclusions on what actions should be taken presented to him by the end of February.

Previously, the president had instructed McNamara to undertake the appraisal

"without regard to arbitrary or predetermined budget ceilings."45

Undaunted by the enormity of the demands, McNamara relished the opportunities they offered. His readiness to implement the president's requests evoked

both awe and disbelief from Chairman Carl Vinson of the House Armed Services

Committee. TestifYing on 23 February, McNamara told Vinson that he expected

to submit recommendations before the end of that month. The chairman could

hardly believe that in such a short time span the Defense Department could have

studied and presented a detailed statement of requirements for missiles, aircraft,

and vessels. Stewart Alsop observed that McNamara's three crisp "yes, sir" answers

to questions suggested that he had mastered the machinery of the Pentagon even

before entering fully into the obligations of his office.46

The president spelled out in his State of the Union address three particularly

worrisome issues requiring immediate attention: First, the need to enhance the

capability of conventional forces "to respond, with discrimination and speed, to

any problem at any spot on the globe at any moment's notice." This required

additional air transport forces. Second, the president wanted rapid acceleration

in Polaris submarine production and deployment by using currently unobligated

shipbuilding funds and thereby advancing the original schedules by at least nine

months. Third, he directed the secretary of defense, pending completion of the

overall 000 appraisal, to reexamine the missile program, improving its organization and "cutting down the wasteful duplications and the time-lag that have

handicapped our whole family ofmissiles."47

The department stood ready to act on all of these fronts. The pace of the

secretary's activities, particularly with respect to missiles, could have been set back

by his statement of 6 February, as reported in the press, that the celebrated missile
McNamara and the New Frontier 13

gap of the 1960 presidential campaign was more myth than reality. Given that

the Democrats had campaigned vigorously against the failure of the Eisenhower

administration to cope with Soviet superiority in missile production, McNamara's

purported admission at a background briefing session with newsmen over cocktails came as a shock. Later, when questioned at a hearing of the House Armed

Services Committee, he denied that he had said there had been no missile gap

and maintained that he had said there was no "destruction gap" or "deterrent

gap."48

In any event, the flap over the missiles failed to keep McNamara from considering development of a deterrent nuclear force so great that the Soviets would not

dare to risk an assault. The mix of bombers, missiles, and submarines would have

sufficient counterforce capabilities to survive a first-strike attack and still be able

to retaliate and destroy the enemy's strike forces. This impressive buildup would

go beyond the concept of a massive retaliatory strike, which had been at the heart

of the Eisenhower policy. It would send a message to the Soviets that emphasized

deterrence rather than a second strike.49

At the same time, McNamara's planners felt concern that this approach

carried with it many of the problems associated with the strategy of massive

retaliation. To respond to lesser challenges, they took steps toward what would

later be called "flexible response." The buildup of missiles or bombers could

have little effect on the so-called wars of liberation in the Third World to which

Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev devoted so much attention. The traumatic

failure at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961 and the continuing failure to overthrow

the Castro regime focused unwelcome but very urgent attention on the means

to cope with non-nuclear challenges. In the competition for the allegiance of the

newly independent Third World countries, the Soviets seemed to enjoy all the

advantages. Nuclear superiority did not mean much in dealing with problems of

new nations. A better strategy would link economic and political actions with

counterinsurgency programs and so confront communist subversion or guerrilla

warfare in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Long before flexible response became

official doctrine, its principles were in place. In a special message to Congress on

28 March 1961 the president observed that "we must be able to make deliberate

choices in weapons and strategy, shift the tempo of our production and alter the

direction of our forces to meet rapidly changing conditions or objectives at very

short notice and under any circumstances."5o

To effect the host of changes he felt necessary for successful defense of the

United States, McNamara introduced the most unsettling of all his innovations in

the spring of 1961, namely, the reshaping of the budget process.* In the hands of

Comptroller Charles Hitch, it seemed a mini-revolution. In essence, civilians, for

the most part young iconoclasts from the Rand Corporation and the academic

* See Chapter IV.
14 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

community, moved in to examine and sometimes override the judgments of the

Joint Chiefs in shaping military policy. They engaged first what they considered the shocking inefficiency of the traditional process stating requirements and

programs wherein the individual services drew up lists of needs with little reference to interconnections between them. Duplication and waste, they believed,

accompanied the rivalry for money among the services. 51

The waste and inefficiency that so distressed such young aides as Alain

Enthoven derived not only from rivalry among the services and the inability of

the JCS to harmonize their needs, but also from structural change in the American military economy as the armaments industry moved into newer fields of

technology. Consequently, there developed a pressing need for a more rational

system of management for the future. This might not achieve a reduction in

costs; indeed, the administration asked for more money, not less, in maximizing

the FY 1962 budget. But according to the new managers, the worth of the added

costs could be measured by an increase in effectiveness of the nation's defense

efforts. The new system would apply financial management to the decisionmaking process for force structure and weapon systems. That relationship would be

established and maintained through budgetary control and accountability for

performance, under the awkward name of the planning-programming-budgeting

system (PPBS).

The speed with which the secretary established task forces to examine the

major problems of the department deepened the sense of ferment. Within

three days of taking charge at the Pentagon he had four task forces undertake

the following missions: (1) provide requirements for strategic forces and continental defense; (2) explore the conduct of limited war; (3) review the entire field

of research and development; and (4) consider the effectiveness and usefulness

of foreign and domestic bases and installations. The Washington Post called it a

"crash reappraisal" that cut across service lines. Representatives from the Joint

Staff, the military departments, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense all

participated in these task forces. They had extremely short deadlines: 13 February for the first two task forces and 20 February for the other two. McNamara

wanted their final revised studies in hand by 25 March. 52

McNamara followed the activity with a barrage of specific questions that

eventually grew to more than a hundred in number directed at individual officials.

They ranged from queries about base closings to the rate of missile production

acceleration to the appropriate organizational placement of DoD space research.

No office escaped the secretary's scrutiny or the extensive list of numbered questions originating from him or Deputy Secretary Gilpatric. For example, General

Lemnitzer had to provide by 15 May a statement of quantitative requirements

for strategic nuclear weapon delivery vehicles based on target analyses and survivability factors-number 12 on the list. Number 14 required Secretary of the Air

Force Zuckert to submit data on operating plans, costs, and total effectiveness
McNamara and the New Frontier 15

of the proposed B-70 program. Number 6 tasked Director of Defense Research

and Engineering Herbert York to report on command and control of operational, particularly strategic, forces. Ranking did not indicate magnitude of the

issue or urgency of the problem. Although numbers 1 and 2 concerned revision

of the basic national security policies and controlled response in the event of a

thermonuclear attack, respectively, the sensitive questions of Minuteman ICBM

expansion and Titan II squadron reductions were numbered 20 and 21. 53

The first few months left a paramount and unmistakable impression of the

intent to fundamentally shake up the Pentagon-its familiar patterns, its accustomed habits, and its ways of doing business. Encrusted procedures would yield

to altered management techniques and to such new organizations as the Defense

Intelligence Agency. Not least apparent already was the larger role of civilian

responsibility.

Whether the consequences of these changes would measure up to the claims

made by the McNamara team remained to be seen over the long term. Through

1961 the resistance of the military services to both the manner and substance of

the changes, combined with such early tests as the Bay of Pigs episode in April

and the Berlin Wall crisis in August, fueled doubts. But regardless of the longrange verdict, from the outset the McNamara Pentagon had boldly embarked on

far-reaching reforms, some built on procedures and structures established under

earlier administrations, others McNamara's own contribution.
CHAPTER II

Shakeup in the Pentagon

Two days before the inauguration of President Kennedy, Secretary ofDefensedesignate McNamara met with his future deputy secretary, assistant secretaries,

and service secretaries to discuss how he envisioned their roles and relationships.

He wished "to integrate the Service Secretaries into the Defense operation as an

arm of the Secretary of Defense" instead of having them "function only as an

advocate of their own Military Departments."l Army Secretary-designate Elvis

Stahr suggested that McNamara's concept "entailed a fundamental change in the

traditional responsibility of a Service Secretary." McNamara agreed but felt the

change "was consistent with the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958." Perhaps

to reassure his listeners, McNamara stated that "he was under no obligation

to make any major changes in organization without complete personal study."

Organizational change, McNamara seemed to suggest, was secondary to a change

in attitude and procedure. 2

The difference would sometimes be hard to discern. To be sure, in light of

the reforms that followed, McNamara's cautious response here, as in that to his

congressional interrogators in his military posture briefing on 23 February 1961,

appears somewhat disingenuous. He told congressmen that it would take time

"to determine the changes in organization, methods, and procedures,"3 but his

impatience showed early and often. A year later he claimed that "the efficient

organization of the Defense Establishment is a never-ending task." Indeed, he

regarded the defense effort as a dynamic activity subject to constant change and

requiring continual adjustments.4 Although he had a study made of the matter,

he had no detailed plans for comprehensive structural reorganization largely

because he deemed them unnecessary. He could implement his ideas and disarm

potential critics by citing the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958

as his authority. This act represented President Eisenhower's response to DoD's

organizational deficiencies evidenced by the persistence of interservice disputes

that had plagued the department from its inception. It had been conceived with

16
Shakeup in the Pentagon 17

the clear intention of accelerating the trend toward centralization of authority

under the secretary of defense.*

After 1958 the expanded powers of the secretary gave him the authority, should he choose to exercise it, of transferring, reassigning, abolishing, and

consolidating functions "to provide in the Department of Defense for more effective, efficient, and economical administration and operation and to eliminate

duplication." He could designate one or more ofthe services to develop and operate new weapons or he could establish new agencies to handle supply and service

activities common to more than one department, all without going to Congress

for approval.5 The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 did not permit the secretary to 0) merge departments; (2) appoint a single chief ofstafffor all the armed

forces; (3) prevent a service secretary or member ofthe Joint Chiefs from presenting to Congress, on his own initiative, recommendations relating to the Defense

Department; or (4) transfer or abolish any statutory functions or agencies of

000 without congressional review. The short but significant list of constraints

set boundaries but still left McNamara ample powers to make changes. 6

McNamara's predecessor, Thomas Gates, had taken considerable advantage

of his increased powers, a fact that the new secretary occasionally acknowledged.

Initiatives by Gates included the establishment of both the Defense Communications Agency in May 1960 and a major joint activity, the Joint Strategic Target

Planning Staff, in August 1960. And even as the Eisenhower administration was

coming to an end in January 1961, Gates contemplated placing OSD-not the

military departments, as JCS Chairman Lemnitzer noted with displeasure-in

charge of all intelligence activities. This prepared the foundation for the creation

of the Defense Intelligence Agency by McNamara that soon followed. Lemnitzer

cautioned himself to watch his blood pressure at this time; no doubt it continued

to rise under McNamara.?

The Symington Report

During the presidential campaign, in September 1960, Kennedy appointed

a Committee on the Defense Establishment, consisting ofsix influential civilians

and headed by Sen. W. Stuart Symingtont of Missouri, the first secretary of the

Air Force 0947-50), to study the administration and management ofthe Department of Defense and recommend necessary or desirable changes. By 5 December

the committee had drawn up a plan for broad revisions of the military establishment, proposing fundamental changes in both the composition and conduct

of 000. By comparison with this proposed reorganization, probably the most

* See Watson, Into the Missile Age, ch IX.

t The othets wete Clark M. Clifford, Thomas K. Finletter, Marx Leva, Fowler Hamilton, and Roswell L.

Gilpatric.
18 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

far-reaching ever officially advanced for the Defense Department, McNamara's

innovations would seem like minor variations.

The committee offered five major recommendations that would radically

reorganize the Defense Department: (1) greater centralization of full power in

OSD, with all appropriations made to the secretary rather than to the military

departments; (2) abolition of the JCS, replacing it with a chairman of a joint

military staff presiding over a new military advisory council chosen from senior

military officers permanently separated from their services; (3) abolition of the

separate military departments and their secretaries, undersecretaries, and assistant

secretaries; (4) retention of individual military services and their chiefs of staff,

but with responsibility only for logistics and administration and reporting directly

to the secretary of defense; and (5) replacement of existing unified commands by

four new ones-a strategic command, a tactical command, a defense command,

and a command in charge of National Guard and Reserve elements, with responsibility for civil defense.

The committee wanted to replace the seven assistant secretaries of defense

with two under secretaries, one for administration and one for weapon systems.

It also made a gesture to mollify the Navy-arguably the principal loser in the

proposed changes-by placing the strategic command under its leadership.

The Army would control the tactical command, and the Air Force, continental defense. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be eliminated, a chairman

would direct an enlarged Joint Staff and serve as the principal military adviser

to the president and the secretary of defense. Additionally, a special assistant to

the secretary of defense would perform arms control duties and provide liaison with the State Department and other involved agencies. This appointee, in

Symington's opinion, might have "the most important job in the Government

with the exception ofthe President."8

The president-elect and his secretary of defense-designate certainly recognized the deficiencies identified in the Symington report, but Kennedy gave

no specific endorsement to the committee's remedies, stating that he would

take them under advisement.9 He never implemented the recommendations.

McNamara later offered a number of explanations for not acting on them, ranging from his need to study more closely the problems of the department to a

conclusion voiced some years later, to wit: "It seemed to me, when I took office

... that the principal problem standing in the way of efficient management ofthe

Department's resources was not the lack of management authority-the National

Security Act provides the Secretary of Defense a full measure of power-but

rather the absence of the essential management tools needed to make sound decisions on the really crucial issues of national security."lO

But no matter how much distance the president and secretary of defense

attempted to place between themselves and the report, their demurrals did not
Shakeup in the Pentagon 19

reassure those who saw their organizations endangered by the proposed structural

changes.!! McNamara never identified himself as a supporter of the Symington

report. He did say that he would review the proposals but continued to delay

any formal response until he had become fully familiar with the current organization. Given evidence that he seemed very much disposed to make organizational

changes in 000, those suspicious of McNamara's intentions plainly had grounds

for concern. 12

McNamara's selection of Roswell Gilpatric, a prominent member of the

Symington committee, as his deputy raised questions during the Senate hearings on Gilpatric's nomination. Sen. Styles Bridges (R-N.H.) referred to this

connection when he asked the deputy secretary-designate if he believed that the

Kennedy administration would implement the report. Admitting that he agreed

with the report's conclusions, Gilpatric qualified his position by stating that

"before I accepted designation for the Deputy Secretaryship of Defense, I fully

understood both the views of the President-elect and of Mr. McNamara, as they

have publicly expressed them, including Mr. McNamara's statement here today."

Gilpatric still believed that changes would be made in light of rapid advances in

weapons technology. 13

The tone of the hearing seemed to convey a disposition in Congress, as indicated by the queries of Senator Bridges, not to support a major reorganization,

and this signal no doubt helped to bury the report. 14 McNamara, reflecting a

generation later, claimed he never doubted that he could "get control of that

Department without the organizational changes that had been proposed by the

Symington Committee. I thought that could be done by recruiting the proper

kinds of people, by laying our the approach to formulation of security policyi.e., integrating foreign policy, security policy, military strategy, force structure,

and budgets-and by developing the tools to apply that set of intellectual

concepts."15

The lilnce Task Force

At the beginning of February McNamara assigned General Counsel Cyrus

Vance to assist him in reviewing existing practices and in planning necessary

changes. Vance set up the Office of Organizational and Management Planning to

oversee the in-house review. It proved its worth in helping to chart the organizational adjustments that occurred during McNamara's tenure.

Under task number 81,* the general counsel was to "review the activities of

the total military establishment and identifY those operations which can be organized to serve all services"; in number 82 he was to "undertake a comprehensive

study of alternative long range organizational structures for 000." Both assign-

* See Chapter 1.
20 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

ments, directed on 8 March 1961, carried a completion date of 1 September

1961. 16

During his first year in office, McNamara made two major organizational

changes under the authority of existing legislation. One, the establishment

of the Defense Supply Agency (DSA), effective 1 October 1961, occasioned

controversy that erupted into the public arena. Given the tensions arising from

the intelligence lapses in the Bay of Pigs operation, the other change, creation

of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in August 1961, might have provoked

greater reaction within and outside DoD, but this proved not the case. No matter

the differences in their public reception, the two agencies shared the distinction of being the first of many institutional additions to OSD by McNamara.

The precedent of previously established agencies reporting to the secretary of

defense-Defense Communications Agency (DCA), Defense Atomic Support

Agency (DASA), and National Security Agency (NSA)-eased the way for these

new agencies. Secretary Gates had created DCA on 12 May 1960 as the single

manager for all military communications, integrating separate service elements

into a single system. 17 It served as a model for the two McNamara additions.

Changes of lesser moment took place within OSD. On 29 January 1961 a

new assistant secretary of defense (installations and logistics) replaced the two

assistant secretaries overseeing installations and logistics. And on 31 January

the assistant secretary (health and medical) had his functions transferred to the

assistant secretary for manpower. These two changes freed up two assistant secretaryships for assignment to other functions. Thus, two new staff offices came into

being in 1961: an assistant secretary for research and engineering* and an assistant secretary for civil defense. 18

In some respects, McNamara made his strongest impact in areas where he

created no new structures or agencies. The need to exercise greater control over

military operations became clear to McNamara shortly after taking office. On

an inspection trip to the Strategic Air Command's headquarters in Omaha on

4-5 February 1961 the secretary became alarmed by the rigidity of the Single

Integrated Operational Plan (SlOP). He came away haunted by what he saw

as inadequate control of the strategic forces by civilian authority. The danger of

missiles being fired off accidentally or without the sanction of the White House

required immediate attention. He devoted much effort during 1961 to ensuring

proper control of the nuclear forces. t To redress this situation, McNamara established a committee under retired Air Force General Earle E. Partridge. Although

the Partridge Committee report did not satisfy the secretary, it initiated the

creation of a mechanism for increased OSD control over future SIOPs.19

* From 19 May 1961 to 15 July 1965, this assistant secretary served also as depury director for defense research

and engineering. The position of assistant secretary carried statutory rank.

t See Chapter XlI.
CHART 1

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

9 MARCH 1961

-------------------- SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ARMED FORCES ,

POUCY COUNCil

--------------------, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

J I I I I I I I I I

D1RECTDROF ASSISTANT SECRETARY II ASSISTANT SECRETARY ASSISTANT SECRETARY ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAl COUNSEL ASSISTANT SECRETARY ASSISTANT TO THE ASSISTANT TO THE ASSISTANT TO THE

DEFENSE RESEARCH OF DEFENSE OF DEFENSE OF DEFENSE OF DEFENSE OF THE DEPARTMENT Of DEFENSE SECRETARY SECRETARY SECRETARY

AND ENGINEERING (Comptroller) (_powe~ Onstaliationsand (I_nal Security Of DEFENSE {Public Affairs) (legislative Affal,,) (Atom~ EIIOI9Y) (Special Operatiofls) Logistics) Allal,,)

I I I JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF DEPARTMENT Of THE AAMY DEPARTMENT Of THE NAVY DEPARTMENT Of THE AIR FORCE

SECRETARY OF THE AAMY SECRETARY Of THE NAVY SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

I

CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

THE CHIEF Of STAFF, AAMY UNDER SECRETARYAND CHIEF UNDER COMMAN- UNDER SECRETARY AND JOINT STAFF ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF SECRETARY DANTOf ASSISTANT SECRETARIES CHIEF OF NAVAl OPERATIONS OfTHEAAMY NAVAl AND MARINE OF THE AIR FORCE

CHIEF OF STAFF, AIR FORCE OPERATIONS ASSISTANT CORPS

COMMANDANT, MARINE CORPS* CHIEF Of STAFF, AAMY SECRETARIES CHIEF OF STAFF, AIR FORCE

Of THE NAVY

I

I

DEFENSE

I I

DEFENSE

I

NATIONAl

I ATOMIC SUPPORT COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY

AGENCY AGENCY AGENCY

EASTERN

CONTINENTAl ATlANTIC ST1RATEGIC AlASKAN ATlANTIC CARIBBEAH AIR AND EUROPEAH PACIFIC

COMMAND COMMAND COMMAND DEFENSE MEDfTER· COMMAND COMMAND AIR

COMMAND RAHEAH COMMAND

COMMAND

* WHEN PERTAINING TO MARINE CORPS MAmRS
22 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

Also accomplished without reorganization, the secretary's decision in 000

Directive 5160.32 on 6 March 1961 to assign responsibility for space research,

development, and engineering to the Air Force had major consequences for the

services in terms of defining their respective roles and missions.2o Given the

potential significance of military activities in space, the distress of the Army

and Navy was understandable. Here, as elsewhere, the volume of queries that

McNamara hurled at his staff, the ]CS, and the military services threw potential adversaries off balance. He moved so fast that he gave little time for effective

coalitions to form. To carry out his decision to place all research and development space activities in the hands of the Air Force, the Vance team acted swiftly.

They knew that interservice rivalry and stratagems could derail proposed changes

even in a mission as important as the space function. McNamara directed that no

one could undertake a new space project beyond the preliminary research stage

without the approval of the secretary or deputy secretary. 21

Defense Intelligence Agency

The twin objectives of increasing the control of OSD and enhancing efficiency inspired the establishment ofthe DIA-the first new agency formed under

McNamara's aegis.

On 8 February 1961, McNamara informed the ]CS that the National Security Council "on the recommendation of the Joint Study Group on Foreign

Intelligence Activities of the United States Government requires the Department

of Defense to effect a wide variety of organizational and procedural changes in its

military intelligence activities." In response, the secretary proposed to establish

a defense intelligence agency "which may include the existing National Security

Agency, the intelligence and counter intelligence functions now handled by the

military departments, and the responsibilities of the Office of the Assistant to the

Secretary, Special Operations." Accordingly, he asked the ]CS to draft an initial

directive for such an integrated agency within 30 days.22

The Joint Chiefs responded on 2 March with a detailed plan for a "Military Intelligence Agency" to achieve "maximum economy and efficiency." They

had pronounced views on how the agency would relate to the ]CS and OSD and

pointedly chose the title "Military Intelligence Agency" rather than "Defense

Intelligence Agency." To assist and advise the director, they wanted to establish

a military intelligence board, chaired by the director, with service intelligence

chiefs, the Joint Staff ]-2, and the director of the National Security Agency as

members. They made a point of emphasizing inclusion of the National Security Agency within the scope of the new agency. Moreover, they maintained, the

Joint Chiefs should have direct operational control of the agency.23 The ]CS plan

never materialized. The Bay of Pigs fiasco in April and strong endorsements from

General Maxwell Taylor, the president's military adviser, and Dr. James R. Killian,
Shakeup in the Pentagon 23

Jr., who had been Eisenhower's science adviser, for a unified Pentagon intelligence

agency helped ensure that the secretary's intention to place the new agency under

OSD would prevail.24

The final directive on 1 August placed authority for the DIA under the secretary rather than the JCS. The National Security Agency remained untouched.

The chain of command ran from the secretary of defense to the director of the

DIA "through the JCS." While the director would be guided by both the JCS

and the secretary, the directive noted that the chiefs would act "under the authority and direction of the Secretary of Defense, and the United States Intelligence

Board." Plans for a consolidated budget confirmed the judgment of a DIA historian years later that the result was "a union-not a confederation of Defense

intelligence and counterintelligence activities," as the JCS would have preferred.

The triservice leadership of the agency, however, suggested some appreciation of

the sensitivities of each ofthe military services as well as the qualifications needed

for the posts: its first director was Air Force Lt. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll; his deputy

was Maj. Gen. William W Quinn, Army chief of information; and the chief of

staff was Rear Adm. Samuel B. Frankel, deputy chief of Navy intelligence. The

agency became operational on 1 October 1961.25

Congress and the military services expressed concern about the enhanced

authority acquired by the secretary. The very act of consolidation meant that the

Army, Navy, and Air Force intelligence offices would come under close OSD

supervision. With service intelligence policymaking removed from their jurisdiction they would have limited activities and would have to function under

constraints never experienced before. The Joint Chiefs transferred their residual

intelligence functions to the DIA in June 1963 when the secretary announced

the "disestablishment" ofthe Intelligence Directorate (J-2) ofthe Joint Staff.26

To counter negative views of their intelligence operations and cast doubt

on the effectiveness of the new agency, the services fed fears in the press and

in Congress that monolithic intelligence findings might emerge from OSD's

centralized office, with legitimate criticism stifled and service intelligence officials

tempted or coerced into tailoring their findings to the prejudices of the secretary

of defense. The assurances of DIA officers allayed some of this criticism. General

Quinn, deputy director, emphasized to the Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations on ISMay 1962 that the "DIA represents the culmination of intensive

studies of Defense intelligence activities by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other

components of the Department of Defense." Thus, DIA was in no sense solely

an OSD venture. 27

When the question of additional costs for the new agency inevitably surfaced

in Congress, General Quinn anticipated savings but only in the future. 28 When

asked whether the new agency would duplicate CIA activities, Quinn acknowledged some inevitable but unimportant overlap. The purposes of the DIA

involved only military intelligence, and, though the Army, Navy, and Air Force
24 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

had representatives with the CIA, the DIA could provide better than the CIA

what the services required. When asked if he thought CIA appropriations should

be reduced if the DIA took over part of its workload, Quinn demurred, saying "I

would not want to address myself to that one."29

Unspoken but hovering above all discussions about intelligence lingered the

failure of the CIA at the Bay of Pigs.* Fairly or not, the president blamed first

that agency, and then the military chiefs. McNamara's relative ease in achieving

the desired centralization owed much to a recognition of these criticisms. By the

time of the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 the DIA had become a key

source of intelligence.3D

An assistant director for scientific and technical intelligence, appointed on

30 April 1964, reflected expansion of those activities. In the course of 1964

DIA coordinated and shared relevant intelligence with NSA in the new Defense

Special Missile and Astronautic Center. It also assumed overall management

supervision of a worldwide special intelligence communications system designed

to serve the secretary of defense, the JCS, the military departments, and unified

commands}1

Defense Supply Agenry

By contrast with DIA, establishment of the Defense Supply Agency should

have occasioned little uproar. While logistics constituted a central concern of the

services, jurisdiction over supply did not normally cause great debates. Also, the

governing principle for DSA-one agency to purchase common supplies for all

the services-had precedents before McNamara entered office. In 1961 some

11 common supply categories operated under the single manager system,t but

under the aegis of a military service. The McCormack amendment to the 000

Reorganization Act of 1958, Sec. 202c(6), had specifically stated: "Whenever

the Secretary of Defense determines it will be advantageous to the Government

in terms of effectiveness, economy, or efficiency, he shall provide for the carrying out of any supply or service activity common to more than one military

department by a single agency or such other organizational entities as he deems

appropriate."32 Despite ample precedent and the deliberateness with which

McNamara proceeded-it took almost six months before the secretary made his

final decision-DSA aroused more opposition than had any of the other agencies

previously established. Indeed, only the jurisdictional battle over space research

and development elicited greater passions.

* See Chapter VIII.

t The single manager system stemmed from the 1955 Hoover Commission recommendations that called for

rhe secretary of defense to appoint one of rhe three service secreraries as single manager for a selected group of

commodities or common services.
Shakeup in the Pentagon 25

Ironically, the situation seemed made to order for the secretary's intervention in 1961. The military services had accepted the single manager system as a

way of responding to persistent congressional pressures for efficiency and reduction of duplication. Such categories as subsistence, clothing and textiles, medical

supplies, petroleum products, construction supplies, and automotive supplies

had been integrated under a single manager system to avoid congressional insistence on a new agency to effect unified procurement. But despite these advances,

disagreements continued over what to classify as common-use supplies as well as

over development ofmore uniform procedures of distribution. 33

To devise a "long-term blueprint for managing common supply and service

activities," McNamara appointed a committee headed by Vance on 23 March

1961. Vance worked with the services' assistant secretaries for installations and

logistics to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of continuing the existing

system ofsingle managers, establishing a new agency under the secretary of one of

the military departments, or creating an agency under the secretary of defense.34

The committee presented its findings on 11 July 1961 after an exhaustive

examination of the alternatives. The committee valued all DoD properties in the

supply systems at $42 billion, and at $68 billion for currently used equipment

(ships, aircraft, etc.). Production equipment in use amounted to $5 billion, as did

storage and excess/surplus awaiting transfer or disposal. Overall, the committee

estimated the Defense inventory at $120 billion.

Concern centered primarily on the $42 billion investment in the supply

inventories, which had a gross number of 4.2 million items cataloged, of which

fewer than 20 percent belonged in the "common use" classification, that is, identical items used by two or more services. The committee determined that in such

broad categories as general supplies or automotive supplies many items did not

fit into the responsibilities of the single manager. Some of these would have to

remain within the jurisdiction of individual services. Any increase in the number

of single managers would produce more duplication and a greater variety of

procedures.

The prospect of consolidating all supplies under one military department

seemed equally uninviting. It could exacerbate tensions between the services and

make the chosen one susceptible to charges of favoritism. Moreover, the confusion and the likely bitterness attending such a reorganization might make any

new system less responsive to combat requirements.

As noted above, the committee's third alternative consolidated supply

services in a separate agency under the aegis of the secretary of defense. The military services would retain management of their weapon systems as well as their

own retail supply distribution systems and facilities, as in the past, while the new

agency would take over wholesale management of common supplies within the

continental United States. The chief drawback to this alternative stemmed from

the danger of it becoming a "control" rather than a "service" agency.35
26 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

At hearings on the Defense Supply Agency in May 1962, a member of the

subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations noted

that someone had facetiously remarked that the "DSA was a single manager for

the single managers." Facetious or not, this was a description with which the

agency's first director, Lt. Gen. Andtew T. McNamara, a former Army quartermaster general, appeared comfortable. He observed that his authority would total

that now existing on several levels, and "I have a clear path to the Secretary of

Defense. That gives me an opportunity, as you know, to manage quickly, perhaps

more so than they [single managers] had."36

The final plan for the agency differed from the Vance committee's version in

two respects. Under the committee's proposal, a defense supply council, which

included the chairman of the JCS and the deputy secretary of defense, would

have supervised DSA operations. But Secretary McNamara preferred to have the

council serve in a strictly advisory capacity, with the director possessing broad

authority to run the agency. He did not limit the agency head to a military figure,

although the first director was indeed an officer. The director would report to the

secretary of defense, a decision taken after the JCS indicated an unwillingness to

take on responsibility for DSA activities.37 In this important respect, the DSA

differed from the Defense Communications Agency and the Defense Intelligence

Agency, which reported to the secretary of defense through the JCS.

In a news release of 31 August 1961 announcing his intention to establish

the agency, the secretary claimed that if all the items under consideration came

into the integrated management inventory of the new agency, the total value

could amount to $21 billion-more than five times as much as the existing integrated inventory of $3.7 billion-resulting in a potential inventory reduction

of 2 to 4 billion dollars. The new agency would create a stock fund to finance

procurement ofsupplies.38

In DSA's first annual report, for fiscal year 1962, General McNamara made a

special point of noting how swiftly, after coming to a decision, the secretary acted

to launch the agency. Mter announcing its establishment on 31 August, on 12

September the secretary had called the newly selected director back from Korea

"post-haste" to take charge. On 1 January 1962, when DSA became operational,

it took control ofsix major Defense Supply Centers to which it added three more

by 1 July. Although these actions dealt only with soft goods, not with weapon

systems, they marked one of the biggest steps toward unification in DoD's

history. And with an open-ended charter the scope of DSA's operations did not

stop with plans for 1962.39

In the shorr run, at least, a dramatic reduction occurred in the 13,000 written reports required by the service and supply organizations of the new agency.

These reports had covered such items as the number of fire hydrants on a military base. As General McNamara put it, "Somebody years ago apparently wanted

to know how many fire hydrants there were on the base and asked for a report.
Shakeup in the Pentagon 27

They've been grinding them out regularly ever since." The agency director

probably understated his judgment when he said there was room for "drastic"

improvement in this area.40

Not simply would this change result in savings of hundreds of millions of

dollars in procurement costs, it would bring the nation's most creative business

management talent and methods to bear on procurement issues, just as military operational planning and weapon research had benefited from such research

groups as the Rand Corporation and Massachusetts Institute of Technology's

Lincoln Laboratories. A similar breakthrough, the secretary told the president in

September 1961, could come in logistics management, "where we spend half of

the Defense budget." He observed that 60 percent of procurement dollar expenditures went into single-source procurement. Where source competition existed,

prices went down from 30 to 60 percent. To support this initiative, he proposed

to establish the Logistics Management Institute as a "non-profit, fact finding and

research organization, guided by a group of trustees of national reputation and

supported by a contract with the Defense Department." The institute, established

late in the fall of 1961, would provide a wide range of advice: simplifying specifications, increasing competitive defense buying, and encouraging incentive-type

contracts that would link cost with performance.41

Predictably, the euphoria that followed the establishment of the DSA

dissipated before the end of 1962. In June and July 1962 a House special subcommittee on defense agencies, after a long and hard look at the activities of DSA

and its powers, now concentrated under the secretaty of defense, roundly criticized what it saw as excessive centralization at the expense of the military services.

Numbers alone told some ofthe story. The subcommittee learned that DSA as of

28 February 1962 had 10,129 personnel-9,487 civilian and 642 military-and

by 30 June 1963 the projected total would reach 23,057-22,025 civilian and

1,032 military.42 DSA's work force came mainly from personnel transfers that

created commensurate personnel decreases in the military departments. This did

not carry the intended message to the committee but rather seemed to confirm

charges of excessive power in 050, an apparent preoccupation of this congressional subcommittee.

Its chairman, Rep. Porter Hardy (D-Va.), expressed the widespread concern

that McNamara was implementing his hitherto masked master plan to unify all

defense activities in his office and include a general staff of the kind Congress

long had opposed. "The Defense Supply Agency," Hardy charged, "in effect,

could become the J-4 for the Department of Defense. The Defense Intelligence

Agency could become the J-2 for the Department of Defense; and in fact, it may

be it probably is. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, if divorced from their service responsibilities, could become the J-3."43

In this light critics interpreted DSA as a bypassing of the single manager

system, instituted by the Eisenhower administration specifically to ensure the effi-
28 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

ciency that Secretary McNamara now claimed could come only through his plan.

The secretary spoke positively on this issue: "I think we can prove that we will

save men and money and material through the Defense Supply Agency that were

not saved under the single management concept." He did not budge in the face

of congressional skepticism.44

Continued criticism from the military services reinforced suspicions about

McNamara's ultimate designs for 000. To them, the DSA symbolized the erosion

of the authority that the military services and the JCS had formerly enjoyed.

Sectetaty of the Army Elvis Staht shared these views, even though he couched

them in diplomatic language when he left office in 1962. While he viewed the

secretary of defense as "certainly the ablest man I have ever been closely associated with," he also noted that "there just are not enough McNamara's." The job

McNamara was trying to do was too big for one man.45

The subcommittee registered its reservations in its report in mid-August

1962. McNamara's protests notwithstanding, the subcommittee equated DSA

with the creation under OSD of a fourth system of supply, if not a fourth military department:

There is almost unanimous opposition among military personnel to the creation of a fourth service of supply or an independent logistic department.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are in unanimous agreement that there should be

no fourth service ofsupply. Informal discussion with other highly respected

military personnel completely support the subcommittee's position that each

service must have complete control over its own logistical support function.

This, of course, would include distribution of supply beyond the wholesale

level; yet according to the former General Counsel of the Department of

Defense, there is nothing in the law that would prevent the assignment to the

Defense Supply Agency of the responsibility for the distribution ofsupply to

the military services.

Therefore, the committee concluded, "there is an inherent danger in the Defense

Supply Agency that cannot be overlooked .... It could well be the forerunner of

a fourth service ofsupply. "46

The subcommittee's report challenged the statutory authority under which

McNamara had authorized DSA, but refrained from stating explicitly that

the McCormack amendment* was illegal. It sought a new amendment to the

National Security Act that would validate the actions taken by the secretary

through a particular date in 1963, but would state that "no activity or function

being conducted or performed by any military department or military service on

the effective date of this act will be transferred, consolidated, or assigned to any

agency heretofore created under the authority of this section." Given the sever-

* See above, p. 24.
Shakeup in the Pentagon 29

ity of the House subcommittee's judgment about DSA's authority and the issues

the report raised, surprisingly the panel's recommendations evoked little response,

outside of newspaper comments.47

In contrast to the House subcommittee, the Senate seemed to look benignly

on the DSA's needs, without much regard for the potential dangers the new

agency posed. Sen. Leverett Saltonstall paved the way in hearings before a

subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee in May 1962, eventually bringing about the passage of the final appropriation for supply operations

requested by 050.48

When the House Committee on Government Operations reported on 20

September 1962 on its study ofthe DSA, it took into account the Armed Services

Committee's mid-August report and its subcommittee's objections to the DSA

and dismissed them almost out of hand. For one thing, Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Vinson had agreed to the McCormack amendment, including

the broad authority granted to the secretary of defense. Moreover, the secretary

had authority independent of the McCormack amendment to establish the DSA.

Most significantly, a decided congressional majority wanted leadership from

the secretary of defense and favored the action taken in this instance. In brief,

Congress saw no need for a modification of the 1958 act or of the McCormack

amendment.49

The promise of vast savings, more than the logic of Secretary McNamara's

arguments, won the day and allayed congressional concerns over the statutory

legitimacy of DSA. As the new agency demonstrated an ability to meet or exceed

its stated goals-for FY 1963-65, DSA reported direct annual cost savings of

$61.8 million, $99 million, and $197 million50-Congress took notice. A model

of how efficiency could affect costs, the agency represented an irresistible combination: reduction of waste without reducing security. The reality, of course, fell

short of perfection, challenged regularly on every front,5! as vested interests felt

threatened and errors of judgment became evident. But DSA's acceptance III

1962 permitted further consolidation of competing units within 000.

Civil Defense

Acquisition by transfer of a function new to DoD-civil defense-required

the establishment of another assistant secretary of defense position in 1961,

a major organizational change. Civil defense had remained a stepchild in

the national security family during the whole decade before the advent of the

Kennedy administration in 1961. Little more than $500 million-an average of

$54 million per year-had been spent on civil defense from 1951 through 1959.

During the same period, Congress slashed an average of more than 80 percent

from appropriation requests for civil defense.
30 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

Until 1958 the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) had responsibility for the function. Although the question of greater Defense involvement

arose during the 1950s, when the Soviet Sputniks in 1957 triggered a wave of

apprehension in the United States the Eisenhower administration did not turn

to 000 but chose in 1958 to merge the FCDA and the Office of Defense

Mobilization (ODM), creating a new Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

(OCDM).52

Efforts during the Eisenhower years to initiate an extensive civil defense

program found little support in the White House. The Security Resources Panel

of the ODM Scientific Advisory Committee (Gaither Panel) in its report of

November 1957 recommended a five-year program to shelter the civilian population at a cost of $25 billion. The president did not choose to act on this and

other recommendations of the panel for protection against bomber and missile

attack.53

Public concern about civil defense mounted rapidly during the early

months of 1961 as the expanding Soviet missile threat, the Bay of Pigs disaster, and the worsening Berlin crisis provided daily grist for the mills of the news

media. Within the new Kennedy administration studies and discussions pointed

toward greater emphasis on civil defense and assignment of the function to the

Department of Defense. In December 1960 the Symington Committee had

recommended placing civil defense under 000. Secretary McNamara supported

increased funding, particularly for fallout shelters. Forced to take cognizance

of growing pressure from Congress and forceful criticism from the Republican

governor of New York, Nelson D. Rockefeller, President Kennedy, on 25 May

1961 in his Special Message to the Congress on Urgent Needs, delivered in

person to a joint session, outlined a plan to shift responsibility for civil defense

to the Department of Defense and to greatly increase expenditures. He followed

through with Executive Order 10952 on 20 July, which transferred OCDM's

civil defense function to 000. He pledged that the function would remain civilian in nature. He proposed also to reconstitute OCDM as a small agency, the

Office of Emergency Planning, to provide staff advice to the president and assist

in the coordination of civil defense functions. 54

In his report to the country on the Berlin crisis on 25 July, the president

detailed the changes he proposed to bring about in the civil defense program. He

mentioned most prominently the assignment of basic responsibilities to the secretary of defense and his request to Congress for a $207 million appropriation. The

emphasis would be on fallout shelters. 55

It has been suggested that a prime reason for shifting civil defense to 000

was to remove it from the jurisdiction of the Independent Offices Subcommittee

of the House Appropriations Committee to the Department of Defense Subcommittee. Chairman of the Independent Offices Subcommittee Rep. Albert Thomas

(D-Tex.) was notoriously skeptical about civil defense and cut its appropriation
Shakeup in the Pentagon 31

regularly. More sympathetic, the chairman of the Defense Subcommittee, Rep.

George H. Mahon, also of Texas, steered the FY 1962 supplemental appropriation for civil defense through the House in August 1961. Unfortunately for civil

defense, in January 1962 the chairman of the Appropriations Committee, Rep.

Clarence Cannon (D-Mo.), reassigned the function to Thomas's subcommittee. 56

Civil defense imposed an additional task on OSD. Even though he recognized

the relationship between civil and military defense, civil defense management was

not an assignment that a burdened secretary had actively sought. Predictably,

McNamara insisted on having responsibility for the whole civil defense program,

not merely the shelter program as OCDM proposed. Once accepted, McNamara

devoted the same energy to this responsibility that he brought to everything else.

In rapid order on 31 July 1961 he appointed Special Assistant Adam Yarmolinsky

as the interim civil defense head and followed up on 31 August by creating an

assistant secretaryship for the function. The first and, as it turned out, the only

assistant secretary for civil defense, Steuart L. Pittman, a Washington attorney,

assumed office on 20 September. Before the end of the year he had available the

services ofsome 1,100 employees transferred from OCDMY

To secure money quickly, the administration included civil defense in the

third amendment to the FY 1962 budget. Congress promptly approved $207.6

million on 10 August which, McNamara pointed out in testimony before a

House subcommittee on 1 August, would go chiefly for a public shelter identification and marking program ($93 million) and for stockage. Transfer to 000

of a prior appropriation of $49.2 million to OCDM raised the total available

for civil defense to $256.8 million. At the same time the secretary reassured

the congressmen that the effort would remain under civilian control but that it

would be "integrated with all aspects of military defense against thermonuclear

attack." In keeping with his commitment to cost effectiveness, he pledged to seek

maximum protection at the lowest possible cost.

In his statement the secretary pointed out that protection against fallout from

nuclear explosions was much less costly than protection from the effects of blast.

Moreover, the expensive blast shelters would be competitive with antimissile

defenses such as the Nike-Zeus while fallout shelters would be complementary

rather than competitive. An effective missile defense system would diminish the

need for blast shelter. Meanwhile, effort would go toward developing a greater

fallout protection system to serve some 50 million Americans. 58

During the summer and fall of 1961, when the civil defense fever reached its

apogee, the White House supported a large civil defense program but it did not

go all out, probably because ofthe large costs the commitment would entail. Still,

in his draft memorandum to the president in October McNamara proposed that

the major portion of the $400 million he wanted for civil defense in FY 1963

go for a major fallout protection program. Secretary of State Rusk suggested an

even larger effort, "substantially beyond the modest increase proposed in the FY
32 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

'63 000 budget." The president's brothet, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy,

opposed the fallout shelter program, later calling himself "a minority of one."59

At a meeting with his advisers on 24 November, the president decided in

favor of a public shelter program rather than a private one. He settled on a civil

defense program of $700 million annually for five years at a total cost of $3.5

billion. This represented a compromise between proposed $400 million and $900

million programs. He and McNamara agreed to the preparation of a statement of

the National Civil Defense Program detailing the roles of federal, state, and local

governments and private citizens. They also planned to meet with congressional

leaders and state governors to discuss proposed programs and organizational and

communications arrangements. Sensitive to the need to inform a nervous public,

they also promised preparation and nationwide dissemination of a booklet on

fallout protection by the end of the year. 60

By mid-December the civil defense program had evolved sufficiently for

Deputy Secretary Gilpatric to unveil it in a press conference. He announced that

000 would request civil defense funds "in the neighborhood of $700 million"

for FY 1963. Priority would be on providing 20 million spaces in community

fallout shelters in the next fiscal year, for which the federal government would

provide financial incentives to states and localities, which would have to play an

important role.6!

As the worry over nuclear attack waned during the early months of 1962,

so did support for the federal program. Still, in hearings before congressional

committees in January and February McNamara remained firm in his support

of the $695 million he actually requested for civil defense. He maintained that

the proposed program represented his own personal convictions and those of

President Kennedy. The greater part of the money-$460 million-he pointed

out, would pay for incentives to educational institutions, hospitals, and welfare

institutions to provide shelter spaces. He balked at providing shelter for the total

U.S. population of 180 million people, which the Atomic Energy Commission

estimated would eventually cost $25 billion. He calculated the cost of DoD's

proposed shelter program over the next four years at more than $3 billion, of

which the federal government would pay $1.8 billion. Members of the congressional committees voiced disapproval and skepticism about the cost and extent of

the shelter program. 62

Observers noted the mercurial rise and decline of national concern about

civil defense in the span of a year. In April 1962 one journalist recalled that in

December 1961 he had heard a top Defense Department official declare that "the

whole thing jumped from apathy to hysteria before we had a chance to catch our

breaths." Four months later, he found that "the same official and his associates

are anxiously trying to determine whether interest has slipped back into apathy."

Assistant Secretary Pittman was acutely aware of the change in the interim:

"Public interest was at an extraordinarily high pitch last fall, following the Berlin
Shakeup in the Pentagon 33

crisis. It is now rather quiet. Whether this quiescence is disinterest or a very sensible 'wait-and-see' attitude is difficult to analyze."63

By this time the home shelter building boom that had flourished during the

fall and early winter had collapsed. Moreover, of the 35 million pamphlets on

fallout protection deposited in post offices for pickup by the public, 4 million

still remained. The booklet appeared at a time (late December 1961) when the

near-hysteria over civil defense was still close to a peak. In its final form the booklet had already shed much ofits alarmist tone.64

Congressional action or inaction mirrored the fluctuation in public interest

and concern. In essence, the reversal of support for the heart of the programshelter-building-reflected a public sense that a truly effective civil defense

program that could protect the population of the country lay beyond the nation's

capacity, not only financially but militarily, especially in the event of a first

nuclear strike against the United States. Congress did not complete its work on

the FY 1963 civil defense appropriation until late September. It gutted the shelter

program and provided a mere $113 million for all of civil defense.65

The prospect for vigorous support of a large civil defense effort grew dimmer

even though the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 caused President Kennedy

to inquire into the progress of the program and to alen civil defense authorities in the southeastern states to possible danger. Thereafter the administration

kept paying lip service to civil defense, even as the program continued to sink

into near-obscurity. Pittman must have seen the handwriting on the wall when

McNamara proposed in February 1963 to reduce the position of assistant secretary of defense for civil defense to director of civil defense.66

In spite of the suppon of the president and the Governors' Conference

during the summer of 1962 for full funding of the shelter program in the FY

1963 appropriation request, Congress had chosen to provide only a ponion.

For FY 1964 DoD asked for $346.9 million for civil defense, but received only

$111.6 million.67 Supported by his staff and scientific experts, Pittman fought

valiantly for the fallout shelter program in appearances before congressional

committees. He succeeded with the House of Representatives, securing authorization in August 1963 for $175 million for shelter incentives. The Senate Armed

Services Committee did not act on the House authorization bill, which led to the

resignation of the dispirited Pittman on 31 March 1964. The same day Secretary

McNamara, in a further signal of loss of interest in civil defense, transferred the

civil defense function to the secretary of the Army, who assigned the responsibility to a director of civil defense. The official explanation was that the operational

responsibility for civil defense belonged in the Army.68

A disillusioned Pittman believed that McNamara confined his support to

shelter survey, marking, and stocking and gave little more than token backing

to the vital shelter incentive proposals. Although McNamara continued to tell

Congress that fallout protection was the most cost-effective damage-limiting
34 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

measure against nuclear attack, this had to be understood, Pittman subsequently

observed, "in the context of his growing hostility toward ABM [Anti-Ballistic

Missile] and commitment to the doctrine of'mutual assured destruction.'''69

For FY 1965 DoD requested $358 million, from which Congress deleted the

greater part, intended for the fallout shelter program. The final appropriation was

$105.2 million. Civil defense fared no better in FY 1966, receiving only $106.8

million against a requested $193.9 million. Thereafter appropriations for civil

defense declined still further. 70

Although presidents from Truman to Johnson asked for large sums of money

for civil defense, Congress responded consistently by slashing the appropriation

requests. The sticking point throughout seems to have been the shelter programproviding money for shelters in public buildings and providing incentive money

for shelters in private buildings. Most ofthe funding approved seems to have gone

for stockage of supplies, shelter survey and marking, education and training, a

warning system, communications systems, and technical guidance and assistance

to state and local civil defense agencies. These did not require the huge sums that

a national fallout shelter program would have required.

The organizational demotion of civil defense in DoD paralleled the decline

in public and congressional concern and in money allocated for the function.

McNamara and Secretary of the Army Stephen B. Ailes tried to put the best

face on the downgrading, but there could be little doubt of its true meaning.

Although occasional bursts of interest in civil defense occurred thereafter, and

McNamara continued to ask for money for civil defense, it never again elicited

from any administration or the country the level of attention reached in 1961-

62.

The author of the official history of the U.S. civil defense program, Harry

Yoshpe, concluded that "the record provides little evidence of Presidents, other

than Kennedy, perhaps, making a serious effort to get the Nation and the

Congress to face up to the civil defense problem." And even Kennedy may have

come to consider his effort overdone. According to presidential assistant Arthur

Schlesinger, "Kennedy feared overexciting people about public issues, as he came

to believe that his call for an air raid shelter program had done during the Berlin

crisis of 1961."71 Many factors in addition to high cost contributed to the failure

to develop a viable national civil defense structure-public apathy and fatalism,

secrecy, the quarrels over civilian vs. military control, and the absence of a legislative base. The Kennedy administration apparently expected that placing civil

defense under the Defense Department would give it an aura of military necessity

and facilitate securing greater support from Congress. After a promising beginning the program reverted to its accustomed minor role in national defense. It

seems most probable that the Kennedy/McNamara policy of relying on offensive nuclear forces to deter attack rather than on a defensive strategy based on
Shakeup in the Pentagon 35

an anti-ballistic missile capability and civil defense sealed the fate of the latter.

In competition with other 000 high-priority programs sponsored by the JCS

and the military services, civil defense, a newcomer in 000, could not hope to

compete without the strong support of an effective political constituency. Somehow, in all the years after World War II, such a constituency did not emerge and

civil defense remained a nagging yet marginal concern.

Counterinsurgency

Unlike civil defense, from the very beginning of the Kennedy administration

the counterinsurgency mission had a powerful constituency-the president and

the secretary of defense-and received continual and close attention and support

from this highest level of authority. Kennedy and McNamara engaged themselves

with much intensity in developing an organization to direct counterinsurgency

policy and the forces to perform the mission.

Their disposition to create forces to counter insurgencies was greatly fortified by an address on the likely future of war and peace among the nations of the

world given by the leader of the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev, on 6 January 1961, just two weeks before Kennedy became president. In his speech, which

the State Department titled "The Communist Doctrine of Wars of Liberation,"

Khrushchev forecast diminished likelihood of global and conventional local wars

but an increase in "national liberation wars"-uprisings of peoples against their

imperialist or colonial oppressors. "The Communists," he went on, "fully support

such just wars and march in the front rank with the peoples waging liberation

struggles."72 Kennedy subsequently described the address, to a convocation of

Communist party organizations in Moscow, "as possibly one of the most important speeches of the decade" and considered its content a "pattern of [Soviet]

military and paramilitary infiltration and subversion which could be expected

under the guise of 'wars ofliberation'."73

The president's views about wars of national liberation and U.S. responses

were also influenced by Brig. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale's report of his 2-14

January visit to South Vietnam at the request of outgoing Secretary of Defense

Gates. Lansdale, who had made his reputation as a counterinsurgency expert in

the Philippines and was currently deputy assistant to the secretary of defense for

special operations, asserted that the Communist Viet Cong's expanding control

over much of the country had made them confident of victory in 1961. He listed

numerous actions that the South Vietnamese should take with U.S. support;

otherwise the probable Communist victory would result in the quick loss of the

rest of Southeast Asia and constitute "a major blow to U.S. prestige and influence

... throughout the world."74 Kennedy reviewed Lansdale's report on 26 January and was so impressed that he directed that a 28 January meeting of his top
36 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

officials-Vice President Johnson, Rusk, McNamara, Lemnitzer, CIA Director

Allen W Dulles, and others-scheduled to discuss the planned Cuban invasion,

be broadened to include South Vietnam, and that Lansdale attend.75

Still another significant document at this time influenced the president's

views on counterinsurgency-a Pacific Command-initiated study eventually

titled "Basic Counterinsurgency Plan for VietNam," begun in early 1960 and

finally completed on 4 January 1961, with inputs from the U.S. country team in

Saigon and concerned Washington departments and agencies. It called for extensive South Vietnamese political, military, economic, and psychological actions,

with U.S. advice and assistance, against the Viet Cong insurgency. The president

may have first learned ofthe plan's contents at the 28 January meeting.76

Several days later, at his initial meeting with the National Security Council

on 1 February, Kennedy directed McNamara in consultation with other interested agencies to "examine means for placing more emphasis on the development

of counter-guerrilla forces." Special Assistant McGeorge Bundy formalized the

request on 3 February in National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM)

No.2, adding that the White House wished to be informed "promptly of the

measures which it [000] proposes to take."77

Thereafter, until his untimely death in November 1963, the president maintained extraordinary interest and participation in all phases of expanding U.S.

counterinsurgency activities in underdeveloped Asian, African, and Latin American nations undergoing communist pressures. These included not only overt

and covert military operations, but local police training, civic action programs

(school, health, and political), agricultural improvements, riot control, and

psychological and propaganda activities.

Since the counterinsurgency effort was so broad, it involved many governmental agencies, including the Defense, State, and Treasury departments as well

as the CIA, the Agency for International Development, and the U.S. Information Agency, none of which had overall responsibility. Following the Bay of Pigs

disaster of April 1961, the Cuba Study Group concluded that future Cold War

operations "should be planned and executed by a governmental mechanism capable of bringing into play, in addition to military and covert techniques, all other

forces, political, economic, ideological, and intelligence, which can contribute to

its success."78

The initial attempts to centralize responsibility were not successful. On

8 December 1961, however, a special NSC Counter-Guerrilla Warfare Task

Force,*noting the "magnitude and urgency" of indirect communist aggression

and the lack of a "single [U.S.] high-level locus of authority and responsibility" to

* The task force included Richard M. Bissell, Jr. (CIA), Lansdale from 000, Walr Rosrow (White House), and

Henry C. Ramsey (State). They served as individuals, not as representatives of their agencies. See editorial note,

FRUS 1961-63, VIII:229.
Shakeup in the Pentagon 37

respond with the "vitally needed concerting of inter-agency resources," proposed

the organization ofsuch a body. General Taylor agreed and had so recommended

to the president.79

After several weeks of discussion over its composition, organizational form,

and placement, on 18 January 1962 Kennedy directed the establishment of the

Special Group (Counterinsurgency)* "to assure unity of effort and the use of

all available resources with maximum effectiveness in preventing and resisting

subversive insurgency and related forms of indirect aggression in friendly countries." Its membership consisted ofthe president's military representative (General

Taylor) as chairman, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Deputy Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric, General

Lemnitzer (the JCS chairman), new CIA Director John A. McCone, presidential special assistant McGeorge Bundy, and AID Administrator Fowler Hamilton.

Initially, the president listed Laos, South Vietnam, and Thailand as the nations

for which interdepartmental programs should be prepared and conducted to

prevent or defeat subversive insurgency.so In mid-June, he added eight others to

the group's purview: Burma, Cambodia, Cameroon, Iran, Ecuador, Colombia,

Guatemala, and Venezuela. S1 Thereafter, some of these were deleted but others,

chiefly from Latin America and Africa, were added.

The Special Group (CI) met weekly for about two hours. The members, not

substitutes, were expected to attend; they could bring no support staff (thereby

necessitating prior agenda preparation). As departmental or agency heads or

deputy heads, members were expected to ensure timely responses to proposed

actions. Attorney General Robert Kennedy's presence obviously served as an

additional inducement to attend and act. General Taylor chaired the group

until October 1962, when he became the JCS chairman. He remained a group

member, but State's Alexis Johnson replaced him as group chairman and NSC's

Michael Forrestal became the White House representative. Early in April 1963,

when W. Averell Harriman became the under secretary for political affairs, he

replaced Johnson as the group chairman. By then, much of the intense activity and attention that marked the group's early days had passed-innovation

and introduction of ideas and plans had given way largely to their implementation. When President Kennedy first introduced the counterinsurgency effort, he

intended it specifically as an anticommunism measure; in 1963 and after, this

meant that U.S. actions, particularly in Latin America and Africa, supported

friendly but not necessarily democratic or popular regimes in many countries.

* What eventually would popularly be known as "counterinsurgency" initially included many other termssublimired war, counter-guerrilla operarions, guerrilla warfare, covert aggression, special operations, and

numerous others. The first general use of "counterinsurgency" within the government apparently occurred with

PACOM'S Basic Counterinsurgency Plan for Viet-Nam, frequently cited as the Crp. However, the term seemed

not to have gained widespread use until after the Special Group (Counterinsurgency) was established in January

1962. It was generally referred to as Special Group (CI).
38 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

President Johnson abolished the Special Group (CI) early in 1966 and transferred

its functions to the newly established Senior Interdepartmental Group.82

Implementing counterinsurgency policy proceeded rapidly in response to

the president's initial formal directive of 3 February 1961. McNamara tasked the

Joint Chiefs and the assistant secretary for international security affairs "to examine the means for placing more emphasis on the development of counterguerrilla

forces." Kennedy met with the JCS on 6 and 23 February, asking detailed questions and requesting reports on actions they were taking. He indicated an interest

in every facet of the subject: What was the size of the force and the number

of men in training at the Army's Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North

Carolina, and at the two subordinate centers, in Germany and Okinawa? What

was the rank of the Fort Bragg center's commander? How many Military Assistance Advisory Group personnel in Vietnam and those training Laotian troops

had received guerrilla training? What types of equipment and training were

being supplied to these troops and to those ofsuch other nations as Iran, Congo,

Ecuador, Colombia, etc.? What was the DoD's specific role in training the

Cubans being readied for the forthcoming Bay of Pigs invasion? And within the

66 current MAAGs, what proportion of their effort was devoted to counterinsurgency training and to teaching the operation of American-supplied military

equipment? He directed that "the JCS make 'a sort of analysis' of what we can do

around the world in building anti-guerrilla forces," asking the chiefs for comment

regarding each Latin American country. It seemed that any and all details of a

counterinsurgency program were of interest to the president. 83

The military services responded variously to the president's intense interestthe Army and Air Force quickly and enthusiastically, the Navy somewhat less, and

the Marines far less. Almost immediately, the Army increased its Special Warfare

School manning by 500 spaces while McNamara proposed another 3,000 men

and $19 million in the amended FY 1962 budget request to double the size of

the Special Forces and allow establishment of a fourth unit, in Panama. Kennedy

included these requests in a message to Congress on the Defense budget on 28

March. 84 In his 25 May summons to the legislature on urgent national needs, the

president informed Congress that he had directed McNamara to reorient additional forces for "sub-limited or unconventional wars" and have the services place

"new emphasis ... on the special skills and languages which are required to work

with local populations."85

Late in 1961, Congress on its own added $7.5 million to the Army budget

specifically for the development of new Special Forces weapons and equipment.

Even earlier, on 5 September 1961, McNamara directed that the MAAG in

South Vietnam also serve as an experimental command for the development of

organizational and operational procedures in the "conduct of sub-limited war."

The next month, in a memorandum to the president, the secretary proposed

$100 million in Army R&D funds for each of the next five years for "remote area
Shakeup in the Pentagon 39

limited warfare" to improve what he termed "an existing situation that is very

unbalanced."B6

The Army, as the likely major participant in counterinsurgency operations, responded aggressively to the numerous presidential recommendations

and also took many steps on its own. It opened the Panama center in mid-1961

and enrolled increased numbers of foreign students there and at Fort Bragg; it

enlarged the breadth and scope of its training and educational courses and

increased enrollment; it began to send likely flag officer candidates to Vietnam for

short-term, on-the-spot training; and it established a special course at Fort Bragg

for officers and/or enlisted men going to appropriate MAAG and attache posts.

At the president's firm suggestion, the Army accorded members of the Special

Forces a unique headgear-the green beret-even though several years earlier it

had responded negatively to a similar proposal. And, again on Kennedy's recommendation, the Army raised the rank of the Special Forces Center's commander

to flag-officer level. To much fanfare, on 12 October the president visited Fort

Bragg where, in addition to 82d and lOlst Airborne Division demonstrations,

the Special Forces Center executed judo, guerrilla, and other counterinsurgency

tactics in response to orders given in foreign languages including Russian and

Czech. One trooper with a small rocket engine attached to his back ascended

30 feet and flew some 200 feet, landing near the president, an impressive feat

indeed.B7

The presidential interest in counterinsurgency also caused the Air Force to

move quickly, with major impetus coming, surprisingly, from then Vice Chief of

Staff Curtis LeMay, the very embodiment of "strategic" doctrines and operations.

At his direction, in mid-April 1961, the Air Force activated the 4400th Combat

Crew Training Squadron (code named Jungle Jim) at Eglin AFB, Florida, with

352 men and 32 B-26, C-47, and T-28 aircraft-all ofWorld War II vintage-to

devise techniques for supporting counterinsurgency operations. Following the

Army example, LeMay authorized a unique uniform featuring an Australian-type

bush hat, fatigues, and combat boots.B8

In September the squadron became operational, coincidental with McNamara's

decision to use Vietnam as a U.S. military experimental laboratory. The president approved on 11 October a proposal to deploy a segment of the 4400th to

Vietnam "for the initial purpose of training Vietnamese forces." The detachment,

code-named Farm Gate and consisting of 155 men and 16 aircraft, arrived in Vietnam during November-December 1961. Deeming the 4400th and its Farm Gate

contingent a success and in accord with the president's counterinsurgency objectives, the Air Force in January 1962 expanded the squadron to group level, and

three months later established the Special Air Warfare Center with two groups

(the 1st Air Commando and 1st Combat Applicad6hs). The Air Force enlarged

its special forces to 3,900 men and 184 aircraft in 6 squadrons by 30 June 1964

and planned for 10 squadrons, 5,800 men, and 253 aircraft a year later. Moreover,
40 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

in support of the Army's Special Forces, elements of these USAF units took up

station in Panama, Europe, and the Far East for the training of indigenous forces

and to conduct contingency and combat operations in Vietnam and elsewhere as

necessary. 89

At best, the Navy initially responded lukewarmly to the president's calls for

counterinsurgency measures. Although it considered several measures during

1961, the Navy took no organizational action until 1962 when it authorized

60-man SEAL (Sea-Air-Land) teams, one each for the Atlantic and Pacific fleets,

with a mission to "develop a ... capability for sabotage, demolition, and other

clandestine activities conducted in and from restricted waters, rivers, and canals"

and to provide training for this purpose to Allied personnel. Under the existing

circumstances, Vietnamese requirements received initial attention, and the first

major SEAL operations occurred in Vietnam in April 1962.90

The other early naval counterinsurgency measure proposed but also kept

on hold during 1961 involved the organization of SEABEE technical assistance

teams (STATs) to provide developing countries with "technical training, engineering support, and construction assistance in their nation-building efforts." In

February 1962, the Navy directed establishment of four 13-man teams; however,

mission and funding questions delayed operational status until late January 1963,

when the first team arrived in Vietnam for six months of "nation building" in

support of remotely located Army Special Forces. Thereafter, during the remainder of the advisory years, more than a dozen STATs served in Vietnam both as

trainers and as construction workers. 91

The Marines considered themselves natural counterinsurgency warriors and

therefore believed they required no special training. When the president early

on questioned service commanders on what steps they had taken or proposed,

Marine Commandant David Shoup stated that his troops were ready to go in

and act as guerrillas, not serve as trainers to indigenous forces. Kennedy wryly

commented that the countries in question would have to do their own guerrilla

and anti-guerrilla combat, adding that he realized that "this would disappoint

the Marine Corps, but that into each life, some disappointment must fall."

Some years later, Marine Lt. Gen. (then Maj. Gen.) Victor Krulak described the

Marine Corps attitude: "The Marines knew it [counterinsurgency] was going to

go away. Hell, we've been to Nicaragua, we know all about that jazz .... They

[only] paid the President of the United States lip service." Actually, the Marines

did introduce counterinsurgency subjects into their school curricula, embarked

on language training, and sent representatives to the DoD- and government-wide

training courses. And in the spring of 1962, HMM-362, a Marine squadron of

helicopters, was dispatched to Vietnam for combat support of the Vietnamese.92

Although 000 appeared to have made major progress in 1961, Kennedy on

11 January 1962 stated that the capability was inadequate to meet the "threat

of Communist-directed subversive insurgency and guerrilla warfare ...." It
Shakeup in the Pentagon 41

should, he added, duplicate preparations for conventional warfare-doctrinally,

organizationally, and functionally. He wanted the Army to appoint a general officer immediately under the chief of staff "as the focal point for Army activities

directed at this problem" as well as another flag officer to serve similarly in the

Joint Staff. He left it to McNamara to decide whether comparable appointments

were needed in the other services; the secretary opted for additional-duty assignments there.93

Two days later, McNamara informed the president that the Army had

appointed Maj. Gen.-designate William B. Rosson with the title of special

assistant to the chief of staff for special warfare; shortly after, in mid-February,

General Krulak became the Joint Staff's special assistant for counterinsurgency

and special activities. Both generals met with the president on 5 March, at which

time he expounded that counterinsurgency was "the most pressing war either at

hand or in prospect." Krulak would soon become DoD's top counterinsurgency

official, "always being sent for by the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, or the President," as he later recalled. "It turned out," he

also recalled, "that when McNamara went somewhere, he took me with him."94

In his 11 January directive, the president also called for extensive training

programs from the service academies through the National War College level

to insure that all officers were properly instructed about subversive insurgency.

He directed that his requirement for Army officers to serve in Vietnam for short

periods of training under actual guerrilla conditions be expedited and broadened to include the other services. Moreover, officers being sent as attaches or

to MAAGs in nations where communist insurgency was likely should undergo a

pre-assignment period of training at the Army's Special Warfare Center. Kennedy

expected DoD "to move to a new level of increased activity across the board. I

expect to direct similar action in other departments which have a part to play

in this matter."95 McNamara followed the president's lead. On 14 February he

reported to the Senate Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations on the buildup

of "specialized guerrilla warfare forces." He followed this up with a speech on

countering wars of liberation that would "require some shift in our military

thinking. "96

To further impress the importance that he attached to the subject, the

president in March 1962 proposed that specific counterinsurgency training

or experience be a mandatory prerequisite for promotion to flag-officer rank.

McNamara and Gilpatric dissented here, arguing that such training or experience

"should be included among the criteria bearing on, rather than made a prerequisite for, selection ...." They believed that a blanket requirement would inject "an

undesirable degree ofinflexibility into the promotion and assignment system."97

Kennedy also continued to emphasize the non-military aspects of counterinsurgency. At the West Point commencement on 6 June 1962, the president

declared that the role of the new officers far exceeded their military duties; it
42 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

included political, economic, and social matters. He called the armed forces "an

arm of our diplomacy," emphasizing that their role was "to deter war as well as

to fight it." Three months earlier, on 13 March, he had issued detailed instructions for the training of all officer-grade personnel and the establishment of the

National Interdepartmental Seminar, a special joint-agency school under State's

Foreign Service Institute, for both military officers and civilian officials being

assigned to underdeveloped countries. The school graduated its first class on 3

July 1962 and the president met the graduates at the White House and emphasized their importance in nation-building and forestalling communist takeovers

in the developing countries ofLatin America, Mrica, and Asia. *98

On 24 August 1962, after more than 18 months of piecemeal policy guidance, including numerous and conflicting drafts prepared primarily by the State

Department and JCS, Kennedy approved a document entitled U.S. Overseas

Internal Defense Policy and distributed it widely as NSAM No. 182. As indicated by its title, the 30-page doctrinal statement plus three annexes spelled out

in detail the roles and missions of the several governmental agencies involved

in attempting to avert or combat communist-inspired insurgencies in affected

nations by taking timely political, economic, social, cultural, and military

actions. Although DoD's list of tasks was extensive, a major stated objective, no

doubt with an eye to the increasing Indochina entanglement, was to "minimize

the likelihood of direct U.S. military involvement in internal war by maximizing

indigenous capabilities."99

Thereafter, counterinsurgency became more a normal day-to-day function

rather than a special program. Kennedy did not let up in his abiding interest in the activity, as when upon his return from a June 1963 trip to Europe,

he praised the Special Forces unit garrisoned in Germany but told McNamara

it could be better employed by "demonstrating and training allover the underdeveloped world where the guerrilla actions are rising in intensity."loo General

Taylor informed the president that joint mobile training teams were currently in

9 Latin American countries and plans called for 91 teams in 12 Latin American

countries during FY 1963. In Asia, teams were now in six countries as well as

in two African nations. Army Chief of Staff General Earl Wheeler added that

a limiting factor to the number of deployed teams was often the opposition of

the U.S. ambassador. 101 The president then directed Secretary Rusk to address

this problem with his ambassadors. When the joint State-DoD message was

judged insufficient, he instructed that the ambassadors be given "a real sales job

on why it is going to be so helpful to them, what a good face forces can put on

our nation, and how inspiring they are." A joint follow-on message of 2 December 1963, some six pages in length, urged the use of Special Forces elements in

underdeveloped or newly developed nations. 102

*By the beginning of 1965 about 1,000 had completed the course.
Shakeup in the Pentagon 43

Certainly, by the time of Kennedy's death in November 1963, the role of

counterinsurgency within 000 operations had in large measure met the administration's stated goals. In personnel, funding, and weapons, it would never

compete with the other major 000 missions, but for the intended purpose of

combating and defeating the spread of communism in underdeveloped or developing countries, it had acquired, with McNamara's strong support, the degree of

commitment and promise ofsuccess that Kennedy had intended.

The Space Mission

Inevitably, space research and development became a prime issue among the

military services in the early 1960s. The Soviet Union's successful launching of

the Sputnik satellite in October 1957 and others thereafter set off shock waves

that had still not subsided at the time the Eisenhower administration left office.

Sputnik had galvanized a drive within the United States to upgrade university

education, as federal funds poured into crash programs ranging from intensive

study of foreign languages to expanded research in physics. It also inspired plans

to catch and overtake Soviet space exploration. With the passage of the National

Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 and the establishment of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) shortly thereafter, the nation had

taken a giant step toward a fuller exploitation ofits space resources.

The spectacle of Soviet satellites circling above American skies gave way to

even greater embarrassment when the Soviets successfully placed the first man

into orbit in April 1961. These achievements dramatized to the world the apparent superiority of the Soviets in science and technology, not excluding military

technology.

Given the attention that space pioneering attracted, there existed ample

incentive for intense competition among the services for the military application of space technology. Each service had an expensive agenda to push as the

Kennedy administration entered office. Prior to this time no clear division of

service responsibilities nor any definition of their respective jurisdictions existed,

posing the first of two space issues that McNamara faced after taking office.

The other issue related to jurisdictional boundaries between NASA and

000. Although the latter had conducted virtually all space activities in the immediate aftermath of the 1957 Sputnik panic, NASA took over the major portion

after its establishment in 1958. Confusion over boundaries persisted, however,

particularly when NASA had to depend on and borrow so much from the military to advance its Mercury man-in-space project. The 1958 act had intended to

address this problem through the creation of the National Aeronautics and Space

Council, but the council had not yet succeeded in clarifYing all relations between

NASA and 000, particularly for the development oflaunch vehicles. 103
44 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

McNamara concentrated his attention more on interservice than on civilmilitary competition over control of space research. On 6 March 1961 he issued

DoD Directive 5160.32, declaring that "research, development, test, and engineering of Department of Defense space development programs or projects,

which are approved hereafter, will be the responsibility of the Department of the

Air Force." This paragraph received the most notice from the press and military

departments, although two other paragraphs may have had equal significance.

One of them required submission of proposals for research and development of

space projects beyond the preliminary stage to OSD's director of defense research

and engineering for evaluation. The other made clear that proposals submitted

to DDR&E had to receive approval from the secretary of defense or the deputy

secretary before they could go ahead. The Air Force may have achieved the status

of primus inter pares, but its primacy went no further than the military departments. Control would reside in OSD. The directive did not preclude preliminary

research on the part of other services. 104

The swift reaction within the Pentagon had less to do with the accretion of

the secretary's powers than with his choice of the Air Force as the controlling

service. The latter's leadership, understandably elated over McNamara's decision,

made a not wholly successful effort to contain its satisfaction. Before a congressional committee on 18 March Air Force Chief of Staff General Thomas D.

White disavowed any intention of taking over any project currently under way: "I

might say I pontificated, again, to my commanders ... the Air Force would bend

over backward to meet the requirements of the Army and the Navy as prescribed

by the directive."105

General White's gracious response did little to calm feelings in the other

military departments, which perceived not only the preemption of a vital mission

by the secretary of defense but also equally peremptory follow-up actions that

appeared to reinforce the Air Force position. McNamara had already announced

a sweeping reorganization within the Air Force that, in part, would facilitate its

new role. Most of the changes that followed, the Air Force had contemplated

for some time. A new organization, the Air Force Systems Command, headed

by General Bernard A. Schriever, would take over the responsibilities of the Air

Research and Development Command, as well as weapon system procurement

and production functions formerly under the Air Materiel Command (redesignated Air Logistics Command). An independent Office of Aerospace Research

would promote and monitor basic research. Schriever's new command would

begin functioning on 1 April 1961. 106 This whirlwind of activity fed rumors that

the Air Force intended to take over civilian as well as military space programs.

White and Schriever even admitted to considering the possibility, though not

advocating it. Under questioning by the House Committee on Science and Astro-
Shakeup in the Pentagon 45

nautics in mid-March both backed off, Schriever noting, "I see no reason why we

cannot work shoulder to shoulder in the most cooperative manner and there is

plenty to do for both, I can assure you." 107

But to the Army, whose plans for the Nike-Zeus antimissile system seemed

in jeopardy, General Schriever's apparent deference to NASA still left an impression that the Air Force would function as the exclusive custodian of the military's

interests in space. In the same committee hearings, Assistant Secretary of the

Army for Research and Development Richard S. Morse saw in the assignment of

development responsibilities to the Air Force a step toward ultimate operational

control of whatever developed from research. He viewed McNamara's directive

as a management tool "which really tends to then control an ultimate role and

mission" ofthe armed services.los

In mid-February, even before McNamara had issued his directive, the point

man for the Army's opposition to the Air Force, Lt. Gen. Arthur G. Trudeau,

chief of Army research and development, had testified to the House committee

that "the military use of space is too vital to be entrusted to anyone service,"

expressing preference for a unified military space agency to one controlled by an

individual service.I09 Conceivably he might have seen things differently had the

Army gotten the powers given to the Air Force. Trudeau's views represented the

Army position. Even General Lemnitzer joined the criticism, although circumspectly, in his role of]CS chairman. A generation later he made clear his feeling

that the ]CS had had little say on the 6 March directive and spoke more bluntly,

claiming that the Army was better prepared for the space research job than any

other service, with the help of "Wernher von Braun and his people that we had

brought over from Peenemunde."*IIO

Desirous of expanding its air defense mission beyond its point defense role,

the Army particularly suffered distress because it believed itself on the verge of a

breakthrough with the Nike-Zeus antimissile missile that would convert it into

an antisatellite weapon with a much broader mission than originally anticipated.

If space connected to air, it also connected to earth. The Army had a variety of

capabilities for carrying out a requirement to push into space. III Army leaders

had no neologism like "aerospace" to gain attention, but they could point to a

solid, well-advanced program ofspace research accomplishments.

The continuing drumbeat of criticism of the March 1961 directive forced

OSD into a defensive position, but it did not retreat from the substance of the

decision in favor of the Air Force. Gilpatric conceded in testimony before the

House Committee on Science and Astronautics on 17 March that the order

had not been referred to the ]CS for consideration, but presumably the views

of the individual chiefs were included in the comments of the service secretaries.

Gilpatric made no apologies for the speed of OSD's actions and for the short-

* The German research center in World War II that developed the V-weapons.
46 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

cuts employed: "A major criticism ofthe Department of Defense, which has been

made for many years both in the Congress and elsewhere, has been the slowness of the decision-making process within the Department." He and Secretary

McNamara believed in prompt, firm decisions. The alternative would be equivocation and compromise that watered down directives and ultimately satisfied no

one: "You can't change anything in the Pentagon without stepping on somebody's

toes."112

That Gilpatric and not McNamara expressed these sentiments had significance for those whose toes were stepped on. Some inferred that Gilpatric's service

as under secretary of the Air Force in the Truman administration and more recently as chairman of Aerospace Corporation, a non-profit company supporting

Air Force space and missile work primarily, might have biased his outlook.

In reality, the Army challengers should not have experienced shock at

McNamara's directive, particularly since President-elect Kennedy had appointed

a special task force to recommend solutions to the space jurisdictional questions

and the panel had come to much the same conclusion. Under the chairmanship ofJerome B. Wiesner, his chief science adviser, the Ad Hoc Committee on

Space on 12 January 1961 recommended that Kennedy centralize control of all

military space development. Gilpatric noted later that the Air Force already had

responsibility for "over 90% of the total defense effort in space development

activities." 113

Within a week of the issuance of the March directive, the JCS and all but

one of the military secretaries fell in line. The exception, Army Secretary Stahr,

remained unhappy with the order as well as with the downgrading of the civilian

secretaries. Eventually, 15 months later, for other reasons as well, he resigned at

the end ofJune 1962.*

Service opposition came from the Navy also. Even before McNamara

issued his directive on 6 March, Vice Adm. John T. Hayward, the Navy's top

research director, had joined General Trudeau in opposition to issuance of the

order. Service dissent caused McNamara to ask Vance: "Is there evidence in the

testimony that either Trudeau or Hayward ... acted in any way contrary to

instructions which I have given that 'once a decision has been made, I expect all

members of the Department to support it fully?'" I 14 The query implied that he

might take disciplinary action against what he regarded as insubordination, but

this did not happen. Within the year the charge of muzzling dissent would arise

again, but for the moment McNamara's strong language silenced critics within

000.

Only three weeks after McNamara issued his directive, the president

informed Congress that the administration would ask for an increase of $125.67

million for NASA for a FY 1962 total of $1.23 billion. Whether the military

* See p. 93.
Shakeup in the Pentagon 47

would receive what they considered an appropriate share of these funds caused

anxiety in all the services, especially the Air Force. 115

Although the military may have had worries about NASA's role, from the

OSD perspective sharing authority with NASA seemed readily acceptable. DoD

held responsibility for space activities "peculiar to or primarily associated with

the development of weapons systems, military operations, or the defense of the

United States"; its portion of the national space program would complement the

work of NASA. McNamara and NASA Administrator James E. Webb jointly

reviewed the total program and agreed to maintain close cooperation through

constant exchange of information. Defense personnel as well as missile boosters and tracking facilities stood ready to support NASA space experiments. For

FY 1963 the Air Force had NOA (new obligational authority) of $1.1 billion

for space research, development, testing, and evaluation, more than double the

amount in the FY 1961 budget. IIG

President Kennedy infused the space program with new power and purpose

in his Special Message to Congress on Urgent National Needs on 25 May 1961.

Directing attention to the space competition with the Soviet Union, he made his

famous proposal for "landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to the

earth." To help make it possible he asked for additional funds to accelerate development of rockets and satellites. This daring concept did, indeed, require close

cooperation between NASA and DoD; the latter had been supportive of NASA

from the beginning of the U.S. commitment to space exploration, and the new

administration, as it expanded the program, reaffirmed that partnership. I 17

LeMay's Reappointment, Anderson's Departure

By 1963 McNamara had decided that changes in military leadership were

needed to reinforce his organizational changes. McNamara found himself increasingly at odds with two of the chiefs-General Curtis E. LeMay and Admiral

George W. Anderson, Jr.-both of whom had entered office on McNamara's

recommendation in 1961 (LeMay became Air Force chief on 30 June 1961, and

Anderson took over the Navy on 1 August that year).

During the House Armed Services Committee's consideration ofthe FY 1964

authorization bill in the spring of 1963, it appeared that the committee's provision of extra funds for the RS-70* was energizing LeMay's supporters in Congress

to urge his reappointment in June to another two-year term as Air Force chief

of staff Because LeMay had a high and generally favorable public profile, his

supporters believed a challenge would ensue if he were replaced. Moreover, they

felt that the president, given other difficulties on Capitol Hill, would not risk

angering the many congressmen who supported LeMay and his ideas. Some in

* See Chapter VI.
48 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

the press saw LeMay's reappointment as a test case of whether the president and

McNamara were willing to tolerate differing views from the military. I 18

On 6 May the president announced that he was extending LeMay's term, but

by one instead of the customary two years. At the same time he made the unexpected announcement that he was replacing Admiral Anderson as chief of naval

operations. To avoid anticipated criticism Gilpatric and Navy Secretary Fred H.

Korth visited key congressional members a few hours before the announcements

and assured them that the decisions did not stem from any disagreements the

two officers had with administration policy. In a later interview, Gilpatric recalled

that when the president, McNamara, and he discussed DoD personnel matters,

the subject of LeMay's tenure frequently came up. According to Gilpatric, LeMay

rubbed the president the wrong way: "Every time he had to see LeMay he ended

up in sort of a fit." The general "couldn't listen" and "would make what Kennedy

considered perfectly ... outrageous proposals that bore no relation to the state

of affairs in the 1960s." Everyone was aware of the problem, but the alternatives

seemed "so much worse" that "we just resigned ourselves to living with him." The

president extended his tenure by a year, according to Gilpatric, because "it would

be rougher with him out than with him in."* The press speculated that behind

the decision lay fear that simultaneously removing LeMay and Anderson, both

popular officers, would cause a tremendous uproar. I 19 The LeMay decision, then,

probably represented a tactical choice by the administration to avert a confrontation.

The decision not to retain Anderson for another term came as a surprise.

At a press conference Kennedy denied a charge that he was replacing him as a

warning to other naval officers to toe the line and expressed the highest confidence in Anderson, who, he pointed out, was being offered another post in

government. Anderson subsequently accepted the position of ambassador to

Portugal. Although the president made it appear a routine change, unnamed

Defense Department officials explained to the press that Anderson had not

"handled his job as was expected," citing, among other things, the contretemps

with McNamara during the Cuban missile crisist and his public criticism of

McNamara's TFX decision.* One press account, however, stressed Anderson's

differences with Secretary Korth, particularly over a planned Navy reorganization,

as the major reason for his removal. 120

* Subsequendy, in mid-I964, President Johnson reappointed LeMay for another seven months, until 31 January 1965. Speculation about this unusual appointment suggested that it was to permit him to complete 35 years

ofservice. Perhaps even more likely, his retirement would occur arrer the 1964 election and thus would preclude

his waging public criticism of administration policy during the campaign.

t See Chapter IX.

:j: See Chapter XVII.
Shakeup in the Pentagon 49

A Balance Sheet

If it did not have the formal or overarching, integral quality of other major

DoD reorganizations, McNamara's drive to transform the department during

these early years of his tenure between 1961 and 1964 nonetheless produced

significant and sweeping changes. Change on such a large scale, inevitably, was a

product of many factors-unrelenting Cold War pressures, rapidly shifting technological and bureaucratic demands, and a strong-willed temperament. Above all,

the inspiration for McNamara's action came from his pragmatic ethos. To achieve

maximum efficiency in management, with concomitant savings to the taxpayer,

was a special point of pride with McNamara. He entered office with the belief

that he could solve management problems that had overwhelmed his predecessors. A joint agency such as the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Air Force as

a single management agency for space research under OSD supervision, exemplified what could be accomplished by realignment and consolidation.

There always existed the political need to assure Congress and the public

that the emphasis in the proposed changes on cost containment and on centralizing authority would result in greater security for the nation. The secretary saw

himself as an educator, convinced that the public would respond favorably if only

it could understand his aims. He encountered opposition from all sides-from

the military services, from Congress, and occasionally from the White House. He

tried to placate or disarm opponents with broad assurances, as with the space

function. But his retreats were tactical and his compromises minimal. In the

Kennedy years he managed, for the most part, to face down his critics and carry

through his plans.

Centralization of power in OSD, the most visible change, and so much

a product of a steady progression from the beginning of the department,

required no new legislation or radical reorganizational scheme. (See Chart 2.)

The Kennedy administration's handling of the Symington Committee's findings underscored this conclusion. Gilpatric openly confirmed the direction that

McNamara was taking in a speech he delivered in Monterey, California, on 2

May 1962. Referring to aerospace activities, he observed:

Generally speaking, these steps have had a common design, namely, to bring

together and establish more centralized control over functionally alike activities in the military establishment .... The effect of most of the changes

and the other steps that I have outlined will leave you with one impression,

and that is that there has been a tendency, a very pronounced tendency, to

centralize more authoriry in the Office of the Secretary of Defense-a trend

that has given rise to considerable skepticism and criticism in a number of

quarters. Ten years ago, I myself, would have shared those doubts. Now I see

no alternative to this centralization. 121
CHART 2

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

1 AUGUST 1964

f-- -----------------

: ARMED FORCES I

L ~~::~ _ SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

I

ASSISTANT TO THE

SECRETARY

(LogillatlYeAllalrs)

I

ASSISTANT TO THE

SECRETARY

(Atomic Ene!wl

I

GENERAL COUNSEl

OF THE DEPARTMENT

Of DEFENSE

I

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

Of DEFENSE

(PuIlI1c_1

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

Of DEFENSE

I ASSISTANT SECRETARY

OF DEFENSE

~Securily

-I

I I ASSISTANT SECRETARY

OF DEFENSE

(-.slllld

l.ogIstIcsl

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

OF DEFENSE

(Compln>IIer)

I I I

DIRECTOR OF

DeFENSE RESEARCH

AND ENGINEERING I

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

Of DeFENSE

(AdmIn-I I I

T 1 I JOINT CHIEfS OF STAFF I I DEPARTMENT Of THE ARtIY DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT Of THE AIR FORCE

CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS Of STAFF SECRETARY Of THE ARtIY SECRETARY OF THE NAVY SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

I THE H CHEF Of STAFF, ARtIY UNDER SECRETARY AND CHIEF UNDER COMMAN- UNDER SECRETARY AND JOINT STAFF ASSISTANT SECRETARIES Of SECRETARY DANTOF ASSISTANT SECRETARIES CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERAllOHS OF THE ARtIY NAVAL AND MARINE OF THE AIR FORCE

CHIEF Of STAFF, AIR FORCE OPERAllOHS ASSISTANT CORPS

COMMANDANT, MARINE CORPS * CHEF Of STAFF, ARtIY SECRETARIES CHIEF OF STAFF, AIR FORCE

OF THE NAVY

COMM:llOHS II ~E II = I I ATOMIC DEFENSE SUPPORT I AGENCY

I

I

I I DEFENSE

SUPPlY

AGENCY

ALASKAN

COMMAND

CONTINENTAL

ATlANTIC I AIR I EUROPEAN COMMAND DEFENSE COMMAND

COMMAND

PACIFIC

C~

SOUTHERN

COMMAND

STRIKE

COMIIAND

STRATEGIC

AIR

~D

* WHEN PERTAINING TO MARINE CORPS MATTERS
Shakeup in the Pentagon 51

McNamara would not always have his way. Errors of judgment about new

weapon systems would raise obstacles in the path of reorganization. His critics

correctly claimed that McNamara had intended that his changes would enhance

OSD's authority. That he encountered opposition to his efforts is hardly surprising. What is surprising is the extent of his achievements in the Kennedy years, at

a time when Congress frustrated such other programs as military assistance, civil

defense, and the proposed reorganization ofthe National Guard and the Reserve.

The secretary's success suggests that the idea of more centralized command had a

wide appeal, particularly when combined with the rhetoric of a forceful personality who promised-and seemed to deliver-impressive savings in the operation

of the vast Defense machine. The positive image of a man in charge helped to

win support, often hesitant and wary but in the end admiring, for many of his

reorganization plans.
CHAPTER III

Expanding the FY 1962 Budget

Just as the Eisenhower administration transformed the Defense budget inherited from the Truman administration, Kennedy and McNamara imposed their

own imprint on Eisenhower's final budget. In each instance the difference was

dramatic. Where Eisenhower in the name of fiscal responsibility cut Truman's FY

1954 Defense budget of $41.3 billion by some 15 percent, the Kennedy administration added almost 12 percent to Eisenhower's proposed budget of $41.8

billion for FY 1962.

A5 the Korean War wound down in 1953, the Eisenhower administration

embraced a strategic concept of massive nuclear retaliation popularly characterized as "a bigger bang for a buck." This involved greater reliance on nuclear

forces, permitting Eisenhower throughout his tenure to submit 000 budgets

leaner than Truman's final one by cutting conventional forces. Only the very

last Eisenhower budget reflected the growing realization by the president and

his advisers that changing world conditions required increased conventional war

capabilities. l

The Kennedy team came into office convinced that the United States needed

even greater conventional capabilities than provided in Eisenhower's proposed

budget. Looming crises in Laos, Vietnam, Cuba, and Berlin seemed more likely

to require non-nuclear forces. Kennedy took a strong personal interest in the

concept of counterinsurgency-using specially trained personnel to prevent and

combat subversive insurgency and other forms of indirect aggression in friendly

countries. For an overall strategic concept, the new administration adopted the

idea of flexible response-the ability to respond at levels ranging through the

whole gamut of military force, from counterinsurgency to massive retaliation.*

The need for more resources, including enhanced major weapon systems, to

provide this range of capabilities occasioned a blizzard of budget-related activity

in the early months of 1961.

* For rhe Kennedy adminisrrarion's emphasis on counrerinsurgency and its adoption of the concept of flexible

response, see Chapters II and XlI, respectively.

52
Expanding the FY 1962 Budget 53

To obtain additional funds the Kennedy administration submitted to Congress amendments to the FY 1962 budget rather than attempting a wholesale

revision. The administration put forward three sets of amendments-in March,

May, and July-that together proposed adding more than $5.6 billion. To further

fine-tune and accelerate desired changes, it also sought supplemental appropriations to the FY 1961 budget, though in smaller amounts.* This incremental

approach allowed the Kennedy White House and the new DoD leadership time

needed for deliberation on the complex Defense budget issues, although the July

amendments represented a necessarily hurried response to the worsening situation in Berlin.

Eisenhowers FY 1962 Budget

In his State of the Union message on 12 January 1961, a week before leaving

office, Eisenhower displayed a measure of satisfaction with the nation's defenses,

dismissing the so-called bomber gap as "always a fiction" and contending that the

missile gap "shows every sign of being the same." However, in presenting the FY

1962 budget to Congress on 16 January, he acknowledged that "the advent of

nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles in the hands of a potential adversary has confronted this Nation with a problem entirely new to its experience."

To provide a deterrent against attack and ensure survival of adequate retaliatory

forces should an attack occur, he urged continuation of the Navy's highly mobile

Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missile and the Air Force's Atlas, Titan, and

Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), most of them encased

in concrete-hardened silos. Eisenhower also observed that the emergence of the

ballistic missile threat required extensive revamping of U.S. air defense forces.

Accordingly, he had begun efforts to improve warning time in both land- and

space-based detection systems, as well as to strengthen manned and missile air

defense systems. 2

The Eisenhower budget proposed $41.84 billion in new obligational authority

(NOA),t more than three percent above the preceding year's request of $40.577

billion. The expenditure estimate of $42.91 billion was almost five percent higher

* During its last months in office the Eisenhower administration obtained from Congress two supplemental

appropriations to the overall FY 1961 federal budget. The Kennedy administration obtained a third supplemental, enacted on 31 March 1961, which included $264.9 million for various Defense functions. On 29 May it

requested a fourth supplemental that contained $15 million for retired military pay and $40 million for Army

personnel. The House and Senate approved $14.5 million for retired military pay, but rejected the $40 million

for Army personnel. Because it was so late in the fiscal year, the Senate Appropriations Committee recommended that the $40 million item be included in the FY 1962 appropriation bill.

t New obligational authoriry is the amount appropriated by Congress, including cash and new contract authorization, minus appropriations to meet previously unfinanced contract authorizations falling due during the fiscal

year.
54 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

than the estimate for FY 1961 ($40.995 billion).* Both increases exceeded the

inflation rate and represented a gain in real terms.

TABLE 1

Eisenhower Proposed FY 1962 Budget (NOA)

by Appropriation Category

($ billions)

Military personnel

Operation & maintenance

Procurement

RDT&E

Military construction

Revolving & mgt funds

Total (military functions)

Military assistancea

12.266

10.842

13.378

4.349

.985

.020

41.840

1.800

a Military assistance was not a part ofthe Defense Department budget but was customarily

shown in connection with it.

Source: The Budget ofthe United States, FY 1962, 482.

The NOA request for the Army-$l 0.406 billion-reflected a greater emphasis on conventional warfare capabilities, although the number of divisions remained at 14. The Army would receive $1.8 billion for procurement as compared with

$1.6 billion in 1961 and $1.4 billion in 1960, an increase of 29 percent over

the three-year period. The Navy's budget of $12.23 billion allowed it to build

30 ships, 10 more than in the previous fiscal year, but the total number would

remain the same. Eisenhower requested funds for procurement of long leadtime components for 5 additional Polaris submarines, bringing the number of

authorized Polaris vessels to 19. The Navy would have 817 vessels, including 14

attack carriers. The Air Force budget-$17.856 billion-completed the funding

of 13 Atlas and 14 Titan squadrons and anticipated completion of 12 Minuteman squadrons by June 1964. For the first time in 25 years no money would

go for procurement of manned bombers; B-52 and B-58 production would be

terminated on completion of current production schedules in the summer and

fall 1962. The 84 Air Force combat wings-4 fewer than the year before-would

include 34 strategic wings. 3 All told the armed forces would have 2,492,900

* Budget submissions also contained estimates of expenditures for the fiscal year. These esrimares mighr be more

or less rhan NOA and were subjecr to congressional change.
Expanding the FY 1962 Budget 55

members, with 870,000 for the Army, 625,000 for the Navy, 175,000 for the

Marine Corps, and 822,900 for the Air Force. These numbers were identical with

those for FY 1961.4

TABLE 2

Eisenhower FY 1962 Budget

Planned Composition ofArmed Forces

Army

Divisions

Battle groups

Navy

Warships

Other

Attack carrier air groups

Marine divisions

Marine air wings

Air Force

Combat wings

Strategic

Air defense

Tactical

30 June 1961

14

9

381

436

16

3

3

88

37

19

32

30 June 1962

14

9

381

436

16

3

3

84

34

19

31

Source: The Budget ofthe United States, FY 1962, 486.

Congress Defers Action

Congressional consideration of the FY 1962 budget was unusual in two

respects. For one thing, work on the budget marked the beginning of a greatly

enlarged role for the House and Senate armed services committees in authorizing appropriations. Previously these committees had authorized funds only for

military construction. However, in the Military Construction Act of 1959, PL

86-149 (Sec. 412(b)), Congress stipulated that "no funds may be appropriated

after December 31, 1960, to or for the use of any armed force of the United

States for the procurement of aircraft, missiles, or naval vessels, unless the appropriation ofsuch funds has been authorized by legislation enacted after such date."

The armed services committees now had to authorize funds for the procurement of aircraft, missiles, and naval vessels-a sizable chunk of the overall 000

budget-before the funds could be appropriated. Congress approved Section 412

in the face of DoD's contention that it was unwise and unnecessary and despite
56 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

the understandably cool attitude of members of the appropriations committees

who felt it encroached on their turfS

A second departure from custom was that the House and Senate put off

substantive budget hearings for a month or more to allow the incoming administration time to reconsider the budget. Prior to Kennedy's inauguration,

Director-designate of the Bureau of the Budget David E. Bell informally notified McNamara that he had worked out with the chairmen of the House and

Senate appropriations committees a timetable for submitting amendments to the

FY 1962 budget. Because the defense appropriations subcommittees expected

to delay their hearing schedules, Bell feared that the delay, if prolonged, might

set back passage of appropriation bills well into the new fiscal year. He therefore

asked that proposals for revising the FY 1961 or 1962 budgets be submitted to

the White House by 20 February, so that BoB and the president, after reviewing them, could formally submit amendments to Congress by 15 March. Two

days before the inauguration, in a meeting with his designated key advisers,

McNamara assigned tasks based on the timetable Bell had furnished, although he

mentioned 1 April (not 15 March) as the target date for submitting amendments

to Congress. The schedule, said McNamara, allowed them "very little time,"

and he did "not yet have clearly in mind the political requirements on which

are based the military requirements which in turn generate the specific Defense

programs."6

Knowing that the Eisenhower administration's authorization bill of over

$10.5 billion would undergo revision, the House Armed Services Committee, chaired by Carl Vinson, decided to conduct hearings in two phases. The

first, beginning with testimony by McNamara on 23 February and ending on

28 March after other DoD officials had testified, focused entirely on the U.S.

military posture, the kind of overview the committee had traditionally received

from the Department of Defense at the beginning of each legislative session. The

second phase was to deal with the authorization bill once the new administration

determined the amount of the revised authorization request.? Until that time the

Senate Armed Services Committee also delayed its hearings.

A similar lag characterized the appropriations committees' handling of the

appropriation bill ($40.804 billion)* submitted by the Eisenhower administration. On 16 February the Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations

Committee, chaired by George Mahon, opened hearings on the bill. McNamara,

however, appeared only briefly, as the subcommittee adjourned to show respect

for the memory of one of its members who had recently died. The next day

McNamara did not return, and JCS Chairman General Lyman Lemnitzer testi-

* The appropriation bill of $40,804,345 covered only funds for military personnel ($12,235,000); operation

and maintenance ($10,841,945); procurement ($13,378,000); and research, development, test, and evaluation

($4,349,400). The amount in the bill for military personnel was slightly less than that proposed in Eisenhower's

FY 1962 budget. Military construction and military assistance were each dealt with in separate legislation.
Expanding the FY 1962 Budget 57

ned. For the next several weeks the subcommittee took testimony solely from the

military services' representatives regarding their individual submissions under

Eisenhower's proposed budget, focusing on military personnel and operations

and maintenance. This initial phase of House subcommittee hearings concluded

on 21 March.s Testimony by the service secretaries and other JCS members,

and a return appearance by McNamara, would await the administration's decisions on the amendments it wanted to propose to the apptopriation bill. Also

awaiting submission of budget amendments, the Senate Defense Appropriations

Subcommittee did not conduct any hearings at all in February or March on DoD

appropriations.

A Quick Look by DoD and BoB

At the outset the new administration made clear that DoD programs would

undergo urgent review and identified those areas where it would take immediate action. In his State of the Union address on 30 January, Kennedy announced

that he had instructed McNamara to reappraise defense strategy, operations,

organization, forces, and weapon systems, and to come up with preliminary

recommendations by the end of February. The president would then determine,

based on these recommendations, "whatever legislative, budgetary or executive action is needed." In the meantime he had directed an increase in airlift

capability to assure that forces would respond "with discrimination and speed,

to any problem at any spot on the globe at any moment's notice." The president had also directed acceleration of the entire missile program, including the

use of unobligated shipbuilding funds to construct and place on line additional

Polaris submarines at least nine months earlier than planned. Eisenhower's Polaris

program called for construction of 14 submarines and the procurement of longlead items to build 5 more. Kennedy's directive pertained to the five submarines

for which long-lead procurement had been approved.9 By focusing on airlift

capability and Polaris submarines, Kennedy could achieve immediate results, in

large measure because the infrastructure already existed.

Much of the administration's nrst meeting of the National Security Council

on 1 February focused on the DoD budget, with BoB Director Bell discussing weaknesses in the existing system of budget preparation and McNamara

describing actions being taken with regard to the FY 1961 and 1962 budgets,

including the increase in airlift capacity and the acceleration of Polaris production. McNamara stated that he had ordered a "complete re-appraisal" of the FY

1962 budget based on reports by four task forces that were examining strategic

weapons, limited war requirements, weapons research and development, and

requirements for bases and installations.] 0

McNamara took prompt action in February and March to increase airlift

capacity, a relatively easy and popular change. He increased procurement of Lock-
58 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

heed C-130E extended-range turboprop aircraft from 50 to 99 and advanced

delivery of the first 50 aircraft to March instead of September 1963. 11 DoD also

selected a contractor for the future C-141 jet aircraft. Like the C-130, it could

perform long-range strategic and short-range tactical assignments, but it would

require fewer refuelings, need less tanker support, and cost less to operate. 12

Taking into account a Department of State paper on foreign policy considerations bearing on the Defense budget and after consulting with White House

staff, McNamara submitted on 20 February the report the president had

requested. This hasty review, which addressed "only the most urgent and obvious problems," drew on studies prepared by three of the four task forces. It did

not cover bases and installations, on which McNamara planned to report separately, because he believed any actions taken in FY 1962 to close installations

would have little effect on expenditures in that fiscal year. Overall McNamara

proposed an addition of $2.008 billion to the FY 1962 budget, more than half

of which would be for strategic forces and continental defense. Some 50 pages of

attachments provided details on specific proposals; a separate annex tabulated the

positions taken by the JCS members, most ofthem unanimously. 13

Defense officials discussed the recommendations with Bureau of the Budget

representatives, and on 10 March McNamara and Bell, in a joint memorandum

to the president, put forward those they agreed on (discussions had produced

some adjustments in specific amounts), and indicated those few areas, six in all,

where they differed. For FY 1962 the BoB revisions totaled $159.5 million more

than DoD's.14

Kennedy apparently had expressed concern about increasing the size of the

military budget. His special assistant for national security affairs, McGeorge

Bundy, thought the president was right in thinking it important, "but wrong in

thinking that it is all-important." Bundy felt that any proposed increase in new

obligational authority for FY 1962 would be less than press reports had been

hinting. Moreover, "the state of the country, the state of the world, and the state

of the Congressional mind" persuaded him "that that there will not be great trouble on this point." 15

DoD and BoB had indeed sought ways to contain the additional funding.

The handful of disputed areas reflected disagreements about manner and timing

of funding as well as amounts. One disagreement involved Defense's proposal to

use $330 million of FY 1962 funds as an increment to begin work on an additional 10 Polaris submarines, over and above the 19 already programmed, in

what was termed a "second acceleration." BoB did not contest building 10 more

submarines, rather the manner of funding. It proposed adding $778 million to

the $330 million in FY 1962, making a total of $1.108 billion for full funding

of construction of the submarines. Congress, according to BoB, would probably

criticize partial funding "as a dodge" aimed at reducing the total amount of the

budget revisions. Moreover, partial funding "would be an unfortunate precedent
Expanding the FY 1962 Budget 59

from a management standpoint." In DoD's view, full funding seemed unnecessary, but it indicated it would not object to inclusion of the additional funds. In

the end Kennedy accepted BoB's recommendation. 16

The wider spectrum of Air Force strategic weapons posed more numerous

issues than did naval vessels. On two of these 000 and BoB differed slightly.

One was how rapidly to accelerate the transition from the older liquid-fuel Atlas

and Titan intercontinental ballistic missiles to the new solid-fuel Minuteman.

The Atlas and Titan systems had proved costly, difficult to launch, and vulnerable

to enemy attack. BoB wanted to cancel the last four of the planned eight-squadron Titan II program in order to reduce the anticipated increases in the FY 1962

budget. Defense wanted to cancel only two squadrons, expressing uncertainty

about the reliability of Minuteman. A 000 White Paper noted that "approximately 100 Minuteman missiles dispersed and hardened" could come from

the money saved by the elimination of the last two Titan squadrons. Although

McNamara expressed willingness to accept BoB's position, Kennedy decided to

cancel only two squadrons.l7

Another Defense-Budget disagreement concerned the B-70 bomber under

development, which the Air Force saw as the weapon of the 1970s. Perhaps

because of high expectations surrounding the effort to realize the many possibilities claimed for the B-70-multiple weapon capacity, Mach 3 speed, high-altitude

capability, and use as an intimidating visible deterrent-research and development

of the plane had run into serious trouble by the late 1950s. Between 1958 and

1962 it underwent half a dozen major design changes and two development stoppages. Projections of its ultimate cost mushroomed. Moreover, the aircraft would

not enter the inventory until Polaris and Minuteman had already become integral parts of the strategic retaliatory force. In light of these factors the Eisenhower

administration opposed development of a complete weapon system. It included

$354 million in the FY 1962 budget for developing only one or two B-70 prototypes, a skeletal aircraft without any combat capability. IS

McNamara and his aides displayed perhaps even greater skepticism about

the B-70. Improving Soviet air defenses, particularly surface-to-air missiles,

brought into sharper question whatever virtues the B-70 might possess. Vulnerable on land and not designed to carry the air-to-surface Skybolt missile under

development,* the B-70 would have to fly at subsonic speeds in low-level attacks.

Gilpatric later recalled that he and McNamara, before they took office, concluded

that "the B-70 was a turkey." 19

As a result of its review Defense proposed reducing the FY 1962 funds for B70 development to $250 million. BoB, however, recommended that the president

consider canceling the entire program, in view of the "doubtful need" for such

* Regarding the Skybolr program, for which the Kennedy administration added $50 million in FY 1962, see

Chapter XlV.
60 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

an aircraft and its extremely high projected cost. Here the president decided to

continue the program, but to scale it back a little further than McNamara had

recommended, to $220 million in FY 1962.20

The Bureau of the Budget agreed with Defense's other recommendations regarding Air Force strategic weapons, including some which curtailed or canceled

important programs. One concerned the relative emphasis to be placed on the

two versions of Minuteman, the fixed-site version dispersed in hardened silos

or the more technically complex mobile Minuteman to be mounted on railway

cars whose eventual deployment lay even further in the future. Convinced that

the mobile Minuteman would incur costs incommensurate with the benefits,

McNamara recommended, with Bell's concurrence, the deferral of three mobile

Minuteman squadrons and the substitution in the FY 1962 budget of an equal

number offixed-site squadrons.21

One Air Force bomber fell victim to the quick review. McNamara and Bell

recommended accelerating the already scheduled retirement from the inventory of the medium-range B-47. Under Eisenhower's FY 1962 budget the 900

operational B-47s in 1961 would have declined gradually to 720 in 1962,675 in

1963, and 450 in 1964. McNamara proposed to reduce the 900 to 180 by 1964.

The savings in FY 1962 would be relatively small, $35 million. 22

DoD and BoB did not offer any new proposals regarding the Air Force

long-range B-52 and B-58 bombers. Separately, however, McNamara decided

to uphold the Eisenhower administration's decision to halt their production in

calendar year 1962. OSD analysts concluded that the B-52 or any other manned

aircraft, unless airborne, might not survive ICBM or bomber assaults on bases.

In a choice between procuring an additional B-52 wing or putting the same

resources into the less vulnerable Minuteman or Polaris, the B-52 could not

compete.23 Yet the B-52 had certain advantages: it could carry large payloads and

deliver them with high accuracy. Even more persuasive, unlike Minuteman and

Polaris, it could be recalled from a mission. Although B-52 and B-58 production was scheduled to be terminated in 1962, both bomber forces would remain

substantially intact at least until 1970. If needed, DoD could always order more

manned bombers, but not without incurring a financial penalty.24

The Army's Nike-Zeus anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system prompted different

recommendations from Defense and Budget. The program, whose development

began in November 1956, had a dubious test record. In test firings (22 in all)

after August 1959, only 8 could claim partial success; 5 failed completely.25 In

December 1959 Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy withheld $137 million

tentatively allocated for preproduction. Major continuing technical problems,

high projected production and deployment costs, and a low expected rate of

success all played a part in his decision. 26
Expanding the FY 1962 Budget 61

Anticipating the need for a vigorous offensive, the Army made a preemptive

strike even before the new DoD team took office, claiming in a memorandum to

Deputy Secretary-designate Gilpatric on 17 January 1961 that Nike-Zeus would

provide early warning and an active defense in urban areas against Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Moreover, the very existence of an ABM weapon

would establish "a stable and creditable deterrence." Although the Eisenhower

budget provided no funds for production, the Army recommended a limited

production and deployment using $73.3 million in FY 1961 funds and an additional $313.5 million for FY 1962.27

The JCS divided on the Nike-Zeus issue. Terming ABM "an indispensable

element in deterrence," Chairman Lemnitzer won support for limited production from Admiral Arleigh A. Burke and, of course, Army Chief of Staff General

George H. Decker. But he failed to persuade Air Force Chief of Staff General

Thomas White, who maintained that progress in building ICBMs and their

warheads was running several years ahead of ABM developments. He speculated

that Nike-Zeus might have already reached its maximum technical growth. If

so, the race had really ended before it started. He preferred instead developing

sophisticated offensive warheads that could readily penetrate Soviet defenses.28

Director of Defense Research and Engineering Herbert York supported

White's critique, but without the burden of service interest that the Air Force

chief ofstaff carried. In response to McNamara's request for a "complete reassessment" of ABM activity, York estimated that at the end of FY 1961 expenditures

on Nike-Zeus would reach $2.4 billion without reasonable prospects of achieving

any effective urban defense. York saw no grounds for believing that the situation would change appreciably. Soviet ICBMs, he maintained, would more than

counter any improvements made in the ABMs. Moreover, without a viable U.S.

shelter program the Soviets could destroy populations by radioactive fallout even

if opposed by a more effective antimissile defense system.29

McNamara did not recommend the full amount the Army wanted. Instead

he proposed an additional $82.8 million in FY 1962 funds for Nike-Zeus to

provide the capability for and to begin production oflong-Iead items. This would

allow completion of the first Nike-Zeus installations about October 1965. BoB

opposed the extra $82.8 million, arguing it would entail a decision to be made

in the fall of 1962 about the necessary follow-on funding of $550 million in FY

1963 without the benefit of much additional development data. In accordance

with the BoB recommendation, Kennedy decided to defer a decision on beginning Nike-Zeus production.3°

All these decisions were the product of what one scholar has called a "quick

and dirty look," without the benefit of systems analysis and program budgeting

that would characterize McNamara's later approach to the budget.3\
62 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

28 March Amendment

McNamara's and Bell's recommendations provided the basis for the special

message on the Defense budget that Kennedy delivered to Congress on 28

March detailing a series of proposed amendments for FY 1962. The president

announced his decisions to increase the number of Polaris submarines from 19

to 29, cancel the last two Titan II squadrons, defer work on the three mobile

Minuteman squadrons that had been funded in Eisenhower's budget and replace

them with three fixed-site Minuteman squadrons, reduce the B-70 development program by $138 million (to $220 million), terminate development of a

nuclear-powered aircraft (while transferring some of the related research aspects

to the Atomic Energy Commission), and accelerate the phaseout of a number

of B-47 wings. Among the various proposed changes he mentioned the requirement for additional airlift funds, the need to improve air and ground alerts, and

strengthening forces for limited and anti-guerrilla warfare. Altogether the changes

represented an additional $1.954 billion in NOA.32

Congressional consideration of the Defense budget now resumed in earnest,

with April and May unusually busy months for the pertinent committees and

DoD officials. The administration submitted a revised authorization bill of

$11.9748 billion for procurement of aircraft, missiles, and naval vessels. Of the

nearly $1.5 billion added to the initial bill, $1.09 billion was for naval vessels,

reflecting the major Polaris increase.33 The Senate Armed Services Committee

took up the bill on 4 April, the House Armed Services Committee on 11 April.

Concurrently, the appropriations committees began hearings on an amended

appropriation bill, now enlarged by nearly $2 billion. Mahon's House subcommittee hearings resumed on 6 April, and the Senate Defense Appropriations

Subcommittee, under Chairman Dennis Chavez of New Mexico, began hearings

on 18 April.

Inevitably questions came up that reflected the discomfort of the military

services with decisions affecting their particular interests, with the Army's NikeZeus and the Air Force's bomber programs receiving much attention. At hearings

on the authorization bill, McNamara told Sen. Strom Thurmond (D-S.C.) that

he opposed production of the Nike-Zeus at the time. Thurmond expressed disappointment that the secretary was not pursuing Nike-Zeus as a "great deterrent

toward an attack on this country."34 Before the House Defense Appropriations

Subcommittee, McNamara acknowledged that Nike-Zeus was well along in

development and "progress has been quite satisfactory." But he had doubts about

deploying the system because of technical, operating, and vulnerability problems,

and Nike-Zeus was "a very expensive system in relation to the degree of protection that it can furnish." McNamara held firm that 000 would continue the

weapon's development, testing, and evaluation phase, but for the present not

approve production and deployment. 35
Expanding the FY 1962 Budget 63

Mahon questioned how the decisions had been reached on key strategic and

defensive weapons. "I know that the decision on the NIKE-ZEUS was not written by the Army. I know the decision on the B-70 was not written by the Air

Force, so who made these decisions?" McNamara answered that the president had

made the decisions, "based on recommendations which I made to him, and the

recommendations were my personal recommendations."36

McNamara defended forcefully his decision to stop full-scale development of

the B-70. While nominally keeping it alive with severely reduced development

funding, he left no doubt in anyone's mind that the strategic retaliatory weapon

of the future was the ICBM, not the manned bomber. Sen. Clair Engle (D-Calif.)

challenged the diminished funding for the B-70, suggesting instead the spending

of the putative savings of $138 million "so we can look at it a year earlier, and

then make the decision as to whether or not we ought to either buy it or postpone it." When pressed further about whether he wanted to develop and test the

B-70 "at the earliest possible time," McNamara spoke directly: "I definitely do

not. I definitely do not. I don't want any misunderstanding on this point. I think

it would be a serious waste of this Nation's resources to pursue that program."37

Although an important factor, cost by itself did not drive 000 decisions

on weapon systems. Rather, 000 weighed cost against lead time of production,

reliability of performance, anticipated effectiveness, and the availability of alternative weapons. At a Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee hearing on

18 April, Senator Saltonstall asked McNamara to account for the anomaly of

asking for more fixed-site Minuteman missiles even though he agreed that the

mobile Minuteman mounted on railway cars was a more survivable alternative.

The secretary replied that the fixed-site missile could be developed and deployed

more quickly and so should proceed while the development ofthe mobile version

continued. But cost was clearly important, too. 000 Comptroller Charles Hitch

told Mahon's subcommittee that deferral of three mobile Minuteman squadrons

would save some $80 million, given the difference between the $220 million for

mobile and $140 million for three fixed-site Minuteman squadrons.38

The secretary's emphasis on ICBMs as the offensive weapon of the future

deeply troubled the Air Force and its congressional supporters. Concern for the

future ofmanned bombers, repeatedly expressed during the hearings ofthe armed

services and appropriations committees, became the focal point of congressional

differences with the administration's amended budget. After the House Armed

Services Committee completed its hearings, McNamara met with Chairman

Vinson and other members on 28 April to discuss specific changes the committee

advocated in the authorization bill, particularly with respect to manned bombers and nuclear-powered frigates. The changes included the addition of one wing

each ofB-52s and B-58s at a cost of$525 million and $485 million, respectively;

and the addition of $138 million for the B-70 in FY 1962.39 McNamara felt he

had persuaded the committee to back down on these possible changes. In return,
64 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

he promised to make a statement of "full agreement" with the committee that a

strong heavy-bomber force would be maintained at least through 1970, until full

development of the missile systems. The secretary also accepted the committee's

plan to substitute two nuclear for the three conventional frigates the administration had proposed. All told, he believed he had reduced the committee's

additional authorization recommendations from $1.2 billion to $39 million.40

The secretary's expectations were not borne out. During a freewheeling,

occasionally raucous committee markup of the bill on 2 and 3 May, Vinson was

unable to persuade his fellow members to accept all the agreements worked out

with McNamara. In a subsequent press release, Vinson noted that the committee

would propose an additional $393.2 million, $337 million of which would be

"only" for the continued production ofB-52 and/or B-58 bombers. The committee "found that the Kennedy program will permit an orderly development of the

B-70, and will provide an opportunity to find out a great many things about the

B-70 which must be known before the final decision on its complete development can be made." The committee's report on the authorization bill supported

the administration's position of continuing B-70 development without commitment to a full-scale weapon system.41

Both houses wanted to provide more money to allow production of B-52s

and B-58s to continue beyond 1962; they differed only a little in the amounts to

be provided and the phrasing of the proposed legislation. The Senate on 15 May

approved an authorization bill of $12.5 billion, including everything the president had requested and an additional $525 million earmarked for continuing

production oflong-range manned bombers. On 24 May the House unanimously

approved a somewhat smaller bill ($12.368 billion), providing an additional

$337 million designated specifically for the B-52 and B-58. By voice votes on

12 June both houses approved a conference committee bill of $12.571 billion

which, among other things, retained the Senate's earmarking of $525 million for

long-range manned aircraft without specifYing the type of aircraft. As Vinson

explained, the House conferees had easily accepted the Senate language since the

only bombers being produced were B-52s and B-58s. Vinson also acknowledged

that "little, if any" of the extra money might be spent, "but the authority is there

if it is found necessary to keep these assembly lines going." The president signed

the bill on 21 June.42

26May Amendment

With congressional action on the authorization bill nearing completion,

Kennedy on 25 May, a week before leaving for Vienna to meet Soviet Premier

Khrushchev to discuss the building tensions over Berlin, among other issues,

delivered a special message to a joint session of Congress. The message dealt with
Expanding the FY 1962 Budget 65

"urgent national needs" the president felt required further overall budget increases

for FY 1962. The additional money would serve both Defense and other governmental purposes. The most eye-catching proposal was expansion ofthe u.s. space

program with the aim of putting a man on the moon within 10 years. Other

proposals were ro bolster the conventional warfare capabilities of the Army and

Marine Corps, strengthen civil defense, increase foreign aid, and lower domestic

unemployment. The president also indicated that he was directing McNamara

to begin a reorganization and modernization of the Army,* which, he said, was

developing plans "to make possible a much more rapid deployment of a major

portion of its highly trained reserve forces." The new plans called for the mobilization for operations of two combat-equipped reserve divisions and supporting

elements-89,000 men-within three weeks in an emergency. Eight more reserve

divisions could be ready for deployment in less than eight weeks.43

The following day, 26 May, the White House submitted to Congress further

amendments to the Defense appropriations bill in the amount of $237 million.

The largest share, $138 million, would go for additional equipment for the Army

and Marine Corps; another $22 million would help increase Marine personnel

strength by 12,000 and provide a trained nucleus for a fourth Marine division.44

Since none of the new requests pertained to procurement of aircraft, missiles, or

ships, congressional consideration ofthe authorization bill was unaffected.

The amount of the requested additions was not great, the purposes uncontroversial. But the president's call for reorganization ofthe Army and Reserve touched

a congressional nerve. Congress viewed the whole reserve issue with great political and budgetary sensitivity. On several occasions the Eisenhower administration

had recommended a 10 percent reduction in the number of National Guard

units and Army Reserve personnel receiving pay. It failed in each instance.45 The

prickly reserve issue came to McNamara's attention even before he took office, in a

letter from Theodore Sorensen, the president-elect's assistant. Sorensen noted that

Kennedy had a particular interest in the Reserve and National Guard and wanted

* McNamara subsequently called for an overall srudy of Army organization and recommendations for appropriate changes. Secretary of the Army Stahr formed a committee of military and civilian personnel headed by

Deputy Comptroller of the Army Leonard w: Hoelscher. By January 1962 the secretary of defense and the

president had approved the report of the Hoelscher committee with modifications.

The main features of the committee's wholesale Army reorganization plan included creation of a Materiel

Development and Logistic Command and an Army Combat Developments Command; assignment of tesponsibility to the U.S. Continental Army Command for all individual and unit ttaining, except for highly specialized

training such as at the U.S. Military Academy and the Army War College; transfer of certain operating functions

of the Army General Sraff to new commands and agencies; establishment of an Office of Personnel Operations; realignment of the Army Special Staff and Operating Agencies; and the elimination of several starutory

officers (the chiefs of the technical services-Ordnance, Signal, Quartermaster, Chemical, Transportation, and

Finance) and transfer oftheir functions to other elements ofthe Army. This far-reaching reorganization became

effective on 16 February 1962, but not until December 1964 was it fully completed. See Hewes, From Root to

McNamara, 316-65.
66 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

McNamara to consider "whether these units have ceased to have a major role in

our military posture."46

The president's speech did not layout in full the long-term expectations

for reorganized ground forces, active and reserve. But it did open the way. As

an immediate objective in reorganizing the Army Reserve and National Guard,

DoD sought to achieve maximum strategic mobility by concentrating on more

and better training for 2 divisions and 18 separate combat battalions. A more

flexible organization would facilitate early readiness of the divisions and integration of the separate reserve battalions into regular Army units when needed. In

McNamara's words, "the 'One Army' concept must become a reality as well as a

slogan."47

Congressional questions about that "reality" followed immediately. South

Carolina Democrat Rep. John J. Riley wondered how reservists could find time

for the required enhanced training while trying to earn a living at the same time.

Since it presumably took six to nine months to bring a unit up to combat readiness, he doubted if any could be ready in the three weeks time McNamara had

in mind. In response, McNamara stressed that the reserves would have 48 paid

drills a year, at least two weeks of full-time training, and sometimes three weeks.

Besides, unlike in the past, many reservists had active military experience. Riley

remained unconvinced, as did Pennsylvania Democrat Rep. Daniel J. Flood, who

asserted that McNamara could not be serious: "You are going to give me two

Reserve line divisions in 2 weeks?"48

The appropriation bill worked its way through the House, with Mahon's

subcommittee winding up its hearings 1 June, but not before grilling McNamara

about the future oflong-range bombers. The secretary emphasized that terminating production ofB-52s in 1962 did not mean the end ofthe B-52. He thought

it "too early to conclude that we will not need manned bombers in substantial

numbers at the end of this decade, and therefore I conclude we P.lust be prepared

to maintain in our operational force substantial numbers through 1970."49

He called attention to the more than 700 B-52s and B-58s that would still be

operational at the end of FY 1966. "Should it be decided later," he noted in a

subsequent letter to Mahon, "to maintain this level of heavy bomber aircraft

beyond FY 1966, the request for appropriations can be made several years from

now. There appears to be no need to make such a decision before mid-I963 at the

earliest." To show the thoroughness that had gone into the decision, McNamara

noted plans to preserve B-52 tooling following the completion of production so

that restarting would pose no problem.50

On 23 June the House Appropriations Committee reponed an appropriation

bill of just over $42.711 billion. This included additions of some $758 million

co the budget request as amended, with $449 million designated for manned

bombers. It also represented cuts of $527 million elsewhere, including a flat two
Expanding the FY 1962 Budget 67

percent cut in procurement funds. In a unanimous vote on 28 June, the House

approved the bill unchanged.51

The Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, which had suspended

hearings on the appropriation bill in June, resumed them on 10 July to hear

DoD's reclama to the House bill. Under questioning Gilpatric stated that the

administration took a very grave view of the Berlin situation and that the president had requested Defense and other agencies to reexamine "our needs" to deal

with the situation, a point McNamara reiterated in a statement released later

that day. During the hearings the new Air Force chief of staff, General Curtis

LeMay, made a last effort to win support for the Air Force's manned bomber

program. In a memorandum to Secretary of the Air Force Zuckert on 13 July,

McNamara declared he was "shocked and embarrassed" to read in the New York

Times that the Air Force, and particularly LeMay, was preparing to launch a

vigorous campaign in Congress on behalf of greater investment in and continued

production of bombers. Noting that the decision on heavy bombers had been

made only after thorough discussion with Air Force civilian and military officials,

he informed Zuckert that he expected "every civilian and military leader of the

Air Force will support my decision and that of the President. Please make sure

they understand this."52 Yet LeMay, exercising his prerogative to offer unfettered

congressional testimony, aired his criticisms of the Defense budget before the

Senate subcommittee less than a week after McNamara sent his pointed memorandum to Zuckert.53

The Berlin Crisis and the 26July Amendment

In June and early July tensions over Berlin steadily mounted, causing the

Kennedy administration to begin planning for various military contingencies

there, including the possibility of war.* Additional militaty forces would clearly

be needed, requiring still further increases to the FY 1962 budget.

Seeking former President Eisenhower's views on the developing crisis,

CIA Director Allen Dulles and General Lemnitzer joined McNamara in a visit

to Eisenhower's farm in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, on 15 July. They received a

mixed message. On the one hand Eisenhower seemed willing to support additions to the Defense budget, but he also wanted actions based on "the decisions

ofthe professionals, particularly the Joint Chiefs." On the other hand, he "would

impound every nickel of non-military expenditures that didn't have to be spent."

In his report to the president McNamara expressed fear that Eisenhower might

use a request for additional funds as a reason for "still another attack" on nonmilitary programs. 54

* See Chapter Vll.
68 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

With decisions reached on the size of the necessary military buildup, Kennedy, in a somber mood, went before the nation in a televised address on 25 July

to press for further resources to deal with the situation in Berlin. On the heels

of the address, the administration submitted the next day an amendment to

the Defense appropriation bill, much larger ($3.454 billion) than the first two.

Intended to build up limited war forces, the money requested was considerably

less than the Joint Chiefs and McNamara had proposed. The Joint Chiefs had

asked for an increase of 559,000 military personnel and $6.9 billion in NOA.

McNamara had scaled this down to 480,000 personnel and $4.343 billion. 55 By

excluding costs of mobilizing Army and Marine divisions and naval reservists, the

president arrived at the eventual figure of $3.454 billion, which included $207.6

million for civil defense and encompassed expansion of Army forces, an increase

in tactical air forces, improvement of airlift and sealift capabilities, and procurement of weapons and equipment for non-nuclear forces. 56

Because procurement was involved, the authorization bill had to be amended.

In an atmosphere bordering on national emergency, the process proceeded rapidly.

On 27 and 28 July, respectively, the Senate and House armed services committees

authorized an additional $958.57 million, adding this sum to the $12.571 billion

previously authorized. Their consensus permitted quick passage of the bill by

unanimous vote in both houses and its enactment into law on 3 August 1961.57

On 4 August the Senate approved by a vote of 85-0 the Senate Defense

Appropriations Subcommittee's recommendations for an appropriation of more

than $48.848 billion, including the full amount of $3.454 billion the president had requested the week before. The bill also provided money for military

construction, civil defense, and revolving and management funds. In introducing the bill the subcommittee's acting chairman, A. Willis Robertson, noted that

three times in his lifetime despots had miscalculated the strength of American

determination to protect freedom in the world. Senate passage of the bill would

"put Premier Khrushchev on notice" that the United States intended to safeguard

that freedom "at whatever cost." The Senate's approval included $525 million

specifically earmarked for B-52 and B-58 production, as well as $228.84 million

more than the $220 million the administration had requested for development

of the B-70. The day before, the Senate soundly rejected, by a vote of 87-4, an

amendment proposed by William Proxmire (D-Wis.) to delete from the measure

the extra money for continued B-52 and B-58 production. Proxmire referred,

with little apparent effect, to recent correspondence with McNamara in which

the secretary had reiterated his conviction that the extra money for the longrange bombers was unnecessary. Strongest criticism of the Proxmire amendment

and defense of the additional funds came from Sens. Barry Goldwater, Stuart

Symington, and Henry Jackson. 58

The Senate bill differed in several important ways from the House bill

approved at the end of June. On 9 August a conference committee resolved all
Expanding the FY 1962 Budget 69

the differences save one. The conferees slightly pared the additional amounts the

Senate had voted for long-range bombers from $525 million to $514.5 million

(reflecting the House's across-the-board two percent cut on procurement) and

for the B-70 from an additional $228 million to $180 million (making a total

of $400 million instead of $428 million). The only item still in dispute was the

additional money the president had requested to start a fallout shelter program,

which the Senate but not the House had accepted.59

Final agreement came quickly. On 10 August, only two weeks after receiving the president's request, both the House by unanimous roll-call vote and the

Senate by voice vote approved the conference version of the bill. In separate

action earlier in the day the House also approved the additional fallout shelter funds. The final bill, signed into law by Kennedy on 17 August, provided

$46,662,556 billion, an amount almost $6 billion higher than the original

Eisenhower bil1.6o

TABLE 3

FY 1962 Appropriations (NOA) Enacted

by Appropriation Category

($ billions)

Military personnel

Operation & maintenance

Procurement

RDT&E

Civil defense

Total

Source: Congressional Record, 10 Aug 61, 14394-95.

12.805

11.731

16.675

5.244

.207

46.662

The day before the president signed the bill, McNamara recommended against

spending the extra money appropriated for the long-range bombers, the B-70,

and the space glider Dynasoar. Kennedy did not act on the recommendation. In

early October, however, McNamara repeated the advice, indicating that he was

taking into account a recent Senate Preparedness Committee report and a review

just completed of the Defense program for the next several years. Kennedy now

approved the recommendation, a decision McNamara announced on 27 October.61

Given the public warnings that the extra money for long-range bombers

would not be spent, the announcement came as no surprise. Critics of McNamara's buildup of missile forces, seemingly at the expense of manned bombers, now

shifted their focus to the administration's withholding of the additional funds to
70 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

speed development of the B-70, and the Air Force sought to make the aircraft

more appealing by altering its design and augmenting its capabilities. The main

lines of the bomber vs. missile argument in 1961 thus set the stage for a major

controversy over the B-70 and a possible variant, the RS-70, which took place

the following year. 62

Also lingering prominently in the minds of many congressmen were concerns

about the planned reorganization of the Army Reserve and National Guard.

Earlier, in the spring of 1961, McNamara seemed convinced that he could reduce

the strength of the Reserve, improve its overall efficiency, and bring selected units

to a higher state of combat readiness. The Berlin crisis scrambled the Pentagon's planning for the Reserve reorganization, shifting the goal from a gradual

and orderly change to an accelerated buildup in the summer and fall. Extending

the enlistments of regulars and calling up reserve forces provided the additional

strength to help meet the crisis. The chronic reserve issue would continue to

receive its full share of attention in the next session ofCongress.

As with any new administration, the McNamara OSD at the beginning of

1961 undertook to reshape the budget it inherited. The first amendment to the

FY 1962 budget in March, formulated under tight time constraints, primarily

reflected external threat perceptions and provided additional means to address

them. Many of the changes involved acceleration of production programs, such

as Polaris submarines and sea and airlift transport; Congress received them well.

Bur McNamara encountered strong opposition to his emphasis on intercontinental ballistic missiles and the consequent deemphasis of armed bombers. He also

found many whose belief in the eventual effectiveness of the Nike-Zeus ABM

program greatly exceeded his own. The modest second amendment in May had

as its chief rationale effecting a more efficient organization of the Army.

Prior to the summer of 1961, even while twice increasing the FY 1962

budget, OSD could pursue a policy of cost containment that McNamara

had made a basic element of his program. Bur the third amendment in July

underscored how external events-in particular, the growing crisis over Berlincould shape the size of the budget. A potential conflict in Europe thus altered

McNamara's plans by requiring more funds than anticipated for accelerated development and procurement of weapon systems that in other circumstances would

have proceeded more slowly and at less cost. Demands for more manpower and

the associated equipment constituted another growth factor in the financial equation OSD sought to solve.

The centrality of the budget in all 000 planning and programming became

quickly apparent to McNamara during his first year at the helm. In the upcoming
Expanding the FY 1962 Budget 71

year Congress would severely test the secretary's willingness to compromise as he

unveiled a new system for preparing the Defense budget for FY 1963, a budget

that would bear entirely his imprint. The same issues that had caused contention within 000 and in Congress-intercontinental missiles, bombers, the B-70,

Nike-Zeus, civil defense, the Reserve and National Guard-would be reprised.
CHAPTER IV

The FY 1963 Budget: Introducing the PPBS

Major alterations of organizational structures and the creation of new agencies wrought important changes in the Department of Defense throughout the

McNamara years, but the core element of the McNamara revolution was the new

methodology introduced at the very beginning that later came to be known as the

Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS). First applied fully to preparation of the FY 1963 budget, it represented not only a different way of looking

at budgets, but a different way of thinking about the functioning of the military establishment. It also provided a frame of reference intimately connected to

another concept, systems analysis, intended to help the secretary of defense make

decisions on a cost-effective basis using quantified data. Over time, the PPBS

would permeate every area of Defense responsibilities, from the preparation of

the budget to conceptions of strategy, from the composition of military forces to

choices of offensive and defensive weapons.

Antecedents

Contrary to the impression some writers have left, McNamara's new approach

to budget preparation did not appear "as Aphrodite from the sea, full-blown,

fresh, beautiful, and topless." Its main elements-program budgeting, systems

analysis, cost-benefit analysis, and multi-year costing-had deep roots in both

business and government. Even the name was not entirely new. A book published

in 1953 had a chapter entitled "Plans, Programs, and Budgets" in which the

author called for the military services to adopt "systems of integrated planning,

programming, budgeting, and operation."!

During the 1950s budgeting innovations worked their way into the Pentagon

as the result, in part, of pioneering work done at the Rand Corporation in Santa

Monica, California, for its main client, the United States Air Force. The Air Force

started to make use ofRand's cost analysis and fiscal planning methods, including

72
The FY 1963 Budget: Introducing the PPBS 73

program budgeting, though "with something less than complete enthusiasm."2 It

also began to arrange its components along functional lines, such as strategic, air

defense, tactical, and airlift forces, and to project program costs for several years. 3

The entertainment of a new approach to defense budgeting went beyond the

Department of Defense. By the end of the decade, the Bureau of the Budget, in

preparing its own analyses of the DoD budget, broke it down both by traditional

budgeting items and by functional categories-strategic retaliatory, continental

defense, ground and sea, and supporting forces. This helped BoB discern any

duplicative or overlapping expenditures in the service budgets by focusing on "the

uses to which the expenditures would be put rather than the unit by which they

would be used."4

For some observers these efforts did not go far or fast enough. Criticisms of

defense budgeting focused on several lingering systemic weaknesses. One was the

imposition of arbitrary budget ceilings at the beginning of the annual budgeting cycle by the White House and the secretary of defense for the guidance of

the military departments and agencies. A second was the reliance on traditional

budget categories-military personnel, operation and maintenance, procurement, research and development, test and evaluation, and military construction.

Sensible as these groupings may have been, they gave little guidance in the vital

matter of harmonizing the costs of the military programs with JCS plans and

objectives. 5

Another widely-perceived flaw was the parochialism inherent in the process.

The military services devised their programs and budgets to serve their own interests regardless of whether they duplicated what another service did. No matter

how much esprit de corps interservice rivalries might foster, they sometimes

reached absurd and even dangerous lengths. In an especially egregious display

of parochialism, an Army general shouted to President Eisenhower immediately

after the Vanguard rocket engines blew up in the nation's first attempt to orbit

a satellite in December 1957: "This is a great day for the Army!" Why? Simply

because the Vanguard was a Navy creation, and its failure seemingly opened

the way for the Army to be first in launching a satellite-its own competitive

Explorer I-into orbit. 6

A severe, persistent critic of budgeting along service lines and by traditional

budget categories, former Army Chief of Staff General Maxwell Taylor, who

became President Kennedy's military representative in July 1961, lambasted these

practices in his autobiographical account, The Uncertain Trumpet, and in testimony before Congress. In 1960 he told one congressional committee:

In spite of the fact that modern war is no longer fought in terms of a separate

Army, Navy, and Air Force, nonetheless we still budget vertically in these

service terms. Yet, if we are called upon to fight, we will not be interested in

the services as such. We will be interested rather in task forces, these combi-
74 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

nations ofArmy, Navy, and Air Force which are functional in nature, such as

the atomic retaliatory forces, overseas deployments, continental air defense

forces, limited war expeditionary forces, and the like. But the point is that we

do not keep our budget in these terms. Hence it is not an exaggeration to say

that we do not know what kind and how much defense we are buying with

any specific budget.?

Knowledgeable members of Congress, too, called for change. Toward the

end of the Eisenhower administration Rep. George Mahon, chairman of the

House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, urged that the DoD budget be

formulated in terms of major military missions, with appropriations categories

pertaining to weapon systems, personnel, etc. grouped and costed according to

their mission. Preliminary efforts to break down the budget into the categories

Mahon had specified were not promising. The Navy "did not think it could be

done, the Air Force doubted that it could be done, and the Army thought it

could be done and submitted the best figures." As a result OSD concluded it

would be quite difficult to come up with figures that Defense could stand behind

in its testimony to Congress, and the initiative was dropped. 8

Prior to his appointment as secretary McNamara had been generally aware

through hearsay of the deficiencies in DoD budgeting practices. He was no

stranger to innovation in financial management from his prewar classes at the

Harvard Business School and application of those lessons in the Army Air Forces

and at Ford. 9 Given his background and aggressive managerial style, it is not

surprising that he undertook the overhaul ofthe Pentagon's budget machinery.

To carry out the task McNamara chose as his assistant secretary (comptroller) a 51-year-old, soft-spoken economist, Charles J. Hitch. A Rhodes scholar

and veteran of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II, Hitch

went to the Rand Corporation in 1948 to organize and head its new economics division. In 1960 he became chairman of the Rand Research Council that

planned Rand's research. That year he co-authored a book entitled The Economics ofDefense in the Nuclear Age. The book, which McNamara read (apparently

after selecting Hitch), criticized current budgeting practices and advocated a

new program-based budget with multi-year projections. While skiing at Aspen,

Colorado, during the week of Christmas, McNamara came across Hitch's name

among the three-by-five index cards he had assembled of candidates to fill positions. McNamara knew what qualities he wanted in a comptroller but was having

difficulty finding the right person. When he first telephoned Hitch to offer him

the job, Hitch refused. Having married late in life, he and his wife had just had

a child, and he was reluctant to move from the Los Angeles area. However, after

the two men later met in Denver, Hitch changed his mind. lo

At his confirmation hearing, Hitch admitted that inexperience in the budgetary field had perhaps left him unqualified for the job. Before accepting the

position, he had shared his reservations with both McNamara and Wilfred ].
The FY 1963 Budget: Introducing the PPBS 75

McNeil, the former OSD comptroller, who convinced him that the job primarily required "leadership and policy guidance," qualities they felt he had. When

needed, he could turn to people on his staff with the desired budgetary experience. At the hearing a senator pointed out that McNeil, who was generally

considered to have done a fine job, similarly had no accounting background. I I

Organizational Framework: Getting Started

The new director of the Bureau of the Budget, David E. Bell, had also heard,

from informed old BoB hands, about the inadequacies of the budgetary system

then used in the Defense Department, which shortcomings he communicated

to both McNamara and the president. Discussions among them in January and

February would lead to changes in the Defense budget process that involved a

longer time span-five years-and with categories organized by purpose or

output of the function or mission of the military forces-the "program packages."12

As authority for instituting the new methodology, McNamara frequently

invoked two directives from President Kennedy that he had received upon taking

office: (1) to develop a force structure to meet u.s. military requirements without regard to arbitrary budget ceilings, and (2) to procure this force at the lowest

possible cost. In fact, the decision to introduce the new system came during the

transition period before the new administration took over. At a meeting with top

aides on 18 January 1961, McNamara accepted in principle Hitch's recommendation to institute a systematic programming approach to budget preparation. 13

Beginning the project, however, suffered delay when Hitch contracted pneumonia toward the end of January. During a discussion of Defense budgetary

matters at the Kennedy administration's first meeting of the National Security

Council on 1 February, Budget Director Bell focused on the weaknesses in the

current system. McNamara described the immediate actions he was taking with

regard to the 1961 and 1962 fiscal year budgets and indicated that during the

spring the Department of Defense and the Bureau ofthe Budget would be developing new guidelines for preparation of the FY 1963 budget. Later that day he

sent a memorandum to Hitch asking him to outline in writing the steps needed

to accomplish this task, emphasizing the development by 1 July of the "guidelines and assumptions" on which to base the FY 1963 budget. Hitch wrote back

on 6 February that on returning to the Pentagon the following week-an apparent allusion to the pneumonia that had hospitalized him-he would immediately

start preparing the guidelines. 14

Once back at work, Hitch moved quickly. By the end of February he established a new office of programming headed by a deputy assistant secretary to

augment the existing three offices for accounting, budgeting, and management. The 31 positions initially allotted to the new office represented a small
76 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

slice of the 200 some employees in the comptroller's office. To head the office

Hitch selected Hugh McCullough, then involved in managing the Navy's Polaris

program. It had two directorates, one for systems planning under John W. Dixon

and the other for weapons systems analysis (later renamed simply systems analysis) headed by the 30-year-old Alain C. Enthoven, a former colleague of Hitch's

who had left Rand the previous year to work at the Pentagon in the directorate

of defense research and engineering. Enthoven had written a 45-page appendix

for Hitch's book about the application of differential calculus to military choices

entitled "The Simple Mathematics of Maximization."15

The brilliant, brash Enthoven and a number of other young analysts-a new

generation of "Whiz Kids"-according to some observers came to Washington

with a certain disdain for the military, not averse to asserting "their youthful

civilian power." Enthoven recalled that before going to the Pentagon he had

thought of writing a book about the management of the Defense Department.

What distressed him as much as anything else was the "absurd notion" that the

comptroller should not have anything to do with weapons, forces, and strategy.

Moreover, Enthoven considered the JCS staff bureaucracy part of the problem,

not part of the solution, and felt that the JCS had become a "great big political

logrolling affair." 16 To Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh Burke many of

the newcomers seemed arrogant and overbearing. They apparently thought that

"all civilian officials of the Department of Defense were superior to all military

officers, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff." 17

On his own immediate staff Hitch had three assistants, of whom the most

important may have been Henry E. Glass, his economic adviser and speechwriter.

Glass provided Hitch detailed institutional memory. He had worked in the

comptroller's office since 1953 and drafted the annual budget statements beginning with FY 1955. Outgoing Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates and Deputy

Secretary James Douglas told McNamara and Gilpatric that Glass was "one of

the most knowledgeable, competent, and helpful men on the staff," and Glass

proved especially valuable during the transition period. Although Glass had a

staff of three analysts, he sometimes found himself stretched by his responsibilities. Not only did he serve informally as a special assistant to McNamara and

prepare the secretary's annual posture statement to Congress, but for a short time

Glass also wrote speeches for Gilpatric, until he realized this additional burden

was more than he could handle. Hitch came to rely on Glass as an indispensable

resource. At a press conference a few years later, Hitch tried to field a particularly

difficult question by at first talking in circles. Displaying a fine sense of humor,

he suddenly stopped, thought briefly, then turned to Glass, "Henry, am I dodging a question to which we have an answer?"18

While new administrations often reflexively reject their predecessor's ways,

Hitch seemed alert to the danger of exaggerating the differences with previous practice. In public speeches and congressional testimony, perhaps reflecting
The FY 1963 Budget: Introducing the PPBS 77

Glass's influence and that of another staff member who had advised him not to

oversell the new system's anticipated benefits and not to break too quickly with

the past, he took care to recognize and pay homage to the accomplishments of

McNeil, who had served as comptroller from 1947 to 1959. In one early speech,

he made a strong case for instituting change, but also stressed his intention not to

discard what had been accomplished in the financial management field. "Quite

the contrary," he declared, "most of what we have remains useful and necessary."19

Hitch knew that the job of putting together the new system would be difficult and time-consuming, telling McNamara in early March that it would take

many months and perhaps years. He intended to contract immediately with the

Rand Corporation, because of its expertise in systems analysis, and later with

other research centers. 20

But McNamara and Hitch differed as to how quickly the changeover should

occur. McNamara, who-as Hitch put it-felt "keenly the need for this analytical tool" and wanted quick results, asked him to apply the new procedures insofar

as possible to the preparation of the FY 1963 budget. Hitch recalled a detailed

presentation he and his staff made to McNamara in the early spring of 1961,

probably in March. Hitch wanted to apply the new procedures only to strategic

forces and to phase them in over a year's time. At the end of the presentation,

McNamara, who had remained unusually quiet, banged his hand on the table

and announced to a stunned audience, "That's exactly what I want," but "do it

for the entire defense program. And in less than a year." In 1965 Hitch recalled

he recommended taking 18 months to phase in the system but McNamara shortened the timetable to six. 21

The hurried spadework began to bear fruit in April. Having received suggestions from each service on how to improve the budget preparation process, Hitch

informed the services' assistant secretaries for nnancial management that he

and his key programming people would soon meet with them and their staffs

to discuss the introduction of the new system. Setting forth his objectives and

sketching the various steps envisioned in the process, he stressed the importance

of identifYing all major programs on a "program package" basis. His programming ofnce, together with the services and Joint Staff, would begin immediately

to denne as many ofthese packages as possible. 22

Hitch formally presented the new procedures to the service secretaries and

Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as to McNamara, Gilpatric, and other OSD officials, on 17 April. His programming office would try to integrate the planning,

programming, and financial management functions in order to provide better

tools for decisionmaking by the secretary of defense and his military advisers.

The system would be keyed to continuous program decisionmaking, not just to

the annual budget cycle. The most important innovation would be the programming arrangement, an examination of the major activities of the Department of
78 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

Defense grouped by functions or missions, such as Central War Offensive Forces,

Central War Defensive Forces, General Purpose Forces, Sealift and Airlift, and

Reserve and National Guard Forces, among others. These functions or missions

would represent "program packages," interrelated groups of elements that could

be considered together because they supported or were close substitutes for one

another. Hitch hoped to complete the programming phase by the end of September, at which time the tentatively approved packages would form the basis for

submission ofthe budget to the president in December.

McNamara confirmed that each major weapon system development program

and all basic and applied research programs would be examined at their inception

as well as at the time of production decision. He intended to examine the entire

plan on paper-key elements such as the number of units, deployment schedule,

estimated kill probabilities, and total estimated cost. Admiral Burke quipped that

this sounded like "program birth control."

A major feature ofthe new approach was the development offive-year projections, expressed in forces and dollars, to serve as a basic official plan, subject to

modification whenever necessary. McNamara wanted to have the multi-year plan

in place by the end of the summer, but definitely no later than the beginning of

1962.

Acknowledging that some "arbitrary" budget decisions would likely be made,

McNamara stressed that he wished to minimize these and to increase the number

of instances where logic provided the basis for decision. As examples of previous arbitrary budgeting, he cited the amounts that in the past had been fixed

in advance for military assistance and the Army Reserve and National Guard.

Finally, McNamara cautioned his listeners not to get "mired down in complexity"

but to "keep an eye on the broad issues and not worry too much about refinement." In principle, he said, never "build into refinement of financial data more

than that required to make a decision."23

BoB's New Approach to the Spring Preview

Changes instituted at the Bureau of the Budget early in the Kennedy administration complemented the budgeting reforms McNamara began at Defense. For

at least a decade the bureau had conducted with each federal government agency

a spring budget preview for the upcoming fiscal year. The preview had produced

"target figures" or "budget ceilings" within which the agencies were required to

submit their fall budget estimates. The problem, as BoB Director Bell saw it,

was that the bureau and the president-in both the spring and the fall-had to

make detailed decisions, "resulting in unproductive effort and premature freezing of positions." To avoid this, Bell secured Kennedy's approval in April 1961

for a more flexible approach. Beginning with the FY 1963 budget preparation,

the spring preview was to focus on major issues and trends for five fiscal years,
The FY 1963 Budget: Introducing the PPBS 79

not just the upcoming one. Moreover, the bureau, not the individual agency as

before, would prepare the projections for the president's subsequent guidance to

the agencies. The agencies were not to feel bound by the preliminary figures when

submitting their estimates in the fall, so long as they included "a plan showing

their recommended priorities for expenditure within the planning figure." When

Bell informed agency heads of these departures from past practice, he pointed

out that they should consider the new procedures "somewhat experimental" and

subject to refinement.24 During the BoB-Defense preview in early May of the FY

1963 budget, Hitch used members of his own budget office, but also encouraged

the military services to contribute personnel to assist in the work. Hitch emphasized that involvement would not commit the services to whatever recommended

projections BoB made to the president. 25

The government-wide spring preview resulted in overall estimated expenditures of some $86 billion for FY 1962, rising to more than $104 billion for

FY 1966. The projection for FY 1963 was roughly $92.6 billion, a figure Bell

thought could be reduced by one or rwo billion dollars, but not much more

without scaling back commitments already made. He recommended that the

president set the preliminary expenditure target at $91 billion. For Defense Bell

recommended a preliminary figure for FY 1963 expenditures of just over $45.3

billion.26

In mid-June Bell informed McNamara ofthe bureau's preliminary projections

for Defense, including new obligational authoriry (NOA) for FY 1963 of around

$47 billion. Bell furnished McNamara a list of policy questions regarding major

weapon systems and problem areas, as well as managerial and organizational

issues, to serve as the basis for their discussion of Defense budget guidelines with

the president. He also sent McNamara a list prepared by bureau staff indicating

areas for saving money, showing specific amounts of anticipated savings. On 20

June DoD and BoB officials set a planning figure of $45.75 billion (NOA) for

FY 1963. Mter further discussion the president reduced the target for Defense to

$44.8 billion. 27 The figure, while not representing a ceiling as in the Eisenhower

administration, nevertheless narrowed DoD's flexibiliry in preparing the budget.

The Requirements/Planning Phase

Installation ofthe new budgeting system in Defense capitalized on another of

McNamara's innovations already under way. In March 1961 DoD components,

at the secretary's request, had begun a series ofstudies-dubbed McNamara's "96

trombones" (the number subsequently grew to well over a hundred)-ofthe most

critical military requirements. These were not requirement studies in the traditional military sense but rather military-economic or cost-effectiveness studies,

comparing alternative ways of achieving a wide range of national securiry objectives, involving costs as well as objectives. The secretary assigned specific projects
80 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

to the Joint Chiefs, the military departments, and members of OSD dealing with

such difficult issues as attempting to estimate the forces and weapons the United

States would need over the next decade to carry our the strategic retaliatory

mission. *28

While many of these studies were still in preparation, Hitch issued general

instructions on 13 May to the military services providing guidance on developing

and submitting their program packages to his office. Specific dates for submission ranged from 3 July to 31 August. The packages included: I-Central War

Offensive Forces, II-Central War Defensive Forces, III-General Purpose

Forces, IV- Sealift and Airlift Forces, V-Reserve and National Guard Forces,

VI-Research and Development including "Space," VII-Service-wide Support,

VIII-Military Assistance Projects, IX-Classified Projects, and X-Department

of Defense.t29 Soon thereafter Hitch sent detailed, supplemental instructions to

each service that applied specifically to their respective program package submissions.30

How did the services react to the new system? Although Hitch's book had

gained wide currency within OSD circles, he recalled that "a lot of resistance"

to his ideas developed among the military. "You find lots of military people who

think that costs are irrelevant and who refuse to look at the alternatives." Glass

had a similar recollection. Much information, he said, "about what was in the

budget was exposed by shredding it out by program. It was also a big job for

them; they had to come up with the initial figures.... They had to increase their

staffs to handle it." Admiral Burke believed that the Navy's weapon systems did

not easily fit into functional or program categories and that the new framework

would effectively dismantle the Navy's existing flexible approach to planning.

Furthermore, for financial managers and budget officials on all the service staffs,

the imposition of quantification tools and the wresting away of decisionmaking

by OSD seemingly impugned their objectivity.31

The Programming Phase

The really innovative phase, the formulation of programs meant to bridge

the gap between military planning and formal budgeting, came second in the

process. After the military services in July and August submitted their program

proposals, the comptroller's office spent approximately two weeks consolidating,

analyzing, and preparing a summary of each package. The directorate of defense

* See p.14. Major srudies included acceleration of the ballistic missile effort, defense against ballistic missiles,

adequacy of air- and sealift capabilities, modernization of ground and naval forces, and the propet mix of

missiles and bombers in the future.

t Subsequently some of these titles were changed. Among the changes, Central War Offensive Forces became

General War Offensive Forces and later Strategic Retaliatory Forces. Further refinements in the titles and

number of program packages occurred over time.
The FY 1963 Budget: Introducing the PPBS 81

research and engineering, not the comptroller's office, had primary responsibility

for reviewing submissions regarding research and engineering programs. 32

Hitch set up a work room (also called a monitoring center or program room)

in the Pentagon. All information was put on viewgraphs for projection on huge

floor-to-ceiling screens. This allowed changes to be made in the projected figures

that showed their effect on the overall packages. Computers were limited in

use early on, but the plan was to rely heavily on them once the system became

more developed. Because members of Congress, particularly the appropriations committees, were accustomed to working with the old budget categories,

McNamara and Hitch decided to prepare the FY 1963 budget in both traditional

and new formats. The traditional titles would be used for presenting the budget

to Congress, the new program format primarily for planning and internal use

within DoD. To transfer data back and forth between the two formats, the comptroller's office developed a "torque converter" to serve as a link between program

and budget; the comptroller also employed the new concept of total obligational

authority (TOA)-the full cost of a program for a fiscal year regardless ofthe year

in which the funds were authorized, appropriated, or expended. Hitch thought

that high-speed computers in the future would be well suited to this task. 33

Despite the newness of the procedures and the press of time, the services,

according to Hitch, submitted "surprisingly complete and thorough" information. The weakest submissions concerned General Purpose Forces, where the

services, with some exceptions, concentrated on describing weapon systems and

combat units instead of analyzing their effectiveness. "To some extent," Hitch

observed, ''Army and Navy problems here are tougher because they have more

complex force structures." By the end of August, when all the submissions were

in, service proposals, including military assistance but not civil defense, totaled

almost $64 billion (TOA). Although the work was conducted during the height

of the Berlin crisis, the deadline for finishing this program review was pushed

back by only one week-to 22 September.34

On completion, the comptroller's office transmitted each program package

summary to McNamara and Gilpatric. With the help of both civilian and military advisers, the two men went over them in great detail in light of the missions

to be accomplished, the cost-effectiveness of the various options for achieving the

goals, and the latest intelligence data on the capabilities of the Soviet Union and

its satellites. A section that defined the issues for decision facilitated their task.

Hitch felt this necessary-at least in the initial year-because so great was the

number of issues that without this information, the work would be unmanageable. Hitch admitted that the definition of issues had been "tricky." "I am sure

that we didn't define them to the satisfaction of everybody concerned. We tried

to do it in a neutral way, and we tried to give the pros and cons wherever we

could see pros and cons on the issues." Little criticism arose about definition of
82 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

the issues. "In fact, all of the reviewing agencies simply accepted our definition of

the issues and gave their advice on those issues as defined."35

On 11 September McNamara provided the service secretaries, Joint Chiefs,

and OSD staff a status report and a timetable for remaining actions on the

budget. In doing so he strongly suggested the need for substantial trimming.

Already he had completed his review of the Offensive War Forces package,

had briefly gone over research and development issues, and had the Sealift and

Airlift Forces package currently under review. He definitely planned to examine

the important General Purpose Forces package before 23 September, the date

when he would send the services the assumptions for use in preparation of their

budgets. But he implied that he might not be able to review all the packages by

then.

During the last week in September McNamara thought he might discuss

with the president "tentative financial levels," since Kennedy had already received

from the Bureau of the Budget, the Council of Economic Advisers, and the Treasury Department estimates regarding the government's general revenue situation.

As for the DoD budget, McNamara did not want "dollar limits" to be the basis

for budget decisions. "Nevertheless," he added, "we must consider the resources

of the country." The submissions of nearly $64 billion (TOA), he felt "offhand,"

were too high. He called attention to the fact that they had already added $6

billion (NOA) to the FY 1962 budget through amendments. His preliminary

review of the service submissions for FY 1963 had revealed many items "where

we don't receive value for the costs involved." Moreover, many items seemed "out

of balance internally within the Services and between the Services."

In any event the services would have a month-until 23 October-to submit

their budgets. Hitch's staff and BoB analysts would then take about five weeks to

try to isolate fundamental issues and controversial items. Prior to submitting the

final budget to the president on 1 December, McNamara hoped to have a full

series of discussions with the service secretaries and the Joint Chiefs. In the past

the chiefs, he understood, had taken part in only some of the budget discussions.

This year he wanted to include them in all the discussions. 36

On 22 September, conceding he had not had as much time as he would have

liked, McNamara sent the services and the chiefs his tentative decisions. The

total for all programs was just under $54 billion (TOA), a substantial reduction

from the nearly $64 billion originally requested by all DoD elements. His estimates, the secretary admitted, were approximate and in many instances still high,

but they would receive further scrutiny once the budget review began. Since the

major objective during the Berlin crisis looked to building up combat power,

McNamara highlighted the importance of cutting back in areas that contributed

little to combat strength, adding, "I have dealt severely in the program review

with all programs I so identified."3?
The FY 1963 Budget: Introducing the PPBS 83

TABLE 4

Military Services' Program Estimates for FY 1963

and Secretary of Defense 22 September 1961 Guidance

(TOA $ billions)

Program

General war offensive forces

General war defensive forces

General purpose forces

Sealift and airlift forces

Reserve and National Guard

Research and development

Service-wide support

Department of Defense

Retired pay

Military assistance

Total

Services'

Estimates

10.39

3.61

22.12

1.48

2.46

7.14

13.03

0.74

1.01

1.70

63.68

McNamara's

22 Sept Guidance

8.93

3.03

18.81

1.27

1.80

5.42

11.06

0.68

1.01

1.70

53.71

Reduction

-1.46

-0.58

-3.31

-0.21

-0.66

-1.72

-1.97

-0.06

o

o

-9.97

Source: Compiled from draft memo McNamara for Kennedy, 6 Oct 61, FRUS 1961-63,

VIII: 160. In his own guidance estimates, McNamara also included an additional $500 million in a miscellaneous category and projected reductions of $3 billion to be obtained from

refining cost estimates and eliminating non-essential items.

The First Draft Presidential Memorandums (DPMs)

The five-year projections proved a difficult task, in part because of disagreements between the Joint Chiefs, as might be expected, on several issues, notably

the relative merits ofindividual weapon systems. In July the chiefs tried to produce

a corporate opinion on force levels for fiscal years 1963-67, but failed, disagreeing on virtually all the important weapon systems. The new Air Force chief of

staff, General Curtis LeMay, stood at the center of the discord. He urged replacing aging B-52 bombers with newer models and producing larger numbers of

Skybolt, Titan, and mobile and fixed Minuteman missiles than the other chiefs

would accept. Except for the occasional backing of JCS Chairman General

Lyman Lemnitzer, LeMay found little support among his colleagues. Since LeMay

considered Minuteman more cost-effective than Polaris, he favored producing

additional Minuteman missiles rather than enlarging the Polaris force. All the

other JCS members, however, wanted the Polaris program to continue beyond

the authorized 29 boats. Although they felt that production of fixed Minuteman missiles should continue beyond the 600 authorized for FY 1964, it was

too early to set the ultimate force level. Despite a request from McNamara that
84 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

they reconsider their positions, the chiefs advised him on 15 August that each

one had reaffirmed his previous stance. Given this lack of agreement, McNamara

turned to his own staff to assemble the projections for long-range nuclear delivery

systems. 38

Sometime during the summer of 1961 McNamara developed a method,

which he would employ throughout the remainder of his tenure as secretary, to

pull together for the president's consideration a wide variety of information on

important strategic and budgetary matters and to stimulate discussion, however

contentious, on what was needed. The idea of a draft presidential memorandum

(DPM) emerged during work by OSD staff members, including Enthoven, on

a paper for the president examining the strategy of massive retaliation and U.S.

nuclear weaponry through testing the implications of different assumptions.

The suggestion was made that such a review should be extended to other areas.

McNamara had these draft memoranda prepared initially by the OSD staff so

they would be written "without compromise or bargaining with other interested

parties." He also conceived of the DPM as a "device to get the views of appropriate departments for my own review" and insisted that each interested party

comment. By circulating them back and forth between himself, the service secretaries, and the Joint Chiefs, McNamara felt he could "force the divergent views to

the surface." 39

Preparation of the first several DPMs supported and supplemented the

review of certain program packages in the FY 1963 budget being conducted

by the comptroller's office in late August and early September. On 29 August

McNamara circulated to the service secretaries and Joint Chiefs the first DPM,

which contained his recommendations for long-range nuclear delivery forces

during the period 1963-67. Having received their comments, he followed this up

with a revised version on the same subject dated 23 September. In the meantime,

he also circulated a DPM on sealift and airlift forces on 1 September.4o

It is not clear whether McNamara discussed his tentative budget decisions

with Kennedy late in September, as he said he might do. However, he did send

to the president on 6 October three draft presidential memorandums. The covering DPM of that date summarized his preliminary budget recommendations for

FY 1963 and projected costs and force structures for four subsequent years. He

appended to it the revised DPM of 23 September on long-range nuclear delivery forces and a DPM dated 30 September transmitting his recommendations

regarding the Nike-Zeus antimissile system.41

In the covering DPM, McNamara noted that the service and related proposals for the program packages averaged about $15 billion more per year over the

period FY 1963-FY 1967 than his own recommendations. The budget estimates

had been based on the assumption that the Berlin crisis would ease by the beginning of FY 1963. His recommendations for that fiscal year, which came to almost

$10 billion less than the services had asked for, also called for fewer combat
The FY 1963 Budget: Introducing the PPBS 85

units and at manning levels lower than those the services proposed. Among his

more significant recommendations on specific weapon systems: disapproval of an

Air Force proposal to purchase additional F-106 interceptor aircraft to replace

F-102s; continuation of the B-70 bomber only as a development program without approving it as a full weapon system, as the Air Force proposed; deployment

of Nike-Zeus missile defense for six cities; and construction of a conventionally

powered attack aircraft carrier (the Navy wanted it to be nuclear-powered).42

While the White House pondered McNamara's DPMs, the Pentagon proceeded

with the budgeting phase.

The Budgeting Phase

If the new procedures worked as hoped, Hitch expected the final phase that

took place each fall-the traditional budgeting exercise-to proceed smoothly

and quickly.43 Within the comptroller's office this work fell to the deputy assistant secretary of defense (budgeting), Joseph S. Hoover, and his staff. The first

time around with the new procedures, however, it proved more complicated and

drawn out than Hitch may have anticipated.

The services and other 000 components submitted their formal budgets on

23 October, accomplishing in a month what had usually taken five months.44

Their proposals, not including funds for civil defense and the military assistance program, totaled $52.734 billion (TOA), some $1.122 billion more

than McNamara's guidance ($51.612 billion). A large portion of the additional amount, $586 million, pertained to classified projects, an area for which

McNamara had provided no guidance. All three services came in under the

amount set for General Purpose Forces. The largest increases in percentage

terms were those for the Sealift and Airlift Forces package, where the Air Force

requested an additional $278 million, nearly a 23 percent increase over what

McNamara had tentatively decided. For Central War Offensive Forces both the

Navy and the Air Force requested additional sums, but relatively modest as a

percentage ofthe total amounts.45

What followed proved in large measure a reenactment of the customary

hectic process of finalizing the 000 budget under tight deadlines, but with

certain new features. The deep involvement of the secretary provided the major

new element, although refinement of the services' budget proposals took place

on several levels within 000. The OSD comptroller's budgeting staff, together

with BoB representatives, conducted a detailed review of the service budgets,

after which they presented their recommendations to the secretary for decision.

A second level ofscrutiny involved another intensive review by McNamara. On 7

November he informed the service secretaries and JCS Chairman Lemnitzer that

during the next two weeks he would be making decisions on the budget proposals, written notice of which they would receive on a day-to-day basis. If they
86 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

desired reconsideration, they were to bring their appeals to his attention within

three days.46 McNamara later said that he and Gilpatric shared the review responsibilities, but a random check ofthe decisions indicates that McNamara made the

overwhelming majority of them. The two men went over some 560 individual

items, transmitting their judgments back to the service secretaries and to the Joint

Chiefs in the form ofsubject/issue sheets that came to be called "snowflakes."47

Still another level of review involved responding to the service appeals or

reclamas. For example, McNamara rejected the Air Force appeal regarding the

B-70 aircraft-for $398.3 million in FY 1962 funds and $675.8 million in FY

1963. On DDR&E's recommendation, in late November McNamara upheld his

earlier decision that no additional FY 1962 money be spent and that only $171

million be spent in FY 1963.48

In the meantime, McNamara's invitation to the service secretaries to comment

on the long-term projections contained in his draft presidential memorandums

produced a mixed reaction. Only one, Navy Secretary John Connally, expressed

general satisfaction with the recommended force levels. While indicating that

higher levels than those McNamara had proposed would bring significant advantages, Connally did not believe them "absolutely essential" to national security.

The Navy response may have been influenced in part by McNamara's decision

a few days before to increase Navy manpower levels. Although McNamara had

initially set Navy strength at 640,600, Connally and new Chief of Naval Operations Admiral George Anderson persuaded him that the Navy needed at least

28,000 more men. "I have thought for some time," McNamara noted in agreeing to the increase, that "the Navy has exercised tighter control over its personnel

than either the Air Force or the Army."49

On the other hand, Air Force Secretary Eugene Zuckert and Chief of Staff

LeMay submitted detailed memorandums taking exception to the strategic force

levels. "I cannot urge too strongly" a reconsideration of decisions concerning

long-range nuclear delivery forces, Zuckert told McNamara. He felt McNamara

had rejected the strengths needed for "a credible option to pre-empt in general

war. This rejection is by choice, not through necessity." Zuckert recommended

raising the levels to those proposed in the Air Force budget submission for FY

1963. Obviously unimpressed, McNamara wrote in the margin of the memo,

"After repeated requests the AF has failed to supply any quantitative analysis of

the deficiency in the force we propose or any such analysis in support of the AF

recommendations."5o

The Army, toO, had trouble with spending and force levels. Army Secretary

Elvis Stahr continued to urge more funds for procurement of Army equipment

and ammunition and to argue for an Army force structure of 16 divisions with a

strength of 1,055,700 men, rather than the 14 divisions and 929,000-man level

McNamara had proposed. Stahr cautioned against assuming that a lowering of

tension over Berlin would justifY reducing U.S. military might. "If there were no
The FY 1963 Budget: Introducing the PPBS 87

Berlin threat," he stated, "I am convinced that we still would have a requirement

to maintain at least our current level of combat readiness for the indefinite furure.

The Communist threat is a constant one, and one that we must be prepared to

challenge in its varied forms at any time and on any front."5l

At a meeting with McNamara on 13 November, all the chiefs except Army

Chief of Staff General George Decker agreed that 14 divisions "were sufficient

to support our tactical and strategic plans, and that in any event 14 divisions

should be properly equipped before new divisions were added." Noting that he

and Gilpatric shared the view of the majority ofthe chiefs, McNamara thought it

wise, in order to permit the earliest possible deactivation of two reserve divisions,

to provide in the budget for sufficient funds and personnel to permit activation

as rapidly as possible of two additional regular Army divisions. He aurhorized

Stahr to increase the Army's budget proposal by an amount necessary to accomplish this objective and to increase Army strength from 929,000 to 960,000.

McNamara asked Stahr to prepare a detailed plan and time schedule for establishing the new divisions and bringing them to a combat state of readiness.52

White House Decisions

Concurrent with the various levels of budget review within the Department

of Defense the White House staff also examined McNamara's tentative recommendations to the president. Reviewers included Military Representative Taylor,

Special Assistant for National Security Mfairs McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant

for Science and Technology Jerome Wiesner, Special Counsel Theodore Sorensen,

and Budget Director Bell. In a memo to the president on 13 November, Bell

spoke for them all in praising "the enormous advances in concept, clarity, and

logic" that McNamara had introduced into the planning and budgeting process

and the "literally revolutionary" changes evident in the preparation of the FY

1963 budget compared with its predecessor. Among the major issues causing disagreement among the White House advisers were the overall size of the

strategic retaliatory force, the level of conventional forces, and specific weapon

systems such as Minureman and Nike-Zeus. Although the military services,

particularly the Air Force, as well as the JCS had proposed force levels higher

than McNamara's, Bell felt McNamara's "impressively logical analysis" of the

relative capabilities of u.s. and Soviet forces had persuaded the White House

staff that higher force levels were not needed. Nevertheless, it seemed to most

of them that McNamara's proposed force levels still looked higher than "purely

military grounds" would justify. However, Bell recognized that the U.S. public

might have difficulty accepting a slowing down of missile development programs.

As for specific weapon systems, the White House advisers agreed that spending

$1 billion for development and procurement of 100 mobile Minuteman missiles

appeared "questionable."53
88 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

On the key issue of increasing Army personnel and the number of regular

Army divisions from 14 to 16, which Bell did not directly address, the Army

received strong backing in the White House from General Taylor. According to

Glass, the additional two divisions were "rammed down" McNamara's throat

because ofTaylor's influence with the president.54

The decision on the number of divisions came over a period of days. On

20 November McNamara told his staff of general agreement on the overall

force structure for all the services, but not the cost of operating these forces. He

believed costs could be cut by an additional $3 billion "without adversely affecting or reducing the force structure." During the next week he would be sending

out daily decisions on budget matters, which he urged them not to appeal if

they could live with them. Some programs would not be canceled, but simply

deferred. One of the many changes discussed with the president the previous

week, he noted, concerned the addition of two regular Army divisions. To effect

this change required a careful plan to adjust tours of duty and dependency travel

and to return two National Guard divisions to reserve duty once the Berlin crisis

abated. 55 At a meeting at Hyannis Port, Massachusetts, over the Thanksgiving

weekend, the president reportedly "took the initiative in arguing for a higher

level" of Army manpower, directing McNamara "to take another look at the

numbers implications." Expectations, however, were that McNamara would go

no higher than 980,000. 56

A second major issue relating to Army manpower centered on a proposal

under study since the spring of 1961 to reorganize the National Guard and

Reserve. Over the years efforts had periodically been made to cut the size of the

Guard and Army Reserve but had been defeated by strong public and congressional opposition. Not only had the Berlin crisis during the summer of 1961

diverted attention from the Army reorganization planning the Kennedy administration had initiated, but the problems encountered in the subsequent partial

mobilization had shaken assumptions on which the administration had begun

to consider reorganization. The Army produced 19 revisions of the plan before

submitting it in mid-November to the OSD comptroller's officeY

McNamara forwarded the plan with some changes to the president on 7

December. The secretary's memo focused on the details of the reorganization

and how to present it to the public, not the cost. To meet contingencies requiring rapid limited mobilization, McNamara contemplated a smaller reserve force

but at a higher state of readiness. He wanted to reduce the combined authorized

strength for the Army National Guard and Reserve from 700,000 to 670,000 and

eliminate 10 divisions, but did not specify how the cut would be allocated. The

overall 30,000-man reduction, he pointed out, would be offset by the addition of

the two active Army divisions. Six reserve divisions, along with nine brigades and

the non-divisional units needed to reinforce the active Army, would have priority

and would receive about two-thirds the amount proposed for the entire reserve
The FY 1963 Budget: Introducing the PPBS 89

program. They would receive increased manning and equipment as well as more

full-time technicians than the current priority units.

And readiness would be increased. By the end of 1964 the readiness objectives for the new priority divisions would be five to eight weeks, a marked

improvement over the current four to six months for deployment of priority divisions. The Army wanted to eliminate only 8 instead of the 10 Reserve

and National Guard divisions recommended by McNamara, on the assumption

that a smaller reduction might lessen political opposition to the proposed reorganization. Nevertheless, McNamara had discussed his recommendations with

Stahr, who told him that he and General Decker considered them "militarily

acceptable." McNamara had asked the Army to prepare a detailed plan for implementing and explaining the program, portraying it "not as a device for reducing

the role of the Army Reserve Components but rather as an effort to enhance the

capability ofthese components to meet the present day military needs." Presented

in this way, McNamara told the president, he felt the plan "should be acceptable

to reserve leadership, Congress, and the public."58 But when a summary of the

plan leaked in the New York Times a week later, intense opposition quickly developed and persisted until completion of congressional action many months later. 59

Toward the end of the budgetary review, probably during the first week in

December, McNamara and Bell met to resolve remaining differences over the

main issues. Previously, the secretary of defense or the OSD comptroller had

gone to the Bureau of the Budget office for this final discussion. McNamara

changed this. He had Bell and his staff come to the Pentagon and assemble in

the secretary's dining room, perhaps the first time that a department head had

not conducted this final reconciliation on Budget's home turf. As Glass recalled,

"McNamara sat at the head of the table, as the judge .... He would take the role

of the President, in other words, reconciling the differing points of view." He

proposed "to reduce to a minimum the number ofissues which the President had

to resolve."6o

On 7 December McNamara sent Bell his final recommendations calling for

almost $50.77 billion NOA for military functions ofthe Department of Defense,

including $692.5 million for civil defense. 61 Amid reports that a balanced overall

federal budget still had not been reached, the president returned to Washington

from Palm Beach, Florida, on 9 December to meet with Bell and McNamara. At

this meeting, also attended by Gilpatric and Hitch, the conferees decided on the

general dimensions of the DoD budget. Afterward Hitch reported to the service

secretaries, chiefs, and OSD staff that McNamara appreciated how "rough" the

budget review had been and that it had produced a "tight budget," so tight that

DoD had to make clear to Congress that any additional cuts would have serious

repercussions. Gilpatric reminded everyone that he and McNamara had taken

seriously the "responsibility of not operating under a fixed budget ceiling."62
90 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

The budget was finally "put to bed" at a White House meeting on 11

December, with the president deciding in favor of 100 extra fixed Minuteman

missiles to bring the total to 200, as McNamara had recommended, but deleting

from the budget funds for the mobile Minuteman and canceling that program.

Still unconvinced of the wisdom of eventually deploying Nike-Zeus, Kennedy

decided against procurement of the weapon in FY 1963. Bell had been recommending that $48.5 billion represent an expenditure target for Defense, and

throughout December he insisted on further cuts. Although the press speculated

that some last-minute budget decisions reflected efforts to stay under budget ceilings, 000 sources "scrupulously" insisted that no ceilings had come into play.63

Despite continued pressure from the Air Force to increase the numbers of

fixed Minuteman missiles even more, McNamara, as well as the president, held

firm. On 23 December Gilpatric received a briefing from LeMay summarizing a

new study confirming the Air Force's earlier conclusions on the need to proceed

immediately on production of the B-70 and to budget for a considerably larger

hardened and dispersed Minuteman force of 900 missiles plus long lead-time

construction of additional missiles in FY 1963 in order to preserve the option

to go to a larger force later. LeMay planned to present the same argument to

the president the following week, but White House Deputy Special Assistant for

National Security Affairs Carl Kaysen urged Kennedy to avoid giving him a definite response on the B-70 since a decision could be postponed at least until the

end of 1962. Kaysen pointed out that "no one outside the Air Force now foresees

going ahead beyond the three prototypes to a procurement program for a variety

of reasons, including high cost ($50 to $100 million per aircraft) and doubt as

to whether the design proposed can perform the missions envisioned for the B70." Kaysen also thought LeMay would raise the need to increase the number

of fixed Minuteman missiles, noting that the Air Force wanted 2,600 by 1967,

while SAC officers informally were talking about 8,000 or 10,000 by that time.

Again he pointed out no need for an immediate decision.64

On 3 January 1962 the president met with the Joint Chiefs, McNamara,

Vice President Johnson, and others in Palm Beach to review the Defense budget.

The Air Force remained untesigned to certain decisions. Vice Chief of Staff

General Frederic H. Smith, Jr., attending in LeMay's absence, while gratified that

the budget included five additional fighter wings for the Air Force and increased

airlift capacity, reiterated strong Air Force concerns about what it considered

deficiencies in strategic nuclear weapons in the period after 1965. Among other

things, Smith called for funding an additional 100 Minuteman missiles in FY

1963 and "at the very least" proceeding with development of the B-70 as a full

weapon system. Kennedy expressed a willingness to hear LeMay make another

presentation on the force structure, but he stressed that the Air Force should be

ready to show how additional forces would enhance overall U.S. military strength

versus that of the Soviet Union. Both the president and McNamara emphasized
The FY 1963 Budget: Introducing the PPBS 91

that the strategic force levels had not been "dictated by availability of funds or

other budgetary considerations."

The other chiefs went along. General Decker remarked that the Army had

"done well by" the budget, although the personnel ceiling remained rather tight.

He reiterated the Army's support for proceeding as soon as possible with NikeZeus production. The reorganization of the reserves had "military advantages,"

but Decker recognized the difficulties that would be encountered in cutting the

number of National Guard or Reserve divisions. Like Decker, Admiral Anderson

expressed general satisfaction with the budget-it would support a "better Navy"

and the Navy could "live with" it-but he thought maintenance and personnel

funds would be tight. Anderson also made the case for the new carrier included

in the budget and went over the rationale for giving it conventional rather than

nuclear propulsion. Marine Corps Commandant General Shoup declared that

preparation of the FY 1963 budget had been superior to any he had witnessed in

the past seven years. 65

On 9 January McNamara briefed congressional leaders of both parties, whom

the president had invited to the White House, on the new budget.66 Right up to

the last minute Kennedy and BoB, in consultation with McNamara, made about

a dozen changes, apparently seeking to attain an overall balanced budget. The

new revisions, mostly cuts, accounted for a further net reduction of some $600

million from the figures McNamara had submitted in early December.67

Notwithstanding all the trimming, DoD still took a huge chunk of the

budget Kennedy formally presented to Congress on 18 January 1962. Estimated

overall expenditures came to $92.5 billion, about what Bell had projected the

previous spring. 000 expenditures, including military assistance, totaled $49.7

billion, considerably more than Bell's spring projection. The $51.6 billion (NOA)

for the Department of Defense represented the largest peacetime defense budget

in history. Even though an increase had been expected, it exceeded expectations.68

The breakdown by program is shown in Table 5.

The budget rested on two optimistic assumptions. The first, which directly

affected the Defense portion and on which McNamara had all along based the

budget preparation, posited that the Berlin crisis would not extend into FY 1963.

The second, more general, anticipated continued robust economic recovery from

the 1961 recession, permitting the president to project an increase in receipts of

$10.9 billion over the previous fiscal year and an operating surplus of as much as

$4.4 billion.69

A Lasting Impact

Though it had drawbacks and detractors, the Planning-ProgrammingBudgeting System the Department of Defense hurriedly inaugurated during

1961 proved extremely durable. Constantly modified, it continued to serve as the
92 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

TABLE 5

January 1962 Budget Estimates for FY 1963 Program

($ billions)

Strategic retaliatory forces

Continental air and missile defense forces

General purpose forces

Sealift and airlift

Reserve forces

Research and development

General support

Civil defense

Military assistance

Proposed legislation

Total obligational authority

Less prior year funds

New obligational authority

a Discrepancy due to rounded figures.

Source: The Budget ofthe United States, FY 1963, 58.

9.4

2.1

18.4

1.3

1.9

5.7

12.8

.7

1.5

.2

53.9 a

2.3

51.6

foundation for budgeting procedures within DoD and spread elsewhere in the

federal government. In August 1965 Kennedy's successor, Lyndon Johnson, favorably impressed by the results at Defense, mandated its adoption by all federal

agencies. Some, like the Department of State, tried but had difficulty making it

work. Perhaps PPBS was better suited to agencies with program-oriented activities. Or, as one writer has observed, perhaps "PPBS works best for an aggressive

master; and where there is no master, or where the master wants the machinery to

produce his decisions without his own participation, the value of PPBS is likely

to be modest and, depending on the people, may even be negative."7o

Certainly McNamara was an aggressive master. Hitch has pointed out that

PPBS gave the secretary of defense the necessary tools for exercising his authority to unify the activities of the military services. And McNamara forcefully used

these tools. But the new system not only provided him greater control over the

budgeting process, it also demanded more time, requiring that the secretary

familiarize himself with the details and relative merits of a multitude of proposals. When Hitch unveiled the new system in the spring of 1961, a member of the

Joint Staff remarked, "Good. From now on, whenever the Secretary of Defense

wants to cut the Army's budget, he will have to name the units."71

McNamara was aware of criticism that he and his staff ignored the advice

of the professional military men. He therefore went to great lengths to consult

with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and even had a compilation made of the number
The FY 1963 Budget: Introducing the PPBS 93

of his meetings with the chiefs regarding the FY 1963 budget-18 in all-which

Lemnitzer later mentioned in his congressional testimony/2 He also made sure

that the service secretaries, as well as the chiefs, received and were encouraged to

comment on the budget submissions of all parties involved.

In one sense, all this represented a broadening of participation in the budget

preparation. Viewed from another perspective, however, PPBS represented a

concentration of power in McNamara's and OSD's hands, for they conceived and

inaugurated the system, provided the fiscal guidance, defined the controversial

issues, drafted the memorandums to the president, made the final budget recommendations, and accepted or rejected the services' reclamas.

Some saw in the greater concentration of power a danger that lower-level

doubt and dissent would be stifled. Since the new system reduced bargaining

between OSD and the services, it might tempt OSD "to ignore or simply not to

hear things it would rather not hear-other beliefs about technological change,

different estimates of costs and gains, conflicting views of the contingencies and

uncertainties." Thus Defense programs might become "more nearly tailored to

one estimate of the future and to one cost-benefit calculus than in a period when

decision-making was less centralized."73

Others feared that the new system diminished the roles of the service secretaries. Dissatisfaction with the preparation of the FY 1963 budget, no doubt,

contributed to the resignations of Navy Secretary Connally and Army Secretary Stahr, as well as to the near-resignation of Air Force Secretary Zuckert.

Just before Christmas 1961, Connally, upset with McNamara's handling of the

airlift and sealift portion of the FY 1963 budget, announced his intention to

return to the state of Texas to seek the gubernatorial nomination. He was the

first Kennedy appointee to leave the administration. Stahr stayed on until the

following June, when he left to become president of Indiana University. In an

interview he praised McNamara personally, but decried the over-centralization of

decisionmaking in the hands of the secretary and his aides. As an example, Stahr

cited McNamara's personal review of each ofthe hundreds ofsubject/issues in the

final stages of the budget preparation, some dealing with millions of dollars but

others with much smaller amounts. While he thought this reflected admirable

dedication on McNamara's part, it also represented a kind of "overreaching" for

personal control.74 McNamara's involvement in every detail ofthe budget process

was so great that it prompted concern among some DoD officials as to what

would happen if he became incapacitated. They doubted whether a substitute or

a successor would have his capacity for handling such a large volume ofwork/5

Rather than resign, Zuckert decided to adapt to McNamara's way of operating, He had thought about leaving as a result of mounting frustration over a

series of clashes with OSD, but instead convened a meeting of key advisers in

December 1961 at Homestead Air Force Base in Florida. He told them that the

Air Force had been losing to McNamara on budget issues and needed to improve
94 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

the quality of its position papers and briefings, which had failed to impress

McNamara and others in 050. Zuckert, having first met McNamara in 1940

when they were on the faculty of the Harvard Business School and having maintained contact with him after the war, may have known him better than anyone

in the administration. He later observed that McNamara, "as I had learned

from long association, is pragmatic and basically unsentimental about his work.

He believes simply that if what you are asking is not in harmony with what he

wants you to do, he should reject your proposal, and he should not feel sorry for

you."76

Notwithstanding the criticism, the new procedures accomplished much of

what McNamara had hoped for. He took special pride in the avoidance of the

arbitrary budget ceilings formerly employed. Constraints, of course, did come

into play, but of a different nature. By an "arbitrary" budget ceiling, Hitch carefully noted in January 1962, "I mean one that has been decided in advance

independently of the job to be done or the program approved-not the use of

ceilings on particular programs as a management tool to enforce financial discipline."77

For McNamara, renunciation of budget ceilings became a matter of doctrinal rectitude. Adhering too rigidly to President Kennedy's instruction on the

matter, he was reluctant to admit they could intrude in any form into the budget

calculations. When speaking of constraints he seemed to avoid even using the

word "ceiling." According to Glass, McNamara "insisted on maintaining to the

bitter end that this country can afford whatever defense program it needs ...

that we start with the program, and whatever that program costs, that's what we

ask for." Glass pointed out that McNamara obviously "had to keep in mind the

overall federal budget and fit the Defense program into that"-and some of the

secretary's private comments during the FY 1963 budget preparation reveal his

recognition of this need. But McNamara's way of reviewing a program allowed

him to "keep working it over until he got it within the necessary bounds....

This is what he had in the back of his mind, even though he would not acknowledge it." McNamara refused to "acknowledge that he had to fit the Defense

program into the total federal budget, so we had to keep that policy line going in

everything having to do with him."78

Pressures in the other direction, such as the need to satisfY Congress of the

adequacy of the proposals, may have also been at work. A story has been told

that at some point in 1961 several White House aides tried to arrest the growth

in the number of U.S. missiles. The United States had 450 missiles, McNamara

wanted to increase the number to 950, and the Joint Chiefs wanted 3,000. The

White House staffers had learned, however, that 450 missiles were just as effective as twice that number. When the president addressed the issue, the following

exchange reportedly took place with McNamara:
The FY 1963 Budget: Introducing the PPB5 95

"What about it, Bob?" Kennedy asked.

"Well, they'te right," McNamara answered.

"Well, then, why the nine hundred and fifty, Bob?" Kennedy asked.

"Because that's the smallest number we can take up on the Hill

without getting murdered," he answered.79

Another source of pride was the adoption of five-year force projections,

a feature, like PPB5, that became permanent not only in the Department of

Defense but throughout the federal government. Hitch realized that only the

planning for FY 1963 had much validity and that the initial long-term projections for FYs 1964-67 were of necessity "very, very crude and rough." For that

reason he and McNamara decided not to use them in their presentation to

Congress on the FY 1963 budget. Hitch marveled, however, at McNamara's

persistence and foresight in developing the multi-year projections. "It just meant

a hell of a lot of quick, arbitrary decisions," Hitch said, "but I've never seen a

man so hard to discourage; and, in the end, he was right."so

Hitch remained as comptroller until 1965 when he returned to academic

life. His own quiet persistence-as well as his gentlemanly demeanor, balanced

explanations of the new system, and clear vision of what he hoped to accomplish-may have contributed as much or more to the successful launching of

PPB5 than McNamara's forceful managerial style. In any event McNamara highly

valued Hitch's contributions, recalling him to be a "superb" comptroller, not so

much in an accounting sense, but more in the area of strategic planning and the

derivation offorce levels from that planning.s1

However much the introduction of PPB5 constituted a positive, far-reaching

achievement for McNamara, Hitch, and others in 050, it came at substantial

cost, too. Not only did the new process leave service sensibilities bruised, particularly the Air Force's, but the resulting budget provoked major controversies

with Congress, in part because of perceived shortcomings in the way it had been

prepared.
CHAPTER V

Congress and the FY 1963 Budget

Congressional consideration of the FY 1963 Department of Defense budget

presents something of a paradox.* On the one hand, although the requested

amount of $47.907 billion was the largest since the Korean War, the appropriation bill-in the words of one scholar-"slipped through Congress almost

unnoticed." 1 Floor debate evoked little partisanship despite the congressional elections scheduled for the end of the year. On the other hand, two intense

controversies erupted during committee hearings. They centered on the issue of

legislative versus executive powers, specifically (1) whether Congress could force

the administration to spend money appropriated to develop the RS-70 aircraft,

and (2) whether it could prevent the administration from reducing the overall

strength ofthe Army National Guard and Reserve.

The chief opposition to administration plans came from members of the

president's own party, including 78-year-old Carl Vinson, the powerful chairman

of the House Armed Services Committee; Virginia Sen. A. Willis Robertson,

acting chairman of a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations; and Louisiana Rep. F. Edward Hebert, chairman of a House subcommittee

on reserve affairs. Only timely intervention by President Kennedy in the RS70 dispute and Secretary of Defense McNamara's promise to study that matter

further, plus a carefully crafted compromise with Congress regarding the National

Guard and Reserve reorganization, avoided more serious rifts. The disputes,

however, marked the beginning of what would increasingly become a strained

relationship between McNamara and Congress.

* Treated here and in other chapters on 000 budgers is consideration only of rhe appropriation bill for major

military functions, which did not include military construction and housing. Regarding the separate bills for

milirary assisrance, see Chapter XVI. Funds for civil defense were included in the 000 appropriation bill for

FY 1962 after the president in July 1961 transferred responsibility for civil defense from OCDM ro 000.

However. in subsequent years beginning wirh FY 1963, civil defense was also funded by a separate appropriation bill.

96
Congress and the FY 1963 Budget 97

McNamara at Center Stage

Although McNamara had testified before congressional committees in connection with the FY 1962 budget and other matters, his basic presentation (known as

the posture statement) and the budget for FY 1963 marked the first that he and

his staff had developed on their own. Presenting them to Congress involved intensive effort. During a three-week period from late January through mid-February

1962, he spent all or part of 13 days appearing before the armed services committees on procurement authorization, which came to $12.4811 billion, as well as the

appropriations subcommittees regarding the appropriation bill.

McNamara held firm views regarding the nature of the presentation. For

one thing, he favored a lengthy, comprehensive statement. "I don't care if it

takes a thousand pages," he told Henry Glass, who prepared the statement. "I

want to get into the details of the programs and give the pros and cons." Glass

advised against this because of DoD's not infrequent adversarial relationship with

Congress: "We make our case and let them make their case." In the end Glass

drafted the statement the way McNamara wanted, though this kind of elaboration gradually disappeared from subsequent renditions. 2

The finished statement came to 167 pages and included 38 tables, an introduction describing the preparation of the budget, a survey of the international

situation and its bearing on military policies and programs, and a review of the

major defense policy problem areas. Subsequent sections corresponded rather

closely to the program packages. The discussion of foreign policy represented an

innovation, something McNamara felt provided the necessary intellectual foundation for military strategy, force structure, and the budget. McNamara recalled

that Secretary of State Dean Rusk had supported its inclusion, but others at the

State Department saw it as a usurpation of the responsibility of the secretary of

state}

How much of the statement to read to the committees posed a problem.

A drawn-out presentation risked losing the attention of committee members,

a point about which Sen. Margaret Chase Smith of the Senate Armed Services

Committee felt strongly. Committee members, she observed, became restless and

disinterested if they had to wait a long time before asking questions. McNamara's

assistant for legislative affairs, Norman S. Paul, therefore suggested that the secretary enter into the record a classified comprehensive statement at the beginning of

his testimony. He then could read a shorter classified version, perhaps no longer

than 45 minutes, which would allow time for questions. Both the long and short

classified statements could have complete sets of tables attached. Finally, an

unclassified version of the longer statement, with tables, might be given to the

committee for release to the press.4

When McNamara led off the authorization hearings before the Senate

Armed Services Committee on 19 January 1962 and its House counterpart on 24
98 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

January, he employed a somewhat different method for condensing the presentation. Each committee member received a copy of the entire classified statement.

But in reading the statement the secretary skipped over less important portions

that had been lined in blue in the margin. He intended to pause at three or four

points so committee members could raise questions on matters covered to that

point.S

The plan worked better with the House than the Senate committee, whose

members, as Senator Smith had predicted, grew restless. After listening to

McNamara read about the first quarter of the statement before asking questions,

the senators frequently interrupted the rest of his reading. On the other hand, the

perhaps more disciplined House committee under Chairman Vinson confined

most of its questioning to just two periods, allowing McNamara to read virtually

without pause during the entire mornings of 24 and 26 January and a good part

ofthe latter afternoon.6

McNamara did not accept Paul's advice in another respect. Paul had wanted

the secretary to present a detailed accounting of the savings that had occurred

as a result of his organizational changes. Since it was an election year and with

authorized spending and expenditures projected to rise significantly, Paul thought

committee members would raise probing questions about cost savings. When the

subject did come up during the Senate hearings, McNamara explained why he

had said nothing about it in the posture statement. First, he pointed out that

savings from some changes were difficult to quantifY in dollars and cents. Second,

and perhaps more importantly, the timing was not right. As McNamara admitted, "I did not wish to embarrass myself or the members of the committee by

coming in here asking for $8 billion more for 1963 than the original submission

for 1962, and at the same time trying to prove I had saved X amount of dollars."

Pressed nevertheless by Stuart Symington to provide figures on how much money

he had saved by adopting new procedures, the secretary responded that he would

try as time permitted to come up with this information.*7

McNamara and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Lyman Lemnitzer

spent three full days before the Senate committee, with a majority of the 15

members present at each session. The pace of the hearings then quickenedperhaps in part because committee participation waned. On some days as few as

two or three members joined Chairman Richard Russell, who conducted most

of the questioning of the service secretaries, including newly appointed Secretary

of the Navy Fred Korth, and their principal military advisers. On 2 February the

committee wrapped up its hearings and awaited completion by the House Armed

Services Committee of its hearings and House action on the authorization bill.

McNamara's performance astonished his audiences, including his own staff.

In the past, after rather brief opening remarks, secretaries had often relied on

* Regarding rhe announcement by McNamara in July 1962 of a Cost Reduction Program, see Chapter XVII.
Congress and the FY 1963 Budget 99

subordinates when they needed to delve into details. It quickly became apparent

to Glass that McNamara "didn't need us, because he had, in addition to the statement, a set of backup books, each of which had to be an inch thick. No matter

how I would arrange these backup papers-we would develop a hundred or

more-he would rearrange them to suit his presentation. He could immediately

turn to the right backup paper in the right book to supplement what was in the

statement."8 According to one newspaperman, who must have received his information from someone present at the closed sessions, McNamara's statement not

only exceeded in length all previous presentations by secretaries of defense, but

was "possibly the most reasoned and well-constructed." This same press account

indicated that the secretary had displayed thorough understanding of the subject

and had spoken almost with "relish."9

Although a new administration had prepared the budget and posture statement employing untried procedures and under the pressure of the Berlin crisis,

congressional committee members were unstinting in their praise. Russell

called the presentation "a new peak in our hearings" and "an encyclopedic statement." Sens. Leverett Saltonstall and John Stennis also commended McNamara.

Symington termed the statement "unique" and thanked the secretary for giving

the committee "a great deal more justification for this tremendous amount of

money than has been presented before."10 Vinson, who had served in the House

since 1914, said it was a "magnificent" presentation, "the most comprehensive,

most factual statement that has ever been my privilege to have an opportunity to

receive from any of the departments of Government." Especially impressed with

McNamara's evenhandedness, he said, "you dealt with both sides ofthe problems.

When you reach a decision, you set out the reasons why you reached that decision. You point out why-it probably could have been done the other way, but

the other facts were superior and therefore you followed the method you did."!!

In neither armed services committee did McNamara face sharp questioning.

Granted he had to respond to criticisms of the manner in which the National

Guard had been activated during the Berlin crisis and to explain the reasons

behind some of the key weapon systems decisions, such as the increase in the

number of Polaris submarines, the limiting of the number of fixed Minuteman missiles, and the request of only $171 million for the RS-70 development

program, but much of the questioning focused on technical aspects where he

could demonstrate his mastery of detail.

During the House hearings inquiries about the administration's decisions the

previous year not to spend funds appropriated for certain weapon systems certainly

revealed annoyance. Vinson asked McNamara to place on record an explanation of

why, "after the President signs the appropriation bill and it becomes the law ofthe

land, and after Congress makes the money available, then you say notwithstanding all of those facts, 'I do not think that 1 should spend the people's money

for these things.''' Massachusetts Republican William H. Bates was worried about
100 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

similar situations in the future: "I just wondered what kind of position we are

going to find ourselves sometime in if we really want something. What do we

have to say then-that we mean this or what? Just how would we accomplish the

will of the Congress? Because this is an authoriry contained in the Constitution

for the Congress." In response to Bates's question as to his authoriry for not carrying out the provisions of a law, McNamara asserted that a series of precedents

existed for such action, that appropriations represented only a ceiling for expenditures, but that "it might be different when the Congress wishes to mandate an

action and indicate the action in the law itself" The matter was dropped, and

he subsequently provided the committee a more detailed statement on executive

prerogatives in the spending of appropriated funds. 12 But the expressed concerns

gave warning of difficulties ahead.

Rebellion over the RS-70

Stretching the hearings out through the end of February, the House committee took testimony from the military service representatives in two separate

phases-the first focusing on general military posture and the second on the

specifics ofthe authorization bill. During the first phase in mid-February Air Force

Secretary Eugene Zuckert and his military aides said little about the RS-70.* The

Air Force indicated it had recently submitted an alternate proposal to the Office

of the Secretary of Defense regarding the aircraft, but had not yet received a reply.

Zuckert was joined-as he had been during the Senate committee hearings-by

Vice Chief of Staff General Frederic Smith, because Chief of Staff General Curtis

LeMay was just returning to work after recuperating from an illness. 13

By the end of the month LeMay was making his views known. On 26

February, in the second phase, Air Force representatives expressed to Vinson's

committee their unhappiness over the limited RS-70 program during a detailed

briefing-at the committee's invitation-by Col. David C. Jones, depury chief of

the Strategic Division of the Air Force's Directorate of Operations. Jones reported

that during the past week OSD had rejected the Air Force's recent proposal.

That proposal called for three additional protorype aircraft in the development

program by using $80 million of the $180 million of impounded FY 1962 funds

and $491 million in new FY 1963 funds. LeMay supported Jones's presentation

and framed the issue largely in terms of bombers versus missiles, pointing out

the desirabiliry of a mix of both manned and unmanned weapons systems but

contending that manned systems could perform more missions and had greater

flexibiliry than missiles. 14

* The Air Force proposed to develop the RS-70 (the "RS" for Reconnaissance-Strike) as a more versatile aircraft

than the B-70, which was a bomber designed to drop bombs on designated targets. The RS-70, carrying airto-surface missiles and yet-to-be developed reconnaissance radar, would survey damage following an attack and

strike surviving targets it could find.
Congress and the FY 1963 Budget 101

More openly chafing over the previous year's unspent money than before,

committee members sought a way to show support for the Air Force's new RS-70

proposal and considered amending the authorization bill. Such action posed a

practical problem. If the committee approved the amendment and the additional

money were later appropriated, one member wondered "how in the world are we

going to implement that and get the Defense Department to follow the Congressional recommendations? .... And they flaunted us and slapped us in the face on

this B-70 program this year, and I am just thinking that we ought to rise up, Mr.

Chairman, and let the Defense Department and the administration know that we

are not at all in favor oftheir actions on this matter." 15

An amendment of this kind raised a jurisdictional problem, too. The administration had requested research and development funds, so it remained uncertain

whether the Air Force proposal for additional funding properly fell within the

purview of the Armed Services Committee's procurement authority. Air Force

representatives argued that the proposal envisioned using $180 million of the

$491 million for the three additional prototypes; the committee should therefore

consider that amount as production funds. Vinson accepted this interpretation

and indicated that the committee would amend the authorization bill accordingly.16

The next day, 27 February, LeMay let loose a vigorous defense of the Air

Force's desire for more funding of both the RS-70 and the Minuteman missile in

open session before the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, chaired

by A. Willis Robertson. What especially worried LeMay was the administration's

heavy emphasis on increasing limited warfare capabilities and the projected

downward trend in spending on strategic weapons, whether missiles or bombers,

from about 18-20 percent of the total defense budget to approximately 8 percent

in some four years. "I do not think you can maintain superiority in this field with

that sort of program," he said. Newspaper accounts called his comments the first

major dissent within the administration on defense policies. 17

A second bombshell quickly followed when Vinson's committee, having

concluded its hearings on 28 February, unanimously reported an authorization bill with six amendments that raised the total amount to nearly $13.066

billion. News of the committee's action appeared even before formal issuance of

the report. Although McNamara was clearly the intended target, the key amendment "directed" the secretary of the Air Force to spend $491 million during FY

1963-about three times the amount the administration had requested-to

develop the RS-70. The committee also proposed to broaden its authority by

adding a provision to Sec. 412(b)* that would require authorization of funds not

only for procurement, but also for research and development of the RS-70. The

committee's discontent went beyond the immediate issue to what it perceived as

* See Chapter II!.
102 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

the diminished role of Congress in shaping national policy. It posed the question

whether Congress's function was "solely a negative one in that it can withhold

authoriry or funds and prevent something from being done? Or can it exercise a

positive authoriry and by affording the means require something to be done?"18

McNamara professed public surprise at the committee's action. During his

appearance in January, the committee had seemed to him satisfied with the administration's approach on the RS-70. Moreover, it had not asked him to return to

discuss the issue and had made its decision without further testimony from him.

Given the importance of the issue, McNamara said he welcomed an opportuniry

to appear again before Vinson's committee or any that would hear testimony on

the issue. He subsequently learned that a statement attributed to him about the

committee's seeming lack of interest in the RS-70 had infuriated Vinson. 19

Faced with a major political test of wills and possible constitutional crisis,

President Kennedy sought advice on how to deal with the committee's challenge.

McNamara wanted him to contest the wording of the proposed amendment.

However, his special assistant for legislative affairs, Lawrence F. O'Brien, warned

the president that he would lose any floor fight with Vinson, thus weakening his

position in future confrontations with Congress. Finally, White House lawyers

counseled him simply to ignore the language, if it became law, since the Constitution's separation of powers accorded him the ultimate authoriry.2o

The president adopted a two-track policy: he stood solidly behind McNamara

while at the same time extending an open hand to Congress. Asked at a press

conference on 7 March about the controversy, he emphasized his heavy reliance

on and great confidence in McNamara, but also acknowledged congressional

authoriry and competence. Kennedy expressed the hope that the administration

could talk it over with both the armed services and the appropriations committees of both houses so "we can get a better judgment as to what the language will

be at the end." A week later, he advocated waiting until all the committees and

the full Congress had acted before determining what he would do, but expressed

confidence that the matter would be resolved satisfactorily.21

McNamara sought advice. In a meeting on 5 March he asked the Joint

Chiefs whether their views on the RS-70 had changed from the previous fall and

whether the budget should be readjusted as Vinson's committee had indicated.

LeMay remained the only supporter of additional funding. McNamara made

clear his continuing opposition to imposing arbitrary dollar limits or ceilings

on programs, but he and the president had concerns that the overall cost of the

RS-70 program might reach $10 billion and have a detrimental effect on the rest

of the Defense program.22 So convincing was the secretary in his professed openmindedness that Chief of Naval Operations Admiral George Anderson left the

meeting worried that he might be considering cutting back the Polaris program

as a way to free up funds to accelerate development ofthe RS-70. 23
Congress and the FY 1963 Budget 103

The secretary also met with key aides to develop a plan of action, including tactics for presenting DoD's case to Congress and the public. He very much

wanted to avoid a public fight with Vinson over the constitutional question of

legislative-executive powers, a fight that might appear to be a clash between civil

and military authorities.24 Seeking to head off support for Vinson in the Senate,

he planned to meet with individual senators and small groups. But Paul, in light

of press reports suggesting that Russell and his committee intended to support

the House committee's proposed bill, urged McNamara to meet with the entire

Senate Armed Services Committee. Paul felt the Senate committee at this point

would likely go along with any substantial increase for the RS-70, but that a

majority of its members could be persuaded otherwise "if they get a full briefing

on the facts."25

McNamara received another opportunity to present his case, but not before

Russell's committee. On 14 March, at Vinson's invitation, he appeared in executive session before the full House Armed Services Committee. Paul advised him

to say something at the very beginning about the partnership between the legislative and executive branches on Defense matters. Calling attention to Vinson's

recent statement that he did not want to run the Department of Defense but

only to "sit at the table" and make a point now and then,26 Paul also remarked,

"We all know that this represents a slight understatement of the Chairman's position, but some reference to the wisdom and farsightedness of his Committee

would be in order." McNamara did just this. But his blend of deference to the

committee and its chairman, plus his detailed exposition of the reasons for limiting the development of the aircraft, brought no apparent softening of Vinson's

position.27

Having failed to persuade the committee to change its mind, McNamara held

a press conference the next day and released a 2,500-word statement-an unclassified version of his statement the previous day-detailing his reasons for opposing

full development of the aircraft. He surprised reporters by singling out Air Force

Chief of Staff LeMay as the only JCS member who had opposed the administration's position.28

Hopes for a compromise grew. In a joint television interview, asked who

would win in any showdown, Hebert foresaw a clear-cut congressional victory, but

Henry Jackson of the Senate Armed Services Committee predicted a compromise

"in which both sides will give," a prediction which Assistant Secretary of Defense

for Public Mfairs Arthur Sylvester pointedly drew to McNamara's attention. Elsewhere on Capitol Hill and at the Pentagon others spoke in a conciliatory vein.

"These aren't the kind of people who're going to annihilate themselves in a bloody

political brawl," commented a Vinson aide. "Surely," remarked one Defense official, "men of good will can find some middle ground for agreement."29

Fueling the hopes was the perception that Vinson's support in the House

was waning. In particular, members of the House Appropriations Committee
104 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

resented what seemed an invasion of their turf. Chairman George Mahon and

other members of his Defense Appropriations Subcommittee informed Vinson

they would fight any move to direct the president to spend the additional money

before it was appropriated, because this was "impractical and improper." Moreover, the language ofthe amended authorization bill made it seem that the Armed

Services Committee was directing Mahon's committee to appropriate money.

Mahon himself visited the White House to convey these views to the president.30

Vinsons Walk in the Rose Garden

Aware that McNamara had been unable to persuade Vinson to change his

mind but that Vinson's support in Congress was weakening, President Kennedy

moved to defuse the crisis. On the morning of 20 March, the day before the

scheduled House floor debate on the authorization bill, he told Speaker John

McCormack (D-Mass.) and other Democratic Party leaders that he wanted to

talk the matter over with Vinson. McNamara joined them that afternoon at the

White House and brought information the president had requested about the

administration's actions on items Congress had added the previous year to the

FY 1962 budget. The secretary pointed out, "We have utilized the funds for

the purposes for which Congress appropriated them in 18 instances. Only in 3

cases-the B52 Wing, the B70, and Dynasoar-have the funds been 'impounded

by the Executive Branch."'3!

At the White House meeting Vinson in effect-as McNamara recalled-told

the president: "You're a young President, I'm a senior member of Congress; but I

have tremendous respect for you as President and for the office of the President.

I understand the constitutional conflict that lies beneath the surface here. I don't

want to surface that. You don't want to surface it. I led my troops up that hill, I

was the leader of the B-70, I'll put them in reverse, and I'll lead them down the

hi11."32

According to a detailed newspaper account, Kennedy expressed willingness

to send Vinson a letter outlining a compromise. When Vinson immediately

produced a draft letter from his briefcase, Kennedy, amid laughter, remarked,

"That's where you got the name 'Swamp Fox.'" Vinson wanted the president to

sign the letter, but they decided that McNamara would sign it and that a second

letter from the president would accompany it. While McNamara and one of

Vinson's aides-Philip W Kelleher-hammered out the language of the first

letter, the president, apparently growing impatient, invited Vinson for a walk in

the Rose Garden. By the time they returned, the text ofthe letter had been agreed

on.33

Mter the meeting McNamara and Kennedy's special counsel, Theodore Sorensen, drafted the second letter, which Sorensen and O'Brien took to Vinson's

office for approval. O'Brien recalled that one of Vinson's aides participated in the
Congress and the FY 1963 Budget 105

meeting. "I at least, and I think Ted shared that view, realized that the staff representative, and I can't even remember his name [Philip W Kelleher?], who was a

very key staff fellow with Vinson, was the adamant one .... And even as Vinson

talked, this fellow would move into the conversation in very strong protest. In

fact, almost to the point where I didn't appreciate it. His views were unequivocal

and there was no way of compromising [them]. Frankly, after a lengthy conversation, Vinson started to debate with his own staff fellow .... Vinson overruled

the staff member, said that he found this acceptable and we would shake hands

on it."34

Some contemporary and later accounts have conveyed the impression that the

president persuaded Vinson to change his mind during their walk on the White

House grounds. 35 But it seems evident that both men, eager to compromise,

had decided to do so before then. What became known as the "Stroll in the Rose

Garden" was thus not so much a sweet-talking presidential exercise as it was icing

on the cake.

On the House floor the next day, 21 March, Vinson read the letters from the

secretary of defense and the president, both couched in extremely polite terms. In

his letter McNamara said that "we are anxious to work with you, your committee and the Congress in the spirit which a Government of divided powers such

as ours must maintain in order to function successfully." McNamara indicated

that he was initiating a new study of the RS-70 "in the light of the recommendations and representations of the Armed Services Committee" that would "give

full consideration to the magnitude of the committee program and the depth

with which the committee has emphasized this." He also promised that if some

of the technology developed more rapidly than anticipated, "we will wish to take

advantage of these advances by increasing our development expenditures; and

we would then wish to expend whatever proportions of any increases voted by

the Congress" these advances would warrant. Kennedy's letter drew attention to

McNamara's willingness to reexamine the RS-70 issue, but focused primarily on

the constitutional issues raised by the committee's recommendation. "I would

respectfully suggest," wrote Kennedy, "that, in place of the word 'directed,' the

word 'authorized' would be more suitable."36

Asking his House colleagues to accept the president's suggestion, Vinson-in

a bit of self-congratulation-maintained that insertion of the language directing

the president to spend the additional money had forced the administration to

compromise. He contended that his committee "had to raise a good ruckus and

a good fuss" to make its point. According to Vinson, McNamara had not only

been worried that he would lose in any showdown with Congress but that also he

might be wrong about the RS-70Y

By voice vote the House accepted Vinson's motion to substitute "authorized"

for "directed" in the provision regarding the RS-70 and that day passed a $13.066

billion authorization measure, 403 to O. On 2 April the Senate Armed Services
106 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

Committee recommended a slightly smaller authorization bill of $12.9693 billion,

but also including $491 million for the RS-70. On 12 April the House by voice

vote concurred in the Senate version, which then became law on 27 Apri1.38

A brief flap occurred when a Pentagon spokesman announced that the study

McNamara had promised was already in progress, implying that no new study

would be undertaken. McNamara quickly released a statement expressing annoyance at this implication. The Air Force, he pointed out, had issued instructions

on 21 March for a new study to be conducted by a military-civilian team headed

by Air Force Under Secretary Joseph Charyk. On the floor of the House Hebert

took great satisfaction at McNamara's clarification. All this signified, said Hebert,

that "Mr. Vinson has not capitulated, the Committee on Armed Services has

not capitulated, the House of Representatives has not capitulated, and Secretary

McNamara boldly and firmly stands behind his agreement to take a new look at

the RS-70 program and iffound feasible to proceed with its production as authorized."39 In the end, not only did most of the press reject congressional victory

claims, but some of Vinson's colleagues privately said he had emerged from the

skirmish with "something less than flying colors."40

Vinson's motivation remains puzzling. He either changed his mind quickly or

did not feel as strongly about the issue as it seemed. His challenge to the administration may have served more as a ploy to gain support from his colleagues on the

RS-70 issue and less a reflection of his concern about congressional impotence.

As one veteran southern senator noted at the time, Vinson "usually runs with

the man in the White House." Soon after working out the compromise, Vinson

remarked to O'Brien, "I feel good about this, Larry, because I really want to help

the President." Months later, having perhaps forgotten the zeal with which he

had pursued the matter, Vinson informed Gilpatric that his aim had been "simply

to relieve Congressional frustration and pressure within his Committee."41

Neither Kennedy nor McNamara gloated over the outcome. Expressing

high regard for Vinson but dispelling any notion that he had changed his mind,

McNamara expressed the hope that Congress would eventually come round to

his position. He conceded Vinson's great wisdom and experience in military

matters as a result of his service in Congress "since two years before I was born."

McNamara believed that the Armed Services Committee had not received all of

the information about the RS-70 decision until his special appearance before it

on 14 March.42

The confrontation further damaged McNamara's relationship with his friend,

Air Force Secretary Zuckert, who in a personal letter took sharp issue with some

ofMcNamaras public statements. To one journalist it had seemed that McNamara

had gone out of his way to castigate General LeMay as out ofstep with the other

chiefs. The press had even speculated that LeMay might be fired for publicly

supporting the RS-70, and Zuckert resented the implication that his chief ofstaff

had shown disloyalty to the administration's programs. He also told McNamara
Congress and the FY 1963 Budget 107

that his statements had created "unfairly in the public mind an undeserved lack

of confidence in the Air Force and its leadership."43

Furor over Army National Guard and Reserve Reorganization

No sooner had the administration sidestepped one controversy over the

RS-70 than another surfaced in the appropriations subcommittee hearings over

the proposed reorganization of the Army National Guard and Reserve. Like the

dispute over the RS-70, it did not emerge until well after McNamara's opening

testimony.

When Mahon's House Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations began hearings on the Defense budget on 15 January, the reorganization

proposal was not complete, despite much speculation and controversy already

developing in the press. Mahon therefore acceded to OSD's request to postpone

questioning witnesses about the proposal until completion ofthe plan.44

McNamara had submitted to the president on 13 January a slightly modified version of the plan put forward in December 1961. The new plan still called

for reducing the combined authorized strength from 700,000 to 670,000, but

proposed the elimination of 8 (4 each from the Reserve and the National Guard)

instead of 10 divisions. It had "the obvious advantage of disturbing fewer states

and individuals" and would hopefully "moderate to some extent the opposition

of the reserve component leadership." But the proposal still lacked specifics, and

by law it had to go to two advisory bodies-the General Staff Committee on

National Guard and Army Reserve Policy, and the Reserve Forces Policy Boardas well as to the state governors, prior to implementation.45

In testifying before Mahon's subcommittee at the end ofJanuary and beginning of February and then in mid-February before Robertson's Senate subcommittee, McNamara did less reading of the posture statement than he had done before

the armed services committees and more answering of questions. Nevertheless, he

received similar accolades from the members, one of whom called him "a veritable walking encyclopedia." Florida Democrat Robert L. F. Sikes, who chaired

a few sessions in Mahon's absence, called McNamara's presentation "one of the

finest demonstrations of knowledge of the subject and willingness to cooperate and work with the committee that I have seen in my time here." Sikes later

marveled that the secretary never "had to refer to a backup witness for information with which to answer committee questions. This is almost unbelievable. As a

matter offact, he left such a complete picture in the minds of his listeners that he

nearly killed the rest ofthe hearings. Much that followed was anticlimax."46

Regarding the reorganization plan, McNamara pointed out to the subcommittee that the 1OO,OOO-man increase in the size of the Active Army lowered the

requirements for the Army National Guard and Reserve. Despite the planned

reduction in combined reservist strength from 700,000 to 670,000, however,
108 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

"there would be no parallel reduction in costs or in our appropriations request

for fiscal year 1963 since these reserve components will be maintained at higher

levels of combat readiness." McNamara cautioned that it was "quite possible

that in fiscal year 1963 the Army reserve components will not be able to maintain even the 670,000 strength level," a development mostly attributable to the

suspension of the six-month training period the previous fall to help the Active

Army buildup.

The reorganization plan met a solid wall of opposition from the General

Staff Committees on National Guard and Army Reserve Policy at their meeting with Army Under Secretary Stephen Ailes and McNamara on 26 January.

With McNamara's and Ailes's concurrence, the committees established an ad hoc

group, which met during the period 7-15 February, to try to find ways to minimize disruption to the readiness status, organization, and programs of the reserve

components. The full committees met on 16 February and, on the basis of the

group's findings, again rejected the plan. Meeting on 24 February, the Reserve

Forces Policy Board, the secretary of defense's advisory group on reserve affairs,

also opposed realignment of any divisions and any reduction in the number of

drills.47

The plan therefore underwent further revision. Not until the end of March

did the Army submit to McNamara a still more refined proposal, one which

Ailes felt achieved "the necessary objectives, within the funds made available

under the past and presently proposed budgets." It would further reduce the paid

drill strength but provide for two additional brigades, so that each of the eight

realigned divisions would have a brigade, a feature Ailes believed would make

the plan much more acceptable. Another major change from the previous plan

reduced the net loss of units from about 700 to 450.48

On 30 March Ailes finally brought the plan, with its 642,000 strength level,

before Mahon's subcommittee then winding up its hearings. Ailes pointed out

that it still targeted eight divisions, bur he preferred using the word "realined"

rather than "eliminated" because a skeletal division headquarters would remain

and eight brigades would be created in place of the eliminated divisions. Ailes

would not yet reveal, at least for the record, the affected units, since the plan

still required acceptance by the state governors. Ailes took considerable heat for

his reluctance to do so. One committee member emphasized how unreasonable

it was to submit a plan "showing a cur of eight units, and to believe officials of

the department are not going to be expected to make a statement as to what they

expect to cut. I do not understand how you can keep from informing the public.

I do not see how the Secretary can put off talking to the Governors until June,

when this budget will be on the floor within 2 or 3 weeks." Ailes admitted having

a list of the eight divisions, bur thought it would be unfortunate if the governors received the information through the newspapers instead of in a face-to-face

discussion with Defense officials. Rep. Gerald R. Ford (R-Mich.) asked, "What
Congress and the FY 1963 Budget 109

is the use of a presentation or discussion of the plan if it is a nebulous plan that

may not go into effect?" Ailes's testimony concluded on a sour note when Mahon

told him that he really was not ready to make a presentation to the committee.49

The House subcommittee's response to Ailes jolted the administration into

action. On 2 April the White House submitted to the House of Representatives several proposed amendments to the appropriation bill, most importantly

the further reduction in the Army Reserve by 28,000 from the 670,000 in the

administration's original budget estimate. Two days later, on 4 April, the Army

announced the details of the plan, including the units slated for realignment, and

thereby set off a storm of controversy. 50

Reservists, their organizations, and state governors vociferously denounced

the plan. The public furor included a sharp letter from former President Truman

to Kennedy, in which he extolled the history ofthe 35th National Guard Division

composed primarily of Missouri and Kansas men, one of the units designated

for elimination, and asked the president to reconsider breaking up the division.

Truman and many of his family had served with the division, including a first

cousin who became its commanding general during World War II.51

In Congress, with the House Appropriations Subcommittee having finished

its hearings, the focus shifted to the Senate side. On 6 April Ailes-along with

Maj. Gen. Donald W McGowan, chief of the Army's National Guard Bureau,

and Maj. Gen. Frederick M. Warren, chief ofArmy Reserve and ROTC Affairsdiscussed the plan with Robertson's subcommittee. Boasting that he graduated

cum laude in Latin from a small Virginia college and therefore knew the meaning

of the prefix "re," Robertson chided Ailes for using the word "realinement": "I

know what to realine the front wheels of my car means," he declared, "but when

you realine the four divisions of the National Guard, are they being put back in

line or have you abolished them?" Ailes explained that the plan involved both

"cancellation" of obsolete units and "addition" of new ones.

The subcommittee's main concerns, however, focused not on semantics but

the plan's origins and cost. The senators wanted to make sure that it originated

in the Army for military and not political reasons and that it was not imposed

by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. "Did the plan come from the Army

and go up to the throne," Robertson asked, "or come from the throne down to

the Army?" Ailes replied that it originated in the Army to meet military requirements. He provided the information that though the paid drill strength would

fall to 642,000, the amount requested-some $780 million-remained the same

as the previous year. Committee members asked how much more it would cost if

DoD retained the 700,000-man strength and received the answer that it would

be $61.3 million more.

When Robertson and Senator Saltonstall asked for his views, McGowan

equivocated, saying that "within the strength and budgetary guidelines the Army

staff has produced the best possible plan." When Robertson asked what the
110 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

guidelines were and whether McGowan had meant that "you cannot go above

certain money figures," the general replied, "That is one guide. It always has to

be." Warren stated that he opposed the reduction. 52

Still another congressional participant entered the fray. Representative Hebert

had asked McNamara to postpone implementing the plan until a House armed

services subcommittee on reserve policy, which he headed, could hold its own

hearings.53 McNamara did not appear before Hebert's subcommittee, which began

hearings on 16 April amid "a lot of fanfare and publicity." The task of defending the plan fell to Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower) Carlisle P. Runge,

who underwent some "rough going" but "held up manfully," in Paul's view, and to

Army Under Secretary Ailes. 54

In the meantime, the House Appropriations Committee, based on the Mahon

subcommittee recommendations, had reported out on 13 April an appropriation bill of $47.839 billion. It differed from the president's recommendations in

only a few significant respects, one of which was that it added $58.8 million for

the Army National Guard and Reserve to maintain the strength at 700,000. In

an additional major change it added $223.9 million for the development of the

RS-70, but with no stipulation directing that this money be spent. The two-day

House floor debate, often lacking a quorum, seemed uncharacteristically subdued,

what one representative called a "love feast." Just before departing Washington

for the Easter recess, House members on 18 April rejected several minor amendments, and by a vote of 388-0 passed a Defense appropriation bill providing the

same amount reported out by the Appropriations Committee. 55

The Senate Weighs In

The House-approved appropriation bill next went to the Senate for consideration. Robertson's subcommittee resumed hearings in mid-May on the OSD

reclamas to it. Within days of the House's action, McNamara made up his mind

that, breaking with tradition, he personally would present the appeal. In the past

the deputy secretary or the OSD comptroller had done so. In this case Gilpatric

submitted a written reclama to Robertson that reflected McNamara's determination, when he appeared in person, to accept the increased amounts the House

had voted for the RS-70 and the reserves on the understanding, as Gilpatric told

the staff, that "we will use the flexibility given."56

In his appearance on 15 May, McNamara focused on those items the House

wanted to cut, mostly, he acknowledged, in the interest of saving money and

encouraging managerial efficiency, objectives that he shared. He was willing to

accept as many of these as possible, even though some might cause difficulty, but

not those items he felt would seriously interfere with the proper running of the

department. The controversial items in the bill, of course, involved amendments

that increased funding levels-for the RS-70 and for maintaining the Army
Congress and the FY 1963 Budget III

Reserve and National Guard at 300,000 and 400,000 strength, respectively. On

these and other increases, McNamara made a gesture of concession. "How much

of the additional funds provided for each of the items could profitably be utilized

during the coming fiscal year has yet to be determined," he stated. "Recognizing

the strong congressional interest in these matters, we will want to restudy each of

them in much greater detail. Accordingly, I recommend that the additional funds

appropriated by the House be retained in the bill."57

The questioning covered many areas, but Robertson made a special effort to

pin down McNamara regarding the RS-70. "You are now going to restudy this

and, if you do not want to spend it, you are not going to do so. Is that what you

mean?" McNamara replied, "If there is no military requirement for the expenditures, I don't believe that I should recommend to the President that they be

spent, and I don't believe you would wish me to spend it."58

McNamara had another fight on his hands. The president of the National

Guard Association, Maj. Gen. William H. Harrison, Jr., sent him a telegram alleging errors in his 15 May testimony. Contrary to what McNamara had claimed in

describing obsolete and inefficient units, Harrison said that the Army National

Guard had no 90-mm. antiaircraft units and had had no veterinary-type units

since World War II. Harrison charged that providing "misleading information"

to Congress and the public only harmed the national defense effort and asked

McNamara to issue a public correction. McNamara's response corrected a number

of Harrison's assertions and offered no concessions. 59

On 8 June the Senate Appropriations Committee reponed a bill providing $48.429 billion, some $590 million over what the House had approved. It

included $491 million for the RS-70. While accepting the House language to

maintain Army National Guard and Reserve strength at 400,000 and 300,000

respectively, the committee also added $6.7 million for the Air Force Reserve

and $4.17 million for the Navy Reserve. Faced with the committee's action,

McNamara showed a willingness to compromise. If Congress passed the measure,

he would not proceed with the plan to cut the National Guard and Reserve.

On the RS-70 controversy, he noted that the additional funds "probably can be

advantageously spent" for research and development of advanced radar.GO

On 14 June the Senate passed the appropriation bill, 88-0. The Senate

version stipulated that Army Reserve end-strength reach no less than 300,000,

with Army National Guard strength programmed to attain an end strength of

400,000. Because the House bill did not contain mandatory strength levels,

these differences in language, among others, needed to be resolved in conference

committee.61 As the beginning ofthe fiscal year approached on 1 July 1962 without passage of new appropriation bills, Congress passed continuing resolutions

to permit the functioning of federal agencies, including DoD, into the new fiscal

year.
112 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

Finessing the Controversies

In his own mind McNamara went back and forth on the desirability of

compromise. After many state governors had protested to the White House

sharply criticizing the reserve reorganization plan, he asked one of his aides,

"Is this the right thing to do?" "Yes," the adviser replied, "but it's sure going to

stir up a helluva fuss and offend a lot of people." "Well, we're going to do it,"

declared McNamara. ''I'm not in this job just to please."62

At the urging of the president, concerned over the growing opposition,

McNamara agreed to address the annual Governors' Conference in Hershey,

Pennsylvania, on 2 July. In the speech McNamara explained how elimination of

some units would be carefully arranged so as to minimize turbulence and asserted

that "far from diminishing the role of the reservist, it will give him a new and

even more important part in the Nation's defense." Afterwards the secretary met

behind closed doors with the governors' National Guard committee for about an

hour and a half. He asked them to study the plan and provide comments and

suggestions and also offered to meet with them as a group or individually. Later

he had the new secretary of the Army, Cyrus Vance, send individual telegrams

on his behalf to each of the governors politely reiterating his willingness to work

with them. The private session, however, only hardened the opposition.63

The next day, by voice vote without dissent, the governors adopted a resolution opposing the plan. They wanted the National Guard to maintain its strength

at 400,000 and requested that McNamara restudy the question. They also urged

no action in any state until the National Guard advisory committee had time to

go over the details of whatever new plan would emerge. The governors' resolve

in spite of the arguments he had mustered may have surprised McNamara. Years

later he recalled that "not a single governor would support the elimination of the

National Guard divisions, even though everyone of them knew the divisions

were hollow. "64

OSD settled the disagreement with Congress over the reorganization plan

through an artful compromise worked out with Senator Robertson and Representative Mahon. In long, detailed letters sent to the two men on 20 July,

McNamara recapitulated the history of the dispute, reiterated Defense's belief

that 642,000 men were all that would be needed to support current military plans, but acknowledged that the current fiscal year would be "a period of

unusual change and that a somewhat higher strength may be required to ease

the transition from the present structure to the one required." If the conference committee would drop the mandatory language about end strengths in the

Senate bill, DoD would authorize and program a strength of 400,000 for the

National Guard and 300,000 for the Army Reserve in FY 1963, subject to three

conditions: (1) all units would have to maintain at least 90 percent of personnel qualified in their military specialties; (2) reserve components would have to
Congress and the FY 1963 Budget 113

apply the same recruiting standards as the Active Army; and (3) no units would

be permitted to exceed their authorized strength except those specifically authorized excess strengths to accommodate reservists on drill pay starus who would

be displaced by the realignment.65 These conditions were much more stringent

than the language of an earlier draft, wherein McNamara had agreed, if Congress

dropped the mandatory language, to authorize and program a drill pay strength

of 400,000 for the National Guard and 300,000 for the Reserve without condition. The draft simply recognized, as McNamara had cautioned in the posture

statement in January, that "it will probably not be possible actually to attain the

strengths in an orderly and efficient manner."66

The tougher conditions virtually ensured that the higher strength levels

would not be reached. By one assessment, the Department of Defense found

a way "to exploit the executive's institutional advantages." It was difficult for

Congress and Guard supporters to take exception to these conditions "without

seeming to flout the public's interest in well-prepared reserve forces." The Department thus "succeeded in achieving indirectly what it failed to achieve directly

through reduced appropriations for the Guard."67

The conference report, approved by voice vote in the House on 26 July and

in the Senate on 1 August, called for total appropriations of $48,136,247,000.

The amount seemingly represented $229 million more than the administration

had requested, but it was actually $285 million less because it included reappropriation of an unspent $515 million from FY 1962.68 The bill included an extra

$58.8 million for the Army National Guard and Reserve, as well as the conditions

proposed by Defense and accepted by Robertson and Mahon. The conferees also

approved a compromise amount of $362.6 million for the RS-70. The amounts

in the FY 1963 budget proposed and approved for the RS-70 varied considerably,

as follows (in millions):

Budget Estimate

Passed House

Passed Senate

House/Senate Conference Action

$171.0

223.9

491.0

362.6

The president signed the bill into law on 9 August.69

Congressional opinion varied as to DoD's likely courses of action. Representative Ford thought the extra money appropriated for the RS-70 would not

be spent-McNamara seemed as adamant as ever-and that "under the criteria

which have been used for the National Guard and the Reserves, criteria which

I think are sound-I have doubts that as a practical matter they can attain a

strength of 700,000." On the other hand, Senators Saltonstall and Robertson

believed that the legislative language would preserve the 700,000-man reserve

force and that Defense would indeed spend the extra money on the RS-70Jo
114 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

Not until after final congressional action on the appropriation bill did the

Hebert committee release its report (17 August) regarding the reorganization plan. Predictably, the report came out strongly against realignment. It not

only opposed the proposed cuts but also chastised McNamara for failing to give

consideration to individual state requirements in the event of local or national

disasters. The report reminded the secretary of defense that "Congress, having

enacted such legislation, has the power to repeal any legislation which in its

opinion hinders and defeats the purpose and intent of the Congress." This clear

warning to the Pentagon against flouting the will of the legislators was underscored by the sarcastic remark that neither "the Constitution nor our Creator has

endowed these experts in the Pentagon with the cloak of infallibility." Noting

the unchanging amount of $781 million budgeted for the reorganized reserve

components as the plan passed through its later versions, the report contended

that the subcommittee "would be naIve indeed to accept testimony from Defense

and Army witnesses to the effect that budgetary guidelines were not an overriding consideration" in the plan's formulation. Hebert told a reporter, "I don't think

the White House realizes how serious the schism is between McNamara and the

Congress." Certain provisions in the Hebert report, however, assisted McNamara

in carrying out the plan. Despite suspicions of executive aggrandizement, the

subcommittee did agree to eliminate obsolete and unnecessary reserve units.

While insisting that deactivation of the eight Army Reserve and National Guard

divisions was premature, it did not specifically rule out such action.?!

Following extensive consultation among Defense officials, members of

Congress, reserve organizations, and governors, McNamara and Secretary of the

Army Vance unveiled the final reorganization plan on 4 December. How much

had the plan been modified? One reporter felt it was "substantially unchanged"

from the original proposal, another that it contained few concessions to critics. Yet the opposition had lessened, in part because of Pentagon explanations

of the military necessity for reorganization and the patient, ongoing discussion of the issue that "blunted early charges" that McNamara was "ramrodding

his ideas through without seeking advice of Congress." Hebert announced his

support because of "significant revisions" and because Defense had followed the

consultative procedures recommended by Congress. The National Guard Bureau

withdrew its opposition, although a few governors remained unpersuaded. In

announcing the final plan, the administration regarded reorganization as an

accomplished fact and a major victory. The anticipated shortfall in strength did

in fact occur. By 30 June 1963 (end of the fiscal year), Army National Guard

paid drill strength stood at 360,700 and Army Reserve paid drill strength at

237,000, a total of 597,700. Although Defense had programmed for 400,000

and 300,000 end strengths, respectively, unusually high turnover rates kept the

numbers down.72
Congress and the FY 1963 Budget 115

Patience, persistence, and the passage of time also served McNamara well in

the RS-70 controversy, as the promised restudy ofthe matter dragged on through

the summer and fall of 1962. On 1 June the Air Force study group submitted

a preliminary report, giving three alternate development plans, all envisioning a

substantial program for the RS-70. Later that summer LeMay and Zuckert indicated their preferred options, and in early September Zuckert submitted a new

proposal calling for eight experimental RS-70s that would require $591.4 million

in NOA in the FY 1964 budget,73

McNamara again put the question to the JCS. On 29 September the chiefs

recommended reorienting the B-70 to the RS-70 concept and suggested that

McNamara approve those parts of the Air Force proposal needed to demonstrate feasibility ofthe RS-70 and its associated subsystems. But the previous day,

before the JCS recommendation reached him, McNamara had decided to disapprove the Air Force proposal, noting in a memo to the chiefs that costs would

likely come to about $3 billion more than the $8.2 billion the Air Force had estimated, that the plane's claimed technical performance "cannot be supported by

the current state of the art," and that the RS-70 would not significantly enhance

U.S. capabilities to deter or wage thermonuclear war. He advanced four alternate

approaches: (1) complete the manufacture and testing of the three prototypes

with total cost not to exceed $1.3 billion; (2) continue to develop radars and

related equipment that might prove useful; (3) consider alternative applications of

manned aircraft; and (4) begin development of a new aircraft-the RBX, which,

because ofits post-strike reconnaissance mission, would prove less costly than the

RS-70. He estimated that 50 RBX aircraft would cost $1.4 billion,74

A major personnel change worked in McNamara's favor. On 1 October General Maxwell Taylor succeeded Lemnitzer as JCS chairman. That day

McNamara met with the chiefs-and their new chairman-and suggested they

reconsider their endorsement ofthe RS-70 concept. The drawn-out process tested

congressional patience. Rep. Leslie C. Arends (R-Ill.) wrote McNamara urging

him to report to Congress, indicating he had heard rumors that the promised

study would not be released until Congress went home prior to the congressional

elections in November. He charged that McNamara intended to kill the program

by a process of "study and re-study, and re-study of the studies." A DoD spokesman commented that the Joint Chiefs were looking into the issue and would

probably make a recommendation to the president within a month,75

During the month of October 1962 the Cuban missile crisis occupied

much of the time and attention of high U.S. government officials, including

McNamara and the JCS. After a series of exchanges among themselves, the chiefs

on 6 November put forward a compromise proposal calling for the manufacture

of five prototype RS-70s to test the aircraft's effectiveness, while deferring a decision on the production of additional aircraft. General Taylor, however, agreed

with McNamara on halting the RS-70 program and advocated directing efforts
116 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

toward development of a purely reconnaissance aircraft. All the various arguments-those initially advanced and subsequently modified by the Air Force, the

views of the Joint Chiefs and their new chairman, and McNamara's analysis and

recommendations-were laid out in a 36-page draft memorandum McNamara

sent the president on 20 November. In the meantime the program's prospects

received a setback when the Air Force announced on 15 November that the first

prototype test flight, scheduled for December, would be delayed three or four

months because of problems with sealing the aircraft's fuel cells,76

At a meeting at the Kennedy home in Hyannis Port, Massachusetts, on

20 November with McNamara and other key advisers, Kennedy approved

McNamara's recommendations as supported by Taylor. Two days later McNamara

announced the Department of Defense's intention to add $50 million in FY

1963 funds to the RS-70 development program. No public mention was made

of the decision to go ahead with the new reconnaissance aircraft or the disposition of the rest of the $362.6 million Congress had appropriated for the RS-70.

The announcement did indicate, however, that the Department would make

a full presentation on the results of the restudy of the R5-70 program to the

armed services and appropriations committees during hearings on the FY 1964

budget?? Congress would make one last, relatively feeble effort the following

year to revive the R5-70 program, but for all practical purposes the program was

dead.

Congressional approval of the FY 1963 budget, along with the subsequent

realignment of the Army National Guard and Reserve and the virtual cancellation of the R5-70, represented major triumphs for McNamara. Notwithstanding

grumbling and snide remarks about the arrogance of McNamara's "Whiz Kids,"

he could also take heart from the general congressional acceptance of the new

planning and programming methods used in preparing the FY 1963 budget.

Early in 1962 McNamara was indeed riding high. As one seasoned Washington journalist observed, "If Robert McNamara were a man whose head could

be turned by a compliment, he might find himself hard put to keep eyes front

amid the widespread tribute" ~oming his way. Not only was the president telling

visitors that McNamara was the "most satisfactory" cabinet member, but Capitol

Hill veterans, after listening "in undisguised awe to McNamara's precise analyses

of force requirements," were calling him the greatest ever secretary of defense?8

The first few months of 1962 probably marked the zenith in McNamara's relations with Congress.

Thereafter these relations deteriorated and caused concern within 05D.

During the year Hill staffers had told officials in the office of McNamara's assistant for legislative affairs that Congress, recognizing McNamara's administrative

abilities, at first "gave him his head," hoping that he would bring efficient orga-
Congress and the FY 1963 Budget 117

nization to Defense. However, by the time members of Congress realized how

quickly he had accomplished this task, it was too late to assert themselves because

McNamara "was too far ahead of them." A study prepared within the legislative

affairs office in October 1962 forecast an effort by Congress in 1963 to reassert its authority relative to the department, with more outspoken and pointed

criticism, some of it personal, directed at the secretary. These criticisms would

probably involve his alleged "disregard of human or morale factors," "disregard

of military professional opinion in favor of civilian experts," and his "predilection" for quantitative solutions. To counter the anticipated criticisms the paper

suggested, among other things, that McNamara "warm his public image" by

stressing his interest in human factors and concern over morale and, most importantly, that he establish a pattern of consulting Congress in advance of his major

actions.79
CHAPTER VI

The FY 1964 Budget

The Kennedy administration's proposed Department of Defense budget for

FY 1964 reached a level surpassed only in FY 1952 during the Korean War. This

occurred despite rigorous efforts by Secretary of Defense McNamara to control

spending, including cancellation of the Skybolt missile system under development for use by U.S. and British aircraft,* and reservations by the president and

White House advisers about the need for a sizable strategic force. Presented to

Congress in January 1963, the budget request totaled some $49.314 billion in

new obligational authority (NOA) for military functions, $1.4 billion more than

the amount sought the previous year.

For the first time the administration encountered strong public and congressional pressures to reduce military spending. While certain members of Congress

again tried to add funds for various projects, they generally failed, lacking the

broad support and enthusiasm that had characterized past efforts. Though

Congress spurned calls for drastic cuts, budget trimming proposals carried the day

and resulted in an appropriation bill of just over $47.22 billion enacted late in

the session in October 1963. Defense appropriations leveled off in FY 1965, only

to be followed by sharp increases in subsequent years due primarily to the greatly

expanded U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia. 1 The approved FY 1964

and 1965 budgets, with Congress holding the line, thus represented significant

pauses in the upward trend in military spending.

The timetable for preparing the FY 1964 budget resembled that ofthe preceding year, with the planning and programming phases occurring during late spring

and summer and submission of estimates by the military services at the beginning

of October 1962. The new procedures instituted the previous year,t by now generally considered a success, remained in place, but with a few refinements. One was

*The decision in fall 1962 to cancel Skybolt and the ensuing controversy in Anglo-American relations is covered

in Chapter XIV.

t See Chapter IV.

118
The FY 1964 Budget 119

the adoption of a Five-Year Force Structure and Financial Program (FYFS&FP)

to serve as the base for budget projections. Begun toward the close of the FY

1963 budget cycle, this document underwent revision early in 1962 and received

McNamara's approval on 16 April.2 Two days earlier, another procedural modification, the Program Change Proposal (PCP) process, allowed the services at any

time to submit proposals to alter programs. Approved changes were to be continually incorporated into the FYFS&FP to keep it up-to-date. 3

White House Expectations

Notwithstanding his demonstrated drive for improving efficiency and reducing costs, McNamara faced pressure from the White House through the summer

and fall of 1962 to lower spending even more. The high cost of strategic weapon

systems remained a major concern. In April, responding to President Kennedy's

expressed desire that costly major weapon systems should meet design objectives

and operational requirements "under realistic conditions," the secretary replied

that except for a few revolutionary, unique weapon systems that filled an urgent

national need, he wanted to ensure that "the component development and then

the system development is carried out before production is started." This would

apply to "even very important" new systems and "especially very complex and

expensive ones."4

DoD Comptroller Charles Hitch elaborated on this idea in a public address in

September 1962. Before committing to development of a large weapon system, he

noted, "we should be reasonably confident that, iftechnically successful, the contribution of the system to our overall military capabilities" would be worth its "full

cost." In some instances OSD might want to commit only to the development

phase and postpone a decision on production and deployment. "To the greatest

extent possible," Hitch stated, "we want to do our thinking and planning before

we start 'bending metal.'''5 Such promised scrutiny did not augur well for expensive weapon systems under development, such as the RS-70 aircraft* and Skybolt

missile, that were nearing a decision on whether to go ahead or not.

From the start, during the government-wide budget preview, the Bureau of

the Budget made clear its desire to cut defense spending. The preview began

with a request from BoB Director Bell to McNamara and other cabinet heads in

early April 1962 for a briefstatement of each department's major goals, as well as

ptogram changes anticipated through FY 1967 that would have a significant effect

on the budget. On 23 May McNamara submitted projections totaling $55.26

billion in NOA for major military functions in FY 1964, including $1.5 billion

* Regarding McNamara's decision in November 1962 nor to spend additional FY 1963 funds Congress had

appropriated for development of the RS-70 and insread to maintain a limited development program, see

ChapterV.
120 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

for military assistance. In July BoB listed both possible upward and downward

adjustments. It recommended that prior to the budget decisions in the fall 000

update its strategic force projections in light of more recent intelligence estimates

and perhaps look at "somewhat lower u.s. force objectives."6

These recommendations formed the basis of a discussion on 17 July that

McNamara, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric, and Hitch held with Bell

and his staff. McNamara, who had read the BoB comments, seemed "quite receptive," promising to deal promptly with the questions the bureau had raised and to

discuss its proposals with 000 officials. BoB suggested that the Skybolt program,

because of rising cost estimates, undergo a thorough review before McNamara

decided to commit the weapon system to production. 7

BoB's hopes that further review within Defense might lead to generally

lowered force projections proved unfounded. Perhaps as a result of the meeting

with Bell and his staff, McNamara the following day asked the Joint Chiefs of

Staff and the services to review the adequacy of the overall military posture as

represented in the FYFS&FP and give special attention to appropriations for FY

1964 programs. Several weeks later the Joint Chiefs and the individual service

secretaries replied, indicating-not surprisingly-that they required more forces

than the just approved FYFS&FP had shown. 8 Since the spring the chiefs had

been at odds over force structures while drafting the latest Joint Strategic Objectives Plan, JSOP-67. JCS Chairman General Lemnitzer eventually worked out a

number of compromises regarding the JSOP which he forwarded to McNamara

on 27 August, including a proposal to increase the number of Army divisions

from 16 to 17 in FY 1965 instead ofthe 18 desired by the Army in FY 1964. His

reply a few days later to McNamara's request for a review of the overall military

posture confirmed the force levels Lemnitzer and the chiefs had recommended

for the JSOp'9

As the White House explored ways to reduce the federal budget, broader

budgetary and political considerations came into play. Kennedy and his advisers wanted very much to keep overall federal expenditures for FY 1964 below

$100 billion. Coming in under this figure, which had considerable symbolic

value, would increase the chances that fiscally conservative members of Congress

would support the president's planned tax cut proposal. During the spring budget

preview, federal government expenditure projections had reached $108 billion,

which BoB staff reduced to $102 billion. Bell and Deputy Director Elmer B.

Staats felt that $101 billion would be an appropriate minimum, and even that

would require "a tight, strongly held, budget policy."IO Following meetings with

cabinet heads during the summer, BoB presented a memo to the president at the

end of August calling for FY 1964 expenditures of about $100.4 billion, including $50.4 billion for military functions, not including military assistance, and

emphasizing the difficulty, especially in the area of defense, of cutting spending

further. II
The FY 1964 Budget 121

At the beginning of October Kennedy met with Bell, Treasury Secretary C.

Douglas Dillon, and Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers Walter

Heller to discuss the memo and whether to keep estimated expenditures under

$100 billion, as the president put it, for "the political argument of the tax thing."

Some, including Special Counsel Theodore Sorensen, urged that the estimates

be lowered well below the $100 billion mark, to around $98.4 billion. If the

amount fell barely under $100 billion, Sorensen thought the mark would definitely be exceeded the following year, which-in an apparent allusion to the 1964

elections-was "a worse year to do it." In defense spending, Skybolt emerged

as a possible candidate for cancellation, but the president appeared inclined to

continue the program because of the British involvement. Bell pointed out the

difficulty of finding areas for further reduction, given the large built-in increases

in both defense and space programs. The president nevertheless asked Bell and

Dillon to study ways to reduce the overall estimates by about $2 billion.!2

A few days later Dillon suggested to Bell that among other things DoD might

reduce expenditures further by phasing in military pay increases in two steps,

immediately canceling both Skybolt and the Mobile Medium-Range Ballistic

Missile (MMRBM), and by keeping research and development at the FY 1963

level. These steps would cut $525 million from the overall budget. Bell believed

they should stress to the president the "very strong upward pressures" on the

budget, for example, the lack of provision so far for production and development of Nike-Zeus, additional Minuteman missiles, or an expanded military

space program, all of which Bell noted were under active consideration within

DoD.!3 Although McNamara did not participate in these late summer and early

fall discussions, Bell probably informed him of their basic thrust. In any event

the White House concerns gave McNamara little upward flexibility in shaping his

budget.

Other factors complicated the process. As had happened in 1961 with the

building of the Berlin Wall, an international crisis-this time over Cuba-added

strains and distractions to what was, even in the best of circumstances, an intensive and time-consuming process involving DoD, BoB, and the White House.

The Cuban missile crisis undoubtedly slowed work on the budget, especially

during the hectic days at the end of October, and may have caused the president and other top officials to give insufficient attention to some key budgetary

matters.

However, well before that, on 22 September, McNamara acknowledged that

OSD was falling three to four weeks behind in preparing the early versions of

draft presidential memorandums (DPMs) on the RS-70, strategic nuclear forces,

Nike-Zeus, and other key programs.!4 As Hitch saw it, flaws in the programming

timetable and the new PCP procedures were the major reason for the delay. In

May OSD sent the services a schedule for review by the secretary of submission

of certain important programs, but did not impose penalties for late submittals.
122 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

Indeed many proved tardy. Moreover, the services took advantage ofthe new flexibility to propose changes wherever and whenever they wished. As a result the

comptroller's office was "flooded with program change proposals-too many,

too large, and too late." By late September it received PCPs recommending additions of $6.7 billion to McNamara's spring projections for FY 1964 and even

larger additions for subsequent years. The office did the best it could to review

and process them, but Hitch realized his staff could not complete the work by 1

October, which would delay the ensuing budget review. IS

Shrinking the Service Estimates

OSD faced the awkward task of reconciling the White House desire for

substantially lowering already tight preliminary spending projections with military

service recommendations for huge spending and NOA increases. Inherent in the

budgetary process, the problem was nothing new. But the FY 1964 gap between

White House expectations and service estimates turned out to be extraordinarily

large. Final estimates for military functions, which the services submitted on 1

October, totaled $61.034 billion (NOA).16

During October and November OSD reduced the estimates by examining

closely a large number of specific items, however small in cost, and by cutting

several majot programs. In a memorandum on 24 October McNamara informed

all DoD principals that he soon would begin making tentative decisions, based on

staff evaluations, on remaining issues. Appeals had to be made within three days.

He exhorted the services to "ruthlessly eliminate all activities, the cost of which is

not commensurate with their contribution to our national defense." Finally, he

promised that he would judge their appeals "predominately from the standpoint

of critical military necessities." Ofsome 600 proposed items, OSD made cuts in

about 400. The services appealed 73 of these cuts; OSD eventually granted only

about a third of the appeals. These actions resulted cumulatively in downward

adjustments of $12.5 billion and upward adjustments of $1.4 billion, a total net

reduction of $11.1 billion (NOA). In mid-November OSD released the text of

McNamara's 24 October memorandum and informed the press about the huge

service budget requests and the "economizing" drive in the Pentagon intended to

soften the impact of an anticipated federal budget deficit in FY 1964.J7

McNamara also tackled major issues in his DPMs, preliminary versions of

which he circulated for comment to the service secretaries, the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, and White House staff. The majority focused on program packages, such

as strategic retaliatory forces and general purpose forces, but a few dealt with

specific programs such as the RS-70 and the Nike-Zeus antimissile system. Aware

of criticism by some members of Congress that he paid little attention during

the preparation of the budget to the views of the uniformed military, McNamara

encouraged the chiefs to express their views and provided assurances that he
The FY 1964 Budget 123

would fully and fairly convey them to the president. In a meeting on 15 October, McNamara told the chiefs and the service secretaries that he would send

them, in addition to two DPMs recently circulated, similar papers that would

require a "tremendous amount" of their time and attention. He wanted their

"personal judgments" on these matters, although he acknowledged he might not

always accept them. Before submitting a final memorandum to the president,

McNamara wanted to understand clearly any split views among the Joint Chiefs

so he could discuss the disagreements in the memorandum. 18

The major disagreements that arose between McNamara and the Joint Chiefs

concerned strategic retaliatory forces, as well as deployment of an anti-ballistic

missile defense system. The service chiefs opposed McNamara's recommendations

to cancel the Skybolt missile; only General Taylor, who had replaced Lemnitzer

as JCS chairman on 1 October, sided with McNamara on its cancellation.l9 On

the Minuteman missile, however, the chiefs' joint position was much closer to

McNamara's than the Air Force's. The gap between OSD and the chiefs on the

one hand, and the Air Force on the other, was most striking in the long-range

projections:

illS. 1966 l2.6Z 1968

Air Force

Minuteman 900 900 850 750

Improved Minuteman ---.1QQ 800 1200

Total 900 1,200 1,650 1,950

OSD

Minuteman 800 800 800 800

Improved Minuteman .ill ---.3..5..Q -.5.Q.Q

Total 800 950 1,150 1,300

While the chiefs jointly supported the Air Force request for 900 Minutemen in

FY 1965, they wanted 1,050 in FY 1966 and 1,200 in FY 1967, only 100 more

in FY 1966 and 50 more in FY 1967 than McNamara but 450 fewer than the Air

Force for FY 1967.20

White House advisers took altogether different positions on the budget from

those ofthe services and the Joint Chiefs. Both Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Carl Kaysen and Science Adviser Jerome Wiesner thought

the strategic retaliatory force levels too high, however much they represented

drastic reductions from the service estimates. Kaysen suggested slowing down

the Minuteman buildup more than McNamara wanted. McNamara's arguments

seemed to him "more a defense against service demands for a bigger force than

justification of the forces he has requested." Kaysen also suggested cutting naval

general purpose forces by $1 billion and using the money either to reduce the

budget or to increase Air Force and Army logistical support. In a memorandum
124 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

to the president on 4 December, Wiesner, more forceful in his criticism, thought

the recommended force levels "greatly in excess of those required to maintain

a secure deterrent." Moreover, he said, "the very rapid build-up of our missile

forces will almost certainly intensifY the arms race." Wiesner offered two alternatives to McNamara's recommended levels, the more severe stabilizing the number

of Minutemen at 800 in FY 1966 and holding the number of Polaris submarines

at 35 in FY 1967 instead ofincreasing it to 4pi

Nike-Zeus remained controversial, although the debate within the administration was perhaps not as sharp as the previous year. The Army proposed

deploying the Nike-Zeus system beginning in 1967 and a more advanced Nike-X

system in 1969. McNamara recommended that no deployment of either system

be decided on. Instead he wanted to reduce the Nike-Zeus test program, develop

fully only the Nike-X system, and delay a decision on deployment of the latter

until mid-I964. The Army proposal, he felt, would cost an additional $2.7

billion and provide only limited protection under Nike-Zeus during the 1967-69

time frame. Another reason for delay, as Harold Brown later explained, was that

"once you start deploying something, it is very, very hard to change. All of the

effort would have gone into getting the bugs out of Nike Zeus, and there would

have been very little effort left over for developing Nike X."22

Nike-Zeus proponents received a boost from a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) issued in early July, indicating that the Soviet Union was placing

greater emphasis on forces for both retaliatory and preemptive action, on nuclearpowered submarines, and on forces for intercontinental attack, particularly

ICBMs. To report on the implications of the estimate for U.S. military policy,

the president established an interagency committee chaired by the Department of

State, with Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) Paul Nitze representing Defense.

While the committee's report submitted in late August called for no major

changes in U.S. retaliatory forces, it concluded that the Soviet Union's rapid

strides in developing anti-ballistic missile defenses and its initial deployment of

such systems might give it a propaganda advantage that the United States would

have to counter with its own anti-ICBM systems. Although Nitze-with McNamara's backing-had demurred, earlier, at the end ofJuly, the committee favored

reconsideration, "with due weight given to the political considerations favoring

deployment as quickly as feasible at least on a limited scale."23

A longtime advocate of Nike-Zeus, General Taylor, then serving as the president's military adviser, told the president in August of deficiencies he perceived

in the report, including the failure to describe clearly enough the encouragement

to aggressiveness by the Soviets, especially in Western Europe, if "they beat the

U.S. to an effective ABM while the u.s. remains unprotected." Taylor urged an

immediate decision on Nike-Zeus deployment, but the matter was put off until

the fall budget deliberations. Subsequently, in November, Secretary of State Dean

Rusk weighed in with McNamara, making essentially the same argument as the
The FY 1964 Budget 125

committee report and Taylor. He declared that a decision not to deploy, in light

of the Soviet Union's apparent deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system, had

"immense political and psychological implications" for U.S. national security for

a decade to come.24

The Joint Chiefs of Staff divided over Nike-Zeus, with Chief of Naval Operations Admiral George Anderson backing the Army position and Air Force Chief

of Staff General Curtis LeMay essentially supporting McNamara's. Taylor, of

course, supported the Army. An NSC staff member reported that Taylor felt so

strongly about Nike-Zeus that he "deliberately and sharply split" with the secretary of defense on the issue.25

At a meeting in Hyannis Port over the Thanksgiving holiday, on 23 November, the president reached several tentative budget decisions, generally accepting

all of McNamara's recommendations. He approved a force level of 950 Minuteman missiles for FY 1966, of which 150 would be the improved version. He

also decided to cancel Skybolt, subject to discussions with the British on possible alternatives, and to add 6 Polaris submarines, bringing the total to 41. After

McNamara summarized the arguments on Nike-Zeus and Taylor spoke in favor

of the Army proposal, Kennedy again deferred a decision on deployment until

the conclusion of the budget process, but decided to go ahead with McNamara's

reduced development program.26

Final Decisions

As budget preparation drew to a close, McNamara erected defenses against

criticisms-some that he then faced from the White House and others he anticipated from Congress-that portrayed his recommended force levels as either

unnecessarily high or dangerously low. With the former, he marshaled a number of

arguments to persuade Wiesner and others, including Kennedy, ofthe inadvisability offurther reductions. As for Congress, he asked the chiefs to agree to inclusion

in the final budget memorandum of a statement that they had provided him

"continuing counsel and assistance" in developing the budget and that although

the force structure did not include everything the services had recommended,

the chiefs believed the proposed program would "further increase our combat

effectiveness and provide powerful forces in a high state of readiness for defense

of the security interests of the United States." But the chiefs balked, preferring

instead alternate language Admiral Anderson proposed, stating that the secretary's

program did not include "all the forces, modernization and improvement" they

had recommended.27 On 3 December McNamara sent a slightly modified memorandum to the president recommending total Department of Defense NOA,

including military assistance and civil defense, of $54.4 billion. He inserted a

footnote explaining that the chief of naval operations, the Air Force chief ofstaff,

and the commandant of the Marine Corps had "certain reservations, particularly
126 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

as regards the rate of modernization and the growth in combat effectiveness of

certain US forces in relation to the Sino-Soviet threat. "28

At a White House meeting on 5 December that lasted nearly two hours,

attended by presidential advisers, top OSD officials, and General Taylor (but not

the Joint Chiefs), McNamara carefully went over his memorandum, focusing on

the large gap between service estimates and his own recommendations. Differences over strategic retaliatory forces, besides the RS-70 and Skybolt, centered on

the number of Minuteman missiles. He noted that the chiefs had recommended

more such missiles than he, and they "felt fairly strongly on that point."29

In response to a question from the president, McNamara stated that approval

of the Army's requested additional division, which he opposed, would cost about

$1.5 billion over five years in equipment, support forces, and operating expenses.

But he pointed out, and Taylor concurred, that neither the Joint Chiefs collectively nor Army Chief of Staff General Earle Wheeler separately wanted to press

for an additional division at present. McNamara thought more necessary a

substantial increase in PEMA (Procurement of Equipment and Munitions for the

Army). For FY 1964 he proposed spending $3.3 billion on PEMA, whereas in

previous years it had been well below $2 billion.3°

As for the Navy, McNamara mentioned that the differences centered on

the shipbuilding and conversion program, with the Navy requesting about $2.2

billion and McNamara recommending approximately $500 million less for FY

1964. Over several years his recommendations would save $2-3 billion. Disagreements involved both the amount of money and how to use it. The Navy wanted

to phase in nuclear submarines earlier than McNamara did and also to replace

conventional frigates with nuclear-powered ones. In scaling back the Navy estimates, the secretary recognized that shipbuilding was "a very popular issue

with certain members of Congress and I anticipate great controversy on it."

McNamara concluded his presentation by drawing attention to the chiefs' views

as described in the memorandum and asked Taylor to say more on the subject.

Taylor remarked that the secretary had made a "very fair" presentation. The

Army, he said, appeared quite happy with the budget, especially with the extra

procurement money. The Navy concerned itself primarily with modernization

and what it considered a declining aircraft inventory. The Air Force, the "most

unhappy" of the services, was upset that strategic capabilities were not keeping

pace with the increasing Soviet threat.3!

The president then spoke at length, questioning the need for the "awful lot

of megatonnage" in U.S. strategic weapons, and remarked, "I don't see quite why

we are building as many as we're building." Taylor said he always felt "we probably have too much and I think if we were starting from scratch I would still take

that position." However, at the present time, there were "too many imponderables for us to back away and go back to a very small force." Kennedy continued

probing the justification for the strategic force levels and cited Wiesner's recent
The FY 1964 Budget 127

memorandum calling for reductions in the number of Minutemen from 950 to

800 and Polaris submarines from 41 to 35. In countering Wiesner's arguments,

McNamara dwelt on the many uncertainties in U.S. estimates, particularly the

questionable effectiveness of Hound Dog missiles and an "archaic" B-52 force.

He responded unequivocally to the president's queries about further reductions:

"I would say that my recommendation to you on our strategic forces is to take

the requirement and double it and buy it. Because I don't believe we can under

any circumstances run the risk of having too few here.... I think it's money well

spent." When the president asked whether the proposed force levels would deter

the Soviet Union, McNamara replied that their purpose was principally to deter,

but they also gave the United States and its allies "the confidence that we have

that deterrent power."32

McNamara admitted that the total number of Minuteman missiles projected

for FY 1968 was certainly open to argument, but he saw "no room for argument"

about the 150 now under debate. He worried that a decision against the additional missiles would lead to the charge that the administration was changing

the nation's fundamental military policy by not procuring the weapons needed

to destroy the Soviet Union's nuclear capability. The Air Force, which had been

substantially cut, felt strongly about this issue and would make it public.

McNamara also thought he would be unable to rebut a second anticipated

charge, namely that cuts in the number of Minutemen missiles and Polaris

submarines would "lead us to a position where the Soviets have more megatonnage and more warheads." He feared that a myth like the "missile gap" could

easily develop, fanned by deep emotions beginning to surface in the Pentagon. "I

don't mean to say that Curtis [LeMay] is emotionally biased, but he is saying that

the program that I am presenting is endangering the national security. And he

believes it." When Bell suggested that needlessly high force levels might nurture

the opposite myth, namely indefinite U.S. nuclear superiority, McNamara

replied, "I can fairly state today that that is the national policy, Dave. I'm also

prepared to recognize it may not be the right policy, but I don't think we ought

to change it in the fiscal '64 budget.... In a minute we have to say that our

policy is to maintain nuclear superiority. Now, maybe we can change that someday but we can't change that today without seriously weakening the alliance."

Wiesner finally conceded McNamara's point by admitting that "we have to face

the whole issue of what we're trying to accomplish and we can't do it in three

days and a budget." In the end, Kennedy came out for more air- and sealift forces

and requested that more attention be paid by the Air Force to "indirect warfare."

After a brief discussion on Nike-Zeus, the president expressed the desire to postpone that decision a little longer.33

In mid-December, in a formal address in New York City as well as in a national

radio and television appearance, Kennedy endeavored to prepare public opinion for

the upcoming record budget, with its high deficit and his tax cut proposal, and
128 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

to clarifY some key defense issues. One was Minuteman. The first 20 Minuteman

missiles, stored in silos near Great Falls, Montana, had been declared operational on 11 December. Pointing to this initial capability, the president stressed

McNamara's belief that as Minuteman became available in large numbers, defense

expenditures would "peak off." In remarks that appeared to doom Nike-Zeus, the

president also said he saw no sense, because of the high cost involved, in deploying an anti-ballistic missile system until it was perfected. He drew attention to

the technical difficulties in trying to "shoot a bullet with a bullet" and asserted

that "if you have a thousand bullets coming at you, that is a terribly difficult task

which we have not mastered yet." But he did not think the Soviet Union had

either.34

As he had the previous year, the president invited the Joint Chiefs to his

Palm Beach, Florida, residence over the Christmas holiday, 27 December, to hear

their views on the budget. The most critical was Admiral Anderson, whose relations with McNamara had become strained after a verbal confrontation with the

secretary during the Cuban missile crisis. Anderson cited inadequacies in Navy

personnel and in funds for operations, spare parts, and maintenance, and urged

that the Navy have more say in these areas. In general he asked for more Navy

authority and more attention given to "professional judgement." He also voiced

disappointment that the Navy had asked for eight additional nuclear attack

submarines and received only six.35

In contrast, General Wheeler pronounced the budget "most satisfactory" to

the Army and repeated a comment McNamara had made in one of his DPMs

that the Army would be in its best shape since the Korean War. Still, the Army

was not happy with its personnel level of 960,000 and with postponement of the

decision to deploy Nike-Zeus. During a sporadic discussion regarding Nike-Zeus,

the president stressed that a $9 billion deficit projected for the next fiscal year

made the system too expensive a proposition at the time. The president queried

both Wheeler and McNamara on the cost difference between the Army's NikeZeus proposal and McNamara's more modest development program. Kennedy

subsequently said he had decided to stay with McNamara's recommendation on

Nike-Zeus.36

Although the Air Force probably fared the worst of the services in the budget

decisions, General LeMay observed that "in his five years of budget planning this

had been the best with the greatest amount of agreement among the Chiefs and

the best feeling of support from their civilian superiors, including the President,

that the Joint Chiefs had ever had." LeMay had misgivings about inadequacies in

Air Force assault forces, the slow rate of modernization of tactical fighters, and

insufficient funding of air defense. His major concern, however, related to the

strategic forces, where he discerned a trend toward an all-missile force. He had

presented his arguments to McNamara and had been "properly heard," but his

strong concerns remained. General David Shoup, commandant of the Marine
The FY 1964 Budget 129

Corps, believed that the budget's procurement funding would leave the Marine

Corps "the best they had ever been in peacetime." The president then expressed

concern about sea and air transport and fighter aircraft and requested further

study on these matters. Kennedy reminded the group of the huge amounts of

money the administration had spent in the last two years on defense and of the

various international crises it had had to deal with. He felt quite certain about the

need for more dollars rather than fewer in the future, and envisioned at least as

many troubles worldwide, and in Latin America probably more. While the chiefs

should be "constantly mindful" that "we are doing enough," he also wanted them

to remember that he faced a hefty budget deficit.37

After a discussion of future policy toward Cuba, Taylor put forward a Joint

Chiefs proposal concerning testimony before Congress, which was approved.

The proposal read: "Provided the Chiefs are on record with a corporate position,

the official queried may state that position indicating it is unanimous or split as

the case may be, without identifYing the views of an individual chief or service.

Under such circumstances, any member of JCS may explain his personal position in accordance with usual procedures bearing on testimony before Congress."

McNamara said that in accordance with the proposal, only he, Gilpatric, and the

chiefs would disclose any positions or decisions taken by the chiefs. 38

Admiral Anderson, disappointed with the meeting, recalled that as he went

over his areas of disagreement with McNamara, neither the secretary nor Gilpatric

said anything. At the end of the meeting, Kennedy "thanked us all, we left, and

there were no changes made." This was not quite true. Afterwards McNamara

and Gilpatric continued the discussion with the president alone and agreed on no

further changes in the sealift and tactical airlift portion of the budget. However,

they did decide to add 72 C-130 transport aircraft, causing an adjustment in the

NOA estimate to reflect the change but leaving the expenditures estimate unaltered.39

In his message to Congress on 17 January, the president proposed a federal

administrative expenditures budget of $98.8 billion and NOA of $96.1 billion.

Kennedy acknowledged that the economy's performance in 1962 had not met

expectations. To stimulate growth he was including in the budget a tax reduction and reform proposal, although its initial effect would be a revenue loss.

This had contributed, he said, to his decision to limit proposed expenditures

severely, except in national defense and space programs. He characterized Defense

programs as essentially continuing the emphases of previous years on strengthening strategic retaliatory forces, improving air and missile defenses, increasing the

strength and flexibility of conventional forces, and bolstering counterinsurgency

forces. 4o In fact, funds for strategic retaliatory forces, Table 6 shows, declined

rather sharply from the administration's FY 1962 estimates.

The final DoD estimates in the president's budget message amounted to

$49,314,237,000 NOA for military functions. The addition ofmilitary assistance,
130 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

military construction, civil defense, proposed supplementals, and a separate new

appropriation title (Family Housing, Defense-as required by the 1962 Military

Construction Act) brought the overall Defense estimates to $53,960,637,000, the

largest military budget since the Korean War. Use of $300 million in transfers

from prior year balances reduced this to $53,660,637,000.41

TABLE 6

TOA and NOA by Program, FY 1962-FY 1964"

($ billions)

FY62 FY62 FY63 FY64

(Original) (Final) (Current Est.) (Budget Est.)

Strategic retaliatory forces 7.6 9.1 8.5 7.3

Continental air and

missile defense forces 2.2 2.1 1.9 2.0

General purpose forces 14.5 17.5 18.1 19.1

Sealift and airlift forces .9 1.2 1.4 1.4

Reserve and Guard forces 1.7 1.8 2.0 2.0

Research and development 3.9 4.3 5.5 5.9

General support 12.3 12.7 13.7 14.6

Civil defense .3 .2 .3

Military assistance 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.6

Proposed legislation .9

Total obligational authority b 44.9 51.0 52.8 55.2

Less financing adjustment 1.2 1.6 1.5 1.5

New obligational authority 43.7 49.4 51.3 53.7

" Numbers do not add in all instances due to rounding. Figures exclude cost of warheads.

bTotal Obligational Authority (TOA) was usually larger than NOA because it included

elements not part ofNOA, such as transfer ofunobligated balances, reappropriations, and net

offsetting receipts (collections from the public).

Source: Table 1, Financial Summary, House, Subcommittee ofthe Committee on Appropriations, Hearings: Department ofDefeme Appropriatiomfor 1964, 88 Cong, 1 sess, 109.

Congressional reaction to the budget by both parties was negative. Republicans denounced it quite harshly; Senate Minority Leader Everett Dirksen (R-Ill.)

called it "incredible" and "a mockery of the Administration's brave talk of letting the taxpayer keep more of his money through tax reductions." ]. William

Fulbright (D-Ark.), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said

that on first impression the budget, especially for defense, looked "extraordinarily

high." Another prominent Democrat, House Appropriations Committee Chair-
The FY 1964 Budget 131

man Clarence Cannon, termed the budget "entirely too big" and promised that

Congress would "look for and find places to cut it substantially without impairing

national security."42

The Ups and Downs ofthe Authorization Bill

Concurrent with the president's budget message to Congress, DoD submitted to the House and the Senate a draft of proposed legislation authorizing some

$15.358 billion for procurement, research, development, test, and evaluation of

aircraft, missiles, and naval vessels. During the previous year's clash over the RS70, Congress had amended its procedures to require authorization of funds not

only for procurement but also for research, development, test, and evaluation.

As a result of the broadened scope of their responsibilities, the armed services

committees planned to hear testimony not only from McNamara, the service

secretaries, the JCS chairman and service chiefs, but also from Harold Brown,

director of Defense Research and Engineering.43

Despite concern within OSD over the antagonism some members of Congress had displayed toward McNamara the previous year, Hitch remained upbeat

in the fall of 1962 about prospects for the FY 1964 budget. Some observers,

however, predicted acrimonious confrontations with Congress, particularly over

the reduced funding for the RS-70 and cancellation of Skybolt. Certain congressmen promised strong protests about Skybolt, in part because of a feeling of

betrayal, since they regarded continuing administration support of Skybolt as the

price paid for their acceptance of the diminished RS-70 program. Others simply

desired a greater voice in shaping defense policy, an attitude that promised closer

scrutiny of McNamara's policy decisions than they might otherwise have invited

from a technical point of view.44

Assistant for Legislative Affairs David McGiffert believed that the previous

year's controversy over National Guard and Reserve reorganization would not be

revived. Yet he foresaw continuing difficulties regarding the RS-70 and possible

tough questioning, especially in the Senate, over Skybolt. He also anticipated

pressures to accelerate the shipbuilding program, a favorite cause ofHouse Armed

Services Committee Chairman Carl Vinson, who was understood to have raised

the issue recently with the president. In fact, Vinson asked a congressional staffer

to obtain from the Navy a list of ships it had requested but which McNamara

had rejected, plus a prioritized list of approximately 10 ships the Navy would

like to have included in the budget if Congress were to amend the appropriation

bill. At the top of the latter list were the two additional nuclear-powered attack

submarines.45

When McGiffert discussed with Vinson the upcoming posture hearings, the

chairman said he wanted McNamara to read his entire statement, even though

it would take a substantial period of time. He expected the secretary to cover
132 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

Skybolt and the RS-70, although he would wait to receive an explanation for

Skybolt's cancellation before deciding whether to hold separate hearings on that

subject.46

Longer than the previous year's, the posture statement, prepared by Henry

Glass of Hitch's staff, came to 221 pages, including 40 pages oftables. McNamara

spent 17 hours (30 January through 4 February 1963) presenting and discussing the statement with the House Armed Services Committee, during which he

devoted considerable time the first morning to a discussion of the Cuban missile

crisis and its aftermath. To McGiffert it seemed that the committee questioned

McNamara "exhaustively, frankly, and in some respects, caustically" about the

key issues, whereas the previous year his appearance before the committee was

"all sweetness and light." In particular, the questioning on the RS-70 revealed

a strong majority feeling that the manned bomber program should continue.

However, Vinson told McNamara privately that he felt the RS-70 as proposed

was not desirable.47

Following McNamara's appearance, Representative Hebert revealed in a radioTV interview that the committee had learned that the secretary had overridden a

majority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on both the RS-70 and Skybolt decisions.

These decisions, the congressman declared, did not raise questions of civilian

control over the military, but dealt with weaponry matters where "military judgment should be given full consideration." Hebert believed that Congress had

probably furnished the secretary of defense too much power. The question for

Congress now was whether "we want to take back that power. "48

During subsequent testimony Hebert sharply pressed Brown regarding his

recommendations on the RS-70 and Skybolt, as well as how much military advice

he had received on these matters. But Brown declined to name the military

members of his staff he had consulted. Hebert also questioned General Wheeler

and Admiral Anderson as to McNamara's consultations with the chiefs and to

what extent they had directly advised the president. McGiffert believed that the

Louisiana congressman was serving as "Vinson's stalking horse" in pursuing this

line, but Vinson had lost his zest for the kind of confrontation that in 1962 had

raised serious constitutional questions. When a committee member inquired

whether the chiefs should be asked to divulge the number of times McNamara

had reversed or changed their unanimous decisions, Vinson maintained it would

be improper to do so long as Congress desired civilian control ofthe military.49

At the conclusion of the hearings, the committee met on 25 February to

prepare its report and unanimously approved by show of hands an amendment

to provide $134 million for two additional nuclear-powered attack submarines.

It also added $363.7 million for two more prototypes of the RS-70. Feelings ran

especially strong on the RS-70. A colleague asked Vinson if he "would entertain consideration of legislation to clip the Secretary of Defense's wings just

a little bit?" Again reflecting a less strident position, Vinson replied, "I am not
The FY 1964 Budget 133

hot enough on any legislation to take away from the Secretary and the President

the authority in military matters. I cannot do that and the Congress won't do

that. That won't be a sensible thing." On 6 March the committee unanimously

reported a bill of $15.856 billion authorizing everything the administration had

requested, as well as the additional funds for the RS-70 and attack submarines.50

During two days of House floor debate on the measure, 12-13 March,

McNamara became the object of biting criticism. Rep. Leslie Arends and Hebert

delivered slashing attacks, while insisting their comments were not personal.

Arends used the word "monarchy" to describe McNamara's management style.

On 13 March the House approved the additional funds for the RS-70, but by

an unexpectedly close vote, 224 to 179. To some degree, McGiffert felt, the nay

votes may have reflected cost-consciousness, but the vote indicated "much greater

support than last year for our position" and "more willingness to express dissent."

Proponents of budget reduction lost another key vote. By a margin of 245 to

149, basically along party lines, the House defeated a Republican amendment to

cut $800 million from the bill. The committee version thus remained intact, and

on 13 March the House passed, 374 to 33, an authorization measure of $15.856

billion.51

Unlike its House counterpart, the Senate Armed Services Committee aimed

primarily at reducing expenditures, but it too gave McNamara a thorough, albeit

more deferential, grilling. Although Chairman Richard Russell expected McNamara's' testimony to take at most two days, the secretary spent four days (19-22

February), more than 20 hours in all, before the committee. As in the previous

year committee members frequently interrupted his testimony with questions on

both minor details and broad issues. They even raised several questions before

he began reading the posture statement on the first day, 19 February, instead of

waiting for breaks at certain points. At the outset Russell pressed McNamara to

describe his conception ofthe role ofCongress in providing for the defense ofthe

country, asking whether the secretary believed "Congress is entitled to play more

than merely a passive role in reviewing decisions of strategic policy." McNamara

responded that Congress's role was to authorize forces and appropriate funds, but

that it needed also to properly understand the strategy underlying the administration's proposals. 52

On the second day, Margaret Chase Smith submitted to McNamara 36 questions regarding the unclassified version of the posture statement, a few of which

she discussed verbally with him. Following testimony by Brown, the service secretaries, and their military aides, the committee concluded its hearings on 8 March,

having covered a host of issues without giving much indication of what kind of

bill it would report.53

Following House action, the Senate committee on 9 April reported an authorization bill of only some $15.147 billion, about $709 million less than the House

measure and $211 million less than the administration request. The reductions
134 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

resulted essentially from a three percent uniform cut in research, development,

test, and evaluation; a three percent cut in certain support areas, e.g., spare parts;

and reduced procurement quantities ofsome aircraft, missiles, and ships. And the

committee eliminated funds the House had voted for the two extra attack submarines. On the other hand, it approved without change the House's increased

amount for the RS-70. Bya 9 to 8 vote, at the urging of Senator Thurmond, it

added $196 million to begin procurement of Nike-Zeus.54

Much of the Senate floor debate centered on the Nike-Zeus amendment. In

an extraordinary move, on 11 April the Senate agreed to Thurmond's proposal to

consider the matter in executive session, the first time it had taken such action

since 1943. Thurmond argued the need for Nike-Zeus to keep up with the Soviet

Union's development of an antimissile system that reportedly could shoot down

Polaris missiles and possibly even Minuteman missiles. However, supporters of

the administration's position, led by Russell, carried the day. Following a nearly

four-and-a-half-hour secret session, the Senate approved, 58 to 16, Russell's

amendment to remove the funds for Nike-Zeus. A tragic event influenced the

Senate's deliberations. The day before, a Thresher submarine and its entire crew

were lost in the North Atlantic. Citing the disaster, Russell and his supporters

defeated an amendment to restore the funds for the two additional attack submarines, which were of the Thresher type, on the grounds that the submarine's loss

was reason for putting additional money, if any, into Polaris submarines. Later

that day the Senate passed by voice vote an authorization bill of about $14.951

billion.55

OSD informed the two committees that it opposed all the Senate cuts except

the elimination of the additional funding for two more submarines and the three

percent across-the-board reduction in R&D funds. To provide ammunition for

the House conferees in deliberations with their Senate counterparts, Vinson asked

McNamara to furnish him a statement, signed by the secretary, the JCS chairman, and each member of the Joint Chiefs, regarding the effect of the proposed

Senate cuts on U.S. military capabilities. The response spoke of the reductions'

"deleterious effect on our ability to maintain the required degree of offensive and

defensive capability." Separately, the military services provided detailed comments

to the armed services committee chairmen. 56

These efforts had a mixed result. The conferees reinstated only half of the

Senate cut but eliminated the funds for two additional attack submarines

approved in the House version. They also retained the additional money the

House voted for the RS-70. On 13 May the conference committee reported

an authorization bill of over $15.314 billion, merely $44 million less than the

administration had requested. The bill, approved by voice vote of the Senate on

13 May and the House the following day, became law on 23 MayY Below is a

comparison ofthe requested and approved amounts through the key stages:
Administration Request

House Armed Services Committee

House

Senate Armed Services Committee

Senate

Conference Committee/Enactment

The FY 1964 Budget 135

$15,358,691,000

15,856,391,000

15,856,391,000

15,147,491,000

14,951,481,000

15,314,291,000

Callsfor Substantial Cuts

The criticism of excessive fat that had greeted the federal budget, and especially

the defense portion, upon its presentation to Congress in January 1963 became

more pointed and widespread as congressional hearings unfolded in the spring and

summer. Some criticism had a partisan edge, but other proposals for budget reduction came from the president's own party.

Talk of steep cutbacks by prominent Republicans and a number of Democrats put the administration on the defensive. In light of the projected $11.9

billion deficit, Mautice H. Stans, former Bureau of the Budget director under

President Eisenhower, suggested to Republican members of the appropriations

subcommittees how the FY 1964 federal budget could be cut by $10-15 billion,

which party leaders formally announced as a goal. Kennedy challenged them to

indicate specifically where the cuts should come and "whose life is going to be

adversely affected by those cuts." Eisenhower joined the fray, claiming the budget

could be reduced by $13 billion without jeopardizing national security and especially questioning the large amounts budgeted for space exploration. In response

Kennedy ridiculed the competence of Stans, whom the former president had

cited as an authority, and dismissed talk of wholesale spending cuts, which, he

said, would cut "the heart out of the military budget." Among Democrats, A.

Willis Robertson, a member ofthe Senate Appropriations Committee, urged a $6

billion overall reduction, including $1.258 billion in defense, and said he would

support the president's tax cuts only if they were accompanied by corresponding

spending reductions. 58

Wanting to respond in greater depth to Eisenhower's charge, Kennedy asked

McNamara to prepare "an analysis of what our military strength was in 1961 if

there had been a call for military action at that time, what is available to us today,

and what will be available next summer." McNamara's response took sharp issue

with Eisenhower's claim, "in view of the many critical deficiencies and vulnerabilities present in our defense posture in 1960 and 1961," which necessitated

subsequent large increases in defense spending. As a prime example of the weakness that the Kennedy administration had inherited, McNamara maintained that

"if we had continued our forces and readiness at the 1960-1961 level, we would

not have had enough forces to carry out a successful invasion of Cuba if that

should have proved necessary in the missile crisis of October 1962. "59
136 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

Concurrently, the White House asked DoD to analyze the effect on the

U.S armed forces of a $7.756 billion cut in FY 1964 new obligational authority,

with the cuts allocated among the services in proportion to the amounts of their

budget requests to Congress. Using the individual services' estimates of how they

would absorb such cuts, Gilpatric forwarded to the White House the requested

figures, with the caveat that OSD had not had sufficient time to determine

whether, if the budget were to be reduced by that amount, the cuts should come

in the areas indicated by the services.6o

Academic voices joined the debate. In a pamphlet entitled A Strategy fOr American Security, Seymour Melman, professor of industrial management at Columbia

University, and several Columbia colleagues decried the unnecessarily large military

budget and its effects on American society, and the U.S. "overkill" nuclear forces

capability. The defense budget, they claimed, could be cut by $16-24 billion. On

29 March Rep. William F. Ryan (D-N.Y.) sent the pamphlet to McNamara and

asked the secretary to respond to Melman's recommendations. In a detailed commentary on the pamphlet Alain Enthoven concluded that it generally represented

"very poor scholarship and analysis" and was "full of inaccuracies, contradictions

and unsupported allegations." His remarks formed the basis ofOSD's reply to Ryan,

which Melman rebutted in a letter to Ryan. The congressman then made public all

three letters.61

Melman mailed the pamphlet to McNamara and asked for an opportunity

to discuss it with him and OSD staff. On the secretary's behalf, Hitch replied

that many in OSD had read the pamphlet. He knew that Melman would "not

be surprised to learn that we completely disagree with most of its major conclusions." However, Hitch did invite Melman to the Pentagon for a talk, where the

two men, joined by Enthoven and Henry Glass, met on 7 June, without any

apparent meaningful result.62

The House Shaves the Appropriation Bill

The gathering momentum in favor of budget cuts produced dramatic results

during House consideration ofthe appropriation bill. During McNamara's lengthy

testimony (6-13 February), as well as the subsequent testimony of General Taylor,

the Joint Chiefs, and the service secretaries, the Subcommittee on Department of

Defense Appropriations, chaired by George Mahon, gave little indication that it

would slash defense spending. Members like Gerald Ford seemed more interested

in identifYing instances in which McNamara had denied or reduced military

service requests for funds, particularly on the RS-70 and Skybolt, or overridden

the recommendations ofthe chiefs, lines of inquiry that pointed to congressional

restoration of funds taken out of the budget. After nearly four months, which

included testimony from Melman and other advocates of budget reductions, the
The FY 1964 Budget 137

subcommittee concluded the hearings on 20 May obviously in a different frame

of mind.63

A month later, on 21 June, the House Appropriations Committee accepted

the subcommittee's recommendations and reported a bill of only $47.092 billion,

approximately $2.2 billion less than the administration request. It did not include

the extra funds for the RS-70 that the armed services committees had authorized.

McNamara immediately issued a statement indicating pleasure at the committee's

action regarding the RS-70, but also protesting the reduced funding for procurement ofAir Force tactical aircraft and for military personnel, which he said would

necessitate a manpower reduction of 60,000. Mahon indicated privately that he

thought the cuts excessive but that "he had to go as far as he did to prevent a split

with the Republicans on his subcommittee."64

In presenting the bill on the floor of the House Mahon delivered a strong

endorsement of McNamara, who was, he said, "on top of the job" and "devoting

his enormous talent and energy to the public interest and deserves the respect

and the admiration of the American people." On 26 June the House passed the

bill, with minor amendments, by a vote of 410 to 1. Vinson was absent during

the floor debate and no House member offered an amendment to restore any of

the funds removed from the bill. Democratic leaders may have thought it wiser

to seek restoration ofsome ofthe funds when the Senate took up the measure.65

Averting Deeper Cuts in the Senate

The sizable House cuts posed difficult questions for OSD in determining which to appeal to the Senate. The cuts hit the Air Force, which had less

budget flexibility than the Army or Navy, especially hard. Brown pointed out to

McNamara the difficulty in requesting restoration of the three percent acrossthe-board cut in research, development, testing, and evaluation. The Senate,

Brown felt, would likely respond that OSD had already accepted a three percent

cut imposed by the armed services committees on aircraft, missiles, and ships,

presumably the most important part of the program. The question might well

be asked as to why it would then contest a three percent cut on the remainder. Instead Brown recommended that McNamara indicate "what the specific

impact" ofthe cuts would likely be. Heeding the advice, McNamara sent Defense

Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman Russell a letter of reclama on 12 July,

describing in detail the effects of the cuts DoD was appealing-a total of about

$437.2 million, less than a quarter the amount the House had pared. McNamara

expressed the department's willingness to accept the three percent blanket cut

in research, development, test, and evaluation, except as it pertained to military

space programs and the Air Force's classified programs.66

Despite congressional passage of continuing resolutions to ensure funding

of federal programs beyond 1 July into FY 1964, McNamara expressed concern
138 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

at the slow pace that legislation worked its way through Congress. McGiffert

predicted that the current session might stretch even into November or December. McNamara therefore asked the service secretaries and others to provide him

descriptions of the impact on military programs caused by the delays so that

he could discuss the matter with Russell and other key members of Congress.

When McGiffert pointed out that Russell's support during the upcoming weeks

of anti-civil rights legislation might divert his attention from defense legislation,

McNamara replied that Russell was "quite familiar with the effect on Defense

of delays. If we can layout the facts of our situation, I am sure he will place our

national interests first." However, neither McNamara nor McGiffert had hopes

for a sizable restoration of the House cuts, which was one reason, as McNamara

explained, that he did not appeal more ofthem.67

New advocates for a 000 spending reduction-two young, recently elected

senators-now entered the debate over the size of the budget. George McGovern (D-S.D.), a 41-year-old former director of Kennedy's Food for Peace program

who had served two terms in the House of Representatives, and Gaylord Nelson

(D-Wis.), a 47-year-old former governor of Wisconsin, both urged deep budget

cuts. In July 1963, McGovern and Nelson sent a letter to McNamara complimenting him on his congressional budget presentations, but pointing out that

testimony of other 000 officials had raised "serious doubts" in their minds about

U.S. military programs, particularly the continued stockpiling of nuclear weapons. Through correspondence and meetings with OSD officials, they probed the

justifications for various aspects of the budget. In a major speech on the Senate

floor on 2 August, McGovern decried the "overkill" capability of U.S. defense

forces and tentatively proposed cuts of $4 billion in the Defense budget and $1

billion in the Atomic Energy Commission budget. Other senators, mostly junior

members, indicated they planned to speak in the same vein in the near future.

McGovern and others had talked with Melman, who apparently had tried to win

them over to his position. But McGovern's proposed cuts fell far short ofthe $16-

24 billion called for by Melman.68

McGovern wrote to McGiffert thanking him for the cooperation that OSD

had shown him and Senator Nelson, and expressing the hope that nothing in his

speech would be "detrimental in any way to the best interests of the country."

In his dealings with OSD officials, McGovern adopted a reasonable, courteous

tone, indicating he trusted that 000 leadership would understand he was not

"another Melman." He essentially wanted to promote a public debate on defense

matters and the budget in particular that would strengthen rather than weaken

the defense program.69

Prior to the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee hearing to consider

Defense's reclama on the House bill, Russell confided that he expected about 30

votes in favor of drastic cuts as a result of the efforts by Melman and McGovern.

He would report out the bill only when he could get it on the calendar quickly
The FY 1964 Budget 139

in order to prevent any buildup of sentiment to reduce the DoD budget further.

McGiffert thought Russell was overestimating such sentiment and that the

number ofsenators favoring deep cuts would amount to 15 at mostJo

DoD sent a large delegation to Capitol Hill for the hearing on 20 August,

including Gilpatric, Brown, Generals Taylor, LeMay, and Wheeler, and other

high-ranking military officials. Gilpatric and Taylor did virtually all the testifying.

In arguing for the restoration offunds, Gilpatric stressed that the limited test ban

treaty* signed the previous month with the Soviet Union had not altered "our

assessment of the military threat confronting us now or likely to face us in the

future." Asked to comment on proposals for slashing the Defense budget, Gilpatric said that Melman had "grossly oversimplified the problem" and that even the

$4 billion cut McGovern advocated "would eliminate over one-half of the entire

segment of the 1964 budget that supports strategic retaliatory forces." Taylor

concentrated on debunking the "overkill" thesis, assuring the subcommittee that

McNamara had "required the military authorities in the Pentagon to justify every

strategic weapon supported by this budget" and that every one of these weapons

had the "unanimous support" of the Joint Chiefs. These were vigorous arguments

against further cuts, but, because DoD had accepted so many of the House cuts,

one writer called the reclama "an unprecedented retreat."71

Nevertheless, the presentation had some effect. On 17 September the

Senate Appropriations Committee, in reporting an amended bill, made a series

of changes that restored $289.4 million of the amount the House had cut. This

included $60 million for the Mobile Medium-Range Ballistic Missile, a restoration DoD had not requested. McNamara, however, had assured key senators that

if the money were restored, he would proceed with the next phase ofthe weapon's

development and would not reprogram the funds. 72

Floor consideration ofthe measure on 24 September followed the vote earlier

in the day, after a month-long Senate debate, to approve the limited test ban

treaty, and discussion of the treaty carried over into the debate on the appropriation bill. Russell may well have arranged the schedule with this in mind, knowing

that the Senate would be unlikely to approve even a slight reduction in Defense

spending on the heels of approving the treaty. As expected McGovern offered an

amendment to reduce procurement and R&D funds by 10 percent or about $2.3

billion. In lengthy remarks he argued that excessive military spending was leading

to "the neglect of other vital sources of national strength." Russell, an opponent

of the test ban treaty, declared that because the United States enjoyed only a slim

margin ofsuperiority over the Soviet Union the amendment would invite war by

reducing U.S. strength. He warned against "an unjustified spirit of optimism as

to the future designs of Soviet Russia" based on the test ban treaty. Russell's and

even McGiffert's more cautious estimate a month earlier regarding Senate support

* See Chapter XIII.
140 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

for deep budget cuts proved wide ofthe mark. The Senate rejected the McGovern

amendment, 74 to 2, with only Jennings Randolph (D-WVa.) joining the South

Dakota senator. It also narrowly voted down, 45 to 43, an amendment by Leverett Saltonstall to cut procurement funds by about $158 million and another, 72

to 5, by William Proxmire to delete the $60 million the Appropriations Committee had added for the MMRBM. The Senate then passed the bill, 77 to 0.73

Although Russell had been in the minority on the test-ban treaty vote, the

Senate's actions on the appropriation bill represented not only a triumph for his

views, but also a testament to his legislative skills. In a personal letter, Gilpatric

praised "the masterful fashion in which you brought the debate on the Bill to the

optimum conclusion. This country is indeed fortunate in having you at the leadership helm ofthe Senate on national security matters."74

Following a conference report that split the differences between the House

and Senate versions, the House on 3 October approved, 335 to 3, an appropriation of slightly more than $47.22 billion (NOA). The Senate gave its approval

later that day by voice vote, and the bill became law on 17 October.75 The

amount was about $2.1 billion less than the administration had requested:

Administration Request

Passed House

Passed Senate

Conference Committee/Enacted

$49,314,237,000

47,092,009,000

47,339,707,000

47,220,010,000

Subsequent additional appropriations for military construction, family housing,

and civil defense and a deficiency appropriation for military personnel brought

the total to $49,929,659,000.

White House and Department of the Treasury interest in reducing federal

spending, plus McNamara's own cost reduction program and cautious approach

in approving production of major new weapons systems, clearly exerted strong

downward pressures on the FY 1964 Defense budget. It is ironic, however, that

the secretary, who labored hard to tighten the budget, had to defend it from

public and congressional calls for further reductions.

It must be noted, too, that budget cutting did not focus solely on DoD.

Large projected deficits and the president's tax cut proposal provided ample

reasons for Congress generally to rein in federal spending. In the fall of 1962

administration officials began using terms like "fiscal responsibility" in a way

that reminded one observer of the Eisenhower administration's approach to the

budget. In light of the administration's own recognition of the altered economic

realities, little wonder that Congress subsequently reduced the overall federal

budget for FY 1964 by $6.5 billion.76
The FY 1964 Budget 141

Calls for defense spending cuts had other roots, too, including partisanship,

though Democrats ranked among the strongest proponents of cuts. Yet the motivation behind proposals for across-the-board cuts by McGovern and others may

have derived in part from frustration among the rank and file in both houses in

dealing with the complexities of the Defense budget, along with an unwillingness

to follow the lead of senior members of the armed services and appropriations

committees. Moreover, in the immediately preceding sessions, Congress had

only reluctantly, and essentially for constituency reasons, cut military spending.

In effect it had tried to maintain a balance of power with the executive branch

by increasing military spending. In this session it may have occurred to some

members that withholding appropriations constituted a more effective way of

exercising power. Finally, the relaxation in tension with the Soviet Union following the signing of the limited test ban treaty, plus the growing perception of U.S.

military strength as so vast that substantial cuts could safely be made in defense

spending, also helped contribute to the trimming of the administration's budget

request,77

Some of the motivation reflected resentment of McNamara, who increasingly became the object of criticism, in part because of his brilliance, forcefulness,

and self-assurance. The working over that Sen. John L. McClellan (D-Ark.) and

the Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee gave McNamara during

the TFX hearings that spring further diminished his standing with Congress.*

"There's no doubt about it," an anonymous Democratic senator was quoted as

saying in March, "the Congressional honeymoon with Bob McNamara is over."

The press made much of the worsened relationship. Some saw the reason primarily as McNamara's personality and management style,78

That the FY 1964 000 budget did not suffer even more is attributable in

large measure to the general support for the administration's programs by Mahon

and Russell, as well as to Vinson's less contentious attitude that allowed another

effort to increase funding for the RS-70 to fizzle out. Russell, who helped defeat

the Thurmond amendment to add funds for Nike-Zeus during consideration of

the authorization bill, played the key role. As a biographer has noted, Russell, a

consistent supporter of Kennedy's defense buildup, often found himself out front

ofthe administration on military spending matters. Chairman of both the Armed

Services Committee and the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, he presided,

as one Senate colleague remarked, "over the spending authorization and substantive law for about half the government as far as money goes." Yet the Kennedy

administration deserves credit, too. It took the movement for defense spending

reduction seriously and responded to it pragmatically.

Although McNamara expressed public indignation during the spring of 1963

over the cuts made in the budget, the administration at the same time signaled

* See Chapter XVII.
142 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

that it might itself initiate deep cuts in DoD spending in upcoming years, in part

to offset the balance of payments deficit.79 The hints came as the Pentagon began

preparing the FY 1965 budget, a task started under Kennedy that would have to

be completed by his successor, Lyndon B. Johnson.*

* See Chapter XVIII.
CHAPTER VII

Berlin: The Wall

A grave crisis in Berlin in the summer of 1961 shook the twin pillars of

Department of Defense policymalcing-strategic planning and the budget-and

displaced Laos and Cuba as the central foreign policy focus of the new Kennedy

administration. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's renewed threat to turn control

of access to West Berlin over to the government of East Germany forced the

administration to augment further the FY 1962 Defense budget, with a third

amendment in July 1961, and to confront the limitations of available U.S. military options and larger questions of overall national and Allied security strategy.

As an immediate consequence, the crisis required the calling up of reserves,

reorganizing the National Guard, and increasing the number of Army divisions.

In the larger scheme these measures heightened Pentagon awareness of the value of

conventional alternatives to nuclear forces. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

for International Security Mfairs Henry Rowen later observed, "The Secretary

of Defense quickly realized during the Berlin crisis that he didn't want to use

nuclear weapons and that the options he had with existing forces and plans didn't

look good."! Berlin thus presented the adminisrration with both an early foreign

policy test and a seminal opportunity to apply the still evolving concept of flexible response.

Berlin in the Eisenhower Administration

Berlin remained a potential Cold War flash point after the 1948-49 Berlin

blockade and airlift, bur almost a decade passed before it flared up. Although

petty harassment in the form of delays and "administrative" difficulties periodically plagued individual passengers traveling to Berlin in Allied military convoys,

there was no direct challenge to the status of the city until 10 November 1958,

when Khrushchev asserted that the Soviet Union would "hand over to the sovereign German Democratic Republic [GDR] the functions in Berlin that are still

143
144 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

exercised by Soviet agencies." Two weeks later the warnings became explicit. On

27 November the Soviet Union sent the three Western powers a note calling for

an end to Allied rights in West Berlin and the conversion of West Berlin into

a "free ciry." The Western powers were given a grace period of six months to

follow suit, failing which the Soviet Union would carry out the planned measures

through an agreement with the GDR.2

Khrushchev's action was a calculated effort to achieve several goals. As one

White House official remarked, "If Khrushchev could force the west to grant East

Germany legal recognition, he would not only secure the status quo throughout

Eastern Europe but would demoralize the West German government in Bonn,

disrupt NATO, stop the momentum of western unification and regain the European offensive."3 Such potential benefits seemed to justify the threat, even at the

risk of precipitating a crisis, but strong Western objections caused Khrushchev

to back off. The grace period gave him time to maneuver, as he claimed the six

months was "fully sufficient to provide a sound basis for the solution of the questions connected with the change in Berlin's situation."4 He committed himself

to no particular date. Initially, vehement Western reaction denounced not only

the unilateral Soviet action but also the idea of West Berlin as a neutralized "free

ciry." Washington responded that there would be no negotiations "under menace

or ultimatum." Further discussions on Berlin would have to take place within the

wider context of a settlement of the German problem and European securiry.5

The Soviet Union agreed to discuss Berlin with the Western allies at the Geneva

Foreign Ministers Conference in May 1959, signaling it would allow the treary

deadline to elapse. For their part, U.S. leaders showed some flexibiliry, proffering

token concessions so long as the accommodation would not interfere with Allied

rights in West Berlin. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles himself had appeared

willing in 1958 to allow East Germans to serve as Soviet deputies for such nominal administrative tasks as stamping documents or issuing passports.* This

approach did not appeal to West Germans, and its appearance of appeasement

may have figured in Khrushchev's reviving the Berlin crisis when another opportuniry presented itself. That opportuniry would not come during the remainder

of the Eisenhower administration, however, and Khrushchev seemed willing to

postpone a resolution until a new administration took office.6

Indecision, Spring 1961

In his memoirs, the Soviet premier claimed that he awaited the outcome of

the presidential election in 1%0 before taking any further step. The new president, young and untested, may have appeared to Khrushchev as a more malleable

*An ailing Dulles was succeeded by Christian A. Herret, Jr., on 22 April 1959. Dulles died on 27 May, rhe day

the six-month deadline expired.
Berlin: The Wall 145

negotiating partner than Eisenhower. The Soviet Union lowered the rhetoric as

the Kennedy term began but left no doubt about its intentions regarding Berlin.

Even if the United States did not stand ready to give formal recognition to an

East German government or accept West Berlin as a demilitarized entity, it

should at least join with the Soviet Union in removing the outdated occupation

status in Berlin. This was the suggestion of Mikhail Menshikov, Soviet ambassador to the United States, in conversations with Adlai Stevenson weeks after the

presidential election.?

The fragile truce prevailing in late 1960 did not last long. Even before

the inauguration Khrushchev sounded a harsh note in a speech voicing Soviet

support for wars of national liberation. He emphasized that the West was "particularly vulnerable" in West Berlin to a separate treaty between the Soviet Union

and the GDR.8 Six weeks later, on 17 February 1961, a strongly worded aidememoire to the Federal Republic made it clear that if the West did not participate

in a peace treaty in the future, a separate arrangement would end "the occupation

regime in West Berlin with all the attendant consequences."9

Why the seeming mixed signals from Moscow? Perhaps fearing China's growing nuclear capability, the Soviets initially sought a rapprochement, a collaboration

of convenience with the West, as Averell Harriman's discussions in November

1960 with Menshikov hinted. The resumption of Khrushchev's bluster may have

come as a response to Chinese leader Mao Tse-tung's assertion of Soviet softness toward the United States. lO Possibly, and more likely, the deterioration of

East Germany through increasing loss of population to the West was not simply

draining the GDR's resources but its morale as well. Shoring up the East German

position would entail a more aggressive attitude toward the West.

The renewed tension may have stemmed from actions on the U.S. side as

well, even if misread. Kennedy speculated later that the March and May amendments to the FY 1962 Defense budget may have provoked the Soviet Union.

Moreover, Harriman's statement in Moscow in March 1961 that "all discussions in Berlin must begin from the start" may have come across inaccurately

as Kennedy's repudiation of concessions made under Eisenhower. Nevertheless,

these explanations failed to take into account that Khrushchev had manifested

truculence before Kennedy moved into the White House. I I

The revival of the long-simmering Berlin issue forced the new administration to confront the possibility of a crisis, probably in the near future. Initially

it seems to have hoped that the tensions would dissolve short of violence, as had

happened in the past. The Soviet Union had backed down before and might

do so again. Any confrontation should come clearly from the Soviet side, not

from any hasty action by the United States. Significantly, Kennedy's State of the

Union address on 30 January 1961 made no mention of an impending crisis over

Berlin. 12
146 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

The president's failure to mention Berlin caused concern in West Germany.

At a meeting with Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano on 17 February, Kennedy stated then and repeated in the following month to West Berlin Mayor

Willy Brandt and in April to Chancellor Konrad Adenauer that the United States

remained fully engaged and would not retreat from its pledge to preserve freedom

in West Berlin. 13

White House reassurances to German leaders represented more than cosmetic

efforts to calm an anxious ally's fears. In fact, Washington had no illusions about

the fragility and tentativeness of the lull in Soviet-American relations over Berlin.

Preparations were well-advanced on scenarios to deal with anticipated troubles.

Some dated back to the Soviet challenge in 1958 to turn Berlin into a "free city"

and involved Britain and France as the allies most affected by changes in Berlin.

Ofspecial importance was LIVE OAK, a tripartite planning group established by

the United States, Britain, and France on 4 April 1959 under U.S. Commanderin-Chief, Europe (USCINCEUR) General Lauris Norstad to deal with the military implications of any Soviet action that might threaten Allied access to Berlin.

As of June 1960 Norstad had assumed responsibility for all LIVE OAK planning and execution, including planning for coping with any attempted closure of

ground access to Berlin.I4

As part of the preparation, on 7 October 1960 the State Department had

asked Defense to suggest from a wide-ranging checklist measures that might be

accorded discussion priority or given early implementation. At OSD's request

later in October, the Joint Chiefs, on 26 January 1961, six days after Kennedy's

inauguration, proposed several actions, including public relations and economic

measures, for unilateral tripartite implementation. More importantly, they proposed the holding of a tripartite military exercise that would "demonstrate

determination to maintain U.S. legal rights in Berlin." In forwarding the JCS

recommendations to Secretary of State Rusk, Assistant Secretary of Defense for

International Security Affairs Paul Nitze did not favor the military exercise "at

this time" but wanted to establish a tripartite operations staff (in addition to the

existing planning staff) under Norstad. Nitze made it clear that the capability to

respond quickly and effectively to a Berlin contingency "should be carefully timed

and executed to achieve the maximum benefits."15

Divisions among the allies and within the U.S. defense establishment compounded the difficulties DoD faced as it assumed an increasing role in the planning

for Berlin contingencies. LIVE OAK was a case in point, as differences developed over the utility as well as the size of a probe along the autobahn to Berlin to

test Soviet intentions. The Europeans believed that NATO conventional ground

forces were no match for the Soviets, who vastly outnumbered the allies in weapons and troops. The Joint Chiefs and Norstad agreed, convinced that defense of

the West, including Berlin, remained anchored to a low nuclear threshold, which

had been the prevailing assumption of the previous administration. In contrast,
Berlin: The Wall 147

during the spring and early summer of 1961 McNamara and Nitze insisted to

Norstad that strong probes down the autobahn and other conventional responses

should be looked at. 16

At issue were fundamental doubts the McNamara team had about the views

of Norstad, the chiefs, and the allies on the role of conventional forces in Europe

and the mindset-inherited from the Eisenhower years-that maintained whatever action took place on the conventional level would quickly escalate to the

nuclear and that in any case Soviet aggression could more effectively be deterred

playing the nuclear card. The reservations extended not only to the strategic

philosophy inherited from the Eisenhower White House but to the inherited

machinery as well. Kennedy's national security team did not dismantle existing

organizations such as the U.S. Coordinating Committee on Contingency Planning for Germany and Japan; it simply bypassed them. Ad hoc policy studies and

special investigations took their place until the Berlin Task Force, headed by the

State Department's Foy Kohler, was established in July 1961. Planning for the

defense of Berlin fell into a larger framework of NATO policy, with Nitze having

taken responsibility for a full-scale review ofthe situation.I?

The Acheson Initiatives

As Soviet pressures mounted and U.S. military planning proceeded fitfully,

the president turned to former Secretary of State Dean Acheson for advice on the

developing crisis. In a special report on Berlin on 3 April 1961 Acheson warned

the president that the Soviets "more likely than not" would provoke a crisis later

in the year. He concluded that short of a mutually acceptable reunification plan

for all of Germany, no solution to the problems ofWest Berlin appeared in sight.

But if every course of action were "dangerous and unpromising," inaction would

be "even worse." In this circumstance, he declared, "a bold and dangerous course

may be the safest." Acheson's admonition came through as nothing less than a

thinly veiled recommendation that the West should be prepared to go to war

over Berlin if necessary. Economic and political measures would not suffice by

themselves. Significantly, Acheson believed that a buildup of conventional forces

would reinforce nuclear deterrence. 18

Acheson's belligerent warnings stood in stark contrast to an earlier study

prepared by the State Department in March entitled "The Problem of Berlin,"

which aired the possibility of an arrangement allowing for a limited East German

role in controlling access to West Berlin without sacrificing the West's basic position. Such negotiations, State said, ought to be preceded by a strong warning to

the Soviets that an act of aggression would result in mobilizing U.S. forces as

massively and effectively as the invasion of South Korea did in 1950. However,

further detailed contingency planning would prove difficult, if only because "the

governments concerned, particularly the British, are reluctant to commit them-
148 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

selves to rigid courses of action on a purely hypothetical basis and thus to deprive

themselves offreedom to exploit any opportunity for new diplomatic approaches

which might present themselves as the situation develops."19

OSD found State's conclusions unsatisfactory. ISA's policy planning staff

expressed concern that the State paper "does not deal with the situation which

would arise if the Soviets increased pressures for a Berlin settlement and we

decided to initiate existing contingency plans as a response . . .. Thus the paper

gives an impression of a readiness to make concessions which ISA should oppose."

In brief, ISA complained that "the paper has a pessimistic, defeatist tone which,

though possibly justified on factual basis, seems inappropriate as a setting for

discussions with the British or any other country." ISA recommended a more

positive view of contingency measures. 20

In the short run, at least, Acheson's advice determined the administration's

approach during British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan's visit to Washington

in early April. Although Acheson never claimed that his proposal had become

administration policy, his dominant personality conveyed that impression to

Macmillan. His recommendation created alarm: In the absence of an agreement

on Berlin, the allies should be prepared to take military countermeasures, including sending a division down the autobahn, if routes were blocked. The British

and many in the White House circle believed in pursuing negotiations, while

Acheson and Nitze, the latter speaking for OSD, saw only futility and frustration

in that course. Yet Acheson, for all his belligerence and irritability with those who

disagreed with him, may well have been less adamant than he sounded.21

Whether or not the Acheson April initiative was less rigid than its rhetoric, it

opened a round of intense examination of U.S. and NATO preparedness in the

event of a new crisis over Berlin. Previously, in March, McNamara asked the Joint

Chiefs again for countermeasure suggestions against Soviet aggressive action. The

chiefs responded before the end of April in two reports. On the positive side

they found no fault with U.S. contingency planning, but they cited "important

deficiencies" in the tripartite planning. To give the Soviets pause would require

considerably more Allied troops in place in Europe, and the allies should attempt

no probe of ground access until that time. In a third report on 4 May, they

responded to Acheson's recommendations, which they found for the most part

"a realistic analysis of a complex politico-military problem." They recommended

modifYing his proposed division-size probe by shifting it to a later stage in the

confrontation process. Since a battalion-size force might conceivably open the

autobahn, a larger force would come into play only if the smaller probe should

fail. The JCS reports supported vigorous efforts to restore ground access to Berlin

before trying an airlift. On the other hand, the chiefs believed that because Berlin

was ultimately indefensible against overwhelming Soviet ground forces, resorting

to a general war, involving nuclear weapons, might be preferable to engaging in
Berlin: The Wall 149

a conventional conflict. The ]CS apparently judged that a low nuclear threshold

should remain a primary objective.22

This assumption, clearly a legacy of the Eisenhower era, disturbed OSD and

focused the debate on the continuing relevance of the Eisenhower strategy. While

the ]CS reliance on rapid progression from conventional to nuclear response may

have been thinkable in 1958, Nitze viewed it as much less so in the current situation. He wanted the president to have more flexibility in decisionmaking and

encouraged "new policy guidance which would facilitate development of military

plans for graduated, intermediate military actions between small conventional

operations and general nuclear war, and also for possible U.S.-West German

military actions as an intermediate step between u.s. unilateral and tripartite or

NATO military actions."23

McNamara, too, found Acheson's views more persuasive than those of the

]CS. The idea of having to move directly to nuclear war after only token ground

action he found repugnant on moral as well as logical grounds. But given the

chiefs' concern, his report to the president on 5 May 1961 incorporated their

views without accepting either their doubts about the defensibility of Berlin or

their inclination to rely on the nuclear option. McNamara envisioned among

other factors an East German uprising that might be supported by the new

special u.s. forces being created. He asked Nitze on 19 May to draft a revision of

NSC 5803, "U.S. Policy Toward Germany," that would raise the nuclear threshold by providing for use of "substantial conventional military force" to reopen

the way to Berlin; concurrently, he asked the ]CS to address the same matters.

Moreover, he urged Nitze to work with the chiefs and the State Department in

arranging for the participation of the West German government in Berlin contingency planning.24

The ]CS response was cool but correct. They found the phrase "substantial

conventional military force," for example, too vague, and told the secretary that

they had initiated action to secure estimates ofthe forces that would be needed to

reopen access to Berlin. The chiefs also expressed concern about limiting use of

nuclear weapons to general war measures.25

Norstad provided little comfort for the McNamara views. The NATO commander saw no virtue in a large probe not found in a smaller probe, if the objective were just to smoke out Soviet intentions. Should the East Germans or the

Soviets block access to Allied traffic, they could frustrate a probe of any size; "the

greater the force used the greater the embarrassment which would result from

failure." Nor did he see any advantage in using West German troops to reopen

the autobahn. Moscow would perceive such a step as a West German invasion

of the GDR, and a calculated escalation of hostilities.26 Norstad's pessimism

may have derived from his close association with the NATO allies, specifically

with the British and French principals in Berlin, who were reluctant to support a

bolder policy.
150 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

The meeting ofthe North Atlantic Council in Oslo in early May underscored

the lack of agreement on firm collective action. The key questions concerning

economic countermeasures and steps to be taken to increase manpower in the

event of blockage of access to Berlin were not answered at that session. Seeking

to resolve uncertainties, on 29 May Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric asked

for JCS advice on temporary reinforcement of U.S. forces in Europe as a way

of demonstrating the seriousness with which the United States regarded Soviet

threats. 27

The Vienna Summit

Allied differences over Berlin policy were far from resolved by the time of the

Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting in Vienna on 3-4 June. As late as 3 June, Thomas

K. Finletter, U.S. permanent representative to the North Atlantic Council, was

still emphasizing the need for the council to understand and confront the serious

nature ofthe problem posed by the threat to Berlin.28

The president's encounter with France's President Charles de Gaulle in Paris

on 31 May was one more unhappy augury of the future. De Gaulle's blessing

for the Vienna session came cloaked in condescension. Kennedy had no problem

with de Gaulle's flat statement that any acceptance of interference with Allied

access to Berlin would lead to the loss of Germany and the serious weakening

of NATO in all parts of the alliance, but he parted company over the French

president's contention that existing contingency plans for probes at any strength

were worthless. Since the West could not match Soviet power in Berlin, the

only appropriate riposte, de Gaulle asserted, was to threaten general war at the

outset of any aggression. Still, they agreed at least that Kennedy would inform

Khrushchev that the West would not accept any change to Berlin involving the

use offorce. 29

The meeting in Vienna proved to be as tense as anticipated, with Khrushchev

alternating between smiles and scowls in a pattern that had become familiar over

the past half dozen years. To one of his staff, Kennedy depicted the man as "a

combination of external jocosity and 'internal rage.'" Khrushchev was unnerving

in his apparently sudden changes of moods. The two leaders could not even agree

on what constituted the status quo in Berlin. Khrushchev had the advantage of

having won from Eisenhower an admission in 1959 that the status of divided

Berlin was "abnormal." The Soviet premier's behavior at Vienna suggested that he

expected to win more concessions from Kennedy. The president, though, held his

ground on a unilateral change of status in West Berlin. His parting comment to

Khrushchev, that "it would be a cold winter," clearly implied that a difficult time

lay ahead. 3o

When the meeting adjourned Khrushchev made it clear that he intended

to sign a treaty with East Germany unilaterally and confirmed this in an aide-
Berlin: The Wall 151

memoire on the same day as his final position. Whatever the United States and

its allies might do, the Soviet Union would sign a treaty by December.3! Although

Kennedy described the talks as serious, he made a point in a public address of

saying that there were "no threats or ultimatums by either side." By glossing over

the critical differences, he made possible a cooling period that at least minimized

the danger of a rash decision.32

A delay of the official U.S. response to the Soviet aide-memoire for some

weeks may have provoked Khrushchev into revealing publicly on 15 June his

intention to solve the Berlin problem his own way by the year's end. These public

threats were followed by a protest against a West German plan to have the Bundestag meet in Berlin. East German leader Walter Ulbricht contributed to the

tension by warning that Tempelhof airfield might be closed when West Berlin

became a free city.33

Within the national security community the events at Vienna accelerated the

planning begun prior to the Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting. On 25 May, a week

before going to Europe, the president delivered a special message to a joint session

of Congress on meeting urgent national needs, among them the Army's plans to

accelerate deployment of its reserve forces. When fully implemented, the president said, these plans would provide two combat-equipped divisions and their

supporting forces, a total of 89,000 men ready for operations on three weeks'

notice and 10 divisions deployable with eight weeks' notice. "These new plans

will allow us to almost double the combat power of the Army in less than two

months, compared to the nearly nine months heretofore required."34

On 6 June the Joint Chiefs answered Gilpatric's query of 29 May about what

kinds of temporary reinforcements would become available in the event of a

crisis. The deployment of two airborne battle groups along with 224 aircraft to

major training areas in Germany could occur within two to three weeks. Deployment of an airborne division of 11,555 men could take place on a crash basis

within nine days. The chiefs preferred to use one of 27 National Guard divisions

scheduled for training exercises in the summer of 1961 and extend the term of

service by 30-60 days. The mobilization would be accompanied by a presidential

declaration of a national emergency and the calling up of more reserve troops as

well as more national guardsmen. Such action would send a message to Moscow

and to the American people about the seriousness ofthe emergency.35

TOward the Berlin Wall

In the disarray following the Vienna summit the president turned again to

Acheson, whose earlier report provided a coherent view along with specific action

recommendations that had obvious appeal to Kennedy. Acheson's response, in a

long report submitted on 28 June, advocated both a buildup of U.S. conventional forces and preparations for general nuclear war. The Soviets had to be
152 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

convinced, he asserted, that the United States would go to war-even nuclear

war-in defense of Western interests in Europe. This perception was indispensable ifthe Soviet Union was to be deterred. By reducing the issue to simple terms

Acheson played a pivotal but not conclusive role in determining U.S. policy on

Berlin.36

Both State and Defense gave Acheson's report a mixed reception. Those whom

Acheson labeled as soft-liners behaved according to form. Many of these "softboiled eggheads," as journalist Joseph Alsop called them, were from the White

House-Schlesinger, Kaysen, Wiesner; no doubt he had in mind also some State

Department officials. In OSD McNamara and Nitze generally favored Acheson's

approach, but McNamara did not agree with the pace and scale of the proposed

mobilization. Within the White House staff the report elicited the approval of

Taylor and Rostow, but they were in the minority compared with such opponents as Sorensen and McGeorge Bundy. The reservationists feared that Acheson's

advice was aimed "in the main to escalate the crisis, intensifYing it to the brink of

war."3? Even Acheson's longtime friend Harriman was disturbed by the report's

seeming hawkishness. He wondered aloud to Schlesinger: "How long is our

policy to be dominated by that frustrated and rigid man? He is leading us down

the road to war."38

The president himself remained undecided. Immediately following an inconclusive National Security Council meeting on 29 June, at which Acheson made

his case, Kennedy had Bundy request departmental recommendations for preparatory measures in support of possible future actions. On 6 July the JCS submitted

to McNamara a proposal for mobilizing 559,000 military personnel, supported

by 40,000 civilians, at a cost of $13.9 billion for FY 1962 and $17 billion for

FY 1963. It included a breakdown of manpower and equipment for the three

services.39

The large increase in forces and the staggering costs projected by the Joint

Chiefs may have had an adverse effect on the president, perhaps making him

more sensitive to a memorandum Schlesinger presented on 7 July that was critical

ofAcheson's approach and emphasized instead political rather than military means

of coping with the Berlin problem. On the following day Rusk, McNamara, and

Taylor met with the president at Hyannis Port to discuss strategy.40 Recognizing

that the United States was not in a good position to negotiate, they agreed to fashion specific political and military approaches to dealing with Berlin. While Rusk

would move ahead with negotiating strategies, McNamara was to produce a military plan centered on conventional resistance to Soviet or East German aggression

at a level that would permit the United States to demonstrate both its determination to fight if necessary and its willingness to allow the Soviets an opportunity

to negotiate. Kennedy could then raise the risks of conflict without letting them

get out of contro1.41 Given their doubts about the effectiveness of conventional
Berlin: The Wall 153

forces, the JCS supported partial mobilization measures as long as they would be

ancillary to the "main reliance" on nuclear response.42

While the president accepted Acheson's position against early negotiations,

he opposed the latter's recommendation for a declaration of national emergency.

Countering the former secretary of state's assertion that such a declaration was

essential to deter Khrushchev from going too far, Rusk exposed inconsistencies in

Acheson's position on 13 July when he cited the report's stated "need for keeping

early steps in a low key." At NSC meetings on 13, 17, and 19 July, McNamara

in each instance maintained that a declaration of national emergency was not

immediately needed and could wait until the situation required it. The secretary

of defense had the backing of the president's economic advisers, who had previously warned Kennedy that a proclamation could set off a surge of panic buying

and send prices sky-high. The Acheson plan for a proclamation of national emergency "was allowed to die a quiet death" at the meeting on 19 July, when Acheson

finally agreed to McNamara's flexible timetable.43

On 14 July, while discussions were still underway, McNamara sought information from the JCS on the timetable for deploying reinforcements absent a

national emergency.44 Their recommendations, costed out at $4.3 billion, yielded

to the president's decision three days later on a lower estimated cost of $3.2

billion. On 24 July the president directed preparation to deploy to Europe up to

six Army divisions and supporting air units after 1 January 1962.45

These decisions opened the way for the president to lay down a clear American position in a radio and television address, in which the initiative for once

would come from the administration, not Khrushchev. Kennedy's speech of 25

July focused on Berlin because there, in Kennedy's words, "our solemn commitments ... and Soviet ambitions now meet in basic confrontation." Recognizing

the Soviet Union's historic and legitimate concerns about its position in Central

and Eastern Europe, Kennedy offered "to consider any arrangement or treaty in

Germany consistent with the maintenance of peace and freedom, and with the

legitimate security interests of all nations." With some passion he made clear his

wish to avoid having "military considerations ... dominate the thinking of either

East or West .... Now, in the thermonuclear age, any misjudgment on either

side about the intentions of the other could rain more devastation in several

hours than has been wrought in all the wars of human history."46

Kennedy's speech provided ample grounds for raising rather than lowering

voices over Berlin. While refusing to accept Acheson's advice to declare a national

emergency, he proposed steps somewhat short of a full-blown mobilization,

including a large increase in the draft, and requested congressional authorization

of extension ofterms ofservice and recall to active service ofselected reserve units

and individual reservists. He asked for a buildup of military forces, especially the

Army, beyond the modest increases represented in the March and May amend-
154 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

ments to the FY 1962 Defense appropriation bill. The Army would grow from

875,000 to approximately one million men, an increase considerably more than

the 50,000 figure the Army had earlier requested. Navy and Air Force aurhorized

strengths would increase by 29,000 and 63,000 men, respectively.* To pay for

the buildup the president asked Congress to appropriate an additional $3.454

billiont for FY 1962.47

The sense of crisis engendered by the president's address persisted as the administration submitted its request to Congress on 26 July for authority to order to

active duty ready reserve units and individual reservists for one year, and to extend

tours of duty. Responding quickly, Congress granted the personnel authority on

1 August and approved the thrice amended FY 1962 budget on 10 August. The

president signed it into law a week later.48

Presidential adviser John J. McCloy, after visiting Khrushchev at his summer

home on the Black Sea on 26-27 July to discuss disarmament, reported on the

Soviet leader's strong reaction to Kennedy's address. Khrushchev insisted on

regarding it as a declaration of "preliminary war"; he intended to treat it as an

ultimatum that must be met both by a Soviet peace treaty with East Germany and

by new preparations for war. Ominously, he observed that while the superpowers

might survive such a war, all of Europe would be destroyed.49 On 11 August, two

days before beginning of construction of the Berlin Wall, Khrushchev announced

publicly what he had told McCloy privately: Ifthe West initiated war in response

to a separate peace treaty, the Soviets would strike at NATO bases wherever they

were to be found. 50

Perhaps the real danger in the escalation of the Berlin confrontation lay in

the storm Khrushchev could whip up if, after years of threatening, he concluded

a separate peace treaty with East Germany. A peace treaty that legitimized the

German Democratic Republic would change the status quo if East Germany

joined in negotiations between the major powers. This prospect could not help

but agitate U.S. planners and inspire grim scenarios of what would follow from a

separate Soviet treaty.

Despite the growing tension, during August DoD made only limited progress

toward a military buildup on the scale requested by the president and approved

by Congress. Aside from 3,000 troops earmarked for three European-based divisions, reinforcements for Europe remained on a contingency basis and even this

was limited to planning. OSD assumed that the Soviets would undertake no

serious action until after September and possibly not until the end of the year.

Any possible deployment ofArmy divisions could not occur, as the president had

directed, until 1 January 1962. 51

* The growth ofthe services is reflected in the active duty personnel as of30 June 1962, totaling 2,807,819-

Army, 1,066,404; Navy, 666,428; Marine Corps, 190,962; and Air Force, 884,025.

t This included $207.6 million for civil defense.
Berlin: The Wall 155

The restraint that held back military preparations suggested a piecemeal operation, or at least some uncertainty over objectives. In August the number of u.s.

Army personnel in Europe increased negligibly. This accorded with McNamara's memorandum of 2 August to the secretary of the Army, when he spoke of

the tentative character of the plans to send two additional divisions to Europe.

While recommending advance shipment of supplies and equipment for them,

McNamara suggested that these forces be part of the normal rotation unless the

Berlin situation worsened. 52

The administration's preparations, although consistent with a strategy ofgraduated response, may have appeared so tentative as to have undermined the sense

of determination that Kennedy intended the action to convey. Conceivably, full

rather than partial mobilization and the dispatch of troops to the scene on a

crash basis rather than mere intensification of the planning process would have

produced more restraint on the other side.

In determining the pace and scale of u.s. mobilization, the president had

to be mindful of the position of the NATO allies and his own Joint Chiefs. Any

change in the status of occupation forces in Berlin affected France and Britain

as much as it did the United States. The group of intimately concerned powers

included West Germany, which became part of quadripartite planning in July;

the question of responding to the Soviet Union also involved General Norstad

in his dual capacity as USCINCEUR and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

(SACEUR). The views of all these parties reflected a mixture of skepticism and

apprehension over the possible consequences ofthe U.S. initiatives enunciated by

Kennedy.53

While Lemnitzer admitted that partial mobilization might display Western

determination and might even push back the timetable for a planned Soviet operation, he had also warned McNamara on 12 July that 559,000 additional military

personnel (half of them for the Army) would not alter the basic strategy of either

the United States or NATO, which, by JCS reckoning, remained anchored to

a nuclear response. 54 A low nuclear threshold also remained fundamental to

Norstad's conception of the defense of Europe. McNamara gathered from a

conversation with Norstad on 23 July that SACEUR could not envisage NATO

waging a "non-nuclear war and, at the same time protect the nuclear storage

sites and NATO's nuclear capabilities." Norstad also objected to any conversion

of NATO-dedicated, nuclear-capable aircraft to non-nuclear use. He could not

separate the problem of Berlin from his larger responsibilities as SACEUR. As

Nitze later observed, Norstad "was from the old school of 'massive retaliation' ...

totally at odds with the flexible response approach that McNamara and I agreed

was preferable."55

The difficulties U.S. officials encountered in bringing the allies over to their

position became apparent in conversations between Acheson and West German

Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss on the weekend of 29-30 July at Nitze's
156 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

home in southern Maryland. While Strauss recognized in principle that the three

occupying powers would have to take the initiative in maintaining their position

in Berlin, he had trouble focusing on just what should or could come next. He

liked the idea of economic sanctions, or of naval action to close the Baltic or

Black Seas, but he seemed unhappy about alternatives should those actions fail.

The prospect of conventional warfare on German soil so distressed Strauss that

he preferred to evacuate the entire population of West Berlin rather than accede

to Soviet pressure. This agitated statement came after midnight. In the brighter

light of the morning he disavowed any implication that Berlin was not worth

fighting for or that it should be evacuated rather than become a casus belli. He

thought that the West was not ready for confrontation but he was also unable to

recommend what the West should do when it became ready to act. 56

Differences among the allies soon became public. The New York Times pointed

out British indignation over the charge of softness at the same time that British

leaders worried about public apathy. The French echoed these concerns when,

according to the Washington Post, they used the term "saber rattling" to characterize U.S. behavior at the end of July. While de Gaulle spoke of the need for

firmness in Berlin, the French cautioned against sweeping military preparations.

In West Germany, Brandt, seeking to unseat Adenauer in forthcoming elections

as chancellor of the Federal Republic, called for a Western peace conference over

Germany, which Adenauer promptly denouncedY On 5 August, a week before

the Wall went up the foreign ministers of the tripartite powers met in Paris, without any noticeable effect on Berlin policy except for a decision to invite West

Germany to join the tripartite Washington Ambassadorial Steering Group.58

The Wall

The flight of East Germans to the West became a flood-30,OOO in July and

additional thousands in the first 12 days of August 1961. To stop this hemorrhage that was seriously weakening the GDR economy Khrushchev and his East

German surrogates chose to act. Citing a Warsaw Pact declaration that called on

the GDR to establish control around West Berlin, GDR leader Ulbricht blamed

West German provocateurs for the exodus and set in motion border controls. The

"Berlin Wall," a barricade of barbed wire erected suddenly in the early morning

hours of 13 August, was subsequently augmented by concrete construction after

pavement and streetcar tracks were torn up.59 The gradual construction of the

Wall suggests that Khrushchev may have been testing Western reaction. If so, he

won his gamble, never a particularly risky one given Western disarray prior to 13

August. The onus for a response now fell squarely on the West.

The Wall seemed to come as a "complete tactical surprise." The timing could

not have been better from the Communists' standpoint. Many Western leaders

were away from their desks-Kennedy in Hyannis Port, Macmillan on vacation
Berlin: The Wall 157

in Scotland, and French officialdom presumably at the Riviera. It was August,

after all. Although Ulbricht had talked about a "wall" prior to 13 August~ its

actual construction was not anticipated. Every scenario floated by U.s. planners centered on a crisis growing out of a Soviet peace treaty with East Germany'

and consequent interference with access to West Berlin. Perhaps, as has been

suggested, amid the heated exchanges ofJune and July, Ulbricht's reference to a

wall became "lost in the background noise."6Q

Berlin, August 1961'

The Soviet-East German action caused both apprehension and relief in U.S.

and Allied circles. Western observers had increasingly worried over the refugee

flow and its impact on the health of East Germany;, a barrier wall might at least

inhibit an East German revolt as its economy worsened.. Rusk's public statement

on 13 August certainly evidenced a sense of relie£ '~vailable information," he

announced, "indicates that measures taken thus far are aimed at residents of East

Berlin and East Germany and not at the allied position in West Berlin or access

thereto." His additional comments to the effect that limitation on travel in Berlin

violated the status quo represented little more than the usual protest.6-1
158 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

What seemed to be a passive response on the part of the three occupying

powers caused a deterioration in morale in West Berlin and West Germany.

Washington considered imposing restrictions on East Germans traveling to

the West but U.S. officials deemed such a step both trivial and inappropriate.

Although the administration also considered reinforcing the Berlin garrison,

McNamara did not think it desirable and no action was taken. From Lemnitzer's

perspective as chairman of the JCS, "everyone appeared to be hopeless, helpless,

and harmless."62

OSD's stance did not depart significantly from the State Department's at this

juncture. McNamara had made known his thoughts on the crisis at congressional hearings two weeks before the Wall went up. He gave considerable credence

to the belief that Khrushchev's position showed "a marked change and a much

firmer line today than existed" in 1958. At the same time he cautioned against a

panicky buildup in response to this change: "We should not rush to increase our

forces and then rush to tear them down." The peaks and valleys of an adversarial

relationship, he stressed, should not deter the Defense Department from a steady

course of planning.63

The Wall changed neither McNamara's rhetoric nor his reasoning, at least not

in the initial stage of its construction. On 14 August, he assured an interviewer

of "Western determination to defend the freedom of Berlin and to defend the

Allied rights in Berlin ... [and] to build up the military power, to provide a more

effective deterrent, as well as to insure an increased capability for military action

in the event the deterrent fails." While this reiteration of policy reflected admirable consistency, it did not respond concretely to the crisis at hand. McNamara

declared that "the recent move to blockade East Berliners ... is unrelated to any

action we have taken. It does, of course, violate the treaties which we are parties

to and I understand that a strong protest therefore will be submitted against the

action that has been taken."64

Only after Berliners themselves, notably Mayor Brandt, demanded stronger

protests did the United States take any action. Brandt released an urgent letter

that he had sent to President Kennedy on 16 August in which he asked, among

other things, for dispatch of U.S. troops to Berlin as an earnest of America's

continuing intention to remain in the city.65 In response, the president sent two

high-level figures-Vice President Lyndon Johnson and retired General Lucius

Clay-to visit Berlin and hopefully raise its inhabitants' morale. The former represented political authority while Clay symbolized the spirit of 1948-49 when

he commanded the forces that kept the Berlin Airlift going. Johnson, in an

address to the West Berlin parliament on 19 August, invoked the language of the

Declaration ofIndependence, assuring Berliners that Americans had pledged "our

lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honor" to the survival of Berlin.66

The president considered making Clay the U.S. military commander in

Berlin, but refrained from acting on the appointment largely because both
Berlin: The Wall 159

Lemnitzer and McNamara feared that such a move would strain relationships with

the command structure already on the scene. They had recommended naming

Clay as chief of mission with the rank of ambassador, thereby relieving Ambassador Walter C. Dowling in Bonn of his duties as chief of the Berlin mission. On

30 August the president instead appointed Clay as his personal representative in

Berlin, effective 15 September.67*

At the direction of the president, over the objections of McNamara and

Lemnitzer, the dispatch of a Seventh Army battle group of 1,500 men on 20

August demonstrated another effort to impress the Soviets and the West Berliners

alike with the seriousness of America's support. The convoy proceeded along the

autobahn to Berlin unchallenged, an action interpreted as a successful riposte,

even if belated, to the construction of the Wall. Its success demonstrated, as

McNamara adviser William W Kaufmann observed, that Soviet leaders "were not

all that interested in a showdown." The battle group entered Berlin in triumph,

greeted by Vice President Johnson in person. 68

A disquieting incident connected with the move conveyed a different message.

The convoy's commander unwittingly set a precedent that the Soviets subsequently used against future troop movements from West Germany to West Berlin.

As the convoy arrived at the checkpoint on the approach to the city shortly after

dawn on 20 August, a Soviet officer had some difficulty counting the number of

soldiers on the trucks. The U.S. commander then ordered the troops to dismount

and so expedite the count. While counting was an accepted practice, not so

dismounting from trucks. It set a precedent that showed among other things just

how vulnerable the tripartite powers were to Soviet/GDR interference with their

access to Berlin.69

Aside from providing a temporary boost in morale to the beleaguered city,

the combination of highly visible troops and high-level U.S. visitors on the scene

in fact accomplished little, as the Soviet leadership gave no signs of being intimidated or even impressed. They continued to extend the Wall, and on 22 August

issued new regulations curtailing movement of West Berliners into East Berlin.

No Western outcry followed this change.7°

Nor did the allies show any significant reaction to the ending of the quadripartite status of East Berlin. The Soviets reinforced the symbol of the Wall by

terminating all occupation agencies in East Berlin. They gradually reduced the

number of entry places to one-Checkpoint Charlie at Friedrichstrasse-a

concession they probably would not have made had they not wanted teciprocity

in West Berlin. Before the year ended the U.S. commandant denied himself entry

into East Berlin when GDR officials insisted on processing documents of U.S.

* The significance of Clay's role in Berlin did not go unrecognized in Moscow. Khrushchev later claimed that

he chose Marshal Ivan Konev to be the Soviet commander in East Berlin to signify how seriously the Soviets

regarded the situation. See Khrushchev Remembers, 459.
160 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

civilian personnel entering with him. This self-denial severed formal official relations between the four-power commandants.?!

Soviet behavior during the last half of 1961 suggested that the publicized

U.S. troop convoy of 20 August amounted to a kind of empty bravado, and

certainly not the deterrent to further aggression that Kennedy intended. The

building of the Wall without evoking stronger action from the United States and

the allies seemed to embolden Khrushchev to more overt challenges. The accusation on 23 August that the Western powers were abusing the access agreements

of 1945 by transporting "all kinds of revanchists, extremists, saboteurs, and spies"

from West Germany into West Berlin by air prompted only a warning by the

United States against any interference with the aircraft of the Western powers in

the air corridors.72

Still, Khrushchev may have pushed too far. Presidential Assistant McGeorge

Bundy later speculated about Khrushchev's "rigidity of . . . performance as a

negotiator." A little more flexibility, some modest compromises on the Soviet

side, Bundy thought, might have created a breach between the United States

and its NATO allies. Indeed, U.S. planners gave signs of compromise pointing

"toward acceptance ofthe GDR, the Oder-Neisse line, a non-aggression pact, and

even the idea of two peace treaties." Bundy reported these ideas to the president

on 28 August, but Khrushchev made no compromise gesture that would merit

any ofthese concessions.?3

The president, painfully aware of the situation Khrushchev had forced on

him, knew he had to do more than simply show the flag. Kennedy spurred the

secretaries of state and defense to accelerate countervailing political and military

preparations. He won agreement for a "fundamental reappraisal" of the July decisions "for restrained, gradual military strengthening." Although opposing the 20

August convoy decision, McNamara asked the services on 18 August what they

could do to advance the deployment date for up to six divisions and associated

air units from 1 January 1962 to 15 November 1961.74

In Europe LIVE OAK, the tripartite planning group in being long before

the crisis erupted, still was in no position to act. It had not even settled the

matter of coordination between the three LIVE OAK powers-the United

States, Britain, and France-and the other NATO nations. NATO Secretary

General Dirk Stikker complained to Norstad on 3 August about the failure ofthe

tripartite group to keep him informed of their preparations. As late as 26 August

the Washington Ambassadorial Group could offer at best only an expression of

hope by the u.S. representatives that "instructions would go forward to General

Norstad to have Live Oak planning take account of NATO implications."75

If Allied coordination lagged, a major reason lay in the indecision and lack

of clear direction in Washington. Rusk and McNamara sought assistance through

the joint State-Defense Berlin Task Force, established in July. Once the task force
Berlin: The Wall 161

got under way in August meetings became regular and the link between the leaders-Kohler and Nitze-became firmer.?6

For all McNamara's initial agreement in principle with Acheson on the advisability of a general mobilization and a buildup of conventional forces, he continued

to proceed deliberately. He wanted to reorganize ground forces and overhaul

what he saw as the current inefficient management and operation of Reserve and

National Guard contingents. The Berlin Wall crisis brought to the foreground

what McNamara had been trying to avoid: namely, the necessity to increase

expenditures that would ensue from declaration of a national emergency before he

had completed these and other changes. In this context his reluctance to commit

funds for more contingency planning takes on greater understanding. In the end

he yielded to the imperatives of the moment. On 24 August he listed for the

president the reserve units of the Army, Navy, and Air Force that 000 planned

to call to active duty. This callup of over 76,500 men would not necessarily mean

deployment of troops to Europe, only preparation for it; until September no final

commitment to significant overseas reinforcements occurred.?7

The White House also continued to move cautiously. On 31 August, after

much debate, the administration authorized Norstad as CINCEUR to deal with

possible impediments to air access to Berlin by replacing civil aircraft with military if necessary and by permitting fighter planes to take "aggressive protective

measures," such as immediate pursuit to deflect harassment. The White House

denied Norstad authority to direct fighter planes to take action against antiaircraft and missile attackers because the allies refused to delegate this authority

to Norstad. The hitch revealed the continuing state of uncertainty in Washington

and among the allies over appropriate measures to take against Soviet encroachments.78

Arguably, Soviet resumption of atmospheric nuclear testing on 30 August,

rather than the building of the Wall, finally pushed the administration to more

decisive action. Persuaded of the need for more aggressive measures, on 7

September McNamara proposed ordering elements of four National Guard divisions to report for duty between 15 October and 15 November. He also proposed

an increase of 37,000 military for the European Command, deployment of the

4th Infantry Division, and dispatch of an aircraft carrier and supporting ships

for the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. Two days later the president approved

the sending of 37,000 men to augment the Seventh Army in Europe, but delayed

decision on the other proposals,?9

The buildup of conventional forces did not impress the NATO allies or

allay their fears, nor did it appear to impress Moscow. It was time to play the

nuclear card that most ofthe Europeans considered the strongest gambit available

to the allies. Obviously speaking as the administration spokesman, in a public

interview on 28 September McNamara forcefully proclaimed that "we will use
162 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

nuclear weapons whenever we feel it necessary to protect our vital interests." He

drove the message home: "Our nuclear stockpile is several times that ofthe Soviet

Union and we will use either tactical weapons or strategic weapons in whatever

quantities wherever, whenever it's necessary to protect this nation and its interests." Weeks later, on 21 October, Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, also speaking with

full administration approval, echoed the message-U.S. nuclear retaliatory power

was so great it would be self-destructive for an enemy to attack. U.S. power was

so much greater than that of the Soviet Union he was confident Moscow would

not "provoke a major nuclear conflict."8o

In November 1961 OSD prepared for use in discussions in NATO a detailed

paper on NATO military policy in the Berlin crisis intended to assure the allies,

particularly West Germany, that U.S. nuclear preponderance was great enough

to deter Soviet aggression.81 For a German reaction McNamara read the OSD

paper to Defense Minister Strauss (who followed the text he held in his hand)

after dinner at McNamara's home on 26 November, in the company of Nitze and

Gilpatric. Nitze impressed Strauss by emphasizing that in light of their "general

war inferiority, the Russians could rationally only conclude on discontinuation

and restoration of our rights of access to Berlin." Strauss reacted favorably, but

that led to discussion ofthe uses of nuclear weapons and the consequences.82

"Poodle Blanket"

Statements about using nuclear weapons if necessary were declaratory,

intended to reassure the NATO allies and warn the Soviet Union. The operational policy continued to emphasize the buildup of conventional forces, although

now with greater urgency. Early in September, on the 8th, the president raised a

number of probing questions about added deployment of non-nuclear forces, to

which McNamara responded on 18 September, laying out the risks but concluding: "While a conventional build-up alone would be unlikely to convince him

[Khrushchev], the absence of a build-up would probably increase his doubt of

our determination." That same day the president withheld approval ofsending to

Europe the six divisions that Lemnitzer and Army Chief of Staff General George

Decker had recommended (the other chiefs opposed sending any divisions at the

time), instead approving callup of an infantry division, an armored division, and

supporting forces, a total of75,OOO men.83

The result was further acceleration of a process that had been under way

since spring. The term "horse blanket" applied to the long list of proposals for

action from a State-Defense team headed by Nitze and Seymour Weiss, special

assistant to the secretary ofstate. Nitze and Weiss had principal responsibility for

stuffing as many potential responses to Soviet provocations as they could, from

small-scale military probes to general war, under the horse blanket.84 By the

fall of 1961 the Berlin Task Force had reduced the horse blanket to a "poodle
Berlin: The Wall 163

blanket" covering a short but still robust set of options and permitting formulation ofmuch more specific responses to Soviet actions than the horse blanket.

Under the poodle blanket, in an exercise developed largely by Nitze's International Security Affairs office, Allied measures fell into four progressive phases

calibrated to the degree of Soviet provocation and Allied success at the various

levels of force. Soviet interference with access to Berlin, but well short of permanent closure, constituted the first phase and warranted probes of platoon strength

on the ground and fighter escort in the air, counteractions that incurred small risk

of general war. The second stage, continuing and significant Soviet-East German

blockage oftraffic, would be met with "such non-combatant activity as economic

embargo, maritime harassment, and UN action" along with NATO mobilization

of forces and reinforcement from the United States. A third stage called for a

naval blockade or some similar global action, or non-nuclear air action and nonnuclear ground advance in division strength or greater into East Germany. Lastly,

if none ofthese efforts led to termination ofSoviet provocations, nuclear weapons

would be employed, initially in selective attacks for purposes of demonstration

and proceeding through use oftactical weapons to a general nuclear war. 85

On 13 October the Joint Chiefs offered their own approach, emphasizing the

importance of securing maximum NATO participati~n and placing on the Soviets the onus for initiating an attack. From the White House, Taylor advised that

any non-nuclear ground advance not be confined to the autobahn. So long as East

Germans constituted the resisting force, the allies should not be held back from

extending their operations. The tenor of the JCS and Taylor comments suggested

State-Defense general approval ofthe poodle blanket program of actions. 86

In response to these recommendations, on 18 October the president authorized the U.S. commandant in Berlin to send two or three tanks to Checkpoint

Charlie to demolish any illegal barrier. The tanks would then withdraw from the

border and park just inside the Western sector. This aggressive posture derived

from an agreement by State, OSD, and JCS on policy guidance for Norstad in

which the president specifically endorsed the principles of the poodle blanket,

namely that the United States should be in a position to undertake "a sequence

of graduated responses to Soviet/GDR actions in denial of our rights of access."

The president further made clear that he wanted as much emphasis placed on the

capacity to fight with non-nuclear forces as on efforts to enhance the credibility

of the nuclear deterrent. The poodle blanket plan with its four phases received

NSC approval and became NSAM 109 on 23 October 1961,87

As plans went forward during the summer and fall the U.S. assumption that

the British and French would support the American initiatives was not borne

out. Their discomfort over what they still construed as U.S. impulsiveness added

to Norstad's unease over policies flowing from Washington. He worried about

when he could act independently without excessive and time-consuming consultation with his superiors. To visiting representatives of State and Defense in late
164 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

September he expressed doubt about NATO's willingness to use nuclear weapons "under any contingency."88 Norstad had reason for concern. There existed no

consistent administration policy to guide SACEUR at lesser levels than full-scale

conflict. The Joint Chiefs advocated granting him advance authority to respond

unilaterally to Soviet or GDR ground-to-air attacks in the Berlin Corridor. But

given French and British hesitation, OSD demurred. After a White House meeting on 13 September the president decided that Norstad would be given approval

if the British, French, and West Germans agreed. McNamara expressed to Rusk

his doubt that the allies were prepared to go along. 89

Publicly, U.S. planners had to hide their frustrations, but behind the closed

doors at White House and NSC meetings they vented fully. When the president asked at a meeting on 20 October about relations with the allies, Acheson

responded, "we need to tell them." This seemed to be one time that Acheson's

hard line had the full backing of his colleagues. But this shared sentiment had to

remain behind closed doors.9o

The reluctance ofthe allies to approve strong actions proposed by the United

States might have complicated planning but did not prevent the administration

from preparing to substantially increase U.S. forces in Europe. Previously, on

10 October, McNamara had secured the president's approval to deploy, beginning 1 November, 11 Air National Guard fighter squadrons and a tactical control

group. At the same time, seven Tactical Air Command fighter squadrons would

return from Europe to the United States. Additionally, the Army would preposition in Europe equipment for one armored division and one infantry division.

The president also agreed to the rotation of five battle groups of the 4th Infantry Division, thus making available at least two combat-ready battle groups in

Europe at all times for an indefinite period. All these measures were supplementary to the augmentation of the Seventh Army by 37,000 personnel and the

deployment of the 3rd Armored Regiment from the United States to Europe. For

the most part these actions resulted from the recommendations offered by the

Berlin Task Force in early October. On 23 October Norstad judged that instead

of the rough equivalent of 16 combat divisions in the center, NATO would have

approximately 24 combat divisions by the end of the year, most of them effectively manned.91

The channels of diplomacy were never closed. Kennedy announced on 13

September, one month after the erection of the Wall, that he would agree to

Rusk meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko at the forthcoming UN General Assembly session late in September.92 The Gromyko-Rusk talks

afforded Khrushchev another opportunity to scrap his timetable for a separate

treaty. In a speech to the Soviet Communist Party Congress on 17 October, he

claimed that Gromyko's talks with Kennedy and Rusk in the United States gave

the impression that the Western powers were showing "a certain understanding of
Berlin: The Wall 165

the situation and are inclined to seek a solution for the German problem and the

West Berlin issue on a mutually acceptable basis." Consequently, he stood ready

to concede that "we shall not insist that the peace treaty be signed ... before Dec.

31,1961."93

Confrontation at Checkpoint Charlie

Whatever the reason for Khrushchev's postponement of the deadline, there

followed almost immediately the most serious confrontation in Berlin since the

Berlin blockade of 1948, not as dramatic as the Wall but potentially more explosive. On 27 and 28 October, at Checkpoint Charlie, an entryway between East

and West Berlin, U.S. tanks faced Soviet tanks.

The confrontation may have been a reaction to what the Soviets interpreted

as provocations, specifically the behavior of General Clay, the president's special

representative in Berlin. Immediately on his return to Berlin from Washington

on 19 September, Clay ostentatiously increased patrols on the autobahn. His

aggressiveness was not only a personal gesture on behalf of worried West Berliners but perhaps also a calculated departure from the White House's management

of the Berlin crisis. As McNamara had worried, Clay's status made an intricate

command relationship in Germany even more convoluted. Maj. Gen. Albert

Watson II, the senior U.S. officer and commandant in Berlin, reported in his

political capacity to Ambassador Dowling in Bonn and in his military role to

Norstad in Paris through General Bruce Clarke, commander of the U.S. Army,

Europe in Heidelberg. Additionally, a State Department mission in Berlin headed

by E. Allan Lightner, Jr., reported both to Dowling and Watson as well as directly

to Washington. 94

As it happened, Lightner was en route with his wife to the opera in East

Berlin when he was stopped at Checkpoint Charlie on the evening of 22 October

and asked to show identification. Up to this time a display of civilian automobile license tags had sufficed to permit passage. The United States held that the

requirement to show personal identification served to erode the right ofthe occupying power to travel anywhere in Berlin. When Lightner refused to show his

identification to the GDR officer, there ensued a few hours of tense face-offs that

ended with the diplomat reentering East Berlin accompanied by a squad of U.S.

military police with loaded rifles. 95

On the following day Ulbricht issued a decree requiring Allied personnel in

civilian dress to identifY themselves before entering East Berlin. Two days later

U.S. armed patrols again accompanied civilian officials across the line and Clay

asked Watson to deploy tanks at Checkpoint Charlie. Clay's reaction alarmed the

allies, particularly the British, who had never objected to showing their passports

when asked. Concern grew when Marshal Konev, Soviet commander in East
166 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

Berlin, intervened to send tanks to the city. This new display ofstrength induced

Clay on 27 October to move u.s. tanks to the demarcation line, after which the

Soviets deployed tanks within 100 yards of them.96

After some 16 hours Khrushchev ordered the tanks pulled back and in his

self-serving account of the event claimed victory. According to the Soviet premier

the encounter at Checkpoint Charlie was part of a Western plot to exploit the

Soviet 22nd Party Congress as well as an occasion to bulldoze the border installations. Forewarned through intelligence channels, Soviet tanks had stopped the

U.S. tanks in their tracks. Khrushchev boasted: "I proposed that we turn our

tanks around, pull them back from the border, and have them take their places

in the side streets . . . . I assured my comrades that as soon as we pulled back

our tanks, the Americans would pull back theirs." Having provided a face-saving

formula for retreating, he observed that the United States responded within 20

minutes. So he claimed "it was a great victory for us, and it was won without

firing a single shot."97

Much of this bluster was a cover for Khrushchev's retreat. The Soviet Union

had provoked a crisis, worried over its escalation, and relented before it got out

of hand. Although it could take satisfaction in the fact that East German officials

continued to reject U.S. civilians who would not show their identification documents, Americans circumvented the inspection by entering East Berlin by subway

rather than by automobile.98

Aftennath: Clay vs. Washington

The United States was as anxious as the NATO partners-and obviously

the Soviets themselves-not to go to war over as minor an issue as the passport

contretemps. The more critical point remained to prevent the East Germans

from forcing the United States to accept their sovereignty over East Berlin before

signature of a treaty. And to achieve this objective, the administration had already

determined to take commensurate risks. Ambassador Dowling felt that it was

vital that the United States make continuing efforts to exercise the right of entry

into East Berlin by sending in new probes.99

Clay shared these general views. Rather than making him more cautious, the

Lightner incident at Checkpoint Charlie may have persuaded him of the need

for strong actions; he saw tank deployments at the checkpoint as the only practical approach. In his judgment, Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson's protests in

Moscow served no useful purpose and might "indeed force hardening of Soviet

backing of East German action." Rather than wait for a Soviet response, likely

in any event to be a rejection, Clay recommended that the United States seize

the initiative and pressure the Soviet Union until the harassment ceased. There

should be no negotiations, he felt, until the Soviets relented. 100 The Joint Chiefs,

for their part, sympathized with Clay, but preferred to pursue "minimum proce-
Berlin: The Wall 167

dures at present and reserve stronger measures for use if needed as result of

further Moscow talks." In this State concurred. lOl

Clay's apparent inability to live with uncertainty and ambiguity separated

him from his colleagues. Macmillan thought him "a public danger." Rumors that

he was in trouble with Washington gathered currency when he returned home in

November and again in January 1962 for consultations with the president and

officials at State. 102 Meanwhile, the foreign ministers of France, Britain, West

Germany, and the United States met in Paris on 10-12 December in advance of

the North Atlantic Council meeting. Recognizing that any appearance of dissension would embolden Khrushchev to engage in more provocations, the NAC

communique on 15 December announced the intention to resume five-power

talks in the hope of producing a negotiated settlement. The united front notwithstanding, questions about the timing of and basis for negotiations occasioned

much discussion and proved extremely divisive. Stikker noted that as a result of

continuing disagreements during the drafting of the communique, the Council "came as near in my memory it has ever come to a public breakdown over a

major issue."103

A State Department draft of a modus vivendi of 6 March 1962 dealt not

only with Western access to Berlin but also with reaching a mutual understanding that force would not be used to "change the external borders of Germany

or the demarcation line inside Germany." Such an understanding, subsequently

approved by the president for talks between Rusk and Soviet Foreign Minister

Gromyko, would give the West unimpeded access for civil and military traffic. 104

In the absence of Soviet agreement, harassment of U.S. aircraft continued

along the corridor between the Federal Republic and West Berlin throughout

February and March 1962. Such tactics as excessive limitations on the space

Allied aircraft could use did not stop U.S. military aircraft from Bying at altitudes

the Soviet Union was trying to reserve for itself Before this latest test of wills

ended, MIGs were Bying into the path of Allied aircraft, buzzing civilian Bights

to Berlin, and dropping metal chaff to interfere with Allied radar facilities. On

one occasion, 14 February, they buzzed the plane carrying the British ambassador

to Bonn. But the West persisted, and both civilian and military aircraft continued

their missions.!Os

Ultimately, U.S. patience was rewarded with some success. Although the

Rusk-Gromyko conversations on Berlin, which had begun on 11 March, terminated without agreement on 27 March, the two ministers noted that they would

resume contact at an appropriate time. Three days later Soviet Bights at the

disputed altitudes ended as abruptly as they had started. In April both Clay and

Konev, the two most visible antagonists, retired from their positions in Berlin. 106

By May the worst causes of friction had much diminished. Clay confirmed

the existence of a new mood in Berlin when he testified in executive session

before the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees on ISMay.
168 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

After making clear that the British and French had strong differences with the

thrust of U.S. policy, he observed that "at the present moment ... our situation vis-a-vis the East German and Soviet Governments is one of returning to

the status which existed prior to the construction of the wall. At the time that

I left there, there were no harassments; the Soviet guards on the Autobahn were

being very polite, very circumspect, and even the East German policemen were

behaving properly. I think that this may continue, because their efforts at harassment did not destroy the morale of the West Berliner." Clay felt justified in

taking some credit for the calm that had returned to Berlin, acknowledging that

the weakness of the East German economy contributed to the softening of the

Communists' position. IO?

Clay could not have foreseen that the Soviets were preparing a new tactic to

force the West's hand on Berlin; namely, the construction of a ballistic missile

base in Cuba to use as a bargaining chip in negotiations over the status of West

Berlin. Conceivably, some of the saber-rattling that occurred in Berlin in late

summer and early fall of 1962, such as using armored carriers to transport Soviets

to their war memorial in West Berlin, was intended at least in part to divert U.S.

attention from the Cuban venture.

Soviet indications of going ahead with a treaty with the GDR and turning over travel control to GDR authorities required the administration to offer

repeated assurances of U.S. steadfastness. To help allay West Germany's continuing anxiety over seeming contradictions in the administration's position and to

impress on the Soviet Union U.S. resolve, McNamara emphatically stated at a

press conference on 28 September 1962 that the crisis in Berlin was the "most

serious that we have faced since the end of the Korean War" and that the United

States would use "whatever weapons are required to defend our vital interests."

Although the Cuban threat would soon overtake the Berlin problem, these statements were in the context of Berlin and possible resort to nuclear weapons. The

House and Senate both responded with a concurrent resolution promising to use

"whatever means may be necessary" to defend Allied rights in West Berlin. The

House passed it on 5 October by a vote of 311-0, and the Senate adopted it by

voice vote on 10 October.I08

Had the Cuban missile crisis* that followed within a few days taken a different turn, perhaps removal of missiles might have occurred as an exchange for

U.S. concessions in Berlin-an obvious linkage. As Berlin observer John Ausland

noted, "Just as Cuba was in America's backyard, so Berlin was in Khrushchev's.

Whereas Kennedy had the advantage of being in a position to control movement

to Cuba with naval power, Khrushchev was able to control travel to Berlin with

land power. Besides, talk of blockading Cuba inevitably evoked memories of the

Berlin blockade."lo9 In settling the Cuban missile issue the superpowers made

* See Chapter IX.
Berlin: The Wall 169

mutual concessions as both backed away from a general war; but these did not

include an acceptance of East German control of access routes or a conversion of

West Berlin into a free city.

TOward a Soviet-GDR Treaty

Flare-ups over Berlin continued sporadically throughout 1963, most of them

petty but still agitating. In late October 1963 Moscow provoked another incident when it required U.S. troops traveling in convoys to dismount. The purpose

seemed to be more to annoy than to make any substantive statement, and the

episode actually generated more static within the U.S. military ranks than it

did between the rival powers. When Norstad blamed the autobahn incidents in

part on U.S. soldiers at the checkpoint, Lemnitzer, who succeeded Norstad on

1 January 1963, challenged Norstad's claim in a message to Taylor, defending

the conduct of U.S. military personnel as "exemplary" in that duty. General Paul

Freeman, commander in chief, u.s. Army, Europe, had wired Lemnitzer from

Heidelberg of his displeasure over interference by a "high military member of a

sister service" in a matter that had caused the officers in charge of the checkpoints enough grief as it was. 110 Another old issue that resurfaced concerned air

safety in the Berlin air corridors. As late as the last week of May 1964 the Soviets

were harassing Allied controllers with demands for flight plans without sufficient

advance notice. I I I

Even such occasional provocations ceased when the Soviet Union finally

signed a Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance, and Cooperation with East

Germany on 12 June 1964. After six years at the center of the tension over Berlin

the treaty came as an anticlimax. What counted in the pact was what was left

unstated. The rhetoric of traditional statements of friendship and collaboration

between the two countries ignored any reference to Allied troops in West Berlin

or to their right of access to the city. Only two brief mentions of West Berlin

appeared in the document. I 12

The Soviet Union tacitly gave up its demands. The U.S. position stayed

exactly as it was in 1958. To confirm this, the three Western powers announced

on 26 June that "any agreement which the Soviet Union may make with the

so-called 'German Democratic Republic' cannot affect Soviet obligations or

responsibilities under agreements and arrangements with the Three Powers on the

subject of Germany including Berlin and access thereto." Moreover, they pointedly observed that "West Berlin is not an 'independent political unit.''' Frontiers

could be fixed finally only when a final peace agreement was concluded for the

whole of Germany. Ironically, while the Soviet-GDR treaty had nothing to say

about the issues that Khrushchev had raised with such regularity over the preceding six years, it specifically accepted the agreement reached at Potsdam in 1945

that had divided Berlin into Allied occupation zones. I 13
170 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

The West achieved its major objective, namely, to hold the line in Berlin

against unilateral Soviet actions that would jeopardize the Allied position.

Moscow could claim some success as well. By stopping the flow of people from

east to west it had secured some stabilization within East Germany.114 Nevertheless, the overall impression was that U.S. policy had triumphed over Soviet

designs despite often bitter divisions among the allies and acrimonious differences between U.S. planners. The long, drawn-out Berlin crisis had finally ended.

Berlin's significance diminished in the next few years as other flash points dominated the Cold War scene.

The Berlin affair provided McNamara with an early lesson in the complexity

of formulating national security policy in the context of European politics and

multilateral decisionmaking. His ability to fashion a consistent policy during the

extended crisis suffered from difficulties in reaching consensus, first of all, within

DoD, particularly agreement between OSD and the Joint Chiefs. In Europe

Norstad, understandably sensitive to the concerns of the allies, had continuing doubts about the doctrine of flexible response and McNamara's and Nitze's

emphasis on conventional forces. Outside the department, McNamara had to

cope with pressures from White House agents, especially Acheson and Clay, who

would have used conventional forces more aggressively than Defense preferred

and from allies who regarded flexible response as not only an insufficient deterrent but an excessive demand on their resources. The threat to Berlin raised a

host of questions that defied easy answers much less concurrence on the part of

the several stakeholders-when and whether to enter negotiations, the number

of troops to be mobilized, when and how to deploy them, and the relationship

between the conventional and nuclear options, including the range of alternatives

within the nuclear spectrum and when to resort to tactical vs. strategic weapons.

Nevertheless, for all the pitfalls, the Berlin crisis afforded the Pentagon a

larger role in shaping U.S. foreign policy. While Defense was nominally a junior

partner of State in the process, the military nature of the Berlin crisis broadened

the influence of McNamara and Defense, as reflected in the dramatic increase

in DoD funding in the third amended budget of FY 1962, the enlargement of

conventional forces, and employment of the Reserve and National Guard forces.

Defense emerged from the Berlin crisis at center stage in the formation and

management of national security policy.

Further, the crisis afforded an opportunity to test in practice the flexible response doctrine. A product ofslow and unsteady evolution, to be sure, its introduction here nevertheless created a foundation of experience for application of the

concept in future crises, of which the next, Cuba, followed in short order in

1962. The Berlin test reinforced McNamara's belief in the wisdom of flexibility

and in the futility of reliance solely or primarily on the nuclear option. For flex-
Berlin: The Wall 171

ible response to be credible ultimately required a buildup of not only u.s. but

NATO conventional forces and the centralization of nuclear weaponry under

u.s. control, realizations of which remained elusive and debatable and posed

challenges in some ways as daunting as coping with the tempest over Berlin.
CHAPTER VIII

The Bay of Pigs Fiasco

Ofthe three major international crises the Kennedy administration confronted in 1961, Berlin was the only one where the United States and its allies found

themselves face to face with the Soviet adversary. In the other two areas-Southeast Asia and Cuba-the Soviet Union had surrogates serving its interests.

In Cuba, the Kennedy administration inherited a major dilemma and a controversial enterprise. Conceived by the CIA and advanced secretively in the last

year of the Eisenhower administration, the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961

grew out of a felt need to respond forcefully to events in Cuba that increasingly

identified its leader, Fidel Castro, as a threat to the United States and other countries in the Americas. l

The Eisenhower Legacy

The initial flush of enthusiasm following the overthrow of the repressive Batista

regime in January 1959 gave way before the end of the year to U.S. disenchantment

with the behavior of Castro, Batista's charismatic successor. Castro quickly cast the

United States as the enemy, proclaimed himself a communist, and turned to the Soviet

bloc for support. During Eisenhower's last year in office Castro hounded into exile

thousands of middle-class Cubans and rounded up, imprisoned, or executed hundreds

more as enemies ofthe new state. The break with the United States appeared irrevocable

as Castro expropriated the property of u.s. citizens and laid plans to export Havanas

brand ofcommunism throughout Latin America.

The United States effectively cut off U.S. oil to Cuba in October 1960 and

denied Cuban sugar to the American market in December, major economic blows

to the new regime.2 It is doubtful that a less hostile u.s. stance might have turned

the Castro revolution away from Soviet influence, given the symbolic and ideological importance of Yankee imperialism to the Cuban revolution. A break with

the United States more likely provided vital cement for the new dictatorship.

172
The Bay of Pigs Fiasco 173

The United States severed relations with Castro on 3 January 1961,17 days

before Kennedy's inauguration.3 An American public that had become increasingly appalled not only by the blatant anti-Americanism of Castro's rhetoric but

also by his brutal treatment of opponents lent the move strong support. The

flood of embittered exiles pouring into Florida helped create an environment that

could and would nurture a clandestine operation against Communist Cuba.

The Eisenhower administration had initiated planning early in 1960 for a

guerrilla operation to overthrow the Castro government. By the summer of 1960

the CIA undertook to form and train a strike force of 200-300 exiles supported

by a small air unit of B-26s. As the planned covert operation grew into a paramilitary operation, Defense and State only gradually became aware of the details.

When State learned of the CIA intention to establish Cuban assault training in

Florida, it opposed use of any American-controlled territory for the purpose;

the CIA then moved the training camps to Guatemala. In the Pentagon the JCS

had been giving considerable thought to ousting Castro but had not yet been

presented with an action plan.4 Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh

Burke, a leading figure in voicing opposition to Castro, attended the relevant

NSC meetings in March 1960, and in November he suspected that "something

was cooking" when Navy intelligence provided information on the Cuban exiletraining base in Guatemala. But as late as January 1961 many specifics of the

CIA planning remained unknown to the JCS. General Lemnitzer, the chairman,

absorbed himself in other problems, such as the crisis in Laos, which seemingly

had higher priority in the winter of 1960-61. While the JCS felt concern over

the safety of the Guantanamo naval base in Cuba, Army Chief of Staff General

George Decker later reflected that he never considered it to be "a strategic necessity in any sense ofthe word."5

The Cuban undertaking remained firmly in the hands of the CIA, under the

direction of Richard M. Bissell, Jr., deputy director for plans. Bissell and CIA

Director Allen Dulles briefed President-elect Kennedy on 18 November 1960

about the plan to overthrow Castro. 6 By then the scheme had developed into a

full-blown scenario, with the attack set for March 1961 and the town ofTrinidad

on Cuba's south central coast as the assault site. Some 60 to 80 lightly armed

invaders would stage an initial landing, followed by 600 to 750 men equipped

with heavier weapons. Air strikes from Nicaragua-based bombers flown by Cuban

exile pilots would support the landing. If all went well, this operation would

spark a general insurrection and the establishment of a provisional government

with the blessing of the United States. Should the plan miscarry, the guerrillas

would disperse into nearby hills to resume their campaign from there.?

Eisenhower maintained his general interest in the project, endorsing the new

paramilitary concept on 29 November 1960. While there is no evidence that the

5412 Committee, which supervised covert activities, ever formally approved the
174 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

invasion plan during his administration, at a White House meeting on 3 January 1961, the date on which diplomatic relations with Cuba were severed, the

president charged the Joint Chiefs with finding means of training Cuban exiles

in preparation for an invasion. No doubt, in Eisenhower's view this program

had the status of a contingency plan, but he had given no specific operational

approval. He later claimed, according to General Maxwell Taylor, that he had

never seen specific plans for an invasion of Cuba, although, at the same time, he

made known his belief that Castro was a real and present danger to the United

States. In a meeting between Eisenhower and Kennedy on the eve of the inauguration the outgoing president asserted that his administration was "helping

train anti-Castro forces in Guatemala" and that the effort should be "continued

and accelerated." Moreover, in the long run the Castro government must not be

allowed to continue in Cuba.8

Road to 'Trinidad"

The new administration had little time to assess the situation. Although Kennedy repeatedly expressed doubts about the feasibility ofthe CIA invasion plan, he

did not crystallize his reservations. The ambiguous message of Eisenhower, whose

military credentials he could not hope to match, seemed to imply acceptance of

an assault on the island. The civilian advisers that Kennedy brought with him to

the White House, along with his major appointees in State and Defense, were

not yet familiar with each other. Most of them seemed reluctant to challenge the

judgment of men who had helped win World War II, not only Eisenhower but

key members of the Joint Chiefs and the CIA.9 The president personally admired

Bissell, whose easy Ivy League manner permitted him to move comfortably as well

as confidently in the presidential circle. As a Democrat with professional credentials that went far beyond Yale, Bissell stood in line to succeed Dulles as director

ofthe CIA. His service in the Truman and Eisenhower administrations along with

his role as prime mover in the U-2 operation had earned him the support of the

new administration, even when his briefings appeared elliptical and more advocative than informative. 1o

Theodore Sorensen later thought that Kennedy fell victim to a variety of pressures. Would he be willing to liquidate well-laid plans, leave Cuba free to subvert

the hemisphere, and betray idealistic young Cubans, who, as Dulles put it, "asked

nothing other than the opportunity to try to restore a free government in their

country?" Moreover, even if Kennedy wanted to back away from such an operation, he faced imperatives that made it necessary to act immediately. The Cuban

brigade had attained a peak of preparation and could not stay much longer in

Guatemala. There was the danger that the Guatemalan government, increasingly unhappy over public exposure of the training sites, would move to shut

them down if the plan were put on hold. What would be the political fallout
The Bay of Pigs Fiasco 175

from a disbanded force loose in the United States to spread its discontent among

Republican opponents of the administration? Furthermore, the president had to

consider that if he delayed a decision, new Soviet arms and Soviet-trained pilots

could make Cuba impregnable to an invasion by an exile army. I I

In fact, Kennedy had contributed to the rush to judgment. .fu a presidential

candidate he had known in a general way of preparations being made for the

liberation of the island in 1960 and made Eisenhower's seemingly half-hearted

progress toward that goal a campaign issue. He contrasted the vigor that his

administration would display in office with what he represented as Eisenhower's hesitant behavior and promised to help Cubans fight Castro at home and

abroad. This brought forth a denunciation by the Republican candidate, Richard M. Nixon, who called it "the most shockingly reckless proposal ever made

in our history by a presidential candidate during a campaign." In claiming that

Kennedy's policy would violate many U.S. treaties and lose all America's friends

in Latin America, Nixon overreached, for the record suggests he intended to

follow the same policy if and when he entered the White House. After the election

Kennedy couched his public statements in rhetoric that unmistakably portended

strenuous efforts to remove the Castro regime. In a press conference on 25 January 1961, he made clear that he would not resume relations with a nation whose

revolution had been seized by "external forces."12

Given these conditions and circumstances, the setting left little room to

cancel Operation Trinidad, the invasion plan named for the debarkation point.

The president knew when he took office that the Cuban brigade of some 1,000

men, scheduled for a 50 percent increase, was training in Guatemala. .fu previously planned, the brigade would go ashore near Trinidad, on Cuba's south coast,

far from the main centers of the island, and hold the area until the anticipated

uprising took place. Castro's army would require time to engage the liberators. By

that time Cuban-exile pilots flying B-26 bombers from Nicaraguan fields would

destroy Castro's small air force on the ground and secure the beachhead from air

attack. Even if the effort failed the worst-case scenario would have the invaders

melt into the nearby Escambray mountains where they would join other resisters

in guerrilla warfare against the Castro regime. 13

The]CSRole

While the Joint Chiefs had knowledge of these preparations, the CIA's tight

security kept from them essential information needed to provide informed judgments on the feasibility of invasion plans. The incoming administration first

addressed the Cuban issue on 22 January 1961, when Secretary Rusk met with

McNamara, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, General Lemnitzer, CIA Director Dulles, and other senior officials to discuss the subject. This marked the first

occasion the JCS had to consider formally the Trinidad operation; they clearly
176 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

were frustrated by their oursider role, even as the military had been asked to

provide limited support for the mission. The previous fall Admiral Robert Dennison, commander of the Atlantic Fleet, had been informed of a CIA request for a

large landing ship, the USS San Marcos, in addition to smaller landing vessels,

but not told abour their intended use. When Dennison called Lemnitzer abour

the request, the latter promised him that he would receive a CIA briefing, but at

year's end they were still in the dark. 14

Despite having incomplete information, in anticipation of being asked for

their opinion, General Thomas White, Air Force chief ofstaff, had already submitted an assessment of the Cuban situation and a review of possible options to his

colleagues on 10 January. He compared the small number of guerrilla groups in

the Escambray mountains with Castro's army of 32,000, police force of 9,000, and

people's militia ofsome 200,000, all being steadily reinforced with Soviet military

equipment. For an invasion to succeed, help would have to come from outside

and could require surveillance support, an economic blockade, or even military

intervention by U.S. forces. At a meeting with President Kennedy on 25 January,

Lemnitzer, speaking for the Joint Chiefs who were present, made clear that if a

successful landing occurred, "at that point we would come in and support them."

These meetings were followed by another at the White House, on 28 January,

where the president, joined by Rusk, McNamara, Lemnitzer, Dulles, and Vice

President Lyndon Johnson, heard Dulles's report and reached decisions that lent

further impetus to the invasion plan. Kennedy authorized "increased propaganda,

increased political action and increased sabotage," and he specifically approved

continued overflights of Cuba for these purposes. He directed 000 and the CIA

to "review proposals for the active deployment of anti-Castro Cuban forces on

Cuban territory" and asked for prompt report ofthe results. 15

The Joint Chiefs presented another paper, on 27 January, prepared under

the direction of Brig. Gen. David W. Gray of the Joint Staff, that more forcefully contrasted the increasing military capabilities of the Castro government and

the weaknesses of the forces being assembled by the CIA and expressed further

JCS concerns. The chiefs remained particularly troubled by the absence of any

follow-up measures should the initial assault fail. The Gray report, forwarded

to McNamara by Lemnitzer, urged that an interdepartmental planning group

develop detailed plans with specific tasks assigned to participating executive agencies. The objective was to have "continuous evaluation of the situation as a basis

for determining U.S. course of action," and also to establish "command relationships for implementation of each course of action."16

On 3 February the chiefs pronounced the proposed beachhead "the best

area in Cuba" to accomplish the mission of the Cuban task force. If estimates

of Castro's air defense capabilities proved correct, the invaders' planned air

operations appeared to be "within the capability of the Air units and should be

successful." No overt U.S. involvement need follow if operations proceeded as
The Bay of Pigs Fiasco 177

currently planned. But even with this note of measured optimism, the chiefs

expressed misgivings that if a problematic Cuban uprising did not occur in the

wake of the landings the Cuban army could eventually wipe out the beachhead.

On balance the JCS judged that "timely execution of this plan has a fair chance

of ultimate success and, even if it does not achieve immediately the full results

desired, could contribute to the eventual overthrow ofthe Castro regime." I? This

evaluation had a Delphic ring, particularly over the meaning of "fair chance of

ultimate success."

At least one military interpretation of "fair chance" might have led to the

cancellation of the invasion had it come to the attention of the president or his

civilian advisers. General Gray calculated "fair chance" to be "thirty in favor and

seventy against," a figure that Lt. Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, director of the Joint

Staff, did not present to Lemnitzer when he reported the military evaluation to

the JCS chairman on 1 February. The chiefs' hesitation also could have been

discerned in their significant suggestion that an "independent evaluation of the

combat effectiveness of the invasion force and detailed analysis of logistics plans

should be made by a team of Army, Naval, and Air Force officers, if this can be

done without danger of compromise of the plan."IB

During these deliberations, the JCS had to keep in mind other considerations, among them the security of the Guantanamo base, a by-product of the

Spanish-American War and an important base for Caribbean defense. They had

misgivings about granting the Cuban brigade support from or retreat to the base,

given an unpredictable Castro reaction in the event of the invasion's failure. The

chiefs in January had rejected Rusk's proposal to include the Guantanamo base in

the planning process. 19

Given the reservations expressed, the ]CS position on the original Trinidad

plan should have been seen by Kennedy and McNamara as plainly contradictory. As Arthur Schlesinger observed, "there was plainly a logical gap between the

statement that the plan would work if one or another condition were fulfilled and

the statement that the plan would work anyway." The most convincing explanation for the apparent "sloppiness in analysis" was the chiefs' assumption that once

the invasion had begun U.S. involvement would become inevitable.2o With the

United States fully and visibly involved, the enterprise had to succeed; the nation

would not accept failure. This obvious but misguided reasoning lay behind the

hopes ofthe Cuban exile leaders as well as the CIA invasion managers.

More forthright communication at this crucial juncture would have revealed

the extent of the chiefs' reservations. They gave vent to their misgivings, but privately among themselves rather than to the president, or so they claimed. Marine

Corps Commandant General David Shoup reportedly asserted, "If this kind of

an operation can be done with this kind of force, with this much training and

knowledge about it, then we are wasting our time in our divisions; we ought

to go on leave for three months out of four." Admiral Burke saw the plans, the
178 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

product of civilian thinking, as "weak" and "sloppy," discounting the chiefs' own

lack of firm guidance. Doubts notwithstanding, Shoup and Burke both approved

the Trinidad plan.21 Perhaps they expected the president to veto it eventually, or

possibly they hoped that the administration would intervene with U.S. forces at

a critical moment to ensure success. They may have preferred to register demurrals within their own counsels without going on record in direct opposition to the

commander in chief.

In any case, the president and the secretary of defense appear to have failed

to sense the significance of the ]CS caveats, embracing the positive vibrations and

ignoring the veiled warnings. Bissell made the most of the "fair chance" estimate

at a meeting in the White House on 8 February 1961, with McNamara, Rusk,

Dulles, Nitze, Bundy, and others in attendance, when he pressed the president

for an early decision on the operation. The invasion, Bissell felt, should come

no later than 31 March, with the final decision to move ahead made at least 21

days before D-Day. Rusk and Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle opposed

making a decision at the time. Kennedy asked for alternatives to a full-fledged

invasion that might require support by U.S. planes and ships. He preferred that

the Cuban liberators land gradually and quietly so that the operation would

appear to come from the mountains as a Cuban in-house uprising rather than as

an outside Yankee-sponsored invasion.22

The ]CS then sent three officers to inspect the covert force in Guatemala.

After visiting from 24 to 27 February 1961, they reported that the visibility of

the brigade's activities militated against its chances of a surprise attack. They estimated the chance of achieving surprise, essential to success, at only 15 percent.

In the absence of surprise, the operation would fail, they judged, because the

Cuban air force could sink most, if not all, the vessels of the invasion force. The

]CS informed the secretary of defense on 10 March that a landing could succeed

initially, but its ultimate success depended on a popular uprising. The constraints

were formidable. As an investigation headed by General Taylor later noted, "This

effort to treat as covert an operation which in reality could not be concealed or

shielded from the presumption of U.S. involvement raised in due course many

serious obstacles to the successful conduct ofthe operation. "23

Even though McNamara displayed no special interest in this problem, both

Rusk and Kennedy appreciated fully the extent ofthe political fallout that would

occur in Latin America over disclosure of an overt U.S. role in the enterprise. But

even greater political costs accrued to aborting the invasion. The push for a decision obscured the plan's fatal flaws. Presidential assistant Richard Goodwin later

judged that it "was doomed from start to finish."24 Hindsight exposed the plan

for what it was-not a mere miscalculation but an absurdity that called for sending 1,200 to 1,400* men on an amphibious invasion of a country defended by a

*The numbers for rhe brigade varied over time; the final strength figure was some 1,400.
The Bay of Pigs Fiasco 179

32,000-man army and a militia of more than 200,000. U.S. World War II experience with island invasions in the Pacific, where John Kennedy had commanded a

PT-boat, demonstrated that a successful assault required overwhelming strength.

In this instance valiant Cuban-exile invaders faced enormous odds.

Despite the pressures to act, the president continued to temporize over Trinidad. When he asked the CIA for refinements, Bissell promptly provided them.

On 11 March Bissell suggested preceding the actual full-force assault with a diversionary landing elsewhere by a force of 160 men to seize a beachhead contiguous

to terrain suitable for guerrilla operations. 25 The president still could not accept

Trinidad as presented. He continued to explore the feasibility of a night attack

that included immediate seizure of a flight strip to support B-26 planes and that

would avoid risking the opprobrium of a strike from a u.s. base, thus minimizing the appearance ofD.S. involvement. 26

The JCS took another look at the CIA plans in a memorandum to McNamara on 15 March. The CIA offered three alternative concepts. The first was the

original paramilitary plan to launch the invasion near Trinidad. The chiefs now

viewed it as doubtful because the change to a night amphibious landing without

the support of air strikes and an airborne landing would deprive it of "the psychological impact of the original concept."

A second alternative, considered and discarded, called for a landing on

the northeast coast, using an airborne company at "evening nautical twilight,"

followed by nighttime debarkation of the brigade's main forces. Ships would

depart before daylight and planes could begin flying the next day from a captured

airstrip. While this scenario met some of the earlier stated concerns, it did not

meet those of the JCS. They judged that even if the Cuban volunteer force could

land and sustain itself without resupply for three days, logistic support difficulties

and the distance from the northeast coast to Havana made this alternative "least

likely" to succeed.

The third and most plausible alternative proposed an amphibious landing on

the southern coast, specifically the Zapata peninsula that protruded into the Bay

of Pigs. Two infantry companies would seize key areas after dark, with the rest

of the brigade following before daylight. Aircraft would begin operations from

airstrips the next morning. Of the three, the ]CS agreed that ''Alternative III

has all the prerequisites necessary to successfully establish the Cuban Voluntary

Task Force, including air elements, in the objective area and sustain itself with

outside logistic support for several weeks." The drawback, they recognized, lay in

the isolation of the area. Its inaccessibility could limit support from the Cuban

public. 27 The chiefs' recommendation of alternative three became a critical factor

in the president's decision and one that would have serious repercussions in the

postmortem examination of the failed operation.
180 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

The Civilian Leadership Role

If the Joint Chiefs appeared to react by turns inconsistently or equivocally

to the planning for the invasion, McNamara and his OSD staff seemed even

more uncertain and tentative. When the chiefs submitted their recommendations

to McNamara, including their reservations, he accepted them without subjecting them to his usual close scrutiny. Preoccupation with other seemingly more

pressing matters in his early days in the Pentagon and a deference to military

judgment in this instance may have disposed him to go along. What seemed

initially a minor role for Defense may also have influenced his judgment of the

recommendations. Still, at a meeting on 28 January* with Rusk, Dulles, Gilpatric,

and the Joint Chiefs, McNamara stated that the "CIA should be told that their

plan is not considered to be a good one" and that there was need for an alternate plan. In retrospect McNamara felt that he had let himself "become a passive

bystander. "28

Paul Nitze, McNamara's chief liaison with the State Department, would be

no happier than the secretary of defense with his own role. Nitze had established

a division ofresponsibilities in his international security affairs office in which his

assistant, William Bundy, dealt with special issues like Cuba. "So I was really not

dealing with Cuba much," Nitze recalled, without excusing himself, more than

20 years later. The particular official assigned to ISA for linkage with the CIA,

Brig. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale, "was very able, but a loner and a difficult person

to control." When Lansdale complained to Nitze that the Cuban invasion plan

would not work, Nitze discussed it with Bundy, who favored the undertaking. "I

was busy and left it to them despite my doubts," Nitze concluded. 29

Hence prominent military and civilian leaders moved ahead with the invasion plan, haltingly and at times skeptically but without sufficient challenge to

prompt a fundamental reappraisal. Under Secretary of State Chester Bowles and

Sen. J. William Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, were among the few senior figures in the government to speak out against

the plan. In a memorandum to Kennedy on 30 March, and again at a 4 April

meeting at State, Fulbright took a strong position against the operation and

urged instead a policy of containment.30 But the doubts of other key participants

were resolved either by changes in tactics or by faith in Bissell's leadership. Rusk,

although initially opposed, was not inclined to disturb a consensus; once assured

the air strikes would come from captured airstrips and not from U.S. bases, he

went along. McGeorge Bundy, on 15 March, also approved the revised plan. He

told the president that Bissell had accomplished a difficult job of making the

landing plan both low-keyed and plausibly Cuban: "I have been a skeptic about

Bissell's operation, but now I think we are on the edge of a good answer."31

*The meeting at the Pentagon followed the one at the White House (see p. 176).
The Bay of Pigs Fiasco 181

With the president's advisers in early spring still "engaged in learning their

jobs and learning about one another at the same time," the magnetic personality of Richard Bissell easily dominated. Bissell's impressive record at the CIA

inspired confidence. Many years later, he defended himself by observing that "it

is amazing in hindsight that none of those concerned with planning and decision

making ever said 'the king has no clothes on' or ever recognized as purely wishful thinking the assumption that official denials of responsibility by Washington

would be plausible to anyone, least of all the u.s. press, given the character and

scale of the invasion." At the time, however, he had not seen that the force of

his own conviction helped to delude reasonable men, including himself. In his

memoir, written shortly before his death in 1994, Bissell confessed shortcomings

in his understanding of clandestine operations. Despite the air of authority he

exuded, he regretted that he had not worked more closely with Richard Helms,

the CIA director of plans, who as "a better judge of the agency's limitations"

might have persuaded him "to consider cutting back the scope of the operation

in some way."32

The kinds of questions that McNamara might ordinarily have asked of the

CIA planners came from lesser White House civilian advisers whose views could

more freely be deflected. Schlesinger had sent memoranda to the president

containing his objections, which he admitted "look nice on the record, but they

represented, of course, the easy way out."33 Mter listening to Bissell explain the

details of the invasion plan, Goodwin claims to have rather timidly asked, "How

do we know the Cuban people will support the rebels, why do we think they want

to overthrow Castro?" According to Goodwin, "without a moment's hesitation,"

Bissell turned and said to a colleague, "We have an NIE [National Intelligence

Estimate] on that, don't we?" If the senior officials around the table could accept

this answer as definitive, what could Goodwin possibly do, a young man with no

experience in military planning, covert or overt, who had never been involved in

such major decisions? "And across the room were the men who had done it all."34

Among the more obvious failures in planning were intelligence lapses, including that pertaining to the question raised by Goodwin and summarily dismissed

by Bissell. As Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric pointed out some 20 years

later: "What went wrong fundamentally was a complete misconception of the

situation inside Cuba. You can say that it was an intelligence failure. There was

a lack of understanding throughout our government-State, Defense, and the

White House-of how much support Castro had among his people."35 Other

intelligence failures stood out as well, for example the lack of knowledge about

coral reefs in the Bay of Pigs, or about the barely passable mangrove swamp that

blocked the escape route to the Escambray mountains, 40 miles away. Perhaps

the switch from Trinidad to Zapata in March, so late in the planning, left insufficient time to explore all the obtainable information.
182 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

Such intelligence as the administration did receive filtered selectively through

the partisan Cuban community in Miami. On 3 March former U.S. military attaches in Cuba reported from Miami the presence of 60,000 Cubans in the Florida

area with more arriving every day: "Most of them are refugees from the Castro

regime and almost all are willing to render assistance to the U.S. in order to overthrow that regime. They constitute a valuable potential of continuing intelligence

information on Cuba." At the same time the attaches noted that 17 U.S. agencies

dealt with refugee matters in Miami, but there existed "no policy agreement or

established procedure among all agencies to properly exploit the potential and

eliminate duplication of effort. Coordinated and organized methods do not exist

which would expedite techniques used for the gathering of intelligence information." The attaches recommended to Brig. Gen. Frederick O. Hartel of ISA,

less than seven weeks before the invasion, establishment of a central coordinating board.36 Three weeks later, at OSD's request, the Army took the initiative

to ensure cooperation among the three services and with State representatives to

"make possible the timely receipt and exploitation of military intelligence information" and also set up liaison with the CIA and other agencies-this only a

month before the invasion.37

Lack of coordination as well as inadequate intelligence presaged trouble.

The first meeting of the interdepartmental working group, following up on the

informal discussions begun in January, did not occur until 22 March. The paper

it produced the next day containing agreed tasks for assignment to the various

agencies constituted, as Taylor's postmortem report observed, "the first successful

action to formalize the interdepartmental coordination which up to this point

had depended largely upon ad hoc committees and meetings at Presidential

level."38

Deficiencies also plagued the propaganda campaign aimed both at stirring

up the Cuban public and justifying the activities of the Cuban invasion brigade

to the outside world. At the president's behest, Schlesinger cooperated with State

Department representatives in producing a "White Paper" on Cuba.39 Early

drafts carried the tide of "The Communist Totalitarian Government of Cuba as

a Threat to the Peace and Security of America." On 24 March, ISA reviewed a

third draft that General Hartel considered a "suitable vehicle for presenting the

Cuban matter before the Inter-American Peace Committee" of the Organization of American States.40 The scattershot publicity effort involved on an ad hoc

basis Schlesinger, Dulles, Edward R. Murrow at USIA, Adolf Berle at State, and

William Bundy at Defense. It is questionable if any draft of the hurriedly assembled justification of an invasion would have made a difference. The final report

on 3 April, little more than three weeks after the president had asked for a White

Paper, came just two weeks before the invasion itself
The Bay of Pigs Fiasco 183

Of course no amount of propaganda could conceal the fatal flaws in the invasion plans, particularly the assumption of a mass uprising of disaffected Cubans.

On 4 April the JCS, in response to a request from McNamara, stated that after

the 1,300-man brigade secured the beachhead, the force would grow to 6,000

within the following month and would have accumulated enough equipment to

sustain as many as 20,000 guerrillas. These expectations defied reality. During the

course of a meeting with his top advisers on 16 March the president had asked

Admiral Burke his view on the operation's chance ofsuccess. Burke gave "a probability figure of about 50 percent."41 Both the Cuban Revolutionary Council in

Miami and the CIA planners in Washington failed to heed the president's warnings about u.s. abstention from overt involvement. Almost on the eve of the

landing Kennedy stated his intent to withhold approval if there atose any danger

of compromising the United States. His comment at a press conference on 12

April that "there will not be, under any conditions, an intervention in Cuba by

the United States Armed Forces" should have made this point abundantly clear

even to the most myopic believer in the Cuban-exile cause.42

Invasion

The cumulative weight of the errors of commission and omission created

too heavy a burden for an operation so problematic to begin with. Although the

emphasis on secrecy may have prevented interdepartmental cooperation within

the U.S. government, Castro did not require sophisticated intelligence devices

to learn about exile forces training in Guatemala for an imminent invasion. The

precise date alone remained uncertain because the administration kept postponing D-Day, from 5 April to 10 April, and finally to 17 April, and the president

insisted that he might cancel the operation up to 24 hours before the approved

D-Day. He gave formal approval for the landing on 16 Apri1.43

A series of preparatory actions had to precede D-Day: air strikes by supposedly defecting Cuban pilots, infiltration of men and weaponry, and a diversionary

landing in distant Oriente province. None of them succeeded. The diversionary

force, intended to lure Castro's force to the east, failed to land. While the D-2 air

strikes of eight B-26s did take place, they destroyed only five of Castro's planes

and damaged some.* The clandestine landing at night, with ships to depart by

daybreak, aborted. None of the cover stories carried weight. The effort to pass off

one ofthe Cuban-exile pilots as a defector from Castro when he landed a B-26 in

Miami was soon exposed.44 The tale of Cuban pilot defectors lacked all credibility, particularly when an unexpected genuine defector flew his plane to Florida,

permitting comparison between a real Cuban aircraft and the bogus CIA planes.

Moreover, Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa informed a receptive UN audi-

*Cuban air srrengrh was esrimared variously from as few as 12 planes ro as many as 37.
184 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

ence that the raid presaged a full-scale invasion organized by the United States.

Castro had ample time to round up potential supporters ofthe expected invading

force.45

Bay ofPigs Invasion

These opera bouffe events coming on the eve of invasion had a profound

effect. Fear of even -greater exposure led Rusk,: with the .'president's approval,

to cancel a second air strike scheduled for D-Day out of fear of the impact of

U.S. involvement on world opinion. CIA Deputy Director General Charles

Cabell, filling in for, Dulles while the director was out of town, and Bissell tried

unsuccessfully to change Rusk's decision that the dawn· air strikes the following

morning should not take place until they could come from a Cuban airfield.

Although Rusk gave them -leave to take their case to Kennedy, they chose not

to.46

In! the opinion of both the CIA and the JCS, failure to permit a second

strike against Cuban air bases became the major factor in the invasion's collapse.

McNamara seemed to offer some support to this view when he claimed that

"the decision to cancel some of the D-Day air strikes . . . was made at the only

meeting at which neither I nor the Chiefs participated."47 The effective Castro
The Bay of Pigs Fiasco 185

air assaults on the landing force, the sinking of the ship supplying munitions,

the malfunctioning of radio communications equipment-all traced back to the

cancellation of the second strike. One view of the aborted campaign laid responsibility on Rusk and Ambassador Adlai Stevenson for overreacting to United

Nations hostility.

Years later Lemnitzer claimed that Castro's air force would have been

destroyed had the White House followed the Joint Chiefs' advice and permitted another strike against Cuban airfields. He believed that Stevenson had been

receiving such vehement criticism in the UN for the obvious U.S. involvement

in the Cuban venture that the ambassador persuaded Rusk and Kennedy to call a

halt to the strike without informing the JCS oftheir decision.48 For the CIA, the

aborted "second strike" became a shibboleth permitting the agency to deflect the

inevitable charges directed against its leaders. The influential journalist Charles

J. V. Murphy presented the CIA argument in a long article in Fortune, in which

he claimed that McGeorge Bundy, acting for the president, fatally compromised

the invasion by countermanding the air strike at a critical moment preceding the

landing.49

Arguably, the issue of the second strike got blown out of proportion by its

partisans. In refutation, Roger Hilsman, director of State's Bureau of Intelligence

and Research, maintained that even if the second strike had gone ahead it would

have had limited effect. He pointed out that whatever success the first attack may

have achieved, a second strike would have found planes dispersed and protected.

The aborted "second strike" explanation, satisfYing as it may have been to its

proponents, did not take into account the other factors in the failure such as the

long stretch of almost impenetrable marshland that separated the invaders from

the mountains to the east. Nor did it explain why a single vessel carried all of the

vitally needed ammunition. Above all, it did not recognize that the absence of

a supportive population, ready to take up arms with the liberators, doomed the

enterprise. In this circumstance, as Hilsman observed, "if Castro's air attacks on

the beachhead had not crushed the one-thousand-man landing force, the twohundred-thousand-man army of militiamen that followed would certainly have

done so."50

The plight of the invaders came as a shock to administration leaders. By 19

April, two days after it had begun, the invasion collapsed. Despite some initial

successes on the ground, the 1,400 Cuban-exile liberators proved no match for

20,000 troops and the unopposed Cuban air force. In the waning moments of

the disaster the United States could only have its destroyers take survivors off

the beach.* If fired upon, the destroyers were authorized to return fire. On the

following day, 20 April, at the direction of the president, the JCS directed the

* The prisoners raken ar rhe Bay of Pigs remained in Cuban cusrody umit rheir release ro rhe Unired Srares on

25 December 1962.
186 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

commander in chief Atlantic (C1NCLANT) to conduct patrols off the c~ast

to facilitate the evacuation of survivors, but the ships might fire only in selfdefense. 51

The Taylor Report

Unlike his indecision in the preparatory stages of the operation, the president acted with dispatch after its failure. On 22 April he asked General Taylor to

chair an investigation of the disaster. The Cuba Study Group began work on the

same day with Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Dulles, and Admiral Burke as

the other three members. The circumstances could not have been more depressing. As Taylor noted at his meeting with the president, "I sensed an air which I

had known in my military past-that of a command post that had been overrun by the enemy. There were the same glazed eyes, subdued voices, and slow

speech that I remembered observing in commanders routed at the Battle of the

Bulge or recovering from the shock of their first action."52 Talking with some 50

witnesses made him all the more aware of the state of confusion that characterized the operation and the semantic problems inherent in the use of the term

"fair" chance ofsuccess.

The Taylor report, submitted to the president on 13 June, treated the lessons

learned judiciously. Such discretion may have reflected the group's composition,

as Taylor's three colleagues all had interests to protect. Robert Kennedy was a jealous guardian of his brother's reputation, while Burke and Dulles represented the

two agencies under heaviest criticism for their roles in the operation. Taylor, who

saw himself as the "sole disinterested member," never implied that the group's

composition in any way inhibited the investigation. 53

The "proximate cause" of the fiasco, according to Taylor's report, lay in the

critical shortage of ammunition that led to the surrender of the landing force.

While not calling it the most important cause of the failure, the study group

concluded that "the Executive branch of the Government was not organizationally prepared to cope with this kind of paramilitary operation." On the question

of how close the invasion came to success, the study group produced a mixed

verdict: "Had the ammunition shortage been surmounted, which is to say, had

the Castro air been neutralized, would the landing force have accomplished its

mission? .... Under the conditions which developed we are inclined to believe

that the beachhead could not have survived long without substantial help from

the Cuban population or without overt U.S. assistance." Burke and Dulles felt

uncomfortable with the "conjectures in this paragraph." Since the well-motivated

and aggressive Cuban expeditionary force fought well enough without air cover

and in spite of an ammunition shortage, they thought it "reasonable to believe

that if the CEF had had ammunition and air cover, they could have held the

beachhead for a much longer time." Such a success "coupled with CEF aircraft
The Bay of Pigs Fiasco 187

overflying Cuba with visible control of the air, could well have caused a chain

reaction of success throughout Cuba with resultant defection of some of the

Militia, increasing support from the populace and eventual success of the operation."54

Lemnitzer had taken this position in his comments to congressional leaders at

the White House on 19 April. The JCS chairman made the point that the Cuban

force could get ashore with "reasonable chance of success," but that "ultimate

success was considered to be dependent upon the reaction and manner in which

it generated disaffection in Castro militia, [and] produced uprisings in Cuba in

support of anti-Castro forces."55

The study group did not rebuke Lemnitzer and his JCS colleagues for their

ambiguous stance. It recognized that the individual chiefs "did not and probably

could not give the plan the same meticulous study which a commander would

give to a plan for which he was personally responsible." The group's original draft

report used the term "de facto approval," which was deleted in the final report of

13 June. Modification oflanguage did little to mollify the Joint Chiefs. While the

Taylor group found fault with civilian leaders, including the secretary of defense,

for overlooking the initial JCS preference for Trinidad, it did not exonerate the

military leaders for their subsequent acceptance of Zapata. "The record is clear,"

said the study group, "that the Chiefs subsequently took active part in considering changes to the plan as it developed into final form, did not oppose the plan

and by their acquiescing in it gave others the impression of approval."56

The Taylor group recommended a governmental mechanism that would offer

more leadership than the 5412 Committee or the ad hoc task forces that had

functioned in 1960 and 1961. The group proposed the creation of a permanent

committee of under-secretarial rank from State, Defense, and the CIA, with a

full-time chairman who would report directly to the president. This new body,

with the suggested name of Strategic Resources Group, would replace the 5412

Committee and become the basic coordinator of Cold War strategy for the countries or areas assigned to it by the president for that purpose.57

Burke objected to the proposal, bur the main opposition came from the State

Department, which resisted any centralization that would undermine its predominance. According to Taylor, "Dean Rusk was less than enthusiastic abour an

interdepartmental committee reporting to the President with a potentially important role in foreign affairs which might impinge on the traditional responsibilities

of the Department of State." State's resistance blocked the recommendation, bur

Rusk could not prevent the president from bringing management of covert activities into the White House under a new Special Group (Augmented), chaired by

Taylor.58

A sense of urgency clearly animated the language and the spirit of the Cuba

Study Group's final recommendations. It concluded that while the paramilitary

operation may have collapsed, it typified "a form of Cold War action in which
188 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

the country must be prepared to engage." It was a question then of seeing to

it that a future Zapata would have "a maximum chance of success." The report

urged upon the president and public a new awareness of the emergency facing

the nation: "The first requirement ... is to recognize that we are in a life and

death struggle which we may be losing, and will lose unless we change our ways

and marshal our resources with an intensity associated in the past only with times

of war." This might include an announcement of a limited national emergency

and a review of treaties and international agreements "which restrain the full use

of our resources in the Cold War."59

The crisis in Cuba posed no more threat to the nation's security than similar

troubles in Laos and Berlin, the study group observed, but Cuba remained the

primary focus, if only because of "the general feeling that there can be no longterm living with Castro as a neighbor." Ultimately, the study group could see

only two solutions: internal discontent that would topple the dictator or active

measures on the part of the United States to effect his removal. Neither course

appeared feasible in the short run. The power of Castro's police state blocked the

first approach and the second, according to the group, could occur only "through

overt U.S. participation with as much Latin American support as can be raised."

Pessimistically, the group concluded that if the administration chose not to make

a decision, in effect it was resigning itself to the passive alternative over which it

had less control.60

Recriminations

A domestic and international political disaster for the Kennedy administration, the Bay of Pigs led to much soul-searching and postmortem efforts to

understand the reasons for the failure. "Victory has 100 fathers and defeat is an

orphan," Kennedy remarked immediately after the misadventure. Blame fell most

heavily on the CINs Richard Bissell, who in turn pointed the finger at the president's hesitation to commit U.S. forces. Congressional critics faulted the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, particularly its chairman, General Lemnitzer, for not quashing a

poorly conceived enterprise and for conveying to the president only vague misgivings. The JCS, in turn, blamed both the CIA and the president, because the

agency had failed to consult with military professionals and the president fatally

crippled an already flawed operation by canceling a second air strike at a critical

moment.61

Two major figures-the president and his secretary of defense-ultimately

accepted responsibility for failure. The president recognized that his was the final

authority. As he told Bissell, ifthe United States had operated under a parliamentary system, he would have had to resign, but they served under the American

system. Only the two CIA leaders, Bissell and Director Allen Dulles, would step

down after suitable intervals, though they exited gently.62
The Bay of Pigs Fiasco 189

Publicly, the president and the secretary of defense accepted the blame for

the disaster. Characteristically, McNamara seems to have settled on self-recrimination out of a sense of duty and loyalty to the president. At the same time he

must have realized that his failure to participate more actively and critically in

examining the plan was a grievous mistake. In an interview a quarter century later

he acknowledged the error: "I deeply regret that at that time I didn't recommend

against it."63 As for the president, he privately harbored anger and disappointment

toward those who had led him down the ill-advised path, including his predecessor, Dwight Eisenhower. Plans for action against Cuba had reached an advanced

stage under the previous administration, presided over by a figure of surpassing

military experience. Having criticized Eisenhower during the campaign for passivity in the face of Castro's provocations, Kennedy could not disown measures he

himself had advocated for Cuban "fighters for freedom."64 The president recognized his own error in not making clear to his advisers the doubts he had about

the operation and his failure to act on those doubts.

At congressional hearings on 19 May Lemnitzer, taking note of press releases

implying that responsibility for the invasion failure rested with the JCS, asserted

that he and his colleagues had not attempted to rebut their complicity. At the

same time, he stated that the chiefs' responsibilities did not extend beyond the

armed forces of the United States and their operations. The Department of

Defense had no responsibility for planning or conducting covert paramilitary

operations in time of peace; those tasks belonged to the Central Intelligence

Agency. Lemnitzer admitted that the JCS did evaluate and appraise the plan,

offered comments, and assessed that the plan had "a fair chance of accomplishing

its limited and initial objectives."65

Army Chief ofStaff Decker later claimed that the JCS role was to make minimal comments on the plan and then send them on to the secretary of defense.

If the operation subsequently miscarried, "it was obvious that somewhere along

the ·line someone had made decisions which adversely affected the success of the

operations. Whether these were made by the President or someone else, I do not

know. But, at any rate, the operation was caused to fail by the failure of those

who were managing it to follow the recommendation that had been made by the

Joint Chiefs of Staff .... We were merely on the sidelines as observers and advisers."66

Burke owned up to more responsibility than either Lemnitzer or Decker.

Years later he claimed that "stupidity, not only of the administration but also of

the Chiefs, me included," prevented them from seeing through what they had

started. He qualified this admission with a reminder that at "every meeting that

the Chiefs had with the President, and we had a lot ofthem, the President would

say, 'This is not a military operation.' We would suggest something, and he would

say, 'This is not a military operation, not your operation. We want your advice

and your advice only. You have no responsibility for this.' We were told this at
190 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

every meeting over and over again. It took." Burke's mea culpa suggested that if

the invasion had been seen as a military operation the ]CS would have demanded

more commitment, including the use of U.S. forces to assure victory.67

Although McNamara commented to the president that "the operation failed

because you acted on faulty advice from your advisors, particularly the representatives of CIA and 000, including myself," he continued to nurse a grievance

against the ]CS. He believed that for all their disclaimers they had let the administration down. This message came through clearly in his delayed and then

lukewarm response to congressional attacks against the ]CS in the press and at

the 19 May Senate Foreign Relations Committee executive session hearings.68

The secretary's apparent coolness toward Lemnitzer, like the president's, never

got on the record. Rather, it showed up indirectly in Kennedy's appointment of

Maxwell Taylor as his military representative and in McNamara's obvious disregard for Lemnitzer's judgment. Lemnitzer, equally disenchanted with McNamara,

later expressed his frustrations primarily by railing at the secretary's use of the

whiz kids in systems analysis to second-guess the ]CS. Still, the president retained

Lemnitzer as chairman and recommended him to be supreme allied commander

in Europe (SACEUR) the following year.69

How much of the recrimination that Lemnitzer and his colleagues suffered

after the Bay of Pigs invasion resulted from their failure to communicate their

doubts more clearly beforehand posed a reasonable question. Their resentment

understandably centered on ground rules that left them as advisers without

authority and prevented them from staffing the operation appropriately. Their

most serious grievance stemmed from their lack of any significant say in or

control of the operation. Too many factors related to the success of the mission

depended on imponderables such as the scale of a popular uprising or on political issues outside their purview. Moreover, the chiefs found it troubling that

assessments of the invaders' combat readiness came from second- and thirdhand

reports.

Tennessee Sen. Albert Gore's public call on 20 May for the removal of the

Joint Chiefs created a backlash. u.s. News & World Report, in particular, came

to Lemnitzer's defense, quoting Sen. Francis Case (R-S. Oak.) that he "was flabbergasted that the reputation of the military services of the United States could

be laid on the line by persons not in the military establishment." The article

gave the impression that if the military chiefs had been properly consulted, the

operation would not have gone ahead without appropriate support. The ]CS felt

unfairly criticized over the debacle but kept official silence and released no selfserving leaks, although in his testimony on 19 May Lemnitzer implicitly blamed

the CIA.70

The CIA and its partisans had less reticence about finger pointing, which

found its way into Charles Murphy's article in the August issue of Fortune that
The Bay of Pigs Fiasco 191

blamed the Cuban failure on the administration's meddling in CIA planning.

When McNamara read the article, he professed to be "shocked by the general

impression left by the story." He proceeded to rebut the author's assertion that

political considerations in the end compromised the president's judgment. He

objected most strongly to Murphy's claim that the CIA expected U.S. military

help during the landing. "At no time during the planning," McNamara told the

president, "was I aware of any such assumption. On several occasions before the

operation started, you stated categorically that U.S. combat support was not to

be provided to the Cubans in the invasion force, and that they were to be told of

this decision."7!

The substance of the article became a public issue when the president commented on Murphy's version of the Bay of Pigs fiasco as it appeared in the Time

magazine issue of 1 September. Kennedy's expressed annoyance at his news confetence on 30 August moved Time and Fortune publisher Henry Luce to request a

meeting with General Taylor in New York. The publisher, worried about damage

to his professional reputation, capitulated, with Murphy present. At the end ofthe

discussion Murphy, claiming no malice or rancor intended, extended his regrets

for offending the president. He conceded that his sources "may have made honest

errors in detail."72

While the article raised a storm in the oval office, the president made it clear

to Luce that he wanted no public corrections of the piece. "I have felt from the

beginning," he wrote the publisher on 12 September, "that it would not be in the

public interest for the United States to take formal responsibility for the Cuban

matter other than the personal responsibility which I have earlier assumed . . ..

For the present, facing as we do so many difficult problems, I would prefer that

we let the matter lie as it is."73

Internal feuds within the CIA kept the issue alive for many years. CIA

Inspector General Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., left out of the operation in 1961,

faulted his colleagues. He claimed a decade later that the lack of accurate intelligence was responsible for the disaster: "There is no other place to put the blame

for that than on the agency mounting the opetation." He noted that excluding so

many knowledgeable CIA experts from the planning process wasted important

expertise.74

Other interpretations of the event would continue to circulate, with varying

degrees of credibility. Its value as a "lesson of history," however, assured that the

Bay of Pigs would resonate in future policy deliberations and political forums as a

watershed episode. Schlesinger, for example, had no doubt that the errors of 1961

were translated into success in 1962 during the Cuban missile crisis. Murphy, on

the other hand, believed strongly that the debacle at the Bay of Pigs contributed

to the growth of communist activity in the Americas. Still others wondered if any

lessons were learned, as the Vietnam quagmire soon followed.75
192 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

Repercussions

The most visible immediate repercussions saw the role of the CIA and to a

lesser extent the JCS diminished. Both lost status within the Kennedy administration. Taylor, recalled to active duty on 1 July 1961, shortly after the study

group submitted its report, became military representative of the president. He

would provide military advice and assistance to the president, but not in competition with the JCS,?6

The humbling of the JCS was only temporary. Not so the CIA, where the

impact of the Bay of Pigs miscalculation had a more lasting effect. The agency

would not again control large-scale paramilitary operations. This constituted a

victory for the Joint Chiefs. On 28 June 1961, the president directed that in the

future "the Department of Defense will normally receive responsibility for overt

paramilitary operations. Where such operation is to be wholly covert or disavowable, it may be assigned to CIA, provided that it is within the normal capabilities

of the agency. Any large paramilitary operation wholly or partly covert which

requires significant numbers of militarily trained personnel ... is properly the

primary responsibility of the Department of Defense with the CIA in a supporting role."*77

As for the persisting Cuba problem, on 20 April, even before the dimensions of the disaster had become fully known, Kennedy ordered DoD to prepare

contingency plans that involved the use of U.S. forces to overthrow Castro. The

charge embraced alternatives ranging from a blockade of Cuba to a landing of

U.S. troops. Within six days the JCS prepared a lengthy response for McNamara.

They warned that whatever the course taken, any military action should be

"swift, sharp, and overwhelming and should present the remainder of the world

with a fait accompli. "78 By the end ofthe month, McNamara and the chiefs gave

Kennedy a preferred plan and timetable for an assault on the island. On 1 May,

with the president's approval, McNamara asked the chiefs to provide detailed

instructions "designed to minimize the lead time required, and maximize security

during the period between the decision and the invasion."79

Similarly, McNamara charged Nitze with a broad range of responsibilities following an NSC meeting on 22 April 1961. He wanted Nitze to explore

with the State Department the political and military implications of recruiting

Cuban nationals as part of the U.S. army, possibly under the name of "Freedom

Brigade," and consider the possibility of providing unilateral or bilateral security

guarantees for Central and South American countries. The secretary also raised

the idea of developing some form of Western Hemisphere police force to cope

with communist subversion throughout the area. In his instructions to both ISA

* The lack of timely and accurate military intelligence as well as concern over CIA supporr clearly influenced

McNamara's decision to establish the Defense Intelligence Agency on I Augusr 196I. See Chapter II.
The Bay of Pigs Fiasco 193

and the JCS, McNamara concluded with a caveat to the effect that contingency

plans remained just that and should not indicate that military action against

Cuba was probable.8o

McNamara's cautionary advice reflected the uncertain balance the administration maintained in the aftermath of the debacle. Despite the anger and

frustration that fueled support of plans to overthrow Castro, Walt Rostow, deputy

special assistant to the president for national security, tried to lower the volume

on 21 April when he urged that the momentum of an active foreign policy established in the first months of the administration not become another casualty of

the Bay of Pigs. Compared with problems in the Congo, Laos, and Berlin, he saw

the setback in Cuba as only a minor affair. Without minimizing the dangers of

a communist base in Cuba, or the necessity to prepare for intervention if Castro

overplayed his hand, he stressed the importance of not "swinging wildly."81

JCS planners probably had little need of McNamara's and Rostow's pleas for

restraint. While CINCLANT Admiral Dennison, acting for the Joint Chiefs,

prepared a plan that could be implemented on five days' notice, he warned on

19 May that such rapid reactions "could not be maintained indefinitely without reducing readiness, training, and morale." Moreover, there would be loss of

secrecy through repositioning of U.S. units, and impairment of ability to deal

with emergencies elsewhere in the world. In the following month, the chiefs

informed the secretary that "more leeway must be provided in the reaction time,"

and recommended a reaction time within 18 days from "Execute" to ''Assault.''

In an emergency, a two-division airborne assault could be launched against the

Havana area in five to six days.82

Even if the chiefs had been disposed to give in to the passions of the day,

an NSC action taken on 5 May and approved by the president on 16 May

would have cooled their ardor. In its general agreement that U.S. policy should

aim at the overthrow of Castro, the council also agreed that none of the aggressive military measures hitherto identified would achieve that result, lacking the

endorsement of the JCS and 000. The NSC preferred to emphasize the positive

results that might follow from a close collaboration with Latin American nations

in the Organization of American States (OAS). In concert they could initiate

such anti-Castro actions as breaking diplomatic ties, preventing arms shipments,

establishing a Caribbean security force, and denouncing the Cuban leader as an

agent of international communism.83

The NSC also discouraged a proposal to organize a separate Cuban military

force in the United States for the very reason that its proponents wanted one:

A separate exile force implied military action that the administration did not

choose to pursue. Drawing on the 4 May findings of the Nitze-led interagency

task force, the NSC adopted a policy toward Cuban exiles that echoed the hopes

of liberation but posed them in terms of lesser expectations. A proposal to train

4,000 Cubans went too far. Despite the desirability of having a military lead-
194 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

ership to take advantage of Castro's overthrow at the right time, the drawbacks

far outweighed the advantages. Hostile critics in the UN and elsewhere would

question the purpose of this military training. Moreover, such a military contingent would be a "useful, but not an essential, element" in an invasion. The NSC

deleted the concept and the emotive language of a "Cuban Freedom Brigade."

Instead, it "agreed that no separate Cuban military force should be organized in

the United States, but that Cuban nationals would be encouraged to enlist in the

U.S. armed forces under plans to be developed by the Secretary of Defense."84

Although the Taylor group clearly expressed a preference for national mobilization and covert action against Cuba, the cautious NSC approach prevailed. At

the same time, the president and the attorney general, who had a major role in

overseeing planning of covert operations, wanted to instill new vigor into efforts

to remove Castro. To this end there followed a wide spectrum of activities under

the aegis of the Special Group (Augmented) in 1962, including such anti-Castro

schemes as Operation Mongoose.*

The Cuban missile crisis of 1962, embodying a frightening fulfillment of the

worst nightmares about a Soviet-Castro connection, would intrude soon enough

to reprise many of the same questions-and reservations-in a much larger strategic context and with the consequences offailure potentially far graver.

* See Chapter IX.
CHAPTER IX

The Cuban Missile Crisis

Conceivably the Cuban missile crisis would have occurred even had there

been no Bay of Pigs debacle in 1961. Continuing U.S. efforts to isolate Communist Cuba, the unresolved Berlin problem, and Soviet resentment of U.s. missile

bases in Turkey, each or in combination, might have proved sufficient to precipitate a Soviet-American confrontation in the Caribbean in 1962. Yet the disaster

at the Bay of Pigs, in strengthening Kennedy administration resolve to overthrow

Castro, undoubtedly contributed to growing friction with Castro's chief patron.

Khrushchev's mistaken perception of weakness in Washington in the wake of the

Bay of ~igs may also have factored in the Soviet decision to transport intermediate-range ballistic missiles to Cuba in the summer of 1962, which in turn seemed

to confirm the worst suspicions about the Kremlin's hostile intentions. l

Failure at the Bay of Pigs did not signal abandonment of plans for removing

Castro or even the possible invasion of Cuba. Within the year and a half between

April 1961 and October 1962, the Kennedy administration engaged in a series

of provocative actions against the Cuban leader, notably the ouster of Cuba

from the Organization of American States, the use of the Alliance for Progress

to damage Cuba's economy, military support to anti-Castro Cubans, and, more

clandestinely, consideration of assassination schemes against Castro and his aides.

By October 1962 it must have seemed almost inevitable to Castro and his Soviet

ally that an invasion itself could occur at any moment.

While denying that the United States intended to go beyond any contingency

plans and actually invade the island, McNamara admitted 25 years later that he

could understand why the Soviet Union and Cuba anticipated U.S. intervention.2

He himself had presented to the president on 29 April 1961 the Joint Chiefs'

recommendation for a swift, overwhelming invasion that would take the island in

eight days. There could be little doubt that the Kennedy administration conducted

a vendetta after the Bay of Pigs embarrassment or that its objective continued to

be the removal of the Cuban dictator from power one way or another.

195
196 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

A shuffling ofroles and influence within the administration altered the principals involved and to some extent the choice of tactics but not the overriding

goal. Attorney General Robert Kennedy, who had no role in the failed operation,

emerged after April 1961 as head of a special group in charge of Cuban affairs

and a leading advocate of a more aggressive approach. The rwo major CIA figures

associated with the fiasco, Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell, left office within a

year of the event. Their departure did not signifY the banning of the CIA from

further activities against Cuba. The agency, though tarnished and embarrassed,

was too valuable a tool to be left out ofthe Kennedy plans. It continued to undertake projects designed to subvert or remove Castro through covert action, but

it now had to function under appropriate guidance from the White House and

closer coordination with DoD. The State Department suffered some diminution

of authority as well. From July 1961 General Maxwell Taylor, as military representative of the president and, from 1 October 1962, as chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, carried much weight on Cuban matters. So did OSD in general,

even if the JCS (excepting Taylor) never managed to redeem itself in Kennedy's

eyes from its putative errors. The personal commitment of Robert Kennedy,

the imaginative if sometimes chimerical special operations ideas of Brig. Gen.

Edward Lansdale in OSD, and the increasingly assertive voice of DoD, impatient

with State's caution, dominated administration planning in Cuban matters after

April 1961.

Supporting Cuban Exiles

Even as the Bay of Pigs setback caused them great dismay and considerable

disillusionment, the community of Cubans in the United States remained an

asset to be cultivated and organized as a pillar of the anti-Castro strategy. The

NSC sought to maintain support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council even if

it could not recognize it as a government-in-exile. Robert Kennedy, who pressed

his brother to remove Bissell from the CIA less for his failure in April than for

"sitting on his ass and not doing anything about getting rid of Castro" in the

months afterwards, urged the use of exiles for the purpose.3

Unfortunately, the Revolutionary Council and other self-styled leaders within

the exile community proved almost unmanageable. Their internal feuds alone

made it impossible for the United States to mobilize a common front with a

common agenda; charges and countercharges, usually involving softness toward

Castro, undercut their credibility. Intelligence assessments of one Cuban leader,

Reuben de Leon Garcia, a former minister of defense in pre-Castro Cuba, revealed

him to be "completely untrusrworthy, personally ambitious, and dangerous." The

Revolutionary Council under Jose Miro Cardona had a reputation for integrity
The Cuban Missile Crisis 197

and selfless devotion to the task of liberating Cuba, but its leaders never forgave

the administration for not providing the U.S. military assistance that they believed

had been promised during the April 1961 invasion. Proposals to incorporate

Cuban exiles into the u.s. armed services as individuals rather than as a unit met

with opposition from exile leaders. The council would accept funds for training

but not a loss of Cuban identity. Nothing less than a guarantee of an invasion

would satisfY them.4

Nonetheless, the Defense Department persisted in developing a program for

Cuban volunteers in the armed services. Within three weeks of a presidential

directive of 5 May 1961, DoD presented a plan for inducting up to 2,000 Cubans between the ages of 18 and 26 "with the dear understanding that they are

not being prepared as a combat force."5 Doubts about the legality as well as the

language difficulties ofCuban refugees in the services were brushed aside.6 Neither

concern kept the president from accepting McNamara's program for inducting

Cuban volunteers, and the secretary made it dear that he expected implementation "as quickly as possible." Language problems would be avoided by initially

inducting only English-speaking refugees; an exception in the Selective Service law

allowed enlistment of aliens.?

Despite the administration's enthusiasm the program did not succeed. Recruitment numbers alone underscored the problem. For the period 29 July 1961-

31 March 1962, of 898 Cubans processed at the Miami examining station, only

124 qualified for induction, with many rejected for moral or security reasons. 8

Miro Cardona complained about discrimination as a reason for disappointing

results. His intervention with Deputy Secretary Gilpatric resulted in changes that

established Spanish-language training units and increased the number of recruiting stations. 9

The heart of the difficulty lay in the refusal of the refugees to join the armed

forces unless they could count on fighting against Castro. Military service as a

form of refugee resettlement held little attraction for most young Cubans. When

the president in September 1962 asked McNamara and the JCS about forming a

new Cuban brigade, the Joint Chiefs responded negatively. Based on the experience with Cubans in the army they cited a lack of qualified leadership as well as

the continuing evidence of Cuban reluctance to join the U.S. armed forces unless

they could serve in separate units. 10

The administration's inability to harness the energies and ambitions of the

exiles to its anti-Castro efforts was symptomatic of its difficulty in moving often

dramatic proposals from the planning board to action. Even plans more promising ofsuccess than the Bay of Pigs failed to survive the scrutiny of a process that

still had to balance competing strategic concerns and weigh short-term benefits

and satisfaction against long-term consequences.
198 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

Operation Mongoose

Operation Mongoose offered the most extreme example of the administration's determination to undo the damage of the Bay of Pigs episode. Established

by the president in November 1961 under CIA auspices, Mongoose came under

the general guidance of OSD's General Lansdale, who, as chief of operations, coordinated covert actions within the government against the Castro regime. Robert

Kennedy became a member ofthe new Special Group (Augmented) (SGA), chaired by Maxwell Taylor, to oversee Operation Mongoose. Membership also included Gilpatric (DoD), McGeorge Bundy (White House), U. Alexis Johnson

(State), John McCone, who succeeded Dulles as CIA director, and General

Lemnitzer (JCS). McNamara and Rusk occasionally attended meetings. Under

the rubric of Mongoose, which covered a broad array of programs, the administration at its highest levels attempted to devise means to reverse the Bay of Pigs

setback. I I

Lansdale's primary objective was to foster conditions inside Cuba that would

lead to a successful uprising, avoiding the kind of circumstances that had fatally

damaged Operation Zapata. Inevitably, there arose temptation to include assassination as a way to solve the Cuban problem. This term per se never appeared

in the Taylor report,* although the idea had been discussed in the CIA under

the euphemism of "executive action capability" before the Kennedy administration took office. It also apparently came up in a conversation during the summer

of 1961 berween Kennedy and Florida Sen. George Smathers, but the president

firmly ruled out consideration of this approach to removing Castro. The assassination option, however, was revived by the Mongoose planners, the proposed

method of execution ranging from enlistment of underworld gunmen to placing a 12

poisoned pill in Castro's food.

According to Richard Helms, later CIA director and in 1962 the agency's

deputy director for plans, despite the arcane language that masked assassination

plans, the notion not only was seriously entertained but became a priority project.

Having been asked "to get rid of Castro," Helms remembered a meeting in January 1962 where "there were no limitations put on the means." Helms felt that

the atmosphere legitimized assassination as a tool in the overthrow of the Cuban

communist regime. Although sufficient "plausible deniability" existed to protect

the attorney general and the Mongoose director from connection with assassination plots, there was also sufficient rage about Castro, as McNamara admitted, to

generate an assortment of wild-eyed schemes. 13 Whether assassination or other

concepts, actions never seemed to match words. Under prodding from the president, the SGA did develop more plans for sabotage and paramilitary raids, but

even before the missile crisis the spirit of the operation was sapped by a recogni-

* See Chapter VIII.
,

Robert S. McNamara, secretary of defense, 1961-68.
JOHN F. KENNEDY LIBRARY

Roswell L. Gilpatric, deputy secretary of

defense, 1961-64.

.. Cyrus R. Vance, secretary ofthe Army,

1961-64; deputy secretary of defense,

1964-67.
Above: President Kennedy visiting Pentagon in April 1963, accompanied by Secretary

- McNamara and Deputy Secretary Gilpatric.

Below: Defense budget meeting at Hyannis Port, November 196_1.

CECIL STOUGHTON/JOHN F. KENNEDY liBRARY
JOHN F. KENNEDY LIBRARY

McGeorge Bundy, special assistant to the

president for national security, 1961-66.

ROBERT KNUDSEN!JOHN F. KENNEDY LIBRARY

Walt W. Rostow, key presidential aide

and State Department policy planning

council chairman, 1961-66.

LOOK!STANLEY TRETICK

Theodore C'. Sorensen, special counsel to

the president, 1961-64.

Jerome Wiesner, President Kennedy's

science adviser.
Secretary McNamara testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, September 1961.

\'THE TROUBLE WITH THAT KNOW-IT-ALL McNAMARA IS HE

KNOWS IT ALL.'"
Secretary McNamara with Sen. Richard B. Russell, chairman ofthe Senate Defense

Appropriations Subcommittee.

Key legislators

on defense matters,

clockwise from top

left, Reps. Carl Vinson

and Otto Passman and

Sense George McGovern

and Barry Goldwater.
JOHN F. KENNEDY liBRARY

Top to bottom: Secretary McNamara (far right) with President

Kennedy at Fort Bragg for counterinsurgency capability

demonstration, October 1961; Brig. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale,'

Pentagon special assistant for counterinsUrgency warfare and

special operations; u.S. Special Forces soldiers visiting South

Vietnam village, 1962.

NARA
Paul H. Nitze, assistant secretary of

defense for international security affairs,

1961-63; secretary ofthe Navy, 1963-67.

Charles J. Hitch, DoD comptroller,

1961-65.

Harold Brown, ·director.of defense

research and engineering, 1961-65.

Alain C. Enthoven, director of Pentagon's

systems analysis office, 1961-65.
CECIL STOUGHTON/JOHN F. KENNEDY UBRARY

Above: Secretary McNamara and Secretary of State Dean Rusk -meeting with President

Kennedy at the White House, December 1962.

Below: President Kennedy with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (right to left, Admiral George W

Anderson, Jr~, USN, Chairman General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA, General Curtis E. LeMay,

USAF, General Earle G. Wheeler, USA, General David M. Shoup, USMC), January 1963.
Above: Secretary McNamara at Pentagon press conference, 23 October 1962, discussing

Soviet missile buildup in Cuba.

Below: Reconnaissance photo ofmedium-range ballistic missile site, San Cristobal, Cuba, 23

October 1962..
Left: Soviet Premier Nikita

Khrushchev with Cuban

leader Fidel Castro.

Below: ExCom meeting ,

on Cuban missile crisis,

19 October 1962.
Clockwise from top:

Undersecretary of State

George W. Ball; newly

installed U.S.-USSR "Hot

Line," August 1963; outgoing

and incoming CIA directors

Allen Dulles (left) and John

McCone with Kennedy,

September 1961.
ROBERT KNUDSEN/JOHN F. KENNEDY LIBRARY

President Kennedy addresses large crowd in West Berlin, 26 June 1963.
Top left: Launch ofTitan II ICBM, 26 October 1962; right, 23 August 1962 cartoon

showing McNamara trying to close purported "missile gap."

Below: President Kennedy observing launch of Polaris missile, 16 November 1963.
Above: President Kennedy with Secretary

McNamara and General Taylor at the White

House, January 1963.

Left. McNamara visited by Laotian Prince

Souvanna Phouma, July 1962

Below: U.S. Ambassador-at-Large W Averell

Harriman with Royal Laotian delegation, '

May 1961. '

UPI
Above: U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge meets with Ngo Dinh Diem in Saigon.

Below: President Kennedy signing the limited nuclear test ban treaty, 7 October 1963.

CECIL STOUGHTON/JOHN F. KENNEDY LIBRAR'
The Cuban Missile Crisis 199

tion that conditions for a popular revolt had not emerged in Cuba and that in fact

Castro's grip on the country had become firmer. 14

Whatever the shortcomings of Mongoose, they were not unique to that operation. Nothing seemed to work well in 1961. A CIA report in November 1961

pointed out that Castro had sufficient internal support to survive in the immediate future. Help from the Warsaw bloc, with $357 million in credits, would

compensate for shortages in the economy. Despite Latin American collaboration in ousting Cuba from the OAS early in 1962, Latin America could not be

expected to give much energy to further anti-Castro actions. Some nations, such

as Venezuela, preferred to postpone collective action until after the Alliance for

Progress began functioning. Others, such as Chile, expressed sympathy for U.S.

objectives in bringing down Castro but urged delay because of the increase in

Castro's strength after the Bay of Pigs. 15

Prospects for success in 1962 appeared no brighter than in 1961. Differences developed between Lansdale and the CIA over the role of sabotage in the

Mongoose program. New guidelines failed to clarify Mongoose's methods, and

the "noise level" of activities obviously affected the potential for concealment. 16

The muddled state of Mongoose in the summer of 1962 became apparent in

a memorandum from State's project officer for the program, the deputy director

of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs. He found that the CIA believed

a revolution could be mounted by late 1963 bur would quickly face defeat if not

supported by substantial U.S. military force. Defense claimed it needed 18, or

at least 12 days, of preparation, even though some units might get ready in as

little as 5 days. State wanted a "virtual civil war situation" before U.S. military

intervention could become politically acceptable. The three conditions presented

a large barrier. 17

Not surprisingly, Operation Mongoose went by the board during the Cuban

missile crisis in October. Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Lt. Gen. Marshall Carter noted that action against IRBM sites in Cuba "cannot be planned,

controlled, and operated through the cumbersome procedures of MONGOOSE

and therefore it is not in MONGOOSE channels.... The time has long since

passed for MONGOOSE-type, Special Group-type consideration." The president

and SGA terminated all Mongoose sabotage activities on 30 October 1962.l8

Contingency Plans

While exploring a range of paramilitary and clandestine options, the administration also conducted more conventional planning to address the Cuban

problem. As part of the effort to recast U.S. strategy after the Bay of Pigs, State

developed a paper, "Guidelines of U.S. Policy Toward Cuba," in the summer of

1961. Refined repeatedly over the following year, the paper did not satisfy, except

in the most general way, the requirements of DoD officials, who in Septem-
200 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

ber complained that the initial guidelines, too vague and too passive, failed to

come to grips with specific Cuban threats to national security. Not that the

State Department's objectives lacked focus. They were indisputable-the reduction of Castro's capability to direct and support subversion, the encouragement

of developments in Cuba to separate the country from the Sino-Soviet bloc,

and the political isolation of Castro. A proposed four-point shipping program

would close u.s. ports to countries whose vessels carried goods to Cuba. Other

suggested measures contemplated aid to an anti-Castro rebellion and ultimately

the deployment of U.S. forces. 19 Yet the paper conspicuously failed to produce a

consensus within the administration about how to implement the objectives. If

Defense found State's approach wanting, in November 1961 U. Alexis Johnson,

deputy under secretary ofstate for political affairs, complained to William Bundy

of ISA that DoD was "very close-mouthed about exact military plans," intimating that it needed to be more forthcoming in dealings with State over Cuba.20

The State Department's effort to establish guidelines for a coherent strategy

paralleled work on a more specific contingency plan that the NSC's Task Force

on Cuba had begun in April 1961 immediately after the Bay of Pigs venture

collapsed. This plan, known as Contingency Plan 1, proposed an invasion force

of 60,000 ground troops to secure control of the island. To set the plan in

motion would require 25 days from the time of decision to D-Day.21 On 29

April the president, with the strong support of Secretary McNamara, approved

the outline, but wanted the lead time reduced from 25 days to no more than a

week. McNamara instructed the JCS on 1 May to fill in the military details of

the plan; two days earlier he had indicated interest in five days between decision

and execution.22

CINCLANT planners submitted an outline plan to the JCS on 1 May that

included McNamara's five-day reaction time, but CINCLANT, with the Joint

Chiefs' approval, considered the time span unrealistic and recommended a twotrack arrangement. OPLAN 314-61, with an 18-day lead time, provided for simultaneous airborne and amphibious assaults, while OPLAN 316-61 provided for

deployment of airborne assault forces within 5 days, to be followed by an amphibious invasion 3 days later. Planning continued throughout 1961 and into 1962.23

In January 1962, McNamara, dissatisfied with the lead times, wanted the

reaction time of 314-61 reduced from 18 to 4 days and the 5 days in OPLAN

316-61 cut to 2 days. Under pressure the JCS produced an air strike contingency

plan with a two-day lead time, OPLAN 312-62, independent of either OPLAN

314-61 or 316-61. It could likely be a first step followed by initiation of 314-

61 or 316-61. The formidable strike force still would include an attack carrier, a

destroyer squadron, two Marine air groups, and 17 Air Force fighter squadrons.

Generally, the ]CS accepted the secretary's reaction time projections with reluctance, and with assumptions that some advance warning would be available and

that some prepositioning would be possible. 24
The Cuban Missile Crisis 201

Before final adoption of 312-62, new information in July and August 1962

about a Soviet buildup of Cuban air defense capabilities resulted in increased

focus on improving air-strike plans. In all of the contingency plans, the most

likely scenario precipitating U.S. action was an offshore incident that could

expand into a conventional limited conflict. While recognizing that force deployment to the Caribbean would have an impact on military readiness in other parts

of the world, the Joint Chiefs showed little concern about its effect on SovietAmerican relations.25

IfCuban contingency plans evolved in relative isolation from the larger Cold

War context, the White House bore some of the responsibility for heeding assurances from Khrushchev and Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin to Robert Kennedy

and Theodore Sorensen (see below). In addition, although they knew of Soviet

activity in Cuba, NSC and State Department policymakers expressed doubts

about Kremlin involvement, believing that Khrushchev would not presume to

participate in any military actions against the United States in the Caribbean.26

Even so, the State Department informed U.S. embassies in Europe at the end

of August 1962 that the Soviet Union was shipping to Cuba large quantities of military materiel, including transportation, electronic, and construction

equipment, cranes, and fuel tanks. Beyond reference to sophisticated communications systems, State speculated about the possibilities of surface-to-air missile

installations in the Soviet package. Moreover, "this renewed evidence of Soviet

willingness to make sacrifices on behalf of Cuban strength is also significant

of Soviet interest and willingness ... to expand its influence in other areas of

Latin America." The day before the State message, 29 August, a U-2 mission had

discovered surface-to-air missile sites under construction.27

Although the State communication did not specifY offensive weapons as part

of Soviet support for Cuba, the president had already raised the question on 23

August in NSAM 181, asking for an analysis ofthe military, political, and psychological impact of Cuba-based missiles that could reach the U.S. mainland.28 In

the White House these remained hypothetical questions until the end of August,

under the governing assumption that the Soviet leader would not risk a conflict

with the United States in an area so distant from Eastern Europe. Further, the

administration believed Khrushchev would not dispatch nuclear weaponry to an

ally as impetuous as Castro when he had denied it to Warsaw Pact allies under

closer geographical control.

Hypothetical or not, Gilpatric sought answers from the Joint Staff on Cuban

capabilities for attack against the United States. At a meeting of the Special

Group (Augmented) on 10 August, attended by Rusk and McNamara, McCone

warned that the Soviets would put medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs)

into Cuba. On 1 September Gilpatric reported to the president JCS views that

while Cuban offensive and defensive capabilities had grown over the summer

months, U.S. forces in current contingency plans could meet any new threat,
202 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

although MIG aircraft could strike targets as far north as Tampa and even farther

on a one-way mission.29

Still it would require a quantum leap of imagination to move from an expectation of marginal and remote damage from Cuba's existing weaponry to an

attack by offensive missiles with the 1,000-mile range of a MRBM, armed with

a nuclear warhead, let alone a similarly armed intermediate-range ballistic missile

(IRBM) with a range of 2,000 miles. On 12 September CINCLANT notified

the Joint Chiefs of "an estimated 3,500 bloc military advisors and technicians

engaged in military construction, training and operating newly acquired military

equipment." On the same day an agent in Cuba spotted a large convoy with long

trailers heading westward from Havana. When his report reached Washington on

21 September, the CIA distributed it with a comment that the agent had probably seen surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).3o Despite these signs and portents, the

Defense Intelligence Agency noted as late as 5 October that reports of Soviets

dispatching SAMs to Cuba remained allegations; the weapons had a very short

range and, even if the reports were true, there was "no evidence to suggest that

the missiles can be used offensively."31

The CIA had noted more than two weeks earlier the installation of 12 SAM

sites in the western half of Cuba and speculated that more would come to cover

the rest of the island shortly, but these missiles had a range less than 35 nautical

miles. Similarly, while detecting Soviet MIGs at Cuban air bases in early September, the DIA had considered the MIG to have a combat radius of only 380 miles.

Since Iraq, Egypt, and Indonesia now had MIG-21s, it seemed plausible that

Cuba had also received them, but u.S. intelligence had no more proof of nuclear

warheads being supplied to Cuba than to other Soviet clients.32

Both the CIA and DIA based their judgments on empirical patterns of Soviet

behavior. Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) 85-3-62 on the military

buildup in Cuba, submitted on 19 September, stated the belief that "the USSR

values its position in Cuba primarily for the political advantages to be derived

from it." As for the Soviet military function, it remained essentially defensive,

designed to inhibit the United States from overthrowing Castro. The report

concluded that the Soviets would not want to risk U.S. retaliation by excessive

provocations, whatever advantage the deployment of offensive missiles or the

establishment of a submarine base might give them. Either development "would

be incompatible with Soviet practice to date and with Soviet policy as we presently estimate it."33

These assumptions received reinforcement from periodic assurances voiced

by Soviet leaders in September and early October. Ambassador Dobrynin had

told White House Special Counsel Sorensen personally that Khrushchev wanted the president to know he would do nothing to aggravate tensions before the

congressional elections in November. In this spirit, McGeorge Bundy assured the

American public on television on 14 October, the same day U-2 planes photo-
The Cuban Missile Crisis 203

graphed MRBM sites, that the Soviet military presence in Cuba was tolerable,

adding, "I know there is no present evidence, and 1 think there is no present

likelihood, that the Cubans and the Cuban government and the Soviet government would in combination attempt to install a major offensive capability."

Examination of the film the next day revealed the offensive missile launching

equipment.34

Prologue: September-16 October

Meanwhile, during September, the JCS had intensified preparations for a

possible military confrontation. The president involved himself in these matters

when on 21 September he expressed to McNamara his concern over lack of agreement between Air Force Chief of Staff General leMay and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Anderson over the extent oflosses the United States would incur in

attacking SAM sites. Kennedy also wanted assurance that contingency plans were

kept up to date, "taking into account the additions to their [Cuban] armaments

resulting from the continuous influx of Soviet equipment and technicians."35 Two

weeks earlier, he had asked for McNamara's reaction to formation of a Cuban

brigade. Even after the JCS expressed opposition to the idea, Kennedy persisted.

In the event of a military operation he felt it essential to have some plan for the

brigade's use, whether or not any ofits members had "flat feet." McNamara promised a response by 17 October, a promise overtaken by unexpected events.36

McNamara offered his own contributions to the contingency preparations.

He specified the occasions that would call for military force. After meeting with

the JCS on 1 October, he suggested in a memorandum to them the next day that

military action could involve not only removal of Soviet weapon systems bur also

the removal of the Castro regime itself, with the latter objective perhaps a necessary precondition to permanent achievement of the former. While he did not

elaborate on the removal of Castro, he did go into detail about provocations that

might require military action. He cited six instances: (1) Soviet interference with

Western rights in Berlin; (2) evidence that the Soviet bloc was installing offensive

weapons in Cuba; (3) an attack against the U.S. naval base on Guantanamo; (4)

a serious popular uprising in Cuba leading to a request for U.S. assistance; (5)

Cuban armed assistance to communist elements in other Latin American nations;

and (6) a presidential decision that the Cuban situation necessitated military

action in defense ofthe nation.37

In response to McNamara's pressure for preparation for contingency plans,

the JCS reviewed the steps the military might take in the face of different challenges and, just a few days before the discovery of Soviet missiles in Cuba,

presented a list that included plans for a blockade, an air strike, and invasion.38 While these plans covered a wide range of possibilities, they could not

cover everything. As long as the exact nature of the threat remained unknown,
204 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

making the precise fit seemed impossible. For example, while a blockade quickly

presented itself as one means of bringing the Cuban economy to a standstill,

there was little thought given to a less blunt instrument-a selective blockade or

quarantine such as the president actually utilized at the peak ofthe crisis.39

As suspicions of Soviet deception increased and the press and Congress became aware of the expanded threat, a political campaign season brought charges

of ineptitude on the part of the administration. Republican Sen. Homer Capehart of Indiana, seeking reelection, as early as 27 August called for an invasion

of Cuba to remove the Soviet intrusion. The administration found it particularly

difficult to deal with the barrage of criticism from Sen. Kenneth Keating (R-N.Y.),

who claimed knowledge from unidentified sources of the presence of MRBMs in

Cuba. His accusation that the administration was doing nothing about the threat,

uttered in the heat of Keating's own reelection bid, became a divisive issue as election day approached. Keating never divulged his sources, which remained a matter

of conjecture a generation later.4o

Heightened tensions caused Cuba to accuse the United States before the

UN General Assembly of a campaign of hysteria in preparation for an invasion.

The suspense ended abruptly when two U-2 reconnaissance planes, previously

hindered by weather conditions from inspecting the western part of the island,

photographed the missile sites on 14 October. The two planes returned to their

base without challenge, bringing photographs immediately dispatched to Washington for processing and analysis. The results disclosed the infrastructure at San

Cristobal, from erector launchers to radar vans to fueling trucks, for mediumrange ballistic missiles.41

The next day, two U-2s returned with pictures of an additional launching

site. McGeorge Bundy immediately recognized the significance of the pictures

when he received them on the evening of 15 October but waited until the next

morning to lay them before the president. When Kennedy later asked reasons for

the delay, Bundy responded that the information had not become available until

late at night and the need for further analysis made a morning meeting preferable. Moreover, if the news had broken that evening it might have disturbed the

normal routine of those who, like McNamara, had gone to dinner engagements,

from which their early departure would have given rise to public conjecture.

Bundy's caution was justified.42

Bundy broke the news at the White House at 8:45 a.m. on 16 October, his

action beginning the "thirteen days" of crisis. The president immediately summoned his major advisers, a group he formalized on 22 October as the Executive

Committee (ExCom) of the National Security Council, with himself as chairman, to take charge and meet each morning until further notice.

43

He deemed the

full NSC too unwieldy for rapid response and too large to maintain secrecy. The

members of the ExCom came not only from the NSC and the White House staff;

at times it included also such experienced and trusted advisers as John McCloy,
Soviet Offensive Missile Buildup in Cuba, October 1962

Range ofSoviet MRBMs and IRBMs in Cuba

Displayed by Secretary McNamara at Special Cuba Briefing, 6 February 1963. The 1,100 nautical-mile medium-range ballistic missile could reach Washington, D.C., Dallas, and St. Louis; the

2,200 nautical-mile IREM, almost all targets on the North American continent.
206 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

Dean Acheson, and Robert Lovett. *44 To allay Soviet suspicions, the president

himself made an effort to keep his normal schedule. When meetings took place

sometimes at the Pentagon and at the State Department rather than at the White

House, Robert Kennedy usually attended and spoke for his brother. The guise of

normality worked.

In the course of the thirteen days disagreement inevitably occurred between

civilians and the military. General Taylor, on behalf ofthe JCS, spoke in favor of a

series of air strikes against offensive weapons and a blockade to prevent the introduction of more weapons.45 The JCS chairman joined in what became known as

the "hawk" position, one he shared with Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze

and, particularly, Acheson. The president himselfseemed to lean in this direction

in the early meetings of 16 and 17 October. Against this position the "doves"

urged a step-by-step program to give diplomacy a chance. Rusk and Ball fell into

this category, with Bundy and McNamara also there but for different reasons.46

McNamara differed most sharply from Taylor over the function of nuclear weapons in a potential conflict. The Joint Chiefs thought that the MRBMs in Cuba

changed the strategic balance "substantially"; McNamara believed they changed it

"not at all." Many years later he recollected that he had not seen "the problem as

a military one, at least not in the narrow sense of the term, but rather as a political problem. "47

For the purpose of analysis, the crisis may be divided into two phases: the

first, 16-21 October 1962, and the second, 22-28 October. Through the middle

of October the JCS continued to work on contingency plans even as they

discounted much of the accumulating intelligence information. The chiefs designated Admiral Robert Dennison, commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet, as

head of a unified command with primary responsibility for Cuban contingencies. Bulk supplies were prepositioned in Florida, security at Guantanamo Naval

Base was increased, and the Air Force assembled a tactical strike force in Florida.

The deceptive Soviet stance on sending "defensive" equipment to Cuba, which

persisted even through Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko's face-to-face meeting

with Kennedy in the White House on 18 October, inhibited U.S. diplomatic

actions, but no such inhibition applied to military activities.48

Act I: 16-21 October

Once the Soviet provocation was confirmed, the president's first impulse was

to take immediate action, subject to determining the state of readiness of the

Soviet missiles and hence their immediate threat to U.S. territory. At the White

House meeting the morning of 16 October McNamara stressed that any air strike

* The membership included Vice President Johnson, Rusk, McNamara, Gilpatric, Treasury Secretary Douglas

Dillon, Robert Kennedy, Taylor, CIA Director McCone, Under Secretary of State George Ball, Ambassador at

Large Llewellyn Thompson, Bundy, and Sorenson.
The Cuban Missile Crisis 207

should take place before the missile sites became operational. The secretary went

on to include air strikes against airfields and aircraft and all potential nuclear storage sites as well. All this would involve a massive effort.

Changes in position on the major issues occurred among the participants in

response to argument and the uncertainty of developing events. If McNamara

initially sounded hawkish at this meeting, Taylor approached this second Cuban

crisis with some wariness. Worried about timing and the ability to destroy all

missiles in a surprise attack, Taylor suggested beginning with reinforcement of

Guantanamo, a pause to get ready, followed by concurrent strikes against missile

sites and airfields, a naval blockade, and evacuation of dependents from Guantanamo. McNamara's stand on bombing attacks was carefully hedged. Any planned

air attack must take place before the missiles became operational. If sites housed

launch-ready missiles he would oppose the air attack, deeming the danger excessive in relation to any gain. Moreover, any attack would also have to hit airfields

and nuclear storage sites-"a fairly extensive air strike."49

This did not represent the considered opinion of the Joint Chiefs. They

clearly favored an air strike "even after the missiles were operational," with "no

political preliminaries" and against a wide variety of targets, including MIG and

IL-28* airfields as well as missile sites. They reasoned that any Soviet military

retaliation would be confined to measured steps. One such scenario envisioned

a nuclear strike against Johnston Island (a nuclear test site) in the Pacific should

Soviet technicians die in a U.S. strike. As fot an assault against West Berlin, the

chiefs thought that strong military actions would fall "short of direct seizure."50

Taylor won support from McCone and Secretary of the Treasury Dillon.

McNamara, more concerned with the potentially destructive effects of an attack,

was not convinced that the Soviet riposte would be minor and manageable.

Nor did he agree with the JCS assertion that the military danger of missiles in

Cuba was sufficiently great to warrant attack even after the missiles were operationaI.51

This policy standoff on 16-17 October forestalled a decision to attack, but

pressure for action mounted at an ExCom meeting on 18 October when intelligence analysts discovered evidence of fixed IRBMs in addition to the already

identified MRBM sites. The IRBMs had twice the range of the MRBMs, and

could strike all of the continental United States with the exception of the Pacific

Northwest. In light of these new revelations the JCS preference for striking all

military targets rather than just missiles and nuclear storage sites gained ground.

Concern about the effects ofsuch action on Berlin and Tutkey, however, checked

ExCom's enthusiasm for the JCS approach as did Robert Kennedy's worry over

the damage a first strike would do to "the United States in the pages of history."

* When the crisis erupted about two dozen IL-28s had been delivered. Of these, three-quarters were still in

their shipping crates.
208 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

McNamara subsequently suggested that only two courses of action had emerged

in the ExCom discussion on 18 October: "I would call one a rapid introduction

to military action. The other is a slow introduction to military action .... The

slow introduction is a political statement followed, or accompanied, by a blockade. The rapid introduction is a brief notice to Khrushchev followed by a strike."

On 20 October the president decided in favor of a blockade under the less bellicose name of quarantine. It would be accompanied by a demand that Khrushchev

remove the missiles or face an air strike.52

The outcome of intense exchanges during ExCom meetings accorded with

positions the president had always favored: a message, a show of firmness, and

options left available for both superpowers. Robert Kennedy, McNamara, and

Gilpatric came to share these views. The more they looked at the consequences

of a direct strike the more doubts they had. Its potential effect on the Jupiter

missiles in Turkey and on the West's position in Berlin stayed in their minds, if

not always on the table.53 The worry that a surprise attack against Cuba would be

analogous to Pearl Harbor, "a Pearl Harbor in reverse," to use Robert Kennedy's

phrase, can be found repeatedly in Sorensen's notes on the discussions. 54

McNamara and Gilpatric spent much time together during the days of the

crisis and early on engaged in their own version ofwar gaming, sometimes spending hours playing both sides of the confrontation. Gilpatric believed that during

these sessions "McNamara became convinced that this limited form of blockade,

quarantine, was the best move .... He never shifted from that ground from that

point on."55

By a process of elimination the idea of a blockade, refined and presented as

a "quarantine," emerged from the ExCom as the preferred course of action. First

raised by Taylor in the context of his air strike proposal on 16 October, the idea

of a blockade was taken up by Vice President Johnson and then by McNamara

as he pondered the uncertainties connected with a preemptive strike. The secretary of defense initially felt that the quarantine alternative "doesn't seem to be a

very acceptable one, but wait until you work on the others." An air assault, he

projected, would trigger an inevitable Soviet reprisal, followed by massive U.S.

mobilization, and then by an invasion force to support an uprising. 56

Years later Nitze remained convinced that the Soviet Union's strategic inferiority in intercontinental missiles immobilized its leaders. Like Taylor, he had no

fears of a major war or of an attack on Berlin or Turkey: "Of course they could,

but would they dare do that in the face of the nuclear superiority of the United

States at the time? It seemed to me to be improbable that they would, although

you couldn't guarantee it." Moreover, the inferior Soviet strategic position in the

Caribbean was a critical factor: "In the area of Cuba we had them a hundred to

one. They had four submarines in the area and we made every one ofthose damn

submarines surface. So there was nothing they could do in the area."57
The Cuban Missile Crisis 209

Nitze and McNamara divided over the latter's concern that the use of nuclear

weaponry could lead to a holocaust if escalation of the conflict got out of hand.

In this context McNamara's seemingly unequivocal statement to Congress in

January 1963 was misleading when he claimed: "We faced that night the possibility of launching nuclear weapons and Khrushchev knew it, and that is the

reason, and the only reason, why he withdrew those weapons." Years later Bundy

asserted that McNamara had been misunderstood; McNamara was referring not

to nuclear superiority but to the common nuclear danger. To an American Legion

meeting in September 1964 McNamara made the point that U.S. conventional

superiority played an essential role in the outcome of the confrontation.58

At the moment of reckoning, how the Soviets would react to U.S. nuclear

power, to the danger of nuclear war, or to the superiority of U.S. conventional

forces in the area, created a serious division among ExCom members. Nitze

and the JCS stood ready to risk a nuclear, or any other kind of Soviet response,

confident that none would come. McNamara, Bundy, and the president's closest advisers lacked that confidence. Hence the resort to a quarantine when the

military could provide no guarantee that a surgical air strike would destroy all

the missiles. 59

Act Il' 22-28 October

In a major address to the American people on 22 October, the president announced thar the Soviet Union was installing offensive missiles in Cuba to "provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere." After explaining

the characteristics of the power and reach of medium- and intermediate-range

ballistic missiles, he pronounced the Soviet action "an explicit threat to the peace

and security of all the Americas, in flagrant and deliberate defiance" of numerous

international agreements, understandings, and his own public warnings. He also

exposed the duplicity of Soviet leaders who had deceived the United States about

their intentions. Given the extent ofthe danger, he announced a number of immediate "initial" actions and ordered "a strict quarantine on all offensive military

equipment under shipment to Cuba." All ships containing such equipment would

be turned back. If the military buildup continued, he had "directed the Armed

Forces to prepare for any eventualities." The president stated that any nuclear

missile launched from Cuba against any Western Hemisphere nation would be

regarded as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States and would be met

by "a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union." Having asserted this firm

but measured response, the president requested the GAS and the UN Security

Council to help in the dismantling and withdrawal of the offensive weapons under

the supervision of UN observers before he would lift the quarantine. Finally, the

president called on Khrushchev "to halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless,

and provocative threat to world peace" and to join in a "search for peaceful and
210 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

permanent solutions." There was no mention of an air strike or an invasion or of

attacks on Soviet ships at sea.60

The speech fit the Kennedy mold-it kept options open. He followed up

with a quarantine prodamation interdicting delivery of offensive weapons to

Cuba and listing the specific categories of proscribed weapons. At the same time,

he gave the secretary of defense considerable latitude in implementing the proclamation, including taking into custody vessels refusing to identify cargo or to

accept search. Moreover, the president signaled continuation of military preparations for an air strike and even a landing force in the event of the failure of the

quarantine. He also upgraded the armed forces' alert status to Defense Condition

(DEFCON) 3. *61

So while the president rallied the nation to a course short of war, the second

phase of the crisis opened on 22 October with obvious administration trepidation about the effectiveness of the new quarantine. ExCom members understood

fully the absence of any assurance that the quarantine measure would rid Cuba

of Soviet bases without major U.S. concessions, such as withdrawal of Jupiter missiles from Turkey or U.S. forces from Guantanamo. Nonetheless, when

Gilpatric weighed its advantages and disadvantages, he judged that it offered the

best course for controlling the consequences of military action.62 The president

and secretary of defense shared this view.

Recognizing that the next few days would be critical, McNamara set up

living quarters in the Pentagon so that he could take full charge around the clock.

Beyond the confines ofthe White House and Pentagon, intense diplomatic activity characterized the week of 22 October. Acheson went to Paris and later to

Bonn to inform President de Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer and elicit their

blessing. The two leaders responded positively as did the OAS whose council by

a vote of 19 to 0 on 24 October backed the president. In New York, Ambassador

Adlai Stevenson worked to create sentiment in the United Nations against the

Soviet actions. 63

Despite the importance of these steps, the focus of ExCom's attention remained on the quarantine-how to establish it and how to enforce it. Soviet ships

in the Atlantic en route to Cuba presumably would seek to breach a blockade

that the Kremlin immediately labeled as unacceptable. Moreover, low-altitude

reconnaissance aircraft determined on 23 October that the Soviet Union was

accelerating the missile-site buildup rather than suspending its efforts.64 By 25

October, however, three of the Soviet ships suspected as missile carriers seemed to

be altering course, and the CIA reported that at least 14 of the 22 Soviet vessels

ordered to do so had turned back. But the glow of this perceived success was

dimmed by news leaked by Rep. James Van Zandt, a Republican candidate for

* DEFCON indicates the level of teadiness in prepatation for hostilities, with DEFCON 5 reflecring normal

peacetime readiness and DEFCON 1 being the highest alert posture.
The Cuban Missile Crisis 211

the Senate in Pennsylvania, that the Navy, after challenging but not boarding the

Soviet tanker Bucharest, had allowed it to proceed to Cuba.6S

Given the absence of any evidence of a halt in construction, let alone dismantling of sites, and following the downing of a U-2 over Cuba on 27 October

(see page 222), the ]CS recommended an air strike against those bases no later

than 29 October, "unless irrefutable evidence" revealed in the meantime that the

offensive weapons were being dismantled.66 Within 000 the secretary and his

military chiefs continued to differ on action that the United States should take

against the missile bases. The chiefs stood united in their advocacy of an air strike

unless the quarantine served to dislodge the missiles.67 They accepted, of course,

the presidential decision for a quarantine, but their preference for stronger action

manifested itself in instructions to SACLANT on 22 October that referred to the

"blockade" of Cuba, apparendy regarded as a stronger term than quarantine. The

message included instructions that "forceful boarding and control of the ship's

operation may be necessary. If boarding meets with organized resistance, the ship

will be destroyed." With the quarantine set to start at 10:00 a.m. on 23 October, on the preceding afternoon the ]CS, with McNamara's approval, instructed

CINCSAC General Thomas Power to prepare to go to DEFCON 2, the level

before maximum readiness, at the same time on 23 October.*68

The chiefs also made known their concerns about other actual and potentiallimitations on their freedom of action. In often strident terms they opposed

Brazil's proposal at the UN for nuclear-free or missile-free zones in Latin America

and Mrica. Too much attention, they claimed, was paid to world opinion or to

''Allied support," as if the United States should wait for the approval of others

before taking measures in its own defense.69

Not even the softening of the Brazilian proposal satisfied the ]CS. The State

Department seemed more willing to accept a denuclearized zone that would have

the UN set up an inspection system to cover Soviet and Cuban activities in the

Caribbean. The chiefs regarded any such zone as a Soviet scheme to entrap the

United States. They believed application of any nuclear-free concept to Latin

America would inhibit American power with only minimal costs to the Soviets'?o

By contrast, even the hawkish Nitze appreciated the value of at least studying the

Brazilian proposal carefully. It contained seeds of a workable formula, "to which

the USSR would be more willing to agree than to dismantling in itself."71

The ]CS sounded equally dubious about offers of military assistance from

Argentina and Venezuela. Rather than welcoming this evidence of hemispheric

solidarity, the chiefs remained wary of a Latin American role in an enlarged

command. If these interested parties pressed for an OAS international command

arrangement, the only acceptable compromise would be to encourage OAS

members to have their forces report to CINCLANT for operational comrol.72

* Allegations that SAC went to DEFCON 1 cannot be verified from official evidence.
212 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

Enforcement of the quarantine engaged McNamara's close attention because

conventional military procedures might not communicate the political messages

that the administration intended the action to convey. Consequently, he insisted

on personal management of the operation. What he later called "McNamara's

Law"-that there was no way to predict the direction a crisis might take-lurked

at the back of his mind. The secretary expressed his anxiety over potential misunderstandings that could easily arise between the U.S. naval challenger and the

Soviet respondent, particularly if no Russian-speaking officer was on board a ship

doing the search.73

The civil-military tension, of course not new to the Pentagon and which had

been building almost from the start of McNamara's tenure, reached a dramatic

climax in a confrontation between the secretary of defense and the chief of naval operations on 24 October. On that night McNamara went to the admiral's

control room, as he did on every night of the crisis, to ask Admiral Anderson to

bring him up to date on the events of the day and to brief him on the progress of

the quarantine. According to McNamara's account, when the CNO informed him

that a Soviet vessel would reach the quarantine line the following day, McNamara

asked what he would do when it got there. Anderson responded that he would

stop it. When asked in what language he would stop it, Anderson lost his temper:

"How the hell do I know? I presume we'll hail it in English." This reply did not

satisfY McNamara, who goaded Anderson into saying that the Navy would fire

a shot across its bow and if necessary put a shot through the rudder. McNamara

remembered Anderson telling him that "you've imposed a quarantine, and our job

is to stop the vessels from passing the line." McNamara disagreed: "Let me tell

you something. There will be no firing of any kind at that Soviet ship without

my personal authority, and I'm not going to give you permission until I discuss it

with the President. We're trying to convey a political message, we're not trying to

start a war." Gilpatric, who was present the whole time, recollected that Anderson

"sort of exploded ... [and] used some very strong expletive to the effect that,

'This is none of your goddamn business. This is what we're here to do .... We're

doing this ever since the days ofJohn Paul Jones, and if you'll just go back to your

quarters, Mr. Secretary, we'll take care of this.''' After they left the control room

McNamara told Gilpatric "that's the end of Anderson .... He won't be reappointed."74 Anderson recalled the encounter as less confrontational and denied

that he used much of the language attributed to him by other accounts,?5 The

exchange disclosed a fundamental difference between the two men in their understanding ofthe quarantine's purpose.

McNamara looked at what lay beyond the horizon. His concerns proved

justified. There did occur unpredictable events that might have led to disastrous consequences. On 27 October, at the height of the missile crisis, Navy

ships forced to the surface a Soviet submarine, B-59, charged with the mission

to develop a Soviet naval base at Mariel Bay, Cuba. The vessel carried a nuclear-
The Cuban Missile Crisis 213

tipped torpedo. Its commander, fearing that his submarine was under attack,

had been tempted briefly to arm the torpedo. He resisted the temptation, but it

was not until 2002, at the 40th anniversary commemoration in Havana of the

Cuban missile crisis, that the United States learned that Soviet submarines carried

nuclear weapons. This incident occurred just a few hours after Soviet surface-toair missiles shot down a U-2 over Cuba. On the same day a U.S. aircraft on an

air sampling mission crossed into Siberian airspace. Although these two incidents

aroused fears on the part of both superpowers, they reacted with restraint; both

assumed at least for public consumption that errors had occurred. A5 Kennedy

blurted out, "There is always some son-of-a-bitch who doesn't get the word."76

In evaluating the contents of the Kennedy tapes made during the missile

crisis historians Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow judged in retrospect that

McNamara's moderation may have been exaggerated. While giving him credit

for reining in the hawks and discouraging precipitous action, they saw him as

increasingly concerned with the details of military preparation as the crisis intensified and ready to employ substantial force to remove the missiles. This may be

a plausible judgment, but the pervasive uncertainties that affected all of the principals throughout were reflected in the almost daily changes in position taken by

most participants in the ExCom meetings.77

JCS .preparations on 27 October for a massive invasion, assumedly with

McNamara's blessing, were evident in the array of forces poised for an attack:

two aircraft carriers accompanied by nine escorts and a separate task force of 12

destroyers and cruisers; three Marine battalions that had reinforced Guantanamo,

along with a Marine expeditionary brigade en route from California; some 850

Tactical Air Command aircraft in the southeastern states; and four Army divisions assigned to CINCLANT. At the same time, SAC had 52 B-52s airborne

with 196 nuclear weapons, and 611 bombers on IS-minute alert.78

When the Soviet Union conceded on 28 October, thus ending the crisis, the

administration could claim that the carefully calibrated quarantine had prevailed.

Khrushchev's behavior from 22 to 28 October displayed a characteristic mix

of bluster and deviousness, with just a touch of occasional candor. He angrily

denounced the president's address to the nation and then denied the presence of

offensive missiles to the United Nations. His willingness, in his response to the

UN secretary general, to stop further deployment if the United States ended its

blockade may have constituted a sign ofreasonableness, as was his order to Soviet

ships on 25 October to reverse course. It also may have been a ploy to avoid a

confrontation at sea while he accelerated the pace of his preparations on land.

His rambling offer in a letter on 26 October to remove missiles in return for a

U.S. pledge to lift the blockade and renounce invasion of Cuba was contradicted

by a truculent letter of 27 October insisting on the removal ofJupiter missiles

from Turkey as the price for Soviet removal of missiles from Cuba. In addition
214 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

the Soviet Union would pledge not to invade or interfere in the internal affairs of

Turkey, and the United States would make the same pledge regarding Cuba.79

Robert Kennedy has been credited with solving the problem of the two

Khrushchev letters by suggesting to his brother that he respond to the first and

ignore the second. This stratagem worked. On Sunday, 28 October, Khrushchev

agreed to remove the missiles and accept a "no invasion" pledge without reference

to Jupiter missiles. What changed his mind is still a matter of speculation. Was

it submission to U.S. nuclear superiority or was it the relative weakness of Soviet

forces in the area? Or was it knowledge that the United States was prepared

to strike if there was no resolution of the crisis on that Sunday? In his preface

to Robert Kennedy's account of the crisis McNamara claimed that President

Kennedy conceived a "strategy which applied pressure against the Soviets without

ever pushing them to the point where they were forced to an irrational, suicidal,

spasm response."80 In essence, it was the doctrine offlexible response in action.

Acheson did not agree. He removed himself from ExCom deliberations after

it became apparent that the president would not follow his advice to destroy

Soviet missile sites in Cuba. Reflecting on Robert Kennedy's Thirteen Days when

it appeared some six years after the event, Acheson contrasted his own lawyer's

logic with the intuitive behavior of the Kennedy brothers. Granting that the

hundred-to-one shot had paid off, he attributed it "to plain dumb luck." In his

view, the administration had survived the crisis because Khrushchev retreated

when the military confrontation seemed inevitable.81 Few members of the

ExCom would have supported Acheson's judgment.

The Joint Chiefs were skeptical of Khrushchev's surrender on the suspenseful

Sunday in October. Like Acheson and Nitze, they had not shared McNamara's foreboding that the world might be coming to an end. They assumed that

Khrushchev was playing for time "to delay direct action by the United States

while preparing the ground for diplomatic blackmail."82 But corroborative

evidence of a changed Soviet attitude came when the Cuba-bound Soviet tanker

Grozny, which had engaged the attention of the ExCom meeting on 27 October,

stopped dead in the water on 28 October. Moreover, no other Warsaw bloc ship

was entering the quarantine zone. This action not only resolved the question of

what steps to take if the ship refused to accept a search, it served as an earnest of

Khrushchev's intentions. In a statement later in the day, the president congratulated the Soviet leader on his "statesmanlike decision to stop building bases in

Cuba, dismantling offensive weapons and returning them to the Soviet Union

under United Nations verification."83

Epilogue: 29 October-20 November

Despite the dramatic release from tension after 28 October the ExCom did

not exult over Khrushchev's blinking.84 Fulfillment ofthe Soviet pledge took three
The Cuban Missile Crisis 215

difficult weeks; many loose ends could have unraveled and led to a tragic third

act that would have prolonged the crisis. At the 28 October morning meeting of

the ExCom, called after receipt ofthe full Tass text of Khrushchev's first letter, the

members identified seeds of formidable new difficulties. One concerned the UN

role in verifYing Soviet compliance; U.S. air reconnaissance would be suspended

on the assumption that the United Nations would fly the mission the next day.

Second, the president intended to include the 1L-28 bomber among the offensive

weapons to be removed, although he agreed that the United States should not get

"hung up" on this issue.85

The most immediate concern, however, was the credibility of the promised

Soviet undertakings. For surveillance, on-site inspection was vital; the quarantine

would remain in effect until resolution of that issue. Verification depended on

Cuba's willingness to admit a UN inspection team into the country. Castro made

it clear in his statement of 28 October that permission for this purpose hinged on

U.S. abandonment of the Guantanarno naval base, an action clearly unacceptable

to the United States. The resulting stalemate made ground inspection impossible.

Not even an extended November visit from Soviet First Deputy Premier Anastas

1. Mikoyan could budge Castro from what he considered infringement on Cuban

sovereignty.86 The initial solution involved resumption of U.S. air surveillance

and overflights of Cuba by U-2s, with the tacit agreement of the Soviet leaders.

These measures proved a serviceable compromise for verifYing the dismantling of

the Soviet missile sites and removal of the missiles by sea, as well as for monitoring Cuban behavior.87

Arrangements for dismantling and monitoring the removal of missiles then

advanced with relative ease. By 6 November the United States and the Soviet

Union had agreed on procedures whereby a Swedish vessel under UN contract

would inspect incoming Soviet ships while nine outgoing Soviet merchant ships

carrying offensive weapons would accept visual and photographic inspection by

U.S. warships.88

Missile surveillance issues focused primarily on Cuba and Castro's concerns;

the matter of 42 1L-28s centered on U.S.-Soviet understandings. The light bomber did not become a subject of controversy during the missile crisis itself since

few were assembled, but it was an offensive weapon system capable of carrying

nuclear bombs and reaching key targets in the southeastern United States. After

28 October the 1L-28s increasingly represented a further test of compliance with

U.S. demands. When the OIA estimated a reasonable time for the Soviet Union

to disassemble, load, and transport the missiles, it included the 1L-28s in its

survey. It believed that of the 33 bombers sent to San Julien airfield, only 13 had

been uncrated, of which 7 were flyable. The other 9 of the original 42 remained

unassembled at another airfield. 89

It took three weeks of difficult negotiations to settle the problem ofremoving

the 1L-28s. The United States maintained the quarantine and threatened to expand
216 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

it by including petroleum products. Moscow claimed that the bombers were to

be transferred to Cuba and therefore stood apart from the Kennedy-Khrushchev

October agreements. Moreover, it said, the planes were really obsolescent, not offensive weapons, and intended only for defensive purposes.90

While informal exchanges continued in New York throughout the first three

weeks of November, the president ratcheted up the pressure by refusing to state

formally that the United States would not invade Cuba. Within DoD General

Counsel John McNaughton suggested taking "a serious look ... at the possibilities of sabotaging the IL-28s."91 In a letter to Khrushchev on 6 November, the

president stresssed U.S. concern about the bombers and unwillingness to accept

their continued presence in Cuba. On 7 November Nitze proposed for ExCom

consideration even more drastic action. He suggested warning Soviet negotiator

Vasily Kuznetsov privately, followed, if necessary, by a public statement, asserting

the unacceptability of the continued presence of "an important weapon system

capable of offensive use." If this and a presidential assurance that U.S. actions

would not include invasion of the island failed to sway the Soviet Union, Nitze

proposed an air attack on the bombers. 92 In the meantime, so as not to indicate

any softening of U.S. resolve, SAC's alert status remained at DEFCON 2.93

News of Soviet implementation of its pledges on missiles, capped by the

president's statement on 20 November that "all known" Soviet missile bases in

Cuba had been dismantled, served to defer discussion of Nitze's recommendations.94 Earlier, on 10 November, Ball provided the president with a detailed

memorandum on possible U.S. policy alternatives pending a Soviet reply on the

IL-28s. After considering a variety of assumptions and possible courses of action,

none of which he recommended, Ball observed that the United States would have

to decide whether to consider Cuba a puppet of the Soviet Union or accept the

Soviet assertion that it could not control Castro. "In that [the latter] event we

would tacitly or explicitly accept the fact or fiction (whichever it might be) that

Khrushchev had complied to the extent of his ability and thereafter concentrate

our pressure on Cuba." Then the United States could refuse to assure that it

would not invade the island and, for reasons of U.S. and hemisphere security, not

allow Castro to possess offensive weapons. For DoD, Nitze concurred in concentrating pressure on Cuba. He considered agreement on ground inspection more

important than the IL-28s. Since the remaining weapons on the island would

belong to Cuba, the onus in the event of a U.S. attack would fallon Cuba.95

Matters never reached the point of an air strike. In his 12 November reply to

Kennedy Khrushchev again emphasized the obsolescence ofthe IL-28 and that the

United States had little to fear since only Soviet airmen flew the planes. He also

hinted at the touchy relationship with Castro. In the end he agreed on removal,

stating, "We give a gentleman's word that we will remove the IL-28 planes with

all the personnel and equipment related to those planes, although not now but

later ... when we determine that the conditions are ripe to remove them." The
The Cuban Missile Crisis 217

same evening, at the behest of the president, Robert Kennedy at a Soviet embassy

reception informed Ambassador Dobrynin that if the USSR completed IL-28

removal within 30 days the United States would immediately announce an end to

the quarantine.96

At an ExCom meeting on 12 November, President Kennedy addressed the

questions of "continued surveillance and the form of an assurance against invasion," suggesting that "we could set the IL-28s off against the quarantine and

our assurances against invasion off against safeguards covering reintroduction of

missiles." Nitze, for his part, in a memorandum to the ExCom on 15 November,

saw some advantages in the controversy over the IL-28s. "Had the Soviet Union

removed both bombers and missiles in the initial withdrawal," he pointed out,

"such complete acquiescence might have made it politically infeasible to do more

than accept the return to status quo ante." Under the circumstances, however,

the United States had an opportunity to use force or the threat of force against

the bombers to help effect the "removal of the Soviet presence from Cuba and

reorientation ofthe Cuban regime. "97

The Soviet Union did not rush to accept the Kennedy proposal. It continued to speak of removing the IL-28s only after lifting of the blockade and would

accept UN observation posts in Cuba only if they were also established elsewhere

in the Caribbean and the United States. The response coincided with renewed

complaints from Castro to UN Secretary General U Thant about U.S. overRights.

The Cuban president warned that "any war plane which violates the sovereignty

ofCuba by invading our air space can only do so at the risk of being destroyed. "98

The White House had no intention of accepting Moscow's solution, certainly

not an inspection team that would cover the United States without also including Soviet ports. Kennedy so informed Khrushchev on 15 November. 99 Before

a new stalemate developed the Soviets granted further concessions, particularly

agreement to the completion of the removal from Cuba of 42 ballistic missiles,

"the exact number the Soviets claimed were there." Evidence of Soviet good faith

prompted Rusk on 17 November to recommend to the president suspension of

low-level reconnaissance missions the following day. This was done even though

some ExCom members thought these Rights necessary to keep up pressure on the

Soviet Union. IOO

When Khrushchev finally agreed on 20 November that all of the IL-28s and

supporting personnel would leave Cuba within 30 days, the president immediately lifted the quarantine. IOI The administration considered that these actions

dropped the curtain on the missile crisis on a happy note. The White House

essentially accepted a line of reasoning previously offered by John McCloy on 16

November-that with missiles and IL-28s out ofCuba, the Soviet military on the

island would "die on the vine." Other Soviet equipment and troops would also

gradually leave because they had lost their mission to safeguard strategic missiles,

no longer on the island. I02
218 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

On 28 November the Joint Chiefs advised McNamara that "we are entering

a new phase ofthe Cuban situation" that called for a select relaxation ofthe readiness posture and a return to a DEFCON 5 alert status.I03 McNamara informed

Congress on 30 January 1963 that 42 ballistic missiles had been removed between 5 and 9 November and 42 IL-28s on 5-6 December. He added that all of

the bombers and 36 of the missile transporters had been uncovered for photographic and visual inspection aboard the Soviet vessels. The Soviets had had no

time, he noted, to construct dummy missiles. Without the missile erectors and

fuel and oxidizer trailers, whatever might remain of a missile system would

be inoperative. 104

Nonetheless, there lingered "unfinished business," as the president noted on

7 February, chiefly the continued presence of Soviet forces in Cuba that could

pose a threat to the hemisphere. IDS Also, potentially inflammatory loose ends

still trailed from the crisis. Cuba never permitted on-site UN inspection of the

missiles; no safeguards were ever provided against the reintroduction of offensive

weapons. Furthermore, U.S. substitution ofits own means ofinspection provided

a standing invitation for Castro to create an incident by shooting down a reconnaissance plane. Under these circumstances, the termination of the crisis did not

lead to an appreciable relaxation of efforts to oust Castro or limit his regime's

influence in Latin America. The "unfinished business" mentioned by the president occupied Defense as much as it did State, and indeed the ramifications of

the missile controversy ranged far beyond Cuba, involving also the impact of the

event on the U.S. presence in Berlin and the fate ofthe Jupiter missiles in Turkey.

Impact on Berlin

Given the Soviet capability to create trouble in Berlin at any moment, it

followed that turmoil in the Caribbean would reverberate in Europe. On 28

September 1962 Khrushchev informed Kennedy that he would take no action on

Berlin until after the November elections in the United States, but on 18 October Gromyko warned the president at the White House that the Soviet Union

would be "compelled" to sign a treaty with East Germany unless negotiations

with the United States provided some positive and rapid results. I06 By that time

the administration knew of the missiles in Cuba and recognized that Khrushchev

seemed intent on confronting the United States with crises in Cuba and Berlin.

After the meeting with Gromyko the president saw no alternative to doing"...

something. Because if we do nothing, we're going to have the problem of Berlin

anyway .... We're going to have this thing stuck right in our guts, in about 2

months [when the IRBMs are operational]."I07

Given this connection, Defense officials had to ask themselves whether Berlin would be held hostage to Soviet freedom of action in Cuba and whether a

U.S. assault against the missiles would lead to Soviet aggression in West Berlin.
The Cuban Missile Crisis 219

When Kennedy expressed concern at a meeting on 18 October that military

action against Cuba could place the future of Berlin at risk, McNamara "surmised

perhaps that was the price we must pay and perhaps we'd lose Berlin anyway."I08

A special national intelligence estimate on 19 October suggested that the Soviet

Union would link the two areas and push for negotiations on both Berlin and

Cuba. Nitze's office agreed with the assumption that Berlin stood out prominently on Khrushchev's Cuban agenda. Whatever the Soviet interest in the Cuban

venture, its investment in Berlin appeared much greater; any settlement on Cuba

that compromised the U.S. position in Berlin "would be widely read as a US

acceptance of partial defeat in a contest involving significant US interests."I09

Defense also worried over the impact on Allied solidarity if the Soviet Union

responded to a blockade in the Caribbean with a reciprocal response in Europe.

The United States could incur blame for creating a casus belli while Moscow

might escape criticism if it retaliated with a blockade of its own against the

West in Berlin. Yet failure to prevail in an area where U.S. interests "are seriously involved and those ofthe Soviet Union are not" would also destroy faith in

U.S. leadership. When ISA planners speculated about the effect of only a partial

blockade of Cuba on Soviet behavior in Berlin, they concluded it would make

no difference in Soviet calculations. They asked themselves such "hypothetical"

questions while recognizing that they might not stay hypothetical for long.I10

In a memorandum of 19 October McGeorge Bundy saw the dilemma in

much the same terms. If the Soviets imposed a Berlin blockade ostensibly in

response to a blockade ofCuba, it would "inevitably stir feeling among all Europeans that this crisis was in some measure the fault ofthe Americans." Bundy feared

that morale in Berlin would crack if the United States did not respond further

by increasing its military efforts and being "prepared to confront Khrushchev at

a very early stage with a bluntly nuclear choice." Even if these signals helped to

hold Berlin, Bundy speculated, the USSR probably would not lift its blockade

unless the United States did the same in the Caribbean. In such a stalemate Soviet

weapons would stay in Cuba and Castro would remain in place.III

ExCom's Berlin-NATO subcommittee, chaired by Nitze, at its initial meeting

on 24 October opposed taking dramatic initiatives, such as introducing nuclear

weapons into Berlin. It viewed the idea of such a diversion to force the Soviets

out of Cuba as "not ... a useful undertaking," at the very least. 112 Nevertheless, the president required a response to his questions about a buildup of forces

in Europe. ISA offered an outline of a plan. Starting with a first increment of a

corps of three Army divisions, plus one Marine division, and 10 Air Force fighter

squadrons along with naval units, Nitze recommended a second large increment of forces from all of the military services, with the hope that the allies in

Germany would follow the same incremental framework. I13

Planning had progressed this far before the crisis ended and fortunately had to

go no further. Although the fear persisted that Moscow might use a Cuban settle-
220 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

ment to force a negotiated settlement on Berlin,114 Khrushchev's concessions,

beginning on 28 October, moved the administration ftom a mood of pervasive

pessimism over the fate of Berlin to a state of near euphoria. Not only was there

an anticipation of gteater unity among the allies in tesponse to the successful U.S.

stand against the missiles, but ISA wanted to tecommend fot ExCom consideration that the allies take advantage of the momentum by reducing concessions

they had previously been prepared to make over Berlin. ll5 Yet it was only after

the Soviet Union signed a treaty with East Germany in 1964 that relaxation

occurred.*

Withdrawal ofJupiter Missilesfrom Turkey

Early on the crisis spotlighted the relationship between Soviet IRBMs in Cuba

and U.S. Jupiter missiles in Turkey and inevitably inspired the idea of a mutual

withdrawal. The United States had 15 Jupiter missiles in Turkey, operational since

April 1962, poised to strike at Soviet targets across the Black Sea. Khrushchev

equated them with the 42 Soviet missiles in the final stages of readiness in

Cuba. I 16 Pointing out the Soviet tendency to think in terms of parallels, Ambassador Thompson warned ExCom to be prepared for Soviet pressure to remove

the Jupiters from Turkey. In a paper dated 21 October, ISA's William Bundy also

reflected about a mutual withdrawal of missiles from foreign bases-the Soviet

Union from Cuba, the United States from Turkey and Italy or elsewhere. He

noted that "hitherto we have considered the subject of 'foreign military bases' an

untouchable subject for negotiation." Even if the exchange made sense from a

military point of view, the political impact might be too high. II?

Thompson's and Bundy's intuition proved correct. A generation later, Fedor

Burlatsky, a leading and knowledgeable academic affiliated with the Central

Committee of the Communist Party in the 1960s, reported that at a meeting in

the Crimea in April 1962 Defense Minister Marshal Rodion Malinovsky emphasized to Khrushchev that U.S. missiles in Turkey could reach Soviet targets

within 10 minutes after launch. Conceivably, this information influenced the

Soviet leader's decision to deploy missiles in Cuba on the assumption that what

was sauce for the goose was sauce for the gander, even though there were significant differences in the respective threats.t 118

During a meeting with advisers on 16 October, the president observed that

the United States had no missiles threatening the Soviet Union in the manner the

IRBMs in Cuba threatened America. Bundy reminded him about the Jupiters

in Turkey. They may have escaped Kennedy's attention for the moment because

* See Chapter VII.

t Jupiter was a liquid-fueled missile with a range of I,500 miles, deployed only in Italy and Turkey. Very similar

to the Thor missile sent to Btitain, the Jupiter was nearing obsolescence when it was fielded. By the end of 1963

all Jupiter and Thor missiles would be removed ftom the NATO area.
The Cuban Missile Crisis 221

he had previously recognized their obsolescence and early in his administration

asked for arrangements to remove them from Turkish soil. Essentially they filled

no military need. ll9

Other reasons existed to remove the ]upiters. The United States would appear

as a peacemaker, displaying sensitivity and flexibility without degrading the

nation's strategic position. But the negative impact ofsuch a decision outweighed

the positive in the minds of administration strategists. Severe repercussions would

follow in NATO. The Turks would see themselves as pawns in a Soviet-American chess game. Turkish soldiers, not Americans, were manning the ]upiters.

"Removal of the weapons, in the most real sense," according to an ISA memorandum on 21 October, "is an act of disarming our friend." It would also appear as

capitulation to Soviet blackmail, with dangerous consequences elsewhere. l2O

Given these considerations, the ]CS opposed a draft presidential order that

would have prohibited the firing ofJupiter missiles from Italy or Turkey without

further presidential authorization, "even in the event of a selective nuclear or nonnuclear attack on these units by the Soviet Union in response to actions we may

be taking elsewhere." They pointed out that regardless of unilateral acts by the

United States, Soviet attacks against the Jupiter missiles in Turkey or Italy would

constitute aggression and would raise binding NATO obligations to retaliate.

New restrictions would undermine the credibility of NATO's defense structure

in Europe. 121

The ]CS argument did not persuade the president. At a White House meeting

on the morning of 22 October Kennedy expressed concern that General Norstad,

Supreme Allied Commander Europe, should fully understand that there would be

no reprisal from ]upiters in Turkey or Italy in response to a Soviet attack from

Cuba without specific authorization from the White House: "What we've got

to do is make sure these fellows ... don't fire them Uupiters] off and think the

United States is under attack. I don't think we ought to accept the Chiefs' word

on that one." Taylor followed this up with a message to Norstad directing that no

missiles should be fired from Italy or Turkey without presidential authorization. 122

The issue moved from the wings to center stage of the missile crisis when

Khrushchev presented revised Soviet terms in his second letter (27 October)

demanding the removal of]upiters from Turkey concurrently with recall of Soviet

missiles from Cuba. Walter Lippmann had already floated the idea in his newspaper column on 2S October, and the Soviets may have thought he had done so

with the president's approval. Lippmann had suggested that the missile systems in

the two countries could be dismantled without altering the balance of power. 123

The reasons for Khrushchev's provocative addition in the second message

remain open to question. Whether or not pressure from the Politburo or Khrushchev's own calculations brought Turkey into the picture, it complicated the

ExCom's deliberations. Citing Raymond Hare, U.S. ambassador to Turkey, Nitze

claimed that it would be "absolutely anathema" to the Turks to pull the missiles
222 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

out. Next would corne a demand for denuclearization of all NATO territory.

Explanations about their obsolescence would not mollify the Turks. 124

Khrushchev had presented the administration with a serious dilemma. If the

United States, knowing the Soviet position, now attacked the missiles in Cuba it

would stand accused of recklessness. At the ExCom meeting on 27 October the

president asked: "Having made it public, how can he take these missiles out of

Cuba if we just do nothing about Turkey?"125 On the other hand, if Kennedy

accepted a trade, Turkey, the other NATO allies, and his political opponents as

well, would see it as a sellout.

The dilemma deepened as news reached the White House during the meeting that Maj. Rudolph Anderson's U-2 plane had been shot down over Cuba

by a Soviet surface-to-air missile. Taylor urged an air strike against the offending SAM site the next day, and McNamara called for a major air strike. If the

Soviets responded with an attack on Turkey, the secretary recommended that

the United States respond by attacking the Soviet Black Sea fleet. The linkage

issue had compounded the crisis. On his way back to the Pentagon that evening,

McNamara wondeted if he had seen his last Saturday night. 126

The president sought to find a way to convince Turkish leaders that withdrawing missiles from their country in favor of a Polaris substitute would strengthen rather than weaken their security. He also recognized that he had no time

to persuade them of this advantage. At this juncture Robert Kennedy proposed

a simple bur deft solution-to respond only to Khrushchev's letter of 26 October and ignore the letter of 27 Octobet in which the Soviet premier had cited

the missile linkage as a quid pro quo (see page 214). That Moscow did not push

the issue of the second letter stemmed in part from the implied assurance Robert

Kennedy had given Ambassador Dobrynin in a conversation on the 27th. Even as

the attorney general said that the United States would remove the Soviet missile

bases if the USSR did not do so, he indicated that the ]upiters would corne out of

Turkey if the offensive weapons left Cuba. A period of time would have to elapse

before action in Turkey would take place; if any leak occurred in the interval the

deal would fall through. 127 The arrangement allowed Khrushchev to save face

by embracing the carrot rather than the stick. In his memoirs he crowed about

his generous behavior as a victor. He not only saved Cuba from invasion bur felt

sympathy for the distraught younger brother ofthe president who, he professed to

believe, sought Soviet help against the aggressive designs ofthe U.S. generals. 128

Quiet diplomacy worked to solve the Turkish question, but it was not a

triumph to celebrate publicly. Not until the posthumous publication of Robert

Kennedy's Thirteen Days did the implicit U.S. promise become public. As Bundy

noted 20 years after that revelation, "the assurance on Turkish missiles remains far

less important than the stick that Robert Kennedy carried to Dobrynin: a threat

of further action within days," unless the Soviet Union agreed by the next day

to the demand for withdrawal of the missiles. U.S. preparations for air attacks
The Cuban Missile Crisis 223

and invasion had become clearly visible. Whether correctly or not, it seemed to

Bundy, Khrushchev deduced that time for further negotiations had run out. l29

As for Turkish-American relations, fortunately secrecy prevailed. The administration pursued the removal ofthe Jupiters within a NATO context, unconnected

to the Cuban crisis, and based on a need to bring on an effective replacement. l3o

In a letter to the Turkish minister of defense in January 1963 about supplying new

weapons, McNamara had in mind Turkish sensibilities. He emphasized that while

Thor and Jupiter in 1957 were the only strategic ballistic missiles that NATO

had ready for operation, rapid technological change had made them vulnerable,

to the extent that it was questionable if they could survive a surprise attack. As a

replacement for the Jupiters, McNamara directed the JCS chairman on 18 January to assign three Polaris submarines to duty in the Mediterranean beginning no

later than 1 April 1963, and to insure dispatch of 14 F-l 04G aircraft to Turkey in

April 1963. 131

By announcing the Turkish removal as part of a phaseout of these missiles,

McNamara effected the transition painlessly, avoiding what might have become

an awkward and embarrassing issue for both the United States and NATO.

When the question of a deal with the Soviets came up in congressional hearings on 6 February, he replied, "I can say without any qualifications whatsoever

there was absolutely no deal, as it might be called, between the Soviet Union and

the United States regarding the removal of the JUPITER weapons from either

Italy or Turkey." He went on to note that when Khrushchev had brought up an

exchange during the missile crisis, "the President absolutely refused to discuss it

at that time, and no discussion took place, and certainly there was no agreement

to withdraw weapons from any allied nation in association with a response to the

agreement ofthe Soviets to withdraw offensive weapons from Cuba."l32

Years later McNamara still believed that there "was no 'deal'-no private

'trade' of missiles. I was in the room when the President told Bobby what he

wanted from the Soviets. The President said: 'Make it crystal clear, Bobby, that

there is no deal.''' The former secretary of defense did admit, however, that Robert

Kennedy provided Dobrynin with a "piece of information" to the effect that the

Turkish missiles were coming out soon in any event. Ifthis was a distinction without a difference, McNamara did not see it that way. ''A piece of information," he

claimed, "is a hell of a lot different than a private deal."l33 Whatever its name, the

ploy embodied a species of diplomacy by the president and the attorney general

that yielded a strikingly successful result.

Cuba after the Missile Crisis

United States relations with Cuba after the crisis afforded none of the satisfaction that the resolution of the Jupiter question gave to the administration.

Castro held on to power and his potential for mischiefin Latin America remained
224 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

a threat. Reports of Cuba's intentions to export communism throughout the

hemisphere regularly flowed into Washington. The Soviet humiliation in October

seemed to embolden rather than discourage Castro and his colleagues. 134 It was

hardly surprising then that the president and his brother maintained their preoccupation with eradicating Castro's regime.

Throughout 1963 the secretary of defense and the ]CS chairman worked

on contingency plans to counter Cuban subversion aimed at fostering instability

in Latin America. 135 Continuing overflights of Cuban territory required a careful elaboration of the rules of engagement the United States should follow in the

event of a Cuban attack on U.S. ships or aircraft. 136 Provocative as low-altitude

overflights ofCuba might have seemed, Castro's refusal to allow on-site inspection

permitted no alternative. In spite of its shortcomings, aerial inspection offered

a reasonable substitute, one that the Soviet Union and Cuba tacitly accepted, at

least for the period immediately following the crisis. 137 The general uncertainty

about a situation over which the United States had limited control, however,

revived old schemes to undermine the Castro regime and sparked new ones.

The concept of a Cuban brigade took on new life after Castro released more

than 100 prisoners seized in the Bay of Pigs episode. It appeared that these veterans could form the nucleus of another possible assault force, underscoring U.S.

determination to maintain pressure on Castro. For all the usual reasons, nothing

much came of the idea. Indeed, freelancing Cuban volunteers became an embarrassment by initiating unauthorized activities. In March 1963 a hit-and-run raid

on a Soviet vessel in the Caribbean evoked public applause for its boldness but

also inspired the U.S. Coast Guard to greater vigilance to prevent such incidents

in the future. 138 Ambivalence over the use of the volunteers manifested itself in

the reaction of the State Department and the United States Information Agency

to Robert Kennedy's proposal to send Cuban exile leaders on a speaking tout of

Latin American countries. USIA opposed the trip for fear that the exiles would

more likely remind an audience ofthe Bay of Pigs disaster than awaken an awareness ofthe communist threat. 139

To coordinate a new set of policies and actions, the president established on

8 January 1963 the Interdepartmental Committee on Cuba with Sterling]. Cottrell, deputy assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, as chairman.

Secretary of the Army Cyrus Vance and Army Chief of Staff General Earle

Wheeler represented OSD and JCS, respectively.140 Defense soon found itself

at odds with State when the latter did not "make the overthrow of the Castro/

Communist regime an objective of the U.S." The committee did not appear to

have carried much weight or to have provided adequate coordination among the

constituent agencies. 141

At a meeting with Kennedy in February 1963 McNamara persuaded the

president to seek from Congress more military assistance keyed to counterinsurgency plans. The discussion covered such possibilities as instigating and staging
The Cuban Missile Crisis 225

"selected terrorist incidents in Latin American countries designed to implicate

Castro" and arranging "for caches of Soviet-Czech arms to be 'discovered' in

selected Latin American countries, ostensibly smuggled in from Cuba." At the

same time, as the CIA's William Colby noted, the Kennedy "fury over Castro"

led to the appointment of Desmond Fitzgerald of the CIA as head of a special

Cuban Task Force to reexamine sabotage and infiltration options and proposals to

assassinate Castro. More secret and better able to entertain covert measures than

Cottrell's organization, the task force tried to avoid the mistakes of Mongoose. 142

The Joint Chiefs continued to focus on military plans and objectives. When

they met with the president at the end of February, the chiefs made a point of

saying that there would be no need to preposition troops in the southeastern

United States in advance of any military operation against Cuba. The visible

tension preceding such an event would allow them ample time to mobilize forces.

McNamara noted in April that the JCS wanted to make sure that "there be no

precommitment against an invasion ofCuba."143

McNamara assured the president in May 1963 that all contingency plans

were being kept up to date. In the face of new deliveries of Soviet T-34 medium

tanks and self-propelled anti-tank weapons to Castro's army, the Defense Department had improved its capability for transporting large numbers of troops and

heavy equipment at an early stage of an operation. McNamara outlined the time

sequence for future strikes: from decision to attack to a full-scale air assault would

require 3 days; from landing of troops until all major combat forces were ashore

would require another 9 days; and the time from the beginning to the end of the

operation would total 27 days.144

Despite White House and DoD interest, these activities probably did not

amount to much more than rhetorical flourishes, game-playing removed from

reality. Given reservations about Cuban exiles and doubts about Latin American

allies, did the administration seriously see an invasion of Cuba as the next step

after the missile crisis? And what of the non-invasion pledge? Or were military

plans conceived less in anticipation of a final blow against Castro than as a means

of deterring Castro-and his Soviet patron-from new aggression in the hemisphere to compensate for their defeat in October 1962? It appears likely that the

bellicose notes emerging from planning sessions reflected in part sheer frustration

over U.S. inability to capitalize on the successful ending of the missile crisis and

remove the still dangerous Castro regime from Cuba.

The lack of concrete results from the long anti-Castro campaign took its toll in

friction among government agencies responsible for Cuban affairs. State-Defense

differences deepened in 1963, with Defense officials repeatedly describing State

initiatives directed at Cuban-sponsored subversion in Latin America as too soft.

Specifically, Secretary of the Army Vance felt that State plans depended too heavily on limited travel control and propaganda approaches while avoiding more

aggressive options such as "non-attributable" actions against petroleum resources,
226 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

sabotage of Cuban facilities through chemical or biological contamination, or

flooding the island with counterfeit currency. If State followed Defense recommendations, Vance said, presumably the Cuban military would have to maintain

a high alert and consume supplies and manpower that otherwise would have

strengthened the Castro regime. 145

The pattern of Cuban-American relations remained much the same after

Lyndon Johnson became president in November 1963. A stream of reports about

Castro's subversive activities in Latin America flowed into the CIA and DIA

networks, as they did under Kennedy, without yielding any conclusive way of

dealing with them. 146 State prevailed in the rejection of a CIA proposal to attack

and cripple the Matanzas power plant, for fear the action might slow down withdrawal of Soviet troops from Cuba or invite another U-2 shootdown. When in

February 1964 Castro threatened to shut off the water supply to the U.S. naval

base at Guantanamo Bay to protest the U.S. seizure of Cuban fishing boats off

the coast of Florida, Johnson ordered the construction of a desalinization facility to convert seawater and make the base self-sufficient. Friction with Panama,

fueled by both Cuban assistance to procommunist insurgents and longstanding

nationalist resentment towards the United States over U.S. control of the Panama

Canal, boiled over into rioting in January 1964 that led to a sealing of the Canal

Zone border and evacuation of U.S. military personnel from areas outside the

Canal Zone. McNamara, with "solid evidence" of Castro's involvement in the

Panamanian unrest, had DoD prepared to implement contingency plans and

intervene with infantry and military police should the communists threaten to

seize power. Tensions diminished when Johnson offered to renegotiate the 1903

treaty and State and Defense agreed on other concessions that carefully balanced

recognition of Panamanian sovereignty with protection of U.S. interests. 147

Castro outlasted U.S. efforts to eliminate him for reasons that were complex.

His survival was not simply a consequence of the U.S. pledge against invasion,

nor a result of a calmer atmosphere following the Soviet capitulation. For all the

exasperation with Castro, the use of military force to oust him had more appeal

than necessity. A nuisance and always a danger as a role model or an exporter of

communism to Latin America, Castro nevertheless posed no immediate military

or political threat to the United States after the missile crisis. While the quick

action in Panama reflected continuing sensitivity to the spread of Castroism,

as would the intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, Latin America

assumed a lesser role in U.S. national security deliberations after 1962. DoD,

along with the CIA and State Department, would continue to craft-and

discard-scenarios for overthrowing Castro, but diminishing urgency produced

a tacit recognition by mid-decade that the nation could live with a non-nuclear

communist neighbor.
The Cuban Missile Crisis 227

Further, despite the inability to remove Castro, Kennedy and Johnson established checks against the expansion of his influence and the intrusion of Soviet

forces in the hemisphere that mitigated the sense of failure. Kennedy's Alliance

for Progress, with its emphasis on social and economic programs, represented a

genuine effort to recast hemispheric relations and address Latin America's domestic problems even as it was intended to counter communist influence. Although

in the absence of reformed economies, U.S. aid remained limited and primarily military, Johnson could take comfort in positive developments in Brazil,

which rejected a move toward a possible communist takeover,* and Venezuela,

where the government responded vigorously to Cuban subversion and mobilized hemisphere-wide support for a resolution in the Organization of American

States condemning Cuba's "acts of aggression." With the GAS resolution of 26

July 1964, wherein member states voted to impose economic sanctions and sever

diplomatic relations with Cuba (all except Mexico subsequently did), the menace

ofCastro had dwindled to an irritant. 148

For McNamara the missile crisis confirmed a conviction that nuclear weapons

were inherently unusable and that only a flexible response to military challenges

made strategic as well as tactical sense. Resorting to force to resolve the SovietAmerican confrontation would have involved conventional arms and would have

drawn its strength from the military advances that OSD had directed and implemented in 1961 and 1962. Had Khrushchev reneged on his pledge to remove

offensive weapons from Cuba, he would have had to face more than 100,000 U.S.

troops, many hundreds of aircraft, and scores ofships poised to invade the island.

In retrospect, the favorable resolution of the missile crisis restored U.S.

pride and prestige damaged by the Bay of Pigs failure. Cuba in 1962 provided

an arena for a crucial Cold War contest in which the United States prevailed.

In another arena, Southeast Asia, the combination of political resolve and military might that proved successful in Cuba could not serve as an effective model.

There, incremental response and self-imposed restraint failed to achieve a successful outcome against a different enemy and under greatly different circumstances.

*In March 1964 Brazilian President Joao Goulart. with the collaboration of the Brazilian Communist Party,

seemed bent on seizing dictatorial powers. The JCS dispatched a carrier task group to the area to register the

seriousness of U.S.• concern, bur the crisis passed. with the help of Brazil's armed forces, when Goulart stepped

down on 1 April. See Phyllis R. Parker. Brazil and the Quiet Intervention. 1964.
CHAPTER X

Laos

A small insular country half a world away, Laos was an unlikely international

flash point for the United States in the Cold War. Shortly, neighboring Vietnam

would far overshadow it in significance, but in January 1961 Laos briefly eclipsed

even Cuba and Berlin as a place of crisis and urgency requiring the incoming

administration's immediate attention. At a meeting in the White House on the

day before the inauguration of his successor, President Eisenhower, echoed by

Secretary of State Christian Herter, forcefully impressed on Kennedy that Laos

was "the key to the entire area of Southeast Asia," indeed, "the cork in the bottle."

Should Laos fall to the communists, the "free world" would lose the whole region.

So dangerous did they view the situation that the United States might have to go

in there and fight it out. If the SEATO* allies refused to participate in the struggle, then the United States would have to go it alone. 1

Paul Nitze remembered Laos as "a smoldering ember, waiting to burst into

flames." So pressing did the danger there seem that Vietnam received hardly any

mention in Eisenhower's conversation with Kennedy. Press commentary reflected

that emphasis. The New YtJrk Times Index for 1961 devoted only 8 columns to

Vietnam, compared with 26 to Laos.2

What accounted for the judgments by senior government officials that identified Laos as central to U.S. foreign policy and Vietnam as only peripheral in

1961? The United States had become involved in Indochina as early as 1950 in

support of the French struggle to retain their rule over the area against the assault

ofthe revolutionary Viet Minh under Ho Chi Minh. The French failure to prevail

led to the Geneva agreements in 1954,t which recognized the independence of

* SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Otganization) was a collective defense pact signed in Manila on 8 September 1954 by the United States, Great Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Pakistan, and

Thailand.

t These agreements, included in a declaration of 21 July 1954, were the work of the conference held in Geneva

by rhe Soviet Union, China, France, the United Kingdom, Cambodia, Laos, and the Viet Minh. Neither the

United States nor the Bao Dai government ofViemam concurred in the final declaration.

228
Laos 229

the three States ofIndochina-Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos-but divided Vietnam at the 17th parallel into a northern sector controlled by the Communist Viet

Minh and a Western-oriented southern Vietnam pending future nationwide elections. Although Laos was not officially divided, the insurgent Communist Pathet

Lao was regrouped in two provinces. The United States refused to sign the accord

and established a U.S. presence in place of France in South Vietnam to support

the regime.3

Laos, the smallest of the three states, had few qualifications for nationhood in

the Western sense of the nation-state. Customarily in conflict, the country's four

ethnic groups, of which the Lao were only one, had little experience with formally

organized armies; those were the creation of the French colonizers and their American successors. An impoverished land with a largely subsistence economy, when

not ruled by foreign invaders Laos was dominated by fiefdoms controlled by a few

aristocratic families under a weak monarch.

The chief contenders for power in the late 1950s were the weak royal government, the Pathet Lao under Prince Souphanouvong, and a neutralist faction

under Prince Souvanna Phouma, half-brother of Souphanouvong. The royal government faction, nominally headed by Prince Boun Oum, was dominated by strongman General Phoumi Nosovan. Into 1960 these remained the chief players in the

prolonged contest for control of Laos.4

In its dosing years, the Eisenhower administration sought to bring about establishment of an anticommunist pro-Western government in Laos. This proved

a difficult task in the prevailing circumstances of instability and unpredictability

that seemed to be the distinctive features of the country. Governments rose and

fell, generals and political leaders came and went, switching sides out of expediency, and uncertainty reigned. The political disarray persisted and seemed acute

at the very time the Eisenhower administration departed office. No doubt it gave

added insistence to Eisenhower's warning to Kennedy about Laos.

In aiding its preferred faction in Laos the United States violated the Geneva

Accords in spirit and letter, as did North Vietnam, which supported procommunist forces even more openly. Complicating the issue was that North Vietnamese

supply lines to the Viet Cong insurgents in South Vietnam passed through southern Laos. In providing a purportedly civilian advisory group, under the name

Programs Evaluation Office (PEO), that obviously pursued a military training

mission, the United States was clearly in violation of the Geneva Agreement on

the Cessation of Hostilities in Laos, which prohibited the "introduction into Laos

of any reinforcements oftroops or military personnel" from outside Laotian territory.5

When the United States looked for aid from allies to cope with the situation

in Laos it found divided counsels and confused responses. The European members

of SEATO-Britain and France-believed that the Boun Oum regime, supported by the United States, would surely fail; they opposed anything resembling
1he Key Position ofLaos in SoutheastAsia
Laos 231

military intervention. fu co-chair of the Geneva Conference Britain maintained

hopes in a diplomatic solution. France, resentful of growing U.S. influence in

Indochina, offered little support for U.S. initiatives, and inclined toward the

leader of the neutralist faction, Prince Souvanna Phouma. Prince Sihanouk of

Cambodia recommended convening a 14-member international conference to

address the problem. Only the Asian allies-South Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines, and Pakistan-each with a special interest in containing a communist

neighbor, urged a vigorous U.S. response.6

Tension over Laos ran high in Washington as Eisenhower left office. At a

White House meeting on 2 January 1961, Eisenhower and other officials registered

frustration over French obstructionism and British caution. Three days earlier,

the State Department had issued a statement that "mindful of its obligations

under the SEATO Treaty, the United States Government would take the most

serious view of any intervention in Laos by the Chinese Communists or Viet

Minh armed forces or others in support ofthe Communist Pathet Lao, who are in

rebellion against the Royal Laotian Government."?

Only a week before Kennedy's inauguration the Joint Chiefs of Staff had

regarded a bilateral agreement with Laos "as a matter of urgency." Given the grip

of the domino effect metaphor on the Eisenhower administration it came as no

surprise that its leaders, including the president himself, spoke of unilateral intervention to save not just Laos, but Thailand, Cambodia, and South Viernam as

well, if a multilateral approach should fail.s

Responding to the Eisenhower Warning

The message that the outgoing president conveyed to his successor on 19

January unquestionably alerted Kennedy to the seriousness of the crisis, but it

offered little guidance. McNamara, a participant in the meeting on 19 January,

reported that when Kennedy asked what he might anticipate from the SinoSoviet bloc if the United States or SEATO intervened, Eisenhower's reply "was

not completely clear." He implied that the communist bloc could provide more

support for the Pathet Lao than the SEATO powers could for the Royal Lao

Government (RLG). Nonetheless, departing Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates

expressed himself as "exceedingly sanguine" about the U.S. capability to cope with

"any foreseeable test," assuming only one limited war situation to cope with at the

time.9

If an emergency existed in Laos in January 1961, the practical options available to the new administration were few. The prevailing consensus viewed the

Boun Oum government, under the controlling Phoumi, as in a near state of

collapse that could bring on a communist takeover of the entire country. What

should the Kennedy team do in this circumstance? They recognized that other

areas of the world occupied a more central place in U.S. foreign policy than did
232 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

Laos. But Cuba and Berlin did not yet loom as problems requiring immediate

solution, and in Southeast Asia Vietnam appeared to have secondary importance.

Laos took priority, requiring tactical if not strategic decisions that would absorb

the attention of policymakers for at least a short but signi£lcant period. Presidential adviser Theodore Sorensen claimed that Kennedy spent more time on Laos in

his £lrst two months than on any other subject. 10

The president faced the choice of (1) allowing Phoumi to fall, with the hope

of minimal consequences; (2) accepting a division of the country similar to that

of Vietnam but with an even more difficult frontier to defend; (3) providing military aid to a nation apparently unwilling or incapable of using it properly; or (4)

coming up with a diplomatic solution that would secure a genuinely neutral coalition government. The last seemed the most sensible, but it had its pitfalls, not

least the likelihood that the North Vietnamese would use Laos as a steppingstone

toward the conquest of South Vietnam and the possibility that neutralism would

lead to the surrender, not just of Laos, but of all Southeast Asia.

In a lengthy report prepared during the inaugural weekend (21-22 January), a

newly formed State-Defense-CIA-ICA* task force listed adverse factors hindering

U.S. efforts in Laos: the deteriorating military situation; extensive military support

of the Pathet Lao by the communist bloc; virtually a complete lack of backing

of U.S.-proposed actions by other SEATO members and South Asia nations as

well as their general non-recognition of the Boun Oum-Phoumi government; and

£lnally, "the geography of Laos ..., a most undesirable place in which to commit

U.S. forces to ground action." With little chance of a political settlement so long

as a military victory appeared unlikely, and given the currently strong position of

the Pathet Lao in northern Laos, the communists might yet establish a puppet

state there to use as a springboard against Thailand and South Vietnam.

The task force recommended several military measures in hopes ofimproving

the Laotian position, the more drastic of which would allow Thai planes to attack

the communist airlift and ground troops, and commit U.S. aircraft if the Chinese

began £lghter protection of the Soviet flights. On the diplomatic side, the task

force suggested discussions with the Soviet Union and pressure on the Laotian

king to seek the creation of a neutral commission that would obtain and supervise a cease-£lre, a return of military forces to positions spelled out in the Geneva

Accords, and, possibly, free elections. I I

When the president and his chief advisers discussed the task force report on

23 January, McNamara stated that implementing the military recommendations

would be helpful but would not "reverse the unfavorable longer term prospects."

Rusk generally favored the military proposals but suggested waiting until the

State Department undertook discussions with the Soviet Union. The president

* The International Cooperation Administration (ICA) was a separate agency created by the Eisenhower administration to furnish military and technical assistance under the U.S. mutual security program.
Laos 233

expressed alarm at the lack of support from the SEATO partners. He observed

that "if the British and French aren't going to do anything about the security of

Southeast Asia, we tell them we aren't going to do it alone. They have as much or

more to lose in the area than we have." General Lemnitzer demurred, stressing

the vital importance of Laos to the security of the entire Southeast Asia area. In

the end, the president authorized 000 to prepare for but not actually carry out

the task force's military recommendations for support of the RLG forces, pending

State discussions with the SEATO allies and with the Soviet Union. 12

Two days later the president, meeting with the Joint Chiefs for the first time,

discussed world problems, of which Laos stood first on the JCS list. In response

to Kennedy's observation that he had few viable options, the chiefs stated that a

combination of military and diplomatic measures was possible. In the short run,

they advocated support of indigenous forces without major U.S. intervention.

Given the obstacles the diplomatic approach was encountering among allies and

with the Soviet Union, it seemed obvious that time was running out. The White

House had no choice but to keep open military options. The steadily deteriorating position of Phoumi's forces required action simply to retain a bargaining

position. The president withheld a decision on any military initiative. 13

The Joint Chiefs, still pained by the Korean War experience, feared having

to fight another war in Asia. They informed the president on 6 February that the

dispatch oftroops to Southeast Asia would initially limit U.S. ability to cope with

emergencies elsewhere in the world. 14 This ruled out direct U.S. intervention

except as a last resort and placed a premium on such alternatives as increasing material assistance to Phoumi to prop up his forces. U.S. reluctance to deploy troops

also sent a negative message to Laos's neighbors, Thailand and South Vietnam.

The shock upon discovering the limitations on U.S. military capabilities in

Laos or elsewhere in Southeast Asia caused OSD to set in motion an expanded

airlift development and production program to speed long-range deployment of

Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) forces. Laos also drew attention to the importance of counterinsurgency units and a new look at limited warfare, which

would become an important part of McNamara's agenda in the early years of the

Kennedy administration. Brig. Gen. Edward Lansdale, a veteran of antiguerrilla

activities in the Philippines and Vietnam and soon to be active in Cuban operations also (see Chapter IX), warned that failure to create a counterinsurgency

program quickly would lead to loss of control of the area. A successful program,

however, might save South Vietnam as well as Laos by denying the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong a safe haven in Laos. 15

In the continuing contest between diplomatic and military responses to the

crisis, the latter had an advantage. OSD and JCS had empowered the commander

in chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) to make some kinds of decisions without reference

to Washington, whereas the U.S. ambassador to Laos operated for a time under

greater constraints from the State Department and the White House. Although
234 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

State served as the primary agent for Laotian matters, failure to delegate authority weakened its position vis-a-vis DoD, where ISA's Laos desk cooperated closely

with ]CS's Laos Battle Staff. 16 A Laos interagency task force inclined toward the

DoD position and built on hopes for a successful Phoumi offensive in February. The task force believed that open but limited support of Phoumi's offensive

would underline the seriousness of the U.S. commitment without justifYing any

increase in Soviet assistance to the Pathet Lao. 17

The consensus in the administration over the need to shore up the failing RLG

and a lack of agreement over the means of doing so posed a genuine dilemma. A

possible way out lay in an appeal to the SEATO powers. If the neutral nations

of Asia would not lend their help, perhaps the allies in SEATO would support

Laos in fulfillment of the SEATO protocol of 1954 embracing the free states of

Indochina. Such action might obviate unilateral American intervention. Thailand

enthused over this approach and urged joint action to employ the NATO formula

for Laos. Adoption of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, in which an attack

against one nation constituted an attack against all, would remedy SEATO's differences over the defense of the RLG. However, though Thailand might have won

over the Philippines, both France and Britain were reluctant to accept even the

legitimacy ofthe Boun Oum government. 18

These divisions within SEATO predictably resulted in ineffectiveness. When

the SEATO Council met at the end of March it produced only a toothless resolution that noted a conventional "grave concern" over external communist support

of the continuing Pathet Lao offensive in clear disregard of the Geneva Accords.

The council then expressed its wish for "an unaligned and independent Laos,"

secured by negotiations, not warfare, but stated that if these efforts failed SEATO

would be prepared "to take whatever action may be appropriate in the circumstances." 19

With the apparent closure of all other avenues, the administration had nowhere to turn except back to a coalition government that would include both

Phoumi and the neutralist Prince Souvanna, a compromise that would appeal

to the French and British allies. Even the Soviets might accept an arrangement

involving Souvanna, although they wanted an international conference to achieve

it. In Washington, Ambassador Menshikov brought up the idea of a Souvannaled government. U.S. Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson reported early in March

that Khrushchev for the first time appeared convinced about the seriousness of

the U.S. interest in a neutral status. If the USSR also pressed for a conference,

he thought it might be deferring to Chinese views. The new Soviet willingness to

negotiate probably meant that they expected the Pathet Lao to win, if not now,

then later. Like the Americans, the Soviets faced other issues that held higher

priority. As Khrushchev told Thompson, he did not want a confrontation over

Laos. "Why take risks over Laos? It will fall into our laps like a ripe apple."20
Laos 235

So limited were the administration's policy options that it welcomed anything

staving off immediate disaster. While State now looked reluctantly to Souvanna

for a political solution, it did not wish it to be at any cost. Souvanna should be

pushed into a position in which he would lead a non-communist neutral government. If this came to pass, no international conference need convene. Hopes

rested on a meeting between Phoumi and Souvanna in Phnom Penh where

Souvanna himself expressed concern about the Soviet-assisted buildup of Pathet

Lao forces. 21

American apprehension at the level of Soviet support notwithstanding, the

difficulties ofthe Phoumi forces did not stem from scanty U.S. aid. The enhanced

role of Phoumi in 1960 had accelerated the rate ofsupply deliveries and transfer of

funds. JCS instructed CINCPAC to divert additional emergency monies to Laos

from undelivered Military Assistance Program funds targeted for elsewhere. Along

with these efforts in February 1961, the PEO, together with the U.S. ambassador,

CINCPAC, and the JCS, approved activation of additional Laotian antiguerrilla

forces. Military assistance would permit increasing these forces from 20,000 to

29,800, a reflection of their perceived importance. The additional 9,800 would

consist of Hmong, the ethnic people in the northeastern mountains most actively

engaged in fighting the Pathet Lao. The force level of the regular army (FAL)*

would remain at 29,000.22

Given the performance ofthe beneficiaries, DoD had no enthusiasm for throwing more aid at the Laotian army. Even so, in the absence of a modus vivendi between Souvanna and Phoumi, alternatives to more help appeared limited. Accordingly, in February 1961 Defense and State approved additional millions in

assistance to help meet expanded military operations. In March the cost of aid

rose dramatically as Phoumi's plight worsened. Internal airlift support for the

government's forces required an increase in funding. The escalating cost of surrogate fighting in Laos led the president on 28 March to ask the secretary of defense

for a tally of military and economic assistance provided Laos since the 1954

Geneva agreements.23 McNamara found that through 31 December 1960 this

had amounted to $277 million, of which only $63 million went for military aid.

Another $65 million, programmed or obligated, had not been used by the end of

1960. McNamara added that the data presented "do not adequately reflect a wide

variety of emergency actions taken since August 1960 by Department of Defense

and other agencies to support operations in the current crisis in Laos."24

The administration did seek to assert some control over the use of resources.

When General Phoumi wanted to raise six special battalions, the American threat

to cut off payments forced him to use the personnel from those battalions to

serve as replacements for existing units.25 This triumph of American efficiency

came as a minor victory without much meaning. In reality, assistance to Laos was

* Forces Armees de Laos.
236 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

as expensive as it was apparently wasteful. Defense officials observed that while

the PEO had submitted a preliminary budget of $19.8 million for FY 1962, it

did not include two supplements amounting to $4.9 million. And this was just

the minimal requirement for supporting Phoumi's army. If hostilities continued

on the same scale, another $5 million or more would have to go into the final

budget. Therefore, according to an ISA analysis in April, a budget request of $30

million would be more realistic than the original $19.8 million figure. 26

The rising cost of aid to Laos, the extremely slow diplomatic progress, and

the bleak military situation presented a grim outlook. At the end of February

Walt Rostow, deputy presidential assistant for national security affairs, had reported to the president that "Phoumi is stuck. In the twenty-one days estimated by

our people as required to take the Plaine des Jarres, he has made four to seven

kilometers .... In addition, the good General has been politicking rather than

using his forces to increase our bargaining position in the negotiations ahead." A

week later, Rostow saw the situation as close to hopeless. He told the president,

''As we have feared, the Communists launched a probing offensive against Phoumi's men. Without much fight our boys fell back, apparently beyond the crucial

crossroads. "27

The same day, 7 March, Rostow's aide Kenneth P. Landon asserted that a

decision had to be made immediately. "On the premise that the Soviets regard

Laos as a revolving door to Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, and VietNam," he

urged the use of forces from other SEATO nations, rushing the necessary weapons into Laos through a massive open airlift, sending Diem's forces in South

Vietnam on guerrilla raids into North Vietnam, and making known to the world

U.S. readiness to move with its own forces against the communists in Laos. 28

ISA chimed in with the NSC staff in sounding the alarm. Rather than

avoiding escalation, the United States had better risk it. Fears of escalation that

tended to paralyze Western response to communist aggression in Laos validated

the Chinese Communist argument for stepping up pressure against the West in

vulnerable places in Asia and other parts of the world. Should SEATO and the

United States now back down from support of Phoumi, the Chinese would have

won their argument with the Soviets, namely, that aggression carried no risk of

escalation by the other side. For the United States to inform the communists

that it had no intention of backing down would impose greater restraint on their

actions in Southeast Asia and elsewhere.29

In the meantime, on 3 March the president directed General Lemnitzer to

prepare a plan for recapturing the Plaine des Jarres, the open grassy plateau in

central Laos that occupied a key strategic position, and on 9 March the president

and his top advisers considered it. McNamara presented the JCS plan, under the

code name of Millpond; more properly a concept, it had 17 preparatory steps

leading to recapture of the Plaine starting about 1 April. The JCS envisioned the

plan as supporting the CIA and what was primarily a Royal Laotian Army effort.
Laos 237

The only direct DoD involvement called for delivery of supplies to Vientiane in

an emergency, placement of a Marine Corps squadron in Thailand to provide

helicopter maintenance, and augmentation of the PEa in Laos and the Joint

U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group QUSMAAG) in Thailand. No consensus for outright military intervention emerged although the president approved

the 17 actions proposed by the Joint Chiefs.3o

There was still no consensus on a hard line. At a meeting of Defense, CIA,

and United States Information Agency officials with the secretary of state on

12 March, Rusk spoke of the gravity of the situation. He listed several actions

that the United States might take, ranging from a warning to military intervention. More aggressive than either State or JCS, OSD wanted U.S. aircraft to

deliver essential military assistance materiel directly to Laos rather than through

Thailand. McNamara also wanted to use the T-6 aircraft already in Laos in the

possession of Phoumi to bomb military targets. He was convinced that simple

propeller aircraft would best serve the fledgling Royal Lao Air Force. The Joint

Chiefs equivocated. Lemnitzer felt that T-6s should be employed only after a

decision to use the B-26s as well. But he warned that air operations alone would

not suffice; to prevail, adequate ground forces would be required. Memories of

Korea remained strong.31

More meetings with the president on 20 and 21 March brought no decision on

action. At the White House meeting on 21 March Rusk spoke of a "two-stringed"

approach-negotiation and action. The "two-stringed" approach offered nothing

new. If it was not functioning in February, it certainly would not work in an even

more precarious military situation in March. It seemed that only Millpond, the

program of activities approved by the president on 9 March, offered hope, and

the United States could "go on from there." The distance between the long-term

covert activities of Millpond and the short-term position of Phoumi's force on the

edge of disaster appeared formidable. The only clear decision that won approval

was to inform congressional leaders and have the president speak out to the American people-and to the communist world as well-with a warning over the crisis

in Laos.32

At a televised news conference on 23 March 1961, using three large maps of

Laos as a backdrop, Kennedy pointed to areas under communist domination in

August 1960 and December, and then to the dramatic Pathet Lao expansion of

the next three months. Blaming the North Vietnamese and the large-scale Soviet

airlift to the Pathet Lao, he asserted that "if these attacks do not stop, those

who support a truly neutral Laos will have to consider their response." While

the nation would avoid blundering into a military solution, Kennedy stated that

"every American will want his country to honor its obligations to the point that

freedom and security of the free world and ourselves may be achieved."33 The

president's language implied that if the communists did not halt their advances

they would face massive U.S. intervention. But Kennedy was only bluffing,
238 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

according to McGeorge Bundy, who said he did not "remember any time when

there was a decision to engage in military intervention in Laos-discounting

what the undercover boys did." The administration assumed that only through

strong language could it achieve its real objectives-cease-fire and a neutral coalition government. Nevertheless, the key to the Kennedy statement lay in the call

for "constructive negotiation." By no coincidence, on the same day the British

proposed to the Soviets an immediate cease-fire, verification of the effectiveness

of the cease-fire by the International Control Commission (ICC),* and reconvening the Geneva Conference after the cease-fire took hold. Moreover, the matter of

a neutral Laotian government of national unity would have to be settled as soon

as possible,34

The administration split between optimists and pessimists over the Soviet

role in ending the crisis. Optimists seized on the combination of the president's

message and the British bilateral talks with the Soviets to anticipate early action.

Even before 23 March the British had discerned signs of Soviet moderation and

had evinced interest in asking Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to reconvene

the ICC in New Delhi. Llewellyn Thompson from Moscow voiced his belief

that the Soviet Union would not take excessive risks in Laos but had adopted

an aggressive posture to balance Chinese influence in Southeast Asia. A positive

spirit pervaded a meeting between Kennedy and Harold Macmillan at Key West,

Florida, on 26 March, although the British prime minister could not offer blanket endorsement for anything but a limited SEATO action in the event hopes for

a negotiated settlement collapsed. McNamara was with the pessimists who were

skeptical about prospects of Soviet support,35

An informed ISA official regarded as "curious" any suggestion that the Soviet

Union was experiencing pressute to come up with a prompt settlement in Laos.

He found the idea suspect if only because the notion of the Soviets being boxed

in came from the Polish ambassador in New Delhi. Interest in negotiations might

be just a way of Soviet foot-dragging in conference meetings, recognizing they

had nothing to fear from U.S. military intervention as long as talks continued. It

seemed that if any party became boxed in by negotiations, it would be the United

States. The only alternative seemed a clear determination to use force unless the

Soviets met U.S. terms for negotiation.36

Initially, the skeptics seemed to have it right. British skittishness about a

SEATO role signaled the absence of a concerted SEATO position. At Bangkok

the member nations, meeting on 27-29 March, approved talking, not fighting.

On 1 April the Soviets resolved SEATO's dilemma by accepting the U.S.-British

proposal for a revived Geneva conference.J7 It led to hopes that the Soviets would

put their weight behind a meaningful cease-fire.

* The group created by the 1954 Geneva Conference to monitor the armistice.
Laos 239

New optimism was sparked by the appointment of the distinguished diplomat, 69-year-old Averell Harriman, as Kennedy's roving ambassador. Harriman

had met Souvanna Phouma in India on 21 March and came away impressed with

his sincerity and personality. He recommended U.S. support for a government

built around Souvanna's leadership, with the Pathet Lao occupying minor roles if

necessary. Consequently, Souvanna was invited to Washington on 20 April for a

meeting that never took place; Rusk, claiming a previous engagement in Georgia,

offended the sensitive prince by his absence from Washington. More likely, the

Bay of Pigs crisis on that date would have prevented a meeting even had Rusk

been in town.38

Although the skeptics at ISA came around at last to considering the possibility of working with Souvanna, they were annoyed by the communist insistence

that he was the only legitimate leader, as opposed to the "illegitimate" Boun Qum

government. They recognized that Souvanna might provide the key to a solution.

As Col. Thomas Wolfe, head of ISA's Sino-Soviet desk, observed: "I don't know

whether he can be bought, cajoled or otherwise persuaded to disown the shadow

government, but this would certainly seem to be worth working on."39

Divisions within DoD

Soviet acceptance on 1 April 1961 ofthe British proposal for an international

conference diverted attention from Souvanna and the nature of the coalition

government that might emerge from negotiations. Instead, it focused on the first

steps-a cease-fire and means of enforcement. As it became urgent to speed the

delivery of U.S. arms and equipment to Phoumi's forces, ISA asked CINCPAC

to fill critical shortages as quickly as possible.4o

Much needed doing before an enforceable cease-fire could take place. Two

Canadian officers who had served with the ICC in 1955 and 1956 pointed out to

ISA that the requirement of unanimity in the decisionmaking process would make

prompt ICC action improbable even if the agency could discover incidents of

violation, not likely given the state of transportation and communications within

Laos. Moreover, the Hmong, the one Western-backed force serious about fighting, would have become as difficult to police as the Pathet Lao; if they cooperated

in disarming themselves, they would need protection against the less compliant

Pathet Lao. There was a need, according to the Canadians, for an ICC organizational change that might get information to teams in the field, permitting them

to act expeditiously without having to go back to Vientiane for further instructions.41

In a report to McNamara on 11 April the ]CS agreed with these reasons for

the past ineffectiveness of the ICC and objected particularly to the requirement

that field inspection teams receive permission from the two warring parties before

moving into the area. The JCS paid special attention to the unanimity provision,
240 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

which they saw as a recipe for paralysis. With the communists represented by

Poland, the West by Canada, and the neutralists by India, the latter "reluctant to offend either side," the commission could not operate capably. General

Lemnitzer doubted that serious improvements could come about or that the ICC

could eliminate covert communist assistance to the Pathet Lao. In this context,

the return of the ICC would be contrary to u.S. interests. U.S. efforts to stockpile supplies for the Laotian government forces could be curtailed by the ICC

"without slowing up the flow of Bloc assistance to the Pathet Lao." Lemnitzer

wanted the United States to insist that the commission limit its functions initially

to confirmation of a cease-fire before assuming any other duties. The Joint Chiefs

also strongly opposed an informal State Department suggestion to add two more

neutralist nations, such as Burma and Cambodia, to the commission.42

The defense secretary had received similar advice from his ISA staff. If verification of a cease-fire, a critical issue, could not be satisfactorily arranged, Nitze

recommended that the United Kingdom as co-chair of the Geneva Conference

demand that the ICC for Vietnam inspect the Hanoi airfield and the main access

routes on the North Vietnamese side of the Laotian border. The only drawback

to this plan was the likelihood that the Soviets would demand a similar widesweeping ICC investigation in Laos "beftre the United States could complete a

supply build-up in support of the present RLG." If the Soviets should turn down

the proposal, at least aid to Phoumi would continue.43

But the Nitze memorandum did not say what good this aid would do if

Phoumi's forces could not hold on, no matter the level of aid. Evidence of

disaster abounded in April. Phoumi's offensive on 5 April, designed to retake

highways critical to the control of the Plaine des Jarres, collapsed within a week

as the Pathet Lao strengthened their positions both north and south of the main

highway junction.

So discouraging appeared Phoumi's position that the task force on Laos on 10

April had discussed the possibility of a "Lebanon-type" operation, even though

U.S. troops flown into a landlocked country could hardly be equated with

Americans on the beaches of Beirut in 1958.44 The task force and the Pentagon

were swayed by a report of Lt. Gen. Thomas J. Trapnell, whom McNamara and

Lemnitzer had sent to Laos in mid-March to assess the U.S. plan for recapturing

the Plaine des Jarres and to judge how well Phoumi had reassigned his commanders. Trapnell reported panic in the government, with little chance for survival, let

alone recovery of the Plaine des Jarres at this time. He recommended bombing

the Pathet Lao on the Plaine, providing Phoumi with armed helicopters, and raising nine additional battalions. Trapnell also proposed converting the PEO into

a full-scale military assistance advisory group (MAAG) and assigning uniformed

U.S. officers down to the battalion level. 45

The administration, believing it had no alternative but to continue providing

aid until a cease-fire occurred, accepted some ofTrapnell's proposals. At a White
Laos 241

House meeting on 13 April, DoD requested an increase of seven battalions and

more than 2,600 replacement and service troops for the Laotian army at additional costs of $330,000 per month in Defense support funds and $1.8 million

in MAP monies for their initial equipment.46 On 19 April, coincident with the

Cuban Bay of Pigs debacle, the administration converted the PEO into a MAAG

and accepted the creation of seven new battalions. But this flurry of activity did

not respond to a more crucial question, the matter of U.S. military intervention,

either unilaterally or under a SEATO umbrella.47

Pathet Lao columns continued to make advances in northern Laos with minimal resistance from government forces and to consolidate their political control

wherever they went. These events accelerated and led to numerous meetings in

Washington that produced no firm decisions.48

While Kennedy recognized that the communists were stalling on implementing a cease-fire they had agreed to on 17 April and were exploiting the projected

conference in Geneva to complete the conquest of Laos, he also had to confront

the emergency posed by the Bay of Pigs crisis. If the debacle in Cuba did nothing

else, it diminished the credibility of the JCS and the CIA, at least for a time. The

president reconsidered the JCS judgments on Laos and found their answers as

ambiguous as they had been over the chance ofsuccess for the Cuban brigade at

the Bay of Pigs. The Joint Chiefs had suggested the unlikelihood of Soviet intervention in Laos, but they were not sure; they spoke of supplying U.S. combat

forces by air, but there were only two usable landing strips in all of Laos. According to Sorensen, Kennedy exclaimed several months later: "Thank God the Bay of

Pigs happened when it did. Otherwise we'd be in Laos by now-and that would

be a hundred times worse." Earlier, Robert Kennedy noted that "if it hadn't been

for Cuba, we would have sent troops to Laos." He went on to say those troops

probably would have been destroyed, forcing an escalation that might have led to

a nuclear war with China and the Soviet Union.49

The president made his remark in September 1961, the attorney general in

June. Actually, at the end of April and in early May the United States appeared

ready to intervene unilaterally. When someone as influential as Harriman, then

in Laos with General Lemnitzer, could cable Washington for the deployment of a

division-size U.S. force to Thailand, it showed the depth ofthe crisis.50 Harriman

saw the military situation as out of control. He thought that the Pathet Lao,

supported by professionally trained North Vietnamese cadres, could take over the

entire country unless the United States or SEATO intervened or a credible ceasefire was arranged. Accepting this urgency, the president on 26 April approved

movement of naval forces into the South China Sea and the Gulf of Siam and

also approved alerting forces earmarked for movement into Laos under SEATO

plans. 51

More might have been done short ofinserting troops. If U.S. troops were not

to go into the country, at least the administration might have authorized the use
242 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

of B-26s to bomb Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese positions. The president's

fear of escalation, reinforced by the ultimate hesitations of his military advisers,

no doubt contributed to erring on the side ofrestraint.

In March the ]CS had spoken of dispatching a 60,OOO-man force, claiming

that it could match whatever the enemy, including the Chinese and North Vietnamese, might bring to bear. But if no large-scale intervention seemed feasible,

they advised staying out. At a critical meeting on 29 April, the military leaders

deemed the Laotian situation desperate, but they could not come up with a single

coherent solution. Rather, they engaged in the same temporizing that characterized their advice on the Bay of Pigs earlier in the month. When pressed by

Robert Kennedy, McNamara expressed his opinion that "we would take a stand in

Thailand and South Vietnam," perhaps pointedly omitting Laos. General LeMay

observed that airpower could stop the Pathet Lao but still not win the countryside. Army Chief of Staff Decker believed that the United States must hold on to

as much of the three Indochinese countries as possible but confessed that he saw

no good place to fight in Southeast Asia. Admiral Burke "thought it possible to

go in." McNamara continued to manifest his fear of intervention when he made

the point that the enemy could easily deny use of airfields needed to move U.S.

ttoOPS into Vientiane. 52

The NSC meeting on 1 May reflected conflicting advice ftom other parts of

the administration also and from senior advisers. McNamara proposed using

SEATO forces to move into the Laos panhandle, the long narrow southern extremity of the country, "recognizing that if we do we must be prepared to win."

He spoke of the possible need to use nuclear weapons to win a war in Southeast

Asia. General Taylor opposed the use of U.S. troops in Laos; CIA Director Allen

Dulles cautioned about a Chinese response if the United States entered the Laos

panhandle. As a result, the NSC continued a holding action and agreed that a

final decision should await "further developments in the cease fire negotiations"

and a ]CS presentation ofthe military implications of possible actions. 53

As requested by the NSC, McNamara and Gilpatric provided the president on 2 May with DoD's position on "Alternative Courses of Action in Laos."

Attached were memoranda expressing the views of the individual chiefs and

two of the service secretaries. One alternative would accept the loss of Laos and

compensate for it by introducing U.S. and SEATO forces into Thailand and

South Vietnam. After describing Laos as "one of the least favorable places in the

world for direct U.S. military intervention," and "weighing the pros and cons,"

McNamara and Gilpatric favored intervention-the only instance over a period

of two years where McNamara departed from his usual hesitation on the subject.

They preferred to set a 48-hour deadline for a satisfactory cease-fire in Laos at

the existing battle line. Ifthe deadline passed without a satisfactory response, the

United States should then move its forces to protect vital centers in Laos and

hold them until obtaining a cease-fire. Admittedly, McNamara and Gilpatric
Laos 243

observed, should the Chinese and North Vietnamese attack, "at some point, we

may have to initiate the use of nuclear weapons in order to prevent the defeat of

our forces." Still, they did not believe that the Soviet Union would allow the situation to get to that brink.

Disagreements once again expressed by the Joint Chiefs, and also by the service

secretaries, undermined this conclusion. While Lemnitzer agreed with McNamara,

Admiral Burke advised deploying troops to Thailand and South Vietnam immediately and into Laos within 48 hours. Air Force Chief of Staff General White called

any intervention by ground forces "maldeployment," and recommended the use of

U.S. airpower against military concentrations in Laos and against North Vietnam

and China if necessary.54

At this juncture, Harriman's influential voice lent weight to McNamara's judgment. From Saigon, Harriman gave his imprimatur to Lemnitzer's doubts about

the credibility of any cease-fire without direct intervention by SEATO forces to

secure the territory in Laos still held by Phoumi's forces. When he learned on 3

May that a cease-fire agreement had occurred in one sector, Harriman warned

against the enemy stringing SEATO along with partial cease-fires that would

permit the Pathet Lao to consolidate their gains. Such compliance would make

the military situation all the more difficult if negotiations broke down.55

Despite the combined judgment ofHarriman, McNamara, and Lemnitzer, the

president remained skeptical of a military solution. The recent Bay of Pigs failure

haunted him. Not even Harriman's prestige could turn away doubts raised by the

differences among the Joint Chiefs. And the apparent willingness of Lemnitzer

and McNamara to entertain the apocalypse that would result from ultimate escalation to nuclear weapons Kennedy could not accept. 56

Geneva: May-June 1961

The sudden acquiescence by the parties to both a cease-fire and a 14-nation

conference in Geneva to implement it relieved the administration for the time

being of further agonizing over intervention. The chairs of the conference, the

Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, had issued a formal call on 24 April for

a meeting, based on a cease-fire in place prior to the event. With the first session

scheduled for 12 May, the ICC delay in confirming the reality of a cease-fire and

which Laotians should attend caused postponement of the opening until 16 May.

By accepting the invitation to stop the fighting on 3 May, the Pathet Lao and

their allies resolved the Kennedy administration's doubts over what action to take.

Rusk immediately told the U.S. ambassador to advise the Laotian government "to

cooperate without raising complicating issues on picayune details."57

Why the Pathet Lao agreed to go to the peace table remains obscure. Conceivably, had they continued to stall they might have overthrown Phoumi and taken

over the entire country; time seemed on their side. Possibly they feared that the
244 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

United States would make good its threat to intervene. By entering into negotiations, the communists could proceed with their conquest of Laos without

immediate worry over U.S. military reaction. Possibly, a Soviet decision against

excessive involvement also played a large role. Or perhaps the North Vietnamese,

in control of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, had no need to press their allies to take over

all ofLaos.

The U.S. reaction to reconvening the Geneva Conference on the basis of a

shaky cease-fire is less obscure. Although suspicions about North Vietnamese good

faith in particular remained high, the very act of negotiation appeared to offer

some prospect for peace without excessive loss of face or even of strategic positions. The alternative was the loss of Laotian sovereignty to outside communist

elements. The negotiations also rested on the assumption, as Deputy Secretary

Gilpatric later observed, that the Laotian situation was negotiable, while that

of Vietnam was not: "In the case of Laos, you did not have Ho Chi Minh and

General Giap, who were determined to take over South Vietnam." Even though

both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China were involved, Laos

remained a localized conflict compared with what Vietnam turned out to be. 58

DoD planners remained unhappy with the reasoning behind the reconvening

of the conference at Geneva. They sympathized with the Thais, who, despairing

of any SEATO support, wanted a bilateral defense pact with the United States.

Also distressed, Diem in South Vietnam felt that any change that legitimized

Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese control in Laos would threaten his nation's

survival.59

Before departing for Geneva, Nitze, who headed the Defense Department

component of the U.S. delegation, made an effort in a memorandum of 9 May

to strengthen Harriman's position opposing a "tripartite" Laotian representation

at the conference that would separate Souvanna from the Pathet Lao. He wanted

those two factions considered as a single entity since Souvanna, in Defense eyes,

was as much a spokesman of the Pathet Lao as was his half-brother. If Souvanna's "neutralists" got separate status it would give an automatic 2-to-l advantage

to the communists. Nitze also believed that the U.S. delegation should hold out

against complete neutralization or demilitarization of Laos, since any such action

would play into the hands ofthe enemy.60

The substance of this message reflected the more aggressive stance of the

DoD members of the U.S. delegation to the conference. As expressed by ISA's

George Carroll, "we did not think that it was possible to find a purely political solution to Laos, in the sense that we felt that the Communists would not

give one inch except in the face of force." At some point in the conference, they

believed, the United States would have to make clear that it preferred military

action to a communist-dominated Laos.61

While this summation did not conflict with the substance ofthe State Department's scope paper outlining the U.S. approach to the 14-nation conference,
Laos 245

the spirit came through as distinctly different. DoD's tone sounded as bellicose

as its message. Unlike the generalities of the State views, it identified specific

points where military action had to come into play. Any sign of weakness over

seating Pathet Lao representatives, over convening in the absence of a genuine

cease-fire, or over inadequate powers invested in the reconstituted ICC should

trigger an American walkout from the conference. The "proper order of business

of the Conference" ought to be, in sequence, a cease-fire, seating of the Laotian

parties, empowerment of the ICC, and formation of a coalition government. But,

according to Carroll, no such arrangement would occur "without the threat of

application offorce. "62

The 000 representatives took some satisfaction in forcing on State a recognition that the communists had no intention of abiding by the terms of the

Geneva Accords. This gave little consolation, however, since the U.S. position did

not contain a threat of unilateral military action. "The fact that we did not have

a firm decision to act," Carroll claimed, "also meant that we would have to watch

the faces of the Thai's [sic], the RLG, and the South Vietnamese as they saw us

back down from one position to the other. Had we been able to tell Thailand and

South Vietnam our intentions to accept defeat in Laos prior to their arrival in

Geneva, we would have been on much firmer ground in dealing with them at the

Conference. "63

Whether or not explicit threats of military retaliation would have worked is

speculative and doubtful; the existing military situation gave all the advantages to

the communists and they made the most of them. On such vital issues as Laotian

representation in Geneva, the powers of the ICC, or the credibility of the ceasefire, the Americans repeatedly gave way.

The latter rwo questions posed immediate interconnected problems. To be

meaningful a cease-fire required verification, with appropriate powers vested in

the reconstituted ICC, which had no means of inspection. Consequently, the

certification of a cease-fire by the Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese was no

more than "wishful thinking." By accepting such certification as valid, Secretary

Rusk compromised the U.S. position.64

Rusk's opening assertion in Geneva that the United States would continue

negotiations only as long as the cease-fire remained in effect lacked credibility. The

Pathet Lao continued to attack Meo tribesmen without concern about violations;

the ICC had no presence at the scene. Moreover, at the same time, the U.S.-

recognized government of Boun Oum initiated negotiations with the neutralists

and communists in Laos against the advice of 000 representatives. It refused to

take one of the three proposed Laotian chairs at Geneva and be outnumbered by

Souvanna and his half-brother. To make matters worse, the Indian chairman of

the ICC seemed more interested in giving priority to the issue of a functioning

coalition government than to a verified cease-fire.65
246 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

The West won only cosmetic victories, such as postponing the opening day

of the conference to 16 May because the matter of representation remained

unsettled. To avoid the seating issue, the British and Soviets proposed to seat as

an observer any Laotian group that a conference member requested. Although the

United States was prepared to accept the RLG as the only legal government, it

agreed to seat other Laotian factions on the understanding that their presence did

not confer official recognition. Somewhat lamely, the U.S. delegation explained

that it had "no support among delegations in Geneva, with exception of RLG, to

hold out on what non-Communist delegations consider to be a trivial point of

procedure."66

Self-delusion served as a prescription for failure. Some glimmers of hope

emerged in the course of the conference, even in the view of a DoD representative, but they came not from a change of fortunes on the battlefield but from

Harriman's tactics as head of the U.S. delegation after Rusk's departure on 20

May and from apparent Soviet disinterest in the future of Laos. Harriman was

a more influential figure than Rusk in Geneva; the secretary was there only for a

few days. The impending summit meeting of Kennedy and Khrushchev in Vienna

in early June would offer an opportunity for the president to test the sincerity of

Khrushchev's professed wish for a genuinely neutral Laos. Harriman urged the

president to make clear to Khrushchev just what "neutrality" meant: first and

foremost, the alignment of Laos with neither side and military withdrawal on

both sides, including the North Vietnamese and Chinese Communists.67

While the two leaders met in Vienna on 3-4 June, a stalemate continued in

Geneva. A proposal by the French to implement their military role in Laos, as

provided for under the 1954 accords, met with Chinese objections and a consequent temporary adjournment of the conference. The delay provided some

breathing space for the West, as members of the conference waited for results

of the Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting. The wait seemed worthwhile when the

conferees agreed on removal of Laos from the Cold War rivalry under a genuine

neutralization of the country. Khrushchev agreed with Kennedy's comment that

"Laos is not so important as to get us as involved as we are" and went on to say

that "the Soviet Union has no commitment in Laos, has never undertaken any

obligations in that area, and will not do so in the furure."68

But the respite was short-lived. When the conference resumed on 6 June, it

did so in the shadow of the fall of Padong in the Meo highlands to the communists, making an obvious mockery of the cease-fire. Both the United States

and the United Kingdom decided to boycott the conference. Years later Nitze

recalled that Kennedy became so angry at Khrushchev's apparent repudiation of

their agreement for a cease-fire and neutralization that he leaned toward DoD's

proposal for military action but finally decided in favor offurther discussion with

the Russians. The Defense Department thereafter publicly described Padong's

fall as "a minor engagement which had resulted in few losses to either side, and
Laos 247

that the Meo had simply removed to nearby positions"; in no sense was this

battle to be a second Dien Bien Phu. Harriman appreciated this press approach

and labeled it a strong propaganda victory since even the neutralists vigorously

condemned the communists for breaking the cease-fire. A few days later, on 12

June, the U.S. and British delegates returned to the conference table.69

Some comfort attended this public relations victory. Even greater satisfaction

followed when the three princes-Boun Oum, Souvanna, and Souphanouvongagreed to meet on 19 June in Zurich. Within four days they had patched together

an agreement for the beginnings of a coalition government that promised the

establishment of a neutral Laos outside the protection of any military alliance,

notably SEATOJo But how would the coalition government function, since the

balance of power in Laos had not changed? Would not the Pathet Lao, in conjunction with the Souvanna-Ied neutralists, remove the Boun Oum faction at the

earliest opportunity?

The Phoumi Burden, 1961-1962

With this concern in mind, talks had begun between Defense and State and

between British and U.S. military leaders about a possible SEATO initiative.

Just days before the three princes agreed to form a new government, CINCPAC

and his British counterpart discussed the dispatch of SEATO forces into Laos

to secure key points along the Mekong River, thus freeing Phoumi's forces to

attempt to regain areas lost since early May. CINCPAC proposed rules of engagement to the British for a force of approximately 13,200 troops that would take

counterguerrilla action as necessary to protect lines of communication and,

barring broad-scale Chinese or North Vietnamese intervention, could resist

attacks,?l

Despite the bold plans for action, conversations in Honolulu, Washington,

and London had little result. While the military discussed their plans in Honolulu, they realized that such plans would seriously disturb those SEATO members

not participating in the conversations. Phoumi, by contrast, confronted a more

realistic situation-the strong sense of superiority displayed by Souphanouvong

at the meeting of the princes and how closely he seemed to work with Souvanna.

For this Phoumi blamed the ambiguities and uncertainties in the U.S. position

and asserted that without strong U.S. pressure a communist takeover would

ensue; Souvanna's power he considered fictional, resting wholly on his half-brother's Pathet Lao forces. Phoumi wanted a guarantee of U.S. military involvement

if negotiations broke down.72

From Vientiane, Ambassador Winthrop G. Brown recommended on 28 June

against meeting Phoumi's demands. Whatever the risks of going along with

Souvanna, the risks of backing a failed Phoumi were considerably higher. Phoumi's

belief that he could establish a military equilibrium without introducing foreign
248 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

forces had little credibility. Brown believed that intervention would require preparing the nation "to fight at least a Korean type and perhaps a larger war."73

One DoD representative in Geneva, however, George Carroll, supported

Phoumi's argument. He agreed that "almost the entire grocery store was given

away" at Zurich. The communists used the deliberations of the three princes as

an opening wedge to fashion a communist-dominated coalition government.

Without a U.S. guarantee of the sort Phoumi wanted, the royal government had

to give in and accept the three-chair concept in Geneva. Boun Oum was then

only one ofthree equal claimants for legitimacy.74

Phoumi took his case on 29 June to Washington, where he met separately

with the JCS, McNamara, Rusk, and the president. They encouraged him to

believe that even without military intervention the United States remained a firm

bulwark of the legitimate royal government. Meanwhile, on 26 June in Paris,

Harriman sought to impress on Souvanna the importance ofhaving a strong ICC

in place to uphold the integrity of the cease-fire. With this change, the United

States could then provide ample economic assistance as an inducement to form

an effective coalition government. The ambassador-at-large pursued a two-track

diplomacy designed to push Phoumi into a reformed and genuinely neutralist

Laos under Souvanna's leadership.75

Nitze at ISA also favored this approach. Mter listening to Phoumi's expectations of military successes by the end of July, Nitze still doubted his ability to

produce any satisfactory results. He advised McNamara to pursue a coalition

government that might have a reasonable prospect of maintaining its independence. A reformed Souvanna was the key. Nitze also made clear that firmness in

support of Laos should not be linked to direct u.s. military intervention.76

There was some inconsistency in the U.s. approach to both Phoumi and

Souvanna, but the former posed the immediate problem. Phoumi had managed

to manipulate the U.s. military in the past and may have believed that he could

do so again. Although he received equivocating responses to questions about U.s.

military support, Phoumi no doubt left Washington hopeful that he had been

successful in winning such support.77

In the summer of 1961 military support seemed to consist ofreviving SEATO

plans for major counterinsurgency activity for defense of the Mekong River cities

and particularly for increased military assistance for the Meo (Hmong) tribesmen,

willing and committed members ofthe self-defense corps ofthe Laotian army. The

Hmong would receive "arms, ammunition, and other support" for 7,700 tribesmen,

enabling them to playa larger role in the conflict.78 With all this activity, however,

the one element that could have turned the tide in Laos never was approved: the

direct deployment of SEATO and u.s. troops. Everything else was peripheral or

marginal.

In one of his many memoranda to the president during this period, Rostow

on 26 June saw a trap of Soviet devising. In Laos, as in other pans of the world,
Laos 249

Khrushchev had worked out a strategy that followed a regular pattern: "He

exerts pressure at some point on our side of the line; by such pressure he creates

a situation in which we can only reply at the risk of starting a nuclear war or

escalating in that direction; faced with this prospect, we look for compromise; he

backs down a little; and a compromise is struck which, on balance, moves his line

forward, and shifts us back."79

Defense officials subscribed to much of Rostow's thesis. If Soviet activities

were not quite as sinister as he perceived, they at least played a significant part

in the destabilization of Laos. In his lengthy analysis of U.S. policy on Laos,

ISA's Carroll blamed the U.S. plight on the lack of continuity in policy, lack of a

clear-cur goal, and inadequate intelligence information. By the time the Kennedy

administration recognized the paramount importance of military aid, it came

too little and too late compared with the magnitude of help given to the Pathet

Lao by the communists. In brief, Carroll attribured much of the failure of U.S.

strategy and taerics to idealistic and unrealistic attitudes of the State Department

elite. He had a sense that the administration could not make up its mind whether

or not Laos was vital to the defense of Thailand and South Vietnam and consequently could not make up its mind abour the kind of force needed to save that

part ofLaos crucial to the defense ofthe region. 8o

The desultory negotiations for a viable coalition government did little to

change 000 judgments. Communist cease-fire violations did not slacken. Supplies

poured into South Vietnam via Laos along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. North Vietnam, bolstered as before by Soviet equipment, infiltrated its own troops into and

through Laos. In June 1961 McNamara informed the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee in executive session that he had evidence that 2,860 North Vietnamese

armed agents had infiltrated into South Vietnam by way of Laos over the previous

four months and that some 12,000 were active in South Vietnam.81

Despite these and other signs of a deteriorating situation the official U.S.

policy remained the same: rely heavily on diplomatic moves and rally behind

Souvanna on the assumption that he could establish a neutralist government. In

July and August numerous tripartite (American, British, and French) meetings

considered how best to obtain a genuine cease-fire, a viable ICC, a truly neutral

Laotian government, and finally, Soviet agreement so that the Geneva Conference

could proceed with some degree of confidence and progress.

At the State Department's behest, George F. Kennan, the U.S. ambassador

to Yugoslavia, succeeded early in September in opening a special channel of

communication between Kennedy and Khrushchev on Berlin and Laos through

the Soviet ambassador in Belgrade. Kennan reported that "the Soviets expected

the channel to be ... a strictly bilateral communication involving no obligation

of consultation or information with either side's allies." In response Rusk pressed

for an agreement on the removal of all foreign forces from Laos, and he subsequently received from Kennan word that the Soviet ambassador understood that
250 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

the Soviet Union considered "Chinese and Viet Minh armed personnel as foreign

troops to be removed."82

Earlier, on 10 August, JCS chairman Lemnitzer briefed Kennedy and top

advisers, including Secretary McNamara and General Taylor, on three different

plans under consideration. Two of these involved the use of SEATO forces in

Laos. A third plan, still being formulated, had the objective of driving the opposition out ofsouthern Laos by employing the combined armies ofThailand, South

Vietnam, and Laos, supported by U.S. forces. This plan enjoyed favor since it

was believed impossible to save South Vietnam without first securing southern

Laos.83

Still other proposals received attention at the top. The "Johnson Plan," after

Deputy Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson, called for two parallel courses

of action: first, a diplomatic attempt to move Geneva negotiations forward to a

successful conclusion, and second, military preparations should these negotiations

fail. The diplomatic effort would press for a Souvanna neutralist government.

Military preparations would include bilateral contacts with SEATO members, an

increase of American and Thai military advisers with the Royal Laotian Army,

aerial reconnaissance of northern Laos, phased introduction of indigenous troops

initially, and then SEATO troops, as required, in support of SEATO Plan 5.84

On 29 August the Johnson Plan underwent scrutiny at the White House

by Kennedy and high-level officials. The president endorsed continued pressure

for a diplomatic settlement with the objective of establishing a neutralist government. McNamara again voiced concern about the requirements of crises in both

Laos and Berlin, proposing that "we should make no commitments to undertake

military action until we had reviewed the situation in Laos in the light of world

problems at the time, especially the situation with respect to Berlin. We would

not want to tie down substantial forces in Laos if these forces were required to

deal with the Berlin situation."

Kennedy approved the military proposals in part, i.e., continued contingency

planning for intervention but no commitment for implementation; increasing

American military advisers with the Laotian army to a total of 500, with the Thai

army supplying a similar number; outfitting and supporting another 2,000 Hmong

guerrillas, bringing that force to a level of 11,000; and conducting aerial photo

reconnaissance over Pathet Lao territory twice a week with Thai or "sanitized"

aircraft.85

The Joint Chiefs, obviously frustrated and discouraged with the president's

latest decision to continue down the diplomatic path, vented their dissatisfaction to McNamara on 7 September, asserting that preoccupation with Berlin was

diverting attention from Southeast Asia, just as the response to the Berlin Blockade in 1948-49 had led to the loss of China to the communists. In their view,

matters in Laos had become so bad that the United States "must take immediate and positive action to prevent a complete communist takeover of Laos and
Laos 251

the ultimate loss of all Southeast Asia to include Indonesia." Unless diplomatic

progress was immediately forthcoming, before the end of the rainy season (late

September or early October) and the resumption of full-scale combat, a communist victory might well happen unless SEATO forces intervened.86 McNamara

did not respond to the Joint Chiefs, perhaps because he recognized that the

president's strong preference for the diplomatic approach and his reluctance to

intervene militarily reflected the painful lesson of the Cuban debacle five months

earlier.8?

Continuing to plan and push for expanded military preparation should open

resumption ofhostilities occur, on 29 September the JCS forwarded to McNamara

a proposal to restore virtually all of Laos to royal rule. This would require the use

of SEATO troops in large numbers initially, and in far greater numbers if North

Vietnamese forces intervened and if they invaded South Vietnam also. Should

hostilities expand to include a Chinese-North Vietnamese invasion of Laos, the

SEATO forces would need 15 divisions and some 278,000 men-of which 4

would be U.S. divisions, 2 from the continental reserve. 88

Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, speaking for McNamara, replied to this latest

plan on 3 October, noting his concerns over the possibility of a crisis in Laos and

Berlin at the same time, the effects elsewhere of assembling an air force for Southeast Asia and on U.S. nuclear strike capabilities, and the effect ofthe deployment

of the Seventh Fleet to Southeast Asia on the rest of the Pacific area. And he

questioned the viability of any military intervention in this area that involved

the use of forces from the continental reserve. Gilpatric concluded his evaluation

by stating that "the President's decision on the proposed plan may well hinge on

the risks of getting into a serious two-front situation." In reply, the Joint Chiefs

observed that only intervention could stem the worsening situation and the

subsequent loss of Laos, Vietnam, and the rest of Southeast Asia. Intervention

might require mobilizing additional forces and confronting two limited wars, but

"we may be faced with such a contingency" anyway. 89

The administration continued to look toward a diplomatic solution. It found

encouragement in the agreement among the three princes on 8 October to have

Souvanna as sole candidate for premier and in his willingness to try to form a

government of national unity. To further his efforts the United States, Britain,

France, and Australia agreed on a general plan for regroupment, integration, and

eventual demobilization of the Lao armed forces, with the expectation of creating

a new national army no longer based on group affiliation.9o

Both ISA and the JCS recognized that depending on Souvanna risked not

only his being a tool of the communists, it undermined the already precarious

defense of the rest of Southeast Asia. In this circumstance, Phoumi remained the

only alternative to total disaster. "He is the only driving force in Laos," observed

Brig. Gen. William H. Craig of the Joint Staff after an extensive visit to Southeast

Asia in August-September, but to make him function successfully "we must begin
252 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

to get tough with him." Craig wanted to force him to release incompetent officers, whom Phoumi apparently preferred over competent leaders, and to revamp

the training program. As a means of effecting change, Craig's team suggested the

need of a MAAG-embassy team "of the sort that we had in Greece under Van

Fleet and Peurifoy."*91

In the absence of such authority, OSD, at the request of the Joint Chiefs,

on 19 October asked State and the Agency for International Development for

an additional FY 1962 allocation of $4.5 million to fund an increase in Phoumi's regular forces from 38,487 to 46,921 and the irregular troops (auto-defense)

from 13,800 to 15,400. Particular effort would go toward expanding training for

officers and NCOs. As one ISA official observed, "Since 1954, we have attempted

to meet the recurring crises in Laos by increasing the force basis from 15,000 at

that time to 62,000 proposed by this action. It is obvious that we are not getting

results. "92

Ultimately, State and AID, which had the responsibility for financing the

Laotian troops, rejected the money request on the grounds that Phoumi was misusing funds he already had. In a memorandum to William Bundy in November,

U. Alexis Johnson accused Phoumi of integrating poorly trained irregular soldiers

into the regular combat units and arbitrarily increasing his force level well beyond

authorized strength. "Because of his past record of presenting us with faits accomplis and his present reluctance to consult with our military representative in Laos

on the organization of the FAR [royal army]' approval of your request would

constitute ... funding of these unilateral changes." ICA used much the same

language in expressing to ISA annoyance at Phoumi for obligating funds for his

own ends "in the full expectation that the U.S. will eventually pay the bill."93

Defense recognized the validity of these charges but still clung to Phoumi as

the best hope for the survival of a non-communist kingdom. The MAAG chief,

Brig. Gen. Andrew J. Boyle, asserted in late December 1961 that Phoumi, for all

his faults, occupied a stronger position than he would have had negotiations for a

new government been completed in May. He pointed out training improvements

as well as the greater aggressiveness among unit commanders.94 While many of

his observations may have been wishful thinking, the one prediction he made

came true: a future rift between the Pathet Lao and an ally, Kong Le.t

At this time, DoD seemed to stand alone in its support ofPhoumi. Harriman,

assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs since 29 November, had reached

the limits of his patience and called for punitive action to force the Laotian general

to conform to U.S. policy. Phoumi stood in the way of his efforts to test Soviet

* Lt. Gen. James Van Fleet headed the American military mission in Greece in 1947-49. John E. Peurifoy was

the assistant secretary ofstate for administration during the same years.

t Kong Le, a 28-year-old captain, led a bloodless coup that for a time seized control of Vientiane in August

1960. Thereafter, he led a faction that sided from time to time with the Pathet Lao or the Boun Oum government,
Laos 253

intentions; the fashioning of Souvanna's coalition government would mark success

or failure. When Phoumi demanded two key seats in the Souvanna government as

the price of his agreement and then proceeded, though ineffectually, to mount a

new offensive against the Pathet Lao, Harriman acted. He recommended stopping

the $4 million monthly cash payments to the Laotian government in December

1961. It was resumed the next month only when Boun Qum agreed on 10 January to meet with the other princes.95

Convinced that he still had Defense and CIA backing to carry him, much

as in 1960, Phoumi's habit of going his own way had not changed. Against U.S.

advice he reinforced Nam Tha, a small village 15 miles from the Chinese border,

despite recognition that this action would provoke both the Pathet Lao and the

Chinese. By moving 5,000 troops into the town before the end ofJanuary 1962,

he evoked memories of Dien Bien Phu. When Boun Qum rejected further meetings with the other princes, Harriman acted again. This time he held back the

money that Phoumi used to meet his troop payroll, effective February 1962.96

Phoumi's confidence about rallying his friends in Washington behind him

was not misplaced. The Joint Chiefs pressed the MAAG chief to evaluate the

effect ofsanctions on Phoumi's fortunes and the CIA made a gloomy estimate of

the consequences of halting financial and military aid to Laos. Operations could

continue for only 45 days and, even worse, "the more opportunistic" of Phoumi's

commanders, assuming the abandonment of Phoumi, might rush to an accommodation with the Pathet Lao. The president accepted this appraisal but reacted

by authorizing the secretary of defense in April to plan the withdrawal of MAAG

training teams located in forward field positions. Moreover, DoD and Phoumi

had lost congressional friends, among them Sen. Allen J. Ellender (D-La.), who

had returned from Laos in February with a damning report on the status of the

country. Ellender judged that the Eisenhower administration had made a grievous mistake when it gave military aid to one faction in what Ellender considered

a civil war. The losers had then brought in the North Vietnamese: "It was purely

and simply a controversy among the Lao."97

Despite these setbacks, Phoumi's American friends did not fail him. Supplies

and arms continued to flow into the country; the sanctions amounted to only a

part of the aid package. Boun Oum was forced back into negotiations, but only

in part because of Harriman's hard line. Phoumi himself remained the single

most important cause of his own difficulty, and once more through his failure on

the battlefield.

Ironically, the fall of Nam Tha on 6 May 1962 almost achieved Phoumi's

objective of entangling U.S. troops in Laos. This latest failure made it impossible for the administration to overlook the Pathet Lao's open breach of the

cease-fire. Thailand itself, not just the Mekong Valley, lay in jeopardy. The Joint

Chiefs in their report of the defeat to McNamara on 11 May charged that by
254 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

abandoning the incremental encroachment on RLG territories in favor of a major

confrontation, the communists had provided "conclusive evidence" of Souvanna's

inability to control the Pathet Lao and also of the futility of relying on him to

establish and lead a neutral Laos. They asked for removal of restraints on Phoumi's freedom of military action and for implementation of SEATO Plan 5 if

the communists failed to withdraw from their new positions. They neglected to

mention that Phoumi's movements in Nam Tha had precipitated the latest crisis.

McNamara's marginalia on the JCS memorandum made it clear that he regarded

Phoumi as not only inadequate and unresponsive but gravely undermined by his

successive misadventures. The secretary's comments reflected his skepticism about

the JCS recommendations. 98

Geneva Again:June-July 1962

What followed seemed in many ways a reprise of the crisis in 1961. The

White House felt compelled to publicize a military option that would combine

appropriate restraint with such military preparations as the situation required.

Still, the president hesitated to do more than dispatch a part of the Seventh Fleet

to the Gulf of Siam, as he had done in 1961, until McNamara and Lemnitzer,

then on the scene in Southeast Asia, returned to Washington. During May 5,000

U.S. troops arrived in Thailand. On 24 May the president increased pressure by

requesting contingency plans involving occupation of northwest Laos by Thai

troops and recapture of the southern panhandle by Thai, South Vietnamese,

or U.S. forces. 99 In short, what he had disallowed a year before he approved in

May 1962.

It still remained unclear how much further the United States would go. An

interdepartmental working group, composed of JCS, 050, and State representatives, on 31 May 1962 recommended occupation of the Mekong Valley. This

major objective, if achieved, would deny the north-south road system in southern

Laos to North Vietnamese supplying the Viet Cong in South Vietnam. 100

At a meeting held at the Pentagon on 2 June, McNamara vigorously

dissented from the working group's views. He deemed the plan to occupy and

control the valley with only 8,000 to 10,000 U.S. troops insufficient without

effective assistance-it would require a backup force of about 40,000 U.S. troops,

most of them in Thailand, to make it work. Lemnitzer suggested consideration

of an amphibious operation to cut across North Vietnam and seal off infiltration routes into Laos and South Vietnam. McNamara wanted a buildup of U.S.

forces done quietly and said that an action should occur "only in conjunction

with the movement of ground forces forward into the Panhandle." Subsequently,

he told the president of his reservations about contingency plans, and particularly

his fear of the possibility of rapid escalation of the conflict once embarked on.
Laos 255

On 5 June he told the JCS that he doubted the value of denying the North Vietnamese a north-south road if it had little effect on their supply routes into South

Vietnam. He perceived a considerable logistical obstacle in the way of an intervention. The u.s. military in the Southeast Asia area estimated that 2,500-2,600

tons of supplies a day would initially be needed to support combat operations,

but at best only 2,000 tons could be transported into Laos by vulnerable air, rail,

and road facilities. In further comments on the subject on 12 June, McNamara

claimed that while he and the Joint Chiefs shared the State Department's interest

in retaining the Mekong River Valley, they felt "it was unwise militarily to introduce u.S. forces for the sole purpose of occupying that valley."IOI

Control of the Mekong Valley also held a psychological dimension. With

so much of the country in communist hands, the royal government's control of

the valley assumed particular importance for State Department leaders. Should

the valley be lost, U. Alexis Johnson concluded, "the political shock effect in

Thailand and South VietNam would be severe and would cause internal political repercussions of an adverse nature, the limits of which would be difficult to

predict." Moreover, as the valley bordered on Cambodia its loss could lead to a

confrontation between Prince Sihanouk and a communist power, which in turn

would probably lead to his accommodation with communists. 102

Fortunately, as in 1961, a deus ex machina-an agreement among the three

princes to form a national government-intervened. Phoumi, sobered by his

reverses and by the rising hostility of Washington, allowed his relative, Prime

Minister Sarit Thanarat of Thailand, to move him to accept a Souvanna-led

government on 11 June 1962. On the communist side, u.S. threats of intervention, more credible than in 1%1, may have influenced the Pathet Lao. Phoumi

would have far less authority in the new government than if he had accepted

the proposal of a year earlier. Souvanna would become both prime minister and

minister of defense, with Phoumi and Souphanouvong as deputy premiers, each

with a veto over cabinet decisions. Phoumi would also serve as finance minister with control over aid funds. Souvanna's neutralists would hold seven seats,

with four apiece going to the Phoumists and the Pathet Lao. The remaining four

would be given to right-wing neutralists outside Phoumi's circle. 103

Eager to rid themselves of the Laotian problem and Phoumi burden, administration leaders applauded the new move toward a coalition government, with

Souvanna as the repository of u.S. hopes for a neutral Laos. The State Department identified economic assistance as "our chief and perhaps our only effective

instrument in helping Souvanna maintain Lao independence." But before taking

any specific steps toward reinforcing a new coalition government all parties had

to agree on the conditions for neutrality, which meant that the powers of the

ICC became the first item on the agenda of the reconvened Conference on Laos

at Geneva. Since the ICC lacked the authority to punish cease-fire violations, the
256 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

U.S. delegation feared having to withdraw MAAG support within the prescribed

75 days without assurance that the Viet Minh and the Soviets would withdraw

their military personnel. 104

A Laotian statement of neutrality presented by Souvanna on 9 July was accepted by conference members and incorporated into the Formal Declaration and

Protocol on the Neutrality of Laos on 23 July 1962. The administration found

particularly distressing a statement that the new government would not "recognise the protection of any alliance or military coalition, including SEATO." The

arrangement appeared too one-sided, particularly when the ICC checkpoints

tallied only 40 North Vietnamese withdrawing from Laos over the 75 days following the signing of the Geneva Accords. Suspicion of communist intentions,

ostensibly confirmed by this information, motivated strong opposition by Thailand and South Vietnam, but they signed on. 105

Rather than retaliate for North Vietnamese behavior, Harriman insisted on

having the military advisers withdrawn promptly and urged against any kind of

violation by the United States, "neither 'black' reconnaissance flights to confirm

whether the North Vietnamese had actually withdrawn nor cloak-and-dagger

hanky-panky." He argued, according to Roger Hilsman of the State Department,

that blame for the failure of the Geneva agreements would fall exclusively on the

communists while the United States would gain international support if U.S.

military intervention became necessary. Consequently, the MAAG in Laos was

formally dismantled between mid-August and the 7 October deadline, while U.S.

troops in Thailand left by November. The CIA's Air America* ceased dropping

arms to tribal groups in northeastern Laos although two CIA observers remained

in the mountains to monitor Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese activity. 106

Such precautions suggest a picture of less than complete U.S. compliance

with the declaration. While the MAAG disappeared, its residual functions went

to an augmented military attache office. Moreover, CINCPAC recommended

the establishment in Bangkok of a nonresident MAAG-Laos, with responsibility

for handling all aspects of providing materiel for Laos. The AID mission in Laos

would take over such functions as preparing and monitoring the defense support

budget with Air America, while DoD provided and arranged for storage of military assistance materiel. 107

The launching at last of a neutralist regime under Prince Souvanna in July

1962 did not mean that the United States had successfully thwarted North Vietnam's efforts to use Laos in its war against Diem in South Vietnam. The Ho Chi

Minh Trail remained open and North Vietnamese control of the Laotian borders

of South Vietnam continued largely unhampered. But Laos itself remained intact;

both sides recognized that it was not the place to stage a contest.

* Air America had operared in Laos since 1960 under a CIA conrracr in supporr of Mea rribesmen.
* *

Laos 257

For eight more years, until 1970, Laos maintained itself as an independent

entity, with the United States supplying critical economic aid to Souvanna, and

even on occasion-in 1963-mobilizing troops in Thailand in his support.

Souvanna, finally recognizing that the primary threat to his survival and to that

of his neutralist position came from the Pathet Lao and their North Vietnamese

patrons, gladly accepted U.S. aid. So did Kong Le, whose break with the Pathet

Lao in 1963 seemed to vindicate CIA activity. In looking back over these events,

William Colby, the CIA station chief in Saigon from 1959 to 1962, claimed that

the agency's operations in Laos proved that the commission that investigated the

Bay of Pigs disaster had wrongly condemned CIA's paramilitary functions. Some

300 to 400 CIA personnel, he asserted, supported more than 30,000 troops in

tribal areas and lost fewer than 10 men in the process. lOB

Souvanna himself had moved so far from his anti-American posture of 1961

that in December 1964 he worked out an agreement to permit U.S. planes to

attack communist installations along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. With his approval,

reconnaissance planes observing North Vietnamese movements of supplies along

the trail could get permission to use "suppressive fire." Souvanna reportedly said

that "in such a situation, if U.S. and Thai forces are engaged it would only be to

defend liberty against Communist subversion in Southeast Asia." The American

ambassador reported on 10 December that Souvanna fully supported "the US

program of pressures against North Vietnam and believes they should be carried

out with deliberate 'sangfroid'." Specifically he requested U.S. aircraft to engage

in armed reconnaissance over infiltration routes, which he recognized as meaning

that if we "see anything moving on the road, either day or night, attack it." His

only caveat was an unwillingness to make public U.S. military action in Laos in

violation of the 1962 Geneva agreements for fear of both domestic and international reactions.! 09

If the 1960s witnessed continued de facto division of Laos, at least U.S. fears

in 1961 of a collapse, with the communists occupying all of Laos, went unrealized. Although South Vietnam had little reason for satisfaction with the solution,

use by the Viet Minh of the Ho Chi Minh Trail alone could not account for

Diem's inability to contain the Viet Cong in light of their relatively limited activity in 1961 and 1962. Thailand took more satisfaction in the short-term balance.

Diplomacy seemed to have worked. Colby noted that at the end of the 1960s

the battle lines remained largely unchanged from the beginning of the decade.

Moreover, the Laotian conflict may have produced more of a victory than originally appreciated, he felt, since the 70,000 North Vietnamese troops involved in

Laos were "thereby not available to help fight the Americans in South Vietnam."

Hilsman was also ready to call the administration's ability to follow a narrow path
258 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

between full-scale military intervention and complete surtender to the communists "a victory-ofsorts." Rather than making Laos an ally in the Cold War and

perhaps requiring large-scale military intervention, the long-run interest of the

United States, he believed, lay in an accommodation with China in Southeast Asia

that would deny the area to the communists. ItO

Rostow interpreted the steady movement of North Vietnamese down the

trails through Laos, in violation of the Geneva Accords, as a "firebell in the

night." He urged the secretary of state and the president on 28 November 1962

to put pressure on the communists while the situation in both Laos and South

Vietnam remained relatively quiet. To the question of whether it was worth risking a major crisis over a continuing but limited flow of men and supplies to the

Viet Cong, he said yes. The president, having just survived the Cuban missile

crisis, judged otherwise and did not accept Rostow's advice. While sympathetic

with the president's position, and with the American propensity to act only when

the balance of power was clearly in danger, Rostow felt it a mistaken decision:

"With hindsight, ... I would judge Kennedy's failure to move promptly and

decisively to deal with the violation of the Laos Accords the greatest single error

in American policy ofthe 1960s." III

Kong Le surprisingly shared some of Rostow's sentiments. In 1964 he noted

that the United States had learned in Korea to meet force with force. "More

recently, you seem to have forgotten that lesson. No one doubts your great power,

least of all the Communists. Yet you seem unsure. Compared to your strength,

yout policies seem weak in purpose. This is what makes it difficult for us Asians

to understand you."112

Within the administration, only 000 officials appeared willing to follow the

logic of an aggressive posture in Laos. The Joint Chiefs, in particular, counseled

preparations for the highest level of escalation, including the use of nuclear weapons, as the only way to guarantee the security of Southeast Asia. They judged that

the movement of the Seventh Fleet to the Gulf of Siam in April 1961, and again

in May 1962, when the president agreed to deploy combat troops to Thailand,

forced the communists to make whatever concessions they made in those years.

But even conceding the accuracy of these conclusions-and communist

records supporting them remain unavailable a generation later-they provide no

assurance that full-scale warfare, with all the risks involved, would have achieved

security. The JCS, more divided than united, agreed on introducing U.S. troops

only on condition that the administration be willing to employ nuclear weapons,

a risk that the administration, including McNamara, contemplated but would

not take. Not only did the White House have to take into account the effect of a

major war on the U.S. position throughout the world, but the elements needed

for a successful action with conventional means appeared lacking in Laos-access

to ports, usable roads, adequate airports, and above all indigenous reliable armies.
Laos 259

If the United States did not intervene militarily in Laos it was not because

the administration believed that there could be genuine neutrality in the Cold

War, but rather because South Vietnam, with its accessible highways, harbors, and

airstrips-and apparently more solid leadership-presented a more appropriate

place for a stand against a communist takeover. Intervention in Vietnam eventually

proved more of a mistake than it would have been in Laos, iffor different reasons.

But in the Kennedy years Laos remained intact under a government increasingly

more susceptible to Western influence than to that ofthe communists.

McNamara's role in making or influencing policy on Laos in 1961-62 is not

as clear as his record in other international crises such as Cuba and Vietnam. It

is clear that he was conflicted about whether the United States should intervene

and how and to what extent. His views obviously shifted in response to the seemingly ever-changing circumstances in a near-chaotic Laos, but his more consistent

positions and instincts appear to have been to stay out and pursue other than

military measures. His reluctance to become involved was apparent; he advanced

or supported positions on intervention only as a last resort. He warned of grave

consequences and probable escalation that might involve China and the Soviet

Union. The end result of a great power confrontation over Laos could be a

nuclear conflict that would have the direst effect on all concerned. Although

more than once he spoke of the possible use of nuclear weapons in Laos, it may

be reasonably inferred from his known deeply-felt attitude toward their use that

he would not have sanctioned their employment. In this he was at one with President Kennedy.
CHAPTER XI

Vietnam: Reluctant Engagement, 1961-1963

In Indochina, Kennedy faced much the same challenge and dilemma as Eisenhower: how to avert a deeply entangling military involvement while avoiding a

negotiated settlement between competing political and ideological rivals that would

give the communists an unacceptable foothold in Southeast Asia. Even as U.S.

intervention in Laos helped to neutralize communist influence there, Vietnam soon

emerged as the graver threat to the containment of communism in Asia and, indeed, a defining battleground in the larger Cold War struggle.

With its sizable population, staunch anticommunist leadership under the Ngo

family, and accessible seacoast, South Vietnam, despite its own unsettled conditions, looked defensible in a way that Laos could not be. Neutrality never

received consideration in U.S. plans for South Vietnam. Rather, the issue from its

creation-like Laos it was a product of the Geneva Accords of 1954-always remained how to protect the new nation, an independent republic by 1955, from

the hostile and more powerful communist regime of North Vietnam.

Tempting as it would be to blame the unraveling of South Vietnam on U.S.

failure to block the supply routes along the Ho Chi Minh Trail that allowed men

and materiel from the North to infiltrate through Laos, more significant was the

gathering internal political and social unrest that diminished President Ngo Dinh

Diem's standing and effectiveness. Diem, such an attractive figure to his American patrons when he assumed power in 1955-a highly educated Catholic who

was both an authentic nationalist and a dedicated anticommunist-increasingly

resorted to authoritarian rule and clandestine means to consolidate his fragile position. Achieving control at the price of silencing dissidents and imprisoning or

executing many of his critics, the stubborn, aloof mandarin in whom U.S. leaders

had placed such high hopes had reduced South Vietnam to a police state by the

end of Eisenhower's second term, with the consequence not simply a steady loss of

popular support but the attraction of Diem's opponents to the communist cause

260
Vietnam (1961)
262 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

and the formation of the National Liberation Front (NLF) and its military arm,

the Viet Cong (Ve).

Kennedy and Counterinsurgency, January-April 1961

Though still a lesser priority than the immediate problem in Laos, that the

Diem government was in deep trouble was well established by the time Kennedy

took office. Until late in the decade American military advisers had concentrated on

preparations to counter a conventional external assault on the South from North

Vietnam. With growing domestic opposition to Diem and the rise of the Viet

Cong, the Eisenhower administration began to focus on the threat of internal

insurgency and took steps to meet the danger by developing in 1960 the Counterinsurgency Plan (CIP), which in 1961 became an important project of the Kennedy administration. In April 1960 Admiral Harry Felt, commander in chief,

Pacific, forwarded to the JCS a study on countering communist insurgency in

Laos and South Vietnam. This original plan went through a long drawn-out

evolution before it reached a final form in January 196L1

The CIP seemed ready for implementation just as the new administration

was preparing to take power. The plan postulated a two-track arrangement for

strengthening South Vietnam: (1) major political and administrative reforms in

the Diem government, including bringing dissident but non-communist elements

into the cabinet and dissolving the political apparatus of the Diem family, and

(2) increasing the military strength of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam

(ARVN) from 150,000 to 170,000 and training and equipping 32,000 of the

60,000-man Civil Guard. To make full use of the enlarged military, the increase

would be accompanied by greater delegation of authority to military commanders

in the field within a more efficient chain of command that omitted the civilian

political leaders at the provincial and locallevels.2

In January 1961 Secretary of Defense Gates sent Brig. Gen. Edward Lansdale,

his deputy assistant for special operations,* to Vietnam on a 12-day inspection

trip. Lansdale's report affirmed the conclusions of the earlier CINCPAC study. He

saw Vietnam "as a combat area of the cold war." Diem's plight he described as

critical, almost hopeless, and 1961 looked to be "a fateful year." Drastic changes

must come immediately in the shape of political reform and military assistance.

Whether or not Washington approved of Diem, he was "still the only Vietnamese

with executive ability and the required determination to be an effective President."

Even as it pressured him to make changes, the United States had to assure him of

*Lansdale had been instrumental in helping defeat a communist insurgency in the Philippines and during

earlier service in Vietnam had become a close friend of Diem. One of the main characters in Graham Greene's

1955 novel, The Quiet American, may have been based on Lansdale. He also was the model fot the fictional

Colonel Edwin B. Hillandale, whom William J. Lederet and Eugene Burdick depicted quite favorably, despite

the tide, in their 1958 novel The Ugly American.
Vietnam: Reluctant Engagement, 1961-1963 263

its backing. Regrettably, Lansdale noted, Ambassador Elbridge Durbrow had pressed Diem too hard in the past, and consequently had become almost persona non

grata.3

The recommendations for reform fit the Kennedy administration's pragmatic

approach as well as its still emerging Southeast Asia strategy. No sharp break with

the immediate past would occur. Kennedy shared with Eisenhower a conviction

that the Moscow-Peking axis had to be confronted everywhere, and that the loss

of South Vietnam would presage the loss of all Southeast Asia. Kennedy favored

greater flexibility of means to combat the enemy and gave higher priority to

counterinsurgency and to the political dimension ofthe Vietnam problem.4

The CINCPAC and Lansdale reports also found a willing audience with

their recommendations for increased military assistance. At a White House meeting on 28 January 1961 the president observed that the Lansdale report "for the

first time, gave him a sense of the danger and urgency of the problem in VietNam." At its conclusion, he authorized the proposed increase of $28.4 million to

expand the ARVN forces by 20,000, and $12.7 million to improve the Vietnam

Civil Guard, and confirmed it in writing on the 30th.s

The president seemed to consider Lansdale a possible successor to Ambassador

Durbrow. No one appeared to fit Lansdale's description of the new ambassador

better than Lansdale himself: "a person with marked leadership talents who can

make the Country Team function harmoniously and spiritually, who can influence

Asians through understanding them sympathetically, and who is alert to the power

of the Mao Tse Tung tactics now being employed to capture Vietnam and who is

dedicated to feasible and practical democratic means to defeat these Communist

tactics." If chosen ambassador he would arrive as Diem's friend. 6

Though impressed with Lansdale, Kennedy did not appoint him ambassador to South Vietnam. The general's maverick qualities posed only part of the

problem. The Defense Department did not want a military "political" man with

CIA connections as the head of the country team in South Vietnam. Lansdale's

message discomfited the Pentagon leadership? Despite the spadework for counterinsurgency and the eloquent rhetoric on its behalf, the U.S. military mindset

that had helped to build the ARVN to withstand a conventional invasion from

the North would not entertain such a radical shift in emphasis. If political

reform, land distribution, and training of the Civil Guard comprised part of a

counterinsurgency program, the military could accept them as long as they did

not interfere with the more conventional and still primary military mission.

Even more telling, Lansdale and McNamara lacked personal chemistry..When

the general returned from his tour of Vietnam, McNamara asked him for a 10-

minute briefing. Lansdale then dumped on the secretary's desk a clutter of VC

weapons-rusty knives, swords, pikes, and punji stakes. He did so not to dramatize the primitive weapons used by the enemy, but rather to demonstrate that

success rested on "ideas and ideals" rather than on technically advanced arms-
264 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

"Let's at least learn that lesson." Instead, Lansdale learned that McNamara had no

taste for his dramatic gestures and unconventional methods. As Lansdale put it, "I

didn't get along with [him] at all. We were civil to each other, but that's about it."8

The disaffection was mutual, but did not prevent McNamara from appreciating the thrust of Lansdale's argument. McNamara kept Lansdale on his staff as

an assistant under the supervision of Deputy Secretary Gilpatric and, although

Lansdale would later lament that he was never able fully to "educate" the secretary "to understand the real meaning of the war," McNamara was sufficiently

persuaded, whatever Lansdale's influence, to move ahead in February and March

with plans for implementing a counterinsurgency program. 9

The military side of the CIP/Lansdale recommendations appeared to get a

boost when Lt. Gen. Lionel C. McGarr, chief of the Military Assistance Advisory

Group (MAAG), Vietnam, dispatched encouraging reports on the progress of

counterinsurgency planning, particularly training of the Civil Guard. By March

he expressed conviction that the South Vietnam government (GVN) would

accept and implement the CIP military provisions. Moreover, Lt. Gen. Thomas

Trapnell's report* of 28 March confirmed acceptance by the South Vietnamese

of the military part of the CIP. He strongly supported McGarr's objection to the

State Department requirement that military actions be approved by the ambassador prior to implementation. He suggested to the JCS that the MAAG should

have the authority to "decide and direct military matters." The Trapnell report

implied that McGarr's difficulties in implementing his part of the counterinsurgency plan stemmed from State Department interference as much as from the

flaws in Diem's regime. lO

If Trapnell overlooked the sluggish response of the GVN to its promised reforms, Ambassador Durbrow had not. Earlier, in January, grudgingly admitting

that an unsophisticated people had little opportunity to create a democratic twoparty system in Vietnam, he deplored Diem's persistent procrastination and put

little stock in his professed willingness to take U.S. suggestions "under active

consideration." In his view, only if Diem genuinely carried out reforms could

South Vietnam diminish the VC threat. I I

The problem involved more than Diem's intransigence-it included the conflict between the American military and civilian leadership in South Vietnam over

the direction of the CIP. The State Department evidently felt that "the military

is not sufficiently anti-guerrilla-conscious," while the MAAG resented what it

considered oversimplified civilian solutions. McGarr believed that while it was

important to have a balance of forces in Vietnam, including an increase in ranger

units to combat the Viet Cong, the latter offered no "cure all." Moreover, the

American and South Vietnamese governments should not minimize the external

threat from North Vietnam. Augmentation of bigger, regiment-size units would

* Trapnell, at Secretary McNamara's direction, conducted an inspection trip of Southeast Asia, during which he

visited Vietnam on 16-17 March. For his findings on Laos, see Chapter X.
Vietnam: Reluctant Engagement, 1961-1963 265

be necessary to protect against that contingency as well as establish control over

larger areas where the VC were entrenched. In letters to the Pentagon in February and March, McGarr voiced objections to the ambassador's attempt to insert

himself in military affairs, and emphasized the need for a sustained conventional

effort that still could entail flexible elements. 12

State cited Lansdale's recommendation to use more small units, presumably

ranger companies, to deal with the VC insurgents and win back the countryside.

It suggested that North Vietnam would be deterred from invasion because an

act of naked aggression would damage communism's standing before the world

and trigger a U.S. and SEATO response that North Vietnam no doubt wished

to avoid. These considerations, in State's view, gave priority to beefing up ARVN

ranger forces and assigning to MAAG more officers with specialized knowledge

of guerrilla warfare. 13

Using arguments supplied by McGarr, Deputy Assistant Secretary (ISA) William Bundy informed State's George McGhee on 13 March that under the CIP

the ranger companies were intended to supplement, not replace, regular units.

They could perform vital services only by careful coordination with the operations of larger forces. 14 By determining for the Vietnamese the number of ranger

units and how they should be used, the State Department, in McGarr's judgment,

undermined the counterinsurgency program. The administration must understand

"that neither MAAG or the Ambassador can direct the GVN to follow our recommendations-we can only work through persuasion and advice." Withdrawing or

withholding aid from the Diem government based on its compliance with U.S.

requirements would only weaken the government's military effort. IS

The Kennedy administration attempted to straddle conflicting positions with

little success. On the one side Durbrow advised no "green light" for Diem until he

had complied with his promises of civil as well as military reform. On the other

Defense held that excessive pressure on the GVN would prove counterproductive.

This standoff between the embassy and the MAAG invited McNamara's attention

and possible intervention. 16 As it turned out, the impasse got at least temporarily resolved when Frederick Nolting, the newly-designated ambassador to South

Vietnam, met with General McGarr in late April to exchange views about the

procedural aspects of their relationship in Saigon. They agreed that in the future

they would discuss significant differences on military matters. If unable to reach

a joint decision, McGarr could take his case directly to CINCPAC, and the

ambassador, if he considered it necessary, would comment on the MAAG views

through State channels. McGarr suggested that this arrangement relieved Secretary McNamara from having to take any action at the momentY

Still, this understanding did not go to the heart of the two basic, and related,

problems inhibiting progress in the struggle against communism in Indochina:

(1) disagreement and ambivalence among U.S. agencies on actions to take in

South Vietnam, and (2) the inability and unwillingness of the Diem regime to
266 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

reform its structure, both military and civil. Differences within and between U.S.

departments facilitated Diem's resistance to U.S. demands. Not only could he

playoff one agency against another, but he could count on occasional sympathy

for his position from one or another U.S. advisory group whenever the White

House pressed him too hard.

Among the agencies concerned with Vietnam, the CIA was a key player, and

it, too, was affiicted with uncertainty and ambivalence. CIA Director Allen Dulles

claimed that while his agency had sought to convince Diem to carry out operations against North Vietnam, the South Vietnamese leader consistently diverted

CIA-trained units intended for action in the North to cope with VC provocations

in the South. But despite Dulles's professions of interest in a campaign against

North Vietnam, his enthusiasm was tempered by the reality that the dissident

North Vietnamese who might be recruited for sabotage came from areas too far

removed from worthwhile geographic targets. Like Diem, he would concentrate

agency efforts on the war in the South. IS

Lemnitzer's 29 March response to McNamara's queries on increased use of

helicopter and special warfare units underscored the complicated circumstances

and fractured coordination. The ]CS chairman relayed McGarr's judgment that

the helicopters currently in place comprised all that the Vietnamese could utilize.

As for special warfare units, Lemnitzer noted that the MAAG trained the regular

Vietnamese forces in counterguerrilla operations, the International Cooperation

Administration trained the Vietnamese Civil Guard and police, and the CIA

provided training in guerrilla warfare. Although the chairman felt that "during

the past year ... great progress has been made both in the simplification of U.S.

responsibilities and in the Vietnamese organization," his response pointed up the

difficulty of achieving a coordinated military effort where no one element in the

U.S. establishment exercised control and the South Vietnamese ministries themselves lacked integration. 19

The Gilpatric and Staley Reports

The differences between the CIA and the ]CS, between the CIA and 000,

or between the MAAG and the ICA, might not have had serious consequences if

the counterinsurgency campaign had shown genuine progress. Despite optimistic predictions and reports from American military observers, excluding Lansdale,

the situation in South Vietnam grew worse. The plight of the Diem regime and

the failure ofmilitary action against the Viet Cong pushed the White House, and

particularly McNamara, to inquire further into the progress of U.S. aid to Diem.

One mission followed another in the Kennedy administration.

Secretary of State Rusk, regarding South Vietnam as chiefly a military rather

than a political issue, initially assumed a passive role, in effect accepting the

primacy of military judgment. Consequently, the president took the initiative
Vietnam: Reluctant Engagement, 1961-1963 267

on 20 April to establish a new task force on Vietnam under Deputy Secretary

of Defense Gilpatric, with members from the White House, State, CIA, and

USIA.20 McNamara told Gilpatric that the president wanted an appraisal of the

prospects for communist domination of the peninsula and of proposed measures

to prevent it from happening. Characteristically, McNamara wanted a plan submitted within a week's time. 21

Gilpatric designated Lansdale as his chief operations officer. Representatives

from DoD, State, JCS, and the CIA met with Gilpatric on 24 April to hear

McGarr, visiting from Saigon, identifY immediate areas of u.s. concern. It was

agreed to prepare a draft plan for the president's consideration.22

This was a tall order given the administration's already full plate in late April,

what with a review launched that same week of the Bay of Pigs debacle and the

continuing preoccupation with Laos. Gilpatric, reflecting on the task force a

generation later, spoke ofthe genuine surprise in Washington over the troubles in

South Vietnam and bemoaned "the rise in tensions, the riots, and all the internal

problems that came upon us so quickly there in the early part of '61, because

President Eisenhower and his advisers had not stressed that area as being as problem-prone as it turned out to be."23

The task force provided an opportunity for McGarr to elaborate his thoughts.

With 58 percent of the country "under some degree of Communist control or

influence," he conceded the government was losing, not winning, that the tempo

of the insurgency was increasing, and that "this trend, if continued, can be fatal."

While acknowledging the relevance of political and social factors long-term in

wresting the countryside away from the Viet Cong, McGarr continued to argue

that a military solution had to come first and that "there is absolutely no substitute for adequate military force ...." He admitted that although "there is seldom

a 'purely military' answer to the domestic unrest in which guerrilla action flourishes," the antiguerrilla action that he advocated was military, but he insisted that

conventional organizations at the division and corps level could be adapted for

unconventional purposes as well.24

Although this view did not square with Lansdale's notion of confronting the

internal threat with more specialized unconventional means, the task force could

do little to change direction. The task force report of 1 May stressed increased

support of the CIp, as approved in January, but with no change in emphasis. The aid program would involve more of the same, but target resources for

greater effectiveness. As Gilpatric later expressed it, "The major issue that developed in the task force that I headed was to what extent we would augment the

some 1600-man presence that we had in South Vietnam. After many arguments

amongst ourselves, ... we made certain recommendations: not of combat forces,

not of uniformed military people from the combat ranks, but enlarging our military assistance personnel, sending out training groups to help the Vietnamese

organize their provincial units, the home guards, and the like."25
268 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

Previously, on 29 April, the president had approved military actions that were

incorporated in the task force report, leaving political and economic aspects for

later consideration.26 Consensus remained elusive. The State Department, now

concerned abour its role, felt that Defense had too large a presence in the plans,

and proposed that State officials take the lead. The end result saw the establishment of a new setup under State leadership in which Lansdale was merely the DoD

representative.27

Lansdale, no longer the group's operational head, reacted indignantly, urging

McNamara and Gilpatric to stay our ofthe new arrangement. "Having a Defense officer, myself or someone else, placed in a position of only partial influence and of

no decision permissibility would be only to provide State with a scapegoat to share

the blame when we have a flop." The 6 May final version of the task force report

represented the State Department's position. 28 Latet observers judged that Lansdale's impetuosity, and his apparently unqualified support of Diem, had damaged

the initially favorable impression he had made on the White House with his ideas

about guerrilla warfare. By this time the president had become as wary of precipitating military action in Vietnam as in Laos.

The Gilpatric task force proposals, approved in part on 29 April and 11 May,

produced significant bur still incremental changes in U.S. policy. The president

aurhorized additional personnel for the MAAG and asked for a study on "the

size and composition of fotces which would be desirable in the case of a possible commitment of U.S. forces to Vietnam." In the meantime he confirmed the

immediate deployment of 52 Special Forces troops to Vietnam, to be followed

by another 350, to accelerate the training of their Vietnamese counterparts. This

would involve assignment to remote areas to work with ethnic tribal groups

and to accompany them into actual combat operations, although the mission

was discreetly termed "combat support." As for the problem of coordination of

efforts, a presidential directive to all chiefs ofmission on 27 May formally charged

them with the oversight and coordination of all the activities of the United States

government. Bur while Ambassador Nolting's authority thus encompassed the

MMG, the directive specified that "it does not, however, include United States

military forces operating in the field where such forces are under the command

of a United States area military commander. The line of authority to these forces

runs from me, to the Secretary of Defense, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff ... and to

the area commander in the field. "29

To improve morale in South Vietnam, Nolting received instructions to begin

discussions with Diem on the possibility of arranging a defensive alliance with

the United States and formally rejecting the Geneva Accords. The new round

of Geneva talks on Laos, however, raised doubts about the steadfastness of U.S.

support both in Sourh Vietnam and Laos.30 The crisis of confidence in the Diem

government required some dramatic action. Kennedy sent Vice President Johnson

on a tour of Southeast Asia in May, chiefly to underscore in Saigon the continuing
Vietnam: Reluctant Engagement, 1961-1963 269

U.S. commitment to South Vietnam. The visit followed on the heels of a letter

from the president to Diem on 8 May that reiterated support for a collaborative

effort against communist aggression and suggested that the United States would

consider the GVN request for a troop strength increase. Johnson left an impression with Diem that, if he would outline his needs, Washington would meet

them. The vice president believed that Vietnam would fall if Diem's position were

not bolstered. As the "Winston Churchill of Asia" only Diem, he thought, could

check communist expansionism in the region}l

Johnson's visit seemed to promise Diem more than the president had intended. New aid would have to await the examination of South Vietnam's economy

by a panel of economists headed by Eugene Staley of the Stanford Research Institute. The panel met with Vietnamese officials in Saigon on 23 June to discuss

how South Vietnam would finance the costs of expanding both its armed forces

and its economic and social programs. Reformation of the country's tax structure

was judged vital, and this meant major changes in distributing the burden of the

war. The landowning mandarins would have to share the economic load as well

as political power to defeat the Viet Cong, helping in the goal to deliver agricultural and social services to rural areas. 32 The Staley report concluded that no

military successes could have lasting significance unless accompanied by major

societal changes, but then compromised its own advice by recommending large

military increases before the proposed reforms could possibly be instituted. Still,

William Bundy later characterized the Staley report of 14 July as "a courageous

and thoughtful attempt to look to the long term and to put economic measures

for the people alongside military action, in more or less equal priorities." Bundy

would also recognize that no matter how astute the recommendation, no regime

in a developing country, in Asia or elsewhere, could easily embrace a plan that

appeared to weaken its power base.33

Kennedy reviewed the Staley report and on 11 August issued National Security

Action Memorandum 65. He agreed to provide equipment and training assistance

for an increase in the Vietnamese military to 200,000 if a review before reaching

the 170,000 level showed that the larger number could be met. There was no decision to deploy American troops for direct combat use.34

Throughout the process of deepening U.S. involvement in South Vietnam

in 1961 the president avoided hard and fast commitment, absent indication of

Diem's willingness and ability to carry through his promised reforms. At the same

time, he undoubtedly realized that to abandon Diem would open the administration to criticism from political opposition at home, especially after the failure at

the Bay of Pigs and the appearance of appeasement in Laos. Both political and

military realities constrained the president's ability to pull out of South Vietnam

even if the regime refused to comply with U.S. requirements.

The events of the summer afforded the administration little satisfaction.

As 1961 wore on Berlin diverted attention for the moment from Southeast
270 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

Asia. But South Vietnam could not be ignored for long. The crisis over Berlin,

though more intense, abated after the confrontation at Checkpoint Charlie and

the callup of U.S. reserves.* Developments in Laos, although still unsettled, at

least offered some promise of a neutral government. South Vietnam's situation,

on the other hand, worsened in the fall. A sense of impending destruction of the

Diem regime in September 1961 derived not from new threats from the North

but from spectacular guerrilla gains in the South. When the Viet Cong overran a

provincial capital 20 miles from Saigon on 18 September, publicly beheaded the

province chief, and captured large supplies of arms without interference from the

ARVN, it forced the Kennedy administration to face up to the plight of Diem,35

The Taylor-Rostow Mission

By the fall of 1961 the military strength of the Viet Cong had grown to approximately 15,000 men, a five-fold increase in two years. The government's

estimate of 1,000 VC losses per month served to underscore the enemy's success

in rounding up new recruits, whether by infiltration from the North or by attracting replacements from areas throughout South Vietnam. Moreover, VC units grew

bolder, attacking in larger numbers with more sophisticated equipment. Against

this reality, the cautiously optimistic reports from the MAAG and the embassy

appeared all the more hollow. Long overdue, the time for a high-level U.S. assessment of the problems in South Vietnam had come. Diem's appeal on 1 October

for a bilateral defense treaty along with additional aid hastened the reckoning.

The president sent his military adviser, General Maxwell Taylor, accompanied

by Walt Rostow from the NSC staff and Lansdale, to provide a firsthand report

on the threat and recommend steps to cope with it. The announcement of the

trip on 11 October immediately drew inquiries from the press corps about the

possible employment of U.S. troops, prompted by word of discussions in the

Pentagon regarding options for U.S. intervention ranging from a naval blockade

to a SEATO border patrol to seal off the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The Taylor mission

offered Kennedy a means for necessary fact-finding and to defer decision on what

could be a controversial next step.36

A day before the announcement, William Bundy noted in a memorandum to

McNamara that "the idea of sending US military units in some form was generally in the ascendant." He had expressed to McNamara his personal feeling that

"it is really now or never if we are to arrest the gains being made by the Viet Cong

.... An early and hard-hitting operation has a good chance (70% would be my

guess) ofarresting things and giving Diem a chance to do better and clean up." As

Bundy ruefully recalled years later, "the breathless character of this memorandum

speaks for itself." His advice to McNamara, however, included the estimate of a

* See Chapter VII.
Vietnam: Reluctant Engagement, 1961-1963 271

30 percent chance that "we would wind up like the French in 1954; white men

can't win this kind offight."37

Taylor received his charge from the president on 13 October, and arrived with

his party in Saigon on 18 October to begin a week-long high-profile visit to all

partS of South Vietnam. The mission intended to signal to Diem how seriously

the Kennedy administration viewed the failing struggle with the Viet Cong, and

that, as the president told Taylor on his departure, "the independence of South

Vietnam rests with the people and government ofthat country." The group found,

according to Rostow, "a vicious circle of bad military tactics and bad administrative arrangements" resulting in "a defensive, reactive military posture which was

permitting the Viet Cong to create conditions of frustration and terror, certain

to lead to a political crisis if a positive turning point was not soon achieved."

Continuing Vietnamese doubts about American commitment and a devastating flood that ravaged the Mekong Delta, the latter leaving thousands homeless,

further compounded the problem.

Taylor and his colleagues met with President Diem and the army field commander, General Duong Van Minh, in Saigon. From American advisers they

heard firsthand about Diem's isolation from his countrymen and his increasing

authoritarianism. After listening to familiar complaints about the lack of a serviceable intelligence system, the absence of a national plan, and the subordination of

military leaders to corrupt provincial chieftains, Taylor still recognized that Diem

could not be abandoned; there was no suitable replacement in sight. Taylor's group

concluded that "we should stick with Diem, hoping to effect improvement by

persuasion, by example, and by a larger advisory presence to assist his government

and armed forces."38

In all these discussions counterinsurgency seemed relegated to a lesser place.

Lansdale disagreed with Taylor's approach, particularly when he felt that Taylor

disparaged his expertise on Vietnamese matters. He alleged that Taylor sent him

afield, "noodling out the defense ofthe Laotian-South Vietnamese border."39

Taylor delivered the report, written in the mountain retreat of Baguio in the

Philippines, to Kennedy on 3 November. Years later Taylor claimed that he "had

no enthusiasm for the thought of using U.S. Army forces in ground combat in

this guerrilla war," expressing doubt that large American units could adapt to the

needs of jungle warfare. Diem apparently never raised the issue specifically with

Taylor in 1961, though he did so at a private meeting with Lansdale. However, in

his report, Taylor did recommend the "introduction of a U.S. military Task Force

without delay," a force of 8,000 initially to serve a variety of purposes-render

logistical support to flood relief and military operations, conduct combat operations necessary for self-defense and security, and provide backing for the GVN

forces if necessary. He doubted if "our program to save SVN will succeed without . "40 it.
272 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

Almost everything in the report nudged the United States into greater entanglement with the fortunes of South Vietnam. McGarr may not have won U.S.

intervention in sufficient strength to tip the balance, but Taylor recommended

sending several companies of U.S. helicopters before the end of the year. This

deployment accorded with the Kennedy prescription of providing the Diem

government "with equipment and with military units and personnel to do those

tasks which the Armed Forces of Vietnam cannot perform in time." A small part

of the U.S. force Taylor recommended would be combat troops to provide for

the defense of the others. Thus the expansion of the U.S. commitment proceeded

fitfully but inexorably. Even as the president spoke against dispatch of American

troops, he ordered an Air Force Jungle Jim squadron to South Vietnam to instruct

the ARVN in simple and adaptable techniques for guerrilla warfare. The Jungle

Jim project-code-named Farm Gate-brought u.S.-manned propeller-driven

transport and light aircraft to VC-infested areas where they engaged in what were

again characterized nominally as combat support operations.* In accepting the

thrust ofTaylor's findings and guidance, Kennedy bore his share of responsibility

for what amounted to a qualitative change in the U.S. stake in Indochina.41

It may be that in the absence of a blanket commitment and definitive policy

restatement the actions issuing from the Taylor mission marked no break with the

past. Yet the report recommended and set in motion a program of U.S. controls

of GVN military operations that went beyond advice and training. The United

States should support, in Taylor's words, "a limited partnership" in the war, but

"limited" belied a more intricate relationship and the partnership envisioned by

Taylor made direct intervention more likely. Taylor noted that "ifthe first contingent is not enough to accomplish the necessary results, it will be difficult to resist

the pressure to reinforce. If the ultimate result sought is the closing of the frontiers and the clean-up of the insurgents within SVN, there is no limit to our

possible commitment (unless we attack the source in Hanoi)."42

The president continued to resist the broad application of the Taylor report

recommendations, exercising caution over too precipitate action that might turn

the Vietnam struggle into an American war that he neither sought nor intended.

By comparison, DoD expressed impatience, believing that the Taylor recommendations did not go far enough. In a strongly worded memorandum to the

president on 8 November, McNamara, speaking also for the JCS, judged that

a force of 8,000 or so troops in "a flood relief context will be of no great help

to Diem." Such halfway measures would not have a decisive impact; rather they

would enmesh Americans in an inconclusive struggle. The better alternative would

be the dispatch ofsubstantial U.S. forces, along with a willingness to bring the war

to North Vietnam. Conceivably this action might trigger Chinese intervention,

*See p. 39. McNamara and the Joint Chiefs would finesse the question of whether the squadron's activities

constituted a combat role by decreeing that Farm Gate could undertake combat flights so long as a Vietnamese

military person was on board for training purposes (FutreJl, The Advisory Years, 80-83).
Vietnam: Reluctant Engagement, 1961-1963 273

a possible danger that would have to be carefully weighed. Some six divisions,

McNamara said, 205,000 men, would suffice, without diverting resources from

Berlin. The defense secretary and the ]CS agreed on no commitment of forces

for other than a massive effort to prevent "the fall of South Vietnam to Communism."43

Three days later Rusk and McNamara sent the president a comprehensive

program for South Vietnam that expanded upon the latter's memorandum and

included the introduction of the Taylor-recommended support troops "as speedilyas possible." They recognized the seriousness of what they were proposing, that

deployment of large combat units would cause sharp domestic and international

reaction.44

At aWhite House meeting the same day, 11 November, Kennedy raised a number of questions, without reaching any decisions, about the desirability and practicality of the Rusk-McNamara proposals. In a followup NSC meeting on 15

November the president considered the prospect of Chinese and/or Soviet intervention. After expressing concern about enlisting the support of allies, he decided

not to take action on the proposals.45

In spite of his skepticism, a week later Kennedy approved the resulting NSAM

111 that called for the United States to pursue "a sharply increased joint effort

to avoid a further deterioration in the situation in South Viet-Nam." In return

for greatly increased U.S. military assistance, South Vietnam was to undertake

military and governmental reform to achieve more effective prosecution of the

war.46 Still, by rejecting the more far-reaching aspects of the DoD-State program

for direct intervention-the president stipulated that no U.S. troops would go to

South Vietnam to enter combat-Kennedy could portray his own position as a

prudent middle course. Prophetically, NSAM 111 was titled "First Phase of VietNam Program."

The White House may have felt relief at emerging from deliberations on the

Taylor report with a firm but moderate course of action. At the same time there

appeared only a modicum of recognition in the administration that it had

traversed a key crossroads on the path to escalation of U.S. involvement. Nor

was there appreciation that the evolving concept of "limited partnership" engendered as much resentment on the part of the Vietnamese as it did anxiety among

the Americans. The collaboration presumed U.S. superiority and a managing of

Vietnamese affairs that was both patronizing and intrusive.47 Diem had no objection to Americans managing operations of their own uniformed personnel, or

in principle to the equipping and training of the Civil Guard and Self Defense

Corps to relieve regular GVN troops of static missions, and certainly not to the

increased economic aid for flood relief and rehabilitation of the stricken areas

of the Delta. But the terms of the NSAM document included specific functions of

advisers in every corner of the South Vietnam government. The key demand on
274 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

the GVN called for "prompt and appropriate legislative and administrative action

to put the nation on a wartime footing to mobilize its entire resources," including an "overhaul of the military establishment." It is hardly surprising that these

instructions, entailing blatant interference in the internal affairs of the junior

partner, aroused resistance.48

Among the Taylor report's recommendations the matter of the organization

and size of MAAG Vietnam occasioned months of discussion and controversy

between the many players involved-the White House, OSD, JCS, State, the

U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), Ambassador Nolting, and the MAAG. The

chief issue concerned the establishment of a new U.S. military command in

South Vietnam-U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV)-under

a four-star general and the relationship of the command to PACOM, Washington, and especially Nolting, who as chief of mission fought fiercely to retain his

authority over the military in the country.49

After months of complicated maneuvering, resolution came in February 1962

with the establishment of MACV by CINCPAC and subsequent agreement between DoD, State, and Nolting that the new MACV commander, General Paul

D. Harkins, and the ambassador would, in effect, share responsibility. The latter

remained the "senior U.S. representative."50

McNamara's Initiatives, December 1961-July 1962

The lack of response and reform from the South Vietnamese government and

its military to the requirements for change stated in NSAM III led McNamara

to conclude that he needed "continuous personal contact" to review progress and

see what could be done within the framework of existing policy. This judgment

resulted in a meeting of Defense officials from Vietnam, PACOM, and Washington in Honolulu on 16 December 1961. The secretary, as always, identified

specific tasks to achieve specific objectives, and he expected quick responses.

Money, he said, would pose no problem.51 He continued to criticize South

Vietnam's president for failing to live up to his end of the "limited partnership."

Training the Civil Guard and the Self Defense Corps moved too slowly, facilities

were too limited, and the 5,OOO-strong ranger force remained mired in rearguard

police work. The Honolulu meeting broke up with the uneasy recognition that

GVN unwillingness or inability to meet its commitments would place limits on

U.S. freedom of action. 52

Despite the authority he brought to any situation important to him, McNamara in this instance struggled to carry out the innovative ideas that attracted

him. Part of the difficulty stemmed from the still-persisting divided command

between ambassador and general in South Vietnam, which stood to impact the

conduct ofAmerican operations. William Bundy accepted it as a fact oflife, while
Vietnam: Reluctant Engagement, 1961-1963 275

Robert W Komer of the NSC staff saw in the absence of a single authority the

root of U.S. frustration in Southeast Asia. He cited Robert Thompson's* wry

commentary that Americans were averse to the appointment of proconsuls even

when the situation required it.53

To help cope with divided and competing authority in Washington there

emerged interagency coordinating committees with overlapping responsibilities,

initially the Special Group (Counterinsurgency), established on 18 January 1962.

It had a mission to ensure recognition throughout the government that subversive

insurgency was "a major form of politico-military conflict equal in importance

to conventional warfare," an understanding to be reflected in all U.S. programs,

but particularly in South Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand. 54 Less than six months

later the secretary of state appointed Averell Harriman to take charge of a new

interdepartmental task force for all Southeast Asia. McNamara at first offered his

full support, but then qualified it by suggesting that some of its mission could

duplicate that of the existing Task Force/Vietnam, which, he feared, would be

overshadowed by the new agency.55

On such matters as organization of DoD or reordering of the budget process

or even the conceptualization of strategic doctrines, McNamara did not hesitate

to impose his judgment on the ]CS. But, understandably perhaps, he showed

the chiefs greater deference when it came to choosing military commanders for

the field. While he wanted immediate action to implement the Taylor report, he

turned to uniformed colleagues for selection of the new commander of MACV.

Accepting the advice of the ]CS, to replace McGarr he picked the 57-year-old

General Harkins, a protege ofTaylor. McNamara described him to the president

as "an imaginative officer, fully qualified to fill what I consider to be the most

difficult job in the U.S. Army."56

In selecting Harkins McNamara chose a traditional leader rather than one

sympathetic to the new ideas of counterinsurgent warfare. His choice bothered

both McGeorge Bundy and Roger Hilsman. Bundy observed that the secretary "does not seem to have a personal judgment of General Harkins." It would

be, he felt, "little more than a lucky accident" if an officer coming off SEATO

duty would be the right man for the Vietnam post. Hilsman thought that in

Harkins McNamara had chosen a veteran from a conventional mold and that

matters of political warfare, guerrilla operations, and the vitally important social

and economic aspects of the conflict lay outside his experience. Diem's secretary

questioned the need for a new command and expressed Vietnamese suspicions

that the United States would exploit the change to tighten its control over the

country.57 McNamara saw the arrival of a military leader empowered with more

authority than his predecessor as a step in the right direction.

* See below, p. 277.
276 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

Although McNamara deferred to the military in choosing a MACV commander, he did not hesitate to make decisions about policy initiatives such as the

defoliation program. Despite his doubts about this form of chemical warfare, it

appealed to him as an imaginative antiguerrilla tactic that Defense could quickly

implement. The JCS participated in initiating the program; technical aspects came

under the director of defense research and engineering. McNamara cautioned the

service secretaries that the operation would proceed only after resettlement of

affected villages and provision of alternative food sources.58 On 2 February 1962

he advised the president that the first spraying had occurred on 13-16 January

for approximately 16 miles along Route No. 15. He urged extension of the test

program largely because the areas already sprayed did not include a sufficient

variety of vegetation to permit full evaluation of the use of defoliation techniques

before proceeding with a large-scale program. Even as he recognized that the defoliation program by itself would not win a war, he found its possibilities intriguing,

particularly its susceptibility to measurement. The president agreed. 59

As with so much else in the U.S. experience in South Vietnam, the defoliation

initiative began with optimism and ultimately ended in disillusion. The hopedfor benefits from increases in military aid of all kinds, particularly helicopters

and light aircraft, yielded similar unsatisfactory results. Through the summer of

1962, following the president's guidance, McNamara emphasized U.S. assistance,

not direct participation in combat, with the underlying assumption that success

would come from the benefits of U.S. training and advice. McNamara asked for

rapid responses to the decisions made at Honolulu in December 1961, specifically

how many U.S. advisers would be needed at the GVN battalion-and-above level

and the schedule to have them in place. The secretary also wanted development of

an operations plan whereby the GVN forces would clear a particular province and

then have the Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps take over to hold it. In all, he

wanted progress reports on some 15 individual actions.6o

Periodic status reports in 1962 under the rubric "Operation Beef-Up" rarely

failed to mention the impressive number of helicopters and light aircraft sent to

South Vietnam. Assistance included support of coastal control and surveillance

as well. The combined U.S.-Vietnamese Maritime Surveillance Patrol had begun

functioning as early as 22 December 1961, and by 9 January 1962 could report

successful interdiction of junks carrying weapons and materiel from North Vietnam to the Viet Cong.61 Such activities could go on, as Nitze advised Sen. Henry

Dworshak (R-Idaho), with U.S. personnel restricted to so-called advisory and

training roles,62 even though the administration had to exceed the level of force

permitted under the Geneva Accords to achieve its aims.

Despite the continuing efforts to emphasize the limited nature of U.S. combat

participation, McNamara pressed for substantial but temporary increases in American military personnel to help with the new tasks imposed on American advisers.

The new partnership recommended by Taylor and translated into programs at
Vietnam: Reluctant Engagement, 1961-1963 277

the December 1961 and subsequent Honolulu meetings brought about major

increases in the U.S. military presence.63 At the sixth Honolulu meeting on 23

July 1962 the secretary stated as his goal a South Vietnamese military that could

dispense with American support within three years. Even as the buildup occurred,

phased reduction became the key to McNamara's thinking about the future U.S.

position in South Vietnam. America's contribution could gradually diminish as

the GVN's correspondingly rose. Harkins's belief that a year after ARVN forces

became fully operational they could eliminate the VC may have been too optimistic, but McNamara still looked to the end of 1965 as a reasonable date. Conscious

of demands elsewhere as well as of budgetary constraints, the secretary looked

forward to early reduction of military assistance programs in South Vietnam that

had increased from $101.4 million for FY 1961 to $177 million for FY 1962 and

$179.4 million for FY 1963.64 Cost consciousness, while not the driving force

behind the 000 approach to South Vietnam, always remained a factor, despite

McNamara's earlier observation that money "would pose no problem."

The Strategic Hamlet Program

Despite all the attention being given to advisers and weaponry in 1962, civic

action seemed to hold out the most promise for success in that year. The Viet Cong

controlled much ofthe countryside through a combination ofterror and promises

of economic reform. Consequently, civic action required protection for the Vietnamese peasant and the implementation of promised government reforms.

These two elements came together in the "strategic hamlet" concept, a fortified community consisting of several hamlets combined to form a village, thus

contributing to a pacification program designed to remove the influence as well

as the presence ofViet Cong in afflicted areas. This involved relocation of populations, not itself a new practice; the French had attempted to establish secure zones

in their war with the Viet Minh. But the strategic hamlet program reflected a new

approach. It germinated in the course of Vice President Johnson's visit in May

1961, when the United States agreed to help finance the Civil Guard to free regular military units from static defense positions. The Civil Guard and Self Defense

Corps (SOC) would protect villages while U.S. specialists worked with Vietnamese counterparts in supporting village-level health and public works measures.

Conversations about developing strategic hamlets did not go beyond that

stage in the summer of 1961 as Viet Cong power waxed. They came into focus

in the fall following the coincidence of the catastrophic monsoonal flood, which

devastated 10 million acres of rice and left behind 320,000 refugees, and U.S.

pressure for reforms in the political and military organization of the country

following the Taylor visit in October. To address both his civilian and military

problems, President Diem gave attention to the recommendations of Sir Robert

Thompson, head of the British Advisory Mission in Vietnam, who had applied
278 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

the strategic hamlet program successfully against communist insurgents in

Malaya in the 1950s. The Thompson approach argued that counterinsurgency

should give priority to winning the allegiance of rural Vietnamese and depriving

the Viet Cong of the infrastructure disaffected peasants had provided-an objective more important than striking at Viet Cong strongholds and killing enemy

soldiers. After sweeps of the countryside in the past the GVN forces would withdraw, and too frequently the VC would regroup and return.65

The hamlet program, particularly as formally proposed to Diem by Thompson, caught the attention of Hilsman at State, and through him Averell Harriman.

Using Thompson's language, Hilsman envisaged "hedgehogs of strategic hamlets,

slowly spreading out like an oil blot from the sea toward the mountains and

jungle." While one lone hamlet might not have much effect in itself, a series of

them, each a compact defensible unit, could give villagers freedom to choose

between the Viet Cong and the government. They would make the right choice

only if the GVN seriously made an effort to change the peasant's lot in life, and

this meant civic action that would include agricultural loans, effective education,

and honest administrators. From Hilsman's perspective, the Defense Department

should have rallied to the concept. The main source of the enemy's power lay

not in the supply line from North Vietnam but rather in the countryside that

nourished the guerrillas voluntarily or under duress. By denying the insurgents

food and potential recruits from the villages, the GVN would force them into

submission through defeat at the hands oftroops trained in the tactics of counterinsurgency devised by the U.S. Army.66

While the Thompson plan intrigued the State Department, the military

exhibited less enthusiasm. In the first place, as McGarr had complained, the British seemed to be poaching on a U.S. preserve. Second, it would undermine the

unitary chain of command that both the embassy and the MAAG had been seeking throughout 1961; Diem's provincial chiefs, not the ARVN generals, would

supervise the paramilitary and civilian parts of the plan. Third, Thompson urged

that the Mekong Delta, a part of the country where VC influence was limited,

serve as the initial model for further experiments. Only gradually would the strategic hamlet concept be extended to more dangerous sectors. General McGarr in

late 1961 would not have placed the Delta among his priorities.67

But the MAAG chief objected particularly that the Thompson plan placed

the cart before the horse, putting political concerns above military. McGarr

wanted the political and economic phase of the plan to follow military action.

Only after clearing the area of insurgents, he maintained, could the SDC assume

authority and civic action begin. Yet the hamlet part of the plan most appealed to Diem. Sensible or not from a military perspective, its implementation

would permit the Diem government to diminish the authority of the army in the

strategic hamlets and invest it in the paramilitary units under the control of

the province leaders who owed their powers to the Ngo family.68 By rallying to
Vietnam: Reluctant Engagement, 1961-1963 279

the Thompson plan Diem could hope to reduce the power of the generals and at

the same time appear responsive to U.S. demands for new tactics in counterinsurgency.

Notwithstanding reservations from McGarr, the Thompson plan interested

McNamara, who embraced it as a workable concept promising immediate dividends. U.S. aid increased on every level on the assumption that money would

follow, provided a coherent plan existed. Stepped-up military training of the

SDC complemented the civilian programs. This took the form of establishing

SDC units for the hamlets capable ofwinning the respect of the rural population

and credible enough to relieve the ARVN of police duties.69

Statistics seemed to confirm the optimism that the strategic hamlet program

inspired, and they particularly impressed the secretary of defense. In Saigon in

May 1962, at the end of his first inspection trip to Vietnam, a two-day visit,

McNamara observed that "the fortified hamlet and strategic village concept is

very sound, that in these areas attacks have dropped off, that SDC training is

effective." While it would still take years to clear out the Viet Cong, "progress was

good." Even Lansdale, who usually denounced deviations from his own preferred

methods, defended the program against criticsJo

Good news of this kind continued into the summer and fall of 1962. As

reports flowed into the Pentagon, General Lemnitzer felt heartened by the "good

picture of the slow but steady progress in the strategic hamlet program," particularly after the GVN finally announced a national plan for the hamlets. At last it

appeared that the GVN had come around to accepting the importance of planning on a national level, something still sorely lacking when General McGarr

submitted his valedictory report to CINCPAC and McNamara in March 1962.

Until the summer of 1962, counterinsurgency planning resided in MAAG's

Geographically Phased National Level Operations Plan for Counterinsurgency

Operations. McGarr reported with some pride on the increasing integration of

political, psychological, economic, and sociological activities that accompanied

the military role in the countryside. 71

The trouble with the reports coming from the field and the expectations

they generated was that they remained just that, and they reflected as much wishful thinking as solid evidence. The GVN moved too quickly in expanding the

strategic hamlets without a well-defined national plan. By mid-November 1962

the government had designated 10,971 for development, with 3,353 reported as

completed. The ]CS admitted that this rush to build hamlets evidenced "little

planning and less coordination." Out of the more than 3,000 hamlets reported

functioning, they judged that no more than 600 met the necessary requirements for effective defense. Yet Taylor, now the ]CS chairman, could conclude

his summary without "modifYing the views expressed by General Harkins and

Ambassador Nolting regarding the long-term virtues ofthe program."72
280 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

A schizophrenic quality pervaded many American official reports on the conduct of the war. The regular status reports told of the number of new hamlets

built and Viet Cong killed at the same time that they observed that enemy attacks

had increased and that the VC appeared to be winning rather than losing the

war. One status report in June 1962 interrupted its celebration of progress with

the recognition that GVN's control of the countryside was eroding faster than it

was being secured. The Viet Cong still enjoyed an "aura of invincibility."73 Even

in the face of swelling numbers of enemy casualties, Hilsman would ask, ''And

how do you know if you're winning?" American journalists on the scene repeatedly asked the same question. The answer, too often for the comfort of the U.S.

mission in Saigon, held that Diem was losing, not winning. To counter these

impressionistic conclusions, Walt Rostow, now in the State Department, recommended the use of sampling techniques in representative areas to "obtain some

measure of the way the tide is moving," but getting access to hamlets under even

partial VC control would prove difficult. Moreover, if the central government

learned about certain hamlets being selected for regular observation, it might act

to influence the results of the survey,74

Whether or not an accurate assessment could come from statistical techniques

remained arguable. No one could dispute, however, that the prospects of defeating communist insurgency in 1962, after a glimmer of hope, grew dimmer. The

Diem regime had no intention of allowing the hamlets to develop along democratic lines, or of enacting the genuine political and economic reforms demanded

by its U.S. benefactor. For Diem's brother and chief adviser Nhu, "a Rasputinlike nemesis" appointed to head the program, the strategic hamlets offered little

more than political opportunity. The more hamlets he could establish, the more

he could manipulate to serve the purposes of the Ngo family. Furthermore, the

hamlets would not come under the central command structure American advisers

deemed critical,75

If the Diem government looked to use the strategic hamlets to promote its

power against rival generals, U.S. slowness to recognize this, as well as other

miscalculations, placed some of the responsibility for failure of the program on

the Kennedy administration. While some in the administration understood that

forced evacuation alienated the villagers, they wrongly assumed that the benefits

to the populace would override short-term disaffection. Even when the regime's

intentions became clear, the administration was disinclined to oppose Diem and

Nhu openly. As evidence of the shortcomings of the effort became visible, both

Nolting and Harkins registered uneasiness about the GVN building hamlets in

areas ofVC strength,76
Vietnam: Reluctant Engagement, 1961-1963 281

Comprehensive Plan for South Vietnam, July 1962-May 1963

McNamara, on the other hand, had reason to overlook the self-serving motives

of the Ngo family in manipulating the strategic hamlet program. His persistence

lay in the high hopes he invested in the Comprehensive Plan for South Vietnam

(CPSVN) that emerged from the meeting in Honolulu in July 1962. After a year

and a half of piecemeal projects he would finally have a blueprint for victory that

would embrace all the earlier plans and give a coherence heretofore lacking. Moreover, the CPSVN would be completed at the same time as Diem's national plan.

MACV completed work on the plan and forwarded it on 19 January 1963

to CINCPAC, who endorsed it and forwarded it to the Joint Chiefs. The plan

proposed that within three years the GVN would develop a capabiliry to defend

itself against the continuing threat, thus permitting the withdrawal of u.S. military assistance. This would meet McNamara's stated objective of getting out of

Vietnam by the end of 1965.77

To move the CPSVN from the drawing board to the field would require

major adjustments in the military assistance program (MAP), particularly for FY

1964. The South Vietnam national plan would have to be integrated into the

CPSVN, adding to its already considerable expense. The MAP would include

funds for the Civilian Irregular Defense Group, Montagnard mountain tribesmen whom the United States had been supporting concurrently with the strategic

hamlet program. The additional funds became all the more urgent because the

program according to McNamara's timetable had to fit into FYs 1963-65.78

Terminating most of the U.S. role in South Vietnam at the end ofthree years

would compensate for the high costs of the comprehensive plan. Mter 1965,

with minimal help from U.S. personnel, McNamara thought the GVN ought to

complete the counterinsurgency effort. But even before the CPSVN would have

run its course, McNamara had his sights set on returning 1,000 U.S. troops by

the end of 1963. This scenario of greater cost in the present to produce fewer

costs in the future accounted in large measure for his positive reading of conflicting reports from the field. Successes weighed more heavily than setbacks. When a

military defeat did occur, Americans and Vietnamese alike refused to recognize it.

It fell to skeptical officials from the State Department and White House, such as

Hilsman and the NSC's Michael Forrestal, journalists such as David Halberstam

and Neil Sheehan, and field officers such as Lt. Col. John Paul Vann to realize

that the war was being lost and that nothing being done would likely reverse the

outcome.79

The battle of Ap Bac on 2 January 1963 dramatically illustrated the difference in outlook between the skeptics and the optimists. Throughout 1962 U.S.

advisers had hoped to lure the VC into open combat in sufficient numbers to

permit the conventional forces of the GVN to overwhelm them. At Ap Bac, the

GVN had an opportuniry to meet the VC in a battle that should have led to
282 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

the enemy's destruction. When GVN forces went after a VC radio station at the

settlement of Ap Bac, in the Mekong Delta, they stumbled upon a regular VC

battalion. The outcome was not victory, but disaster.8o

The ARVN had surrounded a force one-fourth its size and emerged with the

loss of more than 170 men killed or wounded, among the dead three American

advisers, and in the wreckage five U.S. helicopters. Vann attributed the defeat

to failures in training, intelligence, discipline, command, and courage. A unit of

350 guerrillas had taken on the forces of a modern army and prevailed. The VC

lost 18 men, with 39 wounded. Vann, devastated by the loss, left the Army and

leaked to reporters his dark view ofthe state of affairs in Vietnam. 81

Yet DoD's reaction was pointedly subdued. Vann's anger and despair found

no echo in MACV headquarters, in PACOM, or in the Pentagon. When

CINCPAC confirmed to JCS the shooting down of five helicopters, Taylor

asked for a strong statement from Harkins rebutting the charge of a crisis and

commenting not on the downed helicopters but on the fine fighting qualities of

the South Vietnamese soldiers. Harkins reported that ARVN forces "had made a

number of errors," but described them mainly "as errors of courage rather than

cowardice." Harkins and Admiral Felt downplayed the importance of the battle,

blaming the bad publicity on American journalists like Sheehan, who, reporting in the Washington Post, called the Ap Bac operation "one of the most costly

and humiliating defeats yet on the South Vietnamese army and its United States

military advisers." Care to avoid a rift with Diem and his government generally guided the U.S. policy of putting a favorable gloss on even a major military

setback.82

Such efforts to wish away what the CIA station chief in Saigon, William

Colby, later called "a stunning defeat" exacerbated tension between the press and

the embassy and, worse, blinded officials to increasingly harsh reality. Rather

than regard the incident as a warning about the condition of the GVN forces,

the Pentagon preferred to see it as an aberration. On 7 January 1963 the JCS did

send out a team, headed by Army Chief of Staff Wheeler, to assess the situation

in South Vietnam. The group's appraisal ofthe U.S. Comprehensive Plan and the

GVN National Plan later in the same month ignored the message Ap Bac might

have offered. Despite difficulties Harkins had in persuading Diem to listen more

closely to MACV advice, the Wheeler team felt that "victory is now a hopeful

prospect" and that the three-year plan to phase out U.S. support was sound. No

major changes seemed necessary.83

The administration in Washington, not well served by such upbeat estimates

and disposed itself to take a blinkered view, highlighted the positive and rationalized the negative. Thus in his State of the Union address on 14 January 1963

the president could announce that "the spearpoint of aggression has been blunted

in Viet-Nam."84 Even among the critics none urged abandoning the effort, the

prevailing sentiment being to accelerate improvements.
Vietnam: Reluctant Engagement, 1961-1963 283

Three months later the CIA presented in NIE 53-63 a more equivocal view

of conditions in South Vietnam. On the one hand, the authors believed that

enemy progress had been curtailed and that there was improvement in the situation. On the other hand, there appeared "as yet no persuasive indications that

the Communists have been grievously hurt." Given an assumption of no great

increase in outside support, it appeared "that the Viet Cong can be contained

militarily and that further progress can be made in expanding the area of government control and in creating greater security in the countryside." But the

intelligence community did not find "that it is possible at this time to project

the future course of the war with any confidence." While some signs of promise

in resolving political weaknesses showed, it remained "questionable" if military

success could be translated into long-term political stability.85

An earlier version of NIE 53-63 had displayed more clarity about the prospects for success in South Vietnam and more pessimism. CIA Director John

McCone, who reversed his earlier sober judgments and accepted the views of

"people who know Vietnam best" (Harkins, Nolting, Felt, Wheeler), dictated the

final form. A generation later former CIA official Harold P. Ford cited the revised

NIE 53-63 as an example ofthe damage distorted intelligence could do.86

On the strength of a flawed reading of the war's progress CINCPAC and

the JCS recommended early in February 1963 increases in GVN paramilitary

force levels for FY 1963-from 81,000 to 86,000 for the Civil Guard and from

80,000 to 104,000 for the Self Defense Corps. William Bundy found these

figures reasonable and recommended McNamara approve them. Similarly, when

CINCPAC asked for a helicopter company plus a maintenance support unit,

the secretary and the JCS had no difficulty in approving the request. Confidence

in the progress of the comprehensive plan continued sufficiently high to permit

the introduction of jet aircraft into the Vietnamese Air Force.87 Although funding for six jet aircraft had been included in the FY 1962 MAP budget it had

been deferred because of its seeming prohibition in the Geneva Accords. But in

February 1963 Bundy and his staff could tell the JCS that the Geneva agreement

permitted weapon replacements in Vietnam that were not allowed in Cambodia.

Admittedly a loose construction, it provided a gloss that State and 000 found

convenient.88

The Buddhist Rebellion and the Fall ofDiem

Spring 1963 presented the administration with another reality check. The

Buddhist rebellion of 8 May exposed fatal weaknesses in the GVN, but even

before this eruption it became increasingly difficult for even the optimists to

overlook the signs of failure: The Viet Cong were growing stronger, the strategic hamlet program was losing ground, and impatience with the rule of the Ngo
284 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

family was increasing rapidly. American correspondents III Saigon made this

information abundantly clear to the world at large.89

The delivery of jet aircraft to the Vietnamese became one of the casualties

of the changing atmosphere. By the end of April it did not seem worthwhile to

challenge the International Control Commission over the issue; American pilots

in F-1 01s could do a better job of photo reconnaissance than Vietnamese pilots

in T-33s, according to Hilsman, who remarked, "We don't want to rock the tippy

ICC boat more than we have to." Two months before, Bundy might have disregarded this advice, but in May both Bundy and McNamara accepted it.9o

A more serious jolt to complacency came out of a reevaluation ofthe CPSVN

itself. Almost a year after its encouraging launching, it still lacked significant

statistical information for making valid programming decisions. On 20 April

Bundy recommended McNamara withhold approval until full review of the military assistance plan for South Vietnam at the meeting in Honolulu scheduled for

6 May. Furthermore, ISA opposed the large increase proposed for the military aid

program for FY 1964. The secretary agreed to withhold a decision until he had

an opportunity to examine detailed charts on both u.s. and ARVN forces that

would let him determine the planned withdrawal ofD.S. supporting elements.91

Skepticism about the viability of his withdrawal plans bothered but did not

daunt McNamara. He felt momentarily buoyed by General Harkins's sanguine

comments at the May meeting in Honolulu about the progress of the war, a

view shared by "all elements of the Country Team." It still seemed appropriate

to anticipate the return of some U.S. units by Christmas. McNamara reminded

Hilsman of how bleak things had looked a year and a half before. Harkins's report

gave reason for renewed confidence. 92

CINCPAC inserted a sobering note with reference to the secretary's immediate goal of withdrawing 1,000 men from Vietnam, recommending withdrawal in

three or four increments and postponing the decision to implement the move.

The Joint Chiefs concurred. Although discussion of details about the impending

withdrawal continued through the summer of 1963, the political and religious

turmoil in the country froze any action. In fact, the critical need for maintenance personnel called for an increase in U.S. numbers from 16,201 at the end of

August to 16,732 by the end of October. The 1,000-man withdrawal goal seemed

increasingly shaky.93

McNamara was not without his own doubts, which he manifested in complaints about CINCPAC's fiscal projections for FYs 1965-68. He saw the fouryear $575 million for MAP as $270 million too much for the South Vietnamese

forces to absorb. The equipment provided would be too costly and too complicated for the ARVN to handle. The JCS instructed CINCPAC to rework the

proposed program.94

Between May and November 1963, when the Diem regime fell, the ARVN's

military struggle against the Viet Cong took a back seat to domestic upheaval
Vietnam: Reluctant Engagement, 1961-1963 285

within South Vietnam. Two days after the meeting in Honolulu adjourned on

6 May, a Buddhist revolt against the Ngo family broke out in the city of Hue.

The immediate cause of the uprising was indiscriminate firing on a crowd of

Buddhists seeking to fly their sect's flags in public despite a government ban

against such exhibitions. The incident, in which several were killed, energized the

many factions discontented with South Vietnam's society: Buddhists opposed to

the preferential treatment of Catholics, peasants resentful of feudal landlords, a

middle class angry at the insufficiency of reforms, and a public impatient with

corruption everywhere. While eight or nine people died at Hue, it was the selfimmolation of Buddhist monks protesting the regime of Diem and his family

that shocked the American public.95 Amid this disturbing spectacle of civil unrest

and violence, the battle against the Viet Cong seemed to recede into the background in the summer and fall of 1963.

Had the government handled the protests with restraint, followed by some

reasonable concessions, the outcome might have been different. Instead, the

brutal repression of Buddhists, callous remarks by Mme. Nhu, Diem's sister-inlaw, and the declatation of martial law in August intensified the opposition and

evoked revulsion in the United States and abroad. Diem made a few ineffectual

and transparently unenthusiastic promises to investigate the source of the trouble

initiated by his brother, but they only added to his difficulties with the American patron. The United States felt trapped between its commitment to win a

war against the communists and its identification with an increasingly unpopular

regime. Rather than making an effort to alleviate U.S. embarrassment, the Diem

government lashed out against the United States. Initially misled by Diem and

Nhu, American officials became aware that the ARVN had not carried out the

attacks on the Buddhist pagodas on 21 August-Nhu, unknown to the army,

had used his Special Forces.

Ambassador Nolting, who had gone out of his way to accommodate the

regime, saw the situation as serious, but felt that the GVN would "come through

this one slowly," a position not widely shared in Washington and contradicted

by the American press. 9G Further confrontation awaited Diem; Nolting's successor as ambassador, Henry Cabot Lodge, possessed a notoriously shorrer temper.

Appointed by the president in June during Nolting's absence on leave, Lodge

planned to take up residence in September. In the meantime, Nolting returned to

Saigon in July for one last attempt to influence Diem-too late. En route to South

Vietnam, Lodge learned that Diem had imposed martial law after Nhu's Special

Forces attacked the Buddhist pagodas in a betrayal of Nolting's understandings

with the Ngo family.97 The steady deterioration of Diem's standing exposed the

bankruptcy of the U.S. military's soft line with the GVN. The argument that

reprisals against the South Vietnamese president, a strong anricommunist, could

have negative effects upon the conduct of the war seemed less persuasive as the

year wore on.
286 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

Even MACV had lost patience. U.S. military advisers feared that Nhu's

efforts to pin the blame for the pagoda assault on the South Vietnamese army

would generate loss of public confidence in the army and further undermine the

war effort. U.S. reaction in some official circles progressed beyond mere dissociation from the Diem government to sympathy for potential coups planned by

disaffected generals. While Lodge doubted the steadfastness of the ARVN generals, let alone the coherence of their plans, he passed along the advice that only

Nhu's removal could keep Diem in office. The military leaders needed to know

how the United States would react to a coup. From a source as highly placed as

Diem's personal secretary of state, Nguyen Dinh Thuan, Lodge learned that "the

Army would turn firmly against Nhu if it knew that the U.S. would under no

circumstances support a government with the Nhus in control." If Washington

held firm, the army would respond, Lodge informed the State Department on 24

August.98

State replied promptly the same day, cabling Lodge that the "US Government cannot tolerate situation in which power lies in Nhu's hands. Diem must be

given chance to rid himself of Nhu and his coterie." If Diem would not separate

himself from his brother the administration would "face the possibility that Diem

himself cannot be preserved." The most controversial section of the cable carried

the instruction to tell "appropriate military commanders we will give them direct

support in any interim period of breakdown [of] central government mechanism."99

It is difficult to conceive of a clearer signal to coup leaders than this message

contained, and Lodge recognized it as such. The author of the provocative cable

was not the president or even the secretary of state or secretary of defense, all

out of town at the time, but evidently Assistant Secretary of State Hilsman, with

the involvement also, according to Hilsman, of State's Harriman and George Ball

and NSC staff member Michael Forrestal. 100 Both Kennedy and Rusk knew of

its contents; Gilpatric acting for McNamara, and Maj. Gen. Victor Krulak of the

Joint Staff for Taylor, had approved its dispatch. Gilpatric had judged it unnecessary to disturb the secretary's vacation. While Lodge agreed with the substance

of the message, he had some doubts about the suggestion that the United States

had "only to indicate to [the] 'Generals' that it would be happy to see Diem and/

or Nhus go, and [the] deed would be done." The situation had become complicated, and he recommended that "we should bide our time, continuing to watch

[the] situation closely."lOl

The cable went out on Saturday, 24 August. By Monday, McNamara and

Taylor had returned to Washington; along with CIA Director McCone they felt

as uncomfortable with the cable as Lodge. They seemed inclined toward giving

Diem one more chance to take action against his brother. On 29 August Rusk

instructed Lodge and Harkins to let the generals know that the United States did

not plan direct involvement of U.S. forces in an attempted coup but remained
Vietnam: Reluctant Engagement, 1961-1963 287

willing to bless any coup that had a good chance of success. For the moment,

however, information that the coup plans had been called off on 31 August

resolved Washington's ambivalence. 102

Probably more than other components ofthe administration, DoD gained relief from this development. At a White House meeting on 29 August McNamara

had said that he saw "no valid alternative to the Diem regime," even as he recognized that a coup would probably occur. Taylor urged caution in any coup plans.

But rebellious South Vietnamese generals forced the U.S. military to look more

closely at the political liability that Diem had turned into, and ultimately senior

U.S. military leaders were as willing as Ambassador Lodge to accept the overthrow

of Diem if carried out with minimal damage to the war effort.I03

If the Vietnamese generals' decision to call off a coup relieved pressure for

the moment, it also permitted differences within the Kennedy administration

to surface, as occurred in a high-level meeting at the State Department about

the Vietnam situation on 31 August with Vice President Johnson, Rusk and

McNamara, General Taylor, former Ambassador Nolting, and others present.

Rusk and McNamara spoke out against a coup, particularly one engineered by

Washington, McNamara urging the quick reestablishment of communication

between the U.S. mission and Diem. In an arresting exchange that followed, Paul

Kattenburg, deputy director of State's Southeast Asian Mfairs office and recently

returned from Vietnam, conveyed Lodge's comment to him that if the United

States continued to acquiesce in Diem's repressive regime "we will be butted out

of the country within six months to a year." Kattenburg said he had known Diem

for 10 years, that there was little prospect of him reforming, and that it would be

better "at this juncture" to disengage "honorably" before conditions further deteriorated. Rusk dismissed Kattenburg's take on the situation as overly grim and

"largely speculative," saying that "it would be far better for us to start on the firm

basis of two things-that we will not pull out of Vietnam until the war is won,

and that we will not run a coup." McNamara, according to Krulak's account

of the meeting, concurred, with Vice President Johnson getting the last word,

stating that he had "great reservations ... with respect to a coup, particularly

so because he had never really seen a genuine alternative to Diem," and "that

from both a practical and political viewpoint, it would be a disaster to pull out."

"We should stop playing cops and robbers and get back to talking straight to the

GVN," Johnson added, and "once again go about winning the war." The session

ended inconclusively, but with opponents of a coup d'etat clearly outnumbering

those who favored it. 104

While Washington wrestled with the contradiction between not aiding the

coup and wanting to change the regime, the Ngo family refused to yield to American pressure. Nhu even went on the offensive, accusing the CIA of plotting with

the Viet Cong and on one occasion suggesting eviction of Americans from South
288 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

Vietnam. French President Charles de Gaulle had characteristically added to the

confusion by proposing unification and neutralization of Indochina. !Os

From Saigon Lodge offered a clear-cut proposal to demonstrate U.S. displeasure by cutting back on aid. But before accepting Lodge's proposal the NSC in

early September wanted to know if the war could be won with Diem. Once again

decisions hung fire until another mission could supply answers. McNamara,

demanding immediate action, dispatched General Krulak the same day, 6

September, to South Vietnam to determine the potential for military victory.

Hilsman, as assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs, picked Joseph

Mendenhall of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, and former political counselor

at the embassy in Saigon, to examine the political prerequisites for success of a

post-Diem regime. McNamara had directed Krulak to leave within minutes ofthe

NSC decision but did allow the aircraft to delay long enough for Mendenhall to

join Krulak on the journey. 106

Krulak visited American advisers in the field-some 87, he claimed-and

reported they were making progress at an impressive pace and that the political crisis was only a minor impediment. Mendenhall visited major cities and

provincial towns, spoke with Vietnamese he had known in the past, and came

away with the perception that civil government had broken down in Saigon and

that a religious war berween Catholics and Buddhists was pushing the country

into chaos. The widespread anger over the brutality of the Special Forces could

escalate into a majority preference for the VC over the Ngo family's rule, said

Mendenhall. The war could not be won while the Ngos stayed in power. Given

these conflicting observations, the president asked the rwo men on their return:

"The rwo of you did visit the same country, didn't you?"107

The sharp differences berween Defense and State interpretations of events

in South Vietnam underscored the White House's dilemma. In public interviews on 2 and 9 September the president revealed a predilection for the State

position, suggesting that Mendenhall's report would carry more weight than

Krulak's. Aside from the behavior of the Ngo family toward the Buddhists, the

suspicion persisted that Nhu was dickering with the North Vietnamese to seek a

rapprochement entailing removal of the U.S. presence from South Vietnam. IDS

Yet, frustrated as he may have been with the behavior of the Nhus and with the

inability of his advisers to reach a consensus, Kennedy had few options as long

as he accepted the "domino" principle. Much as the administration disliked the

Saigon regime, it could not move itself to contemplate withdrawal. It had the

choice then ofliving with Diem or finding a replacement.

Seeking "the best possible on-the-spot appraisal of the military and paramilitary effort to defeat the Viet Cong," Kennedy asked McNamara on 21 September

to go to Vietnam for the purpose. Taylor and William Bundy accompanied the

secretary. Hilsman, pessimistic about the mission, asked "what new questions

could be put, what new officials consulted, and what a Washington delegation
Vietnam: Reluctant Engagement, 1961-1963 289

could accomplish that the Saigon mission couldn't." Domestic political considerations were uppermost in Kennedy's mind, in Hilsman's judgment, as the

president had concern about a possible backlash at home from a perceived abandonment of South Vietnam. Kennedy did ask McNamara and Taylor to take into

account in their inquiry both political and military factors. But on the long plane

ride to Saigon the secretary noted pointedly that his was a military, not a political

mission. If it had been political, Rusk and Harriman would have been present. I09

The mission, in retrospect, was as important a milestone for U.S. policy in

South Vietnam as the earlier Taylor mission. Intentionally or not, it set in motion

the overthrow of the Diem regime little more than a month later. McNamara

and Taylor quickly saw the hopelessness of the situation, stating that they had

little confidence in the regime changing its ways: "Indeed, pressures may increase

their [Diem's and Nhu's] obduracy. But unless such pressures are exerted, they

are almost certain to continue past patterns of behavior." Taylor's JCS colleagues,

from their perch in the Pentagon, had other views. Whatever the differences

among the Joint Chiefs, they united in their opposition to the removal of Diem.

In their judgment no other leader could take his place. fu late as 30 October,

General Harkins in Saigon also did not want to get rid of Diem. llo

Despite the reservations, their firsthand experience in South Vietnam disposed

McNamara and Taylor to change course. They stood ready to accept Lodge's harsh

measures, such as suspending certain loans and terminating financial backing of

the Special Forces. These steps would let the Diem government know how seriously the United States regarded political repression in Saigon without giving the

matter so high a profile it would have sealed Diem's fate. Moreover, they felt that

"a program of limited pressures ... will not have large material effects on the

GVN or the war effort, at least for 2-4 months." Couching a stern message in

diplomatic language gave Diem one more chance to reshape his government.

At the same time, on 2 October, the White House announced that McNamara and Taylor had concluded "that by the end ofthis year, the U.S. program for

training Vietnamese should have progressed to the point where 1,000 U.S. military personnel assigned to South Viet Nam can be withdrawn." But McNamara's

confidence in his own timetable was clearly eroding. He was skeptical of Harkins's

figures that the South Vietnam government controlled 80 percent of the population after observing that its position in the Delta "is weak and precarious. Prove

me wrong." He found no answer to his questions about reduction of U.S. forces.

He could conclude only that it was necessary to continue to train the Vietnamese

to replace U.S. people and let them fight their own war. III

Lodge moved quickly to implement the McNamara-Taylor recommendations. He expected that the new policy would force Diem to come to him without

closing the door to reconciliation. To make the signal even clearer the ambassador expanded the meaning of the report to include the recall ofJohn Richardson,

Colby's successor as CIA station chief in Saigon and intimate of Diem. 112
290 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

In the meantime, the leaders of the aborted military revolt of August were

encouraged by the elliptical message from Washington. Although the McNamaraTaylor report did state that "at this time, no initiative should be taken to encourage

actively a change in government," the operative word was "actively." Its undertones differed from the message the coup leaders had heard two months before.

The embassy knew that they were going to act. It did not have precise information

on the timing. 113

Ironically, almost at the last minute, just before the coup that took the lives

of the Ngo brothers, Diem finally appeared ready to approach Lodge. He asked

Lodge to accompany him to the opening on 27 October of an atomic energy

laboratory. On 1 November, the day of the coup, Diem used the visit of Admiral

Felt to request that Lodge make arrangements to discuss exactly what the United

States wanted from his government. The next day the Ngo brothers were dead,

victims ofthe generals' rebellion. 114

The death of President Diem on 2 November 1963, followed so closely by

the assassination of President Kennedy 20 days later, ended a seminal chapter in

what was to become America's longest war. There can be little argument that the

continuing escalation of U.S. involvement that marked the Johnson years sprang

inexorably from actions taken during the Kennedy administration.

Of all the agencies in that administration, McNamara's 000 played the

largest role in the process. The u.s. ambassador headed the country team that

reported to the secretary ofstate. His military counterpart, first the MAAG Vietnam chief, and then the commanding general of MACV, functioned in a slightly

subordinate position. But Secretary Rusk's perception of the war as primarily a

military responsibility permitted McNamara quickly to fill the vacuum at the

top created by Rusk's deference to 000. Within State a strong point of view,

expressed by Harriman and Hilsman as successive assistant secretaries ofstate for

Far Eastern affairs, objected both to the GVN's conduct of the war and to the

increasing military involvement of the United States. 000 benefited from the

passive support of Ambassador Nolting, always sympathetic to Diem's problems,

and from the active support of influential White House adviser Walt Rostow.

Not coincidentally, the important Taylor-Rostow mission of 1961 and the

McNamara-Taylor mission of 1963 had as leaders White House or 000 officials,

not senior figures in the State Department. In between those visits the regular

meetings in Honolulu of U.S. officials involved in aid to South Vietnam took

place at CINCPAC headquarters at the invitation of McNamara.

000 had its own internal differences that contributed to the lack of consensus during these formative years of the Vietnam entanglement. While the JCS

and CINCPAC viewed the war as essentially a conflict between the ARVN and

guerrillas serving as surrogates for the North Vietnamese military, McNamara
Vietnam: Reluctant Engagement, 1961-1963 291

had some doubts about this diagnosis and its resulting prescriptions. Earlier, in

1961, even the ]CS had had reservations about Taylor's judgment that South

Vietnam could not be saved without the introduction of a U.S. task force. When

McNamara and Rusk, also in 1961, recommended dispatch of combat forces

"only if necessary," Nitze argued that "there was no such thing as being a little

bit pregnant, and an open-ended commitment could well lead to an American

involvement in another major ground war in Asia under unfavorable political and

logistical circumstances."115 Whatever his qualms, McNamara went along with

the Taylor recommendations.

McNamara's concern over waste and excessive costs tempered his aggressive

inclinations. He supported such innovative measures as counterinsurgency warfare

and defoliation as a way of breaking out ofwhat he perceived as rigid, inefficient,

and usually expensive programming by the military chiefs. But he opted for tradition in the choice of Harkins for the MACV post and was never comfortable

with Lansdale's more extreme ideas. Increasingly, the costs of the Vietnam war

disturbed him. The largest share of the MAP--44 percent-went for the Far East

in FY 1963, as it did regularly during this period. I 16 Whenever possible he scaled

down financial requests that he considered out of line. He accepted the costs as

bearable during his first two years in office on the assumption that by the end of

1965 most U.S. forces would have left South Vietnam.

The rush of events and the welter of conflicting advice, normally challenges

he met head-on, frequently overwhelmed McNamara when it came to Vietnam.

For all his supposed reliance on his civilian Whiz Kids and on his own quick

reading of problems, he never quite grasped, or he came to understand too late,

the full complexity of the situation in Southeast Asia. David Halberstam noted

the oddity of his failing to utilize the talents of his bright young civilian assistants, preferring to move "virtually alone in an area where he was least equipped

to deal with the problems, where his training was all wrong, the quantifier trying

to quantify the unquantifiable." The mastery he quickly acquired in such areas

as civil defense, strategic doctrine, and ballistic missiles was missing on Vietnam, where his preoccupation with body counts and kill ratios overlooked or

discounted other, sometimes plainer and more compelling, manifestations of

success or failure. His later confessions of error invariably underscored his ignorance of Vietnam, its history, its people, its culture. In this McNamara of course

was not alone among the makers of policy. State's Kattenburg recalled the 31

August 1963 meeting with a dozen of Kennedy's best and brightest presentalong with the defense secretary were Rusk, Taylor, Bundy, and Colby among

others-to discuss what to do about the Diem problem:

... I listened for about an hour or an hour and a half to this conversation

before I was asked to say anything ... and they looked to me absolutely

hopeless, the whole group of them. There was not a single person there that
292 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

knew what he was calking about. It simply looked, to me, that way. They

wete all gteat men. It was appalling to watch. I didn't have the feeling that

any of them ... teally knew ... Vietnam. They didn't know the past. They

had fotgonen the history. They simply didn't undetstand the identification of

nationalism and Communism, and the more this meeting went on, the more

I sat there and I thought, "God, we're walking into a major disaster." 117

In the end, McNamara, the consummate manager, failed, as did his generals, to understand how to manage a new kind of conflicr. Counterinsurgency

meant more than defeating guerrillas with unconventional tactics. In Vietnam, it

meant, as Lansdale, Hilsman, and others recognized, a struggle for the allegiance

of a discontented and restive populace, winnable only when the government of

South Vietnam as well as its U.S. advisers accepted this imperative. Lansdale's

vision often seemed blurred by his personal ties to Diem as well as by his self-serving idiosyncratic ideas, yet he seems to have had a clearer perception of some of

the underlying realities of the war than did the secretary of defense or the Joint

Chiefs. The JCS, under Lemnitzer and Taylor, for their part too narrowly viewed

Vietnam through the prism of Korea, despite occasional acknowledgment of

differences inherent in a guerrilla conflict. If McNamara's approach was sometimes

too analytical, theirs-proceeding from the premise that if the South Vietnamese

forces could not cope with the enemy, the United States should commit as much

military power as required to defeat the communist adversary in Southeast Asiawas too simple.

Both McNamara and his uniformed colleagues made their share of mistakes

in Vietnam. If the military professionals understated their own culpability,

McNamara at length may have been overly self-recriminating in his pained mea

culpa years after. Although there was enough blame to go around, McNamara

eventually would bear most of the burden for the fateful misjudgments-many

of them his own-that had their origins in the Kennedy administration.
CHAPTER XII

Flexible Response

The advent of nuclear plenry in the 1950s created a need for guidelines for the

use of nuclear weapons in war. The first clearly enunciated policy on the subject,

the massive retaliation doctrine of the Eisenhower years, gave primacy to the

maintenance of a powerful strategic nuclear force and looked to it as the answer to

conflict at most levels. But its chief objective always was to deter conflict, particularly at the nuclear level. Inevitably, the rising nuclear forces of the Soviet Union

and the emergence of challenges to U.S. interests in a growing number of areas

around the world at relatively low levels of conflict called into question the validiry and efficacy ofthe massive retaliation doctrine.

Kennedy entered office in January 1961 intent on changing the doctrine of

massive retaliation. During the presidential campaign he had voiced strong criticism of Eisenhower's strategic policies, implying that he would subject them to

a searching review. Within weeks of taking office, McNamara came to share

Kennedy's concern about the need to find a more acceptable alternative.

From the beginning, the Kennedy administration struggled to fashion a strategic doctrine that would guide u.s. policy in the desired direction-toward

a concept called "flexible response." This term received currency from its use

in former Army Chief of Staff Maxwell Taylor's book The Uncertain Trumpet,

published in 1959. Taylor had taken a strong position against massive retaliation,

viewing the use of nuclear weapons only as a last resort. He advanced a strategy of

"flexible response," which envisioned waging war with non-nuclear forces at graduated levels ofintensiry. For deterring nuclear war or fighting it, a force with a few

hundred nuclear weapons that could inflict unacceptable damage on an enemy

would be adequate.! This view came to be known as finite deterrence and had

some support from Army and Navy leaders. It was the broader concept of flexible

response that attracted the new administration.

The initial tendency by Kennedy and McNamara to minimize the prospects

for use of nuclear weapons in conflicts undoubtedly received reinforcement from

293
294 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

the international crises of the first two years of the new administration. The Bay

of Pigs, Laos, Vietnam, Berlin, and the Cuban missile crisis brought home the

recognition that there were circumstances where nuclear weapons should not be

employed. A corollary view held that conventional war forces allowed a more

proportionate and a more appropriate response and that they should be strengthened and improved to be effective at various levels of conflict. Accordingly,

McNamara added to Army strength in particular. The president gave personal

attention to the creation of counterinsurgency forces to deal with threats at the

lowest levels of conflict. Under the Kennedy administration, conventional war

forces reached a higher level of effectiveness than at any time since the Korean

War. The existence ofthese forces at a high level of operational and logistical capability may have influenced in some measure the decision in 1965 to enlarge the

u.s. role in the war in Vietnam.

Although conventional force was the preferred response, nuclear force was the

absolute weapon and remained paramount in the development of doctrine. Here,

too, there could be graduated response because ofthe availability oftactical nuclear

weapons for battlefield use. And even at the higher levels of nuclear warfare there

were gradations of strategic nuclear effort that focused on target systems and

acquired distinctive names. "Counter-cities" strategy aimed to destroy an enemy's

productive resources, urban areas, and populations. The Kennedy administration,

seeking to diminish the possibility of general nuclear war, gave serious thought to

"counterforce" doctrine-nuclear attack limited to an enemy's nuclear forces. This

involved consideration of first strike or second strike and assurance of maintaining a reserve nuclear force capable of absorbing a first strike from the enemy and

executing an effective second strike.

Any efforts to alter nuclear strategy had to take into account the reaction of

the NATO allies. NATO had occupied a central place in U.S. strategic planning

ever since its inception in 1949. In the 1960s the NATO allies had strong doubts

about the flexible response doctrine, viewing its emphasis on conventional warfare

as too dangerous and too expensive. It evoked specters ofWorld War I and World

War II battlefields, killing grounds that had drained the European countries of

generations of young men. In addition, raising the nuclear threshold might well

encourage rather than deter aggression; the enemy could engage in conventional

warfare knowing that the West would be reluctant to escalate to nuclear warfare

and even self-deterred from doing so. In a conventional war Europe would be the

battleground while the United States and the Soviet Union could refrain from the

use of nuclear weapons against each other. And if tactical nuclear weapons came

into play Europe would still provide the battle arena. Given this reading of possibilities, the European NATO countries had good reason to cling to the deterrent

threat of use of nuclear weapons at the lowest possible threshold as the best strategy.
Flexible Response 295

Despite support for flexible response by OSD and Taylor, the Joint Chiefs

and the military were slow to embrace the concept. Massive retaliation had

guided the Air Force in its principal mission of carrying out the strategic nuclear

offensive and given it primacy among the services. The Army, although it stood

to gain from flexible response, remained uncertain about coping with the Soviets

in large-scale conventional warfare. The Navy feared that continued emphasis on

strategic nuclear forces and greater emphasis on ground forces would diminish

the need for its carriers and affect its status within the military establishment. In

general, all the services shared the apprehension that McNamara and OSD under

the emerging doctrine would exercise greater authority over strategic and force

planning.

The strategic doctrine debate hence had important national and international

dimensions and involved a prominent array of players involved in discussion and

debate, including McNamara and his OSD assistants, the Joint Chiefs, the military services, NATO members, think tanks, and informed observers. Each of the

various proposed strategies presented complex theories and rested on necessarily

tentative foundations. The lack offirm knowledge about potential enemy capabilities and intentions meant that any strategy was suspect and hypothetical-subject

to change and, in the event of conflict, even drastic revision. All of these strategies

essentially represented theories that proponents hoped would never be put into

practice. Any authority they carried derived from the availability of military forces

that might or might not be able to carry them out as intended. Since the actual

circumstances of a future conflict could not be predicted accurately and therefore

remained problematic, the persistent uncertainty had a strong sobering effect on

the deliberations of the strategic thinkers and planners engaged in trying to settle

on a consistent strategic doctrine in an unpredictable and inconstant world.

The shifting and complicated nature of strategic thinking during the McNamara years-especially between 1961 and 1964-was reflected in the range and

variety of concepts that underwent scrutiny: finite deterrence, flexible response,

graduated response, controlled response, counterforce, counter-cities, no-cities,

full first strike, first strike, second strike, negotiating pauses, assured destruction, damage limiting. This thinking in the Defense Department and elsewhere

spawned a body ofideas, studies, and actions: the missile gap, the Acheson report,

the Hickey report, the Partridge report, the Basic National Security Policy document, the Athens and Ann Arbor addresses, draft presidential memoranda, and

an enormous volume of papers, memos, and correspondence. Out of this welter

emerged not a single overall strategic doctrine but a work in progress-a rational, pragmatic guide based on experience and subject to adaptation as constantly

changing circumstances warranted.
296 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

Basic National Security Policy (BNSP)

The volatile state of the international scene and unsettled course of strategic

thinking no doubt inclined the new administration to question the Eisenhower

practice of promulgating an annual Basic National Security Policy (BNSP),

despite its apparent flexibility. Eisenhower had used the BNSP as a policy tool,

outlining broad national security aims and strategy,* thus providing strategic

guidance to State and Defense. The breadth of the strategic guidance permitted a substantial measure of adaptability in determining the military budget and

the military force structure, often necessary and useful when Congress failed to

provide adequate funds to meet the requirements derived from the BNSP.

From early on, as it pondered changes in strategic policy, the Kennedy administration wrestled with the question of whether to continue the system of issuing

an annual BNSP. According to Paul Nitze, "President Kennedy was advised by

Richard Neustadt, who was then a professor at Columbia University, in a preinaugural memorandum, that a BNSP document would be used by the departments

and agencies to further their pet programs and would reduce and hedge his freedom of action."2 Indeed, military service contributions to the BNSPs included

language designed to favor their own interests, allowing them to do precisely

what Neustadt alleged. Moreover, retention of the BNSP did not comport with

Kennedy's preference for a more informal system of national security policy decisionmaking. Kennedy eschewed Eisenhower's institutional approach, diminishing

the role of the National Security Council and dismantling other aspects of the

previous system.

Nevertheless, consideration of continuation of the BNSP occupied the Kennedy administration for almost two years. In DoD the chief proponent for the

BNSP was Nitze, who as assistant secretary of defense for international security

affairs was properly concerned with it. He argued with McNamara that the Pentagon needed the coherence that the BNSP could supply. McNamara had doubts

about obtaining consensus, and the Joint Chiefs seemed to prove his point when

they decried as premature any attempt to draft a doctrine that would permit

controlled responses according to a range of options. In the spring of 1961, ISA

Deputy Assistant Secretary Henry Rowen, acting for Nitze, began a reassessment

of the BNSp, completing a draft that delineated a new strategy for controlled and

discriminating nuclear response. Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric

circulated it on 5 May and asked for a military assessment ofsuch options as maintaining a ready reserve nuclear force and avoiding initial attacks against industrial,

population, and governmental centers. Once again McNamara expressed skepticism about the value of JCS contributions to such a plan and about the BNSP

itself as the Joint Chiefs elaborated on the dangers of adopting a variety ofstrategic

* See Watson, Into the Missile Age, 36-38.
Flexible Response 297

options. Nuclear planning, they believed, required simplicity of response.3 Moreover, neither Kennedy nor McNamara wanted to be tied to a BNSP that might,

even with its flexibility, restrict their options in dealing with the many contingencies that characterized u.s. defense problems in 1961 and subsequent years. This

ISA attempt to delineate u.s. policy died an early death.

Only Walt Rostow's efforts kept the BNSP issue alive into 1963. As chairman of the State Department's Policy Planning Council he produced revised

drafts of the BNSP between December 1961 and 7 May 1962, the last an ambitious document 166 pages in length, for consideration by Secretary Rusk, the

president, and NSC members.4 Having examined earlier drafts, the Joint Chiefs

persisted in resisting an emphasis on conventional forces and what they perceived

as a deemphasis of nuclear forces. According to General Taylor's military assistant,

Col. William Y. Smith, they would have accepted the document if "dehydrated

and reshaped to incorporate their comments." Without fully endorsing the JCS

position, Taylor, as the president's military representative, wanted inclusion of the

role of tactical nuclear weapons and statements of policy on the dual capability of

military forces, conventional response to aggression, a multilateral NATO MRBM

(medium-range ballistic missile) force, and modernization of NATO forces. 5

Neither the JCS nor Taylor succeeded in modifying the document. Arguably,

the nub of their objections came down to the assignment of responsibility for the

19 studies relating to military policy called for in Rostow's document. Only one

consigned the principal role to the Joint Chiefs, while the chiefs shared responsibility for six others with ISA. In a memorandum to Taylor on 1 August, Colonel

Smith viewed Rostow's BNSP as "noteworthy for its stark portrayal of the loss of

influence of the JCS and the concurrent development of a civilian-military general

staff in OSD."6

On 17 January 1963 the president signaled the end of the debate over the

BNSP by rescinding NSC 5906/1, the last Eisenhower BNSP, and directing that

policy guidance would come from "existing major policy statements of the President and Cabinet Officers, both classified and unclassified." Gilpatric let the Joint

Chiefs know that he had not been "overly concerned at the failure ofthe Administration to complete the development of a new BNSP." Statements ofthe president

and secretary of defense along with NSC actions would serve in its stead.?

McNamara even more pointedly rejected a BNSp, for which he felt no need;

his posture statements would suffice to provide the necessary guidance for the

fashioning of the SIOPs.* Rowen reported to Rostow in July that the secretary

had asked the JCS: "On what problems do you need high level guidance?" The

six issues raised by the Joint Chiefs included targeting capability ofstrategic retaliatory forces and the force levels needed for NATO to contain a Soviet attack by

non-nuclear means. McNamara made it clear that answers to these questions did

* SlOP stood for Single lnregrared Operarional Plan. See below, p. 316.
298 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

not lie in a BNSP. Rostow had continued to work on a BNSP even after January

1963 but regretfully noted to Rusk in July that "so far as the Pentagon is now

concerned the BNSP is dead."8

Given their own reservations, the Joint Chiefs accepted McNamara's disregard

for the BNSP with equanimity. When they examined an NESC (Net Evaluation

Subcommittee ofthe NSC) report on national planning submitted to them in July

1964, the question of the utility of a BNSP arose once again. Their response, six

months later in January 1965, made clear that they did "not lack policy guidance

for the preparation of military plans. Necessary guidance is obtained through both

face-to-face meetings and a continuing exchange of written memoranda with the

Secretary of Defense." Any attempt to "condense this guidance in a single document could result in a paper so broad that it would be difficult to keep meaningful

and yet up to date." Moreover, if the document did contain specific guidance,

it could impose excessively inflexible restrictions on planning. In brief, the Joint

Chiefs agreed that a BNSP was unnecessary; at most, establishment of a "small,

high-level interagency group might facilitate the timely initiation and coordination of political-military planning."9

Would a BNSP have served a useful purpose during these years? It seems

doubtful that any document that might have been adopted could have exercised a

significant influence. Given the doubts expressed by the White House, McNamara, and the JCS, any new product likely would have been a lowest common

denominator compromise that could not have been the coherent guide such a

document was intended to be. The leaders of the administration clearly preferred

a mode of national security policymaking different from that oftheir predecessors.

The "Missile Gap"

While debate over the BNSP went on in the background, the administration grappled with the numerous elements of policy competing for attention and

resolution. As a first order of business, it had to address an issue that had gained

prominence in the presidential campaign of 1960 and that remained a subject of

considerable controversy-the myth of Soviet nuclear superiority. The Democrats

had charged the Eisenhower administration with responsibility for permitting a

"missile gap" to develop in the 1950s, leaving the United States in a position inferior to the Soviets with respect to missiles. Although the perception played well for

the Democrats in the fall election, acceptance of Soviet missile superiority, if left

undisputed, could undermine the case for flexible response.

The missile gap controversy, following the shock of Sputnik, the successful

1957 Soviet space launch, engaged an inquiring press and a nervous public over

the last two years ofthe Eisenhower administration. Well-publicized May Day parades and periodic news reports from Moscow dramatizing Khrushchev's boasts

about the prowess of Soviet missiles culminated in an announcement by the Soviet
Flexible Response 299

premier on 27 January 1959 that the Soviet Union had begun mass production of

intercontinental ballistic missiles. Earlier, on 16 January, Secretary of Defense Neil

McElroy reportedly admitted at a secret briefing before a Senate committee that

the Soviet Union would have a missile superiority of 100 over the United States

by 1960. Although McElroy had asserted at a news conference on 22 January

that the figure of 300, advanced in the press, was an exaggeration, he confessed in

effect that a gap did exist even if its size had been overstated. President Eisenhower

confirmed its existence when he informed the public on 28 January that the

United States was closing the gap. His assurance did little to calm critics. IO

Given this background, it came as no surprise that the missile issue provided

fodder for the 1960 presidential campaign. In August of that year Senator

Kennedy warned about dangerous days as the missile gap loomed "larger and

larger ahead." Over the next two months of campaigning he repeatedly demanded

a crash missile program to accompany a complete reevaluation of national defense

organization. His first State of the Union message, in which he "instructed the

Secretary of Defense to reappraise our entire defense strategy," echoed this particular campaign theme. Specifically, McNamara was to reexamine the missile program

in light ofthe gap. I I

In the midst of an apparent consensus over a missile crisis the secretary of

defense made an embarrassing gaffe-revealing that his examination of the problem found that U.S. strategic military power considerably exceeded that of the

Soviet Union. The trouble began at a background session with a group of newsmen in his Pentagon conference room on 6 February 1961, where he offhandedly

said that "if there was a gap, it was in our favor." To McNamara's chagrin, headlines appeared the next morning describing the missile gap as a myth. Although

they did not identifY McNamara as the source, the journalists made no effort to

disguise the origins of the story. Appearing naive or inexperienced in the ways

of Washington, McNamara seemingly failed to recognize the potential ammunition he was giving to the Republican opposition, still smarting over Democratic

attacks alleging the existence of a missile gap.12

Clearly the administration suffered embarrassment from McNamara's inadvertent disclosure. A disclaimer did not stop further inquiries. Official spokesmen

noted ongoing studies had reached no conclusions yet about the missile gap. The

president himself hoped that no gap would be found. 13

General Lemnitzer, chairman of the JCS, later wondered about the figures

bandied about. He had thought a small gap possible, but in favor of the United

States, "that we were in the lead. The strange thing about it, was that in the

campaign, it came out the other way around .... That was the way it ended up in

politics." Gilpatric, also reflecting on the question a generation later, claimed that

the gap "was not an issue that was fabricated. It was a case of no one on the U.S.

side knowing specifically."14
300 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

The secretary quickly recovered his composure. He explained away the missile

flap as simply a matter of emphasis. A missile gap existed only in the sense that the

United States lagged behind in the number of ICBMs. Given the small number

on both sides, this amounted to little in terms of the overall U.S. strategic posture

in the spring of 1961. Technically, the gap had no meaning. What mattered at the

moment, he told newsmen at the notorious meeting on 6 February and congressmen two weeks later, was "our total deterrent strength, and I stated there was

no destruction gap or no deterrent gap as it related to our present situation." In

this context, the United States enjoyed a commanding lead in long-range bombers, while the accelerated production of Polaris and development of Minuteman

missiles represented a further strengthening of overall U.S. nuclear superiority. In

April he informed another congressional subcommittee that for most of 1963 a

small missile gap in ICBMs might exist but by the end of that calendar year the

U.S. inventory of ICBMs "may exceed that of the Soviet Union." Confident of

his figures, he convinced Congress that this was a foregone conclusion.ls

In effect, the new secretary of defense confirmed the judgment of his predecessor, Thomas Gates, who had informed senators in January 1960 that while

the Soviets probably held the lead in the number of missiles, there was no

"deterrent gap."IG Ironically, Congress and the press construed Gates's characterization as acknowledging the existence of a missile gap, while they concluded that

McNamara, expressing much the same sentiments, exposed the gap as a myth.

Obviously, enough confusion existed about a gap to permit conflicting interpretations.

Adding to the confusion was the difference between the theoretical capability of the Soviets to produce a missile and their probable rate of production and

deployment. The theoretical capability obviously would exceed their probable rate

of production. Beyond these considerations questions existed about the reliability

and accuracy of the missiles in reaching their targets as well as about the vulnerability of prospective targets. The effectiveness of potential missile defenses would

become a factor in measuring relative strength and deficiencies. 17

National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) in 1960 and 1961, the period when

they would have the most influence on the Kennedy administration, underscored

reasons for uncertainty about all aspects of the Soviet missile program. While the

findings in the NIE reports were consistent within the limits of available information, what the analysts did not know far exceeded what they did know about

Soviet production of missiles, let alone the uses to which they might be pur. In

May 1960 the CIA admitted that "exhaustive reexamination has failed to establish Soviet ICBM production rates or to provide positive identification of any

operational ICBM unit or launching facility other than the test range." Three

months later, the analysts noted that they still had "no direct evidence ofthe present or planned future rate of production. As yet, we can identifY no ICBM-related
Flexible Response 301

troop training activities, nor can we positively identifY any operational launching

site, as distinguished from the known test range facilities." In December 1960, at

the time of McNamara's designation as secretary of defense, they noted that estimates of Soviet ICBM forces were "highly tentative."18

By June 1961, after the controversy over the gap had mostly subsided, the

CIA could report that "US intelligence has acquired a considerable body of additional information pertaining to Soviet programs for ICBMs and other ballistic

missiles."19 Credit for more accurate identification of the state of the Soviet

missile program went in part to the new spy satellite, SAMOS (an acronym for

satellite and missile observation system), which orbited on 31 January 1961 and

made some 500 passes before its transmitters were switched off. SAMOS developed its own film, scanned it electronically, and radioed the pictures to ground

stations. Not until September 1961 did the satellite produce reliable evidence

that Soviet ICBM strength stood at a much lower level than U.S. analysts had

assumed-10-25 launchers for ICBMs and 250-300 launchers for MRBMs. Still,

it remained clear that of all the Soviet programs, their missile systems remained

the most difficult to project. 20

As McNamara entered office, he had a choice between the figures offered by

the CIA and Air Force intelligence; the latter, with a strong interest in higher estimates, regularly dissented from the CIA's findings in this period. The Air Force

sought to eliminate the putative gap by increasing the number of missiles and

bombers. McNamara fully recognized the self-serving interest in the Air Force

estimates. Years later he noted that a copy of Air Force intelligence estimates had

been leaked to members of Congress, and this formed the basis of the charges

against the Eisenhower administration in the presidential campaign of 1960. The

new secretary made it clear that he and his staff judged the CIA estimates more

accurate than those ofthe Air Force. 21

By January 1961 enough information had emerged to show the early figures as

greatly overstated. A downward revision from the estimate of possibly 500 Soviet

operational ICBMs in place by 1962, made by the Eisenhower administration in

1959, seemed reasonable, particularly when distinguishing between "ICBMs for

inventory" and "ICBMs on launchers."22

The success of SAMOS and other reconnaissance satellites in replacing the

more vulnerable U-2s for surveillance of Soviet installations raised the CIA's status

in OSD's estimation, helping to offset some ofthe damage to the CIA's reputation

from the Bay of Pigs fiasco. The two agencies achieved close cooperation through

the easy relationship between Richard Bissell of the CIA and Joseph Charyk,

under secretary of the Air Force in the Eisenhower administration, who stayed on

for two years under McNamara. Bissell, whose career was shortened by his role in

the Bay of Pigs disaster, figured prominently in the building of both the U-2 and

the satellite systems. Charyk and McNamara had worked together as Ford offi-
302 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

cials in the 1950s. This fruitful relationship survived Bissell's departure in 1961,

but ended when the Air Force pressed for control over the entire reconnaissance

project in 1963.23

To reduce potential disputes and sort out lines of responsibilities, Deputy

Secretary of Defense Gilpatric and Deputy Director of the CIA General Charles

p. Cabell agreed in September 1961 to establish a joint National Reconnaissance

Office (NRO), headed by an Air Force official, to finance and control all overhead reconnaissance projects. The Air Force regarded control ofthe photo satellite

program as a basic part of its mission, prescribed by McNamara, to perform

"research, development, test and engineering of Department of Defense space

development programs or projects."24

Another agreement between the CIA and OSD made the secretary of defense

the executive agent for the program, with the NRO under his direction and control. Although developed jointly with the CIA, the NRO would operate as a separate entity of DoD. This arrangement did not signal a victory for the Air Force,

given McNamara's concern that Air Force dominance could jeopardize his capacity

to make independent judgments on weapon procurement and strategic planning.

Consequently, he often continued to side with the CIA in opposition to Air Force

positions, as he had earlier in assessing the missile gap.25

The missile gap disappeared as an issue when Gilpatric provided in a widely

publicized speech on 21 October 1961 what amounted to the official interment

of the "gap." He noted that "the destructive power which the United States could

bring to bear even after a Soviet surprise attack upon our forces would be as great

as-perhaps even greater than-the total undamaged force which the enemy can

threaten to launch against the United States in a first strike." Gilpatric's confidence in U.S. second-strike capability gained assurance from the CIA estimate in

September that the number of Soviet ICBMs on launchers appeared to be between

10 and 25, with no marked increase expected during the immediately succeeding

months.26

Why did the Kennedy administration engage in a rapid buildup of strategic

missiles after it perceived that the United States did not lag behind in a deterrent

gap? McNamara's ICBM program did not simply represent an automatic response

to a presidential mandate or a submission to political pressures. The secretary

appeared to have taken seriously the message of the CIA reports, particularly in

late 1960, that considered the relatively low Soviet production schedule a temporary phenomenon, to last only until a new generation of more powerful missiles

came on line. Moreover, the CIA noted that the building of an ICBM force "has

emboldened the Soviets to challenge the West on a vital issue like Berlin, and has

led them to engage the West in other areas around the world formerly conceded

to be beyond the reach of Soviet power."27
Flexible Response 303

The Acheson Report

Aware from the outset of NATO's uneasiness over the missile gap and any

movement away from massive retaliation toward flexible response, the Kennedy

administration sought to assuage the allies' worries while trying to make them

understand the need to reassess strategic doctrine as Cold War relationships and

conditions evolved. To prepare for presentation of changes in guidance at future

NATO meetings, Secretary Rusk commissioned former Secretary of State Dean

Acheson in early February 1961 to chair an Advisory Committee on NATO.

President Kennedy met with Acheson twice in March for discussion ofthe report,

and the NSC made changes in it late in the month.28

Acheson also held discussions on major issues with leading OSD officials,

particularly Nitze, a former colleague at the State Department and the Defense

representative on the committee. They agreed on the importance of addressing NATO's concerns about the appearance of the United States decoupling

its defense from its European partners. And they recognized that the change in

nuclear doctrine implicit in flexible response would evoke resistance or objections

that might be deflected by conceding Europeans a greater voice in nuclear targeting. The ]CS expressed itself as generally in accord with the final version of the

report but suggested a small number of modifications. 29

The Acheson report, approved by the president on 21 April as a policy directive entitled "Regarding NATO and the Atlantic Nations," highlighted the virtues

of flexible response and helped advance a strategy that Kennedy and McNamara

had already begun to develop. The major thrust of the report appeared under

the heading "A Pragmatic Doctrine," wherein Acheson urged that the allies give

first priority to contingencies short of nuclear or massive non-nuclear assault. To

establish a credible deterrent against a subatomic war, NATO should improve

its non-nuclear forces to the point where it would have the capacity of "halting

Soviet forces ... for a sufficient period to allow the Soviets to appreciate the wider

risks of the course on which they are embarked." The report stressed that nuclear

weapons in Europe should be carefully controlled. Moreover, the alliance's vital

interest demanded that "the major part of U.S. nuclear power not be subject to

veto," although the United States should have veto power and control over the use

ofnuclear weapons by other NATO countries. The president "should make entirely

clear his intention to direct use of nuclear weapons ifEuropean NATO forces have

been subjected to an unmistakable nuclear attack or are about to be overwhelmed

by non-nuclear forces." This reassurance would presumably help make more palatable to the NATO countries the U.S. suggestions for change in doctrine. 3o

The Europeans seemed unimpressed by Kennedy's remarks to the NATO

Military Committee on 10 April when he outlined the report's main recommendations and by General Lemnitzer's comments at the same session. Lemnitzer

told the Military Committee that it was "imperative for the security of NATO"
304 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

that America's strategic forces be "sufficiently invulnerable to be able to absorb, if

necessary, an initial nuclear attack, and still retain the ability to inflict unacceptable

damage on the attacker." The allies responded negatively despite the emphasis on

the continued U.S. presence in Europe and pledge to share information on nuclear

targeting. The new NATO secretary general, Dirk Stikker, specifically warned

against letting the pendulum "swing too far away from massive retaliation."31

Lemnitzer spoke as a u.s. member of the Military Committee, but he and

the Joint Chiefs were dispatching a different message to the secretary of defense.

Like their European counterparts, the chiefs questioned dependence on conventional forces. "While accepting the desirability of 'raising the threshold' ..., the

Joint Chiefs of Staff cannot envisage, now or in the future, a situation in which

an attack by as much as 60 divisions could be held by non-nuclear means for a

period of possibly weeks." In reviewing a draft of Acheson's report in late March

they continued to express reservations, despite claiming to be "generally in accord"

with it. They disagreed (as did Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, General

Norstad) with the Acheson position that the more likely contingencies-those

short of nuclear or massive non-nuclear attack-deserved "first priority." The JCS

preferred a less emphatic "priority"-on the grounds that limited war with the

Soviet Union was no more likely than a general war.32 The policy directive issued

by the president on 21 April ignored the JCS position.

The Joint Chiefs' skepticism may have impaired the ability of OSD to make

effective arguments. In any event, the allies either ignored the call for increased

ground troops, or, as the British did, actually reduced their numbers. As for the

dangers of an independent nuclear force, the French consciously flouted the U.S.

preference by continuing development of their own nuclear deterrent. Franz Josef

Strauss, West Germany's defense minister, paid a visit to Norstad at Supreme

Allied Headquarters, Europe (SHAPE) to emphasize the error ofletting the Soviets think that "there was a clear threshold beneath which conventional forces may

be employed."33 These responses of the NATO allies in 1961 occurred at a time

when the United States, energized by the Berlin crisis, materially increased its

contribution to NATO's conventional military strength.

Administration officials made repeated efforts to win over the Europeans.

Gilpatric denied rumors that the United States would abandon the nuclear option.

Nitze, in particular, took the offensive, working with Thomas Finletter, U.S. representative to the North Atlantic Council. Finletter tried to convince the British that

an increase in conventional capabilities would not decrease nuclear deterrent capability, while Nitze emphasized to Secretary General Stikker what to him seemed

obvious: "We should be prepared for lesser things; the alternative is accommodation to the Russian intentions, for example, a free city ofWest Berlin, which is not

acceptable to Europe."34

But as the December meeting of the NATO Military Committee drew closer,

U.S. Representative General Clark Ruffner warned that "with the U.S. empha-
Flexible Response 305

sis on buildup of conventional forces, we have consistently been faced with the

feeling among our NATO allies that we are deemphasizing our nuclear capability. The fact that the U.S. has powerful strategic forces and will not hesitate

to utilize them when the occasion arises demands constant reiteration."35 These

arguments, no matter how compelling they appeared to Americans, did not

convince Europeans.

The Athens andAnn Arbor Addresses

Despite the strong negative reaction of the NATO allies to the proposed

policy, McNamara continued to press for it. At the Paris meeting of NATO ministers in December 1961 he made an unsuccessful attempt to sway European critics.

Understandably, the substance of his talk centered on the recent Berlin crisis and

on the importance of U.S. readiness to meet it on any level. But in advocating

the presence of large and diversified forces in the service of NATO, he delivered

an ambiguous message that confused his listeners. At the same time that he listed

the impressive numbers of strategic ballistic missiles and long-distance bombers,

he expressed shock and dismay at witnessing "glaring weaknesses" in NATO's

conventional ground forces, with "deficiencies ... so extensive that both initial

and sustained combat effectiveness are inadequate to meet NATO's needs."36 His

alarm over Europe's failure to contribute did not mesh well with the confidence

he expressed in the u.s. nuclear contribution. Europeans considered the latter

sufficient if the United States really intended to use its nuclear power; by alluding to conventional forces and to the seeming advantage the Soviet Union held

in non-nuclear forces, McNamara raised suspicion about the United States' real

nuclear intentions. If he had provided accurate information to his allies, why then

the alarming demand for more conventional forces from them?

Against this background ofskepticism and disagreement, McNamara delivered

a major address to the North Atlantic Council in Athens on 5 May 1962 in which

he intended to clarifY the many misunderstandings that had clouded the meaning

of flexible response. And since counterforce seemed one of the most contentious

components of flexible response, the Athens meeting offered an opportunity to

explain fully its role in nuclear strategy.

The initial draft ofthe Athens speech was the work ofWilliam W. Kaufmann,

a McNamara consultant and key adviser on strategic matters. Kaufmann recollected some years later, "I went off into a corner and started to draft the Athens

speech at the request of Rowen. I don't recall receiving any guidance on it; it just

seemed like a good subject for a speech." He also noted that McNamara encountered difficulty in gaining its acceptance within the administration but finally

"bulled it through," with the president's support.37

Indeed the president had "read with interest" the draft of McNamara's remarks

and suggested changes and emphases. He wanted McNamara "to repeat to the point
306 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

of boredom that our general war response will come only if our allies are subjected

to major attack." He expressed strong concern that the speech be "held within the

alliance" and not become available to the Soviets.38

The task McNamara set for himself at Athens, to resolve all doubts, was formidable, especially after the cool reception Europeans had accorded most of his

initiatives during the past year. He hoped to convince NATO members that

nuclear weapons represented no panacea, and that the immediate future demanded

a new type of deterrent policy. Perhaps he delivered an overload of information.

Kaufmann suggested that the Athens speech tried to convey too many messages to

too many audiences.39 Over the span of one hour, McNamara offered Europeans a

detailed exposition ofAmerican thought on such major strategic issues as the way

in which the United States planned its nuclear operations, the dangers of proliferation of national nuclear forces, the concept of a multilateral NATO MRBM

force,* and the changed role strategic nuclear forces would play in the composition offuture deterrents.4o

Counterforce and the imperatives that made it essential as a new NATO

strategy emerged in the following passage that highlighted how nuclear technology and weapons had revolutionized warfare since 1945.

The unprecedented desrructiveness of these arms has radically changed ways

ofthinking about conflict among nations. It has properly focused great attention and efforts by the Alliance on the prevention of conflict. Nevertheless,

the U.S. has come to the conclusion that to the extent feasible basic military

strategy in general nuclear war should be approached in much the same way

that more conventional military operations have been regarded in the past.

That is to say, our principal military objectives, in the event of a nuclear war

stemming from a major attack on the Alliance, should be the destruction of

the enemy's military forces while attempting to preserve the fabric as well as

the integrity of allied society. Specifically, our studies indicate that a strategy

which targets nuclear force only against cities or a mixture of civil and military targets has serious limitations for the purpose of deterrence and for the

conduct of general nuclear war.

In our best judgment, destroying enemy forces while preserving our own

societies is-within the limits inherent in the great power of nuclear weapons-a not wholly unattainable military objective. Even if very substantial

exchanges of nuclear weapons were to occur, the damage suffered by the belligerents would vary over wide ranges, depending upon the targets that are

hit. If both sides were to confine their attacks to important military targets,

damage, while high, would nevertheless be significantly lower than if urbanindustrial areas were also attacked.41

* See Chapter XV.
Flexible Response 307

McNamara granted uncertainty that the Soviet Union would follow the U.S.

path, but he claimed that it would have strong incentives to do so. He presented

figures intended to give comfort to allies. And the conclusions that followed

from them he intended should end once and for all doubts about U.S. purposes.

"The United States has made clear," McNamara insisted, "that it places the major

Soviet nuclear forces threatening Europe in the same high priority category as

those also able to reach North America. In short, we have undertaken the nuclear

defense of NATO on a global basis. This will continue to be our objective. In

the execution of this mission, the weapons in the European theater are only one

resource among many. "42

The secretary placed heavy emphasis on a U.S. nuclear blanket that would

cover NATO. Indivisibility of control was a key term in McNamara's lexicon,

with unity of planning, decisionmaking, and direction vital in responding to

enemy actions. "There must not be competing and conflicting strategies in the

conduct of nuclear war," he asserted. "We are convinced that a general nuclear

war target system is indivisible and if nuclear war should occur, our best hope

lies in conducting a centrally controlled campaign against all of the enemy's vital

nuclear capabilities," something not possible if other nuclear forces targeted

against cities operated independently. "In the event of war," he was convinced,

"the use ofsuch a force against the cities of a major power would be tantamount

to suicide .... In short, then, weak nuclear capabilities, operating independently,

are expensive, prone to obsolescence, and lacking in credibility as a deterrent."43

It took no leap ofimagination for Britain and France to identifY themselves as the

"relatively weak nuclear forces" that McNamara mentioned.

Aware of the possibility of misinterpretation, the secretary anticipated it by

confessing that he realized there were those who believed that "the United States

and the Soviet Union might seek to use Europe as a nuclear battleground and

thus avoid attacks on one another's homelands. Not only does my government

emphatically reject such a view; we also regard it as unrealistic. It ignores the basic

facts of nuclear warfare I have described."

U.S. authority would extend to tactical nuclear weapons as well, which would

be minimized if not entirely removed in time. McNamara observed that the introduction of battlefield weapons into NATO occurred when its shield was weak and

the Soviet atomic stockpile small. Under those circumstances NATO could hope

to stop a Soviet advance quickly by use of tactical nuclear weapons. Conceivably,

the situation might hold true in the early 1960s, but not for much longer. NATO

could not avoid nuclear retaliation in the event it initiated use of nuclear weapons.

The secretary warned that "even a local nuclear exchange could have consequences

for Europe that are most painful to contemplate. Further, such an exchange would

be unlikely to give us any marked military advanrage. It could rapidly lead to

general nuclear war."
308 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

If the use ofstrategic nuclear and tactical nuclear weapons entailed too great

risks, the logical alternative to deterring subnuclear warfare lay in the strength of

NATO's conventional troop disposition. McNamara admitted that a conventional

forward defense would not necessarily defeat every conceivable mobilization of

Soviet power, but in the event of impending defeat nuclear strategy would come

into play.44

The United States had already done its share to buttress both conventional

and nuclear forces. In the wake of the Berlin crisis, it had raised by $10 billion

the previously planned levels of non-nuclear defense expenditures for FYs 1962

and 1963, increasing the number of its combat divisions from 11 to 16. And

the United States now prepared to do more: exchange detailed information on

nuclear forces, consult about basic plans, and commit Polaris submarines to

NATO service. The secretary dramatized U.S. priorities by noting that "effective

today" he would commit the five fully operational Polaris submarines for NATO

use. Beyond these measures, the United States stood willing to discuss with the

allies the need for a NATO medium-range ballistic missile force "as soon as possible after this meeting."

While McNamara's optimistic conclusions did foresee difficulties ahead, none

were insurmountable. "The question is not one of the ability of the Alliance but

of its will. The obstacles are real .... However, the brute facts of technology and

the realities of military power cannot be denied. They call for us to take common

action."45

No immediate response came from the allies on the doctrinal issue of counterforce, but they wondered how the proposed MRBM force stood any chance

of implementation given the U.S. emphasis on conventional armaments. Both

supporters of the multilateral concept and those, such as the British, with a preference for independent national nuclear forces, were left shaking their heads

over U.S. intentions and whether any European entity had a role to play in the

new scheme. On other subjects the reaction was muted, owing to both the classified nature of the Athens discussion and a need to digest the full import of

McNamara's statement, with its mixed signals and wide-ranging scope.46

When McNamara covered much of the same ground in his commencement

address at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor six weeks later on 16 June

1962, the allies became more outspoken. The Ann Arbor address, distilling and

spotlighting the Athens themes in a public forum, provided an occasion for Europeans to air publicly views they already held-and had articulated in executive

sessions-over the past year.47

The inspiration for a public version ofthe Athens speech came from McNamara. His assistant, Adam Yarmolinsky, prepared the first draft, with the help of

Rowen and Alain Enthoven of the comptroller's office; Daniel Ellsberg, then an

ISA staffer, revised it; Kaufmann merely added some minor touches, although he

opposed its presentation because of its broad political implications.48 McNamara
Flexible Response 309

at Ann Arbor unintentionally attracted attention to the more sensitive portions

of the Athens pronouncements but omitted the careful reasoning that underlay

them. The intricate explanations at Athens became oversimplified at Ann Arbor.

Opponents could seize on phrases and recommendations, take them out of

context, and shade their meanings. When McNamara asserted that "basic military strategy in a possible general nuclear war should be approached in much the

same way that more conventional military operations have been regarded in the

past," the concept emerged as a possible first-strike option. When he spoke of the

importance of centralized control and of the dangers inherent in the creation of

national nuclear forces, he appeared to insult the national pride of both Britain

and France.49 Publicity provoked Europeans into defiant postures; it precipitated

the very reactions McNamara's advisers had wanted to discourage and permitted

the Europeans to evade the powerful issues that he was trying to convince them to

confront.

At no point, for example, did the allies face up to the feasibility of conventional defense in Europe and the possibility ofsuccessfully meeting a conventional

attack with conventional forces. Although McNamara at Athens had pointed out

deficiencies in NATO's non-nuclear forces, he had also pointed out the strengths

of the conventional forces at hand, especially that "NATO has more men under

arms than the Soviet Union and its European satellites."50 He deplored the allies'

tendency to judge themselves hopelessly inferior in a non-nuclear conflict.* In

short, McNamara in great detail at Athens and in broad strokes at Ann Arbor

attempted to persuade the allies to his way of thinking about strategic policy. He

had asked for an increased commitment, but only a modest one.

Counterforce and Flexible Response

McNamara's strong preoccupation with a counterforce strategy in 1961-62

had its roots in the strategic thinking of the 1950s. By the end of that decade

counterforce had emerged as a more humane alternative to the indiscriminate

doctrine of massive retaliation because it would allow the United States to target

military installations while sparing heavily populated cities. Accompanying the

counterforce/no cities policy came an emphasis on damage limitation through

anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs) that would help protect U.S. urban areas from the

effects of a nuclear war. It attracted attention first among strategic analysts in the

Air Force and at Rand but did not receive official policy consideration until the

Kennedy administration took office.51

The counterforce strategy may have been set in motion early in 1961 at an

evening meeting of the secretary with Enthoven, Marvin Stern, a DDR&E offi-

* While the Soviet Union had 147 divisions, they were smaller than their Western counterparts and most of

them were maintained at much less than full strength. See Chapter XlV.
310 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

cial, and Kaufmann. The "no cities" aspect held a special appeal. According to

Stern, "McNamara listened for about two hours as Kaufmann gave a very good

low-key briefing on counterforce/no cities. He asked no questions during the

briefing, and at the end he asked the key question: 'What good is it if the other

guy doesn't do the same thing?'" To which Stern offered the answer, educate the

Soviets about the mutually destructive qualities of the nuclear weapon. 52 And if

their education proved to be incomplete, U.S. possession of a sophisticated satellite system in SAMOS, the capacity to survive the effects of a first strike, and the

Strategic Air Command's ability to destroy the enemy's military arsenals could

combine to keep deterrence credible.

Kaufmann saw himself chiefly as the explicator of the counterforce concept

and maintained that it was Comptroller Charles Hitch, Rowen, and Enthoven

who influenced McNamara. He observed that the linking of "no cities" to counterforce signified not only confidence in U.S. power to destroy most military

targets, but also to spare civilian lives. Looking on counterforce as "in the nature of

controlled response," Kaufmann thought that there were "various ways of implementing it as a strategy." Mass destruction would be avoided. An attack on enemy

cities would come only in the final stage of a nuclear war if necessary. 53

Like Kaufmann, McNamara recognized in counterforce the possibility of a

system of controlled response permitting rational choices of the level of warfare

to be pursued. To function effectively counterforce required a close management

of military operations to a degree not attempted in the past and determination of

quantifiable measurements of the number and variety of weaponry needed and

the funds to acquire them. OSD would exercise central authority in determining

choices ofweaponry.

In some key respects OSD and the JCS took adversarial positions on the

counterforce subject. When McNamara asked the Joint Chiefs in March 1961

to present a "doctrine" on thermonuclear attack that would permit controlled

response and negotiating pauses in the event of a Soviet nuclear attack, they

found the concept impractical, at least for the present. As they warned the secretary, national strategy for limited war called for the use of "whatever weapons

and forces are required by the military and political exigencies involved in each

particular situation and by the national objectives to be attained." They responded

formally but more elliptically in April when they said that there was "no significant likelihood" of a nuclear attack against the United States "which would be so

executed that it would be to the advantage of the United States and/or its Allies

in the current period to respond under a degree of control beyond that provided

in current policy, doctrines and strategic plans."54 In effect, they were saying that

the NATO strategic concept of 1957, MC 14/2, supporting massive retaliation,

remained valid in 1961. Whether war came by deliberate attack or by miscalculation, NATO could not prevent the Soviets from overrunning Europe unless

NATO used nuclear weapons strategically and tactically.
Flexible Response 311

In an accompanying note to McNamara on the same day, 18 April, Lemnitzer

underscored this message in stating his personal judgment that "we do not now

have adequate defenses, nor are our nuclear retaliatory forces sufficiently invulnerable, to permit us to risk withholding a substantial part of our effort, once a

major thermonuclear attack has been initiated." His skepticism about a definitive doctrine notwithstanding, Lemnitzer and the Joint Chiefs remained willing

to examine options for controlled attack and response as they made plans for the

mid-I960s.55

In SIOP-63, the Joint Chiefs made no significant changes from SIOP-62*

except for recommending a measure of greater flexibility by withholding attacks

against several categories of targets-all attacks against China and satellite states

except those essential in suppressing satellite-state air defenses, direct attacks

against primary control centers in the Sino-Soviet bloc, and attacks against

urban-industrial centers in communist countries. But division occurred over the

matter of damage criteria in the JCS report to McNamara on 18 August 1961. A

majority of the chiefs opted for a 75 percent expectancy of destroying not only

Moscow and Peking but also nuclear delivery forces threatening the United States

and other military and industrial resources. Air Force Chief of Staff General

Curtis LeMay dissented, asserting that too many major control centers would

remain untouched. The Air Force asked for more stringent criteria, with a 90

percent assurance of destroying or neutralizing nuclear delivery forces and essential military installations and 70 percent assurance of inflicting severe damage to

critical elements of the industrial infrastructure. McNamara accepted the majority view in general but with reservations that brought the damage criteria closer

to those proposed by the Air Force. His position rested on achieving a capability to withhold all attacks except those essential to destruction of nuclear forces

and retaining a reserve force that could destroy or neutralize most of the enemy's

other assets. 56

In September 1961, the secretary portrayed the new strategic approach to the

president as a two-part program: "in the event of a Soviet nuclear attack, first, to

strike back against Soviet bomber bases, missile sites, and other installations associated with long-range nuclear forces, in order to reduce Soviet power and limit

the damage that can be done to us by vulnerable Soviet follow-on forces, while,

second, holding in protected reserve forces capable of destroying the Soviet urban

society, if necessary, in a controlled and deliberate way."57

Initially, McNamara found qualified support for counterforce doctrine from

the Air Force. Taylor would later note that Air Force leaders at first were unenthusiastic because of their attachment to manned bombers and concern that

counterforce strategy focused primarily on ICBMs, but once they perceived that

counterforce advanced their long-term interest, the "counterforce extremists ran

* See below, p. 316.
312 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

out ofthe ceiling in terms ofrequirements for missiles and aircraft." And, indeed,

USAF leaders recognized that a striking force capable of carrying out counterforce objectives would require a substantial increase in bombers and missiles for

the service. The Air Force's conception of counterforce differed from McNamara's

by including a possible preemptive strike against Soviet nuclear forces as an

intrinsic part of the strategy. SAC Commander in Chief General Thomas S.

Power observed later that it would be foolhardy to claim certainty of knocking

out the Soviet Union's residual strategic force through a retaliatory attack. Planners must leave open the option of a first strike. 58

LeMay and his chief planner, Maj. Gen. David A. Burchinal, reacted much

the same as Power in a conversation with Gilpatric in December 1961. Assuming the availability of a large, hardened, and dispersed Minuteman force and an

"immediate go-ahead on the B-70," they envisioned "full first strike capability."

LeMay in July 1962 offered testimony on behalf of counterforce as compelling

as anyone on McNamara's staff, but not for the same reasons: "When we speak of

counterforce we mean a capability of attacking the enemy's forces and destroying

them. There has been a theory advanced by some people in the past that all you

required was a force of the necessary size to destroy X-number of his cities, and a

threat of having that done would deter him from starting a war."59

Air Force views on first strike received little encouragement from OSD.

McNamara's focus on an effective and credible second-strike capability helped

inspire the early attention he gave to the Polaris seaborne and Minuteman hardened missiles, least vulnerable to an offensive striking force. This became a critical

element in OSD's thinking. There would be "no B-70s parked and concentrated

on some airfields where they can be knocked out by enemy ballistic missiles,"

Enthoven recalled. "Instead, our forces would be ICBMs in concrete and steel

underground silos, missiles in submarines ... so that the Soviets wouldn't attack

us because we could strike back in retaliation."6o

But if the Air Force's version of counterforce differed from OSD's, other

voices within OSD or closely aligned to it also expressed reservations about the

doctrine. Nitze, for example, expressed the view that "to win a war in politically

meaningful terms it would be necessary to have a counterforce capability," but

he doubted that a counterforce second-strike capability was "technically feasible."

And if a true counterforce capability could not be attained, there was a need for a

balanced force that could provide more than a second-strike capability. Nitze later

pointed to these weaknesses as contributing to the downgrading of the doctrine

in 1963.61 Taylor would point to concern over costs, as the increase in requirements for the Air Force alone "would have been astronomical." Moreover, in

questioning whether "counterforce is related to flexible response," he agreed with

the Joint Chiefs' position. Responding to a McNamara request in April 1961,

the JCS stated that "attempts to implement a strategy including such options
Flexible Response 313

[controlled response and negotiating pauses], or declarations ofsuch intent, would

at the present time be premature and could gravely weaken the current deterrent

posture."62

These criticisms did not impress the secretary of defense in 1961. He gave

attention to the other side of the coin-the impact that lessening of the danger

of nuclear conflict would have on conventional defenses. If the success of a counterforce strategy raised the nuclear threshold so high that strategic missiles would

not be deployed by either side, then conventional forces would offer the logical

alternative for defense ofWestern Europe.

Given the greater cost of conventional forces and the perceived imbalance

between NATO forces and their Warsaw Pact counterparts, it seemed logical

to look to battlefield nuclear weapons to compensate for inferiority in ground

forces. But enthusiasm for tactical nuclear weapons had dimmed considerably

since the end of the 1950s. Skeptics such as Enthoven considered the placement

of these weapons in Europe to be a mistake. He claimed later that no one could

ever come up with a credible scenario for use of battlefield nuclear weapons.

Instead of rectifying conventional manpower imbalances they would exacerbate

them. No matter how resolute the intention to limit these weapons to distinct

military objectives, their use would escalate conflict into an uncontrolled and

unrestrained exchange of strategic weapons, first in Europe and then between

continents. Moreover, pressures in time of crisis would mount to commit these

fotward-based nuclear weapons before they would fall into enemy hands.63

McNamara made plain his impatience with tactical nuclear weapons in a

barrage of questions he asked Lemnitzer in May 1962 about their usefulness:

"What is the purpose ofthese weapons? In what contingencies would they be used?

And to achieve what objectives? .... Is it not at least as plausible that the bilateral

use of tactical atomic weapons in Europe would be to our military disadvantage?

In any case, is it feasible to defend Europe with such nuclear weapons without

destroying it?" These searching questions reflected the secretary's belief that "our

posture, doctrine, and understanding of objectives for use oftactical nuclear weapons in ground combat in Europe is in a very unsatisfactory state."64 At year's end

they were still debating the issue. In December the Joint Chiefs used a draft ofthe

State Department's BNSP to observe that "strategic nuclear capabilities required

for general war, in which the total resources of the nation are committed, do not

of themselves preclude a concurrent military requirement for adequate capabilities to employ appropriate nuclear weapons in the lesser circumstances of limited

war."65 "Appropriate" in this context clearly meant tactical nuclear weapons.

McNamara had spoken with great certainty about the merits of counterforce

at Athens and Ann Arbor, but the concept had never been fully accepted within

DoD. Differences over many aspects of the strategy, besides the tactical nuclear

issue, persisted throughout 1962. Contributing to the concept's demise was the

unrelentingly negative reaction to counterforce in Europe.
314 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

The special virtue of counterforce that had attracted McNamara-a credible

controlled mode of flexible response-received little attention from the Europeans. Instead came a rush to judge the new strategy as evidence of U.S. weakness of

will, especially by the French. McNamara's message fitted into a French perception

of general U.S. discrimination against France over the years. The United States

had repeatedly rejected French requests for aid in developing nuclear weapons.

French strategists shared with President de Gaulle criticisms of the U.S. strategy,

which they regarded as a threat to both Europe's security and to France's role in

the world. They maintained that a French nuclear capability with enough strength

to destroy a number of the enemy's cities would serve to discourage adversaries. France's nuclear fOrce de frappe could act as the trigger that would bring, if

necessary, U.S. nuclear power to bear, and so serve as a further deterrent to Soviet

aggression.66

Britain's reaction should have been less negative, since McNamara attempted

to make clear that the Athens and Ann Arbor strictures did not apply to the

RAP's nuclear force, already integrated into the defense plans of the alliance.

When the British press ignored this and made much of his reference to the inability of "relatively weak national nuclear forces" to deter aggression, McNamara

responded that he had in mind only nations with limited nuclear capabilities that

would be a danger to the alliance if employed independently. "I was therefore not

referring to Britain-which is wholly clear to anyone reading the speech in its

entirety. "67

McNamara's clarification did not sit well with a government that intended

to use its deterrent power independently if necessary. Prime Minister Harold

Macmillan certainly was not appeased. Three days after the Ann Arbor speech he

entered in his diary a judgment which his French colleagues could share: namely,

that McNamara had foolishly condemned all national nuclear forces except those

of the United States.68 At year's end, Macmillan had to bear the double burden

of having McNamara abruptly cancel Skybolt* missile development on which the

British had previously pinned their hopes of an additional nuclear capability, and

then having former Secretary of State Acheson lecture on Britain's need to face up

to its declining world status: "Great Britain has lost an empire and not yet found

a role."69 In this atmosphere it was not surprising that the meanings the United

States had vested in counterforce had little chance for an objective hearing from

British officials.

While the Germans paid more attention to the specific requirements of counterforce and conventional forces than did their British and French counterparts,

they also did not welcome the changes. West Germany regarded itself as the front

line of NATO defense, the most exposed and most vulnerable territory in the

alliance. Any change from time-tested strategies held potential dangers. Unlike

* See Chapter XIV:
Flexible Response 315

the United States, West Germany believed that the crisis over the Berlin Wall did

not point to the need to furnish more troops to stop Soviet aggression by conventional means. Rather, the Germans continued to subscribe to emphasis on a low

nuclear threshold for nuclear exchange that would quickly rise to a strategic level.

The threat of massive retaliation remained the key to deterrence; counterforce

that devalued the nuclear weapon could lead to a conflict fought on German soil.

Only an assurance of early escalation to the nuclear threshold would assure deterrence.70

Resistance by the European allies to non-nuclear alternatives and to counterforce doctrine proved unshakable. Their concern was with the impact on

them rather than with the theory and technology of the doctrine that so engaged

OSD, the Joint Chiefs, and the services. The higher nuclear threshold implied

in McNamara's search for alternatives to massive retaliation required increased

contributions of conventional forces and raised the question of U.S. commitment to Europe. Both considerations damaged the credibility of the American

will to defend Europe. Additionally, Europeans, as always, not only feared the

higher cost of conventional forces but also felt it would be futile to attempt to

compete with the Warsaw Pact's perceived superiority in numbers of troops.

While the allies might share McNamara's doubts about tactical nuclear weapons

on the assumption that they would complicate rather than solve NATO's defenses

by putting their civilian populations at risk, they would not agree to increased

conventional forces as a reasonable alternative. The very element offlexibility that

appealed to OSD lay at the heart of their concern. The only acceptable defense

of Europe, in the minds of most allies, continued to be the strategic nuclear

weapon employed at the lowest possible threshold in any general war with the

Soviet Union. Successful implementation of a counterforce doctrine would raise

the nuclear threshold to unacceptable levels.

Although OSD and the ]CS continued through 1963 to pursue the possibilities of counterforce through studies, they came to accept that the doctrine was not

viable. In addition to the opposition of the NATO allies, such difficult problems

as locating and destroying elusive Soviet targets, the cost effectiveness of offensive

missiles versus defense measures such as ABM systems and civil defense, and the

perception of counterforce as a first-strike strategy, created doubts that could not

be overcome.?l

A generation later McNamara would say that he had held a loose construction of counterforce's significance. He claimed that he did not intend his Athens

and Ann Arbor speeches to reflect "a shift to a counterforce doctrine, but rather

a statement of policy which we hoped would influence the Soviets, were we

and they ever to be involved in a nuclear exchange, to limit severely the initial

launches of nuclear weapons in the hope that we would avoid destruction of our

societies." His underlying purpose was to accelerate NATO's movement toward

flexible response. "I never did believe in a counter-force strategy per se. What I
316 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

was trying to suggest without labeling it as such was a damage-limiting strategy,

premised on attacking military targets as opposed to population centers. It was

only appropriate, I think, if it ever was appropriate, to that limited period when

they had so few weapons relative to ours."72

SlOP and Command and Control

An essential element of U.S. nuclear strategy, especially under a counterforce

scenario, was a reliable and effective command and control system. This indispensable need had long engaged the attention of DoD's leaders and planners. The

Eisenhower administration had previously made an effort to address the absence

of a clear command structure with the aid of a report prepared under Lt. Gen.

Thomas F. Hickey. In 1959, NSC's Net Evaluation Subcommittee, chaired by

Hickey, took on the task of determining targets to be destroyed and the weapons required for the purpose. The Hickey study group quickly encountered the

dilemma over whether to give priority to destruction of nuclear delivery forces

over the targeting of governmental, industrial, and communications centers.

The former was "counterforce," the latter "countercity," with counterforce needing greater resources to match probable improvements in Soviet capabilities. The

Hickey group avoided a choice between the two targeting philosophies in its

initial report in November 1959, NESC 2009,73

It remained for Secretary Gates to use the Hickey report as a basis for introducing a major change in coordination and a national target list. The advent of

the Polaris submarine missile system projected the Navy onto the strategic nuclear

scene and raised important questions about overall coordination and direction of

nuclear strategy and forces. Frustrated by the inability of the JCS to resolve these

questions, Gates called for a single integrated operational plan, with the Strategic Air Command as the appropriate agency to develop it. Braving criticism from

the Army and Navy but with the strong support of President Eisenhower, Gates

established the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff QSTPS) at SAC headquarters in August 1960. While CINCSAC would direct the JSTPS, he would have a

deputy from a different service (the Navy) and a staff drawn from all the services.

The National Strategic Target List (NSTL) would also come under the SAC

commander. JSTPS managed to produce the first Single Integrated Operational

Plan (SIOP-62) before the end of 1960,74 Efforts by the Air Force to acquire

command and control over all strategic nuclear forces, including the Navy, did

not succeed.

McNamara's assurance about a sure second-strike capability depended on a

command and control system above and beyond anything existing. Although

Lemnitzer regarded the production of SIOP-62 as the most significant achievement of his tenure as JCS chairman, the new secretary of defense did not share

his enthusiasm. In examining the plan, McNamara and his staff saw no clear
Flexible Response 317

command structure in place. Reservations about the utility of the SlOP emerged

in discussions in the National Security Council less than two weeks after Kennedy's inauguration. fu Director of the Bureau of the Budget David Bell observed:

''At present the nearest thing to a defense plan is the Joint Strategic Operations

Plan USOP]* of the JCS, which has not been wholly approved by the Secretary

of Defense and is not wholly supported by the budget. In the absence of clear

strategic doctrine, a definite defense policy, and an approved implementing JSOP,

determinations resulting from budget and program reviews have been in many

respects arbitrary." McNamara shared Bell's frustrations. From the outset of his

term as secretary he knew full well that the lack of common assumptions among

the three military departments on strategic doctrine required immediate attention.75

McNamara's doubts about fashioning a coherent consensus out ofthe customary conflicts and compromises between the services deepened when he visited

SAC headquarters in February 1961 and encountered firsthand the rigidity that

assumed massive retaliation as the only response to Soviet provocation. General

Power's explication of the Air Force's "big bang" strategy only served to exacerbate

the secretary's concerns.76

Dissatisfied with both Hickey's 1959 report and SIOP-62, McNamara asked

the JCS in March 1961 to draft a doctrine that would take into account controlled

responses and negotiating pauses. Their reply made clear that options implicit in

controlled responses conflicted with their conception of the appropriate use of

nuclear weapons. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union, in their estimation, had secure retaliatory forces capable of conducting such a controlled response

as a second strike. To the extent that they contemplated flexible response they

saw it as the capability to use nuclear missiles, bombs, and shells deliverable from

aircraft, land-based silos, surface ships, and submarines. Nuclear planning, in their

judgment, required removal of all limitations "until our forces are endowed with

sufficient invulnerability to permit holding a portion in secure reserve."77

This JCS response appealed to OSD planners even less than the second

Hickey report, which on 1 December 1961 stated that a controlled response strategy could not be implemented until the late 1960s. The report, however, did

produce a list of strategic targets and their projected growth over the next 10

years, and an estimate of performance characteristics of planned weapon systems, including the numbers of missiles needed to destroy projected targets. The

recommended force posture included 2,000 Minuteman missiles and 40 Polaris

submarines. Although they believed that a controlled response strategy was feasible

much sooner than the Hickey group envisaged, Hitch and Enthoven appreciated

the effort, the latter later calling it "by far the best available on the subject to that

date."78

*JSOP was the product of a JCS ditective in 1952 designed to place the planning process on a systematic and

tegular basis. The proper title was "Joint Strategic Objectives Plan,"
318 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

But Hitch and his quantifiers found bothersome the reasoning behind the

percentages of estimated damage. Why the same figures for both cities and military targets? Why no connection between offensive and defensive forces? Hickey's

report suffered further from failure to take into account major changes in intelligence estimates between June and December 1961. Not only had the intelligence

community sharply reduced its earlier projection of Soviet ICBMs on launchers,

but it also estimated that the Soviets' hardened missiles would not become operational until 1965-66. Hitch rejected the Hickey report's implicit view that all of a

list of advanced capabilities had to be achieved "before it makes sense to abandon

the spasm war concept."79

The persistent question of command and control over strategic forces led

to preparation of papers, at the secretary's request, on specific deficiencies in the

current system and on areas requiring attention. Despite some differences between

the reports of the DDR&E and the chairman of the JCS, they both pointed to

the vulnerability of the command center at SAC to nuclear attack and on the

need for new, more orderly procedures for devolution of authority in the event

of such attack. In particular, the reports emphasized that procedural and physical

safeguards against unauthorized use of nuclear weapons required immediate attention. McNamara looked on improvement of command and control capability as

of the "highest priority." Consequently, on 24 August 1961 he recommended to

the president creation of a command and control task force to "investigate the

interrelated organizational, doctrinal, and equipment aspects of the command

and control system; [and to] develop and evaluate alternative means by which

improvement can be effected. "80

In September the secretary selected General Earle E. Partridge, recently retired

commander of the North American Air Defense Command, as task force chairman. McNamara wanted a proposal for a command structure that would be

"compatible with plans for the controlled and flexible employment of forces in

the event of nuclear war." The task force completed its assignment on 17 November with recommendations for organizational changes that called for acquisition of

equipment and for centralization of authority over the unified commands. 81

The Partridge committee's report, which recommended a consolidation of

command and control under a commander in chief, disappointed McNamara. As

the secretary reported to a congressional committee in June 1962, "the Partridge

report has not been implemented, because it was an advisory report, and it

contained many suggestions, for example, which neither the Chiefs nor I thought

deserved implementing." When pressed for more detail, McNamara did not

conceal his irritation with the panel's work. Its recommendations included a

"certain consolidation of control either within the Joint Chiefs of Staff or relating

to the unified commands. And I will tell you quite frankly, I don't know which.

I thought it was such an absurd recommendation, I didn't read it." Changes in

equipment and doctrine recommended by the Partridge committee did not sat-
Flexible Response 319

isfy McNamara's concerns for centralizing authority in OSD or for advancing

"controlled and flexible employment of forces."82 In later years the SlOPs clearly

reflected the centrality of OSD.

Assured Destruction

The command and control problem no doubt contributed to the declining

interest in counterforce. By the close of 1963, within the Pentagon, counterforce

no longer remained a significant element of flexible response. If any particular

event marked a clear break with the doctrine the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 did. It sensitized McNamara to a deeper awareness of the implications

of a nuclear war and strengthened his conviction that the nuclear weapon did

not offer a useful tool in the superpower conflict. "One of the reasons why

McNamara backed off the no-cities doctrine," according to Enthoven, "is that it

was being erroneously interpreted as a theory whereby thermonuclear war could

be made tolerable, and therefore fought and won. Gradually he turned against it

because it seemed to be getting bent out ofshape."83

The price of an acceptable counterforce strategy ultimately proved too high.

The increase in the potential effectiveness of Soviet offensive forces had reached

the point in 1962 where the defensive side of counterforce, that is, the ability

of the United States to survive a massive nuclear assault, had become too problematic. Too many lives and too much property were at stake. Even if defenses

capable of shooting down a sufficient number of enemy missiles could be built,

the cost would be astronomical. Most likely, the United States could not buy

effective defense at any price. On the offensive side, counterforce whetted the

Air Force's prodigious appetite for ever more missiles and manned bombers to

achieve its mission. The mission encompassed a dangerous temptation to acquire

first-strike capability, a facet of counterforce that the secretary did not welcome

and did not consider feasible.

After 1962 McNamara, increasingly convinced of the need to avoid use of

nuclear weapons altogether, centered his attention on creating a capability that

would suffice to deter attack. During the summer and fall of 1963, in iterations

of a draft presidential memorandum, he pursued a new theme he termed "assured

destruction" as offering the best prospect for deterrence. In a refined draft on 6

December, "Recommended FY 1965-FY 1969 Strategic Retaliatory Forces,"

McNamara set forth general nuclear war objectives with the major focus on

assured destruction. This objective required the capacity "to destroy, after a well

planned and executed Soviet surprise attack on our Strategic Nuclear Forces, the

Soviet government and military controls, plus a large percentage of their population and economy (e.g. 30% of their population, 50% oftheir industrial capacity,

and 150 of their cities)." Acquisition of such a capability would give confidence
320 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

that the Soviet Union would be deterred from attacking. The numbers cited represented an objective rather than reflecting existing capabilities.84

McNamara recommended against adding up to 750 Minuteman missiles to

reach a total of 1,950 as proposed by the Air Force, because they would not make

a significant difference in a nuclear war. He rejected the notion that these additional offensive forces would be cost-effective in reducing damage inflicted on

the United States by a Soviet attack. As for a fUll first-strike capability that could

render the Soviet Union helpless, he found it not feasible during the projected

time period. The forces recommended were sufficient for assured destruction and

could "accomplish what might reasonably be able to be done" to contribute to

"damage limiting."85

In the very next month the secretary oddly revived prospects for support of

damage limitation in his Senate testimony in January 1964, perhaps inadvertently

or possibly to win over congressional skeptics. He ruled out a "cities only" strategy

as "dangerously inadequate" and a full first-strike force as "simply unattainable,"

recommending a "damage limiting" strategy as "the most practical and effective

course for us to follow," to destroy the war-making capability of the enemy.86

In fact, it seems that he merely substituted the term damage limiting for assured

destruction; his description of(he strategy's objective clearly fit assured destruction.

Whatever his intention, he triggered another round of debate over counterforce

versus countercity targeting. It provided another opportunity for LeMay to insist

during the drafting ofthe Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan QSCP-65) that damage

limitation should have priority over countercity strategy. A compromise brokered

by Taylor, at the time chairman ofthe JCS, in February 1964 included elements of

both counterforce and assured destruction strategies.87

The compromise within JCS did not sway McNamara. His downgrading of

the civil defense program reflected accurately his views on damage limitation. The

combination of an inevitably high death rate in the event of a Soviet attack and

the high cost of expanding shelters to shield the public demonstrated convincingly

that the number of additional survivors per billion dollars expended would not

justify the marginal returns on the investment.*88

The same pessimism pervaded McNamara's position on ABMs as revealed in

a draft presidential memorandum of 14 November 1963. He lost whatever confidence he might have had initially in the Army's Nike-Zeus because it could not

discriminate between real warheads and decoys. And he remained less than enthusiastic about its successor, the Nike-X, which held only slightly more promise as

an effective defense against incoming missiles. At most he would recommend a

strategic program "to provide the technical and organizational base for later decisions" on such elements as the Nike-Zeus test program. Meanwhile, the Nike-X

"would be limited to development work only."89

* See Chaptet II.
Flexible Response 321

In February 1965 the secretary pointed out to the House Armed Services

Committee that "over and above the technical problems there are even greater

uncertainties concerning the preferred concept of deployment, the relationship

of the Nike-X system to other elements of a balanced damage-limiting effort, the

timing of the attainment of an effective nationwide fallout shelter system and

the nature and effect of an opponent's possible reaction to our Nike-X deployment."90 In brief, the advances of nuclear technology seemed to render the urban

and industrial centers of both the United States and the Soviet Union equally

vulnerable, thereby providing a deterrent far more effective than an ABM could

offer.

These conclusions derived from a series of studies conducted by Rand, by

the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, and particularly by a task force led by

Brig. Gen. Glenn A. Kent, USAF, begun in the summer of 1962. The Kent group

completed its study in January 1964, concluding that potent use of U.S. strategic

offensive forces against enemy offensive forces could achieve damage limitation

that would reduce population losses at lesser costs than defensive measures. In his

testimony before congressional committees in the winter of 1964-65 the secretary repeatedly mentioned damage limitation as an important element of assured

destruction, but there were limits to the effectiveness of both active and passive

defenses. Area defense forces, he noted, could destroy enemy vehicles before they

reached their targets, and civil defense programs could reduce the vulnerabiliry

of urban centers. But "pervading the entire Damage Limiting problem is the

factor of uncertainry." Along with the excessive costs of attempting to solve the

problem would be the adversary's abiliry to "offset any increases in our defenses

by increases in their missile forces." The first objective of strategic nuclear forces

had to be the capabiliry for assured destruction. This would ensure "with a high

degree of confidence" that the destruction of, "say, one-quarter to one-third of its

population and about two-thirds of its industrial capaciry" should be sufficient to

deter an aggressor from attacking. Mutual vulnerabiliry was the path to securiry.

In this context increased damage-limiting measures offered diminishing, marginal

returns.91

In practice, the Pentagon's shift from counterforce to assured destruction was

a logical transition. Assured destruction could be accommodated without significant changes in the SLOP. Targeting of Soviet strategic bases, of course, continued

even as cities became prime targets. As new Soviet military targets appeared and

were identified they became potential objects of U.S. attack. Enthoven observed

in 1968: "Our targeting policy, as reflected in the guidance for the preparation

of a targeting plan, has not changed. From 1962 on, the targeting plan has been

based on the principle that we should have different options that target strategic

forces and cities."92

* *
322 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

Semantic nuances sometimes obscured and confused the strategic debate in

these years, but the flexibility that McNamara and his colleagues sought went

beyond any specific doctrine. Having reached the point where he perceived

nuclear warfare itself as suicidal, the secretary wanted a powerful nuclear component sufficient to serve only as a deterrent. The special emphasis on conventional

forces as the most viable means of defending Europe provided the necessary nonnuclear component of flexible response. As for what constituted sufficiency on

the nuclear side, McNamara asserted that massive retaliation was "useless."93 The

huge numbers of nuclear weapons required would not guarantee U.S. security.

At the opposite extreme, finite deterrence, Taylor envisioned that a few hundred

nuclear weapons would suffice to deter aggression, but that proposition became

less cogent as Soviet nuclear strength rapidly expanded. By contrast with massive

retaliation and finite deterrence, McNamara regarded assured destruction, "an

actual and credible capability," as having the best probability of deterring attack.94

It represented the highest level of graduated response under the flexible response

doctrine, to be invoked only after the failure of conventional and tactical nuclear

responses. Able to survive a first strike against the United States, controlled assured

destruction forces could be calibrated according to prevailing circumstances and

used incrementally. For all of these strategic concepts the basic question remained

the same-how much nuclear weaponry was enough to deter aggression?

The key to DoD's policies, nuclear and non-nuclear, resided in "controlled

response," with the "response" as varied and flexible as possible and the "control"

firmly in the hands of Washington. This linkage remained intact when assured

destruction became the declared dominant nuclear strategic option. Indeed,

controlled response had an almost mantra-like ring to McNamara and his circle,

as ifthrough appropriate incantations it might solve all manner ofstrategic issues.

In the larger context, "no cities," "damage limitation," and "assured destruction"

conjoined as components in the securing of the important objective of establishing firm command and control of nuclear weapons centered in OSD.

Throughout his first years in office, the secretary worked to raise the consciousness of the NATO allies about the need to consider new strategies along

such paths as counterforce and assured destruction. A year after the Cuban missile

crisis, he publicly dwelt on the need to impress continually on the allies the realization that they no longer lived in a time of Western nuclear monopoly.95 He

admitted in 1994 that, having concluded in the early 1960s that nuclear weapons had no military utility, in long private conversations with both Kennedy and

Johnson he "had recommended, without qualification, that they never, under

any circumstances, initiate the use of nuclear weapons. I believe they accepted

my recommendations. But neither they nor I could discuss our position publicly

because it was contrary to established NATO policy."96 He might have added that

such an admission would have raised a storm of protest within DoD and Congress

as well as within NATO.
CHAPTER XIII

The Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

That "the best is the enemy of the good" is a saying at least as old as Voltaire.

According to an even older adage, "better is half a loaf than no bread." Both characterized the Kennedy administration's bumpy road to a limited nuclear test ban

agreement. In an exchange with Sen. John Sparkman a week after the treaty was

signed in August 1963, McNamara admitted that "a full and properly inspected

comprehensive test ban would in my opinion be more desirable than the limited

three-dimensional ban."! Even when the celebrants sounded a cautionary note, as

in McGeorge Bundy's observation that the treaty marked "a good first step," or in

Arthur Schlesinger's recognition that "it was not the millennium," they agreed that

it represented, in President Kennedy's words, "a step towards peace-a step towards

reason-a step away from war."2

Other parties to the debate over the test ban treaty, including members ofthe

scientific community and key elements within the government, questioned not

only the efficacy of a limited test ban but the wisdom of any type of ban. The

Defense Department especially had its share of dissenters. The generally receptive views of McNamara, and to a lesser degree of General Taylor, first as White

House military adviser and then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, frequently

did not reflect the thinking of the Joint Chiefs. Both former and current chiefs of

the military services had doubts about the "best" as well as the "good."3 Limited

as well as comprehensive test bans, they believed, endangered the nation's security. Since the latter was impossible to achieve, it was therefore less dangerous; the

former troubled them precisely because it could be achieved.

Although a majority of arms control experts looked on a test ban as a useful

development in which the relative position of each side, according to one study,

"would remain virtually unchanged while the absolute danger to both might be

reduced," the chiefs challenged this view; they saw the cessation of testing as a

benefit to the other side. From their perspective, even ifthe treaty did not solidifY

Soviet superiority in high-yield weapons, it would impede needed research on the

323
324 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

U.S. side. Above all, Soviet cheating in the future, which might be expected, could

enhance Soviet nuclear capabilities at the expense ofthe United States.4 Thus were

drawn the outlines of a dispute that lasted throughout the Kennedy administration and beyond.

Initiatives under Eisenhower

As far back as 1946, efforts had been made to put the nuclear genie back in

the bottle. In that year the Acheson-Lilienthal report became the basis of the U.S.

Baruch Plan for international control of atomic energy. Ten years later President

Eisenhower proposed halting the production of nuclear weapons and encouraging the reduction of stockpiles, and offered variations on this theme during his

second term. The early Eisenhower proposals all assumed that some weapons

would remain in the atomic arsenal even after disarmament. Toward the end of

the decade, however, general and complete nuclear disarmament became the goal.

Machinery for negotiating nuclear arms reduction had existed since the establishment of the United Nations Disarmament Commission in 1952. The U.S.

position, as expressed in official policy statements in 1960, assumed that elimination of weapons of mass destruction would proceed in gradual, verifiable stages.

The Soviet position entailed both a pledge against first use of nuclear weapons

and international inspection to follow (but not before) the renunciation of weapons of mass destruction. On-site monitoring of a halt to nuclear weapon testing

and phased liquidation of stockpiles had no place in the Soviet program. Given

Soviet superiority in conventional forces and weaponry, the United States was

reluctant to accept bans on nuclear weapon testing or production without verification and other guarantees that were unacceptable to the Soviet Union, resulting in

a stalemate.

The issue was too important to be left unaddressed. The Geneva meeting

of foreign ministers in 1959 established a Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament-in addition to the two superpowers, it consisted of four members each

from NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries-to explore solutions. The committee had made little progress by 1961.5 Although mutual suspicion hampered

the negotiating process, a U.S.-USSR moratorium on testing, begun in 1958,

lasted to the end of the Eisenhower administration. Unfortunately, Eisenhower

himself provided a pretext for later Soviet resumption of nuclear testing when

he prefaced an announcement in December 1959 that the United States would

continue the moratorium with the caveat that "although we consider ourselves

free to resume nuclear weapons testing, we shall not resume nuclear weapons tests

without announcing our intention in advance of any resumption."6 Whether a

comprehensive treaty could have materialized at this time remains a matter of

speculation, as the downing of the U-2 over Sverdlovsk on 1 May 1960 chilled
The Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 325

the atmosphere. The Geneva Conference recessed on 5 December and did not

reconvene until President Kennedy was in office.

Kennedy partisans later accorded Eisenhower grudging credit for initiating negotiations for a test ban, but faulted him for his relative passivity. Eisenhower did

establish a high-level Committee of Principals* to coordinate an executive branch

review of arms control policy and gave his blessing to negotiations, but McGeorge

Bundy dismissed his Atoms for Peace and Open Skies proposals as "substantively

trivial." Even Bundy, however, allowed that the president succeeded-and it was

no mean achievement-in permanently reversing the presumption fostered in

the Pentagon that testing could not be limited or prohibited altogether. In brief,

Eisenhower opened the way for Kennedy to make choices that had not been foreclosed by his predecessor's decisions'?

Establishment ofACDA

Kennedy indicated his intent to extend the testing moratorium and pursue

other means to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons and escalation of the

arms race when he asked in his Inaugural Address that both superpowers ". . .

for the first time, formulate serious and precise proposals for the inspection and

control of [nuclear] arms ...."8 But first he asked that negotiations be postponed

from February to March, until a panel of experts headed by James B. Fisk, president of Bell Telephone Laboratories, had studied technical considerations relating

to any agreement on ending nuclear weapons tests. As an earnest of his intentions the president appointed John J. McCloy, the well-regarded former U.S. high

commissioner for Germany, as his adviser on disarmament and arms control, to

oversee the expanded arms control effort.9

McCloy on the whole enjoyed strong support from the leadership of both

State and Defense. Dean Rusk years later counted McNamara as a staunch believer

in the virtues of arms control, stating that because of his assistance, "I never had to

arm-wrestle the Joint Chiefs on this score. McNamara took care of all disputes with

the chiefs inside the Pentagon." Rusk may have overstated McNamara's unequivocal support, but the defense secretary was fundamentally committed to the broad

principle. Paul Nitze, another dependable champion despite his own occasional

qualms, recalled that when he accepted the position of assistant secretary of

defense for international security affairs, the president asked him to pay particular

attention to arms control. More than willing to comply, Nitze had extensive experience with arms control as head of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff

in 1950-53 and as adviser to the U.S. delegation to the Disarmament Conference

*The committee, formed in 1958, included the secretaries ofstate and defense, the CIA director, the chairman

of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the White House science adviser. Kennedy expanded the membership

to include the chairman of the ]CS and directors of USIA and subsequently the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. See FRUS 1961-63, VII: 13-14.
326 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

in Geneva in the summer of 1960. He subsequently played an important role in

the establishment ofthe Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), which

emerged from the McCloy review. But for Nitze's influence ACDA might have

become an isolated backwater at State, with little connection to other elements

of the national security bureaucracy and hence little coordinating authority or

clout. "So 1 testified at length on its behalf," Nitze noted, "and was instrumental

in getting ACDA established as an independent agency." 10

McCloy made an eloquent appeal in August 1961 for a careful delineation of

the new agency's bureaucratic relationships when he testified before Congress for

the bill establishing the agency. Because responsibility for negotiating disarmament

proposals fell within the province of the State Department, he recommended

that the director report to the secretary of state. But the director would not be

just another bureau chief in the department. The agency would have a "semiautonomous character," with separate budget and annual reports to Congress, and

the director an enhanced standing and direct access to the president as principal

adviser on disarmament. 11

Whether or not the credit for creating ACDA belongs to Nitze or McCloy,

the new agency was established in September 1961 under the directorship of

William C. Foster, a former deputy secretary of defense in the Truman administration. 12 The JCS expressed unease over the jurisdictional arrangement. Asking

how a director with the equivalent rank of an under secretary could issue recommendations that would be coordinated at the cabinet level, the chiefs would have

preferred just strengthening the existing disarmament bureau within State. OSD

registered similar concern when Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric asked for

clarification of ACDA's relationship with the NSC; he wanted to be sure that

ACDA recommendations would pass through the NSC as well as through State.

The designation of Foster, with his prior Defense background, as principal adviser

to the president defused much of the 000 criticism, as did the expansion of the

Committee of Principals to include the JCS chairman. 13

JCS dissatisfaction might have had a more significant impact on Congress in

1961 but for the supportive views of Eisenhower and JCS Chairman Lemnitzer.

The former president sent a personal note to McCloy on 29 June to let him know

that "I heartily concur in your purpose."14 Lemnitzer testified on 25 August that

"the vital interests of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in this area are clearly recognized

by all concerned." The chiefs agreed to a centralized direction of arms control

efforts. ''Arms control affairs," he recognized, were "inextricably intermeshed with

military as well as political matters. Necessarily, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have a

vital and continuing interest in every facet of arms control as an integral part of

their responsibilities for the military security of the United States." Congressional appreciation of Lemnitzer's testimony was reflected in Rep. James O'Hara's

response to Lemnitzer: "I think it is news of major importance when the Chief
The Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 327

of Staff [sic] comes before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and recommends an

agency, the goal of which is the end of arms. I wish that the widest publicity

could be given your testimony." 15

Proposing a Test Ban Treaty

The review of disarmament proceedings begun by McCloy early in 1961

encompassed transcripts from 250 negotiating sessions in Geneva. McCloy focused initially on the sweeping U.S. disarmament plan of 27 June 1960, which called

for balanced, phased reductions of forces to minimal levels, with on-site inspection of air and naval bases as well as missile launching pads. U.S. and Soviet force

levels would drop from 2.5 million to 2.1 million in the first stage. An international disarmament control agency would monitor each nation's compliance. But

the proposal barely met the JCS requirements, let alone Soviet interests. The latter

had no intention of allowing the kinds of controls indicated in the U.S. plan.

And when the U.S. Disarmament Administration* attempted to revise the 1960

proposal by accepting nuclear-free zones and uninspected bans on transferring

nuclear weapons to other nations, the Soviet Union was not appeased and the

Joint Chiefs were not satisfied. 16

In light of steadfast resistance from all sides, not surprisingly the McCloy

group settled for pursuing a nuclear test ban rather than embark on the broader

and more difficult negotiations over general disarmament. The United States then

unveiled on 18 April 1961, in conjunction with its British partner, a compendious draft treaty for a test ban. At the 292nd meeting in Geneva ofthe Conference

on Cessation of Nuclear Weapons Tests the allies presented a detailed text ofsome

60 pages, proposing inspection machinery that would cost $2.5 billion dollars to

install and $500 million each year thereafter. The plan provided for a Control

Commission to supervise a worldwide detection system, with equal U.S. and

Soviet representation and three neutral observers holding the balance, and an

administrator to carry out the commission's policy. To placate the Soviet Union

the treaty stipulated strict safeguards against inspectors ranging beyond their

immediate assignment; observers from the host country would accompany inspection teams along prescribed routes and would restrict their inspection to areas

predetermined by seismic data. The plan proposed to ban all tests in the earth's

atmosphere, in outer space, in the oceans, and underground, except those producing signals ofless than 4.75 seismic magnitudeY

The test ban plainly posed risks for the United States, particularly the possibility of Soviet tests going undetected at high altitudes or underground below the

4.75 seismic threshold. McCloy recognized the gamble implicit in signing such

a treaty but felt that other considerations outweighed the risks. In March he had

*Eisenhower had esrablished rhe Disarmamenr Administration, the predecessor to ACDA, as a unit inside the

State Depanmenr in 1960.
328 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

outlined for the president the benefits that could flow from such an accord. At

the very least it would break the deadlock over disarmament and provide experience in superpower cooperation in matters of arms control and inspection,

perhaps leading to other avenues of cooperation, such as the exploration of outer

space. It would also help halt the spread of nuclear weapons to other nations.

And important "political gains" would accrue in the form of enhanced U.S. international stature. IS

None of these hopes materialized in 1961. The Soviet negotiators refused to

join their U.S. counterparts in what the State Department called "a great adventure in international collaboration for peace." If the U.S. side was cautious, the

Soviet side was refractory. Instead of the single impartial administrator envisaged

in the treaty, a concept Moscow seemed willing to accept the year before, it now

demanded a tripartite administrative board-a troika. Additionally, the Soviets

insisted on limiting annual inspections in the USSR to three visits (the Western

nations sought 20), with all manner of restrictions on staffing and procedures.

If no staff could be hired, no control posts established, and no interpretation of

seismic data allowed, State noted, the treaty would be a sham. "At almost every

stage in the process, there would be abundant opportunity to thwart and block

the mechanism of control .... The whole purpose of the test-ban treaty is to

deter clandestine tests. What deterrence would this Soviet system offer?" For his

part, Khrushchev told Kennedy at the June 1961 summit meeting in Vienna that

more than three inspections would be "tantamount to intelligence, something the

Soviet Union cannot accept." 19

By the time of the Vienna summit the Soviets had in fact lost interest in

a test ban treaty. Having earlier allowed the two issues to be treated separately,

Khrushchev now insisted on linking a comprehensive test ban to general and

complete disarmament. Only with the latter achieved would he agree to abandon

the troika arrangement and accede to external controls. Khrushchev informed

Kennedy that "ifthere were general and complete disarmament there would be no

question of espionage because there would be no armaments. Then there would

be no secrets and all doors must be open so that complete verification could be

ensured."20 Political commentator Walter Lippmann, speculating about reasons

for the Soviet shift, thought Khrushchev may have sought to avoid alienating

the Communist Chinese, who had their own nuclear ambitions, or he may have

counted on blame for the failure to fall on Washington if the United States rejected

a treaty because of objections to the troika. "The question," said Lippmann, "is

whether, with a resumption of testing, they will catch up with us, perhaps surpass

"21 us.

Of course, the Soviet Union was not alone in the conviction that testing

offered definite advantages. The Atomic Energy Commission and Joint Chiefs had

their own misgivings about limiting nuclear testing. Assumptions about Soviet

cheating only in part explained their hesitation. The AEC worried about the
The Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 329

United States standing pat on its weapons stockpile. "Nuclear weapons development is not a static science," the agency reported to Congress in January 1961.

"Our weapons scientists are convinced that further nuclear testing would achieve

major advances in weapons design." fu for the threat to health from nuclear fallout, the agency noted that testing could be conducted underground or in outer

space without causing fallout. 22

The JCS shared the AEC's reservations along with even deeper suspicions

about Soviet behavior during the moratorium. They feared Moscow was conducting clandestine tests even as the United States abided by its self-denying rules.

Their overriding worry was that the Soviet Union might achieve a breakthrough

at the expense of the United States during the pause. Not until a reliable system

of verification was developed and became operational could they accept any

prolonged test ban. With the McCloy review still under way, on 11 March 1961

they asked for an immediate presidential decision on resuming testing, maintaining that a continued voluntary moratorium was not in the best interest of the

nation. Absent an agreement within 60 days after resumption of negotiations

the service chiefs recommended U.S. renunciation of the moratorium. Looking

beyond the Soviet Union to the Sino-Soviet relationship, they suggested later in

March that should a treaty be concluded and Communist China not accede to it

within "a reasonably short time," that, too, would provide grounds for the administration to resume testing. A week later they recommended 1 June as a deadline

for concluding an agreement with the stipulated safeguards; if the Conference on

Cessation of Nuclear Weapons Tests produced no such accord by that date, the

United States should begin testing nuclear weapons as soon as possible.23

The draft text of a nuclear test ban treaty that State introduced at Geneva on

18 April thus encountered a lack of enthusiasm if not overt hostility from the JCS.

Col. E. F. Black, military assistant to the deputy secretary of defense, dismissed the

Joint Staff's cool reception as owing to their understandable reluctance to spend

much time analyzing military implications of a nuclear test ban treaty during

its interim development. He likened the situation to painting "a moving train,"

and "now that the train has stopped and the engineer has gotten out to throw

the switch on the track ahead" he recommended that the Joint Staff take a careful

look.24

McNamara himself had already identified some problems with the treaty,

but expressed them without the vehemence of the chiefs. At a meeting of the

Committee of Principals on 2 March he asked, first, how the United States might

disengage itselffrom a treaty in the event ofsubsequent actions by other countries,

and second, how the administration could extricate itself from the current voluntary moratorium.25 By 28 July, convinced that the Soviet Union had no interest

in a treaty except on terms unacceptable to the United States, McNamara proposed that the president initiate preparations to resume nuclear weapons testing

while continuing efforts to negotiate a satisfactory agreement. He had Director of
330 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

Defense Research and Engineering Harold Brown notifY Jerome Wiesner, White

House science adviser, of DoD's belief that in the short run a delay in the resumption of nuclear testing would not have a substantial effect but over the long run

"possible Soviet gains from testing must certainly be considered an important

military disadvantage to the U.S. Therefore, the position of the Department of

Defense ... is that nuclear weapons testing underground should be resumed as

soon as it is politically expedient."26

Although the defense secretary had come to share the chiefs' sense of urgency

about resolving the issue sooner rather than later, the president was intent on giving diplomacy a wider window and preferred deferring any resumption of testing

for six months while pursuing but keeping preparations to a low profile. Kennedy's

reluctance to resume testing did not signifY any greater faith in Soviet trustworthiness. On the contrary, his patience was wearing thin. He told British Prime

Minister Harold Macmillan in May that if there was no progress in negotiations

with Khrushchev "the United States should be ready to resume nuclear tests for

both seismic research and weapons development." He criticized Khrushchev for

rejecting U.S. and British proposals submitted in April despite efforts to accommodate Soviet views. But the president was attempting to sustain, in the words of

AEC Chairman Glenn T. Seaborg, a difficult "balancing act."27 Late in June he

announced the formation of an advisory committee, chaired by Wolfgang K. H.

Panofsky of Stanford University, to determine if the Soviet Union was conducting clandestine tests, and to what effect. At the same time the panel was asked to

weigh the advantages ofthe United States resuming testing.28

In its report to the White House on 8 August, the Panofsky panel concluded

that there was no immediate need for the United States to resume testing, for it

found no evidence that the Soviets were secretly breaking the moratorium. Granting that self-denial would limit possibilities for some weapons development, the

panel envisaged other ways of compensating for the absence oftests. Except for the

strong backing ofJohn S. Foster, director ofthe University ofCalifornia's Lawrence

Livermore Laboratory, the JCS received little support for challenges to both the

premises and the conclusions of the Panofsky report. The single concession to the

military and to the national weapons laboratories came in the recognition that if

the Soviet Union was testing secretly, in the long run the United States would have

to abandon the moratorium or risk impairing its military position.29

Notwithstanding his frustration with the Soviets the president accepted the

judgment of the Panofsky panel and put off any immediate resumption of testing. By midsummer, though, the internal differences within the Department of

Defense had narrowed and the Pentagon's civilian and military leadership stood

united in their opinion ofthat decision. Lemnitzer complained about the Panofsky

report's "conjectural" conclusions based on unconfirmed or inadequate intelligence

estimates. McNamara saw no alternative to testing, and he was joined by the presi-
The Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 331

dent's military representative, General Taylor. In a memo to Kennedy on 7 August

and in a statement the next day before the NSC, Taylor argued the need for the

United States to test and develop light strategic warheads and small atomic weapons, including the neutron bomb, in order to have the tactical means to execute

U.S. military strategy.3o

In holding out against these military opinions the president listened to his

national security affairs assistant, McGeorge Bundy, who discounted Taylor's views

as "subject in a measure to criticism that one can generally apply to estimates from

professional soldiers on weapons development: they tend to think in terms ofwhat

we can do while minimizing what the enemy can do with the same opportunity."

Kennedy evinced skepticism about the Joint Chiefs' analysis in a memorandum

to Taylor: "Was it done by one, two, or three men? Was it done outside of the

Defense Department by a group of scientists, or what? This is particularly interesting in view of the fact that the Chairman of the AEC seems to find himself

'in general agreement [with] the findings and conclusions of the [Panofsky]

report."'3!

End to the Moratorium

After 30 August the moratorium critics suddenly had a stronger claim, as the

Soviet Union announced on that day that it would resume testing, blaming the

West's intransigence for precipitating its action. Two days later, it exploded the

first nuclear device in its new test series, providing the president with reason to

follow suit. Bundy later wrote that of all the provocations in Soviet-American relations in 1961-62, the Soviet announcement disappointed the president the most.

Kennedy's immediate reaction, according to Sorensen, was unprintable. He felt

that Khrushchev must have been aware of preparations for resumption of testing

when they met in Vienna. Nonetheless, Kennedy countered with what Sorensen

characterized as "a controlled and deliberate response."32

Several considerations caused Kennedy to postpone a decision. First, he could

not be certain that Khrushchev had deliberately deceived him. McCloy gleaned

from his discussions in Moscow in late July that Soviet scientists and military men

were pressing the Soviet leader to test a 100-megaton bomb, prompted in part

perhaps by Eisenhower's veiled threat in his aforementioned December 1959 statement (see page 324). In a White House meeting with Senate leaders on 31 August

Sen. Hubert Humphrey (D-Minn.) suggested to the president that a split in the

Kremlin may have caused Khrushchev to yield to the protesting hard-line faction

against his own inclination. Although Allen Dulles said the CIA discerned no sign

of any rift, Seaborg implied in his memoirs that Khrushchev had favored serious arms control negotiations during this period. Further, the United States was

simply not ready to resume testing overnight. The absence of equipment in place
332 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

to undertake major tests posed a practical obstacle to any effective early response

to the Soviet action. Even underground testing, Seaborg advised the president,

required a level of planning and preparation that exceeded the capacity of existing

facilities.33

Finally, there was the political factor. Edward R. Murrow, director of the

United States Information Agency, urged delay in order to reap propaganda benefits from the Soviet action that would strengthen U.S. international standing.

McNamara helped the political case by telling the president he saw no military

necessity for bombs of 100-megaton size. Ifso, Moscow would derive no particular advantage from testing weapons of that magnitude, and the administration

could effectively blunt congressional pressure for retaliation. Under these circumstances, it was just as well that the president proceeded slowly.34

While Kennedy deferred a riposte, he could not conceal his dismay over the

failure of the test ban negotiations. He and his staff hoped that world outrage,

spurred by U.S. denunciation of their behavior, might impress the Soviets. The

Soviet decision, he asserted, "presents a hazard to every human being throughout

the world by increasing the dangers of nuclear fallout." The Soviet government's

action exposed "the complete hypocrisy of its professions about general and

complete disarmament." Recalling Arthur Dean, chairman ofthe U.S. delegation

to the Disarmament Committee, from Geneva, on 3 September the president,

along with Prime Minister Macmillan, proposed an atmospheric test ban without

inspections. Expected to further isolate the Soviet Union in the United Nations if

it rejected the proposal, the offer allowed Moscow six days to reply.35

Unfortunately, the Soviet resumption of tests in the atmosphere did not

provoke the anticipated strong international response. A conference of 24 nonaligned nations meeting in Belgrade on 1 September displayed unhappiness with

both countries. The neutral bloc asked both Kennedy and Khrushchev to meet

again at the summit, but refrained from explicit criticism of the USSR.36 The

Soviet testing continued.

To underscore its rejection of the joint U.S.-U.K. proposal, the Soviet Union

conducted two additional atmospheric tests between 1 and 5 September. On 5

September Kennedy announced the U.S. decision to resume underground testing

while keeping the deadline open on atmospheric testing. Although, unlike those

of the Soviet Union, the tests would be conducted underground and in laboratories, without danger of fallout, the president regretted having to take such a step.

He lamented to aides, "What choice did we have? They had spit in our eye three

times. We couldn't possibly sit back and do nothing at all. We had to do this."37

The ]CS were no happier with the decision for underground testing than

with the proposed ban on atmospheric testing. The former, limited in yield,

served primarily for expensive development of small tactical weapons. The latter,

while politically attractive for international consumption, had "profound" implications for the U.S.-Soviet nuclear competition that disturbed others in DoD
The Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 333

besides the Joint Chiefs. Even Nitze later conceded that "many of the concerns of

the JCS were valid." At a meeting of officials on 2 September, the day before the

Kennedy-Macmillan announcement, Gilpatric and Brown observed that such an

agreement would preclude the United States from conducting atmospheric tests

needed to develop antimissile weapons, to test the vulnerability of missile-launching sites, and to evaluate the impact of electromagnetic radiation on those sites.38

The arguments for resumption of atmospheric tests became more compelling in light of continuing Soviet testing activity in the fall of 1961 and the tepid

response of nonaligned nations that cast doubt on the political rationale for a

test ban. Based on the latest Soviet test series, a Defense White Paper estimated

that the "Soviets could have early capability of launching into intercontinental

ballistic or orbital trajectories payloads of 50-100 MT. "39 It did not escape attention in the Pentagon that the Soviet military newspaper, Red Star, claimed that

the USSR possessed nuclear warheads equivalent to 100 megatons and had the

missiles to deliver them. In view of these developments, even as he dismissed the

utility of the 100-megaton bomb, McNamara gave his "considered opinion that

we must continually be prepared to conduct those tests most vital to us and that

these tests should be conducted in any environment, upon the approval of the

President. "40

Actually, the president and the NSC approved atmospheric testing in

principle as early as 2 November 1961 but hedged the decision with a host of

reservations, including assurance that atmospheric fallout from such tests would

be kept "to an absolute minimum." Circumstances alone forced a delay in implementing the decision, as reviving the organization and restarting facilities that had

been idled during the moratorium involved, as predicted, long and costly preparations. As Lemnitzer noted, firms manufacturing special cables for the test site

had stopped production, and it would take months before supplies became available again. Lemnitzer and McNamara remained less committed than the chiefs

to full-blown testing, and the general reiterated the conviction that matching

development of the Soviet-sought superbomb was unnecessary for U.S. security.

The superbomb, Lemnitzer told the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic

Energy, was a "terror weapon" rather than a weapon having any serious strategic

use.41

While the administration rebuilt the testing infrastructure and negotiated

with the British for permission to use Christmas Island, a sparsely inhabited atoll

1,000 miles south of Hawaii, as a site for the new tests, the UN General Assembly stepped up its efforts to move the nuclear powers toward disarmament. An

Irish resolution on 4 December 1961 called for an international agreement,

with inspection and control provisions, under which nations possessing nuclear

weapons would not transfer them to states without weapons. On the same day

Sweden sponsored a resolution, opposed by the United States but accepted by

the Soviet Union, to inquire into conditions under which non-nuclear nations
334 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

would agree not to acquire nuclear weapons nor allow use of them on their territories. In December, the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament was expanded

to an Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) in order to press more

effectively for negotiations on general and complete disarmament.42 Within the

United States, too, arms control proponents kept up the pressure. In a controversiallecture at Cornell University early in January 1962 Hans Bethe, a Cornell

physicist and adviser to ACDA, told his audience, with reference to the superbomb threat, "there is not much difference between 100 and 10 megatons from

the military point of view. Ten megatons is enough to destroy nearly any big city

.... Nothing has been fundamentally changed by the Russian tests ... nothing

fundamental is likely to be changed by any amount offuture nuclear testing."*43

Such countervailing pressures fed Kennedy's reluctance to make public the

time and place ofthe forthcoming tests. He kept hopes alive in the winter of 1962

of reaching some understanding with the Soviets that would stay the u.s. decision. At their meeting in Bermuda in December 1961, Macmillan played on the

president's sensibilities by linking U.S. use of Christmas Island with a promise to

make a new effort to achieve an arms control agreement with the Soviets. Kennedy

complied by postponing announcement of the tests through the first two months

of 1962.44

The latest delay threatened to dissolve the administration's fragile consensus on atmospheric testing. Divisions within DoD, never far from the surface,

reemerged. The JCS had earlier agreed to the terms of the April 1961 test ban plan

but now rejected them. Soviet behavior since April convinced the Joint Chiefs that

the Soviets could not be trusted to abide by treaty restrictions. McNamara and

Gilpatric did not accept this judgment. Although they recommended moving

ahead with the test series, they remained willing to sign a test ban treaty despite

risks of Soviet violations. McNamara consistently believed that the United States

would suffer no disadvantage if an enforceable treaty could be obtained in 1962.45

When the president finally announced the test schedule on 2 March 1962, he

again pointed out that the fallout would be far less than the contamination created

by the Soviet series, and that U.S. resumption was solely a result of Soviet refusal

to accept an enforceable treaty ban. In a lengthy public address he noted that he

was acting in advance of the ENDC meeting in Geneva on 14 March, on which

he still pinned hopes for accommodation with Moscow. The United States made

another overture by offering to eliminate any threshold for underground explosions and to limit annual inspections on Soviet territory to small areas of high

seismic activity. When the Soviet Union rejected these conciliatory gestures, again

dismissing the inspection plan as an espionage ploy, the United States commenced

* Bethe's talk resembled Lemnitzer's congressional testimony on the point of the superbomb and largely mirrored

McNamara's position as well, but the disclosure of classified information in a public venue triggered calls for an

investigation into an alleged breach of national security and resulted in a White House review of the incident

and a reprimand.
The Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 335

its series of atmospheric tests, designated Operation Dominic, on 25 April 1962

near Johnston and Christmas Islands in the Pacific.46

The administration exercised care to minimize radioactive fallout. Testing the

Polaris missiles with nuclear warheads occasioned little discussion at the White

House because those missiles would be fired over water, where a failure would not

be catastrophic. But in testing the Atlas missile at Vandenberg Air Force Base, the

prospect of a mechanical malfunction and missile abort, with a possible release of

radioactive nuclear material requiring decontamination and evacuation of a land

area, gave pause. Bundy recommended putting off the Vandenberg testing, telling the president that the psychological and political consequences of a mishap

outweighed the advantage of "user confidence" that would result from a successful

firing. McNamara's support ofthe Atlas test was at best thin. If pressed, Bundy felt

that he would order its cancellation. Bundy did not rule out a two-kiloton nearsurface experiment for late May in Nevada.47

The Joint Chiefs, on the other hand, strongly favored continued testing, including at Vandenberg. They especially wanted to learn about the impact of

high-altitude explosions on radio communications. But the White House, never

comfortable about the atmospheric tests, soon showed impatience. The Atlas,

nearing obsolescence, gave critics another reason to justify cancellation of the

Vandenberg program. Bundy and the president dwelt on the failures accompanying the tests, one oftracking, another of a missile launching. Unhappy as well over

the publicity given to the high-altitude tests, the president looked forward to their

early conclusion. As Lemnitzer scribbled in his notes of a 20 June 1962 White

House meeting, the president wanted to "get it over."48

From differing perspectives, Lemnitzer and McNamara would agree that not

enough was gained from the six months oftesting between 25 April and 4 November 1962. The JCS chairman appeared to believe the tests not extensive enough,

the secretary of defense that the tests could not yield enough to make them worth

the effort. By contrast, Seaborg thought the tests-the first U.S. atmospheric tests

since 1958-on balance useful. Despite the limitations and difficulties, the Dominic operation, in his estimate, "produced many important successes": vindicating

"the elaborate computational and certification procedures which were developed

during the moratorium," revitalizing America's nuclear laboratories, and, not the

least, "reawakening" the U.S. defense posture.49

Search for Compromise, March-November 1962

Though they encountered a stalemate over the testing issue, U.S. officials in

Geneva returned to yet more far-reaching discussions by the Eighteen-Nation

Disarmament Conference on the subject of general disarmament. As with the

test ban proposal, the administration struggled to fashion a set of provisions that

could both achieve consensus within the U.S. national security bureaucracy and
336 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

contain at least some elements acceptable to the Soviets. Even with an agreed set

of objectives, gaining concurrence on procedures and formulas for implementing a

comprehensive disarmament treaty presented an enormous challenge. Perhaps as a

token of goodwill, ACDA adopted the favored Soviet term "general and complete

disarmament" as the goal. In a memo for the president on 3 March 1962, ACDA

Director Foster specified, however, that any reduction of U.S. power resulting

from a treaty should be matched by "equalizing changes elsewhere."5o

The plan, as approved by the Committee of Principals and based in large part

on recommendations that had changed little from the June 1960 U.S. disarmament proposal, sought to secure maximum agreement in such areas as production

of fissionable materials and elimination of chemical and biological weapons. At a

White House meeting on 6 March the president raised questions about inspection

and verification. Foster responded with a proposal for a zonal random sampling system* as the best approach to inspection. With respect to weapon systems,

Foster wanted to focus on reduction ofstrategic delivery vehicles, while the president agreed with McNamara and Lemnitzer that the United States should seek a

30 percent across-the-board reduction of all armaments, with production cutoff

deferred until the second stage.51

Over the next six weeks the administration hammered out an "outline"

treaty, a summary of which it released on 18 April 1962. But the Soviet Union

had already presented to the ENDC its own version of a pact on "General and

Complete Disarmament Under Strict International Control" a month earlier, on

15 March. Each draft treaty contained three stages. Stage I of the Soviet treaty

called for total elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles, abolition of foreign bases,

withdrawal of troops from foreign territories, and reduction of Soviet and U.S.

forces to 1.7 million with corresponding arms and expenditures reductions.

In Stage I of the U.S. plan, all non-nuclear arms and nuclear weapon delivery

systems would be cut by 30 percent; production of weapons-grade fissionable

material would end; and U.S. and Soviet armed forces would be reduced to 2.1

million men each. The two proposals converged more closely in Stages II and III;

under both plans, Stage III would bring general and complete disarmament, with

national armed forces retained only for internal order and an international peacekeeping force operating under the UN.52

As in earlier iterations of the plan, the JCS had trouble with the 2.1 million

troop-strength ceiling under Stage I. They projected a minimum of 2.57 million

needed to operate armaments after a 30 percent reduction. Nor did their criticism let up after the Geneva Conference recessed in September 1962. The chiefs

complained to McNamara that ACDA's position on disarmament had periodically

shifted to accommodate the Soviet Union, while the Soviet position remained

essentially unchanged since 1960. Moreover, they claimed that ACDA tended to

* Whereby each side would divide irs rerrirory inro zones for moniroring and verificarion purposes.
The Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 337

put forth negotiating positions before proper evaluation. The recess, they argued,

should be used to stiffen the U.S. stance rather than offer new concessions.53

McNamara called the JCS criticism simplistic, noting that in light of ongoing

reevaluation "it would indeed have been remarkable had no changes occurred."

What mattered, he asserted, was whether such changes served to make reasonable

agreements possible: "I believe that they have."54 ISA, less diplomatic, declared

that "the majority ofJCS studies are so loaded with caveats as to constitute unreasonable measures which the USSR, even should she become desirous of reaching

agreements, would not accept." Too many JCS studies, according to ISA, showed

how reductions would affect the United States, without considering their effect on

the Soviet Union. OSD had to overrule them "on occasions when better studies

might have won support."55

Despite continuing internal dissension and seemingly irreconcilable differences with Moscow, the administration doggedly pursued the Geneva talks. All

during the spring and summer of 1962, even as the Dominic testing program

proceeded, the Western delegations searched for a way to engage the Soviet Union.

As in 1961, when the goal of "general and complete disarmament" appeared

impossibly complicated, the diplomats turned back to a test ban treaty as a more

attainable objective. The Soviet and U.S. draft treaties on disarmament both

included banning of tests as a natural component of the disarming process. Even

though the obstacles, notably on-site inspection, that had doomed general disarmament in the past had also derailed test ban negotiations, a test ban seemed to

have a better chance for success than did any other alternative in sight.

The eight new members of the ENDC introduced a compromise test ban

proposal just two days before the United States formally unveiled its proposals on

general disarmament. To resolve the test ban impasse, the eight urged consideration of (l) establishing a control system by expanding listening posts already in

place, (2) having an international scientific commission conduct on-site inspections, and (3) setting in motion regular consultation between the commission and

the nuclear powers with respect to significant seismic events. The recommendations were stated broadly enough to permit Soviet acceptance as long as it was

understood that on-site inspections would occur only at the invitation of the

country in which a suspicious event occurred.56

The United States, normally more insistent with regard to the on-site issue,

showed itself open to the eight-nation proposal. New technological advances in

underground detection by 1962 had made possible a promising replacement for

the on-site examinations that prompted a rethinking of the U.S. position. The

technological breakthrough came gradually, beginning with seminal work by the

Pentagon's Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) under Director Herbert

York in 1959. Under the name of Project VELA, 000 inaugurated a program

to devise a means to detect more accurately nuclear explosions fired both under-
338 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

ground and in space.* By the time the Kennedy administration took office the

technology was sufficiently advanced to elicit cautious confidence and continued

support. During FY 1962 the total appropriation for VELA was $60.168 million

with an estimated $162 million budgeted for FYs 1963-65.57

On the strength ofthe program's progress, conveyed publicly in a 000 report

released 7 July 1962, Bundy told the president he believed the recent advances

would permit the United States to relent on its demand for on-site inspection and

thus open the way for a nuclear test-ban accord with the Soviet Union. Moreover, satellite photography would provide a further means of checking on certain

kinds of underground tests. 58 In effect, technology reinforced Bundy's conviction,

shared with McNamara, that chances of a profound clandestine breakthrough

from new tests were slight compared with the potential benefits of stopping

nuclear proliferation.

Not everyone in the administration felt as sanguine over VELA. Rusk

emphasized that the VELA findings were preliminary and would require further

evaluation "before they could be the basis for any modification of prior U.S.

proposals." At a news conference on 12 July he granted that the VELA research

offered "some promising signs" but cautioned that it was presumptuous to assume

that its implementation could completely supplant control stations within the

nuclear nations and on-site inspection. On his arrival in Geneva two days later,

Ambassador Dean caused a brief sensation by suggesting that VELA might allow

the United States to dispense with detection stations inside the Soviet Union,

appearing to contradict Rusk, who issued a statement on 16 July clarifying the

administration's position. 59

Adding to the confusion was an ambivalent 1 July report from the Inspection

Study Group, an interagency unit ACDA established in October 1961 to define

and evaluate the inspection requirements of arms control plans. The group

concluded that while verification appeared theoretically feasible by means of the

latest equipment and methodology, more experimentation was warranted as well

as improved intelligence capabilities before on-site inspections could be restricted

or eliminated.60

When the Soviet Union announced the launching of a new series of atmospheric tests on 21 July, pressure mounted on the United States to respond to

the latest ENDC test ban proposal. Rumors generated by positive reports on the

VELA project and misreading of Dean's remarks convinced some observers that

a shift in U.S. policy was underway. In fact, between 26 July and 1 August the

White House held almost daily top-level meetings to formulate the U.S. position,

*Because there already existed a capability to detect explosions in the earth's atmosphete, the VELA project

excluded low-altitude tests. VELA's main challenge was to find a reliable method to monitor underground tests.

Success meant developing a long-range detection capability that would obviate the need for on-site inspection.

The trick was to distinguish the detonation signals associated with a nuclear test from earth tremots of similar

energy caused naturally by an earthquake.
The Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 339

with debate centering on the degree of confidence that could be placed in the

VELA results. At one point, Rusk asked whether the United States should support

a comprehensive ban assuming "we knew neither side could test." McNamara and

Seaborg answered affirmatively, but many of the attendees remained uneasy about

the potential for Soviet advantage should VELA prove inadequate. Dean thought

that if they were not careful they might be "walking into a Soviet trap." At the

1 August meeting Kennedy read a letter from Macmillan, who two weeks earlier

had told the House ofCommons that VELA would help to facilitate a final treaty

by rendering on-site inspections unnecessary; Macmillan now prodded the president to act. Lemnitzer dismissed the prime minister's importuning as the British

having "another fit of weakness," but Bundy noted pressure coming from allover

to define the U.S. stance.61

Kennedy emerged from the 1 August afternoon session to announce at a

press conference that although the United States stood on the verge of a system

of detection and verification for underground testing "which will be simpler and

more economical," and although "it may be that we shall not need as many as

we've needed in the past," an end to on-site inspections would be premature,

specifically with regard to the most problematic issue, unidentified underground

events. The United States and the United Kingdom formally presented a comprehensive test ban treaty proposal, a revised version of the April 1961 draft proposal,

to the plenary session of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on 27

August 1962 that spelled out exactly what concessions the administration was

prepared to make consistent with what the president had described as "the technical realities. "62

The terms of the U.S.-u.K. proposal demonstrated the limits of the administration's faith in the new seismic devices even given the risks that arms control

advocates like McNamara and Nitze were willing to tolerate. While U.S. negotiators spoke of fewer control stations and inspections, the comprehensive ban

adhered to the principle of mandatory on-site inspection. Under the plan, an

international scientific commission, much like the body mentioned in the 1961

draft treaty but with an enlarged neutral membership and an executive officer

with reduced staff, would report evidence of suspected nuclear tests. The opposite side, not the country being inspected, would determine which of the certified

events were to be examined up to an unspecified number annually for each side.

Nationals of the suspect party could not serve on the inspection team reviewing that particular incident.63 Given these conditions, the administration must

have realized that the revised treaty would be no more acceptable to the Soviets

than the earlier one had been. The president's advisers had in fact anticipated the

outcome and had wrestled with the details of a backup proposal.64

The submission by the United States and Britain of a second, more limited,

treaty proposal on the same day suggested that the comprehensive test ban treaty

was a stalking horse for a more serious-and more circumscribed-alternative.
340 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

Instead of a treaty banning tests in all environments, the limited plan would end

testing only in environments susceptible to monitoring by national means. The

ban could then dispense with international verification and on-site inspections.

Concomitantly, the one environment omitted from the second draft treaty plan

of 27 August was underground, where there still existed no assurance that the new

detecting devices could monitor all thresholds. Although Kennedy and Macmillan declared their "strong preference" for the comprehensive ban, they expressed

confidence also in the alternative as an accord that would lead to "a definite downward turn in the arms race." In the words of the alternative treaty's preamble,

"immediate discontinuance of nuclear weapon test explosions in the atmosphere,

in outer space, and in the oceans will facilitate progress toward the early agreement providing for the permanent and verified discontinuance of nuclear weapon

test explosions in all environments."65

Despite the removal of the on-site inspection requirement, the Soviet Union

rejected the more modest version of the treaty almost as strongly as it did the

comprehensive proposal. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vasili Kuznetsov charged

that the gist of the U.S. position had not materially changed "during all the years

of negotiations" and that the United States would derive special advantages from

small underground tests effectively "legalized" under the partial ban. Moscow

offered to consider a cutoff date, such as 1 January 1963, after which there would

be an "understanding" prohibiting testing of any kind. While Kennedy welcomed

the idea of a cutoff date to end all testing, he reminded the American public that

no moratorium or gentlemen's agreement would suffice. "This is the lesson," he

informed the press, "of the Soviet Government's tragic decision to renew testing

just a year ago."66 Once again the disarmament talks ended in stalemate.

Seizing a Window ofOpportunity

The ENDC meetings in Geneva recessed on 7 September 1962 amid "a deep

feeling offrustration and gloom," with plans to reconvene on 12 November. In the

interval the Cuban missile crisis diverted the world's attention from test ban negotiations. But it was only a temporary diversion. Indeed, the crisis served to focus

both U.S. and Soviet thoughts on the dangers of nuclear warfare and consequently

on the increasing urgency of reaching some kind of agreement. On 4 November,

a week after the height of the missile confrontation, the president announced that

the offer made in March to stop further nuclear tests "still stands," if the Soviet

Union would accept an "effectively verified test ban treaty."67

If the United States was sobered by the Cuban crisis, the Soviet Union appeared to have been equally affected. Little more than a week after Kennedy expressed

the imperative need to resolve the testing issue, the USSR representative in

Geneva recommended to the ENDC on 13 November that unmanned seismic

stations be used to supplement existing national detection stations. When the U.S.
The Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 341

side summarily rejected the so-called "black boxes" as an inadequate substitute

for personnel on-site, Khrushchev followed up with a letter to Kennedy on 19

December that extended yet another overture. The Soviet premier implied that the

two leaders essentially agreed that on-site inspections were not really necessary, but

that the president's hands were tied by Senate opposition to cessation of testing;

to overcome that obstacle, he professed a willingness "to meet you halfway in this

question." Claiming that Dean had informed Kuznetsov on 30 October that two

to four inspections on Soviet territory per year would suffice, he offered to accept

two to three on each other's soi1.68

Dean's alleged concession took the administration by surprise. The United

States had asked for 20 annual inspections in 1960 and then reduced them in

1961 to a sliding formula of 12 to 20 depending on the actual number of suspicious events taking place. This was the official U.S. stance in December 1962.

At the least the United States would agree to 8 to 10 a year, and that was the

number Dean advised the president he had mentioned to Kuznetsov. But Dean's

conversations seemed to affect the U.S. bargaining position. The ambassador felt

it necessary to write a vigorous defense of his discussions with the Soviet negotiators, categorically denying Kuznetsov's assertions in an II-page letter to William

Foster. Dean insisted that when asked if the United States would accept two or

three visitations, he had replied "emphatically no."69

Dean resigned as chairman of the U.S. delegation to the ENDC on 27

December. Whatever his culpability, the Soviet proffer of permitting two or three

inspections per year as a sudden earnest of cooperation seems disingenuous. As

Soviet specialists in the State Department recognized, Khrushchev had cited the

"three" quota at his meeting with Kennedy in Vienna in June 1961, more than

a year prior to the discussions with Dean that supposedly moved him to make

the offer. Moreover, Moscow continued to look on arms control as much as a

propaganda vehicle as a subject for serious negotiations. Khrushchev's speech to

the Sixth Congress ofthe Socialist Unity Party in East Berlin on 16 January 1963

coupled the "struggle to prevent thermonuclear war" with a call for a German

peace treaty as a pre-condition for disarmament.7°

Throughout his exchanges with the Soviet premier, the president accented

the positive and exhorted Khrushchev to go the extra length, as he was himself

prepared to do. Kennedy welcomed Khrushchev's tacit acceptance of the principle of on-site inspections-"not just because of the concern of our Congress

but because they ... go to the heart of a reliable agreement." He appreciated

the delicacy of the issue of inspections in the vicinity of defense installations and

underscored U.S. flexibility by reducing the number ofinspections from the 12-20

formula to 8-10; if he refused the Soviet demand for 2 or 3, internally he coaxed 6

from his advisers as a "rock-bottom" position. Further, the administration signaled

it would accept five automatic (unmanned) seismic stations if the Soviet Union

balked at seven. Kennedy postponed underground tests in Nevada for the dura-
342 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

tion of the consultations. Confidence-building efforts notwithstanding, progress

toward a treaty remained at a standstill. When the tripartite talks in New York

and Washington ended in deadlock, the president ordered the resumption of

underground testing, which began at the Nevada site on 8 February 1963.71

Kennedy's sincerity in seeking accommodation with the Soviet Union on

obstacles in the way of a settlement never came into question. He hoped through

superpower collaboration on a test ban to diminish the larger danger of nuclear

proliferation, and he assumed the Soviet Union shared that objective. He worried

in particular about the nuclear aspirations of China-and, to a lesser degree,

France. He worried, too, as he told Macmillan, that "some unfortunate press

report" might "damage or even wreck the prospects for real agreement" by its

effect on the NATO allies. When the time became ripe for a final agreement he

wanted to inform the Europeans well in advance ofsigning.72

The failure to achieve the hoped-for settlement in the winter of 1962-1963

stemmed not solely from resistance on the Soviet side. Khrushchev correctly identified opposition to a test ban treaty in the U.S. Senate as a major hurdle. But

opposition also came from inveterate skeptics in the U.S. scientific community.

One of the most influential critics, physicist Edward Teller, associate director of

the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, had consistently opposed test ban negotiations and now told House Republicans that such a ban as that proposed by the

Soviet Union "would be virtually unpoliced. It would endanger our security and

would help the Soviet Union in its plan to conquer the world." Even Nelson

Rockefeller, the liberal Republican governor of New York, expressed concern over

the "apparent weakening" of U.S. inspection requirements. Some of the harshest

criticism in the Senate came from Connecticut Democrat Thomas Dodd, who

charged in a lengthy tirade on 21 February that the administration invited war by

granting excessive concessions to the Soviets. Dodd blasted "an aggressive faction

in the scientific community," singling out Hans Bethe, that had given "persistently

wrong-headed advice" to both Eisenhower and Kennedy. Prominent Democratic

senators Richard Russell, Stuart Symington, and Henry Jackson joined Dodd in

opposition to the proposed test ban.73

The guardedness of leading legislators and scientists found reinforcement in

the longstanding attitudes of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When Nitze gave the

JCS an opportunity on 14 February to comment on ACDA's latest proposition,

they disputed virtually the entire range of ACDA recommendations as to what

constituted a "reasonable deterrent," including the further relaxation of the onsite inspection quota to six inspections (the JCS had never budged from the

12-20 figure) and the exclusion of sensitive defense installations from inspection,

which the chiefs said amounted to a veto. They found particularly disturbing

ACDA's continuing overestimation of the capability of seismic devices to distinguish between natural phenomena and nuclear activity and the acceptance of a

4.0 detection threshold, which would effectively institute "an unpoliced morato-
The Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 343

rium" on underground testing below that level. The JCS wanted assurance that

testing below the threshold would be specifically authorized, so that u.s. technical advances from low-yield testing would not be unilaterally halted while the

Soviet Union proceeded with undetected clandestine activity. Finally, the chiefs

disapproved of a nonwithdrawal clause that prevented any abrogation of the

treaty for three years, which they thought counter to U.S. interests if a state not a

party to the treaty (notably Communist China) conducted nuclear testing in the

interim.74

ACOA took into account the JCS concerns but responded with only grudging

modifications. For example, as an apparent compromise on the three-year notice

before withdrawal, ACOA accepted a two-year period along with a cumbersome

fallback provision permitting withdrawal after 60 days if the aggrieved party felt

that a test by a non-party had jeopardized its national security and called a conference to present its case. As for the time it would take to detect explosions below

the 4.0 threshold, ACOA tried to convince the chiefs that improvements in VELA

would enable the United States to detect "virtually all seismic events" inside the

Soviet Union within three to four years; given other sophisticated monitoring

systems, ACOA considered the risks acceptable. On the veto assertion, if U.S.

negotiators did not exclude sensitive defense installations, they could not prevent

the Soviet Union from inspecting similar U.S. bases.75

Unpersuaded by ACOA's arguments or analysis, the Joint Chiefs conveyed

their dissatisfaction to McNamara in a memorandum of 21 March, recommending further review before the United States made such a critical commitment.

McNamara had backed the JCS on similar challenges to ACOA in the past, but

his greater willingness to accept a less than perfect test ban pact, strengthened

by Brown's scientific judgment as director of defense research and engineering,

had been clearly laid out in two long memoranda of his own to the president

on 12 February. In his customary methodical fashion he weighed the U.S.-USSR

military balance with and without a test ban-both comprehensive and atmospheric-as it would affect or not affect both strategic retaliatory and tactical

nuclear forces. He concluded that in the larger scheme little of predictable significance would result from continued testing, though he acknowledged an element

of risk from unforeseeable developments. The United States in 1963 had "a clear

strategic superiority" over the Soviet Union as well as more advanced nuclear technology. Any change in the strategic balance would for the most part come from

policy decisions on the composition and character ofthe forces rather than moderate improvements in warhead efficiency resulting from testing. Even if the relative

military position ofthe United States were diminished by Soviet cheating-and he

granted the U.S. position could be "seriously affected" by a prolonged undetected

covert Soviet program-the nation's ability to inflict massive civilian damage in a

second strike remained a sttong deterrent. In brief, McNamara would take risks

(where the JCS would not) on the grounds that an enforceable comprehensive
344 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

test ban would lock in U.S. superiority in nuclear technology, and even if evasions

occurred, they would not have a critical impact on national security.76

The proliferation issue, addressed in a second memorandum for the president, provided McNamara incentive enough to support a test ban treaty. He

foresaw eight countries capable of acquiring at least a few nuclear weapons and

a crude delivery system in the next 10 years even without advances in technology. Untestricted testing could accelerate the trend toward cheaper and therefore

more accessible weapons. "It is probably not an exaggeration," the secretary wrote

Kennedy, to say that a ban on testing "is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for keeping the number of nuclear countries smalL" Besides limiting

diffusion of weapons, cooperation between the two major nuclear powers on a

test ban would set an example and precedent for restraining others from testingJ7

In one important respect the intramural debate within Defense in the winter

and spring of 1963 seemed irrelevant. With U.S. and Soviet negotiators unable

to move beyond fundamental differences on inspection numbers and procedures,

or even which matter should take priority, the two sides remained so far apart

that no agreement seemed in prospect. Seaborg observed in his memoirs that any

apparent convergence in the two positions and the reduction of the stalemate to

one or two bones of contention was an illusion. As Harriman would later testifY,

even if the United States had accepted Khrushchev's limit of three inspections,

the respective sides remained so at odds on the technical details of the inspection

protocol that a meeting of the minds seemed out of the question. "When I saw

the details of what our experts would demand in the way ofthe kind ofinspection

..., the large area over which we would have helicopters range, and the number of

holes we would have to drill, and that sort of thing ... I am satisfied they would

never have agreed to it."78

When asked at a press conference on 8 May about the likelihood of a treaty

with the Soviet Union, the president replied: "No, I'm not hopeful, I'm not hopeful. There doesn't seem to be any sense of movement since December on the

offer of two or three that the Soviets have made." Instead of drawing closer to

an agreement, Kennedy admitted "we seem to be moving away from it," adding

with a seeming air of resignation that "perhaps the genie is out of the bottle and

we'll never get him back in again." Anticipating yet another round of tests in the

absence of a treaty, the president said the failure to reach an accord "would be a

great disaster for the interests of all concerned."79

Despite the somber outlook, in another press conference on 22 May Kennedy

vowed to "push very hard" through the spring and summer "in every forum"

to revive the stalled negotiations, acutely aware of the dwindling time available

to them before the post-Cuba window of opportunity might close shut forever.

Previously, on 6 May, he urged ACDA and the Committee of Principals to use

the upcoming recess at Geneva for "an urgent re-examination" of possible new

approaches.80
The Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 345

Through the spring of 1963, then, ACDA continued to draft variations on

its basic treaty proposal and the Joint Chiefs continued to register reservations.

Divisions within 000 remained as pronounced as earlier, perhaps even more

so. In their comments on an ACDA draft of 24 May the chiefs discerned little

change and responded with much the same rebuttal. On 14 June McNamara

informed Foster that DoD concurred with the revised proposal even as he dutifully forwarded the JCS's separate views for the president's consideration. The

depth ofJCS disaffection emerged starkly in a conversation between LeMay and

McNamara on 24 June. Striving for some degree of harmony, McNamara had

suggested a rewording of the chiefs' statement, but LeMay said they rejected any

alterations "apart from such of the changes as related to matters of grammar or

style." LeMay contested every matter of substance, including the putative technological advantage that the United States had over the Soviet Union. When

McNamara asked LeMay to name the technically qualified individuals on whom

the chiefs were relying for advice, the general could come up with only one

person, Air Force Maj. Gen. Dale Smith.8!

On 26 June, the secretary circulated to JCS Chairman Taylor, as well as to

Seaborg of the AEC and the president's science adviser Wiesner, a request for

comment on three "White Papers" related to the test ban that incorporated the

facts and judgments that had emerged from the extended series of springtime

meetings. The administration obviously felt a need to demonstrate to Congress

a coherent position that even if not amounting to a true consensus at least

fairly reflected divergent viewpoints. At a key meeting during this period, as the

Committee of Principals tried to forge a "broad consensus" and McNamara highlighted the Joint Chiefs' stubborn differences, Rusk professed perplexity over how

the chiefs could take a separate stance from that of the president-something he

would never do in the foreign policy arena. McNamara explained that the law

enabled the chiefs to present their personal opinions directly to Congress and

indeed required them to do so when asked.82

McNamara had hoped the administration could avert a "head-on collision,"83

not only with the JCS but also with the AEC and other opposition elements

within the Pentagon who were not prepared to dismiss technical evidence of the

shortcomings of the new detection devices or discount the effect of Soviet cheating on the strategic balance. The White Papers exercise, however, rather than

leaving the impression of essential concurrence on the broad outlines of a test ban

treaty, spotlighted the dissent and underlined the lack of consensus within the

government.

Harriman's Mission to Moscow

The indispensable partner to an agreement, of course, remained the Soviet

Union, not the JCS. Dejection mixed with perseverance during the spring of 1963
346 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

as participants on both sides, buoyed by a commitment to establish a direct "hot

line" link between Washington and Moscow,* sought a way out of the impasse.

Complicating matters was the Kremlin's preoccupation with growing strains in the

Sino-Soviet relationship. In April Khrushchev met with Norman Cousins, editor

of the influential Saturday Review and a peace activist then touring the Soviet

Union, at Khrushchev's vacation home on the Black Sea. By turns introspective

and agitated, Khrushchev conveyed to the journalist his good-faith intentions, the

pressure he was getting from his own dissidents, and lingering unhappiness over

the Dean affair, which he believed had squandered a golden opportunity for a

settlement. Although Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson advised Rusk on 24 April

that internal and external pressures were preventing the Soviet leader from moving

on the test ban issue "at this time," Kennedy, pressed by a tenacious Macmillan,

proposed to Khrushchev informal high-level discussions aimed at clearing the

air and getting the talks back on track. In two long letters dated 8 May and 8

June, the Soviet premier waxed alternately cranky and conciliatory before finally

consenting to receive a senior Western delegation, suggesting 15 July for the

group's arrival in Moscow. 84

Hence, what appears to have been a mutual interest in rescuing the test ban

negotiations in the aftermath of Kennedy's glum 8 May press conference preceded

fitful but steady progress that gave cause for optimism. A major impetus came

from Kennedy's historic address at American University on 10 June, two days

after Khrushchev's most recent letter agreeing to the new round of discussions.

The commencement speech, fashioned by Sorensen, dwelt on the positive aspects

of Soviet-American relations, including the claim that "almost unique, among

the major world powers, we have never been at war with each other." What the

United States wanted, Kennedy declared, was "not a Pax Americana enforced on

the world by American weapons of war," but "a just and genuine peace" that in

the nuclear age had become "the necessary rational end of rational men." After

framing his remarks in a broader context, at length the president turned to the

immediate objective, securing agreement "where the end is in sight, yet where a

fresh start is badly needed ... a treaty to outlaw nuclear tests." Heralding the

scheduled resumption of superpower talks, Kennedy pledged with "good faith

and solemn convictions ... that the United States does not propose to conduct

nuclear tests in the atmosphere so long as other states do not do so."85

The speech received ample notice at home, but it had an even more powerful effect abroad, particularly in the Soviet Union, where the leadership reacted

favorably to both the tone and substance of the statement. A CIA report claimed

that the Soviets felt no head of state would make such a bold commitment to

peace and disarmament unless convinced ofthe likelihood of an agreement. While

*This was a teletype link between the two capitals confirmed in a memorandum of understanding of 20 June

1963. See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963,521-23.
The Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 347

they resented Kennedy's singling out Communist transgressions as "the primary

cause of world tension today" (after promising no finger-pointing), the president's

message had produced an "excellent atmosphere." Khrushchev later told Harriman

that he thought it the best speech by any president since Franklin Roosevelt. More

persuasive evidence of Soviet appreciation than the private confidence to Harriman

was the reprinting of the entire text in the Soviet press and the unjamming of

Western broadcasts ofthe speech, the first such occurrence in 15 years.86

Expectations increased with the appointment of Harriman as the U.S. chief

delegate. With his long experience in dealing with Soviet leaders, the veteran

diplomat was a natural choice to head the delegation. Despite his commanding

reputation, or perhaps because of it, while continuing to occupy important posts

at State, he had not been part of Rusk's inner circle and, in Schlesinger's words,

had been "rather systematically excluded" from Soviet affairs. Both Schlesinger

and John McNaughton, the DoD general counsel who would accompany the

delegation, cite Carl Kaysen, Bundy's deputy, as a key figure in engineering Harriman's appointment after another logical choice, John McCloy, turned out to be

unavailable. Tapping the accomplished statesman for the assignment invested the

delegation with unquestioned authority and stature and confirmed the president's

earnestness. "As soon as 1 heard that Harriman was going," a Soviet embassy staff

member told Schlesinger, "I knew you were serious."87

The month between the agreement to meet in Moscow and the departure of

Harriman as head of the mission proved a busy and ultimately fruitful period, but

not without setbacks. By virtue of the president's manifesto, the initiative fell to

the United States to set the agenda, yet a truculent Khrushchev, perhaps posturing for the benefit of his hard-liners, again ruled out inspections on Soviet soil

and insisted on coupling any test ban treaty with a non-aggression pact between

NATO and the Warsaw Pact nations. As the Joint Chiefs and naysayers dug in

their own heels at home, Harriman was faced with competing demands and little

room to maneuver, the early skirmishing for position threatening to pull the rug

out from under him before even arriving at the bargaining table.88

Rusk's instructions to Harriman stated as a first objective "a comprehensive

treaty, with adequate verification of uncertain events underground." This would

include some inspections. Only "if the Russians refuse to budge on a comprehensive treaty" would the mission move on to a partial treaty, covering all

environments except underground. Harriman was also to make an effort to gain

French adherence without making it a requirement, and at the same time press the

Soviet Union to convince China to join the fold. A week later further instructions

to Harriman once again referred to a comprehensive ban as the primary goal, but

specifically mentioned the 27 August 1962 draft that omitted underground testing as a model for a fallback limited test ban agreement. As for the Soviet push for

a non-aggression pact between the two blocs, it would have to await the conclusion of a test ban accord.89
348 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

Harriman's final guidance even touched on general and complete disarmament, partly in anticipation of Foreign Minister Gromyko's wanting to explore

a proposal he had introduced in the ENDC regarding first-stage disarmament.

Although the United States would not entertain any Soviet desire "to proceed

rapidly to complete and general disarmament on terms which we have always

found unacceptable," recent movement on the U.S. side on the general disarmament question opened the door to the possibility of a serious discussion on the

subject of "separable first stages." In May, Defense had agreed to destroy 30 B-47s

each month for two years, 10 ofwhich would come from storage, in return for the

USSR following suit with destruction of an equivalent number ofits own medium

jet bomber Badgers. ACDA recommended initiation of the process beginning 1

January 1964 contingent on adequate verification procedures that included "adversary" inspection.90

DoD's flexibility had its limits. At a meeting of the Committee of Principals

on 8 July McNamara rejected a 50 to 75 percent reduction in strategic delivery

vehicles as damaging the credibility of the West's nuclear deterrent and wasting its superior nuclear power, especially if such deep cuts were not matched by

compensatory reductions in the Soviet Union's superior conventional capabilities.

The secretary felt that ACDA leaned too far toward accommodating the Soviet

position by seeming to accept a symmetrical reduction of forces that ignored the

disproportionate advantage the Soviets enjoyed in conventional strength. They

could afford to decrease their troop level in East Germany but NATO could not.

When Foster interjected that he understood that this advantage in conventional

forces had lately diminished, McNamara agreed "we had made substantial progress" bur that the West was still clearly behind. In general, McNamara preferred

a more gradual approach of an initial 30 percent reduction across the board and

additional cuts later, sticking with the same formula he had backed a year earlier.

His cautiousness here was supported by Taylor and CIA Director McCone. 91

Given the differences within the Committee of Principals, they agreed only

that Harriman should receive instructions to take no "initiative relating to changes

in our position [regarding] strategic delivery vehicles." In skirting any specific

recommendation, the committee, besides getting hung up on McNamara's issues,

felt that Harriman would have enough on his hands in Moscow in dealing with

a test ban agreement without becoming entangled in the thickets of general and

complete disarmament.92

Before leaving Washington, Harriman had a 45-minute conversation with McNamara on a range of topics that could come up in Moscow. The secretary

mentioned the ABM program as one area where both sides could benefit from

a mutual scaling back of enhancements and escalating costs that had "no end in

sight." McNamara commented on his stance on weapons reduction and identified trade and outer space as two specific fields for possible cooperation. Notably,

Harriman left the meeting with the assurance that McNamara not only would
The Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 349

"fully support a comprehensive test ban treaty" but believed such a ban was of

"grave importance."93

Among other matters needing clarification before Harriman met with the

Soviet negotiators was the "special" relationship with the United Kingdom, which

had functioned harmoniously in the two countries' joint pursuit of a series of

disarmament proposals in the first two years of the Kennedy administration but

experienced some tense moments on the eve of the mission to Moscow. While

Macmillan had always supported U.S. proposals, he often appeared more conciliatory toward Soviet views and more aggressive an advocate of a testing accord

than his transatlantic partner. The British seemed to want a test ban at almost any

price, McNaughton recalled, and friction over perceived U.S. tentativeness and

British impatience, compounded by personality clashes, strained relations during

preliminary meetings in London. The appointment of Quintin Hogg, Lord

Hailsham, as the chief British delegate to the Moscow talks especially proved an

irritant. A State Department profile on Hailsham noted that he combined "a high

degree of political and intellectual astuteness, together with political ambitions,

with just enough instability (or perhaps better, unpredictableness) to permit occasional impetuous actions and public statements which subsequently cause both

him and his party much embarrassment and concern."94

Hailsham shortly lived up to his reputation, aspiring to play the role, not of

lower-level facilitator, but of mediator between Kennedy and Khrushchev, much

as Roosevelt had between Stalin and Churchill. If the British had had their way,

another summit would have followed from the negotiations in Moscow. The president discussed this possibility with Harriman on 10 July but expressed reluctance

to accept the idea for fear of difficulties it might cause in Germany and France.

He would consider doing it "just to sign the test ban treaty." The British also

seemed to be insufficiently sensitive to the possibilities of Soviet cheating after the

treaty signing. When McNaughton raised the point at the preparatory conference

in London the last week ofJune, the British "pooh-poohed" it. Sir Solly Zuckerman, the chief scientific adviser for the United Kingdom, dismissed the notion

by saying, "I suppose they could go out behind the sun and blow up something if

they wanted to spend all their natural resources to do it."95

As it turned out, once in Moscow the British presence was barely visible. The key player, "the ball carrier," in McNaughton's phrase, was Harriman.

With him firmly in command many of the issues that had befogged the atmosphere during prolonged wrangling in the past evaporated over a week of hard

but forthright bargaining. To the Soviet demand for the inclusion of France as a

signatory the Anglo-American side countered with a demand for China's inclusion. Neither of these powers intended to join, and neither the United States nor

the Soviet Union had the means of persuading them. Kennedy and Macmillan

corresponded at length on "the special nature of the French problem," recognizing de Gaulle's innate distrust of the ''Anglo-Saxons'' and France's understandable
350 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

aversion to subscribe to a test ban at a pivotal point in the country's rudimentary

nuclear program. Macmillan hoped that even if they could not get de Gaulle to

sign they could prevail on him to grasp "the symbolic importance which such a

treaty may have for all of us" and refrain from "destroying ... the moral effect" of

the treaty with "intemperate remarks." As for China, Kennedy assumed probably

correctly that Khrushchev was as anxious to abort a Chinese nuclear project as he

was, although the Soviet premier always tried to give the impression, as Harriman

told McNaughton, of not being greatly concerned. "They're going to have them

anyway," Khrushchev reportedly told Harriman, "but they won't have any military

capability for several years and in any event it's not going to amount to anything.

It'll be like the French capability. Forget it." And, according to McNaughton,

Khrushchev implied that "you could forget the British, too."96 Whether or not

Khrushchev believed this, his bravado---or fatalism-helped to remove both

France and China as sources of contention between the superpowers.

Khrushchev brought up the subject of a non-aggression pact at the first

meeting with Harriman on 15 July and Gromyko broached it almost daily. As

McNaughton remembered, "Harriman's position was flat out. We were not negotiating a Non-Aggression Pact, period. Now, he didn't necessarily say it like that

but it came out that way." At most, in return for yielding on the linkage demand,

Khrushchev won an understanding in the final communique that the United

States would take up the matter with its allies.97

To the surprise of U.S. negotiators, Gromyko objected to a provision sought

by the United States (and thought to be supported by the USSR as well) to

permit, albeit with stringent controls, nuclear testing for peaceful purposes. The

Soviet Union argued that such a loophole would undermine the credibility of any

ban. In return for acceding to the Soviet position, the United States extracted a

concession that Moscow had resisted previously: namely, the right to withdraw

from the treaty if a nation decided its vital interests would be damaged by adherence to treaty provisions. McNaughton said the Soviet government did not want a

withdrawal clause on the grounds that "you don't spend your time at the wedding

talking about divorce," but relented in exchange for the U.S. striking the peaceful

uses provision when Harriman made clear his instructions required him to walk

away without the withdrawal protection.*98

All the foregoing questions ultimately proved peripheral. The success or failure of the negotiations in Moscow turned on the principle of on-site inspections

that had been a barrier to a settlement for years. Seaborg reduced the problem to

its "baldest form": "the Soviets were persuaded that the United States wanted to

*The withdrawal clause, contained in Article 4, was plainly aimed at China and its ongoing nuclear program.

Seaborg later noted the irony that "when the anticipated trigger event for activating the withdrawal clause-a

Chinese nuclear test-occurted in October 1964, withdrawal from the [treaty] was not even suggested as an

appropriate U.S. response." Nevertheless, had the withdrawal right not been included, the Senate may not have

ratified the treaty. See Seaborg, Kennedy, 247.
The Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 351

inspect in order to spy; many on our side were convinced that without adequate

inspection the Soviets would cheat."99 The stumbling block was removed by

agreement within the first 24 hours to exclude underground testing and limit

the ban to atmospheric, undersea, and outer space environments, which could

be policed without on-site verification; by dropping underground testing, the

problem of inspection disappeared, and the negotiators could concentrate on

composing their differences on the remaining surmountable sticking points. The

price paid for an accord, which both sides now judged worthwhile, was the abandonment of a comprehensive test ban for a limited test ban.

Debate over the Treaty

The negotiators finished their work on 25 July, and Rusk, Gromyko, and

British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Alec Douglas-Home initialed the

final document, a "Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere,

in Outer Space and Under Water," for their respective countries on 5 August. IOO

Accompanying Rusk in the U.S. delegation that attended the official signing in

Moscow were senior senators J. William Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, John O. Pastore, chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic

Energy, Democrat Hubert Humphrey, and Republicans Leverett Saltonstall and

George Aiken. Conspicuously absent were Democratic and Republican members

of the Armed Services Committee, Saltonstall excepted. A bipartisan delegation

served not simply to exorcise the unhappy memory of Woodrow Wilson's experience in Versailles in 1919 but also to recognize the opposition the treaty could

face in the Senate. Indeed, two days before the initialing of the treaty the president felt that if Fulbright and Bourke B. Hickenlooper, ranking minority member

of Fulbright's committee, did not attend, he should scrap the idea of a Senate

representation in Moscow. Although Hickenlooper did not join the delegation,

the legislative presence sufficed to justifY proceeding with the plan. IOI

In submitting the treaty for ratification the president made a point of not

claiming too much. He presented it as a first step in reducing tensions, curbing

pollution in the atmosphere, and opening the way to further agreements among

the major powers. The treaty itself could not end the threat of nuclear war or

outlaw the use of nuclear weapons, nor could it substitute for U.S. military power.

Progress in developing nuclear technology would continue through underground

testing. Continued research on the peaceful use of atomic energy would also

continue. And since atomic laboratories were to be maintained, atmospheric testing could be resumed if necessary. 102

The timing of the treaty's presentation to the Senate received as careful attention as the text itself. Three days elapsed between the signing of the treaty and its

delivery to the Senate. Rusk worried that if the administration moved too swiftly,

senators would bridle at the slighting of the consultative process. With public
352 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

opinion strongly favoring ratification, however, the president was in the mood to

"hit the country while the country's hot. That's the only thing that makes any

impression to these goddamned senators." 103

Rusk had come away from a July meeting with the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee feeling good about the treaty's prospects there, but the Preparedness

Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services was

another story. Headed by Mississippi Sen. John Stennis and including such notable defense hawks as Henry Jackson, Strom Thurmond, and Barry Goldwater, the

committee was as formidable as it was hostile to any perceived weakening of U.S.

security. The subcommittee's leading witnesses insured there would be a heated

debate. John Foster and Edward Teller ofthe Livermore Laboratory were longtime

opponents of any test ban. The Stennis subcommittee had the greatest interest

in the opinions of the Joint Chiefs, whose own reservations members knew from

previous testimony, most recently in June before Harriman left for Moscow. Then,

Admiral George Anderson, the outgoing chief of naval operations, stated that the

Soviet Union could not be trusted to live up to its obligations: "Our previous

experience with the Communists makes us acutely aware that their concepts of

truth, of ethics, of morals are vastly different from our own." LeMay expressed the

view that "to maintain a favorable balance of military power we must have nuclear

superiority. To do this I firmly believe we must continue our nuclear weapon

development programs and be able to conduct nuclear testing as required."I04

When LeMay testified again in August, after the signing of the treaty, he

did not change his position. But, upon questioning, he conceded that there were

political advantages to a test ban. "Balancing the two together," LeMay suggested,

"1 believe that if we take certain safeguards to reduce the risk in the technical and

military field, we could reduce them [the risks] to an acceptable degree so that we

could go ahead and approve the treaty and see if these political gains materialize.

But only if we take the safeguards." Teller, less equivocal, insisted that "if we sign

this treaty we are taking a very great risk. And 1 think that if the treaty is not ratified, the risk will be less." The physicist's testimony carried all the more persuasion

because he came across, as Fulbright told the president, as "John L. Lewis and

Billy Sunday all wrapped in one."105

On 9 September the Stennis subcommittee reported to Chairman Russell of

the Senate Armed Services Committee its judgment that the treaty "will affect

adversely the future quality of this Nation's arms, and that it will result in serious,

and perhaps formidable, military and technical disadvantages. These disadvantages, in our judgment, are not outweighted or counterbalanced by the claimed

military advantages." The committee thus threw up a major but not insurmountable hurdle in the way of ratification. Even the subcommittee's report recognized

"the existence of other factors which, while not within the scope of this report, are

pertinent to a final judgment on the treaty."I06
The Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 353

Acceptance or rejection rested ultimately with Fulbright's Senate Foreign Relations Committee where the treaty, as Rusk had anticipated, enjoyed solid support.

While Harold Brown encountered withering skepticism as a ratification advocate

before the Stennis subcommittee, the Fulbright committee went along with his

argument that the treaty would not threaten U.S. strategic superiority. Senators

friendly to the administration were quick to seize on his professional judgment

as having more authority than that of fellow scientist Teller, given his broad experience and greater access to information and intelligence as director of Defense

Research and Engineering. Brown effectively neutralized Teller's opposition, but

the military testimony more than the scientific had to be countered for the administration to succeed; McNamara and Taylor undertook this task. IO?

McNamara's voice came across clear and his conclusions unambiguous. He

had always believed that the United States held a commanding lead over the

Soviet Union in nuclear technology, and he remained convinced that only minimal advances would come from further testing in the atmosphere. The United

States, he noted, had demonstrated in Cuba, Vietnam, and Berlin that "our will

matches our might," and had done so without resort to nuclear arms. The vast

increase in U.S. nuclear forces, "accompanied as it was by large increases in Soviet

nuclear stockpiles, has [not] produced a comparable enhancement in our security." Even the Soviet leaders, he believed, had grasped that "sheer multiplication

of a nation's destructive nuclear capability does not necessarily produce a net

increase in its security." While this, or any other treaty, did not come risk free,

the most serious risk was an outbreak of national euphoria, he warned. In sum,

"the risks under the treaty are either small or under our control, and the values

of the treaty are substantial even if we consider only the military area. The scales

are clearly tipped in favor of the treaty, Mr. Chairman. It has my unequivocal

support." 108

The JCS disagreed with the secretary's judgment but struggled to find a

comfortable position in the face of personal intervention by the president and

what increasingly looked like a losing battle for them. On the eve ofthe Harriman

mission, as it became evident that Khrushchev was amenable to a limited test

ban, the Joint Staff had drafted a memorandum for the secretary recapitulating

the litany of objections posed in previous assessments and deeming a limited

ban "militarily disadvantageous." The draft never went forward to McNamara,

as under persistent White House pressure and Taylor's brokering, the chiefs gave

a grudging nod to the treaty in the context of overriding non-military considerations. Kennedy had managed to get the chiefs to go on record with at least a

qualified embrace of the treaty before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

prior to meeting with Stennis's panel, where the president fretted that in "a much

hotter atmosphere" and "under interrogation by Scoop Jackson . . . and Barry

Goldwater and Strom ... these fellows can be taken along a road ...."109
354 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

The chiefs exacted a set of "safeguards" as prerequisites for their approval-the

continuance of underground nuclear testing to improve weapons, the maintenance of laboratory facilities to assure continued progress in nuclear research,

maintenance of resources to resume testing in the atmosphere if necessary, and

improvement of monitoring devices to detect Soviet violations and keep abreast of

Sino-Soviet nuclear activity-but these actions had already been committed to by

the president and amounted to a face-saving device that gave the JCS a graceful

exit and the administration a way to parry the charge of presidential coercion. As

Kennedy chuckled to Fulbright, "let them claim they got that out of us."IIO

LeMay indeed pointedly referred to the "safeguards" in his halfhearted endorsement ofthe treaty before the Stennis committee. When Goldwater in particular scoffed at the chiefs' seeming eleventh-hour conversion, LeMay said that the

president had spoken with them as a body and individually, but he did not defend

McNamara against Goldwater's insinuation that the secretary of defense had

limited their participation and ignored their opinion despite McNamara's claim

"under oath" that he had consulted with them "hundreds of times." McNamara

in fact had discussed the subject, if not the treaty per se, with the Joint Chiefs

on a regular basis, but such resentment as they had against the administration

they directed primarily at the secretary. In the end, by indulging the political case

for approving the treaty the chiefs showed they were good soldiers while washing

their hands of responsibility. On strictly military grounds they never wavered in

their negative judgment that the treaty was a liability and a threat. Taylor later

professed to be "surprised by the outcome and rather proud of the Chiefs for

overcoming their instinctive opposition to a testing agreement with a dangerous,

distrusted adversary." Years later, asked to look back on his major achievements as

JCS chairman, he offered, tongue in cheek, "my part in persuading Curtis LeMay

to support the limited test ban treaty."lll

Having thus prevailed over the opposition within the military, the administration worried only about a possible crippling reservation or amendment rather

than outright rejection. None came. While the Stennis subcommittee opposed

the treaty by a 6-to-1 majority, most senators responded to the persuasive power

of the president and the overwhelming weight of public opinion. With the JCS

out of the fight, the Foreign Relations Committee recommended ratification by

a vote of 16 to 1 on 29 August 1963. Even Everett Dirksen, Republican minority

leader and articulate critic of the treaty, voted in favor of ratification, along with

four other Republicans. The only amendment accepted was a largely pro forma

procedural proviso that all future amendments to the treaty would require Senate

approval. It did not affect the language of the document. The treaty passed on 24

September 1963 by a majority of 80 to 19; the president signed the ratification

document on 7 October in the Treaty Room of the White House before a bipartisan congressional delegation.IIZ
*

The Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 355

* The product of intense debate and stubborn perseverance, the Nuclear Test

Ban Treaty was a diplomatic triumph for Kennedy and Macmillan, both of whom

considered it a milestone in the thawing of the Cold War and a vindication

of their steady determination. ll3 Although it held undeniable risks, as the Joint

Chiefs never let McNamara forget, on balance there was sufficient reason to believe

that the benefits from the accord would have more lasting significance than the

drawbacks when the potential impediment to nuclear proliferation, the end to

radioactive fallout in the atmosphere, and the spur to superpower cooperation

were factored into the equation. Of transcendent importance, the test ban treaty

seemed to confirm mutual recognition of the folly of nuclear war and the concomitant need to take measures for eliminating its possibility.

When the most cherished expectations underlying the test ban campaign

failed to materialize, some among the treaty proponents and Kennedy faithful

attributed the unfulfillment to Kennedy's death less than two months after ratification. Roger Hilsman saw in the treaty a measured step toward detente that

would have led to more progress had Kennedy survived. Seaborg lamented Kennedy's death in the fall of 1963 and Khrushchev's fall from power in 1964. Had they

lived and remained in office, he speculated almost two decades later, the world

might have witnessed advances in arms control that were lost when they passed

from the scene. In 1988, on the 25th anniversary of the treaty signing, Wiesner

ruefully observed that "we should not only remember what it was but what it

could have been." While a salient achievement, it did not lead to a comprehensive

ban. Instead, by the 1980s new technologies had made nuclear competition more

dangerous than ever. 114

Regrets over missed opportunities and the settling for a partial nuclear test

ban took on greater urgency as global nuclear activity expanded rather than

contracted over the next generation. The treaty helped slow but certainly did

not stop the spread of nuclear weapons to other nations. Nor did the agreement

retard the development of nuclear technology, which introduced new offensive

and defensive systems that further complicated the U.S.-USSR rivalry. Weapons

became more lethal as an increase in the number of warheads and improvements

in the speed, range, and accuracy of missile delivery marked the next two decades.

And although atmospheric tests no longer poisoned the air, the reliance on underground testing so eased anxiety over fallout that testing became more routinely

tolerated, leading Kaysen to observe that the treaty, contrary to slowing the arms

race, might have accelerated ir. 115

Still, if in retrospect the high hopes in the fall of 1963 proved inflated,

hindsight should not dismiss the worth of the effort or the value of what was

achieved. Although the genie might not have been put back in the bottle, the

nuclear menace became more closely monitored and the permissible boundar-
356 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

ies of testing circumscribed worldwide, and for this the Kennedy administration

deserves much credit.

Doubtless, the test ban cause would have failed in 1963 if the Defense Department had not climbed aboard. Credit for success belongs in large part to

the secretary of defense and his close associates, the deputy secretary and the

chairman of the JCS, who gave the endeavor their blessing. In a deeply-divided

Defense Department where the Joint Chiefs registered articulate opposition,

McNamara was not wholly out of sympathy with the services. Along with the

JCS, he had favored the resumption oftesting in 1961 when the Soviets broke the

moratorium. Moreover, he took up the JCS argument against ACDA's occasionally arbitrary actions and overstated technical results. But he still had fundamental

differences with the service chiefs in what was in many ways a manifestation of

the larger test of wills over his attempts to widen the military's vision of what

constituted national security.

By 1963 McNamara had arrived at two conclusions about nuclear testing

not shared by the Joint Chiefs. Whatever gains might have come from continued testing did not equal the benefits conferred by cessation oftests; furthermore,

whatever gains the Soviet Union might achieve either through cheating in the

banned areas or through experimenting underground would be checked by the

ongoing U.S. ability to cope with any Soviet nuclear threat through the strategy of assured destruction. In brief, he believed that the military balance, already

in U.S. favor, would not be threatened. Despite the troubling uncertainty that

would continue to surround nuclear testing in the 1970s and 1980s and the

continuing danger and instability stemming from other unfinished aspects of

the nuclear arms control agenda, McNamara's judgment here proved essentially

correct. The partial test ban treaty of 1963 has rightfully been called "the first

concrete achievement in postwar arms control," and, coming on the heels of the

peaceful resolution of the Cuban missile crisis, a powerful symbol along the road

to East-West detente. I 16 Robert McNamara was instrumental in the accomplishment of that limited but nonetheless historic undertaking.
CHAPTER XIV

NATO Relations: Transatlantic Differences

By 1961 the Western alliance had forged an impressive record: as an infrastructure for the economic revival of Europe, as an agent supporting the unification

of Europe, and as a defender of its members from external invasion. But in the

1960s serious controversies developed between the United States and other leading

members of NATO-France, Germany, and Great Britain-that created unmistakable strains within the alliance. As the decade advanced, some analysts even

speculated about the possible end of the alliance. They judged that NATO had

outlived its usefulness, had become a victim of its own success, and had "begun to

founder," but they clearly misjudged the enduring strength ofthe ties that held the

organization together.!

From the perspective of many of the statesmen and soldiers involved in the

day-to-day management ofthe alliance, "success" would not have described NATO's

condition, past or present. The Kennedy administration inherited grievances accumulated over a dozen years of NATO's history. While it made an effort to change

some of the patterns set in the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, many of

the proposed changes exacerbated rather than calmed tensions within the alliance.

Had NATO terminated in 1963 or 1964, its dissolution would likely have resulted

from the anger and frustration of junior partners rebelling against the dominance

ofthe senior partner.

The record of the Kennedy years discloses a divergence in strategic thinking

between European allies who wanted a low nuclear threshold with early resort to

nuclear weaponry if attacked, and the United States with its push toward a high

nuclear threshold and substantial conventional forces to make a nuclear response

unnecessary. The need to recast NATO relations, however, had become evident

before the election of 1960. Many of the ideas identified with the Kennedy

administration carried over from the last Eisenhower years, including disillusionment with the doctrine of massive retaliation and offering NATO a medium-range

ballistic missile (MRBM) force to counter European interest in independent

357
358 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

nuclear capabilities. Massive retaliation as a strategy gave way to enthusiasm for a

flexible response that placed less reliance on nuclear weapons and more on conventional forces. How to win European allies to this way of thinking held priority in

the administration's NATO policy.

Each of the major allies had some complaint involving American leadership:

the British felt unhappy with Washington's indifference to the "special relationship" between the two countries nurtured during World War II and carried over

to the Cold War period; France resented u.s. efforts to thwart development of

its ftrce de .frappe; Germany chafed at its perceived second-class citizenship in the

alliance; and the other nations reflected some of the Gaullist doubts about u.s.

steadfastness in the face of Soviet nuclear power. For its part, the United States

had its own bill of particulars against its European partners: inadequate appreciation of U.S. responsibilities in Southeast Asia, sluggishness in response to the

Berlin confrontation, and a willingness to allow the United States to assume the

major burden of their defense despite a growing and worrisome U.S. balance of

payments deficit.

NATO Strategy in 1961

Some of the most formidable alliance problems of the early 1960s derived

from the launching of Sputnik in 1957 and its portent. Whatever successes Europe

had enjoyed under U.S. protection in the past, it now had to deal with the potential consequences of the new power of the Soviet Union to challenge the United

States in its own territory with weapons that did not exist in 1949. That containment had succeeded and Soviet efforts to derail Europe's growth had failed did not

influence the attitude ofthe European partners as much as did their concern about

the credibility of the U.S. role in European security in the future. This caused

NATO to focus in this period particularly on what constituted defense in an age

of approaching nuclear parity between East and West.

In this new climate, U.S. leaders stressed the inadequacy of the old nuclear

strategy delineated in NATO's 1957 plan MC 14/2, which provided for nuclear

response to any Soviet intrusion into the territory of a member nation no matter

what the motivation or the scale. Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR) General

Lauris Norstad had made an effort to refine the policy by introducing the notion

of a "pause" after a Soviet attack before unleashing a full nuclear response.

Although never clearly defined, "pause" did address the possibility that the adversary might have made a mistake and might be granted some time to permit a

graceful withdrawal before a full-scale war erupted. 2

The changed circumstances in the 1960s required something more than the

Norstad pause to maintain the nuclear deterrent while reducing danger of nuclear

war. The Kennedy administration in general and the McNamara Pentagon in
NATO Relations: Transatlantic Differences 359

particular put forth plans for revising the composition of U.S. forces in Europe,

using assumptions not shared by the European allies. The differences centered

on American efforts to emphasize a buildup of European conventional forces to

maintain the deterrent and to keep the nuclear war threshold as high as possible.

These judgments, either implicit or explicit, appeared in the report Dean

Acheson prepared for the president and the State Department in the spring of

1961 under the title "A Review of North Atlantic Problems for the Future."*

The revised doctrine aroused uneasy feelings in the NATO allies. Did the abhorrence of nuclear weapons signifY U.S. intentions to abandon the nuclear defense

of Europe? If not, would the threshold rise so high that the Soviets could take

over Europe before it was reached? In speculating about answers to these questions, Europeans perceived sentiments in the United States that could cause it to

abandon the alliance, not only discontent with the balance of payments deficit

that might lead to withdrawal of U.S. forces, but also a revived American interest

in counterinsurgent and unconventional warfare that might signal the displacement ofEurope by Southeast Asia in U.S. consciousness. Even before the Acheson

report had been commissioned these fears were reflected in a message from

Norstad to McNamara asking him to give German Chancellor Adenauer assurance that "we do not intend to withdraw ground forces from NATO."3

Some European anxiety about the new administration was justified, and misgivings were voiced in Washington as well. Within the State Department some

Europeanists felt that an excessive emphasis on conventional forces ignored the

European partners' legitimate concerns over nuclear defense. From a different

perspective Norstad was quick to note that conventional forces alone provided

an inadequate deterrent. In a letter of qualified support for Acheson's recommendations he expressed his discomfort with assigning the growth of ground forces

"first priority." "As you know," he wrote to Acheson, "the idea of an exclusive

first priority bothers me considerably, but my reason for raising the subject in

this connection is that here again I think we might be introducing controversy

which is unnecessary at this stage of the game."4 Given circulation of these caveats, Europeans might have recognized that the United States had not abandoned

all the underlying commitments of the Eisenhower administration, and that,

notwithstanding Acheson's report, the nuclear component remained the bedrock

of NATO's defense. The president's message to NATO, however, did not buttress

the positions of SACEUR or the Europeanists in the State Department. Speaking to NATO's Military Committee meeting in Washington on 10 April he

mentioned "reenforcement of the capabilities of NATO in conventional weapons"

before getting around to the continuation of "an effective nuclear capability."s The

day after Norstad wrote his letter to Acheson the president accepted the Acheson

report as official policy.6

* The report and the policy changes that ensued arc discu>sed in Chapter XII.
360 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

This shift ofemphasis implicit in flexible response had an immediate impact on

Defense's relations with European counterparts. Soothing anxious allies was primarily State's role. But to plan a buildup of conventional forces required advancing

convincing arguments for the Europeans to increase their defense budgets.

A comparison of conventional capabilities of NATO forces on the Central

front with Soviet troops in East Germany and Poland revealed an apparently

alarming imbalance. A ]CS evaluation of NATO M-day* units assigned to the

Central Region as of 1 April 1961 emphasized the inadequacy of NATO's conventional strength. From Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Germany, Canada, the

United Kingdom, and the United States the organization could count on 22

divisions, of which the United States would furnish 5 and Germany 8. In blunt

language the report stated that "with the exception of the US and Canadian

forces, all these units have a reduced combat effectiveness because of personnel

manning levels, equipment problems, and austere combat and logistics support

forces." This pessimistic analysis would have been even more negative had it taken

into account, as the report noted, the maldeployment of these units.? By contrast,

the Soviet Union had 22 ready divisions in East Germany and Poland and another

51 divisions deployed in western Russia. This figure excluded 34 divisions from

Warsaw Pact members. Even if reliability of the numbers was in question, the

combat advantage appeared heavily weighted in the Soviet favor. 8

The glaring weaknesses in NATO forces in Europe obviously informed

Norstad's wariness about the thrust of Acheson's report. He shared with the

SHAPE planners the belief that NATO had a continuing need for nuclear weapons. He did not accept the assumption that the most likely contingency "is one

short of nuclear or massive non-nuclear attack." With a nuclear defense still

vital, Norstad's preferred solution was for a highly mobile land-based system of

MRBMs under NATO auspices, a concept that itself occasioned considerable

debate during this period.t In Washington the ]CS also had doubts about giving

non-nuclear forces first priority.9 Within ISA Deputy Assistant Secretary Henry

Rowen emerged as a minority voice in believing it possible to close the gap in

conventional forces without too much difficulty. It would require, he speculated,

"perhaps an increase ofabout 10 to 15 percent in present NATO defense budgets." 10

In his comments to Acheson, Norstad pointedly noted that the allies regarded

any plans that downplayed nuclear warfare as unsatisfactory. The British mounted

an effort to water down the U.S. proposals to augment conventional forces,

temporizing as much as possible. ISA officials speculated that the primary reasons

involved money difficulties and perhaps sensitivity to a retreat from the "special

relationship." The argument used by the British centered on a rapid but modest

deployment of five to seven divisions over a four- to five-day period, sufficient to

* M=Mobilization.

t See Chapter xv.
NATO Relations: Transatlantic Differences 361

show NATO's resolve and induce the Soviets to withdraw. The nuclear option

would come into play only ifthe Soviets were not deterred. II

From early on the Germans posed more direct opposition to a conventional-force emphasis than the British. Chancellor Adenauer, alarmed at reports

in American newspapers about the United States abandoning Europe, regarded as

anathema the very notion of replacing a nuclear with a conventional-first strategy.

Consequently, senior u.s. officials took pains early in 1961 to assure the Adenauer

government that the United States would not weaken the nuclear strike force in

Europe. Averell Harriman, the president's roving ambassador, gave this message

to German Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss in Bonn early in March. At ISA,

meanwhile, Nitze not only disavowed false reports about U.S. strategy but claimed

that "there could be no doubt that the United States would, as in the past, consider

an attack upon a NATO country as an attack upon itself and would consider its

nuclear deterrent as being as applicable to a nuclear attack upon Europe as upon

the United States." 12

European confusion ensued as much from McNamara's rethinking of u.s.

military policy writ large as from the specific question of conventional vs. nuclear

forces. The secretary's drive for efficiency, which had as a by-product a change

in allocation of NATO costs, could lead to a loosening of U.S. ties to Europe.

This was a subject of NATO Secretary General Paul-Henri Spaak's farewell visit

to Washington in February 1961. While Spaak agreed that the other NATO

countries should pick up more of the defense burden, he insisted that "the U.S.

should be more precise in its views as to what it wanted done. U.S. vagueness had

appeared to threaten NATO with U.S. withdrawals from Europe." The United

States had to clarify its attitudes in clear and unambiguous terms. 13 It seemed to

many that the overarching question of American reliability had to be confronted

even more urgently than the raising of the nuclear threshold.

Even without transatlantic prodding, U.S. studies of future policy toward

NATO had gotten underway, Acheson's only one of many. At a meeting of State

and Defense officials on 3 February to discuss the establishment of the Acheson

study group, Nitze had enumerated Defense strategic studies currently in preparation for the purpose of coming up with conclusions suitable for budget planning

by 20 February. These reviews would give guidance to planners working on

NATO force requirements for 1966. Only incidentally did they pertain to special

European concerns. 14

But as the policy review developed, the JCS position seemed closer to Europe's

than to the administration's. JCS attention centered on nuclear preparedness.

Lemnitzer recommended improvements in conventional armaments to accompany an appropriate mix of sea and land MRBMs for Europe, with special heed

to earmarking for NATO U.S. Polaris submarines that could survive a surprise

attack. For his part, Norsrad agreed on the need for a buildup of ground forces,
362 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

but he did not want nuclear weapons neglected. He regarded NATO forces in

Europe as more deficient in nuclear than conventional strength. 15

Lemnitzer's and Norstad's judgments accorded with those of the European

partners. As U.S. representative on the North Atlantic Council Thomas K. Finletter observed in a message of 19 April, when NATO got down to the "brass tacks"

of long-range planning it wanted the pendulum to shift only modestly from a

nuclear emphasis. The British expressed concern over potentially unaffordable

costs of a buildup; the French turned their attention to the "pause" in the event of

an attack, wanting assurance that it would be brief and followed by a decision on

a nuclear response. 16

NATO Force Requirementsfor the 1960s

These views did not deter Kennedy or the civilian leaders of Defense from

sticking with their plans for raising the nuclear threshold and strengthening

NATO's capabilities in conventional weaponty, as the president made clear in his

remarks before NATO's Military Committee on 10 April 1961.l7 This was not

what the allies wanted to hear from Washington. For a decade Europeans, according to former Army Chief of Staff Maxwell Taylor, had accepted "exaggerated

claims for the merits of atomic weapons." They now had to cope with American

pressure for a drastic change of thinking, and despite sympathy from SACEUR

and ]CS, as well as expressions of understanding from Acheson and Nitze, the

tactics of persuasion were less than subtle. As Taylor observed, "relatively junior

officials of both State and Defense, fired with a missionary zeal to reverse or at

least reform the nuclear-oriented strategy of NATO, took off for Europe on various pretexts." They succeeded only in deepening European suspicions of U.S.

intentions. IS

Failure to approve SACEUR's recommended increase in nuclear delivery vehicles meant that European forces would remain less equipped proportionately in

nuclear delivery units in 1966 than U.S. divisions and air wings in Europe. The

United States would have to make a special effort to gain Allied acceptance of the

view that the existing level of nuclear weapons, adjusted and modernized, along

with U.S.-based and sea-based strategic strike forces, would suffice for Europe's

military security. Recognizing Allied discomfort over the elevation of conventional

above nuclear defense measures, Nitze suggested supplying Europeans with more

information about the extent ofthe U.S. nuclear capability in Europe. 19

Secretary General Dirk Stikker, who succeeded Spaak in April 1961, concurred. Disturbed particularly about discrepancies between SACEUR briefings and

the new Kennedy administration policies, he felt that in the absence of convincing

evidence the European partners would not wish to commit themselves to significant changes in their defense programs. While the Germans could do more on the
NATO Relations: Transatlantic Differences 363

conventional side, they wanted to go forward with the buildup of nuclear weapons, particularly MRBMs. Belgium "would continue to hide behind the Congo

situation and do nothing." Nor would Italy and Norway be inclined to expand

their military forces without more compelling arguments.20

At a meeting with Stikker on 14 June, Secretary Rusk and Acheson agreed

that the United States would have to spell out clearly just what it regarded as vital

NATO force requirements for 1966. Stikker believed that in the event of a reduction in some forces and equipment such as MRBMs, Europeans would demand

compensation in the form of manned strike aircraft. Deployment of intermediate-range ballistic missiles became especially sensitive in light of the European

allies' increasing interest in acquiring their own nuclear capabilities.

On this subject no early meeting of minds ensued. Gilpatric reported to

McGeorge Bundy on 15 June about an effort to convince the allies that NATO

already had a substantial nuclear capability in Europe. Earlier, in April, State and

Defense officials had discussed the commitment of five Polaris submarines to

NATO for the life of the alliance.21 In informing McNamara of this proposed

commitment, Bundy requested that DoD undertake to study how many submarines should ultimately be committed to NATO in addition to the first five,

whether they should be on "assignment" to a NATO command or earmarked for

assignment, and in what areas the vessels should be deployed. 22

In his response, prepared by William Bundy in ISA, McNamara agreed to

the commitment of five submarines to NATO in 1963, but believed that the

first squadron of nine Polaris subs, including the initial five, should "be retained

in a strategic role under control and authority of the United States." He added

that no Polaris submarines in addition to the first five "should be committed to

NATO until it can be established conclusively that the U.S. national nuclear

strike capability will not be jeopardized by this action." McNamara wanted the

submarines sent to NATO but assigned to USCINCEUR and deployed in the

Mediterranean, not the Atlantic, because the Europeans would then identifY

them with continental defense. The submarines would be earmarked for assignment to SACEUR in wartime.*23

JCS analysis emerging from the initial studies of force projections for 1966

argued that NATO's conventional defenses could not hold back a Soviet invasion.

An enemy possessing both nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities would not likely

allow the momentum of a major attack to stop for a significant period by withholding nuclear weapons.24 An Army study confirmed this judgment. Citing MC

70 it identified for end-I963 a need for 41 2/3 M-day and post-M-day division

equivalents anticipated by M+30 days. To reach this figure required assuming the

complete fulfillment of British and West German commitments and return of

French divisions from Algeria. These forces had to face possibly as many as 215

* See Chapter XV
364 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

Warsaw Pact divisions. And even ifthe Soviet Union could field only 60 divisions

in the Central sector, the West would come up with little better than one-third

as many matching forces. Including reinforcement capability, a more accurate

assessment of NATO forces available by M+30 days showed a little more than 29

divisions, not 41 2/3. 25

The most significant of the many reports that followed from the Acheson

review may have come from McNamara's NATO Working Group established in

JCS early in June and headed by Brig. Gen. Edward L. Rowny to evaluate NATO

military policy and force structure for the Central Region. In some respects its

findings did not differ substantively from others. The task force identified the

equivalent of 22 rather than 21 NATO divisions on this front, which it reduced

to only 19 division equivalents as compared to the 20 ready divisions the Soviet

Union could deploy against the West with minimal difficulty, plus 35 more

employable after reinforcement.

Unlike most of the judgments about NATO's military capabilities, however,

the final Rowny report, submitted in September, found compensations for

weaknesses and offered reasons for some optimism. First, NATO air forces, qualitatively as good as their Soviet counterpart, had an advantage in air-to-air missiles.

Second, the report suggested that it would be misleading to accept the number

of Soviet divisions at face value. In East Germany the Soviet Union actually had

only 20 combat-ready divisions at 70-85 percent strength and they were smaller

and less reliable than those of the NATO allies. Third, the report cited the greater

potential for growth in future NATO military contributions. The allies, particularly Germany, were building up at a time when the Soviet Union was reducing

its conventional strength. A well-prepared defender, it noted, need not match an

attacker one-to-one. Sophisticated defense weaponry could blunt an invasion.

"We have, in sum, reasons for a qualified optimism about implementing the NSC

Directive. "26

The secretary of defense wanted hard information on the costs involved in

building up NATO forces. He showed particular interest in efforts to standardize

000 procedures used in costing NATO force structures. The preliminary report

in July could not supply this part of the task, but by September 1961 figures

became available. For the years 1961 to 1966 the final revised estimated cost of

total NATO forces came to $29.631 billion for the armies, $27.922 billion for

the navies, and $26.646 billion for the air forces, a grand total of more than $84

billion in this period. 27

The Berlin crisis of 1961 increased pressures on Europeans to share the burden of coping with the consequences of the Berlin Wall. When Kennedy announced to the allies on 20 July 1961 that the United States would add 217,000

men to the U.S. armed forces, he asked them to make comparable increases.

The needed NATO forces would cost 61 percent more than the current level of

NATO military expenditure for the next five years. The steady increase in antici-
NATO Relations: Transatlantic Differences 365

pated expenditures projected in the report of the NATO Working Group reflected

this need.28

Whatever optimism the working group wished to generate was dissipated by

the continuing shortfall of forces and funds in the face of the apparently overwhelming conventional power of the adversary. Without a remedy there would be

continued reliance on a nuclear panacea. In the words of one ISA study, "It is this

disparity in ground strength that has both dictated-and in turn been influenced

by-NATa's basic strategy; to plan on resorting to nuclear war, general war, at

the outset of a war with the Soviet Union. The policy has been almost exclusively deterrence oriented, with relatively little regard for the political or military

objectives of any conflict that might, nevertheless, occur." The initial European

response to this challenge was not encouraging. From a hope that the 19 2/3 effective divisions could be raised to 40, U.S. planners settled for the old figure of 28

1/3 divisions. As of July 1961 only the Low Countries with their contribution

of two divisions each had met their quotas. The United States and France were

to add two more divisions each, Germany three, the United Kingdom one, and

Canada two-thirds. 29

While the ]CS generally agreed on the need to take action on NATO's 1966

force requirements, they were uneasy over a detailed priority list that McNamara

and Rusk had proposed to enhance NATO's ground and air capabilities in forward

areas. They managed to reduce the high-priority list to a set of useful guidelines;3o

still, there remained a mix of nuclear and non-nuclear power, with the balance

tilted toward conventional strength. McNamara continued to emphasize nonnuclear power and to downplay the nuclear dimension of NATO's strategy.

This message came through at the December 1961 meeting of the North

Atlantic Council. The secretary of defense stated that "the Allies have available

a large and diversified nuclear arsenal which now provides, and will continue to

do so for the foreseeable future, a decided advantage in both delivery systems and

nuclear weapons of practically every category." But he went on to observe the

catastrophic implications of a general nuclear war which made the use of such

weapons unlikely. He hoped for non-nuclear forces that could contain an attack

long enough to make the Soviet Union think twice, especially in view of the

backup NATO nuclear forces. 31

While Secretary General Stikker said that he had "never before heard such a

forceful or important statement in the Council" and Spaak, now Belgium's foreign

minister, similarly praised McNamara's address, the Europeans did not take kindly

to McNamara's proposals, particularly his strong advocacy of bigger conventional

forces. Coming so soon after the Berlin crisis, his words had little appeal, especially to the Germans, who looked to the nuclear shield for their salvation from

the Soviet Union.32

Moreover, U.S. actions regarding conventional forces stood in marked contrast

to reluctant European compliance. Before the end of 1961 the addition of 40,000
366 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

troops from the United States brought to full strength the Seventh Army's combat

and support units. Given the jump start precipitated by the Berlin confrontation, the United States could claim by 30 June 1962 that it had already responded

to the council recommendation of December 1961 in both troop numbers and

nuclear weapons. Approximately $15 billion would go to nuclear forces alone

during FY 1963, demonstrating that the United States regarded the Soviet nuclear

forces posing a threat to Europe as having the same high priority as those that

could reach North America. The commitment on 5 May 1962 of the entire operational Polaris submarine fleet-five boats, each with 16 missiles-represented

an earnest of the U.S. MRBM nuclear pledge. By the end of 1963 SACLANT

would receive double this number. The U.S. Navy had the nuclear submarines

fully operational but anticipated a shortfall in both cruisers and destroyers. Plans

went ahead to augment SACEUR's ground forces with three mechanized infantry

and two armored divisions as M-day units. For 1963 and 1964 the U.S. Air Force

planned to provide NATO with 3 missile and 39 aircraft squadrons.33

As the Berlin crisis receded in February 1962, it seemed apparent that progress was being made toward "providing a higher plateau offorces." West Germany,

affected more than its allies by the Berlin troubles, committed a ninth division

to SACEUR and organized three more. Raising the conscription period from 12

to 18 months assured maintenance of these higher force levels. In France, the

Berlin crisis triggered the return of two divisions from Algeria, with the possible

commitment oftwo or three more in 1962. Great Britain, on the other hand, was

expected to reduce slightly the number of personnel in the British Army of the

Rhine but not the number of units. Similarly, the Low Countries increased their

NATO forces slightly, but no dramatic changes were anticipated. By contrast,

Greece and Turkey raised the manning levels of their M-day divisions to 76 and

91 percent of their respective goals, but both would need considerable U.S. military assistance to sustain the increases. Overall, the prognosis for the growth of

conventional forces was favorable, with 24 1/3 divisions in place by February

1962, and hopes high that France and Germany between them would bring the

total to 30.34

In November 1962 McNamara presented a more sober picture ofthe military

establishments of France, Germany, and Great Britain. A comparative analysis of

their respective contributions gave the nine German M-day divisions a combat

capability of "fair" to "poor" and the air force, still in a developmental stage, a

"fair" rating. Only the German navy earned the status of "good," even though

plagued with deficiencies in its shipbuilding program, logistical system, and

storage facilities. The British Royal Air Force and Navy received overall "good"

ratings. Not surprisingly, the report rated the Navy air arm second only to that

of the United States. But the three divisions Britain committed to NATO, rated

fair, had inadequate logistical support, required modernization of equipment, and

possessed little offensive capability above the battalion level. France's navy and air
NATO Relations: Transatlantic Differences 367

force received "good" ratings, but its army, with only two divisions yet committed

to NATO, had serious problems with supplies, modern equipment, and support

units, and received a rating of fair. In terms of GNP (gross national product)

devoted to defense, however, France's 7.9 percent came closest to the 10.6 percent

ofthe United States. Britain spent 7.5 percent, while Germany with a larger GNP

than either Britain or France devoted only 5.4 percent to defense budgets.35

Failure to achieve many of its stated goals may explain the somewhat sour

account of NATO country force capabilities that OSD presented a year later, on

27 November 1963, just after President Johnson took office. For every advance,

such as an increase in the combat readiness of the Belgian armed forces over a

two-year period, there was a corresponding setback; Belgium intended to withdraw four battalions from Germany. Although Canada did increase its forces in

Europe in response to the Berlin crisis, its reply to the 1963 triennial review questionnaire suggested that it would reduce its defense contributions over the next

few years. France had brought back all its combat forces from Algeria, but would

assign only two of its five divisions to NATO. Greece and Turkey were major

casualties of reduced U.S. military assistance. And when seven other NATO

members pledged contributions of $13.5 million to supplement U.S. aid to

Greece, redemptions of the pledges came slowly. Of all the allies, only Germany

and Britain appeared to be advancing military posture without stepping backwards. 36

In May 1963 McNamara presaged this negative evaluation with his own

gloomy response to President Kennedy's earlier query about the comparative progress in defense efforts of the United States and its NATO partners. He compared

the U.S. Seventh Division combat slice of24,000 troops (including non-divisional

combat units) with those ofthe principal allies. Denmark came closest to the U.S.

model with 21,900. France, Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom trailed

with 19,000, 19,900, 20,500, and 20,900, respectively. Moreover, he noted that

current basing and deployment of NATO air forces rendered them "extremely

vulnerable to surprise attack." None of the NATO air forces, aside from those

of the United States, possessed logistical capability to sustain operations for more

than 20 to 30 days. In sum, he told the president that NATO's force composition

was badly out of kilter, and "in the event that we cannot induce our NATO allies

to build up their conventional forces so that they can have a credible conventional

war option, some realignment ofthe NATO force structure is clearly called for."37

By early August the situation had not significantly improved, as McNamara

turned his attention to the JCS share ofresponsibility. He complained to the JCS

chairman that "more than ever I am convinced that we have no satisfactory war

plans or strategy for the conduct of combat operations between a conventional

land and air battle on the one hand and all-out nuclear war on the other."38

The NATO ministerial meeting at Paris in December 1963 highlighted U.S.

accomplishments in strategic retaliatory forces. In his remarks McNamara observ-
368 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

ed that ICBMs of all varieties would increase from 488 to 1,717 between 1963

and 1966, while the total number of manned bombers would decline from 1,295

to 710 over the same period. In 1963, he noted, the number of ICBMs (488)

represented more than a four-fold increase from 1961. Concurrently, tactical

nuclear weapons in Europe had increased by almost 60 percent since early 1961.

As for ground forces, the United States had expanded the number of combatready Army divisions by 45 percent in the past two years. The strategic reserve

had eight Army divisions compared to only three in 1961. McNamara noted

that the United States planned to increase airlift capacity by 400 percent by 1968

compared to 1961 in further support ofEuropean defense.

The secretary omitted from his statement mention of efforts the Allied powers had made toward the common goal. That he did not consider the efforts

satisfactory came through in his comment that "the United States Congress and

American public opinion will become increasingly restless about a situation in

which the U.S. maintains qualitative standards-manning levels, stocks and force

readiness-generally higher than those of our Allies." To underline his point he

spoke of the continuing unfavorable balance of payments situation and of U.S.

plans to reduce the gross foreign exchange costs of military operations in Europe,

which amounted to about $1.7 billion per year. McNamara, however, did not fail

to mention those countries-Germany and Italy-which had made substantial

efforts to offset U.S. defense expenditures. But his overall evaluation of NATO's

progress toward meeting its military objectives was grudging at best. 39

A reading of NATO's force levels in this period, 1961-63, need not have

yielded overly negative judgments. The organization's military strength grew substantially, even if its members failed to move at the rate prescribed by u.s. officials

or by the North Atlantic Council. Despite apprehension over the new thrust in

U.S. policy, conventional strength moved upward.

Earlier, in March 1963, the two major continental allies, France and Germany, had received qualified praise from McNamara. Along with the sense that

the Germans could do more, DoD appreciated the steps they had taken. From

1961 to 1963 the total net annual expenditures for military forces rose from

11.574 billion to 17.856 billion marks (approximately $4 billion to $4.5 billion).

Although McNamara wanted the German defense program to proportionately approximate that of the United States in budget and manpower, he saw a defense

contribution of about seven percent of the country's GNP as "about the maximum that we can realistically expect the FRG to achieve during the time frame of

1963-67."40

The feeling toward de Gaulle's France was more ambivalent. OSD looked unfavorably at de Gaulle's preference for pursuing a national nuclear program instead

of increasing expenditures on modernizing the French army. Still, ISA admitted

that "the U.S. would be hard put to criticize the extent ofthe French defense effort
NATO Relations: Transatlantic Differences 369

at its current level," estimated at 7.7 percent of GNP for 1962 and 7.6 percent for

1963.41

Given the uneven conditions of the force structures of most of the allies,

McNamara sought new ways of winning support for building conventional forces. At the meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Ottawa in May 1963 he

expressed his concern over the imbalance among military forces, military strategy, and defense budgets. By constituting itself as a Defense Planning Committee

CDPC) in 1963 the NAC attempted to put into effect a NATO Force Planning

Exercise that would examine rhe interrelated issues ofstrategy, force requirements,

and available resources. However, France's refusal to consider a strategy preparing for limited war on the Central front limited the scope of the new committee,

requiring the United States to shift its focus from strategy to force structure and

budgets.42

NATO commanders responded to the DPC charges in August 1964 by submitting two scenarios based on their experience in planning exercises that could

serve a force structure for 1970, but these did not gain acceptance. The two

proposed force goals, Alpha and Bravo, would have required costs that the allies

felt they could not afford.43

In late 1964 McNamara had doubts about the commitment of the Joint

Chiefs and SACEUR, supported by the European allies, to building a credible

conventional force. SACEUR's Alpha and Bravo goals wanted to preserve "at all

costs," according to a State-Defense paper in October 1964, "the ability of ACE

[Allied Central Europe] forces to fight a general nuclear war, which is the least

likely contingency." Alpha and Bravo conventional forces could make only a

marginal contribution to a general nuclear war as opposed to a small-scale nonnuclear conflict.44

In this standoff the secrerary saw it as his mission to continue to educate the

Joint Chiefs, SACEUR, and their European colleagues in the virtues of his version

offlexible response. If he failed to convert his adversaries in the force planning for

1966, he could hope for more success in planning a force structure for 1970. To

sustain a defense effort that would meet these goals required acceleration of the

pace of arms sales that had replaced military assistance to the more prosperous

members of NATO.*

While sales of U.S. equipment provided a source of income, they also created

some dissension within the alliance. The French, Germans, and British had their

own agendas, which did not mesh with those of the United States. Their interest centered not on buying U.S. weapons for conventional warfare, but on acquiring nuclear capability for themselves. Although public rationalization for

independent nuclear deterrents derived from the putative loss of U.S. credibility

after Sputnik, it was national pride as much as perceived American vulnerability

* See Chaprer XVI.
370 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

and unreliability that motivated France, Germany, and Great Britain and led to

confrontations between them and the United States. The disaffected allies' tactics

differed but their objectives were much the same.

France and the Force de Frappe

General de Gaulle returned to power in 1958 in a France still bruised by the

experiences with the United States in Indochina and Suez. Even before Sputnik

(l957)-and the Fifth Republic (l958)-France believed that only a French

nuclear deterrent could provide both security and respect. Like the British, but

without their expectations of success, de Gaulle's France undertook extensive

negotiations with the United States, which ranged beyond the sensitive issues

of nuclear arms. They involved base rights and cost-sharing arrangements for

U.S. troops in France. In 1960 and 1961, Philippe Baudet, civilian deputy for

national defense, led missions to Washington to work out reciprocal purchases

of military equipment. Although nuclear weapons technology rarely came up, it

always lurked just beneath the surface of any negotiations as a divisive issue.45

The U.S. concern about the unfavorable balance of payments with France

figured in a proposed plan for reciprocal purchases ofmilitary equipment, worked

out in May 1961, that provided for U.S. purchase of $25 million worth of materiel in France and French expenditures of $50 million in the United States,

primarily for F-100 aircraft and Tartar batteries.* In August William Bundy

strongly recommended accepting the agreement, which State also favored. The

trade agreement entered into force on 20 December 1961.46

Negotiations with France, while never easy, continued and covered a wide

range of weaponry, including missiles such as the short-range surface-to-surface

Mace. When these proved too expensive, the more advanced Pershing missilest

were substituted in negotiations. From the U.S. perspective this would represent

a generous conveyance of missile technology in the form of tactical surface-tosurface weapons, although the package would not include warheads or technical

nuclear information. Questions about funding the request for Pershing missiles did

not present a major obstacle to the plan. State and Defense authorized Norstad on

3 May 1961 to make a conditional offer of one Pershing battalion to the French,

arranged on a cost-sharing basis, with the U.S. share at $20 million out of a total

cost of $68 million.47

Initiation of negotiations aroused already latent worries in ISA about providing France more advanced types of missiles such as the Pershing. As one official

put it: "The French would be given privileged information concerning an inertial

*Medium-range naval surface-ro-air (SAM) missiles.

t The Pershing-l ballistic missile was a surface-ro-surface, two-stage, solid-propelled rocket suitable for a nuclear

warhead and having a range of between 100 and 400 nm.
NATO Relations: Transatlantic Differences 371

guidance system which would be almost identical to that used in ballistic missiles.

This might be construed to be in conflict with current U.S. policy which prohibits any U.S. assistance which would encourage accelerated development of an

independent ballistic missile capability." This sentiment had wide acceptance in

Nitze's office. Rowen supported selling the Sergeant instead of the Pershing to the

French. "Its maximum range of 75 n. mi.," he noted in a memorandum to Nitze

in November, "limits its potential for mischiefsubstantially as compared with the

400 n. mi. Pershing."48

Consideration of France's nuclear capability independent of NATO's authority or U.S. control, always a concern, ultimately became the reason for denying

France the Pershing missile as well as provision of other technical information that

might assist development of the independent French strategic nuclear capabilitythe fOrce de frappe. But this outcome was neither the initial Defense position nor

the result of Defense pressures. Indeed, some sympathy for the French position

existed within 000, based on prior U.S. commitments, as well as a recognition

that French purchase of U.S. equipment would alleviate the unfavorable balance

of payments created by dollars spent in France for U.S. troop support.49

Franco-American relations worsened in 1962 as de Gaulle's hostility to U.S.

leadership in NATO took more concrete form. In January 1963, soon after de

Gaulle's provocative press conference of 14 January, in which he expressed again

France's intention to have its own independent nuclear deterrent, OSD informed

Norsrad that it envisioned no role for Pershings in the NATO nuclear force.

"Moreover, in keeping with strong U.S. preference for multilateral over national

approach to nuclear problem, resurrection of French (or other country) interest

in Pershing system at this time would not repeat not be advisable." This attitude

fed even further de Gaulle's conviction of a U.S. conspiracy, abetted by the British, to subordinate France to American imperial design. 50

At the same time that DoD denied France the weapon, it was actively pressing the president to approve sale of two Pershing battalions to the Germans. The

obvious inconsistency of treatment did not go unobserved. In August 1963 the

Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) chief in Paris asked for a review of

the U.S. position, given the revival of French interest in the weapon. He suggested

"the use of this French interest as a bargaining point in our (US) discussions with

them." From his perspective, he could not understand the logic of letting the

French in principle have other delivery systems such as Honest John and NikeHercules, which could also use nuclear warheads, and "yet balk at selling them

SERGEANT and PERSHING, which we have already sold to the Germans."51

France and the United States appeared heading for a collision course in

NATO from early on in the Kennedy administration, and the fallout from the

friction appeared in every area of arms sales. But even as the political climate

grew colder between the two countries, France still persisted in seeking technical

and other assistance from the United States, and some Defense officials, with the
372 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

notable exception of General Norstad, persisted in supporting French requests.

Defense argued that if France could reduce the cost of developing aforce de frappe,

which would occur later if not sooner under any circumstance, it might use the

savings to contribute to NATO's conventional forces. 52

Ambassador to France James Gavin along with General Taylor argued that

the nation had earned the same right as Britain to nuclear information under

terms of the 1958 amendments to the Atomic Energy Act that authorized transfer of technical information and material to countries which already had made

substantial advances in developing atomic weapons. The first French nuclear tests

had occurred by the time the Kennedy administration took office, and it seemed

only a matter of time before France would join the nuclear club. The most that

the United States had conceded to the French under an agreement of 27 July

1961 authorized release of nuclear information for training French NATO forces.

However, this agreement did not provide for exchange of information for designing or developing or manufacturing atomic weapons. 53

Gavin tried to use this opening late in 1961 to have the United States make

available to France enriched uranium for military purposes in sufficient amount

to enable France to dispense with the construction of an expensive gaseous diffusion plant. He felt that such aid would counteract de Gaulle's steady subversion of

NATO by facilitating action the French would do on their own in the long run,

but at great cost. He rationalized that failure to help would lead to anarchic development of national nuclear programs or situations where France and Germany

might combine their efforts separate from the United States and NATO. Gavin

did not convince Rusk, who responded that "upon reflection here I believe that to

furnish enriched uranium to France for military applications would lead to other

French requests relating to production of nuclear weapons."

Gavin subsequently took his case to the president in March 1962, but without success. While Kennedy did show some sympathy for Taylor's and Gavin's

views, he did not challenge the adamant hostility of Rusk, Norstad, and his advisers in the White House. 54

By the spring of 1962 the NSC had made nonproliferation of nuclear weapons a fundamental article of U.S. policy. Kennedy aide Sorensen later wrote that

Kennedy felt that any nuclear aid, in light of de Gaulle's outlook, "would not

win General de Gaulle to our purposes but only strengthen him in his." He was

probably correct. When the United States offered Polaris missiles (minus nuclear

warheads) to France on the same terms given Britain at the Nassau Conference in

December 1962, de Gaulle rejected the offer out of hand, stating that it had little

immediate practical value for France.*55

The surprise in the Franco-American relationship came not from the deadlock

over mutual purchasing agreements, but the persistence on the part of Defense,

* See Chapter xv.
NATO Relations: Transatlantic Differences 373

despite State opposition, to pursue negotiations. Despite de Gaulle's hauteur, in

keeping talks alive France always sought to facilitate the completion of its force de

frappe. 56 The apparent dogged perseverance of French defense officials in exploring all possible avenues of nuclear assistance from the United States suggested

the extent of France's needs. But their efforts did not fit the image de Gaulle was

fashioning for France in EuropeY Given his perceived intransigence, it seemed

reasonable for U.S. policymakers to cut their losses with France and concentrate

on cultivating the other two major partners-Britain and Germany.

Germany: Nuclear Aspirations?

The repeated conflicts with France had their impact on German-American

relations, since there was more common ground between the French and Germans

than American leaders were willing to see between 1961 and 1963. Chancellor Adenauer continued to brood over what he considered the inadequate U.S.

response to the building of the Berlin Wall. And like the French, the Germans

also had strong reservations about raising both conventional force levels and the

threshold of nuclear response.

Increasingly, pressure mounted in the Federal Republic for a more active

voice in determining the use of nuclear weapons, particularly those stationed on

German soil. Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss, head of the Christian Social

Union Party, a junior partner ofAdenauer's Christian Democratic Union, loomed

as a German Gaullist seeking a share of nuclear power decisions. Strauss, a burly,

bluff, and opinionated politician, proposed that any member nation could initiate use of nuclear weapons with the joint recommendation of the supreme allied

commander. Speaking at the North Atlantic Council meeting in December 1961,

Strauss asked what would be the American reaction to the Soviets achieving parity

in ICBMs. He implied that Europe needed its own deterrent against a Soviet

threat that would spare the United States in a deal over the heads of Europeans.58

In essence, de Gaulle seemed to speak for a German constituency as well as for

France.

In this context, McNamara's Athens speech in May 1962 and his Ann Arbor

speech in June decrying nuclear proliferation as well as disparaging small independent nuclear establishments received as cool a reception in Germany as in

France and evoked suspicion of the new Kennedy administration, with its apparent intention to dictate NATO policy in ways very different from those of the

Eisenhower team. U.S. inability to empathize with Europe's concerns led to an

uneasiness further exacerbated by Strauss's confrontational style. 59

German suspicion of U.S. intentions emerged in discussions between

members of the U.S. and German general staffs at the Pentagon in December

1962. Speaking for the German delegation, General Friedrich Foertsch, inspec-
374 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

tor general of the German Army, addressed a series of queries, each with a hidden

agenda, to the Americans. Why did they want to delay taking action on many

issues until the United Kingdom had joined the European Economic Community (EEC)? Would the United States withdraw its troops or change its position

on Europe once Britain entered the EEC? Why could the United States not see

that the Cuban missile crisis demonstrated that nuclear weapons comprised a

vital element in Western defense? At the same time he made an effort to convince

the chairman of the ]CS that the Germans did not really wish to acquire nuclear

weapons. It was not a happy meeting. As Lt. Gen. Andrew]. Goodpaster of the

]CS staff noted, continued discontent might push the Germans into de Gaulle's

camp, if not into a neutralist accommodation with the Soviet Union. GO

Strains in the German-American partnership in December 1962 affected

not only the military chieftains. A week after the meeting at the Pentagon, the

German embassy in Washington raised new questions arising from McNamara's

and Rusk's recommendation at the NATO ministerial meeting for a review of

the alliance's strategic concept. Once again emphasis on non-nuclear forward

defense raised doubts in German minds about the U.S. commitment to nuclear

warfare. McNamara's blunt comments at the NATO ministerial meeting in

December 1962 on NATO's strength being substantially below the necessary

level in equipment, troops, and availability of ready reserves struck a raw nerve.

Reports that the Federal Republic should compensate for these deficiencies and

raise its manpower contribution to 750,000 further disturbed the Germans. It

would mean a 50 percent increase above the current projected level of 500,000.

If achieved, the increase would impose more than financial difficulties. As Horst

Blomeyer-Bartenstein, first secretary of the embassy in Washington, informed the

State Department, "such a large German army would be an irritant not only to

the Soviets but also to certain of our Western friends, even to some people in the

United States." Furthermore, the Germans wanted clearer answers on the future

ofthe MRBMs before considering an increase beyond the 500,000 level.G1

The Kennedy administration paid more attention to German dissatisfaction than to French complaints. The White House and State Department, if not

Defense, dismissed France as a lost cause. Their expectations did not go beyond

isolating de Gaulle and minimizing the damage his government could do to the

alliance. Germany, on the other hand, deserved more solicitous treatment. Its

location on the edge of the Iron Curtain, the locus of the armies of the NATO

partners, placed Germany geostrategically in a more important position. Germany

deserved consideration for other reasons, too. Unlike France, the Federal Republic

had made no formal effort to acquire a nuclear capability, a particular blessing,

because Germany as a nuclear power would present political and psychological

implications far more incendiary than France's membership in the nuclear club.

The United States, McNamara told Rusk in February 1963, should see to it that

frustration over U.S. policies did not reach such a level as to move Germany in
NATO Relations: Transatlantic Differences 375

France's direction.62 Germany's willingness to make financial arrangements to ameliorate the uneven balance of payments between the two countries also contributed

to a positive image ofthe Adenauer government.63

All these factors lay behind the decision of DoD, with State Department

concurrence, to sell Pershing-1 missiles to Germany, under NATO control. In

April 1963, Gilpatric informed the president he supported these purchases on

political grounds to show U.S. willingness to cooperate with Germany in building

up a military establishment that would have the same tactical nuclear capability

as that of u.s. forces. To refuse such a sale would damage U.S.-German relations

"at a particularly critical moment in the history of the Alliance." The politicoeconomic argument gained force from the value these new arms sales would have

for the defense posture of NATO. In 1964 the Pershing became operational in

West German troop units.64

Despite the concerns for German sensibilities, U.S. officials, both State and

Defense, recognized that with all Europeans the heart of the matter lay in the

U.S. deemphasis of a nuclear strategy and the elevation of a conventional strategy.

McNamara's understanding of these sentiments of NATO allies found expression

in his attempts to reassure them of the continued U.S. nuclear commitment to

NATO. Unfortunately, he usually also made references to the apocalyptic consequences of nuclear weapons that would make their use a disaster for friend and

enemy alike. Earlier, in looking over McNamara's address before the Athens meeting in 1962, the president anticipated reactions it might evoke and suggested

changes to clarify the U.S. position.65 Not even the most careful fine-tuning was

likely to satisfy the European partners. General Norstad, on the scene in Europe,

had understood the limits of verbal persuasion. Consequently, he, too, in 1962

looked for other approaches, including the Strauss proposal to have the nuclear

decision made by the country attacked in concert with the SACEUR. He turned

over other ideas as well, among them the formal identification of the U.S. president as "executive agent" of the alliance and-more daring-the establishment of

a European force armed with its own nuclear weapons."'66

Skybolt

Of all the U.S. partners in NATO, the United Kingdom should have been the

most secure and the most supportive. Amendments to the U.S. Atomic Energy

Act had assisted its role as a nuclear power, and the United States seemed prepared

to maintain the special relationship that separated Britain from the Continent

as surely as the Channel itself But although Britain had its own limited nuclear

force, this relationship was troubled by the same misgiving harbored by Getmany

and France-dependence on the United States for nuclear defense. Each nation

'" See Chapter xv:
376 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

reacted somewhat differently, but none with the intensity of feeling of the AngloAmerican wrangle over Skybolt.67

Though less disruptive to the two countries' relations than the 1956 Suez

crisis, the U.S. decision in December 1962 to halt development of the Skybolt

missile, whose use was to be shared with the United Kingdom, created doubt and

suspicion in each country about the other's motives and trustworthiness. Gilpatric recalled that "just as the British overreacted to the cancellation of Skybolt, we

overreacted to their overreaction."68 Only an agreement hurriedly worked out

between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan in the Bahamas-for

the United States to furnish Polaris missiles as a substitute-avoided a serious

breach.

Begun in 1959 by the u.s. Air Force, the Skybolt air-to-surface ballistic

missile was to have a range of 1,000 miles, carry nuclear warheads for launching from a B-52 bomber, and become operational by the end of 1964. Complex,

costly, and of uncertain reliability, Skybolt represented more of a gamble than any

weapon the United States had developed. Air Force initial estimates of research

and development costs ($184 million) and of procuring 1,000 missiles ($679

million) were unrealistically low.69

In 1960 the Macmillan government, after provisionally deciding to end its

own expensive long-range missile program (Blue Streak), reached an agreement

with the Eisenhower administration to buy Skybolt, ifsuccessfUlly developed, for

use on the Royal Air Force's Vulcan bombers. British costs would be minimal-for

missiles purchased and fitting them to the Vulcans. Each country could terminate

its participation in the program after consultation with the other. By extending

the life of its V-bomber force, the arrangement would permit the United Kingdom to maintain an independent nuclear deterrent beyond the 1960s, a cherished

fixture in the defense policy of Macmillan's Conservative government. Questioning by the Labour Party of the need for an independent deterrenr and doubts

whether Skybolt would ever materialize only hardened the government's public

commitment to and reliance on Skybolt. Secretary of Defense Gates and other

OSD officials repeatedly conveyed to the British their concerns about the cost and

difficulty of developing the weapon and warned them not to count on successful completion, yet stopped short of recommending cancellation. In the FY 1962

budget submitted to Congress in January 1961, the Eisenhower administration

requested no new funds for Skybolt, proposing to stretch out the previous year's

appropriation and leave to the incoming administration and a new secretary of

defense the decision on its fateJo

When he took over, McNamara essentially had three choices: continue the

program at Eisenhower's funding level, increase it by $50 million as the Air Force

had requested, or stop development. Years later he declared that the weapon

had been "a pile of junk." Yet, from the beginning, he gave Skybolt a fair trial.

After a quick study that led to McNamara's recommendation to add the $50
NATO Relations: Transatlantic Differences 377

million, Kennedy included the amount in his March 1961 budget amendment

that Congress subsequently approved.?! The secretary based his recommendation

on technical and strategic grounds, but political considerations no doubt played

a part in the president's approval. For Kennedy to stop the program soon after

entering office would have appeared a strange about-face, since he had criticized

Eisenhower during the election campaign for skimping on the nation's defenses

in order to control spending. Then, too, cancellation, occurring when the new

administration was accelerating the Navy's Polaris development, would have especially infuriated the Air Force and its supporters.

Less than a month after requesting the additional money, the president

approved a policy directive regarding NATO that seemed to diminish Britain's

chances of obtaining Skybolt. Declaring that in "the long run, it would be desirable if the British decided to phase out of the nuclear deterrent business," the

statement reflected prevailing thought in the administration that British defense

spending should be devoted more to conventional forces. Moreover, the directive stated, if Skybolt's development were "not warranted for U.S. purposes alone,

the U.S. should not prolong the life of the V-Bomber force by this or other

means."72 A small but influential group at the State Department had contributed

to that conclusion with their belief that Britain's independent deterrent encouraged German and French aspirations for national nuclear forces and impeded the

creation of a multilateral force (MLF) in Europe.* But the directive ignored the

inconsistency of adding money to the budget to develop a weapon that would

serve, at least in part, an undesirable purpose.

By the fall of 1961, during preparation of the FY 1963 budget, rising cost

estimates, dissatisfaction with the program's management by the primary contractor, the Douglas Aircraft Company, and skepticism within the government about

Skybolt's worth compared with other strategic weapons caused McNamara to conduct another reappraisal. In a preliminary report on 31 October DoD's Committee on Strategic Weapons questioned whether the weapon's development should

be continued "even if all technical problems are overcome. It does not seem to add

any very significantly new rype of threat to our arsenal nor to be much cheaper

or more reliable than available weapons." OSD Comptroller Charles Hitch made

a similar point, arguing that by the time Skybolt became part of the U.S. arsenal

both Minuteman and Polaris would have provided the nation with its necessary

retaliatory power.?3 To make matters worse, on 21 October the Air Force had

submitted a revised program that raised estimated research and development

costs to $492.6 million, more than doubling the initial estimate and representing

$100 million more than McNamara was told during a visit to the Douglas plant

the previous month. In addition estimated production costs now stood at $1.27

billion, a $591 million jump. Despite the dramatic increases, and over the strong

* For the MLF, see Chapter XV.
378 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

objections of some of the president's advisers, McNamara recommended and the

president approved the revised plan. But approval was conditioned on Skybolt's

completion on time and at the estimated cost.74

The British complaint at the time of Skybolt's cancellation in December

1962 that they had been left in the dark concerning the growing doubts about

the program had little merit. On the contrary, the Kennedy administration, like

its predecessor, sought to keep them fully informed. In March 1961 DR&E

Deputy Director John Rubel, who had monitored the program since its inception,

summarized for McNamara the history of the discussions regarding Skybolt and

warnings the Eisenhower administration had given about possible cancellation.

Rubel concluded: "It is quite important that the British, in eliciting our cooperation on Skybolt, which we are glad to give, should refrain from overplaying this

program in the political arena. Our flexibility of action will be compromised if

they do that. We should promise no more than we intend-they should not place

a lien on our intentions."75

Also in March, after the decision to request $50 million more for Skybolt,

McNamara told British Minister of Defence Harold Watkinson that the United

States intended to continue the program and promised to notifY him "if any

hitches developed." Watkinson received a mixed message from other OSD officials; Gilpatric stated that "the program was coming along well," while Rubel and

others spoke more cautiously about its prospects. In December 1961, McNamara,

having just given his conditional approval to a more costly program, told Watkinson that "we were doing everything possible but ... we still had reservations as

to whether all the technical problems could be solved." The following month the

president informed British Secretary of State for Air Julian Amery of his doubts

whether Skybolt would ever work. "One should not bank on it too much," he

said. The remark nearly caused Amery to falloff his chair. The president hastened

to assure Amery that everything was being done to make it work.76

Moreover, there was little substance to the charge that U.S. officials failed

to appreciate Skybolt's crucial importance to the Macmillan government. Only

a few weeks after the inauguration, OSD prepared a briefing paper for the

White House pointing out that, "because of the political sensitivity stemming

from the British Government's decision to cancel the Bluestreak missile and to

rely in large measure on the Skybolt to extend the life of their V-bomber force,

every indication of technical or funding difficulties for the development of

Skybolt has brought prompt expressions of British concern." The British would

likely claim, the paper suggested, that the United States made an unqualified

commitment to furnish Skybolt, even though it was obligated to do so only "if

the missile is successfully developed." In April 1962 the president's science

adviser, Jerome Wiesner, ptepared a lengthy report for Kennedy focusing on

technical problems in the weapon's development, while noting that a recommendation within the Eisenhower administration to halt Skybolt had been
NATO Relations: Transatlantic Differences 379

"overruled on the grounds that this would be politically impossible In view

ofthe commitment to the British.''?7

The first two Skybolt test firings in the spring of 1962 were unsuccessful and

McNamara grew more displeased with still rising cost estimates and the Douglas

company's poor performance; a decision had to be made that fall whether to begin

production. After the Bureau of the Budget suggested further reappraisal of the

program, the secretary asked the comptroller and the DR&E director to examine

alternatives. Late in August Hitch and Harold Brown gave him a lengthy memorandum analyzing the program's technical and financial aspects and various courses

of action. When the three met on 24 August, Hitch suggested and McNamara

agreed that they wait until the fall, then drop Skybolt from the FY 1964 budget

during the concluding phase ofits preparation.78

The effects of cancellation on the British remained a major worry. Brown

and Hitch included in their memorandum a section entitled "The British

Consideration," which acknowledged the difficulty of predicting British reaction to cancellation. However, they pointed out that in the fall of 1960, when the

Eisenhower administration considered ending the program, the State Department

feared the Macmillan government might fall if the program ended. An attached

paper prepared by ISA's European Regional Office emphasized that the United

Kingdom would feel "let down" by and resent termination of the program.

The effect on British public opinion "should not be underestimated," the paper

warned,79

If the United States prior to this time was entirely forthcoming with the British regarding Skybolt, the same cannot be said for McNamara's subsequent

meeting with new Minister of Defence Peter Thorneycroft, who had succeeded

Watkinson in July 1962. During Thorneycroft's visit to the United States in

September, McNamara, obviously constrained because he had not yet recommended cancellation, did not reveal that he was leaning in that direction. He

told Thorneycroft that Skybolt's costs "had further gone up," but left his visitor

with the impression that the program "would go forward." Thorneycroft, who

also talked with Kennedy, recalled that he "went out of my way" to impress on

both the president and McNamara Skybolt's importance for the British and that

he received from the latter assurances "as categorical as you could get" that the

United States would continue the program.80

McNamara apparently did not decide to recommend cancellation until toward the end of October, during the Cuban missile crisis. This was when BoB

Director David Bell informed McGeorge Bundy that DoD's budget review would

likely result in a "firm recommendation" that Skybolt be halted. According to Bell,

McNamara and Gilpatric felt cancellation "can and should be considered on its

merits without reference to a 'commitment' to the British." If decided on, cancellation was "regarded as consistent with our present policy to favor the phasing out

by the British oftheir strategic nuclear bombing forces."81
380 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

At the White House's request, the State Department prepared a quick analysis of the consequences of cancellation, which it predicted, among other things,

"could be an unmitigated political blow to the Conservatives. The British would

certainly feel let down-hard." The decision would have even wider ramifications.

If it seemed that the United States was '''double-crossing' our oldest and closest

ally-and it might well appear this way-it would be a serious blow to our whole

alliance system." Echoing State's concern about the likely impact of cancellation,

on 3 November Nitze urged that McNamara offer to dispatch a high-ranking official to London to discuss with Thorneycroft the technical and military aspects

of possible cancellation and that the president also immediately inform Macmillan. 82

McNamara was not ready to notify the British. He wanted first to obtain the

views ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff. On 5 November he returned Nitze's memo, after

writing in the margin: "As we discussed over the telephone, only today did I send

my tentative recommendations on Skybolt to the Chiefs. I believe we should hold

the message to Thorneycroft until we hear from the Chiefs. We will try to provide

for 3 weeks 'consultation' with the British before the 'leak date' of approximately

12/10."83 The budget would essentially reach completion during the first week of

December, and 10 December seemed a reasonable date to anticipate that stories

about it might begin appearing in the press.

On the same day, 5 November, McNamara received a message from Thorneycroft referring to British press reports that Skybolt production was about to begin;

this forced his hand. Two days later he met with the president, Rusk, Bundy, and

Nitze to discuss how he should respond. He and Rusk pointed out that cancellation "would create a very grave problem for the British Government-might even

bring it down." In general they thought the British should be provided much

advance warning and "a chance to come up with something by way of an adequate

substitute." McNamara and Bundy believed that, in the end, the United States

would probably have to provide Polaris missiles. They agreed that McNamara

should inform Ambassador David Ormsby Gore and Thorneycroft of the likelihood of cancellation.84 Save for McNamara's understandable lack of complete

candor with Thorneycroft in September, his handling of the matter to this point

could hardly be faulted.

The meeting with the president led to a flurry of activity. First, McNamara

told Ormsby Gore on 8 November that rising cost estimates for Skybolt procurement ($1.4 billion to over $1.75 billion), along with previous increases, had

caused the administration to reconsider "the worth of the weapon." He had

referred the question to the Joint Chiefs, but did not expect their views for several

weeks. He wanted to let the British government know that the United States was

"reconsidering the program." In a telephone conversation with Thorneycroft the

next day, McNamara repeated what he had told Ormsby Gore and added that

the British would have several alternatives to consider, which he would be will-
NATO Relations: Transatlantic Differences 381

ing to come to London to discuss. Consultations probably could not take place

until after 23 November (when McNamara planned to discuss the defense budget

with the president). Thorneycroft said he would have his ministry "consider

how the V-bomber force might be operated without Skybolt and what the u.s.

and British governments should state to the public in the event the program is

cancelled." McNamara gained the impression that the British wanted to consider

a submarine-launched missile if it seemed termination of Skybolt would make the

V-bomber force obsolete.85

After notifYing the British of possible cancellation, the administration quickly

worked out its policy. McNamara had proposed offering Minuteman and Hound

Dog missiles to compensate for Skybolt's elimination. At this point, on 20

November the Joint Chiefs recommended staying with Skybolt; only the new JCS

chairman, General Taylor, favored cancellation. On 23 November, at a defense

budget meeting in Hyannis Port with the president, McNamara weighed various

courses of action on Skybolt and came down in favor of cancellation. The president-apparently after little discussion-approved ending the u.s. involvement

subject to consultation with the British. The next day Rusk wrote McNamara

that any discussions with the British should be limited to three alternatives: (1)

continuation of the program on their own, (2) their use of Hound Dog instead

of Skybolt, and (3) their participation in a sea-based medium-range ballistic

missile force, i.e. Polaris force, "under multilateral manning and ownership." Rusk

stressed the impossibility "of our helping them set up a nationally manned and

owned MRBM force."86 The third alternative, MLF, had strong backing from

some of Rusk's subordinates at State who also favored the end of the British independent deterrent.

But McNamara postponed his trip to London, thereby increasing chances

that word of cancellation would leak to the press before he arrived. He could have

gone as early as 26 November, having received the JCS views, the president's decision, and Rusk's recommendations. That morning White House staff thought he

would leave in the evening. By noon, however, he decided to put off the trip,

hoping to go later in the week. When he avoided setting a date, Bundy grew

concerned and called to advise against delay. An ISA staff member suggested that

Nitze and Rubel go as an advance party, but McNamara replied, ''I'll take care of

it." Not until 6 December did he decide that he would stop in London on the

way to Paris, where the NATO Council was meeting on 12 December.87

In the meantime, press reports began to appear on both sides of the Atlantic

that Skybolt was in trouble and would be canceled. None ofthe earlier test flights

had been fully successful, and news ofthe failure ofthe fifth test-the first guided

launch-on 28 November only fueled speculation. Moreover, disparaging public

remarks about declining British power by Dean Acheson stung British public

opinion.88 A highly charged atmosphere awaited McNamara in London.
382 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

According to Under Secretary of State George Ball, McNamara needlessly

soured the atmosphere by his airport arrival statement referring to the five unsuccessful tests. Having seen a draft of the statement, Ball telephoned McNamara

urging him to omit remarks about technical problems, which would imply that he

intended to cancel Skybolt, not consult about its future. McNamara, according to

Ball, acknowledged that perhaps he should not make such reference, but he said

"somebody had to tell the British people about the deficiencies ofthis weapon and

the British Government wasn't doing so." For Ball, McNamara's unwillingness to

heed his advice "illustrated both the strength and weakness of his temperament.

Once he had made up his mind something should be done, he would damn the

torpedoes and full steam ahead, in spite of any incidental breakage caused by

inappropriate timing."89 Negative press reaction to McNamara's statement may

not have been entirely the result of what he said. Ormsby Gore thought that officials within the Ministry of Defence "through sensational leaks to the press . . .

sowed maximum distrust of American motives and made the siruation as difficult

as possible."90

In retrospect, far more important than McNamara's delay of the trip to

London and disregard ofBall's advice was his failure (later much regretted) to fight

the State Department's objections to offering Polaris as a straight replacement for

Skybolt. In McNamara's view Rusk did not feel strongly about the matter, but did

not wish to fight over it with his zealous subordinates. So McNamara adhered to

the line State had established. Just before leaving Washington, in a meeting with

the president, Rusk, and Bundy, he said he would present the strongest possible

case "for the technical decision which was anticipated." He would offer the three

alternatives State had spelled out, but did not believe the British would be happy

with any of them. At some stage, he might propose giving them "a more up-todate weapons system on the condition that the venture become multilateral if and

when a multilateral force should be developed," and he mentioned Polaris. The

president indicated "his general approval" of McNamara's approach, and said "he

was not eager to join in a large share of further development costs for a weapon to

be supplied only to the British."91

The issue came to a head when McNamara met with Thorneycroft on 11

December. After the secretary read a long explanation of the U.S. position and

presented the three options, Thorneycroft quickly dismissed them, launched into

a vigorous defense of the British independent deterrent, and pressed McNamara

to indicate his willingness publicly to endorse the deterrent, which McNamara

obviously could not do. As U.S. officials had foreseen, Thorneycroft suggested

that the United States had an obligation to provide Great Britain with a substitute for Skybolt that would permit preservation of the independent deterrent. In

Rubel's view, he "evoked images of the most dire betrayal ... on the part of the

Americans who had, in fact, done nothing more than cancel a development that

should never have been started, to which the British had contributed nothing, for
NATO Relations: Transatlantic Differences 383

which the Americans had no real military need, and which the British had identified as their 'independent nuclear deterrent.'" The meeting broke up without

agreement.92 Further discussion of Skybolt would have to await the KennedyMacmillan summit meeting in Nassau in the Bahamas the following week.

McNamara had expected Thorneycroft to ask specifically for Polaris; he returned to Washington complaining that the British had not done their homework,

that they had not given any thought to what they would like as a replacement. The

complaint was wide of the mark. After hearing from McNamara on 9 November, Thorneycroft had an interdepartmental group intensively study the matter

and prepare a negotiating paper that Macmillan approved.93 The problem was

not British laziness or a breakdown in communication between Washington and

London, as some scholars have maintained,94 but that Thorneycroft wanted what

McNamara could not offer.

The denouement occurred at the Nassau summit meeting (18-21 December), where McNamara, Nitze, and Rubel represented Defense, and Ball-Rusk

having made a prior commitment-represented State. When the president offered

to continue Skybolt development as a joint Anglo-American project on a SO-SO

basis, Macmillan pointed out that "although the proposed British marriage with

Skybolt was not exactly a shotgun wedding, the virginity of the lady must now

be regarded as doubtful." If accepted, the British would have "to spend hundreds

of millions of dollars upon a weapon which the President's own authorities were

casting doubts, both publicly and privately." He also rejected the offers of Hound

Dog and Polaris as part of a multilateral, mixed manning force. The two leaders

finally agreed on 21 December that the United States would sell the United Kingdom a still to be determined number of Polaris A-3 missiles (less reentry vehicles),

along with their missile launching, fire control, and ship navigation systems. The

missiles would be carried on British submarines. The British Polaris forces and

equivalent U.S. forces would be made available in any NATO multilateral nuclear

force that might be created. The issue of the independent British deterrent was

finessed with an ambiguous phrase. When "supreme national interests are at

stake," the British forces could be temporarily withdrawn on appropriate notice.

The British felt that McNamara played a helpful role at the conference. According

to Macmillan, he was "much more reliable than President Kennedy, who makes

the facts fit his arguments."95

A curious postscript involved another Skybolt test by the Air Force the

next day, 22 December-authorized by Gilpatric in McNamara's absence-and

the issuance of a triumphant press release with exaggerated claims of the test's

success. McNamara had left Nassau for Colorado to spend the Christmas holiday.

Kennedy, accompanied by Ormsby Gore, had gone to the president's home in

Palm Beach, Florida. There the president received the news of the test and "went

through the roof." He could not understand how anyone could have authorized

it when he and Macmillan had just decided to cancel Skybolt and, on top of
384 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

that, then claim a completely successful test. He immediately telephoned Gilpatric, who "got the full fury of the storm." McNamara made known to LeMay his

annoyance over the press release, admonishing him that he trusted "that for both

our sakes there will be no recurrence ofsuch incidents."96

The United States canceled Skybolt for budgetary, technical, and strategic

reasons, not because it wanted to eliminate the British independent deterrent,

though that had been a leading objective of the MLF supporters at State, who

viewed the Nassau agreement to substitute Polaris as a terrible surrender. Although

the British considered Nassau a splendid diplomatic triumph that rescued them

from a difficult situation, the Macmillan government itself created the predicament by going too far out on a limb in its commitment to Skybolt and the

independent deterrent. The episode left Kennedy suspicious of British motives,

and McNamara, who had subsequent problems dealing with Thorneycroft,

convinced ofthe defence minister's unreliability.97

McNamara may have committed missteps, but short of offering the British

Polaris missiles without strings at a very early stage, a crisis of some magnitude

could not have been avoided. As Ormsby Gore later observed, however the Americans handled the matter, "there was bound to have been considerable friction."98

Looking back four months after Nassau, Kennedy wondered whether "Polaris

wasn't inevitable as the outcome .... Once this sequence started, there possibly

was nowhere else for it to stop."99 As for the MLF, Skybolt was one thread within

the larger debate over the sharing of nuclear weapons with the European allies, an

issue that would increasingly focus the Kennedy administration's attention.

In the short run, the Skybolt furor revealed two nations with a common

language and different understandings. Nevertheless, the breach was healed more

quickly than the Suez confrontation six years earlier. It did not destroy the relationship or the alliance: the British received a better missile than they could have

expected a few years before; the Americans had the satisfaction of bringing Britain

into the projected multilateral force; and the alliance emerged intact, iffrayed.

In the longer run, the Skybolt affair underscored the lack of coherence and

clarity that characterized NATO policy during much of the Kennedy and Johnson

administrations. Britain, no less than France and Germany, became suspicious

and anxious about the U.S. nuclear posture. Despite professions of continuing

commitment to the nuclear strategic role of the 1950s, Washington's actions often

seemed to undercut declarations. On the heels of Athens and Ann Arbor the

Skybolt affair did nothing to bolster U.S. credibility as a reliable partner.
CHAPTER XV

MLF: A Notion Too Far

In NATO's history there is a striking similarity in the roles played by the

European Defense Community (EDC) in the early 1950s and the Multilateral

Force (MLF) a decade later.* Both were experiments in the integration of national

forces, which if successful would have served as powerful agents in advancing the

cause of a United States of Europe. The EDC aimed to resolve the destructive

rivalry between Germany and France and would have facilitated the tapping of

German resources for use in NATO. It was also intended as an instrument for

keeping West Germany bound to the NATO camp without the Federal Republic becoming a formal member of the alliance. The MLF sought to accomplish

still other ends-arm the SHAPE command with medium-range ballistic missiles,

discourage independent German and French nuclear initiatives, and reassure European allies of the reliability of U.S. nuclear guarantees.

Both the EDC and MLF failed, in large measure because, however sound the

objectives, an array of competing political, strategic, and bureaucratic interests, as

well as complicated legal, logistic, and financial issues, made common agreement

both at home and abroad impossible to achieve. In both instances an ambitious

plan foundered on a host of practical problems and fell victim to unrealistic

expectations. Multilateralism's most ardent supporters, a prominent coterie of

State Department policy planners led by Robert Bowie, Gerard Smith, and Henry

Owen, joined in the Kennedy administration by George Ball and, more guardedly, Walt Rostow, insisted, as with the EDC, that the purpose of the MLF was

not just to frustrate the development of national nuclear weapon systems on the

Continent or to manage the French and German "problems," but to make Europeans full and worthy partners of the United States. In theory, an MLF could

help break down antiquated and dangerous nationalist behavior and pave the way

for a united Europe based on the American model as espoused by such reformers

*An earlier version of rhis chaprer, writren by Lawrence S. Kaplan, appeared under the title "The MLF Debate"

in Douglas Brinkley and Richard T. Griffiths, eds,john F Kennedy and Europe, 51-65.

385
386 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

as French economist Jean Monnet. That the MLF idea survived as long as it did,

from 1960 to 1965, was a tribute to the devotion ofthese true believers.

The MLF never won such dedicated adherents in the Defense Department,

which tended to regard a multilateral structure that included in its purest form

a mixing of crews from different countries as militarily unworkable because

of language, cultural, and other barriers. In general, the Pentagon's interest

in the MLF centered less on the lofty objective of altering NATO's nationalist

proclivities rhan on the more limited and urgent need to meet alliance security

requirements, though both had strategic implications and at times both of necessity factored into DoD decisionmaking.

Birth ofa Concept

Through the 1950s Europe's dependency on the U.S. atomic arsenal for the

defense of the Continent against a Soviet missile threat contributed to increasing

strains in the NATO alliance and underscored the need to involve the Europeans

more directly in their own security. For Defense planners in the Eisenhower years

the challenge was to bolster European confidence and capability while maintaining adequate control over deployment and use of nuclear weapons.

The nuclear stockpiles the United States had established in Europe in the

aftermath of the Soviets' Sputnik launch provided a precedent for having atomic

weapons on the Continent. Although the stockpiling put delivery systems in

European hands, the United States retained custody over nuclear warheads

through a "dual key" arrangement whereby firing could occur only by authorization of the president and under the orders of the supreme allied commander,

Europe. To SACEUR General Lauris Norstad, who was instrumental in developing the stockpiling program, this provision offered a satisfactory formula for a

NATO missile force under U.S. authority that presented benefits for both Europe

and the United States. Beginning in 1958 the United States deployed liquidfuel Thor and Jupiter IRBMs in Great Britain, Italy, and Turkey, but range and

safety issues limited their utility and acceptability from the start and made them

poor candidates for an effective deterrent. Norstad believed that installing a new

generation of medium-range ballistic missiles on the Continent under the banner

of NATO and command of SACEUR could not only achieve greater military

security for Europe but at the same time meet the demands for nuclear sharing

made by some of the allies and counter nationalist nuclear aspirations in France

and Germany.* Norstad's plan presumed the use of a land-based, solid-propellant Polaris system to replace the Thors and Jupiters. The Norstad initiative was a

* On French and German nuclear thought during this period, see Chapter XIV. On the French, see also

Constantine A. Pagedas, Anglo-American Strategic Relations and the French Problem, 1960-1963: A Troubled Partnership, 69-85. John 5teinbruner provides an incisive analysis of French and German nuclear thinking in The

Cybernetic Theory ofDecision, 164-68, 214-15.
MLF: A Notion Too Far 387

harbinger ofthe MLF concept, though the emphasis on U.S. custody and control

and a "multinational" (separate national units under a unified command) rather

than a "multilateral" (common ownership and mixed manning) system bore little

resemblance to the more far-reaching concept championed by the policy planners

in the State Department.!

Mounting criticism ofthe liabilities of a land-based system persuaded DoD to

reconsider the possible advantages of basing the Polaris at sea. The State Department's Bowie Report in 1960 advocated a submarine-based MRBM force for

NATO that Bowie believed stood a better chance of furthering the multilateral

concept than basing the weapon on national soil and offered other advantages as

well. Although the Army and Air Force backed SACEUR's preference for a landbased missile, citing the higher operational costs, more complex logistics, and

lesser accuracy ofthe seagoing version ofthe Polaris, they and Secretary ofDefense

Gates acknowledged that seaborne deployment might make sense initially because

ofits ready availability and lesser vulnerability and political sensitivity. Putting the

missiles at sea would be more acceptable to the NATO allies than putting them

on land, where they would be more visible targets and invite intense domestic

debate and opposition. Also, Pentagon planners worried that greater vulnerability of the land-based missile to capture could put pressure on NATO to use the

weapon before it might be seized.

In August 1960, the submarine concept got a timely assist from Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Nathan F. Twining, who, evidently independently of the State Department advocates, became convinced of the merits of

a sea-based NATO MRBM force and introduced his own submarine proposal.

With Twining's conversion and Gates's own second thoughts about deploying the

Polaris on European soil, OSD moved in the direction of the submarine option

while the JCS* held out for future augmentation of the force by a land-based

program. There remained fundamental disagreements with State over the custody

and control issue and the feasibility of mixed manning as well as differences over

cost and the linkage between the U.S. and European contribution.2

Defense and State representatives worked hard through the fall of 1960 to reconcile the deep-seated conflicts in their respective positions.3 Each side made

concessions on substance and language so that Secretary of State Christian Herter

was able to promulgate a broad patchwork "concept" at the NATO ministerial meeting in Paris in December.t Herter recommended that the United States

commit to NATO before the end of 1963 an interim MRBM force of five nuclear

submarines, armed with Polaris missiles, on condition that the Europeans come up

* Twining's support of the sea-based concept had been a personal endorsemenr rather than a joint recommendation by the chiefs.

t Watson, Into the Missile Age, 550n, cites Herter's speech here as conraining one of the first express uses of the

term "multilateral force," which unril then had generally been referred to simply as "NATO MRBM force."
388 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

with an acceptable system to manage them. Also, the NATO nations would be

expected to purchase approximately 100 missiles to meet NATO's requirement

through 1964. Although Herter hoped "such a force would be truly multilateral,"

he conceded that crews might be mixed only "to the extent considered operationally feasible by SACEUR" and that "a suitable formula" would have to be devised

to govern weapon use and procedures.4

]FKand the Ottawa Signals

Six weeks after the December 1960 meeting in Paris President Kennedy took

office. Between Cuba, Laos, and Berlin, the new administration had a full slate of

foreign policy tests to grapple with, along with its overhaul ofthe Eisenhower strategic doctrine, before it could come to grips with the complexities of fashioning a

multilateral nuclear deterrent in Europe. At the same time, the MLF contained

too much potential, and too much effort and energy had already been invested,

for it to be dismissed without further exploration.

Even absent the preoccupation with pressing decisions on Cuba and Berlin,

a program as vague as Herter's concept and as lacking in consensus within the

government would have had trouble moving forward. Despite the temporary

bridging of differences between Gates and Herter prior to Paris, such was the

unsettled state of the MLF in January 1961 that dissension over the next step

persisted not only between State and Defense but within 000 between OSO,

JCS, and SACEUR. Norstad doggedly pursued his own agenda, accepting Herter's pledge of five Polaris submarines but insisting they could not take the place of

mobile land-based missiles. Although the services and OSD joined in opposition

to an independently controlled MLF and any erosion of presidential authority

over the use of nuclear warheads, another split flared over the primacy of nuclear

vs. conventional forces and whether, in light of the administration's shifting strategic priorities, any compelling need existed for a separate European nuclear

capability. While Rear Adm. John Lee, director of the ISA Policy Planning Staff,

was a key supporter ofthe missile program, Lee's superior, Assistant Secretary Paul

Nitze, was not.s At a meeting attended by NATO Secretary General Paul Henri

Spaak and U.S. Defense leaders, Nitze expressed doubts about the effectiveness

of a European nuclear force. The ISA boss felt that while the United States could

look at the nuclear sharing concept, it should "urge that NATO's chief effort go

into strengthening conventional forces." McNamara, in full agreement, cited

financial as well as military and political considerations as obstacles to an MLF.

He regarded the five Polaris submarines offered by Herter as sufficient for NATO's

needs and opposed the large number of ballistic missiles indicated in proposed

new NATO requirements.6

Nor was there complete accord within the State Department, where most of

the MLF proponents held forth. Secretary of State Rusk and Under Secretary Ball,
MLF: A Notion Too Far 389

much like Herter and his deputy Douglas Dillon before them, often seemed as

wary of the zeal of Smith, Bowie, and Owen as they were troubled by the rigidity

of obstructionists at DoD. Europeanists at State like Ball may have dragged their

feet on the MLF because they were overly "mindful of the lessons of the EDC."

Eventually the Bowie-Owen band of activists found allies in Ball, who became

their unofficial spokesman, and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Atlantic Affairs

Robert Schaetzel, but few senior officials shared their fervid devotion. Although,

with a sympathetic Lee at ISA and Rostow at the White House (Rostow moved

over to State in December 1961 to head the Policy Planning Council), the true

believers constituted an imposing and influential group, in the early days of the

Kennedy administration they wielded limited power in the shaping ofD.S. NATO

policies.?

Nor did any groundswell of enthusiasm for the MLF erupt from the intended

recipients on the European side. The muted European response to the American initiative may have reflected apprehension over the direction of the shift

in U.S. strategic policy toward flexible response. Or it may have reflected the

confusion over which of the proposals-Norstad's original land-based concept

or Herter's sea-based option unveiled at Paris-represented the U.S. position.

Both were presented to the NATO Council in the same year. Spaak complained

to McNamara that the U.S. policy was "ambiguous and contradictory." Norstad

insisted that France and Germany really wanted the new, extended-range version

of the Pershing missile. Norwegian Foreign Minister Halvard Lange guessed

the MLF would "lead nowhere." The Europeans clearly disliked the prospect

of having to incur larger national expenditures. Herter's suggestion of linkage

between the European contribution of 100 additional missiles in exchange for the

U.S. commitment of its five Polaris submarines had been disconcerting, as was

the inference of the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe and withdrawal of

the offer of five submarines if the European allies did not pay what Americans

considered to be a fair share. The Europeans could not help but notice American

concern over a worsening balance of payments deficit. 8

In these circumstances MLF discussions proceeded fitfully while the administration sorted out the nuances and staff, laden with briefing papers, shuttled

between agencies and embassies. At a press conference on 8 February 1961 Kennedy announced the appointment of Dean Acheson to head an advisory group on

the future of U.S. NATO policy,* which, the president said in response to a question, would look at NATO possession of nuclear weapons as one of the "central

matters of interest to us." Speaking to the Canadian Parliament in Ottawa on 17

May the president formally committed to the NATO command the five Polaris

submarines in the spirit of the Herter proposal and went on to say: "Beyond this,

we look to the possibility of eventually establishing a NATO sea-borne force,

* See Chapter XII.
390 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

which would be truly multi-lateral in ownership and control, if this should be

desired and found feasible by our Allies, once NATO's non-nuclear goals have

been achieved."9 Despite leaving wide latitude for interpretation, the expansive tone of the president's statement must have heartened MLF supporters and

renewed their determination to surmount the obstacles posed by the Pentagon.

Few may have known that the "truly multi-lateral" phrase in the speech was the

handiwork of Henry Owen, who inserted the words into the draft that White

House speechwriter Theodore Sorensen sent him for comment. 10

The Ottawa message had as much to do with the concept of Atlantic partnership as with European unity, two potentially antithetical ideas whose tension

underlay much of the MLF debate and that could coexist comfortably as long

as no effort was made to give them real substance. For all the noble sentiment,

Kennedy gave no indication he was prepared to weaken u.S. presidential control

over nuclear weapons. Encouraging as the Canadian address may have been

to believers in the MLF, from abroad there came little sign of positive reaction

and within DoD little evidence of quickening activity to justify their optimism.

The only genuine appreciation of the president's evocation of the possibility of

a multilaterally owned and controlled NATO nuclear force came from Germany.

In a memorandum to the State Department, the German government welcomed

the idea and wished to help implement it with personnel and money. The Federal

Republic hoped that negotiations would begin soon and that the United States

would "express its rea] intentions concerning the degree of NATO control contemplated over the submarines."11

German endorsement came as a mixed blessing. On the one hand, Germany's involvement in a collective enterprise was vital to dampening its interest in a

national nuclear capability. The promise of a new multilateral force seemed one

way of alleviating Bonn's doubts about the direction of u.s. policy. State took

pains to assure the Germans that while negotiations might have to proceed slowly,

the United States was continuing its active study of the MRBM requirement.

On the other hand, so long as Germans were the only Europeans to embrace the

Multilateral Force, attention would focus not on a new NATO nuclear entity but

on potential German control ofthat entity, heightening the anxiety ofBritain and

other countries over that prospect. 12

Defense Reservations, 1961-1962

The European reaction, although of concern, remained peripheral to resolving intractable internal differences among the several U.S. parties to the debate.

MLF realization remained elusive because of the administration's own reservations, not the least the caveat in Kennedy's Ottawa speech that any advancement

of the MRBM program would have to await attainment of non-nuclear, conventional force goals-not an incidental aside but a pointed, telling remark, intended
Clockwise from top: Secretary

McNamara interrupts conference

with 'Roswell Gilpatric, Paul

Nitze, and Adam Yarmolinsky

to take phone call; squash with

Secretary ofAgriculture Orville

Freeman; standing at window of

Pentagon office. (From Library of

Congress Look Collection.)
· Clockwisefrom top left: Rollout ofTFX; Navy

Secretary Korth leaving TFX probe; Secretary

McNamara and Assistant Secretary of.Defense

(I&L) Thomas Morris·hold pres~'conference 'on

results ofsurplus base study. .
Secretary ofthe Air Force Eugene M.

Zuckert, 1961-65.

William I? Bundy, assistant secretary of

defense for international security affairs,

at swearing-in, November 1963.

John H. Rubel, assistant secretary of

defense for strategic weapons, 1961-63.

Henry S. Rowen, deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security

affairs, 1961-65.
Clockwise from top: President Kennedy with British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan at

Nassau, 19 December 1962; Skybolt missiles under the wings of a B-52H; Skybolt cartoon,

December 1962.

"GENTlEMEN, WE SIMPLY MUST PUT HUMPTY DUMPTY TOGETHER AGAIN."
Above:' President Kennedy with German Chancellor Adenauer and Berlin Mayor

Willy Brandt, June 1963.

Below: Cartoon ofNATO tattoo.

JOHN F. KENNEDY LIBRARY
CECIL STOUGHTON/JOHN F. KENNEDY LIBRARY

Above: President Kennedy with Vice President Johnson, September 1963.

Below: President Johnson meets 24 November 1963, 48 hours after Kennedy's assassination,

with McNamara and Rusk, Ambassador Lodge, and George Ball.
Clockwise from left. Secretary

McNam~a departing Pentagon

he1.iport;-Secretary ofState

Rusk with Ambassador Lodge

and South Vietnam~se General

Nguyen-Khanh; General Paul

Harkins (right), head ofthe

MACV Command in South

Vietnam, with-General Taylor,

September 1963.
Clockwise from top left. U.S.

Army Special Forces team;

U.S. Marine troop transport

helicopter squadron in the

Mekong Delta; guided missile

light cruiser Oklahoma City,

flagship of U.S. Seventh Fleet, in

Saigon harbor, July 1964.
USS Maddox operating at sea, early 1960s.

NARA

J\

I\

,J

A UH-1B Huey recovers a U.S. helicopter shot down by Viet Cong at Ap

Bac, January 1963.
President Johnson escorted by Secretary McNamara on visit to Pentagon Concourse, 21 July 1964.
Secretary McNamara reports cost reduction results at press conference, 7 July 1964.
Arthur Sylvester, assistant secretary of

defense (public affairs), 1961-67.

Solis Horowitz, director of DoD organizational and management planning,

1961-64, later assistant secretary of

defense for administation.

Kermit Gordon, director, Bureau ofthe

Budget, 1962-65.

Henry Glass, economic advisor to the

DoD comptroller, 1961-65, later assistant

to the secretary and deputy secretary of

defense.
Above: Secretary ofthe Army Stephen Ailes briefing press on proposed reorganization of

Army Reserve components, 15 March 1965.

Below: OSD General Counsel John McNaughton (far left) and Deputy General Counsel

Leonard Niederlehner (thirdfrom left) with legal staff: April 1964.
Above: President Johnson meeting with Secretary McNamara and the Joint Chiefs at LBJ

Ranch, December 1964.

.Below: The Joint Chiefs of Staff: April 1965, left to right, General John l? McConnell, USAF,

Admiral David L. McDonald, USN, Chairman General Earle G. Wheeler, USA, General

Harold K. Johnson, USA, General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., USMC.
-Above: Vietnam ta~geting briefing in May 1965.by Lt. Col. Robinson Risner, USAF, who six

months later would be a POW in a Hanoi prison.

Below: Left to right, McNaughton, now assistarit secretary for international security affairs,

Lodge, Sylvester, and General ~illiam Westmoreland awaiting Secretary McNamara's arrival

at Tan Son Nhut Airbase, South Vietnam, 1965.'
Secretary McNamara during a quiet moment in the Cabinet Room ofthe White House, 28

January 1964.

M£NAM~RA'S WAR

.. LE.rS SEE T~AT VAMNEV COMPASS AGAIN. L~
MLF: A Notion Too Far 391

both to remind the NATO partners of the importance of improving conventional

defenses and to afford the administration breathing room on the nuclear matter

until it could settle on an agreed course of action. The president repeated the

point in June to Spaak's successor, Secretary General Dirk Stikker, indicating that

"the question ofMRBM's was for the fairly distant future."13

Acheson's report, delivered in draft to the White House in March and emerging from NSC review on 21 April 1961 as an official policy directive, reinforced

the go-slow approach. The former secretary of state advised against an MRBM

proposal that could prove divisive, drain resources, and "overshadow" and divert

attention from "more pressing tasks" relating to Berlin and "preparing NATO

forces for lesser contingencies." Acheson criticized specifically the Norstad plan

and its support for land-based MRBMs. But any U.S. MRBM plan, Acheson

wrote McNamara in July, "would seem to be the wrong kind of signal to give our

allies just when we were trying hard-and for the first time-to persuade them

that the path to salvation lies through non-nuclear, rather than nuclear, improvement." He envisaged a destructive internal debate within NATO reflecting British

fears of a nuclear-armed Germany as well as French demands for custody over

warheads on missiles in France. Further, he did not trust the "paper" commitment

to SACEUR as a sufficient safeguard to maintain centralized control and prevent

accidental or premature use of an enhanced European nuclear capability. Echoing

Kennedy at Ottawa, Acheson concluded that only "after non-nuclear improvements have been achieved" should European participation in the nuclear program

be considered-"ifthis is what our allies want"-and then only if the missile force

were seaborne, where it would be "in a safe place ... in American hands." 14

In the meantime, Norstad, finding himself increasingly isolated, reluctantly

moved toward accepting a seaborne force if a compromise could keep some

land-based missiles in the package. Among his other concerns he feared that a

nuclear force at sea would enhance the role of the Navy and the Supreme Allied

Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT) at the expense of SACEUR and blur their

responsibilities. Norstad forwarded to the president SHAPE's views that the

Polaris submarines should be assigned to SACEUR and incorporated into NATO's

normal command structure subject to SACEUR's direct control. In the communication SHAPE responded to a list of questions about operational guidelines and

weapon characteristics, citing accuracy and cost issues raised previously about the

sea-based mode. The idea of a mixed crew SHAPE found especially impractical

on small vessels. 15

Acheson's strictures (his widely circulated report came to be known as the

"Green Book"), the president's own apparent qualms,16 and the infighting at Defense stalled any progress on the MLF through the remainder of 1961. Notwithstanding the expectations of the Multilateral Force's supporters, the reality was

that three days after his speech in Ottawa the president forbade further dispersal

of nuclear weapons for the support of non-U.S. forces until the import of such
392 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

actions could be studied. 17 In a long conversation with Stikker, Nitze made clear

to the secretary general that control over use of nuclear weapons in Europe would

remain with the president. Stikker protested that this view contradicted the president's statement at Ottawa, and added that if the president alone could authorize

the nuclear decision then the North Atlantic Council had nothing to discuss.

The meeting adjourned without any resolution of the question, even after U.S.

Ambassador to NATO Thomas K. Finletter tried to find some common ground

by suggesting that Nitze and Stikker may have had a simple misunderstanding

and Finletter rendered a more flexible reading ofthe U.S. position. IS

Nitze's stance on the control issue represented a Defense view that had not

materially changed since the nuclear sharing concept was first broached. For

McNamara, like Gates, the Polaris submarines offered to NATO betokened a

symbol of U.S. commitment, not a first step toward surrendering control over

nuclear weapons to a new entity. Not only did McNamara hold firm in that

conviction, he insisted that the five submarines pledged to NATO should not be

turned over until the United States had a squadron of nine Polaris subs deployed

and five additional ones had become available. Given the relative strike capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union, "it is of the utmost importance,"

McNamara asserted in December, "that we retain exclusive control of all available

Polaris submarines for at least the next 24 months." By the end of the year the

DoD stance on the subject of an independent European nuclear force if anything

had hardened since the onset of the Kennedy administration. Still, there was

enough hint of promise in the president's rhetoric and in the State Department's

perseverance to send mixed signals to NATO's International Staff in Paris, which

continued to pose questions to which no definitive answers would come. 19

External geopolitical imperatives had given rise to the MLF and those same

pressures now sustained it. As always, Germany occupied the foreground of U.S.

concerns about stemming nuclear proliferation within the alliance. When German

Defense Minister Strauss spoke with his British counterpart Harold Watkinson

near the close of 1961 about Europe needing means of its own to respond to

Soviet aggression, he sounded an ominous note in his observation that "there will

be a new Germany when Adenauer is gone." Watkinson reported to McNamara

Strauss's admonition that he could not "afford to be associated with any proposal

which appears to place Germany in a weaker position as a nuclear power than

its allies." The message was clear. Willingly or not, Great Britain and the United

States had to come up with an arrangement that satisfied German needs for greater

equity and nuclear security within the framework of the alliance or face the prospect of Germany going it alone in the post-Adenauer era. Yet the shift underway

in U.S. strategic doctrine from "massive retaliation" to "flexible response" meant

a more measured, discreet U.s. commitment to the use of nuclear weapons and,

implicitly, tighter reins at the helm, making German leaders more nervous-and

restive-than ever over dependence on u.s. nuclear striking power. West Germany
MLF: A Notion Too Far 393

had looked to Norstad's land-based MRBMs, under SACEUR's control but on

German soil, as a way out of the predicament, but with that option having fallen

out of favor, one of the few alternatives left to u.s. policymakers seeking German

cooperation was a nuclearized MLF under a centralized NATO command structure.20

By mid-February 1962, despite persisting friction, most of the key constituencies in the Defense Department had recognized the utility of a NATO MRBM

force, albeit with varying degrees of conviction and for divergent reasons. For ISA

and the OSD leadership the plan's political value (providing cover for Strauss and

comfort for others unsure of U.S. nuclear dependability) had appeal even among

those skeptical of the military requirement; for the JCS, unswayed by Acheson's

and McNamara's contrary conclusion, the motivation remained what in their

judgment was the military necessity to replace aging bombers and outdated Jupiters and Thors. OSD, but not JCS* at this point, was willing to recommend a

seaborne force; the "cheapest and quickest means" to get it would be to mount

Polaris missiles on surface ships rather than the planned but costly submarines.

According to ISA representatives present at a meeting with a State delegation

on 21 February, Defense even granted the feasibility of mixed manning. At that

meeting, White House Special Assistant Carl Kaysen reported, State and Defense

concurred in a preference for a new NATO command distinct from SACEUR

and SACLANT for the MLF. But State and Defense could not compose their

differences, according to Kaysen, over the extent and terms of European participation and in particular over the paramount issue of U.S. control of the warheads.

Whereas Defense, no doubt with strict instructions from McNamara, wanted an

explicit, categorical declaration on the U.S. retention of veto authority over use

of the weapons, State thought such a peremptory statement up front would have

a numbing effect on further discussions with the Europeans. The departments

agreed to refrain from an early confrontation on the issue and simply noted "serious obstacles in U.S. legislation and past policy to the creation of a force the use

of which is not subject to veto," while professing a willingness to examine the

question at a later date. 21

Stikker had weighed in with his own thoughts on the veto provision and

other aspects of the revived MLF debate in a memorandum he handed Finletter in late January 1962. Calling for "an integrated missile force owned and

controlled by NATO and placed under the command of SACEUR," the plan to

be implemented in stages, Stikker believed it prudent to begin with the establishment of a pilot force of merchant ships equipped with a small complement

of Polaris missiles and then proceed to more advanced delivery systems, including surface naval vessels, conventional or nuclear-powered submarines, possibly

*Lemnitzer succeeded Twining as chairman of the Joint Chiefs in October 1960; he did not share Twining's

interest in the sea-based concepr, siding wirh Norsrad instead.
394 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

a land-based missile, and perhaps a new missile specifically designed for the new

force. He estimated the cost of 80 merchantmen in the initial phase at approximately $1.25 billion including 320 missiles, with maintenance and operational

costs ofthe fleet running up to $250 million a year. Sharing the expense would be

governed by the current distribution of payments for NATO's infrastructure, with

the U.S. share at 30.85 percent, followed by West Germany's 20 percent. As for

control over the warheads, he suggested that pending a final solution "the following procedure could be adopted during the first stage of the establishment of the

force. The NATO Council should instruct SACEUR to employ the ... [force]

only when the use of tactical 'atomic battlefield weapons' has been authorized.

The United States would then virtually have a right ofveto for the time being."22

Stikker's penchant for cutting to the chase continued to outpace the still

evolving and delicate negotiations within the U.S. government. He was looking

far ahead of the Defense Department, where the ]CS, and for that matter many

of the leaders in OSD, regarded the Multilateral Force as at best a fig leaf to

accomplish their respective purposes while sustaining others' illusions. Whether

or not the ]upiters and Thors would give way to the Navy's Polaris or to a new

mid-range ballistic missile (Missile "X") funded at $100 million for FY 1963 and

administered by the Air Force, by fits and starts the chiefs were coming around to

concurrence with OSD on the need for action even if it meant under the auspices

of an MLF. Still, DoD was not only on a different page but working from a

different script than Stikker or the missionaries at State.23

Norstad, who had helped plant the idea of the MLF and then seen his

version preempted by men he considered misguided ideologues, became increasingly distressed by the direction of both the State Department and his Pentagon

colleagues. He objected strenuously to Finletter's proposed statement that accented

the advantages of "external" long-range ICBMs and, by implication, denigrated

the medium-range armaments Norstad championed. "The enemy threat," Norstad

cabled Lemnitzer, "must be considered in its entirety and dealt with through the

integrated and intelligent use of all weapons and all forces." He could not have

been happy with State's message to Finletter on 16 April that authorized the U.S.

ambassador to inform the North Atlantic Council of steps the United States was

willing to take toward creating "a genuinely multilateral NATO MRBM Force."

They included commitment to NATO of U.S. nuclear forces outside Europe

beyond those already committed and, as a second step, should the allies desire, the

United States joining in "developing a modest sized (on the order of 200 missiles)

fully multilateral NATO sea-based MRBM force." State's guidance provided

some of the details the Europeans had long been seeking, including "sufficient

degree of mixed manning to ensure that no single nationality is predominant in

the manning of any vessel," but stopped short of ceding authority over use of the

weapons to the multilateral force. On that sticking point, State demurred:
MLF: A Notion Too Far 395

... US would be prepared to furnish warheads. Ways should be found to

safe-guard design data, e.g., US custodians could remain aboard any multilarerally manned NATO vessel wirh standing orders to release the warheads

in case a properly authenticated order to fire was received through agreed

channels .... A formula which would involve transfer of warheads or procedures for using the force without US concurrence would require amending existing US law and could well entail other obstacles, depending on the

character of the arrangements. The US is willing, however, to consider any

proposal which is put to it by a clear majority of the Alliance.

That the statement omitted any reference to SACEUR except for a one-line

mention that the new force "would come under appropriate NATO commanders' command," and that he had not even been consulted on the MRBM proposal,

Norstad took as a personal affront. ''Aside from the rudeness involved," he complained to Lemnitzer, "is it tactically wise to make, without any consultation or

coordination with me or my headquarters, a statement to the North Atlantic Council dealing with a subject which I proposed in 1957, which I have followed closely

since that time, and which bears almost exclusively on my ability to discharge my

assigned functions?"24

McNamara's reaction to the 16 April cable that so infuriated Norstad was

curiously restrained. In a meeting at the White House with Kennedy and Rusk to

discuss the statement prior to its release and formal issuance as National Security

Action Memorandum No. 147, he conveyed to the president the strong dissent

of the JCS and secured deletion of language on multilateral control of the U.S.

Polaris submarines assigned to NATO that the chiefs found particularly objectionable. McNamara dutifully communicated the chiefs' views but stated his own

belief that no compelling military requirement existed for a European MRBM

force. He worried about the cost of such a commitment, which he figured to be

as much as $2 billion, a burden that would compete with what he deemed the

greater requirement for an increase in Europe's conventional defense capabilities.

He went along with Rusk and State, except for insisting on the aforementioned

deletion, because of the plan's potential political payoff and because he believed

"we must indeed get off dead center in discussion of these issues." Moreover,

McNamara was likely less exercised over the statement to NATO than were

Norstad and the JCS, or General Maxwell Taylor (currently the president's military representative), because he doubted that the Europeans would accept the

"quasi-offer."25

After a meeting with McNamara on 18 April, Taylor noted that McNamara

was in fact "entirely happy" with the transmittal of the MRBM guidance because

it did not give the Europeans the degree of control they wanted and when they

rejected it he would then be in a better position to present a counter-proposal: an
396 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

offer for the United States to provide the weapons and manning personnel at no

charge to the allies, in exchange for their agreement to increase their conventional

forces. McNamara would not have to wait long to test his scenario.26

Athens andAfter

McNamara seized on the North Atlantic Council ministerial meeting in

Athens in May 1962 as an opportunity to elaborate on his strategic views and

claim the high ground in an MLF debate that was still nowhere close to resolution. At Athens he would educate the Europeans as to the facts of nuclear life and

the problems inherent in the organization and control of nuclear warfare. Prior to

the commencement of the formal sessions he arranged for the defense ministers a

briefing on "the necessary overall unity of major nuclear operations," especially the

need "for positive central direction of the nuclear campaign. The briefing would

be part of a program to move our Allies from 'theatre' to 'global' nuclear thinking"-and, left unsaid, away from thinking about either national or independent

European nuclear forces.2?

McNamara dominated the Athens meeting, explaining in great detail the

range of technical and other problems associated with a NATO MRBM force,

cautioning at one point that "we expect our allies will wish to consider very carefully the full implications of undertaking this venture." While dangling the carrot

of the MLF as described in the Finletter proposal and repeating earlier statements

that the United States stood prepared to enter into discussions of a multilateral

MRBM force if that was what the allies wanted, he spoke of complicated questions, such as whether the force was militarily necessary and how to ease the

burden of heavy costs, which the United States had no intention of bearing alone.

Above all, he made clear that the emerging U.S. strategy gave priority not only

to the indivisibility of control of nuclear weapons but to the elevated importance

of conventional weaponry. His bottom line affirmed that national nuclear forces

would not be welcome under any circumstances and that a unified European

MRBM force could become possible under the right conditions, but it remained

secondary to the strengthening ofthe conventional arsenal, the cornerstone ofthe

new strategy.28 These themes would not fully resonate and did not receive broad

media attention until McNamara restated them in his more publicized Ann Arbor

address* a month later, but the thrust of his thinking should have become crystalclear to the Europeans at Athens.

McNamara's emphasis on conventional armaments effectively sidetracked

any serious discussion of the MLF at Athens, and left the Europeans wondering

whether the barring of U.S. help to national nuclear aspirants meant implicit

support for the multilateral concept, or whether both were being sacrificed on

* See Chapter XII.
MLF: A Notion Too Far 397

the altar of a more conventional strategy. The MLF's supporters in the State

Department felt let down not just by McNamara's indifference to the European

integration objective but by the president's own equivocation and seemingly flagging interest in the initiative despite approving NSAM 147. The continued lack of

action on the MLF, State believed, would result in precisely what McNamara had

preached against at Athens, a vacuum that encouraged development of national

nuclear capabilities along the lines of what the French were doing and what the

Germans were intimating.

If State's policy planners felt disappointed by the outcome of the Athens

meeting, Norstad must have seethed as he watched McNamara deliver a devastating blow to his MRBM plans, all but ruling out the land-based missile and

multinational manning-the heart of his program. Moreover, McNamara had

not only challenged the wisdom of the European MRBM deployment but openly

discounted the military importance of the medium-range missiles. In so doing

McNamara not only provoked Norstad but inadvertently undercut the NATO

Military Committee, whose MC 99 paper, prepared without the administration's

guidance, reflected Norstad's justification for NATO MRBMs. With Stikker and the committee deferring to Norstad, the United States found itself on

a collision course with its alliance partners that both State and Defense officials

had so assiduously tried to avoid. To gain control over MC 99 and prevent the

NATO Council from "jumping the track" and nullifying the progress achieved

in clarifying the u.s. position at Athens, Col. Lawrence Legere recommended to

General Taylor that MC 99 could be treated as "expressing 'purely military' views

... and either placed in cold storage or, if necessary, overruled by compelling

political and economic considerations." In the meantime, Legere wrote Taylor

on 1 June, Stikker and the council should hold off on approving the draft paper

while SACEUR produced detailed documentation for the military utility of the

MRBM. McNamara directed the Joint Chiefs to submit a study on this very issue

by 31 August.29

Little more than a month after the Athens meeting, then, the administration's

disarray on the MRBM issue became apparent again, in an embarrassing conflict

played out in front of the Europeans between SACEUR, supported by "most all

military authorities," according to his staff, and u.s. political authorities over

whether or not there existed a military requirement for a ballistic missile nuclear

delivery system to modernize his strike force in Europe. 3D

On 15 June the White House sent Finletter on a damage control mission

with instructions to amplify the meaning of McNamara's comments at Athens,

in particular "to establish with considerable finality the United States position on

the military requirement for the MRBM." Straying little from the set piece and

mixed message that had become all too familiar to the Europeans since Ottawa,

Finletter informed the North Atlantic Council that MRBMs were "not urgently

needed for military reasons," as NATO's Soviet targets could be covered by already
398 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

programmed U.S. nuclear forces, but that the United States remained committed

to exploring a multilateral seaborne MRBM force if the allies wished to participate in one-so long as it did not divert resources from "a continuing vigorous

buildup of NATO non-nuclear forces" and so long as the allies understood the

substantial costs.* The Finletter presentation became widely regarded as a mistake

as the double-edged message had already worn thin with the Europeans, and this

iteration only compounded European vexation over where exactly Washington

was going with it. In a tour of the alliance capitals following the presentation,

Rusk stressed that the U.S. purpose was not to kill the MRBM idea or deliver "a

mortal blow to the multilateral force," or "put any proposals forward on a takeit-or-Ieave-it basis." But it did not help that McNamara delivered his Ann Arbor

speech on 16 June, repeating and reinforcing his Athens themes the same week

that Finletter and Rusk were abroad supplying interpretations that appeared to

split hairs and shade meanings for European consumption. At the White House,

Taylor warned of navigating rudderlessly, leaving both the allies and Norstad in

the lurch: "It is important for us to get our national position aligned both in the

ambassadorial and in the military channels."3l

Stikker's patience already frayed, the NATO chief blasted the administration

for a policy he deemed disingenuous, unintelligible, and lacking leadership. Henry

Kissinger, Harvard University professor and a consultant with the National Security Council in the summer of 1962, met with Stikker in Paris on 26 June and

came away with the impression that "as Secretary General of NATO, he found it

impossible to tell what our objectives were. NATO was being deluged with visitors

from Washington, each of them with a slightly different version of United States

policy." Between the utterances of RostDw, Rowen, Nitze, Finletter, and Taylor,

not to mention Rusk, McNamara, and Norstad, "how could he tell what Administration policy was?" Above all, Stikker expressed exasperation as to how alliance

members could possibly entertain a proposal to pay for a missile system whose

sponsors considered it militarily useless. Elsewhere, too, the reaction ranged from

irritation to incredulity. Italy, Germany, and Greece, among others, found the

MLF offer insincere and in any case less likely than ever to see the light of day. 32

Of course, McNamara had as his ultimate goal that the alliance members

should perceive the futility of pursuing the multilateral force and come to their

senses and accept reliance on the Americans' "external" ICBM commitment

while devoting their energies and resources to the conventional buildup at home.

As Kennedy later recalled the subtext of the administration's apparent seesawing:

"It had been the idea-Acheson's to begin with-that we drag out a multilateral

force proposal and let the Europeans wrestle with it for a while, until they saw

* Henry Rowen, Nitze's deputy in ISA, wrote the instructions and remembered going with Robert Bowie to

see Norstad who, furious at again not being consulted, "had them standing while he kept swinging a golf club

back and forth 'virtually at our heads.'" See memcon Neustadt with Rowen, I Jul 63, fldr Memcons-U.S., box

21, Neustadt Papers, JFKL.
MLF: A Notion Too Far 399

all the bugs in it and decided they'd be better off to leave nuclear forces to us."33

Neither McNamara nor the president anticipated, however, that the Europeans

would become more agitated than resigned, nor that the French and Germans

seemed ready to proceed if necessary on their own, possibly in collaboration,

rather than abandon the idea of a continental nuclear deterrent. Moreover, as one

analyst noted, the European governments found no more agreeable than their U.S.

partner the alternative of expanding their armed services to meet increased conventional force requirements.

In view ofthis, it should not be surprising if the major European powers seek

to base their security on atomic weapons rather than on manpower. They are

all subject to acute problems of manpower availability and to the political

implications of compulsory service.... The idea that the US and UK strategic forces should furnish the firepower while they furnish the cannon fodder is wholly unacceptable. These facts, while not directly related, condition

Allied thinking on the need for weapon systems such as the MRBM.34

And so whereas McNamara and others in the administration, never comfortable with the multilateral concept, hoped that it would be "disposed of" after

Athens,35 the item remained on the agenda, with the United States and the European principals doing the equivalent of an Alphonse-and-Gaston routine--each

side waiting for the other to take the initiative in moving the plan one way or

another off dead center. In what amounted to a return to square one in the

summer of 1962, the administration again faced the dilemma of risking a splintering of the alliance and proliferation of national nuclear planning-all the more

prohibitive under the new "controlling" strategy--Dr providing the Europeans at

least a modicum oftheater nuclear security.

With a nod to European dismay, Kennedy took pains in his July Fourth

speech in Philadelphia to reaffirm the importance ofthe transatlantic partnership,

declaring that "we believe that a united Europe will be capable of playing a greater

role in the common defense" of the free world. He remained vague and his advisers at odds on prescriptions for achieving that unity, but the brief allusion to the

Western nations' collaborative role was a forceful signal of United States resolve

to stay engaged in Europe and exert what influence it could to promote a unified

alliance and cohesive defense. Rusk's special assistant Charles Bohlen (whom

Kennedy appointed U.S. ambassador to France in September) told the president

he thought it essential that the Europeans understood the United States was not

resorting to "any sort of gimmick or scheme" to address their concerns, that it had

earnest intentions, and that the solutions were complicated. Still proceeding more

by drift and instinct than by direction, the White House appeared inclined to take

a serious look at the MLF rather than leave Europe's nuclear fate to the French

and Germans. September found McGeorge Bundy, the president's special assistant

for national security affairs, in Copenhagen undertaking to persuade the Euro-
400 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

peans that "[American] opposition to small national forces should not be read

as proof of a general American determination to exclude even a new and united

Europe from nuclear weapons." At the same time, Bundy took care not to promise what remained uncertain-the approval of "appropriate agencies" of the U.S.

government to the specific custody arrangements and agreement on the financing

apparatus. 36

Sensing a window of opportunity, the MLF faction at State used the summer

of 1962 to regroup, corralling new support among those seeking to fill the postAthens vacuum with a mechanism that, for all its flaws, still had potential as an

instrument for unity. Ironically, throughout these years, just as the Multilateral

Force's demise appeared near, it would gain a new lease on life because even as

a token it continued to serve a useful political putpose, and because for all the

barely veiled contempt much of the U.S. national security establishment showed

it, an undesirable MLF offered a more palatable option to many than indulging

Norstad's multinationalism or de Gaulle's separatism.

Drawing on Ottawa, NSAM 147, and guidance already in place, the MLF

lobby resumed the campaign for a multilateral seaborne MRBM force as if the

Athens setback had never happened. Bowie, Owen, and Schaetzel deftly cultivated their White House connections with the help of Ball and Rostow. Seymour

Weiss, deputy director of State's Office of Politico-Military Affairs, remembered

how proficiently Owen's "tight circle" became "a formidable and intimidating

machine." Gerard Smith, back at State as a consultant, crisscrossed Europe on a

series of trips beginning in August, trying to get the allies back on message. At

ISA, Lee worked diligently to head off conceivable Navy resistance to a seaborne

force that could involve stationing foreigners aboard U.S. ships. Although Admiral Hyman Rickover was quick to torpedo the notion of manning submarines

with crews of mixed nationality, Lee steered the matter to Rear Adm. Frederick

Michaelis, a surface-fleet officer (under the supervision of Vice Chief of Naval

Operations Claude Ricketts, another surface-fleet officer), an arrangement that

promised a more favorable recommendation as well as a felicitous match with the

latest thinking to base the MLF on surface naval or merchant vessels. Lee's adroit

maneuvering yielded results when Michaelis's report indicated the MLF was

manageable from the Navy's standpoint and OSD's director of defense research

and engineering, Harold Brown, chimed in with a strong endorsement of the

surface-ship mode.37

MLF opponents chafed as the multilateral idea regained momentum. Legere,

who felt neither McNamara nor Rusk paid sufficient attention to the bureaucratic

stratagems of the MLF activists and their capacity to wrest control of U.S. NATO

policy, urged Taylor to talk to the president about not getting too far out in front

of a still debatable proposition. He grumbled that columnists like James Reston

and Joseph Alsop were making too much of the MLF drumbeat, Reston treating the Fourth ofJuly speech and followup press conference "as though they will
MLF: A Notion Too Far 401

dwarf the Monroe Doctrine in the history books." McNamara and Rusk, even if

they were inclined to weigh in more strenuously, by September had Cuba on their

minds.38

As for Norstad, he and his staff argued to the end that the physical presence

of medium-range missiles in forward areas was vital to deterring limited aggression and that the mobility ofthe Soviet IRBMs that turned up in Cuba reinforced

their case for land-based NATO MRBMs, but even the Joint Chiefs seemed to

realize that the best chance for SACEUR to get the weapons lay in anchoring

his claim to the seaborne MLF as the only plan in play. When the JCS issued

the report requested by the secretary, they accepted a mix of external and theater

missiles, with a stated preference for the improved land-based Missile "X" but

with a bow to the "almost as good" Polaris. Norstad, allowed to ventilate his frustration, pleaded his case to Kennedy during a visit to Washington in mid-July,

but Rusk's and McNamara's briefing notes for the president depict the meeting as

more a gesture of courtesy than an occasion for reappraisal.39

After months of being marginalized, his visit to Washington in fact proved

Norstad's swan song. Had the Cuban missile crisis not intervened in October, his

designated successor, General Lemnitzer, would have been SACEUR throughout

the fall of 1962. Instead, Lemnitzer did not assume the post until January 1963,

leaving both men in Paris uncertain about their respective roles. (Lemnitzer did

take over the U.S. European Command while he waited for Norstad to leave.)

Despite professions of his "close personal relationship" with Lemnitzer (cited

twice in one cable), Norstad fretted about the dangers of a divided command and

sought reassurance from McNamara that there would be no change in his overall

authority. He never received it. The Kennedy administration looked on Norstad as

a troublesome holdover from the Eisenhower era and had been searching for the

right moment to move him out of Europe without further rattling the Europeans.

The door that slammed shut at Athens reopened for State's multilateral boosters

but not Norstad.40

As their schedules returned to normal late in 1962 following the Cuban crisis,

the secretaries of state and defense turned their attention to NATO business and

the MLF matter. McNamara in particular had qualms over the message State's

Europeanists were sending the allies* and information Admiral Lee was imparting on his own travels abroad. Smith and Lee were communicating details relating

to MLF ownership and operation that McNamara considered premature. The

defense secretary may have felt nervous over the interest being generated by the

U.S. emissaries and questioned whether the allies fully grasped the extent of their

fiscal obligation and that no action would be taken on the MLF without a prior

* On 16 November, Ball gave a major speech to a NATO gathering in Paris in which he spoke of the critical

challenge of upgrading conventional forces but also allowed, in an unmistakable reference to give-and-take on

the nuclear issue, that the Americans had no monopoly on wisdom and, no less than the Europeans, would have

to adjust attitudes and habits. See "NATO and the Cuban Crisis," Dept ofState Bulletin, 3 Dec 62,831-35.
402 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

commitment to expand conventional forces. Although Rusk and Bundy agreed

that Smith and Lee had not exceeded their mandate, Rusk believed the allies

were still not facing up to the problems of command and control. McNamara

was concerned enough about the administration's schizophrenic handling of

the MLF-some were selling the concept, others pouring cold water on it, he

remarked at a DoD-State conference on 30 November-that he suggested the

item be kept off the NATO Council's December agenda. Still not satisfied with

the ]CS review of NATO MRBM requirements, he asked for additional targeting data while blocking a proposed Mediterranean Pilot Force that would have

replaced missiles in Turkey and Italy with a small pilot MLF in the aftermath of

the Cuban affair. The year 1962 wound down much as it had begun, with believers and unbelievers seeking to inflate and deflate the MLF balloon as it struggled

to stay aloft.41

Impact ofNassau

The MLF topic, McNamara made sure, received no formal consideration

at the 13-15 December NATO ministerial meetings. Relieved by the successful

defusion of the Cuban crisis and buoyed for the moment by the effective demonstration ofWestern solidarity, the defense ministers were in an upbeat mood and

willing to cut the Americans some slack, though worry over the Soviets' next move

and the future shape of the alliance inevitably crept into the background. Taylor,

who became ]CS chairman in October 1962, had warned McNamara that "there

would almost certainly be some spill over" of the MRBM subject during the

December consultations with the allies.42 And indeed, the sessions were punctuated with published reports, promptly denied, of behind-the-scenes deliberations

in which the United States was said to be contemplating relinquishing veto power

over launch of the weapons. McNamara retained an air of confidence, not unlike

at Athens, that the Europeans would never accept the American "ifs" and would

eventually balk at any MLF plan because ofthe heavy collateral responsibilities.43

Once again, McNamara underestimated the staying power of the MLF, this

time his assumptions overtaken by the U.S. decision, in which he had a pivotal

role, to cancel Skybolt, the air-launched missile on which Britain counted to

maintain its measure of nuclear independence under the "special relationship"

it enjoyed with the United States. The Nassau Conference of 18-21 December

culminated ostensibly in an agreement with the British government to terminate

Skybolt for reasons of cost and production delays,* but in reality ended in a haze

of recriminations and ongoing negotiations to clarifY what had been decided and

how to preserve the special relationship with the British without fatally compromising the administration's larger goal of a unified European security framework.

* See Chapter XIV.
MLF: A Notion Too Far 403

With the British insisting on obtaining Polaris as a substitute for Skybolt, the

White House faced the challenge of how to calm British nerves and the political furor that followed Skybolt's cancellation (as well as repair the longstanding

personal relationship Kennedy and other u.s. leaders had with Prime Minister

Macmillan) without incurring French and German resentment and demands for

their own "national" Polaris forces. The MLF beckoned again as a facile answer,

at least conceptually, to a many-sided problem. The British in effect got Polaris

so long as London committed to integrate its allocation into a "multilateral

NATO nuclear force," with the face-saving proviso that the British could withdraw their missiles from the organization if and when "supreme national interests

are at stake."44 De Gaulle, offered the same terms, i.e., purchase of Polaris and

assignment of French missiles to a NATO command except in a national emergency, rejected the overture as having too many strings attached and enhancing

U.s. domination more than French security.45 The administration, left yet again

to reconcile words and actions, had to explain to West Germany and Italy why

they should not be proffered the same accommodation and how such "national"

dispensations squared with the U.S. commitment to collective solutions to European defense needs.

It was symptomatic of the confusion and ambiguity surrounding the Multilateral Force that in the immediate aftermath of Nassau the concept's most fervent

supporters brooded over its prospects having been severely damaged by the bilateral Polaris concessions even as the Nassau bargain appeared to elevate its role and

imbue it with an official imprimatur. As always with the MLF, the devil lurked

in the details. The Skybolt accord was cobbled together with such vaguenessboth by design and as a result of hurried preparation-that, as Richard Neustadt

later wrote in his report to Kennedy, each participant could interpret the outcome

from his own partisan perspective, "from his own predisposition," and find validation and a mandate for pursuing whatever course he favored.46 That could

mean a resurrection of Norstad's multinationalism, with continuing lip service to

multilateralism where expedient, or a deepening genuine commitment to multilateralism as a matter of policy and principle. While Nassau may have narrowed

the options available to the president (or placed them in sharper relief), it also

accelerated an overdue reckoning on what course u.s. policy should take. The

upshot still awaited definition.

As a White House memorandum indicated, two tracks remained open to

the administration at the start of 1963 (three if one counted a combination of

the two). The first focused on subsidizing British and French (if the latter could

be persuaded) national MRBM forces, and entertaining possible requests from

Germany, Italy, and others as well, in exchange for a loose commitment to incorporate these forces eventually into an MLF; the second, creating a bona fide

multilateral mixed-manned nuclear force open to all NATO members, with a

central command and yet to be determined restrictions on control of warheads.
404 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

Despite their instinctive misgivings about pursuing the MLF down any track,

Kennedy and McNamara, painted into a corner by the Skybolt denouement

and fearing most of all a Franco-German nuclear program in the absence of any

concrete u.S.-sponsored alternative,* leaned toward the staff recommendation to

press ahead with the second track. McNamara remained no less determined to

subordinate any nuclear program to the conventional force priority, and indeed,

on 12 January 1963, the same day that he and Rusk agreed at the White House to

develop plans for the multilateral enterprise, the defense secretary asked the chairman of the JCS and the secretary of the Air Force to continue studies of NATO's

capabilities for non-nuclear conflict and conventional force requirements. As for

the president, he was willing to go down the MLF road to avoid the alternative

of proliferation-as he told a national audience in an interview with the three

television networks the evening before the Nassau conference, the worst situation

would be having "ten, twenty, thirty nuclear powers who may fire their weapons

off under different conditions"-but neither he nor the British were particularly

enthused by the post-Nassau construction ofwhat the two governments had seemingly consented to. On the way out of a cabinet meeting, he joked to McGeorge

Bundy, "If Macmillan and I had known what we were signing we might not have

signed it."47

By 19 January an interdepartmental steering committee had already produced

an outline of what the Multilateral Force would look like. It proposed assigning to the MLF such national forces as 20 British-based U.S. B-47s, 55 British

V-bombers, and three Polaris submarines, which the JCS considered an "overly

large ... initial commitment." The commander of the projected force would

report to SACEUR, and its command headquarters would have representatives

from each NATO nation. The United States, "at least initially," would maintain

custody of the warheads and exercise a veto over their use. Participating nations

would contribute a fair share of all U.S. research and development work after 1

January 1963 from which the MLF would benefit, but no single nation would

be permitted a share of more than 40 percent of the personnel nor charged more

than 40 percent of the cost. U.S. financial participation would depend on the

other participating nations raising their defense budgets "by an amount sufficient

to cover both their contribution to the multilateral nuclear force and also provide

for necessary improvements in their conventional forces." To prove the seriousness

with which the United States now viewed the MLF and to hasten its implemen-

*On 22 January, de Gaulle and Adenauer signed a Franco-German Treaty of Cooperation. The stunning development was a key factor in the more aggressive wooing ofthe Europeans in the direction of a fuJi-fledged MLF.

De Gaulle's refusal to participate in a NATO nuclear force and France's veto of British entty into the Common

Market added a sense of urgency to firming up the MLF effort. See Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the United

States ofEurope, 333-36. A second factor was Kennedy's decision ro remove the Jupiters from Italy and Turkey,

which, without the promise of an MLF, would have left the two countries shorn of an auxiliary nuclear role and

with the perceprion of a sudden unacceptable vulnerability. See Steinbruner, Cybernetic Theory, 252.
MLF: A Notion Too Far 405

tation, the steering group recommended the u.s. seek approval from the North

Atlantic Council for bilateral discussions within the foregoing context and that

an individual with the rank of ambassador, assistant secretary, or under secretary

head the negotiating team.48

Scrambling to assure Bonn that the appearance of a special arrangement with

the British was not meant to reduce Germany to a second-class status, State's

European bureau wasted no time in instructing the U.S. embassy to emphasize the

multilateral language in the Nassau declaration and the integral role planned for

Germany in the new scheme: "The point to be stressed with the Germans is that

a major new line of policy has been unfolded at Nassau." In a message of 10 January, cleared with OSD's ISA, State wired that "Nassau permits immediate start on

multilateral mixed-manned component of nuclear force." In what by any standard

was a tortured characterization of the meaning of Nassau, Ball explained to the

North Atlantic Council on 11 January that both the U.S. and British governments

"had felt grave responsibility to take no steps re Polaris which would be prejudicial to ability of whole alliance [to] mobilize full potential for nuclear defense."

Ignoring what remained a contentious issue at the Pentagon, Ball proclaimed that

with respect to the mixed-manning feature of the nuclear force, the United States

"believes more strongly than ever that this component is essential."49

The Merchant Team

The whirlwind of activity in the aftermath of Nassau led to the appointment

of a State-Defense negotiating team on 24 January 1963 under the direction of

Livingston Merchant, a senior foreign service official, former ambassador to

NATO and assistant secretary ofstate for European affairs during the Eisenhower

administration, and a close associate of Bowie. With Smith joining Merchant and

Lee, the senior Defense member, at the head of the delegation, its leadership had a

strong, experienced pro-MLF background. On 21 February the president instructed

the Merchant team to investigate "as a matter of urgency ... the possibility of

an international arrangement" relating to the creation of a Multilateral Force.

Merchant, Smith, and Lee, with a large support staff, traveled through Europe

from 22 February to 17 March, visiting Paris, Rome, Brussels, Bonn, and London

with the goal of completing preliminary agreements with the allies "preferably

prior to the Italian elections in April."50

The record of conversations at the White House through January and February leaves no doubt that Kennedy gave the Merchant group the green light to

proceed earnestly on the MLF negotiations, but he did so hesitantly. At a meeting

in the president's office on 18 February, he began by expressing "deep concern"

about the endeavor "and particularly the fact that the United States might be

tying itself too closely to a project that might fail." Over the next several months

as the MLF remained a "hot and cold item" for the president and prospects for
406 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

successful conclusion of the round of preliminary agreements waxed and waned,

there occurred considerable finger-pointing within the administration as to what

exactly had been aurhorized and, if given a green light, how vigorously and explicitly the Merchant team had been instructed to advance the MLF proposition.

McNamara later insisted that "the Merchant mission was simply supposed to have

been a more intensive, more exploratory, version of the Smith-Lee mission" that

had gone abroad in the fall of 1962. "It was supposed to have been bound by the

same cautionary limits on non-commitment." Merchant's party, McNamara said,

"had a restricted hunting license and they knew it." He blamed the true believers

for "capturing" the Merchant operation, Owen and Schaetzel in particular choosing "to hear only the words which licensed them to proceed. "*51

In truth, even objective observers had trouble discerning the mixed signals.

Rusk, no friend to the MLF advocates even as he gave them a long leash, believed

that Nassau represented a turning point, after which the MLF "became a real

undertaking for us," whether the British were serious or not about their part

of the bargain, which he admitted was never nailed down. Bundy later chided

himself for not reining in the "passionate believers" who "pressed the case more

sharply and against a tighter timetable" than was prudent. "I myself," Bundy

wrote Kennedy in June 1963, "have not watched them as closely as I should

have, and more than once 1 have let them persuade me to support them where

1 might well have been more skeptical." At the same time, Bundy observed that

the administration, of necessity, had to up the ante after Nassau or "we would

have left General de Gaulle a free field." McNamara himself conceded that the

whole post-Nassau exercise "took on more significance than it otherwise would

have" following de Gaulle's threat to polarize the alliance around the nuclear issue.

Nitze, who felt McNamara did not adequately keep his top assistants and immediate staff adequately informed as to his thinking, would say in retrospect that the

MLF "made sense as an interjm measure to get the Germans hooked," and that

even the agnostics were aboard in the absence of any other antidote to an independent European deterrent. 52

In the end, there was little to distinguish Nitze's position in January 1963

from Ball's assessment that "the only thing we had was MLF. Therefore jt was

proper to make that the vehicle of all our efforts and to keep it in the forefront

* Steinbruner notes that with BaIrs help, the MLF coalition at State was able to circumvent Jefftey Kitchen,

head of the politico-military affairs office, William Tyler, Schaetzel's boss in the European bureau, and "other

parts of rhe State bureaucracy which were either unreliable [MLF] advocates or direcr opponents" (Steinbruner,

Cybernetic Theory, 250, 252-55). McNamara traced the problem to Rusk, to whom he was willing to defer as

the principal voice on matters of foreign policy but faulted for being temperamentally indisposed to controlling

his own stalf. McNamara told Neustadt he had "great respecr" for Rusk bur added thar Rusk's "disrasre for challenging his people" prevented the secrerary ofsrate from disciplining or firing Owen and left rhe "harcher work"

to him. Owen, whom McNamara described as "Machiavellian," srruck Neustadr as "rhoughrful, indefarigable,"

and "capable when roused of dedicarion bordering on fanaricism" (draft memcon Neustadt wirh McNamara, 29

Jun 63, 5-6,13, Adr Memcons-U.S., box 21, Neusradr Papers, JFKL).
MLF: A Notion Too Far 407

of all discussions." For all his private doubts and occasional protests, McNamara

was neutralized by the circumstances and up to a point, during this period as at

other times, he tacitly supported the MLF while convinced as ever that long-term

it would fail. If the Merchant team went about its mission too aggressively, "selling" and "arm-twisting" rather than simply "ascertaining" European interest, it

seems to have made little difference-the Europeans weren't buying and as soon

as the theoretical concept took on detail and definition the American sponsors, as

happened repeatedly, beat a retreat.53

As with earlier attempts to reach closure, all the treacherous undercurrents

in the MLF debate resurfaced. Even the submarine vs. merchantman quarrel,

apparently resolved, reemerged when the Germans expressed uneasiness over the

survivability of a surface missile platform and Merchant requested latirude to offer

the Europeans the submarine option. Rickover's known hostility to basing the

MLF on U.S. submarines for fear of compromising U.S. nuclear reactor technology (Rickover had met with the president on 11 February to convey his concerns

directly) and presumed congressional opposition to sharing Polaris submarines with

allies-along with the established cost and manning advantages of the surface

mode-clinched the argument for basing the missiles on surface vessels. 54

SHAPE and the Joint Chiefs refused to accept the mixed-manning aspect

of the MLF as a given, even after Kennedy enjoined JCS Chairman Taylor and

Chief of Naval Operations Anderson to heed the importance of that decision "as

Merchant begins his explorations" and to work with their senior counterparts

in Europe to win them over to the idea. In a personal note to the two on 21

February, the president acknowledged "there are many professional problems in

operating any mixed manned force, and I know also that we have much still to

do before we can say that the plan for the MLF is solid all the way through, but

if we can get it through the heads of the senior military people in Europe that

this is the way to get about a problem they and we share, we shall be more than

halfWay home." In June Lemnitzer became upset that his speech to the Western

European Union Assembly had been construed as outright support for the MLF

and advised Taylor that he was only speaking on the subject generally and not

taking a position, "other than to indicate that I would welcome any augmentation

ofACE [Allied Command Europe] nuclear capabilities regardless ofthe mode."55

New obstacles arose. Foy Kohler, U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, warned that the Soviets were "deadly earnest" in their distress over the possibility of eventual German control of nuclear delivery systems that could penetrate

the U.S.S.R. The MLF touched a sensitive Soviet nerve, according to Kohler,

and even though the nuclear force as proposed would be less menacing than a

national German program, the Soviet Union would still react "with considerable alarm and perhaps with specific counter-actions." On the control issue, John

McNaughton, DoD general counsel, reminded the White House of the complicated legal issues relating to any transfer of weapons even if the president retained
408 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

veto authority under an agreed rule of "unanimity" whereby no missile could be

fired without the unanimous consent of the participating nations. At the same

time that Kennedy insisted he absolutely had no intention of giving up the U.S.

veto, he acceded to Smith's and Merchant's entreaty that "the political effectiveness of the proposal would be gravely compromised if there were no modification

of our existing practices," i.e., if the U.S. monopoly on ownership and control of

the weapons was such that the nuclear-sharing premise became a mere charade.

Kennedy, McNaughton recalled, did not fully realize the implications of transferring ownership of the weapons to the MLF, which was "in a sense a corporation

owned by a bunch of countries":

... It's one thing to say that we have a veto because the boatd of directors

can't overrule us; it's quite another thing to be sure that the corporation down

the line is going to behave completely consistent with our veto. There is also

a question that ifwe have our nuclear weapons in these ships, it's conceivable

that someone could compromise the design information.... The President

would come to a meeting on the MLF and would say something like, "We

shouldn't worry about this because of course we'll still own the warheads,"

and someone would squirm in his chair and say, "Mr. President, the decision

you took three weeks ago was that we would sell the warheads to the corporation." There would be a pause while he'd think how he could have made

such a decision, then they'd go through the argumentation of how you could

protect design information, how you could avoid the unauthorized firing by

way of international custodial units, ... and the like. This happened twice.

On each occasion he thought that we were still going to own the warheads.

It remained for Rusk to comment that any diminution of U.S. control over the

MRBM force would aggravate the Soviets' "overriding fear that the Germans wili

somehow manage to obtain control of nuclear weapons which they can fire on

their own decision. "56

Judging from the cooi Europ~an reception of the Merchant entourage, neither

the Soviet Union nor MLF dissenters in the United States had reason to worry

about any imminent weapons transfer. Although Merchant on his return notified Rusk that "a substantial element of the leadership of important members of

the Alliance wants an MLF-and any doubts on this score in the United States

should be set at rest" and a Ball-drafted telegram to the embassy in London

relayed that "Merchant's team made gratifYing progress" in Bonn and Rome, an

unvarnished U.S. Information Agency evaluation based on a monitoring of the

European press, and Merchant's own caveats, told a different story. "More doubts

were raised ... than laid to rest as the preliminary result of Mr. Merchant's European trip," read a USIA briefing dated 7 March. "Initial reaction ranged from

open antagonism in France, through mounting skepticism in West Germany and

Britain to qualified endorsement in Italy and Scandinavia." The Germans contin-
MLF: A Notion Too Far 409

ued to push for a submarine instead of a surface nuclear fleet and for clarification

of the control mechanism, as did the Italians. Merchant believed he could rely

on the Belgians to "scramble aboard the bandwagon" despite their concern over

expenditures. "The returns are not yet in," he said, "from The Hague, Ankara and

Athens, but none of these will crucially affect the prospects or the outcome ....

The Scandinavian countries, Portugal and Luxembourg, I consider out and in my

own judgment Canada is dubious." Everywhere there was apprehension over the

financial obligations of the participating countries, stemming from Merchant's

calculation that the U.S. contribution would be on the order of one-third of the

total funding requirementY

Although Merchant felt he had made some headway with the British after

a "decidedly tepid" first meeting, and that at the end of the day "the leverage

we possess" would "prevent them wrecking our policy," London remained a key

impediment to achieving a consensus among the allies. Even before the ink dried

on the Nassau agreement, Macmillan had donned blinders and, at the prodding

of the Defence Ministry, begun to hedge on the multilateral commitment, viewing the multinational provision as the crux of the document and the multilateral

section as a non-binding corollary. While the Foreign Office sought to smooth

over the differences with the U.S. interpretation, which emphasized the integral

connection between the two and their marriage in another section, the Ministry of

Defence panned the MLF as unaffordable, superfluous, and having the potential

for mischief in empowering Germany and provoking the Soviet Union. Moreover,

as Ball recognized, the British had their own "conditioned reflex against mixed

manning."* Minister of Defence Peter Thorneycroft was adamant that the United

Kingdom not relinquish its grip on nuclear independence for what seemed a feckless effort to spite de Gaulle and curry favor with the Germans. Thorneycroft

derided the MLF as "a remarkably unproductive way of spending £500 million,"

on another occasion skewering the proposal as "the biggest piece of nonsense that

anyone had ever dreamt up."58

Merchant put the best possible face on his mission's less than encouraging

progress, trumpeting small victories and discounting significant setbacks. In his

report to Rusk, followed by a meeting at the White House on 22 March, he

concluded that despite sizable hurdles there was "sufficient evidence of European

interest to warrant an unconditional endorsement" of a surface fleet multilateral

force. He suggested placating German and Italian resistance by expressing U.S.

willingness to consider a possible follow-on addition ofsubmarines to the fleet at

a later date, and recommended the administration "move ahead vigorously on all

fronts" so that the preliminary agreement could be signed and sealed during the

*Lord Montgomery, calling the MLF "utter and complete poppycock," asked: "How can a ship fight effectively

if a third of the crew is Portuguese, a third Belgian, and a third Danish? ... You might just as well man a ship

with a party of politicians" (J. W. Boulton, "NATO and the MLF," Journal ofContemporary History, Jul-Oct 72,

289).
410 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

president's visit to Europe in June. Kennedy agreed to write German Chancellor

Adenauer and Italian Premier Fanfani seeking their approval and offering cooperation to resolve any lingering issues, but until the administration had a firmer

commitment he chose to delay the start of consultations with Congress, which

Merchant had urged begin early. Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

William Tyler left for Bonn and Rome at the end of March with the pledge that

"a decision to go forward now with a surface force would not preclude consideration of submarines at a later stage" and that, on the control issue, the United

States was not wedded to the unanimity principle if the allies preferred a different arrangement, so long as U.S. concurrence constituted an element of any new

formula. The Tyler visit, buttressed by McNamara's dispatch of Admiral Ricketts

a week later to convince the Germans of the military soundness and survivability

of the surface mode,* succeeded in gaining Adenauer's acquiescence in a provisional agreement with the understanding that the surface ship and veto topics

could later be reexamined. With Germany in the fold and the assumption that

the Italian government would follow soon after the country's spring elections, the

MLF advocates seemed to have turned another corner, sustaining their momentum even though for every stumbling block they eliminated, a new one seemed

to stand in the way. 59

Slowing the Pace

Merchant had hoped that the NATO conference at Ottawa in late May would

present an opportunity for putting the final pieces in place to achieve preliminary

agreements with the remaining holdouts, principally Britain, and bolstering the

president's position before the White House undertook discussions with Congress.

But the combination of unrelenting challenges and accumulating doubts finally

took their toll and slowed the MLF drive.

Both financing and operability questions increasingly clouded the picture as

the allies got nearer the brink. Even the obliging Adenauer raised the money issue

in his 2 May letter of assent. McNaughton recalled Kennedy wondering why the

Germans would bankroll an MLF with the Americans wielding a veto over its

exercise: "He would say ..., 'If I were a German, I wouldn't be interested in this.

What are you giving me that I haven't already got? ... You're giving me something that I can't fire without the Americans firing it with me. I've already got

an American force backing me up.''' The main problem, however, was Britain,

whose defiant opposition to the multilateral concept underscored the fragility of

the enterprise and whose conspicuous absence from the coalition made the others'

participation moot in terms of the credibility and relevance of the organization.

*McNaughton accompanied Ricketts to explain the U.S. position on the veto question. The Germans disliked

rhe unanimiry idea nor because rhey distrusted rhe Unired States but because they believed it gave the other

European participants too much power to nullifY a concerted action.
MLF: A Notion Too Far 411

British refusal to join the club would reduce the venture to a largely U.S.-German

affair and resurrect the same issue that had plagued the MLF startup after Kennedy's maiden Ottawa speech two years earlier. The Ottawa meeting in the spring of

1963 produced a cautious communique reminiscent of past vague affirmations.

Instead of paving the way for closure on an agreement, it became an occasion

for pausing and taking stock. Mter scrapping Merchant's June deadline, the president's advisers, including MLF staff, determined to work more deliberately toward

a draft treaty without any specific timetable.60

With the arrival of summer, some in the administration clearly evidenced

relief at the interruption in MLF negotiations. The uncertain status of the MLF

gave McNamara a pretext for backpedaling on nuclear assistance to Italy, deferring a decision until "we know where we are with the MLF and are better able to

judge what effect changes on the Italian political scene will have on that country's

attitude toward its force modernization requirements and toward the Alliance in

general." In a memorandum to the president on 15 June Bundy advised a switch

in the approach to the Europeans "from pressure to inquiry." He enumerated a

list of potential snags and warned the president against expending excessive

political capital on the program in the face of "only grudging support among the

very people in whose interest the force has been designed." Bundy said it would

be wrong to abruptly abandon the MLF, that they should seek "to widen the

discourse . . . instead of pressing in a somewhat nervous and narrow way for a

single specific solution." His portrayal of the troubles ahead must have disposed

Kennedy to confront his own doubts about the MLE Even as the president

continued to exhort his troops to stay the course and as he made every good faith

effort to give Merchant's mission a chance of success (McNaughton learned that

Kennedy himself actually wrote some of the paragraphs to Adenauer "making a

solid pitch for the MLF"), he was too intuitive and pragmatic not to, in Taylor's

words, "smell a rotten apple."61

Still, the MLF idea stayed very much alive in the summer of 1963. Kennedy's inspiring address at the Paulskirche in Frankfurt on 25 June paid a glowing

tribute to the interdependence of the Western alliance and spoke of the need to

develop "a more closely unified Atlantic deterrent, with genuine European participation." "How this can best be done," he said, "is now under discussion," though,

he added, it was "in some ways more difficult to split the atom politically than

it was physically." On 28 June McNamara approved Merchant's proposal for an

interdepartmental coordinating committee for carrying forward MLF plans, nominating McNaughton and Ricketts as the regular Defense members and Rear Adm.

N. G. Ward as Ricketts's alternate. Later in the summer Merchant set about to

revive a negotiations schedule with the formation of a working group to address

outstanding issues pertaining to financing, ownership, command and control, and

operability arrangements. John Steinbruner notes that the will ofthe MLF propo-
412 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

nents "remained undiminished. Like contemporary versions of Sisyphus, they

slowly began to roll the rock back up the hill. "62

In July Kennedy suggested a trial demonstration of the mixed-manning concept and asked 000 for a report on the feasibility of establishing an experimental

mixed-manned ship or ships for that purpose. The plan called for using a guided

missile destroyer to enable MLF participants to become proficient in the maintenance and operation of complex electronic and other systems and/or a naval

auxiliary ship to practice more routine mixed-crew training. The ship(s) would

operate as part of the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and the U.S. Second

Fleet in the Atlantic, and participate in U.S. and NATO exercises as appropriate.

A U.S. naval officer would command any vessel involved in the project and, while

no single nation would have a majority of the crew, the administration thought

it desirable that no less than half the personnel on a U.S. ship be U.S. nationals.

McNamara had concurred in the demonstration so long as it did not signifY any

commitment to advancing MLF negotiations or the draft of a treaty. As late as

October the president seemed intrigued with the idea as both a test case and an

earnest of U.S. sincerity, at little downside cost, that might also buy some time to

get the British to come around while keeping the Germans engaged.63

Implementation of the mixed-manning experiment, and the fate of the MLF,

would fall to Kennedy's successor. With the president's assassination in November

1963, along with dramatic political developments in Germany and Britain that

saw Adenauer and Macmillan ousted from office in October, inevitably the MLF

campaign slackened during a reevaluative transitional period. Whether the MLF

would have continued to evolve and come to fruition had Kennedy lived is grist

for speculation, but he did give signs of wearying of trying to rescue a concept

that he knew full well-from his own June travels in Europe and Bundy's constant

reminders-had little real constituency outside the State Department's European bureau. Neustadt's extensive interviews with White House staff members

in 1963 reveal a president who had neither devotion toward nor illusions about

the achievement of a shared nuclear force, and by the fall of that year it seemed

only a matter of time before he would have lost patience and interest as well. The

demonstration project may have afforded a graceful means to keep the MLF "on

ice" while Kennedy turned his attention to a test ban treaty and other possibly

more attainable goals.64

Johnson and the MLF

At a meeting in the White House on 6 December 1963, senior officials briefed the new president, Lyndon Johnson, on the status of the Multilateral Force

prior to the semiannual NATO session scheduled for later that month in Paris.

Both McNamara and Rusk urged caution, with McNamara repeating his familiar

refrain of "no military requirement for the MLF" and Rusk interjecting that they
MLF: A Notion Too Far 413

really could not know the nature and extent of future u.s. missile requirements

until they analyzed the latest intelligence estimates on Soviet nuclear activity. The

importance of continuity in relations with the allies received emphasis in a State

Department paper prepared for the conference. State expected MLF would not

be a prime topic since "no aspect ofthis subject [nuclear control in the alliance] is

ripe for action at this time" and the "basic problem ... is still very far from solution."65

Johnson had little experience and not much appetite for foreign affairs

compared with his cosmopolitan predecessor. Philip Geyelin wrote that for all

his robust qualities the provincial Texan "had no taste and scant preparation for

the deep waters of foreign policy." Furthermore, he had little in common by

temperament or upbringing with the Eastern intellectuals who dominated the

New Frontier's inner circle and the party's foreign policy establishment. Yet he

felt secure enough to retain members of Kennedy's brain trust, and in the end he

relied on their judgment and advice to a greater degree than the more cerebral and

introspective Kennedy. In foreign affairs especially the central cast remained much

the same, with Rusk and McNamara gaining influence and McGeorge Bundy,

while staying on as national security adviser, losing some clout in a White House

environment less tight and intimate.66

The presence of so many key holdovers promised a smooth transition, bur

what that portended for the MLF was anybody's guess. Among the older hands

there remained both unbowed believers in the multilateral principle like Ball and

Rostow, and determined opponents. Even as McNamara and Bundy rode the brake

on the multilateral negotiations, the MLF contingent hoped the Johnson changeover might jump-start them.

To some extent MLF proponents had grounds for optimism. The president gave his blessing to the mixed-manning demonstration project in January

1964,* consented to preliminary consultations with Congress that Kennedy had

finally",authorized shortly before he died, and in April.conveyed what sounded

like a forthright endorsement of "the establishment of a multilateral nuclear

force composed of those nations which desire to participate." At a key meeting

at the White House on 10 April attended by Ball, Finletter, Rostow, and Smith

(who had succeeded Merchant as the head of the MLF.'s negotiating team), with

McNamara notably absent and 000 not represented, Ball requested intensifYing

congressional contacts with an eye to drafting a charter and possibly achieving a

signed agreement by year's end. Finletter opined that "the U.S. had to stop being

diffident abour the MLF" and "if the President would give the go-ahead sign, the

MLF would be accepted by a number of countries." Johnson directed that State

* The U.S.S. Biddle (later renamed rhe U.S.S. Ricketts after the death in July of the admiral most closely associated with the MLF) began assembling a crew from six NATO nations and the United States and set sail in

October. See Glenn T. Seaborg, Stemming the Tide: Anns Control in the Johmon Years, 108.
414 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

broaden its discussions with the appropriate congressional committees, bur with

Bundy registering Defense's "serious reservations" and other complicating factors

coming to light, the meeting concluded with not as affirmative a consensus or as

committed a commander in chief as the MLF faithful chose to ponray.67

Still, activity over the spring and summer of 1964 did nothing to dispel the

impression that the administration was energetically pursuing a multilateral force

objective. McNamara himself endorsed expanding the sharing of nuclear information with the allies (assuming no transfer of weapons) and asked the Joint

Chiefs to undertake a comprehensive study of prospective MLF command and

control procedures, with particular attention to the prevention of unauthorized

or accidental detonation. In August he wrote Rep. George Mahon, chairman of

the House defense appropriations subcommittee, professing his "personal support

and that of the Defense Department for this important program." Yet the defense

secretary designated Nitze, who moved over from ISA to become secretary of the

Navy in November 1963, and McNaughton, who took over ISA in July 1964, as

his principal representatives on MLF matters-neither of whom was keen on the

MLF, or for that matter in the past had masked his disdain for the idea.68

Had the European allies become more receptive and given the latest movement some impetus, events might have taken a different course. Bur with the

exception of Germany, not a single country was strongly committed to the plan

in the summer of 1964. In Britain, where the Conservative Party had replaced

Macmillan as prime minister with Alec Douglas-Home, neither major political

party was supportive, and indeed Bundy's assessment a year earlier that "almost no

one with any political standing is personally favorable to the MLF" still applied.

With scathing sarcasm, the London Times defense correspondent observed that

"a fleet of missile firing ships, manned by polyglot crews and wearing ensigns of

many colours, has begun to stream erratically through the exposed and turbulent

waters of Anglo-American relations." Italy continued to demur under a musicalchairs succession of governments. Greece and Turkey expressed a wish to participate but had no funds to spare (Kennedy had characterized them as "waiting only

for a complimentary ticket"). The Netherlands showed some warmth toward

the MLF, bur its decision, like Belgium's, appeared to be predicated on what the

British decided. The remaining NATO members, including France and Canada,

excluded themselves entirely, with France becoming ever more adversarial and

threatening to leave the alliance.69

Even German support appeared to waver for lack of evident progress and

worry over alienating de Gaulle. Johnson huddled with German Chancellor

Ludwig Erhard in Washington in June for a wide-ranging review of the international scene, including a pro forma reaffirmation of the two nations' commitment

to produce an MLF agreement by December. But the British then introduced

a potential poison pill with the proposal of an alternate concept, an Atlantic

Nuclear Force (ANF), that married their preference for a federation of national
MLF: A Notion Too Far 415

nuclear forces with a token element of mixed manning. They suggested a mixedmanned force consisting of select strike aircraft and land-based missiles (over

time both the Pershing and ICBM Minuteman were mentioned); the latter, of

course, were anathema to McNamara even as the land-based MRBM on the European continent appealed to Norstad's disciples at the Pentagon, who relished the

opportunity to revisit the land-based option, though minus the mixed-manning

provision. McNamara, in an ironic turn as MLF champion, tried as best he could

to squash the British initiative, urging German Defense Minister Kai-Uwe von

Hassel to "keep the door open" to the British proposal as a "possible add-on" to

the surface missile fleet but not permit it to sidetrack the American plan. Nonetheless, with Labour's Harold Wilson succeeding Douglas-Home in October and

eagerly embracing the ANF concept as politically advantageous, with the Dutch

and Belgians taking their lead from London, and with the French and Germans

reacting to dueling propositions that further muddied the nuclear relationships

among the allies, there resulted renewed uncertainty over the status ofthe MLFJo

At home, too, the MLF was running into trouble. Leery House and Senate

leaders, particularly members ofthe Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, skeptical

of the ability to maintain secrecy and security under conditions of nuclear sharing, postponed scheduled hearings and kept MLF lobbyists at arm's length. Both

on the Hill and at the White House, the combination ofthe long road leading up

to the November elections, the momentous civil rights legislation that dominated

the u.s. national agenda through much of 1964, and especially the unfolding

events in Southeast Asia, shunted the tangled MLF negotiations to the periphery. Protecting Johnson in a way he felt he had not adequately served Kennedy,

Bundy finally harnessed State's MLF operatives, whom he deprecated in a blistering memo for the president as free-lancing zealots with a "passionate commitment

to their own view of Europe."* Johnson accepted Bundy's recommendation to

clear all MLF activity through the White House, including the requirement that

all officials traveling overseas on MLF business have specific written instructions

and that the secretaries ofstate and defense designate officials authorized to talk to

the press on the subject. With the national security adviser's procedural guidance

formally issued as NSAM No. 318 on 14 November, the administration would

speak with one voice on the MLF, even if only to deliver an epitaphJl

Demise

By the time the Johnson administration refocused on the MLF late in 1964,

the plan had lost much ofthe traction it gained earlier in the year. A coalescing of

*Bundy also took a mild swipe ar McNamara for paying more arrention to sales rhan srarecraft, referring in

the memo to the secretary's fretting over the U.S. losing aircraft market-share to the British when helping U.K.

business would be good politics: "One of our jobs is to introduce McNamara the statesman to McNamara rhe

merchant and make sure they do not get in each other's way."
416 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

circumstances and pressures-congressional coolness, Allied disinterest, French

hostility, Soviet anxiety, State and DoD's increasing absorption with Vietnam, and

the eleventh-hour diversion created by the British hybrid alternative-proved too

inhibiting for even the MLF diehards to overcome.

As part of the retooling in NSAM 318, Bundy recommended the suspension of any end-of-the-year deadline while using the occasion of Prime Minister

Wilson's December visit to the White House to take a final stab at softening the

British position. Although he, Rusk, McNamara, and Ball all viewed the MLF

as "the least unsatisfactory means of keeping the Germans well tied into the alliance," they strongly opposed a mere bilateral German-American pact and felt they

had to keep the British "in the game." Bundy appears to have been influenced,

or reinforced, by a 10 October memo from NSC aide David Klein advising that

if they were not careful, the MLF could weaken rather than strengthen NATO

and lead to disintegration rather than unification. Klein also showed sensitivity,

as certainly did Bundy, to the effect failure would have on the president's political stature. They had to give Johnson as well as Erhard and Wilson a graceful exit.

"The last thing we want to do," Klein wrote Bundy, "is tie this MLF millstone

around the President's neck ...." They had to broaden the MLF into something

Germany and Great Britain could both accept or "tailor ... tactics so that the

amount of broken political crockery will be minimized." Searching to "make the

British and the Germans see their common interest in agreement," Bundy was

even willing to contemplate "a new name for the enterprise," posing the title

''Atlantic missile force" that was barely distinguishable from the British ANF.72

Bundy further consolidated MLF responsibility under a small ad hoc committee consisting of McNamara, Rusk, Ball, and himself, with Neustadt, who stayed

on after completing his Skybolt report, managing the staff work and directing

preparations for the Wilson meeting with Johnson.?3 Whether the ANF represented a serious attempt to resolve the Anglo-American impasse dating to Nassau,

as the British maintained,74 or merely a ploy to abort the MLF in order to cling

to the vestiges of a national nuclear deterrent, the proposal of a mixed-manned

land-based Pershing or Minuteman force got no acceptance. Minuteman especially was a "non-starter," Bundy said, wiring Neustadt in London at the end of

November that "U.S. Congress and military would find security threat in mixed

manned Minuteman overwhelming .... A surface ship is a very simple machine

compared to a silo, and if difficulties ofsailing with foreigners trouble the Earl of

Burma [Admiral Lord Mountbatten], he should consider living underground with

wogs next to a megaton." A few days earlier he told Ball that looking at "a deeply

reluctant and essentially unpersuaded Great Britain," "a protracted and difficult

Congressional struggle," and increasing strains in the alliance, "the MLF is not

worth it."75

Wilson's 6-9 December visit to Washington followed a flurry of last-minute

memos and conversations anticipating German, British, and French reactions
MLF: A Notion Too Far 417

to various scenarios, with the gathering realization that the likelihood of forging

a compromise that would satisfy all the principals was close to nil and perhaps

not even desirable at this point. A chief concern on the eve of Wilson's arrival

was that even if the parties could reconcile the British and German positions,

de Gaulle, sensing that the MLF was verging on success, might turn up the heat

on the Germans and threaten to wreak havoc with NATO and Franco-German

relations. With a lull in the Cold War, a Franco-German nuclear partnership

becoming increasingly unlikely as relations between the two countries became

more tense, and the prospect of an independent German nuclear initiative in the

absence of an MLF also diminishing, the greater danger to some now seemed to

lie in the rupture of the alliance and needless provocation of the Soviets over an

ill-conceived, awkwardly imposed nuclear arrangement that had more cosmetic

value than strategic relevance. To Bundy, the risk ofill-advised action had come to

outweigh the risk of inaction. In a memo to the president on 6 December 1964,

the day before the meeting of the U.S. and British leaders, he gave Johnson a

summation of how "the devil's advocate would state your choices":

(l) !fyou go full steam ahead, you face a long, hard political fight, a

major confrontation with de Gaulle, and a possibility of defeat or delay

which would gravely damage the prestige of the President.

(2) !fyou go halfsteam ahead, there will probably be no MLF, bur it will

not be your fault alone.... Your wisdom, caution and good judgment will

have the praise ofliberals, of military men, of the British, of the French, and

of many Germans-and you will have freedom to make a different choice

later if you wish?6

A suddenly engaged Johnson believed the German question still critical and

worried that the Germans would not wait long to develop their own separate

deterrent if they felt themselves consigned to the role of nuclear outsiders in

NATO's power structure. The president and his senior advisers went through "five

days of stormy intramural debate," with McNamara somewhat surprisingly joining Ball in arguing for a stronger pro-MLF U.S. stance to break the impasse. The

defense secretary may have felt obliged to side with what he perceived as the president's inclination, or he may have feated that in the absence of an agreement a

later fallback might entail a land-basing concession. In the end Johnson bowed to

political realities and the futility of pressing the case with a Congress every bit as

uncomfortable with the MLF's unanswered questions as the European legislatures,

and that from long experience he recognized as insurmountably arrayed against

the conceptF

Johnson chose, then, not to force the issue with Wilson during two days of

insubstantial talks, after which the pair distributed a bland communique pledging

continued cooperation in pursuit of a unified Atlantic strategic nuclear defense.

The real message that came out of the anticlimactic summit lay in NSAM 322,
418 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

issued eight days after the prime minister's departure and spelling out the effective demise of the MLF. It declared that the United States remained committed as

ever to the collective, integrated defense of the Atlantic alliance but would leave

it to the allies to propose what form the nuclear arrangements should take, on

the understanding that under any plan the United States would retain a veto for

the foreseeable future over firing of the weapons. Further, the president emphasized, any agreement should take into account the legitimate interests of both

Great Britain and Germany and reflect French "opinion and ... desires" as well.

For good measure, the president removed any timetable and placed a gag order

prohibiting "any American official in any forum to press for a binding agreement

at this time." So deadening was the message that McNamara appears to have

made no significant reference to the MLF at the December meeting of the North

Atlantic Council, nor did the council communique on 17 December give any

indication that the subject ever came up for discussion.78

To insure that Wilson did not spin the outcome to suggest that the president had tilted toward the British or dropped the MLF for the ANF, or lest the

impression result that the United States had succumbed to French or Soviet pressure, Johnson leaked NSAM 322 to James Reston of the New .York Times, who

conveyed the thrust of the document from the White House perspective in an

article of 21 December 1964. As Harlan Cleveland, who would succeed Finletter

as U.S. ambassador to NATO, observed, Johnson essentially adopted the posture

Bundy had recommended to both Johnson and Kennedy, "namely to encourage the enthusiasts to see if they could bring it off, but not get committed to it

personally." Although Johnson would remain solicitous to efforts at home and

abroad to resuscitate the MLF, announcing, for example, at a press conference on

16 January 1965 that "we will continue to follow the progress of these talks with

the greatest ofinterest," the resignation of Smith (the day ofthe Reston story) and

the dismantling of the State Department's MLF unit by year's end put into sharp

relief how fatal a blow had befallen the multilateral concept.79

The downhill spiral would continue for another year until the MLF finally

expired at the close of 1965. Owen and remnants of the band of true believers

stayed on in other capacities, refusing to give up hope completely and seizing the

occasional vital sign as a reward for their vigil. Ball and Rostow remained influential advisers who continued to preach the merits of multilateralism but mostly to

their own small chorus of followers. McNamara told Bundy in March 1965 that

000 had "already begun to give thought here to some 'more modest possibilities.'" In April the defense secretary, perhaps being polite, conceded to Ball that

a new look at the problem "could be quite useful" and asked McNaughton to

serve as DoD's representative for a study of both the ANF and MLF. At a NATO

defense ministers' meeting in Paris 31 May-1 June, McNamara proposed a select

committee on nuclear planning that could provide an organizational means of

sharing nuclear responsibility while avoiding physical transfers of the weapons,
MLF: A Notion Too Far 419

the consideration of which had caused so much contention. Subsequently, the

thrust of the administration's nuclear-sharing deliberations increasingly shifted

from hardware remedies to consultation on issues relating to nuclear technology

and policy, culminating with DoD's establishment of a NATO Nuclear Planning

Group in 1966.80

Finletter was gone by September 1965. In October, with all but the last nails

in the coffin, a paper probably authored by Bundy, who was as responsible as any

member of the Johnson administration for removing the MLF from the nation's

agenda, offered last rites and an overblown eulogy with the comment that the

MLF had been "one of the best motivated and most imaginative [proposals] that

the US has put forward in the last 15 years." As late as 8 November John Leddy,

who had become assistant secretary of state for European affairs in June, tried to

coax one last gasp with a plea to Rusk to urge the president and McNamara to

reconsider a genuine collective nuclear weapons system rather than mere consultative arrangements. The end came, appropriately, with a visit to the White House

by Chancellor Erhard in December, almost a year to the date of Wilson's visit

and the issuance of NSAM 322. In a sense the other shoe in the Anglo-German

standoff now dropped. Prior to the meeting with Erhard, Bundy advised the president that "the Germans no longer really expect that we will support a MLF, and

I believe that if you and Erhard could reach a firm agreement . . . that no new

weapons system is necessary, the way might be open toward a non-proliferation

treaty and toward a new collective arrangement for command control and consultation in NATO." Erhard gamely importuned Johnson on the need to share actual

ownership of weapons, but in essence acknowledged in the official joint statement

that the time had come to let go and move on. For all practical purposes, the

passing of the Multilateral Force occurred with that meeting, on 20 December

1965.81

One of the more astute postmortems on the failure of the MLF came from

Alastair Buchan, whose early obituary in October 1964 noted prophetically: "It

may well be, therefore, that the MLF will in the end prove to have been nothing but an expensive and time consuming detour on the road to a more effective

system of political and strategic planning among the Western allies ... a solution

which became blocked by reason of French chauvinism, British hesitations and a

series offalse American judgments."82

John Steinbruner defined the central dilemma among the several inherent

flaws that plagued the MLF: "To grant the Europeans some control over nuclear

weapons was the politically indicated course of action; to deny any dispersion of

control was the militarily indicated course." The conceit was plausible so long as

the MLF, in Steinbruner's words, was "carefully wrapped in vagueness." Though

McNamara and OSD countenanced the MLF for a time as "a military toy to keep
420 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

the children quiet," to use Buchan's phrase, they kept it on a short leash when it

threatened to deflect funds and priority from the conventional forces or undermine centralized U.S. control ofthe nuclear trigger.83

McNamara, unless one understands that he never bought into the principle, and bestowed or withdrew DoD support for the plan depending on the

bureaucratic or political vicissitudes of the moment, appears uncharacteristically

equivocal if not sometimes paradoxical in his attitude toward the MLF. For such

a rigorous analytical thinker to blow so hot and cold reflected, as Steinbruner

explains, the distinct separation in his mind between the political and military

dimensions of the issue and his acceptance of the political rationale even when it

collided with conviction and logic.84 Years later McNamara himself would explain

simply that he went along with the MLF as a half-baked solution to a political

problem if it satisfied the Europeans' need for a greater sense of nuclear security,

even if they grossly exaggerated the effectiveness of its deterrent value. "I didn't

believe that it was a very satisfactory solution," he said in a 1986 interview, "but

I did recognize the [political] problem. If the Europeans were willing to accept

the MLF as the solution to the problem, then I was willing to support the MLF,

and I did so on that limited basis. It turned out the Europeans weren't willing to

support it, and therefore we withdrew it."85

Bundy would later say that the MLF drew its nourishment from a hope and

a fear: "a hope to turn nuclear weapons into an instrument for advancing the

unity of Europe, and ... a fear that without membership in this shared force,

the Germans would be dangerously drawn to the French and British course of

national nuclear capability. The hope proved unattainable, and the fear groundless."86 If on occasion McNamara and for that matter even Bundy seemed to have

a kinship with the State Department's more ideologically driven adherents, it was

because, however profound the difference in their temperaments and perspectives,

they in fact shared an abiding interest in the non-proliferation goal-persuading

Germany to forgo an independent nuclear program and, beyond that, preventing

the proliferation of national nuclear systems generally. Although with hindsight

it became clear that Washington's fear of nuclear proliferation within the Atlantic alliance was as overstated as the Europeans' fear of nuclear isolation, the MLF

proved useful in providing an outlet for nervous allies to ventilate and a breathing

spell for Washington, too, during a dangerous interval in the Cold War. If the

multilateral effort did not foster the grand design, the level of integration that was

the enthusiasts' dream, it may have helped avert the disintegration that constituted their worst nightmare by buying time for the alliance to figure out a new

paradigm for the West's nuclear arrangements in a world of dramatically changing technologies and strategies. To that extent, the multilateral venture realized

some lasting redeeming significance despite its unfulfilled vision and ultimate and

mostly unlamented demise.
CHAPTER XVI

The Embattled Military Assistance Program

Military assistance from the United States to its allies began with the huge

lend-lease program in World War II that helped Britain, Free France, the Soviet

Union, China, and other countries. At the onset of the Cold War, a few short

years after World War II, the United States found it prudent to reinstitute military assistance on a global scale to nations threatened by communist aggression.

By 1961, after more than a decade of such help, the goal of using economic and

military aid to rebuild war-torn nations of Europe and Asia to prevent the spread

of communism seemed fulfilled. In the meantime, new challenges raised by what

seemed an expanding communist threat made distant corners of the globe appear

vital to U.S. security. Soviet Premier Khrushchev's encouragement in January 1961

of wars of national liberation further impelled the United States to assure threatened nations they would receive help from Washington. Yet by the end of the

Eisenhower era, congressional and public sentiment was turning against foreign

assistance to what some considered ungrateful allies and unworthy recipients. l

The new administration undertook to reverse that trend and reinvigorate foreign

aid. Its initiatives, energetically advanced in the spirit of the New Frontier, sought

to overhaul and redirecr the Military Assistance Program (MAP) to make it more

efficient and responsive.

Adjusting the FY 1962 Budget

Military assistance and economic assistance were the two components of the

foreign aid program, under the overall supervision of the International Cooperation Administration (ICA), a semi-autonomous agency in the Department ofState.

The secretary of defense managed MAP with the help of the assistant secretary for

international security affairs, to whom he delegated broad powers for executing

the program. The Joint Chiefs and the military departments provided advice and

recommendations on all aspects of military assistance. Within 000 there always

421
422 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

existed the need to coordinate and balance the military assistance and the military

sales programs, which obviously had an important effect on each other.

The proper balance between economic and military assistance programs had

long been a contentious issue between State and Defense and in Congress. Both

programs were part of the Mutual Security Program (MSP) budget, and transfers

of available funds between the two often occurred by mutual consent. Congress

had always played a powerful role in determining both the funding and the organization for foreign aid. From one year to the next, funding the foreign aid program

remained a prolonged and complex process in both the executive and legislative

branches ofthe government.

From the beginning, Kennedy's transition team considered the MAP process

deficient because it did not offer the president alternative budget plans and did

not spell out the implications of military aid. State Department planners held that

military aid served numerous non-military purposes-securing U.S. base rights,

countering communist military assistance, maintaining internal security, sustaining pro-American regimes, and nation-building, which were ICA goals as well.

Designing MAP solely on the basis of military considerations would not always

best serve U.S. interests.2

Intent on continuing foreign aid programs, Kennedy was just as determined

to reverse the balance of payments deficit to maintain the integrity of the dollar

and a sound U.S. economy. To reconcile these seemingly contradictory policies,

one month after taking office Kennedy instructed his staff to develop means "for

fair sharing in both foreign aid and military partnership" with the European allies

as well as methods to ease the balance of payments deficits. He believed such

measures would demonstrate to Congress and the American people the value of

foreign assistance.3

On 25 February 1961 Rusk, McNamara, Budget Director David Bell, and

others met to discuss the FY 1962 MAP budget. ISA Deputy Assistant Secretary

William Bundy offered a figure of nearly $2.4 billion in new obligational authority (NOA)* (originally proposed to Eisenhower by State and Defense) as opposed

to $1.8 billion agreed to by Eisenhower. He justified the larger amount by pointing to the administration's strong emphasis on coping with conventional and

low-intensity conflict and the priority on promoting self-sustaining growth in the

underdeveloped countries. Bundy introduced the idea of the United States serving as "the arsenal of the free world," by which he meant greatly expanding export

of military equipment and services to developing countries through cost-sharing

assistance.4

When the ensuing discussion revealed the many obstacles MAP faced, Rusk

and McNamara deferred a substantive review because there was insufficient time

to work through the issues before the March deadline for submission of the

* Unless otherwise indicated, all money figures are NOA.
The Embattled Military Assistance Program 423

amendments to the FY 1962 budget. Instead, within the next 10 days McNamara

would provide funding levels and other recommendations for State's consideration.5 These ideas-cost-sharing, the proper mix of military and economic aid,

and shifting MAP to the DoD budget-held McNamara's attention throughout

his tenure.

Although the Joint Chiefs supported ISA's recommendation to increase the

FY 1962 funding to $2.365 billion, McNamara informed Rusk on 7 March that

the final figure depended on the amounts requested for military assistance and

economic aid, the extent of Allied cost-sharing, and the size of the DoD budget.

He suggested to Rusk that they delay a joint recommendation until these matters

were settled. The president, however, made his preference clear when he informed

Congress on 22 March of his intention to submit a total $4 billion foreign aid

request, of which only $1.6 billion was for military assistance. Kennedy also

proposed legislation to integrate the separate government aid programs* under a

single agency.6

Meanwhile, on 15 March Rusk proposed to McNamara a joint State-Defense

study to determine how best to formulate MAP's future role in promoting U.S.

strategic interests. Without awaiting a formal reply,t in late March he appointed

Charles Burton Marshall of State's Policy Planning Council to begin the study?

OSD contributed to the study, but without consulting the Joint Chiefs, the service secretaries, or the unified commands, all ofwhom had important roles in formulating MAP programs and budgets.8 Marshall's report, issued on 17 May, recommended long-term military assistance programs to improve forces and thereby

reaffirm the resolve of the United States "not just to hold a line but to push on

to required achievements in joint security." The cost for this ambitious program,

Marshall estimated, would be between $750 million and $1 billion in addition to

the $1.6 billion FY 1962 authorization already requested. 9

McNamara and Rusk pared the figures, and the following day recommended

to the president that because of "the gravity of the present international situation" $400 million should be added to the MAP budget. Such action would give

substance to the new emphasis on greater and more rapid assistance to threatened

countries. But it would require public and congressional support. Rusk had previously advised Kennedy that a bold and imaginative program had a "better chance

of Congressional approval and popular acclaim" than more of the same old Cold

War military assistance rhetoric. In the end, on 25 May Kennedy reduced the

proposed increase to $285 million and justified a total request for $1.885 billion

by citing the deepening crisis in Southeast Asia and growing needs in Latin America and Africa. lo

*These included the ICA, Export-Import Bank, Peace Corps, Food-for-Peace, and Development Loan Fund.

t DoD Deputy Secretary Gilpatric formally concurred with Rusk's recommendations on 29 March. See FRUS

1961-63, IX:24 I.
424 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

Perhaps more significant than the revised amount, however, was DoD's accompanying proposed legislation to (1) streamline MSP procedures by sharply

delineating between economic and military assistance to allow each program to

be evaluated on its own merits; (2) continue the three-year authorization authority to ensure stability in long-range planning; (3) raise the $55 million ceiling on

military aid to Latin America to $60 million; and (4) repeal the 1954 prohibition

against using MAP funding for internal security purposes in these nations. Finally,

OSD recommended authorization for the president to furnish up to $400 million

from U.S. military stocks as emergency aid to threatened countries. If used, this

would be in addition to the $1.885 billion authorization request. During their

early June 1961 hearings, members of the usually sympathetic House Foreign

Affairs Committee had little difficulty with the increased funding request, but

some bristled at the proposed amending legislation as a threat to their prerogatives

and "an expression of no confidence in Congress." 11

Legislative leaders informed the White House that the foreign aid bill was in

trouble with possible cuts of 20 to 30 percent. These estimates proved exaggerated.

However, McNamara did encounter tough questions during committee hearings

from Rep. Otto E. Passman (D-La.), the irascible chairman ofthe House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations Appropriations, who loathed foreign

aid and was determined to kill what he deemed a wasteful program. 12

Passman insisted that provisions for funding contingencies already written into

the budget made the $400 million transfer authority unnecessary. Allowing the

president to transfer funds without any congressional approval, Passman remarked,

would just be adding $400 million to the MAP budget. McNamara objected that

the authority was tightly controlled and necessary for rapid, decisive action at times

Congress was not in session. Unimpressed, Passman dryly remarked that based on

his 13 years on the committee he had observed that "there is practically always an

emergency." 13

On 4 August the House Foreign Affairs Committee authorized $1.8 billion, a

slight reduction of $85 million from the May request, because members remained

unconvinced events warranted the additional funds. Their Senate counterparts

approved only $1.55 billion. A compromise on the part of the House managers

of the legislation authorized $1.7 billion for each of FYs 1962 and 1963 budgets.

DoD's legislative proposals fared poorly. Aware of congressional opposition, OSD

dropped its request to separate MAP and economic funding. Congress adopted

a two-year authorization, not the extended one requested by McNamara. The

House and Senate split their differences and authorized $300 million for the

controversial presidential authority to draw from 000 stocks for emergency aid.

On 31 August both chambers passed the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and

President Kennedy signed it into law on 4 September. 14

As requested by Kennedy in his March message to Congress, the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act established the Agency for International Development (AID),
The Embattled Military Assistance Program 425

which on 3 October 1961 replaced the International Cooperation Administration

and the Development Loan Fund.* The secretary of state retained responsibility

"for the continuous supervision and general direction of the assistance programs."

Guided by the act and the recommendations of a presidential task force, AID

took over not only responsibility for foreign assistance but also for coordinating

economic and military assistance. 15

The 1961 authorization act had as its principal objective the shifting of military assistance from grant-aid to sales so that Allied countries, especially those

recovered from World War II, would pay for a greater share of their defense. New

authority enabled the president to offer investment guaranties to encourage private

enterprise initiatives in developing countries by protecting American businessmen

from investment loss resulting from war, revolution, expropriation, or confiscation

by foreign governments. The law also broadened the president's ability to sell military equipment to friendly nations on credit terms. The administration expected

these measures would encourage sales of U.S.-manufactured weapons and equipment by the private sector to friendly countries, thus helping to reduce the nation's

balance of payments deficit. Fees charged for credit guaranties and money from

sales would be placed in a revolving account established by Congress to finance

additional sales until the reserve was exhausted. 16

The $1.7 billion authorization, however, met opposition from Passman in

the appropriations committee. On 1 September, he proposed an appropriation of

$1.3 billion, feeling that the $300 million in presidential emergency authority and

DoD recoupments from previous years would make up any shortfalls. Twelve days

later, however, the Senate Appropriations Committee recommended the full $1.7

billion. The conference committee compromised on a $1.6 billion appropriation.

On 30 September Congress voted that amount for military assistance, Kennedy's

original 22 March requestY

Of the total available for FY 1962, just over 50 percent went to a handful of

countries-Greece, Iran, Turkey, Republic of China (Taiwan), South Korea, and

South Vietnam. MAP underwrote new equipment-166 F-104 and RF-104 jet

aircraft, including 94 for future delivery to Greece, Turkey, Taiwan, and Korea;

thousands of jeeps and trucks for Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Taiwan, and Korea;

hundreds oftanks, including 135 for Greece and 54 for Korea; Nike surface-to-air

missiles for Taiwan and Korea; and ground-to-ground missiles for Greece, Turkey,

and Iran. Military assistance planners earmarked FY 1962 money to increase South

Vietnamese forces from 170,000 to 200,000 and to develop a special logistics base

in Thailand. Altogether 57 nations received grant military aid in FY 1962, ranging

from almost $275 million for South Korea to $20,000 for Sudan. IS

Equipment might be substituted, deferred, or withdrawn from delivery, depending on the situation. At the end of FY 1962 the lag between obligation of

*E.O. 10973,3 November 1961, set the terms for the establishment ofthe Agency for International Development.
426 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

funds for equipment and services and the actual delivery of the items had created

a cumulative unexpended balance for grant-aid military assistance, the so-called

"pipeline," of $2.784 billion, despite delivering $1.375 billion in assistance by

30 June 1962. MAP could, of course, be adapted and expedited when necessary.

To improve mobility of South Vietnamese forces, the FY 1962 program added 5

more helicopters to the 18 already programmed in FY 1961. All were delivered

by the end of FY 1962. Conversely, 10 transport or liaison aircraft for Vietnam

programmed in FY 1962 would not be delivered until sometime afterJuly 1962.

In April 1962 Comptroller Charles Hitch reported to McNamara that the

program was in such disarray that a different approach was needed. McNamara

then ordered ISA to revalidate the undelivered balances, and henceforth he took

personal interest in expediting MAP deliveries. His efforts would lower the pipeline balance by one-third by FY 1965. Because aircraft, tanks, and wheeled vehicles

usually were delivered in installments, however, a backlog persisted. 19

Latin America

The painful experience with Cuba in 1961 caused the administration to pay

new attention to the military assistance program for Latin America. Throughout

the previous decade military aid to Latin America had centered on the defense of

the hemisphere against extetnal enemies. The focus changed in 1961. Guided by

the lessons of the Bay of Pigs, the u.s. government identified the major threat as

internal subversion inspired by Cuban revolutionaries.2o

Accordingly, the administration pressed Congress to repeal the 1954 prohibition against using MAP funds for internal security purposes in Latin America and

to increase funding in FY 1962 above the $55 million ceiling. Supplying arms to

Latin America was always a sensitive topic, and committee members complained

that mere military aid would only create unnecessary armies commanded by "front

men" or "stooges of the United States." McNamara offered vigorous testimony

at congressional hearings in June 1961, citing the Cuban threat and urging the

importance of raising the ceiling on military aid for internal security, though he

would later acknowledge that "military programs alone will not solve the problems of instability which arise from the continued economic difficulties in much

of Latin America." Asking for $60 million for internal security assistance in addition to the $600 million Congress had appropriated for economic assistance, he

deemed it "a small price to pay-10 cents on the dollar-for the maintenance of

the stable political conditions necessary to allow economic growth to proceed."

Sen. George Aiken (R-Vt.) worried whether arms and materiel given directly to

Latin American governments might strengthen the power of dictators or set off

wars against neighbors. Admitting the validity of such concerns, McNamara

claimed that "the program we are presenting will not in any way contribute to a

so-called arms race in Latin America." McNamara's assurance did not allay congres-
The Embattled Military Assistance Program 427

sional unease, but it was only in 1963 that Congress imposed a ceiling of $57.5

million for military equipment programmed in a single fiscal year for Latin

America, at the same time adding approximately $20 million in defense services

annually.21

In a genuine effort to help address the larger problem and as a potential bulwark against the penetration of Castro's communism in the Western Hemisphere,

in 1961 Kennedy initiated the Alliance for Progress, an ambitious cooperative

program for economic and social development. The alliance was formalized by 19

Latin American countries and the United States in a treaty signed at Punta del

Este, Uruguay, on 17 August. McNamara told the House Armed Services Committee later "that the military assistance program has reinforced, and has been

reinforced by, U.S. efforts under the Alliance for Progress." He emphasized that

"the largest part ofOut military assistance program for Latin America is ... specifically tailored to help provide communication and transportation equipment and

internal security training."22

Friction between State and Defense over military assistance to Latin America

developed and persisted throughout 1961 and into 1962. A State Department

report in April 1962 appeared to blame the military in Latin American nations for

Castro's success in making "his influence felt in every country. With the exception

of Uruguay, every country is far from stable." An even more pessimistic assessment in August 1962 reflected State's criticism ofthe military assistance programs,

focusing on the "extravagance and irresponsibility" of the military in all the Latin

American countries. Lemnitzer, replying for the JCS in August, branded the judgments unfair-they reflected "extremist criticisms and unwarranted assumptions."

At the same time, he agreed with the comments ofthe commander in chiefCaribbean (CINCCARIB) that the officers heading missions had not succeeded, as the

State critics asserted, in exerting personal influence over Latin military leaders.23

The United States could not shake off its bad neighbor image during the

Kennedy and Johnson administrations and Latin America remained a source of

concern and contention about policy during the 1960s. As a force for promoting

internal security and stability in Latin American nations MAP made only limited

progress.

The Kitchen Steering Group

As the FY 1962 military assistance bill slowly made its way through congressional committees, the administration realized that MAP policy and organization

required reexamination. In May 1961 presidential assistant McGeorge Bundy

called for a more thorough review of military assistance than the Marshall report.

At a meeting on 26 May to discuss the report, Deputy Secretary of Defense

Gilpatric suggested formation of a group to make "a more specific series ofrecommendations. "24
428 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

Accordingly, the secretaries of state and defense established on 8 July 1961

an interagency steering group chaired by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for

Politico-Military Affairs Jeffrey c. Kitchen and including representatives from

State, OSD, the Joint Staff, BoB, and the White House. The group examined

programs in six nations on the periphery ofthe Sino-Soviet bloc-Greece, Turkey,

Iran, Pakistan, Sourh Korea, and Taiwan-that appeared most vulnerable to direct

attack. ISA asked the Joint Chiefs on 2 August whether smaller military forces in

the designated six nations could achieve the same objectives. The JCS responded

on 29 September, recommending against MAP reductions for the six countries in

the foreseeable future because their military forces were essential to implementing

"a forward strategy."25

In December the Kitchen group issued its findings. Consistent with presidential guidance, it favored economic development over military assistance to the six

countries since it did not consider direct military aggression against them likely in

the next decade. Reducing military assistance would, in turn, enable the administration to devote more resources to its top priority of economic development

for nation-building, thus promoting internal reform and raising standards of

living. The report further proposed an austere FY 1963 MAP budget that continued "deferring force improvement so far as possible." McNamara disagreed with

much of the report, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) Paul Nitze called the

conclusions "arrant nonsense," and the Joint Chiefs insisted the proposed reductions were dangerous and destabilizing.26 William Bundy, OSD's representative in

the steering group, agreed with the report in general but had reservations abour

sharp reductions of funding for Korea and Turkey as well as the huge decrease

in deliveries for FY 1962-67 to the six peripheral countries from approximately

$5.5 billion to about $3.5 billion. Rear Adm. Harry Smith, the JCS participant

in the group, disagreed with the proposed reductions. He concluded the United

States was urging its allies to increase their defense contriburions while it reduced

its own military assistance to nations essential to U.S. strategic interests. The JCS

agreed "that this is no time to make, nor to plan, reductions in military aid to the

six countries."27

Proposals for cuts also met stiff bureaucratic resistance from U.S. ambassadors

and other embassy officials reluctant to lose the leverage the program provided

them in dealing with their host countries. Others worried that a proposal to reduce

funding and shift the savings into economic aid might result in the elimination

of MAP. Furthermore, the president warned that Congress was more favorably

disposed to supplying military assistance than economic assistance; he asked that

000 "help sell Congress on economic assistance."28
The Embattled Military Assistance Program 429

The FY1963 Program

Despite his opposition to the Kitchen group's report, McNamara was sympathetic to reducing MAP-supported military forces as well as military assistance and

held his initial FY 1963 budget request to $1.7 billion. Informed in early October

of his decision, the Joint Chiefs reminded him that developments in Southeast

Asia and the recent Berlin crisis made it imperative that funding be increased to at

least $2.2 billion.29

Kennedy discussed funding with the chiefs on 3 January 1962. After hearing Lemnitzer's objection to reduction of MAP from $1.7 billion to $1.5 billion,

he asked Taylor to telephone BoB Director Bell, who reassured him that a cut of

$200 million would not force reductions in planned programs. Probably unsure of

the timing or the amount of the proposed reductions, McNamara wanted further

study oftheir full implications.30

Influenced by the Kitchen group's report, however, OSD deferred $80-85

million from the FY 1962 budget and cut more than $125 million from the six

country programs, thus lowering its FY 1963 MAP budget request to $1.5 billion.

The president then scheduled an NSC meeting for 18 January to resolve the funding issue. Prior to the meeting, the Joint Chiefs insisted that "any reduction in

military assistance to these six [front-line] countries is strategically unsupportable."

They regarded diminution of funding as incompatible with the administration's

new emphasis on a conventional military buildup for fighting limited wars on

the periphery to check communist aggression. In their eyes, "economic assistance

should complement MAP."31

At the 18 January NSC meeting, the president pointed to interrelationships

between trade policy and military interests by remarking that the United States

was spending $3 billion a year overseas to maintain its security but at heavy cost

to the nation's economy. Because of the balance of payments deficit, Kennedy

continued, the United States "must either do a good job of selling abroad or pull

back." He instructed AID Director Fowler Hamilton to undertake reviews of

"the military and economic aspects of long range US aid planning" for the six

countries and reminded his audience that MAP and AID activities were simultaneously complementary and competitive. He further directed the Joint Chiefs to

reconsider their comments on the Kitchen report and recognize that "decreases in

military aid would be compensated by increases in economic aid."32

In mid-February, however, the chiefs reaffirmed their position as still valid.

Given the close connection between economic and military assistance, they argued

that any changes to MAP had to take into account the "effect on Free World military posture in the given area." Moreover, from previous experience they doubted

Congress would approve "dollar-for-dollar transfers from MAP to AID." They

further pointed out that the threat had not changed so neither should the amounts
430 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

of military aid. Unpersuaded by the chiefs' contentions, on 13 March the president requested a $1.5 billion appropriation for MAP.33

Earlier, when McNamara had appeared before a congressional committee late

in January 1962 to testifY on DoD appropriation requests, he was asked how he

could possibly defend less money for military assistance than the previous year in

view ofthe deteriorating situation in Southeast Asia. He explained that DoD could

shift funds earmarked for other nations to South Vietnam, which confronted a far

more serious direct threat. These shifts in funds would permit an overall reduction

in military assistance,34

At the secretary's subsequent appearance in mid-March before Passman's subcommittee, the Louisiana congressman took issue with McNamara's accounting,

insisting that OSD had padded its request and then used the accumulated unexpended balances and recoupments to spend more than Congress appropriated

for programs it had never approved-more than $300 million in FY 1962. Aside

from Passman's "usual intensive questioning," there was "obviously considerable

apathy" and the hearings were poorly attended.35

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, approved 1 August 1962, authorized

$4.67 billion for FY 1963, $206 million less than requested, although the $1.5

billion MAP request remained intact. The legislation also forbade sales of certain

defense articles to "economically developed countries" unless they were unavailable

from U.S. commercial sources. It also enjoined the president eventually to terminate military grant aid to nations "having sufficient wealth" to equip and maintain

their own military forces,36

During subsequent appropriations hearings, however, Passman, arguing that

MAP had been overfunded for years, maneuvered to cut the appropriation by

$200 million despite well-publicized objections by McNamara and Lemnitzer. In

an attempt to counteract Passman's tactics, in late August and again in mid-September Kennedy made strong public statements about the shortsightedness of

reducing foreign assistance. McNamara, too, tried to marshal congressional support

for his MAP figures through late summer and early fall, but bowed to the inevitable in early October by informing Rep. Gerald Ford that $1.375 billion was

DoD's minimum requirement,3?

In the end, Congress approved a cut of $369 million in foreign aid and reduced MAP to $1.325 billion, or $175 million less than the administration's FY

1963 request. As a result, four of the six key countries suffered reductions, Taiwan

and Korea being especially hard hit. Passman's untelenting campaign to reduce

overall MAP funding and the increased costs ofsupport for Southeast Asia forced

OSD into a juggling act-a proposed decrease in military aid to four of the six

key countries to permit increasing assistance to Thailand and South Vietnam. The

Joint Chiefs protested that this would retard force modernization and leave the

affected nations unable to meet the communist threat.38
The Embattled Military Assistance Program 431

McNamara shifted the FY 1963 MAP funds to meet the rising Vietnam costs

and increased military assistance to Thailand while attempting to address the

chiefs' concern. South Vietnam's extra $122.9 million bought patrol boats and

various types of landing craft, 18 helicopters, 23 propeller fighter-bombers, plus

additional ammunition as well as construction funding, and Thailand's additional

$32.8 million went for 9 transport aircraft, 8 helicopters, and construction projects. To offset South Vietnam's extra money, South Korea, the Republic of China,

and Turkey took reductions of $198.2 million, mainly from eliminating aircraft

deliveries and ship programs. Korea had to defer 223 tanks and 73 howitzers.39

Troubles atAID

In late May 1962 AID Director Hamilton submitted his response to the president's request of 18 January for a review of U.S. aid planning. Hamilton sought

closer coordination berween military and economic aid to make both more effective. The resulting synergy, he concluded, would identifY opportunities to enhance

the overall foreign assistance effort. Meshing the budget planning and programming cycles ofAID and DoD would also facilitate interagency coordination. Kennedy responded byissuing NSAM No. 159 on 31 May, which generally endorsed

Hamilton's course and charged him with implementing the new procedures.40

This task proved beyond Hamilton. He ran afoul of Passman, who used AID's

failure to show positive results to browbeat administrators and pare economic

aid requests. Hamilton never fully recovered from his awkward start, and AID

suffered from comparison with McNamara's streamlined administration of MAP

and ISA's energetic performance. For example, McNamara took a personal interest

in reducing the unacceptable and embarrassing rwo-year backlog in MAP deliveries. He also directed ISA to initiate procedures with AID to ensure that the agency

acted on DoD proposals within 7-to-14 days.41

Kennedy also grew dissatisfied with the "apparent lack of control and coordination" in matters of foreign aid and the inability of AID and other agencies to

advance U.S. interests overseas. Under pressure from OSD, State, and the White

House, Hamilton, who, according to Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Carl Kaysen, "never really did achieve a clear understanding ofwhat he

was trying to do," resigned as director of AID in November 1962. Budget Director Bell succeeded him in December. A highly regarded manager, Bell's experience

in BoB and his stature among congressmen made him an excellent choice.42

On leaving, Hamilton recommended that the president "create a permanent

advisory group of private citizens on foreign assistance" to study AID and find

ways to revive public and congressional support for the administration's faltering foreign assistance programs. On 6 December, the president established the

Committee to Strengthen the Security of the Free World; to garner bipartisan
432 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

support for the foreign aid program he named as chairman a prominent Republican businessman, retired General Lucius D. Clay.43

The Clay Committee

At the 22 January 1963 NSC meeting the president again emphasized that

foreign assistance offered first and foremost a way of improving the security of

the United States. The Clay Committee would review the existing AID program

for the purpose of ensuring that U.S. assistance would be in the national interest.

The committee met from 24 to 28 January and 25 to 27 February. Aside from

a few private sessions, its meetings were informal "hearings," with representatives

from the execurive branch discussing their respective economic or military assistance programs. From the outset, Clay believed that the "rich NATO nations" had

to share the defense burden with the United States, particularly for aid to Greece

and Turkey. Committee members affirmed that military and economic assistance

programs were essential to U.S. national security bur should be reduced because

they were "too diffuse" and trying "to do too much in too many countries."

Members were skeptical about the value of military assistance to Latin American

nations. Although generally more critical of economic aid, they believed, as did

McNamara, that annual military aid could be cut gradually from $1.5 billion to

$1 billion over the next several years.44

OSD objected to the Clay proposal to force the NATO members to share

MAP expenses for Greece and Turkey. It also pointed out that military assistance

to Mrica and Latin America, which the committee would eliminate, consisted

primarily of military training programs and was clearly "worthwhile in terms of

return per dollar spent." McNamara affirmed his support for increased assistance

to Latin American nations to continue civic action and internal security initiatives.45

William Bundy's comments of 8 March on the committee's draft report restated McNamara's concerns and proposed that aid to Latin America be "reduced

to a minimum" rather than eliminated. Bundy also opposed the proposal to incorporate military assistance to South Vietnam into the regular DoD budget because

it would undercut the administration's policy of "merely assisting" the Vietnamese.

McNamara worried that the committee's position that in two years MAP basic

needs could be met by a $1 billion appropriation would be interpreted byopponents as an endorsement for that amount when such a figure was really not feasible

until FY 1968 at the earliest. The secretary insisted that for FY 1964 the "rockbottom figure" was $1.325 billion and reduction beyond that level would create

"serious damage in key areas. "46

The committee did acquiesce in a revision of the draft report that softened

the tone but did not alter the substance. Still both Bundy and Bell expected it to
The Embattled Military Assistance Program 433

recommend no major cuts, and the former thought the committee might prove

helpful to 000 "in this year's Congressional fight." But during a background

briefing before the report's release, Clay gave reporters the impression that MAP

might be cut $500 million.47

The Clay Committee report, issued 20 March 1963, reaffirmed the great importance offoreign assistance to national security while noting concern that it was

either "over-extended in resources and under-compensated in results" or poorly

administered. It also observed that Americans resented the burden of paying for

foreign aid while "other prospering industrialized nations" did not shoulder their

fair share. The report singled out MAP, particularly direct military aid, for praise

because "dollar for dollar" it contributed more to the security of the free world

than other similar 000 expenditures. Nevertheless, the committee concluded that

military assistance appropriations could be reduced to $1 billion "in a few years."

Although the report noted McNamara's caveat that 050 could not attain that

goal until FY 1968, it also pointed out that several nations had military forces far

in excess oftheir requirements.48

The committee suggested MAP and AID funding might be reduced by $500

million, but the president ultimately decided against any cutback in MAP. Passman interpreted the findings, Clay remarked, "as a recommendation for a drastic

cut in the President's program. Which it was not." Passman's initial reaction was to

call for foreign assistance to be chopped in half "to show the world that we are no

longer going to be suckers." He was hardly alone; many newspapers also focused

on Clay's recommendation to reduce foreign assistance.49 This set the stage for a

prolonged and nasty battle between McNamara and Passman.

The Shift to Military Sales

From early on McNamara, an ardent booster of export sales of weapons and

military equipment, pushed 000 "to promote sales of U.S. manufactured military

equipment in every way possible." To encourage export sales, the 1961 Foreign

Assistance Act authorized use of MAP funds to extend liberal credit terms to foreign governments, which in turn stimulated demand for military arms and equipment.

McNamara testified in March 1962 that military sales were replacing grant aid

"to the greatest extent possible." The aggressive military export sales program had

as a major goal offsetting the balance of payment deficits incurred from stationing U.S. forces overseas. To this end, McNamara directed that credit sales receive

top priority in planning. The $15.5 million allocated for credit assistance in FY

1961 swelled to $142 million in FY 1963 before dropping to $100 million in

FY 1964. Funds generated by transaction fees, finance charges, and recoupments

were deposited into a revolving account that made financing new credit sales less
434 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

dependent on MAP-appropriated funds. Military export sales rose steadily from

$523.6 million in FY 1961 to $1,527.2 million in FY 1964. For the same years

grant aid declined from $1,449.9 million to $793.1 million. Sales deliveries more

than doubled, from $474.8 million in FY 1961 to $1,025.5 million in FY 1964,

as grant-aid deliveries rose slightly from $709 million to $818.9 million for the

same period. 50

In NSAM No. 242 of 9 May 1963 the president reinforced the call for selling

equipment to allies to ease the drain on U.S. gold reserves. McNamara enthusiastically supported this measure and in early July directed 000 "to aggressively

pursue" its implementation. To avoid the risk of encouraging developing countries

to use grant economic assistance for purchasing military hardware, Rusk counseled a conservative approach to ensure that military sales did not divert funds

from economic development or upset regional military balances. He expected that

State would provide political guidance on sales and collaborate with 000 in cases

where potential competition existed between military grant aid and sales.51

On 8 July 1963 McNamara revised 000 policy and delineated in detail the

administration ofmilitary assistance. ISA assumed responsibility for conducting all

MAP activities within 000, including direction of military aid programs, supervision of military sales, and interdepartmental coordination and planning, using

various cost and availability data provided by the service secretaries to develop and

review programs. The Joint Chiefs would advise the secretary of defense on strategy, forces, and requirements by country and region, recommending priorities and

budgets coordinated with unified commands and MAAGs.52

With his realignment of MAP procedures completed, McNamara encouraged an activist ISA to seek out new markets, expand old ones, and sell more

and more on favorable credit terms. Military sales surged. Germany, Australia,

the United Kingdom, and Italy represented the largest volume of sales. Those

four plus Canada, France, Japan, and Switzerland accounted for $1.283 billion,

84 percent of all FY 1964 military exports. That was about to change as credit

sales to developing countries accelerated. In mid-I964 Congress provided in the

Foreign Assistance Act of 1964 for greater participation by private credit agencies

in commercial financing of military sales as well as large-scale use of the ExportImport Bank (Ex-1m Bank) to finance arms sales to developing countries.53

Provisions added to the act authorized the president to protect individuals

and firms doing business in the United States against credit and political risks

related to credit sales of military equipment to friendly foreign governments and

international organizations. This would encourage private financing of sales by

guaranteeing repayments and help reduce the balance of payments deficit. 000

credit policy adopted in October 1964 envisaged that the Ex-1m Bank or private

banks would finance military assistance credit sales to industrialized countries.

Military assistance credit authority would also be extended to sales to non-industrialized countries, regarded as less creditworthy, at higher interest rates. Between
The Embattled Military Assistance Program 435

FY 1962 and FY 1966, industrialized nations accounted for $207.1 million in

credit sales, but developing countries purchased $548.5 million through credit

assistance, with the $435.6 million borrowed by Near East and South Asian

nations accounting for most ofthe total. 54

The FY 1964 Program

In beginning consideration of the FY 1964 MAP budget, McNamara focused

DoD's attention again on long-term planning. On 21 January 1963 he met with

the Joint Chiefs to discuss the FY 1965-69 five-year guidelines for MAP. He

proposed a gradual decrease from $1.5 billion in FY 1965 to $1.2 billion by FY

1969 as opposed to the original straight-line projection of $1.7 billion per annum

that the JCS had previously agreed to during preparation of the FY 1963 budget.

The chiefs concurred with the new guidelines subject to adjustments they wanted

to meet the cutbacks, a reconsideration of certain reductions, an agreement that

the guidelines were more targets than ceilings, and an understanding that changing

circumstances might require more money. With the secretary's acknowledgement

that the figures were not a ceiling but a "realistic objective," in mid-March 1963

General Robert J. Wood, USA, OSD's new director for military assistance, devised

a five-year plan to accommodate the reduction to $1.16 billion by FY 1969. Wood

assumed that greater contributions by European nations would support NATO,

that some less developed nations would manufacture light arms and commercial

consumables to supply some of their own military equipment needs, and that

the substitution of cheaper weapon systems to meet military requirements would

reduce overall MAP grant-aid costs. Based on these computations, McNamara

requested $1.405 billion for FY 1964.55

As McNamara expected, congressional foes of military assistance used the

Clay Committee's $1 billion figure against him. If the committee, the president,

and the secretary of defense were all on record that reductions could be made,

there were congressmen happy to oblige. McNamara acknowledged the $1 billion

figure in his prepared opening statements to the several congressional committees

but quickly added that the Clay Committee also approved a gradual reduction

just as DoD planned. Still, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Thomas

E. Morgan (D-Pa.) asked if the secretary planned to reduce military assistance to

countries whose military forces the Clay Committee deemed larger than needed;

McNamara responded, "Yes, sir."56

Passman's appropriations subcommittee once again bedeviled McNamara during his mid-May testimony. Passman's hectoring started with a reminder to McNamara that the president had previously reduced the foreign aid request by $400

million and that Clay had "indicated further reductions could be made." Over the

next day-and-a-half Passman doggedly continued to insist that earlier reductions

had not damaged MAP, and McNamara just as determinedly rejected the chair-
436 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

man's observations. In a series of contentious exchanges, Passman charged that in

the past OSD had used unspent funds to pay for new programs not authorized by

Congress. McNamara gave as good as he got, but Passman remained determined

to eliminate "fat" from MAp, "the most wasteful part of the foreign aid program,"

which would work better stripped to "the bare essentials." He was in a position to

make good his threatsY

TestifYing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 13 June, McNamara tried to deflect Passman's criticisms by repeatedly stating his preference

that Congress cut the regular Defense budget rather than his military aid request.

With the exception of sharp questions from Wayne Morse (D-Ore.), the hearing

on military assistance was favorable. Rusk and Bell, testifYing on the economic

aid program, were less fortunate, as senators expressed their intention to cut the

foreign assistance request, stop the grant-aid giveaways to Western Europe, make

changes in the AID program, and end assistance to underdeveloped countries

when, in Morse's words, "so much has to be done in depressed areas in our own

United States."58

Even as the Senate hearings continued, McNamara wrote to Chairman Morgan advising him that in view ofincreased costs for more ammunition for Vietnam

and for two additional divisions and improved communications equipment for

India, any cuts to the FY 1964 request would have serious consequences. Moreover, the initial FY 1964 budget request had underestimated by $50 million the

amount required to finance an expanding credit sales program that could make

a "significant contribution to [solving] the balance of payments problem." In

short, McNamara needed more money at a time when Congress appeared clearly

opposed to authorizing his original request. The depth of congressional sentiment

against foreign assistance became clear as the House Foreign Affairs Committee

in August reduced the overall foreign aid authorization request by another $438

million.59

The timing for any reductions was particularly unfortunate at this juncture

because ofreverses in South Vietnam. On 16 August McNamara agreed to co-sign

with Rusk a round-robin letter to each House committee member to head off

further reductions in foreign assistance during the floor debate on the authorizing legislation scheduled to begin on 20 August. It did little good. McNamara

learned from Representative Ford in early September of Passman's intent to reduce

the MAP appropriation to $1 billion. Ford thought he could get a figure of $1.05

billion, and in exchange McNamara guaranteed that, barring further emergencies,

he would continue to reduce the program.60

In reaction to the looming reduction of approximately 30 percent, on 20 September Wood and William Bundy coordinated a revised FY 1964 program based

on funding of $1.05 billion to serve as a basis for discussions with the JCS, unified

commanders, and AID as well as a preliminary planning document for the FY
The Embattled Military Assistance Program 437

1965 program. The following day McNamara approved the draft with minor exceptions but rejected its use in preparation of the FY 1965 MAP budget, due

informally to BoB by 30 September, until Congress took final action on the FY

1964 package.61

The authorization process resulted in a compromise between the two houses

that provided $1 billion for military assistance, $405 million less than DoD had

requested; it severely cut economic assistance programs. On 16 December the new

president, Lyndon Johnson, signed the Foreign Assistance Act of 1963, decrying

the trend in Congress "to hamstring Executive flexibility" and reduce funds with

a "consequent dangerous reduction in our security." The same day he directed the

creation under George Ball's chairmanship ofthe President's Committee to Examine the Foreign Assistance Program and assigned it responsibility for the foreign

aid studies that Kennedy had requested in May 1962.* Ten days later Johnson

issued NSAM No. 276 requesting that AID and DoD prepare for his review the

major changes to their assistance programs resulting from the congressional reductions.62

In the House, Passman dominated committee deliberations to make certain

the MAP appropriation included no more than the reduced $1 billion authorization. He argued that OSD's practice of using recoupments to start unjustified

projects proved the program suffered no lack of funds. The Senate went along,

and on 6 January 1964, deaf to presidential entreaties, Congress appropriated $1

billion for MAp'63

The following day Bell informed McGeorge Bundy of the distribution of the

foreign assistance reductions as required by NSAM 276. DoD had determined to

"honor all explicit commitments" and meet the increased needs ofLaos and South

Vietnam by deferring planned modernization programs and radically slashing

small programs of little military significance elsewhere. The force modernization

cutbacks fell most heavily on some ofthe nations bordering communist countries.

Shortly after, on 17 January 1964, increased ammunition demands from South

Vietnam forced AID to transfer $50 million from economic contingency funds to

military assistance accounts.64

McNamara was already worrying that the escalating needs in Vietnam foreshadowed more shortages. In testimony of 23 March, he sought $143.1 million

in military assistance for South Vietnam in FY 1965 compared to $196 million

in FY 1964, a 28 percent reduction, but quickly added his doubts about the sufficiency ofthat amount and the likelihood that increases for Vietnam would have to

come at the expense of other countries or from economic aid.65

* This initiative died a quiet death when Ball and othet committee members were unable to reach a consensus.

After listening to committee members and senior congressmen disagree over the program at a White House

dinner, the president left the AID organization intact and did not recommend major changes (interv David Bell

by Paige E. Mulhollan, 27 Dec 68, pt 1,25-29, LBJL).
438 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

TABLE 7

Selected Country Programs (MAP), FY 1964

($ millions)

Unified OSD's OSD's Final

Commanders Original Revised MAP

Requests Program Program Program

Greece 114.6 103.1 80.0 69.5

Turkey 188.5 183.3 131.3 142.0

Iran 55.3 54.4 40.1 50.2

Pakistan 44.0 48.6 41.5 44.5

Taiwan 135.7 133.8 94.3 82.0

Korea 207.1 205.1 150.4 147.1

Vietnam 179.2 159.1 175.5 219.5

Total NOA 924.4 887.4 713.1 754.8

Source: Poole,fCS andNational Policy 1961-64, pt III:165; Military Assistance Program FY

1966 Estimates, 27, 29, 33, 35, 41, 47, 49, box 72, Subject files, OSD Hist. "Final program"

includes $50.3 million of$55 million added in amendment passed 1 October 1964.

Bell suggested that creating a small reserve fund from amounts listed for force

modernization in Greece, Turkey, Taiwan, and 'Korea, plus possible savings gained

by shifting force maintenance accounts to the DoD budget, would be a prudent

way to offset anticipated Vietnam increases. He reluctantly accepted the lower

figure for Vietnam as a device for McNamara's congressional presentation, but suggested a thorough review of "major MAP-supported objectives and missions"

before coming to grips with the actual funding for Vietnam.66

The FY 1964 congressional reductions not only left the Military Assistance

Program seriously underfunded, but forced OSD to make major adjustments in

its military aid plan. For example, Greece would not receive 54 self-propelled

howitzers and Turkey would not get the initial increment of medium tanks to fill

shortages in its armored units. Cutting half the equipment proposed for Thailand deferred delivery of 120 light tanks and armored cars. Korea did not get the

1,300 jeeps and trucks scheduled and it received 10, not 20, F-5 jet aircraft. The

Republic ofChina would wait longer for tanks to replace its World War II-vintage

models. By contrast, Thailand received more aircraft, and South Vietnam got 39

attack and 19 cargo aircraft, 25 helicopters, and more than 30,000 carbines and

rifles to outfit an additional 25,000 army troops.67
The Embattled Military Assistance Program 439

The FY1965 Program

Planning for the FY 1965 submission, which began in the fall of 1963, occupied the 28 October OSD staff meeting. Responding to the secretary's previous

guidance, Wood prepared a $1.310 billion MAP budget for FY 1965. Affected

by his experience with the FY 1964 budget, McNamara expressed doubt that

Congress would approve such an amount considering its recent fierce attack on the

FY 1964 request and the weak public support for the administration's foreign aid

program. Asked by Wood what a realistic figure might be, McNamara suggested

$1.2 billion, a figure he had arrived at three days earlier. Together with recoupments of $125 million, MAP would have $1.35 billion, but McNamara anticipated

that Passman "will come along and chop $300 million out." To preclude that, the

secretary decided to submit an austere MAP budget reduced to an absolute minimum. To help accomplish this, he requested preparation of legislation to transfer

such military assistance expenses as NATO infrastructure and training outlays to

the budgets ofthe military departments.68

After McNamara's decision to reduce MAP to $1.2 billion, ISA revised the

program. Its 12 November draft sliced military assistance to key nations, the

hardest hit being Korea and Turkey, and struck $40 million from the contingency

fund. These cuts enabled McNamara to increase military aid for Vietnam by $20

million.69

Transfer of some MAP funding to the Defense budget was one facet of a

bolder McNamara move to reorganize the military assistance budget for FY 1965.

An initial draft ofthe plan, forwarded on 22 November 1963 to State, BoB, AID,

and the White House for coordination, proposed transferring the part of MAP

money "closely related to U.S. forces," i.e., operating in South Vietnam, to the

Defense budget, separating the remaining military aid authorization and appropriation legislation from economic aid legislation, and establishing a military sales

credit fund. Because military aid was far more comparable to items in the Defense

budget than to economic aid, he believed that Congress should consider it in relation to the Defense program as a whole. McNamara proposed also to eliminate

Section 622(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 that gave the secretary of

state "continuous supervision and general direction" over foreign assistance. State

balked at this provision, but otherwise concurred with the recommendations,

contingent on presidential approval. Bending to State's concerns, the secretary

dropped the contentious issue before discussing the plan with Kennedy shortly

before the president was assassinated. In early December McNamara informed

President Johnson that Kennedy had approved the revisions in principle. He

further explained that OSD was "virtually under a mandate from the Senate" to

present a substantially modified military assistance bill and that approval of his

recommendations could reduce the FY 1965 request.70
440 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

Johnson approved the revisions on 7 December but enjoined McNamara to

conduct the military assistance program "in accordance with the foreign policy

guidance ofthe Secretary of State." McNamara then informed interested committee chairmen in the House and Senate about his proposals. Reaction was mixed.

Some like Senator Fulbright, who favored putting military assistance appropriations in the DoD budget, agreed with the ideas; others like Representative

Morgan rejected the concept of lumping MAP into the Defense budget and

otherwise found the changes so sweeping that they could only be decided "at the

highest level of out government."71

In early December Johnson consulted with his longtime friend and political

mentor, Armed Services Committee Chairman Sen. Richard Russell, and concluded that at most Congress would appropriate $1.2 billion for the FY 1965 program,

but "there is no assurance we can obtain anything close to that amount."72 On

16 December, the president reaffirmed his intention to request $1.2 billion, but

within days changed his mind, apparently as part of his "drive for economy,"

and reduced the figure to $1 billion. Bitter experience with the FY 1964 budget

submission and the president's caution seem to have convinced McNamara to ask

for the minimum the legislators would support. This would place on Congress

the onus for any future failures of military policy attributable to inadequate MAP

funding. On 10 January 1964 he informed BoB of his FY 1965 MAP request of

$1 billion; in mid-March Johnson forwarded it to Congress,?3

With the $1 billion ceiling, ISA again revised its plans by dropping the

"regional" groupings of countries in favor of categories such as "forward defense,"

"military base programs," etc., which William Bundy felt would emphasize the

close ties between the DoD budget and military assistance programs, delineate

precisely the appropriate function of specific military assistance instead of lumping general totals under a region or country, and highlight the programs in direct

support of U.S. forces. He aimed to display the importance ofthe FY 1965 request

in a readily understandable format for hearings before congressional committee~.

In late March, the JCS agreed that the FY 1964 and FY 1965 programs reflected

an "acceptable distribution" of resources among the regional groupings and recipient countries. The chiefs objected, however, to assistance to Burma at the expense

of Korea and Vietnam. Funding for the FY 1964 ammunition program for Vietnam alone required a substantial increase,?4

As everyone anticipated, military assistance became a controversial subject

throughout 1964, with McNamara shuttling back and forth between the authorization and appropriation committees in the two houses. Testifying before the

House Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations in February

1964, he exchanged barbs with Rep. Melvin Laird (R-Wis.) over the extent of the

damage done by the congressional reductions to military assistance in the previous

session. Laird suggested McNamara ask for more funding or resort to Section 510
The Embattled Military Assistance Program 441

emergency financing to meet the unanticipated materiel requirements ofViernam.

McNamara retorted that congressional cuts in the FY 1964 program had forced

him to cut assistance to Vietnam.75

McNamara concluded his opening statement before Passman's subcommittee

in March 1964 with a warning that unless Congress assured MAP of at least $1

billion for the next several years, "the military strength we have helped to build up

around the periphery of the Communist Bloc will quickly melt away." He placed

the responsibility for OSD's request for $1 billion for FY 1965 squarely on the

shoulders ofCongress, which had "made it crystal clear to the Executive Branch that

it is unwilling to appropriate a larger amount." As suggested by William Bundy,

McNamara organized his presentation to Congress into six categories* and justified each in some detail. Passman dismissed both format and contents as "just

about the same every year." McNamara asked Passman to "support wholeheartedly the $1 billion," even though only 40 minutes before two committee members

had told him he would probably not even get that amount. By contrast with Passman, the House Foreign Affairs Committee was supportive of the authorization,

and subsequent canvassing ofsympathetic members of Congress produced strong

support for the $1 billion request,76

Press reports ofJCS unhappiness with the $1 billion ceiling and of Taylor's

warning to Congress that any MAP reduction would force the United States to

reduce indigenous forces and make up the shortfalls with more expensive U.S.

troops, or concede that it did not have adequate strength to support its national

interests, created additional pressure for favorable consideration. McNamara's

confrontational defense of the military assistance request made headlines and

probably encouraged Congress to pass it or risk appearing to vote against national

security. The tactic, however, left the economic assistance package vulnerable to

reductions. As McGeorge Bundy told the president, "Bob has done what he quite

often does-made the case his own way without checking with everybody else."77

While McNamara's maneuver to secure passage of the MAP budget was

working, other elements of his legislative package were foundering by mid-January 1964. Such influential members of the House as Morgan, House Speaker

John McCormack, Majority Leader Carl Albert, and Carl Vinson opposed separating MAP funding from overall foreign assistance and placing it within the

000 budget. This change, they reasoned, would work against passage of the

economic aid package,78 In late February McCormack reiterated his strong opposition to separating the MAP authorization. Although McNamara continued to

favor separate bills and believed that it was an issue for the president to decide, he

opted not to press this view. To facilitate committee consideration ofthe pending

*They were forward defense, Alliance for Progress securiry, milirary base righrs, gram-aid phaseout, free world

oriemations, and u.s. forces and military assistance program administration.
442 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

legislation, he eliminated proposals to transfer certain military assistance items to

the 000 budget and have separate legislation for credit assistance "until there is a

more favorable outlook for affirmative Congressional action."79

During Senate Appropriations Committee hearings in mid-July, McNamara

declared that anything less than a sustained commitment of $1 billion for MAP

would result in reduced capabilities of Allied forces and require a corresponding

increase in U.S. military forces overseas. The new chairman of the JCS, General

Earle G. Wheeler, testified that the FY 1964 reductions had seriously disrupted

the chiefs' carefully planned MAP distributions. Military assistance, he continued,

was essential to the counterinsurgency campaign in South Vietnam against growing communist activiry, hence reductions to the FY 1965 program "would be a

tragic emasculation of a program vital to our national security interests."8o

The House Foreign Affairs Committee initially went along with the $1 billion

authorization as requested, but on 18 May the president asked for an additional

$55 million for South Vietnam. The House agreed and on 1June approved $1.055

billion. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, acting in early July, reduced the

House figure by $10 million. In mid-August, McNamara asked Morgan, who served on the committee of conference, to urge authorization ofthe amount requested, warning that recent events in Southeast Asia and Mrica* might "well require a

request for a supplemental appropriation after the first of the year." The SenateHouse conference report, issued on 1 October, reinstated the original amount, and

on 7 October Congress both authorized and appropriated $1.055 billion in military assistance. The president, crisscrossing the nation in his reelection campaign,

signed both bills the same day without fanfare. 81

McNamara's legislative concessions and OSD pressure on Congress, coupled

with demonstrable progress in "tightening up the program" and presidential armtwisting, resulted, according to Bell, in "the most favorable [foreign assistance

legislation] in many years." Perhaps more important, Passman's sponsor, House Appropriations Committee Chairman Clarence Cannon, had died on 12 May 1964

and was replaced by George Mahon, a friend ofthe president's, who "wouldn't play

Passman's game." Under the new leadership foreign aid funds were cut only eight

percent, the lowest since the program began, and there were no new restrictions

on military aid. Indeed, the legislation strengthened U.S. government guarantees

to private individuals and corporations against risks of default on credit sales by

friendly governments.82

The FY 1965 MAP experienced the usual readjustments. Greece, Korea, and

the Republic of China received less ammunition and training and fewer vehicles,

communications equipment, and other supplies. Turkey lost helicopters and utility aircraft, small naval vessels, and an air defense missile system. Thailand and

*Violence spread in the Katanga province of the Congo during mid-1964 as stability in the new nation

collapsed. United Nations forces intervened in June 1964, and the United States sent transport aircraft and a

few military personnel to help quell the insurgency.
The Embattled Military Assistance Program 443

Vietnam again benefited at the expense of other countries, receiving additional

ammunition, aircraft, landing ships, patrol craft, equipment, and supplies as well

as training and construction money.83

Preparing the FY1966Request

Even as the battle over the FY 1965 MAP budget became more heated McNamara was looking ahead. On 4 February 1964 he requested that Wood provide

him with projected military assistance dollar guidelines for the FY 1966-70 period. Wood responded that"in the present climate" an NOA ofmore than $1 billion

would be unacceptable to Congress. The JCS in April 1964 crafted their input

around a $1 billion ceiling and recommended improved procedures to limit the

upward spiral of operational and maintenance costs and special attention to new

contingency requirements of grant aid to allies. The chiefs especially sought increases in FY 1966 for Turkey and Korea and considered current dollar guidelines

for the other forward defense nations as the minimum.84

McNamara also decided to submit again his proposal to separate economic

and military aid. At the end of August the new ISA assistant secretary, John

McNaughton, revived the issue ofseparating credit assistance funding from grant

aid, a move that had been dropped when Congress refused to approve OSD's

entire package of changes. Early in October, McNamara approved McNaughton's

suggestion to study proposed strategy and force structures for forward defense

countries to help establish an appropriate level of MAP funding in future years.

ISA also sought the chiefs' advice on the strategic implications of OSD's proposed

FY 1966-70 program. Their 20 October response predicted that military assistance

under the $1 billion ceiling would be inadequate and result in widespread shortages ofmajor combat elements, especially naval and air forces in Turkey and Korea

as well as naval forces in Taiwan. If current trends continued, force modernization would be almost impossible, and by 1970 much combat equipment would be

obsolete, leaving allies incapable of coping with the threat. In such circumstances,

planners would have to modify the role of foreign forces, revise objectives, and

phase out or eliminate selected programs. Such changes, the JCS insisted, were

inconsistent with U.S. strategy and would "cause serious adverse foreign political

reaction."85

In mid-November, McNaughton, following McNamara's guidance, prepared

a $1 billion "normal" MAP budget for FY 1966 and added $191 million for

"special" expenses involving Vietnam and Laos for a total of $1.191 billion. On

20 November 1964, McNamara forwarded this preliminary estimate to the Joint

Chiefs for review and comment. McNaughton had acknowledged that modernization and replacement of high-maintenance equipment would require a budget

of $1.377 billion. The chiefs concluded that the insufficiency of the request to

modernize forces in the forward defense countries meant that the combat capabili-
444 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

ties of those nations would deteriorate. Nevertheless, ISA believed the $1 billion

was sufficient, if austere, for peacetime purposes. Thus OSD requested $1.191

billion and included language to separate economic and military assistance, place

MAP as a line item in the Defense budget, and obtain the long-sought-after

continuing authorization authority. This last provision would eliminate the need

to testifY twice annually on military assistance before congressional committees.86

At a meeting with OSD, State, AID, and White House staff on 24 November, however, BoB had proposed a lesser figure of $1.136 billion, with additional

funding for Vietnam to come from reductions in grant military aid to the forward

nations. Wood thought BoB's reductions were an attempt to keep "the total u.s.

budget below some sacred figure (unstated)." He wanted to hold the line on the

original request but feared OSD would compromise at $1.160 or $1.170 billion.

OSD agreed to the $1.170 billion, forcing McNaughton to reduce credit assistance

for Latin America and decrease funding for Taiwan and India, while increasing it

for Brazil and Panama, leaving a net decrease of $21 million. McNamara recommended to Bell on 5 December a revised figure of $1.170 billion for FY 1966.87

The chiefs, in the midst of preparing their mid-range Joint Strategic Objectives Plan, which included an assessment of MAP requirements, replied in late

December to McNamara's request of 5 December for comment. They considered

that $1.170 billion would not meet the growing demands from Vietnam, would

create "serious quantitative deficiencies," and would have a negative effect on

"qualitative improvement of existing forces." They opposed shifting MAP to military department budgets, advised getting Congress to lift the ceiling on military

assistance to Latin America, and again proposed separate legislation for military

sales credit assistance funds. 88

Previously, on 4 December, Bell notified Budget Director Kermit Gordon of a

FY 1966 request for $1.170 billion and for two legislative changes: a four-year

authorization and separate economic and military assistance bills. A few days

later Bell summarized for the president the recent history of foreign aid and the

proposed recommendations in the pending FY 1966 request. Outlays for military

assistance had substantially declined. Grant-aid to Western Europe, with minor exceptions, had been phased out. Bell wanted the president to "make a major effort"

to obtain a multi-year authorization but recommended against seeking separate

economic and military assistance bills, despite McNamara's objections. Then on

20 December Gordon, as expected, endorsed the full amount of the MAP request

but somewhat unexpectedly cut the overall AID request by $100 million. 89

Meanwhile, heavier fighting in South Vietnam in the fall of 1964 required

more military assistance, compounding OSD's problems, since FY 1965 MAP

funding had already been exceeded. The burden to make good the shortfalls again

fell on the forward defense countries. The Joint Chiefs opposed additional cuts

to these nations in order to support Vietnam and feared "serious political repercussions." Barring dramatic new changes to justifY invoking Section 510 of the
The Embattled Military Assistance Program 445

Foreign Assistance Act or new legislation, AID officials doubted OSD would

choose to use Section 510 authority to draw from U.S. stockpiles or seek to shift

some Southeast Asia requirements to the Defense budget because McNamara preferred to control MAP expenditures through his self-imposed $1 billion ceiling.

This left a transfer ofAID funds to military assistance as a likely alternative.9o

Bell informed Johnson on 10 December of the need to transfer $50 million

from the contingency fund to MAP in order to cover FY 1965 combat requirements

in Laos and Vietnam. Shortly afterward General Westmoreland urgently requested another $65 million for the enlarged South Vietnamese military forces.

This requirement, plus an unanticipated $35 million increase in associated costs

attributable to Southeast Asia, left MAP short $100 million. On 22 December

McNaughton recommended that McNamara use either Section 510 authority or submit a supplemental request to cover Westmoreland's needs; otherwise,

manipulating the FY 1965 MAP budget to "shave the $125 million off of your

Congressional-presentation figures" to meet MACV's latest need wOlJld create

"political (if not military) mayhem."91

McNamara had previously been unwilling to ask Congress for supplemental

funding because during his testimony he had opposed a move by some members

of the House Foreign Affairs Committee to raise OSD's $1 billion request for FY

1965. After considering a supplemental request or use of Section 510 "drawdown"

authority, McNamara reprogrammed MAP accounts and requested $50 million

from AID. By decreasing some accounts by $31.2 million he was able to assemble

$81.2 million for increases to various recipients, of which more than $53 million

went to Vietnam. The ceiling on MAP left funding for the rapidly expanding demands ofVietnam dependent on a fixed budget that would be inadequate to meet

overall needs.92

By January 1965 the grant-aid portion of the Military Assistance Program

had been steadily reduced in accordance with a goal originally announced by

President Kennedy. The pace of the reductions, however, had proceeded more

rapidly than desired by McNamara or the Joint Chiefs, creating imbalances in the

forward defense country programs. Other unexpected new requirements, especially for South Vietnam, constantly forced OSD to juggle MAP funds to pay for

the mounting costs of military assistance to Southeast Asia. Congressional cuts in

appropriations also forced OSD to adjust its planned programs to compensate for

chronically inadequate funding. Modernization offorces in the six forward defense

nations sputtered, and progress on streamlining the size of Korean or Turkish

forces came to a halt.

Since 1962 growing demands from Vietnam for military assistance had siphoned funds from other areas; that trend seemed likely to persist in the near term.

While grant aid declined, there occurred a significant shift to credit and military

sales thanks largely to favorable congressional legislation designed to protect U.S.
446 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

TABLE 8

Military Assistance Program Comparison of

NOA Request with Actual Funding, FY 1961- FY 1965

($ millions)

Estimated

NOA Recoup. Reapp. Fundin~ Actual Actual Actual Actual

FY Request Estimate Request Availability Recoup. Reapp. Funding

1961 2,000.0 155.7 25.0 2,180.7 1,800.0 120.6 23.6 1,944.2

1962 1,885.0 100.0' 25.0 2,010.0 1,600.0 240.7 b 14.3 1,855.0

1963 1,500.0 204.6 25.0 1,729.6 1,325.0 250.2 b 24.2 1,599.4

1964 1,405.0 125.0 25.0 1,555.0 1,000.0 119.6 22.3 1,141.9c

1965 1,055.0 85.0 1.6 1,141.6d 1,130.0 116.8 22.2 1,269.0

•Revised upward in June 1962 to $317.7, which along with FY 63 estimate of $204.6 totaled

$522.3.

bOfthe $522.3 estimated for FY 62 and FY 63, only $490.9 was actually realized.

cExciudes $90 million transfer from economic assistance.

dPunding availability is short ofactual program requirements by $73.4 million.

Source: Statement of General Robert J. Wood, Director, MAP, before Senate Appropriations

Cte, 23 Ju164, fldr Military Assistance FY 1965 Budget, box 31, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist.

business investments and minimize risks. Conversely, Congress thwarted OSD

plans by reducing budget requests in committee, by including restrictive legislation in the various foreign assistance acts, and by asking tough questions about

MAP purpose and content. It also rejected OSD proposals to extend authorizations, separate military assistance from economic aid, and place the program in

the overall 000 budget. The success OSD enjoyed with favorable legislation for

military sales and credit guarantees was offset somewhat by the larger issues that

remained unresolved. OSD and State, for example, had still not agreed on the relationship between AID and MAP. Moreover, the $1 billion ceiling left funding for

the rapidly expanding demands of Vietnam dependent on a fixed budget; barring

additional funds this threatened to damage the overall program.93 McNamara had

made some progress, but in 1965 the Military Assistance Program still faced a

highly uncertain future.
CHAPTER XVII

The Search for Savings

McNamara entered office firm in the conviction that he could bring about

greater efficiency and significant savings in running the Department of Defense.

It did not take long for him to become aware of the many complex problems in

constant interplay he would have to address in order to succeed. Procurement of

materiel and supplies represented the biggest and most promising area for yielding

large savings. Other possibilities included cutting Defense expenditures abroad,

which would have the salutary effect ofreducing losses in the international balance

of payments account; closing or consolidating excess bases; and improving the

weapon system selection and acquisition process. In this last category, the secretary

encountered one of the most nettlesome issues of his tenure-the controversy over

the TFX fighter plane. McNamara, as was his wont, dealt expeditiously with all of

these matters, some ofwhich proved more politically sensitive at every level--departmental, domestic, and international-than he may have anticipated or even realized.

McNamara's active and very public assault on waste, duplication, and inadvisable expenditures of taxpayer monies was a conspicuous and persuasive source of

his influence in the early 1960s. His position, as expressed in a public address in

April 1963, may have seemed to pander to public opinion, but its substance represented a deeply felt belief in the importance of economical management of the

Department of Defense and in his ability to do the job: "Every dollar we spend

inefficiently or ineffectively is not only an unnecessary addition to the arms race

which threatens all mankind, bur an unfair burden on the taxpayer, or an unwise

diversion of resources which could be invested elsewhere to serve our national

interests at home or abroad."!

Balance ofPayments

As the world's strongest and wealthiest power, the economic health of the

United States affected most ofthe rest ofthe world. A chronic balance ofpayments

447
448 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

(BOP)* problem throughout the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations constantly threatened to undermine the well-being of the country and the

international community. All three presidents devoted much time to finding ways

to diminish the U.S. deficit, which had significant domestic and international

political as well as economic repercussions. They held frequent meetings with their

top advisers-the secretaries ofstate, treasury, and defense and other officials-sent

special messages to Congress, suggested or directed actions to be taken, and followed closely the progress of measures proposed or implemented. The issue occasioned two special presidential messages to Congress by Kennedy-in 1961 and 1963.

Kennedy also established a Cabinet Committee on the Balance of Payments, headed by Secretary of the Treasury Dillon, that met frequently and reported regularly

to the president on efforts to reduce the persistent deficits.2

A host of factors contributed to the problem. As Dillon told President Johnson in December 1963, "the balance of payments problem is many faceted and

requires constant attention on many fronts." Much of the concern centered on

the outflow of gold from the United States-especially critical because of the role

played by the American dollar in foreign exchange and transactions. If the U.S.

gold supply fell below the level regarded as minimal-$12 billion-the resulting

loss in the dollar's value might have a devastating effect on the world economy

and international trade. Key to maintaining a stable equilibrium was the balance

of exports vs. imports between the United States and its trading partners. During

the 1950s and 1960s this balance was generally favorable to the United States and

helped to offset debits in the other accounts. Other factors affecting the deficit were

capital investment abroad, U.S. economic assistance to foreign countries, tourism,

which alone by 1963 was accounting for as much as $1.5 billion outflow from

the United States, and-a prime contributor-Department of Defense spending

for goods and services overseas.3

Defense expenditures abroad went chiefly for maintenance of U.S. forces,

including military housing and other construction, purchases of supplies and services, employment offoreign nationals, and military assistance, and involved thousands of civilian employees stationed overseas as well as service personnel and their

families. Direct military expenditures abroad, including military assistance and

atomic energy, had grown steadily from 1951 on, reaching a peak of $3.435 billion

in 1958 and hovering at about $3 billion for several years thereafter. Europe,

particularly the major allies-Britain, France, and Germany-presented the most

serious problem, since the largest numbers of U.S. troops were stationed in those

countries. Elsewhere, Japan and Canada accounted for additional hundreds of

millions in Defense outlays. Expenditure deficits appeared likely to run at contin-

* The balance of payments account is a record of all international transactions between countries involving

merchandise trade, capital assets, and services.
The Search for Savings 449

ued high rates. Since DoD played a large part in the creation of the continuing

deficit problem, it had to be a part ofthe solution.4

Late in 1960, at the insistence ofTreasury Secretary Robert Anderson, Eisenhower directed measures to cut the DoD deficit, most immediately curtailing the

amount of money spent by U.S. troops and their families. On 16 November

he ordered a reduction in the number of civilian employees and dependents of

military personnel stationed overseas. Secretary of Defense Gates specified on 25

November that the dependent population be reduced from nearly 500,000 to

200,000 by 31 July 1962, at a monthly rate of 15,000, beginning 1 January 1961.

He also directed that beginning 1 December only products of u.s. manufacture

be purchased, with exceptions for such items as perishable goods.5

These sweeping measures encountered objections immediately, and requests

for exceptions came from all quarters. MAAG personnel were especially vocal, as

they generally had long assignments, and among those ordered home were wives

who played a useful social role. The JCS made a case for Berlin personnel, and the

Continental Air Defense Command appealed strongly on behalf of its people

stationed in Canada. Because of alleged hardship assignments in Okinawa,

Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, and Panama, dependents there were excepted. The

DoD-directed cuts caused political fallout that had reached the boiling point when

McNamara came on the job.6The message was clear. The Kennedy administration

would have to address what appeared to be an unfair burden on DoD if only to

restore morale in the armed forces.

On 19 January 1961, the day before Kennedy took office, the president-elect

met with Eisenhower and a circle of their advisers to discuss the most pressing

problems he would be facing. Anderson spoke forcefully about the "delicate . . .

balance of payments situation," particularly the "gold erosion ... still going on

at a rate which we cannot afford." Eisenhower discussed the effects on morale of

putting too much of the burden of alleviating the BOP deficit on the overseas

u.s. military and their dependents?

The Kennedy administration early on considered and pursued a host ofinitiatives to diminish Defense overseas expenditures, including reductions in the number of military and civilians and their dependents abroad; voluntary cuts in spending by these people; increased purchase ofu.s. Savings Bonds and greater savings

in Soldiers, Sailors, and Airmen Deposits; reductions in units stationed overseas;

rotation of units overseas (thereby lessening the number of dependents); transfer

of overseas procurement for supplies and services to U.S. sources, subject to certain

exceptions; consolidation of organizations and facilities; decrease in military assistance expenditures, including MAAGs; reduction in employment of foreign

nationals; and cuts in overseas construction. The measures that seemed to offer

the best hope for bringing in revenue were increased military equipment sales and

offset payments by Allied countries-particularly Germany, which had the largest

number of U.S. troops.
450 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

In his State ofthe Union address on 30 January 1961, Kennedy took notice of

the effect of these actions on the military: "Ways will be found to ease our dollar

outlays abroad without placing the full burden on the families of men whom we

have asked to serve our Flag overseas." He followed this with a special message

to Congress on 6 February emphasizing the seriousness of the BOP deficit and

proposing measures to deal with it, particularly the gold outflow.8

By then DoD had already taken action. On 1 February Deputy Secretary

Gilpatric recommended and Kennedy approved rescinding Eisenhower's directive

of 16 November 1960 curtailing movement of dependents abroad and substituting a modified plan calling for a smaller reduction in their number. In addition,

Gilpatric suggested reducing expenditures by military and civilian personnel,

spending less for contractual services, and having host countries share expenses at

facilities used for joint training.9

Indeed, the several measures contemplated for reducing DoD expenditures

abroad were all subsequently put into effect in some degree. Some were constrained by overriding political considerations. The Berlin crisis of 1961, for

example, required cancellation of plans to reduce forces in Europe, where there

were some 300,000 U.S. military, mostly in Germany. European fears, particularly in Germany, that withdrawals would signal a change in U.S. strategic policy,

even a withdrawal from Europe, gave the Kennedy and Johnson administrations

pause. Although the United States increased its Army forces in Europe by 45,000

during 1961, the German government feared that withdrawals in 1962 and thereafter would mean at the least a diminution of the U.S. defense posture in Europe.

Thus, the political sensitivities ofAllied countries, including Japan in the Far East,

frequently served to frustrate DoD efforts to reduce its presence abroad and the

cost ofsupporting troops around the world. 1o

DoD could not take steps to put into effect most ofthe plans it had drafted to

alter the status offorces and dependents in Europe until well into 1962, by which

time the Berlin crisis had abated. In July McNamara announced a program to

reduce DoD expenditures abroad from the $2.6 billion deficit in FY 1961 to $1.6

billion in FY 1963. The proposed measures involved rotating Army units without

dependents, reducing Air Force dependents in Europe, cutting back Army strength

in Europe, scaling back Air Force strength in a number of countries, and shortening unaccompanied tours of Air Force military personnel to 15 months. The

secretary made a special point of detailing limitations on procurement ofsupplies

and services for use abroad to hold such expenditures "to an absolute minimum."

The president quickly approved the list. 11

Reducing overseas forces proved difficult and eventually impossible with the

growing involvement of the United States in Vietnam. A projection by the OSD

comptroller in March 1963 provided for reducing force deployment in foreign

countries from about 629,000 as of June 1962 to 590,000 by 30 June 1968, a

modest decrease over a six-year period. More than three-quarters of the decrease
The Search for Savings 451

would be Army troops. The Army had contributed to the effort to cut back during

1962-63 by rotating four battle groups at three-month intervals to Germany for

service in Berlin. 12 BJ.lt the growth of overseas deployment caused by the increasing commitment to the Vietnam War made this a losing battle.

The best hope of offsetting DoD overseas expenditures lay in persuading Allied countries to agree to share the U.S. troop costs, primarily through purchase

ofAmerican military equipment. Discussions with Germany, begun in the 1950s,

continued, with the United States pressing for greater payments by the Germans.

Initially, on 24 October 1961, the two countries signed a memorandum of

understanding to create a cooperative logistical system that included cost-sharing in research and development projects, depot supply support and maintenance

services, storage facilities, U.S. military equipment sales, and joint use of training areas in Germany. FRG payments were expected to be "sufficient to insure

that military transactions of direct benefit to the u.s. balance ofpayments" would

"offset the transactions of U.S. forces in Germany of benefit to the FRG balance

of payments." The largest item listed was FRG military procurement in the United

States, estimated to amount to $400-450 million for the period January 1961-

March 1962.

In November 1961 Gilpatric informed the president that German Defense

Minister Strauss had told him that the FRG would place orders for $1.3 billion for

1961-62 of which $1 billion would actually be paid to the United States in those

years. Gilpatric anticipated that this would reduce DoD foreign expenditures to

less than $2 billion a year. As with most such estimates then and in succeeding

years, it proved optimistic. Efforts to make similar arrangements for offsets with

France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Japan for much lesser amounts met with

less success. The French stated unacceptable conditions for increasing purchases,

but the Italians agreed to purchase $100 million of military equipment from

the United States. In September 1962 Germany extended the offset agreement

through 1964. 13 In 1963 DoD was still spending abroad at about the same rate

as in previous years. Without the German agreement the DoD BOP deficit would

have been much greater. Negotiations with other Allied countries for offset agreements achieved little benefit. 14

Kennedy's frustration over resolving the BOP problem came out at a prolonged White House meeting on 18 April 1963. He "remarked that we seem to be faced

with a screwy system, in which we had to squeeze public activities in the spheres

of defense and aid in order to let the private activities of tourism and foreign

investment go forward untouched. However, that was how life was, and how the

system operated." Nevertheless, on 18 July 1963, in a special message to Congress,

the president reported overall progress on the balance of payments deficit. He

gave DoD good marks for its efforts to diminish overseas expenditures, noting

a decline in net outlays from $2.7 billion in 1960 to $1.9 billion in 1962. He

also stated that efforts would continue to induce other Allied countries to follow
452 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

Germany's example by purchasing U.S. military equipment. McNamara sent frequent reports to the president about progress in redeploying troops from Europe

and cutting expenditures abroad, especially with reference to Germany.15

In the name offoreign policy interests, Secretary ofState Rusk exercised a measure ofveto power over DoD proposals to reduce overseas expenditures. Responding

to a request from the president, in September 1963 McNamara proposed a number of changes in the disposition of U.S. forces abroad, including reducing U.S.

strength in Korea and Europe and in some U.S. military headquarters, returning

aircraft to the United States from Europe on an accelerated schedule, rotating

USAF fighter squadrons to Europe and Japan, and cutting back on foreign procurement of goods and services, hoping to reduce by $339 million DoD expenditures abroad. Rusk opposed redeployment of aircraft from Europe, cuts in

the ground forces in Europe and Korea, and reductions in purchases of foreign

oil-particularly from Venezuela. Reiterating previous dissents, he concluded

"that our basic national security posture and foreign policy interests would be so

seriously jeopardized through their acceptance that I recommend that they not

be approved." The president agreed with Rusk and approved only the remaining

Defense proposals, which totaled $190 million in estimated savings. 16

In NSAM 270 on 29 October 1963 Kennedy approved a number of DoD

redeployment, reorganization, and reduction actions over the next three years.

At the same time, he reaffirmed U.S. intention to retain six division equivalents

in Europe as long as required. "The United States," he declared, "will continue

to meet its NATO commitment." In December Secretary of the Treasury Dillon

informed President Johnson that redeployments did not involve Germany because

German purchases of U.S. military equipment were fully offsetting the dollar cost

of American troops there. In a followup message Dillon stated that without the

German offset it would not be possible to maintain six division equivalents in

Germany. The secretary pointed out that the Germans had agreed to place orders

in 1963 and 1964 to cover U.S. costs, but they would not commit themselves

to make payments for those years. It appeared that Germany would make the

payments for 1963, but prospects did not look good for 1964. By late April 1964,

however, Dillon could inform the president that progress payments from Germany

on military procurement were larger than actual deliveries. I?

The importance of German offset payments received special attention in May

when President Johnson affirmed U.S. retention of six division equivalents in

Germany but made clear that ifthe FRG did not meet its offset commitment the

United States would be "forced to reconsider the question of U.S. force levels."

Fortunately, German offset payments in 1964 and 1965 were sufficient to balance

the cost of U.S. troops in Germany.18

When Johnson sent a special message to Congress on 10 February 1965, he

had in hand the 1964 BOP results. The overall deficit had been reduced to an

estimated $3.0 billion, an improvement over the $3.6 billion deficit in 1962
The Search for Savings 453

and $3.3 billion in 1963, thanks to the favorable trade balance of exports over

imports. Once again the president directed decreases in U.S. expenditures abroad,

including cutting Defense and AID expenditures "to the bone" and increasing the

sale of military equipment to foreign customers. 19 Also, gold losses in 1964 had

amounted to only $125 million, a marked improvement over the 1963 loss of

$461 million. For 1965 Secretary Dillon anticipated a gold loss of at least $500

million. Still, as of early 1965 the U.S. gold holdings totaled $15 billion, more

than a third of the free world's holdings, as the president put it. Dillon's gold

loss estimate was low, for by June the gold outflow for 1965 had reached $1.1

billion-half of it to France because of de Gaulle's new policy of converting all of

his country's dollar holdings into gold.20

At mid-I965 BOP prospects seemed promising, depending on the success of

proposed measures. Overall, if conditions proved favorable, there was a possibility of reducing the $3.1 billion 1964 deficit by more than one-half DoD's part

would be to reduce expenditures by another $50 million in 1965 and $100

million in 1966.21 But looming ever larger was the prospect of increased rather

than decreased Defense costs overseas as the United States became more deeply

involved in Southeast Asia. The engagement in larger-scale hostilities in Vietnam

soon effectively foreclosed DoD efforts to playa positive role in cutting the BOP

deficit.

The Cost Reduction Program

When President-elect Kennedy introduced his new defense secretary-designate

to the press in mid-December 1960, he noted that they agreed on the need for an

efficient defense establishment that would make "the wisest possible use . . . of

the public moneys devoted to its maintenance."22 Kennedy's remark provided the

genesis for McNamara's cost reduction program. According to Assistant Secretary

of Defense for Installations and Logistics (I&L) Thomas Morris, it was "really just

an organized management-by-objective approach to giving priority attention to

the most important opportunities for economy and efficiency."23 McNamara had

come from the business world and freely admitted borrowing key elements of his

cost reduction efforts from the private sector. He was certainly not the first secretary of defense to seek to rein in spending, but his commitment, persistence, and

enthusiasm for savings and efficient management of government operations made

him the most effective.

The new defense secretary acted quickly upon taking office, circulating his

famous "96 trombones," several ofwhich directed I&L to reexamine logistics functions, including procurement, contracting practices, and inventory controls, and

to undertake a comprehensive five-year review of all 6,700 domestic and foreign

military bases and installations.24 The directives reflected a belief that the public

sector could be as efficient as the private and that waste in DoD could be iden-
454 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

tified and eliminated. Subsequently, McNamara made use of Kennedy's remarks

on the Defense budget to justifY cutting back or canceling the development or

procurement of several weapon systems, including the nuclear-powered aircraft,

the Titan II missile, and the B-70. Cost reduction focused initially on base closings

and program reductions, but McNamara had something more in mind-a formalized program to encourage efficient logistic management, especially procurement,

that would result in significant DoD savings.25

McNamara took a hard look at the procedures for the awarding of $29.3

billion in prime contracts in FY 1962. He focused especially on non-competitive

contracts where he anticipated that significant cost savings could accrue from the

use of competitive bidding and cost reduction incentives. These procedures would

reverse the trend to large, sole-source contracts whose prices, he believed, might

be reduced an average of 25 percent, realizing an annual saving of $480 million

by FY 1967. The secretary also focused on the cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) contract

that gave contractors no incentive to hold down expenditures. In mid-March 1962

the revised Armed Services Procurement Regulation specified the firm fixed-price

contract as the most preferred type of DoD procurement agreement, an innovation OSD claimed would save an estimated $100 million in FY 1962 alone.

Other contracting reforms, such as the increasing reservation of cost-plus-fixed-fee

contracts for basic research involving several unknowns, and the use of cost-plusincentive-fee contracts for the development and production of weapon systems,

were expected to lower final costs even more.26 Reacting to contractor criticism

that his competitive procurement policies threatened their profit margins, the

secretary insisted to his staff that DoD should not pay high prices to ensure profits for inefficient producers but should allow efficient ones to make a satisfactory

profit.27

McNamara also gave great attention to emerging techniques to deal with basic

management functions such as inventory control. In early April 1962 he expressed

his delight that I&L's initiatives to reduce stockpiles of combat consumables

might save large sums annually. Moreover, his concept for a formal cost reduction program began coming into focus. At the mid-May White House Conference

on National Economic Issues, McNamara restated his mandate from the president

and ticked off DoD savings realized from contract cancellations and reductions

and base closings. He explained that more efficient organization-the consolidation of common service activities into single entities, such as the new Defense

Supply Agency, and improved procurement policies-promised even greater future

savings.28

McNamara instituted a broad new plan in a 5 July 1962 memorandum to the

president titled "Defense Department Cost Reduction Program," a document that

reported DoD progress in cutting logistics costs since January 1961 and identified

cost reduction goals for the next five years. The secretary cited Kennedy's initial

instructions:
The Search for Savings 455

1. Develop the force structure necessary to our military

requirements without regard to arbitrary budget ceilings.

2. Procure and operate this force at the lowest possible cost.

He then listed three principles adopted in 1961 that he estimated would save DoD

$750 million in FY 1963:

1. Buying only what we need to achieve balanced readiness.

2. Buying at the lowest sound price.

3. Reducing operating costs through integration and standardization.

Applying these standards in FY 1962 to improve inventory control had accounted for reductions of $150 million in procurement ofspare parts while transfers of excess stocks between departments accomplished savings ofmore than $225

million and the sale ofsurplus stocks deposited an estimated $10 million into the

U.S. Treasury. The application of "value engineering" practices by technicians and

contractors was reducing "goldplating," the practice of using the most expensive

components during production. A small turbine wheel milled from stainless steel,

for example, cost $175 while an equally acceptable molded plastic version sold for

$2. For the year, the Air Force and Navy reported savings of $64 million achieved

through value engineering; DoD wanted to save at least $100 million annually.

Shifting $650 million from sole source to competitive contracts in the 12

months ending 31 March 1962 forecast savings of 25 percent, bearing out McNamara's conviction that competition would result in lower costs. Furthermore,

moving away from cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts, DoD switched nearly $1 billion

to incentive contracts during FY 1962 at an estimated savings of $100 million.

The long-term goal was to save $600 million.29

In mid-September 1962 McNamara provided the service secretaries and the

DSA and DCA directors with a schedule showing categories and subcategories

where DoD might achieve his desired savings of $3 billion in logistics by FY

1967. For FY 1963 the cost reduction goal was $1.152 billion. Applying strong

management practices promised major savings-$257 million in operating costs

from base closures, $80 million from paperwork reduction and standardization,

and $116 million from other improved procedures.3D I&L established an interservice working group to set specific quantitative targets, either in terms of dollars or

percentage improvement for DoD agencies, to prepare formats of progress reports

to the secretary, and to recognize civilian and military employees who produced

outstanding savings or innovations. 3!

The interservice working group identified specific dollar savings goals for the

services and DSA through FY 1965. Curtailing overbuying of initial spare parts

could save 5 and eventually 10 percent of the $2 billion cost each year. Increased

use of excess stocks in lieu of new procurement would save $690 million by FY
456 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

1965. Eliminating goldplating of weapon systems could save DoD $100 million

in FY 1964. Increasing competitive contracts from 32.9 percent oftotal awards in

FY 1961 to 39.9 percent by FY 1965 might save $494 million and cutting fixedfee contracts during the same period from 38 percent of total procurement to

12.3 percent could save a potential $683 million by the end ofFY 1965. Overall,

the group reported reductions in FY 1962 of $1.207 billion and savings of nearly

$4 billion through FY 1965.32

On 18 October Morris forwarded the group's findings for McNamara's approval. Five days later Deputy Secretary Gilpatric sent the savings targets to the

service secretaries and DSA, expressing pleasure that forecasts in McNamara's July

memorandum to the president might be achieved and even exceeded in the next

three years.33

Morris submitted the first Cost Reduction Progress Report to McNamara on

21 December. It identified "hard savings"-cost reductions "precisely measured

and placed under control at time of realization," and "cost avoidance savings,"

those actions that prevented future increases that would have occurred if previous

practices had continued. The latter category, while a legitimate accounting tool,

was susceptible to great fluctuations. For example, the shift to competitive and

incentive contracts produced anticipated hard savings of $91 million in FY 1963

but for the same categories cost avoidance economies accounted for an estimated

$115 million in savings plus another $177 million in anticipated savings-a total

of $292 million.

It was important to differentiate, as Morris did, between actions initiated to

save money and actual realization. Cost avoidance procedures provided an illustration. By reducing its mobilization pipeline-the time it took to move materiel and

personnel from their starting point to their point of use-from the standard 120

days of available supply to fewer days depending on mode of transportation and

class of supply, the Army saved $500 million in its FY 1964 budget. This paper

adjustment saved no actual money (because the supply already existed), but the

Army would avoid having to request $500 million in FY 1964 to maintain a 120-

day supply. Furthermore, as a "permanent cost avoidance" DoD would carry $500

million in recurrent savings in future fiscal years.34

Credit for such recurrent annual savings became a significant portion of the

cost reduction program's overall savings by McNamara's reckoning. Put simply, a

savings achieved in one year continued to carry over as a cumulative amount into

successive years. For example, accountants would credit the same FY 1963 savings

of $1,000 on belt buckles as $2,000 in FY 1964, as $3,000 in FY 1965, and so

on. In July 1963 Marine Corps Commandant General Shoup told McNamara

that he would save money only the first time but did not see how DoD could take

credit for that initial savings year after year. The secretary replied that "we retain

the benefit of every saving."35
The Search for Savings 457

McNamara was pleased with Morris's report; at a 7 January 1963 staff meeting he directed senior 000 officials to give the program their closest attention. He

enjoined them to review objectives with an eye to avoiding exaggerated savings,

instructed the OSD comptroller to audit the data independently to ensure accuracy, and requested the recently established Logistics Management Institute* to

evaluate the savings separately "to be sure they are realistic." He asked the staff not

"to kid ourselves" about savings and, where possible, to uncover additional ways to

economize.36

Yet McNamara's enthusiasm for cost reduction led him to stretch its claims

to the limit in his FY 1964 posture statement to Congress, the first time the cost

reduction program appeared as a separate entry there. Morris had differentiated

between hard savings and cost avoidance, identifYing $793 million in real, measurable savings in the FY 1964 budget and another $1 billion in "new cost prevention." McNamara's posture statement lumped them together with their combined

enormous savings.37

Few congressional committee members asked critical questions about the cost

reduction program during the January 1963 hearings. Sen. Paul H. Douglas (0-

Ill.), chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Defense Procurement and himself

a well-known economist, observed that the committee had not previously had

"sound solid figures" to verifY the enormous potential savings to be gained from

the shift to competitive contracts. The secretary modestly replied that he was

merely "applying the free enterprise system to the Defense procurement."38

On the House side, perhaps the most penetrating question came from Rep.

Robert Sikes (D-Fla.), who wondered why Defense costs kept rising despite McNamara's efforts to contain them with his impressive program. McNamara agreed

the 000 budget had grown in recent years but insisted that savings would come

from improved management and administrative efficiency. In April 1963 OSD

prepared a lengthy answer to the question for Chairman George Mahon's Subcommittee on 000 Appropriations in which it attributed the increased budget to the

administration's goal of creating forces necessary to meet the communist challenge,

particularly the limited war threat. Research and developments costs, especially

for the exceedingly complex missile and space technology, had also risen rapidly.

These increases, OSD pointed out, would have been a great deal more but for the

savings realized from the cost reduction program.39

Nonetheless, the confusion over rising Defense budgets despite reducing costs

through cost avoidance techniques persisted. In December 1963, the 000 deputy

comptroller (budget), Joseph Hoover, proposed to reduce DoD's NOA appropriation requests in FY 1964 and FY 1965 by $793 million and $1.082 billion

respectively to account for anticipated savings from price competition and decreased use of fixed-price contracts identified in the FY 1963 year-end progress

*See Chapter II.
458 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

report on cost reduction. Morris insisted, and McNamara agreed, that the proposal

was "totally unrealistic" because the savings represented the avoidance of cost overruns that were not traditionally budgeted in advance.4o

McNamara was a tenacious advocate of the cost reduction program. Previously, at a 21 January 1963 OSD staff meeting, he had reinforced earlier instructions to the service secretaries and military chiefs "personally to take charge of the

program in their department" in the interests of greater efficiency and economy.

Rising Defense costs and increasing budget deficits put pressure on everyone to

reduce costs. "Any of us," he told his senior staff, "could take $3 billion out of

the budget without reducing force levels or the efficiency and effectiveness of

our military potential, by better management, good judgment, and reduction of

unessential expenditures." He formalized that guidance in a DoD directive issued

1 February 1963 that gave I&L responsibility for implementing the cost reduction

program throughout the department and made the service secretaries responsible

for monitoring and reporting their respective programs and achieving monetary

goals. Savings, classified as either hard or cost avoidance type, would result from

applying efficient practices and actions.41

McNamara followed his own advice and closely monitored the service results.

While quick to praise good results, he also demanded that DoD elements meet

their assigned goals. In early April, for instance, he expressed disappointment that

only the Navy had exceeded the goal of37 percent set for price-competitive awards

and asked the service secretaries to inform him of plans to increase the number of

such awards during the remainder of FY 1963. Later that summer he also admonished individual secretaries for failure to achieve desired goals.42 The secretary's

personal interest, his characteristic attention to the smallest detail, and his genuine

enthusiasm for the program ensured that cost reduction efforts would retain high

visibility within DoD.

On 8 July 1963 McNamara submitted his first annual cost reduction program

progress report to the president. The 10-page memorandum claimed that the program had already saved DoD in excess of $1 billion, with almost $4 billion to be

realized by FY 1967. Examples of specific savings illustrated each category of the

program. Better still, McNamara claimed, 000 had effected these savings without sacrificing national security, indeed had greatly increased the nation's military

forces and capabilities. The next day McNamara devoted his weekly staff meeting to the subject. Morris briefed the senior officials on the contents of the 8 July

report while McNamara's running commentary identified areas, such as aircraft

spare parts, where greater savings could be realized.43

The staffmeeting served as a dress rehearsal for the secretary's 11 July press conference. Speaking from a podium, McNamara, with occasional assistance from

Morris, reviewed a series oflarge charts that detailed the Cost Reduction Program's

results. A handout set forth the accomplishments for the assembled reporters.

Questioned about such precise savings, McNamara responded that there was an
The Search for Savings 459

accuracy in the range of plus or minus five percent and he carried the details in

his pocket so he could check periodically with the secretaries to make sure everyone was on target. AJ; for savings resulting from competitive bidding, McNamara

insisted that competition forced businessmen to hold costs to a minimum leve1.44

Following the change in administrations, President Johnson, pledging to Congress that the government would "set an example of prudence and economy,"

became a powerful advocate for the Cost Reduction Program. McNamara, in turn,

urged his staff to redouble efforts to improve management and identify savings,

particularly for those goals established by the program.45 On 1 December, Johnson and McNamara each sent letters to 7,500 Defense contractors. The president

noted that 55 cents of each Defense dollar went to contractors and called on them

to reduce costs significantly either by initiating cost savings programs or by accelerating existing ones. OSD would consider their compliance with his request

when making future awards. McNamara's accompanying letter identified his cost

reduction objectives and urged contractors to adopt value engineering to insure

they bought only what they needed, purchased items at the lowest sound price,

and conducted their own operations in the most efficient manner.46 In support

of the president's urging, McNamara directed revision of the Armed Services

Procurement Regulation and preparation ofguidance informing contractors ofthe

basic DoD requirements for their cost reduction programs. By early March 1964,

at least 1,500 contractors, including all major corporations, had pledged their

support, a response McNamara deemed to be "fantastic."47

Congress generally remained enamored ofMcNamara's cost-cutting initiatives,

although a few members voiced vague doubts about his figures. During McNamara's testimony before the House Committee on Armed Services in January 1964,

Chairman Vinson wanted to send every member of Congress a copy of the cost

reduction program. Representative Hebert, usually a testy inquisitor, complimented the secretary for implementing previous committee recommendations; on

behalf of the minority, William H. Bates (R-Mass.) expressed admiration.48 Senators were equally lavish with their praise. Richard Russell, chairman of the Senate

Armed Services Committee, exclaimed that McNamara's program was without

precedent in his 30 years in government. Republicans like Leverett Saltonstall

offered similar encomiums.49 There were also scattered murmurings of disbelief

Rep. Porter Hardy, Jr., confessed to being "a little skeptical" about McNamara's

numbers, but hoped that they would stand up to scrutiny.50 Republican Melvin

Laird was more outspoken, likening McNamara's savings to boasting about how

much "you would have saved by not buying horses since 1899." McNamara cited

several examples of real savings, and soon thereafter Rep. Sikes politely declared

the two in "substantial agreement" and McNamara moved ahead with the posture

statement.51

In January 1964 ArmedForces Management questioned McNamara's contention

that competitive procurement saved 25 cents on every dollar spent and wonder-
460 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

ed if accepting the "lowest sound price" made good sense in the long term. In

mid-June, the Wall Street Journal asserted that Defense auditors were unable to

substantiate in any detail a large slice ofthe claimed cost reductions.52

McNamara issued DoD's second annual cost reduction report with the now

familiar fanfare at a 7 July 1964 press conference. The $2.5 billion savings realized

in FY 1964 far exceeded OSD's original estimate of $1.5 billion, and the revised

savings goal of $4.6 billion a year by FY 1968 was $600 million more than the

previous target. The secretary again stressed the savings inherent in competitive

contracts, adding that DoD was a full year ahead in meeting its goal of reducing cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts to around 12 percent of all contracts. Against a
The Search for Savings 461

backdrop of wall charts, McNamara, pointer in hand and a microphone around

his neck, lectured reporters for nearly an hour on cost reduction accomplishments during FY 1964. When one reporter asked who had verified the savings

figures, McNamara explained that OSD had established a separate audit function

under the comptroller with 285 auditors. OSD distributed 15,000 copies of the

7 July report, including copies to all members of Congress and their staffs and to

more than 7,000 contractors.53

Press coverage of the FY 1964 report was generally favorable, but some

reporters felt the exact future/dollar savings claimed defied calculation.* Critics

questioned whether the secretary's decision to reduce air-to-air and surface-toair missile procurement for the Air Force and Navy in the interest of savings had

in fact hampered readiness. 54 In mid-July McNamara devoted his weekly staff

meeting to the cost reduction program. While acknowledging that the military

departments had done "a magnificent job" and had far exceeded his expectations,

he thought DoD had only "scratched the surface" and urged greater reductions,

particularly by eliminating goldplating. It was crucial that the press not "think

that this is a numbers racket" and he noted that 285 auditors had questioned and

removed abour $500 million ofthe proposed reductions. He expressed annoyance

at newspaper reports that "undermine confidence in our savings data," apparently

a reference to coverage of his press conference that noted the reductions were not

submicred directly from the DoD budget.55

To highlight DoD's Cost Reduction Week (20-25 July 1964), President

Johnson spoke at a Pentagon ceremony on 21 July honoring men and women

of the Defense Department who had identified significant savings. He lavishly

praised McNamara's cost-cutting efforts, and the following day told his cabinet

that McNamara's exemplary results had given them all a mark to shoot for and

urged them to study and adapt DoD's techniques.56 He subsequently instructed

his recently established II-member task force, composed of private and public

sector representatives, to organize a formal cost reduction program throughout

federal agencies and improve standards for interagency cooperation on common

problems. 57

Naturally enough, the task force relied on DoD's model, stressing the need for

top-level support and recognition and reward of deserving employees, hallmarks of

McNamara's program. 58 Even before the task force issued its 10 November report,

in a 31 October speech Johnson publicly accepted its recommendation to establish

*The report itself concluded that certain conditions prevented "unqualified audit validation ... for the first

three quarters of FY 1964," and the deputy comptroller for audit policy in the February 1965 quarterly report

admitred that, "in most instances, reported goals were not of a nature to permit meaningful audit evaluation at

this point in rime." Yet the next quarter's audit report in April, prepared by another deputy assistant secretary,

stated that although nOt all costs had been validated, "the savings reporred conform to the criteria specified in

the above-mentioned directive and instruction." See memo ASD(I&L) for SecDef, 22 Oct 64, w/atchmts A.l

and F, fidr Cost Reduction 1964, box 977, Subject files, OSD Hist; memo ASD(I&L) for SecDef, 16 Feb 65,

w/atchmt C, memo ASD(I&L) for SecDef, 20 Apr 65, w/atchmt C: fldr Cost Reduction 1965, box 978, ibid.
462 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

government-wide cost reduction programs that he likened to the highly successful 000 Cost Reduction Program. The praise was all the more striking given the

president's penchant to keep "a tight lid on the task forces" and complain "about

stories even mentioning their existence."59 Johnson believed the American people

would support his expensive Great Society programs only if his administration

demonstrated a commitment to efficient management and cost reduction efforts

throughout the government.60

At this point of the five-year Cost Reduction Program McNamara had not

only implemented a highly praised effort in 000 but had seen the president

extend the concept throughout the executive branch. Each year the military

departments and 000 agencies had exceeded their target goals. Even the defense

secretary's harshest critics admitted that his effective management actions had

cut operating costs, eliminated much duplication, reduced waste, and curbed

Defense spending. McNamara's determined leadership, obvious enthusiasm for

the program, and clearly defined program objectives proved the keys to success. It

remained to be seen whether the secretary's insistence on more and greater savings

and his single-minded approach to achieving his goals would continue to produce

such glowing results.

Base Closures

From the beginning, closure of excess DoD bases constituted a major component of McNamara's search for savings. President Kennedy, not convinced of

the need for all of DoD's 6,700 bases and other installations and recognizing

the political volatility of base closings, wanted, according to Thomas Morris, to

act on "this unpopular project in the first 90 days of his administration." In his

first State of the Union message on 30 January 1961, Kennedy announced that

he had instructed the secretary of defense to consider the elimination of obsolete U.S. military installations at home and abroad. Even as the president spoke,

McNamara had already asked Morris for a list of bases for elimination. On

1 March the secretary reported to the president that the previous action by the

Eisenhower administration, to close 71 installations, was still under way as of 20

January. Beyond these, he and the service secretaries agreed on closing 73 additional domestic and foreign installations. In his 28 March special message to

Congress on the DoD budget, the president announced McNamara's actions and

a continuing search to identify additional surplus facilities. With this precedent, in

subsequent years OSD published a list of base closures in what became, according

to Morris, "a McNamara ritual."61

OSD announced officially on 30 March that it intended to shut down 52

facilities in the continental United States and 21 abroad,* most of them small; a

*These included 4 air bases in England, 2 in France, 4 in Morocco, and 1 in Italy.
The Search for Savings 463

number were inoperative government-owned industrial plants. Nonetheless, the

potential savings were large-an estimated $56.8 million in FY 1962 and the elimination of almost 22,000 military and civilian positions. There were, of course,

a handful of large installations such as Presque Isle Air Force Base, Maine; Naval

Station, New Orleans; Raritan Arsenal, New Jersey; Columbia River Group Pacific

Reserve Fleet, Oregon; and two Air Force bases in Texas. These closings represented a severe payroll loss to the respective local communities. To minimize the

impact, on 31 March McNamara established the Installations and Relocation

Planning Committee, chaired by Morris and comprised ofservice representatives,

to plan phaseout dates for designated bases, assist employees in relocation or reemployment, coordinate with community leaders during the readjustment period,

and organize at installations to carry out the policies. The committee gave way to

the Office ofEconomic Adjustments within I&L on 3 May 1961 with the mission

of mobilizing federal, state, local, and private resources to assist in converting the

closed military bases to other productive uses that would bolster the local economies and offset payroll and job losses.62

Newsmen were quick to note that none of the 19 military bases in Georgia,

home to the chairmen ofthe House and Senate Armed Services Committees, were

included. Despite such criticism, overall editorial reaction was favorable, and most

congressional opposition emanated from more seriously affected areas such as

New Jersey and Texas. More to the point, McNamara conducted the reductions as

announced with only two exceptions, an air base in Texas and Naval Station, New

Orleans, the latter following an appeal to the president by Representative Hebert,

ofthe affected New Orleans district.63

A year later, on 31 March 1962, DoD announced that another 97 facilities

(11 overseas), including 25 government-owned, contractor-operated plants put up

for sale, would close. Most of the installations were old forts, camps, or portions of

bases whose elimination would affect about 4,000 employees and save more than

$20 million annually. DoD subsequently reported that between 30 March 1961

and 31 May 1962 it had closed, sold, or reduced 269 military installations and

eliminated almost 43,000 civilian and military personnel positions at an annual

savings of $256.8 million. In July, 80 more facilities were eliminated or consolidated, affecting only 682 workers while realizing maintenance savings of more

than $5.4 million annually.64 As impressive as these figures appeared, the installations represented less than four percent of DoD's total facilities and, with few

exceptions, the reductions had been relatively painless. That would not remain so

in the future.

Base closure made little news during 1963 until mid-December, when announcement of the closing of almost three dozen more installations, including

several in key Democratic strongholds, created shock waves. Moreover, DoD had

appointed a board to study possible closure of additional naval shipyards. On 7

December McNamara recommended phasing out 35 military installations, 28 in
464 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

the United States and 7 overseas, over the next three-and-one-half years. Included

were the San Francisco and Philadelphia Navy Yards. Shipyard closings excited

special attention and appeals because oftheir large civilian payrolls. Late that afternoon, the president reviewed the proposal and voiced some hesitancy about the

closings. McNamara quickly offered to drop the two navy yards, located in heavily

Democratic districts, until the next round of base closings due November 1964,

at which time he could make a stronger case to Congress. He dropped them from

the first list and substituted the Naval Repair Facility in San Diego, California.

Several other large complexes, such as Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, Fifth Army Headquarters in Chicago, Stead Air Force Base, Nevada, and depot facilities in New

York and Texas, highlighted the closings. Before the official announcement of the

action, scheduled for 12 December, McNamara and other DoD representatives

notified key congressional committees and members ofCongress from the affected

districts of the impending action. As the scale of the actual reductions, 33 installations (26 domestic, 7 foreign), two-thirds of them major, plus the elimination

of approximately 16,000 military and civilian positions and closing of six navy

yards by October 1966, became known, the affected legislators protested swiftly

and vehemently. 65

At his press conference on 12 December, McNamara denied giving any lastminute reprieves to installations designated for reduction and skirted the shipyard

closing issue. He stated that while the Pentagon had under study the usefulness

of the existing 12 yards because of acknowledged excess capacity he was unaware

of any Navy Survey Board recommendations. As expected, legislators from the

hardest hit areas of New York, California, and ·Illinois denounced the reductions.

Chicago Mayor Richard Daley was especially irked because McNamara's decisions transferred Fifth Army Headquarters into a solidly Republican district.66

The administration claimed mail was running 5 to 1 in favor of rhe reductions,

and on 27 December, at the president's direction, McNamara appointed a board,

again headed by Morris, to accelerate the identification of additional unnecessary

installations, focusing on naval shipyards. At a 28 January 1964 press conference

McNamara· promised to visit every yard before making any decision. He also

cautioned his audience that "every base we have is in jeopardy in the sense that we

don't plan to maintain a single one for which there is not a clear and discernible

military requirement." 67

The next round of cuts came on 24 April 1964 when McNamara announced

the closure or consolidation of 63 facilities, including 8 overseas. Most of the

affected installations were small, but closure of several major installations such

as the Watertown (Mass.) Arsenal and two Army ammunition storage depots, in

South Dakota and Nebraska, accounted for slightly more than 26 percent of the

personnel reductions and 17 percent of overall savings. The secretary said that it

would take another six to nine months for DoD to complete its study of Navy

shipyards; he would not forecast when another round of base closings would
The Search for Savings 465

occur. There was relatively little protest about the latest reductions. ''Apparently,''

in Carl Vinson's words, "they've closed bases that no one is concerned about."68

In early October McNamara informed the president of the results of base

closures through the end of FY 1964. Some 574 military installations had been

closed or consolidated, 32,921 civilian and 52,913 military positions eliminated,

and $576.8 million saved annually.69 The following month he received the special

naval yard study, which recommended closing the Brooklyn Navy Yard, phasing

out the Portsmouth (N.H.) Navy Yard by FY 1975, and consolidating the Mare

Island and San Francisco naval shipyards. Based on "Industrial Capability Factors,"

the study determined the Philadelphia Navy Yard to be the best shipyard to retain

and Portsmouth the best to close. Either the Brooklyn or Boston Navy Yard could

be closed, but not both because of the large concentration of naval ships in the

northeast. At a 19 November press conference 16 days after Johnson's resounding election victory, McNamara announced 95 actions to reduce, consolidate, or

discontinue activities in the United States and overseas. Besides the shipyard closings, the historic Springfield (Mass.) Armory and a large number of Army and

Air Force depots and training facilities were closed. The pain of losing more than

63,000 jobs was spread across 33 states and the District ofColumbia.?o

This "most sweeping elimination of bases and installations since World War

II" caused an uproar. Although McNamara and Morris had flown to New York

City to inform Gov. Nelson Rockefeller and Sen. Robert Kennedy of the decision

on the Brooklyn Navy Yard, had met previously with the Maine and New Hampshire congressional delegations to discuss closings in those states, and had ensured

advance notification to each affected member of Congress, there was much grumbling. Time, for instance, reported that McNamara and his aides received 169 calls

from members of Congress the day before he made the announcement. Nonetheless McNamara insisted the decisions were "absolutely, unequivocably, without

qualification, irrevocable unless some new evidence is brought to our attention."

Politicians vowed to pursue measures to keep open many of the threatened

bases. DoD, however, found surprising support in editorial pages that praised

McNamara's "rare political courage" or Johnson's determination to promote

government efficiency. Furthermore, McNamara blunted the criticism by extending the period for closure ofsome facilities to several years, assuring affected career

employees of continued employment elsewhere in DoD, imposing a hiring freeze

to insure job opportunities for displaced employees, and offering job placement

and assistance advice.?!

For the period 1 January 1964-30 September 1966, more than 70 percent of

the 103,852 civilian employees affected by base closures and reductions accepted

another federal job, most (68.6 percent) in DoD. Retirements and resignations

accounted for another 14.4 percent of workers, leaving just over 10 percent

subject to separation.72 The 95 actions announced 19 November 1964 accounted
466 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

for more than 50 percent of all affected jobs since 1961 and provided almost 46

percent ofthe savings of all the reductions up to that time.

McNamara's success in closing or disposing of unneeded DoD facilities was

a tour de force-a remarkable accomplishment unmatched by any secretary of

defense in the ensuing 40 years. He had taken the ax to large, unnecessary, and

politically well-connected military installations, a totally thankless task. He had

saved the taxpayers much money while maintaining DoD's responsibility for its

displaced workers. The release of more than a million acres of land for public and

commercial use reaped large savings. The price McNamara paid was the alienation of influential members of Congress and many state and local officials. The

pain inflicted on senators and representatives by this experience ensured that in

the future Congress would seek to have the final word on closures. Evidence that

communities could not only overcome but could benefit from the loss of military installations did not diminish congressional determination not to experience

another McNamara-type closure process.

The TEXand Cost Effectiveness

To McNamara, big and costly weapon systems, especially aircraft, offered the

likeliest targets for improving the development and procurement process. It seemed apparent that too many of these weapons, duplicating one another in some

measure or other, produced the kind of waste and inefficiency that McNamara

believed he could root out. One of the most important decisions facing McNamara on taking office concerned new fighter aircraft programs of the Air Force

and Navy. This question, inherited from the Eisenhower administration, presented

a tangle ofissues involving cost, service interest, and political fallout.

What became known as theTFX (tactical fighter, experimental) controversy had

its origin in 1959 when the Air Force began looking into development of a variable or sweep-wing structure for a new fighter aircraft, soon designated the TFX.

About the same time, the Navy, also in search of a new fighter aircraft, was

attracted to the sweep-wing design for a fleet air defense plane to be called the

Missileer. The letting of contracts by the two services to aerospace firms to study a

new fighter moved Director of Defense Research and Engineering Herbert York to

initiate study of joint development of a tactical aircraft common to both services.

Meanwhile, throughout 1960 the Air Force aggressively pushed design and initial

development ofits TFX in hopes of getting recommendations from a source selection board by mid-February 1961. On 11 November 1960 Defense Secretary

Gates halted both the Air Force plane and the Navy Missileer, feeling he could

not commit the incoming administration to these expensive weapons,?3 Thus,

deciding the fate of a new fighter for both the Air Force and Navy became one of

McNamara's first major weapon decisions.
The Search for Savings 467

In the TFX McNamara immediately saw a unique opportunity to showcase

his policy of cost effectiveness by instituting a joint service development program

that would produce a common fighter for the Air Force and Navy. Coupled

with a new approach to contracting, he believed his approach would save money

throughout the life of the weapon system. Unfortunately, the TFX did not materialize as McNamara envisioned; instead it became the most controversial weapon

system in 000 history.

McNamara's first step in the new direction came in his instruction to York on

14 February 1961 to oversee a joint service evaluation of the Air Force concept

for an advanced tactical fighter. This provided a more specific focus of commonality for DDR&E's study of the fighter than previously. In early March, the Navy

expressed grave reservations about the value of commonality, and in mid-March

the services submitted their unresolved differences. According to a later Navy

account, the Air Force's cost estimates were "grossly more optimistic," but the

Navy did not challenge them "in order not to embarrass individuals of another

service." York established the Tactical Air Committee to settle the outstanding

issues in 60 days. By May the committee had concluded that two aircraft were

necessary, a complex, high-performance air superiority aircraft (TFX) for the Air

Force and Navy and a smaller, simpler, and cheaper one for close air support,

dubbed attack aircraft experimental (VAX),?4

Early in June, the defense secretary accepted the committee's findings and

decided that the Navy would administer VAX, which eventually developed into

the A-7 aircraft. More importantly, he determined, on the basis ofDDR&E's pricing derived from Air Force cost data, that providing two different air superiority

aircraft, one for the Air Force and one for the Navy, would cost approximately

$1.5 billion more than using one plane for both services. McNamara therefore

directed the Air Force to develop the TFX as a joint service venture, working

with the Navy to meet the requirements of both services,?5 As he later explained,

his objectives were to provide the services with an advanced tactical aircraft that

maximized dependability and minimized costs, goals best accomplished by a

multi-service aircraft.76

McNamara pushed the TFX process aggressively; his personal interest as well

as willingness to make decisions accelerated the program. In early August 1961

he reminded Under Secretary of the Air Force Joseph Charyk to solicit contract

proposals for the TFX promptly so that a development contract might be awarded

before the new year,?7

As the Air Force study progressed, the Navy raised concerns about the proposed new aircraft. Could, for instance, the Air Force requirement for an offensive

supersonic aircraft be harmonized with the Navy's need for a subsonic fighter for

fleet air defense? Navy carrier aircraft needed heavy landing gear to stand up to

carrier landings, but this feature would make the Air Force fighter more cumbersome. The Navy insisted on a total aircraft weight of no more than 55,000 pounds
468 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

while the Air Force's minimum was 65,000 pounds,?8 Both services doubted that

the same aircraft could perform the missions they required.

With the services unable to agree on a common aircraft, McNamara made the

decision for them. On 1 September he directed the Air Force and Navy to develop a bi-service aircraft capable ofexecuting the Air Force's offensive mission and the

Navy's defensive one. To address the Navy's concerns, he ruled on weight and length

restrictions, a configuration to accommodate the prototype radar the Navy wanted,

and an airframe capable of withstanding carrier landings. Despite these specifications, he demanded that changes to the Air Force model to achieve the Navy

mission be held to a minimum. McNamara wanted a request for proposals sent to

industry by 1 October and signing of preliminary contracts by 1 February 1962.79

As scheduled, on 1 October the joint source Air Force-Navy selection board

requested proposals from industry; by mid-December six contractor teams had

submitted bids. By 1 February 1962 an evaluation group rated the Boeing and

General Dynamics proposals the best and the two companies received letter contracts.80

Between April and November 1962, formal selection boards conducted four

extensive evaluations of the merits of the Boeing versus General Dynamics

proposal. In May after a second evaluation, the Air Force rated the Boeing proposal superior and recommended its acceptance. The Navy also rated it superior

but doubted that either proposal could meet naval requirements. McNamara

agreed to a 1 June proposal from Air Force Secretary Eugene Zuckert and Navy

Secretary Fred Korth that the two companies be allowed three weeks to improve

their designs-primarily to correct Navy-stated weight and wing shortcomings.8!

At the end of three weeks, on 20-21 June, the DoD evaluators again stated a preference for the Boeing design. Chief of Naval Operations Anderson indicated that

it was an acceptable preliminary design for meeting Navy requirements. Zuckert

and Korth considered this third set of findings. On the 29th at McNamara's direction, Zuckert allowed the two contractors another 60 days to establish detailed

weapon system designs, address commonality more fully, and provide credible

development and production cost projections.82

At this point McNamara, increasingly concerned that spiraling cost estimates

and rumors surrounding the repeated extensions of the TFX* competition had

adversely affected morale at both aircraft companies, took a hand in 000 dealings with them. In a letter drafted by DR&E Director Brown, Deputy Defense

Secretary Gilpatric on 13 July informed both Boeing and General Dynamics of

the reasons for the extended competition and the conditions the successful bidder

would have to meet. Aircraft performance had to satisfY both services with minimum divergence from a common design to protect the inherent savings as well as

offer credible cost estimates for development and procurement ofthe TFX.83

*In December! 961 the USAF version was designated F-! IIA and rhe Navy version F-I ! lB.
The Search for Savings 469

Following the submission of a fourth set of design proposals along with cost

estimates and development schedules, the Air Force-Navy evaluators on 8 November 1962 completed yet another review. They found that both contractor proposals

were satisfactory and could meet stated requirements. However, Boeing's had "a

clear and substantial advantage" over that of General Dynamics.84

Several days later at a working breakfast held on 13 November, McNamara,

Gilpatric, Zuckert, and Charyk tentatively settled instead on General Dynamics,

apparently because it offered higher commonality of identical parts-83.8 percent

to Boeing's 60.4 percent. Gilpatric believed that Boeing's greater dependence on

different parts would prevent it from achieving the promised $1 billion in savings.

The same day, McNamara and Gilpatric met with President Kennedy and told

him a bi-service TFX could be built. McNamara explained that the Boeing design

had operational superiority, but General Dynamics offered the "best chance of

hitting program date and cost" and would likely be chosen. The president made

no comment. According to Zuckert, who met with McNamara before and after

the meeting with the president, this was a tentative conclusion contingent upon

Zuckert's review of all pertinent TFX material. On 24 November, OSD announced the selection of General Dynamics as the F-IIINB prime contractor.85

The decision came as a shock, not only because civilians had overruled the

military's choice but also because the only written justification for selecting

General Dynamics was a 21 November 1962 memorandum for the record signed

by Zuckert and Korth and approved by McNamara. In the memo they agreed that

"inasmuch as either of the proposed aircraft can perform the mission required by

both services, and the evaluation of the proposals provides no overriding margin

between the competitors, it is necessary to consider other factors in evaluating

these aircraft." They went on to judge several novel technical proposals by Boeing

as developmentally risky. They thought that the greater commonality and integration promised by the General Dynamics proposal would save $623 million against

$397 million for the separate development proposed by Boeing. Finally, they

deemed Boeing's cost estimate overly optimistic.86 In short, as McNamara later

stated,* the greater commonality ofthe General Dynamics design and the company's realistic cost projections were the decisive factors in his decision. He thought

Boeing had really proposed two different airplanes and understated costs, leading

him to conclude that the company "simply did not appreciate the complexities of

developing the TFX."87 Others agreed that Boeing had underestimated costs, but

suspected General Dynamics did too.88

Shortly after the announcement, Sen. Henry Jackson of Washington State,

home of the Boeing Company, met with McNamara. According to one account,

the defense secretary was less than cordial to Jackson, who then turned to Sen.

*DoD General Counsel John McNaughron read the secretary's prepared statement to a congressional investigating committee on 13 March 1963.
470 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

John McClellan, chairman of the Government Operations Committee and its

Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. On 21 December McClellan wrote to

McNamara and asked him to hold up on the TFX contract until his subcommittee

conducted hearings on the matter. Gilpatric informed the senator that the decision

had been made, the project was far along, delay would not be in the national interest, and an amendment to the original letter contract had been signed. McClellan

did not take kindly to this brushoff, and a subsequent meeting with McNamara

about the hearings convinced him that the secretary's brisk, no-nonsense style

was no more than undisguised arrogance. Already a highly charged issue between

McNamara and the military, the TFX now became a political lightning rod as well

because McNamara, in Zuckert's words, "bought himself an unnecessary fight."89

With McNamara having highlighted the TFX as a centerpiece of his wellpublicized economy drive, the congressional hearings examined and at length challenged his notions of efficiency, management, and ethics. In testimony before a

subcommittee of the Joint Economic Committee, not the TFX Investigation

Committee, on 28 March 1963, he insisted that the TFX undertaking was the

most important action to date in reducing the number of U.S. weapon systems.

The commonality of the winning proposal underlined that economy and efficiency in DoD could be well served by a multi-service rather than a single-service

weapon. The resultant savings from having one aircraft instead of two would

probably exceed a billion dollars in TFX development, production, and operation

costs.90 This figure came from a 7 March memorandum prepared by A. W Blackburn, a former Marine test pilot and aeronautical engineer working in DDR&E,

who assumed savings of $400 million in development, $290 million in production, $160 million in inventory stocks over eight years, and another $150 million

if procurement reached 1,500 units.91

The cost-saving claims notwithstanding, the choice ofGeneral Dynamics seemed to some congressmen arguable and arbitrary. A later congressional report in

1970 complained that there was "no paper work, no documentation, and no special

staff studies" of key issues and questions raised by the military and characterized

McNamara's actions as "capricious, lacking in depth, and without factual substantiation." Even such close supporters as Charyk felt McNamara compounded

the TFX's difficulties by appearing to be "making up his mind by himself" and

"running roughshod over all these things."92

Instead of headlining the prospect of achieving substantial economies, news

accounts focused on charges, brought up by the McClellan committee, of conflict

of interest, political favoritism, and DoD civilian disregard of military advice.

Returning fire, Pentagon spokesman Arthur Sylvester accused unnamed senators of

placing their "state self-interest in where the contract goes." An angry McNamara

wrote McClellan on 9 March that the fragmentary releases of the hearings had

"undermined public confidence in the integrity and judgment" of OSD officials.93

After filing an affidavit with the committee on 13 March and testifYing on the
The Search for Savings 471

21st, two days later McNamara again protested the selective release of portions of

testimony of witnesses; he was especially incensed over newspaper reports that he

wept under Senate questioning.94

Among the more damaging charges, McClellan's committee alleged conflict

ofinterest by Gilpatric and improprieties by Korth in the contractor selection process.* An expanded inquiry, launched after the hearings closed, led Korth to resign on 15 October 1963 as a result of his conclusion that "certain of his actions

appeared inconsistent" with the high standards of office he had sought to follow.

Several days earlier, the New J0rk Times had reported that Gilpatric would be leaving government around Christmas. Within days of President Johnson assuming

office on 22 November, ugly allegations surfaced that he had received $100,000 to

ensure General Dynamics would get the TFX contract. McNamara, however, had

never discussed the TFX matter with the then vice president.95

Besides these troubling accusations of personal misconduct that shadowed the

TFX decision throughout 1963, TFX development itself was not going smoothly,

as rising costs seemed to validate congressional skepticism. Contrary to Blackburn's analysis, the Navy's estimated cost of a TFX aircraft had increased dramatically from $4.5 million to $7.75 million between 8 January and 20 March 1963.

McNamara deemed realistic cost estimates essential and placed strict limitations

on changes leading to higher costs. Glaring overruns threatened the inherent

savings he believed existed in joint production and fixed-price-incentive-fee contracts, as well as undermining the credibility of the department's commitment

to cost-cutting. In the midst of the hearings, McNamara ordered key staff from

DDR&E, the OSD comptroller's office, and the Air Force and Navy to commence

monthly meetings once McClellan's investigation concluded.96

In mid-January 1964, McNamara requested the latest information on the TFX

to include a review of the original versus currently estimated costs. The initially

proposed empty weight of the plane was 38,804 pounds, but by mid-December

1963 it stood at about 45,000 pounds. The Navy's reply, delivered on 5 February, warned that the increasing weight of its F-IIIB mandated major changes in

the aircraft to make it acceptable for shipboard use. This would, of course, further

reduce commonality. After listening to Navy briefings in early February, Brown,

Zuckert, and new Secretary of the Navy Paul Nitze concluded that present weight

reduction efforts were encouraging and that development of the F-l11 B should

continue.97

Eventually, in May 1964,t General Dynamics received a fixed-price-incentive-fee contract of the type McNamara greatly preferred as a means of placing

the burden of performance and cost control on the contractor's shoulders. Since

* Gilpatric's law hrm had represented General Dynamics, and Korth's banks, which he headed before becoming

secretary of the Navy, had made loans to the company.

t Until then the company did the work under the authority of an amendment to the original letter contract in

December 1962.
472 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

becoming secretary of defense, his own study of several major weapon systems

purchased since 1958 had revealed that all came in at least 300 percent over original estimates. A Harvard Business School study published in 1962 supported him;

it showed that the average cost increase for 12 major weapon systems was 220

percent.98

A fixed-price-incentive-fee contract promised to reduce cost overruns byestablishing an upper limit set by the government, usually 30 percent above the target

cost. It followed that a fixed-price-incentive-fee contract would force bidders to

submit realistic cost figures because the government would no longer compensate

them for overruns. Furthermore, the contractor had an incentive to hold down

costs to make a higher profit because the firm would still receive the full amount

specified in the contract.99

Letting the contract resolved only one problem-who would build the plane.

A host of others remained. McNamara was willing to trade off lowered performance levels for an acceptable means of reducing weight since he viewed the extra

operational advantages desired by the services as unacceptable development risks

that would result in cost overruns. By late July 1964, however, modifications to

weight and performance had lowered commonality between the Air Force and

Navy versions to 78.8 percent. Just as disconcerting, the Air Force, Navy, and

contractor were using different assumptions, different methods of calculation, and

different starting points when estimating aircraft weight and performance characteristics. Finally, the Navy's design review of 14 August found that most of the

several configurations submitted for the F-lllB reduced commonality substantially, some to less than 30 percent. IOO

These persistent problems and disagreements led to the creation in August

1964 of a DDR&E ad hoc group to study F-IIIB problems. It reported on 1

October that the final version might not meet the Navy's specifications chiefly

because of weight increases. Research and development cost projections were up

at least $100 million over earlier estimates and fewer aircraft than planned were to

be ordered, further increasing unit costs. WI Thus costs and weight for the F-lllB

continued to rise while commonality continued to fall. No one could tell if these

problems were systemic or might be corrected.

On 15 October 1964, about two weeks ahead of schedule, McNamara was

on hand to witness the rollout of the first test F-IIIA at the General Dynamics plant in Fort Worth, Texas.* He reminded the thousands of spectators that

this was an aircraft "some believed could never, would never, be built. It will be

built." He lauded the plane as uniquely versatile in its performance capability

and multi-mission competence. He further praised the program for its technical

achievements and noted that joint design and development had saved $1 billion

*According to program schedules, the Navy's F-IIIB was due for rollout around I April 1965 and initial Right

test around I June (Aviation Daily, 23 Dec 64).
The Search for Savings 473

in costs over two separate weapon systems. On 21 December 1964, 10 days ahead

ofschedule, the first F-111A test flight occurred and, despite various technical and

mechanical problems, deemed insignificant for an aircraft ofsuch complexity, was

declared a success. The day was surely McNamara's, but doubts persisted about the

aircraft's weight and, more importantly, about steeply rising developmental costs

that might force cutbacks in expected production. 102

In the short run, at least, McNamara had weathered the TFX storm. The

McClellan Committee investigation had adjourned its hearings in mid-November

1963 and did not resume in 1964. The F-111A program was slightly ahead of

schedule and the F-111B* seemed to be making progress. Success came at a price.

McNamara had set a standard for savings that was impossible to achieve. After all,

if economy tipped the balance in favor of General Dynamics, then costs had to

be carefully controlled and this did not appear to be happening. McNamara was

later adamant that the TFX was "an absolutely correct decision." He charged that

the military services did not really go along and he could not "monitor underlying day-to-day-change-orders that the two services put in to their versions of

the TFX." He faulted Congress for not supporting the project and the Navy for

resistance to the F-111 and poor implementation of the concept. 103 One might

add that McNamara's perceived dismissive treatment of influential legislators, the

public sniping between civilians and the military over the TFX, and conflict of

interest charges all contributed to impair the program. Later these festering quarrels would reemerge to discredit the entire TFX effort.

In the years 1961-1965 McNamara pursued his search for savings with genuine conviction, sustained enthusiasm, and dogged determination. Secure in the

knowledge that he had full support from Kennedy and Johnson, he acted boldly

and purposefully to carry out his initiatives. Thus, four years after taking office,

McNamara could point to impressive savings and efficiencies throughout the

Department of Defense. He had helped to reduce the balance of payments deficit through many measures, most notably the offset agreements arranged with the

West Germans and the closing of dozens of U.S. overseas base facilities. His development and management of the Cost Reduction Program produced large savings,

ferreted out waste, streamlined contracting procedures, and became a model for

the whole executive branch to emulate. Closing unneeded military bases in the

United States met strong opposition despite McNamara's best efforts to ensure that

displaced employees received comparable jobs or were retrained for new ones, but

the action unquestionably saved much money. Only with the TFX, the showcase

for commonality in the development and production of complex weapon systems,

did McNamara falter, amid controversy over selection of the contractor, costs that

*The first test F-IIIB had its rollout on II May 1965; its first /light followed a week later.
474 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

rose beyond initial projections, and criticism of the plane's performance capabilities. On balance, McNamara proved highly successful as a business manager.

Among his many management triumphs there can be little doubt that, whatever

the disappointments, his search for savings stood at the forefront.
CHAPTER XVIII

Tightening the Budget: FYs 1965 and 1966

By the end of 1963 favorable circumstances helped the Department of Defense embrace cost cutting more fully as a major objective. Most importantly, the

international climate had improved since the Kennedy administration's first two

years in office. The Berlin crisis, the Bay of Pigs invasion, and the Cuban missile

crisis lay behind. The situation in South Vietnam, although of growing concern,

did not yet require large resource allocations. The signing of the limited nuclear

test ban treaty in August 1963 had appeared, at least to some, to signal a relaxation

of tension between the United States and the Soviet Union. Accordingly, large

outlays for defense did not seem as desirable or necessary as before. After two years

of approving increased budgets, Congress had cut more than $2 billion from the

FY 1964 Defense appropriation bill, thereby underscoring its altered perception of

national security requirements.* The cut occurred at a time when the Department

of Defense foresaw a stabilizing of expenditures after the heavy spending of previous years. 1 Finally, McNamara's cost reduction program, formally inaugurated in

July 1962 and reflecting his commitment to efficient management and elimination of unnecessary expenditures, achieved substantial savings in its first year.

Cost cutting gained extra impetus and authority from a succession of wellpublicized measures by President Johnson, immediately after assuming office in

November 1963, to reduce the size of the FY 1965 budget then nearing completion. In part he was motivated by a desire to slash federal expenditures for the

upcoming fiscal year below the politically symbolic ceiling of $100 billion in order

to gain support of congressional fiscal conservatives for the Kennedy-proposed tax

reduction program stalled in the Senate for months. Because Defense spending

accounted for more than half of all expenditures, DoD became the focus of much

ofthe new president's rhetoric and attention.

*For congressional acrion on rhe FY 1964 appropriarion bill, see Chapter VI.

475
476 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

During the 1964 presidential election campaign, when DoD was putting together its FY 1966 budget, Johnson continued to champion the cause ofrestraint.

Bur the administration's proposals for reduced Defense budgets in FYs 1965 and

1966, which freed up funds for the president's Great Society domestic programs,*

left it vulnerable to Republican charges, most prominently from presidential candidate Barry Goldwater, that it was weakening the nation's defenses.

The Kennedy Administration and the FY 1965 Budget

The planning-programming-budgeting system-what came to be called

PPBS-that McNamara introduced in 1961 steadily gained wider acceptance by

the services. Yet dissatisfaction within OSD about FY 1964 budget procedures

prompted changes for FY 1965 aimed at furnishing the secretary of defense more

time to evaluate force structure and programs.

Since a flurry of last-minute Program Change Proposals (PCPs) had complicated and delayed the process in the summer of 1962, OSD Comptroller Charles

Hitch urged McNamara to advance the timetable for FY 1965 by a few weeks. He

recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide preliminary force structure

proposals by 1 May 1963 and that the services and other components submit all

major PCPs by 15 June. Earlier deadlines would enable the secretary to complete

his own review of the force structure and major PCPs by 15 August, not midSeptember as before. McNamara essentially accepted the recommendations but

pushed up the date for submission of major PCPs even more-to 1 June. He also

wanted the services to submit an updated Five-Year Force Structure and Financial

Program (FYFS&FP) on 1 May 1963, although this date, along with others, was

allowed to slip.2

Another change involved completing the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan aSOp)

sooner in order to integrate it better into the budget process and to allow an

earlier updating of the FYFS&FP. Some of the Joint Chiefs, especially the Air

Force's General LeMay, feared that McNamara's emphasis on the FYFS&FP might

diminish the importance of the JSOp' However, in late 1962 McNamara asked

the chiefs to accelerate their work on the next plan, JSOP-68, so that it could help

provide guidance for reaching decisions on the FY 1965 force structure. Accordingly, the chiefs submitted several sections ofJSOP-68 in December 1962; their

JSOP force structure proposals went to McNamara in April 1963. They split on

more issues than in the previous year. Major differences continued to involve

the required numbers of Air Force strategic missiles, Army divisions, and aircraft

carriers, as well as personnel levels for all the services. LeMay wanted far more

Minuteman missiles (1,950) in the force by FY 1969 than the others. Chairman

*Johnson first publicly used the term "Great Society" in his address at the University of Michigan on 22 May

1964.
Tightening the Budget: FYs 1965 and 1966 477

Maxwell Taylor and the Army proposed 1,350, the Navy and Marine Corps 1,400.

Taylor submitted separate recommendations to McNamara, calling the continental defense program probably the weakest of all and urging additional efforts to

develop Nike-X as a high-altitude intercept system.3

Considerations other than military ones shaped the Defense budget. More

than in the previous year, the reluctance of the administration to exceed the $100

billion mark in federal expenditures acted as a brake on spending. In April 1963,

as it launched the annual spring budget preview, the Bureau of the Budget estimated overall expenditures for FY 1965 at $106 billion and suggested reductions

of $4.7 billion, including $1.3 billion in space programs, interest on the public

debt, and Defense, which might lower the total to $101 billion. Budget Director

Kermit Gordon urged department heads to pare down their projected expenditures, emphasizing President Kennedy's intention to apply a substantial portion

of additional revenue expected from "the advance of the economy to full employment (anticipated with the enactment of the tax program)" toward eventually

eliminating the budget deficit. This meant, Gordon cautioned, a tighter budget

than would otherwise be available.4

In its preliminary projection, OSD estimated 000 expenditures at $52.69

billion, which included military assistance and civil defense as well as military

functions. BoB subsequently arrived at virtually the same figure. Following consultations with McNamara and other cabinet heads, in early August Gordon sent the

president the bureau's recommended planning figures. The president approved.

BoB set the 000 expenditure target at $52.7 billion, the government-wide target

at $102.1 billion. Gordon mentioned possible changes in military programs, including cutbacks in the number of Minuteman missiles and attack carriers and

cancellation ofthe Dynasoar* spacecraft.5

While BoB examined overall expenditure targets and individual departmental estimates, McNamara and Hitch met with limited success in accelerating the

planning and programming phases. By the fall of 1963 the services had submitted

some 300 PCPs. Despite requirements for earlier submissions of key items, slippages continued, deadlines had to be extended, and important target dates, such as

that for PCP submissions, which already had been pushed back to 31 August, were

not met. On the assumption that the 31 August date would allow it to review and

decide all major PCPs by early September, OSD initially had established 21 October as a deadline for submissions of a further updating of the FYFS&FP, but had

to let that slide to 30 December. As Hitch later put it, "the calendar defeated us."

Program review became "mixed up in a very undesirable way" with the budgeting

phase that followed.6

'" Conceived in 1958 in the wake of the Soviet launch of Sputnik, Dynasoar was intended to be a prototype

military space plane capable of achieving hypersonic speed but short of orbital velociry. In December 1961 a

new plan called for attainment of orbital flights. McNamara increasingly questioned the military missions the

project could serve, especially in light of NASA's progress in piloted flight in its Gemini and Apollo programs.
478 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

This complicated matters for the services and other DoD components, which

had submitted budgets at the beginning of October totaling some $60.9 billion

(NOA), including military assistance.? At that point the Air Force alone had $3.5

billion of PCPs that OSD had not yet acted on. On 7 October, in forwarding his

proposed budget to Secretary Zuckert (it had been due in OSD on 1 October),

LeMay pointed out that only a few PCP decisions had been received from OSD.

Consequently, many proposals had to be excluded from the basic budget and

shown only as addendums. Although he recognized the administrative necessity

ofsubmitting a budget, LeMay felt that uncertainties about the proposed program

changes and the size of the final budget made it too early to furnish an analysis of

future Air Force capabilities.8

LeMay had even sharper criticisms. In September the Joint Chiefs and the

National Security Council received from OSD early versions of draft presidential

memorandums (DPMs) regarding Defense programs in the FY 1965 budget.9

LeMay believed they really represented "a preview to decisions already reached."

More generally, in LeMay's view the tentative decisions in the DPMs reflected "an

abandonment of one of the basic tenets of the OSD program system-the merit

of reviewing proposals as a package. The draft memoranda, at least as made available, indicate a piecemeal approach to force considerations."lo

Navy dissatisfaction during the program review centered on McNamara's rejection of its proposal to provide nuclear propulsion for a conventional carrier

Congress had authorized in FY 1963. After reviewing the Navy's appeal and discussing the matter with Secretary Korth, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral

David McDonald, and others, McNamara reaffirmed his decision on 25 October. He did not accept the Navy's argument that five nuclear-powered task forces

were as effective as six conventionally-powered ones. Although nuclear carriers

would clearly be more expensive, McNamara contended it was not a matter "of

merely trying to hold down costs, but whether any amount of money, large or

small, is better spent on nuclear or on conventional ships." Moreover, obtaining

congressional approval of additional funds for nuclear construction would most

likely result in long delays. Nor did McNamara accept the Navy's fallback position to defer construction of the conventionally-powered carrier, presumably in

the hope of securing approval of a nuclear-powered carrier. Deferring construction, he said, might create an impression that construction of new attack carriers

was not really required. However, Spurgeon Keeny of the NSC staff argued that

if projected expenditures for FY 1965 turned out to be tight, construction of the

conventionally-powered carrier should be deferred. Neither the requirement for

the conventional carrier nor the urgency of its construction, he believed, had been

demonstrated. I I

The DPM on strategic retaliatory forces recommended a Minuteman force

much smaller (McNamara now favored a leveling off at 1,200 missiles) than Le-
Tightening the Budget: FYs 1965 and 1966 479

May and the other chiefs had advocated. NSC staff member Carl Kaysen, an

advocate of smaller strategic forces, thought that the justification for the 1,200-

Minuteman force rested on McNamara's belief that the numbers were "the

minimum the Services will accept." He believed that a good case could also be

made for a force of950 in FY 1969. 12

By mid-November OSD and the White House staff began joint consideration

of the DPMs. Five of these-land-based tactical air forces, attack carrier forces,

airlift and sealift forces, a national underground command center, and research

and development-were examined at a meeting on 15 November. 13 The conferees

pondered nearly 30 items, reaching decision on some and deferring others, including the fate of the Dynasoar program, to a meeting a week later. Following that,

McNamara intended to go over the budget with Kennedy at Hyannis Port on 29

November (the day after Thanksgiving, as had been the administration's practice).

He would then prepare a joint memorandum with Gordon setting forth their

differences so that the president could make his final decisions by no later than 10

December. 14

Kennedy's Assassination:Johnson Takes the Reins

In the early afternoon of 22 November, while Defense and White House representatives were engaged in their second budget meeting at the Pentagon, they received word that the president had been shot in Dallas, Texas. McNamara recalled

that in the midst of the discussion, his secretary informed him of an urgent telephone call, which he took in his office. It was Attorney General Robert Kennedy

telling him that the president had been shot. McNamara returned to the conference room and, "barely controlling my voice, reported the news to the group.

Strange as it may sound, we did not disperse: we were in such shock that we simply

did not know what to do. So, as best we could, we resumed our deliberations."

About 45 minutes later the attorney general called again to report that the president

had died. McNamara adjourned the meeting "amid tears and stunned silence."15

McNamara then went to the JCS meeting room to inform the Joint Chiefs,

who were conferring with a group of West German military officials. After the

Germans departed, the secretary and the chiefs agreed to order a worldwide alert

of U.S. forces. At Robert Kennedy's request, McNamara and General Taylor

accompanied him to Andrews Air Force Base in suburban Maryland to meet Air

Force One carrying the body of the dead president, his widow, and new president

Lyndon Johnson, who had taken the oath of office aboard the aircraft before leaving Dallas. In the Executive Office Building later that evening Johnson met with

McNamara, for whom he had developed great admiration and respect while serving as vice president. Johnson recalled that he told the secretary that "if he ever

tried to quit I would send the White House police after him."16
480 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

Near the top of the list of the most pressing matters facing the new president stood the FY 1965 budget, regarding which Johnson received much advice.

Former President Eisenhower, who drove to Washington from his Gettysburg farm

the day after the assassination, stressed the importance of a prompt tax cut for

the nation's economic health, the need to hold down expenditures for FY 1964,

and the projection of even lower expenditures for the following fiscal year. Gordon

sent Johnson a memorandum describing BoB's functions and responsibilities and

pointing out that, although many tentative decisions had been made on the FY

1965 budget, the president still had time to put his own stamp on it if he were

prepared to invest a great deal of time. On Sunday, the 24th, Gordon met with

the president and described for him the burden he would take on if he decided to

make the budget his own; Johnson said he would do it. l ?

The tragic circumstances that brought Johnson to office made his first weeks

predictably hectic. His decision to undertake a major shrinkage of the budget,

with so little time left before its presentation to Congress in late January, intensified the pressure on him, demanding innumerable meetings and telephone calls

and long hours ofstudy. He later said he "worked as hard on that budget as I have

ever worked on anything.... I studied almost every line, nearly every page, until I

was dreaming about the budget at night."18

On the 25th, the day of Kennedy's funeral, Johnson convened a late-evening

meeting with his top economic aides, including Gordon and Chairman of the

Council of Economic Advisers Walter Heller, to discuss the budget. If it turned

out to be the first budget to exceed $100 billion in expenditures, the president

believed that congressional approval of the proposed tax reduction would prove

difficult. He was worried that the Senate Finance Committee, particularly its

powerful chairman, Harry Byrd, might prevent the measure from even reaching

the Senate floor. He told the group, "Unless you get that budget down around

$100 billion, you won't pee one drop." The next day Gordon reported to the president that prospects were brighter than they looked the previous night for paring

expenditures to around $100 billion, in part because McNamara now felt he could

reduce Defense spending by an additional $600 million. Nevertheless, the working

figure of $101.5 billion they had settled on contained cuts that would "provoke

outcries from the wounded agencies and their clienteles." 19

For Johnson, known as a big spender during his years in Congress, budget

trimming now became the order of the day. In addition to providing assurance of

continuity following Kennedy's death, the new president strove to impress upon

government officials the overriding need for frugality. On the 26th McNamara

conveyed to the Joint Chiefs, service secretaries, and other DoD officials Johnson's

desire that all presidential appointees continue in office. The best way to honor

the memory of President Kennedy and to show loyalty to his successor was "to get

back to work." The secretary indicated that the budget ought to be completed by
Tightening the Budget: FYs 1965 and 1966 481

10 December; no major issues remained for decision.2o Meeting with the chiefs

a few days later, Johnson stressed his commitment to economizing and urged

them to take steps to reduce the cost of defense procurement. He asked them to

examine again their budget requirements, emphasizing that "unless the Congress

is convinced of this Administration's dedication to frugality and thrift, legislation

vital to the well-being ofthe country will not move."21

In his public statements, too, Johnson made government economy a central

theme. Before a joint session of Congress on the 27th, he urged prompt passage

ofthe civil rights and tax cut bills and promised to administer government expenditures "with the utmost thrift and frugality." The president also visited the

Pentagon, where in the building's auditorium he urged his listeners "to protect

your country's purse, to safeguard not only her military strength but her financial

stability. I count on you and I plead with you to put a premium on sparing instead

ofspending, to get along with less while you are doing more."22

During these first few weeks in office Johnson's goal seemed merely to lower

anticipated FY 1965 expenditures to just under $100 billion, which Gordon felt

was not difficult to accomplish. Had he lived, Kennedy probably would have done

the same. Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon had reached an understanding with

Kennedy that the budget would be under $100 billion, although Dillon thought

that $99.5 billion was as low as it could go. "But we all knew," Dillon acknowl- .

edged, "there were ways of making budget figures appear somewhat smaller." At

DoD some savings resulted from imaginative bookkeeping, which the press noted

was nothing new in the federal government. McNamara balked, however, at

juggling the figures too much, telling the president and Gordon, "We just can't

screw up the integrity ofthe financial process over here."23

The timetable for preparation of the Defense budget suffered only a slight

delay; the meeting interrupted by news of Kennedy's death resumed on 27 November. McNamara did not accept BoB's proposals to postpone procurement of 50

Minuteman missiles and effect other savings in that program. On 6 December he

submitted to Johnson the final version of the DPM on strategic retaliatory forces

and the next day a DPM with his overall recommendations on the budget. In the

latter he estimated Defense expenditures at $51.4 billion and new obligational

authority for military functions, military assistance, and civil defense at $51.0

billion. At his first news conference, on 7 December, Johnson indicated he had

been meeting on the budget that morning with McNamara, who was planning

to spend several hundred million dollars less than he had the previous year, partly

by reducing civilian employment in DoD. At a separate press conference at the

White House McNamara spelled out these plans, which also involved reductions

in noncombat military personnel. On 9 December the president made his final

budget decisions at a meeting with McNamara, apparently approving all of the

DPM's recommendations.24 The next day the secretary announced one ofthemthe cancellation of Dynasoar and its replacement by a Gemini-manned orbital
482 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

laboratory combination, which would save about $100 million during the next 18

months.25

Sometime in mid-December Johnson decided to reduce federal expenditures

even more. But shaving another $2 billion overall, observed Gordon, required

"painful surgery." Contributing to the savings were changes in the Defense budget

directed by the White House in late December, including a further lowering ofthe

civilian manpower level and a variety of other adjustments that brought Defense

expenditures down from $51.4 billion to $51.2 billion and NOA from $51 billion

to $50.88 billion. Yet the president in his public pronouncements remained vague

about the eventual size of the budget, suggesting that it would be around $99

billion but also emphasizing how difficult it was to reduce it further. 26

On 30 December McNamara, Gilpatric, the Joint Chiefs, and Gordon met

with the president at the Johnson ranch in Texas for a last look at the Defense

budget. Johnson made a special effort to hear out leMay, who reiterated his

concern about the steep decline in procurement of strategic weapons-from $9

billion in FY 1962 to a projected $3 billion in FY 1969-and urged that the Air

Force be allowed to reprogram funds to begin development of both a new bomber

and an interceptor aircraft. Johnson asked leMay to submit a formal proposal

to McNamara and the JCS, and after it had been "worked over," he wanted to

"explore it further inasmuch as he knew many of his old colleagues on the Hill

were worried over this trend toward an all-missile force." There followed discussion

about BoB's earlier proposal to postpone procurement of 50 Minuteman missiles

in FY 1965, which Gordon said he had since withdrawn. leMay considered the

50 missiles the minimum required, thought that 150 more would be desirable,

and noted that he favored an eventual force of 1,400 Minuteman missiles while

McNamara wanted only 1,200. The president decided to leave the 50 Minuteman

missiles in the budget. Afterwards, in a jovial atmosphere, the president reported

that McNamara and the chiefs were "really on the ball this morning." While posing

for a picture with leMay, the president was overheard to say, "I want to see more

of the Chiefs than I've been seeing. Not pro forma meetings, either." McNamara

told the press the budget still was not final. Expenditures would be about $1

billion less than the previous year; nevertheless the reduced funds would produce

"defenses superior to those in any other time in our history in peacetime."27

Although the White House had hinted that the final budget would be smaller

than at first anticipated, Johnson surprised many observers by the size of the reduction. In his budget message to Congress on 21 January 1964, he announced

$97.9 billion in projected expenditures for FY 1965, $900 million less than the

estimate for FY 1964. It was only the second budget in nine years to project lower

expenditures than the previous year. In the DoD appropriations budget (NOA),

the president requested $50.88 billion, including military assistance, about $120

million less than the previous year.28
Tightening the Budget: FYs 1965 and 1966 483

In late January the Senate Finance Committee favorably reported out the tax

cut bill, after Johnson had instructed Gordon, as a gesture of courtesy, to deliver

an advance copy of the budget to Senator Byrd at his Washington apartment. By

the end of February, with opposition to the bill dwindling, both the House and

Senate approved it. On 26 February, barely six hours after the Senate action, the

president signed the tax bill into law,29 thus capping a remarkably productive first

three months in office.

McNamara dearly played a major part in helping the president achieve the

sharp scaling down of the proposed FY 1965 budget that led to passage of the

tax reduction bill. And his efforts no doubt enhanced Johnson's already favorable

opinion of him. Harold Brown recalled a humorous bur significant exchange at a

budget meeting, probably in December 1964. Since the president could not be

expected to know the numbers and designations ofvarious aircraft that McNamara

was discussing, the secretary tried to make light of his own mastery of detail by

saying, "Well, there are all these names and all these numbers, Mr. President, and I

myself can't really identify all the numbers with the aircraft that they are supposed

to belong to." McNamara was obviously trying to be polite; everyone knew he

could identify all the aircraft. But the president responded, "Yes, we all know you

are kind of backward and can't be expected to understand these things." Johnson's

riposte, according to Brown, "got a very big laugh and it was the President's way of

saying how smart he considered McNamara to be."3o

McNamara's last-minute trimming also helped launch the Great Society programs. He remembered drawing "a chart to show the President how I anticipated

the per cent of GNP devoted to defense should drop between 1964 and 1965 and

subsequent years. I pointed out this should permit, by the saving in per cent of

GNP going to defense, a financing of both additional public and private goods.

And among the public goods to be financed could be programs to meet the pressing problems of our society-programs which would be developed under the term

Great Society."3!

Yet Gordon felt that the president's handling of the FY 1965 budget marked

the beginning of a "credibility gap." Some journalists told him that Johnson had

deceived the press by emphasizing the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of getting

the budget much below $101-102 billion, when in their judgment it was not that

difficult. It seemed the president sought "to build up the tension" in order "to

make the achievement of getting it below a hundred billion even more dramatic

than it would have been in any case." McNamara took a more sympathetic view,

acknowledging that the president was ridiculed at the time for some ofhis gestures

to reduce expenditures, such as turning our the White House lights. He considered

them "a dramatic indication of his insistence that every part ofthe government, in

every possible way, increase efficiency, reduce expenditures in order that the funds

saved could be spent to meet the pressing needs of our society."32
484 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

The FY 1965Authorization Bill

Congressional action on the DoD authorization bill for research and development and for procurement proved quicker and less contentious than in the

previous two years, despite a larger request. The administration asked for just over

$17.185 billion (NOA), a figure enlarged by a wider jurisdiction over research

and development authorization that the armed services committees had recently

assumed.* Without this the amount would have been lower than the previous

year's $15.3 billion.33

The election year, with the two major nominating conventions scheduled to

take place in the summer, provided an incentive for speedy congressional action.

The House leadership wanted the appropriation bills for all departments passed

by 5 June to allow Congress to adjourn by 13 July. These target dates meant the

Defense authorization bill had to be approved as early in the session as possible. To

hasten the process Chairman Carl Vinson asked DoD to submit the authorization

request to his House Armed Services Committee as soon as possible, even before

the president's annual budget message to Congress when the request was normally

transmitted. After McNamara submitted it on 15 January, Vinson announced he

would open hearings on 27 January.34

Given the intense feeling in Congress about certain Defense budget issues and

partisan attacks to be expected during a presidential election year, the outlook for

the authorization and appropriation bills in the congressional committees at first

seemed uncertain. Prior to the hearings the secretary had customarily paid visits to

key members of Congress, including Vinson and Chairman of the Senate Armed

Services Committee Richard Russell, who also chaired the Senate Appropriations

Defense Subcommittee. McNamara's assistant for legislative affairs, David McGiffert, recommended that the secretary drop in occasionally on McGiffert's

breakfast meetings with groups of congressmen, assistant secretaries of defense,

and other Defense officials, and that the secretary increase the frequency of his

luncheons with members of Congress, including Mendel Rivers, slated to replace

Vinson as House Armed Services Committee chairman when the latter retired at

the end ofthe current session.35 To what extent McNamara heeded this advice has

not been determined. If he did, this may have helped to smooth the authorization

process.

In January, before hearings began, McNamara dealt forcefully with a charge

made by Barry Goldwater, a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, that U.S. long-range missiles were not dependable. McNamara immediately

responded that Goldwater's claim was "completely misleading, politically irrespon-

*In PL 88-174, 7 November 1963, Congress amended the 000 authorization procedures by giving the armed

services committees responsibility for authorizing funds for all Defense research and developmenr, not just those

related to aircraft, missiles, and naval vessels.
Tightening the Budget: FYs 1965 and 1966 485

sible, and damaging to national security."36 The rebuttal helped keep the issue

from being a focus of the upcoming hearings, although it did come up sporadically.

The chief worry in OSD was the likelihood that Congress would cut the

authorization request. At a McNamara staff meeting in January, McGiffert remarked that authorizations had declined between FYs 1962 and 1964. He anticipated that what with the president's economy drive, the pending tax bill, and

the election in November, congressional "economy-mindedness" would probably continue. Vinson had already said he wanted to cut $390 million-about six

percent-from the research and development authorization. McGiffert noted that

the recent broadening of the armed services committees' authorization responsibilities made the budget vulnerable to cuts in more programs. On the other hand,

McNamara pointed out that past reductions might have stemmed in part from

unsatisfactory presentations by DoD officials. In reviewing past testimony regarding areas where cuts had occurred, he found that in certain cases "the witnesses

were not prepared, or took positions at variance with the President's budget."37

Another new element entered into the authorization process-hearings by

a subcommittee on research and development recently established by the House

Armed Services Committee in response to its expanded jurisdiction. Meeting for

four days in mid-January 1964, the subcommittee heard testimony from Brown

and from military service representatives.38

McNamara's appearances on 27 and 29 January before Vinson's full committee were shorter and calmer than the previous year. The secretary presented his

customary posture statement-the classified version consisted of 247 pages,

including 54 pages of charts and tables. Committee members showed unusual

interest in overseas developments, particularly in Vietnam. However, questioning

on missile dependability proved rather mild, which McGiffert interpreted as reluctance by some Republicans to become too closely linked with Goldwater early in

the campaign year.39

Testimony from service representatives between 30 January and 7 February

was also relatively brief. LeMay made a strong pitch for an additional $52 million

to begin work on a manned bomber and $40 million for an interceptor. On 13

February, in what one newspaper called "record time," the committee reported

a $16.915 billion authorization bill, $270.5 million less than the administration

request. It cut funding for research and development by $362.5 million, including $37 million for the bomber and interceptor. Then it turned around and added

$92 million for the two planes. In a dissenting report four committee Democrats

objected to the addition as "premature" and "unwarranted" and offered an amendment to remove it.4o The amendment lost easily, which McGiffert attributed to

"sentimental votes for Vinson, enthusiasm for the bomber, and the relatively small

amount of money involved." On 20 February the House passed the authorization

bill without change, 336 to 0.41
486 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

The Senate acted with similar dispatch. Although two committees experimented with a new procedure designed to speed subsequent work on the appropriation

bill, the experiment had no ostensible effect on consideration of the authorization

bill. The Senate Armed Services Committee and the Defense Subcommittee of

the Committee on Appropriations, both chaired by Russell, decided to hold joint

hearings in February to avoid duplicative testimony and to lighten the burden of

attendance by members who served on both committees. McNamara led off the

testimony (3-5 February) in poorly attended sessions; only 8 of the 31 members

of the two committees attended the final day of his testimony. Goldwater did

not participate at all. McGiffert observed that "nothing particularly significant or

controversial" had so far come up, but he expected some Republicans to try what

they had done during the House hearings, i.e., wait until Air Force representatives testified and attempt "to elicit as much equivocal testimony from them as

possible."42

When the authorization phase of hearings concluded on 21 February, McNamara sent Russell a letter urging the Armed Services Committee to restore all the

research and development funds cut by the House. At the same time he called

funding for the follow-on bomber and the interceptor premature. He felt that

the Air Force still had not made a case for proceeding with the bomber's development. On 25 February the Armed Services Committee reported a bill of$17.040

billion, $125.5 million more than the House. It removed the money added for

the interceptor, but retained $52 million for the bomber. During floor debate

on 27 February several senators, including George McGovern, spoke out against

the extra money for the advanced bomber, but by a vote of 64 to 20 the Senate

rejected McGovern's amendment to delete the funds. It then passed the bill as

reported, 80 to 0.43

The conference committee, adopting most of the Senate's language on points

in dispute, recommended the money for the bomber but eliminated that for the

manned interceptor, leaving an amended total of nearly $16.977 billion, $208

million below the original request. All the Republican House conferees refused to

sign the report, contending that the final figure should have been closer to the

House version, and that the higher amount ran counter to recommendations

for steeper cuts made by the House subcommittee on research and development. However, by voice votes the Senate, on 5 March, and the House, on 9

March, approved the conference bill. In signing the bill on 20 March, President

Johnson paid tribute to Vinson's role in its passage and to his 50 years ofservice in

Congress. "No man in the history of this republic knows more about the posture

of our defense," the president said, "and no man has done more to improve it."44
Tightening the Budget: FYs 1965 and 1966 487

The FY1965Appropriation Bill

Despite hopes that Congress would also move quickly on the overall 000

appropriation request of $47.471 billion (NOA),* the measure became bogged

down first in the House, then more so in the Senate. The many witnesses appear~

ing before the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, chaired by George

Mahon, testified over a period of two months, 20 January through 19 March.45

During his three days of testimony (17-19 February), McNamara read portions

of his long statement, devoting the usual attention to a survey of international

relations. He told the subcommittee that the Cuban missile crisis had "marked

the crest ofthe latest in the series of crises cycles" precipitated by the Soviet Union

since World War II. "We now appear to be on the downward slope of this latest

cycle," McNamara observed, "and tensions in our relations with the Soviet Union

are easing."

McGiffert described the hearings as "far more political than usual." Gerald

Ford and other Republicans pressed McNamara hard on Cuba, Vietnam, and

the issue of missile dependability "in an attempt to find some political advantage." Committee members expressed much concern over the unstable situation

in Vietnam. In his prepared statement, McNamara noted that the conflict was

"a Vietnamese war, and in the final analysis it must be fought and won by the

Vietnamese," then stated shortly thereafter that "the survival of an independent

government in South Vietnam is so important to the security of all of southeast

Asia and to the free world that I can conceive of no alternative other than to take

all necessary measures within our capability to prevent a Communist victory." Ford

seized on the statement, declaring that he had sensed the administration's reluctance to send U.S. combat forces to Vietnam, an intervention he would support.

He didn't "like the use of U.S. forces overseas any better than anybody else,"

but the United States had "to make some hard choices every once in a while."

McNamara answered, "We will make whatever hard choices have to be made."

The subject of Vietnam also provoked several testy exchanges between Melvin

Laird, among other Republican subcommittee members, and McNamara.46

On 17 April the House Appropriations Committee reported out a bill of

$46.76 billion, some $711 million less than the administration's request. It

pointed out that it had, to a greater degree than in previous years, gone along

with the proposed budget. The committee also accepted McNamara's assurances

about missile dependability. In another gesture of support, the committee added

no funds to provide nuclear propulsion for the previously authorized conventional

aircraft carrier because, it said, 000 had not requested the funds and they had

not been authorized. The bill also included the additional $52 million earmarked

*The bill did not include military construction, civil defense, military assistance, and a pay raise, which were

dealt with in separate bills that totaled $3.4 billion (NOA).
488 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

for the manned bomber. On 22 April the House approved the appropriation bill,

365 to 0, after voting down three amendments, the most contentious regarding

the relative share of repair and conversion work to be done by naval and private

shipyards and another that would have added funds for nuclear propulsion for the

carrier.47

The bill still had a long road ahead. On 12 May OSD submitted a reclama

seeking a restoration of approximately $271 million ofthe $711 million the House

had cut. Consideration of the reclama had to wait until the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee held further hearings during a three-day period (25-27 May).

Russell then suspended the hearings to devote his time to the debate over the civil

rights bil1.48 On 22 June McNamara told his staff the logjam on Capitol Hill was

about to be broken and that Russell would reconvene hearings on the appropriation bill, which could be expected to reach the Senate floor by 4 July. There was an

even chance, McGiffert observed, that Congress would finish its work by the end

ofAugust. He pointed out that, primarily because ofthe president's efforts, cuts so

far amounted to only 1.5 percent of the budget request, less than half the previous

year's percentage.49

In the last week ofJune Russell resumed hearings on the appropriation bill,

eventually listening to Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance's presentation of

DoD's reclama on 7 July before concluding the hearings the next day. Following

a recess (10-20 July) for the Republican convention, the Senate Appropriations

Committee on 24 July reported out a bill of $46.774 billion, an amount slightly

above the House bill but still nearly $697 million under the administration's

request. 50

After eight hours of debate on 29 July, the Senate unanimously approved the

bill as reported. As in the previous year, proponents of deep cuts failed to carry the

day. With Russell arguing in favor of the bill as reported, the Senate rejected three

proposed cuts. 51 House and Senate conferees then settled on $46.752 billion, an

amount slightly below either version ofthe bill. On 4 August the House narrowly

accepted the Senate's version stipulating that at least 35 percent ofshipyard repair

and conversion funds be allocated to private yards, despite warnings about the

provision's harmful effects from members representing districts with naval shipyards. The House then approved the conference bill, 359 to O. Later that day the

Senate concurred by voice vote. On 19 August the president signed the appropriation bill into law. 52 The following traces the bill's progress:

Administration Request

House Appropriations Committee

House

Senate Appropriations Committee

Senate

Conference Committee/Enactment

$47,471,000,000

46,759,267,000

46,759,267,000

46,774,401,000

46,774,401,000

46,752,051,000
Tightening the Budget: FYs 1965 and 1966 489

Again Congress had reduced the administration's appropriation request, this

time by some $700 million. What made the action noteworthy was that it came

amidst Republican charges, similar to those Democrats had directed against the

Eisenhower administration during the 1960 presidential campaign, that the Kennedy and Johnson administrations had endangered national security in their pursuit

of lowered spending. In the period before the November election, McNamara

issued vigorous rebuttals, sometimes personally and occasionally through DoD

spokesmen, of claims that the Democratic administrations had failed to inaugurate

a single new weapon system and that DoD was planning to reduce the nation's

nuclear arsenal over the next decade by 90 percent.53

The charges were mistaken, the result in part of excessive partisanship in an

election year, but McNamara's sharp criticisms of the state ofthe nation's defenses

inherited from the Eisenhower administration and the trumpeting of achievements

under his stewardship were themselves politically tinged. In particular his statement before the Democratic party's platform committee in August, which some

felt shattered the nonpartisan tradition of defense policy, so outraged his predecessor, Thomas Gates, that he sent a telegram to Gates attempting to clarify the

statement. At the latter's request McNamara made the telegram public, along with

assurances that he had the highest regard for Gates and his contributions to the

nation's defense. Gates retorted that he was "totally unable to reconcile what you

told the platform committee with the tone and content ofyour dispatch to me."54

Largely Goldwater's doing, national defense emerged as a central issue in the

1964 presidential campaign. His attacks on the administration did not resonate on

Capitol Hill, where members of Congress may have been more concerned about

base closings in their districts.55 Johnson's landslide victory in the 3 November

election-486 to 52 in the electoral vote and a 16 million popular vote pluralitywas attributable to several factors, including the president's success in portraying

Goldwater as an irresponsible extremist whose policies would increase the chances

of nuclear war. McNamara's own statements, while sometimes overblown, may

also have helped persuade both Congress and the public that Goldwater's criticisms of national defense lacked substance.

Preparation ofthe FY1966Budget

As the FY 1965 authorization and appropriation bills worked their ways

through Congress, DoD began preparation of the FY 1966 budget. Since efforts

to advance the FY 1965 timetable had not entirely succeeded, OSD again tried to

move up the key submission dates and to streamline procedures. Hitch's deputy,

Alain Enthoven, in November 1963 had provided a thorough analysis of the

defects in the programming system, including its excessive paperwork and wasted

motion that caused delays, staff overload, and diluted effort. In drafting FY 1966
490 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

budget schedule instructions for McNamara to circulate, Hitch incorporated some

of Enthoven's suggestions and remarked optimistically that he thought an even

tighter schedule would resolve most of the difficulties encountered in the current

year. A major change called for scheduling force decisions and logistics guidance

somewhat earlier to furnish a firmer basis for PCPs and other submissions in the

hope ofreducing unnecessary work. 56

Deadlines for the JCS delivery of the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan OSOP69) were advanced by a few weeks. This would allow OSD to review force levels

and issue changes to the military departments and the Joint Chiefs by 15 May.

Not only was the front part of the schedule tighter than before, but the secretary's

new guidance memoranda were actually updated versions of the previous year's

DPMs, although at this early stage they were not called DPMs in order to make

clear that the guidance remained tentative. Each memorandum for the first time

would contain a logistics section.57

The Joint Chiefs completed the first five parts ofJSOP-69 in mid-February

1964, two weeks ahead of schedule. A month later, when Taylor forwarded Part

VI (force levels), he noted that the chiefs had split on several of the same issues as

the previous year-Minuteman missiles, Army divisions, and Navy aircraft carriers. On Minuteman leMay still stood alone. He now wanted a force of 1,500, the

other chiefs 1,200. With regard to Army divisions, Admiral McDonald, Marine

Commandant General Wallace M. Greene, who had replaced Shoup, and Taylor

wanted to keep the number at 16. leMay recommended a reduction to 14 in the

next five fiscal years. Army Chief of Staff General Wheeler recommended an increase to 17 in FYs 1966 through 1968 and to 18 in FYs 1969 and 1970. The

Navy recommended maintaining the current 15 attack carriers throughout the

cycle; Taylor wanted to reduce the number to 14 in the last year; Wheeler recommended a steady reduction to 13. leMay differed markedly, calling for only 13

carriers in the first year and a decrease of one each subsequent year, leaving 9 carriers in FY 1970.58 Save for leMay the positions ofthe chiefs were not far apart on

major force-level issues.

In May McNamara circulated his guidance for preparation ofstrategic retaliatory force PCPs, noting as a key objective assured destruction of Soviet forces after

U.S. absorption of a surprise attack. For this purpose the secretary now believed

that the adequacy of a 1,000-missile Minuteman force, rather than the 1,200

previously projected as the ultimate size, was "established beyond a reasonable

doubt." He questioned the wisdom of including money in the FY 1966 budget

for 100 additional Minuteman missiles, because of uncertainties about the optimum balance between strategic offensive and damage-limiting forces. Regarding

the Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft (AMSA) on which leMay wished to start

development, McNamara sided with the other chiefs in maintaining that a decision on development and procurement be deferred pending review ofthe program

definition phase.59
Tightening the Budget: FYs 1965 and 1966 491

Following a suggestion by Harold Brown, McNamara announced to his staff

in March 1964 a change in formulating and presenting the budget. He planned to .

discuss strategic and defensive forces jointly and the relationship between them; in

the past this had not received enough attention. The secretary tasked Brown and

Hitch to collaborate in preparing a single draft presidential memorandum on the

subject and suggested specific questions they should address.GO

During BoB's spring preview of the FY 1966 budget, Gordon wanted to emphasize long-range program objectives and asked departments to provide a list

of broad program issues and how they affected TOA and expenditures. In early

May Vance submitted DoD's five-year program and financial projections and, in

a separate letter, a list of 16 sensitive principal force structure issues then under

consideration within DoD.61 That summer the planning and programming phases

went a little more smoothly than in previous years. By the time the budgeting

phase began in the fall, the services and OSD found their estimates much closer

to each other than before. Service budget submissions in early October totaled

$50.78 billion. This did not include $3.65 billion for Defense agencies and OSD

and $370 million for civil defense, bringing the total to $54.80 billion (NOA),

about $6 billion less than the $60.90 billion recommended the previous October

for FY 1965.62

Despite the tighter deadlines in the FY 1966 budget cycle, some slippages occurred, for which the Joint Chiefs and the military services faulted OSD. The

chiefs felt that OSD delays at the outset in providing important requirements studies did not permit timely responses to McNamara's tentative force guidance. Moreover, they thought the 30 days set aside during the summer for preparing PCPs

should be doubled. In support of the chief of naval operations and the commandant of the Marine Corps, in late October Secretary of the Navy Nitze suggested

changes, including increasing the time for preparation of PCPs. In response,

Hitch stated that the current schedule was better than the previous one but that

improvement was still needed. "The basic problem," he observed, "is that there

is barely sufficient time throughout the year to crowd in all the actions that must

be taken." Allowing more time at the beginning would help, as would exercising

"better discipline in adhering to the established schedule."63

McNamara's consultations with congressional leaders on the budget had usually occurred just before the beginning of hearings each January. For FY 1966,

however, he and Vance met with at least two of them, Sens. Mike Mansfield and

Leverett Saltonstall, much earlier-at the beginning of October 1964-to learn

their views on the budget. Mansfield had no suggestions to make but mentioned

that considerable congressional support existed for a manned bomber. While

not opposed to the idea, McNamara said that he wanted to be sure of the military requirements for the plane and the cost implications before he undertook a

program that might run as high as $10 billion. Moreover, he saw no need for an

immediate decision. Saltonstall spoke of congressional interest in a new carrier.
492 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

McNamara indicated that he would likely include a nuclear carrier in the FY

1967 budget.64

At a meeting on 21 November, McNamara, other OSD officials, BoB representatives, and White House staff members resolved several matters in dispute

and left others for later decision, such as a proposal to slow down F-111 aircraft

production until a more advanced avionics system became available. They also

put off a decision to proceed with the huge new C-5 air transport until Enthoven

and Donald F. Hornig, the president's special assistant for science and technology,

could review the costs and benefits of alternative approaches. 65

DoD, BoB, and NSC officials discussed the remaining issues again in the

first week of December. By then Hornig had received a report from his Military

Aircraft Panel unanimously recommending that the C-5 program not go beyond

the program definition phase during FY 1966 and that procurement of sealift

capability be accelerated instead. NSC's Keeny supported McNamara on going

ahead with the C-5, citing political and military considerations that argued for a

prompt decision. Hornig recommended that McNamara put off the decision to

initiate the program until the following year, expand the sealift program with rollon/roll-off ships, and perhaps reduce procurement of C-141 aircraft. In the end

McNamara put forward a compromise, which Hornig accepted, to include funds

in FY 1966 for the C-5 as well as for four new roll-on/roll-offships. Meanwhile,

OSD and Hornig would join in an intensive study to determine the optimum

mix of airlift and sealift forces and their vulnerabilities.66

At this late stage of the budgetary process, Alexei Kosygin, who had replaced

Nikita Khrushchev as premier of the Soviet Union in October 1964, injected a

surprise element. Before the Supreme Soviet on 9 December, Kosygin announced

that his government would reduce its defense expenditures in the coming year

by 500 million rubles (about $555 million). Almost a year earlier, in December

1963, Khrushchev had announced a four percent reduction in defense expenditures, which he had called a "policy of mutual example" since it came at the same

time as a similar downturn in U.S. defense spending. Khrushchev's announcement had prompted Roswell Gilpatric to speculate publicly, after he had departed

office, on the possibility that the process would continue, "perhaps not in an

unbroken decline in tensions, but at least with a definite trend toward less troubled relations in the military sphere." During the 1964 Geneva disarmament

talks the Soviet Union had pressed the United States to agree to a 15 percent

mutual reduction in their defense budgets, but the Americans had countered

that technical talks first had to establish the comparability of cuts since the two

budget systems were quite different.67

Kosygin's announcement gained additional significance from his statement

that the Soviet government acted after learning of the U.S. intention to reduce its

Defense budget. Secretary of State Rusk had passed the information to Foreign

Minister Andrei Gromyko after McNamara's press conference remarks to this
Tightening the Budget: FYs 1965 and 1966 493

effect on 10 November 1964. Kosygin's linkage of the U.S. and Soviet planned

reductions caused concern at the White House and elsewhere. McGeorge Bundy

urged the president to have Press Secretary George Reedy publicize McNamara's

remarks. This kind ofstatement, Bundy added, "not only emphasizes our savings

but speaks of your order to him to keep on improving basic military effectiveness. This is the balanced position we have held with success for over a year, and

I think there is every reason to be proud of it even if Senator Russell is momentarily troubled by the Soviet announcement." And clarifying the record would

stop the "foolish rumors." On 10 December Reedy called attention at a White

House press conference to McNamara's remarks and emphasized that there had

been "no agreement between the two countries on budget cutting, nor any effort

whatsoever at mutuality in this matter."68

The Soviet announcement proved only a temporary distraction. On 11 December McNamara met with the president to wrap up the budget. At this point,

Keeny felt "few, if any decisions" remained. Still, he considered McNamara's

detailed DPM with its final recommendations, like the earlier ones focusing on

specific programs, too long and complex to be useful to the president. He therefore highlighted for the president the most important recommendations, where

McNamara had identified four issues, including the C-5 transport, that until

recently had been in dispute with Gordon and Hornig but on which general

agreement had now been reached. The DPM did not mention certain issues no

longer in question-reducing the Minuteman force from 1,200 to 1,000 missiles,

not proceeding with the advanced bomber and interceptor, and delaying deployment of an ABM system.69 No record of the discussion at the meeting has been

found, but the president apparently accepted the recommendations.

With the budget virtually complete, JCS areas of disagreement with McNamara had become fewer and less pronounced. The official JCS history concluded that the majority of the chiefs moved more toward McNamara's position

than he did toward theirs. Yet the new chairman, General Wheeler, who had

been appointed in July 1964 when Taylor became ambassador to South Vietnam,

told McNamara in November that his views on major issues involving strategic

retaliatory forces had changed as a result of the recent studies McNamara had

commissioned on viewing strategic retaliatory forces as part of a single offensivedefensive package. For example, he now supported the Air Force position on a

new strategic bomber and an interceptor. 70

On 22 December, at the chiefs' gathering with the president at his Texas

ranch, McNamara pointed out that he and they agreed on about 95 percent of

the budget items, but the chiefs had their say. Wheeler expressed concern about

the proposed reduction ofthe Minuteman force, especially since it would occur at

the same time as the phasing out of the Atlas and Titan missiles. He also urged a

speedup in the national fallout shelter program and provision of $200 million for

preproduction funding of Nike-X. LeMay reiterated his support for the strategic
494 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

bomber and interceptor. McNamara replied that he would delay for five months

a decision on proceeding with the bomber. When Admiral McDonald spoke of

shortages in the Navy shipbuilding program, McNamara agreed to add two naval

gunfire support ships. General Harold Johnson, who had succeeded Wheeler as

Army chief ofstaff, indicated that the Army was "doing well" and spoke particularly ofthe excellent equipment it had in the Far East and Vietnam. Like Wheeler,

Johnson favored spending more money on Nike-X/ 1

After the meeting, McNamara told reporters that although he had earlier

thought that FY 1966 Defense expenditures would be around $50 billion, the

amount would be closer to $49 billion, because DoD had achieved "further economies ... while continuing to increase our military strength." He also mentioned

the president's approval in the FY 1966 budget of $157 million to begin development of the C-5/2 By meeting with the chiefs and by holding a series of

pre-Christmas conferences with cabinet heads at his Texas ranch, the president

once more gave the impression of working hard to pare down federal expenditures-this time from estimates as high as $108.5 billion to again below $100

billion/3

Since the issue of national defense had worked to his advantage in the 1964

presidential campaign, Johnson understandably continued to give it play. On 18

January 1965, a week before transmitting his annual budget message to Congress,

the president-in a departure from past practice-sent Congress a special message

on the state of the nation's defenses. A peculiar document according to one journalist, it apparently sought to create an impression ofgreat activity as Johnson took

office in his own right. It said little about foreign problems, particularly Vietnam.

Parts of the message sounded a triumphal note. The president declared the nation

"stronger militarily than at any other time in our peacetime history" and claimed

that his administration and Kennedy's had succeeded in their goal of "assuring

an indisputable margin of superiority for our defenses." Johnson listed the major

advances since 1961: a threefold increase in strategic nuclear forces on alert, a

major expansion in tactical nuclear forces, an eightfold growth in special forces,

a 45 percent increase in combat-ready Army divisions, 15,000 more Marines, a

doubling of airlift capacity, and a 100 percent increase in Air Force tactical firepower to support ground forces. In addition, the United States now had more

than 850 land-based ICBMs, 300 nuclear missiles in Polaris submarines, and 900

strategic bombers, half ofwhich could be airborne in 15 minutes.

Johnson briefly described the Defense budget he would soon present to

Congress, omitting the NOA amount but estimating defense expenditures at $49

billion, some $2 billion less than in FY 1964. This leveling off, he explained, had

occurred because much of the force structure increase had already taken place and

savings had materialized from DoD's cost reduction program. "If, over the next

several years," the president observed, "we continue to spend approximately the

same amount of dollars annually for our national defense that we are spending
Tightening the Budget: FYs 1965 and 1966 495

TABLE 9

Financial Summary by Program, FY 1961-FY 1966 a

($ billions)

FY61b FY62 FY62 FY63 FY64 FY65 FY66

(Orig) (Final) (Final) (Final) (Est) (Est) -- -- -- -- --

Strategic Offensive Forces 7.6 9.0 8.4 7.3 5.3 4.5

Continental Air & Missile

Defense Forces 2.2 2.3 2.0 2.1 1.8 1.8

General Purpose Forces 14.5 17.4 17.6 17.7 18.1 19.0

Airlift/Sealift Forces .9 1.2 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.6

Reserve and Guard Forces 1.7 1.8 1.8 2.0 2.1 2.0

Research and Development 3.9 4.2 5.1 5.3 5.1 5.4

General Support 11.4 12.1 13.0 13.7 14.3 14.6

Retired Pay .9 .9 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.5

Military Assistance 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.2 1.2 1.3

Total Obligational Authority 46.1 44.9 50.7 51.9 51.9 50.9 51.7

Less Financing Adjustment 3.0 1.3 1.3 .8 .9 1.1 3.2

New Obligational Authority 43.1 43.7 49.4 51.1 50.9 49.7 48.6

Adjustments to Expenditures +1.6 +1.0 -1.2 -1.1 +.3 -.4 +.4

Total Expenditures 44.7 44.7 48.2 50.0 51.2 49.3 49.0

a As ofJanuary 1965. Subsequent tables showed slight changes for some years in figures shown

here, as somewhat different program breakdowns came into use. The final figures for FY 1965

and FY 1966 differed from the estimates shown. For FY 1965, TOA came to $51.2 billion,

NOA $50.5 billion, and total expenditures $47.4 billion. The actual amounts for FY 1966,

largely because ofthe buildup in the Vietnam War, greatly exceeded the estimates shown here.

TOA came to $66.5 billion, NOA $63.5 billion, and total expenditures $55.4 billion. The

major change was in General Purpose Forces, where the amount reached $29.5 billion. See

SCAS and SSCA, Hearings: Military ProcurementAuthorizatiomfOr FY1968, 90 Cong, 1 sess,

1967,217-18.

b Preparation of the Defense budget by program began with the FY 1963 budget. The OSD

comptroller later described by program both the original and final FY 1962 budgets, but not

the FY 1961 budget.

Source: SCAS and SSCA, Hearings: Department ofDefeme Programs, and Authorization of

Appropriatiom During FY 1966fOr Procurement, Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation

ofAircraft, Missiles, andNaval vesselS fOr the Armed Forces, 89 Cong, 1 sess, 1965, 206.
496 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

TABLE 10

Comparison ofActive Forces, 1961 and 1965

Actual

June 30, 1961

Actual

June 30, 1965

16

6

29

14

2

5

16

7

39

6

231/2

16

9

21

331

135

28

3/3

117

38

19

106

968

671

190

824

2,653

4

5

13

1

20

42

7

491/2

11

3

15

9

13

328

110

28

3/3

93

16

35

101

858

627

177

820

2,482

Military personnel (in thousands)

Army

Navy

Marine Corps

Air Force

Total

Selected military forces

Strategic retaliatory forces

Intercontinental ballistic missiles (squadrons)

Minuteman

Titan

Atlas

Polaris submarines (in commission)

Strategic bombers (wings)

B-52

B-58

B-47

Continental air and missile defense forces

Manned fighter interceptor squadrons

Interceptor missile squadrons (BOMARC)

Army air defense missile battalions a

General purpose forces

Army divisions (combat ready)

Army special forces groups

Warships (in commission)

Attack carriers

Antisubmarine warfare carriers

Nuclear attack submarines

Other

Amphibious assault ships (in commission)

Carrier air groups (attack and ASW)

Marine Corps divisions/aircraft. wings

Air Force tactical forces squadrons

Airlift and sealift forces

Airlift aircraft (squadrons)

C-130 through C-141

C-118 through C-124

Troopships, cargo ships, and tankers

Active aircraft inventory (all programs)

Army 5,564 6,957

Navy 8,793 8,056

Air Force 16,905 14,875

Commissioned ships in fleet (all programs) 819 880

aDecrease from 1961 to 1965 reflects phaseout of Nike-Ajax and transfer of Nike-Hercules

battalions to Army National Guard.

Source: The Budget ofthe United States, FY 1967, 76.
Tightening the Budget: FYs 1965 and 1966 497

today, an ever-larger share of our expanding national wealth will be free to meet

other vital needs, both public and private." Pentagon officials later predicted that

defense spending could be kept under $50 billion for several years, "barring the

unexpected." The FY 1966 budget message to Congress on 25 January, which

touched briefly on national defense, disclosed that overall federal expenditures

would again come in under $100 billion, at $99.7 billion. The submitted budget

requested $48.565 billion (NOA) for Defense, including $1.17 billion for military

assistance,74

Others in the administration also expressed satisfaction with the state of the

nation's defenses. An unnamed high official, perhaps McNamara, was quoted as

boasting in private that the United States now had "sufficient nuclear power to

survive a surprise attack and in retaliation knock the aggressor right out of the

20th century." But the proposed reductions in the FY 1966 Defense budget,

much as in the previous year, created a dilemma for the administration, requiring

it to demonstrate that a shrinking budget could actually provide more defense.

And in claiming that savings at Defense made money available for Great Society

programs, it had to guard against the impression that it was sacrificing the nation's

security. On the whole, though, it made a good case. One observer thought that,

discounting the "political inflation to its boasts," the administration's claims about

creating superior forces were justified, although the forces relied on weapons

begun almost entirely during the Eisenhower administration,75 Some remained

skeptical. A New York Times editorial in January 1965 warned that reductions in

personnel or procurement were a calculated risk, and "it should be understood

that the nation cannot buy more defense for significantly fewer dollars; it gets less

for less."76 This warning shortly became moot when large-scale U.S. involvement

in the Vietnam War demanded far more men and money.
CHAPTER XIX

Vietnam: Into the Vortex

At the time of President Kennedy's assassination on 22 November 1963 the

United States stood at a critical juncture in its policy toward Vietnam. The execution of South Vietnam President Diem earlier in the month had brought to power

the military leaders who had carried out the coup against him, but the same troubling military and economic situations remained to be reckoned with. To what

extent the coup influenced Kennedy's rethinking and, by some accounts, apparent

desire to withdraw U.S. troops cannot be ascertained. Students of the administration's policies and informed participants are much divided on his intentions.!

Whatever Kennedy's qualms, there seemed little doubt about the direction of

u.s. policy as Johnson and McNamara charted the course. On 23 November, the

day after Johnson took the oath of office, both McNamara and Rusk sent him

status reports on Vietnam in preparation for a planned meeting with Ambassador

Lodge. McNamara emphasized the need for a harmoniously working U.S. country

team and for the strongest possible economic assistance to the new govetnment,

headed by Duong Van ("Big") Minh. Rusk's report, more comprehensive, declared

that the outlook in Vietnam was "hopeful," the new govetnment appeared to have

popular support, and the military situation was still serious but should improve,

as a single chain of command had replaced Diem's and his brothers' dual chain.

Rusk also noted Vietnam's huge financial deficit, labeling it "the major operational

problem we face immediately."2

With Rusk, McNamara, George Ball, McGeorge Bundy, and John McCone

present, Johnson met with Lodge on 24 November. The ambassador presented

a rather sanguine report-domestically, politically, and militarily-to the point

where he thought North Vietnam "might be interested in arrangements ... satisfactory to us." McCone then gave a "somewhat more serious" CIA estimate, noting

increased Viet Cong activity since 1 November (the date of the recent coup) and

growing VC message traffic that might reflect "preparations for further sustained

498
Vietnam: Into the Vortex 499

guerrilla pressures." Consequently, McCone could not offer "a particularly optimistic appraisal of the future." The president indicated misgivings about the u.s.

role, noting the many critics of Diem's removal and assassination, the growing and

more insistent congressional demands for withdrawal, and his own belief that the

administration should have supported Diem. He thought it necessary to help the

new government perform effectively. Since it was too much to expect "to reform

every Asian into our own image," the main objective should be "to get along, win

the war."3

Johnson concluded his first round of action on Viernam with the issuance of

NSAM 273 on 26 November 1963, which emphasized the importance of persuading the new government to concentrate on the critical problems in the Mekong

Delta. He made it clear that "it remains the central object of the United States in

South Vietnam to assist the people and Government of that country to win their

contest against the externally directed and supported Communist conspiracy." He

also asked that planning include "possible increased activity" against North Vietnam and examine the ramifications of pursuing covert military action. At the same

time, he restated Kennedy's directive of 2 October for a phased withdrawal of U.S.

military personne1.4

Whatever the differences in the outlook and temperament of the two men,

Johnson made clear that he would continue existing U.S. policies-in Southeast

Asia as elsewhere. Even if often an outsider in the formulation of the administration's foreign policy, he had tacitly supported it and in any case recognized the

importance of projecting a sense of continuity. Moreover, almost without exception he retained the top advisers who had served Kennedy. In addressing a joint

session ofCongress on 27 November 1963, Johnson declared that "this nation will

keep its commitments from South Vietnam to West Berlin."5

McNamara in Saigon-December 1963

For all his seeming determination to stay the course, the new president worried

about the conflicting reports he had received from Lodge and McCone. Seeking more information, he asked McNamara and JCS Chairman Taylor to visit

South Vietnam on their way home from the December NATO meetings in Paris.6

McNamara was dispirited by what he found in his two-day (19-20 December)

stop in Saigon; since his September visit, the situation had deteriorated to a degree

he had not anticipated. As General Krulak, the JCS special assistant for counterinsurgency matters, who accompanied McNamara, pointed out: "Orders are issued,

but they are often not carried out-because the chain of authority is still preoccupied with its own political and economic survival, and the supervision is just not

there."? In brief, McNamara reported, "the situation is very disturbing." Unless

current trends were reversed in the next two to three months, the result would be

neutralization at best or---even more likely-a communist-controlled state. Not
500 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

only was the new government run by a committee of generals drifting into disaster but it could obtain little help from Lodge and MACV Commander General

Harkins, who disagreed on policy and had little official contact with each other.

McNamara attributed Lodge's behavior to his having "operated as a loner all his

life."8

Not all ofMcNamara's findings were negative. The U.S. resources and personnel he considered more than adequate and could not "usefully be substantially

increased"; he concluded that "we should watch the situation very carefully,

running scared, hoping for the best, but preparing for more forceful moves if the

situation does not show early signs of improvement."9 In his press conference

the same day, 21 December, a more restrained McNamara attributed much of

the current difficulties to the inexperience of the new government and the Viet

Cong using this to its advantage. He still envisioned eventual victory for the Minh

government: "We have every reason to believe they will be successful. We are

determined that they shall be." 10

As 1963 ended and 1964 began, then, McNamara harbored his own ambivalence toward Vietnam. No one recognized more clearly than he the dismal performance of the Minh government, and yet he appeared able to see a positive

outcome to what he had described as an impossible position. On 6 January, the

president received proposals from Sen. Mike Mansfield suggesting the neutralization of Vietnam and a peaceful solution in Southeast Asia. Otherwise Mansfield

visualized deep U.S. involvement such as had occurred in China and Korea.

Johnson asked for comments from his advisers to refute the senator's views. I I

McNamara responded that while the war was a Vietnamese responsibility, "we

cannot disengage U.S. prestige to any significant degree." United States support

since 1954 made extensive engagement inevitable. But even more important,

no matter how serious the situation, "we can still win, even on present ground

rules." 12

At the same time, McNamara pointed out that in keeping with Kennedy's

October 1963 directive to start pulling out U.S. troops (reaffirmed by Johnson

on 26 November), approximately 1,000 had been scheduled for withdrawal by

the end of December.* On 27 January McNamara testified before a congressional committee that withdrawal would continue until the end of 1965; thereafter,

"there might [only] be a continuing requirement for a limited number of U.S.

advisory personnel." 13

The defense secretary's visit to Vietnam in December 1963 left him repelled

by the corruption and incompetence of the government in power and by the

ability of the Viet Cong to continue its advances, particularly in the Delta area

*The purported December withdrawal amounted to a disingenuous statistical exercise. More than 1,000 men

did leave Vietnam but most were part of the regular rotation cycle and included also medical evacuation or

administrative returnees. See Pentagon Papers, bk 3, IVB.4, 30.
Vietnam: Into the Vortex 501

south of Saigon. He strongly supported a revitalized strategic hamlet program

to wean villagers from the Communists. He wanted military assistance directed

toward internal reform. In addition, he found attractive what came to be known

as OPLAN 34A, a plan for sabotage, propaganda, intelligence, and commando

hit-and-run operations against North Vietnam by South Vietnamese troops.

NSAM 273 called for planning for such covert activity that would take into

account North Vietnamese retaliation and international opposition, as well as "the

plausibility of denial." OPLAN 34A at least suggested a sense of movement with

possible immediate results; it appealed strongly to the JCS. General LeMay went

further and advocated aerial bombardment of North Vietnam openly-"We are

swatting flies when we should be going after the manure pile."14

Still, the dangers inherent in offensive action inhibited an immediate change

of policy. Incursions into Laos or bombing of North Vietnam targets carried too

many risks. At the end of 1963 the most that seemed acceptable was a continuation ofsmall CIA-South Vietnamese clandestine actions, even though proponents

recognized that they were too meager and that larger-scale operations were

needed. 15

At McNamara's request, on 21 December the president approved the formation of a DoD-State-CIA committee with Krulak as chairman to review and select

from the 2,000 proposed covert actions contained in OPLAN 34A. The committee completed its report on 2 January 1964 and the JCS endorsed it although they

believed that the covert actions, even if successful, would have no great effect on

the progress of the war. 16 McNamara then joined Bundy, Rusk, and McCone in

recommending to the president the implementation of0 PLAN 34A-progressively

escalating pressure by expanding intelligence collection, increasing psychological operations (leaflet drops and radio broadcasts), and intensifYing sabotage

activities.* Bundy described McNamara as "highly enthusiastic" about the plan,

while McCone expected "no great results," and Rusk thought that "98% of the

problem is in South Vietnam and not in cross-border operations" but that these

operations would convey the message to Hanoi that the United States had no

intention of quitting VietnamY The president approved the plan on 16 January

with a starting date of 1 February.18

OPLAN 34A would require more cooperative effort among the agencies than

in the past. Skeptical of MACV's optimistic reports, McCone told Rusk that the

reporting on Vietnamese operations needed change. U.S. field officers "had been

grossly misinformed by the [South Vietnamese] province and district chiefs."

McNamara also recognized the unreliability of incoming statistical information

and demanded a change in the current reporting system. 19

*Covert activities, ditected by MACV, included distUption of rear area security within North Vietnam, insertion of agent teams into the North, psychological warfare, and maritime and coastal operations. For an account

ofsabotage operations against North Vietnam, see Richard H. Shultz, Jr., The Secret wtzrAgainst Hanoi.
502 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

On 7 January, McCone proposed "developing a new covert method of checking on information on the progress of the war." But McNamara knew that the

military would resist change, if only because in accepting a CIA-operated reporting system he would, by implication, be criticizing both the Saigon command and

the Joint Chiefs. For this reason, as Michael Forrestal of the NSC staff noted to

Bundy, the secretary faced "considerable difficulty in accepting the thought that

CIA should take on a separate reporting function." McNamara subsequently

informed McCone that although he did not oppose improved covert intelligence

collection, the required review ofthe overall reporting system and its improvement

should remain "a joint program" involving all members of the Saigon country

team.20

The Khanh Coup

Any plans for major changes were put on hold after 30 January 1964, when

Maj. Gen. Nguyen Khanh and several other corps commanders in a bloodless

coup removed Minh as chairman of the Military Revolutionary Council (MRC).

No matter how depressing the action, it should not have come as a surprise to

U.S. advisers. McNamara's fact-finding tour in December had confirmed Minh's

ineffectiveness. Despite popular support from Buddhists, students, and other

opponents ofthe Diem regime, the MRC had never taken charge of affairs. Moreover, when the generals put an end to the Diem regime, they also swept away what

passed for a constitutional system.

The success of the Viet Cong in the Delta in previous months owed much

to the leadership vacuum and disarray in Saigon. As McNamara observed only

two days before the coup, Minh and his colleagues had retained responsibility for

military operations after the November coup while assuming additional responsibility for the political and economic functions of a country under siege: "You can

imagine, therefore, that something suffered, and I think that what suffered was the

military administration or the administration of military operations, as their attention was forced onto these political and economic problems."21

What made Khanh acceptable was his opposition to de Gaulle's proposal on

31 January, the day after the coup, for neutralization of all of Indochina under

international guarantees. De Gaulle's initiative touched a raw nerve, already exposed since France had recognized Communist China only several days before and

de Gaulle now included it as a participant in the guarantees. Earlier, in his New

Year's message to General Minh, President Johnson had specifically referred to

neutralization as "another name for a Communist takeover." He made this reference on the advice of McNamara to counteract critical commentary in the press.

McNamara was convinced that the Minh government could not survive neutralization, nor could the rest ofSoutheast Asia.22
Vietnam: Into the Vortex 503

Khanh's pro-U.S. and anti-neutralization stance made U.S. leaders receptive to

his ascendancy, no matter what short-term damage the coup might inflict on the

counterinsurgency campaign. Col. Jasper Wilson, I Corps MAAG adviser and

confidant of Khanh, assured Lodge that Khanh would be a reliable ally. Lodge

found especially attractive Khanh's stated determination to get on with the war.

He depicted Khanh as "the most capable general in Vietnam."23

McNamara looked for improvement from Khanh. Less than a week after

Khanh seized power, McNamara told the Senate Armed Services Committee that

"I have spent considerable time with General Khanh during my visits to Vietnam. He has impressed me as a very intelligent, articulate, courageous, aggressive,

determined Army commander." The secretary was less effusive in withholding any

opinion on Khanh as a chief ofstate, but given the approving adjectives that both

he and Lodge had recited, they clearly sought to make the best of an imperfect

situation.24

The president and the White House staff, fearing that the neglect of military operations that had followed the 1 November 1963 coup would now recur,

directed that Lodge and Harkins be instructed to pressure Khanh to undertake

immediate operations against the Viet Congo In a joint message to Lodge and

Harkins on 31 January, Rusk and McNamara so directed, stating "that there

must be no opportunity for the Viet Cong to benefit from the events of the past

few days-it is essential that he [Khanh] and his government demonstrate to the

people of South Vietnam, the people of the United States and the people of the

world their unity and strength." To do this required stepping up the pace of military operations "immediately and visibly."25

The shakeup produced by the change in government affected the U.S. establishment in Saigon as well. The friction between Lodge and Harkins became more

pronounced. Already the dispatch of Lt. Gen. William C. Westmoreland to Vietnam as Harkins's deputy just before the coup suggested, in the words of a Los

Angeles Times headline, that "Gen. Harkins' Days Numbered." According to the

article, Harkins had made the "unpardonable blunder of remaining optimistic

about the strategy and program of President Ngo Dinh Diem."26

In the White House, Forrestal told Bundy on 4 February 1964 that "if Lodge

must remain, the military commander must be changed. The President might

publicly load Lodge with full responsibility for the whole U.S. effort in South

Vietnam, giving him as deputy the ablest, most modern-minded 3-star general we

can find. General Westmoreland might fill the bill." Beyond this, Forrestal recommended that a "Manager for South Vietnam" be appointed in DoD directly under

McNamara to deal with under secretaries and assistant secretaries ofstate as well as

with the AID director on equal terms.27

Harkins did not depart immediately; his "normal" tour of two years would

not end until February and a pro forma retirement at age 60 would not occur

until June. McNamara did not want to relieve him until Khanh settled in and
504 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

until Westmoreland had been in Vietnam long enough to take charge. Forrestal

believed that the real reason for McNamara's reluctance was that Taylor and the

Joint Chiefs opposed a change at the time.28 In any event, Westmoreland eventually succeeded Harkins in June 1964 on the latter's retirement, and Maxwell Taylor

took over for Lodge as ambassador in Saigon in July. *29

Whether responsibility for lack of progress in Vietnam lay more with the

military than the civilian U.S. representatives in Saigon was immaterial, Under

Secretary of State Ball judged a generation later. Ball felt that Johnson would have

served himself better when he became president had he questioned the rationale

for continuing the U.S. involvement. "Only a leader supremely sure of himself"

could have decided on withdrawal, butJohnson "felt no such certainty." According

to Ball, by avoiding the larger question the United States remained at the mercy of

events over which it could exercise little contro1.30

Two days after the coup, on 1 February, Lodge confessed that he was disconcerted "at first blush" by Khanh's seizing power just when the Minh government

was beginning to make some progress. In a country so short ofleaders it seemed a

waste to lose what few there were. But he found consolation from the way Khanh

catered to American sensibilities, both in his anti-neutralist posture and in providing continuity by keeping Minh on as chief of state. The ambassador's sober

evaluation saw no real alternative to Khanh; another coup could bring neutralism

or worse in its wake. 31

Toward Escalation: Spring 1964

As for the direction of the military campaign, the plight in the Delta should

have given that area priority. Nothing meant more to administration leaders than

retaking the Delta and winning back the countryside.32 A downturn immediately

following Khanh's takeover, having reversed the slight improvement in January,

gave all the more reason for the United States to make counterinsurgency the first

objective of the new government, but it failed to do so. When Assistant Secretary of State Roger Hilsman left the administration in February 1964, the United

States lost a major advocate of counterinsurgency strategy. Only after winning

back the countryside, he believed, through careful restructuring of the strategic

hamlet program, should South Vietnam begin to attack infiltration bases and

training camps in Laos or go after industrial objectives in North Vietnam.33

The difficulty with this approach lay essentially in the time required to accomplish its goals. Could the United States afford to wait until South Vietnam had

created the political, military, social, and economic conditions necessary to defeat

the Communists? Understandably, U.S. leaders wanted quicker solutions, and

many wanted to bring the war to North Vietnam as a means of stamping out its

*See below, p. 518.
Vietnam: Into the Vortex 505

support of the Viet Congo If North Vietnam suffered enough for its aggression

it would pull back and cut its lifeline to the insurgents. A corollary assumption

maintained that the insurgents would wither away once aid was withdrawn.

In fact, the JCS had made this point before the Khanh coup in some far-ranging recommendations to McNamara on 22 January 1964. Obviously concerned

with the continuing deterioration of the South Vietnamese government's ability to pursue reform or prosecute the war in the several months since the Minh

ascendancy, the Joint Chiefs proposed a major escalation of the U.S. military role

beyond counterinsurgency. Emphasizing that the future of Southeast Asia and,

indeed, virtually all of eastern Asia depended on a Communist defeat, the Joint

Chiefs declared that "the United States must be prepared to put aside many of

the self-imposed restrictions" because "we and the South Vietnamese are fighting

the war on the enemy's terms." These restrictions included keeping the war within

the boundaries of South Vietnam, avoiding the direct use of U.S. combat forces,

and limiting the U.S. role to an advisory one. The chiefs indicated that these selfimposed restrictions conveyed "signals of irresolution" to the enemy. They called

for "increasingly bolder actions," specifically the U.S. military commander taking

responsibility "for the total US program in Vietnam" and the Vietnamese government turning over to him "temporarily, the actual tactical direction ofthe war," to

include "ground operations in Laos ... to impede the flow of [enemy] personnel

and material southward." He would also command operations against North Vietnam-aerial bombings, commando raids, and seacoast mining. To undertake these

operations within South Vietnam and Laos and against North Vietnam would

require the overt commitment of additional U.S. combat forces. The chiefs asked

McNamara to discuss their recommendations with Rusk.34

As it turned out, the timing could not have been worse. The Khanh coup

occurred only two days after McNamara sent the proposal to Rusk. Rusk's reply

on 5 February was a brief diplomatic non-reply, agreeing in general with the JCS

premises but implicitly rejecting the recommended solutions. The focus of counterinsurgency, he wrote, was in South Vietnam, and the war "must be fought and

won primarily in the minds of the Vietnamese people." This then meant that the

war was "essentially political-an important fact to bear in mind in determining

command and control arrangements." While agreeing with the chiefs' statement

on the need for an integrated approach to achieve U.S. objectives, he thought any

action for this purpose had to be weighed against the expected result as well as

balanced against the political and military risks incurred by taking that action.

Rusk closed with the bland evasion that State would "always be prepared to

consider promptly ... any courses of action" proposed by DoD and the JCS,35

With the uncertainties prevailing in Vietnam and Rusk's courteous but negative reply to the ]CS proposals, McNamara deferred strategic decisions until he

had visited Vietnam again and determined the progress, if any, being made by the

new Khanh government. Harkins and Lodge saw hopeful signs in Khanh's early
506 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

actions. Nevertheless, Lodge warned that U.S. support remained a critical factor

in the survival of any government, and "we should continue [to] render this in the

full measure."36

Washington's views about Vietnam derived in good part from the cables sent

from Vietnam, which varied in their rendering of events. Rusk publicly labeled the

war a "mean, frustrating and difficult struggle" but winnable. On the other hand,

William Bundy, scheduled to leave OSD in mid-March to become the assistant

secretary ofstate for Far Eastern affairs, saw a political and military situation that

had worsened steadily since November 1963, a view closer to the gloomy appraisal

of CIA officers in Vietnam, who considered the increased Viet Cong momentum a consequence of the recent destabilizing coups. Territorial losses in districts

previously considered successful areas of counterinsurgency particularly distressed

Bundy.37

McNamara heard opposing views on Vietnam policy as he and Taylor, supported by top officials from 000, State, CIA, and AID, prepared during February

and early March for another fact-finding mission to Saigon. From the White

House, Forrestal shared the CIA judgment that the strategic hamlet program,

including militia training and use of the indigenous Montagnards, had to be

revived. The old mix of civil and military counterinsurgency activity suffered

from too many Army Special Forces being moved from the central plateau to concentrate on the Laotian border as they took over CIA operations.38

The Joint Chiefs mounted a vigorous counter to this advice in their 2 March

response to McNamara's request for their views. They reiterated their recommendations of 22 January for overt military actions against the North Vietnamese as

"part of a coordinated diplomatic, military and psychological program" to deter

them from supporting the Viet Congo These actions should occur either with a

"sudden blow for shock effect" or in an ascending order of intensity beginning

with air strikes and continuing through amphibious raids, sabotage, and harassment of shipping and fishing and then increasing to include military targets in

Laos and North Vietnam directly supporting the Viet Cong, airfields and POL

facilities in the North, industrial plants in the Hanoi/Haiphong area, and a sea

blockade of North Vietnam. The chiefs believed that Communist China would

not actively enter the fray. They also observed that even if these intensified operations should cause North Vietnam to terminate its aid, the Viet Cong could

still sustain the insurgency for an indeterminate period. They suggested that

McNamara use their proposals as a basis for discussion on his visit to Vietnam.

The secretary appeared to favor the JCS approach, noting in the margin of their

paper: "OK, fuller use of massive U.S. air power in lieu of US g[roun]d forces."39

Terrorist acts against U.S. personnel and their families added to the secretary's

concerns. Lodge informed the president on 20 February that "in light of recent

terrorism against Americans in Saigon [15 attacks thus far in the month resulting

in 5 killed and more than 50 wounded], I believe North Viet Nam should be told
Vietnam: Into the Vortex 507

secretly that every terrorist act against Americans in South Viet Nam will provoke

swift retaliation against North Viet Nam." If U.S. dependents were evacuated,

it should be made clear that this was not a frightened response to terrorism, but

"clearing the decks for action." The president postponed a decision on evacuation

until McNamara had consulted with Lodge, but he directed contingency planning

that would speed up pressures against North Vietnam.4o

With last-minute instructions on 5 March from the president in the form of

two letters asking for "the most careful possible assessment of" and "the best possible courses of action for improving" the Vietnamese situation, the McNamara-Taylor mission left for Saigon the same day.41 The group spent the 6th in

Honolulu where Admiral Felt informed them that OPLAN 34A was largely a

failure to date; with the exception of the naval blockade, he endorsed the JCS

proposals of 22 January and 2 March for a broadened war with increased U.S.

military participation and overt strikes against North Vietnam.42

After arriving in Saigon on 8 March, McNamara learned that Khanh did not

currently favor major military action against North Vietnam, instead wanting first

to consolidate his political and military positions in the South. This largely coincided with the president's stance that called for McNamara and Taylor to make

Khanh "our boy" and proclaim the fact widely. As Taylor stated, "he [the president] . . . wants to see Khanh in the newspapers with McNamara and Taylor

holding up his arms."43 Consequently, as directed, they toured the provinces and

repeatedly were photographed on town-square platforms with each holding up a

Khanh arm, as if he were the victor in a boxing match or at a political convention.44 The New 10rk Times described McNamara and Taylor as "shaking hands

with wizened old village men, patting childrens' heads, jumping in and out of

helicopters and shaking more hands." They intended, McNamara stated, "to emphasize . . . that Khanh has the full and complete support of President Johnson

and our whole Government and I want to let his people know this."45

The mission returned to Washington on 13 March. The same day McNamara

circulated for comment a draft report, much of which William Bundy had prepared almost two weeks earlier, but that was now updated to include McNamara's findings from the trip--three proposed alternative courses of action and 12

specific recommendations. The secretary found current military equipment and

concepts sound but believed substantially more performance was required from

the Vietnamese military forces and in the economic and civic action areas. He

thought the general situation had deteriorated considerably since his visit the

previous September, noting Viet Cong control over about 40 percent ofthe countryside and domination of 22 of the 43 provinces, the apathy and indifference of

large segments of the population, and the high (and increasing) rate of desertion

among military and paramilitary personnel accompanied by extensive draft dodging, while Viet Cong recruiting was both energetic and effective. And the political

control structure between Saigon and the hamlets and villages had virtually ceased
508 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

to exist since the November coup. The greatest weakness, the secretary declared,

was the uncertain viability of the Khanh government. On the other hand, Saigon

was now exceptionally receptive to U.S. advice.

Of the possible courses of action, McNamara perceived both neutralization

or U.S. withdrawal as catastrophic and constituting major communist victories.

He rejected overt attacks against North Vietnam at the time, but one of his dozen

specific recommendations was to prepare for such action on a 30-day alert basis. In

other major recommendations he advised that the United States declare emphatically that it would support South Vietnam "for as long as it takes to bring the

insurgency under control" and that it fully backed the Khanh government. He

also called for development of what he termed the Program for National Mobilization, including military and paramilitary forces and a newly created civilian

administrative corps. McNamara also proposed to replace many current Vietnamese military aircraft, ground vehicles, and watercraft with better versions. He

wanted widespread local publicity for an already approved important program to

increase the supply offertilizers to farmers threefold during the next two years. His

final two recommendations would authorize (1) South Vietnamese "hot pursuit"

and ground operations along the Laotian and perhaps the Cambodian borders and

(2) U.S. preparation for participation on 72 hours' notice in these border control

operations and in "retaliatory actions" against North Vietnam.46 McNamara estimated that enlarging Vietnamese military forces by some 50,000 would cost up

to an additional $40 million annually, providing the modern military equipment

would require a one-time expenditure of $20 million, and expanding the civil

administrative corps would need about $1.5 million the first year.47

In coordinating the report with the mission participants and their agencies,

McNamara obtained a quick concurrence from all. However, McCone, while

agreeing with McNamara's recommendations, deemed them "too little too late"

and wanted far more action, including major pressures on Cambodia through

border controls, overt U.S. reconnaissance flights over North Vietnam for both

intelligence and psychological purposes, and having Khanh negotiate with Chiang

Kai-shek to deploy two or three Nationalist Chinese divisions to the southern

tip of the Delta in support of the hard-pressed ARVN troops. These and other

McCone comments in the "too little too late" vein were not included in McNamara's final report, presumably with the director's agreement, but the president and

his staff knew about them from their review of McNamara's draft report to which

they were attached.48

The JCS had previously, on 22 January and again on 2 March, taken a position calling for stronger action than McNamara advocated in his report; on both

occasions they had proposed full-scale U.S. military participation in the war. On

4 March, the day before McNamara left for Vietnam, they had discussed the

subject directly with the president, who pointed out the attendant difficulties of

such a step--a still traumatized nation recovering from the recent assassination,
Vietnam: Into the Vortex 509

a Congress and citizenry unprepared for war, and an approaching presidential

campaign and election. The president thought that any combat expansion should

wait until December when the political arena would have been stabilized "with 4

years and 3 months of permanency ahead." Marine Corps Commandant General

Wallace Greene inferred from these comments that "the President . . . was indirectly telling General Taylor that he did not want him to return from SVN with a

recommendation that the campaign there be expanded to include NVN."49 The

next morning, 5 March, when Greene asked about this inference, Taylor replied

that "his neck and the SecDef's neck were on the chopping block."5o

The Joint Chiefs met in two sessions on 14 March to consider McNamara's

draft report. Greene and LeMay made plain their dissatisfaction both verbally and

in writing. The former labeled McNamara's 12 recommendations a continuation

of the status quo and stated that if the United States decided to stay in Vietnam

it should do so with its full concerted power-"half-measures won't win in South

Vietnam." LeMay criticized McNamara's statement that the current war effort was

both "sound and adequate" and called for removing the restrictions against hitting

Viet Cong sanctuaries in Cambodia and North Vietnam's supply and reinforcement lines through Laos along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.51

The Joint Chiefs finally worked out a reply to McNamara on 14 March in

which they concurred in the secretary's recommendations but offered some changes. They deemed the proposed program inadequate to turn the tide against the

Viet Cong "without positive action being taken against the Hanoi Government at

an early date" to deter the latter's aggression and facilitate the counterinsurgency

effort. To increase readiness for such actions, they urged the creation of political

and military support in the United States and South Vietnam for such purposes.

Second, they recommended "hot pursuit" action into Cambodia. Finally, they

suggested that McNamara's proposed reaction time for Cambodian and Laotian

border control activities and for retaliatory actions against the North be reduced

from 72 hours to 24 and for "graduated overt military pressures" against North

Vietnam from 30 days to 72 hours.52 Greene believed that in this fashion Taylor

had gotten the chiefs to "recommend essentially the actions involved in his

[Taylor's] original position and recommendations,"* thus shifting the burden "from

his shoulders to the Joint Chiefs."53

McNamara reviewed his proposed repon on 16 March in considerable detail

with his top staff, the JCS, and the departmental secretaries. He did not accept

the JCS proposals for decreasing the reaction times for operations over Cambodia

and North Vietnam. Admiral McDonald suggested that dependents in Vietnam

be returned and U.S. forces go on wartime footing. "We have been pussyfooting around and need to decide whether to fight," he declared. When McNamara

* . At the meettng of the ]CS and the president on 4 March, Taylor had called for intensifYing the counterinsurgency operations within South Vietnam and a progressive campaign of "selective air and naval attacks against

Notth Vietnam" (memcon ]CS and Pres, 4Mar 64, cited in n 43).
510 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

noted that officials in Saigon thought such a move bad for morale, McDonald

replied that it represented the business-as-usual approach. 54

McNamara forwarded the report to the president the same day and it underwent scrutiny by the NSC on the 17th. The secretary noted that all involved

agencies had concurred in the report and that he had agreed to have the JCS

undertake a detailed analysis of their proposed modifications to his 12 recommendations. When the president asked if the report's proposed actions would

reverse matters in Sourh Vietnam, McNamara assured him that if Khanh acted

energetically, improvement would be apparent within four to six months. Taylor

added that the Joint Chiefs "believed the proposed program was acceptable, but

it may not be sufficient to save the situation in Vietnam" and could require action

against North Vietnam. Johnson addressed the alternatives-putting in more U.S.

forces, pulling out entirely, or neutralizing the region-and decided the 12-point

program was the only realistic option. 55

The president approved the report and issued NSAM 288 on 17 March, directing all agencies to proceed with implementation of its provisions. He also

released a lengthy public statement containing much of the report's substance but

adding that he hoped to continue to withdraw U.S. forces as South Vietnamese

replacements were trained. Yet he cautioned that additional personnel would be

sent to Vietnam if needed in the future. The president concluded: "It will remain

the policy of the United States to furnish assistance and support to South VietNam for as long as it is required to bring Communist aggression and terrorism

under control."56

It soon became apparent that the immediate acceptance of McNamara's report, quickly followed by the issuance of the secret NSAM 288 and the press

release, did not provide the hoped-for solution to the vexing problems of Vietnam. During the period from mid-March through April, the situation worsened

greatly. Khanh proved largely incapable of bringing about the planned civilian and

military improvements within Vietnam. Although he accepted advice readily and

promised much, he lacked the personal capability and experienced people to carry

it out. On 4 April, he finally promulgated the long-pending National Mobilization Plan to place the nation on a full wartime footing, but he had no staff with

the expertise to implement it. Adding to these woes, he had to cope with growing

disputes between the nation's Catholics and Buddhists, as well as equally vicious

squabbles among the latter. Viet Cong attacks grew in scope and number as U.S.-

Vietnamese discussions about proposed increases to the armed forces dragged on,

making little headway despite inability of the ARVN to meet current draft quotas,

curb desertions, and replace growing combat 10ssesY

Many officials in Washington believed the U.S. country team also suffered

from shortcomings and disarray. They regarded Lodge as an excellent diplomat

in his dealings with Khanh, Minh, and other Vietnamese leaders but believed he

lacked managerial skills to oversee the numerous programs to capture the hearts
Vietnam: Into the Vortex 511

and minds of the Vietnamese populace. Nor was there anyone else on hand to

take on this role. The deputy chief of mission, David G. Nes, had been appointed

with the expectation that he would assume this task, but it did not appear that

he had done so. At the same time, the AID program, in the view of Forrestal and

others, sorely needed strong direction and additional people.58 USIA Director

Carl Rowan, who visited Vietnam in mid-April with Rusk, informed the president

in writing that "the weakest part of the war operation, both on our part and that

of the Government of South Viet-Nam, is in the field of information and psychological warfare." Accordingly, he believed that "top priority should be given to a

large scale United States program to improve the GVN ability to win the support

of the people." He concluded that any effort would fail "unless it has the clear

direction of a single individual."59

The military element of the country team also received poor marks. Many

civilian officials in Washington felt that the U.S. military forces were "fighting" the

wrong kind of war, that they had failed to learn from the French, and, like them,

were insisting on waging a conventional war against largely invisible insurgents

who quickly faded into the general population or into the wooded areas nearby or

just across the Laotian and Cambodian borders.60 Adding to these difficulties was

the unpleasant relationship between Lodge and Harkins that McGeorge Bundy

termed "childish," but which came to a head not long before both were expected

to leave Vietnam.61

The difficulty had actually begun with former Ambassador Nolting and Harkins.* In May 1961 President Kennedy had directed that all MAAGs would function under an ambassador's direction, but U.S. forces engaged in military operations in the field were specifically excluded. When Harkins became the MACV

head in February 1962 he received specific authority, agreed to by McNamara and

Rusk and approved by Kennedy, to meet with and discuss U.S. and Vietnamese

military operations directly with South Vietnam's president and other top political

and military officials. This resulted in a stormy relationship between Harkins and

Nolting that became chillier yet when Lodge became ambassador. He and Harkins

failed to keep each other fully informed about pertinent matters and meetings.62

On 21 April 1964 Lodge directed all agency heads within the country team,

including Harkins, to clear with Deputy Chief of Mission Nes any meeting with

Khanh. Harkins immediately protested, pointing to the authority granted him

in the February 1962 directive. Lodge on the 23rd then asked Rusk to settle the

dispute. A week later, in a letter to Rusk on the objectives and needs ofthe ambassadorial post in Saigon, in effect spelling these out for his soon-to-be successor,

Lodge again made much of the fact that the ambassador lacked authority over

U.S. military activities, that the U.S. "military commander has direct access to the

chief ofstate and that the Ambassador does not control all U.S. access to the chief

*See Chapter XI.
512 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

of state and therefore has no way of assuring that all Americans speak with one

voice. Is this special status truly to the advantage of the military? Does it contribute to creating the 'proper political atmosphere'?"63

Rusk's reply to Lodge, concurred in by McNamara, was, unsurprisingly, diplomatic. He conceded that Harkins had the authority to discuss military matters

with the chief of state (Minh) and the prime minister (Khanh), but this should

not conflict with the ambassador's overall supervisory authority to receive advance

notice and provide policy guidance. The secretary also suggested that Lodge might

amend his directive to except Harkins from reporting to Nes: "I think you can

understand that General Harkins would have some sensitivity about appearing to

report to the DCM." Moreover, Rusk thought that Lodge-Harkins consultations

would undoubtedly be so frequent that "an informal relationship is surely easier

and more effective than written communication in almost all cases."64

Meanwhile, in the JCS differences between the members continued after receipt of a Joint Staffstudy recommending certain immediate overt military actions.

leMay and Greene wanted operations "extended and expanded immediately."

Taylor, Wheeler, and McDonald found the study contained nothing to justifY

any change to the president's recent policy statement. In sending the study to

McNamara on 14 April, the chiefs maintained their different positions. Given the

JCS split views in which the majority did not favor immediate military initiatives,

the secretary took no action.65

The lack of unanimity over the proper U.S. military role-adviser, covert associate, or overt participant-would continue for several more months. On 16 May

the JCS suggested that an interagency working group draft a joint political-military plan of action. They pointed out a week later that to date there had been no

consultation with the South Vietnamese govetnment about attacking the North.

"The Department of State," the JCS stated, "should take the lead on this but as

yet has not." During these same weeks, uncertainty characterized internal discussions among administration "hawks" and "doves" on how and when to involve

congressional leaders on the subject of Southeast Asia, on a successor to Lodge,

and on the selection of an AID chief in Vietnam to head up the extremely important civic and economic support projects there.66

Into this atmosphere of indecision and suspense Khanh dropped a bombshell.

Early on 4 May, he told Lodge he was contemplating declaring a state of war and

evacuating Saigon, including the government, the diplomatic corps, and its population of two million; replacing "so-called 'politicians'" in the government with

technicians; suspending some civil rights; and informing Hanoi that any future

interference in South Vietnam's internal affairs would lead to tit-for-tat bombing reprisals. He specifically asked if the United States would undertake bombing

attacks, and he added that an American "army corps" of 10,000 Special Forces

deployed along the Cambodian-Laotian border would stem the communist incur-
Vietnam: Into the Vortex 513

sions. "He thought it was illogical, wasteful, wrong to go on incurring casualties

'just in order to make the agony endure,'" said the ambassador, who concluded his

message to the State Department with the commentary:

This man obviously wants to get on with the job and not sit here indefinitely

taking casualties. Who can blame him? His desire to declare a state of war,

leaving out specific details such as the plans for evacuating Saigon, seems

wholly in line with our desire to get out of a 'business as usual' mentality. He

is clearly facing up to all the hard questions and wants us to do it too.67

Back in Washington, William Bundy, now at State, discerned "a certain sense

of despair and perhaps some trace of panic" in Khanh's remarks and possibly even

"some sense of pique" that the United States was pushing too hard for the National

Mobilization Plan.68 Forrestal suggested that Khanh (and Lodge) may have been

"somewhat shaken by events ofthe last few days"--explosive damage to an American naval ship, a terrorist attack that wounded eight U.S. military personnel, and

the recent upsurge in other Viet Cong military activity.69 Rusk also "detect[ed] a

trace of despair in Khanh's remarks" and wondered why the general wanted active

combat against North Vietnam when he had so recently stated a need to consolidate first his base in the South,7°

Khanh's remarks provoked similar reactions from the field, confirming Washington's impressions. Admiral Felt labeled them a "temporary (I hope) breakdown

under pressures" from both the communists and the United States. Felt saw no

need for full-scale war measures, thought that "evacuation of Saigon is desperation

talk and should be ignored as a passing mood," and proposed Khanh be given

"another pep talk.',?! Harkins had similar views, adding that the solution to

Khanh's problems was "effective execution of the National Pacification Plan ...

without recourse to panicky evacuations or unrealistic schemes for governing without 'politicians."'72

At a 6 May meeting the president instructed McNamara to visit South Vietnam after his meeting with German officials in Bonn 9-11 May. McNamara would

determine the basis of Khanh's outburst and disabuse him of any possibility of

U.S. support to expand the war into North Vietnam or China. McNamara and

John McNaughton, who replaced Bundy at ISA, arrived in Saigon on the 12th

and were met by Taylor and Forrestal, who had arrived a day earlier,73 In meetings

with Khanh, Minh, Lodge and his country team, and with Harkins, Westmoreland, and the MACV staff, the Washington contingent encountered little of an

encouraging nature--either political or military. As Taylor later summed it up, we

"returned ... with no new ideas to translate into programs.... We had little to

allay the impatience of the President, who had hoped for solid evidence that our

policy was indeed on the right track."74
514 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

Immediately after their return, McNamara and Taylor met with the president

on the 14th and with the NSC and an invited bipartisan group of congressional

leaders on the 15th and informed them of the dismal prospects for South Vietnam. McNamara reported that conditions had worsened since his mid-March

visit, the number of people and the amount of territory under Viet Cong control

continued to increase, and the National Mobilization Plan (approved at the

beginning of April) could not become operational until September at the earliest

and perhaps not before mid- or late 1965. He considered it essential to encourage Khanh in his efforts to increase and improve the military forces, to provide

additional financial, logistical, and training support to Khanh, and to provide additional advisory personnel for the civil side of his government. The secretary

assured the legislators that u.s. soldiers did not engage in combat but sometimes

became exposed to fire during the course of training the South Vietnamese.75

The president announced that he intended to seek a supplemental appropriation for increased economic and military assistance but added that "even with

increased U.S. aid the prospect in South Vietnam is not bright."76 A current CIA

report echoed this view, stating that "sustained Viet Cong pressure continues to

erode GVN authority ... undercut US/GVN programs and depress South Vietnamese morale .... In any case, if the tide of deterioration has not been arrested

by the end ofthe year, the anti-Communist position in South Vietnam is likely to

become untenable."??

Preparation of numerous policy proposals intensified during the next few days.

Johnson on 26 May called for joint meetings ofstaffs in Washington and Southeast

Asia within the week "to review for my final approval a series of plans for effective

action" in Southeast Asia,78 The initial plenary session, held in Honolulu on the

morning of 1 June, included more than 50 persons, after which Rusk, McNamara,

Taylor, McCone, Lodge, Felt, Westmoreland, Rowan, Forrestal, and others, 16 in

number, met in three extended sessions of principals that afternoon and the next

day. The remaining 40 participants formed into four working groups, each discussing a pertinent issue. The discussions were varied and far-ranging, as the two-day

conference produced support for applying increased pressure and agreement to

develop an action program but achieved little consensus on specific recommendations.79 McGeorge Bundy informed the president that "no one is recommending

any major decision today [3 June] or, indeed, in the next few days." He indicated

that Rusk and McNamara would not likely push for expanded "military action ...

at least for several weeks, and possibly for quite a lot longer." Bundy also noted

that both Lodge and Westmoreland were wary over proposals for "encadrement"

or "interlarding"-the placement of U.S. military or civilian personnel at the

several levels of South Vietnamese governmental organization; Taylor described it

as "extensive incorporation of American officials into the Vietnamese administrative structure," a measure favored by Johnson. Bundy stated that the only major
Vietnam: Into the Vortex 515

new agreement stemming from the Honolulu meetings concerned the need to

centralize authority for public information activities both in Saigon, under Barry

Zorthian, already there, and in Washington under Robert J. Manning, assistant

secretary ofstate for public affairs. Bundy anticipated no new startling statements

on Vietnam; rather "the political and diplomatic course of action with respect to

Laos is probably still the most immediate possible trigger oflarger decisions."8o

The Other Players: Laos and Cambodia

Bundy's reference to Laos concerned the rapidly worsening situation there.

He could have also mentioned neutral Cambodia, where the unpredictable Prince

Norodom Sihanouk, intimidated by the threat from neighboring China and North

Vietnam, sought to appease them by repeatedly confronting the United States.

Occasional inadvertent incursions across the Cambodian border by South Vietnamese troops prompted strong verbal attacks by Sihanouk against both South

Vietnam and the United States, probably because he believed that North Vietnam

would be the ultimate winner.8!

Laos, where the Communist Pathet Lao remained a plague on Souvanna Phouma's government, posed greater problems. Months before Bundy's observations

about Laos, on 25 February 1964 Hilsman sent Rusk a draft memorandum for

the president emphasizing that "the recent Communist advances in central Laos

highlight the continuing erosion of the situation in Laos." A U.S. response seemed

necessary partly to curtail North Vietnamese aid to the Viet Cong and partly to

disabuse de Gaulle and Sihanouk about the likelihood of communists taking over

Southeast Asia.82

These concerns had existed before the president issued NSAM 288 on 17

March. By this time the danger posed by the Pathet Lao to the Plaine des Jarres

in Laos placed heavy new pressure on the United States to act. The authorized

small-scale "hot pursuit" and intelligence sorties into Laos would not suffice; more

was needed to stop the Pathet Lao. The State Department in February had considered recommending dispatch of both an air squadron and a ground unit. The

JCS preferred a Marine battalion landing team (BLT) over an Army battle group.

William Bundy believed that an air squadron alone would suffice to "provide

the right kind of signal for the area as a whole." McNamara held off support of

ground intervention. As he advised the president on 25 April, "I see only two ways

to prevent an expansion ofthe influence ofthe Pathet Lao in Laos: either we must

support the Geneva Accords or we must be prepared to introduce U.S. forces into

that country. Of the two 1 much prefer the first."83 While no direct involvement

of U.S. personnel was called for, low-level reconnaissance by u.s. aircraft was.

This would mean a step deeper into the war, but OSD planners, more than willing to act,84 found a receptive hearing in the National Security Council on 29

April, when the CIA estimated that while the Pathet Lao by themselves had only
516 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

a 50-50 chance of defeating the non-communist forces, they could quickly overrun the entire country ifjoined by forces from North Vietnam.8S This confronted

the administration with the possibility of a formal partition of Laos if Souvanna

should lose power.

Lack of coordination among U.S. agencies also complicated response to the

growing crisis. For example, at an 18 May meeting with the JCS McNamara became upset on learning that the CIA had been conducting a "trail-watching operation" in Laos for the past two years, employing 1,200 people in the expensive and

unproductive Operation Hardnose. State wanted no publicity about this activity for fear of damaging relations with Souvanna, who had received assurance

from North Vietnam that it would stop using the Laotian roures to the South.

General Greene noted that even the Defense Intelligence Agency did not know

of this operation. He also seemed to relish the discomfort and uncertainty of the

president and secretary of defense as they pressed for measures to arrest or reverse

the Pathet Lao conquest of the Plaine des Jarres, noting that McNamara was now

considering striking targets in North Vietnam, rather than in Laos, even though

he had previously opposed this JCS recommendation. Greene observed that "up

until now, McNamara has pretty much field-marshaled the entire effort in Southeast Asia, and, with the place starting to fall apart, his whiz-kid-Ford-Motor-Company management techniques apparently aren't paying off."86

As an initial response to the Pathet Lao offensive, the United States requested

Souvanna's approval to conduct low-level reconnaissance flights for target and other intelligence on communist activity.87 The loss of an RF-8 to antiaircraft fire

on 6 June and of an F-8 fighter escort the next day led to deliberations on 8 June

among administration leaders on whether to retaliate and, ifso, how. Much discussion centered on whether retaliation would hamper current efforts to reconvene a

Geneva Accords meeting, whether such an attack would constitute a breach ofthe

1962 agreement, and whether to use U.S. F-8 aircraft or unmarked South Vietnamese T-28s. Faced with widely divided views, McNamara told the president he

"was even ready to give up Southeast Asia" if the United States continued to talk

tough but act weak; it was essential to convey a clear message to Hanoi. The president had some doubts. He did not want to violate the Geneva Accords, even if

the communists did. But with the backing of Under Secretary of State Harriman,

McNamara managed to obtain the president's reluctant approval to retaliate.88 On

9 June, eight F-100 planes struck a Pathet Lao antiaircraft installation at Xieng

Khouang. Subsequent evaluation revealed that only four ofthe eight aircraft struck

the intended target; the other four hit another nearby fortified target containing

the quarters of a Chinese economic and cultural mission.89

Whatever the impact of this strike, it had to be weighed against the concern

for maintaining Souvanna's neutral stance and his Government of National Union.

Souvanna's position was to "make maximum use T-28s" to interdict and destroy
Vietnam: Into the Vortex 517

Pathet Lao and Viet Minh supplies but on a basis of "act but don't talk about

it." Still, the situation remained fragile, with a general communist sweep in Laos

always a possibility.9o

During the summer and fall of 1964, the administration remained cautious

about supporting General Phoumi's ever-optimistic plans for more active military

operations in northern Laos. Established policy continued to adhere to the 1962

Geneva Accords as much as possible and to confine escalation largely to air

attacks on Viet Cong infiltration routes and facilities in the Laos panhandle. As

U.S. armed reconnaissance flights increased, Souvanna continued his support but

resisted U.S. efforts in late November to obtain more candor in public statements

concerning these operations. He reiterated his position to "let the actions speak

for themselves"; after all, this was the position of the North Vietnamese, the 1962

accords notwithstanding.91 North Vietnamese use of supply routes to the Viet

Cong through Laos continued to be a vexing problem.

The Tonkin GulfResolution

Meanwhile, in South Vietnam behind every discussion about the state of

Khanh's government lay the question of U.S. military intervention and its need for

public and, particularly, congressional support. Before soliciting a congressional

resolution on the war, the president had his leading political and military advisers

meet in Honolulu on 1-2 June, where, as earlier noted, they reaffirmed the U.S.

commitment to defend South Vietnam and embraced what amounted to an escalation strategy but remained vague and divided as to what steps should follow. On

5 June McNamara submitted to the president a program to strengthen South Vietnam that included preparation of plans for a strike against North Vietnam. That

GVN forces could do the job seemed unlikely. Nor could there be any certainty of

the willingness of the American public to take on new burdens. Journalist Charles

J. V. Murphy asserted in the May issue of Fortune that the Viet Cong was winning

the war and that only major U.S. intervention could avert defeat.92

The depressing outlook moved the administration to consider in June a

congressional resolution to help win public support for greater u.s. involvement

in South Vietnam. With the presidential campaign expected to heat up shortly and

the civil rights bill still under debate, the question arose whether the resolution

should be sought immediately if it could be done without divisive debate. "On

balance," McGeorge Bundy advised the president on 10 June, "it appears that we

need a Congressional Resolution if and only if we decide that a substantial increase

of national attention and international tension is a necessary part ofthe defense of

Southeast Asia in the coming summer."93 Bundy and his brother did not have in

mind a blank check for the president or a dramatic call-up ofreserves. Rather, they

simply hoped to strengthen the president's hand as commander in chief, using
518 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

as precedents previous resolutions on the Middle East (1957) and Cuba (1962).

Although this would require a presidential message and probably a White Paper, it

could send the right message to both friends and enemies in Southeast Asia and

elsewhere. But McGeorge Bundy concluded his 10 June memorandum with the

opinion that "the risks outweigh the advantages, unless and until we have a firm

decision to take more drastic action than we currently plan."94

Except for authorization of a direct U.S. military strike against North Vietnam, the president already had adequate freedom of action without a congressional

resolution. Continuing difficulties in Vietnam suggested that an emergency requiring direct U.S. military action would come sooner rather than later. In the first

six months of 1964 the VC expanded its number of units, increased its terrorist acts, and in general kept up a high rate of successful guerrilla activity. The

number of incidents between January and June 1964 totaled 2,100, far exceeding

the 1,500 for all of 1963, and while a slight decrease occurred in late May and

June, July figures again showed a sharp increase. To justifY drastic U.S. actions,

more dramatic enemy attacks would have to occur; incidents involving assaults on

American dependents or downing of U.S. helicopters might provide the catalyst.

So could the establishment of a U.S. naval base at Cam Ranh Bay, currently under

consideration, where Marine advisers would conduct amphibious training.95

The change in U.S. diplomatic and military leaders in Saigon in the persons

ofAmbassador Taylor (1 July) and General Westmoreland (20 June) portended an

upsurge in operations against the enemy. Lodge's departure to participate in the

Republican presidential primary campaign was not unexpected. McGeorge Bundy

had drawn up a list on 6 June, less than two weeks before the ambassador submitted his resignation, suggesting possible successors, not excluding himself. Bundy

had included McNamara on his list but felt that "he has been trying to think of

ways of dealing with this problem for so long that he has gone a little stale. Also,

in a curious way, he has rather mechanized the problem so that he misses some of

its real political flavor." Taylor was not on the list, but the president announced his

appointment at a press conference on 23 June.96

Neither Taylor nor Westmoreland, of course, was new to the South Vietnam

scene. Westmoreland had been deputy commander since the winter and had overseen a reorganization of MACV during the spring; Taylor, as chairman ofthe Joint

Chiefs of Staff, had played a major role in making Vietnam policy. Bundy noted

that the president's directive to Taylor gave him "full control over everything in

South Vietnam ..., something the military never let the Ambassador have before."

A well-regarded State Department veteran, U. Alexis Johnson, would serve as

deputy ambassador. William H. Sullivan, State's special assistant for Vietnamese

affairs and head of the Vietnam Coordinating Committee, temporarily joined

Taylor in Saigon in July with the understanding that he would soon become

ambassador to Laos (as he did in November). While this "first rate team" could
Vietnam: Into the Vortex 519

not march into North Vietnam, as Khanh wanted, the administration, Bundy

observed, "will be ready to consider new decisions at any time."97

Other significant changes occurred between April and July. The president

named General Wheeler as the new JCS chairman, and Admiral Ulysses S. Grant

Sharp, Jr., replaced Felt as CINCPAC. Forrestalleft the NSC staffto succeed Sullivan at State.9B

It was not long before maritime clashes provided a ready opportunity for new

initiatives. In January 1964 MACV had established the Special Operations Group

to exercise operational control over the South Vietnamese-conducted OPLAN

34A covert sabotage and intelligence collection actions against North Vietnam.

Initially authorized for 1 February-30 May 1964, they had been extended for the

June-September period. Distinct from OPLAN 34A missions were DeSoto operations, electronic intelligence and surveillance patrols by U.S. destroyers in the

Tonkin Gulf that did not actively support the South Vietnamese forays. The first

patrol in 1964 lasted for two weeks in late February and early March, during

which time the destroyer USS Craig was authorized to go within eight nautical

miles of North Vietnam's mainland, well outside the u.S.-recognized three-mile

limit. In a second such mission, dispatched on 28 July, the USS Maddox also had

permission to go within eight miles ofthe shore. A few nights later, on 30-31 July,

several South Vietnamese OPLAN 34A gunboats attacked two islands off the

North Vietnamese coast.99

On 2 August, while patrolling some 25 to 30 miles off the coast of North

Vietnam, the Maddox was fired on by three North Vietnamese torpedo boats. The

destroyer, along with U.S. Navy carrier aircraft from the USS Ticonderoga, struck

back and damaged the attacking craft. Maddox sustained little damage, but the

incident set in motion the Gulf of Tonkin affair. Following the attack the president met with key advisers and decided against immediate retaliation, surmising

"that an overeager North Vietnamese boat commander might have been at fault."

Instead he directed the Navy to send another destroyer, the USS Turner Joy, to

join the Maddox and continue reconnaissance, to provide the ships with air cover,

and to engage in more aggressive action should a repeat attack occur. When Hanoi

refused delivery of a stiff note of protest and warning of "grave consequences" if

further attacks occurred, it was broadcast to the world. 100

In a morning telephone conversation on 3 August the president suggested to

McNamara that he and Rusk brief selected congressmen about the recent events.

McNamara recommended explaining the OPLAN 34A raids because the North

Vietnamese undoubtedly connected the destroyer patrol and the attacks. That

afternoon McNamara described JCS contingency plans for retaliatory air strikes

against North Vietnam for joint committees of the House and Senate and, in

general terms, mentioned the South Vietnamese attacks against North Vietnamese territory on 30-31 July. He attempted to disassociate OPLAN 34A from
NAVAL HISTORICAL CENTER

Track ofMaddox, 1-2August 1964
Vietnam: Into the Vortex 521

DeSoto patrols. lOI Unbeknownst to McNamara and members of Congress, the

South Vietnamese would carry out another OPLAN 34A raid on the night of 3/4

August.*

Shortly after 8:00 a.m. on 4 August (Washington time) the DIA Indications

Center in the Pentagon received a phone report followed almost immediately by a

message indicating that deciphered communications revealed the North Vietnamese were preparing for naval action that night, possibly against the DeSoto patrol.

McNamara informed the president by phone and met with Vance and Joint Staff

officers to discuss possible retaliatory measures in the event of another attack.

The attack on Maddox on 2 August resulting in the president's determination to

retaliate against a repeat North Vietnamese assault no doubt had predisposed

Washington to strike back immediately. 102

Around 11 :00 a.m. (11 :00 p.m. Tonkin Gulf time) the Pentagon's National

Military Command Center received a report that Maddox was under attack, and it

appeared that the North Vietnamese had struck again. But this time the reported

attack, which occurred on a moonless night in heavy seas, was not as clear-cut as

the 2 August attack that happened in broad daylight. Flash messages, reports of

the engagement, some ambiguous and some conflicting, poured in throughout the

day. McNamara repeatedly pressed the Joint Staff and Admiral Sharp in Hawaii

for more precise information, but poor communications between the task force in

the Tonkin Gulf, CINCPAC in Hawaii, and Washington added to the confusion

enveloping the incident. The extraordinary volume of message traffic that overloaded the secure military circuit and communications throughout the hectic day

resulted in repeated delays in clarifYing events, transmitting orders, and making

decisions. 103

McNamara briefed the NSC around 12:40 p.m. and then, along with Rusk,

McCone, Bundy, and Vance, joined the president for lunch. During this meeting

the president tentatively approved retaliatory strikes. Meantime, Maddox had

signaled that evidence ofthe hostile contact appeared doubtful and needed further

evaluation. During the afternoon, McNamara, Vance, and the Joint Chiefs (less

Wheeler who was out of town most of the day) reviewed the latest reports from

Maddox as McNamara tried to clarifY through the Joint Staff and Sharp what

had happened. Sharp informed McNamara that an initial ambush had been

attempted, but he could not be sure that freak radar echoes were not confused

with the noise of incoming torpedoes. When the secretary asked if there was a

possibility that there had been no attack, Sharp initially replied that there was a

"slight possibility," but in later phone calls provided further details supplied by the

task force commander that strengthened his belief that an attack had taken place.

McNamara, Vance, and the Joint Chiefs studied Maddox's reports, Sharp's updates,

*McNamara stated in February 1968 that he did not know of the 3/4 August attacks until after his 6 August

1964 testimony to Congress (SCFR, Hearings: The Gulfa/Tonkin, The 1964 Incidents, 90 Cong, 2 sess, 20 Feb

68,15).
522 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

and available intelligence, particularly another deciphered North Vietnamese

message stating that two "comrades" had been sacrificed, and by late afternoon

came to the beliefthat North Vietnamese torpedo boats had attacked Maddox. 104

By this time the first news reports of the attack had appeared, adding pressure on the administration to confirm the bulletins and act. At the second NSC

meeting ofthe day (the evening of 4 August) the analysis presented by McNamara

and his aides provided the administration with all that it needed for the president

to order air strikes. The attendees also considered both a draft statement that the

president intended to use to inform the American public of the attack and U.S.

retaliation and a draft congressional resolution supporting his actions. Despite

assurances from Sharp, repeated delays in positioning the carriers for the strike

aircraft operations caused more uncertainty about the timing ofthe air attacks and

forced the president to defer his address to the nation until just after 11 :30 p.m.

The retaliatory air raids struck naval craft at five bases and at a petroleum depot.

Code-named "Pierce Arrow," this first U.S. assault on North Vietnam on 5 August

destroyed or damaged numerous naval craft and about 10 percent of the nation's

petroleum supplies. 105

On 5 August Johnson asked for passage of a congressional resolution empowering him to take "all necessary action to protect our armed forces and to assist

nations covered by the SEATO Treaty." He declared "that the North Vietnamese

regime had conducted further deliberate attacks against US naval vessels operating

in international waters" and that he had directed retaliation. TestifYing in executive

session on behalf of the resolution before the Senate committees on foreign relations and armed services on 6 August, McNamara denied any connection between

the destroyer patrol and the South Vietnamese attack on the two North Vietnamese islands on 30/31 July. He stressed that the United States did not participate

in the South Vietnamese operation, much to the disbelief of Senator Morse, who

accused the U.S. Navy of backstopping the South Vietnamese raids and insisted

that the United States was implicated in an act of aggression against North Vietnam.

Later that morning, in front of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, McNamara acknowledged the North Vietnamese denied a second attack had occurred.

However, he cited testimony from eyewitnesses aboard Turner Joy and sonar and

radar readings. He stated that "very hard evidence," the deciphered messages*whose

*At the time and in 1968 testimony McNamara consideted the intercepts unimpeachable evidence that an

attack had occurred on 4 August. Subsequent analysis by former NSA and CIA officials concluded that certain

ofthe decipheted messages transmitted on 4 August were actually describing events of 2 August. More recently,

additional questions have been raised about NSA's reporting of the second incident, including allegations of

errors and misrepresentations in interpreting and conveying the data. See "The 'Phantom Battle' That Led

to War," us. News & World Report, 23 Jul 84, 63-64; New York Times, 31 Oct 05; Robert Hanyok, "Skunks,

Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish: The Gulf ofTonkin Mystery, 2-4 August 1964," Cryptologic Quarterly, Winter 2000lSpring 2001, item 2, Gulf of Tonkin Documents Index, hrrp:llwww.nsa.gov/vietnam/index

(NSA released a partially declassified version on 30 November 2005).
Vietnam: Into the Vortex 523

disclosure would "destroy our intelligence sources," confirmed that there was a second attack. Asked if the United States did anything to provoke the attack,

McNamara agreed with the assertion that "this came out of a clear sky." He assured

members that the DeSoto destroyer patrols were routine, and that, aside from the

highly classified intelligence, the administration had kept nothing from them. 106

McNamara deftly and precisely answered each member's questions, without offering any more information than was requested. He and other officials protected the

secrecy of U.S. control of 34A covert operations against North Vietnam. The day

before McNamara's testimony, the operations had been temporarily suspended. 107

On 7 August the House adopted the resolution unanimously (416-0); the Senate took similar action, with only two negative votes (88-2). The president signed it into law on 10 August. The joint resolution, which became known as the

Tonkin Gulf Resolution, granted Johnson far-reaching discretionary executive authority. Senator Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, agreed

with Kentucky Sen. John Sherman Cooper that the resolution gave the president

"advance authority to take whatever action" he deemed necessary on behalfofSouth

Vietnam. lOB

Officials in Washington temporarily suspended 34A activities but did not

change 34A policy despite North Vietnamese complaints to the International

Control Commission about the maritime raids launched from Da Nang. On 7

August the ICC notified Westmoreland that it would send members to Da Nang

to conduct an investigation. He reacted by concealing some ofthe fast patrol boats

used in the covert operations in nearby coves. 109

On 15 August, anticipating that North Vietnam would likely publicly protest

future maritime attacks against its territory and military forces, McNaughton requested that the JCS Office of the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and

Special Activities (SACSA), which handled the 34A program, develop a plan for

publicly acknowledging the covert operations against North Vietnam. After weighing the pros and cons of having General Khanh in Saigon admit to the maritime

attacks and leaflet drops, SACSA concluded that "once the door is opened, US

political and military officials at all levels must be prepared to field a multitude of

queries." This they were not willing to do. Accepting the risk of exposure, in September the president authorized the resumption ofthe covert 34A operations. I I0

The immediate conjunction of the Tonkin Gulf incidents with a congressional resolution gave rise then and later to suspicion that the second attack was a

trumped-up affair by the administration to gain legislative support for a more aggressive Vietnam policy. Ball, the devil's advocate in White House meetings, doubted the existence of any attack. And even the president showed skepticism when,

according to Ball, he later remarked, "Hell, those dumb, stupid sailors were just

shooting at flying fish." 111 It seems clear that in the brief period 4 and 5 August

Washington could not resolve the contradictory evidence and elected to accept the

probability of attack. Since 1964 the weight ofscholarly opinion, based on exten-
524 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

sive review and analysis of the evidence, is that there was no second attack on the

DeSoto ships.1l2

The haze surrounding the second incident in particular, combined with rapid

introduction of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, would continue to spawn charges

that the administration deliberately misled Congress to secure passage ofthe measure. Later bitterness over the war and the momentous events that followed the

Tonkin Gulf crisis further fueled the conspiracy thesis. But in the absence of any

substantiating proof, the charges remain unsupportable. No matter how eager the

administration may have been to exploit a real or imagined provocation, there is

no evidence that it manufactured the second incident. I 13

Still, in the short run, the Tonkin Gulf Resolution served the administration's

objectives well. As the election campaign progressed, the congressional resolution

helped protect the president from Senator Goldwater's attacks, permitting Johnson

to stress firmness while advocating moderation. Where the Republican candidate

seemed to support unlimited involvement in Vietnam, Johnson claimed that he

wanted to avoid sending ''American boys 9 or 10,000 miles away from home to

do what Asian boys ought to be doing for themselves." Indeed, as the campaign

progressed, Johnson felt free to move from emphasizing his steadiness over Vietnam to stressing the dangers of the wider war that he claimed Goldwater was

espousing. I 14

Crisis in Saigon

Neither the political nor the military situation in the South allowed the administration to implement its plan for more aggressive measures against the North.

From his vantage point as information officer in the Saigon embassy, Zorthian

recalled "the absolute chaos with the lack of any Vietnamese government structure,

the gradual and then the abrupt deterioration of the Vietnamese Army . . . . We

couldn't get up in the morning knowing there would be a government in hand."

The trouble was not that official Washington was unaware of Saigon's problems

but that it simply failed to realize the depth ofthe government's plight. IIS

Entering August the Khanh regime faced imminent collapse. Khanh spoke

boldly of his war leadership, but in reality he had to spend his time trying to cope

with student unrest, Buddhist rebellion, and Catholic plotting, all abetted by the

ongoing and growing Viet Cong subversion. Following the Gulf of Tonkin incidents, he attempted to remove the popular though ineffectual and disaffected Big

Minh from the scene by issuing a provisional constitutional charter that would

abolish the office of chief ofstate and make himself president with sweeping powers. Ensuing riots forced Khanh to offer his resignation on 25 August 1964. The

Military Revolutionary Council refused the offer and instead established a triumvirate, with Khanh, Minh, and Lt. Gen. Tran Thien Khiem, the defense minister

and one of Khanh's co-conspirators of the January coup, to run the government
Vietnam: Into the Vortex 525

temporarily. On 13-14 September, an attempted coup by several generals, with

little popular or military support and actively opposed by the U.S. embassy, failed

and further frayed governmental authoriry. In the short term these eruptions led

to the creation of a shaky civilian government by the beginning of November,

complete with a new constitution, a new chief of state, and a new premier, but

with Khanh as the military commander in chief whose authoriry was under pressure from a group ofyouthful generals, usually referred to as the Young Tutks, who

sought to assert military control. 116

Given the chaos in Vietnam and an upcoming election in the United States,

few military initiatives occurred during the summer and fall of 1964. The president, as Forrestal noted, wanted "to keep the lid on," and avoid any unhappy

surprises that might make unfavorable headlines at home before November. The

Joint Chiefs, as usual, were divided. Against the advice of LeMay and Greene, who

urged extensive air strikes against North Vietnam, Wheeler and the other JCS

members supported Taylor's position "that it was important not to overstrain the

currently weakened GVN by drastic action in the immediate future." 117

The inactiviry, however, was one-sided. The Viet Cong insurgency did not let

up in this period, and there was no evidence that any U.S. message of determination influenced Hanoi. Rather, Washington's behavior appeared fitful and uncertain, hardly evidence that the United States intended to win a war that its client

state could not win on its own. Instead offollowing up the signal provided by the

Tonkin Gulf Resolution, the Johnson administration displayed little more initiative than its South Vietnamese ally. 118

On 10 September Johnson agreed to the issuance of NSAM No. 314, which

provided for the resumption of DeSoto patrol operations but directed that they

"be clearly dissociated from 34A maritime operations." The thrust of the memorandum's recommendations for military action was defensive: GVN air and ground

movements into the Laotian corridor would be limited and U.S. units would "respond as appropriate" to attacks on them. The administration still hoped that these

modest measures, together with political and economic actions, would lift South

Vietnamese morale. 119

The DeSoto patrols were suspended again in September after what was

thought to be another enemy attack. On 18 September, a night with weather

conditions similar to those of 4 August, the USS Morton and USS Edwards radioed that they were under attack from four unidentified boats. The destroyers

opened fire but there was no response. There had been no visual sightings, only

radar. Later, in congressional hearings on the Gulf ofTonkin in 1968, McNamara

would testifY that lack of credible evidence in this instance had deterred him and

the president from taking retaliatory action. 120

Through October intelligence reports and messages from Taylor reported that

conditions continued to deteriorate in South Vietnam as its government became

more disarrayed and pressure from the North increased. On 27 October the JCS
526 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

told McNamara that "strong military actions are required now in order to prevent

the collapse of the US position in Southeast Asia." They recommended military

actions in ascending order up to the level of U.S. strikes in the South and "forward

deployment of US combat units in Southeast Asia." Predictably, LeMay and

Greene wanted to go further and undertake "selective air strikes against DRV to

include air strikes on infiltration routes." McNamara's position underscoring the

higher priority of political and economic over military measures prevailed until

election day. 121

This policy did not help either American or Vietnamese morale. The sense of

impotence increased when, just before the U.S. election, on 1 November 1964,

the Viet Cong attacked with mortars the air base at Bien Hoa, only a dozen miles

from Saigon, killing 4 Americans, wounding 72, and destroying 5 B-57s and

damaging another 13. This bold strike impelled Ambassador Taylor and the Joint

Chiefs to call for an immediate and powerful response against North Vietnam.

But the president resisted; the election was only three days away. As Rusk noted in

a message to Taylor, "we are inevitably affected by election timing. Quick retaliation could easily be attacked as [an] election device here."122 According to Greene,

during McNamara's 2 November meeting with the Joint Chiefs, Taylor twice

expressed concern that "a major effort in South Vietnam might result in a war

with Communist China." McNamara, also worried about China, told the chiefs

that "the President being born in Texas is inclined to take some action. He wants

to move, but he wants to be God-damned sure of himself before he does so."123

Several years later, in writing his memoirs, the president ascribed his non-response

to the unsteadiness and military weakness of the South Vietnamese government,

just being re-formed under civilian leadership, and his fear of Viet Cong attacks

against U.S. dependents in Saigon. 124

Even as the administration rebuffed the military hawks, the deepening gloom

over conditions in South Vietnam had forced it to reconsider its options in Vietnam. Weeks earlier, in September, when the president had heard Taylor's pessimistic description of the political confusion in Saigon, he asked "if anyone doubted

whether it was worth all this effort." The answer he received then-and probably

wanted-held that the United States could not afford to allow Hanoi to succeed.

McNamara made a point of noting that "money was no object" in examining

courses of action in Southeast Asia. Rusk was convinced that it would be worth

any amount to succeed. And the president weighed in with the observation "that it

was necessary not to spare the horses." The translation of this political conviction

into military action would require, as the Joint Chiefs clearly understood, far more

than a tit-for-tat response. Vigorous air strikes offered only one alternative; even

the deployment of U.S. ground forces should not be excluded. 125 Consciously or

not, the administration seemed to be gearing up to do what it had never wanted

to do in the past, take the war out of Vietnamese hands and into its own. This
Vietnam: Into the Vortex 527

prospect followed inevitably from the premise that South Vietnam could not be

allowed to fall to communism. Not only the military chiefs accepted the possible

use of U.S. armed forces, but also McGeorge Bundy, who as early as 31 August

1964 suggested to the president that "we should have a hard look at this grim

alternative .... It seems to me at least possible that a couple of brigade-size units

put in to do specific jobs about six weeks from now might be good medicine

everywhere." 126

Back to the Drawing Board

After deciding not to retaliate for the Bien Hoa attack of 1 November, the

next day, just before the national election, Johnson established an NSC Working

Group, chaired by William Bundy,* to conduct another in-depth review of U.S.

Indochina policy. Using the resources of State, 000, and CIA, by 17 November

the group compiled a 100-page draft and a 20-page summary that then underwent

close scrutiny by departmental secretaries or equivalents who constituted themselves the Executive Committee, and by Taylor (back in Washington for about a

week, beginning 27 November). The president also reviewed the earlier drafts,

before approving a much-altered and shortened version on 3 December 1964. 127

Its first sentence said it all: "US objectives in South Vietnam (SVN) are unchanged"-stop North Vietnamese support of the Viet Cong and end the latter's

insurgency operations, reestablish an independent and secure South Vietnam, and

maintain the security of the non-communist countries in the area. 128 In a ''first

phase" 30-day military period, the United States would concentrate on supporting

South Vietnamese and Laotian ground and air operations against infiltration and

"possibly" conduct air strikes against the North "as reprisal against any major or

spectacular Viet Cong action." Beyond the 30-day period, the first-phase actions

might be expanded during a designated "transitional phase' by deploying large

numbers of U.S. aircraft to South Vietnam, possibly initiating air raids a short

distance into North Vietnam, and by preparing to remove American dependents

from South Vietnam. Thereafter, if South Vietnamese governmental effectiveness

improved and if Hanoi failed to negotiate and agree to acceptable terms, "the US

is prepared-at a time to be determined-to enter into a second phase program,

in support of the GVN and RLG, of graduated pressures directed systematically

against the DRY" to consist primarily "of progressively more serious air strikes ...

and of appropriate US deployments to handle any contingency." 129

The same day, in his instructions to Taylor, the president outlined what he

regarded as the two major problems: South Vietnamese governmental instability and continued Hanoi support of the Viet Cong; in his view the former far

*Other members included John McNaughton; Hatold Ford, CIA senior China-Asia officer; Vice Adm. Lloyd

M. Mustin, senior operations officer, JCS; and McGeorge Bundy.
528 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

outweighed the latter in importance. Consequently, improved SVN governmental

performance was essential "before new measures against North Vietnam would be

either justified or practicable." He authorized Taylor to initiate planning for the

second phase "with the understanding that the USG does not commit itself now

to any form of execution ofsuch plans." 130

The 3 December policy statement and the instructions to the ambassador both

addressed diplomatic, political, economic, and civic matters, including even

sanitation and hygiene, since any hopes of success rested on obtaining a viable

government and winning the backing of the South Vietnamese people. Johnson

sent the new policy statement and a copy of his instructions for Taylor to McNamara, Rusk, and McCone on 7 December, along with the injunction that he

considered them a "matter of the highest importance" whose substance "should

not become public except as I specifically direct." 131

Despite consideration of plans for more aggressive actions, the latest policy

statement represented only a limited change. It still held out some hope of regeneration of an effective South Vietnamese government, negotiations with North

Vietnam, and the possibility, if need be, of air strikes. The major difference was the

more precise calibration of the sequence of military actions, especially a projected

air campaign against the North.

Events in the winter of 1964-65 bore out the improbability of a viable government coming to power in Saigon. The civilian government of Tran Van Huong,

installed in late October-early November, lasted only until 20 December, when

Khanh and the Armed Forces Council (AFC) abolished the High National Council, the temporary legislative body, pending an election and establishment of a

general assembly.132 Huong stayed on temporarily until 27 January 1965, when

Khanh took over direct control of the government and designated a new premier

and then another on 16 February.133 In the course ofthese maneuverings he completely alienated Taylor, who now viewed him as nothing more than an inveterate

schemer. The last straw was Khanh's reported approach to the Viet Cong for the

purpose of establishing a neutralist government with himself at its head. 134 At last,

after the AFC put down an attempted coup against Khanh on 19-20 February,

it voted the next day to send him packing as a roving ambassador abroad. Taylor

described the period as "the most topsy-turvy week since I came to this post."135

The lack of responsibility by Saigon's ruling elite seems to have slowed rather

than accelerated the U.S. takeover of the war. Even when a U.S. officer housing

billet in Saigon was bombed on 24 December 1964, killing 2 Americans and

wounding 66 Americans and Vietnamese, despite extremely strong recommendations from Taylor, Westmoreland, Sharp, and the JCS for reprisal air strikes against

North Vietnamese barracks, Johnson, supported by McNamara and Rusk, rejected

the proposal. 136 In a lengthy message of explanation to Taylor on 30 December,

the president provided the rationale for his disapproval. Obviously most important

was the turmoil and disunity among the Vietnamese people and the lack of a func-
Vietnam: Into the Vortex 529

tional government. Nor, he noted, should "we ... be widening the battle until

we get our dependents out of South Vietnam." Additionally he wanted improvement in the apparently weak measures for protection ofU.S. barracks and aircraft.

Finally, he questioned continued recommendations for air attacks against the

North. "I have never felt that this war will be won from the air, and ... what is

much more needed and would be more effective is a larger and stronger use of

Rangers and Special Forces and Marines .... I am ready to look with great favor

on that kind of increased American effort, directed at the guerrillas and aimed

to stiffen the aggressiveness of Vietnamese military units .... I myself am ready

to substantially increase the number of Americans in Vietnam if it is necessary

to provide this kind of fighting force against the Viet Cong."137 It seemed clear

that the president, as well as McNamara, Rusk, and McGeorge Bundy, still placed

defeat of the insurgents above defeat of North Vietnam as the ultimate solution

to the war, and that depended on the establishment of a stable South Vietnamese

government.

One week after Johnson's inauguration, McNamara and Bundy, concerned

about what they saw as failed U.S. policy in the wake of continuing internal

upheaval in the South, warned the president that "our current policy [in Vietnam]

can lead only to disastrous defeat." They saw only two alternatives: the first, to

use U.S. military power in Southeast Asia to check the communist advance; the

second, to pursue negotiations and salvage whatever possible without adding to

current U.S. military risks. They opted for the first alternative, noting that "the

worst course of action is to continue in this essentially passive role which can only

lead to eventual defeat and an invitation to get out in humiliating circumstances."

They noted that Rusk disagreed, hoping that current policy, contingent on a

strengthened regime in the South, would work out. 138 Rather than have Taylor

return to Washington during this tumultuous period in Saigon, the president sent

Bundy to survey the scene.*139

While the Bundy mission was in South Vietnam, in the early morning of 7

February the Viet Cong carried out four attacks-two against U.S. Army personnel in the Pleiku area that resulted in 7 killed and 109 wounded plus damage to or

destruction of a large number ofArmy aircraft. In an evening meeting (6 February

in Washington), supported by the unanimous recommendation of Taylor, Westmoreland, and Bundy (in Saigon) and the NSC members, Johnson authorized

air strikes against four targets in North Vietnam-all barracks-and directed the

evacuation of all American dependents from South Vietnam.tl4o The next day,

the president publicly announced these air strikes along with his order to deploy a

*Bundy's party consisred of McNaughron; Leonard Unger, Srare; Lr. Gen. Andrew Goodpasrer, JCS; Chesrer

Cooper, NSC; and Jack A. Rogers, OSD. They left Washingron on 2 February and returned on the 7th.

t Only Senator Mansfield, attending the NSC meeting along with House Speaker McCormack, voiced opposition to the reprisal Uohnson, Vttntage Point, 125).
530 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

Hawk air defense battalion to South Vietnam; he ended his public release: "Other

reinforcements, in units and individuals, may follow." 141

That evening (the 7th), Bundy arrived from Vietnam with the mission's findings. The first words delivered the message: "The situation in Vietnam is deteriorating, and without new U.S. action defeat appears inevitable." With the stakes

in Vietnam so high, the U.S. investment so large, and no available channel for

negotiation, "development and execution of a policy of sustained reprisal against

North Vietnam" seemed to offer the best "chance of success in Vietnam."142 On

8 February, with Speaker McCormack and Minority Leader Gerald Ford from the

House and Mike Mansfield and Minority Leader Everett Dirksen from the Senate

in attendance, the NSC discussed at length possible future actions. At the conclusion, Johnson observed that "it is true that we have real trouble in Vietnam but we

are not going to pull out."143

The initial reprisal action had little effect, as the Viet Cong struck again on 10

February, attacking U.S. Army barracks at Qui Nhon, killing 23 Americans and

wounding 21. After discussions with NSC and congressional members, the president ordered immediate air strikes, again on North Vietnamese barracks, which

were carried out on 11 February with a loss ofthree U.S. naval aircraft. 144

The Viet Cong attacks of 7 and 10 February against U.S. troops proved to be

a turning point for the president and many of his advisers. As he stated during

the NSC meeting on 8 February (and later reiterated in his memoirs) he thought

the time had come "to deter, destroy and diminish the strength of the North Vietnamese aggressors and to try to convince them to leave South Vietnam alone."145

This left no doubt about his objective during the NSC's 10 February meeting;

Bundy noted "that the President had 'turned the corner' and we were on the track

ofsustained and continuing operations against the North."146

Immediately after the president had finally authorized action against North

Vietnam, McNamara asked the Joint Chiefs to ready an eight-week program based

on two or three attacks each week. They responded immediately, sending to the

secretary on 11 February a plan that consisted primarily of air strikes against North

Vietnamese military targets below the 19th parallel but also included proposals

for ship bombardment, continued covert operations, DeSoto patrols, and limited

ground operations across the Laotian border. It also called for deployment or the

readying for deployment of numerous fighter squadrons, a wing of B-52s, a

Marine expeditionary brigade, two Army infantry brigades, an aircraft carrier, and

supporting units to South Vietnam, Thailand, Guam, or elsewhere in the western

Pacific. 147 On 13 February, the president generally approved the JCS plan with

modifications as part of a three-pronged program calling for (1) an intensified incountry pacification effort, (2) limited air action against North Vietnamese targets

(about once or twice a week), and (3) an approach to the United Nations with the

objective of persuading North Vietnam to enter into peace negotiations. 148
Vietnam: Into the Vortex 531

Johnson received reinforcing support from former President Eisenhower with

whom he met on 17 February for several hours, along with McNamara, Wheeler,

Goodpaster, and Bundy. Eisenhower stated the need to deny Southeast Asia to the

communists; however, the South Vietnamese people had to be the critical factor in

that effort. American assistance should take many forms-food, medical, morale

measures for the civilian population, as well as military operations to include a

"campaign of pressure . . . north of the border" to impede infiltration. Should

China or the Soviet Union threaten to intervene, messages suggesting the possible

use of nuclear weapons could be passed to them, as had occurred in obtaining

the Korean War armistice. Eisenhower hoped that the use of U.S. ground troops

would not be required, "but if it should be necessary, so be it." He also provided

one bit of advice that would be largely ignored in the future. Quoting an old adage

that "centralization is the refuge of fear," Eisenhower suggested that the military

mission be "very broadly stated" and then rely on the field commander to do the

job. 149

The next day, 18 February, the president approved the first of planned air

attacks against North Vietnam-the Rolling Thunder air campaign-by both U.S.

and South Vietnamese aircraft. The initial mission, scheduled for the 20th, was

canceled because of the attempted coup in Saigon on 19-20 February. Subsequent

missions, Rolling Thunder II, III, and IV; were also canceled because of continued

concern over the reliability of the Saigon government and military establishment

or because of bad weather. Finally, the first Rolling Thunder attack occurred on 2

March 1965 when USAF fighters and light bombers destroyed 75 to 80 percent

of an ammunition depot base while South Vietnamese Air Force fighters largely

damaged or destroyed most of a naval base at a cost of five USAF and one VNAF

aircraft lost to antiaircraft artillery. 150

Thereafter, until October 1966, this first phase of the Rolling Thunder campaign continued, with the purpose of promoting South Vietnamese morale, reducing the infiltration of men and supplies from the North, and gradually destroying

Hanoi's military bases and forces, all in the hope of weakening the enemy's will

to fight and initiating peace negotiations, while avoiding a conflict with China

and the Soviet Union. Eisenhower's advice notwithstanding, the president and

McNamara retained firm control over Rolling Thunder operations; the targets for

each mission generally required their personal approval. 15l

"McNamara's war"

From the beginning the United States had intended that military assistance to

South Vietnam would consist of providing equipment and advice; success or failure in the conflict would depend on the South Vietnamese themselves. Successive

administrations maintained this position, but it gradually eroded as the Viet Cong

grew stronger, the South Vietnamese government steadily disintegrated, and its
532 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

military forces faced problems of inadequate leadership and high rates of desertion. A major change in the U.S. outlook started to occur with the August 1964

Tonkin Gulf incident and the ensuing congressional resolution, which Johnson

and his advisers viewed as an endorsement of their long-held belief that the fall

of South Vietnam would lead to a communist victory in all of Southeast Asia and

possibly beyond. Action to forestall such a catastrophe seemed imperative.

On the occasion of the Tonkin Gulf incident, the president allowed the Navy

to conduct a single air attack against a North Vietnamese naval base. Concurrently

a sizable buildup of U.S. airpower took place in South Vietnam for the purpose of

combating infiltration into the South along the Laotian and Cambodian borders,

but attacks against North Vietnam were not allowed. This embargo remained

despite Viet Cong assaults against U.S. military forces in November and December 1964. Only after the attacks of 7 and 10 February 1965, which resulted in

unacceptable U.S. personnel and weapon losses, did Johnson reluctantly agree to

sustained, iflimited, air operations against North Vietnam.

Previously, the president, McNamara, Rusk, and other top civilian officials in

Washington had opposed any proposal to introduce U.S. ground troops into

South Vietnam other than in an advisory role, although they had recognized it

as potentially necessary. Even at the time of the Tonkin Gulf incident both Taylor

and Westmoreland had opposed such a step. Although after the February 1965

attacks Westmoreland proposed the deployment of ground troops to protect

several major U.S. bases,152 he went along when Taylor on 22 February disagreed,

"except possibly for protection of [the] airfield at Danang." Taylor feared that a

"white-faced soldier armed, equipped and trained as he is," is not a "suitable guerrilla fighter for Asian forests and jungles." Only with reluctance did Taylor agree to

the need for a Marine contingent to defend the Da Nang air base. 153

Four days later, on 26 February, the president, backed by McNamara, Rusk,

the Joint Chiefs, and Eisenhower's recent supportive advice, rook the next step and

authorized the Marine deployment. 154 On 8 March, two battalion landing teams

arrived at Da Nang, followed in four days by a third team and a helicopter unit. 155

Taylor later reflected "how hard it had been to get authority for the initiation of

the air campaign against the North and how relatively easy to get the marines

ashore. Yet I thought the latter a much more difficult decision and concurred in it

reluctantly." I 56

Even though Johnson considered these latest military actions as a consistent

evolving policy, they did in fact constitute an escalation of what would soon be

an American war. Only U.S. intervention and direction could keep South Vietnam from collapsing. For American policymakers, options other than taking over

combat appeared to have evaporated. Limited bombing did not seem to faze either

the Viet Cong or the North Vietnamese. And extensive bombing not only made

Americans a major target of retaliation but precipitated in turn dispatch of more
Vietnam: Into the Vortex 533

Americans to defend those already in the country. The results were precisely what

McNamara and Taylor had sought to avoid: the Americanization of the war. u.s.

forces in Vietnam grew from 3,164 at the end of 1961 to 23,310 at the start of

1965; deaths from hostile action (including Laos) increased from 11 in 1961 to

147 in 1964. The next year would see the force figure climb to 184,314 and combat fatalities to 1,369.

Until 1965 McNamara appeared to have been of two minds about Vietnam.

It was not that he wanted to abandon the effort, although his frustrations with

Saigon's leadership tempted him from time to time. Nor did he fail to recognize

the importance of the pacification effort. By 1964 McNamara believed that the

war had to be won in the villages of the South, not in the bombing of the North.

fu late as 9 February 1965, immediately after the Pleiku incident, in a report to

the president he gave more attention to the work of AID than he did to the military.157 He remained optimistic throughout 1964 that U.S. support could remain

temporary and discriminate. Even as he gave in to the need for selective bombing

he still maintained some hope that American advisers could leave by the end of

1965. McNamara was a restraining influence on the Joint Chiefs in the first 15

months ofthe Johnson presidency.

At the same time he accepted the inevitability of increased involvement in

South Vietnam, which required lifting restraints. There were "two paramount

reasons," he told the House Foreign Affairs Committee on 11 March 1965, "why

we must succeed in helping that country resist the aggression mounted against it

by North Vietnam. First, a Communist victory in South Vietnam would immediately open the way for further adventures by the Hanoi regime, and by China, in

other neighboring countries .... Second, it is vital that the United States prove

to the world that the form of aggression being tested in South Vietnam is not the

'wave ofthe future.'"I 58

fu early as April 1964 Senator Morse had referred to the conflict in Vietnam

as "McNamara's War." When a reporter asked his reaction, McNamara replied:

"This is a war of the United States Government. I am following the President's

policy and obviously in close cooperation with the Secretary of State. I must say

... I don't object to its being called 'McNamara's War.' I think it is a very important war and I am pleased to be identified with it and do whatever I can to win

it."159 Almost a year later, as U.S. ground troops stood poised to enter South

Vietnam, McNamara reiterated this view in part. He noted, "Some people have

been calling the one [war] in South Vietnam 'McNamara's war.' I don't mind. I

strongly support our policy of helping South Vietnam fight off the Communist

insurgency. But it's not 'McNamara's war'; it's a Communist war, and a dangerous one, and if we don't meet it now it may endanger us more seriously at a later

date."I60 McNamara was correct in that it was not his war; it was a Viet Cong

war, a North Vietnamese war, and becoming an American war with South Vietnam more and more a passive partner by 1965. Whatever the depth of his own
534 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

conviction, he increasingly became the face of a commitment that had passed the

point of no return and he pursued the task with characteristic vigor and authority.

Some 30 years later, in his memoir of the Vietnam War, McNamara recalled that

he delegated many 000 issues to his deputies but "1 increasingly made Vietnam

my personal responsibility. That was only right: it was the one place where Americans were in a shooting war, albeit as advisers. 1 felt a very heavy responsibility for

it, and 1 got involved as deeply as 1 felt 1 could and be effective. That is what ultimately led people to call Vietnam McNamara's War." 161
CHAPTER XX

Conclusion

In his first four years as secretary of defense Robert McNamara had to cope

with an unending series of international crises, a wide-ranging reevaluation and

transformation of national security policy, and the hands-on management of the

Department of Defense colossus-all of this in an unpredictable and menacing

world and an increasingly divisive domestic political environment. Some of the

problems he encountered were of his own making, the result of his own driving

style and sometimes heavyhanded approach. He seemed ever embroiled in controversies with one set of adversaries or another, often at the same time-the Joint

Chiefs and the military services, Congress, state and local officials, the press,

NATO allies, and, of course, the Soviet Union and the communist bloc. The challenges would have daunted a lesser man. McNamara seemed to relish them.

McNamara's bold management style would not have been possible without

the full measure of confidence and support accorded him by the two presidents he

served. Both admired and formed a bond of friendship with this member of the

administration who was at the same time a star performer and a lightning rod of

controversy. Roswell Gilpatric believed that "no cabinet officer in my time has ever

been closer to his Chief than McNamara was to John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B.

Johnson, both ofwhom treated him as first among equals. Not only did Bob never

take advantage of this unique Presidential trust and confidence; he was careful

never to impinge upon, far less usurp, Presidential authority that he could easily

have exercised."l Johnson had an exalted view of his secretary of defense: "I had

a good impression of McNamara from the first day I saw him .... And he has

exceeded my expectations .... When I wake up, the first one I call is McNamara

.... He is smart, patriotic, works hard .... He's like a jackhammer .... No

human can take what he takes, he drives too hard. He is too perfect."2 Without

certain knowledge that his leaders would stand behind him, the secretary would

535
536 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

probably not have undertaken some of his more contentious actions or survived in

office as long as he did.

The mastery that McNamara exerted over the Defense Department in his

first years in office resulted in no small part from his strong personality and dominating presence. Hyperboles employed by the early critics of his accomplishments

reflected the tendency to equate the office with the man. Such labels as "the McNamara Monarchy" and "Master of the Pentagon," and particularly the "McNamara

Revolution," identified the institution with its leader as seldom before or since.3

Eugene Zuckert, who became secretary of the Air Force, later described the striking impact McNamara had on him. "I have never ceased being impressed with the

fact that on January 18th [two days before taking office] McNamara had achieved

such a grasp of the job at hand and had organized his conclusions so thoroughly

that in a meeting with most of the members of his incoming team, he was able to

delineate many of the initiatives which would command major attention during

the coming months."4

From the beginning McNamara had in mind objectives that looked to centralizing in OSD direction of the department, making the military forces more

effective, and reducing the costs of operating the military establishment. His cost

consciousness doubtless derived in part from his experience as comptroller of the

Ford Motor Company and his penchant for statistical analysis. He quickly made

his presence felt by calling into question as many activities ofthe department as he

could identifY. Within weeks of taking office he set in motion task forces to examine every aspect ofthe Pentagon's responsibilities. Many of them cut across service

lines; their number seemed to increase with each passing day, blossoming to some

140 before McNamara had finished taking the measure of the department. With

speed an essential element, deadlines for the reports were short, sometimes only a

few weeks.5

How much of this "revolution" was a matter ofstyle, of appearance of change

rather than a genuine transformation, remains debatable even today. Certainly,

some ofthe changes had been initiated under the Eisenhower administration. McNamara recognized, as did his predecessor, Thomas Gates, that the Department

of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 gave the secretary the power he needed

to effect major changes. Gates had set a notable example of the use ofsuch power

when in 1960 he established the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff to develop

overall target selection and a single integrated plan for strategic operations.6

What distinguished the two administrations was the extent of the new secretary's control of the Defense establishment. McNamara's management approach

employed programming (linking military planning and budgeting) and systems

analysis (assessing essential cost effectiveness and delving into the hard choices

of which funds went into each program) in the service of synergy and efficiency.

As McNamara observed in April 1964, he wanted to examine every area in the

department, and act on what hitherto had been only a partial recognition that the
Conclusion 537

prime rationale for creation of the Defense Department was to bring about close

coordination ofthe missions involved in land, sea, and air warfare.7 Administrative

changes within OSD, while not extensive, significantly altered not only its composition but its reach. New offices of assistant secretaries and several new Defense

agencies served to widen the span of control over 000 exercised by the secretary.8

While the three military departments retained the responsibility to arm,

supply, and support land, sea, and air forces assigned to unified commands, the

secretaries of the departments found their roles much diminished by McNamara's

ideas of 000 organization. At the very beginning he declared flatly that "the

offices of the service secretaries are anachronisms." He saw no sense in developing

a force structure for one service separate from the overall national force structure.

The secretaries, he believed, could make only minimal contributions to a coherent

program unless they knew what the other services proposed to do. McNamara's

emphasis on centralizing management to serve overarching 000 objectives weakened the offices and status ofthe service secretaries.9 The secretaries seemed to have

only the choice of accepting the downgrading oftheir offices or resigning.

There was discomfort in Congress with McNamara's changes, particularly

having OSD assistant secretaries deal directly with officers and civilians in the military departments, bypassing the secretaries in the process. When Chairman Carl

Vinson of the House Armed Services Committee accused McNamara of making

the Office ofthe Secretary ofDefense into a fourth service, the secretary responded

by saying he was not proposing to change the laws governing DoD. Vinson accepted his argument that the OSD assistant secretaries could not perform their

functions without freedom to consult informally with their counterparts in the

services. 10

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also, though not subjected to any organizational

changes, recognized that their stature had been diminished. The secretary maintained that he met with the Joint Chiefs faithfully every week and consulted with

them on all matters, but the chiefs usually found themselves providing sounding

boards for positions he and his OSD staff were advocating. Little of the resentment engendered in the JCS seemed to affect him. Even such a conforming spirit

as General Lemnitzer could not conceal his unhappiness with his role as JCS

chairman under McNamara. Only the anger of the blunt-spoken General LeMay

seemed to impress McNamara, and LeMay could be dismissed as a special case. "It

never bothered me that I overruled the majority of the Chiefs," McNamara later

asserted. He claimed that all he wanted was the right answer, and if four people

proposed the wrong answer and one person the right one, "I supported the one.

If I thought all five were wrong, I selected another answer. Initially, that caused a

certain amount ofresentment and concern."ll

Lemnitzer's successors as JCS chairman, Maxwell Taylor and Earle Wheeler,

had more harmonious and friendly relations with McNamara. They generally,

though not always, went along with the secretary's policies and often succeeded in
538 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

persuading their reluctant JCS colleagues to acquiesce. For sure, some ofthe chiefs

and other military officers regarded Taylor and Wheeler as McNamara's minions,

too close to the throne and overly compliant.

Particularly galling to the Joint Chiefs was the secretary's use of civilian experts

to second-guess the military strategic planners. Teams of youthful managers were

no novelty to the secretary. He had been one of a comparable group of young

men who moved from the Army Air Forces after World War II into important

management positions at Ford. The 1960s version had their mentor in Charles J.

Hitch, who came from the Rand Corporation to the Pentagon in 1961 to become

assistant secretary of defense (comptroller). His brightest disciple, Alain Enthoven,

became the major figure in the development ofsystems analysis. Not all the Whiz

Kids came from Rand; others-economists, engineers, and lawyers-were drawn

from Ivy League universities, industry, and prestigious law firms. Despite their

youth, they exuded energy, intelligence, and confidence in their ability to change

the ways ofthe Pentagon.

Understandably, these civilians provided inviting targets for members of the

military services, and particularly the Joint Chiefs, who perceived them as intruders on traditional military functions. Some of the Whiz Kids, convinced that objective quantitative analysis counted for more than experience, were, or appeared

to be, contemptuous of the military. Enthoven provided an egregious example of

this attitude during a visit to U.S. Air Force headquarters in Germany. When a

general outlined plans for his briefing, the young economist reportedly interrupted

him to say, "General, I don't think you understand. I didn't come for a briefing. I

came to tell you what we have decided."12 Enthoven might not have employed this

language in addressing the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but Lemnitzer's

pique at interference by the Whiz Kids was never difficult to discern.

The Whiz Kids in turn had their own grievances against the Joint Chiefs.

Enthoven could scarcely believe that before McNamara no one had responsibility

for systematically examining strategy and weapon systems. He found it absurd that

the comptroller was not supposed to have anything to do with weapons, forces,

and strategy because they were the exclusive territory of the JCS. In retrospect,

he was convinced that the JCS "had become a great big political logrolling affair"

where officers were assigned to protect the interests of their services without even

a pretense of objectivity. 13 (Enthoven overlooked Comptroller Wilfred McNeil's

significant role in examining forces and weapons in the Eisenhower administration.)

Service competition and infighting among the chiefs played a key role in neutralizing service and JCS challenges to McNamara and OSD dominance. Disinclination to support the needs of a sister service was common; backbiting all too

often accompanied back-scratching. The consequences of this parochialism could

and did affect the larger interests of national security. While working to change
Conclusion 539

the system, McNamara took advantage of service rivalries to advance his own

programs. LeMay, for example, did not support the Army's Nike-Zeus ABM project and in turn received little support from his colleagues in his fight for the B-70.

In such instances the secretary did not have to overrule the chiefs. They defeated

themselves.

As the engine to drive the management reforms, particularly the central task

of formulating the budget, McNamara instituted PPBS-a planning, programming, and budgeting system intended to remove the duplication, waste, service

competition, and uncoordinated appropriation requests that had characterized the

planning and budgeting process in the past. The new process would bring together

the estimates, requirements, expenditures, and anticipated activities ofall the military

departments and agencies in the service of coherent national objectives. Its major

tool, "systems analysis," represented a quantitative approach to problems that evaluated the cost effectiveness of alternative ways of meeting objectives. A key to the

successful operation of the system involved OSD establishing its budget-making

authority over the military departments, to which end McNamara lent himself

wholeheartedly.

The reasoning behind relating missions and operations more closely to the

budget appeared logical. The parochial divide between the services would be

bridged by a system that sought to ensure that their individual service missions

would serve the common national interest in accordance with a common strategy.

Where in the past the Army, Navy, or Air Force might develop programs independently and often in competition with each other, the secretary would now exercise

authority to designate a single service to do the work and employ the weapon

system. In light of the importance of PPBS in McNamara's Pentagon, the role of

Hitch as comptroller and of Enthoven as deputy assistant secretary for systems

analysis became conspicuously important to the operation ofthe department.

The consequent changes reached deep inside the military departments. AB the

1963 DoD Annual Report observed, "the organizational structures of all three

military departments have been realigned since 1961 to provide better support to

the operating forces and more efficient management."14 The Air Force combined

its Air Research and Development Command and part of its Air Force Logistics

Command into a single Air Force Systems Command in 1961. In 1962-63 the

Army consolidated seven technical services chiefly under the new Army Materiel

Command. In 1963 the Navy placed five technical bureaus under the direct supervision of the chief of naval materiel, and command of shore-based installations

directly supporting the fleet under the chief of naval operations.

McNamara expected that the organizational reforms and the new budgeting

system would produce results quickly: according to his own account he was not

disappointed. While efficiency and cost containment as well as centralization of

authority constituted the heart of his agenda, they would not come at the expense
540 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

of national security. And, indeed, he succeeded in enlarging the strength and capabilities ofthe military establishment while carrying out these far-reaching changes.

Although PPBS proved an effective managerial tool and together with organizational reforms and McNamara's intense efforts at cost reduction actually succeeded in reducing many costs, the secretary found himself presiding over Defense

expenditures that grew steadily larger each year, with the exception of FY 1965.

Factors and events beyond his control had great impact on the Defense Department, requiring expenditures that offset and eventually exceeded the savings he

had achieved. In addition to the rising cost of weapon systems, Defense had to

contend with international crises in Berlin, Cuba, and Vietnam that created demands for more men and money.

From the beginning, McNamara dazzled congressional committees with his

impressive intellect, his great self-assurance, his capacity to respond in remarkable

detail to questions, and his assertive no-nonsense style in disputation. Generally,

he appeared before the committees alone, without the usual backup entourage that

secretaries had always brought with them. He was, indeed, a one-man band. At

the same time, McNamara's institutional changes-employment of PPBS, the cost

reduction program, base closures, and OSD control of weapon system choicesprompted close congressional scrutiny and inquiry.

Having dealt successfully with Congress and much of the press in his early

years in office, McNamara seemed unprepared for his diminishing influence in subsequent years. In retrospect, he liked to make a point of noting that he never lost

a key legislative battle and that time had proven the correctness of his positions,

but he came to recognize that his victories left a residue of criticism.ls Moreover,

his record after 1962 did not show him always prevailing. He took the position in

1963, for example, that a billion dollars for military aid was inadequate and unacceptable, yet he failed to secure more in FY 1964. He also failed to recognize that

his best efforts could miscarry.

His stand on the Reserves and National Guard quickly brought him into

direct conflict with powerful congressional opponents. The secretary held that it

was illogical for the two organizations to coexist as inefficiently as they did. Merger

made eminent sense, and he proceeded to act on the assumption that reasonable

people would recognize the wisdom of his judgment. Clearly, he underestimated

the power of vested interests, but he did attempt to court them in Congress from

time to time. Reluctantly and belatedly he came to recognize by 1965 that his

plans to merge the two would fail because the array offorces against him remained

too powerful to overcome. It was not that he misunderstood the reasoning of the

partisans of the Reserves and National Guard or failed to recognize their political

potency. It was just that, as he viewed it, his logic should have won over even the

most obdurate opponents.

McNamara's reputation in Congress suffered from his stubborn stance in favor

of the TFX, an aircraft intended to serve both the Air Force and the Navy. His
Conclusion 541

assuredness and determination made enemies much as it did in his contest with

the Air Force and Congress over the B-70, where he was more successful. The

TFX was produced and found a foreign market, but at an excessively high cost.

The Navy eventually canceled its F-111B program after only a handful had been

delivered. McNamara countered charges of conflict of interest and of poor judgment in the choice of companies to build the plane by blaming service resistance

for undermining the initial plans. He grudgingly admitted that his was a Pyrrhic

victory. 16

Such bitter victories, while impressive, came at a high price-the erosion of

congressional confidence and support. He tended too frequently to blame Congress for failing to do its homework. The undertone of condescension could not go

unnoticed by congressional leaders, even as McNamara professed deference to the

legislative branch and avowed that he strongly believed in its investigative right,

declaring that "the record will show that our cooperation exceeds that of any executive department faced with a similar set of circumstances." Sen. Richard Russell

observed that "McNamara is entitled to the highest praise for the administration

he has brought to the Department of Defense," but "sometimes, I wish he was a

little less sensitive about the few areas in which the views of the Congress differ

from his and that he did not have to react so defensively and combatively to the

exercise of our responsibilities." Adding to the friction, McNamara believed that

the armed services and appropriations committees in both houses ofCongress were

not representative ofthe electorate: most chairmen were Southerners, the members

disproportionately Southerners and reserve oflicers. 17

Norman Paul, the OSD assistant for legislative affairs in 1961-62, noted how

the initial respect for McNamara's dedication and brilliance wore off over time.

Many legislators gained the impression that McNamara was just dictating to them.

While they were free to ask all the questions they wanted to, "essentially they were

there to critique his program. They felt that they should have been brought in

more on the formulation of programs."18 According to Henry Glass, McNamara's

relations with Congress deteriorated over time because "there was a certain talking

down" to its members like a professor in the classroom. ''At the beginning they

were overwhelmed by his knowledge, but he was not well liked, because members

ofthe Congress do not like people who are much smarter than they are, and show

it." Glass observed that "he always seemed to have answers. If he didn't have one,

he thought it up on the spot."19

Gilpatric, who served as McNamara's deputy through January 1964, agreed

that "he didn't suffer fools gladly, and he was so clear in his own thinking and his

own exposition that he tended to show his disdain for pettifogging questions and

tactics" by some congressmen. Moreover, he did not appreciate the importance of

winning over congressional staffs. "It was one thing to go up and see Senator Stennis and explain the whole thing to him or to Senator Russell or Margaret Chase

Smith, but if you or somebody in your behalf hadn't done the spade work with
542 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

their staff, you were just wasting your time .... And McNamara didn't think that

was an efficient way of operating." In Gilpatric's view, it took McNamara a long

time to realize the importance ofthis kind of "missionary work. "20

Still, McNamara's self-confidence and stubbornness in defending his decisions won him admiration as well as hostility in Congress. Vinson, a strong foe

of his plans to bring the military under more direct control of OSD, nonetheless

repeatedly expressed his high regard for the secretary's talents and abilities. On

the occasion of Vinson's retirement from Congress in 1964, he proclaimed that

McNamara was not "just a good Secretary of Defense, he's the best we've had."21

Another antagonist, acerbic Representative Hebert, challenged McNamara's authority and judgment frequently but still wanted an autographed photo for his

office.22 The best testimony to McNamara's success during his first four years

was that, despite the growing resentment and reservations, Congress on balance

approved so much of his agenda.

On the international stage McNamara attained visibility far beyond that of

previous secretaries of defense, at times exercising more influence than Secretary of

State Rusk. Sometimes he upstaged Rusk by speaking out on foreign policy matters

when the latter was silent. Nevertheless, McNamara and Rusk had a mutually

supportive and respectful relationship. McNamara's annual posture statements to

congressional committees began with a sweeping survey of the international scene

and its military significance because he felt the need to fit U.S. military policy into

the larger framework of global geopolitics. When this earned McNamara criticism

that he was encroaching on State Department prerogatives, he maintained that he

acted in concert with the secretary of state, that he expressed his views publicly

and privately on such matters because of the military implications inherent in so

much of foreign policy. The secretary ofstate accepted McNamara's casting a large

shadow in foreign policy and maintained that "we insisted upon cooperation and

worked hard to obtain it." It should be understood, however, that the State

Department retained its traditional prerogatives in foreign relations and often succeeded, with the support of the president, in overruling Defense initiatives and

positions, including such crucial matters as military redeployments and cuts in

overseas forces.23

McNamara and his two presidents felt deeply the responsibility imposed on

them as custodians of the nation's strategic nuclear forces. They devoted much

time and thought to the central problems of strategic policy and the proper role

of nuclear forces. Here the questions were legion. How much nuclear force was

needed? What was the optimum composition? What was the best mechanism for

controlling the use of nuclear weapons? How could their potential use be legitimized? What was their appropriate role in NATO strategy? Could an arms control

agreement be reached with the Soviet Union? Could proliferation of nuclear weapons be halted or curtailed? Should there be a shift of emphasis from nuclear to

conventional forces? How to defend against nuclear attack? All of these issues were
Conclusion 543

intricately connected and occasioned frequent and intense debate and negotiation.

There were few clear-cut resolutions because there could be no definitive answers

to the questions. Indeed, the problems proved enduring.

The Cold War warmed dangerously when tension created critical flash points

in Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam, hardening perception ofthe Soviet Union as

a threat to the United States and world order. Always overshadowing all other

considerations in the u.S.-Soviet relationship loomed the ratcheting strategic arms

competition. fu; nuclear weapons and long-range missiles proliferated, the prospect of nuclear war became more chilling and unthinkable.

The frightening thought of such a war spurred McNamara to seek ways to

lessen the possibility that it might occur. He sought to limit the number of

ICBMs, establish greater controls over U.S. and NATO nuclear forces, and adopt

a strategy of greater reliance on conventional military forces. While preparing for

war, McNamara aimed always to prevent it. He supported efforts to reach understanding with the Soviet Union on the testing of nuclear weapons. Even as the

nuclear competition became more intense, and especially after evidence of nuclear

pollution ofthe atmosphere became more compelling, Kennedy and then Johnson

redoubled efforts to contain the competition and succeeded in achieving at least

one early success-the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963-a crowning achievement

ofthe Kennedy-McNamara years.

While striving to contain the strategic arms competition, the secretary continued to make certain that U.S. "strategic offensive forces are and will continue to

be fully capable of carrying out their basic mission under any foreseeable circumstances." In his annual report for FY 1965 he emphasized that "since 1961 the

number and megatonnage of nuclear weapons in the alert forces has just about

tripled." Missiles continued to replace bombers, but there were still more than 900

manned bombers in the strategic offensive force in 1965.24

Primarily in the formulation of NATO strategy, McNamara's approach to the

use of nuclear weapons reflected his faith in flexible response and a reliance on the

rationality of the communist adversary. Convinced that a nuclear war would be a

disaster for both sides, he advanced early in 1962 a counterforce strategy that could

withstand the damage from a first nuclear strike with assurance that a secure U.S.

retaliatory force would still be able to destroy the enemy's nuclear bases. Knowledge of this capability, he believed, would provide sufficient deterrence against a

first strike on the part of the Soviet Union, and would help to remove the strategic nuclear weapon from any future conflict. McNamara at first seemed unable or

unwilling to recognize the weaknesses in this position-the reliance on the Soviets' responding in kind, the huge cost, the unlikelihood of effective air defense

and civil defense, and the uncertainty whether all enemy prime targets could be

destroyed in a counterstrike.

This position accounted for his insensitivity to Europe's fears that the United

States and the Soviet Union might reach an understanding that not only would
544 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

remove the strategic nuclear option from the defense ofWestern Europe but could

also remove the United States from the continent. McNamara remained fixated, as

demonstrated by his speeches at Athens and Ann Arbor in May and June 1962, on

raising the nuclear threshold as high as possible. The allies were also disconcerted

when later that year, clearly in recognition of the prohibitive difficulties counterforce posed, he seemed to abandon it for assured destruction of cities, industrial

facilities, and strategic nuclear bases.

The NATO allies were mistaken about McNamara contemplating abandonment of Europe. He recognized the deficiencies of any anti-ballistic missile system

and saw his civil defense program rejected by Congress. Moreover, continuing

advances in nuclear technology seemed to make the urban and industrial centers of

both the United States and the Soviet Union equally vulnerable, thereby providing

a mutual deterrent far more effective than any active or passive defense measures

could offer.

From the beginning of NATO the United States had exhorted and pressured

the European members to build larger and stronger conventional forces. Disinclination and inertia ensured that the Europeans would not meet force goals periodically agreed on. McNamara's proposals to raise the nuclear threshold and

place greater emphasis on the conventional forces alarmed and troubled the

NATO allies. Building larger conventional forces would not only impose a costly

burden on the allies, it would feed their sense of insecurity. If the United States

opposed the use of nuclear weapons, would conventional weapons deter a Soviet

assault? The nuclear weapon may have been unusable, but flexible response necessarily had to retain a nuclear option.

Although the nuclear option loomed ominously on both sides in the Cuban

missile crisis in 1962, the antagonists recoiled from the brink. That military power

could be fine-tuned below the nuclear level emerged as a lesson from the crisis.

To achieve success required the measured application of force to the degree that it

would not yield an unwelcome reaction from the adversary. The key was to display

and exercise power in a way that did not "paint the other side into a corner. "25

Such careful calibrations operated on the assumption that the opponent was

equally rational. No matter how high the tension in the fall of 1962, the prospect

of miscalculation, McNamara was convinced, made the Soviet Union as fearful as

the United States ofthe consequences of a nuclear war, and caused it to remove its

missiles from Cuba. He refused to acknowledge that resolution of the Cuban crisis

appeared to rest on a deal with the Soviet Union in which the removal of missiles

from Cuba would be matched by removal of U.S. missiles from Turkey.

With the Berlin and Cuban crises behind it in 1963, the administration focused its attention on Southeast Asia, where it had long perceived another communist threat. U.S. military involvement in Vietnam had been growing steadily

since 1960. When the fateful decision to fight a large-scale war there came in 1965,

it may have been influenced by the considerable buildup ofthe fighting and logis-
Conclusion 545

tical strength of the U.S. armed forces during this period. Beginning in 1961

McNamara personally directed a substantial increase in ready combat forces and in

airlift and sealift capabilities as well as measures to improve command and control

ofthe whole military establishment. The availability ofthe means may have helped

dispose the administration to contemplate with some assurance the extensive use

offorce in Vietnam to achieve its ends.

Efforts at balancing this great military power with diplomacy to achieve the

desired outcome in Vietnam failed badly to meet McNamara's expectations. Vietnam differed greatly from Cuba in most respects. Instead of a short-lived intense

crisis it became a long-running open wound that the United States could not

stanch. The failure before 1965 to recognize the true nature of the complex circumstances in Vietnam led to a costly involvement that powerfully shook both the

domestic and international environments. In the early 1960s McNamara accepted

designation of the conflict as "McNamara's War." In retrospect he expressed guilt

and contrition for his role and for the country's actions.26

While McNamara's behavior in office may have shown the influence of illusion and self-deception, normal human failings, the image of him as deceitful and

manipulative seems wide of the mark. Most of the criticism eventually pointed to

his management of the Vietnam War. Through most of his years in office, McNamara remained convinced that a far militarily superior United States would

prevail in Vietnam. Despite his perception of the incompetence and corruption of

successive governments in the course of his frequent visits to South Vietnam, his

analyses throughout the years 1961-1965 projected eventual defeat ofthe communist enemy.

He proved disastrously wrong in his expectations, although it took time for

the illusion to be punctured, and only some time after a massive troop buildup

had begun. McNamara's opposition to further engagement came later; by then he

was trapped by his earlier expectations and his loyalty to the president. For 20

years after he left office he could scarcely bring himself to speak about Vietnam,

even as his sense of guilt and remorse grew. Not until 1995 when he published

his reflections on the war and his role in it, did he make a public confession of his

putative sins. Ironically, the criticisms that this book provoked were as harsh as any

directed against him during "McNamara's War." Rather than winning appreciation

for candor, his confession unleashed a torrent of angry denunciation from left and

right, from those who condemned McNamara for failing to reveal his sentiments

when his opposition might have made a difference, to those who charged that his

misgivings had fatally damaged the war effort and then tarnished the sacrifice of

those who had died for a just cause.

Critics could also point to the missile gap of 1961 as an example of duplicity. McNamara exposed the gap as nonexistent at the time, observing that even if

the United States trailed the Soviet Union in the number ofICBMs, there was no

"deterrent" gap given the variety of other long-range weapons in America's nuclear
546 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

arsenal. Yet two years later he could speak of a "destruction" gap that justified

his support for a massive buildup of Minuteman and Polaris missiles. His endorsement of rapid growth of nuclear weapons rested on a need to combat the

possibility of a future gap as well as to placate uneasy NATO allies, but the action

appeared inconsistent or, worse, disingenuous.

While grappling with the great strategic and international questions that increasingly engaged his attention, McNamara also devoted time and his usual

energy to important domestic concerns, among the most distressing and troublesome of which were civil rights and racial relations in the military. The call-up of

Reserve and National Guard forces during the Berlin crisis of 1961 caused 000,

belatedly, to give serious attention to discrimination against blacks throughour the

armed forces and generated pressure on the administration to address the race

question. While President Truman by executive order in 1948 had opened the way

for full integration of blacks within the military services, it proceeded slowly, since

changes in the military did not apply to customs and laws in states that housed

many ofthe bases, and little progress had been made toward removing discriminatory practices in many such places.

McNamara essentially followed the White House's approach that 000 would

ensure that all activities within the jurisdiction of the military would be free from

any legacy of segregation. In April 1962 a 000 directive required integration of

all-black and all-white Reserve units "as rapidly as is consistent with military effectiveness," but excluded the National Guard from its scope on the grounds that it

"is an organization of volunteers under the command of the respective Governors." In a report to the president in July 1963 McNamara approved ofsanctions

against facilities that discriminated against black servicemen but only with the

approval ofthe secretary ofthe military department concerned.27

McNamara resolved his seeming ambivalence as the civil rights movement in

the country advanced. After the passage ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964, he strongly admonished the secretaries of the services in July "that it is and will be a continuing responsibility of commanders to foster equal treatment for every serviceman" in support of his rights and of the opportunities offered in the Civil Rights

Act, which also made it possible to deny funding for federally assisted programs if

racial discrimination was not voluntarily eliminated.28

In general, Defense's record on civil rights reflected a swelling current of concern and commitment in the country. One reason advanced for avoiding conflict

with Southern governors and congressmen over a segregated National Guard in

1961 was fear ofthe damage federal intrusion might do to unit performance. This

argument was stood on its head in 1964 when McNamara stated officially that

denial of equality for blacks on or off the base, in the Reserve, or in the National

Guard affected their morale and thus damaged military efficiency. 29

On another front of the civil rights struggle McNamara and 000 also played

a prominent part. Five years after President Eisenhower had federalized national
Conclusion 547

guardsmen and sent Army troops to enforce court-ordered integration at a high

school in Little Rock, Arkansas, President Kennedy, too, had to call in troops to

cope with rioters seeking to deny admission ofJames H. Meredith to the University of Mississippi in Oxford. When 400 federal marshals could not enforce the

ruling of a u.s. Court ofAppeals, the president intervened with federal troops.30

McNamara participated in the discussions that led to the president's decision

on 30 September 1962 to federalize the Mississippi National Guard and to send

in federal troops; the secretary was authorized to use military force as necessary to

enforce the court order}l By the next day the Army had dispatched 20,000 troops

to the Oxford area, including elements oftwo airborne divisions. Troops remained

in Oxford in reduced numbers into 1963; all forces left by 25 July ofthat year.32

The number of troops ultimately deployed in Oxford seemed excessive, but

the reasoning behind the dispatch of airborne troops was that these elite forces

would not only quell the disturbance but that the example set would inhibit future

violent challenges to civil rights. The intervention sent the intended message to

the nation at large-the federal government would use all its powers to uphold

the law of the land.33 As for McNamara, his active role in support of civil rights

earned him, in this arena as in others, powerful enemies as well as friends.

Between 1961 and 1965 Robert McNamara put his mark on the Department

of Defense with deeper impression than any secretary in the twentieth century

before or after him. He would serve longer and effect more change than any other

secretary, but it was the first four years in particular that were so remarkable for

their pathbreaking quality. Harold Brown, who served under him for almost seven

years as director ofresearch and engineering and secretary ofthe Air Force, writing

years later from the perspective of 1978 when he was himselfsecretary of defense,

felt that McNamara "completely changed (for the better) the way the Defense

Department operates. Despite several attempts since then to change it back, that

method of operation remains much more as he left it than as he found it ....

His stamp is on the office much more than that of any of his predecessors or

successors. And this is not because his was the longest tenure; what he changed he

changed during his first four years. "34

Even his detractors testified to the quality ofhis intellect, his managementskills,

his remarkable dedication to and prodigious capacity for work, and his willing,

even aggressive, acceptance of responsibility. His management skills, in particular,

evoked near-universal respect and wonderment. McGeorge Bundy, not given to

hyperbole, wrote of McNamara that he was "an administrator oftruly exceptional

force and skill." Assistant Secretary Eugene Fubini, an outstanding scientist, maintained that "management is not a science, it is an art and McNamara was (is) one

of the great artists of management." Additionally, he inspired loyalty, admiration,

and even affection in his closest associates and assistants in the Office ofthe Secre-
548 THE MCNAMARA ASCENDANCY

tary of Defense. "While 1 consider McNamara to have been the best organized

leader of the Defense establishment since General Marshall," his deputy Gilpatric

observed, "he is not just a management genius; his qualities of heart and spirit and

his generosity and modesty were as effective in attracting the devotion of those

under him as his administrative abilities and his system of exercising authority."35

At the same time he evoked angry opposition, resentment, and even loathing

among contemporaries and later critics. Management guru Peter Drucker pronounced that "the greatest strength of McNamara as a person is that he inspired

admiration; his greatest weakness is that he did not inspire trust." John Blandford,

a longtime, well-informed, and influential counsel of the House Armed Services Committee, asserted that McNamara "was the wrong man in the wrong job

at the wrong time . . . . He centralized when he should have decentralized. He

appeared to ignore professional military advice when he sorely needed sound

military advice." Admiral Ulysses Grant Sharp, CINCPAC between 1964 and

1968, found that McNamara "did not seem to understand military strategy" and

that he ignored "the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military commanders in the field." Sharp felt certain that his "negative opinions" and

"feelings ... [were] shared by the large majority of officers who were in high ranking positions during McNamara's tour as Secretary of Defense." Maxwell Taylor

attested to this sentiment: "I was probably the only man in uniform who ever

said that McNamara was the best Secretary of Defense that had come along. But I

believed it."36

Bur even as the military resented and decried McNamara's methods of administering the department and what many considered his arbitrary and contemptuous

behavior toward them, they eventually derived important benefits from the relationship. Paradoxical as it may seem, they adopted some of his management

techniques, particularly PPBS and systems analysis. Before McNamara left office

the military services, adapting to the new era, had trained their own officers in

the techniques, permitting them to deal with OSD at a high level of competence.

Blandford conceded that McNamara's "greatest contribution ... to our military

structure was to force the military to learn the system [systems analysis]."37

Inevitably, the McNamara Pentagon would not remain the same under successive administrations. ISA would lose some ofits authority in foreign policy matters

and the Joint Chiefs would regain a higher level of authority in their relations with

later secretaries. But the impermanence of many of McNamara's reforms did not

alter the fact that the Department of Defense and its office of the secretary had

experienced lasting change. "When he came in," said John Rubel, deputy director

of DDR&E, "we were infinitely troubled .... We didn't see how we could get our

of some of our problems-this endless escalation of the arms race, this needless

multiplication of strategic weapons. We couldn't see how we were going ro get a

grip on the enormous programs we were supposed to supervise; we were worried

about command control of nuclear weapons; we were worried abour response."
Conclusion 549

Rubel credited McNamara with fundamentally and profoundly "changing the

environment," citing "the enormous difference one man can make."38 Although

putting the genie of nuclear weaponry back into the bottle lay beyond McNamara's capacity, the legacy of flexible response and the continuing importance of

PPBS and systems analysis remained testimonials to his enduring impact on the

Pentagon and the nation's security, despite the dark cloud ofthe Vietnam War that

in the spring of 1965 already threatened to obscure his many accomplishments.
ABM

ACDA

ACE

AEC

AF

AFB

AFC

AFL-CIO

AFPC

AID

AMSA

ANF

ARPA

ARVN

ASD

ASD(C)

ASD(ISA)

ASD(M)

BLT

BNSP

BoB

BOP

C

CEF

CF

CI

CIA

List ofAbbreviations

Anti-Ballistic Missile

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Allied Command Europe

Atomic Energy Commission

Air Force

Air Force Base

Armed Forces Council

American Federation of Labor-Congress of

Industrial Organizations

Armed Forces Policy Council

Agency for International Development

Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft

Atlantic Nuclear Force

Advanced Research Projects Agency

Army ofthe Republic ofVietnam

Assistant Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)

Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Management)

Battalion Landing Team

Basic National Security Policy

Bureau ofthe Budget

Balance of Payments

Comptroller

Cuban Expeditionary Force

Counterforce

Counterinsurgency

Central Intelligence Agency

550
CINCCARIB

CINCLANT

CINCPAC

CINCSAC

CINCSOUTH

CIP

ClCS

CM

CNO

CONAD

CPFF

CPSVN

CVA

DARPA

DASA

DASD

DCA

DCM

DDR&E

DEFCON

DIA

000

DPC

DPM

DSA

EDC

EEC

ENDC

ER

ExCom

FAA

FCDA

FEMA

FM

FRG

FY

FYFS&FP

GDR

GNP

GRFL

GVN

HCA

List ofAbbreviations 551

Commander in Chief, Caribbean

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command

Commander in Chief, Southern Command

Counterinsurgency Plan

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chairman's Memorandum

Chief of Naval Operations

Continental Air Defense Command

Cost-PIus-Fixed-Fee

Counterinsurgency Plan for South Vietnam

designation for attack aircraft carrier

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

Defense Atomic Support Agency

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

Defense Communications Agency

Deputy Chief of Mission

Director of Defense Research and Engineering

Defense Condition

Defense Intelligence Agency

Department of Defense

Defense Planning Committee

Draft Presidential Memorandum

Defense Supply Agency

European Defense Community

European Economic Community

Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference

European Region

Executive Committee (NSC)

Foreign Assistance Act

Federal Civil Defense Administration

Federal Emergency Management Agency

Financial Management

Federal Republic of Germany

Fiscal Year

Five-Year Force Structure and Financial Program

German Democratic Republic

Gross National Product

Gerald R. Ford Library

Government ofVietnam

House Committee on Appropriations
552 List ofAbbreviations

HCAS

HCFA

HR

HSCA

I&L

ICA

ICBM

ICC

IDA

IRBM

ISA

JCS

JFKL

JSCP

JSOP

JSTPS

JUSMAAG

LBJL

LC

MAAG

MACV

MAP

MC

MLF

MMRBM

MRBM

MRC

MSP

NAC

NASA

NATO

NCO

NDUL

NESC

NHC

NIE

NLF

NOA

NORAD

NRO

NSA

NSAM

House Committee on Armed Services

House Committee on Foreign Affairs

House Resolution

House Subcommittee on Appropriations

Installations and Logistics

International Cooperation Administration

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

International Control Commission

Institute for Defense Analysis

Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile

International Security Affairs

Joint Chiefs of Staff

John F. Kennedy Library

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

Joint Strategic Objectives Plan

Joint Strategic Targeting Planning Staff

Joint United States Military Assistance Advisory Group

Lyndon Baines Johnson Library

Library ofCongress

Military Assistance Advisory Group

Military Assisrance Command Vietnam

Military Assistance Program

Military Committee

Multilateral Force

Mobile Medium-Range Ballistic Missile

Medium-Range Ballistic Missile

Military Revolutionary Council

Mutual Security Program

North Atlantic Council

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Non-Commissioned Officer

National Defense University Library

Net Evaluation Subcommittee

Naval Historical Center

National Intelligence Estimate

National Liberation Front

New Obligational Authority

North American Air Defense Command

National Reconnaissance Office

National Security Agency

National Security Action Memorandum
NSC

NSF

NSTL

NVN

OAS

OASD

OCDM

ODM

OMP

OPLAN

OSD

OSS

PACOM

PCP

PEMA

PEO

PL

POF

POL

PPBS

PRO

R&D

R&E

RAF

RDT&E

RG

RLG

ROK

ROTC

SAC

SACEUR

SACLANT

SACSA

SAM

SAMOS

SCA

SCFR

SDC

SEAL

SEATO

SG

List ofAbbreviations 553

National Security Council

National Security File(s)

National Strategic Target List

North Vietnam

Organization ofAmerican States

Office ofthe Assistant Secretary of Defense

Office ofCivil and Defense Mobilization

Office of Defense Mobilization

Organizational and Management Planning

Operations Plan

Office ofthe Secretary of Defense

Office of Strategic Services

Pacific Command

Program Change Proposal

Procurement ofEquipment and Munitions for the Army

Programs Evaluation Office

Public Law

President's Office Files

Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants

Planning-Programming-Budgeting System

Public Records Office

Research and Development

Research and Engineering

Royal Air Force

Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation

Record Group

Royal Lao Government

Republic of Korea

Reserve Officer Training Corps

Strategic Air Command

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic

Office of the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and

Special Activities, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Surface-to-Air Missile

Satellite and Missile Observation System

Senate Committee on Appropriations

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

Self Defense Corps

Sea-Air-Land Team

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

Special Group
554 List ofAbbreviations

SGA

SHAPE

SlOP

SSCA

STAT

STRAC

SVN

TFX

TOA

USA

USAF

USAMHI

USCINCEUR

USG

USN

USSOUTHCOM

VAX

VC

VNAF

WSEG

Special Group (Augmented)

Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe

Single Integrated Operational Plan

Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations

SEABEE Technical Assistance Team

Strategic Army Corps

South Vietnam

Tactical Fighter Experimental

Total Obligational Authority

United States Army

United States Air Force

United States Army Military History Institute

United States Commander in Chief, Europe

United States Government

United States Navy

United States Southern Command

Attack Aircraft Experimental

Viet Cong

Vietnamese Air Force

Weapons Systems Evaluation Group
Notes

Where no record group is specified in the citation, archival accessions are part

of Record Group (RG) 330, retired records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. At the time they were consulted, these records were stored at the Washington

National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland. Where record group numbers are

given in the notes, it should be understood that the records are at the National Archives, College Park, Maryland. Files identified as "OSD Hist" are in the custody of

the OSD Historical Office. Readers should consult the bibliography for complete

information regarding the location of archival materials and for the publisher and

date of publication of printed works.

1. MCNAMARA AND THE NEW FRONTIER

I. George W. Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern: A Memoir, 173.

2. Irving L. Janis, Victims ofGroupthink: A Psychological Study ofForeign-Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, 44.

3. Interv Roberr S. McNamara by Maurice Matloff and Roger Trask, 22 May 86, 24, OSD Hisr.

4. David Wise, "Scholars ofthe Nuclear Age-McGeorge Bundy, Walt W. Rostow, and Jerome B. Wiesner,"

in Lester Tanzer, ed, The Kennedy Circle, 40-4 I.

5. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days:John F Kennedy in the White House, 60-61.

6. Ibid,214.

7. Interv Roberr S. McNamara by Maurice Matloff and Alfred Goldberg, 3 Apr 86, 6, OSD Hist. His reference in the interview to being "so naive abour the ways ofWashington" referred specifically to the quesrion

of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr.'s qualifications for appointment as secretary ofthe Navy.

8. SCAS, Hearing: Nomination ofRobert S. McNamara, 87 Cong, I sess, 17 Jan 61, 3-4.

9. James M. Roherry, Decisions ofRobert S. McNamara: A Study ofthe Role ofthe Secretary ofDeftnse, 67 (emphasis in original); Roger Hitsman, To Move a Nation: The Politics ofForeign Policy in the Administration of

John F Kennedy, 43.

10. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 129, 132; Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy, 255.

11. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 132; McNamara interv, 3 Apr 86, 1.

12. McNamara interv, 3 Apr 86, 4.

13. Ibid, 2-3; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 132; Sorensen, Kennedy, 269; Deborah Shapley, Promise and

Power: The Life and Times ofRobert McNamara, 83-84.

14. McNamara interv, 3 Apr 86, 4; Robert S. McNamara, "Managing the Deparrment of Defense," in Samuel

A. Tucker, ed, A Modern Design ftr Defense Decision: A McNamara-Hitch-Enthoven Anthology, 12.

555
556 Notes to Pages 5-13

15. Shapley, Promise and Power, 83-84; Roger R. Trask and Alfred Goldberg, The Department ofDefense, 1947-

1997: Organization and Leaders, 77.

16. McNamara interv, 3 Apr 86, 2; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 129.

17. Sorensen, Kennedy, 271.

18. Henry Glass, economic advisor to the comprroller between 1961 and 1965, was convinced thar McNamara

wanted to have Taylor as JCS chairman to get him out ofthe White House. See interv Henry E. Glass by

Maurice Madoff er al, 28 Ocr 87, 66, OSD Hisr.

19. Sorensen, Kennedy, 269-70.

20. Brock Brower, "McNamara Seen Now, Full Length," Lift, 10 May 68, 86 (quore); Shapley, Promise and

Power, 89.

21. Brower, "McNamara Seen Now, Full Length," 86.

22. Interv Lyman L. Lemnitzer by Maurice Madoff, 19 Jan 84,18, OSD Hist.

23. Brower, "McNamara Seen Now, Full Length," 88; OSD Hist, Department ofDeftnse Key Officials, 1947-

2000,12,19.

24. Clark R. Mollenhoff, The Pentagon: Politics, Profits and Plunder, 242-43; interv Roswell L. Gilpatric by

Maurice Madoff, 14 Nov 83,6-7, OSD Hist.

25. McNamara interv, 3 Apr 86, 11.

26. Charles J. Hirch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics of Deftnse in the Nuclear Age; Joseph Kraft,

"McNamara and His Enemies," Harper's, Aug 61,43.

27. The Officer, Mar 61, 12.

28. Memos McNamara for Connally and luckert, 9 Jan 61, f1dr Reading File, Feb. 1961-Dec. 1960, box 113,

McNamara Records, RG 200.

29. Memos McNamara for Stahr and Connally, 16 Jan 61, ibid.

30. Gilpatric interv, 14 Nov 83, 8. After leaving office, luckert wrote of rhe decline in the importance of the

service secretaries. See Eugene M. luckert, "The Service Secretary: Has He a Useful Role?," Foreign Affiirs,

Apr 66, 458-79.

31. 000 Reorganization Act of 1958, 6 Aug 58, in Alice C. Cole et al, eds, The Department ofDefense: Documents on Establishment and Organization, 1944-1978, 188-230; 000 Dir 5100.1, 31 Dec 58, ibid, 317;

Robert J. Watson, Into the Missile Age, 1956-1960, vol IV in History ofthe Office ofthe Secretary ofDefense,

243-91.

32. McNamara interv, 3 Apr 86,6-7; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 153; New York Times, 26 Jan 61.

33. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 153-54.

34. Interv McNamara by Maurice Madoff, Alfred Goldberg, and Lawrence Kaplan, 27 Aug 86,31-32, OSD

Hist.

35. Chicago Sun-Times, 18 Jan 61; McNamara interv, 27 Aug 86, 31-32; SCAS, Nomination ofRobert S.

McNamara, cited in n 8, 26.

36. Washington Post, 7 Jan 61.

37. McNamara interv, 3 Apr 86, 11; Watson, Into the Missile Age, 771.

38. Burke memrcd, 10 Jan 61, f1dr no 12 (215-250), Case 1448, drawer 5, Sensitive files, Atleigh Burke Papers,

NHC; David A. Rosenberg, "Admiral Arleigh Albert Burke," in Robert W. Love, Jr., ed, The Chief ofNaval

Operations, 307-09.

39. Lemnitzer interv, 19 Jan 84,17-18.

40. SCAS, Nomination ofRobert S. McNamara, 22-23.

41. Ibid, 5-18.

42. Senate, Cte on Govr Opns, Subcte on National Policy Machinery, Hearings: OrganizingforNational Security,

87 Cong, 1 sess, 7 Aug 61, pt 9:1210-12.

43. Inaugural Address, 20 Jan 61, Public Papers ofthe Presidents ofthe United States: John F Kennedy, 1961,2.

44. Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, 30 Jan 61, ibid, 24.

45. HCAS, Hearings: Military Posture and HR 9751,87 Cong, 2 sess, 24 Jan 62, 3162; Annual Message to

Congress, 24.

46. HCAS, Hearings: Military Posture Briefings, 87 Cong, 1 sess, 23 Feb 61, 637; Srewart Alsop, "Master of the

Pentagon," Saturday Evening Post, 5 Aug 61, 21.

47. Annual Message to Congress, 23-24.

48. Shapley, Promise and Power, 97-99; Baltimore Sun, 17,23 Feb 61. For McNamara's version of these events

see his testimony in HCAS, Military Posture and HR 9751,646-47.
Notes to Pages 13-24 557

49. Edward A. Kolodziej, The Uncommon Defense and Congress, 1945-1963, 330-31; Harland B. Moulton, "The

McNamara General War Strategy," Orbis, Summer 64, 253; William W Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy, ch 3.

50. Kennedy Public Papers, 1961,232.

51. Interv Alain C. Enthoven by Maurice Matloff, 3 Feb 86, 8-9, OSD Hist. See also Alain C. Enthoven and

K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969, chs 2-3.

52. Washington Post, 31 Jan 61.

53. Memo McNamara for SvcSecs et ai, 8 Mar 61, fldr SecDefSpecial Projects 1961-62, box 109, ASD(C) files,

OSD Hist (also in fldr Reading File, May 1961-Mar 1961, box 113, McNamara Records, RG 200); Army,

Navy, Air Force journal, 15 Apr 61.

II. SHAKEUP IN THE PENTAGON

1. Rcd ofmtg, BrigGen George S. Brown, 18 Jan 61, fldr SecDefStaffMeetings Feb-Apr 1961, box 10, AFPC

and SecDefMeetings files, Acc 77-0062.

2. Ibid. Just the day before, at his nomination hearing, McNamara disclaimed any wishes to make immediate

major changes in Defense organization; see SCAS, Nomination ofRobert S. McNamara, 23.

3. HCAS, Military Posture Briefings, 635.

4. See HSCA,Hearings:Department ofDefense Appropriationsfor 1963, 87 Cong,2 sess, 31 Jan 62, pt 2:149.

5. Sec 202, 000 Reorganization Act of 1958,6 Aug 58, in Cole et ai, Department ofDefense, 197.

6. Ibid, 197-200; Watson, Into the Missile Age, 274-75.

7. Notes on NSC mtg, 5 Jan 61, fldr L-215-71, box 29, Lyman L. Lemnitzer Papers, NDUL.

8. Report on Reorganization of 000, Cong Rec, 9 Feb 61,107, pt 2:1928-31; Washington Star, 5 Dec 60.

9. Washington Star, 31 Dec 60.

10. SCAS, Hearings: Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, Fiscal Year 1969, and

Reserve Strength, 90 Cong, 2 sess, 5 Feb 68, 254.

II. Memo Burke for OP-06, 9 Jun 61, fldr 1 Jun-31 Aug 61, Originator's File, Burke Papers, NHC. Burke

commented on the absurdity ofsetting up "a console type arrangement wherein Defense can push a particular button in order to get a particular response ro a given situation."

12. Senate, Cte on Govt Opns, Subcte on National Policy Machinety, Organizing for National Security, 7 Aug

61, pt 9:1192.

13. SCAS, Hearing: Nomination ofRoswell L. Gilpatric, 87 Cong, I sess, 17 Jan 61, 3.

14. Ibid, 3-4.

15. McNamara interv, 3 Apr 86, 13.

16. DoD Annual Report, FY 1961,22; memo McNamara for SvcSecs et ai, 8 Mar 61,9, fldr SecDef Special

Projects 1961-62, box 109, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist.

17. Cole et aI, Department ofDefense, 239.

18. Ibid.

19. Ernest R. May et ai, "History of the Strategic Arms Competition, 1945-1972," II, 588-90, OSD Hist;

intervs Marvin Stern by Alfred Goldberg, 28 Feb, I Mar 67, OSD Hist.

20. Army, Navy, AirForce journal, 15 Apr 61; 000 Dir 5160.32, 6 Mar 61, in Cole et ai, Department ofDefense,

325-26.

21. Department ofDefense, 325-26; Watson, Into the Missile Age, 386 ff.

22. Memo McNamara for JCS, 8 Feb 61, fldr 310.1, box 44, ISA files, Acc 64A-2382.

23. Joint Chiefs of Staff Decision on JCS 2031/159, 2 Mar 61, end "A" draft memo for SecDef and appen to

end "A," "Military Intelligence Agency, General Concept," OSD Hist.

24. New York Times, 4 Ju161.

25. 000 Dir 5105.21, I Aug 61; New York Times, 30 Aug 61.

26. Memo McNamara for C]CS, 21 Jun 63, fldr Reading File, June 20-June 29, 1963, box 118, McNamara

Records, RG 200.

27. SSCA, Hearings: Department ofDefinseAppropriationsfor 1963,87 Cong, 2 sess, 15 May 62, 684-85.

28. Ibid, 684.

29. Ibid, 686-87.

30. Memo Taylor for DirDIA, 30 Oct 62, memo WY.S. [William Y. Smith] for Taylor, 2 Nov 62, fldr Chron

File-Oct-Dec 62, box 27, Maxwell D. Taylor Papers, NDUL.
558 Notes to Pages 24-34

31. DIA, 17 Dec 64, OMp, OASD(A), FY 66 SecDefBackup Book, IV-VII, box 36, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist.

32. Cole et al, DepartmentofDeftnse, 198-99.

33. James E. Hewes, Jr., From Root to McNamara:Army Organization andAdministration, 1900-1963, 312-13.

34. Memo McNamara for DepSecDef et al, 23 Mar 61, w/atchd Report of Study Committee, 11 Ju161, "Integrated Management of Common Supply Activities," 1, IIdr Defense Supply Agency (Creation of), box

124, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist.

35. Ibid, i-iv; Hewes, From Root to McNamara, 313; 000 News Release 885-61, 31 Aug 61, "Secretary

McNamara Announces Decision To Establish Defense Supply Agency," OSD Hist.

36. House, Subcte ofCte on Govt Opns, Hearings: Deftnse Supply Agenry, 87 Cong, 2 sess, 11 May 62, 107.

37. Hewes, From Root to McNamara, 313-14.

38. 000 News Release 885-61, 31 Aug 61, cited in n 35.

39. DoD Annual Report, FY 1962,67,69.

40. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 4 Dec 61.

41. Memo McNamara for Pres, 12 Sep 61, IIdr Reading File, Sepr. 1961-0ct. 1961, box 113, McNamara

Records, RG 200.

42. HCAS, Report ofSpecial Subcommittee on Deftnse Agencies, 87 Cong, 2 sess, 13 Aug 62,6597.

43. HCAS, Special Subcte on Defense Agencies, Hearings, 87 Cong, 2 sess, 4 Jun 62, 6682.

44. Ibid,6702.

45. New York Times, 8 Jul 62.

46. HCAS, Report, cired in n 42,6617,6619.

47. Ibid, 6617, 6625, 6634-35, 6921; Washington Post, 16 Jul 61; Baltimore Sun, 16 Aug 62.

48. SSCA, DoD AppropriationsfOr 1963, 1259.

49. House, Cte on Govt Opns, Deftnse Supply Agenry, H Rpt 2440, 87 Cong, 2 sess, 20 Sep 62, 14-15.

50. DoD Annual Report, FY 1963,84; FY 1964,96; FY 1965,107.

51. See for example Joint Economic Cte, Subcte on Defense Procurement, Hearings: Impact ofMilitary Supply

and Service Activities on the Economy, 88 Cong, 1 sess, 28 Mar 63, 20.

52. Harry B. Yoshpe, "Our Missing Shield: The U.S. Civil Defense Program in Hisrorical Perspective," prepared for FEMA, Apr 81, 16,254-57,273-74, OSD Hist.

53. Watson, Into the Missile Age, 412-13, 418. For a discussion of the Gaither Report, see 136-41.

54. Yoshpe, "Our Missing Shield," 299-314; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 747-49; Sorensen, Kennedy, 613-14;

Kennedy Public Papers, 1961,402-03.

55. Kennedy Public Papers, 1961,536-37; Sorenson, Kennedy, 614.

56. Interv David O. Cooke by Maurice Madoff and Alfred Goldberg, 23 Ocr 89, 23, 050 Hist; Yoshpe, "Our

Missing Shield," 362.

57. Memo McNamara for SvcSecs et al, 31 Ju161, OSD Hist; 000 Dir 5140.1, 31 Aug 61; Washington Post,

31 Aug 61; OSD Hist, Department ofDeftnse Key Officials, 1947-2000, 30.

58. DoD Annual Report, FY 1962,14; House, Subcte ofCte on Govt Opns, Hearings: Civil Defense-1961, 87

Cong, 1 sess, 1 Aug 61, 5-8.

59. Draft memo McNamara for Pres, 6 Oct 61, Foreign Relations ofthe United States (hereafter FRUS), 1961-

1963, VIII: 158-64; Itt Rusk to Maxwell Taylor, 29 Oct 61, ibid, 190-91.

60. McNamara memo, 25 Nov 61, IIdr Reading File, Nov. 1961, box 113, McNamara Records, RG 200;

Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 748; memo Johnson (PoliticalAffs) for Rusk w/atchmt A, 29 Nov 61, FRUS

1961-63, VIII:219-20.

61. Gilparric press conf, 14 Dec 61, Public Statements ofDeputy Secretary ofDefense Roswell L. Gilpatric, 1961,

494-95.

62. HSCA, DoD AppropriationsfOr 1963,599,602.

63. Washington Post, 22 Apr 62.

64. Ibid; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 748; Sorensen, Kennedy, 616.

65. New York Times, 18 Jun 62; Washington Post, 26 Sep 62; DoD Annual Report, FY 1963,321.

66. Sorensen, Kennedy, 108; Yoshpe, "Our Missing Shield," 348; Washington Star, 1 Feb 63.

67. Ltt Pres to Chairmen Senate and House Appropriations Ctes, 2 Aug 62, Kennedy Public Papers, 1962,

601-03; New York Times, 30 Ju162; Yoshpe, "Our Missing Shield," 16.

68. Memo Pittman for SecDef, 4 Aug 62, w/two encl, IIdr Reading File, Aug. 10-Aug. 1, 1962, box 115,

McNamara Records, RG 200; Yoshpe, "Our Missing Shield," 361-70, 376-77.

69. Yoshpe, "Our Missing Shield," 375.
Notes to Pages 34-42 559

70. Ibid, 386-91.

71. Ibid, 18; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 723.

72. American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961,555-58 (quote, 558).

73. Sum Kennedy's remarks to 496th NSC mtg, 18 Jan 62, FRUS 1961-63, VIII:238-42 (quote, 240).

74. Memo BrigGen E. G. Lansdale for SecDef and DepSecDef, 17 Jan 61, in DoD, United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967 (hereafter Pentagon Papers), bk 11, 1-12 (quote, 1).

75. Memo for file by Rostow, 30 Jan 61, f1dr Mtgs w/Pres, 1/61-6/61, box 317, NSF, JFKL; sum rcd ofWhite

House mtg, 28 Jan 61, FRUS 1961-63,1:13-15. Rostow noted that Kennedy asked for copies ofMao Tsetung's and Che Guevara's writings on guerrilla warfare.

76. Watson, Into the Missile Age, 646-49; paper by [Saigon] Country Team StaffCte, 4 Jan 61, FRUS 1961-63,

I: 1-12.

77. Rcd of actions 475th NSC mtg, 1 Feb 61, FRUS 1961-63, VIII:20-23 (quote, 22); NSAM 2, 3 Feb 61,

Pentagon Papers, bk 11, 17.

78. Memo No.3 Cuba Study Gp to Pres Kennedy, 13 Jan 61, FRUS 1961-63, X:603-05 (quote, 605).

79. Msg CAP5416-61 Taylor to Pres, 7 Dec 61, FRUS 1961-63,1:724-25; rpt, "Elements of US Strategy to

Deal with 'Wars of National Liberation'," 8 Dec 61, f1dr CIA Gen 12/61, box 271, NSF, JFKL (quote, 1);

ed note, FRUS 1961-63, VIII:229-30.

80. NSAM 124, 18 Jan 62, FRUS 1961-63, VIII:236-38 (quote, 237).

81. NSAM 165, 16 June 62, ibid, 307, n 3.

82. Maxwell D. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, 200-03, 360-62; NSAM 341, 2 Mar 66, internet copy, LBJL;

Charles Maechling,Jr., "Camelot, Robert Kennedy, and Counter-Insurgency-A Memoir," Virginia Q}tarterly

Review, Summer 99, 438-58; Atthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Robert Kennedy and His Times, 466-67.

83. JCSM-126-61 Lemnitzer fot SecDef, 3 Mar 61, microfiche suppl to FRUS 1961-63, vols VII-IX, Doc 232;

NSAM 2, 3 Feb 61, cited in n 77; memcon, 6 Feb 61, FRUS 1961-63, VIII:27-30; memcon, 23 Feb 61,

ibid, 48-54 (quote, 51); memo C. V. Clifton (White House DefLiaison am for JCS, 18 Feb 61, f1dr DoD

Spec Warfare, vol I, Feb-May 1961, box 279, NSF, JFKL.

84. Memo Clifton for JCS, 18 Feb 61, memcon 23 Feb 61, both cited in n 83; Walter S. Poole, The]oint Chief

ofStaffand National Policy, 1961-1964, pt 1:63; Kennedy Public Papers, 1961, 237; "DoD Activities and

Events in 1961," OSD Hist; SCAS, Military Procurement Authorization, FY 1962,4 Apr 61,20-21.

85. Kennedy Public Papers, 1961,401.

86. OASD(C) FAD 431, 18 Jan 62, OSD Hist; memo McNamara for SvcSecs et al, 5 Sep 61, f1dr chron file,

Jan-Dec 61, box 1, SecDefSpec Asst files, Acc 76-0028; draft memo McNamara for Pres, 6 Oct 61, FRUS

1961-63, VIII:158-77 (quote, 175).

87. Memo Clifton for Taylor, 10 Jan 62, f1dr DoD Spec Warfare, vol I, Aug 61-Feb 62, box 279, NSF, JFKL;

Newsweek, 23 Oct 61; New York Times, 13 Oct 61.

88. Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in SoutheastAsia: The Advisory Years To 1965, 79.

89. Ibid, 80-83; NSAM 104, 13 Oct 61, Pentagon Papers, bk 11, 328 (quote); memrcd DepSecDefGilpatric, 11

Oct 61, FRUS 1961-63, 1:343; Ray L. Bowers, Tactical Airlift, 52; FY 65 SecDef Backup Book, III, Tabs

A & B, box 33, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist.

90. Edward J. Marolda and Oscar P. Fitzgerald, From Military Assistance to Combat. 1959-1965, vol II in

The United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict, 102-04, 111-12, 189-91,218 (quote, 191).

91. Ibid, 112-15, 192-200,344-55 (quote, 113).

92. Memcon w/Pres, 23 Feb 61, FRUS 1961-63, VIII:48-54 (quote, 52); interv LtGen Victor H. Krulak by

Benis M. Frank, 20 Jun 70, 188, USMC Hist Div; Robert H. Whitlow, u.s. Marines in Vietnam: The

Advisory and CombatAssistance Era, 1954-1964, 62.

93. Memo Kennedy for McNamara, 11 Jan 62, FRUS 1961-63, VIII:235-36 (quote, 235).

94. Poole,]CS and National Policy 1961-64, pt 1:69; Krulak interv, 20 Jun 70, 187-88.

95. Memo Kennedy for McNamara, 11 Jan 62, cited in n 93, 235-36 (quote, 236).

96. SSCA, DoD AppropriationsfOr 1963, 14 Feb 62, 21; McNamara Public Statements, 1962, II:873-75, 883

(quote).

97. Memo Gilpatric for Pres, I May 62, f1dr RLG Reading File, 1/2-6/30/62. box 2, Gilpatric files, Acc

66A-3529.

98. New York Times, 7 Jun 62; NSAM 131, 13 Mar 62, Pentagon Papers, bk 12,457-59; memrcd G. C. Moody,

Jr., ExecSec SG(CI), 22 Jan 65, f1dr Counter-Insurgency Spec Gp 1964-66, box 15, Komer files, NSF, LBJL;

Washington Post, 4 Jul 62.
560 Notes to Pages 42-56

99. NSAM 182,24 Aug 62, FRUS 1961-63, VIII:381; ed note, ibid, 382-83.

100. Memo Pres for McNamara, 15 Ju163, IIdr DoD Spec Warfare, vol 1,1962-63, box 279, NSF, JFKl.

101. Memo Taylor for Pres, 24 Ju163, IIdr DoD Spec Warfare, box 1, C. V. Clifron files, NSF, LBJL; memcon

w/Pres, 24 Ju163, FRUS 1961-63, VIII:491-92.

102. Memo Pres for SecState, 26 July 63, IIdr DoD Spec Warfare, box I, Clifron files, NSF, LBJL; memrcd

Clifron, 3 Sep 63, IIdr DoD Spec Warfare, vol I, 1962-63, box 279, NSF, JFKl; CA-5661, 2 Dec 62, IIdr

DoD Spec Warfare, box 1, Clifron files, NSF, LBJL.

103. For an account of space activities in the Eisenhower administration, see Watson, Into the Missile Age,

383-401.

104. DoD Dir 5160.32, 6 Mar 61, in Cole et ai, Department o/Defense, 325-26.

105. House, Cte on Science and Astronautics, Hearings: Defense Space Interests, 87 Cong, I sess, 17 Mar 61,

97-98.

106. DoD Annual Report, FY 1961,23,281; Washington Post, 18 Mar 61.

107. Defense Space Interests, cited in n 105, 106; New York Times, 19 Mar 61.

108. Defense SpaceInterests, 141.

109. House, Cte on Science and Astronautics, Hearings: Research and Developmentfor Defense, 87 Cong, I sess,

17 Feb 61, 51 (quote); New York Daily News, 18 Feb 61.

110. Lemnitzer's protest in a confidential memorandum for McNamara dated 2 March 1961 was leaked ro the

Chicago Sun-Times, 12 Mar 61; Lemnitzer interv, 19 Jan 84,16, OSD Hist.

111. Defense Space Interests, 137-38.

112. Ibid, 15,38.

113. Jerome B. Wiesner et ai, "Report to the President-Elect of the Ad Hoc Committee on Space," 12 Jan 61,

published in part in Defense Space Interests, 17-23. Gilpattic's figure of "over 90%" appears on p. 37.

114. Memo McNamara for GenCoun, 7 Apr 61, w/clipping from Washington Post, 7 Apr 61, IIdr Reading File,

May 196I-Mar. 1961, box 113, McNamara Records, RG 200.

115. Ltr Pres to Speaker, House of Reps, 28 Mar 61, in House, Amendments to the Budget for Fiscal Year

1962 ...., H Doc No 125, 87 Cong, 1 sess, 2; New York Times, 28 Mar 61; White House Press Release,

28 Mar 61, OSD Hist.

116. Organizingfor National Security, cited in n 12, pt 9:1197; National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958,

29 Ju158, PL 85-579, 72 Stat 426 (Sec 102b); DoD Annual Report, FY 1961,403, FY 1963,321.

117. Kennedy Public Papers, 1961,404-05; Roger D. Launius, A History o/the u.s. Civil Space Program, 59-66.

118. Memo Col Howard L. Burris for Vice Pres, I Mar 63, IIdr Colonel Burris 1961-64, box 6, Vice Presidential

Security files, NSF, LBJL; Newport News Times-Herald, 27 Mar 63; Omaha World Herald, 10 Apr 63.

119. Interv Roswell L. Gilpattic by Dennis J. O'Brien, 12 Aug 70, 112, 116-17, JFKl; New York Herald Tribune,

8 May 63.

120. New York Times, 7 May 63; Washington Post, 8 May 63; news conf, 8 May 63, Kennedy Public Papers, 1963,

374; New York Times, 8, 22 May 63. See also Lawrence Korb, "George Whalen Anderson, Jr.," in Robert W.

Love, Jr., ed, The Chiefi o/Naval Operations, 329-30, and Anderson's recollections ofthe events surrounding

his departure as CNO and subsequent ambassadorial appointment in Anderson intervs with Joseph T.

Mason, Jr., 7 Jan and 2 Apr 81, 525-38,605-10, NHC.

121. Remarks at AFSC Management Conference, 2 May 62, Gilpatric Public Statements, 1962, 91, 99.

III. EXPANDING THE FY1962 BUDGET

1. Watson, Into the Missile Age, 757-59.

2. Public Papers o/the Presidents o/the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-1961,919,952-53.

3. Watson, Into the Missile Age, 757-59.

4. The Budget o/the United States, FY 1962,489.

5. Raymond H. Dawson, "Congressional Innovation and Intervention in Defense Policy: Legislative Authorization ofWeapons Systems," American Political Science Review, Mar 62, 42 (quote), 57; Kolodziej, Uncommon Defense, 377-82.

6. Ltr Bell ro McNamara, 12 Jan 61, IIdr New Frontier-I961-1962 Budget, box 5, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist;

rcd of mtg, BrigGen George S. Brown, 18 Jan 61, 3-4, IIdr SecDef Staff Meetings, Feb-Apr 61, box 10,

AFPC and SecDefMeetings files, Acc 77-0062.

7. HR 4362, 87 Cong, I sess, 15 Feb 61; HCAS, Military Posture Briefings, 23 Feb 61,627-29.
Notes to Pages 57-60 561

8. HSCA, Hearings: DepartmentofDeftnseAppropriationsjiJr 1962, 87 Cong, 1 sess, 20 Feb 61, pt 1:1. Part 1

ofthe hearings, which lasted from 20 February through 1 March, covered overall financial statements and

military personnel. Part 2 (1-21 March) covered operations and maintenance.

9. Kennedy Public Papers, 1961,24; ltr Gilparric ro Pres, 3 Feb 61, fldr FY 62 Budget Summary Tables, box 5,

ASD(C) files, OSD Hist; LC, Legislative RefServ, United States Defense Policies in 1961, H Doc 502, 88.

10. Rcd of action 475th NSC mtg, 1 Feb 61, FRUS 1961-63, VIIl:20-23.

11. HCAS, Military Posture Briefings, 634.

12. Rpt, "Strategic Lift Capability for Limited War," 6 Jan 62, FY 63 SecDef Backup Book, 1II-Y, Prog (SA),

box 13, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist; OSD sum paper, "Sealift and Airlift," Program Package IV, 28 Ju161, fldr

G-20-23, box 11, ibid; DoD Annual Report, FY 1961,18.

13. Rusk to McNamara, 4 Feb 61, FRUS 1961-63, VlII:24-27; Itr McNamara to Pres, 20 Feb 61, w/atchmts,

fldr Dept of Defense, General Review ofFY 61 and FY 62 Military Programs and Budgets, box 273, NSF,

JFKL. McNamara's letter and several of the attachments, except for Annex C containing the views of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, are also in FRUS 1961-63, VlII:35-48.

14. Memo McNamara and Bell for Pres, 10 Mar 61, w/atchmts, fldr Dept of Defense, Vol. I-March 1961, box

273, NSF, JFKL. The memo and attachments, except for attached summary tables, are also in FRUS 1961-

63, VIIl:56-65. Comparisons ofthe BoB and 000 recommendations are in Attachment Il, "Proposed Revisions to the FY 1961 and FY 1962 Defense Programs and Budgets Currently in Disagreement."

15. Memo Bundy for Sorensen, 13 Mar 61, FRUS 1961-63, VIIl:65-66.

16. Attachment Il, "Proposed Revisions to the FY 1961 and FY 1962 Defense Programs and Budgets Currently

in Disagreement," cited in n 14. Within the Navy, however, the program's rapid expansion raised other

funding concerns. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh Burke recommended that OSD pay for the

program from other pares of the 000 budget, since the submarine-missile combination was a national

rather than merely a naval program. Use ofNavy funds, he feared, would divert money and personnel from the

service's other fleet elements (Enthoven and Smith, How Much Is Enough?, 16-17).

17. Watson, Into the Missile Age, 363-69, 371; Attachment Il, "Proposed Revisions to the FY 1961 and FY

1962 Defense Programs and Budgets Currently in Disagreement," cited in n 14; "Titan Il: Objectives of

Weapons System," 29 Mar 61 (quote, 6), fldr White Papers 1961-FY 1962 Budget, box 9, ASD(C) files,

OSD Hist; memo McNamara for SvcSecs et al, 17 Mar 61, fldr New Frontier-1961-1962 Budget, box

5, ibid; Kennedy Public Papers, 1961,238. Zuckert recalled that McNamara allowed him ro appeal directly ro

the president on the Titan Il issue, "the last time that ever happened." At a luncheon meeting with the

president in late March, Zuckert persuaded him ro cancel only two instead offour squadrons (interv Eugene

M. Zuckert by Lawrence E. McQuade, 18 Apr 64, 20-21, JFKL). The White House luncheon, which

included the other service secretaries as well as McNamara and Gilpattic, took place on 24 March (interv

Elvis J. Stahr, Jr., by Robert H. Ferrell, 18 Aug 64, 15, JFKL).

18. ODDRE(SW) B-70 chron and paper, 27, 28 Mar 61, fldr White Papers 1961-FY 1962 Budget, box 9,

ASD(C) files, OSD Hist: Watson, Into the Missile Age, 756; Peter J. Roman, "Strategic Bombers over the

Missile Horizon, 1957-1963," journal ofStrategic Studies, Mar 95, 204-08.

19. SCAS, Hearings: Military ProcurementAuthorization, Fiscal Year 1962,87 Cong, 1 sess, 4 Apr 61, 11; interv

Roswell L. Gilpatric by Dennis J. O'Brien, 5 May 70,74, JFKL.

20. Attachment Il, "Proposed Revisions to the FY 1961 and FY 1962 Defense Programs and Budgets Currently

in Disagreement," cited in n 14; Special Message to Congress on the Defense Budget, 28 Mar 61, Kennedy

Public Papers, 1961,238-39.

21. Memo McNamara for SvcSecs et al, 17 Mar 61, cited in n 17.

22. Attachment I, "Agreed Upon Proposed Revisions to the FY 1961 and FY 1962 Defense Programs and Budgets," to memo McNamara and Bell for Pres, 10 Mar 61, cited in n 14: unsignd draft paper, "U.S. Strategic

Force Structure: Changes in Strategic Offensive Force Structure Implied by FY 1961 and FY 1962 Budget

Proposals," 24 Mar 61, fldr FY 62 Backup General Fact Book I, 1st Set ofAmendments, box 9, ASD(C) files,

OSD Hist: Special Message to Congress, 28 Mar 61, cited in n 20, 238. In Attachment I to their memo,

McNamara and Bell estimated the savings from the accelerated phaseout ofthe B-47 at only $10.1 million.

23. Paper, "Stopping B-52 Production," 28 Mar 61, fldr White Papers 1961-FY 1962 Budget, box 9, ASD(C)

files, OSD Hisr.

24. HCA, Department ofDeftnse Appropriation Bill, 1962, H Rpt 574, 87 Cong, 1 sess, 23 Jun 61,7; memo

McNamara for Pres, 16 Aug 61, fldr Dept of Defense, General, August 1961, box 273, NSF, JFKL.
562 Notes to Pages 60-67

25. Paper, "Summary ofCenrrai War Defensive Forces," Program Package II, 31 Aug 61, box II, ASD(C) files,

OSD Hist.

26. Watson, Into the Missile Age, 380-82, 756.

27. Memo Richard S. Morse (ArmyDirR&D) for Gilparric, 17 Jan 61, binder Special Report on FY 61-FY 62

Army Budgets, box 6, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist.

28. Poole,fCS andNational Policy 1961-64, pt 1:184.

29. Ibid, 185-86.

30. Attachment II, "Proposed Revisions to the FY 1961 and FY 1962 Defense Programs and Budgets Currently

in Disagreement," cited in n 14. No documentation has been found on Kennedy's decision regarding NikeZeus, but the decision to continue the program without going into production is inferred from the fact that

the president made no mention in his special message to Congress of 28 March, when discussing measures

to improve continental defense, of any change in the Nike-Zeus program (Kennedy Public Papers, 1961,

235).

31. Memo Hitch for SvcSecs, 20 Mar 61, Adr New Frontier-I96 1-1962 Budget, box 5, ASD(C) files, OSD

Hist; Jon Wayne Fuller, "Congress and the Defense Budget: A Study of the McNamara Years," PhD diss

(Princeton Univ, 1972),378.

32. Kennedy Public Papers, 1961,229-40; ltr McNamara to Bell, 28 Mar 61, Adr New Frontier-I961-1962

Budget, box 5, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist.

33. Ltr Cyrus R. Vance to Vinson, 31 Mar 61, binder FY 1962 Fact Book-Misc, box 5, ASD(C) files,

OSD Hist.

34. SCAS, Military ProcurementAuthorization, FY 1962, 62.

35. HSCA, DoD Appropriationsfor 1962, 6 Apr 61, pt 3:16-17.

36. Ibid, 39-40.

37. Military Procurement Authorization, FY 1962,75-76.

38. SSCA, Hearings: Department ofDeftnse Appropriationsfor 1962,87 Cong, I sess, 18 Apr 61, 12-13; HSCA,

DoD Appropriationsfor 1962,19 Apr 61, pt 3:513.

39. Memo McNamara for Pres, 28 Apr 61, Adr Defense 4/61-6/61, box 77, POF, JFKL.

40. Ibid.

41. HCAS, Hearings: AuthorizingAppropriationsfor Aircraft, Missiles, and Naval Forcesfor the Armed Forces, 87

Cong, I sess, 2, 3 May 61, 1665-1721; press release, 3 May 61, Adr FY 1962 Budget Revisions, box 7,

ASD(C) files, OSD Hist; HCAS, AuthorizingAppropriationsfor Aircraft, Missiles, and Naval Vessel<, H Rpt

380, 87 Cong, I sess, 10 May 61.

42. Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964,311; H Rpt 380, cited in n 41; SCAS, AuthorizingAppropriationsfor

Aircraft, Missiles, andNaval Vessel< for the Armed Forcesfor Fiscal Year 1962, S Rpt 253, 87 Cong, I sess, II

May 61; Conf Cte, Authorization for Aircraft, Missiles, and Naval Vessel<, Fiscal Year 1962, H Rpt 462, 87

Cong, I sess, 8 Jun 61; Cong Rec, 12 Jun 61, 9366-69 (quote 9367); PL 87-53,21 Jun 61 (75 Stat 94).

43. Kennedy Public Papers, 1961,396-406 (quote, 401).

44. Msg Pres to Speaker, House ofReps, 26 May 61, in House, Amendments to the Budget Involving Increasesfor

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Small Business Administration, the us. Information

Agency, the Department ofCommerce, and the Department ofDefense, Military, H Doc 179, 87 Cong, I sess,

29 May 61, I; HSCA, DoD Appropriationsfor 1962, 31 May 61, pt 6: 175-80.

45. Watson, Into the Missile Age, 344, 358-59.

46. Lrr Sorensen to McNamara, 23 Dec 60, Adr New Frontier-I961-1962 Budget, box 5, ASD(C) files,

OSD Hist.

47. HSCA, DoD Appropriationsfor 1962, 31 May 61, pt 6: 178-79. Regarding the Army's planning in early

1961 for Reserve teorganization, see Karl E. Cocke, "Realignment of the Army's Reserve Components,

1945-1969," U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1977, VIII:3-7.

48. HSCA, DoD Appropriationsfor 1962, 31 May 61, pr 6:203-05 (quote, 205).

49. Ibid, 191.

50. Ltr McNamara to Mahon, 5 Jun 61, Adr Reading File, Aug. 196I-June 1961, box 113, McNamara Records,

RG 200.

51. New York Times, 24 Jun 61; Cong Rec, 27, 28 Jun 61, 10621-43, 10672-99; Congress and the Nation, 311.

52. SSCA, DoD Appropriationsfor 1962, 10 Jul61, 1093-1380 (quote, 1152); 000 News Release 695-61, 10

Jul 61, McNamara Public Statements, 1961, II:826; memo McNamata for SecAF, 13 Ju161, Adr Reading

File, Aug. 196I-June 1961, box 113, McNamara Records, RG 200.
Notes to Pages 67-75 563

53. SSCA,DoDAppropriationsfor1962, 18Ju161, 1542.

54. Memo McNamara for Pres, 15 Ju161, w/notes of mtg with Eisenhower, 15 Ju161, fldr Defense 7/61-8/61,

box 77, POF, JFKL.

55. Radio and TV Report to the American People on the Berlin Crisis, 25 Ju161, Kennedy Public Papers, 1961,

533-40; Senate, Amendments to the Budgetfor the Military Functions ofthe Department ofDeftnse, S Doc 39,

87 Cong, I sess, 26 Ju161; memo McNamara for Pres, 18 Ju161, fldr FY 62 Budget File #2, box 8, ASD(C)

files, OSD Hist.

56. SSCA, DoD Appropriationsfor 1962,26 Ju161, 1611-39.

57. Baltimore Sun, 27 Jul 61: SCAS, AuthorizingAdditionalAppropriationsfor Aircraft, Missiles, andNaval Vessels

for the Armed Forces, S Rpt 643, 87 Cong, I sess, 27 Jul 61: HCAS, AuthorizingAppropriationsfor Aircraft,

Missiles, andNaval Vessels, H Rpt817, 87 Cong, I sess, 28 Jul61:New York Times, 29 Ju161: CongRec, 28 Jul61,

12905-16: ibid, 2 Aug 61,13311-22: New York Times, 3 Aug 61; PL 87-118, 3 Aug 61 (75 Stat 243).

58. SSCA, Department ofDeftnseAppropriation Bill, 1962, S Rpt 653,87 Cong, I sess, I Aug 61,3: Cong Rec,

3 Aug 61, 13470-90 (quote, 13477), 13493-502: Baltimore Sun, 4,5 Aug 61.

59. ConfCte, H Rpt 873, printed in Cong Rec, 9 Aug 61,14198-200; New York Times, 10 Aug 61.

60. Cong Rec, 10 Aug 61, 14262-75, 14393-96; New York Times, II Aug 61; Congressional Quarterly Almanac,

1961,147; PL 87-144,17 Aug 61 (75 Stat 365).

61. Memo McNamara for Pres, 16 Aug 61, cited in n 24: memo McNamara for Pres, 7 Oct 61, fldr Defense

Budget FY 1963-January-October 1961, box 7, NSF, JFKL; DoD News Release 1220-61, 27 Oct 61,

McNamara Public Statements, 1961, 1I1: 1448-49.

62. Fuller, "Congress and the Defense Budget," 379.

IV. THE FYI963 BUDGET: INTRODUCING THE PPBS

1. Frederick C. Mosher, "PPBS: Two Questions," in Senate, Cte on Gove Opns, Subcte on National Securiry

and Internl Opns, Planning-Programming-Budgeting: Selected Comment, 90 Cong, I sess, 1967,591; Elmer

B. Staats (ComptGen) statement, 26 Mar 68, Subcte on National Security and Internatl Opns, Hearings:

Planning-Programming-Budgeting, 90 Cong, 2 sess, 1968, pt 3:323. Staats's statement (322-27) contains a

good description of the genesis of PPBS: see also Leonard Merwirz and Stephen H. Sosnick, The Budgets

New Clothes: A Critique ofPlanning-Programming-Budgeting and Benefit-CostAnalysis, 5-12.

2. Rand Corporation, The Rand Corporation: The First Fifteen Years, 20; David Novick, "Origin and History

of Program Budgeting," in Planning-Programming-Budgeting: Selected Comment, 596.

3. Hitch remarks to Army Management Orientation Course, U.S. Army Management School, Fe. Belvoir, Va,

16 Nov 61, fldr Comptroller, Budget, FY 1961-1963, box 779, Subject files, OSD Hist; Glass interv, 28

Oct 87, 38-39.

4. Maurice Stans test, 31 Jul 61, Senate, Cte on Govt Opns, Subcte on National Policy Machinety, Organizing

for National Security, pt I: I 108.

5. Robert W Downey, "An Introduction to the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System in the Department ofDefense: An Overview ofthe Process, Participants and Products," 4, OSD Hist.

6. Richard A. Stubbing with Richard A. Mendel, The Defense Game, 133.

7. Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet, 123-24: Taylor statement, 14 Jun 60, Organizingfor National

Security, pt 1:769-70 (769, quote).

8. Ltr Mahon to McElroy, 18 Aug 59, memo Black for Gates, 17 Nov 59, in Enthoven and Smith, How Much

Is Enough?, 28-30 (quote, 30). Various germane documents, including an OASD(C) report, "Functional

Budget Concept," 28 Nov 60, describing Mahon's efforts in 1959 and again in 1960 to prod DoD into

developing budget justification information along functional or program lines, are in fldr Functional Budgeting, box 112, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist.

9. McNamara test, 7 Aug 61, OrganizingforNational Security, pt 1:1194; McNamara interv, 3 Apr 86,13-14.

10. Hitch biographical sketch and statement, 18 Jan 61, SCAS, Nominations Hearing on Paul H Nitze, CharlesJ

Hitch, Cyrus R. Vtznce, Arthur Sylvester, and Thomas D. Morris, 87 Cong, I sess, 1961, 12-14; Hitch and

McKean, The Economics ofDeftme in the Nuclear Age, 44-59; "Applying an Economist's Yardstick to Defense," Business w"ek, 4 Mar 61, 64: McNamara interv, 3 Apr 86, 14-15: Fred Kaplan, The Wizards ofArmaguidon, 252; Shapley, Promise and Power, 99-100.

II. Hitch test, 18 Jan 61, SCAS, Nominations Hearing, 15, 18-19.

12. Interv David E. Bell by Robert C. Turner, 11 Ju164, 76-77, JFKL.
564 Notes to Pages 75-80

13. For example, see McNamara statement, 19 Jan 62, SCAS, Hearings: Military Procurement Authorization

Fiscal Year 1963, 87 Cong, 2 sess, 4; red of mtg, BrigGen George S. Brown, 18 Jan 61, fldr SecDef Staff

Meetings Feb-Apr 1961, box 10, AFPC and SecDefMeetings files, Ace 77-0062.

14. Red of action 475th NSC mtg, 1 Feb 61, FRUS 1961-63, VIII:20-23; memos McNamara for ASD(C),

1 Feb 61, Hitch for McNamara, 6 Feb 61, fldr FY 1963 Budget-Vol. I, box 17, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist.

During Hitch's absence a Rand colleague, David Novick, sat in Hitch's office and unofficially assumed his

duties. See Enthoven interv, 3 Feb 86, 7; Glass interv, 28 Oct 87, 5.

15. Draft memo Hitch for SecDef, 3 Mar 61,4,6-7, fldr Programming, file #1, box 109, ASD(C) files, OSD

Hist; OASD(C) chart, Feb 61, fldr Comptroller (Budget) 1960-69, box 614, Subject files, OSD Hist;

"Budget: Where Changes Hit Hardest," Armed Forces Management, Nov 61,98; Hitch memo for staff,

10 Mar 61, fldr Programming, file #1, box 109, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist; DoD organization charts, 10

Mar, 22 Sep 61, fldr DoD Organization Charts, box 503, Subject files, OSD Hist; list of employees in

OASD(C), 24 Jul 61, fldr OSD 1961, box 602, ibid; Hitch and McKean, The Economics ofDefense in the

Nuclear Age, 361-405.

16. Kaplan, Wizards ofArmageddon, 254-55; Enthoven interv, 3 Feb 86, 5.

17. Rosenberg, "Arleigh Albert Burke," 309.

18. Ltr Gilpatric to Rockefeller Public Service Awards, 19 Jun 61, fldr RLG Reading File (30 Dec 60-), box 2,

Gilpatric files, Ace 66A-3529; Glass interv, 28 Oct 87, 1-5; Reader's Digest, Mar 64, 128.

19. Fuller, "Congress and the Defense Budget," 56-57; Hitch test, 19 Apr 61, HSCA, DoD AppropriatiomfOr

1962,540; memo Melvin Anshen for Hitch, 7 Apr 61, fldr FY 1963 Budget-Vol. I, box 17, ASD(C) files,

OSD Hist; Hitch address before the National Conference of the Armed Forces Management Association,

Washington, DC, I Mar 61,2-3 (quote, 3), fldr Programming, file #1, box 109, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist.

20. Draft memo Hitch for SecDef, 3 Mar 61, cited in n 15,4,6-7.

21. Hitch remarks before the graduating class of the Industrial College ofthe Armed Forces, Washington, DC,

13 Jun 61, 6, fldr OSD Comptroller 1961, box 779, Subject files, OSD Hist; Shapley, Promise and Power,

101; Hitch, "Development and Salient Features of the Programming System," in Tucker, A Modem Design

fOr Defense Decision, 72.

22. Memos Navy(C) for AsstSecDef(C), 2 Mar 61, Stahr for SecDef, 21 Mar 61, Lyle Garlock (AsstSecAF) for

SecDef, 21 Mar 61, fldr FY 1963 Budget (Chron), box 18, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist; Hitch for SvcAsstSecs

(FM), 3 Apr 61, fldr Programming, file #1, box 109, ibid.

23. Livesay notes, staff mtg, 17 Apr 61, fldr SecDef Staff Meetings Feb-Apr 1961, box 10, AFPC and SecDef

Meetings files, Ace 77-0062. Attached to the notes are a 13-page paper, "A Proposed Programming and

Budgeting Process for FY 1963," dated 17 Apr 61, which Hitch distributed at the meeting (also printed in

Army, Navy, Air Force Journal, 29 Apr 61); a 3-page preliminary "List of Questions Associated with Programming for Fiscal Year 1963 Budget," and a 13-page "List ofProgram Packages for DoD 5-Year Program

Including the FY 1963 Budget."

24. Memo Bell for Pres, 14 Apr 61 (emphasis in original), Itr Bell to SecDef, 27 Apr 61, fldr 110.01 FY 63

1961, box 36, SecDefSubject Decimal files, Ace 65A-3464.

25. Memo Hitch fot SvcAsstSecs(FM), 2 May 61, fldr FY 1963 Budget (Chton), box 18, ASD(C) files,

OSD Hist.

26. Draft memo Bell for Pres, 8 Jun 61, fldr Budget 1963 (3), box 44, Theodore Sorensen Papers, JFKL.

27. Memo Bell for SecDef, 19 Jun 61, fldr 110.01 FY 631961, box 36, SecDefSubject Decimal files, Ace 65A3464; handwritten memo, "6120/61 DoD-BoB meeting," nd and ns, and paper, "Bureau of the Budget

Baseline Projections (1963 Budget Preview)," 20 Jun 61, ibid; memo Bell for SecDef, nd, w/atchd list ofpotential reductions, 16 Jun 61, fldr Misc. Budget, box 6, McNamara files, Ace 7IA-3470; memo William F.

McCandless for DirBoB, 14 Jul61, w/atchd paper, "1963 NOA Adjustments," 3 Ju161, fldr Exec Branch

Memoranda, box 14, David Bell Papers, JFKL.

28. Hitch test, 24 Ju161, OrganizingfOr National Security, pt 1:1006-07.

29. Memo Hitch for SvcAsstSecs(FM), 13 May 61, fldr FY 1963 Budget-Vol. I, box 17, ASD(C) files,

OSD Hist.

30. Memo Hitch for SvcAsstSecs(FM), 19 May 61, ibid.

31. "Applying an Economist's Yardstick to Defense, cited in n 10,64; Glass interv, 28 Oct 87, 49; Rosenberg,

"Arleigh Albert Burke," 309;James R. Schlesinger, "Uses and Abuses ofAnalysis," in Planning-ProgrammingBudgeting: Selected Comment, 126.
Notes to Pages 81-86 565

32. Memo Hitch fot DDR&E, ASD(I&L), ASD(Manpower), 16 Jun 61, memo McNamara for C}CS, 16 Jun

61, /ldr Programming, file #1, box 109, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist; published version of Hitch remarks to

Industrial College ofthe Armed Forces, Washington, DC, 17 Oct 61,19, /ldr OSD Comptroller 1961, box

779, Subject files, OSD Hist.

33. "Budget: Where Changes Hit Hardest, cited in n 15, 96; Hitch, "Development and Salient Features of the

Programming System," 73; Hitch test, 25 Jul 62, House, Cte on Govt Opns, Subcte on Military Opns,

Hearings: Systems Development and Management, 87 Cong, 2 sess, pt 2:528-29.

34. Hitch remarks to Army Management Orientation Course, 16 Nov 61, cited in n 3, 8; Hitch remarks to Industrial College ofthe Armed Forces, 17 Oct 61, cited in n 32, 15; "Pentagon Profile/CharlesJ. Hitch: 'To Balance

the Teeter-Tonet,''' Armed Forces Management, Aug 61,35: Livesay notes, staff mtg, 11 Sep 61, fldr SecDef

Staff Meetings Sept-Oct 1961, box 10, AFPC and SecDef Meetings files, Acc 77-0062: Aviation Daily,

8 Jan 62.

35. Hitch temarks to Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 17 Oct 61, cited in n 32, 20. Copies of the

following program package summaries prepared by the OSD Comptroller are in boxes 9 and 10, ASD(C)

files, OSD Hist: (II) Central War Defensive Forces, 31 Aug 61; (III) General Purpose Forces, 4 Sep 61:

(IV) Sealift and Airlift, 28 Jul 61; (VI) Research and Development, 25 Aug 61: (VII) Service-wide Support,

8 Sep 61; and (IX) Department of Defense (OSD and DoD Agencies), 8 Sep 61. No program package

summaries for Central War Offensive Forces, Reserve and National Guard Forces, and Classified Projects

have been found. Information on Reserve and National Guard forces was sent piecemeal to McNamara in

the comptroller's summaries for program packages II, III, IV, and VII, and was presented as a whole in

Hitch's memo (not in program package summary format) for McNamara, 13 Sep 61. A copy ofthis memo

is in fldt Reserves and National Guard-Package V, box 10, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist.

36. Livesay notes, staffmtg, 11 Sep 61, cited in n 34.

37. Memo McNamara for SvcSecs and C}CS, 22 Sep 61, fldr FY 1963 Budget (Chron), box 18, ASD(C) files,

OSD Hist.

38. Poole,JCS and National Policy 1961-64, pt 1:120-24.

39. Enthoven and Smith, How Much Is Enough?, 53-55. Enthoven and Smith (p. 54) mistakenly state that only

two DPMs were prepared in 1961, one on strategic nuclear forces and the other on general purpose fotces.

They do not mention rhe DPM dated 1 September 1961 that transmitted McNamara's recommendations

on airlift and sealift forces for 1963-1967, a copy ofwhich is in a looseleaf notebook entitled FY 63 DPMs,

box 116, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist.

40. Documentation on the genesis ofthe early DPMs is scarce. No copy ofthe 29 August DPM, the first one,

has been found, but it is mentioned in Zuckert's memo for McNamara of21 September, in /ldr Mise. Budget,

box 6, McNamara files, Acc 7lA-3470, and in Poole,jCS andNational Policy 1961-64, pt I: 123-24. Poole

notes that the JCS copy ofthe 29 August DPM was destroyed.

41. Extracts from draft memo McNamara for Pres, 6 Oct 61, FRUS 1961-63, VIII: 158-77. For the entire text

of the 23 September DPM, see ibid, 138-52. For an extract of the 30 September DPM on Nike-Zeus, see

ibid, 153-55. Complete copies of all three DPMs are in a looseleaf notebook entitled FY 63 DPMs, cited

in n 39.

42. Extracts from draft memo McNamara for Pres, 6 Oct 61, 159-61, 163-64, 166-68, 175, 177.

43. Hitch test, 24 Jul61, OrganizingfOr National Security, pt 1:1009.

44. Aviation week, 25 Dec 61.

45. Table, Comparison of Service Submissions and Sec Def Guidance, fldr Mise. Budget, box 6, McNamata

files, Acc 71A-3470.

46. Memo McNamara for SvcSecs, C]CS, and AdminAsst ro SecDef, 7 Nov 61, fldr 110.01 FY 63 General

7-15 Nov 61 (13 May 61), box 37, SecDefSubject Decimal files, Acc 65A-3464.

47. Paper, author unknown, "Summary of Secretary of Defense Actions on Subject/Issue Considerations

FY 1963 Budget Review," 4 Jan 62, fldr FY 1963-Index of Issues Sheet & Summary of Actions, box 13,

ASD(C) files, OSD Hist; McNamara test, 14 Feb 62, SSCA, Hearings: DepartmentofDefemeAppropriations

fOr 1963, 87 Cong, 2 sess, 6. The service reclamas and summary sheets showing rhe service submissions, as

well as the secretary of defense's tentative and final decisions, are filed in folders and arranged numerically

in boxes 40 and 41, SecDefSubject Decimal files, Acc 65A-3464. An index listing the 560 subjectlissues is

in fldr Index, box 40, ibid.
566 Notes to Pages 86-95

48. Air Force comment, signd by Zuckert and LeMay, 26 Nov 61, and summary sheer for SubjectlIssue 263:

B-70 Development (Air Force), with McNamara's handwritten "no" at the bottom, dated 30 Nov 61, fidr

Subjectflssues and Reclamas-Originals-Nos. 251 thru 275 Inclusive, box 40, SecDef Subject Decimal

files, Acc 65A-3464.

49. Memo Connally for SecDef, 6 Nov 61, fidr Secretaries and Chiefs Comments-Budget-Issues, box 6,

McNamara files, Acc 7IA-3470; memo McNamara for ASD(C), 17 Oct 61, fidr 110.01 FY 63 General

October 1961 (13 May 61), box 37, SecDefSubject Decimal files, Acc 65A-3464.

50. Memos Zuckert for SecDef, 2, 3 Nov 61, fidr Secretaries and Chiefs Comments-Budget-Issues, box 6,

McNamara files, Acc 7lA-3470.

51. Memo Stahr for SecDef, I Nov 61, ibid.

52. Memo McNamara for SecA, 15 Nov 61, fidr FY 1963 Budget (Chron), box 18, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist.

53. Memo Bell for Pres, 13 Nov 61, fidr Misc. Budget, box 6, McNamara files, Acc 7lA-3470.

54. Glass interv, 28 Oct 87, 66.

55. Livesay notes, staffmtg, 20 Nov 61, fidr SecDefStaffMeerings Nov-Dec 1961, box 10, AFPC and SecDef

Meetings files, Acc 77-0062.

56. Memrcd Seymour Weiss, 29 Nov 61, FRUS 1961-63, VIII:220-21.

57. Richard B. Crossland and James T. Currie, Twice the Citizen: A History ofthe United States Army Reserve,

1908-1983,154.

58. Memo McNamara for Pres, 7 Dec 61, fidr FY 1963 Budget (Chron), box 18, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist..

59. New York Times, 14 Dec 61; Gilparric press conf, 14 Dec 61, Gilpatric Public Statements, 1961,497-98;

Washington Star, 10 Jan 62.

60. Glass interv, 28 OCt 87, 29-30.

61. Ltr McNamara to Bell, 7 Dec 61, fidr FY 1963 Budget (Chron), box 18, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist.

62. New York Times, 10 Dec 61; Livesay notes, staffmrg, II Dec 61, fldr SecDefStaffMeetings Nov-Dec 1961,

box 10, AFPC and SecDefMeetings files, Acc 77-0062.

63. FRUS 1961-63, VII1:227, n 5; Desmond Ball, Politics and Force Levels: The Strategic Missile Program ofthe

Kennedy Administration, 134; Aviation Daily, 8 Jan 62.

64. Memo Gilpatric for McNamara, 28 Dec 61, fldr General LeMay's Recommendations, box 6, McNamara

files, Acc 7IA-3470; memo Kaysen for Pres, 27 Dec 61, fldr Air Force 1961, box 94A, POF, JFKL.

65. Memrcd Gilpatric, 3 Jan 62, FRUS 1961-63, VII1:232-34.

66. New York Times, 9 Jan 62. A copy ofMcNamara's briefing notes for the meeting is attached to his memo for

the Vice Pres, 9 Jan 62, fldr Reading File, Jan. 1962, box 114, McNamara Records, RG 200.

67. Ltr Bell to McNamata, 9 Jan 62, fldr Defense Budget History-Kennedy Years (FY 62-64), box 124,

ASD(C) files, OSD Hist; Washington Post, 5 Jan 62.

68. New York Times, 5 Feb 62; Baltimore Sun, 19 Jan 62.

69. Annual Budget Message to Congress, 18 Jan 62, Kennedy Public Papers, 1962,25-27.

70. Statement to Cabinet members and agency heads, 25 Aug 65, johnson Public Papers, 1965, 11:916-17; "Initial Memorandum," in Planning-Programming-Budgeting: Selected Comment, 9-13; Thomas C. Schelling,

"PPBS and Foreign Affairs," ibid, 112.

71. Hitch, "Decision-Making in Large Organizations," in Planning-Programming-Budgeting: Selected Comment,

579; Enthoven statement, 27 Sep 67, ibid, 224.

72. McNamara and Lemnitzer resr, 14 Feb 62, cited in n 47, 6, 93.

73. Planning-Programming-Budgeting: Selected Comment, 12.

74. Paul R. Schratz, "John B. Connally, 20 January 1961-20 December 1961," in Paolo E. Coletta, ed, American Secretaries ofthe Navy, 11:922; New York Times, 8 Ju162.

75. Aviation week, 25 Dec 61.

76. George M. Watson, Jr., The Office ofthe Secretary ofthe Air Force, 1947-1965,215-16; Zuckerr, "The Service Secretary: Has He a Useful Role?," 463-65.

77. Hitch remarks before the Second Conference on Management Problems of Military RDT&E, Quamico,

Va, 8 Jan 62, 3, fidr Programming, file #1, box 109, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist.

78. Glass interv, 28 Oct 87, 45-46.

79. David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest, 72.

80. Brower, "McNamara Seen Now, Full Length," 80.

81. McNamara interv, 3 Apr 86, 15.
Notes to Pages 96-104 567

V. CONGRESS AND THE FY1%3 BUDGET

1. Kolodziej, Uncommon Defense, 417.

2. Glass interv, 28 Oct 87,13-14.

3. McNamara interv, 3 Apr 86, 9. A copy ofthe complete, classified statement is in a binder entitled, "FY 63

Posture Statement," box 12, ASD(C) files, OSD Hisr.

4. Memo Paul for SecDef, 16 Dec 61, f1dr FY 1963 Budget (Chron), box 18, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist.

5. SCAS, Military ProcurementAuthorization, FY1963, 1-3; HCAS, Military Posture and HR 9751, 3159-60.

6. Military Procurement Authorization, FY 1963, 2-73 passim; Military Posture and HR 9751, 3162-85, 3243-

3306 passim.

7. Memo Paul for ASD(C), 18 Dec 61, f1dr FY 1963 Budget (Chron), box 18, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist;

Military ProcurementAuthorization, FY 1963, 23 Jan 62, 225-28.

8. Glass interv, 28 Oct 87, 25. Backup books 1-11 and llI-V for FY 1963 are in box 13, ASD(C) files,

OSD Hisr.

9. Wall Street journal, 22 Jan 62; Neal Sanford, Christian Science Monitor, 20 Jan 62.

10. Ball, Politics and Force Levels, 127-28; Military Procurement Authorization, FY 1963,229-30.

11. Military Posture and HR 9751,3306.

12. Ibid, 3306-07, 3320-22.

13. Ibid, 3697-98, 3796-97.

14. Ibid, 3897-3919. leMay's comments are on 3909-10.

15. Ibid, 3909-11, 3915.

16. Ibid, 3905-07.

17. SSCA, DoD Appropriationsftr 1963, 27 Feb 62, 185-93 (quote, 188); St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 1 Mar 62;

Washington Star, 1 Mar 62.

18. Military Posture and HR 9751, 3963-92; H CAS, AuthorizingAppropriationsftr Aircraft, Missiles, andNaval

Vessels, H Rpt 1406,87 Cong, 2 sess, 7 Mar 62, 1-3,7-9 (emphasis in original).

19. Transc of question and answer period following McNamara's remarks before the Ad Council, 7 Mar 62,

McNamara Public Statements, 1962,11:924-26; memo Paul for McNamara, 14 Mar 62, f1dr B-70-RMcN

Statements-Classified, Unclassified Press Conference, box 4, McNamara files, Acc 71A-3470.

20. Sorensen, Kennedy, 348.

21. Kennedy Public Papers, 1962,202,230.

22. Mtg notes, 5 Mar 62, f1dr Misc-RS-70, box 3, McNamara files, Acc 71A-3470. The notes are unsigned,

but are attached to the following undated handwritten chit: "My notes of yesterday's staff meeting-there

are no other copies. SBB [Sidney B. Berry, Jr.]"

23. Memrcd Anderson, 5 Mar 62, f1dr 5050/3 SecDefStaffMeeting Jan-May 1962, f1dr 5050/3, box 1962-05,

Chief of Naval Operations Immediate Office files, NHC.

24. Mtg notes, Sidney B. Berry, Jr., 8 Mar 62, 6, f1dr B-70, box 108, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist.

25. Memo Paul for McNamara, 12 Mar 62, f1dr B-70-RMcN Statements-Classified, Unclassified Press Conference, box 4, McNamara files, Acc 7lA-3470.

26. Vinson statement before House Rules Cre, 13 Mar 62, 19, f1dr FY 63 BU-B-70, box 18, ASD(C) files,

OSD Hist.

27. Memo Paul for McNamara, 14 Mar 62, cited in n 19; transc, HCAS, Hearings: Authorization ofRS-70, 14

Mar 62 (exec sess), f1dr Strategic Bombers, box 872, Subject files, OSD Hisr.

28. McNamara Public Statements, 1962, llI:976-89; "Text of McNamara's Statement on the B-70 Bombers,"

New York Times, 16 Mar 62 (see also Jack Raymond article).

29. Transc NBC "Today" program, 12 Mar 62, w/atchmt memo Sylvester for McNamara and Hitch, 13 Mar

62,5, f1dr FY 63 Bu-B-70, box 18, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist; Wall Street journal, 14 Mar 62.

30. "B-70 Battle," Business week, 17 Mar 62; Wall Streetjournal, 14 Mar 62; New York Times, 23 Mar 62.

31. Lawrence F. O'Brien, No Final Victories: A Life in Politics from john F. Kennedy to Watergate, 118; note

McNamara for Pres, 20 Mar 62, w/atchd paper, nd, "Summary ofltems Added to the FY '62 Budget by

the Congress," f1dr Defense 1/62-3/62, box 77, POF, JFKL. In the note McNamara indicated that he was

also attaching a brief statemem that Kennedy might wish to give Vinson. No copy of this statement has

been found.

32. McNamara imerv, 3 Apr 86, 24.

33. New York Times, 23 Mar 62; journal and Register, 20 Mar 62,3.
568 Notes to Pages 105-11

34. Sorensen, Kennedy, 348: inrerv Lawrence F. O'Brien by Michael L. Gillette, 30 Oct 85, 2-3, inrernet copy,

LBJL.

35. For example, see New York Times, 23 Mar 62; Washington Post, 22 Mar 62: O'Brien, No Final Victories, 118.

36. The texts ofthe letters, both dated 20 March 1962, are prinred in Cong Rec, 21 Mar 62, 4309-10.

37. Ibid.

38. SCAS, Authorization ofAppropriations ftr Aircraft, Missiles, and Naval vessels, FY 1963, S Rpt 1315, 87

Cong, 2 sess, 2 Apr 62, 1-3: Baltimore Sun, 22 Mar 62: New York Times, 13 Apr 62: PL 87-436, 27 Apr 62

(76 Stat 55).

39. Washington Post, 27 Mar 62: DoD News Release 481-62,29 Mat 62, McNamara Public Statements, 1962,

IIl:1084: Cong Rec, 29 Mar 62, 4942.

40. See Russell Baker, New York Times, 22 Mar 62: Wall Streetjournal, 22 Mar 62; Washington Post, 22 Mar 62;

Time, 30 Mar 62, 29. For the views of other colleagues on Vinson's handling of the affair, see Washington

Star, 24 Apr 62.

41. Rowland Evans, Jr., Reporter, 12 Apr 62: O'Brien, No Final Victories, 118: Gilpattic notes on talk with

Vinson, 19 Aug 63, Adr RLG Reading File, July 1, 1963, box 2, Gilpatric files, Acc 66A-3529.

42. News conf, 21 Mar 62, Kennedy Public Papers, 1962,260: inrerv McNamara by Louis Cassels (as published

in the Denver Post, 29 Mar 62), McNamara Public Statements, 1962, IIl:1085.

43. Ltt Zuckerr to McNamara, 19 Mar 62, Adr B-70-RMcN Statemenrs-Classified, Unclassified Press Conference, box 4, McNamara files, Acc 71 A-3470: CharlesJ. V. Murphy, 'The Education ofa Defense Secretary,"

Fortune, May 62, 268. Regarding rumors ofleMay's possible firing, see New York Times, 5 Mar 62.

44. HSCA, DoD Appropriationsftr 1963, pt 1:5.

45. Memo Vance, Runge, Ailes for SecDef, 13 Jan 62, w/atchmts, memo McNamara for Pres, 13 Jan 62: Adr

110.0 I FY 63 Reserve & National Guard Forces-Package #5, box 38, SecDef Subject Decimal files, Acc

66A-3542.

46. HSCA, DoD Appropriationsftr 1963, pt 2:247, 260: Cong Rec, 17 Apr 62, 6324 (Sikes commenrs).

47. DoD Appropriations ftr 1963, pt 2:58-59: papers, "A Chronology of the Aerions of the General Staff

Committees on National Guard and Army Reserve Policy" and "A Chronology ofthe Actions ofthe Reserve

Forces Policy Board In Connection With the Reserve Componenrs Realignmenr," nd and ns, Adr Backup

Book for Hearings on Army Reserve Componenrs Realignment, box 113, ASD(C) files, OSD Hisr; memo

Ailes for SecDef, 27 Mar 62, Adr 110.01 FY 63 Reserve & National Guard Forces-Package #5, box 38,

SecDef Subject Decimal files, Acc 66A-3542. Minutes ofthe Reserve Forces Policy Board meetings on 1-2

and 25 February 1962 are prinred in HCAS, Subcte No.3, Hearings: Military Reserve Posture, 87 Cong, 2

sess, 1962,6316-20, 6322-35.

48. Memo Ailes for SecDef, 27 Mar 62, cited in n 47, 1-2.

49. DoD Appropriationsftr 1963,30 Mar 62 (Ailes test), pt 6:112-17, 161-69.

50. H Doc 377, Amendments to the Budgetftr the Military Functions ofthe Department ofDeftnse Redistributing

the Funds Requested ftr the Army Reserve Forces, 2 Apr 62, 87 Cong, 2 sess; DoD News Release 521-62,

4 Apr 62, OSD Hist.

51. Ltr Truman to Kennedy, 11 Apr 62, Adr Department of Defense (B), General 1962, box 276, NSF, JFKL.

52. SSCA, DoD Appropriationsftr 1963, 1180-81, 1175, 1186, 1209, 1212, 1231-32. For text of the 4 April

press release cited in n 50, see ibid, 1169-70.

53. New York World Telegram, 6 Mar 62.

54. Livesay notes, staff mtg, 23 Apr 62, 6-7, Adr SecDef Staff Meetings Apr 1962, box 10, AFPC and SecDef

Meetings files, Acc 77-0062.

55. HCA, DoD Appropriation Bill, 1963, H Rpt 1607, 87 Cong, 2 sess, 13 Apr 62,3,8,23; Cong Rec, 17 Apr

62, 6329 (Flood remarks); New York Times, 19 Apr 62.

56. Livesay notes, cited in n 54; Itt Gilpattic to Robertson, 1 May 62, in SSCA, DoD Appropriationsftr 1963,

1281-82 (see also 1835-37): Livesay notes, staff mtg, 7 May 62,8, Adt SecDef Staff Meetings May-Jun

1962, box 10, AFPC and SecDefMeetings files, Acc 77-0062.

57. McNamara statement, w/atchd tables summarizing House actions and DoD reclamas, 15 May 62, SSCA,

DoD Appropriations ftr 1963, 1234-81 (quote, 1248-49). Because McNamara arrived a little late for the

hearing afrer attending an urgenr White House meeting, Hitch read the first few paragraphs ofthe statement.

58. Ibid, 1256.
Notes to Pages 111-19 569

59. Tel Harrison to McNamara, 17 May 62, fIdr McNamara-Reserve Component Material 1965, box 89,

ASD(C) files, OSD Hist; tel McNamara to Harrison, 17 May 62, McNamara Public Statements, 1962,

III: 1292-93.

60. SCA, DoD Appropriation Bill, 1963, S Rpt 1578, 87 Cong, 2 sess, 8 Jun 62; New York Times, 9 Jun 62;

Washington Post, 10 Jun 62.

61. Memo Ailes for SecDef, 15 Jun 62, fldr McNamara-Reserve Component Material 1965, box 89, ASD(C)

files, OSD Hist; New York Times, 14 Jun 62.

62. Louis Kraar, "The Two Lives of Robert McNamara," Life, 30 Nov 62,102.

63. McNamara Public Statements, 1962, IV: 1512-17; Washington News, 3 Jul62; DoD News Release 1124-62,

3 Jul62, OSD Hist; McNamara Public Statements, 1962, 1V:1550.

64. Text ofresolution adopted at the Governors' Conference, 3 Jul62, Cong Rec, 3 Aug 62, A-5968; McNamara

interv, 3 Apr 86, 26.

65. Ltr McNamara to Mahon, 20 Jul 62, fIdr Reserve and Guard Program, box 6, McNamara files, Acc 7lA3470; Itr McNamara to Robertson, 20 Jul 62, fIdr Reading File, July 1962, box 115, McNamara Records,

RG 200.

66. Draft Itt prepared by Glass, 28 Jun 62, 7, fIdr Army National Guard & Reserve-Realignment, box 113,

ASD(C) files, OSD Hisr. See too a second draft, dated 2 July and also ptepared by Glass. The text of the

second letter is virtually identical to the letters sent to Mahon and Robertson on 20 July.

67. Martha Derthick, The National Guard in Politics, 153.

68. Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964,316.

69. House, Department ofDefense AppropriationsfOr 1963: Conference Report to Accompany HR 11289, H Rpt

2036,87 Cong, 2 sess, 25 Ju162, 8; PL 85-577, 9 Aug 62 (76 Stat 318).

70. Cong Rec, 26 Ju162, 13859.

71. Military Reserve Posture, cited in n 47, 6670-77; New York Post, 15 Aug 62.

72. New York Times, 5 Dec 62; Wall Street journal, 5 Dec 62; Itr McNamara to Sen Margaret Chase Smith,

w/atchmts, 18 Oct 63, fIdr Congressional1nfIuence on DoD (Armed Forces Composition), box 93, ASD(C)

files, OSD Hist; McNamara Public Statements, 1962, IV: 1932-62; DoD Annual Report, FY1963,27-28.

73. Memos Charyk for SecDef, 1 Jun 62, LeMay for SecAF, 26 Ju162, and Zuckert for SecDef, 4 Aug 62: fIdr

B-70, box 2, McNamara files, Acc 71A-3470; Poole,JCS andNational Policy 1961-64, pt 1:147; "Office of

the Secretary of Defense Analysis of RS-70 Program as Submitted by USAF," 20 Jul 62, w/appens, fIdr

Analysis of RS-70 Program ..., box 16, Enthoven Papers, LBJL.

74. Poole,JCS and National Policy 1961-64, pt 1:148-50.

75. Washington Post, 7 Oct 62; Washington Star, 17 Oct 62; Washington Post, 18 Oct 62; Bernard C. Nalty, "The

Quest for an Advanced Manned Strategic Bomber: USAF Plans and Policies, 1961-1966," USAF Hist Div,

Aug 66, 10.

76. Poole,jCS and National Policy 1961-64, ptl:150-51; DoD News Release 1859-62, 15 Nov 62, OSD Hist;

McNamara draft memo for Pres, 20 Nov 62, 1-8, fldr Miscellaneous Memoranda and Reports, box 880,

Subject files, OSD Hist.

77. Gilpatric memrcd, 23 Nov 62, FRUS 1961-63, VlII:415-16; DoD News Release 1908-62,25 Nov 62,

OSD Hist.

78. Murphy, "The Education of a Defense Secretary," 102.

79. Draft paper, ns, 5 Oct 62, fIdr Chron File-1962, box 1, Legislative Affairs files, Acc 67A-4632. The author

of the paper was apparently Col. H. M. Hoyler, USMC, director ofthe plans & coordination staff in the

office of the assistant for legislative affairs, who expressed many of the same ideas in similar language in a

memo for David McGiffert, assistant to the secretary for legislative affairs, 24 Oct 62, ibid.

VI. THE FY 1964 BUDGET

1. See table, Department ofDefense Total Obligational Authority (TOA), 1948-1997, in Trask and Goldberg,

The Department ofDefense, 1941-1997: Organization and Leaders, 169.

2. The initial Five-Year Force Structure and Financial Program, dated 15 April 1962, was circulated as an attachment to McNamara memo of 16 April for SvcSecs et ai, fldr 110.01 (5 YR Force Structure 12 Apr 62),

box 20, SecDef Subject Decimal files, Acc 66A-3542. A summary of the program appeated in Baltimore

Sun, 18 Apr 62. The revised program, dated 7 July 1962, was attached to McNamara memo for SvcSecs et

ai, 14 Ju162, fldr FYFSFp, July 1962, box 134, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist.
570 Notes to Pages 119-23

3. 000 Directive 7045.1, "Program Change Control System," 12 Apr 62; 000 Instruction 7045.2, "Procedures for Program Change Comrol and Related Progress Reporring," 17 Apr 62. Also serving as guidance was

a reporr prepared by the Programming Office in OASD(C), "Programming System for the Office of the

Secretary of Defense," 31 May 62 (rev 25 Jun 62), fldr Financial Mgmt 1962, box 780, Subject files,

OSD Hist.

4. Memo McNamara for Pres, 26 Apr 62, fldr Dept of Defense General-April-May 1962, box 274, NSF,

JFKL. In the memo McNamara referred to and summarized the presidem's memo of 17 April expressing

these concerns. No copy ofthe president's memo has been found.

5. Address before the San Francisco section of the Institute ofAerospace Science, Palo Alto, Calif, 5 Sep 62,

8-8a, fldr Comptroller 1962, Budget FY 1962-1964, box 780, Subject files, OSD Hist.

6. Ltrs Bell to McNamara, 3 Apr 62, and McNamara to Bell, 23 May 63, fldr 110.01 (5 YR Force Structure),

box 20, SecDef Subject Decimal files, Acc 66A-3542; draft BoB paper, "Revision of 1964 Preview," 13 Jul

62, fldr 110.01 (5 YR Plan) July thru August, ibid.

7. BoB notes on mtg w/McNamara et al regarding 000 1964 budget preview, ns, 17 Jul 62, fldr NATO,

Weapons, Skybolt 3/63 (I), box 227, NSF, JFKL.

8. Memos McNamara for ClCS, 18 Jul 62, and McNamara for SvcSecs, 18 Jul 62, fldr 110.01 (5 YR Plan)

July thru Augusr, box 20, SecDef Subject Decimal files, Acc 66A-3542; memo Lemnitzer for SecDef, 31

Aug 62, fldr JCS Views Sep-Nov 1962, box 28, McNamara Records, RG 200. The Navy reply was in memo

Korth for SecDef, 31 Aug 62, fldr 110.0I (5 YR Plan) July thru August, box 20, SecDefSubject Decimal

files, Acc 66A-3542. The Air Force response was in memo Zuckert for SecDef, 5 Sep 62, fldr 110.01 FY 64,

23 Nov 62 to -, box 7, ibid. The Army response has not been found.

9. Poole,JCS andNational Policy 1961-64, pt 1:242-44; memo Lemnirzer for SecDef, 31 Aug 62, cited in n 8.

10. Memo Bell for Pres, 22 Jun 62, fldr Bureau of the Budget, General 11/61-6/62, box 270, NSF, JFKL.

Attached to the memo was a covering note from Bell to Bundy and Kaysen, dated 23 June, in which Bell

indicated that the bureau's preliminary recommendations on the FY 1964 budger would be discussed at a

meeting on 25 June with the presidem and others.

11. Memo Bell for Pres, 31 Aug 62, 5, fldr Budget 1964 (I), box 45, Sorensen Papers, JFKL. An earlier but

virtually identical draft, dated 22 August, is in fldr 1964 Budget Tables, box 14, Bell Papers, JFKL. A handwritten marginal notation indicates that the draft was discussed on 23 August with Sorensen, Dillon, and

Kermit Gordon.

12. Transc White House mtg, 2 Oct 62, primed in Ernest R. May, Timothy Naftali, and Philip D. Zelikow, eds,

The Presidential Recordings: John F Kennedy: The Great Crises, 2:321-51 (quotes, 343).

13. Memo Bell for Dillon, 5 Oct 62, w/atchd draft paper, "Possible Reductions in Bureau ofthe Budget Recommended Expenditures for 1964," fldr Budget 1964 (I), box 45, Sorensen Papers, JFKL. The draft paper

has the following handwritten paremhetical notation under the title: "Suggested by Dillon."

14. Memo McNamara for Taylor, 22 Sep 62, w/atchd paper, "Time Schedule for Major Decisions to be Made

by SecDef re FY '64 Budger," fldr 110.01 FY 64 Case Date (23 Aug 62) Jan-Sept 62, box 29, SecDef

Subject Decimal files, Acc 66A-3542.

15. Memo Hitch for SecDef, 24 Sep 62, fldr FY 1964 Budget (Chron), box 22, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist;

Hitch address before Operations Research Sociery ofAmerica, Philadelphia, 7 Nov 62, 14-15, fldr Comptroller, Budget, FY 1962-1964, box 780, Subject files, OSD Hist.

16. The Army and Navy budget submissions were attached to memos Vance for SecDef and Korrh for SecDef,

both 1 Oct 62, fldr 110.01 FY 64, Case Date (23 Aug 62) October 62, box 29, SecDefSubject Decimal files,

Acc 66A-3542. A copy of the Air Force submission has not been found. A tabulation of all three service

submissions of 1 October, organized by ttaditional budget categories, is in fldr FY 1964 Budget (Chron),

box 22, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist.

17. Memo McNamara for SvcSecs et al, 24 Oct 62, fldr FY 1964 Budget (Chron), box 22, ASD(C) files, OSD

Hist; Pemagon background briefing, 16 Jan 63,7, fldr Hitch Press Conference-FY 1964 Budget, ibid;

memo Hitch for SecDef, 10 Jan 63, w/atchd paper, "Summary ofSubject/Issue Considerations," rev 26 Jan

63, fldr 110.0 I FY 64 Jan thru April 1963, box 42, SecDef Subject Decimal files, Acc 69A-3131; New York

Times, 18 Nov 62; UPI wire service dispatch, 20 Nov 62.

18. Livesay notes, staffmtg, 15 Oct 62, 8, fldr SecDef Staff Meetings Sep-Dec 1962, box 11, AFPC and SecDef Meetings files, Acc 77-0062.

19. JCSM-907-62 JCS for SecDef, 20 Nov 62, quored in ed note, FRUS 1961-63, V1II:387-89; memo Taylor

for SecDef, 20 Nov 62, ibid, 390-92.
Notes to Pages 123-31 571

20. Draft memo McNamara for Pres, 21 Nov 62, ibid, 399-401; memo ViceAdm Herbert D. Riley (DirJtStaff)

for SecDef, 4 Dec 62, w/atchd table, "Recommendations of the Joint ChiefS of Staff Relative to Forces Supported by FY-64 Military Budget," fldr FY 1964 Budget (Chron), box 22, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist.

21. Memo Kaysen for Bundy, 14 Nov 62, FRUS 1961-63, VlII:383-85; memo Wiesner for Pres, 4 Dec 62, fldr

Defense Budget FY 1964 Vol. I-Miscellaneous, box 275, NSF, JFKL.

22. Draft memo McNamara for Pres, 20 Nov 62, FRUS 1961-63, VlII:392-97; interv Harold Brown by Steven

Rifkin, 9 May 64, 18, JFKL.

23. NIE 11-8-62, "Soviet Capabilities for Long Range Attack," 6 Jul 62, FRUS 1961-63, VlII:332-33; memo

Johnson (DepUSecState) for Rusk, 29 Jul 62, ibid, 350-51 (quote, 351); memo SecState, SecDef, DirClA,

ClCS for Pres, nd, w/atchd rpt, ibid, 350-51, 355-78.

24. Memo Taylor for Pres, 23 Aug 62, Itr Rusk to McNamara, 28 Nov 62: ibid, 380, 417.

25. Poole, ]CS and National Policy 1961-64, pt 1:193-95; memo Legere for Bundy, 26 Nov 62, fldr Defense

Budget FY 1964 Vol. I-Miscellaneous, box 275, NSF, JFKL.

26. Brown interv, 9 May 64, 19; memrcd Gilpatric, 23 Nov 62, FRUS 1961-63, VIII:415-16; memo Legere for

Bundy, 27 Nov 62, fldr Defense Budget FY 1964 Vol. I-Miscellaneous, box 275, NSF, JFKL.

27. Memo McNamara for ClCS, 29 Nov 62, fldr Classified Chron File-July thtu Dec 1962, box 45, Enthoven Papers, LBJL; "Adequacy of Overall Budget," Tab D to point paper on FY 1964 budget, nd and ns,

bound volume II entitled "Some Controversial Issues during Admiral Anderson's Tenure as CNO," box

1963-35, Chief of Naval Operations Immediate Office files, NHC.

28. Draft memo McNamara for Pres, 3 Dec 62, FRUS 1961-63, VlII:428-31.

29. Preliminary recording transc, White House mtg, 5 Dec 62,10:15-11:57 a.m., 1-2, Miller Center, Univ of

Virginia. The OSD Historical Office is grateful to Timothy Naftali and David Coleman of the Miller

Center for providing a copy ofthe preliminary transcript. The transcript is based on tapes 65 and 66, Presidential Recordings, JFKL. While McNamara and other officials used various figures to describe the differences between the service budget submissions and the president's final budget, a detailed tabulation OSD

later provided the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee showed a total difference of $12.4798 billion

(NOA): $3.7094 billion for the Army, $3.8998 for the Navy, and $4.8706 for the Air Force (SSCA, Hearings: Department ofDefense Appropriationsfor 1964, 88 Cong, 1 sess, 1488-89).

30. Preliminary recording transc, White House mtg, 5 Dec 62, 3-4, 7-8.

31. Ibid, 14-15, 18-19.

32. Ibid, 20-28; see Wiesner memo, 4 Dec 62, cited in n 21.

33. Preliminary recording transc, White House mtg, 5 Dec 62,38-47.

34. New York Times, 20 Dec 62; Washington Post, 20 Dec 62; question and answer period following address

at the Economic Club of New York, 14 Dec 62, and television and radio interview, 17 Dec 62, Kennedy

Public Papers, 1962,885,896-97; Washington News, 19 Dec 62.

35. Memcon w/Pres, 27 Dec 62, FRUS 1961-63, VlII:446-47. McNamara's handwritten notes on the meeting

are in fldr Palm Beach Notes on JCS Views, box 28, McNamata Records, RG 200. A chronology of the

Navy's efforts in the fall 1962 to have two nuclear-powered attack submarines added to the budget, as well

as discussion of the issue during the 1963 congressional hearings, is in paper, "Request for Addition of 2

Nuclear Attack Submarines," Jun 63, fldr Controversial Issues during GW Anderson's Tour Vol. 2, box

1963-35, Chief of Naval Operations Immediate Office files, NHC.

36. Memcon w/Pres, 27 Dec 62, cited in n 35, 448-50, 453.

37. Ibid, 450-52.

38. Ibid, 452-53; memo MajGen John M. Reynolds (ViceDirJCS) for McNamara, Gilpatric, and JCS, 28

Dec 62, w/atchd policy guidance, fldr 092.3 Nassau (1962 Papers) 1963, box 40, SecDefSubject Decimal

files, Acc 69A-3131.

39. Interv George W Anderson, Jr., by John T. Mason, Jr., 7 Jan 81, 522-23, NHC; memrcd Gilpatric, 2 Jan

63, fldr RLG Reading File-Jan. 1, 1963-June 30,1963, box 2, Gilpatric files, Acc 66A-3529.

40. Kennedy Public Papers, 1963, 27-28, 33, 40. A detailed discussion of the Defense portion of the budget

is in The Budget ofthe United States, FY1964, 61-69.

41. DoD FY 1964 Budget Highlights, I-Summary, 1,26 Feb 63, box 20, ASD(C) files, OSD Hisr.

42. Philadelphia Inquirer, 18 Jan 63.

43. HCAS, AuthorizingAppropriationsfor Aircraft, Missiles, and Naval VesseLr, H Rpt 62, 88 Cong, 1 sess, 6 Mar

63,2-3; Itr McNamara to Pres ofSenate, 17 Jan 63, Cong Rec, 19 Feb 63, 2363-64; Baltimore Sun, 22 Jan 63;

SCAS, Hearings: Military ProcurementAuthorization, Fiscal Year 1964, 88 Cong, 1 sess, 19 Feb 63, 2.
572 Notes to Pages 131-36

44. Charles J. Hitch, "What Tying Dollats to Military Decisions Means to Defense Management," Armed

Forces Management, Nov 62; Air Force Times, 5 Jan 63; Robert E. Hunter, "The Polirics of U.S. Defence

1963: Manned Bombers versus Missiles," World Today, Mar 63, 98-99; Hunter, "The Politics of U.S. Defence 1963: The Congressional Question," ibid, Apr 63, 156.

45. Memos McGiffert for O'Brien, 14,21 Jan 63, f1dr White House Major Legislative Reports 1963, box 1,

Legislative Affairs files, Acc 67A-4632; "Overall Shipbuilding and Conversion Program," Tab A to point

paper on FY 1964 budget, cited in n 27.

46. Memo McGiffert for SecDef, 21 Dec 62, w/atchd memrcd, 20 Dec 62, f1dr FY 1964 Budget (Chron),

box 22, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist.

47. HCAS, Hearings: Military Posture and HR 2440,88 Cong, 1 sess, 30 Jan 63, 233-34, 284; memo McGiffert

for O'Brien, 4 Feb 63, f1dr White House Major Legislative Reports 1963, box 1, Legislative Affairs files,

Acc 67A-4632.

48. Baltimore Sun, 5 Feb 63.

49. Memo McGiffert for O'Brien, 11 Feb 63, f1dr White House Major Legislative Reports 1963, box 1, Legislative Affairs files, Acc 67A-4632; Military Posture and HR 2440,614-17,667-69,724-25;]. F. Shumate

(OSD Off of Legis Liaison), rpt on cong hearing, 21 Feb 63, f1dr 000 Authorization (FY 64) 1963, box

781, Subject files, OSD Hist.

50. Memo McGiffert for O'Brien, 25 Feb 63, f1dr White House Major Legislative Reports 1963, box 1, Legislative Affairs files, Acc 67A-4632; Military Posture and HR 2440, 1305-14 (quotes, 1307); Authorizing Appropriationsfor Aircraft, Missiles, andNaval Vessels, cited in n 43, 1-6; Washington Star, 9 Mar 63.

51. Memo McGiffert for O'Brien, 18 Mar 63, f1dr White House Major Legislative Reports 1963, box 1, Legislative Affairs files, Acc 67A-4632; Washington Post, 13, 14 Mar 63; Baltimore Sun, 14 Mar 63.

52. Memo McGiffert for SecDef et al, 5 Jan 63, f1dr 000 Appros FY 64, box 781, Subject files, OSD Hist;

table, "Secretary McNamara's Appearances Before Congressional Committees (Senate), 88 Cong, 1 sess,"

nd, f1dr Foreign Assistance-MAP, AID, etc, box 101, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist; SCAS, Military ProcurementAuthorization, FY 1964,1-81 passim (quote, 5).

53. Military Procurement Authorization, FY 1964,83-90; for Brown's testimony on 26 February, see 411-85,

and for testimony ofthe service representatives on 27-28 February and on 1 and 4-8 Match, 487-1033.

54. SCAS, AuthorizingAppropriations During Fiscal Year 1964for Procurement, Research, Development, Test, and

Evaluation ofAircraft, Missiles, and Naval Vessels for the Armed Forces, S Rpt 123, 88 Cong, 1 sess, 9 Apr 63,

1-5,15; Baltimore Sun, 12 Apt 63.

55. Washington Post, 13 Apr 63; Baltimore Sun, 12 Apr 63.

56. Memo McGiffert for O'Btien, 6 May 63, f1dr White House Major Legislative Reports 1963, box 1, Legislative Affairs files, Acc 67A-4632; Itr McNamata to Armed Svcs Cte Chairmen, 24 Apr 63, Itr Vinson to

McNamara, 29 Apr 63, memo Gilpatric for qcs, 4 May 63, memo Taylor for SecDef, 8 May 63, w/atchd

lrr to Vinson, 8 May 63: f1dr 110.01 FY 64 Jan thru April 63, box 42, SecDef Subject Decimal files, Acc

69A-3131.

57. HCAS, Authorizatiomfor Aircraft, Missiles, andNaval Vessels, Fiscal Year 1964, H Rpt 289, 88 Cong, 1 sess,

13 May 63, 4; Aviation Daily, 13 May 63; Wall Streetjournal, 15 May 63; PL 88-28,23 May 63 (77 Stat 48).

58. Maurice H. Stans, One ofthe Presidents' Men: Twenty Years with Eisenhower and Nixon, 102-03; news confs,

6 Mar, 3 Apr 63, Kennedy Public Papers, 1963,238,307-08; New York Times, 8 Mar 63.

59. Memo Pres for SecDef, 3 Apr 63, f1dr Department of Defense General 1/63-6/63, box 274, NSF, JFK.L;

memos Bundy for Yarmolinsky, 5 Apr 63, and Yarmolinsky for Hitch, 6 Apr 63, f1dr Interagency Memoranda 1961-1968, box 9, Enrhoven Papers, LBJL; memo McNamara for Pres, 17 Apr 63, f1dr Departmenr of

Defense General 1/63-6/63, box 274, NSF, JFK.L. An idenrical copy of the McNamara memo showing

Enrhoven as the drafter is in f1dr Inreragency Memoranda 1961-1968, box 9, Enrhoven Papers, LBJL.

60. Memo Gilpatric for Claude Desaurels, 23 Mar 63, w/archd memo Gilpatric for Pres, 23 Mar 63, f1dr RLG

Reading File-Jan 1, 63-Jun 30, 63, box 2, Gilpatric files, Acc 66A-3529. No 000 analysis was found attached to these documenrs, bur an undated copy of the analysis, enrirled "Impact of a $7,756 Million Reduction in FY 1964 NOA," is in f1dr $7,756 Million Reduction FY 64 NOA, box 1, ibid.

61. Lus Ryan to McNamara, 29 Mar 63, Hitch to Ryan, 11 Apr 63, Melman to Ryan, 3 Jun 63, all in Cong Rec,

20 Jun 63, 10611-15; memo Enthoven for DepSecDef, 30 Apr 63, f1dr Melman-Nuclear Capabilities,

Strategies, etc, box 25, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist.

62. Ltr Melman to McNamara, 10 May 63, Itr Hitch to Melman, 22 May 63: f1dr Melman-Nuclear Capabilities, Strategies, etc, box 25, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist. In the margin of Hitch's Jetter is the handwritten
Notes to Pages 136-44 573

notation: "Prof. M. came in 7 June-talked with Mr. Hitch, Dr. Enthoven & Mr. Glass." No other record

of their discussion has been found.

63. The record of the hearings is in HSCA, Hearings: Department ofDefense Appropriations for 1964, 88

Cong, 1 sess, pts 1-6. McNamara's testimony, in which he was joined by Taylor, comprises all ofpt 1. Testimony by Taylor separately, the Joint Chiefs, certain other OSD personnel, and the service secretaries

comprises all of pt 2. Examples of questioning about the Joint Chiefs' role in budget decisions and

McNamara's denial or reduction of service requests are in pt 1:342-48 and pt 2:129-31, 300-314, 454,

476-81, 505-24, 548-62. Melman's testimony is in pt 6:891-902.

64. HCA, Department ofDefense Appropriation Bill, 1964, H Rpt 439,88 Cong, 1 sess, 21 Jun 63, 3-4; DoD

News Release 893-63, 21 Jun 63; memo McGiffert for O'Brien, 24 Jun 63, Rdr Whire House Major Legislative Reports 1963, box 1, Legislative Affairs files, Ace 67A-4632.

65. Cong Rec, 25 Jun 63, 10820; New York Times, 22 Jun 63; Cong Rec, 26 Jun 63, 11105-29; memo McGiffert

for O'Brien, 1 Jul 63, Rdr White House Major Legislative Reports 1963, box 1, Legislative Affairs files,

Acc 67A-4632; Wall Street Journal, 27 Jun 63.

66. Memo Brown for McNamara, 27 Jun 63, Rdr 110.01 FY 64 May thru August 1963, box 42, SecDef Subject Decimal files, Acc 69A-3131; Itt McNamara to Russell, 12 Jul 63, in SSCA, DoD Appropriationsfor

1964,1502-06; Gilpatric test, 20 Aug 63, ibid, 1562-63.

67. LtCol S. B. Berry staffmtg notes, 15 Ju163, Rdr SecDefStaffMeetings Apt-Jull963, box 11, AFPC and

SecDef Meetings files, Acc 77-0062. The information McNamara tequested was summarized in memo

Hitch for SecDef, 31 Jul 63, Rdr 110.01 FY 64 May thru August 1963, box 42, SecDef Subject Decimal

files, Acc 69A-3131.

68. Julius Duscha, Arms, Money, and Politics, 3; Itr McGovern and Nelson to McNamara, 15 Ju163, Rdr 110.01

1963, box 41, SecDefSubject Decimal files, Acc 69A-3131; Washington Post, 3 Aug 63.

69. Ltt McGovern to McGiffert, 7 Aug 63, fJdr 110.01 1963, box 41, SecDef Subject Decimal files, Acc

69A-3131.

70. Memo McGifferr for O'Brien, 19 Aug 63, Rdr White House Major Legislative Reports 1963, box 1, Legislative Affairs files, Acc 67A-4632.

71. SSCA, DoD Appropriations for 1964, 1562-1652 (quotes, 1564, 1624, 1622-23); Air Force Magazine,

Oct 63.

72. SCA, Department ofDefense Appropriation Bill, 1964, S Rpt 502, 88 Cong, 1 sess, 17 Sep 63,1,62; Baltimore Sun, 18 Sep 63; memo McGiffert for McNamara, 17 Sep 63, Rdr RLG's Notes on FY 64 Budget,

box 1, Gilpatric files, Acc 66A-3529; Itrs McNamara to Russell and to Carl Hayden, both 6 Sep 63, Rdr

FY 1964 Budget (Chron), box 22, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist.

73. Duscha, Arms, Money, and Politics, 6; Cong Rec, 24 Sep 63, 16943-72 (quotes, 16956, 16961); New York

Times, 25 Sep 63.

74. Ltr Gilpatric to Russell, 26 Sep 63, fldr RLG Reading File-July 1, 1963- , box 2, Gilpatric files, Acc

66A-3529.

75. Conf Cte, Department ofDefense Appropriation Bill, 1964, H Rpt 812, 88 Cong, 1 sess, 7 Oct 63, 1-3;

Washington Post, 8 Oct 63; Baltimore Sun, 9 Oct 63; PL 88-149, 17 OCt 63 (77 Stat 254).

76. New York Times, 18 Nov 62; Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964,380.

77. Hunter, "The Politics of U.S. Defence 1963:The Congressional Question," 161; Business w"ek, 31 Aug 63.

78. Newsweek, 25 Mar 63; Atlanta Constitution, 17 Mar 63.

79. Gilbert C. Fite, Richard B. Russell, Jr.: Senator from Georgia, 387-88; Atlanta Constitution, 24 Mar 63

(quote); Baltimore Sun, 26 Jun 63; Washington Post, 28 Jun 63; Business w"ek, 31 Aug 63.

VB. BERLIN: THE WALL

1. Interv Henry Rowen by Alfred Goldberg, 27 Sep 66, 3, OSD Hist.

2. Extract from Khrushchev address, 10 Nov 58, Dept State, Documents on Germany, 1944-1985 (hereafter

Documents on Germany), 545; note from Soviet Union to US, 27 Nov 58, ibid, 558-59; Watson, Into the

Missile Age, 593-97.

3. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 346.

4. Note from Soviet Union, 27 Nov 58, Documents On Germany, 559.

5. Note from US to Soviet Union, 31 Dee 58, ibid, 576.

6. Dulles press conf, 26 Nov 58, FRUS 1958-60, VIII: 122-23; Watson, Into the Missile Age, 596-620.
574 Notes to Pages 145-51

7. Strobe Talbott, rrans, Khrushchev Remembers, 458; Adlai Stevenson, rpt of convers w/Menshikov, 14 Dec

60, fldr USSR General 1960, box 125, POF, JFKL.

8. Dept State, Hist Off, "Crisis over Berlin: American Policy Concerning rhe Soviet Threats ro Berlin, November 1958-December 1962," Research Project 614-E, Feb 70, pt V, 1.

9. Aide-memoite Soviet Union ro Federal Republic of Germany, 17 Feb 61, Documents on Germany, 723-27

(quote, 726).

10. Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, 215-16; Jack M. Schick, The Berlin Crisis, 1958-1962, 138-41.

II. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 347-48.

12. Kennedy Public Papers, 1961,19-28; Hillenbrand memcon w/Bowles, Grewe et ai, 2 Feb 61, FRUS 1961-

63, XIV:5-6; msg 1839 Moscow ro State, 4 Feb 61, ibid, 6-7.

13. Memcon Pres and Brentano et ai, 17 Feb 61, FRUS 1961-63, XIV:8-11; memcon Pres and Brandt et ai, 13

Mar 61, ibid, 25-30; jt US-West German communique, 13 Apr 61, Documents on Germany, 727-29.

14. P. H. Johnstone, "Military Policy Making during the Berlin Crisis of 1958-62," IDA, Rpt R-138, Mar 68

(hereafter cited as IDA Rpt R-138), 1:145; Gregory W Pedlow, "Allied Crisis Management for Berlin: The

LIVE OAK Organization, 1959-1963," in William W Epley, ed, International Cold war Military Records

and History, 87-90.

15. JCSM-33-61 Lemnitzer for SecDef, 26 Jan 61, fldr 381 Germany 1960, box 20, SecDef Subject Decimal

files, Acc 64A-2093; Itr Nitze ro SecState, 10 Feb 61, ibid.

16. JCSM-476-61 Lemnitzer for SecDef, 12 Jul 61, fldr 092 Germany (Berlin) Jul 61, box 51, ISA files, Acc

64A-2382; memo McNamara for ClCS, 9 Aug 61, ibid; Itr Nitze ro John Ausland, 24 Apr 84, Nitze Papers,

LC.

17. IDA Rpt R-138, 1:145-46; Bundy memo of mtg on Berlin, 17 JuI61, FRUS 1961-63, XIV:211.

18. Dean Acheson, "A Review of North Atlantic Problems for the Future," Mar 61, fldr NATO General, Vol.

1, box 220, NSF, JFKL; memo Acheson for Pres, 3 Apr 61, fldr Germany, Berlin-General, box 81, ibid.

Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, 217, n 175, cites an unpublished paper in the Acheson files by Thomas

Schelling, entitled "On the Problem of NATO's Nuclear Strategy" and dated 7 March 1961, which Acheson

kepr while working on NATO policies.

19. Memo George C. McGhee for McGeorge Bundy, w/atchmt, "The Problem of Betlin," 30 Mar 61 (quote,

II), fldr 092 Germany (Berlin) Jan-Jun 61, box 33, ISA files, Acc 64A-2382.

20. Memo DirISA Coordinating Staff(NSC & Collateral Activities) Robert H. B. Wade for ASecState(RegAffs),

30 Mar 61, ibid; memo DirPolPlngStaffBrigGen James H. Polkfor DASD(lSA), 3 Apr 61, ibid.

21. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 380-82; memcon, 5 Apr 61, FRUS 1961-63, XIV:36-37; Poole, ]CS and

National Policy 1961-64, pr 11:151-52.

22. JCSM-237-61 Lemnitzer for SecDef, 13 Apr 61, fldr 310.1 (Proj 87), 1/31-15-2-1, box 51, ISA files,

Acc 64A-2382; memo William Bundy for SecDef, 21 Apr 61, ibid; JCSM-287-61 Burke for JCS for

SecDef, 28 Apr 61, fldr 092 Germany (Berlin) Jan-May 61, box 51, ISA files, Acc 64A-2382; Poole,]CS

and National Policy 1961-64, pt II:151.

23. IDA Rpr R-138, I:l73.

24. Memo McNamara for Pres, 5 May"6l, FRUS 1961-63, XIV:61-63; memo McNamara for ClCS, 19 May

61, fldr 092 Germany (Berlin) Jan-May 61, box 51, ISA files, Acc 64A-2382; memo McNamara for

ASD(ISA), 19 May 61, ibid. .

25. JCSM-353-GI LeMay for SecDef, 25 May 61, fldr 092 Germany (Berlin), Jan-May GI, box 51, ISA files,

Acc G4A-2382.

26. PooIe,fCS and National Policy 1961-64, pt II:154-55.

27. Communique, Ministerial Session ofthe North Atlantic Council, Oslo, 8-10 May 1961, American Foreign

Policy: Current Documents, 1961,483-85; IDA Rpt R-138, 1:187-88.

28. Msg Polro IG46 Finlerrer (Paris) ro Srate, 3 Jun 61, OSD Hist.

29. Memcon Kennedy and de Gaulle, 31 May Gl, 12:30 p.m., FRUS 1961-63, XIV:80-83; memcon Pres and

de Gaulle, 31 May GI, 2:50 p.m., ibid, 84-86.

30. Documentation regarding the Kennedy-Khrushchev summit conference, 3-4 Jun 61, is in FRUS 1961-63,

XIV:87-98 (quote, 98); Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 358-67 (quote, 367), 374.

31. Aide-memoire Sovier Union ro US, 4 Jun 61, Documents on Germany, 729-32; memcon (Akalovsky) Pres

and Khrushchev, 4 Jun 61, FRUS 1961-63, V:230.

32. Radio and TV Report ro American People on Returning from Europe, 6 Jun 61, Kennedy Public Papers,

1961,442.
Notes to Pages 151-59 575

33. Documents on Germany, 733-36, 743.

34. Kennedy Public Papers, 1961,401.

35. IDA Rpt R-138, 1:203-04.

36. Rpt by Acheson, 28Jun 61, FRUS 1961-63, XIV: 138-59; memrcddiscatNSC mtg, 29 Jun 61, ibid, 160-62.

37. Curtis Cate, The Ides ofAugust: The Berlin Wall Crisis-1961, 84-85; interv Abram Chayes by Eugene

Gordon, 9 Ju164, 241-42, JFKL.

38. Harriman's complaint is in Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They

Made: Acheson, Bohlen, Harriman, Kennan, Lovett, and McCloy, 611.

39. Memrcd cited in n 36; NSAM 58,30 Jun 61, FRUS 1961-63, XIV: 162-65; Poole,]CS and National Policy

1961-64, pt II: 167-68.

40. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 386-87; memo Schlesinger for Pres, 7 Jul61, FRUS 1961-63, XIV: 173-76.

41. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 388-89; memo Taylor for Pres, 12 Jul61, FRUS 1961-63, XIV: 186.

42. Bundy memo ofNSC disc, 13 Ju161, FRUS 1961-63, XIV: 192-94; Poole,]CS and National Policy 1961-

64, pt II: 170-71.

43. Bundy memo of disc in NSC, 13 Ju161, cited in n 42; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 389-90; Bundy memo

of mtg, 17 Ju161, FRUS 1961-63, XIV:209-12; Bundy memo ofNSC disc, 19 Ju161, ibid, 219-20.

44. Memo McNamara for qcs, 14 Jul 61, fidr Reading File, Aug. 1961-June 1961, box 113, McNamara

Records, RG 200.

45. Bundy memo of mtg, 17 Ju161, cited in n 43; NSAM 62, 24 Ju161, FRUS 1961-63, XIV:210; Poole,]CS

and National Policy 1961-64, pt II: 174-76.

46. Kennedy Public Papers, 1961,534,538-39.

47. Ibid,535-37.

48. PL 87-117,1 Aug 61; PL 87-144,17 Aug 61.

49. Msg 323 Moscow to State, 28 Jul 61, FRUS 1961-63, XIV:231-34; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 392;

Baltimore Sun, 11 Aug 61.

50. Address by Khrushchev, Moscow, 11 Aug 61, Current Digest ofthe Soviet Press, 6 Sep 61, 9-12.

51. IDA Rpt R-138, II: 134-35: memo Pres for SecDef, 14 Aug 61, fidr 370.01, box 51, Miscellaneous Sensitive

files, Acc 71A-6489.

52. IDA Rpt R-138, II:195-96; memo McNamara for SecA Stahr, 2 Aug 61, fidr Reading File, Aug. 1961-June

1961, box 113, McNamara Records, RG 200.

53. US draft paper for 4-9 Aug Foreign Ministers mtg in Paris, "Military Planning and Preparations Toward a

Berlin Crisis," 2 Aug 61, fidr 092 Germany (Berlin), box 51, ISA files, Acc 64A-2382; see memcons Ministerial Consultations on Berlin, 4-9 Aug 61, FRUS 1961-63, XIV:269-316.

54. JCSM-476-61 Lemnitzer for SecDef, 12 Ju161, cited in n 16.

55. Memo McNamara for qcs, 9 Aug 61, Itt Nitze to Ausland, 24 Apr 84, both cited in n 16.

56. Acheson notes on convers w/Strauss, 1 Aug 61, fidr 092 Germany (Berlin), Jul-Dec 61, box 32, ISA files,

Acc 64A-2382.

57. John C. Ausland, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Berlin-Cuba Crisis, 1961-1964, 10-12.

58. Memcon Ministerial Consultations on Berlin, 5 Aug 61, cited in n 53, 269-70.

59. Ed note, 325, ibid; Ausland, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Berlin, 10,20-21; Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost,

199: Documents on Germany, 773-76.

60. Ausland, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Berlin, 21-22. Helmut Trotnow places the initiative with Ulbricht and

Secretary of the National Defense Council Erich Honecker, cautiously supported by Khrushchev, in "Who

Actually Built the Berlin Wall? The SED Leadership and the 13th ofAugust 1961," in Epley, ed, International Cold War Military Records and History, 41 If.

61. Rusk statement, 13 Aug 61, Documents on Germany, 776.

62. Mins mtg Berlin Steering Group, 15 Aug 61, FRUS 1961-63, XIV:333-34; memo Col Lawrence Legere for

Taylor, 16 Aug 61,335-37, ibid; Poole,]CS and National Policy 1961-64, pt II: 190-91.

63. HCAS, Hearings on]t Res 505,87 Cong, 1 sess, 28 Ju161, 2475.

64. McNamara Public Statements, 1961, Ill: 11 03-04.

65. Ltr Brandt to Pres, 16 Aug 61, FRUS 1961-63, XIV:345-46.

66. Poole, ]CS and National Policy 1961-64, pt II: 192; Ausland, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Berlin, 23; New York

Times, 22 Aug 61; John Newhouse, War and Peace in the Nuclear Age, 157-58.

67. Memo McNamara for Pres, 24 Aug 61, FRUS 1961-63, XIV:369; Kennedy Public Papers, 1961,573. Fears

about Clay's propensiry to act unilaterally were not fully dispelled in August; they would arise again as new
576 Notes to Pages 159-64

crises developed in subsequent months (interv Lemnirzer by Walrer Poole, 2 Feb 77, cited in Poole, JCS and

National Policy 1961-64, pt II:193).

68. Rcd ofmtg Berlin Steering Group, 17 Aug 61, FRUS 1961-63, XIV:347-49; interv William W. Kaufmann

by Maurice Matloff, 23 Jul 86,2, OSD Hist; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 397; Frank Ninkovich, Germany and the United States: The Transftrmation of the German Question Since 1945, 129; FRUS 1961-

63, XIV:350, n I.

69. Ausland, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Berlin, 24. On the problems for the furure relating to the issue of dismounting, note the communication ofGeneral Freeman (Heidelberg) to General Polk, 5 Nov 63, referring

to a letter from Soviet General Yakubovsky of 25 Oct 63 expressing his intentions to enforce existing tegularions, which included dismounting for counting (box 174, Lemnitzer Papers, NDUL).

70. Documents on Germany, 782; Roberr P. Grathwol and Donita M. Moorhus, American Forces in Berlin, 1945-

1994: Cold War Outpost, 92.

71. Ed note, FRUS 1961-63, XIV:704; New York Herald-Tribune, 26 Dec 61.

72. Note from Soviet Union to US, 23 Aug 61, Documents on Germany, 783-84; note from US to Soviet Union,

26 Aug 61, ibid, 785-86; memo Bundy on mtg ofSteering Group, 23 Aug 61, box 2, Miscellaneous Sensitive files, Acc 71A-6489.

73. McGeorge Bundy, Danger and SurvivaL· Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years, 384-85.

74. Memo Nitze for SecDef, 24 Aug 61, fldr 092 Germany (Berlin), 1961 Aug 19-31, box 51, ISA files, Acc

64A-2382; Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, 222; memo McNamara for SvcSecs, 18 Aug 61, IIdr Reading

File, Aug. I 961-June 1961, box 113, McNamara Records, RG 200.

75. Msg 632 Gavin (Paris) to State, 3 Aug 61, OSD Hist; msg 982 State to London, 26 Aug 61, FRUS 1961-

63, XIV:371-73.

76. Ausland, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Berlin, 27.

77. Memo McNamara for Pres, 24 Aug 61, IIdr Reading File, Aug. 1961-June 1961, box 113, McNamara

Records, RG 200; IDA Rpt R-138, Il:135.

78. Poole,JCS and National Policy 1961-64, pt II:197-99.

79. Memo Pres for SecDef, 31 Aug 61, box 35, Taylor Papers, NDUL; Poole,fCS andNational Policy 1961-64,

pt II:202-03.

80. McNamara Public Statements, 1961, III: 1443; Gilpatric Public Statements, 1961, 394-95.

81. Ltr Gilpatric to Rusk, 21 Nov 61, w/encl JCSM-799-61 Lemnitzer for SecDef, 15 Nov 61, w/atchmt, ISA

paper, "NATO Military Policy in the Berlin Crisis," IIdr 092 Germany (Berlin), Jul-Dec 61, box 52, ISA

files, Acc 64A-2382.

82. [Nitzel memcon-McNamara, Gilpatric, Nitze, Strauss-at McNamara's home, 7:00 p.m., 26 Nov 61,

ibid.

83. Memo McNamara for Pres, 18 Sep 61, fldr 092 Germany (Berlin), 1961 Sep 15-23, box 51, ibid (quote,

3); memrcd Taylor, 18 Sep 61, FRUS 1961-63, XIV:428-29.

84. Rowen interv, 27 Sep 66, 2; Kaufmann inrerv, 23 Jul 86, 1; Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 203, credits

Vice Adm. John M. Lee with the concept if not the name.

85. ISA paper, "Esrimate of the Situation #2," 29 Sep 61, IIdr 092 Germany (Berlin), 1961 Sep 24-30, box 51,

ISA files, Acc 64A-2382; ISA draft paper, "Preferred Sequence ofMilitary Actions in a Berlin Conflict," 12

Oct 61, ibid (fldr Oct 1-14). See Itr ViceAdm John Lee (Ret.) to Steven 1. Rearden, 18 May 84, Nitze

Papers, LC, on devolution from horse to poodle by way of pony blanket.

86. JCSM-728-61 Lemnitzer for SecDef, 13 Oct 61, IIdr 092 Germany (Berlin), 1961 Oct 1-14, box 51, ISA

files, Acc 64A-2382; memo Taylor for Nitze, 14 Oct 61, ibid.

87. Memo McNamara for McGeorge Bundy, 18 Oct 61, ibid; msg 553 State to Berlin, 18 Ocr 61, FRUS 1961-

63, XIV:508-09; Itr Pres to SACEUR, 20 Oct 61, w/encl, ibid, 520-23.

88. Memo Seymour Weiss for Kohler and Nitze, 28 Sep 61, IIdr 092 Germany (Berlin), 1961 Sep 24-30, box

51, ISA files, Acc 64A-2382 (quote, 2). Emphasis in original.

89. JCSM-666-61 Lemnitzer for SecDef, 22 Sep 61, ibid (lIdr Sep 15-23); memo Nitze for McNamara, 28 Sep

61, Itr McNamara to Rusk, 30 Sep 61: ibid (lIdr Sep 24-30); memo McNamara for CJCS, 2 Oct 61, ibid

(lIdrOct 1-14).

90. Bundy memo ofmtg, 20 Oct 61, FRUS 1961-63, XlV:519 (emphasis in original).

91. Bundy mins of mtg, 10 Oct 61, ibid, 487-89; memo McNamara for Pres, 10 Oct 61, fldr Reading File,

Sept. 1961-0ct. 1961, box 113, McNamara Records, RG 200; msg Polto 28 Finletter (Paris) to State, 23

Oct 61, OSD Hist.
Notes to Pages 164-73 577

92. Kennedy Public Papers, 1961,601-02.

93. New York Ti'mes, 18 Oct 61; Current Digest ofthe Soviet Press, 8 Nov 61, 5.

94. See Ausland, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Berlin, 36, for Clay's role from the perspective of a member ofthe

Berlin Task Force.

95. Msg 801 Lightner (Berlin) to State, 23 Oct 61, FRUS 1961-63, XIV:524·25; Norstad notes on incidents

in Berlin, 26 Oct 61, NAC Btiefing file, Norstad Papers, DDEL.

96. Ed note, FRUS 1961-63, XIV: 544; Ausland, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Berlin, 40-41.

97. Talbott, Khrushchev Remembers, 459-60. See ed note, FRUS 1961-63, XIV:544.

98. Msg 969 Lightnet (Berlin) to State, 8 Nov 61, FRUS 1961-63, XIV:565-66; Ausland, Kennedy, Khrushchev,

and Berlin, 41.

99. Msg 2258 Lyon (Paris) (Stoessel) to State, 26 Oct 61, msg 1001 Dowling (Bonn) to State, 26 Oct 61:

OSDHisr.

100. Msg 843 Clay (Berlin) to State, 26 Oct 61, ibid.

101. MsgJCS 2029 to SACEUR, 28 Oct 61, msg 855 Lightner (Berlin) to State, 27 Oct 61: ibid.

102. Baltimore Sun, 16 Nov 61; Itt Macmillan to Foreign Secretary, 10 Nov 61, no. 3612, fidt PREM 11/3612,

PRO; New York Post,S Jan 62.

103. Memcon 12 Dec 61, Foreign Ministers mtg, 10-12 Dec 61, FRUS 1961-63, XIV:672-78; American Foreign

Policy: Current Documents, 1961,505-08; msg Polro 804 USRO (Paris) to State, 18 Dec 61, FRUS 1961-

63, XIII:341.

104. Memo Pres for Rusk, 9 Mar 62, FRUS 1961-63, XV:I-3; memo ASecStare(EurAffs) (Kohler) for Rusk, 10

Mar 62, w/encl draft Modus Vivendi, ibid, 4-6.

105. Memo from US to Soviet Union, 15 Feb 62, Documents on Germany, 804-05; Ausland, Kennedy, Khrushchev,

and Berlin, 48-51.

106. Mins NSC mtg, 28 Mar 62, FRUS 1961-63, XV:93-94; American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962,

691; Ausland, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Berlin, 51.

107. SCFR, Executive Sessions (Historical Series), XIV, 87 Cong, 2 sess, 15 May 62, 482-83.

108. McNamara Public Statements, 1962, IV: 1807, 1812; SCFR, EXecutive Sessions (Hist Series), XIV:803.

109. Ausland, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Berlin, 69.

110. Msg Taylor to Lemnitzer, 8 Nov 63, msg Lemnirzer to Taylor, 12 Nov 63, msg Freeman to Lemnitzer, 14

Nov 63: fidr 30, box 174, Lemnirzer Papers, NDUL.

111. Memo ActgASD(ISA) John T. McNaughton for SecDef, 25 May 64, memo McNamara for qcs, 27

May 64: fidr Reading File, May 1964, box 120, McNamara Records, RG 200.

112. Soviet-Easr German Treaty on Friendship, Mutual Assistance, and Cooperation, 12 Jun 64, Documents

on Germany, 871.

113. Declaration issued by France, UK, and US, 26 Jun 64, ibid, 877-78.

114. Marc Trachrenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making ofthe European Settlement, 1945-1963,324, asserts

that "the ending of the tefugee exodus and even the internal stabilization of the East Getman state were

not [Khrushchev's] most fundamental goals." Khrushchev's gteatet concern was the control ofWest Germany's futute.

VIII. THE BAY OF PIGS FIASCO

1. Among many excellent accounts of the Bay of Pigs episode, see Trumbull Higgins, The Perfict Failure:

Kennedy, Eisenhower, and the CIA at the Bay ofPigs; Karl E. Meyet and Tad Szulc, The Cuban Invasion:

The Chronicle ofa Disaster; Haynes Johnson, The Bay ofPigs: The Leaders' Story ofBrigade 2506; Peter

Wyden, Bay ofPigs: The Untold Story; Piero Gleijeses, "Ships in the Night: The CIA, the White House and

the Bay ofPigs," journal ofLatin American Studies, Feb 95, 1-42; Lionel Krisel, "The Bay of Pigs Operation:

An Historical Study with Emphasis on Aspects Involving the U.S. Navy," unpub ms, 1974, NHC.

2. US Prohibition ofAmerican Exports to Cuba ..., 19 Oct 60, American Foreign Policy: Current Documents,

1960,240-01; US Determination ofthe Cuban Sugar Import Quota ..., 16 Dec 60, ibid, 249.

3. Termination of Diplomatic and Consular Relations Between the United States and Cuba, 3 Jan 61, ibid,

251-52.

4. Memo No. 1 from the Cuba Study Group to President Kennedy: Narrative of the Anti-Castro Cuban

Operation Zapata (heteafterTaylor Repon), 13 Jun 61, FRUS 1961-63, X:576-78; Lyman B. Kirkpatrick,
578 Notes to Pages 173-79

Jr., "Paramilitary Case Study: The Bay of Pigs," Naval ~r College Review, Nov-Dec 72, 34; Higgins, The

Perfect Failure, 66; Gleijeses, "Ships in the Night," 5 (n 15).

5. Quoted in Rosenberg, "Arleigh Albert Burke," 311; memo of conf wlPres, 17 Mar 60, FRUS 1958-60,

VI:86J. See also James G. Blight and Peter Kornbluh, eds, Politics ofIllusion: The Bay ofPigs Reexamined;

interv George H. Decker by Dan H. Ralls, 18 Dec 72,3, USAMHI.

6. Taylor Report, FRUS 1961-63, X:580. Trumbull Higgins noted that CIA officials had introduced Kennedy

to leaders ofrhe anti-Castro movement in July 1960: "How much Kennedy learned ofthe agency's plans for

Cuba remains speculative, although it seems to have been a good deal" (The Perfect Failure, 59).

7. Taylor Report, FRUS 1961-63, X:579; Poole, jCS and National Policy 1961-64, pt II:3; Schlesinger, A

Thousand Days, 238; Johnson, The Bay ofPigs, 53-55.

8. Taylor Report, FRUS 1961-63, X:578-79; ed note and memrcd pertaining to 3 Jan 61 White House mtg,

ibid, 2-4; Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, 196; memo McNamara for Kennedy, 24 Jan 61, FRUS 1961-63,

X:44, ed note. Watson, Into the Missile Age, 768, concludes that "when Eisenhower and Gates went out of

office, the foundation for the subsequent debacle at the Bay ofPigs had been well laid. As yet, however, there

was no irtevocable commitment; it would not have been too late to rurn back."

9. Gilpatric interv, 14 Nov 83,22-23; Richard N. Goodwin, Remembering America: A Voice from the Sixties,

173.

10. Richard M. Bissell, Jr., with Jonathan E. Lewis and Frances T. Pudlow, Reflections ofa Cold ~r ~rrior:

From Yalta to the Bay ofPigs, 192. For comments on Bissell's connections with the Kennedy circle see Lucien

Vandenbroucke, "Anatomy of a Failure: The Decision to Land at the Bay of Pigs," Political Science Quarterly, Fall 84, 481-82; Goodwin, Remembering America, 174-75; Evan Thomas, The Very Best Men: Four

Who Dared: The Early Yean ofthe CIA, 237-72.

11. Sorensen, Kennedy, 295-97.

12. New York Times, 23 Oct 60; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 224-26; Kennedy Public Papm, 1961, 10-11.

13. Charles J. V. Murphy, "Grenada and the Bay of Pigs: Two Classic Examples of a President in the Role of

Commander-in-Chief in a Cold War Situation," Situation Report (Publication of the Security and Intelligence Fund), Jan 84, 5.

14. Memcon mtg on Cuba, 22 Jan 61, FRUS 1961-63, X:46-52; Rosenberg, "Arleigh Albert Burke," 311; Higgins, The Perfect Failure, 62-63.

IS. Poole,jCS andNational Policy 1961-64, pt II:4-6; memcon, 25 Jan 61, FRUS 1961-63, X:54-55; memo of

disc, 28 Jan 61, ibid, 61-62.

16. JCSM-44-61 Lemnitzer for SecDef, 27 Jan 61, FRUS 1961-63, X:57-58; Poole, jCS and National Policy

1961-64, pt II:7-8.

17. JCSM-57-61 Lemnitzer for SecDef, 3 Feb 61, FRUS 1961-63, X:67-69.

18. Ibid, 69; Poole,fCS andNational Policy 1961-64, pt II: 10-11; Wyden, Bay ofPigs, 89.

19. On 7 March 1961 the JCS tentatively approved CINCLANT's Contingency Operation Plan 312-61, identifying the defense ofGuantanamo naval base as a prime objective in the event ofa milirary operation. See JCS

2304/30 memo DirJtStaffforJCS, 25 Apr 61,218, NHC; memcon, 22 Jan 61, cited in n 14, 50.

20. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 239.

21. Wyden, Bay ofPigs, 90; Rosenberg, "Arleigh Albert Burke," 311.

22. Bundy memo of mtg wlPres, 8 Feb 61, FRUS 1961-63, X:90-91. McNamara gave his oral approval to

the JCS report on 3 Februaty 1961. See Poole,jCS and National Policy 1961-64, pr II: 12.

23. JCSM-146-61 Lemnitzer for SecDef, 10 Mar 61, FRUS 1961-63, X:119-22; Taylor Report, ibid, 582.

24. Taylor Report, ibid; Goodwin, RememberingAmerica, 172-73.

25. Paper prepared in CIA, II Mar 61, FRUS 1961-63, X: 137-42. In an unpublished manuscript in the Allen

W Dulles Papers at Princeton University, Dulles rebutted the chatge that intelligence advisers misled the

president. He claimed that CIA planners never told Kennedy that the landing of exile troops alone would

trigger mass uprisings that would topple Castro. Lucien Vandenbroucke, however, faulted Dulles and his

colleagues for lack of candid advice, and for harboring expectation that once engaged the U.S. would not

allow the campaign to fail. Bissell in a rejoinder admitted failure of assumptions but not conspiracy to

deceive. See Vandenbroucke, ''The 'Confessions' ofAllen Dulles: New Evidence on the Bay of Pigs," Diplomatic History, Fall 84, 367; Bissell, "Response ro Lucien S. Vandenbroucke," ibid, 380.

26. Taylor Report, FRUS 1961-63, X:583.

27. JCSM-166-61 Lemnitzer for SecDef, IS Mar 61, ibid, 149-50, 154 (quote, ISO).
Notes to Pages 180-88 579

28. McNamara interv, 22 May 86, 26; Robert S. McNamara, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons ofVietnam,

26; ed note, FRUS 1961-63, X:65. McNamara's self-denigration seemed "toO much" for Henry Glass; see

Glass interv, 4 Nov 87, 33.

29. Nitze interv, 3 Oct 84, 46-47.

30. Psychologist Irving Janis in Victims ofGroupthink: A Psychological Study ofForeign-Policy Decisiom and Fiascoes, 42, cited the Bay of Pigs as a primary case study of the "groupthink" phenomenon. On Fulbright's

dissent, see Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 251-52; ed note, FRUS 1961-63, X:185.

31. Memo Bundy for Pres, 15 Mar 61, FRUS 1961-63, X:158; ed note, ibid, 185.

32. Neustadt and May, Thinking in Time, 141, 144-45; Bissell, "Response to Lucien S. Vandenbroucke," cited

in n 25, 378 (quote); Bissell, Reflectiom ofa Cold Wtlr Wtlrrior, 178 (quote).

33. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 255; memo Schlesinger for Pres Kennedy, 5 Apr 61, FRUS 1961-63,

X:189.

34. Goodwin, Remembering America, 175-76.

35. Gilpmic interv, 14 Nov 83, 22-23.

36. Memo US Army, Navy, AF attaches to Cuba for Hartel, DirWestHemisAffs(ISA), 3 Mar 61, IIdr Cuba

1961, box 31, ISA files, Acc 64A-2382.

37. Memo Clyde W Elliott, DepAsst to SecDef(SpecOps), for Hartel, 21 Mar 61, OSD Hist.

38. Taylor Report, FRUS 1961-63, X:585; ed note on first meeting of the Interagency Wotking Group to

coordinate planning for rhe Zapara Operarion on 22 Mar 61, ibid, 167.

39. NSAM 31, II Mar61, ibid, 144.

40. Memo Wayne S. Smirh, RegPo!Affs(State Bur of Intet-American Affs), for DASD(ISA) Haydn Williams,

21 Mar 61, IIdr Cuba 1961, bod1, ISA files, Ace 64A-2382; memo Hartel for Smith, 24 Mar 61, ibid; ed

note, FRUS 1961-63, X:184.

41. Poole,]CS and National Policy 1961-64, pt 1I:20-21; ed notes, FRUS 1961-63, X:185, 159-60.

42. Kennedy Public Papers, 1961, 258; Aleksandt Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, "One Hell ofa Gamble';

Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964,91-92, suggests that Khrushchev believed that his warnings

had deterred American military action against Cuba.

43. Taylor Report, FRUS 1961-63, X:586-87.

44. Ibid, 586-91; Higgins, The Perfect Failure, 130-33.

45. Higgins, The Perfect Failure, 132-33. Despite Cuban claims that their security forces had infiltrated the

Cuban emigre community, Castro privately lamented to Khrushchev that he knew too little about counterrevolutionary activities, and felt that before the Bay of Pigs invasion the KGB had not provided the intelligence cooperation he had wanted. See Fursenko and Naftali, "One Hell ofa Gamble," 97.

46. Taylor Reporr, FRUS 1961-63, X:588-89. For subsequent accounts of events on the scene at the time ofthe

landing, see Grayston L. Lynch, Decision for Disaster: Betrayal at the Bay ofPigs; Albert E. Persons, Bay

ofPigs: A FirsthandAccount ofthe Mission by a U.S. Pilot in Support ofthe Cuban Invasion Force in 1961;

Jack Hawkins, "An Obsession with 'Plausible Deniability' Doomed the 1961 Bay of Pigs Invasion from the

Outset," Military History, Aug 98.

47. Memrcd, Taylor Report, 3 May 61, FRUS 1961-63, X:440.

48. Lemnitzer interv, 19 Jan 84, 22.

49. Murphy, "Cuba: The Record Set Straight," Fortune, Sep 61, 94.

50. Hilsman, To Move aNation, 33; Neustadt and May, Thinking in Time, 144.

51. Taylor Report, FRUS 1961-63, X:596-99.

52. Memrcd, 22 Apr 61, ibid, 318; Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, 180.

53. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, 184-85; Taylor Report, FRUS 1961-63, X:605.

54. Taylor Report, FRUS 1961-63, X:600, 602 (quote), 595 and n 16 (quotes).

55. Lemnitzer's handwritten notes, "Comments to Congressional Leaders," White House, 19 Apr 61, IIdr

L-214-71, box 29, Lemnitzer Papers, NDUL.

56. Taylor Report, FRUS 1961-63, X:583-84; Poole, ]CS and National Policy 1961-64, pt 1I:42-43.

57. Luis Aguilar, ed, Operation Zapata: The "Ultrasemitive" Report and Testimony ofthe Board ofInquiry on the

Bay ofPigs, 44-45.

58. Taylot, Swords and Plowshares, 191-92, 201-03; ed note, FRUS 1961-63, VIII:229-30.

59. Aguilar, Operation Zapata, 51-52.

60. Taylot Report, FRUS 1961-63, X:606.
580 Notes to Pages 188-95

61. Pres news conf, 21 Apr 61, Kennedy Public Papers, 1961, 312; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 289-90.

62. Higgins, The Perfect Failure, 161.

63. McNamara interv, 22 May 86, 23.

64. See Goodwin, RememberingAmerica, 125-26; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 72-73.

65. SCFR, Executive Sessions (Hisr Series), XIIl:pt I, 19 May 61, 572-73; L. James Binder, Lemnitzer: A Soldier

for His Time, 257.

66. Decker interv, 18 Dec 72, 1II:3, 12.

67. Interv Burke by Maurice Marloff, 9 Nov 83,56-58, OSD Hisr.

68. Memo McNamara for Pres, 30 Aug 61, Rdr Reading File, Dec. I960-Nov. 1961, box 113, McNamara

Records, RG 200; New York Times, 27 May 61; also see Lawrence S. Kaplan and Karhleen A. Kellner,

"Lemnirzer: Surviving rhe French Military Wirhdrawal," in Robert S. Jordan, ed, Generals in International

Politics: NATDS Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, 95-96.

69. Lemnirzer interv, 19 Jan 84, 18.

70. U.S. News 6- World Report, 29 May 61; SCFR, Exec Sess, 19 May 61, cired in n 65, 574.

71. Murphy, "Cuba: The Record Ser Straighr," 224,226; memo McNamara for Pres, 30 Aug 61, cired in n 68.

72. Time, 1 Sep 61,14-15; Kennedy Public Papers, 1961,580; memrcd Col ]ulian]. Ewell, USA, ExecAsst to

Taylor, 14 Sep 61, Taylor Papers, NDUL.

73. Ltr Pres ro Luce, 12 Sep 61, Taylor Papers, NDUL.

74. Kirkparrick, "Paramilitary Case Srudy: The Bay of Pigs," 39; Michael Warner, "The CIA's Internal Probe

of the Bay of Pigs Affair," Studies in Intelligence, Winter 98-99,93-10 I; Washington Post, 23 Feb 98. Robert

Pear, "The Pointing of Fingers and rhe Bay of Pigs," New York Times, 30 Dec 87, srared rhar CIA hisrorian

Jack pfeiffer differed significanrly from Kirkpatrick in claiming rhar the CIA was unfairly burdened wirh roo

much of the blame.

75. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 297; Murphy, "Grenada and rhe Bay ofPigs," 7; Tad Szulc, "Kennedy's Cold

War," New Republic, 22 Dec 77; Richard E. Welch, ]r., Response to Revolution: The United States and the

Cuban Revolution, 1959-1961, 185-93.

76. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, 196-97.

77. NSAM 57, 28 ]un 61, FRUS 1961-63, VIII: I 12-13.

78. Memo McNamara for CjCS, 20 Apr 61, ibid, X:306-07; ]CSM-278-61 Wheeler for SecDef, 26 Apr 61,

ibid,373.

79. Memo McNamara for JCS, 1 May 61, ibid, 405-06.

80. Memo McNamara for CjCS, 20 Apr 61, cited in n 78; memo McNamara for ASD(ISA), 22 Apr 61, Rdr

Cuba 092 1%1, box 44, 1SA files, Acc 64A-2382; rcd ofactions 478rh NSC mrg, 22 Apr 61, FRUS 1961-

63, X:316, n 1.

81. Memo Rostow for Pres, 21 Apr 61, FRUS 1961-63, X:310-12. In responding ro Rosrow's paper Nirze approved the emphasis on building the internal capabilities of Latin American countries, developing contingency plans, and above all the warning "to think again before acting in the old grooves." He believed,

however, that public statements telling the world about our approach ro the Cuban problem were of

"doubtful merit" (memo Nitze for SecDef, 26 Apr 61, fldr 11/60-6/61, box 65, Staff Memoranda-Walt

W. Rosrow, POF, JFKL).

82. JCSM 414-61 Burke for SecDef, 16 Jun 61, FRUS 1961-63, X:606-08; Poole,}CS and National Policy

1961-64, pt 11:54-55.

83. Rcd of actions 483d NSC mtg, 5 May 61, FRUS 1961-63, X:481-83.

84. Memo Bundy for Pres, 5 May 61, ibid, 477; rcd of actions 483d NSC mtg, ibid, 482 (quote); memo

McNamara for Yarmolinsky, 5 May 61, ibid, 489; paper for NSC by Interagency Task Force, 4 May 61,

ibid, 468-72 (quote, 468).

IX. THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

I. Research into the genesis ofthe missile crisis benefited from Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev's introduction of glasnost in the mid-1980s, which opened opportunities for Soviet and American veterans of the

episode nor only to enrich their reminiscences, as the Americans did at the Hawk's Cay conference in the

Florida Keys in 1987, but also ro meet together in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in 1987 and subsequenrly

in Moscow (1989), Antigua (1991), and Havana (1992) to share insights. The resulting literature includes

the following: ]. Anthony Lukas, "Class Reunion: Kennedy's Men Relive the Cuban Missile Crisis," New
Notes to Pages 195-202 581

York Times Magazine, 30 Aug 87, 27 If; Mark Kramer, "Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Soviet Command Authotity, and the Cuban Missile Crisis," Cold War Internarional History Bulletin, Fall 93, 40, 45n; John

Newhouse, ''A Reponer at Large: Socialism or Death," New Yorker, Apr 91,70-77; Raymond L. Garthoff,

"The Cuban Missile Crisis: An Overview," in James A. Nathan, ed, The Cuban Crisis Revisited, 49-50; James

G. Blighr et ai, "Kramer vs. Kramer," Cold War International History Bulletin, Fall 93, 41, 47.

2. Lukas, "Class Reunion," 27; Binder, Lemnitzer, 287-88.

3. Senate, Select Cte to Study Govt Opns with Respect to InteH Activities, AllegedAssassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, Interim Report, S Rpt 94-465,94 Cong, I sess, 20 Nov 75,141.

4. J2DM-181-61, DepDirIntelJCS RearAdm W. S. Post,Jr., for ASD(lSA), 24 May61, wlenel, ''Assessment of

Dr. Ruben de Leon Garcia," fldr Cuba 000.1-091, box 31, ISA files, Acc 64A-2382; memcon

DirPolPlngStaff(ISA) Maurice J. Mountain, 22 May 61, ibid; memrcd Asst to SecDef (Spec Ops) Gen

Graves B. Erskine, 26 Apr 61, ibid.

5. Memo McNamara for SpecAsst (Yarmolinsky), 5 May 61, FRUS 1961-63, X:489; memo Yarmolinsky for

SvcSecs et ai, 26 May 61, with proposed plan, fldr Cuba 092 Jan 62, box 44, ISA files, Acc 64A-2382.

6. Memo AsstGenCoun Benjamin Forman for Nitze, 4 May 61, fldr Cuba 373.5-1961, box 31, ISA files,

Acc 64A-2382; memo USecA Stephen Ailes for ASD(lSA), I Jun 61, ibid.

7. Memo McNamara for JCS et ai, 10 JuI61, FRUS 1961-63, X:572, n 3; NSAM 54, 26 Jun 61, ibid, 614.

8. Memo Army SpecAsst for Pers Roy K. Davenport for Yarmolinsky, 13 Apr 62, fldr Cuban Volunteers, Cuba

Sensitive files, Acc 7IA-2896.

9. Ltr Gilparrie to Cardona, 28 Aug 62, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist; DoD News Release 1560-62,24 Sep 62,

OSD Hisr.

10. Memo Pres for SecDef, 7 Sep 62, FRUS 1961-63, X:I049-50; memo SecDeffor Pres, 13 Sep 62, ibid,

1060-62.

11. Memo Pres for SecState, SecDef et ai, 30 Nov 61, ibid, X:688; ed note, ibid, 666-67; Schlesinger, Robert

Kennedy, 477-78.

12. Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy, 481-84, 493.

13. Ibid, 472, 481-85, 489 (quote); Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms & the CIA,

141.

14. AllegedAssassination Plots, cited in n 3, 141, 146-47; Program Review by Chief of Operations, Operation

Mongoose (Lansdale), 18 Jan 62, FRUS 1961-63, X:710 ff; memo CIA Off ofCurrent Intel, 3 JuI62, ibid,

835 ff.

15. American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962,326; msg 1080 EmbCaracas to State, 18 May 61, msg

608 EmbSantiago to State, 20 May 61: OSD Hist; memo CIA Board of Estimates for DC!, 3 Nov 61,

FRUS 1961-63, X:668-72.

16. Memo McCone on mtg ofSpecial Group, Augmented, 16 Aug 62, FRUS 1961-63, X:940-41.

17. Memo DepDir OffofCaribbean & Mexican Affs (Hurrwitch) for ASecState(lntet-AmericanAffs) (Martin),

26 Ju162, ibid, 885.

18. Memo MSC [Carter] for Dir [CIA], 25 Oct 62, in Mary S. McAuliffe, ed, CIA Documents on the Cuban

Missile Crisis, 1962,311-12.

19. Memo DirISA Coordinaring Staff (NSC & Collateral Activities) Robert H. B. Wade for BrigGen W. A.

Enemark, 28 Sep 61, fldr Cuba 0921961, box 31, ISA files, Acc 64A-2382.

20. Note William Bundy to Haydn Williams, 24 Nov 61, ibid; memrcd Enemark, 30 Nov 61, ibid.

21. Weapon Systems Evaluation Group, "Historical Analysis of Command and Control Actions in the 1962

Cuban Crisis," 14 Aug 64 (hereafter WSEG Cuba study), 45-47, OSD Hisr.

22. Ibid, 46-47; memo SecDef for JCS, I May 61, FRUS 1961-63, X:405-06; memo Burke for Wheeler, 29

April 61, ibid, 404.

23. WSEG Cuba study, 51-55.

24. Ibid, 56, 59, 61, 70.

25. Ibid, 76-77.

26. Sorensen, Kennedy, 667-71; Neustadt and May, Thinking in Time, 3.

27. Msg 1205 State to EmbLondon, 30 Aug 62, FRUS J961-63, X:969-71.

28. NSAM 181,23 Aug 62, ibid, 957-58.

29. Memo Gilpatrie for Pres, I Sep 62, w/atchmt memo ViceDir]CS MajGen John M. Reynolds for SeeDef,

I Sep 62, FRUS 1961-63, X:1010-13.
582 Notes to Pages 202-08

30. Msg R122322Z C1NCLANT to JCS, 12 Sep 62, OSD Hist; Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 174-75,

184-86.

31. Memo BtigGen L. A. Hall for DASD(jSA), 5 Oct 62, fldr Cuba Oct 1-7, 1962, box 440, Subject files,

OSD Hisr.

32. DIA, "Chronology re September 18 Report and Formulation of Hypothesis Concerning Location of

MRBM Site," atchmt to memo DirDIA LtGen Joseph F. Carroll for SecDef, 18 Feb 63, fldr Cuba Sep

1962, ibid; SNIE 85-3-62, 19 Sep 62, FRUS 1961-63, X:I075.

33. McAuliffe, CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 91, and McAuliffe's unofficial comments in "Return

to the Brink: Intelligence Perspectives on the Cuban Missile Crisis," SHAFR Newsletter, Jun 93, 4-5, which

pointed out the extent ofthe uncertainties behind the CIA's identification ofSoviet missiles in Cuba. Sherman Kent, chairman of CIA's Board of National Esrimates in 1962, reflected in the spring of 1964 why

Special NIE 85-3-62 missed rhe Soviet deployment of offensive missiles in Cuba in Seprember 1962. He

blamed in part rhe "incredible wrongness of rhe Soviet decision" as well as the limitations of intelligence

analysis; see "A Crucial Estimate Relived," Donald P. Steury, ed, Sherman Kent and the Board ofNational

Estimates: Collected Essays, 187.

34. Bundy, Danger andSurvival, 395, 684; ed notes, 14 Oct 62, FRUS 1961-63, XI:29-30; statement issued by

the Soviet Union, 11 Sep 62, American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962,370-72.

35. Memo Pres for McNamara, 21 Sep 62, FRUS 1961-63, X: 1081.

36. Memo Pres for McNamara, 7 Sep 62, ibid, 1049-50; JCSM-713-62 ActgCJCS for SecDef, 12 Sep 62, fldr

Cuba 12 Sep 1962, box 444, Subject files, OSD Hist; memo McNamara for Yarmolinsky, 3 Oct 62, fldr

Cuba Reconnaissance Photos, Oct. 1962, box 55, McNamara Records, RG 200.

37. Memo McNamara for C)CS (Taylor), 2 Oct 62, FRUS 1961-63, Xl:6-7.

38. WSEG Cuba study, 68-74.

39. Memo McGeorge Bundy for Gilpatric, 2 Oct 62, fldr Cuba Oct 1-7, 1962, box 440, Subject files, OSD

Hist.

40. Facts on File Yearbook, 1962, 292; Thomas G. Paterson, "The Historian as Detecrive: Senator Keating,

Missiles In Cuba, and His Mysterious Sources," Diplomatic History, Winter 87, 11,67; Marcus D. Pohlmann, "Constraining Presidents at the Brink: The Cuban Missile Crisis," Presidential Studies Quarterly,

Spring 89, 339; James Reston, New York Times, 12 Oct 62.

41. Dino A. Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story ofthe Cuban Missile Crisis, 206-07; Fursenko and

Naftali, "One Hellofa Gamble," 221.

42. Ed note, FRUS 1961-63, Xl:29-30; Bundy, Danger and Survival, 395-96, 684-85; Graham T. AJlison, Essence ofDecision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 193.

43. Bundy, Danger and Survival, 396; NSAM 196,22 Ocr 62, FRUS 1961-63, Xl: 157.

44. NSAM 196,22 Oct 62, cited in n 43, 157; Sorensen, Kennedy, 678-79; Taylor, Swords and Plowshares,

266.

45. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, 265-67; off the record mtg on Cuba, 16 Oct 62, FRUS 1961-63, Xl:55-57,

69. See also May et al, Presidential Recordings, 2:435-36.

46. Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy, 506-07, has noted that the terms "hawks" and "doves" originated in the missile

crisis and were popularized in articles by journalists Charles Bardett and Stewart AJsop. James Blight et al,

"The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited," Foreign Afftirs, Fall 87, 173-74, prefer to place McNamara, Bundy,

and Geotge Ball among the "owls" (or "persuaders"), a more flexible group between the "invaders" and "traders."

47. McNamara interv, 24 Ju186, I; May et al, Presidential Recordings, 2:440.

48. Msg JCS 6832 SecJCS M. J. Ingelido to CINCSAC, 21 Oct 62, OSD Hist, authorized CINCLANT "to

move alert aircraft from Homestead AFB on 22 October 62 at your discretion. The Secretary of Defense has

authorized flying of nuclear weapons in connection with this movement." See also Poole, ]CS and National

Policy 1961-64, pt 1I:241-43; Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, 272-73; memcon Kennedy and Gromyko,

18 Oct 62, FRUS 1961-63, Xl:I10-14.

49. Transc ofWhite House mtg, 16 Oct 62, 11:50 a.m., FRUS 1961-63, XI:33-36.

50. "Chronology ofJCS Decisions Concerning the Cuban Crisis," 4 Jan 63, entries for 16, 18 Oct 62, fldr JCS

Chronology 1963, box 445, Subject files, OSD Hist; ]SSC memo 185-62 MajGen]. S. Holtoner, MajGen

David W Gray, RAdm J. D. Wyliefor C)CS, 17 Oct 62, fldr Cuba Oct 17, 1962, box 440, ibid.

51. "Chronology of]CS Decisions," cited in n 50, 16 Oct 62; Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, 267; rcd of mtg,

State Dept, 19 Oct 62, FRUS 1961-63, XI:116, 118-20.

52. May et al, Presidential Recordings, 2:517-29, 557,614.
Notes to Pages 208-14 583

53. Marc Trachrenberg, "White House Tapes and Minutes ofthe Cuban Missile Crisis: ExCom Meetings October 1962," International Security, Summer 85, 167; Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy, 507-08.

54. Neustadt and May, Thinking in Time, 6.

55. Gilpatric interv, 27 May 70, 51.

56. Quoted in Neustadt and May, Thinking in Time, 6; May et al, Presidential Recordings, 2:416. McNamara

claims that he was the first to propose a quarantine, on 16 October (McNamara interv, 8 Jan 98, 3). The first

mention of the blockade by Taylor, at the 16 October morning meeting at the White House, is in FRUS

1961-63, XI:35.

57. Nitze interv, 3 Oct 84.

58. HSCA, DoD Appropriations fOr 1964, 6 Feb 63, pt 1:31; Bundy, Danger and Survival, 448; McNamara

Public Statements, 1964, IV: 1616-17.

59. Neustadt and May, Thinking in Time, 10-11; Allison, Essence ofDecision, 124 ff; rcd of mtg, State Dept,

19 OCt 62, cited in n 51,116-22.

60. Kennedy Public Papers, 1962,806-08.

61. Proclamation 3504: Interdiction ofOffensive Weapons to Cuba, 23 Oct 62, ibid, 809-11; McCone memo

for files, 23 Oct 62, FRUS 1961-63, XI:173.

62. Gilpatric paper, 20 Oct 62, fldr Cuba Oct 20, 1962, box 440, Subject files, OSD Hist.

63. Elie Abel, The Missile Crisis, 112, 126-31.

64. "Chronology ofJCS Decisions," cited in n 50, 23, 24 Oct 62.

65. CIA memo, 25 Oct 62, in McAuliffe, CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, 304; Abel, The

Missile Crisis, 159.

66. "Chronology ofJCS Decisions," 25, 27 Oct 62.

67. Allison, Essence ofDecision, 209-10.

68. Msg JCS 6848 to CINCLANT, 22 Oct 62, 3, memo McNaughton for SecDef, 22 Oct 62: fldr Cuba

Ocr 22, 1962, box 440, Subject files, OSD Hist. Note the justification of a quarantine by Abram Chayes,

legal adviser to the secretary of state, in The Cuban Missile Crisis: International Crises and the Role ofLaw,

66-68.

69. JCSM-328-62 C]CS for SecDef, 26 Oct 62, fldr Cuba Quarantine, box 443, Subject files, OSD His£.

70. Ibid; memo Rusk for Pres, 10 Nov 62, fldr Cuba Nov 10, 1962, box 441, ibid; paper for C]CS mtg with

Pres, 16 Nov 62, FRUS 1961-63, XI:474-76.

71. Memo Nitze for C]CS, 25 Oct 62, fldr Cuba Oct 25, 1962, box 440, Subject files, OSD His£.

72. JCSM-835-62 Taylor for SecDef, 28 Oct 62, fldr Cuba Collection for Security Review, box 444, ibid.

73. McNamara's Law states: "It is impossible to predict with a high degree of confidence what the effects ofthe

use of military force will be because of the risks of accident, miscalculation, misperception, and inadvertence." See Blight et al, "The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited," 186; McNamara interv, 24 Jul 86, 6.

74. McNamara interv, 24 Ju186, 5-7.

75. In Anderson's version ofthe conversation, he claimed to have said in a jocular manner: "Why don't you go

back to your quarters and let us handle this?" (interv Anderson by Walter Poole, 7 Nov 78, cited in Poole,

jCS andNational Policy 1961-64, pt 11:288, n 78). To Maurice Matloff and Roger Trask, Anderson admitted saying, "Mr. Secretary, if you'll go back to your office, we'll go ahead with our job and run the show as

it should be run," but claimed that it was McNamara who introduced John Paul Jones into the exchange

(interv 31 May 84,6, OSD Hist). Gilpatric's recollecrion was closer to McNamara's version; see Gilpatric

interv, 27 May 70, 60-61.

76. Testimony of former participants in the Cuban missile crisis at conferences in Cambridge, Mass., October

1987, and Moscow, January 1989, suggests that the shooting down ofthe U-2 was an unauthorized act by

Soviet generals on the ground. Khrushchev blamed the Cubans directly in Talbott, Khrushchev Remembers,

498-99; Kennedy statement in sum rcd 10th ExCom mtg, 28 Oct 62, recounted in Neustadt and May,

Thinking in Time, 13.

77. Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, eds, The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban

Missile Crisis, 693.

78. Anatoli I. Gribkov and William Y. Smith, Operation ANADYR: Us. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban

Missile Crisis, 141-42.

79. FRUS, 1961-63, XI:233-41, 257-60.

80. Ibid, 279-83; Roben F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir ofthe Cuban Missile Crisis, 15; Schlesinger,

Robert Kennedy, 520.
584 Notes to Pages 214-20

81. Dean Acheson, "Robert Kennedy's Version ofthe Cuban Missile Affair," Esquire, Feb 69.

82. JCSM-844-62 JCS for Pres through SecDef, 28 Oct 62, fldr Cuba Oct 28, 1%2, box 444, Subject files,

OSD Hist.

83. Sum rcd 7th ExCom mtg, 27 Oct 62, 10:00 a.m., FRUS 1961-63, XI:252; sum rcd 10th ExCom mtg,

28 Oct 62, 11:10 a.m., ibid, 284; Kennedy Public Papers, 1962,815.

84. Accotding to Bundy, Rusk's remark, "We are eyeball to eyeball, and 1 think the other fellow just blinked,"

may have had its origins in a boyhood game from his Georgia childhood (Bundy, Danger and Survival,

405).

85. Sum rcd 10th ExCom mtg, 28 Oct 62, cited in n 83, 283-85.

86. Talbott, Khrushchev Remembers, 500; SCFR, Executive Sessions (Historical Series), XV, 88 Cong, 1 sess,

11 Jan 63, 16.

87. SCFR, Exec Sess, cited in n 86, 15-16; memo Nitze for SpecAsst to Pres, 6 Nov 62, w/atchmt memo

McNamara for Nitze, 6 Nov 62, OSD Hisr.

88. Poole,jCS and National Policy 1961-64, pt 11:325.

89. McNamara special briefing on Cuba, 6 Feb 63, McNamara Public Statements, 1963,11:968-69.

90. Nitze commentaries in Col Dean notebook on ExCom mtgs of 5-8 Nov 62, Nitze final draft memo, 7 Nov

62: fldr Cuba Nov 9, 1962, box 441, Subject files, OSD Hist; Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 236.

91. Msg 1189 State to USUN, 3 Nov 62, FRUS 1961-63, XI:363-65; memo McNaughton for Nitze, 9 Nov

62, fldr Cuba Nov 9, 1962, box 441, Subject files, OSD Hisr.

92. Ltr Ptes to Khrushchev, 6 Nov 62, FRUS 1961-63, XI:397-400; Nitze final draft memo, cited in n 90.

93. Sum rcd 24th ExCom mtg, 12 Nov 62, FRUS 1961-63, XI:432.

94. Kennedy Public Papers, 1962, 831; memo for NSC ExCom, 8 Nov 62, memrcd Capt Elmo Zumwalt,

8 Nov 62: fldr Cuba Nov 8, 1962, box 441, Subject files, OSD Hist.

95. Memo Ball for Pres, FRUS 1961-63, XI:424-26; memo Nitze for SecDef, 12 Nov 62,4, fldr Cuba Quarantine, box 443, Subject files, OSD Hist.

96. Msg Khrushchev to Pres, 12 Nov 62, FRUS 1961-63, XI:437-41 (quote, 440); ed note, ibid, 443.

97. Sum rcd 25th ExCom mtg, 12 Nov 62, ibid, 441-42; memo Nitze for ExCom, 15 Nov 62 (quote, 3), fldr

Cuba untitled, box 445, Subject files, OSD Hisr.

98. Ltr Khrushchev to Pres, 14 Nov 62, FRUS 1961-63, XI:451-54; Itt (excerpts) Castro to U Thant, 15 Nov

62, American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962,459-60.

99. Msg Pres to Khrushchev, 15 Nov 62, FRUS 1961-63, XI:460-62; memo Bundy for ExCom, 16 Nov 62,

ibid,467-68.

100. Memo Hilsman for SecState, 16 Nov 62, OSD Hist; rcd of ExCom mtg, 17 Nov 62, FRUS 1961-63,

XI:480-81.

101. Msg Khrushchev to Pres, 20 Nov 62, FRUS 1961-63, XI:496; Kennedy Public Papers, 1962,830.

102. Sum rcd 26th ExCom mtg, 16 Nov 62, FRUS 1961-63, XI:470.

103. Memo JCSM-955-62 Taylor for McNamata, 28 Nov 62, ibid, 538.

104. HCAS, Hearings on Military Posture, 88 Cong, 1 sess, 30 Jan 63, 237.

105. Kennedy Public Papers, 1963, 151.

106. Msg Khrushchev to Pres, nd [c 28 Sep 62], FRUS 1961-63, XV:337-38; memcon Akalovsky, 18 Oct 62,

ibid,371-72-

107. May et al, Presidential Recordings, 2:582.

108. Memo McCone for file, 19 Oct 62, FRUS 1961-63, XI:108-09.

109. SNIE 11-18-62, 19 Oct 62, ibid, 123; ISA paper, "Cuba and Berlin-Some Hypothetical Questions,"

20 Oct 62, 2-3, OSD Hisr.

110. "Cuba and Berlin," 2, 5, 6 (emphasis in original).

Ill. Memo Bundy, 19 Oct 62, sub: The Defense of Berlin if Cuba is Blockaded, OSD Hisr.

112. Rcd ofmtg No.1 of Berlin-NATO Subcte, 24 Oct 62, FRUS 1961-63, XV:396.

113. Memo ns [Nitze] for Pres, 27 Oct 62, ibid, 401-02.

114. Memo William R. Tyler for SecState, 28 Oct 62, OSD Hisr.

115. ISA draft paper, "Re-Examination of Berlin Negotiating Positions," 29 Oct 62, ibid.

116. See James M. Grimwood and Frances Sttowd, "History of the Jupiter Missile System," U.S. Army Ordnance Missile Command, 27 Jul 62, cited in Raymond L. Garthoff, Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis,

rev ed, 12; ttansc ofWhite House mtg, 16 Oct 62, cited in n 49, 37.
Notes to Pages 220-24 585

117. Neustadt and May, Thinking in Time, 12; William Bundy paper, "Generalized Negotiation of Bases as a

Possible Face-Saver ro the Soviets for Withdrawal of Missiles from Cuba," 21 Oct 62,1, OSD Hist.

118. Burlatsky comments ar Wilson Center Kennan Institute, 9 Sep 88, in "Comparisons Between Khrushchev

and Kennedy," mrg rpr, OSD Hist.

119. Off rhe record mtg on Cuba, 16 Oct 62, cited in n 45, 72; sum rcd 7th ExCom mtg, 27 Oct 62, cited in

n 83, 253, 255.

120. Memo (ns) ISA, passed on ro Nirze, 21 Oct 62, "The Implications ofWithdrawal of Our Ballistic Missiles

From Turkey," fldr R&R Unir, Cuban Missile Ctisis, Nirze Black Book II, box 2, Cuba Sensitive files, Acc

71A-2896. See also msg Polro 506 Paris ro State, 25 Oct 62, FRUS 1961-63, XVI:730-33.

121. JCSM-800-62 ViceAdm Herbert D. Riley for SecDef, 21 Ocr 62, fldr R&R Unit, Cuban Missile Crisis,

box 3, Cuba Sensitive files, Acc 71A-2896; memo W. Houser, Off of DepSecDef, for Taylor, 21 Oct 62,

w/atchmt 27 Oct 62, OSD Hisr.

122. White House mtg, 22 Oct 62, 11:30 a.m., May et al, Presidential Recordings, 3:34, 35, n 29.

123. Lippmann, "Blockade Proclaimed," Washington Post, 25 Ocr 62; transc White House mtg, 27 Ocr 62, 4:00

p.m., in May and Zelikow, Kennedy Tapes, 593; lrr Khrushchev to Kennedy, 27 Oct 62, FRUS 1961-63,

XI:257-60.

124. Sum rcd 7th ExCom mtg, 27 Oct 62, cited in n 83, 252-53; May et al, Presidential Recordings, 3:361; Nitze,

From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 232-33. General Lemnitzer as SACEUR objected vigorously ro the removal of

Jupiter missiles from Turkey. He had been a prime mover in convincing the Turks "to become targets" and

recalled how difficult the negotiations had been (Binder, Lemnitzer, 310).

125. May et ai, Presidential Recordings, 3:428.

126. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, 275-76; sum rcd 8th ExCom mtg, 27 Oct 62, FRUS 1%1-63, XI:267;

McNamara's observation in Lukas, "Class Reunion," 71.

127. Memo R. F. Kennedy for Rusk, 30 Oct 62, FRUS 1961-63, XII:270-71; Kennedy, Thirteen Days, 108-09;

Bundy, Danger and Survival, 428-32; Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 234; Kennedy and Khrushchev

msgs, FRUS 1961-63, XI:268-69, 279-83.

128. Talbott, Khrushchev Remembers, 497-98.

129. Bundy, Danger and Survival, 438.

130. Msg 619 EmbAnkara ro State, 13 Nov 62, FRUS 1961-63, XVI:738-39.

131. Ltr McNamara ro Turkish DefMin Sancar, 5 Jan 63, ibid, 743-44; memo McNamara for ClCS, 18 Jan 63,

box 55, McNamara Records, RG 200.

132. HSCA, DoD AppropriatiomfOr 1964, pt 1:57.

133. lnterv Roben McNamara by James G. Blight, 21 May 87, 47-48, JFKL. A letter from Rusk ro Blight in

March 1987 claimed that on the evening of 27 Ocrober 1962 Kennedy had instructed Rusk to arrange

through Andrew Cordier of Columbia University to have U Thant, UN Secretary General, propose the

removal ofboth the Jupiters in Turkey and the missiles in Cuba when the White House gave him the signal.

Only Cordier, Kennedy, and Rusk knew ofthis plan, which was never executed. See James G. Blight and

David A. Welch, On the Brink: Americam and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis, 83-84.

134. Memo Enemark for Sloan, 13 Dec 62, fldr Cuba Dec 11-31,1962, box 442, Subject files, OSD Hisr.

135. Memo McNamara for CjCS, 13 Mar 63, fldr Reading File, Mar. 63, box 117, McNamara Records, RG

200; memo McNamara for ClCS, 12 Sep 63, fldr Reading File, Sepr. 1963, box 118, ibid.

136. Memo GenCounA Joseph A. Califano for U. Alexis Johnson, 14 Aug 63, fldr R&R Unit, Cuban Missile

Crisis, Rules of Engagement, box 3, Cuba Sensitive files, Acc 7IA-2896.

137. Ed note summarizing SNIE 85-2-63, "Reactions ro U.S. Low-Level OverAights ofCuba," 21 Feb 63, FRUS

1961-63, XI:705-06.

138. Memo Cottrell for ExCom, 25 Jan 63, ibid, 678-81; hr Rusk ro Kennedy, 28 Mar 63, ibid, 738-39.

139. Memo Califano for Vance, 27 May 63, Adr R&R Unit, Cuban Missile Crisis, box 4, Cuba Sensitive files,

Acc 71A-2896.

140. NSAM 213, 8 Jan 63, FRUS 1961-63, XI:656-57; memo Bundy for Pres, 4 Jan 63, ibid, 648-49; Itt

McNamara to Rusk, 30 Jan 63, identifying the secretary ofthe Army as DoD representative and Yarmolinsky as a point of contact wirhin OSD, fldr Reading File, Jan. 31-Jan. 18, 1963, box 116, McNamara

Records, RG 200.

141. Memo Cottrell for ExCom, 24 Jan 63, FRUS 1961-63, XI:670-75; sum rcd 38th ExCom mtg, 25 Jan 63,

4:00 p.m., ibid, 687; memo Yarmolinsky for Gilpatric, 18 Apr 63, Adr R&R Unit, Cuban Missile Crisis,

box 4, Cuba Sensirive files, Acc 71A-2896.
586 Notes to Pages 225-34

142. Memrcd Califano, 22 Feb 63, re mtg wiPres 18 Feb 63, w/atchmt (quote, 4-5), Ildr R&R Unit, Cuban

Missile Ctisis, box 4, Cuba Sensitive files, Acc 71A-2896; William Colby and Petet Forbath, Honorable

Men: My Life in the CIA, 189-90.

143. Memrcd Taylor, mtg JCS w/Pres 28 Feb 63, FRUS 1961-63, XI:711-12; memo McNamara for C]CS, 24

Apr 63, w/atchmt DoD-State paper, IIdr R&R Unit, Cuban Missile Crisis, box 4, Cuba Sensitive files, Acc

71A-2896.

144. Memo McNamara for Pres, 7 May 63, IIdr Reading File, May 17-May 1, 1963, box 117, McNamara

Records, RG 200; FRUS 1961-63, XI:802-03.

145. Memo Vance, 18 Feb 63, sub: Cuban Based Communist Subversion in Latin America, OSD Hist.

146. Memo Califano for John H. Crimmins, State Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, 20 May 64, IIdr R&R Unit,

Cuban Missile Crisis, Project 5A. box 3, Cuba Sensitive files, 7IA-2896; CIA Off of Current Intel, no.

1586164, 4 Jun 64, ibid.

147. Memo of mtg w/Pres, 19 Dec 63, FRUS 1961-63, XI:906; paper, "Guantanamo Water Crisis, February

6-21,1964," NSC Histories, NSF, LBJL;Johnson Public Papers, 1963-64,1:271; DoD News Releases 123-

64 and 126-64,10 Feb 64, OSD Hist; WSEG paper, 'The Panama Crisis of 1964," 24 Aug 64, OSD Hist;

LtCol David W Miller, SecJtStaff, US Southern Command, "After-Action Report of Panama Disorders,

9-16 January 1964," 13 Feb 64, IIdr 092 Panama, box 37, ISA files, Acc 68A-0306; Johnson Public Papers,

1963-64,1:436-37.

148. Sum tcd 523d NSC mtg, 5 Mar 64, box 1, NSC Meetings File, NSF, LBJL; American Foreign Policy: Current

Documents, 1964,328-29; McNamara Public Statements, 1965, II:389.

X. LAOS

1. Memo McNamara for Pres, 24 Jan 61, FRUS 1961-1963, XXIV:41-42; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days,

163. The thought of going it alone was in Clark Clifford's memorandum on the meeting of 19 January

between Eisenhower and Kennedy; see Pentagon Papers, bk 2, IY.B.I, 1-2. Fred 1. Greenstein and Richard H.

Immerman stress the Delphic nature of Eisenhower's advice to Kennedy in "What Did Eisenhower Tell

Kennedy about Indochina? The Politics ofMisperception," Journal ofAmerican History, Sep 92, 573-83.

2. Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 182; Walt W. Rostow, The DiffUsion ofPower: An Essay in Recent History,

116; Pentagon Papers, bk 2, IY.B.l, 1-2.

3. Leighton, Strategy, Money, and the New Look, 540-41; Watson, Into the Missile Age, 640-41.

4. For background on Laos in the 1950s, see Arthur J. Dommen, Conflict in Laos: The Politics ofNeutralization; Charles A. Stevenson, The End ofNowhere: American Policy Toward Laos Since 1954; Martin E. Goldstein, American Policy Toward Laos; Bernard Fall, Anatomy ofa Crisis: The Laotian Crisis of1960-1961.

5. Goldstein, American Policy Toward Laos, 167.

6. Stevenson, End ofNowhere, 123; msg 825 Phnom Penh to State, 10 Jan 61, OSD Hist.

7. Memcon w/Pres, BrigGen Andrew Goodpaster, 2 Jan 61, FRUS 1961-63, XXIV:I-4; American Foreign

Policy: Current Documents, 1960, 686.

8. Memo Lemnitzer for SecDef, 14 Jan 61, IIdr 092 Laos 1961, box 36, ISA files, Acc 64A-2382; Schlesinger,

A Thousand Days, 164.

9. Memo McNamara for Pres, 24 Jan 61, cited in n 1; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 164.

10. Sorensen, Kennedy, 640.

11. Memo Nitze for SecDef, 23 Jan 61, w/atchmt, FRUS 1961-63, XXIV:26-40 (quote, 29).

12. Ibid (quotes, 26, 27); memo William Bundy for SecState and SecDef, 23 Jan 61, IIdr 092 Laos 1961, box

36, ISA files, Acc 64A-2382; Poole,jCS andNational Policy 1961-64, pt II:75-76.

13. Memcon wiPres, Goodpaster, 25 Jan 61, 10:15 a.m., FRUS 1961-63, XXIV:42-44; Poole, JCS and National Policy 1961-64, pt II:79-80.

14. Poole,jCS andNational Policy 1961-64, pt II:8!.

15. Memo George C. McGhee, ChmPolPlngCouncil (State), for Nitze, 15 Feb 61, w/atchmt, IIdr Vietnam

370.5-384, box 42, ISA files, Acc 64A-2382.

16. IDA, "Summary ofObservations on the U.S. Command Experience in Laos, August I960-May 1961," first

draft, 17 Oct 63, 19, f1dr Summary of Observations, First Draft, box 233, Subject files, OSD Hist.

17. Sum rcd mtg 8 Feb 61, FRUS 1961-63, XXIV:48-50; msg 0221582 CINCPAC to JCS, 2 Feb 61,

OSDHist.
Notes to Pages 234-40 587

18. Msg 1508 Bangkok to State, 25 Feb 61; msg 1697 Bangkok to State, 21 Mar 61:ibid.

19. See draft position paper, "Reinvigorating SEATO" (for SEATO Conf, Bangkok, 27-31 Mar 61), 14 Mar

61, Hdr South East Asia Laos, box 5, NSC files, Acc 68A-4024; msg Secto 25 Rusk (Bangkok) to Scate,

28 Mar 61, OSD Hist; communique Seventh Ministerial Mtg ofCouncil ofSEATO, 30 Mar 61, American

Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, 940-41.

20. Memcon w/Mikhail Menshikov, 28 Feb 61, FRUS 1961-63, XXIV:63-66; circ msg 1265 State to EmbsAsia, 28 Feb 61, OSD Hist; msg 2139 Moscow to State, 10 Mar 61, FRUS 1961-63, XXIV:82, n 3; Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 130.

21. Circ msg 1323 State to Vientiane, Bangkok, Saigon, et al, 2 Mar 61; msg 1671 Vientiane to State, 11 Mar

61: OSD Hist.

22. Msg 990386 JCS to CINCPAC, 15 Feb 61, msg 990855 DirFE(ISA) 1. C. Heinz to CINCPAC, 21 Feb

61: OSD Hist; Itr DASD(ISA) Haydn Williams to USecState for Econ Affs Ball, 6 Feb 61, Hdr 320.2 Laos,

box36, ISA files, Acc64A-2382; see ItrJohn O. Bell (State) to DASD(ISA) Bundy, 21 Feb 61, Hdr 111-130

Laos 1961, ibid.

23. Ltr Williams to Ball, cited in n 22; memo BrigGen C. V. Clifton (White House Def Liaison Off) for

SecDef, 28 Mar 61, Hdr 092 Laos 1961, box 36, ISA files, Acc 64A-2382.

24. Memo McNamara for Clifton, 30 Mar 61, ibid.

25. Memo LrGen Earle G. Wheeler for SecDef, w/atchmt, 24 Feb 61, ibid; msg PEO 563 ChPEO Laos to

CINCPAC, 6 Feb 61, msg PEO 827 ChPEO Laos to CINCPAC, 2 Mar 61: OSD Hist.

26. Ltr Charles E. Gentry, OASD(ISA)(FE), to lCA (Peter Cody), 5 Apr 61, Hdr 111-130 Laos 1961, box 36,

ISA files, Acc 64A-2382.

27. Memo Rostow for Pres, 28 Feb 61, FRUS 1961-63, XXIV:62-63; memo Rostow for Pres, 7 Mar 61, ibid,

71.

28. Memo Landon for Rostow, 7 Mar 61, box 130, NSF, JFKL.

29. Memo Col Thomas Wolfe for Nirze, 7 Mar 61, Hdr 092 Laos 1961, box 36, ISA files, Acc 64A-2382.

30. Memo McGhee for SecState, 3 Mar 61, FRUS 1961-63, XXIV:68-69; memcon w/Pres (Clifton), 9 Mar 61,

ibid, 72, n I; Poole, ]CS and National Policy 1961-64, pt II:85-87; IDA, "Historical Analysis of the Laos

Incident, August 1960-May 1961, Part II," I Oct 63, 129-30, box 233, Subject files, OSD Hist.

31. Memcon DeptState mtg, 12 Mar 61, file 751J-00/3-1261, Central Files, RG 59. Part ofthis memo appears

in FRUS 1961-63, XXIV:86-88.

32. Memo Rostow for Pres, 21 Mar 61, memrcd (William Bundy), 21 Mar 61: FRUS 1961-63, XXIV:94-96.

33. Kennedy Public Papers, 1961,214; ed note, FRUS 1961-63, XXIV: 100.

34. Bundy quoted in Montague Kern, Patricia Levering, and Ralph Levering, The Kennedy Crises: The Press, the

Presidency, andForeign Policy, 39; aide-memoire ftom UK to Soviet Union, 23 Mar 61, in American Foreign

Policy: Current Documents, 1961, 994-95.

35. William Bundy, "History of Vietnam," ch 3,5-10, William Bundy Papers, LBJL; circ msg 1241 Stare ro

EmbsAsia, 21 Mar61, OSD Hisr: memcon KeyWesr, 26 Mar 61, file 751J-00/2-1261, Central Files, RG 59.

36. Memo Wolfe for Williams, 3 Apr 61, IIdr 092 Laos 1961, box 36, ISA files, Acc 64A-2382.

37. Communique SEATO Council, 30 Mar 61, American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961,940-43.

38. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 335-36.

39. Memo Wolfe for Col William McCrea, ISA, 13 Mar 61, Hdr 092 Laos 1961, box 36, ISA files, Acc

64A.2382.

40. Msg DEF 993225 AcrgDirFE(ISA) William McCormick ro CINCPAC, I Apr 61, Hdr 380.1-400, ibid.

41. Memo George Carroll (PolPlngStaff, ISA) for DirPolPlngSraff BrigGen James H. Polk, 5 Apr 61, Hdr 092

Laos 1961, ibid.

42. JCSM-222-61 Lemnirzer for SecDef, II Apr 61, ibid.

43. Memo Nitze for SecDef, 3 Apr 61, w/archmr, ibid: memo Polk for ASD(ISA), 3 Apr 61, ibid.

44. Sum rpr of Laos Task Force mtg, 10 Apr 61, fldr Laos, Vol. II, box 130, NSF, JFKL; memo Landon for

McGeorge Bundy, II Apr 61, ibid; JCSM-232-61 JCS for McNamara, II Apr 61, FRUS 1961-63,

XXIV:121-23.

45. Memo McNamara for qcs, 10 Mar 61, Hdr Reading File, May 1961-Mar. 1961, box 113, McNamara

Records, RG 200; memo JCS for SecDef, II Apr 61, cired in n 44; JCSM-206-61 JCS for McNamara,

31 Mar 61, wicopy ofTrapnell Rpt, 28 Mar 61, IIdr 092 Laos 1961, box 36, ISA files, Acc 64A-2382.
588 Notes to Pages 241-49

46. Ltr Williams to DASecState(FE) John M. Steeves, 14 Apr 61, fidr 092 Laos 1961, box 36, ISA files, Acc

64A-2382.

47. McNamara notes on 481st mtg NSC, 1 May 61, FRUS 1961-63, XXlV:162-64; memo David W. Quant

(Manpower & Training Div, ODMA), 23 Jun 61, fidr 160-333 Laos 1961, box 36, ISA files, Acc 64A2382. Quanr nared rhar rhe PEO was replaced on 19 April by a MAAG established at the request of the

Laorian government.

48. Dommen, Conflict in Laos, 196-97.

49. Sorensen, Kennedy, 644; Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy, 702.

50. Bundy, "History of Viernam," ch 3, 27.

51. Msg 1985 Laos ro Srate, 1 May 61, FRUS 1961-63, XXIV:165; Poole,jCS and National Policy 1961-64,

pt //:98.

52. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 332-33; Poole,]CS andNational Policy 1961-64, pr //:88-89; memcon State,

29 Apr 61, FRUS 1961-63, XXlV:150-54 (quote, 151).

53. McNamara notes on 481st mtg NSC, 1 May 61, OSD(A), Miscellaneous, Sensirive Files, fidr 381 Laos

April-May 1961, Acc 71A-6489; see also n 47 FRUS citation for an abridged version.

54. Memo SecDef (McNamara) and DepSecDef (Gilpatric) for Pres, 2 May 61 (quare, 3), fidr Laos, Vol. II,

box 130, NSF, JFKL (see also abridged version in FRUS 1961-63, XXlV:166-70); ed note, ibid, 169-70;

memo SecSrate and SecDeffor Pres, nd, sub: Plan for Possible Intervention in Laos, fidr Vietnam and Laos,

box 4, McNamara files, Acc 71A-3470.

55. Msg 1651 Harriman to Srate, 3 May 61, FRUS 1961-63, XXlV:I72, n 2; ed nare, ibid, 170.

56. Srevenson, End ofNowhere, 152.

57. Msg 2012 Vientiane to Stare, 3 May 61, OSD Hist; msg 1207 Srate ro Vientiane, 3 May 61, FRUS 1961-

63, XXlV: 171-72 (quote, 171); American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, 1000-02, 1004.

58. Gilparric interv, 14 Nov 83, 30.

59. "Conference on Laos, Geneva, Swirzerland, 10 May 61," paper by George A. Carroll, 31 Jul61 (hereafter

Carroll Rpt), fidr 092 Laos 1961, box 36, ISA files, Acc 64A-2382.

60. Ltr Williams ro Steeves, 3 May 61, ibid; memo ASD(ISA) for Harriman, 9 May 61, ibid.

6!. Carroll Rpr, 1.

62. Ibid, 2-3 (quote, 3); State Dept paper prepared for International Conference on Laos at Geneva, 3 May 61,

FRUS 1961-63, XXlV:176-83.

63. Carroll Rpr, 5.

64. Ibid, 17.

65. Circ msg 1786 State ro Canberra et al, 13 May 61, OSD Hist; Carroll Rpt, 18-19.

66. Msg Secro 146 Rusk (Geneva) ro State, 15 May 61, FRUS 1961-63, XXlV:197-98; msg Secto 103 Rusk

(Geneva) to Srate, 13 May 61, OSD Hist; msg Secto 118 Rusk (Geneva) to State, 14 May 61, FRUS 1961-

63, XXlV:193-95 (quare, 194).

67. Harriman paper, nd, FRUS 1961-63, XXIV:224-25.

68. Fall, Anatomy ofa Crisis, 225-26; memcon SovietEmbVienna, 4 Jun 61, FRUS 1961-63, XXIV:231-36

(quote, 232).

69. Fall, Anatomy ofa Crisis, 226; Nirze inrerv, 3 Oct 84, 3; Carroll Rpt, 19-20. The question of how much

conrrol the Soviets had over their clienrs was recognized but not always appreciated (Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 517).

70. Memo DASecStare(FE)(EconAffs) (Avery F. Peterson) for DUSecStare for Pol Affs (Johnson), 23 Jun 61,

FRUS 1961-63, XXlV:256-57.

7!. Msg 997728 ViceDirJtStaffRAdm Joseph Wellings to CINCPAC, 17 Jun 61, OSD Hist.

72. Msg 997143 Wellings to CINCPAC, 7 Jun 61, ibid; msg Confe 288 Geneva to State, 27 Jun 61, FRUS

1961-63, XXlV:264-66.

73. Msg 2332 Vientiane to Stare, 28 Jun 61, OSD Hist (summarized in FRUS 1961-63, XXIV:265, n 2).

74. Carroll Rpr, 21.

75. Ibid, 21-22; FRUS 1961-63, XXIV:273, n 1; msg Conle 287 Geneva to State, 26 Jun 61, ibid, 261-63.

76. Memo Nitze for SecDef, 29 Jun 61, FRUS 1961-63, XXIV:273-74.

77. Memo prepared by State for NSC, 28 Jun 61, ibid, 266-72; memcons, 29, 30 Jun 61, ibid, 276-82, 283-86.

78. Memo ASecState(FE) (McConaughy) for USecState (Bowles), 26 Jun 61, ibid, 263-64.

79. Memo WWR (Rosrow) for Pres, 26 Jun 61, fidr Laos, Vol. II, box 130, NSF, JFKL.
Notes to Pages 249-56 589

80. Carroll Rpt, 23-26; memo Carroll for Henry S. Rowen (signd J. M. Lee), 8 Aug 61, fldr 092 Laos 1961,

box 36, ISA files, Acc 64A-2382.

81. SCFR, Executive Sessions (Historical Series), XIII, 87 Cong, 1 sess, 1961, pt 2:115.

82. Msg 227 State to Belgrade, 30 Aug 61, FRUS 1961-63, XXIV:400-01; msg 274 State to Belgrade, 5 Sep 61,

ibid, 402-03 (quotes from n 1 and n 2).

83. Ed note, ibid, 358-59.

84. Memrcds Taylor, 25, 30 Aug 61, ibid, 382-85.

85. Memcon [Robert Johnson]' 29 Aug 61, ibid, 390-98 (quote394); NSAM 80, 29 Aug 61, ibid, 399-400.

86. Poole, ]CS and National Policy 1961-64, pt II: 118-19.

87. Sorensen, Kennedy, 644.

88. Poole,]CS and National Policy 1961-64, pt II: I20-21.

89. Ibid, 121-22.

90. Memo ExecSec(State) (Battle) for McGeorge Bundy, 11 Oct 61, FRUS 1961-63, XXIV:463-64; memo

Heinz for William Bundy, 14 Nov 61, fldr 320.2 Laos 1961, box36, ISA files, Acc 64A-2382.

91. Memo Williams for SecDef, 5 OCt 61, FRUS 1961-63, XXIV:446-49; JCSM-690-61 JCS for McNamara,

5 Oct 61, OSD Hist; memo Taylor for Pres, 26 Sep 61, FRUS 1961-63, XXIV:426-29 (quotes).

92. Ltr William Bundy to Johnson, 19 Oct 61, memo William T. McCormick for William Bundy, 16 Oct 61,

memo William Leffingwell for William Bundy, 18 Oct 61: fldr 320.2 Laos 1961, box 36, ISA files, Acc 64A2382.

93. Ltr Johnson to William Bundy, 18 Nov 61, Itr ActgRegDirFEOCA) James R. Fowler to Heinz, 10 Oct 61:

ibid.

94. Msg ChMAAG Laos to ClNCPAC, 20 Dec 61, fldr 092 Laos 1961, box 45, ISA files, Acc 65A-3501.

95. Memcon Harriman and Winthrop G. Brown (AmbLaos), 18 Jan 62, ibid; Stevenson, End ofNowhere,

167-69.

96. Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 137; Stevenson, End ofNowhere, 169-70.

97. JCSM-IIO-62 Lemnitzer for SecDef, 14 Feb 62, fldr 350.5-680 Laos 1962, box 45, ISA files, Acc 65A3501; SNIE 58-2-62, II Apr 62, fldr Special NIEs, box 16, ISA files, Acc 72A-1495; NSAM 149, 19 Apr

62, FRUS 1961-63, XXIV:695-96; Sen Doc 73, A Report ofUnited States Foreign Policy and Operations, by

Sen Allen J. Ellender, I Mar 62, 87 Cong, 2 sess, 147.

98. JCSM-376-62 Decker for SecDef, II May 62, FRUS 1961-63, XXIV:742-44.

99. Memo Hilsman for Harriman, 12 May 62, ibid, 748-54; memrcd Forrestal, 10 May 62, ibid, 734-35;

memo Forrestal for Rusk, 24 May 62, ibid, 789; DoD Annual Report, FY 1962,49.

100. Memo Johnson for Rusk, w/atchmts, I Jun 62, FRUS 1961-63, XXIV:80 1-09.

101. Memcon Taylor, DeptState [W. H. Sullivan], McNamara, Rusk, Harriman, et al, 2 Jun 62, ibid, 809-13;

memo McNamara for Pres, 4 Jun 62, ibid, 815-16 (McNamara did not sign this memo, and apparently it

did not go to the White House); memo McNamara for Lemnitzer, 5 Jun 62, ibid, 826-27; memcon DeptState [W. H. Sullivan], Rusk, Harriman, McNamara, Taylor, et al, 12 Jun 62, ibid, 842-44. Lemnitzer's

private notes on the latter meeting record that occupation would be advisable only if there were reinforcements available in sufficient numbers to back it up (13 Jun 62, fldr L-204-71, box 29, Lemnitzer

Papers, NDUL).

102. Memo Johnson for Rusk, 9 Jun 62, FRUS 1961-63, XXIV:832-37 (quote, 834).

103. Ibid, 837, n I; Stevenson, End ofNowhere, 177.

104. Memo Brubeck for Pres [26 Jun 62], FRUS 1961-63, XXlV:851-52 (quote, 851); memo Ball for Pres,

28 Jun 62, ibid, 856-60.

105. Declaration and Protocol on the Neutrality of Laos, 23 Ju162, American Foreign Policy: Current Documents,

1962, 1075-83 (quote, 1076); memo Bagley for Taylor, 19 Ju162, FRUS 1961-63, XXIV:864-66; Stevenson, End ofNowhere, 178-79; William Colby, with James McCargar, Lost VIctory: A Firsthand Account of

Americas Sixteen-year Involvement in Vietnam, 195.

106. Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 152. The formal disestablishment of the U.S. Military Assistance Command

was 6 October, one day before the deadline; see DoD Annual Report, FY1963, 115, and Colby, Lost Victory,

195.

107. JCSM-538-62 Lemnitzer for SecDef, 3 Aug 62, fldr 200-234 Laos 1962, box 45, ISA files, Acc 65A-3501;

memo William Bundy for SecDef, 9 Aug 62, ibid.
590 Notes to Pages 257-68

108. New York Times, 23 Apr 63. Sorensen noted that in the spring of 1963 "it was once again necessary for

Kennedy to alert the Seventh Fleet and to stage 'war games' in Thailand as a warning against a Communist

takeover" (Kennedy, 648). See COo Colby, Lost Victory, 197-98.

109. Msg 868 Laos to State, 10 Dec 64, FRUS 1964-68, XXVlII:306-07; Washington Post, 24 Dec 64.

110. Colby, Lost Victory, 198; Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 154-55.

Ill. Roscow, Diffusion ofPower, 288-90 (quote, 290).

112. Quoted in Dommen, Conflict in Laos, 299.

Xl. VIETNAM: RELUCTANT ENGAGEMENT, 1961-1963

1. For a detailed account ofthe Countetinsurgency Plan see Watson, Into the Missile Age, 646-49.

2. IDA, Working Paper No.3, "The South Vietnam Crisis of 1961: Development of the Fitst Presidential

Ptogram," 6 Feb 64,10-13, OSD Hist; text of Basic CIP for Vietnam, 4 Jan 61, FRUS 1961-63,1:1-12.

3. Memo Lansdale for SecDef and DepSecDef, 17 Jan 61, Pentagon Papers, bk 11, 1-3.

4. Roscow, Diffusion ofPower, 264; Bundy, "Hiscory of Vietnam," ch 3, 31.

5. Memo Roscow for McGeorge Bundy, 30 Jan 61, FRUS 1961-63,1:16-19 (quote, 16); memo Pres for SecState, SecDef, 30 Jan 61, fldr 000.1-091.3 Vietnam 1961, box 42, ISA files, Acc 64A-2382.

6. Memo Lansdale for SecDef and DepSecDef, 17 Jan 61, cited in n 3, 3-4.

7. Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 419; notes on mtg between SecState and ASecState(FE), 28 Jan 61, FRUS

1961-63,1:19.

8. Cecil B. Currey, Edward Lansdale: The Unquiet American, 1-2.

9. Ibid, 2.

10. Memo McGarr for US Amb, 24 Jan 61, fldr 370.5-384 Vietnam 1961, box 43, ISA files, Acc 64A-2382; Irr

McGarr co LtGen Williscon B. Palmer, 3 Mar 61, FRUS 1961-63,1:43-44; memo Lemnitzer for SecDef,

11 Apt 61, ibid, 66-67 (quote, 66).

11. Msg 1329 Saigon co State, 31 Jan 61, FRUS 1961-63, I: 25-28. The ambassadot did modifY some of his

criticism as a result of Diem's press conference on 6 February, but only grudgingly; see msg 1351 Saigon co

State, 8 Feb 61, ibid, 29-30.

12. Ltr McGarr CO DitFE(lSA) (RAdm Luther C. Heinz), 27 Feb 61, fldr 092 Vietnam Jan-Oct 1961, box 42,

ISA files, Acc 64A-2382; Itr McGarr CO Palmer, 3 Mar 61, cited in n 10.

13. Memo Edward E. Rice (StatePolPlng) for Anderson, 10 Feb 61, fldr 370.5-384 Vietnam 1961, box 43, ISA

files, Acc 64A-2382; msg 1115 State co Saigon, 1 Mar 61, FRUS, 1961-63,1:40-42.

14. Lrr William Bundy co McGhee, 13 Mar 61, fldr 370.5-384 Vietnam 1961, box 43, ISA files, Acc 64A-2382.

15. Ltr McGarr CO Palmer, 3 Mar 61, cited in n 10 (quote, 43).

16. Negotiating the Clp, Pentagon Papers, bk 2, IVB.1, 13-14.

17. Memo Nitze for SecDef, 18 Apr 61, fldr 334-353 Vietnam, box 42, ISA files, Acc 64A-2382; memo

William Bundy for DepSecDef, 20 May 61, ibid.

18. Memo Dulles for Pres, 25 Mar 61, fldr Vietnam Jan-Jun 61, box 5, Lansdale files, Acc 63A-1803.

19. Memo Lemnitzer for SecDef, 29 Mar 61, ibid. McNamara passed this to White House via Roscow; see

memo Roscow for Pres, 3 Apr 61, w/atchmt, FRUS 1961-63,1:61-63.

20. Ed note, FRUS 1961-63, 1:74.

21. Memo McNamara for DepSecDef, 20 Apr 61, fldr Reading File, May 1961-Mar. 1961, box 113, McNamara

Records, RG 200.

22. Memo William Bundy for Nitze, 21 Apr 61, fldr 092 Vietnam Jan-Oct 1961, box 42, ISA files, 64A-2382;

drafi: notes on first mtgofPresidentialTask Force on Vietnam, 24 Apr 61, FRUS 1961-63,1:77-80; memo McNamara for Pres, 20 Apr61, fidr Reading File, May 1961-Mar. 1961, box 113, McNamara Records, RG 200.

23. Gilpatric interv, 14 Nov 83, 30.

24. Memo Col E. F. Black for Haydn Williams (ISA), 25 Apr 61, forwarding McGarr's presentation co Vietnam

Task Force on 24 Apr, w/atchmt, 15 Nov 60, 1, fldr 370.64 Vietnam 1961, box 43, ISA files, Acc 64A-2382.

25. Memo Gilparric for Pres, 3 May 61, w/atchmt, FRUS 1961-63, 1:92-115; Gilparric interv, 14 Nov 83, 30.

26. Ed note, FRUS 1961-63, 1:88.

27. Pentagon Papers, bk 2, IVB.1, 35-36; drafi: memo ofsecond mtg of Vietnam Task Force, 4 May 61, FRUS

1961-63,1:115 If.

28. Bundy, "History ofVietnam," ch 3, 35; Pentagon Papers, bk 2, IVB.!, 36: Irr Lansdale CO LrGen S. T. Williams, 10 Oct 64, cited in Newman, jFKand Vietnam, 40.
Notes to Pages 268-76 591

29. Draft rcd of acrion 480th mtg NSC, 29 Apr 61, in memo ActgExecSec(NSC) Marion W. Boggs for NSC,

9 May 61, fidr Vietnam Task Force, box 5, NSC files, Acc 68A-4024; NSAM 52, II May 61, FRUS 1961-

63,1:132-34 (quote, 133); Itr Pres to Nolting, 27 May 61, Pentagon Papers, bk 3, IV.B.3, 20.

30. Annex 2 to Lansdale memo transmitring annexes to a Program of Action for South Vietnam, 8 May 61,

Pentagon Papers, bk 2, Y.B.4, 93-100; msg 1675 Saigon to State, 6 May 61, OSD Hist.

31. Msg Lansdale to MAAG-Vietnam (McGarr), 9 May 61, fidr Vietnam file #1 Jan-Jun 61, box 5, Lansdale

files, Acc 63A-1803; rpt Vice Pres, FRUS 1961-63, 1:152-57; Bundy, "History of Vietnam," ch 3, 35, on

the "Churchill ofAsia."

32. Ed note, FRUS 1961-63, 1:179; memo Lansdale for Gilpatric, 26 Jun 61, ibid, 180-81; Itr US Special

Financial Group to Presidents Diem and Kennedy, 14 Jul 61, ibid, 221-23; rpt, Joint Action Program

(Staley Report), Pentagon Papers, bk II, 182-226.

33. Bundy, "History ofVietnam," ch 4,4-5.

34. NSAM 65, II Aug 61, Pentagon Papers, bk 11, 241-44.

35. IDA, Working Paper No.4, "The South Vietnam Crisis of 1961: Part II, Genesis ofthe Second Presidential

Program," 13 May 66, 1-2, OSD Hist; NIE 14.3/53-61, 15 Aug 61, Pentagon Papers, bk II, vi, 245-46; msg

385 Saigon to State, 20 Sep 61, FRUS 1961-63, 1:305-06.

36. IDA Working Paper No.4, 1-2; Diem request in msg 421 Saigon to State, I Oct 61, FRUS 1961-63, 1:316-

17; Kennedy Public Papers, 1961,660; Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, 225-26.

37. Bundy, "History ofVietnam, "ch 4,12-13.

38. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, 225-28, 233-34, 236 (quote, 225); Rostow, Diffusion ofPower, 275.

39. Currey, Lansddle, 236-37.

40. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, 238-39 (quote, 238); Currey; Lansddle, 237-38; msg Taylor to Pres, I Nov

61, Pentagon Papers, bk II, 331-42 (quote, 341).

41. Paper prepared by Taylor, FRUS 1961-63, 1:479-81 (quote, 480); msg Taylor for Pres, 1 Nov 61, Pentagon

Papers, cited in n 40; Bowers, Tactical Airlift, 45; New York Times, 12 Dec 61; Futrell, The Advisory Years,

79-82.

42. See Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, 242-44; Taylor Rpt, Pentagon Papers, bk 2, IY.B.1, 90-103 (quotes, 98,

103).

43. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 537-38, notes Kennedy's skepticism about the Diem regime bur observes too

that he "had no choice now but to work within the situation he had inherited"; memo McNamara for Pres,

8 Nov 61, FRUS 1961-63, 1:559-61 (quote, 560).

44. Memo Rusk and McNamara for Pres, II Nov 61, Pentagon Papers, bk 11, 359-66 (quote, 360); see also ed

note, FRUS 1961-63, 1:576.

45. List of questions prepared by Pres, II Nov 61, FRUS 1961-63,1:576-77; notes White House mtg, II Nov

61, ibid, 577-78; notes NSC mtg, 15 Nov 61, ibid, 607-10.

46. NSAM 111, ibid, 656-57.

47. Memo Lansdale for Taylor, 2 Nov 61, 2, 4, fldr Asst to SecDef #2 Sep-Dec 61, box 5, Lansdale files,

Acc 63A-1803; memo Lansdale for Gilpatric, 30 Nov 61, ibid.

48. NSAM Ill, cited in n 46, 657.

49. For details of this controversy see FRUS 1961-63,1:665-66,673-74,678,702-03,720-23,745-49.

50. For resolution of the controversy see ibid, 11:3-4, 35-38, 46-48,109-12,171.

51. Msg 906345 SecDefto CINCPAC and ChMAAG, 28 Nov 61, ibid, 679-80.

52. Memo Felt for SecDe£, 18 Dec 61, wlenel, sum rcd of con£, 16 Dec 61, fidr Assr to SecDef#2 Sep-Dec 61,

box 5, Lansdale files, Acc 63A-1803. See also FRUS 1961-63, 1:740-44.

53. Robert W. Komer, "Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN Performance in

Vietnam," R-967-ARPA, Aug 72, Rand rpt prepared for DARPA, 85, OSD Hist; Bundy, "History ofVietnam," ch 4, 54.

54. NSAM 124, 18 Jan 62, FRUS 1961-63, 11:48-50.

55. Ltr Rusk to McNamara, 16 Jun 62, Itr McNamara to Rusk, 19 Jun 62, Itr Ball to McNamara, 21 Jun 62: fidr

Task Force Southeast Asia, box 4, Lansdale files, Acc 63A-1803.

56. Memo McNamara for SecState, 18 Dec 61, FRUS 1961-63,1:745; memo McNamara for Pres, 22 Dec 61,

ibid,756.

57. Memo McGeorge Bundy for Pres, 27 Dec 61, ibid, 766; msg 963 Saigon to State, 24 Jan 62, ibid, 11:58-59;

Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 426-27.

58. Msg 2447 ViceDirJtStaftJ. H. Wellings to ChMAAG, Vietnam, 4 Dec 61, OSD Hist.
592 Notes to Pages 276-82

59. Memo McNamara for Pres, 2 Feb 62, FRUS 1961-63, II:71-72; memo NSC ExecSec Bromley Smith for

SecDef, 5 Feb 62, fldr 384 Vietnam Jan-Jun 1962, box 51, ISA files, Acc 65A-350 1.

60. DJSM-1532-61 DirJtStafffor DASD(ISA), 26 Dec 61, w/end, fldr Vietnam Sep-Dec 61, box 5, Lansdale

files, Acc 63A-1803.

61. Paper, "U.S. Military Support for Vietnam," 13 Dec 62, FY 64 SecDefBackup Book, I-II, box 20, ASD(C)

files, OSD Hist; status rpt of military actions in South Vietnam, "First Phase ofViernam Program," 10 Jan

62, fldr Task Force Southeast Asia, box 5, Lansdale files, Acc 63A-1803; memo SecN Korth for SecDef,

16 Nov 62, fldr 370.64 Vietnam, box 51, ISA files, Acc 65A-3501.

62. Ltt Nitze (for McNamara) to Sen Dworshak, 21 Mar 62, fldr 092 Vietnam Jan-Jun 1962, box 51, ISA files,

Acc 65A-350 1.

63. "First Phase ofVietnam Program," 10 Jan 62, cited in n 61; JCSM-535-62 ActgCJCS for SecDef, 23 Ju162,

fldr 333-370.5 Vietnam, box 51, ISA files, Acc 65A-3501; memo William Bundy for DirJtStaff, 1 Aug 62,

ibid.

64. JCSM-617-62 qcs for SecDef, 13 Aug 62, fldr 123.7-324.5 Vietnam, box 51, ISA files, Acc 65A-3501;

memo McNamara for qcs, 23 Aug 62, ibid; SecDef Honolulu Decisions ofJuly 1962, Pentagon Papers,

bk 3, IY.BA, 4; "U.S. Military Support for Vietnam," 13 Dec 62, cited in n 61.

65. Pentagon Papers, bk 3, IY.B.2, 4-14; rcd of Sixth SecDef Conference, Camp Smith, Hawaii, 23 Jul 62,

FRUS 1961-63, II:546-49; memo Dir Vietnam Task Force (Cottrell) to Harriman, 6 Apr 62, ibid, 310-15;

Bundy, "History ofVietnam," ch 5, 7.

66. Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 431-35 (quote, 431).

67. Pentagon Papers, bk 3, IY.B.2,11-13.

68. Ibid, 3-4.

69. Paper Hilsman, 2 Feb 62, FRUS 1961-63,11:73-90; Hilsman, To Move aNation, 438-39; status rpt (MAAG),

"South Vietnam Civic Action-Civil Affairs Program," 12 Feb 62, fldr 092 Vietnam Jan-Jun 1962, box 51, ISA

files, Acc 65A-3501; memo Heinz for DepSecDef, 24 Aug 62, fldr Vietnam 1962, ibid.

70. McNamara Public Statements, 1962, 11 May 62, III: 1166-67; paper prepared in DoD, nd, "Visit to Southeast Asia by the Secretary of Defense, 8-11 May 1962," FRUS 1961-63, II:379-87; memo Lansdale for

Gilpatric, 3 Apr 62, fldr 092 Vietnam Jan-Jun 1962, box 51, ISA files, Acc 65A-3501.

71. CM-917-62 Lemnitzer for SecDef, 28 Aug 62, CM-954-62 Lemnitzer for SecDef, 14 Sep 62: fldr Vietnam

1962, box 51, ISA files, Acc 65A-3501; ltr McGarr to McNamara, 6 Mar 62, w/end rpt for period 2 Sep

61 to 8 Feb 62 to CINCPAC, 8 Feb 62, fldr 334 Vietnam Jan-Jun 1962, ibid.

72. CM-1l7-62 Taylor for SecDef, 17 Nov 62, FRUS 1961-63, II:736-38 (quotes, 737).

73. Status rpt on SE Asia, 27 Jun 62, ibid, 478-81 (quote, 478).

74. Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 440; memo Robert H. Johnson (StatePoIPlng) for Cottrell, 11 Sep 62, FRUS

1961-63, II:644-48 (quote, 644).

75. Leslie H. Gelb and Richard K. Betts, The Irony ofVietnam: The System Worked, 87; Hilsman, To Move a

Nation, 441-42. Frederick Nolting, From Trust to Tragedy: The PoliticalMemoirs ofFrederick Nolting, Kennedy's

Ambassador to Diem's Vietnam, 54-56, was less judgmental about charges that Nhu padded figures and antagonized villagers.

76. Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 441-42.

77. Memo CINCPAC for JCS, 25 Jan 63, w/encl, FRUS 1961-63, I1I:35-49.

78. Memo Heinz for William Bundy, 1 Feb 63, w/encl, 25 Jan 63, fldr 091.1-091.4 Vietnam, box 17, ISA files,

Acc 67A-4564.

79. Hilsman, To Move a Nation; Neil Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul vann andAmerica in Vietnam;

David Halberstam, The Making ofa Quagmire.

80. See Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie, 264-65; William M. Hammond, Public Affairs: The Military and the

Media, 1962-1968,30-32.

81. Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie, 262-63; see also Vann's interv in U. S. News & World Report, 16 Sep 63, after

his retirement, in which he claimed politics in Saigon handcuffed ARVN troops, and Hammond, The

Military and the Media, 31-32.

82. CINCPAC, 8 Jan 63, OSD Hist; Washington Post, 4 Jan 63. For a full discussion ofrelations with the press,

see Hammond, The Military and the Media, 30-38,

83. Colby and Forbath, Honorable Men, 204; JCS Team rpt on South Vietnam, Jan 63, FRUS 1961-63, I1I:73-

94 (quote, 91).

84. Kennedy Public Papers, 1963, 11.
Notes to Pages 283-88 593

85. NIE 53-63, "Prospects in South Vietnam," 17 Apr 63, FRUS 1961-63, III:232-35.

86. Harold P. Ford, CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers: Three Episodes, 1962-1968, 14-23.

87. ]CSM-152-63 Taylor for SecDef, 21 Feb 63, William Bundy for SecDef, 5 Mar 63, SecDef memo for

qcs, 8 Mar 63, JCSM-1l4-63 DepDirJtStaff A. H. Manhart for SecDef, 7 Feb 63: fidr Vietnam 1963,

box 18, ISA files, Ace 67A-4564.

88. JCSM-38-63 Taylor for SecDef, 15 Jan 63, memo William Bundy for ChStaffAF, 21 Feb 63: ibid.

89. For the role of the American press see Hammond, The Military and the Media, 39-65.

90. Ltr Hilsman to William Bundy, I May 63, FRUS 1961-63, III:260-61; memo William Bundy for SecDef,

15 May 63, fidr 438-452 Vietnam 1963, box 18, Ace 67A-4564; memo McNamara for qcs, fidr Reading

File, May 17-May I, 1963, 17 May 63, box 118, McNamara Records, RG 200.

91. Memo William Bundy for SecDef, 20 Apr 63, fidr 091.3-091.4 Vietnam, box 17, ISA files, Ace 67A-4564;

memo SecDef MilAsst George S. Brown for ASD(ISA), 25 Apr 63, ibid.

92. Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 466-67; memrcd of SecDef Conf Honolulu, 6 May 63, FRUS 1961-63,

III:265-68 (quote, 265).

93. Memo JCS for SecDef, 20 Aug 63 (sum rpt on Eighth SecDef Conf Honolulu, 7 May 63), memo

AcrgASD(ISA) Henry S. Rowen for SecDef, 30 Aug 63, CM-874-63 Taylor for SecDef, II Sep 63: fidr

334-381 Vietnam 1963, box 18, ISA files, Ace 67A-4564.

94. Memo McNamara for Nitze, 8 May 63, FRUS 1961-63, III:275-76; memo Heinz for William Bundy, 23

]ul 63, Rdr 091.3-091.4 Vietnam, box 17, ISA files, Ace 67A-4564.

95. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, 289; Pentagon Papers lists nine victims, while CIA reported eight (Pentagon

Papers, bk 3, IV.B.5, ii); memo McCone for Gilpatric, 23 Aug 63, fidr 092 Vietnam Jun-Dec 1963, box 18,

ISA files, Ace 67A-4564.

96. Hammond, The Military and the Media, 39-49; memcon Ball, Nolting, Chalmers B. Wood, George S.

Springsteen, 5 Ju163, fidr 092 Vietnam Jul-Dec 1963, box 18, ISA files, Ace 67A-4564.

97. Msg 299 Saigon to State, 21 Aug 63, FRUS 1961-63, III:595-97. See also Hammond, The Military and the

Media, 55-58.

98. Msgs 324 and 320 Saigon to State, 24 Aug 63, FRUS 1961-63, III:611-14.

99. Msg 243 State to Saigon, 24 Aug 63, ibid, 628-29.

100. A note in the Harriman Papers, fidr Vietnam Aug-Nov 63, box 519, LC, idemified Hilsman as the author,

while Hilsman allocated a share of the responsibility to Harriman and Ball as well as Forrestal and himself

(Hilsman, To Move aNation, 487-88). Presidem Johnson in retrospect felt that sending the wire was "a very

dangerous thing to do." He blamed Hilsman for the acrion, and noted that "when I became Presidem,

the first man I instructed to be fired was Hilsman" (imerv Lyndon B. Johnson by William]. Jorden, 12 Aug

69, LBJL).

101. Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 488; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 991; msg 329 Saigon to Srate, 24 Aug 63,

FRUS 1961-63, III:620-21. McNamara, In Retrospect, 55, wrote that "the fault lay as much with those

who failed to rein him in as it did with Hitsman himself," but Lodge emerges in this account as evasive

about his reaction. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, 292-93, blamed ami-Diem activists in the State Department for the 24 August cable's tone.

102. Hilsman, To Move aNation, 490-92; msgs 272, 279 State to Saigon, 29 Aug 63, FRUS 1961-63, IV:32-34;

msg 0499 CIA Station Saigon to Agency, 31 Aug 63, ibid, 64.

103. Memo of confw/Pres, 29 Aug 63, FRUS 1961-63, IV:26-31; msg 1540 MACV to qcs, 27 Aug 63, ibid,

1II:655-57.

104. Hilsman memcon, Dept State, 31 Aug 63, ibid, IV:69-74 (quote, 73); for Krulak's record of the meering,

see Pentagon Papers, bk 12, 540-44.

105. Transc of broadcast with Walrer Cronkite, CBS-TV News, 2 Sep 63, Kennedy Public Papers, 1963, 652.

Nhu was reported to be talking wirh Ho Chi Minh about reuniting Vietnam and expelling Americans from

the coumry. See Itr William H. Sullivan to Hilsman, 3 Oct 63, fidr General 1963, box 519, Harriman

Papers, LC; Bundy, "History ofVietnam," ch 9, 13, 19; Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 498.

106. Msg 412 Saigon to State, 4 Sep 63, FRUS 1961-63, IV:107-08; memcon w/Pres, 6 Sep 63, ibid, 117-21;

Hilsman, To Move aNation, 500-0 I.

107. Krulak's report is in FRUS 1961-63, IV:153-60; Mendenhall's report, ibid, 144-45, 243-49; memcon,

White House, 10 Sep 63, ibid, 161-67 (quote, 162).

108. Transc ofCronkite broadcast, 2 Sep 63, cited in n 105; transc ofbroadcast on NBC-TV "Huntley-Brinkley

Repon," 9 Sep 63, Kennedy Public Papers, 1963, 659; memo for DirCIA, 26 Sep 63, FRUS 1961-63,
594 Notes to Pages 288-301

IV:295-98; msg 674 State to Saigon, 1 Nov 63, ibid, 521: see also Fredrik Logevall, Choosing war: The Lost

Chance fOr Peace and the Escalation ofwar in Vietnam, 63.

109. Memo Pres for SecDef, 21 Sep 63, FRUS 1961-63, IV:278-79; Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 507-08.

110. Memo ClCS and SecDef for Pres, 2 Oct 63, FRUS 1961-63, IV:337: msg MAC 2028 Harkins to Taylor,

30 Oct 63, ibid, 479-82: H. R. McMaster, Dereliction ofDuty: LyndonJohnson, RobertMcNamara, theJoint

Chief ofStaff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam, 45.

111. Memo ClCS and SecDef for Pres, cited in n 110, 338-42. The McNamara-Taylor mission report was endorsed by the NSC, rcd of action 2472, taken at the 519th NSC mtg, 2 Oct 63, ibid, 353-54.

112. Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 514-15: msg 643 Saigon to State, 6 Oct 63, FRUS 1961-63, IV:384-85.

113. McNamara-Taylor rpt, 2 Oct 63, FRUS 1961-63, IV:339: ed note, ibid, 427; msgs Saigon to State, 28,

29 Oct 63, ibid, 449-52.

114. Hilsman, To Move aNation, 518-20; msg 647 State to Saigon, 25 Oct 63, FRUS 1961-63, IV:437-39: msg

805 Saigon to State, 28 Oct 63, ibid, 442-46: msg 854 Saigon to State, 1 Nov 63, ibid, 514-15.

115. Niue, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 256-57.

116. HCFA, Hearings: Foreign AssistanceAct of1963,88 Cong, 1 sess, 8 Apr 63, 64.

117. Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest, 247: Cong Research Serv interview with Kattenburg, 16 Feb 79, in

S Rpt 98-185, The Us. Government and the Vietnam war: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships,

Part II, 1961-1964, CRS study prepared for SCFR, 98 Cong, 2 sess, Dec 84,161.

XII. FLEXIBLE RESPONSE

I. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet, 5-6.

2. Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 251.

3. Ltr Kaysen to Rowen, 16 lun 61, FRUS 1961-63, VIII: 102-05: Niue interv, 9 Oct 84, 35-36; Poole,JCS

andNational Policy 1961-64, pt 1:82-83.

4. Draft BNSP, 5 Dec 61, FRUS 1961-63, VIII:222-24: ed notes, ibid, 243-47, 281-82.

5. JCSM-277-62 Lemnitzer for SecDef, 12 Apr 62, ibid, 260-62: memo WYS(mith) for Taylor, 20 Apr 62,

fldr T-230-69, box 40, Taylor Papers, NDUL: Itt Taylor to Rostow, 23 Apr 62, FRUS 1961-63, VIII:272-

74.

6. Memo WYS(mith) for Taylor, 1 Aug 62, fldr T-230-69, box 40, Taylor Papers, NDUL.

7. Memo ExecSecNSC for Holders ofNSC 5906,17 Jan 63, ClCS files, RG 218: ed note, FRUS 1961-63,

VIII:455: Poole,JCS andNational Policy 1961-64, pt I: 16: memo Gilpatric for Taylor, 4 Apr 63, fldr T-253,

box 40, Taylor Papers, NDUL.

8. Memo Rostow for Rusk, w/atchmt, 23 ]uI63, FRUS 1961-63, VIII:489-90.

9. Memo CM-381-65 Wheeler for leMay et ai, 14 Jan 65, box 116, Wheeler files, RG 218.

10. Watson, Into the Missile Age, 314-16.

11. "Chronology of Two-Year Dispute on 'Missile Gap,'" New York Times, 9 Feb 61: Kennedy Public Papers,

1961,24.

12. "Missile Gap" chron, cited in n II: McNamara, In Retrospect, 21.

13. Kennedy Public Papers, 1961,67-68: "Missile Gap" chron.

14. Lemnitzer interv, 19 Jan 84, 4: Gilpatric interv, 14 Nov 83, 18.

15. HCAS, Military Posture Briefings, 23 Feb 61 (McNamara test), 646-47: HSCA, DoD ApprosfOr 1962, 6 Apr

61 (McNamara test), pt 3:60.

16. "Missile Gap" chron.

17. OSD paper, "The Problem of Measuring the 'Missile Gap,'" 14 Feb 61, fldr Missile Gap-I961, box 45,

ASD(C) files, OSD Hist.

18. NIE 11-5-60,3 May 60, FRUS 1958-60, III: 404-05 (ed note): NIE 11-8-60, 1 Aug 60, ibid, 437-42: NIE

11-4-60, 1 Dec 60, FRUS 1961-63, VIII:47, n c(4).

19. NIE 11-8-61, Annex C, 7 Jun 61, FRUS 1961-63, VIII:83.

20. NIE 11-8/1-61, 21 Sep 61, ibid, 132; Walter A. McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History

ofthe Space Age, 329.

21. McNamara interv, 22 May 86, 1-2: Edgar M. Bonome, The Missile Gap: A Study ofthe Formulation of

Military and Political Policy, 160-64.
Notes to Pages 301-11 595

22. Kevin C. Ruffner, ed, CORONA: Americas First Satellite Program, xiii; Bissell, Reflections ofa Cold ~nior,

135-38; Gerald K. Haines, The National Reconnaissance Office: Its Origins, Creation, & Early Years, 145-47.

For the "500" figure, see Watson, Into the Missile Age, 351.

23. Haines, NRO, 149-53.

24. DoD Dir 5160.32, 6 Mar 61, in Cole et al, Department ofDefense, 325-26: Haines, NRO, 153; Ruffner,

CORONA, 152.

25. Ruffner, CORONA, 152.

26. Gilpatric address, 21 Oct 61, Gilpatric Public Statements, 1961,395.

27. NIE 11-4-60, cited in n 18.

28. Memrcd DepDirEROSA) S. K. Eaton, 3 Feb 61, fidr 334 NATO, box 45, ISA files, Acc 64A-2382; Policy

Directive, NATO and the Atlantic Nations, 20 Apr 61, FRUS 1961-63, XIII:285-91.

29. Memrcd Capt C. N. Shane, USN, 24 Feb 61, fidr 334 NATO, box 45, ISA files, 64A-2382; JCSM-190-61

Lemnitzer for SecDef, 28 Mar 61, fidr 334 NATO, box 46, ibid.

30. FRUS 1961-63, XIII:285-91 (quotes, 286-87).

31. Kennedy Public Papers, 1961,254-56: statement Lemnitzer at Mil Cte mtg, 10 Apr 61,2, fidr 334 NATO

Apr 1-15, 1961, box 17, ISA files, Acc 64A-2382; Polto 1619, Paris to State, 28 May 61, OSD Hist; memcon, NATO Defense Strategy and Planning, 15 Jun 61, fidr 334 NATO Jun 1-15, 1961, box 21, ISA files,

Acc 64A-2382: Poole, }CS and National Policy 1961-64, pt III:8.

32. Poole,jCS and National Policy 1961-64, pt III:5-6: JCSM-190-61, cited in n 29.

33. Memcon, sub: Visit ofMinister of Defense Strauss to SHAPE, 12 Jun 61,5, fidr Germany Jan-Jun 61, box

33, ISA files, Acc 64A-2382.

34. Memrcd Eaton on 15 Jun 61 Nitze mtg w/Stikker, 27 Jun 61, fidr 334 NATO Jun 1-30, 1961, box 17,

ibid.

35. Memo Ruffner for JCS, 31 Oct 61, ibid.

36. Memo Nitze for SvcSecs et al, 19 Dec 61, w/atchd McNamara remarks at NATO Ministerial mtg, 14 Dec

61, fidr 334 NATO Ministerial mtg, box 46, ibid.

37. Interv William W. Kaufmann by Alfred Goldberg, 14 May 66,7, OSD Hist.

38. Memo McGeorge Bundy for McNamata, 1 May 62, fidr 334 NATO 1961, box 54, ISA files, Acc 64A2382.

39. Interv William W. Kaufmann by Lawrence Kaplan and Maurice Matloff, 14 Ju186, 19, OSD Hist.

40. McNamara Athens address excerpts, 5 May 62, FRUS 1961-63, VIII:275-81.

41. Ibid, 275.

42. Memo William Bundy for SvcSecs et al, 10 May 62, w/atchd McNamara Athens address (full text), 5 May

62,7-8, Policy Planning Stafffiles, Lot 69D-121, RG 59.

43. Ibid, 10-12.

44. McNamara Athens address, 5 May 62, cited in n 40, 278-79.

45. McNamara Arhens address, cited in n 42,24-25.

46. Poole,jCS andNational Policy 1961-64, pt III:70-72.

47. David N. Schwartz, NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas, 165.

48. Kaufmann interv, 14 May 66,7: Kaufmann interv, 14 Ju186, 19.

49. McNamara Public Statements, 1962, III:1505-09 (quote, 1505). See also excerpted text in American Foreign

Policy: Current Documents, 1962, 548-51.

50. McNamara remarks, Ann Arbor, cited in n 49, 1508-09.

51. Watson, Into the Missile Age, 474-75; Alfred Goldberg, "A Brief Survey of the Evolution of Ideas about

Counterforce," 5-21, OSD Hist.

52. Stern interv, 28 Feb-l Mar 67, 7-8.

53. Kaufmann interv, 14 May 66,6-7, 10; Kaufmann interv, 14 Ju186, 16-17; Henry S. Rowen, "Formulating

Strategic Doctrine," Report ofCommission on the Organiwtion ofthe Governmentfir the Conduct ofForeign

Policy, Jun 75, vol 4, 230.

54. JCSM-170-61 Lemnitzer for SecDef, 17 Mar 61, FRUS 1961-63, VIII:72-74:JCSM-252-61 Lemnitzer for

SecDef, 18 Apr 61, ibid, 76-78.

55. CM-190-61 Lemnitzer for SecDef, 18 Apr 61, ibid, 74-75.

56. Poole,}CS and National Policy 1961-64, pt 1:87-92; ed note, FRUS 1961-63, VIII:125.

57. Draft memo McNamara for Pres, 23 Sep 61, FRUS 1961-63, VIII: 138-52 (quote, 142).
596 Notes to Pages 312-22

58. Thomas S. Power, with Albert A. Arnhym, Design fOr Survival, 83, 119-20; Steven L. Rearden, "U.S. Srrategic Bombardment Docrrine Since 1945," in R. Cargill Hall, ed, Case Studies in Strategic Bombardment,

428; interv Maxwell Taylor by Alfred Goldberg, 14 Jun 66, 1, 2, OSD Hist.

59. Memo Gilparric for McNamara, 28 Dec 61, OSD Hist; SCAS, Preparedness Investigating Subcte, LeMay

test in exec sess, 17 Ju162; interv Curtis LeMay by Alfred Goldberg, 12 Oct 66, 4-5, OSD Hist.

60. Enthoven interv, 3 Feb 86, 24-25.

61. Interv Paul Nitze by Alfred Goldberg, 15 Jun 66, 5, OSD Hist; Nitze, From Hiroshima to G!4snost, 246.

62. Taylor interv, 14 Jun 66, 2,5; JCSM-252-61, cited in n 54, 77.

63. Schwartz, NATO, Nuclear Dilemmas, 145-46; Enthoven and Smith, How Much Is Enough>, 124-29.

64. Memo McNamara for Lemnitzer, 23 May 62, FRUS 1961-63, VlII:294-98 (quote, 295-96).

65. JCSM-952-62 Lemnitzer for SecDef, 7 Dec 62, ibid, 436-38.

66. Pierre Gallais, "U.S. Srrategy and the Defense of Europe," Orbis, Summer 63,247; Gallais, The Ba!4nce

ofTerror: Strategy fOr the Nuclear Age; Andre Beaufre, Deterrence and Strategy; Jane E. Srromseth, The Origins

ofFlexible Response: NATO, Debate over Strategy in the 1960s, 48.

67. McNamara reply to press query about Ann Arbor address, 23 Jun 62, McNamara Public Statements, 1962,

IV:1511.

68. Harold Macmillan, At the End ofthe Day, 1961-1963,334-35.

69. Dean Acheson, "Our Atlantic Alliance," 5 Dec 62, Vital Speeches ofthe Day, I Jan 63, 163.

70. Schwanz, NATO, Nuclear Dilemmas, 168-69.

71. Goldberg, "A Brief Survey ofthe Evolution ofIdeas about Counterforce," 29-30.

72. McNamara interv, 22 May 86, 3-5.

73. Warson, Into the Missile Age, 475-77; memo of disc at 387th NSC mtg, 20 Nov 58, FRUS 1958-60, 1Il:147-

52; ed note, ibid, 382.

74. Watson, Into the Missile Age, 490-95, 790.

75. Lemnitzer interv, 19 Jan 84, 47; memo Bell for McGeorge Bundy, McNamara, 30 Jan 61, w/atchd draft

disc notes for I Feb NSC mtg, 2, fldr NSC Meetings, 1961, box 313, NSF, JFKL.

76. Ltr McNamara to Pres, 20 Feb 61, w/atchmt "Memorandum on Review ofFY 1961 and FY 1962 Military

Programs and Budgets," FRUS 1961-63, VlIl:35-48; Stern interv, 28 Feb-I Mar 67,7-8.

77. Poole,]CS and National Policy 1961-64, pt 1:81-84,96 (quote, 83).

78. Memo Hitch for SecDef, 22 Dec 61, sub: Review ofthe Hickey Study, OSD Hist; FRUS 1961-63, VlII: 196,

n 5; Enthoven and Smith, How Much Is Enough?, 172-73.

79. Stern interv, 28 Feb-1 Mar 67, 9; memo Hitch for SecDef, 22 Dec 61, cited in n 78; Enthoven and Smith,

How Much Is Enough?, 172-73.

80. Memo McNamara for Pres, 24 Aug 61, fldr Reading File, Aug. 1961-June 1961, box 113, McNamara

Records, RG 200.

81. Ibid; memo McNamara for Pres, 17 Nov 61, ibid. Memo WYS(mith) for Taylor, 15 Mar 62, Taylor Papers,

NDUL, noted that the Partridge recommendations on the question of devolution of authority in case of

nuclear arrack would be managed informally within OSD.

82. HCAS, Special Subcte on Defense Agencies, Hearings, 87 Cong, 2 sess, 28 Jun 62, 6960.

83. Rowen, "Formulating Srrategic Doctrine," cited in n 53, 231; Enthoven quoted in Gregg Herken, Counsels

ofWar, 170.

84. Draft memo McNamara for Pres, 6 Dec 63, FRUS 1961-63, VlII:545-64 (quote, 549).

85. Ibid, 550.

86. HCAS, Hearings: Military Posture, 88 Cong, 2 sess, 27 Jan 64, 6920.

87. Poole,]CS and National Policy 1961-64, pt 1:105-08.

88. Draft memo McNamara for Pres, 6 Dec 63, cited in n 84, 559.

89. Draft memo McNamara for Pres, 14 Nov 63, FRUS 1961-63, VlII:526-33 (quotes, 528-29).

90. HCAS, Hearings: Military Posture, 89 Cong, 1 sess, 18 Feb 65, 256.

91. Interv Glenn A. Kent by Alfred Goldberg, 11-12 May 66, 4, OSD Hist; memo McNamara for qcs, 9 Jan

64, fldr Reading File, Jan. 17-Jan. 2, 1964, box 119, McNamara Records, RG 200; SCAS and SSCA, Hearings: Military Procurement Authorizations, FY 1966, 89 Cong, 1 sess, 24 Feb 65, 43-46.

92. SCAS, Hearings: Status ofu.s. Strategic Power, 90 Cong, 2 sess, 23 Apr 68, 138.

93. Robert S. McNamara, The Essence ofSecurity, x.

94. Ibid, 53.
Notes to Pages 322-30 597

95. McNamara address to Economic Club of New York, 18 Nov 63, McNamara Public Statements, 1963,

IV:2553.

96. McNamara, In Retrospect, 345. McNamara had used the same language in "The Military Role of Nuclear

Weapons," Foreign Affairs, Fall 83, 79.

XIII. THE LIMITED NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

1. SCFR, Hearings: Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 88 Cong, 1 sess, 13 Aug 63, 120; Sorensen, Kennedy, 740.

2. Bundy, Danger and Survival, 461; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 910; Radio and TV Address, 26 Jul 63,

Kennedy Public Papers, 1963,601-06 (quote, 602).

3. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 911.

4. General Research Corp, "Arms Control of Ballistic Missile Defense," Dec 68, vol I, ACDAiST-145 I, 10,

box 1269, Subject files, OSD Hist; Poole,jCS and National Policy 1961-64, pt 1:399-400, 406.

5. For a summary of arms control activity between 1956 and 1960, see Watson, Into the Missile Age, 729-30.

On the test ban debate in particular, see Arthur T. Hadley, The Nation's Safety and Arms Control, 50-60;

Robert A. Divine, Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954-1960.

6. Statement by Pres, 29 Dec 59, Eisenhower Public Papers, 1959, 883.

7. Bundy, Danger and Survival, 328-29, 334; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 452.

8. Inaugural Address, 20 Jan 61, Kennedy Public Papers, 1961,2.

9. News conf, 25 Jan 61, ibid, 8.

10. Rusk, As 1 Saw It, 251; Nitze interv, 3 Oct 84, 7,10-11; Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 182; Watson,

Into the Missile Age, 727-28.

11. HCFA, Hearings: To Establish a United States Arms Control Agency, 87 Cong, 1 sess, 24 Aug 61, 2-3

(McCloy test).

12. For the announcement of Foster's appointment, see the president's remarks, 26 Sep 61, Kennedy Public Papers, 1961,627. See also Glenn T. Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban, 95. Foster was deputy

secretary of defense from September 1951 to January 1953.

13. Poole,fCS and National Policy 1961-64, pt 1:300-01.

14. Ltr Eisenhower to McCloy, 29 Jun 61, in HCFA, To Establish a United States Arms Control Agency,

31-32.

15. Ibid, 25 Aug 61,78-79,83.

16. Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 188; Poole,fCS and National Policy 1961-64, pt 1:302-05.

17. ACDA, "A Chronology of Disarmament Developments, 1961," nd [1961], 3, box 1270a, Subject files,

OSD Hist; 'The Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty: Gateway to Peace," Dept State Pub 7254, Aug 61,5-6.

18. Memo McCloy for Pres, 8 Mar 61, FRUS 1961-63, VII:14-17.

19. "The Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty: Gateway to Peace," 6-11; Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban,

41-43; memcon, 4 Jun 61, FRUS 1961-63, VII:87. On the West's rationale for 20 visits, see ed note, ibid,

10-11.

20. Memcon, 4 Jun 61, cited in n 19, 87.

21. Lippmann, "The Test Ban," New York Herald Tribune, 20 Jun 61.

22. Washington Star, 30 Jan 61.

23. "JCS Positions and Statements on Disarmament, January 1961-November 1969," Hist Div, Jt Secretariat,

17 Jan 79, 2-3, box 1267, Subject files, OSD Hist; JCSM-182-61 CJCS for SecDef, 23 Mar 61, FRUS

1961-63, VII:21-27.

24. Memo Black for Bonesteel, 19 Apr 61, Rdr Col Black Reading File, 8/1/60, box 4, OSD Admin sec files,

Acc 65A-3078.

25. Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban, 43. See, too, ed note, FRUS 1961-63, VII:I0-14, which

quotes Seaborg's journal entry for a White House meeting on 4 March where the same topic was discussed.

Nitze referred there to DoD concerns over "loopholes" in the composition of the Control Commission and

inspection certification methods "that might negate the purposes of the treaty."

26. "JCS Positions and Statements on Disarmament," cited in n 23, 2; Itt McNamara to McCloy, 28 Jul 61,

FRUS 1961-63, VII:1l6-24; Itr Brown to Wiesner, 3 Aug 61, Doc CK3100242766, Declassified Documents Refetence System, Internet.
598 Notes to Pages 330-37

27. Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban, 69; Irr ]FK to Macmillan, 16 May 61, Rdr Arms Control and

Disarmament Agency General 4/61-5/61, box 255, NSF, ]FKL; U.S. aide-memoire delivered ro Soviet Ministry of For Ms, 17 ]un 61, excerpts in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, 1137.

28. American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, 1137-39; Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test

Ban, 74-75. The II-member Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Testing began meeting in ]uly.

29. Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban, 75; McGeorge Bundy mins 490th NSC mtg, 8 Aug 61,

FRUS 1961-63, VII: 134-35.

30. Lrr McNamara to McCloy, 28 ]uI61, memo ]CSM-517-61 C]CS for SecDef, 2 Aug 61, memo Taylor for

Pres, 7 Aug 61, Bundy mins 490th NSC mtg, 8 Aug 61: FRUS 1961-63, VII:116-24, 125-27, 133-34,

136.

31. Memo Bundy for Pres, 8 Aug 61, Rdr Panofsky Panel, 8/4/61-9/5/61, Panofsky file, Disarmament 1961,

box 302, NSF, JFKL; memo Pres for Taylor, 7 Aug 61, FRUS 1961-63, VII:127n.

32. Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban, 84; Sorensen, Kennedy, 619.

33. Msg 323 EmbMoscow to State, 28 Jul 61, FRUS 1961-63, VII: 110-13 (see also ''A Chronology ofDisarmament Developments, 1961," cited in n 17,5); Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban, 74,83-84;

interv Lemnitzer by Walter Poole, 31 Mar 77, in Poole,fCS and National Policy 1961-64, pt 1:370; interv

John T. McNaughton by George Bunn, 21 Nov 64, 1-2,JFKL; Itt Seaborg to Pres, 7 Oct 61, FRUS 1961-63,

VII: 192-93.

34. Sorensen, Kennedy, 619; Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban, 82.

35. White House statement on Soviet resumption of nuclear weapons tests, 30 Aug 61, Kennedy Public Papers, 1961, 580-81; Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban, 86 (Seaborg gives the date as 2 September); Kennedy-Macmillan jt statement, 3 Sep 61, Kennedy Public Papers, 1961,587.

36. Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban, 85.

37. Statement by Pres, 5 Sep 61, Kennedy Public Papers, 1961, 589-90; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 482.

38. Poole,jCSandNational Policy 1961-64, pt 1:368; Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 190; Seaborg, Kennedy,

Khrushchev, and the Test Ban, 86.

39. "Implications of 50-100 MT Weapons," 12 Jan 62, Adr White Papers 1962 FY 1963 Budget, box 12,

ASD(C) files, OSD Hist.

40."A Chronology of Disarmament Developments, 1961," 9; "Implications of 50-100 MT Weapons," cited

in n 39.

41. Statement by Pres, 2 Nov 61, Kennedy Public Papers, 1961, 692-93; Poole,jCS andNational Policy 1961-64,

pt 1:370-71.

42. Poole,]CS and National Policy 1961-64, pt 1:371.

43. Bethe lecture, 5 Jan 62, memo Spurgeon Keeney, Jr, for Carl Kaysen, 18 Jan 62, Irr Pres to Sen Clinton

Anderson, 22 Jan 62: Rdr Nuclear Testing, Bethe Incident 3/62-7/62, box 376, NSF, JFKL.

44. Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban, 132-35.

45. Ibid, 136-37. JCS discomfort was reinforced by the Twining Committee's report. Initiated by General LeMay on 28 November 1961, the committee was tasked to analyze the military implications ofSoviet weapons

tests. See Twining Committee rpt to ChStaffAF, 5 Jan 62, "Military Implications of 1961 Soviet Nuclear

Tests," Rdr Nuclear Weapons, Twining Committee Report, box 302, NSF, JFKL.

46. Radio and TV Address, 2 Mar 62, Kennedy Public Papers, 1962, 186-92; ACDA, ''A Chronology of Disarmament Developments, 1962," 13 Jun 63, 3, box 1270a, Subject files, OSD Hist; New York Times, 26 Apr

62; New York]ournal-American, 21 Apr 62; Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban, ch 11.

47. Memo Bundy for Pres, 18 Apr 62, Rdr 499th Mtg Nuclear Atmospheric Test 1962, box 313, NSF, JFKL.

48. Poole,jCS andNational Policy 1961-64, pt 1:378-79; Lemnitzer notes on White House mtg, 20 Jun 62, Adr

L-214-71, box 29, Lemnitzer Papers, NDUL.

49. Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban, 158.

50. Memo DirACDA for Pres, 3 Mar 62, Adr Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Cte 2/62-11/62, box 100, POF,

JFKL.

51. Lemnitzer notes on White House mtg, 6 Mar 62, Rdr L-214-71, box 29, Lemnitzer Papers, NDUL; see also

memrcd Lemnitzer, 6 Mar 62, FRUS 1961-63, VII:362-65.

52. ''A Chronology of Disarmament Developments, 1962," cited in n 46, 5; memo Foster for Pres, 9 Mar 62,

Rdr Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Cte, box 100, POF, JFKL; news release, 18 Apr 62, Rdr Disarmament-Nuclear Test Ban Negoriations 4/62-8/63, box 100, POF, JFKL.

53. Poole,]CS and National Policy 1961-64, pt 1:318-19, 322-23.
Notes to Pages 337-44 599

54. Ibid, 323-24.

55. Memo ASD(ISA) for qcs, nd [early Nov 62], ibid, 324 (emphasis in original).

56. "A Chronology of Disarmament Developments, 1962," 7-8.

57. Herbert F. York, Making weapons, Talking Peace: A Physicist's Odysseyfrom Hiroshima to Geneva, 220-21; "VI.

Project VELA," nd, fldr White Papers 1962 FY 1963 Budget, 6-7, box 12, ASD(C) files, OSD Hisr.

58. Documents on Disarmament, 1962, II:633-35; memo Bundy for Pres, 26 Jul 62, fldr Nuclear Testing 1962-

63, box 104, POF, JFKL.

59. Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban, 162-63; on the Dean conrretemp, see ed note, FRUS 1961-

63, VII:487-88.

60. Report of the Inspection Study Group, nd [Jul 62], FRUS 1961-63, VII:524-27; Irr Foster to Bundy, 31

Aug 62, fldr Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, box 257, NSF, JFKL.

61. Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban, 164-68; memo of White House mtg, 1 Aug 62, FRUS

1961-63, VII:527-30; Lemnitzer notes on White House mtg, 1 Aug 62, fldr L-214-71, box 29, Lemnitzer

Papers, NDUL.

62. News conf, 1 Aug 62, Kennedy Public Papers, 1962,591; Documents on Disarmament, 1962, II:791-804; ed

note, FRUS 1961-63, VII:560.

63. Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban, 168-70.

M. Ibid, 164-65; memo ofWhite House mtg, 1 Aug 62, cited in n 61.

65. Documents on Disarmament, 1962, II:804-07, 791-92.

66. ''A Chronology of Disarmament Developments, 1962," 12; news conf, 29 Aug 62, Kennedy Public Papers,

1962,649; Documents on Disarmament, 1962, II:820-32.

67. Memo Wiesner for Pres, 20 Aug 62, FRUS 1961-63, VII:553; statement by Pres, 4 Nov 62, Kennedy Public

Papers, 1962, 822.

68. "A Chronology ofDisarmament Developments, 1962," 15; Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban,

177-79; lrr Khrushchev to Pres, 19 Dec 62, FRUS 1961-63, VI:234-37.

69. Ltr Pres to Khrushchev, 28 Dec 62, FRUS 1961-63, VI:238-40; Itr Dean to Foster, 23 Feb 63 (quote, 3),

fldr ACDA Disarmament 3/7/63-3/31/63, box 258, NSF, JFKL; Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test

Ban, 178-81. Seaborg suggests Dean may have been vaguer in his reply to Khrushchev than he later maintained and that the differing accounts may well have been a case of genuine misunderstanding.

70. Ed note, FRUS 1961-63, VII:625; memo w: O. Anderson for Guthrie, 27 Jun 63, box 560, Harriman Papers, LC (according to Anderson, the Soviet Union had posed the "three" figure as early as July 1960);

ACDA, "A Chronology ofDisarmament Developments, 1963," 14 Aug 64, I, box 1270a, Subject files, OSD

Hist.

71. Lrr Pres to Khrushchev, 28 Dec 62, cited in n 69, 238-39; ACDA, "U.S. Position Regarding a Nuclear Test

Ban Treaty," 9 Feb 63, fldr Disarmament Subject, Basic Doc #2, box 367, NSF, ]FKL; ed note, FRUS

1961-63, VII:644-46; ''A Chronology of Disarmament Developments, 1963," cited in n 70, 1; statement

by Pres on postponing underground testing in Nevada, 26 Jan 63, Kennedy Public Papers, 1963, 104; Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban, 187. '

72. Memo Bundy for Pres, 21 Jan 63, fldr 508th NSC Mtg, box 314, NSF, JFKL; Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev,

and the Test Ban, 181; Irr Pres to Macmillan, 10 Jan 63, Rdr 508rh NSC Mtg, box 314, NSF, ]FKL; Pres

remarks to NSC, 22 Jan 63, FRUS 1961-63, VIII:462.

73. Baltimore Sun, 1 Feb 63; Los Angeles Times, 22 Feb 63; Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban, 187.

74. Memo Taylor for SecDef, 16 Feb 63, w/appen, 9 Feb 63, fldr Disarmament Subject, Basic Doc #2, box 367,

NSF,JFKL.

75. Memo ActgDirACDA Adrian Fisher for Pres, 17 Feb 63, w/memo Fisher for Members Cre of Principals,

17 Feb 63 (quote, 9), ibid.

76. Memo Taylor for SecDef, 21 Mar 63, Rdr ACDA Disarmament 3/7/63-3/31/63, box 258, NSF, JFKL;

memo McNamara for Pres, 12 Feb 63, sub: US-USSR military balance with and without a test ban, Rdr 95

USP Test Ban Treaty Basic, box 3, Atomic Energy files, Acc 69A-2243.

77. Memo McNamara for Pres, 12 Feb 63, sub: Diffusion ofnuclear weapons with and without a test ban agreement, fldr 95 USP Test Ban Treaty Basic, box 3, Atomic Energy files, Acc 69A-2243.

78. Seahorg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban, 190-91 (Harriman quote, 191).

79. News conf, 8 May 63, Kennedy Public Papers, 1963,377-78; Washington Post, 10 May 63; Christian Science

Monitor, 22 May 63.
600 Notes to Pages 344-51

80. News conf, 22 May 63, Kennedy Public Papers, 1963, 424; NSAM 239, 6 May 63, FRUS 1961-63,

VII:692.

81. JCSM-449-63 ClCS for SecDef, 13 Jun 63, memo McNamara for Foster, 14 Jun 63, both in fidr Reading

File, June I-June 19,1963, box 118, McNamara Records, RG 200 (McNamara enclosed a copy ofJCSM449-63 with the latter memo); memcon McNamara wi LeMay, 24 Jun 63, ibid.

82. Memo McNamara for Taylor, Seaborg, Brown, Wiesner, 26 Jun 63, ibid; memcon, 14 Jun 63, FRUS 1961-

63, VII:720-22; Poole,JCS andNational Policy 1961-64, pr 1:397-98.

83. Memcon, 14 Jun 63, cited in n 82, 721.

84. Norman Cousins, "Notes on a 1963 Visit with Khrushchev," Saturday Review, 7 Nov 64; Seaborg, Kennedy,

Khrushchev, and the Test Ban, 179-80,207-09,212-13 (on Cousins' "unofficial liaison" role, see also Milton

S. Katz, Ban the Bomb, 81, 83-84); memo Thompson for Rusk, 24 Apr 63, FRUS 1961-63, VII:687; on the

Kennedy-Macmillan-Khrushchev correspondence during this period, see ibid, 663-718 passim.

85. Commencement address at American Univ, 10 Jun 63, Kennedy Public Papers, 1963, 460-64; Sorensen,

Kennedy, 730-31.

86. CIA Information Report, 11 Jun 63, fidr Disarmament-Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations, 7/63 Meeting in

Moscow, box 100, POF, JFKL; Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban, 217-18; Newhouse, Wtlr

and Peace in the Nuclear Age, 193.

87. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 903; McNaughton interv, 21 Nov 64, 6.

88. See Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban, 227-31.

89. Msg Seeto 20, Rusk for Foster and Harriman, 28 Jun 63, OSD Hist (emphasis in original); instructions for

Harriman, 5 Ju163, FRUS 1961-63, VII:769.

90. Instructions for Harriman, 10 Jul 63, FRUS 1961-63, VII:787; memo Foster for Pres, 12 Jul 63, wlcover

memo for members of Cte of Principals, 12 Jul 63, citing DepSecDef letter to ACDA, 23 May 63, fidr

Disarmament Subject, Basic Documents #3, 5/63-6/63, box 367, NSF, JFKL.

91. Memcon, George Rathjens, 8 Ju163, fidr Disarmament Subject, Basic Documents #3,5/63-7/63, box 367,

NSF, JFKL (see also FRUS 1961-63, VII:772-76).

92. FRUS 1961-63, VII:772-76 (quote, 776, n 6). "Action Taken on Agenda ltems" at 8 Jul 63 mtg ofCte of

Principals, OSD Hist.

93. Memcon Harriman wlMcNamara, 8 Ju163, FRUS 1961-63, VII:776-77.

94. McNaughton interv, 21 Nov 64, 9; biog sketch ofLord Hailsham, in fidr JFK-LBJ, Trips and Missions, Test

Ban Treaty Background (2), box 560, Harriman Papers, LC.

95. Memrcd Kaysen, 10 Jul 63, FRUS 1961-63, VII:789-90; memcon McNaughton, 1 Jul 63, fidr Disarmament Subject, Test Ban Inspections, box 370, NSF, JFKL; McNaughton interv, 21 Nov 64, 7.

96. McNaughton interv, 21 Nov 64, 9, 11; msgs Pres to Macmillart, 16 Ju163, Macmillan to Pres, 18 Jul 63

(quotes, 2, 4, 6), Pres to Macmillan, 19 Jul 63: fidr ACDA Disarmament-Nuclear Test Ban, box 264, NSF,

JFKL; memo Rostow for Pres, 23 Jul 63, wlatchd Rostow memo, 22 Jul 63, fidr Disarmament-Nuclear

Test Ban Negotiarions, 7/63 Meeting in Moscow, box 100, POF, JFKL. Marc Trachtenberg has observed in

A Constructed Peace, 390-91, rhat wirh respect to France and Germany the test ban treaty involved "a whole

web of understandings" oflarger political significance beyond the issue of arms control. On the implications

for the Sino-Soviet relationship, see memo Edward D. Rice for Harriman, 5 Jul 63, fidr JFK-LBJ, Trips

and Missions, Test Ban Treaty Background (2), box 560, Harriman Papers, LC; memo William H. Sullivan

for Harriman, 10 Jul 63, ibid; Gordon Chang, "JFK, China, ana the Bomb," Journal ofAmerican History,

Spring 88, 310. Chang suggests that contrary to Kennedy's ostensible purpose ofenhancing peace and stability, the administration sought to exploit the test ban negotiations to aggravate tensions between the Soviet

Union and China and sharpen the Sino-Soviet split.

97. McNaughton interv, 21 Nov 64, 11 (quote); Livesay notes, staff mtg, 29 Ju163, fidr SecDef Staff Meetings

Apr-Jul 1963, box 11, AFPC and SecDef Meetings files, Acc 77-0062; communique, 25 Jul 63, American

Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963,977-78; memcon Bromley Smith wlPres, 23 Ju163, FRUS 1961-

63, VII:835.

98. McNaughton interv, 21 Nov 64, 13-16 (quote, 15); Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban,

244-47.

99. Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban, 242.

100. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, 5 Aug 63,

American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, 1032-34.
Notes to Pages 351-62 601

101. Memcon Smith wlPres, 23 Ju163, cited in n 97,835; communique, 5 Aug 63, Documents on Disarmament,

1963,294-95.

102. Special msg to Senate, 8 Aug 63, Kennedy Public Papers, 1963,622-23.

103. Tel transc, Pres and Rusk, 24 Jul 63, Item 23C1, Telephone Recordings, JFKL.

104. Memcon Smith wlPres, 23 Ju163, cited in n 97,835; SCAS, Preparedness Investigating Subcte, Hearings:

Military Aspects and Implications ofNuclear Test Ban Proposals and Related Matters, 88 Cong, I sess, 26 Jun

63, 306 (Anderson test), 356 (LeMay test).

105. Ibid, 16 Aug 63,719 (LeMay), 12 Aug 63,558 (Teller); tel transc, Pres and Fulbright, 23 Aug 63, Item

26B5, Telephone Recordings, JFKL.

106. SCAS, Preparedness Investigating Subcte, Investigation ofthe Preparedness Program, Interim Rpt on Military

Implications of the Proposed Limited Nuelear Test Ban Treary, 88 Cong, I sess, 9 Sep 63, 11-12.

107. Hearings: Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, cited in n I, 21 Aug 63, 577-78.

108. Ibid, 13 Aug 63, 108-09.

109. Draft memo JCS for SecDef, nd, fldr ACDA Disarmament-Test Ban Safeguards, box 266, NSF, JFKL;

Poole, JCS and National Policy 1961-64, pt 1:399-400; tel transc, Pres and Mansfield, 12 Aug 63, Item

25CI, Telephone Recordings, JFKL.

110. Ltr Taylor to Sen Richard Russell, 23 Aug 63, wlenel criteria to ensure safeguards, copy in OSD Hist; tel

transc, Pres and Fulbright, 23 Aug 63, Item 26CI, Telephone Recordings, JFKL.

Ill. Goldwater exchange with LeMay at Stennis subcte hearing, cited in n 104, 16 Aug 63,733; Taylor, Swords

and Plowshares, 287; Taylor interv, 18 Oct 83,32.

112. Ed note, FRUS 1961-63, VII:886.

113. See Macmillan, At the End ofthe Day, 484; Sorensen, Kennedy, 740.

114. Hilsman, To Move aNation, 581; Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, andthe Test Ban, 297-30 I;Jerome B. Wiesner,

"The Glory and Tragedy of the Partial Test Ban," New York Times, II Apr 88.

115. Carl Kaysen, "The Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963," in Douglas Brinkley and Richard T. Griffiths, eds,

John F. Kennedy and Europe, 112.

116. Ivo Daalder, "The LimitedTest Ban Treaty," in Albert Carnesale and Richard N. Haass, eds, SuperpowerArms

Control: Setting the Record Straight, 35.

XIV. NATO RELATIONS: TRANSATLANTIC DIFFERENCES

1. See Richard J. Barnet and Marcus Raskin, The Decline ofNATO and the Search fOr a New Policy in

Europe; Ronald Steel, The End ofAlliance: America and the Future ofEurope, 215-16.

2. See Rowen, "Formulating Strategic Doctrine," Rpt ofCommission on Organization ofGovernment fOr the

Conduct ofForeign Policy, vol 4, App K, pt 3:225, n 7.

3. Memo McNamara for ASD(ISA), I Feb 61, fldr Reading File, Feb. 196I-Dec. 1960, box 113, McNamara

Records, RG 200.

4. Ltr Norsrad to Acheson, 20 Apr 61, Norsrad Papers, DDEL.

5. Kennedy Public Papers, 1961,254.

6. Memo Gilpauic for SvcSecs et al, 29 Apr 61, fldr 334 NATO Apr 16-19, 1961, box 17, ISA files, Ace

7. CM-301-61 Lemnitzer for SecDef, wlenel A, 3 Aug 61, fldr 320.2 Jan-Aug, 1961, box 46, ISA files, Acc

64A-2382. For similar views see memos Lemnitzer for SecDef, 28 Mar, 15 Jun 61, ibid.

8. App A, "Current Comparison ofConventional Capabilities," ibid.

9. Msg ALa 327 Norsrad to McNamara and Lemnirzer, 3 Apr 61, 4, Irr Norsrad to Acheson, 20 Apr 61:

Norsrad Papers, DDEL; memo Lemnitzer for SecDef, 28 Mar 61, cited in n 7.

10. Lrr Rowen to Acheson, 3 Mar 61, wlenel, fldr 334 NATO, box 17, ISA files, Acc 64A-2382.

11. Memo DirER(ISA) MajGen F. H. Miller for Nitze, 10 Mar 61, fldr 334 NATO Jan-Jun 1961, box 46, ibid;

memo DirPolPlngStaff(ISA) James H. Polk for Nitze, 15 Jun 61, fldr 334 NATO Jun 1-15, 1961, box 17,

ibid.

12. Memo Nitze for SecDef, 28 Feb 61, fldr 334 NATO Feb 61, box 46, ibid; Baltimore Sun, 8 Mar 61.

13. Memcon Spaak, McNamara, et al, 20 Feb 61, fldr 334 NATO Feb 61, box 46, ISA files, Ace 64A-2382.

14. Memrcd DepDitER(ISA) Eaton, 3 Feb 61, ibid.

15. JCSM-407-61 Lemnitzer for SecDef, 15 Jun 61, fldr 320.2 Jan-Aug, 1961, box 46, ibid; Itr Nomad to

Acheson, 20 Apr 61, cited in n 4.
602 Notes to Pages 362-69

16. Msg Polto 1463 Paris to State, 19 Apr 61, OSD Hist.

17. Kennedy Public Papers, 1961,254.

18. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, 209.

19. Memo Nitze for ASD(AE), 9 Jun 61, memo W. M. Shankle [for ASD(AE) Herbert B. Loper] for ASD(ISA),

13 Jun 61: Rdr 334 NATO Jun 1-15, 1961, box 17, ISA files, Acc 64A-2382.

20. Memcon Stikker, Rusk, Acheson, et al, 14 Jun 61, ibid (excerpted version in FRUS 1961-63, XIII:316-2I).

21. Memo Gilpatric for SpecAsst to Pres for NatSecAff, 15 Jun 61, Rdr 334 NATO Jun 1-15, 1961, box 17, ISA

files, Acc 64A-2382; memo McGeorge Bundy for SecDef, 1 May 61, Rdr 334 NATO May 16-31, ibid.

22. Memo Bundy for SecDef, 1 May 61, cited in n 21.

23. Memo SecDef for SpecAsst to Pres for NatSecAff, 2 Jun 61, w/atchd memo William Bundy for SecDef,

1 Jun 61, Rdr 334 NATO Jun 1-16, 1961, ibid.

24. JCSM-306-61 Burke for SecDef, 5 May 61, Rdr 330 1/1/81-15-2-1, box 45, ISA files, Acc 64A-2382.

25. Memo J. 1. Throckmorton, 1Aug 61, w/encl, "Security ofthe North AdanticArea: A Supporting Study to

'A United States Militaty Program,''' 4-5, Rdr 091.3 JuI-Dec 61, box 44, ibid. For MC 70, see Watson, Into

the Missile Age, 504-06.

26. Memo McNamara for qcs, 2Jun 61, Rdr Jun 1-15, 1961, box 17, ISA files, Acc 64A-2382; CM-275-61

Lemnitzer for SecDef, 14 JuI 61, w/encl, Rdr 334 NATO 2/81-15-2-1, box 46, ibid; Report ofthe Chairman's NATO Working Group (Rowny report), 1 Sep 61, 4, 6-7, ibid.

27. Rowny rpt, cited in n 26, Annex C to App I, "Estimated Cost of NATO Forces FY 61-66"; CM-350-61

Lemnitzer for SecDef, 5 Sep 61, 3, Rdr 334 NATO, box 46, ISA files, Acc 64A-2382.

28. Rowny rpt, 12; Poole,JCS andNational Policy 1961-64, pt IIU5.

29. ISA paper for mtg, "Recommended Allied Force Contributions," 18 Jul 61, Rdr 320.2, box 46, ISA files,

Acc 64A-2382.

30. Msg Topol 365 State to NATO Mission, 16 Sep 61, FRUS 1961-63, XIII:329-32; Poole,fCS andNational

Policy 1961-64, pt III:17-18.

31. Memo Nitze for SvcSecs et al, 19 Dec 61, w/atchd McNamara remarks, 14 Dec 61 (quote, 4), Rdr NATO

1961-65, box 99, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist.

32. Stikker quoted in Poole,fCS andNational Policy 1961-64, pt III:21; msg 1108 Brussels to State, 19 Dec 61,

memcons Rusk and Stikker, 5 Feb 62, Pres and Stikker, 6 Feb 62: FRUS 1961-63, XIII:345, 359-62.

33. Memo DepDirER(ISA) Col Edward A. Bailey, 3 Ju162, 1-2, 1-4, IIA-l, IIAF-l, II-N-l, Rdr 334 NATO,

box 54, ISA files, Acc 64A-2382; DoD Annual Report, FY 1962, 17-18.

34. Memo DepDirER(ISA) R. M. Miner for CoIL. J. Legere, OffMilRep Pres, 12 Feb 62, Rdr 320.2 Jan-May,

1962, box 46, ISA files, Acc 64A-2382.

35. Memo McNamara for Pres, 9 Nov 62, Rdr Reading File, Nov. 30-Nov. 1, 1962, box 116, McNamara Records, RG 200.

36. "Increases in NATO Country Force Capabilities, 1962-1963," ER(ISA) paper, 27 Nov 63, FY 65 SecDef

Backup Book, I-II, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist.

37. Draft memo McNamara for Pres, 24 May 63, Rdr Reading File, May 31-May 18, 1963, box 117, McNamara

Records, RG 200.

38. Memo McNamara for qcs, 8 Aug 63, Rdr Reading File, Aug. 1963, box 118, ibid.

39. Memo McNamara for SvcSecs et al, 21 Dec 63 (quote, 14), Rdr NATO 1961-65, box 99, ASD(C) files,

OSD Hist.

40. See table on net expenditures for the Bundeswehr in Catherine M. Kelleher, Germany & the Politics ofNuclear Weapom, 98; memo Nitze for McNamara, 16 Mar 63, Rdr Reading File, Mar. 1963, box 117,

McNamara Records, RG 200; memo McNamara for qcs, 19 Mar 63, ibid.

41. "French Defense Effort and Economic Capabilities," background paper D. D. Duff, ER(ISA), for NATO

Ministerial mtg, Ottawa, 22-24 May 63, Rdr NATO Ministerial Mtgs-France 1963-64, box 1, ISA files,

Acc 67A-4736.

42. Memo Nitze for SvcSecs et al, 24 May 63, w/atchmts, McNamara remarks, ibid; NATO: Facts (1976), 58;

Stromseth, Origins ofFlexible Response, 54; memcon Rusk, Couve de Mourville, Bohlen, Alphand, 8 Oct

63, Rdr France-General, box 73, NSF, JFKl.

43. "Draft Administrative History of 000, 1963-69," 23, OSD Hist; Poole, JCS andNational Policy 1961-64,

pt III: 135.

44. CM-222-64 Col Bernard Rogers, ExecSec to qcs, for DirJtStaff, 30 Oct 64, w/atchmt, memo Llewelyn

Thompson, 29 Oct 64, Rdr 092.3, box 68, RG 218.
Notes to Pages 370-76 603

45. Memrcd B. K. Yount, ER(ISA), 3 Nov 60, fldr Baudet Mission France 1960-63, ISA files, Acc 67A-4736;

msg 5102 Paris to State, 21 May 61, ibid, on Baudet's plan for a visit to Washington to follow up Novembet

1960 discussions on reciprocal purchases ofmilitary equipment. For an analysis ofFranco-American relations

within the European context, see Erin R. Mahan, Kennedy, de Gaulle, and western Europe.

46. Memo William R. Tyler for SecState, 25 Ju161, memo Bundy for SecDef, 9 Aug 61: ibid; Agreement on

Military Procurement, 20 Dec 61, TIAS 4914 (12 UST 3132).

47. "United States Pershing Missile Offer," ISA background paper for Messmer visit, 29-30 Nov 61, nd,

ER(ISA) memo on "Offer ofPershing to France," 3 May61, memo Yount, 19 May 61: fldr Baudet Mission

France 1960-63, ISA files, Acc 67A-4736.

48. Memo DepAsst(Murual Security) w: K. McNown for ASD(ISA), 8 Aug 61, note Rowen to Nitze, 7 Nov

61, w/atchmt, memo Miller for Nirze, 3 Nov 61: ibid.

49. Memo Miller for Rowen, Williams, Bundy, 13 Nov 61, ibid; Wilfred 1. Kohl, French Nuclear Diplomacy,

217.

50. Msg 01340 Eaton to USCINCEUR, 22 Jan 63, fldr SERGEANT-PERSHING-MACE (France), ISA files,

Acc 67A-4736. For texr of de Gaulle's remarks at the 14 January press conference, see American Foreign

Policy: Current Documents, 1963,378-80,441-43.

51. Memo DepSecDeffor McGeorge Bundy, 22 Apr 63, w/atchmr, Itr Pres to Sen John Pastore, ChJtCte on

Atomic Energy, 1 May 63, Itr ChMAAG(France) H. G. Sparrow ro Eaton, 19 Ju163, ltr Eaton ro Sparrow,

3 Aug 63: fldr SERGEANT-PERSHING-MACE (France), ISA files, Acc 67A-4736.

52. Kohl, French Nuclear Diplomacy, 219.

53. Ibid, 215, 217; msg 2542 Paris to Stare, 14 Nov 61, FRUS 1961-63, XIII:678, n 1.

54. Msg 2542 Paris to State, cited in n 53; msg 3090 State to Paris, 29 Nov 61, FRUS 1961-63, XIII:678-79;

ltr Gavin to Pres, 9 Mar 62, ibid, 687-88; msg 4920 State ro Paris, 14 Mar 62, ibid, 688.

55. Msg 3090 State to Paris, 29 Nov 61, ibid, 678-79; Sorensen, Kennedy, 572-73; American Foreign Policy:

Current Documents, 1963,378-80.

56. "Nuclear Submarine Cooperation with France," background paper D. D. Duff, ER(ISA), for NATO Ministerial mtg, Ottawa, 22-24 May 63, fldr NATO Ministerial Mtgs-France 1963-64, box 1, ISA files, Acc

67A-4736.

57. American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963,378-80.

58. Kelleher, Germany & the Politics ofNuclear weapons, 184-86. U.S. and British worries about Strauss's

nuclear ambitions were reflected in Itr McNamara to Strauss,S Dec 61, fldr Reading File, Dec. 1963, box

113, McNamara Records, RG 200.

59. Kelleher, Germany & the Politics ofNuclear weapons, 186-87.

60. Memrcd Goodpaster, 13 Dec 62, fldr 334 NATO Ministerial Mtgs, box 55, ISA files, Acc 67A-4736.

61. Memo Frank K. Sloan (ISA) for SvcSecs et al, 18 Dec 62, w/atchd McNamara remarks at 14 Dec 62 NATO

Ministerial mtg, ibid; memcon State, 17 Dec 62, fldr 334-350.5 Germany 1962, box 41, ISA files, Acc

65A-3501.

62. Ltr McNamara to Rusk, 25 Feb 63, fldr Reading File, Feb. 1963, box 117, McNamara Records, RG 200.

63. Memo Hitch for SecDef, 26 Feb 63, memo McNamara for SecA, 28 Feb 63: ibid. See also Chapter XVII.

64. Memo Gilparric for Pres, 22 Apr 63, fldr SERGEANT-PERSHING-MACE (France), ISA files, Acc 67A4736; DoD AnnualReport, FY 1964, 188-89.

65. Memo McGeorge Bundy for SecDef, 1 May 62, fldr Reading File, May 17-May 1, 1962, box 114,

McNamara Records, RG 200.

66. Msg 3550 Paris to State, 22 Jan 62, OSD Hist.

67. The Skybolt controversy generated a wealth of analysis and literature on both sides ofthe Atlantic, including an in-house study commissioned by President Kennedy that describes in detail the U.S. side ofthe story.

At Kennedy's request, Columbia University Professor Richard E. Neustadt wrote, "Skybolt and Nassau:

American Policy-Making and Anglo-American Relations." Completed on 15 November 1963 and given to

the president just before his death, it was not declassified until 1992 and was subsequently published in Neustadt, Report to IFf(; The Skybolt Crisis in Perspective, 19-122. Neustadt incorporated the study's findings in other works, most notably his Alliance Politics. He enjoyed virtually unlimited access to U.S. records

and interviewed high-level U.S. and British officials. However, he did not interview Macmillan, and the

Macmillan government refused him access to British records. Among monographs that deal with the British role, see David Nunnerley, President Kennedy and Britain, 127-61; Ian Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and

the Special Relationship: Britain's Deterrent and America, 1957-1962, 240-96, 338-421; John Baylis, Ambi-
604 Notes to Pages 376--81

guity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1964, 290-326; Donette Murtay, Kennedy, Macmillan

and Nuclear Weapons, 31-104; and Nigel J. Ashton, Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold mzr: The Irony of

Interdependence, 152-92.

68. Interv Gilpatric by O'Brien, 30 Jun 70, 88, JFKL.

69. Enthoven and Smith, How Much Is Enough?, 251-53.

70. For Skybolt's early history, see Watson, Into the Missile Age, 373-74, 562-64, and Ronald D. Landa, "The

Origins ofthe Skybolr Controversy in the Eisenhower Administrarion," in Roger G. Miller, ed, Seeing Off

the Bear: Anglo-American Air Power Cooperation During the Cold mzr, 117-31.

71. McNamara interv, 3 Apr 86, 25; memo USecAF Joseph Charyk for ChSraIfAF, 23 Feb 61, f1dr SecAF/Defense, box 47, Thomas White Papers, LC; memo Vance for SvcSecs et al, 30 Mar 61, wlarchmt DDR&E

White Paper, "Skybolt," 27 Mar 61, f1dr White Papers, box 108, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist.

72. Policy Directive, "NATO and the Atlantic Nations," 20 Apr 61, FRUS 1961-63, XIII:289.

73. "Preliminary Report of the DOD Committee on Strategic Weapons," 31 Oct 61, 16, f1dr GAM 87-Skybolt, box 2, DDR&E Skybolt files, Acc 68A-1575; memo Hitch for SecDef, 9 Nov 61, f1dr UK 471.94

1960-1961 Papers, box 9, SecDefSubject Decimal files, Acc 66A-3542.

74. Memo Zuckert for SecDef, 21 Oct 61, wlatchd paper, "GAM-87A System Package Program: Interim Revision 1," 2 Oct 61, f1dr UK 471.94 (27 Apr 62) 1960-1961 Papers, box 9, SecDef Subject Decimal files,

Acc 66A-3542; memo McNamara for SecAF, 1 Dec 61, f1dr GAM 87-Skybolt, box 2, DDR&E Skybolt files,

Acc 68A-1575; Neustadt, Report to jFK 29.

75. Memo Rubel for SecDef, nd, f1dr UK 471.94 (27 April 62) 1960-1961 Papers, box 9, SecDefSubject Decimal files, Acc 66A-3542. The memo was attached to a note ftom S. E. Clements (ISA) to McNamara's

military assistant, Brig. Gen. George S. Brown, dated 21 March 1961. The note was stamped, "SECDEF

HAS SEEN."

76. Memcons Watkinson wiMcNamara, Watkinson wlGilpatric, both 21 Mar 61, f1dr UK 400.112 Complementarity, box 9, SecDef Subject Decimal files, Acc 66A-3542; memcon Watkinson and McNamara, 11

Dec 61 (afternoon), f1dr Official Chron File 1961-62, box CL 1, Paul Nitze Papers, LC; Henry Brandon,

"Skybolt: The Full Inside Story of How a Missile Nearly Split the West," Sunday Times Weekly Review,

8 Dec 63, 29-30.

77. Paper, "White House Brief: Anglo-U.S. Discussions," 6 Feb 61, f1dr UK Skybolt Polaris 11 Dec. 59-29 Jan.

61, box 1, ISA United Kingdom files, Acc 67A-4738; memo Wiesner for Pres, 25 Apr 62, f1dr NATO,

Weapons, Skybolt 3163-Folder 1 of2, box 227, NSF, JFKL.

78. Memo Gilpatric for Zucken, 21 May 62, f1dr RLG Reading File-1I2162 thru 6130162, box 2, Gilpatric

files, Acc 66A-3529; memo McNamara for SecAF, 25 May 62, f1dr GAM 87-Skybolt, box 2, DDR&E

Skybolt files, Acc 68A-1575; BoB draft paper, "1964 Budger Preview: Department of Defense-Military

Functions," 13 Ju162, f1dr FY 1964 Budget Bureau Proposals July-Sept 1962, box 20, McNamara Records,

RG 200; memo Brown for SecDef, 21 Aug 62, wlatchmts, f1dr Skybolt-Studies and AF Press Release ofTest

8121162, box 23, ibid; Neustadt, Report to jFK 30-31; interv with Harold Brown by Steven Rivkin, 9 Jul

64,13-14,JFKL.

79. Draft memo, "Format A," nd, and ER(lSA) paper, "U.K. Participation in Skybolt Program," 15 Aug 62,

both atchd to memo Brown for SecDef, 21 Aug 62, cited in n 78.

80. Paper, "Record of Conversations Regarding Skybolt: Selected Excerpts," nd, f1dr Skybolt (1 of 3), box 21,

McNamara Records, RG 200; interv Peter Thorneycroft by David Nunnerley, 18 Jun 69, 12-13 (quote,

13), f1dr Transcripts-Redmayne-Thorneycroft, box 1, David Nunnerley Papers, JFKL. The paper suggests

that the McNamara-Thorneycroft conversation regarding Skybolt took place on 12 September at SAC headquarters, Omaha, Nebraska.

81. Memo Bell for Bundy, 26 Oct 62, f1dr NATO, Weapons, Skybolt 3163 (1), box 227, NSF, JFKL.

82. Memo, State Dept, "Implications for the United Kingdom of Decision to Abandon Skybolt," 31 Oct 62,

FRUS 1961-63, XIII: 1083-85; memo Nitze for SecDef, 3 Nov 62, wlatchmts, f1dr UK 471.94 (27 Apr 62)

November 1962, box 9, SecDefSubject Decimal files, Acc 66A-3542.

83. Marginal handwritten notes on memo Nitze for SecDef, 3 Nov 62, cited in n 82.

84. Neustadt, Report to jFK 35-37; McNamara notes of conversations relating to Skybolt, 9 Nov 62, f1dr

NATO, Weapons, Skybolt 3163 (1), box 227, NSF, JFKL; Neustadt memcons wlMcNamara, 30 May 63,

3, and 29 Jun 63, 3, f1dr Memcons-U.S., box 21, Richard Neustadt Papers, JFKL. An excerpt of rhe

McNamara notes is in FRUS 1961-63, XIII: 1085-86.

85. McNamara notes, 9 Nov 62, cited in n 84.
Notes to Pages 381-87 605

86. Draft memo McNamara for Pres, 21 Nov 63, FRUS 1961-63, VIII:398-414; memrcd Gilpatric, 23 Nov 62,

ibid, 415; Neustadt, Report to JFK, 41; Itr Rusk to McNamara, 24 Nov 62, FRUS 1961-63, XIII:I086-87.

87. Handwritren note Weymouth for Eaton and Barringer, 26 Nov 62, fldr UK Skybolt-21 Mar 61-30 Nov

62, box 1, ISA United Kingdom files, Acc 67A-4738; Neustadt, Report to JFK, 65 (quote); msg DEF

922514 to London, personal for Bruce from McNamara, 6 Dec 62, fldr UK Skybolt-Dec 3-Dec 31, 1962,

box 1, ISA United Kingdom files, Ace 67A-4738.

88. Aviation week, 26 Nov 62; Daily Express (London), 28 Nov 62; St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 6 Dec 62; comments Covington on GAM-87 GL-l Missile #20032 (fifth launch), 30 Nov 62, fldr GAM 87-Skybolt, box

2, DDR&E Skybolt files, Ace 68A-1575.

89. Telcon Ball and McNamara, 10 Dec 62, 7:25 pm, fldr Britain 12/3/62-11/8/63, box 1, George Ball Papers,

JFKL; Ball, Past Has Another Pattern, 264 (quote); memcon Neustadt w/Ball, 24 May 63, 1 (quote), fldr

Memcons-U.S., box 21, Neustadt Papers, JFKL. Ball's published account differs in some respects with the

record of the telephone conversation. Moreover, McNamara's references to Skybolt went beyond the test

flights. He also spoke ofthe press speculation about Skybolt's future and mentioned that the U.S. government was "taking a very hard look at all of our programs" in preparing the next fiscal year's Defense budget,

which included Skybolt, "one of our bigger programs." Skybolt was "very expensive," he said, "and, technically, extremely complex." Moreover, "costs have climbed sharply." McNamara indicated that he and Thorneycroft later in the day would "review the current status ofthe Skybolt program and its prospects for the

future. As I have said previously, no decision has been reached by our government on the program for

fiscal year 1964" (McNamara Public Statements, 1962, IV: 1966). According to still anorher source, the State

Department the night before had urged McNamara ro delete from the statement all references to Skybolt,

not just comments abour the flight tests, and to delay any public comment about Skybolt until after the

meeting with Thorneycroft; see memo Lennartson for Gilpatric, 12 Dec 62, fldr Skybolt, box 5, Legislative

Affairs files, Acc 67A-4632.

90. Lord Harlech [David Ormsby Gore], "Suez SNAFU, Skybolt SABU," Foreign Policy, Spring 71, 49.

91. Memcon Neustadt w/McNamara, 30 May 63, 4, fldr Memcons-U.S., box 21, Neustadt Papers, JFKL;

Neustadt, Report to IFK, 67-69; Bundy memcon, 10 Dec 62, FRUS 1961-63, vols. XlII, XlV; XV Microfiche Supplement, Doc 27.

92. Aide-memoire, 11 Dec 62, fldr UK 471.96 (27 Apr 62) December 1962, box 9, SecDef Subject Decimal

files, Ace 66A-3542; Rubel notes of McNamara-Thorneycroft mtg, 11 Dec 62, fldr 12/62 Skybolt-Nassau

(1), box 19, Neustadt Papers, JFKL; Rubel paper, "Skybolt Notes," Jun 91, 11, fldr Skybolt, box 869, Subject files, OSD Hist (emphasis in original).

93. Memcon Neustadt w/McNamara, 30 May 63, cited in n 91; Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special

Relationship, 352-57.

94. See, for example, Neustadt, Report to IFK, 48-55; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 859-60. When the

British, according to their 30-year rule, opened the records regarding Skybolt to the public in the early

1990s, Neustadt discovered that his earlier conclusions about British passiviry had been mistaken (Neustadt, Report to IFK, 124-27).

95. Macmillan, At the End ofthe Day, 358; memo of understanding between Pres and Prime Min, 21 Dec 62,

fldr GAM 87-Skybolt 1963-64, box 2, DDR&E Skybolt files, Ace 68A-1575; Baltimore Sun, 1 Jan 63; see

also msg 4 Delegation to Heads of Government Mtg in Nassau to EmbParis, wftext of ltr to de Gaulle,

20 Dec 62, FRUS 1961-1963, XlII:I112-14; jt statement, Kennedy and Macmillan, 21 Dec 62, American

Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962,635-37; Alistair Horne, Harold Macmillan, II:439.

96. Interv David Ormsby Gore by Neustadt, 5 May 64, 19,JFKL; Gilpatric interv, 30 Jun 70, 89; Itr McNamara

to LeMay, 5 Jan 63, fldr Reading File, Jan. 17-Jan. 1, 1963, box 116, McNamara Recotds, RG 200.

97. Memcon Neustadt w/Pres, 27 Apr 63, 1, memcon Neustadt w/McNamara, 29 Jun 63, 1: fldr MemconsU.S., box 21, Neustadt Papers, JFKL.

98. Lord Harlech, "Suez SNAFU, Skybolt SABU," 48.

99. Memcon Neustadt w/Pres, 27 Apr 63, 1, cited in n 97.

xv. MLF: A NOTION TOO FAR

1. For the genesis of the MLF during the Eisenhower years see Watson, Into the Missile Age, 550-61; draft

ms, Ronald D. Landa, "Preparing for the Long Haul: The Office of the Sectetary of Defense and the Defense of Europe, 1953-1961," ch Xl ("Birth of the Multilateral Force (MLF)"), OSD Hist; Pascaline Wi-
606 Notes to Pages 387-95

nand, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the United States ofEurope, 214-15. On the limited deployment of the

Thor and Jupiter, see Watson, Into the Missile Age, 539-43. The terms "IRBMs" and "MRBMs" were used

interchangeably in the late fifties. Watson notes that at Norsrad's suggestion OSD adopted the MRBM

nomenclature in January 1960, perhaps ro distinguish the new delivery vehicles from the much criticized

earlier ones.

2. Landa, "MLF," 15-17; Schwartz, NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas, 78.

3. Watson, Into the Missile Age, 554-60, and Landa, "MLF," 18-38, treat these deliberations, involving

Eisenhower, the JCS, the AEC, and the civilian leadership at State and Defense, at length.

4. Msg Polto A-234 USRO ro State, 17 Dec 60, wlencl text of Herrer statement, FRUS 1958-60, VII, pt

1:674-82.

5. Memcon SecDef, Lemnitzer et ai, 21 Apr 61, Itr Norsrad ro Gilpatric, 2 May 61: Norsrad Papers, DDEL;

memrcd Earon, 20 Apr 61, IIdr 2/81 15-2-1, Jan-Jun 61, box 46, ISA files, Acc 64A-2382; John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory ofDecision: New Dimensions ofPolitical Analysis, 228.

6. Memcon Spaak, McNamara, Gilpatric, USAmbNATO W. Randolph Burgess, Nitze et ai, 20 Feb 61, IIdr

334 NATO-Feb 1961, ISA files, Acc 64A-2382.

7. Landa, "MLF," 44; Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the United States ofEurope, 224-25; memcon Richard

Neustadt wlWeiss, 29 May 63, IIdr Memcons-U.S., box 21, Neustadt Papers, JFKL.

8. Memcon 20 Feb 61, cited in n 6; memrcd Earon, 20 Apr 61, memcon SecDef, Lemnitzer et ai, 21 Apr 61:

both cited in n 5; Landa, "MLF," 42-43; Pagedas, A Troubled Partnership, 85.

9. Kennedy Public Papers, 1961,67,72 (quote), 385.

10. Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the United States ofEurope, 229.

II. Memo Eaton for Nitze, 30 May 61, IIdr 092 Germany, box 33, ISA files, Acc 64A-2382.

12. On the delicate political considerations involving the European governments, see msg 2054 Paris to State,

16 Oct 61, FRUS 1961-63, XIII:333; Itr Rusk ro McNamara, 29 Oct 61, ibid, 333-35; Winand, Eisenhower,

Kennedy, and the United States ofEurope, 226-29.

13. Rcd ofmtg Pres and Stikker, 16 Jun 61, FRUS 1961-63, XIIU22.

14. Policy Directive, 20 Apr 61, ibid, 285-91; memo Acheson for SecDef, 19 Jul 61, 4 (quote), box 216,

Nomad Papers, DDEL.

15. Ltr Walter Sroessel, PolAd SACEUR, to Russell Fessenden, DirER, State, 17 Nov 61, ltr Norsrad ro Pres,

20 Dec 61, w/encl list of SHAPE's questions, 20 Dec 61: Norsrad Papers, DDEL.

16. Kennedy's circumspection regarding the MLF is discussed throughout the chapter. A collection of participants' characterizations ofthe president's attitude toward the MLF is in Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and

the United States ofEurope, 223-24.

17. Msg JCS 997069 ro CINCAL, other commands, 6 Jun 61, OSD Hisr.

18. Memrcd Earon, mtg Nitze and Stikker (15 Jun 61),27 Jun 61, OSD Hisr.

19. Ltr McNamara ro Rusk, 5 Dec 61, IIdr Reading File, Dec. 1961, box 54, McNamara Records, RG 200;

msg Polro A-270 USRO ro State, 16 Dec 61, OSD Hisr. It was this list of questions that prompted the

SHAPE submittal that Norsrad sent on to the White House. See note 15.

20. Memcon McNamara and Watkinson, Paris (15 Dec61), 5Jan 62, IIdr 12/61 NATO Mtg, box 4, McNamara

files, 71A-3470; Alastair Buchan, "The Multilateral Force: An Hisrorical Perspective," Adelphi Papers, No

13 (Oct 64), 5-6.

21. Memo Kaysen for Bundy, 22 Feb 62, IIdr Multilateral Force, General, Vol I, 1/61-12/62, box 216, NSF,

JFKL.

22. Memo ASecState Foy Kohler for Nitze, 31 Jan 62, wlencl, IIdr 333, Jan 62, box 54, ISA files, Acc 64A2382.

23. "Pentagon Presses MRBM Development," Aviation Daily, 26 Feb 62.

24. Msg Norsrad ro C)CS, 20 Feb 62, OSD Hist; msgTopol1579 State ro Missions to NATO and Eur Reg

Orgs, 16 Apr 62, FRUS 1961-63, XIII:380-83; Nomad's angry comment in msg to Lemnitzer, 18 Apr 62,

MRBM (Channels) file, personal NATO (NAC), Norsrad Papers, DDEL. Steinbruner, Cybernetic Theory,

226, and Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the United States ofEurope, 232, identifY Henry Owen as the

primary author ofthe 16 April paper.

25. Minutes ofmtg Kennedy, McNamara, Rusk, Bundy, 16 Apt 62, FRUS 1961-63, XIII:377-80 (quote, 379);

NSAM 147, 18 Apr 62, NATO Nuclear Program, ibid, 384-87; memrcd Taylor, 19 Apr 62, IIdr SPCOL159-88, Taylor Papers, NDUL (quote).
Notes to Pages 396-405 607

26. Memrcd Taylor, 19 Apr 62, cited in n 25.

27. Memo McNamara for qcs, 3 Apr 62, fidr Reading File, Apr. 18-Apr. I, 1962, box 114, McNamara

Records, RG 200.

28. Remarks by McNamara at NATO Ministerial mtg, 5 May 62 (quote, 24), Policy Planning Staff files, Lot

690-121, RG 59.

29. Memo McNamara for qcs, 16 May 62, fidr Reading File, May 17-May 1, 1962, box 114, McNamara

Records, RG 200; memo Legere for Taylor, I Jun 62, fldr Multilateral Force, General, Vol I, 1/61-12/62,

box 216, NSF, JFKL; memo Taylor for Pres, 13 Jun 62, fidr SPCOL-S-34-89, Taylor Papers, NDUL.

30. Msg Norstad to qcs, 18 May 62, memo BrigGen Robert Richardson for Norstad, 20 Jun 62, w/encl:

Norstad Papers, DDEL.

31. Memo Taylor for Pres, 13 Jun 62, cited in n 29; instructions for Finletter, nd, FRUS 1961-63, Xl1l: 408-

11; msg Secto 12, US del at NAC Ministerial mtg (Paris) to Srate, 20 Jun 62, ibid, 411-13; memcon Rusk

and Adenauer, 22Jun 62, ibid, 419-22 (quote, 421).

32. Msg Polto 1711 USRO to Stare, 22 Jun 62, OSD Hist; memcon Kissinger with Stikker (26 Jun 62), 13 Jul

62, fldr T-094-69, box 37, Taylor Papers, NDUL; "Initial Reactions to 15 June 1962 MRBM Paper presented by Amb Finletter," Stoessel comments, memo for file, 19 Jun 62, ibid.

33. Memcon Neustadt w/Pres, 27 Apr 63, fidr Memcons-U.S., box 21, Neustadt Papers, JFKL.

34. Memo Richardson for Norstad, 20 Jun 62, cited in n 30.

35. Memcon Neustadt w/Rowen, 1 Ju163, fidr Memcons-U.S., box 21, Neustadt Papers, JFKL.

36. Kennedy Public Papers, 1962,538; Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the United States ofEumpe, 235-36.

37. Memcon Neustadt w/Weiss, 29 May 63, fldr Memcons-U.S., box 21, Neustadt Papers, JFKL; msg Topol

344 State to Paris, 15 Sep 62, OSD Hist; Steinbruner, Cybernetic Theory, 228-33; 000 study, "NATO

Multilateral Sea-Based MRBM Force," nd [c 15 Sep 62], fidr SPCOL-S-074-88, box 37, Taylor Papers,

NDUL; OSD comments on "NATO Multilateral Sea-Based MRBM Force," nd, ibid.

38. Memo Legere for Taylor, 6 Ju162, fldr T094-69, box 37, ibid.

39. Memo Richardson for Norstad, 6 Sep 62, MRBM file, Norstad Papers, DDEL; memo Legere for Bundy,

19 Nov 62, fldr Multilateral Force, General, Vol 1, 1/61-12/62, box 216, NSF, JFKL; memo Rusk and

McNamara for Pres, undated [16 JuI62], FRUS 1961-63, Xl1l:430-34.

40. Msg LNI 4388 Norstad to SecDef, 2 Nov 62, Norstad Papers, DDEL.

41. Steinbruner, Cybernetic Theory, 233-34; ed nore, FRUS 1961-63, XIII:446-47; memrcd ER(ISA) James

c. Cross, 20 Nov 62, fldr 337, Jan 62 NATO Min Mtgs, box 55, ISA files, Acc 64A-2382; Lemnitzer notes

on DoD-State mtg, 30 Nov 62, fidr L-216-71, box 29, Lemnitzer Papers, NDUL.

42. Memrcd Cross, 20 Nov 62, cired in n 41.

43. The MLF does not appear in rhe NATO Council's communique of I5 December 1962 (NATO Final Communiques, 1949-1974, 147-49); news reports on rhe "veto" subject in Baltimore Sun and Washington Star,

14 Dec 62; on McNamara's conviction that the Europeans would balk at the "preconditions," see Steinbruner, Cybernetic Theory, 234.

44. Srarement by Kennedy and Macmillan, 21 Dec 62, American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, 636.

45. On de Gaulle's summary rejection ofthe U.S. offer, see his 14 January 1963 press conference, excerpted in

American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, 378-80; see also Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the

United States ofEurope, 320-24.

46. Neustadt, Report to ]FK, 98. See, too, Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the United States ofEurope, 319-20;

Murray, Kennedy, Macmillan andNuclear Weapons, 101-04; Buchan, "The Multilateral Force: An Historical

Perspective," 7. Buchan noted that rhe final communique reflecred "two soliloquies rarher rhan an undersranding."

47. Memo, ns, "The Multilateral Force," 27 Dec 62, fldr Multilateral Force, General, Vol II, Merchant, box

217, NSF, JFKL; memo Kitchen for Rusk, 4 Jan 63, FRUS 1961-63, XIII:1123-2S; NSAM 215 to SecSrare

and SecDef, 12 Jan 63, cired in Poole, ]CS and National Policy 1961-1964, pr m:94; memo McNamara

for qcs, 12 Jan 63, fldr Reading File, Jan. 17-Jan. 1, 1963, box 116, McNamara Records, RG 200; memo

McNamara for SecAF, 12 Jan 63, ibid; TV and radio interv, 17 Dec 62, Kennedy Public Papers, 1962,903;

McNaughton interv, 14 Nov 64, 6.

48. Paper, "Outline ofNATO Multilateral Srrategic Retaliatory Force," 19 Jan 63, fidr Reading File, Jan. 31-Jan.

IS, 1963, box 116, McNamara Records, RG 200; Poole,]CS and National Policy 1961-1964, pt III:94-95.

49. Msg 1436 State to Bonn, 21 Dec 62, FRUS 1961-63, Xl1l:467-6S; msg 1569 State to Bonn, 10 Jan 63,

ibid, 468-71; msg Polto cir 27 Paris to State, II Jan 63, ibid, 471-74.
608 Notes to Pages 405-12

50. Memo McNamara for SecN et ai, 29 Jan 63, IIdr Reading File Jan. 31-Jan. 18, 1963, box 116, McNamara

Records, RG 200; memo Pres for members ofMLF Negotiating Del, 21 Feb 63, FRUS 1961-63, XIII:509-

11 (quote, 509); memo for MLF Negoriating Team, 15 Feb 63, IIdr Multilateral Force, General, Vol II,

Merchant, box 217, NSF, JFKL. The laner appears to have come out of the Whire House, and contains

Kennedy's marginal notes; it was signed, however, by Merchant.

51. Memcon mtgw/Pres, 18 Feb 63, FRUS 1961-63, XIII:502-06 (quote, 502); McNaughton interv, 14 Nov

64, 7; draft memcon Neusradr w/McNamara, 29 Jun 63, 12-13, IIdr Memcons-U.S., box 21, Neustadt

Papers, JFKL.

52. Memo Bundy for Pres, 15 Jun 63, FRUS 1961-63, XIII:592-95 (quotes, 594); memcons Neustadt w/Rusk,

27 Aug 63, McNamara, 29 Jun 63, Nitze (draft), 11, 19 Jun 63, fldr Memcons-U.S., box 21, Neustadt

Papers, JFKL.

53. Memcons Neustadt w/Ball, 2 Jul 63, McNamara (draft), 29 Jun 63, 12-13, fldr Memcons-U.S., box 21,

Neustadt Papers, JFKL; Steinbruner, Cybernetic Theory, 250-51, 319.

54. McNaughton interv, 14 Nov 64, 5-8; sum rcd 41st NSC ExCom mtg, 12 Feb 63, FRUS 1961-63, XIII:494-

502; draft White Paper, 15 Feb 63, fldr Multilateral Force, General, Vol III, Merchant, box 217, NSF,

JFKL; memo Bundy for SecState and SecDef, 11 Mar 63, FRUS 1961-63, XIII:524.

55. Memo Pres for Taylor and Anderson, 21 Feb 63, fldr Multilateral Force, General, Vol II, Merchant, box

216, NSF, JFKL; memo Lemnitzer for Gilpatric, 14 Feb 63, fldr SPCOL-TS-004-89, box 143, Lemnitzer

Papers, NDUL; memo SpecAsst(C]CS) A. J. Goodpaster for Nirze, 20 Apr 63, w/atchmr, fldr SPCOL-TS005-89, box 40, ibid; memo Lemnitzer for Taylor, 12 Jun 63, fldr 31 1963, Vol 1, box 174, ibid.

56. Memo Kohler for Bruce, 8 Feb 63, fldr JFK-LBJ Trips and Missions-Test Ban Treaty Background, box

560, Harriman Papers, LC; memrcd Bundy, mtg in Cabinet Room, 21 Feb 63, FRUS 1961-63, XIII:507-08;

McNaughton interv, 14 Nov 64,7 (also see FRUS 1961-63, XIII:561-64); sum rcd 41st NSC ExCom mtg,

12 Feb 63, cited in n 54, 497. On the "unanimity" principle, which represented a significant change in the

U.S. position, see memo Pres for members ofMLF Negotiating Del, 21 Feb 63, cited in n 50,510.

57. Memo Merchant for Rusk, 20 Mar 63, FRUS 1961-63, XIII:529-37; msg 4851 State to London, 14 Mar

63, ibid, 527-28; USIA briefing item, 7 Mar 63, "Initial West European Assessment of US Multilateral

Force Proposals," fldr Multilateral Force, General, box 218, NSF, JFKL.

58. Memo Merchant for Rusk, 20 Mar 63, cited in n 57, 532-33; Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence, 328-30;

msg 485 I State to London, 14 Mar 63, cited in n 57, 528. Murray, Kennedy, Macmillan and Nuclear

Weapons, devotes ch 7 to the subject of British antipathy toward the MLF (Thorneycroft "nonsense" quote

on p. 124).

59. Memo Metchant for Rusk, 20 Mar 63, cited in n 57, 536-37; memo mtg at White House. 22 Mar 63,

FRUS 1961-63, XIlI:537-42; msg 236 State to Bonn, 29 Mar 63, w/enclln Kennedy to Adenauer, 29

Mar 63, ibid, 542-46 (a similar lener was drafted for Fanfani); memo McNamara for Rickem, 9 Apr 63,

fldr Reading File, Apr. 17-Apr. 5, 1963, box 55, McNamara Records, RG 200; McNaughton interv, 14

Nov 64,6-8; msg 2673 State to Bonn, 2 May 63, w/enclltr Adenauer to Kennedy, 30 Apr 63, FRUS 1961-

63, XIII:565-66. Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the United States ofEurope, 345, discusses an interesting

sidelight to Tyler's calIon Fanfani.

60. Ltr Adenauer to Kennedy, 30 Apr 63, cited in n 59, 566; McNaughton interv, 14 Nov 64, 7; communique

NAC mtg, 22-24 May 63, American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963,408-09.

61. Memo McNamara for C]CS, 28 Jun 63, w/atchmt In McNamara to DefMin Giulio Andreoni, 24 Jun

63, IIdr Reading File, June 20-June 29, 1963, box 118, McNamara Records, RG 200; memo Bundy for

Pres, 15 Jun 63, cited in n 52, 592-95; McNaughton interv, 14 Nov 64,7; memcon Neustadt w/Taylor and

Maj William Smith, 3 Ju163, fldr Memcons-U.S., box 21, Neustadt Papers, JFKL. For an extensive examination ofthe MLF see McGeorge Bundy, "The Multilateral Force: Where it came from, what it is, and what

it is not," 24 Jun 63, McGeorge Bundy file, NSF, LBJL.

62. Kennedy Public Papers, 1963,518; Iff McNamara to Merchant, 28 Jun 63, fldr Reading File, June 20-June

29, 1963, box 118, McNamara Records, RG 200; Steinbruner, Cybernetic Theory, 283 (Bowie similarly

compared their plight to Sisyphus's in his interview with Neustadt; see memcon, 1 Jul 63, fldr memcons--

U.S., box 21, Neustadt Papers, JFKL).

63. NSAM 253,13 Ju163, FRUS 1961-63, XIII:604; msgTopol292 State to USRO, 11 Sep 63, ibid, 608-10;

memo McNamara for Pres, 26 Aug 63, IIdr Reading File, Aug. 1963, box 118, McNamara Records, RG

200; Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the United States ofEurope, 350; memcon White House mtg on

MLF, 4 Oct 63, FRUS 1961-63, Xlll:613-14.
Notes to Pages 412-18 609

64. Murray, Kennedy, Macmillan and Nuclear Weapons, 141-43 (quote, 143). Neustadt described Kennedy as

not so much equivocal as "erratic" in his handling of the MLF.

65. Memrcd Rostow, 18 Dec 63, box 173, SIMF files, Lot 66D-182, RG 59: paper, Dept State, 6 Dec 63,

FRUS 1961-63, XII1:635-39 (quote, 639).

66. Philip Geyelin, LyndJJn B. Johnson and the World, 7, 15.

67. Memo McNamara for SecN, 31 Jan 64, Hdr Reading File, Jan. 31-Jan. 18, 1964, box 119, McNamara

Records, RG 200: Johnson Public Papers, 1963-64, 1:496: memo of disc, 10 Apr 64, FRUS 1964-68,

XlII:35-37 (quotes, 35). See, too, memo David Klein for Bundy, 7 Apr 64, Hdr NATO, General-Vol

1, box 35, Agency File, NSF, LBJL. On the misreading, or embellishment, ofJohnson's posirion, see Geyelin,johnson and the World, 160.

68. Ltr SecDef and ChAEC to Pres, 18 May 64, American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964,471-73 (an

unsigned letter dated 15 May was found at the Johnson Library): memo McNamara for qcs, 15 Jul 64,

Hdr Reading File, July 1964, box 120, McNamara Records, RG 200: Itr McNamara to Mahon, 28 Aug 64,

ibid.

69. "Status Report on the Multilateral Force," 19 Aug 64, Hdr 1-11, Office ofMLF Affairs, ISA files, Acc 64A2382: memo Bundy for Pres, 15 Jun 63, cited in n 52, 593: London Times, 7 Jul 64 (cited in Boulton,

"NATO and the MLF," 275); msg Bundy to de Zulueta, w/encl msg Kennedy to Macmillan, 10 May 63,

FRUS 1961-63, XlII:573.

70. Jt communique issued by Johnson and Erhard, 12 Jun 64, American Foreign Policy: Current Documents,

1964,537 (see also communique issued by McNamara and German Defense Minister von Hassel, 14 Nov

64, excerpts, ibid, 552-53): ltr McNamara to von Hassel, 29 Jun 64, Hdr Reading File, July 1964, box 120,

McNamata Records, RG 200: memo NSO for Gen Lemnitzer, 9 Ju164, Hdr SPCOL S-351-89, Taylor Papers, NDUL; note Col K. B. Langdon, U.K.N.M.R., to SACEUR re MLF, 7 Jul 64, w/encl paper, "Presentation of British Technical Study: Inttoductory Statement by Shuckburgh," 2 Jul 64, Hdr SPCOL-S349a-89, ibid. For accounts ofthe genesis and evolution of the ANF, see Andrew J. Pierre, Nuclear Politics:

The British Experience with an Independent Strategic Force, 1939-1970,276-78: Boulton, "NATO and the

MLF," 286-92: Steinbruner, Cybernetic Theory, 289, 294-97.

71. Steinbruner, Cybernetic Theory, 286: Seaborg, Stemming the Tide, 124-25: memo Bundy for Pres, 8 Nov 64,

FRUS 1964-68, XII1:103-07 (quotes, 105).

72. Memo Bundy for Pres, 8 Nov 64, cited in n 71, 104-06: memo Klein for Bundy, 10 Oct 64 (quote, 4), Hdr

Multilateral Force, General-Vol 2, box 23, Subject File, NSF, LBJL.

73. Steinbruner, Cybernetic Theory, 292-93. Steinbruner here depicts Bundy as ftiendlier toward the MLF and

its partisans than the record indicates, pethaps equating indulgence (as McNamara, too, showed at times)

with support.

74. The British ambassador to NATO insisted the proposal was ptesented "in a constructive spirit," offering

cost benefits and other advantages compared with a force of seaborne Polaris missiles. See Shuckburgh

introductory statement to British technical study, cited in n 70.

75. Msg Bundy for Bruce and Neustadt, 29 Nov 64, Hdr Multilateral Force, General-Vol 2, box 23, Subject

File, NSF, LBJL: ed note, FRUS 1964-68, XlII:120; memo Bundy for Ball, 25 Nov 64, ibid, 121.

76. Memo Neustadt for Ptes, 5 Dec 64, Hdr December 1-10, 1964, box 5, McGeorge Bundy files, NSF, LBJL:

memo (ns) for Pres, 4 Dec 64, ibid: memo Bundy for Pres, 6 Dec 64, ibid: memo Bundy for Pres, 6 Dec

64, FRUS 1964-68, XIII: 134-37 (quote, 137).

77. Geyelin, johnson and the World, 160, 168-69: Steinbruner, Cybernetic Theory, 304-07.

78. Jt US-UK Communique, Washington, 8 Dec 64, American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964,615-

16; NSAM 322,17 Dec 64, FRUS 1964-68, XlII:165-67; communique NAC mtg, 15-17 Dec 64, NATO

Final Communiques, 1949-1974, 158-GO. See also FRUS 1964-68, XII1:168-69. The president's instructions to embassies to avoid discussions of NATO and the MLF were carried our lirerally in Brussels that

December, as the ambassador canceled a widely publicized presentation on the origins of NATO that Fulbright lecturer at the University of Louvain Lawrence Kaplan was scheduled to give to members of the

diplomatic community at the American Cultural Center in Brussels.

79. James Reston, "President Urges Full U.S. Effort to ReunifY NATO," New York Times, 21 Dec 64; interv

Harlan Cleveland by Paige Mulhollan, 13 Aug 69,37-38, LBJL; Johnson Public Papers, 1965,1:58; Steinbruner, Cybernetic Theory, 309-10. Steinbruner suggests that the president's actions in the aftermath of the

Wilson visit were nOt intended to kill the project outright but to thwart a conceivable belated Anglo-Ger-
610 Notes to Pages 419-25

man accord, which would have lefr France as rhe odd man out and put Johnson in an untenable posirion

given his and Kennedy's pasr support for the venture.

80. Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy, andthe United States ofEurope, 356 (the date and year ofthe Johnson-Reston

contact are incorrectly cited); memo McNamara for Bundy, 12 Mar 65, f1dr Reading File, Mar. 1965, box

122, McNamara Records, RG 200; memo McNamara for Ball, 7 Apr 65, ibid; Boulton, "NATO and the

MLF," 293-94.

81. Paper (ns but probably Bundy), "The Case for a Fresh Start on Atlantic Nuclear Defense," 18 Oct 65, f1dr

Vol 16, box 5, McGeorge Bundy file, NSF, LBJL; memo Leddy for Rusk, 8 Nov 65, FRUS 1964-68,

XIII:261-62; memo Bundy for Pres, 25 Nov 65, f1dr Vol 17, box 5, McGeorge Bundy file, NSF, LBJL;

memcon Pres, Erhard, 20 Dec 65, FRUS 1964-68, XIII:289-92; jt statement, 21 Dec 65, Johnson Public

Papers, 1965, II:1165-67.

82. Buchan, "The Multilateral Force: An Historical Perspective," 13.

83. Steinbruner, Cybernetic Theory, 172, 153; Buchan, "The Multilateral Force: An Historical Perspective," 13.

84. Steinbruner's application of cybernetics and behavioral psychology to decisionmaking seems overdrawn in

the use ofsyndromes and paradigms to account for McNamara's and others' motives and actions; nonetheless, his analysis is indispensable to comprehending McNamara's seeming inconsistency (see Cybernetic

Theory, 316-19). McNamara adviser William Kaufmann offered another angle: "He used to make fun ofit

in front of Rusk at the pte-NATO meetings He sort of went along with it finally, when he thought

Kennedy was somehow or other committed to it The minute that it became clear that Erhard and LBJ

didn't really give a damn about MLF, he pounced on that thing" (Kaufmann interv, 14 Jul 86, 35).

85. McNamara interv, 22 May 86, 21-22.

86. Bundy, Danger and Survival, 496.

XVI. THE EMBATTLED MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

I. For an account offoreign aid in the Eisenhower administration, see Warson, Into the Missile Age, 657-82.

2. "Selected Problems of Military Assistance," nd [likely Nov-Dec 601, f1dr Transition Memoranda, Topical

Memoranda (2), box 17, Neustadt Papers, JFKL; "Report Prepared by the Policy Planning Council," nd

[drafred 19 Jan 61], FRUS 1961-63, IX:189-90.

3. Diane B. Kunz, Butter and Guns: America's Cold war Economic Diplomacy, 117; NSAM 22, 20 Feb 61,

FRUS 1961-63, IX:199.

4. Memcon, 25 Feb 61, FRUS 1961-63, IX:201-03.

5. Memrcd L. E. Harrison, 26 Feb 61, f1dr 091.3--Jan-Jun 1961, box 44, ISA files, Acc 64A-2382; memcon,

25 Feb 61, cited in n 4.

6. Memo SecDeffor SecState, 7 Mar 61, f1dr RLG Reading File 30 Dec 60, box 2, Gilpatric files, Acc 66A3529; ed note, FRUS 1961-63, IX:220; Kennedy Public Papers, 1961,210-11,207-08.

7. Ltr Rusk to McNamara, 15 Mar 61, FRUS 1961-63, IX:211; ed nore, ibid, 240-41.

8. Poole,JCS and National Policy 1961-64, pt III:153.

9. Rpt prepared by Charles Burton Marshall, 17 May61, FRUS 1961-63, IX:242; memo ActgSecState (Bowles)

and SecDeffor Pres, 18 May 61, f1dr 62 MAP Misc, box 4, McNamara files, Acc 7JA-3470.

10. Memo ActgSecState and SecDeffor Pres, 18 May 61, cited in n 9; memo Rusk for Pres, 10 Mar 61, FRUS

1961-63, IX:210; Special Message to Congress on Urgent National Needs, 25 May 62, Kennedy Public

Papers, 1961, 400; Poole, JCS andNational Policy 1961-64, pt III: 154.

11. HCFA, Hearings: The International Development and Security Act, 87 Cong, I sess, 8 Jun 61, pt 1:72-74,82.

12. "Notes on NSC Meeting," 13 Jun 61, f1dr National Secutity Council (III), box 4, Vice Presidential Security

File, LBJL; interv Lawrence F. O'Brien by Michael L. Gillette, 18 Sep 85, I, 77, internet copy, LBJL.

13. HSCA, Hearings: Foreign Operations Appropriationsfor 1962,87 Cong, 1 sess, 29 Jun 61, pt 1:98-99, 107

(quote).

14. ConfCte, Foreign Assistance Act of1961, H Rpt 1088, 87 Cong, 1 sess, 30 Aug 61, 12-15, 54-56; ed note,

FRUS 1961-63, IX:260; PL 87-195, 4 Sep 61; HCFA, Mutual Security Act of1961, H Rpt 851, 87 Cong,

1 sess, 4 Aug 61,2,54.

15. PL 87-195,22; ed note, FRUS 1961-63, IX:261.

16. PL 87-195,5-6, 13-14.

17. HCA, Foreign Assistance and RelatedAgencies Appropriation Bill, 1962, H Rpt 1107,87 Cong, 1 sess, I Sep

61,8; SCA, Foreign Assistance and RelatedAgencies Appropriation Bill, 1962, S Rpt 991, 87 Cong, I sess, 13
Notes to Pages 425-30 611

Sep 61, 7; ConfCte, Foreign Assistance andRe!4tedAgenciesAppropriation Bill, 1962, H Rpt 1270, 87 Cong,

1 sess, 26 Sep 61, 6; PL 87-329, 30 Sep 61.

18. Ptogramming Div, ODMA, "Priority Listing FY 62 MAP Supplemental," 24 May 61, £Idr FY 62 Bu--

SecDefHouse Sratement May 31-Further Amendments to Budget, box 8, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist; memo

ActgSecState and SecDeffor Pres, 18 May 61, cited in n 9; NSAM 52, II May 61, FRUS 1961-63,1:133:

"Military Assistance Facts," 1 Mar 62,29, box 78, Subject files, OSD Hist; MAP FY 1963 Estimates, 8-9,

11-12,125,147,165,181, Militaty Assistance binders, Subject files, OSD Hist; MAP FY 1962 Estimates,

10-11,186, 190, ibid.

19. MAP FY 1963 Estimates, 7, 198-99: HCFA, Hearings: Foreign Assistance Act of1964,88 Cong, 2 sess, 25

Mar 64, pt 1:85-86; memos ASD(C) for SecDef, 6 Apr 62, SecDeffor ASD(ISA), 9 Apr 62, fidr Reading

File, Apr. 18-Apr. 1, 1962, box 114, McNamara Records, RG 200.

20. ISA papers, "Internal Security in Latin America," 25 Apr 61, "U.S. Guarantees Against External Aggression in Latin America," 26 Apr 61, fidr 092 Inti Affairs Jan 62, box 44, ISA files, Ace 64A-2382. See also

memo DirISA Coordinating Staff (NSC & Collateral Activities) Robert H. B. Wade for DitWestHemis

Affs(ISA), 27]uI61, £Idr Cuba 000.1-092,11 Jul 61-Jan 62, box31, ibid.

21. Hearings: 1nternational Development and Security Act, cired in n 11, 73, 89; SCFR, Hearings: International

Development and Security, 87 Cong, 1 sess, 14 Jun 61, pt 2:670; SCFR, Hearings: Foreign Assistance Act of

1963,88 Cong, 1 sess, 13 Jun 63,175; HCAS, Hearings on Military Posture and HR 9637,88 Cong, 2 sess,

27 Jan 64, 6911.

22. The Charter of Punta del Este, Establishing an Alliance for Progress, 17 Aug 61, American Foreign Policy:

Current Documents, 1961,395-407: Hearings on Military Posture and HR 9637,6910-12.

23. "Report of the Washington Assessment Team on Internal Situation in South America," Apr 62, £Idr 109

Latin America, box 4, McNamara files, Ace 71A-3470: eire msg 230 State to LA posts, 10 Aug 62, FRUS

1961-63, XII:227-28: CM-894-62 JCS for SecDef, 16 Aug 62, fldr 89 Latin America, box 4, McNamara

files, Ace 71A-3470.

24. Memrcd Kenneth R. Hansen, 19 May 61, £Idr Budget-Miscellaneous, box 44, Sorensen Papers, JFKL;

memcon, 26 May 61, FRUS 1961-63, IX:255.

25. Poole,fCS andNational Policy 1961-64, pt III:154; briefing William Bundy for SecDef, 7 Aug 61, £Idr L208-71, box 29, Lemnitzer Papers, NDU; JCSM-677-61 C]CS for SecDef, 29 Sep 61, £Idr 091.3 1961

Jul-Dec, box 44, ISA files, Ace 64A-2382; memo Kitchen for SecState and SecDef, 12 Dec 61, w/Tab A,

"Steering Group Report," £Idr NSC Meetings 1962, 1/18/62, box 313, NSF, JFKL.

26. Memo Kitchen for SecState and SecDef, 12 Dec 61, w/Tab A, cited in n 25 (quote, 40); Poole,fCS and

NationalPolicy 1961-64, pt III:156-57.

27. Tab A, "Steering Group Report," 9, and Tab C, memo Smith for Kitchen, 30 Nov 61, atchmrs to memo

Kitchen for SecState and SecDef, 12 Dec 61, cited in n 25.

28. Memrcd Komer, 23 Oct 61, FRUS 1961-63, IX:271-72: Kennedy's remarks in red of action 508th NSC

mtg, 22 Jan 63, FRUS 1961-63, VIII:460.

29. JCSM-769-61 C]CS forSecDef, 7Nov61, Rill Sees & Chiefs Comments-Budget Issues, box 17, McNamara

Records, RG 200.

30. Gilpatric memrcd, Pres mtg w/JCS, 3 Jan 62, FRUS 1961-63, VIII:232-34; memo Taylor for DepSecDef,

5 Jan 62, w/atchmt, nd, f1drT-141-69, box 29, Taylor Papers, NDU.

31. Memo Bromley Smith for NSC, 15 Jan 62, w/atchd draft NSC red of action; "Guidelines for the Militaty

Aid Program," 13 Jan 62; "Position ofthe JCS on Draft NSC Record ofAction Dated 13 January 1962,"

18 Jan 62 (quotes, 3,4); memo Komer for Pres, 17 Jan 62: £Idr NSC Meetings 1962, l/18/62 (4), box 313,

NSF,JFKL.

32. "Summary of the President's Remarks to the NSC-Januaty 18, 1962," 18 Jan 62, ibid (3); NSC red of

action, nd, FRUS 1961-63, IX:284-85.

33. JCSM-122-62 C]CS for SecDef, 17 Feb 62, fidr Reading File, Feb. 1962, box 114, McNamara Records,

RG 200: Special Message to the Congress on Foreign Aid, 13 Mar 62, Kennedy Public Papers, 1962,216.

The actual figure was $1.7 billion (TOA) because of recoupments and sales. See memo McNamara for

William Bundy, 7 Dec 61, £Idr Reading File, Dec. 1961, box 113, McNamara Records, RG 200.

34. HSCA, DoD Appropriationsfor 1963, 1 Feb 62, pt 2:207-08.

35. HSCA, Hearings: Foreign Operations Appropriations for 1963, 87 Cong, 2 sess, 16 Mar 62, pt 1:380-81;

Livesay notes, staffmtg, 23 Apr 62, £Idr SecDefStaffMeetings Apr. 1962, box 10, AFPC and SecDefMeetings files, Ace 77-0062.
612 Notes to Pages 430-36

36. Philadelphia Inquirer, 2 Aug 62; PL 87-565, 1 Aug 62; memo SecDeffor SvcSecs er al, 8 Sep 62, fldr Reading File, Sept. 17-Sept. 4, 1962, box 115, McNamara Records, RG 200.

37. New York Times, 30 Sep 62; Kennedy Public Papers, 1962,651-52; American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, 1469; ltr McNamara to Hayden, 25 Sep 62, fldr Reading File, Sept. 17-Sept. 4,1962, box

115, McNamara Records, RG 200; Itr William Bundy to Ford, 3 Oct 62, fldr Foreign Aid Appropriation

FY 1963, box H-4, Committee Files. Ford Congressional Papers, GRFL.

38. PL 87-872,23 Oct 62; PooIe,jCS andNational Policy 1961-64, pt III: 161-63.

39. MAP FY 1964 Estimates, 5-8. Military Assistance binders, Subject files, OSD Hist.

40. Memo Hamilton for Pres, 25 May 62, FRUS 1961-63, IX:302-04; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 594-95;

NSAM 159,31 May 62, FRUS 1961-63, IX: 307-08.

41. Interv David Bell by William T. Dentzer, 2 Jan 65, 130, JFKL; memo SecDef for SvcSecs et aI, 31 May 62,

fldr Reading File, May 31-May 18, 1962, box 114, McNamara Records, RG 200.

42. Memo Pres for SecState, SecDef, and DirAID, 23 Jun 62, FRUS 1961-63, IX:316; memo SecState for Pres,

11 Ju162, ibid, 322; memo Kaysen for Pres, 16 Nov 62, ibid, 335-36.

43. Ed note, ibid, 352; Bell interv, 2 Jan 65, 148.

44. Red of action 508th NSC mtg, 22 Jan 63, FRUS 1961-63, VIII:460; memo Bell for Pres, 4 Mar 63, fldr

091.3 MAP Jan & Table 36, box 38. SecDefSubject Decimal files, Acc 69A-3J3I; memo William Bundy

for SecDef, 28 Jan 63, ibid; Jean Edward Smith, Lucius D. Clay: An American Life, 671-72.

45. Memo William Bundy for SecDef, 23 Feb 63, memo Bundy for Bell, 4 Mar 63, fldr 091.3 MAP Jan &

Table 36, box 38, SecDef Subjecr Decimal files, Acc 69A-313 I; memo Kaysen for Dungan, 5 Mar 63,

FRUS 1961-63, IX:344.

46. Memo William Bundy for Clay, 8 Mar 63 (quote, 2), fldr 091.3 MAP Jan & Table 36, box 38, SecDefSubject

Decimal files, Ace 69A-3131; memo McNamara for Clay, 8 Mar 63 (quote, 3), ibid (emphasis in original).

47. Note William Bundy to McNamara,S Mar 63, ibid; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 598-99; Smith, Clay.

672-73; Bell interv, 2 Jan 65, 137.

48. Rpt to Pres from Committee to Strengthen the Security ofthe Free World, "The Scope and Distribution of

United States Military and Economic Assistance Programs," 20 Mar 63,1-2,5,7,19-20, fldr Foreign Assistance-MAP, AID, etc, box 101, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist.

49. Livesay notes, staff mtg, 18 Mar 63, fldr SecDefStaffMeetings Jan-Mar 1963, box 11, AFPC and SecDef

Meetings files, Acc 77-0062; Smith, Clay, 673; New York Times, 21 Mar 63; Steven A. Hildreth, "Perceptions ofU.S. Security Assistance, 1959-1983: The Public Record," in Ernest Graves and Steven A. Hildreth,

eds, U.S. Security Assistance: The Political Process, 54.

50. HCFA, Hearings: Foreign AssistanceAct of1962, 87 Cong, 2 sess, 15 Mar 62, pt I:69; memo McNamara for

Nitze, 18 Sep 62, fldr Reading File, 29 Sept.-18 Sept., 1962, box 115, McNamara Records, RG 200; "Military Sales Credit Financing," 23 Dec 64, fldr SecDef Backup Book, FY 1966 Budget, vols I-III, box 36,

ASD(C) files, OSD Hist.

51. Ltr McNamara to Rusk, 9 Jul 63, FRUS 1961-63, IX:382; Itr Rusk to McNamara, 26 Jul 63, ibid, 383.

52. DoD Direcrive 5132.3, 8 Ju163.

53. "International Sales and Logistics Program," 23 Dec 64, SecDefBackup Book, FY 1966 Budget, vols I-Ill,

box 36, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist; DoD News Release 692-67, 27 Jul 67, OSD Hist.

54. "Military Sales Credit Financing," 23 Dec 64, cited in n 50; "Military Assistance and Foreign Sales Facts,"

May 67, box 63, Subject files, OSD Hist.

55. Poole,JCS andNational Policy 1961-64, pt Ill: 161, citing JCSM-584-62; JCSM-173-63 CJCS for SecDef,

6 Mar 63, fldr 091.3 MAP Feb 1963, box 38, SecDefSubject Decimal files, Acc 69A-3131; Livesay notes,

staffmtg, 18 Mar 63, cited in n 49; HCFA, Hearings: Foreign AssistanceAct of1963, 88 Cong, 1 sess, 8 Apr

63, pt 1:55.

56. Hearings: Foreign Assistance Act of1963, 160-61, 56, 70.

57. HSCA, Hearings: Foreign Operations Appropriationsjbr 1964,88 Cong, 1 sess, 15 May 63, pt 2:85,95.

58. Washington Post, 14 Jun 63; OffLegisLiaison (Dillender), "Report on Congressional Hearing," 17 Jun 63,

OSD Hist; Dillender memo, "Report on Congressional Hearing," 18 Jun 63, ibid.

59. Lrr McNamara to Morgan, 17 Jun 63, fldr 091.3 MAP May thru July 1963, box 37, SecDef Subject Decimal files, Acc 69A-3131; memo ISA for SecDef, 16 Aug 63, w/atchmt, fldr 091.3 MAP Aug thru 15 Sep

63, box 36, ibid; Itr Rusk and McNamara to House members, 19 Aug 63, in McNamara Public Statements,

1963, V:2273-74.
Notes to Pages 436-41 613

60. Memo SecDef for SecA, 8 Aug 63, fIdr Reading File, Aug. 1963, box 118, McNamara Records, RG 200:

memo ISA for SecDef, 16 Aug 63, w/atchmt, cited in n 59: memrcd McGifferr, "Meeting with Congressman

Ford, September 5," 6 Sep 63, fIdr 091.3 MAP Aug thtu 15 Sep 63, box 36, SecDef Subject Decimal files,

Acc 69A-3131.

61. Memo William Bundy for Wood, 20 Sep 63, memo Wood for SecDef, 20 Sep 63, w/McNamaras marginalia: fIdr 091.3 MAP 16 Sep thtu Oct 1963, box 35, SecDef Subject Decimal files, Acc 69A-3131.

62. Conf Cte, Conftrence Report on Foreign Assistance Act of 1963, H Rpt 1006, 88 Cong, 1 sess, 6 Dec 63,

16-17: Johnson Public Papers, 1963-64,1:58: PL 88-205, 16 Dec 63; ed note, FRUS 1961-63, IX:391-92:

NASM 276, 26 Dec 63, ibid, 392.

63. HCA, Foreign Aid and RelatedAgencies Appropriation Bill, 1964, H Rpt 1040, 88 Cong, 1 sess, 14 Dec 63,

36,39,45: PL 88-258, 6 Jan 64.

64. Memo Bell for McGeorge Bundy, 7 Jan 64, memo Komer for Pres, 17 Jan 64, FRUS 1964-68, IX:4, 5.

65. McNamara statement before HSCA (Foreign Operations), 23 Mar 64, fIdr Milirary Assistance FY 1965

Budget, box 31, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist. An expurgated version appears in HSCA, Hearings: Foreign Operations AppropriationsfOr 1965, 88 Cong, 2 sess, 23 Mar 64, pt 1:313-14.

66. Lrrs Bell to McNamara, 22 Jan 64,5 Feb 64 (quote, 2), fIdr 091.3 MAP (22 Jan 64) 1964, box 34, SecDef

Subject Decimal files, Acc 69A-7425: hr McNamara to Bell, 24 Jan 64, fIdr Reading File, Jan. 31-Jan. 18,

1964, box 119, McNamara Records, RG 200.

67. SecDef Backup Book, FY 1965 Budget, vol I, Tab H, "Effect of Reducrions in FY 1964 MAP," box 32,

ASD(C) files, OSD Hisr: MAP FY 1963 Esrimates, 194: MAP FY 1964 Estimares, 183, 201; MAP FY 1966

Estimates, 45, 49.

68. Livesay notes, sraff mtg, 28 Oct 63 (quote, 5), fIdr SecDef Sraff Meetings Aug-Dec 1963, box II, AFPC

and SecDef Meetings files, Acc 77-0062; memo SecDeffor ASD(C), ASD(ISA), GenCoun, 1 Nov 63, ibid:

Itt McNamara ro Bell, 14 Nov 63, Reading File, Nov. 1963, box 119, McNamara Records, RG 200.

69. Memo ISA (Peter Solbert) for SecDef, 12 Nov 63, fIdr Reading File, Nov. 1963, box 119, McNamara

Records, RG 200. The amounr was subsequently increased to $383.5 million.

70. Memo William Bundy for ActgSecState et al, 22 Nov 63, w/atchmt, draft Itr McNamara to Russell, 22 Nov

63, fIdr Defense Budget (1), box 45, Sorensen Papers, JFKL; Irr Ball to Bundy, 30 Nov 63, ibid: memo

SecDeffor Pres, 3 Dec 63, fIdr 091.3 MAP (4 Sep 63) December 1963, box 35, SecDef Subject Decimal

files, Acc 69A-3131.

71. Memo Pres for SecDef, 7 Dec 63, fIdr 091.3 MAP (4 Sep 63) December 1963, box 35, SecDefSubject

Decimal files, Acc 69A-3131: Itt McNamara to Cannon, 13 Dec 63, OSD Hist; lrrs Fulbright to McNamara,

Morgan to McNamara, 20 Dec 63, fIdr 091.3 MAP (4 Sep 63) December 1963, box 35, SecDef Subject

Decimal files, Acc 69A-3131.

72. Cited in Poole,JCS andNational Policy 1961-64, pt 111:167.

73. Memo DepSecDeffor ActgASD(ISA), 16 Dec 63, fIdr RLG Reading File, July 1, 1963-, box 2, Gilpattic

Files, Acc 66A-3529; memrcd Gilpattic, 26 Dec 63, sub: Last minute changes in proposed DoD budger for

FY 65, fIdr 110.01 1963, box 41, SecDef Subject Decimal files, Acc 69A-3131: SecDefstaffmtg notes, 20

Jan 64 (quote, I), fIdr SecDef Staff Meetings Jan-Aug 1964, box 11, AFPC and SecDef Meetings files, Acc

77-0062. The 10 January 1964 date appears in HSCA, Hearings: Foreign Operations Appropriations fOr

1965, 24 Mar 64, pt 1:371: Special Message to Congress on Foreign Aid, 19 Mar 64, Johnson Public Papers,

1963-64,1:394.

74. Memo Wood for SecDef, 4 Feb 64, fidr 091.3 MAP Jan mru March 1964, box 34, SecDefSubject Decimal files, Acc 69A-7425: memo William Bundy for SecDef, 8 Feb 64 (quote, l), ibid; JCSM 271-64 ClCS

for SecDef, 31 Mar 64 (quote, 4), fidr 091.3 MAP (22 Jan 64) 1964, ibid.

75. HSCA, Hearings: DoD AppropriationsfOr 1965,88 Cong, 2 sess, 18 Feb 64, pt 4: 104-06, 109.

76. SecDefstatement before HSCA, 23 Mar 64, 30, cited in n 65; memo Bundy for SecDef, 8 Feb 64, cited in

n 74: Hearings: Foreign Operations AppropriationsfOr 1965, 23 Mar 64 (quotes, 326, 359): "Notes of Discussions of the MAP with Members of Congress," 5 May 64, fidr Reading File, May 1964, box 120,

McNamara Records, RG 200.

77. New York Times, 25 Mar 64; Baltimore Sun, 26 Mar 64; memo McGiffert for O'Brien, 30 Mar 64, fIdr

White House Major Legislative Reports 1964, box 1, Legislative Affairs files, Ace 67A-4632; memo

McGeorge Bundy for Pres, 2 Apr 64, FRUS 1964-68, IX:13-14.

78. Note William Bundy to SecDef, 16 Jan 64, memo Bundy for Ball, 22 Jan 64, fidr 091.3 MAP Jan thru

March 1964, box 34, SecDef Subject Decimal files, Acc 69A-7425.
614 Notes to Pages 442-49

79. Memo William Bundy for SecDef. 24 Feb 64. w/McNamara marginalia. ibid; memo SecDeffor qCS. 16

May 64. fldr Reading File. May 1964, box 120, McNamara Records, RG 200.

80. SecDefstatement before SCA, 22 Ju164, 29-30, fldr Military Assistance FY 1965 Budget, box 31, ASD(C)

liles, OSD Hist; qcs statement before SCA, 22 Jul 64 (quote, 9), ibid.

81. Special Message to Congress, 18 May 64, johnson Public Papers, 1963-64,1:692; HCFA, Report on Foreign

Assistance Act of1964. H Rpt 1443, 88 Congo 2 sess, 1 Jun 64, 22-23; SCFA, Report on Foreign Assistance

Actof1964 to Accompany HR 11380, S Rpt 1188, as summarized in USC: Congressional andAdministrative

News, 88 Cong, 2 sess (1964), vol 2, 3849; itr McNamara to Morgan, 15 Aug 64, fldr Reading File, July

1964, box 120, McNamara Records, RG 200; Conf Cte, Report on Foreign Assistance Act of1964, H Rpt

1925,88 Cong, 2 sess, 1 Oct 64, 6; New York Times, 8 OCt 64; PL 88-634, 7 Oct 64; PL 88-633, 7 Oct 64.

82. Memo Bell for Pres, 7 Oct 64, FRUS 1964-68, IX:28-29; interv Lawrence F. O'Brien by Michael L. Gillette,

11 Feb 86, VI, 14, internet copy, LBJL; PL 88-633, 7 Oct 64.

83. MAP FY 1966 Estimates, 14-15.

84. Memo Wood for SecDef, 4 Feb 64, cited in n 74; JCSM-324-64 qcs for SecDef, 14 Apr 64, fldr 091.3

MAP (22 Jan 64) 1964, box 34, SecDefSubject Decimal files, Acc 69A-7425.

85. Memo McNaughton for SecDef, 31 Aug 64, memo McNaughton fot SecDef, 2 Oct 64, w/McNamara

matginalia, JCSM-888-64 CJCS for SecDef, 20 Oct 64 (quote, 3): ibid.

86. Memo ISA for SecDef, 19 Nov 64 (quote, I), fldr Defense Budget-FY 1966, box 16, Agency File, NSF,

LBJL; memo SecDeffor CJCS, 20 Nov 64, fldt Reading File. Nov. 1964, box 121, McNamara Records. RG

200; memo Solbett for Califano, 19 Nov 64, fldr 091.3 MAP FY66 (19 Nov 64) 1964, box 34, SecDef

Subject Decimal liles, Acc 69A-7425.

87. Memrcd Wood, 25 Nov 64, BoB mtg on FY 1966 MAP Budget, 24 Nov 64, fldr MAP General-1964,

1965, 1966--Jan-Feb-Mar, box 40, Komer liles, NSF, LBJL (emphasis in original); memo McNaughton for

SecDef, 2 Dec 64. fldr 091.3 MAP FY 66 (19 Nov 64) 1964, box 34. SecDef Subject Decimal liles, Acc

69A-7425; memo McNamara for Bell. 5 Dec 64, fldr Reading File, Dec. 1964, box 121, McNamara Records, RG 200.

88. JCSM-1082-64 qcs for SecDef, 29 Dec 64 (quote. 3). fldr 091.3 MAP FY 66 (19 Nov 64), box 34,

SecDefSubject Decimal liles, Acc 69A-7425.

89. Ltt Bell to Gordon, 4 Dec 61, FRUS 1964-68, IX:61-62; memo Bell for Pres, 9 Dec 64, ibid, 76; memo

Komer for McGeorge Bundy. 15 Dec 64, fldr Defense Budget-FY 1966, box 16, Agency File, NSF, LBJL;

memo Gordon for Pres, 20 Dec 64, fldr FI4/FG Budget-Appropriations (Federal Government) (1966

Budget), box 43, WH Conlidential File, LB]L.

90. Memo Chenery for Bell, 17 Oct 64, FRUS 1964-68, IX:32-33; Poole,fCS andNational Policy 1961-64, pt

1II:169-70; memo Bell for SecSrate, 11 Jan 65, FRUS 1964-68, IX:88. On McNamara's liscal tactics see

memo McNaughton for SeeDef, 22 Dec 64. fldr 091.3 MAP (May thru 1964), box 34. SecDef Subject

Decimal liles, Acc 69A-7425; memo Bell for SecDef, 11 Nov 64, FRUS 1964-68, IX:41.

91. Memo Bell for Pres, 10 Dec 64, FRUS 1964-68, IX:81; memo McNaughton for SeeDef, 22 Dec 64, cited

in n 90.

92. Memo Bell for Rusk, 30 Dec 64, FRUS 1964-68, IX:86-87; Itt Vance to Bell, 31 Dec 64, fldr Chron File,

December 1964, box 1, Cyrus Vance liles, Ace 69A-23 17.

93. Memo Komer for McGeorge Bundy, 15 Dec 64, cired in n 89.

XVII. THE SEARCH FOR SAVlNGS

1. McNamara Public Statements, 1963, IV: 1594.

2. Memos Pres for Dillon, 7 Jun 62, Dillon for Pres, 14 Jun 62, Pres for Dillon. 22 Jun 62: fldr Balance of Payments-Misc, box 1, Gilpatric liles, Acc 66A-3529. See also Thomas Zoumanis, "Plugging the Dike: The

Kennedy Administration Confronts the Balance ofPayments Crisis with Europe," in Btinkley and Griffiths,

eds, john F. Kennedy and Europe. 169-88.

3. Memo Dillon for Pres, 2 Dec 63, FRUS 1961-63, IX: I04; memcon White House mtg, 25 May 63, ibid,

XlII:770; Itt Dillon to Rusk, 19 Mar 63. ibid. IX: 169; memcon, 24 ]un 63. ibid. 171.

4. Census Bur, Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, pt 2, 864; Kennedy Public

Papers, 1961, 65. For an account of the Eisenhower administration's handling of the BOP problem, see

Watson, Into the Missile Age, 747-50.
Notes to Pages 449-55 615

5. Memcon w/Pres, 9 Nov 60, FRUS 1958-60, IV: 130-32; Eisenhower Public Papers, 1960-61, 862; msg

JCS 533004 to CINCAL et ai, 25 Nov 60, OSD Hist; msg DA536518 CivAffsDA to HICOMRY Okinawa, 161945Z Dec 60, ibid.

6. Msg X346 CINCONAD to SecDef, 29 Nov 60, msg ECJAJ9-6302 USCINCEUR to OSD, 30 Nov 60,

msg DA541376 CJCS to Notstad and Palmer, 19 Jan 61, msg DA536518 CivAffsDA to HICOMRY

Okinawa, 161945Z Dec 60,4: OSD Hist.

7. Memrcd [Wilton B. Persons], 19 Jan 61, FRUS 1961-63, IX:I-2.

8. Kennedy Public Papers, 1961,21, 57-60,65.

9. Ltr Gilpatric to Pres, 1 Feb 61, fldr RLG Reading File (30 Dec 60), box 2, Gilpatric files, Acc 66A-3529:

news conf, 1 Feb 61, Kennedy Public Papers, 1961, 31.

10. Memo McNamara for Pres, 4 Jun 63, FRUS 1961-63, IX:65: Itr Rusk to McNamara, 7 Jun 63, ibid, 66:

memo Rusk for Pres, [18] Sep 63, ibid, 90; memcon White House mtg, 24 Sep 63, ibid, 186-87.

11. Memo McNamara for SvcSecs et ai, 10 Ju162, w/atchmt "Revised Project Eight," 9 Ju162, I, fldr Balance

of Payments 1963, box 14, Francis Bator Papers, LBJL: memo McNamara for SvcSecs et al, 16 Ju162, fldr

Balance ofPayments-Misc, box I, Gilpatric files, Acc 66A-3529: NSAM 171, 16 Ju162, FRUS 1961-63,

IX:25-26: McNamara Public Statements, 1962, IV: 1574-76.

12. Annual Report ofSecretary ofthe Army, FY 1963, in DoD Annual Report, FY 1963, 114: OASD Comptr

table, "Military Departments' Planned Deployment in Foreign Countries End FYs 1963-1968," 1 Mar 63,

fldr SecDef Staff Meetings Jan-Mar 1963, box 11, AFPC and SecDef Meetings files, Acc 77-0062.

13. Ltr Rusk to Dillon, 1 Feb 61, FRUS 1961-63, lX:106-07: memcon White House mtg, 13 Apr 61, ibid,

115-16: ed note, ibid, 132-33: memo Tyler for Ball, 9 Oct 61, ibid, 130: memo Gilpatric for Sorensen, 27

Nov 61, w/encl memo Gilpatric for Pres, 27 Nov 61,4, fldr RLG Reading File (I July 61-), box 2, Gilpatric

files, Acc 66A-3529; memo Dillon for Pres, 9 Oct 62, FRUS 1961-63, lX:36.

14. Livesay notes, staffmtg, 22 Jul 63, 2, fldr SecDef Staff Meetings Apr-Jul 1963, box 11, AFPC and SecDef

Meetings files, Acc 77-0062: Itr Dillon to Rusk, 8 Mar 63, FRUS 1961-63, IX: 165-66.

15. Memrcd mtg w/Pres, 18 Apr 63, FRUS 1961-63, IX:61: Kennedy Public Papers, 1963,578; draft memo

McNamara for Pres, 19 Sep 63, FRUS 1961-63, IX:94-97: memo Gilpatric for Nitze, 24 Sep 63, fldr RLG

Reading File, July I, 1963- , box 2, Gilpatric files, Acc 66A-3529.

16. Draft memo McNamara fot Ptes, 19 Sep 63, fldr Reading File, Sept. 1963, box 118, McNamara Records,

RG 200: memrcd, 23 Sep 63, FRUS 1961-63, IX:97: memo Rusk for Ptes, nd [c 20-22 Sep 63], ibid, 89-93

(quote, 90).

17. FRUS 1961-63, lX:98-100 (quotes, 100): memo Dillon for Pres, 2 Dec 63, ibid, 104; memo Dillon for

Pres, 18 Dec 63, fldr F04-1 Balance of Payments (I 963-1964), box 49, WH Confidential File, LBJL: memo

Dillon for Ptes, 24 Apr 64, FRUS 1964-68, VIII:5.

18. Memo Bundy fot Rusk, Fowlet, McNamara, 8 May 64, FRUS 1964-68, VIII: 12: memrcd, 20 Sep 65, ibid,

185: Itr McNamara to Rusk, 19 Apr 65, fldr Reading File, April 1965, box 122, McNamara Records, RG

200.

19. Johnson Public Papers, 1965, 10 Feb 65,1:170-77.

20. Ibid, 173: Cabinet Cte on Balance ofPayments rpt ro Pres, nd [c 2 Feb 65], FRUS 1964-68, VIII:86: memo

Dillon for Pres, 4 Jan 65, ibid, 71-73: Cabinet Cte on Balance of Payments rpt to Pres, 7 Jun 65, ibid,

161.

21. Rpt to Pres, 7 Jun 65, cited in n 20, 160, 165.

22. Pres and SecDefjt press conf, 13 Dec 60, McNamara Public Statements, 1961, I: 1.

23. Interv Thomas D. Morris by Alfred Goldberg and Maurice Marloff, 6 Apr 87, 24, OSD Hist.

24. Memo Boatman for Blaisdell er ai, 14 Mar 61, w/atchmt "Projects within the Department of Defense Assigned 8 March 1961," fldr SecDefSpeciai Projects 1961-62, box 109, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist.

25. HSCA, DoD Appropriationsfor 1962, 6 Apr 61, pt 3:63-64, 122-23.

26. DoD Annual Report, FY 1962,43-44.

27. Memrcd Claude Ricketts, SecDefstaff mtg, 2 Apr 62, fldr 5050 Meetings, Conferences, Convenrions &

Visirs Jan-Jun J962, box 1962-04, CNO Immediare Office Files, NHC.

28. Ibid; 000 News Release 839-62, 22 May 62, OSD Hist.

29. Memo SecDeffor Pres,S Jul 62, tldr Reading File, July 24-]uly 2, 1962, box 115, McNamara Records.

RG 200.
616 Notes to Pages 455-62

30. Memo SecDef for SvcSecs and DirsDSA, DCA, 14 Sep 62, wlencl "Summary of DoD's Procurement &

Logistics Cost Reduction Program," Rdr $3 Billion Savings-Cost Reduction Program, box 112, ASD(C)

files, OSD Hist.

31. Memo Morris for Altizer, 14 Sep 62, ibid; memo Morris for AsstSecA et aI, 14 Sep 62, ibid.

32. Memo Morris fOt SecDef, 18 Oct 62, wlencl "Cost Reduction Summary Procurement and Logistics,"

ibid.

33. Memo Morris for SecDef, 18 Oct 62, memo Morris for AsstSvcSecs, DSA, DCA, 20 Oct 62, memo DepSecDeffor SvcSecs and DDSA, 23 Oct 62: ibid.

34. Memo Morris for SecDef, 21 Dec 62, w/encl 5, "Status of Cost Reduction Actions for FY 1963 as of

12/31162," ibid.

35. Livesay notes, staffmtg, 9 Ju163, Rdt SecDefStaffMeetings Apr-JuI1963, box II, AFPC and SecDefMeetings files, Acc 77-0062.

36. Livesay notes, staff mtg, 7 Jan 63, Rdr SecDef Staff Meetings Jan-Mar 1963, ibid.

37. Memo Morris for SecDef, DepSecDef, 29 Dec 62, Rdr $3 Billion Savings-Cost Reduction Program, box

112, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist; draft text for posture statement on Cost Reduction Ptogtam, 31 Dec 62,

ibid; McNamara statement before House Subcte on DoD Approps, 6 Feb 63,137, and Table 5,157, Rdr

FY 64 Defense Budget, box 1, SecDefPosture Statements, OSD Hist.

38. Subcte on Defense Procurement ofthe Joint Economic Cte, Hearings: Impact ofMilitary Supply and Service

Activities on the Economy, 88 Cong, I sess, 28 Mar 63,25.

39. HSCA, DoD Appropriations1Or 1964,13 Feb 63, pt 1:470; draft position paper, nd [Apr 63], Rdr $3 Billion

Savings-Cost Reduction Program, box 112, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist.

40. Memo Morris for SecDef, 5 Dec 63, w/atchmt, Rdr Cost Reducrion Program (FY 1965 Budget), box 34,

ibid.

41. Livesay notes, staff mtg, 21 Jan 63, Rdr SecDef Staff Meetings Jan-Mar 1963, box 11, Acc 77-0062. DoD

Directive 5010.6, I Feb 63, and DoD Instruction 7720.6, issued 7 March, established uniform reporting

procedures and formats.

42. Memo SecDef for SvcSecs and DDSA, 8 Apr 63, Rdr Reading File, Apr. 17-Apr. 5, 1963, box 117,

McNamara Records, RG 200; memo SecDef for SecAF, 9 Aug 63, fidr Reading File, Aug. 1963, box 118,

ibid.

43. Memo SecDeffor Pres, 8 Ju163, fidr July 1, 1963 Cost Reduction Program Memorandum to the President,

box 112, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist; Livesay notes, staff mrg, 9 Ju163, cited in n 35.

44. News conf, II Ju163, McNamara Public Statements, 1963, V:2054-70.

45. Memo SecDeffor SvcSecs et aI, 7 Dec 63, fidr Cost Reduction Program (FY 1965 Budget), box 34, ASD(C)

files, OSD Hist.

46. Ltr Pres to Defense Contractors, I Dec 63,johnson Public Papers, 1963-64, I: 16; itr McNamara to Defense

Contractors, I Dec 63, McNamara Pub/ic Statements, 1963, VI:2679.

47. Memo SecDeffor SvcSecs et ai, 7 Dec 63, cited in n 45; Newsweek, 9 Mar 64.

48. HCAS, Military Posture and HR 9637,29 Jan 64, 7106-08.

49. SCAS and SSCA, Hearings: Military ProcurementAuthorizations, FY1965,88 Cong, 2 sess, 4 Feb 64, 229-30.

50. Military Posture and HR 9637,7107-08.

51. HSCA, DoD Appropriations10r 1965, 17 Feb 64, pt 4:271, 273-74.

52. Armed Forces Management, Jan 64, 8; Wall Streetjournal, II Jun 64.

53. News conf, 7 Ju164, McNamara Public Statements, 1964, III: 1350, 1358, 1360-62; Baltimore Sun, 8 Ju164.

54. Baltimore Sun, 8 Jul 64.

55. Livesay nores, staffmtg, 13 Jul64, fidr SecDefStaffMeetings May-Jull964, box II, AFPC and SecDef

Meerings files, Acc 77-0062; New York Times, 8 Jul 64; Wall Street journal, 8 Jul 64.

56. Memo DirBoB Gordon for Cabinet Members, 24 Jul 64, w/encl "Remarks by the President ro the Cabinet," 22 Jul 64, Rdr Cost Reduction Ptogtam (FY 1966 Budget), box 39, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist; johnson

Public Papers, 1963-64, II:874-75.

57. Ltr Lawton to Pres, 10 Nov 64, w/atchmt President's Task Force on Cost Reduction, "Report to the President," 10 Nov 64,1, 3, Rdr 1964 Task Force on Cost Reduction, LBJL.

58. Ibid, 4, 5.

59. johnson Public Papers, 1963-64, II: 1548-49; Washington Post, 12 Nov 64.

60. Pres statement on "The Great Society," 19 Nov 64, johnson Public Papers, 1963-64, II: 1604.
Notes to Pages 462-68 617

61. Thomas D. Morris, "Taking Charge in Washingron," Harvard Business Review, Jul-Aug 84, 3; Annual

Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, 30 Jan 61, Special Message to the Congress on the

Defense Budget, 28 Mar 61, Kennedy Public Papers, 1961,24,239-40; memo SecDef for Pres, 1 Mar 61,

fldr 88, box 4, McNamara files, Acc 71A-3470; Morris interv, 6 Apt 87, 10.

62. Memos SecDef fot Pres, 1 Mar 61, SecDef fot SvcSecs, 31 Mar 61, fldr 88, box 4, McNamara files, Acc

71A-3470; DoD News Release 269-61, 30 Mar 61, OSD Hist; "Dtaft Administrative History of DoD,

1963-69," vol 5, 1921, ibid.

63. Wall StreetJournal, 31 Mar 61; "Base Closing," nd [post-Sep 66], Notebook Management Decisions 1961-

1966, box 27, SecDeffiles, OSD Hist; HSCA, Hearings: DoD Appropriationsftr 1963,2 Feb 62,238; New

York Herald Tribune, 18 Jun 61.

64. Washington Post, 31 Mar, 11 Jul 62; "Base Closings," nd, in notebook, Management Decisions 1961-1966,

box 27, SecDeffiles, OSD Hist. See also fldr Excess Installations 1962, box 989, Subject files, OSD Hisr.

65. Memo SecDeffor Pres, 7 Dec 63, fldr Defense Department, vol 1[2 of2] 11163, box 11, Agency File, NSF,

LBJL; telcon Pres w/McNamara, 7 Dec 63, 5:03 p.m., fldr December 1963, Chron File, box 1, JFK Series,

transc oftelephone conversarions, LBJL; New York Times, 12 Dec 63; DoD News Release 393-63, 22 Mar

63, OSD Hist.

66. McNamara Public Statements, 1963, Vl:2727, 2729, 2734-36; "Base Closing," cited in n 63; Chicago Tribune, 13 Dec 63.

67. White House press release, 27 Dec 63, in McNamara Public Statements, 1964,1:240-41.

68. DoD News Release 337-64, 24 Apr 64, fldr Closing ofInstallations 1964, box 989, Subject files, OSD Hist;

McNamara Public Statements, 1964, III: 1198-99, 1211; Washington Post, 25 Apr 64.

69. DoD News Release 730-64, 10 Oct 64, w/atchd memo SecDeffor Pres, 8 Oct 64, fldr Closing ofInstallations 1964, box 989, Subject files, OSD Hist.

70. DoD News Release 822-64, 19 Nov 64, ibid; summary paper on "Study ofNaval Requirements for Shipyard

Capacity," nd, fldr Cost Reduction Progtam (FY 1966 Budget), box 39, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist.

McNamara disclaimed any connection between the election and the timing of his announcement

(McNamara PublicStotements, 1964, IV: 1779).

71. Time, 27 Nov 64,29; interv Morris, 6 Apr 87, 15; McNamara Public Statements, 1964, IV: 1780, 1782; see

20 Nov 64 columns and editorials in Washington Evening Star, New York Times, Washington Post, New York

Herald Tribune, and Baltimore Sun; ASD(M), "DoD Program for Placement ofEmployees Affected by Base

Closures and Consolidations," nd, fldr SecDef Backup Book, FY 1966 Budget, vols IV-VII, box 36,

ASD(C) files, OSD Hist.

72. ASD(M), "Job Opportunity Program," 30 Nov 66, SecDefBackup Book, FY 1968 Budget, bk II, vols IIIV, box 60, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist.

73. Michael H. Gorn, "The TFX: Conceptual Phase to F-lllB Termination, 1958-1968," 4-5, 11-12, box

879, Subject files, OSD Hist; Robert J. Art, The TFX Decision: McNamara and the Military, 25-26.

74. "History of the TFX Development," 10 Jan 63, SecDefBackup Book, FY 1964 Budget, vol V, Tab E, box

20, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist; Senate, Cte on Govr Opns, Permanent Subcte on Investigations, Hearings:

TFX Contract Investigation (Second Series), 91 Cong, 2 sess, 24 Mar 70, pt 1:12; memo AIR-506 (Spangenberg) for A1R-09 (Adm Fawkes), 13 Mar 67, George Spangenberg oral hist, exhibit VF-6, internet copy,

www.georgespangenberg.comlexhibitindex.htm;Art. The TFX Decision, 38.

75. Memo SecDeffor SvcSecs, 7 Jun 61, tldr Reading File, June-August 1961, box 113, McNamara Records,

RG 200; memo AIR-506 for AIR-09, cited in n 74; Senate, Cte on Govt Opns, Permanent Subcte on

Investigations, Hearings: TFX Contract Investigation, 88 Cong, 1 sess (hereafter TFX: Hearings), 28 Jun 63,

pt 6:1386-88; TFX Contract Investigation, S Rpt 91-1496, 91 Cong, 2 sess, 18 Dec 70 (hereafter TFX Report), 6.

76. TEX.· Hearings, pt 2:429.

77. See, for example, memos SecDeffor SecAF, 7 Ju161, 3 Aug 61, SecDeffor USecAF, 10 Aug 61, fldr Reading

File, June-August 1961, box 113, McNamara Records, RG 200.

78. Gorn, "TFX," cited in n 73,13-15; Art, The TFX Decision, 48.

79. Gorn, "TFX," 17-18; memo SecDeffor SecAF, SecN, I Sep 61, TFX: Hearings, pt 2:333-34.

80. "History ofthe TFX Development," 10 Jan 63, box 20, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist.

81. Memo SecAF, SecN for SecDef, 1 Jun 62, TFX: Hearings, pt 6: 1399; memo SecDeffor SecAF, SecN, 9 Jun

62, fldr Reading File, 21 June-l June 1962, box 115, McNamara Records, RG 200; "History of the TFX

Development," 10 Jan 63, cited in n 80.
618 Notes to Pages 468-76

82. TFX: Hearings, pt 6: 1599; memo SecAF for Ch, Source Selection Board, 29 Jun 62, memrcd LtGen D. C.

Strother, nd [c 22 Jun 62J: ibid, 1400, 1401.

83. Memo DDR&E for SecDef, II Jul 62, Itt Gilpattic to Lewis, 13 Jul 62: TFX: Hearings, pt 5: 1194-95.

84. Memo SecAF, SecN et aI for CNO, ChStaffAF, 8 Nov 62, ibid, pt 6: 1473-75.

85. Richard Austin Smith, "The $7-Billion Conttact that Changed the Rules," pt II, Fortune, Apr 63, 199; TFX

Report, 23 (quote); interv Eugene M. Zuckert by Lawrence E. McQuade, 11 Jul64, 100, JFKL; "History of

the TFX Development," 4; DoD News Release 1907-62, 24 Nov 62, OSD Hist.

86. Memrcd SecN, SecAF, SecDef, 21 Nov 62, TFX: Hearings, pt 2:350-53 (quote, 351).

87. Gorn, "TFX," 29; Smith, "The $7-Billion Contract," III, 191; TFX: Hearings, pt 2:381, 385 (quote).

88. Inrerv Joseph v. Charyk by James c. Hasdorff, 15 Jan, 24 Apr 74, 24, AF Hist Support Off. The Evaluation

Group estimated Boeing was 21 percent low and General Dynamics 18 percent (see TFX: Hearings, pt

1:146).

89. Shapley, Promise and Power, 210-11; Itt McClellan to McNamara, 21 Dec 62, fldt Misc Congressional Inquiries 1962, box 92, ASD(C) files; Itr Gilpattic CO McClellan, 26 Dec 62, TFX: Hearings, pt 5:1146-47;

interv Zuckert, 11 Ju164, 103; interv Zuckert by George M. Watson, Jr., 3, 4, 5, 9 Dec 86, 133-34, AF Hist

Support Off.

90. TFX Report, 30; Hearings: Impact ofMilitary Supply and Service Activities on the Economy, cited in n 38, I

2-13.

91. Memrcd A. W Blackburn, 7 Mar 63, sub: Cost savings and effectiveness improvements offered by TFX, fldr

TFX, box 108, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist. Only six days earlier, however, Blackburn had informed his boss,

Harold Brown, that there was no supportable basis for McNamara's choice of General Dynamics in operational, technical, management, or cost considerations (memrcd Blackburn for DDR&E, 1 Mar 63, TFX:

Hearings, pt 5:1207).

92. TFX Report, 50; inrerv Charyk, 15 Jan, 24 Apr 74,25.

93. Washington Post, 9 Mar 63; DoD News Release 333-63, 12 Mar 63, OSD Hist; Baltimore Sun, 13 Mar 63.

94. Ltt McNamara to McClellan, 23 Mar 63, wlenel, Washington Star, 23 Mar 63, memcon McNamara wI

Jackson, 23 Mar 63, McNamara notes of conversation with Sen McClellan, 23 Mar 63: fldr Reading File,

March 1963, box 117, McNamara Records, RG 200.

95. "Statement for Secretary McNamara," 16 Oct 63, I, fldr Reading File, October 1963, box 118, McNamara

Records, RG 200; memrcd McNamara, 2 Dec 63, fldr Reading File, December 1964, box 121, ibid; New

York Times, 4 Oct 63.

96. Memrcd McNamara, 29 Mar 63, fldr Memos for the Record, box I, McNamara files, Acc 71A-3470.

97. Memo SecDef for DDR&E, SecN, SecAF, 18 Jan 64, memo ChBurNavWeapons for CNO, 5 Feb 64,

memo DDR&E, SecAF, SecN for SecDef, 15 Feb 64: Hearings: TFX Contract Investigation (Second Series),

pt 2:400, 401-02, 435-37.

98. News conf, 28 Feb 63, McNamara Public Statements, 1963, III: 1428; Art, The TFX Decision, 86, 89.

99. Memo SecDeffor Pres, 8 Ju163, McNamara Public Statements, 1963, V:2077-78.

100. Gam, "TFX," 38; memo SecN for SecAF, 31 Ju164, memo G. A. Spangenberg for R, 14 Aug 64: Hearings:

TFX Contract Investigation (Second Series), pt 2:462-63, 453, 455.

101. Memo Leonard Sullivan, Jr. for DDR&E, I Oct 64, Hearings: TFX Contract Investigation (Second Series), pt

3:479-81.

102. Gam, "TFX," 39-40; DoD News Release 744-64, 15 Oct 64, OSD Hist; McNamara Public Statements,

1964, IV:1656; New York Times, 22 Dec 64.

103. Interv McNamara by Alfred Goldberg, Lawrence Kaplan, and Edward Drea, 8 Jan 98, 9-10, OSD Hist;

interv McNamara by Walt W. Rostow, 8 Jan 75,59-61, LBJL.

XVIII. TIGHTENING THE BUDGET: FYS 1965 AND 1966

1. Gilparric remarks at UPI Conf, Chicago, 19 Oct 63, Gilpatric Public Statements, 1963, 398.

2. Memo Hitch for McNamara, 24 Sep 62, fldr FY 1964 Budget (Chron file), box 22, ASD(C) files, OSD

Hist; memo McNamara for SvcSecs et ai, 4 Dec 62, fldr Budget Guidance and Planning Memoranda 1962-

1967, box 9, Enrhoven Papers, LBJL; memo McNamara fat SvcSecs et ai, 18 Mar 63, fldr Programming

1963, box 782, Subject files, OSD Hist; memo Gilpatric for SvcSecs et ai, 10 Apr 63, fldt FY 1965 Budget

(Chron), box 30, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist. The FYFS&FP of7 January 1963 was not updated until I June

1963; a bound copy of each is in box 134, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist.
Notes to Pages 477-79 619

3. Poole,fCS andNational Policy 1961-64, pt 1:37-38,41,43-44, 160;JCSM-300-63 and CM-524-63 Taylor

for SecDef, 13, 17Apr 63, fldrJCS Views-FY 1965 ProgramApril 1963, box32, McNamaraRecords, RG 200.

4. Troika statement, "Estimates of Revenues and Expenditures, Fiscal Years 1965-1967," 5 Apr 63, w/atchd

summary table, "Preliminary Budget Projections," 2 Apr 63, fldr Budget-I965, box 45, Sorensen Papers,

JFKL; Itr Gordon ro McNamara, 20 Apr 63, fldr Interagency Memoranda 1961-1968, box 9, Enthoven

Papers, LBJL; Itr McNamara ro Gordon, 23 May 63, w/atchd table, "Expenditures by Program-FY 1964-

1968," fldr FY 1965 Budget (Chron), box 30, ASD(C) files, OSD Hisr.

5. BoB paper, "1965 Budget Preview Discussions: Department ofDefense," nd [stamped as received in OSD

on 16 Jul 63], fldr 11 om FY 65 Jan thru Jul 1963, box 44, SecDef Subject Decimal files, Acc 69A-313I;

Enthoven memrcd, 17 Jul 63, fldr Interagency Memoranda 1961-1968, box 9, Enthoven Papers, LBJL;

memo Gordon for Pres, 8 Aug 63, w/atchmts, "1965 Budget Preview: Expenditures" and "List of Possible

Further Reductions for 1965," both 5 Aug 63, fldr Budget 1965 Proposed Planning Figures Background &

Detail, box 45, Sorensen Papers, JFKL.

6. Memo McNamara for SvcSecs et ai, 26 Aug 63, memo Gilpatric for SvcSecs et ai, 27 Sep 63, fldr FY 1965

Budget (Chron), box 22, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist; Hitch address ro the American Society of Military

Comptrollers, 24 Mar 64, fldr Comptroller 1964, box 783, Subject files, OSD Hist. A copy of the revised

and updated FYFS&FP, dated 10 January 1964, is in box 134, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist.

7. Tables of setvices' budget submissions, SCAS and SSCA, Hearings: Military Procurement Authorizations,

FY 1965 [hereafter Hearings: Military Procurement Authorizations], 88 Cong, 2 sess, 1964,82-83. A table,

dated 20 November 1963, showing the amounts the services proposed and the secretary of defense recommended for specific programs for FY 1965 and other fiscal years, is in fldr Back-up for Discussion w/President, box 4, McNamara files, Acc 7IA-3470. Handwritten notations indicate that the rotal difference for

FY 1965 between the two amounts was $9 billion (TOA) as of that date.

8. Memo Zuckert for McNamara, 5 Oct 63, fldr 110.0I FY 65 Oct thru- 1963, box 43, SecDef Subject Decimal files, Acc 69A-3131; memo LeMay for SecAF, 7 Oct 63, ibid. In a covering memo of 15 Ocrober for

McNamara forwarding the Air Force budget and LeMay's memo, Zuckert said that he shared leMay's

"concern about the framework within which the military departments' budgets have been developed this

year" (ibid).

9. The DPM on strategic retaliatory forces, dated 31 August 1963, was sent to the Joint Chiefs on 2 September (Poole,]CS and National Policy 1961-64, pt 1:161-62). OSD transmitted nine other DPMs to the

NSC on 28 September, which covered airlift and sealift forces, the Air Force tactical aircraft program, attack

carrier (CVA) forces, anti-submarine warfare, amphibious assault forces, naval mine warfare, fleer air defense, underway replenishment forces, and block obsolescence (memo Enthoven for Bundy, 28 Sep 63,

w/atchd list, fldr 031.1 WH Draft Memos 1963, box 5, SecDef Subject Decimal files, Acc 69A-3131).

Copies of early versions of the DPMs are in ibid, box 5, and in box 117, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist.

10. Memo LeMay for SecAF, 7 Oct 63, cited in n 8; Poole.]CS and National Policy 1961-64. pt I: 162. During

testimony before the Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee on 25 February

1964, LeMay made similar criticisms of the budget planning procedures (HSCA, Hearings: Department of

Defense Appropriationsfir 1965. 88 Cong, 2 sess, 1964, pt 4:509-1 I). Hitch, in a letter ro Subcommittee

Chairman Mahon on 16 March, responded to the criticisms (fldr FY 1965 Budget (Chron), box 30.

ASD(C) files, OSD Hist).

II. Memo McNamara for SecNav, 25 Oct 63, fldr Nuclear Powered Ships vs Conventional Powered Ships, box

I, McNamara files, Acc 71A-3470; memo Keeny for McGeorge Bundy, 15 Nov 63, FRUS 1961-63, Microfiche Supplement: Vols VII, VIII. IX, Doc 304.

12. Memo Kaysen for McGeorge Bundy, 25 Oct 63, FRUS 1961-63, Microfiche Supplement: Vols VII, VIII,

IX, Doc 302.

13. Memo McNamara for McGeorge Bundy, Gordon, and Wiesner, 13 Nov 63, fldr 031.1 WH Draft Memos

1963. box 5, SecDefSubject Decimal files, Acc 69A-313I.

14. Joseph S. Hoover (OASD(Comptr» memrcd, 16 Nov 63, fldr Defense Budger-1965 Sec. 2, box 15, Agency

File, NSF, LBJL. For Keeny's views on the lasr four DPMs, see memo Keeny for McGeorge Bundy. 22 Nov

63, FRUS 1961-63, VIII:534-37.

15. Intetv McNamara by Robert Dallek, 26 Mar 93. internet copy. 6, LBJL; McNamara, In Retrospect, 89-90. For

Gilpatric's recollection and those of BoB officials at the meeting. see intetv Gilparric by Ted Gittinger, 2 Nov

82. internet copy, 6-7, LBJL; intetv Elmer B. Staats byT H. Baker, 9 Dec 71.7, LBJL; and intetv Kermit
620 Notes to Pages 479-84

Gordon by David G. McComb, 9 Jan 69, 23-24, ibid. Deborah Shapley's accounr draws on rhe recollections

ofhet fathet, Willis Shapley, anothet BoB official in attendance (Promise and Power, 271-72).

16. Shapley, Promise and Power, 274-75; Johnson, vantage Point, 20, 36.

17. Johnson, vantage Point, 31-32; Gordon interv, 9 Jan 69, 24-25.

18. Gordon interv, 9 Jan 69, 24-26; Johnson, Vantage Point, 36.

19. Memo Gordon for Ptes, 25 Nov 63, fldr Budget-I965, box 45, Sotensen Papets, JFKL; memo Gordon fat

Pres, 26 Nov 63, fldr FI4/FG 115 11/22/63-, box 26, WH Confidential File, LBJL; Staats interv, 9 Dec 71,

8-9; Irving Bernstein, Gum or Butter: The Presidency ofLyndon johmon, 3I-32; Dallek, Flawed Giant, 71 -72.

20. Livesay notes, staffmtg, 26 Nov 63, fldt SecDefMeetings Aug-Dec 1963, box 11, AFPC and SecDefMeetings files, Acc 77-0062.

2I. e. v. Clifton and Tazewell Shepatd memo of conf with Pres, 29 Nov 63, fldr White House 1963, box 153,

LeMay Papets, Le.

22. johnson Public Papers, 1963-64,1:8-10, 15-16,43-45.

23. Interv Gordon by McComb, 21 Mar 69, 3-4, LBJL; Charles J. V. Mutphy, "The Desperate Drive to Cur

Defense Spending," Fortune, Jan 64,188; interv Douglas Dillon by Paige Mulhollan, 29 Jun 69,10, LBJL;

telcon between Johnson, Gordon, and McNamara, 10 Dec 63, 11 :50 am, Tape K63 12.06, PNO 17, Telephone Conversations, LBJL.

24. Hoover memtcd, 30 Nov 63, fldr FY 1965 Budger (Chron), box 30, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist; memo Keeny

for McGeorge Bundy, 30 Nov 63, FRUS 1961-63, Microfiche Supplement, Vols VII, VIII, IX, Doc 307;

memo Gordon for Pres, 9 Dec 63, ibid, Doc 309; draft memo McNamara for Pres, 6 Dec 63, FRUS 1961-63,

VIII:545-64; draft memo McNamara for Pres, 7 Dec 63, fldr Budget Memos to the President, box 4,

McNamara files, Acc 71A-3470; news conf, 7 Dec 63, johnson Public Papers, 1963-64,1:34-38; press conf

and news release, 7 Dec 63, McNamara Public Statements, 1963, VI:2680-87; Washington Post, 10 Dec 63.

25. McNamara news briefing and DoD news release, 10 Dec 63, McNamara Public Statements, 1963, V1:2696-

271 1. According to McNamara's memo of conversation, Senators Jackson and Magnuson of Washington

met with the president on 10 December to ask him ra reconsider the Dynasoar cancellation because it would

layoff 4,000 people at Seattle's Boeing plane. Jackson offered to make a deal with the president, promising

not to complain about the Dynasoar cancellation if the administration closed the Navy yards in Boston and

Philadelphia (fldt Memos for the Record, box 1, McNamara files, Acc 71A-3470).

26. Bernstein, Guns or Butter, 34; Gordon interv, 21 Mar 69,3-4; Gilparric memrcd, 26 Dec 63, fldr 110.01

FY 65 Ocrrhru- 1963, box 43, SecDefSubject Decimal files, Acc 69A-313I; news conf, 18 Dec 63,johnson

Public Papers, 1963-64,1:65-71.

27. Memo of confw/Pres, 30 Dec 63, FRUS 1961-63, VIII:587-96; New York Times, 31 Dec 63; McNamara

and Salinger press conf, Austin, Tex, 30 Dec 63, McNamara Public Statements, 1963, VI:2798-2806 (quote,

2799). In a memotandum of 26 December for McNamara, Gilparric summarized the points that McDonald

and leMay intended to raise at the meeting and enclosed a memorandum regarding the Army's points (fldr

RLG Reading File, July I, 1963- , box 2, Gilparric files, Acc 66A-3529). McNamara's handwrirren notes

regarding the meeting are in fldr Back-up for Discussion w/President, box 4, McNamara files, Acc 71A-3470.

Another account of the meeting is a debriefing paper prepared by I. e. Kidd, 3I Dec 63, fldr 7100/2 1965

Budget, box 1964-16, CNO Immediate Office files, NHe. McNamara transmitted the final budget estimates in a letter to Gordon, 10 Jan 64 (fldr FY 1965 Budget (Chran), box 30, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist).

28. Annual Budget Message to Congress, 21 Jan 64, johmon Public Papers, 1963-64, 1:175-87; The Budget of

the United States, FY 1965, 7 I-8 I.

29. Bernstein, Guns or Butter, 37-38.

30. Interv Harold Brown by Dorothy Pierce, 17 Jan 69, 1I, LBJL.

31. McNamara interv, 8 Jan 75, 22.

32. Gordon interv, 21 Mar 69, 6; McNamara interv, 8 Jan 75, 22.

33. Vinson remarks, 27 Jan 64, HCAS, Hearings: Military Posture and HR 9637 [hereafter Hearings: Military

Posture], 88 Cong, 2 sess, 6892.

34. Ibid, 6893; Baltimore Sun, 16 Jan 64; Washington Post, 16 Jan 64.

35. Memo McGiffen for SecDef, 11 Jan 64, Adr 110.01 FY 65 Jan thru Mar 1964, box 35, SecDef Subject

Decimal files, Acc 69A-7425; New York Times, 15 Feb 64. In handwritten notes in the margins of McGiffen's memo, McNamara accepted all the suggestions, subject to limitations on his time in seeing large

numbers of House members during the upcoming week.
Notes to Pages 484-89 621

36. "Goldwater View Belittles ICBMs," New York Times, 10 Jan 64; press statement, 9 Jan 64, McNamara

Public Statements, 1964, I: 1; "McNamara Says Goldwater Errs," New York Times, 10 Jan 64.

37. Livesay notes, staff mtg, 20 Jan 64, fldr SecDef Staff Meetings Jan-Apr 1964, box 11, AFPC and SecDef

StaffMeetings files, Acc 77-0062.

38. Brown's testimony, 17 January, is in Hearings: Military Posture, 7549-7647; for the military service representatives' testimony, 20-22 January, see ibid, 7647-7906.

39. Memo McGiffert for O'Brien, 3 Feb 64, fldr White House Major Legislation Reports 1964, box 1, legislative Affairs files, Acc 67A-4632. A compilation oftestimony before Congress on the Defense authorization

and appropriation bills ror FY 1965 is in James H. McBride and John I. H. Eales, Military Posture: Fourteen

Issues beftre Congress, 1964. The issues included reliability and dependability of missiles, MMRBM, the follow-on bomber, the ABM, nuclear test ban safeguards, employment of the TFX aircrafi:, air and sealifi:,

nuclear power for ships, anti-submarine warfare, Army air support, counter-insurgency (COIN) aircratt,

nuclear strategy, basic advanced weapons research and development, and the balance of power.

40. Hearings: Military Posture, 7474-79; Washington Star, 9 Feb 64; HCAS, Authorizing Deftnse Procurement

and Research and Development, H Rpt 1138, 88 Cong, 2 sess, 13 Feb 64, pt 1: 1-2. For the dissenting views,

see 17 Feb 64, ibid, pt 2: 1-6.

41. Memo McGifferr for O'Brien, 24 Feb 64, fldr White House Major Legislation Reports 1964, box 1, Legislative Affairs files, Acc 67A-4632; Cong Rec, 20 Feb 64, 3068-3100.

42. Memo McGiffert for O'Brien, 10 Feb 64, fldr White House Major Legislation Reports 1964, box 1, Legislarive Affairs files, Acc 67A-4632.

43. Ltr McNamara to Russell, 21 Feb 64, Hearings: Military Procurement Authorizations, 885-97; memo

McNamara for Taylor, 6 Feb 64, FRUS 1964-68, X:22-24 (quote, 24); SCAS, Authorizing Appropriations

During Fiscal Year 1965 ftr Procurement ofAircraft, Missiles, and Naval Vessels, and Research, Development,

Test, and Evaluation ftr the Armed Forces, S Rpt 876, 88 Cong, 2 sess, 25 Feb 64, 1-2; New York Times, 26,

28 Feb 64; Cong Rec, 26, 27 Feb 64, 3602-03, 3678-3701.

44. HCAS, Authorizing Deftnse Procurement and Research and Developmentftr Fiscal Year 1965, H Rpt 1213,

88 Cong, 2 sess, 5 Mar 64, 1-5; memo McGiffert for O'Brien, 9 Mar 64, fldr White House Major Legislation Reports 1964, box 1, Legislative Affairs files, Acc 67A-4632; PL 88-288,20 Mar 64; Pres remarks, 20

Mar 64,johnson Public Papers, 1963-64,1:402-03.

45. The proceedings were published in five parts in HSCA, Hearings: DoDAppropriationsftr 1965, cited in n 10.

46. Memo McGiffert for O'Brien, 24 Feb 64, cited in n 41; HSCA, DoD Appropriationsftr 1965, pt 4: 1-12,

97-117 (quotes, 5, 11-12, 117). On 24 February Hitch and Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower)

Norman Paul also testified before the subcommittee; see ibid, pt 4:375-438.

47. HCA, Department ofDeftnse Appropriation Bill, 1965, H Rpt 1329, 88 Cong, 2 sess, 17 Apr 64, 3, 9, 37,

44; memo McGiffert for O'Brien, 20 Apr 64, fldr White House Major Legislation Reports 1964, box 1,

Legislative Affairs files, Acc 67A-4632; Cong Rec, 21 Apr 64,8260-70,8283-98,22 Apr 64,8494-8538;

McGiffert memtcd, 23 Apr 64, fldr 110.01 FY 65 Apr thru Oct 1964, box 35, SecDef Subject Decimal

files, Acc 69A-7425.

48. Ltr Vance to Russell, 12 May 64, fldr FY 1965 Budget (Chron), box 30, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist; Hitch

writren statement, 25 May 64, SSCA, Hearings: Department ofDeftnse Appropriationsftr 1965, 88 Cong, 2

sess, 25 May 64, pt 2:1-61 (Army test 25-27 May 64, ibid, 62-193).

49. Livesay nores, staff mtg, 22 Jun 64, fldr SecDefStaffMeetings May-July 1964, box 11, AFPC and SecDef

Meetings files, Ace 77-0062.

50. SSCA, DoD Appropriationsftr 1965, pt 2:195-561, 741-837; SCA, DepartmentofDeftnseAppropriation

Bill, 1965, S Rpt 1238, 88 Cong, 2 sess, 24 Ju164, 4; memo McGiffert for O'Brien, 27 Ju164, fldr White

House Major Legislation Reports 1964, box 1, Legislative Affairs files, Acc 67A-4632.

51. Cong Rec, 29 Jul 64, 16778-830; Baltimore Sun, 30 Ju164; Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964,329.

52. HCA, DepartmentofDeftnseAppropriation Bill, 1965, H Rpt 1642,88 Cong, 2 sess, 31 Ju164, 1-4; memo

McGiffert for O'Brien, 3 Aug 64, fldrWhite House Major Legislation Reports 1964, box 1, Legislative Affairs

files, Acc 67A-4632; Cong Rec, 4 Aug 64, 17308-16; New York Times, 5 Aug 64; PL 88-446, 19 Aug 64.

53. 000 news releases, 18 Apr, 29 Jun, 11 Aug, 7 Oct, 19 Oct 64, McNamara Public Statements, 1964, III:

1194-97,1343-45, IV: 1565-66, 1640-42, 1658-60.

54. McNamara statement before the Democratic Party Committee on Resolutions and Platform, Washington,

DC, 17 Aug 64, ibid, IV: 1567-79; McNamara Itr to Gates, 31 Aug 64, w/DoD press statement, 18 Sep 64,

ibid, 1606-10; Mark S. Watson, Baltimore Sun, 24 Aug 64; Shapley, Promise and Power, 287.
622 Notes to Pages 489-94

55. Cungress and the Natiun, 1945-1964,327-28.

56. Memo Enthoven for Hitch, 26 Nov 63, fldr Budget Guidance and Planning Memoranda 1962-1967, box

9, Enthoven Papers, LBJL; memo Hitch for McNamara, 13 Dec 63, w/atchd draft instructions, fldr FY

1966 Budget, box 41, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist. In a memo ofthe same date as rhe latter, McNamara circulated the draft instructions to DoD components for comment (ibid). He sent the final instructions, in

slightly amended form, to the service secretaries and orhers on 21 December (fldr 110.01 FY 1966, box 5,

SecDefSubject Decimal files, Acc 69A-7425).

57. Memo Enthoven for Systems Analysis Staff, 15 Jan 64, memo Hitch for DDR&E et al, 20 Feb 64: fldr FY

1966 Budget, box 41, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist.

58. JSOP-69 (Parts I-V), atchd to CM-1181-64 Taylor for SecDef, 14 Feb 64, fldr JSOP-'69-'71, box 41,

McNamara Records, RG 200; JCSM-219-64 and CM-1272-64 Taylor for SecDef, 16,20 Mar 64, FRUS

1964-68, X:57-64; Poole,]CS and Natiunal Policy 1961-64, pt 1:168, 278, 288. Parts I and II ofJSOP-69

are printed in FRUS 1964-68, X:26-41.

59. Memo McNamara for Nitze, Zuckett, and Taylor, 16 May 64, FRUS 1964-68, X:84-89.

60. Memo Brown for SecDef, 29 Nov 63, w/atchmts, fldr 031.1 WH Draft Memos 1963, box 5, SecDefSubjecr Decimal files, Acc 69A-313 I; Livesay notes, staff mtg, 2 Mar 64, fldr SecDef Staff Meetings Jan-Apr

1964, box 11, AFPC and SecDefMeetings files, Acc 77-0062; memo McNamara for DDR&E and ASD(C),

2 Mar 64, ibid. McNamara's handwritten nores on the points he intended to raise at rhe 2 March staffmeeting are in fldr FY 66 Budget, box 41, McNamara Records, RG 200. Vance carried our McNamara's instruction with a detailed memorandum of 12 March to the service secreraries and other officials; see fldr Chron

File, March 1964, box 1, Vance files, Acc 69A-2317.

61. Ltr Gordon to McNamara, 7 Apr 64, fldr FY 1965 Budget (Chron), box 30, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist; Itr

Vance to Gordon, 8 May 64, fldr Classified Chron File-Jan thru Dec 1964, box 46, Enthoven Papers, LBJL;

Itr Vance to Gordon, 8 May 64, fldr Chron File, May 1964, box 1, Vance files, Acc 69A-2317.

62. Table, OASD(C), "Summary of 1 October 1964 Service Submissions: Fiscal Year 1966 Budget Estimates,"

14 Oct 64, fldr FY 1966 Budget, box 41, ASD(C) files, OSD Hist.

63. JCSM-I000-64 Wheeler for SecDef, 30 Nov 64, memo Hitch for SecN, 18 Nov 64: fldr 110.oI Projects (9

Jan 64) CY 64, 5-Yr Plan Nov 1964, box 37, SecDef Subject Decimal files, Acc 69A-7425. In the 18

November memo Hitch summarized and replied to a memorandum of 28 October from Secretary of the

Navy Nitze, which has not been found.

64. Vance memos of conv, both 1 Oct 64, fldr Memos for the Record, box 1, McNamara files, Acc 71A-3470.

Alrhough the conversations took place on 1 October, the memos were dared 3 October.

65. Hoover memrcd, 23 Nov 64, fldr 110.01 (Budget) August thru- , box 35, SecDef Subject Decimal files,

Acc 69A-7425.

66. Memo Keeny for McGeorge Bundy, 5 Dec 64, fldr DoD-Budget Review-December 5, 1964, box 14,

Agency File, NSF, LBJL; Itr Hornig to McNamara, 7 Dec 64, Enthoven memrcd, 7 Dec 64: fldr Budget

Guidance and Planning Memoranda 1962-1967, box 9, Enthoven Papets, LBJL. According to Keeny's

memo, rhe meeting was scheduled for 5 December, a Saturday. Howevet, no tecord of a meeting that day

has been found. Hornig's letter to McNamara and Enthoven's memo fot the tecord, both dated 7 December,

suggest that the meeting may have been postponed to Monday, 7 December.

67. New York Times, 10 Dec 64; Baltimore Sun, 10 Dec 64; Roswell L. Gilpatric, "Our Defense Needs: The

Long View," Foreign Affairs, Apr 64,369-71.

68. Memo Bundy for Pres, 9 Dec 64, fldr FI 4/FG 115 11/22/63- , box 26, WH Confidential File, LBJL; New

York Herald Tribune, 10 Dec 64.

69. Memo Keeny fot Bundy, 5 Dec 64, cited in n 66; memo McNamara for Pres, nd [another copy is dated

10 Dec], memo Bundy and Keeny for Pres, 10 Dec 64: FRUS 1964-68, X:IB7-91.

70. Poole,JCS andNational Policy 1961-64, pt 1:181; CM-267-64 Wheeler for McNamara, 23 Nov 64, FRUS

1961-64, X:176-79.

71. Clifton memrcd, 22 Dec 64, FRUS 1964-68, X:199-201. Prior to the meeting the chiefs and Chairman

Wheeler, in response to McNamara's request, sent him briefmemos summarizing the matters they intended

to raise with the president. Wheeler's comments are in CM-316-64 of 17 December from Goodpaster, his

assisrant, for McNamara (fldr 110.01 FY 1966, box 5, SecDefSubject Decimal files, Acc 69A-7425). Memos

for McNamara from leMay and from Director ofNavy Program Planning Vice Adm. Horacio Rivero, on behalfofAdmiral McDonald, both dated 17 December, and from Army ChiefofStaffGeneral Harold Johnson,

dared 18 December, are in fldr 110.01 Projects (9 Jan 64) CY 64 5-Yr Plan Nov 1964, box 37, ibid.
Notes to Pages 494-503 623

72. News conf, 22 Dec 64, McNamara Public Statements, 1964, IV:1834-48 (quote, 1835). On 5 December

McNamara, after meeting with the president, had announced that in all likelihood defense expenditures

would not exceed $50 billion in the next budget and that new obligational authority would fall to a little

under $49 billion, which was substantially lower than in any recent years (ibid, 1802-03).

73. Washington Star, 23 Dec 64.

74. Washington Post, 19 Jan 65; Wall StreetJoumal, 26 Jan 65; Johnson Public Papers, 1965,1:62-71, 82-99; The

Budget ofthe United States, FY 1966, 68-79.

75. New York Times, 31 Jan 65.

76. Ibid, 19 Jan 65.

XIX. VIETNAM: INTO THE VORTEX

1. Whether Kennedy would have withdrawn U.S. troops from Vietnam had he lived has been a subject of

much debate and speculation. There is consensus that he would have taken no action until he won reelection in 1964. Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History, and Roben Dallek, An Unfinished Lift: John F Kennedy,

1917-1963, conclude that Kennedy would have withdrawn the troops after the election. Two other studies, by Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam, and John M. Newman, JFK and Vietnam: Deception, Intrigue,

and the Struggle ftr Power, take opposite sides on the issue: Lewy believes Kennedy would have followed

the same course as Johnson, and Newman maintains that Kennedy had begun plans early in 1963 to end

U.S. involvement even at the cost ofdefeat. There can be, ofcourse, no definitive answer. For the musings of

top Kennedy aides Theodore Sorensen and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., in the context ofthe U.S. search 40 years

later for an exit strategy from an entangling engagement in Iraq, see Sorensen and Schlesinger, "What

Would J.F.K. Have Done?," New York Times, 4 Dec 2005.

2. Memo SecDeffor Pres, 23 Nov 63, FRUS 1961-63, IV:627-28; DeptState Situation Rpt, 23 Nov 63, ibid,

629-30 (quotes).

3. Memrcd McCone, 24 Nov mtg, 25 Nov 63, ibid, 635-37.

4. NSAM 273, 26 Nov 63, ibid, 637-40.

5. Johnson Public Papers, 1963-64,1:8-10 (quote, 8).

6. News conf, 7 Dec 63, ibid, 34; memo of teleon, Rusk and McNamara, 7 Dec 63, FRUS 1961-63, IV:690.

7. Rpt JCS SpecAsst(CI) (Krulak), 21 Dec 63, FRUS 1961-63, IV:721-27 (quote, 721).

8. Memo SecDeffor Pres, 21 Dec 63, ibid, 732-35.

9. Ibid, 735.

10. McNamara Public Statements, 1963, VI:2792.

11. Memo Mansfield for Pres, 6 Jan 64, FRUS 1964-68, 1:2-3; memo McGeorge Bundy for Pres, 9 Jan 64, ibid,

8-9.

12. Memo SecDeffor Pres, 7 Jan 64, ibid, 12-13.

13. Ed note, FRUS 1961-63, IV:652; HCAS, Military Posture and HR 9637,27 Jan 64, 6904.

14. NSAM 273, cited in n 4, 639; TheJoint Chief ofStaffand the War in Vietnam, 1960-1968, pt I:ch 7, 38-39,

ch 8, 18-19. The LeMay statement is quoted in Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 526-27.

15. Memo SecDeffor Pres, 21 Dec 63, cited in n 8, 734.

16. JCS and the War in Vietnam, 1960-68, pt I:ch 8, 20-21.

17. Memo McGeorge Bundy for Pres, 7 Jan 64, FRUS 1964-68,1:4-5.

18. JCS and the War in Vietnam, 1960-68, pt I:ch 8, 21.

19. Ltr McCone to SecState, 7 Jan 64, FRUS 1964-68,1:5-6; Rand Rpt, "An Analysis ofLarge-Scale VC Operations," IIdr VNOn Jul-Dec 63, box 18, ISA files, Acc 67A-4564.

20. Ltr McCone to SecState, 7 Jan 64, cited in n 19, 6; memo Forrestal for McGeorge Bundy, 8 Jan 64, FRUS

1964-68,1:7-8; Itr McNamara to McCone, 16 Jan 64, IIdr Vietnam 1964 Gan 7-May 13), box 30, SecDef

files, 050 Hist.

21. Press briefing, 28 Jan 64, McNamara Public Statements, 1964, 1:246.

22. New York Times, 28 Jan, 1 Feb 64; New Year's msg to Minh, 1Jan 64,johnson Public Papers, 1963-64, I: 106;

memo SecDeffor Pres, 21 Dec 63, FRUS 1961-63, IV:734.

23. Msg 1431 Saigon to State, 29 Jan 64, FRUS 1964-68,1:37-39 (quote, 39).

24. SCAS and SSCA, Military Procurement Authorizations, FY 1965, 3 Feb 64, 63.

25. Msg Rusk and McNamara to Lodge and Harkins, 31 Jan 64, FRUS 1964-68, 1:47-48,

26. S. L. A. Marshall, "Gen. Harkins' Days Numbered," Los Angeles Times, 26 Jan 64.
624 Notes to Pages 503-12

27. Memo Forrestal for McGeorge Bundy, 4 Feb 64, FRUS 1964-68,1:59-60.

28. Memo Forrestal for McGeorge Bundy, 30 Mar 64, ibid, 199-201.

29. See Johnson remarks at swearing in ofTaylor, 2 Jul 64, Johnson Public Papers, 1963-64, II:841-42.

30. Ball, Past Has Another Pattern, 375-76.

31. Msg 1467 Saigon to State, 1 Feb 64, FRUS 1964-68,1:54-55.

32. See Saigon msg A-455, Cmdr's Personal Mil Assessment of the 4th Qtr CY 63, Jan 64, box 237, Subject

files, OSD Hisr. The full date ofthe message is not given on this copy.

33. Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 536.

34. A condensed version ofmemo JCS for SecDef, 22 Jan 64, is in ed note, FRUS 1964-68, I:35. The complere

memo JCSM-46-64 is in Pentagon Papers (Gravel ed), III:496-99.

35. Ltr Rusk ro McNamara, 5 Feb 64, FRUS 1964-68,1:63.

36. Msgs COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 13 Feb 64, 1533 Saigon to Stare, 14 Feb 64, box 237, Subject files,

OSD Hist.

37. Rusk's description appeared in the New York Times, 4 Mar 64; memo McGeorge Bundy for Rusk, McNamara,

er al, 18 Feb 64, w/enc1, 13 Feb 64, OSD Hist; William Bundy, "History of Viernam," chs 12, 16. The

president announced William Bundy's new appointment on 29 February 1964 Uohnson Public Papers,

1963-64, 1:322).

38. Memo Forrestal for McNamara, 14 Feb 64, FRUS 1964-68,1:77-79.

39. Memo McNamara for ClCS, 21 Feb 64, ibid, 97-99; ]CSM-174-64 ClCS for SecDef, 2 Mar 64, ibid,

112-18 (quote, 116); McNamara's marginal note, ibid, 118, n 9.

40. Msg 1583 Saigon to Stare, 20 Feb 64, memrcd Forrestal, 20 Feb 64, ibid, 93-95.

41. Ltr Pres to SecDef, 5 Mar 64, ibid, 131-33; New York Times, 6 Mar 64.

42. JCS and the ~r in Vietnam, 1960-68, pt I:ch 9, 11.

43. Msg 1740 Saigon to State, 13 Mar 64, FRUS 1964-68,1:141; memcon (Taylor), ]CS and Pres, 4 Mar 64,

ibid,129.

44. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, 310.

45. New York Times, 10 Mar 64.

46. Memo SecDeffor Pres, 16 Mar 64, FRUS 1964-68,1:153-67 (quotes 166, 167).

47. Ibid, 161-64.

48. Ibid, 164, n 18.

49. Memcon JCS and Pres, 4 Mar 64, cited in n 43; notes on ]CS confwiPres, 4 Mar 64, Binder vall, Wallace

Greene Papers, MC Hist & Mus Div.

50. Notes on ]CS mtg, 5 Mar 64, Binder vall, Greene Papers.

51. JCS and the ~r in Vietnam, 1960-68, ptI:ch 9, 18-20; memo ]CSM-222-64 ClCS for SecDef, 14 Mar 64,

FRUS 1964-68, 1:149-50 and n 3.

52. JCSM-222-64 ClCS for SecDef, 14 Mar 64, cited in n 51.

53. Notes on JCS mtg wlSecDef, 14 Mar 64, Binder vall, Greene Papers.

54. Livesay notes, staffmtg, 16 Mar 64, fidr SecDefSraffMrgs Jan-Apr 1964, box 11, AFPC and SecDefMeerings files, Ace 77-0062.

55. Memo SecDeffor Pres, 16 Mar 64, FRUS 1964-68, I: 153-67; sum red 524th mtg NSC, 17 Mar 64, ibid,

170-72 (quote, 171).

56. Sum red 524th mtg NSC, ibid, 170-72; NSAM 288, 17 Mar 64, ibid, 172-73; Whire House statement, 17

Mar 64,fohnson Public Papers, 1963-64,1:387-88.

57. JCS and the ~r in Vietnam, 1960-68, pt I:ch 9, 24-25; msg 2203 Lodge to Rusk and McNamara, 14 May

64, FRUS 1964-68, 1:315-16.

58. Memos Forrestal for McGeorge Bundy, 30 Mar, 26 May 64, FRUS 1964-68,1:199-201, 385-89.

59. Memo Rowan for Pres, 21 Apr 64, ibid, 254-55.

60. Memrcd Whire House sraff mrg, 30 Mar 64, ibid, 196-99.

61. Ibid, 298, n 1.

62. Memo Forrestal for Bundy, 30 Mar 64, ibid, 199-201; McNamara notes for rpt to Pres, 14 May 64, ibid,

322-27.

63. Ibid, 298, n 2; Itt Lodge to Rusk, 30 Apr 64, ibid, 279-80.

64. Ltr Rusk to Lodge, 7 May 64, ibid, 298-99, n 1.

65. JCS and the ~r in Vietnam, 1960-68, pt I:ch 9, 22-23.
Notes to Pages 512-19 625

66. Ibid, 34-36 (quote, 36); memo Forrestal for McGeorge Bundy, 31 Mar 64, w/atchmt, FRUS 1964-68,

1:206-13; ltr Bundy to Lodge, 4 Apr 64, ibid, 225-29; memos Forrestal for Bundy, 16,28 Apr 64, ibid,

242-43,271-72-

67. Msg 2108 Saigon to State, 4 May 64, ibid, 284-87 (quotes, 287).

68. Memo William Bundy for Rusk, 4 May 64, ibid, 287-88.

69. Memo Forrestal for McGeorge Bundy, 5 May 64, ibid, 289-90.

70. Msg 1838 State to Saigon, 5 May 64, ibid, 291-93.

7I. Msg 070745Z Felt to Taylor, 6 May 64, ibid, 295-96.

72. JCS and the war in Viemam, 1960-68, pt I:ch 10,2-3.

73. Memrcd William Colby, Pres mtg on Vietnam, 6 May 64, document CIGI0011145, http://www.galenet.

com/serveletIDDRS; ed note, FRUS 1964-1968,1:304.

74. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, 311-12.

75. McNamara notes for rpt to Pres, 14 May 64, cited in n 62; sum red 532d mtg NSC, 15 May 64, FRUS

1964-68,1:328-32.

76. Sum red 532d mtg NSC, ibid (quote, 332).

77. Memo by CIA, 15 May 64, ibid, 336.

78. Msg Pres to Lodge, 26 May 64, ibid, 393-94.

79. Sum red Honolulu mtg, 1 Jun 64, ibid, 412-33; McMaster, Dereliction ofDuty, 100.

80. Memo McGeorge Bundy for Pres, 3 Jun 64, ibid, 440-41; Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, 313.

81. William Bundy, "History ofVietnam," ch 12,32-33.

82. Draft memo for Pres, 25 Feb 64, FRUS 1964-68, XXVIII: 14-17, sent on 26 Feb to Vientiane (msg 664),

Bangkok (msg 1438), and Saigon (msg 1319).

83. Memo ASecState (Hilsman) for Rusk, 28 Feb 64, ibid, 21-23; memo Bundy for SecDef, 28 Feb 64, fldr

Reading File, Feb. 1964, box 119, McNamara Records, RG 200; memo SecDeffor Pres, 25 Apr 64, FRUS

1964-68, XXVIII:69-70 (quote, 70).

84. Memo Forresral for Pres, 29 Apr 64, FRUS 1964-68,1:275.

85. Sum rcd 529rh mrg NSC, 29 Apr 64, ibid, 276-77.

86. Memo William Bundy for Harriman, 29 Apr 64, memrcd Colby, 29 Apr 64, ibid, XXVIII:76-80; notes on

JCS mtgs w/SecDef, 17 Apr, 18 May 64, Binder vall, Greene Papers.

87. Msg 1011 Srate to Vientiane, 17 May 64, FRUS 1964-68, XXVIII:88-90.

88. Sum rcd 533d mtg NSC, 6 Jun 64, memrcd Forrestal, 7 Jun 64, memo of confw/Pres, 8 Jun 64: ibid, 141-

42,147-48,152-60 (quote, 159).

89. Memo McGeorge Bundy for Pres, 12 Jun 64, ibid, 184 and n 2, 3.

90. Sum rcd Whire House mtg, 10 Jun 64, msg 1587 Vientiane to State, 11 Jun 64: ibid, 170-74, 181-83

(quote, 182).

91. Msg DEF9535 OSD to CINCPAC, 7 Oct 64, JCSM-897-64 ActgCJCS for SecDef, 22 Oct 64, msg 868

Vientiane to State, 10 Dec 64: ibid, 280, 288-89, 306-07 (quote, 306).

92. Memos McGeorge Bundy for Pres, 3 Jun 64, William Bundy for Rusk, 3 Jun 64, ibid, 1:440-46; paper prepared for Pres by SecDef, 5 Jun 64, ibid, 463; Charles J. V. Murphy, "Vietnam Hangs on U.S. Determination," Fortune, May 64; Pentagon Papers, bk 3, IV.C.I, 76-81.

93. McGeorge Bundy draft memo, 10 Jun 64, FRUS 1964-68, 1:493-96 (quote, 496); memos Bundy for Pres,

10 Jun 64, Bundy for Rusk and McNamara, w/atchmts, 15 Jun 64, ibid, 496-97,500-16.

94. Memos Bundy for Pres, 10 Jun 64, Bundy for Rusk and McNamara, 15 Jun 64, w/atchmt 3 drafted by

William Bundy, ibid, 497,514.

95. Rpt, "Viet Cong Activity-January Through June 1964," fldr vol. 3, box I, NSC Meetings, NSF, LBJL;

draft memo SpecAsst W. H. Sullivan, 13 Jun 64, FRUS 1964-68, 1:500-07.

96. Memo Bundy for Pres, 6 Jun 64, FRUS 1964-68,1:472-73; press conf, 23 Jun 64, Johnson Public Papers,

1963-64,1:802.

97. Memo Bundy for Pres, 25 Jun 64, FRUS 1964-68,1:530-31.

98. See FRUS 1964-68, I:xxiv, xxvii, xxviii.

99. Msg 328 Rusk to Taylor, 2 Aug 64, ibid, 592; Marolda and Fitzgerald, From Military Assistance to Combat,

393-97, 410. The United States armed, equipped, supplied, and trained the South Vietnamese units involved in OPLAN 34A.
626 Notes to Pages 519-24

100. Johnson, Vantage Point, 112-13; Vietnam Information Grp, "Presidential Decisions: The Gulf of Tonkin

Attacks of August 1964," 1 Nov 68, iii, 11-12, doc CK3100511725, http://www.galenet.com/servlet/

DDRS.

101. Teleon McNamara and Pres, 3 Aug 64, 10:30 a.m., no. 4633, pgm no. 10, tape WH 6408.03, LBJL. No

record ofthe 3 August meeting has been found (ed note, FRUS 1964-68, 1:600). This account is drawn from

teleon McNamara and Pres, 3 Aug 64,1:21 p.m., no. 4369, pgm no. 16, tape WH 6408.03, LBJL: SecDef

test on Tonkin Gulf Resolution before SCFR and SCAS (excerpts), 6 Aug 64, 496, 504, 506, fldr Vietnam

1964, box 30, SecDeffiles, OSD Hist; "Chronology ofSecretary ofDefense McNamara's Activities Vietnam

PT Boat Crisis," 6 Aug 64, fldr Vietnam PT Operations Aug. 1964, box 347, Subject files, OSD Hist;

SecDefstatement to SCFR, 20 Feb 68, master copy, 30, fldr Tonkin, box 347, Subject files, OSD Hist.

102. Msg USM 626J to Golf/Eleven/Aipha, 041140Z Aug 64, fldt Presidential Decisions-Gulf ofTonkin Attacks ofAugust 1964, vol I, Tab 9 [2 of 2], box 38, NSC Histories, NSF, LBJL: ed notes, FRUS 1964-68,

1:604-05; DDR&E, WSEG, "Command and Control ofthe Tonkin Gulflncident 4-5 August 1964," Critical Incident Report No.7, 26 Feb 65, 7, fldr Command and Control ofthe Tonkin GulfIncident4-5 August

1964,7, box 239, Subject files, OSD Hist: teleon McNamara and Alfred Goldberg, 23 Mar OS, OSD Hisr.

103. Statement McNamara to SCFR, 20 Feb 68, cited in n 101,23: memo McGeorge Bundy for Pres, Chronology ofthe Gulf ofTonkin, 4 Sep 64, doc CK31 00341 000, http://www.galenet.com/servlet/DDRS.

104. Rcd of teleon, McNamara and Sharp, 4 Aug 64, fldr Gulf ofTonkin (Misc), box 228, Country File, Vietnam, NSF, LBJL: ed note, FRUS 1964-68, 1:607-10: msg to Quebec/India [routing designator] 041646Z

Aug 64, fldr Presidential Decisions-Gulf of Tonkin Attacks of August 1964, cited in n 102; statement

McNamara to SCFR, 20 Feb 68, cited in n 101; "Presidential Decisions: The GulfofTonkin Attacks," cited

in n 100,23-24. The most thorough examination ofthe event is found in Edwin E. Moise, The Tonkin Gulf

and the Escalation ofthe Vietnam War.

105. Sum notes 538th mtg NSC, 4 Aug 64, FRUS 1964-68,1:611-13; ed note, ibid, 626: Radio and TV Report

to American People, 4 Aug 64,johnson Public Papers, 1963-64,11:927-28: "Command and Control of the

Tonkin Gulf Incident," cited in n 102,31-33.

106. Special Message to Congress,S Aug 64,johnson Public Papers, 1963-64,11:930-31; SecDeftest before SCFR

and SCAS (excetpts), 6 Aug 64, cited in n 101, 504-07; SecDef test before HCFA (Exec Sess) (excerpts),

6 Aug 64, 524-27, fldr Viernam 1964, box 30, SecDeffiles, OSD Hisr.

107. Memo ActgSpecAssist SACSA for qcs, 5 Aug 64, fldr Vietnam QuI-Aug 64), box 43, Wheeler files,

RG 218.

108. Special Message to Congress,S Aug 64, cited in n 106: ed note, FRUS 1964-68,1:664: Cong Rec, 7 Aug 64,

110, pt 14:18409 (Fulbright quote).

109. Baltimore Sun, 3 Aug 64; New York Herald Tribune (ed), 3 Aug 64; COMUSMACV to CINCPAC et al,

OPLAN 34A Operations, 070519Z, atchmt to memo DirJtStaff for qcs, 8 Aug 64, fldr Vietnam QulAug 64), box 43, Wheeler files, RG 218. The message also states that some boats were relocated because of

threat of an air attack; other sources identify the new location as Cam Ranh Bay. The ICC, with members

from Poland, Canada, and India, supervised the provisions ofthe 1954 Geneva Accords.

110. Memo A. R. Brownfield (DepSACSA) fat qcs, 15 Aug 64, w/atchmt, fldr Vietnam Oul-Aug 64), box 43,

Wheeler files, RG 218. For the role of SACSA in 34A, see Shultz, Secret war Against Hanoi.

Ill. Ball, Past Has Another Pattern, 379.

112. The literature on the Tonkin Gulfinciclent is extensive. See fat instance: Johnson, Vantage Point; McNamara,

In Retrospect; FRUS 1964-1968, vol I: SCFR, Hearings: The GulfofTonkin, The 1964 Incidents, 90 Cong,

2 sess, 20 Feb 68; Marolda and Fitzgerald, From Military Assistance to Combat; Moise, Tonkin Gulfand the

Escalation ofthe Vietnam War; Ezra Y. Siff, Why the Senate Slept: The GulfofTonkin Resolution and the Beginning ofAmericas Vietnam War; Joseph c. Goulden, Truth Is The First Casualty: The GulfofTonkin AffairIllusion andReality; John Prados, "Essay: 40th Anniversary ofthe GulfofTonkin Incident," National Security

Archive, 4 Aug 04, internet copy; Edwatd Drea, "Received Information Indicating Attack: The Gulf of

Tonkin Incident 40 Years Later," MHQ: The QuarterlyJournal ofMilitary History, Summer 04. Moise is the

most convincing that a second attack did not occur. Marolda's position has evolved based on subsequent

analysis and additional information. In 2005 he concluded that no attack had occurred on 4 August; see

Edward J. Marolda, "Summary of the Tonkin Gulf Crisis of August 1964," 13 Jul OS, Frequently Asked

Questions: Tonkin Gulf Crisis, August 1964, http://www.history.navy.millfaqs/faqI20-l.htm. Former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird has said, "From all I was able to determine when I read the dispatches five

years latet as sectetary of defense, there was no second attack. There was confusion, hysteria, and miscom-
Notes to Pages 524-30 627

munication on a dark night" (Melvin R. Laird, "Iraq: Learning the Lessons of Vietnam," Foreign Affiirs,

Nov-Dec 05, 31).

113. Gelb and Betts, Irony o/Vietnam, 104.

114. Johnson remarks at Akron Univ, 21 Oct 64, johnson Public Papers, 1963-64, Il:1387-94 (quote, 1391);

Brian VanDeMark, Into the Quagmire: Lyndon johnson and the Escalation o/the Vietnam War, 19.

115. Ted Girringer, ed, The johnson Years: A Vietnam Roundtable, 23-24.

116. FRUS 1964-68, I, contains numerous documents covering this period. A good summary ofthem and the

uncertainties ofthe time is in jCS and the War in Vietnam, 1960-68, pt I:ehs 12, 13.

117. Interv Forrestal by Paige Mulhollan, 3 Nov 69, in VanDeMark, Into the Quagmire, 20; memo of White

House mrg, 9 Sep 64, FRUS 1964-68, 1:749-50 (quote, 750).

118. Gelb and Betts, Irony o/Vietnam, 105;jCS and the Wilr in Vietnam, 1960-68, pt I:ch 12, 5.

119. Memo McGeorge Bundy for Pres, 8 Sep 64, FRUS 1964-68, 1:746-49; NSAM 314,10 Sep 64, ibid, 758-60.

120. Memrcd McGeorge Bundy, 20 Sep 64, FRUS 1964-68,1:778-81; Chester 1. Cooper, The Lost Crusade: America in Vietnam, 241-42; George MeT. Kahin, Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam, 237.

121. CM-124-64 Wheeler for SeeDef, 9 Sep 64, Pentagon Papers (Gravel ed), III:564; memo JCSM-902-64

Wheeler for SecDef, 27 Oct 64, FRUS 1964-1968, 1:847-57; memo McNamara for Wheeler, 29 Oct 64,

f1dr Reading File, Oct. 31-20, 1964, box 121, McNamara Records, RG 200;jCS and the Wilr in Vietnam,

1960-68, pt I:ch 12,37,40,44-45.

122. Figures for the losses at Bien Hoa vary slightly among several sources: FRUS 1964-68,1:873, n 2; Pentagon

Papers, bk 3, Iye3, 4;jCS and the War in Vietnam, 1960-68, pr I:ch 13, 10. For exchanges between State

and Saigon, see msgs 1357 and 1360 Saigon to State, 1451 Wheeler to Sharp, 978 and 979 Stare to Saigon,

all I Nov 64, FRUS 1964-68, 1:873-79 (quote, 878).

123. Memrcd, sum JCS mtg w/SecDef, 2 Nov 64, Greene Papers.

124. Johnson, ~ntage Point, 121.

125. Memo ofWhite House mtg, 9 Sep 64, cited in n 117,749-55 (quotes, 752, 753).

126. Memo Bundy for Pres, 31 Aug 64, FRUS 1964-68, 1:723-24.

127. Ed notes, ibid, 886-88, 964-65, 974; memrcd, White House mtg, 19 Nov 64, ibid, 914-16; NSC wkg gp

paper, 21 Nov 64, ibid, 916-29; notes on White House mtg, 1 Dec 64, ibid, 965-69; ExCom paper, 2 Dec

64, ibid, 969-74.

128. ExCom paper, cited in n 127 (quote, 969).

129. Ibid (quotes, 970).

130. Instructions Pres to Taylor, 3 Dec 64, FRUS 1964-68, 1:974-78.

131. Memo Pres for SecState, SecDef, DirCIA, 7 Dec 64, ibid, 984, 969-78; McNamara, In Retrospect, 163.

132. Msgs 1351 Saigon to State, 31 Oct 64,1416 Saigon to State, 6 Nov 64,1870 Saigon to State, 20 Dec 64:

FRUS 1964-68,1:860-61,890-92,1014-16.

133. Memo DepDir(l&R)(Denney) for Rusk, 27 Jan 65, ibid, Il:91-93; msgs 2322 Saigon to State, 27 Jan 65,

2617 Saigon to Stare, 16 Feb 65, ibid, 93-95, 281-82.

134. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, 330-31; msg 2382 Saigon to State, 3 Feb 65, FRUS 1964-68, Il:124-26;

memcon McGeorge Bundy group w/Taylor and Emb staff, 4 Feb 65, ibid, 133-38.

135. Taylor, Swords andPlowshares, 336-37; DeptState Situation Rpt, 20 Feb 65, FRUS 1964-68, Il:339-41; msg

2720 Saigon to State, 23 Feb 65, ibid, 349-50 (quote, 349).

136. Msgs 1941 Saigon to State, 25 Dec 64, 1975 Saigon to State, 28 Dec 64, JCS 5458 Wheelerto Westmoreland, 28 Dec 64,1365 State to Saigon, 29 Dec 64, FRUS 1964-68, 1:1043-44,1049-53.

137. Msg CAP 64375 Pres to Taylor, 30 Dec 64, ibid, 1057-59.

138. Memo Bundy for Pres, 27 Jan 65, ibid, Il:95-97.

139. Msg 1549 State to Saigon, 27 Jan 65, ibid, 98-99.

140. Sum notes 545th mtg NSC, 6 Feb 65, memrcd Colby, 6 Feb 65, memrcd Vance, 7 Feb 65: ibid, ISS-57,

158-60,160-68.

141. Statement on dependent withdrawal, 7 Feb 65, johnson Public Papers, 1965, I: 153; White House sratement

on retaliatory attacks, 7 Feb 65, ibid, 153-54n.

142. Memo Bundy for Pres, 7 Feb 65, FRUS 1964-68, Il:174-81 (quote, 175); Annex A, paper prep by Bundy

Mission members, 7 Feb 65, ibid, 181-85 (quotes, 181).

143. Sum notes 547th mtg NSC, 8 Feb 65, ibid, 188-92 (quote, 192).

144. jCSand the Wilr in Vietnam, 1960-68, pt !loch 17,21-22; ed note,FRUS 1964-68, Il:212. The JCS history

put the number wounded in the Qui Nhon arrack at 22, but subsequent sources cite 21.
628 Notes to Pages 530-45

145. Sum notes 547th mtg NSC, cited in n 143 (quote, 191); Johnson, Vantage Point, 129.

146. McCone memrcd, 10 Fcb 65, FRUS 1964-68, II:220-25 (quote, 223).

147. JCSM-100-65 CJCS for McNamara, 11 Feb 65, ibid, 240-43;jCS and the Wtzr in Vietnam, 1960-68, pt II:

ch 18,5-11.

148. Msg 1718 State to Saigon, 13 Feb 65, FRUS 1964-68, II:263-65.

149. Goodpaster memrcd of mtg w/Pres, 17 Feb 65, ibid, 298-308.

150. Msg 2654 Saigon to State, 19 Feb 65, ibid, 328; Jacob Van Staaveren, Gradual Failure: The Air Wtzr Over

North Vietnam, 1965-1966,81-85.

151. Van Staaveren, Gradual Failure, 3-7, 323-24.

152. jCS and the Wtzr in Vietnam, 1960-68, pt II:ch 19, 1-2.

153. Msg 473 Taylor to JCS, 22 Feb 65, FRUS 1964-68, II:347-49.

154. Msgs 1840 State to Saigon, 26 Feb 65, JCS 736-65 Wheeler to Sharp and Westmoreland, 27 Feb 65: ibid,

376, 380-81.

155. Ed note, ibid, 413.

156. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, 338.

157. Memo SecDeffor Pres, 9 Feb 65, fldr Vietnam 1965 Uan 14-May 10), box 32, Subject files, OSD Hist.

158. HCFA, Hearings: Foreign Assistance Act of1965, 89 Cong, 1 sess, 11 Mar 65, pr 4:628.

159. Baltimore Sun, 26 Apr 64.

160. New York Times, 11 Apr 65.

161. McNamara, In Retrospect, 41.

XX. CONCLUSION

1. Ltr Gilpatric to Thomas Morris, 16 Jan 78, w/atchmt, 2, OSD Hist.

2. Doris Kearns, Lyndon johnson and the American Dream, 177.

3. Hanson Baldwin, 'The McNamara Monarchy," Saturday Evening Post, 9 Mar 63; Stewart Alsop, "Master of

the Pentagon," ibid, 5 Aug 61; Theodore H. White, "Revolution in the Pentagon," Look, 23 Apr 63.

4. Lrr Zuckert to Thomas Morris, 15 Feb 78, w/atchmt, 6, OSD Hist.

5. Memo McNamara for SvcSecs et ai, 8 Mar 6 I, fldr Reading File, Dec. 60-Dec. 61, box 113, McNamara

Records, RG 200.

6. Watson, Into the Missile Age, ch 15.

7. "McNamara Defines His lob," New York Times Magazine, 26 Apr 64.

8. Cole et ai, DepartmentofDeftnse, 239.

9. McNamara interv, 27 Aug 86,21-22.

10. Ltrs Vinson to McNamara, 23 May 61, McNamara to Vinson, 25 May 61, Vinson to McNamara, 5 Jun 61,

in Army, Navy, Air Force journal, 10 Jun 6 I.

I I. McNamara interv, 3 Apr 86, 17, 18.

12. Quoted in Henry L. Trewitt, McNamara, 13.

13. Enthoven interv, 3 Feb 86, 5.

14. DoD Annual Report, FY 1963,32.

15. McNamara interv, 3 Apr 86, 22; McNamara interv, 8 Jan 75, 15.

16. McNamara interv, 8 Jan 98, 9-10.

17. Gilpatric interv, 30 Jun 70, 91-92; press conf, 5 Feb 62, McNamara Public Statements, 1962, Il:n5;

McNamara interv, 8 Jan 75,13-14; Cong Rec, Senate, 21 Mar 67,75.

18. Interv Norman Paul by Dorothy Pierce McSweeney, 21 Feb 69, 36-38, LBJL.

19. Glass interv, 28 Oct 87, 23-24, 27.

20. Gilpatric interv, 30 ]un 70, 91-92.

21. Wtzshington Post, 1 Jan 65.

22. McNamara interv, 3 Apr 86, 27.

23. Ibid, 9-10, 20-21; Rusk, As [Saw It, 521; memrcd McGeorge Bundy, 23 Sep 63, FRUS 1961-63, IX: 97-

98; Nitze interv, 3 Oct 84, 32.

24. DoD Annual Report, FY 1965, 13-14.

25. Quoted in James A. Narhan, "Force, Statecraft, and American Foreign Poliey," Polity, Winter 95, 241.

26. McNamara, In Retrospect.
Notes to Pages 546-49 629

27. Interv Adam Yarmolinsky by Alfred Goldberg and Ronald Landa, 14 May 93,26, OSD Hist; Yarmolinsky

paper, "Gays, Blacks, the Military and the Community," 25 Jun 93, 2-3, ibid; Morris J. MacGregor, Jr.,

Integration oftheArmedForces, 1940-1965,520; New York Times, 21 Apr 62; memo McNamara for Pres, 24

Jul 63, in Morris J. MacGregor and Bernard C. Nalty, eds, Blacks in the United States Armed Forces: Basic

Documents, XIII: 169-70.

28. Memo McNamara for SvcSecs, 10 Ju164, in 000 News Release 510-64,13 Ju164, McNamara Public Statements, 1964, Ill:1380-81.

29. Ibid. McNamara underscored the linkage between integration and enhanced military effectiveness.

30. Sorensen, Kennedy, 486-87.

31. Pres rpt to nation on situation at Univ of Mississippi, 30 Sep 62, Kennedy Public Papers, 1962, 726-28;

McNamara interv, 27 Aug 86, 3-4.

32. Washington Post, 3 Ocr 62; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 948; msg Howze to Wheeler, 4 Oct 62, Rdr

XVIll Airborne Corps Messages, 1-7 Oct 62, box 12, Records ofOxford, Miss. Operations, 1961-63, RG

319; CGUSCONARC/CINCARSTRlKE to RUCAC/CGUSARMYTHREE et ai, 23 Ju163, Rdr Dept of

the Army (CONARC) II, Messages Sent Oan-JuI63), box 10, ibid.

33. Sorensen, Kennedy, 487-88.

34. Ltr Brown to Thomas Morris, 23 May 78, OSD Hist.

35. McGeorge Bundy, The Strength ofGovernment, 37; Itr Fubini to Thomas Morris, 6 Jan 78, OSD Hist; ltr

Gilpatric to Morris, 16 Jan 78, w/atchmt, 3, ibid.

36. Lm Drucker to Morris, 6 Feb 78, Blandford to Morris, 8 Mar 78, Sharp to Morris, 9 Apr 78, OSD Hist;

Taylor interv, 18 Oct 83, 18.

37. Ltr Blandford to Morris, cited in n 36.

38. White, "Revolution in the Pentagon," 46.
Notes on Sources

and Selected Bibliography

The most important records used in research for this volume were retired files

in Record Group (RG) 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, at

the Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland. The Records Center has since transferred some of these files to the National Archives at College

Park, Maryland. Eventually the remainder will be sent there.

Key among the RG 330 materials are the annual subject-decimal files of the

secretary and deputy secretary of defense, plus other collections of Robert McNamara files that span his entire tenure. In 1992 a large collection of McNamara

files in RG 330, designated Accession 71A-4401 and comprising 203 boxes, was

transferred from Suitland to College Park. McNamara deeded the collection to the

National Archives, where it became part of RG 200, Donated Records. Although

most of the research took place while the collection was at Suitland, citations are

to its new box numbers and new name at College Park-McNamara Records.

McNamara himself made few records. He kept no diaries and prepared typewritten memoranda, which are scattered throughout the files, of only a few of the

many meetings he attended. Nor did he have a secretary listen in on telephone

conversations to take notes, as did some officials like George Ball at the Department of State. His personal imprint, however, is evident in occasional handwritten

summaries on lined notepads enumerating a paper's major points, in "to do" lists,

and in marginal notations on memoranda he received. The notepad jottingsoften undated, lacking context, and extremely sketchy-are generally of less value

than the marginal notations.

A particularly useful source in RG 330 are notes of McNamara's weekly Monday morning staff meetings, prepared usually by R. Eugene Livesay. Attendees

included the service secretaries, the chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the

deputy secretary and assistant secretaries of defense, and McNamara's special assistants. As a rule meetings dealt with organizational, management, legislative, and

budgetary matters, and sometimes featured a special briefing on a weapon system

630
Bibliography 631

or an issue of current concern. Seldom did they delve into broad policy or strategic issues. McNamara discontinued the meetings held during the Truman and

Eisenhower years of the Joint Secretaries and the Staff Council and only brieRy

in 1961 held Armed Forces Policy Council meetings. In effect his staff meetings

replaced the meetings of these former bodies. Notes of the staff meetings are in

Accession 77-0062, which also holds records of the earlier meetings of the Joint

Secretaries, Staff Council, and Armed Forces Policy CounciL In previous volumes

of the OSD History Series this accession was called either AFPC Meeting files

or OASD(C)(A) files. Here it is called AFPC and SecDef Meetings files. Also of

utility are notebooks in the OSD Historical Office containing handwritten notes

made by McNamara's military assistant, Sidney B. Berry, Jr., not only of certain of

the staff meetings, but also of several meetings the secretary held separately with

the Joint Chiefs and of meetings during his visits to Southeast Asia in SeptemberOctober and December 1963 and March 1964.

No complete record of McNamara's appointments has been found. The OSD

Historical Office has fragments of an appointment book, but the irregular, scattered entries diminish its usefulness and reliability. Much ofMcNamara's high-level

meeting schedule can be gleaned from Roswell L. Gilpatric's appointment books at

the Kennedy Library and from the appointment books of Secretary of State Dean

Rusk at the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and of Presidents Kennedy and

Johnson at the respective presidential libraries.

In RG 330 the files ofthe assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, both the annual collections of general files and the more specialized

regional or country files, proved extremely helpfuL Oflimited value were the files

of deputy secretaries Gilpatric and Cyrus R. Vance, which consist essentially of

chronologically arranged outgoing correspondence, and the files of special assistants and other assistant secretaries.

A notable exception are the files retired by the assistant secretary of defense

(comptroller). Two accessions, on loan from the Suitland Records Center to

the OSD Historical Office, were essential in the writing of the budget chapters.

Accessions 71A-2684 and 73A-497, which together span the years 1947 to 1970,

represent material gathered by Henry Glass during his service in the comptroller's office and as special assistant to the secretary and deputy secretary. Previous

volumes in the series cited them as the files of the Assistant to the Secretary and

the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Here they are called Assistant Secretary of

Defense (Comptroller) files, or more simply ASD(C) files. Upon completion of

Volume VII the office will return them to the Records Center for eventual transfer to the National Archives. Also useful regarding the budget are the files of the

assistant for legislative affairs (Accession 67A-4632), which contain OSD's weekly

reports, 1962-1964, to Lawrence F. O'Brien, the president's special assistant.

The authors took advantage of the OSD Historical Office's extensive subject

files of newspaper and journal clippings, a collection of miscellaneous material on
632 Bibliography

the Vietnam War, congressional publications, and other reference material, as well

as a partial collection ofthe secretary of defense's telegraphic cables.

Next in importance to OSD records were the holdings of the Kennedy and

Johnson libraries, especially the national security files. Collections of the papers

of OSD officials at these repositories include those of Gilpatric and Adam Yarmolinsky at the Kennedy Library and Alain C. Enthoven at the Johnson Library. The

William Bundy papers at the Johnson Library consist only of his lengthy draft

manuscript on the Vietnam War. The Johnson Library also has an unprocessed

collection of Harold Brown papers, which library officials indicate contains mostly

speeches and awards. Among the personal papers of OSD officials in other repositories are those of Paul H. Nitze at the Library ofCongress.

Joint Chiefs of Staff material includes the papers of Air Force Chiefs of Staff

Thomas D. White and Curtis E. LeMay at the Library of Congress, the extremely

rich papers of Chief of Naval Operations Arleigh A. Burke (his tenure lasted only

through 1 August 1961) at the Naval Historical Center, and the retired records

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (RG 218) at College Park, including Earle G. Wheeler's files as chairman. The papers of Lyman L. Lemnitzer and Maxwell D. Taylor,

Wheeler's predecessors, are at the National Defense University Library. Taylor's

papers include material from his service as the president's military representative,

1961-62, and as ambassador to South Vietnam, 1964-65. The Naval Historical

Center has the papers of Burke's successors, George W Anderson and David L.

McDonald, but neither is organized for research. Much good documentation for

their tenures is in the Chief of Naval Operations Immediate Office Files (Double

Zero Files), which are processed and for which a detailed finding aid is available.

The U.S. Marine Corps History and Museums Division has Wallace M. Greene's

notes as commandant, many ofthem handwritten, of meetings beginning in 1964

that President Johnson held with McNamara and the JCS regarding Southeast

Asia. Papers at the Hoover Institution of Greene's predecessor, David M. Shoup,

and of Edward G. Lansdale yielded nothing of use.

The primary published documentary collections used were Public Papers ofthe

Presidents ofthe United States, the OSD Historical Office's limited edition volumes

of Public Statements ofSecretary ofDefense Robert S. McNamara, and the Department of State's indispensable Foreign Relations of the United States series. The

authors also utilized the growing number of published transcripts ofWhite House

meetings and telephone conversations and in some cases consulted audio tapes for

which transcripts have so far not been made. They made use, too, of documentary

collections on the internet, particularly declassified documents at www.galenet.com.

Supplementing the memoir literature were oral history interviews conducted

by the OSD Historical Office, the military services, and the Kennedy and Johnson

libraries. Especially helpful were interviews the presidential libraries undertook

during the 1960s and early 1970s when events were still relatively fresh in participants' memories, as well as Richard Neustadt's interviews conducted at President
Bibliography 633

Kennedy's request in the wake of the 1962 Skybolt crisis and Alfred Goldberg's

interviews in the late sixties with U.S. officials regarding strategic questions.

Doctoral dissertations, as well as unpublished studies and research reports produced within the Department of Defense and elsewhere, proved valuable. Note

should be made of the seven-volume draft administrative history of the Department of Defense, 1963-69, and the JCS Historical Division's volumes on the Joint

Chiefs of Staff and national policy, and the Joint Chiefs and the war in Vietnam.

Some records used in the preparation of this volume remain classified. The

select bibliography that follows includes records, publications, and other materials

cited in the notes.

OFFICIAL RECORDS AND PERSONAL PAPERS

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kans.

Lauris Norstad Papers

Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, Mich.

Gerald R. Ford Congressional Papers

Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, Tex.

Francis M. Bator Papers

William P. Bundy Papers

Alain C. Enthoven Papers

National Security File (NSF)

Agency File

McGeorge Bundy Files

Country File

Country File, Vietnam

C. V. Clifton Files

Robert W. Komer Files

National Security Council Histories

National Security Council Meetings File

Subject File

Recordings and Transcripts ofConversations and Meetings

Vice Presidential Security Files

White House Central Files

Confidential File

Subject File

John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Mass.

George W. Ball Papers

David E. Bell Papers

Roswell L. Gilpatric Papers

Kermit Gordon Papers

National Security Files (NSF)

Richard E. Neustadt Papers

David Nunnerley Papers

President's Office Files (POF)

Presidential Recordings

Meeting Recordings

Telephone Recordings

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. Papers

Theodore C. Sorensen Papers

Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

W. Averell Harriman Papers
634 Bibliography

Curtis E. LeMay Papers

Paul H. Nitze Papers

Thomas D. White Papers

Marine Corps History and Museums Division, Washington, D.C.

Wallace M. Greene, Jr. Papers

National Archives, College Park, Md.

General Records ofthe Department of State (RG 59)

Central Files

Lot Files

66DI82,S/MF(SpecialAssistanttotheSecretaryofStateforMultilateralForceNegotiations)

Files

69 D121, SIP (Policy Planning Council) Files

Donated Records (RG 200)

Robert S. McNamara Records

Records ofthe Joint Chiefs ofStaff (RG 218)

Chairman, Joint Chiefs ofStaff Files

Earle G. Wheeler Files

Records of the Army Staff (RG 319)

Records of Oxford, Mississippi Operations

National Defense University Library, Washington, D.C.

Lyman L. Lemnitzer Papers

Maxwell D. Taylor Papers

Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.

Arleigh M. Burke Papers

Bumpy Road Files

Originator's Files

Sensitive Files

Chief of Naval Operations Immediate Office Files (Double Zero Files)

Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Arlington, Va.

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptrollet) Files

Sidney B. Berry, Jr. Notebooks

Biographical Files

Secretary of Defense Cable Files

Subject Files

Public Record Office, Kew, London, England

Prime Minister's Office Files (PREM 11)

Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Md.

Records ofthe Office ofthe Secretary of Defense (RG 330)

64A-2093 SecDefSubject Decimal Files, 1960

64A-2382 ISA Files, 1961

65A-3078 Administrative Secretary Files, 1955-61

65A-3464 SecDefSubject Decimal Files, 1961

65A-350 lISA Files, 1962

66A-3529 Roswell Gilpatric Files, 1961-64

66A-3542 SecDefSubject Decimal Files, 1962

67A-4564 ISA Files, 1963

67A-4632 Legislative Affairs Files, 1961-64

67A-4736 ISA Files, 1957-63

67A-4738 ISA United Kingdom Files, 1957-62

67A-480 1 Legislative Affairs Files, 1961-64

68A-0306 ISA Files, 1964

68A-1575 DDR&E Skybolt Files, 1959-64

68A-4024 National Security Council Files, 1947-65

69A-2243 Atomic Energy Files, 1958-63

69A-2317 Cyrus Vance Files, 1964-67
69A-3131

69A-7425

71A-2170

7lA-2896

71A-3470

71A-6489

76-0028

77-0062

SecDefSubject Decimal Files, 1963

SecDefSubject Decimal Files, 1964

Notman Paul Files, 1962-65

Cuba Sensitive Files, 1961-64

Robert McNamata Files, 1961-68

Miscellaneous Sensitive Files, 1951-66

SecDefSpecial Assistant Files, 1958-73

AFPC and SecDefMeetings Files, 1950-72

INTERVIEWS

Bibliography 635

Air Fotce Historical Support Office, Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, D.C.

Charyk, Joseph V. Interviewed by James c. Hasdorff. Washington, D.C., 15 January, 24 April

1974.

Zuckert, Eugene M.lnterviewed by George M. Watson,Jr. Washington, D.C., 3,4,5,9 December

1986.

Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, Tex.

Brown, Harold. Interviewed by Dorothy Pierce. Washington, D.C., 17 January 1969.

Cleveland, Harlan. Interviewed by Paige E. Mulhollan. Washington, D.C., 13 August 1969.

Dillon, C. Douglas. Interviewed by Paige E. Mulhollan. New York, 29 June 1969.

Gilpatric, Roswell L. Interviewed by Ted Gittinger. New York, 2 November 1982 (Internet

copy).

Gordon, Kermit. Interviewed by David G. McComb. Washington, D.C., 9 January 1969.

Johnson, Lyndon B. Interviewed by William J. Jorden. LBJ Ranch, Tex., 12 August 1969.

McNamara, Robert S. Interviewed by Walt W. Rostow. Washington, D.C., 8 January 1975.

____. Interviewed by Robert Dallek. Washington, D.C., 26 March 1993 (Internet copy).

O'Brien, Lawrence F. Interviewed by Michael L. Gillette. New York, 18 September, 30 October

1985, 11 February 1986 (Internet copies).

Paul, Norman. Interviewed by Dorothy Pierce McSweeny. Washington, D.C., 21 February 1969.

Staats, Elmer B. Interviewed byT. H. Baker. Washington, D.C., 9 December 1971.

John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Mass.

Bell, David E. Interviewed by Robert C. Turner. Washington, D.C., 11 July 1964.

____. Interviewed by William T. Dentzer. Washington, D.C., 2 January 1965.

Brown, Harold. Interviewed by Steven Rifkin. Washington, D.C., 9 July 1964.

Chayes, Abram. Interviewed by Eugene Gordon. Washington, D.C., 9 July 1964.

Gilpatric, Roswell L. Interviewed by Dennis J. O'Brien. New York, 5, 27 May, 12 August 1970.

McNamara, Robert S. Interviewed by James G. Blight. Washington, D.C., 21 May 1987.

McNaughton, John T. Interviewed by Lawrence E. McQuade. Washington, D.C., 14 November

1964.

____. Interviewed by George Bunn. Washington, D.C., 21 Novembet 1964.

Ormsby Gore, David. Interviewed by Richard Neustadt. Boston, 5 May 1964.

Stahr, Elvis J., Jr. Interviewed by Robert H. Ferrell. Bloomington, Ind., 18 August 1964.

Zuckert, Eugene M. Interviewed by Lawrence E. McQuade. Washington, D.C., 18 April, 11 July

1964.

Marine Corps History and Museums Division, Washington, D.C.

Krulak, Victor H. Interviewed by Benis M. Frank. San Diego, Calif., 20 June 1970.

Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.

Anderson, George W. Interviewed by John T. Mason, Jr. Washington, D.C., 7 January, 2 April

1981.

Historical Office, Office ofthe Secretary of Defense, Arlington, Va.

Anderson, George W. Interviewed by Maurice Matloff and Roger R. Trask. Washington, D.C., 7

August 1984.

Cooke, David O. Interviewed by Maurice Matloff and Alfred Goldberg. Washington, D.C.,

23 October 1989.
636 Bibliography

Enthoven, Alain C. Interviewed by Maurice Marloff. Stanford, Calif., 3 February 1986.

Gilpatric, Roswell L. Interviewed by Maurice Matloff. Washington, D.C., 14 November 1983.

Glass, Henry. Interviewed by Maurice Marloff, Lawrence Kaplan, Alfred Goldberg, and Robert J.

Watson. Washington, D.C., 28 October 1987.

Harriman, W Averell. Interviewed by Alfred Goldberg and Doris Condit. Washington, D.C.,

29 May 1975.

Kaufmann, William W. Interviewed by Alfred Goldberg. Washington, D.C., 14 May 1966.

____. Interviewed by Lawrence Kaplan and Maurice Marloff. Washington, D.C., 14 July

1986.

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u.s. CONGRESS: GENERAL

Congressional Record. 1961-1965.

U.s. CONGRESS: HOUSE HEARINGS

Committee on Appropriations. Subcommittee. Department ofDeftnse Appropriationsfor 1962. 87

Cong, 1 Sess, 1961.

___. Department ofDefense Appropriationsfor 1963. 87 Cong, 2 Sess, 1962.

___. Department ofDeftnse Appropriationsfor 1964. 88 Cong, 1 Sess, 1963,

____. Department ofDeftnse Appropriationsfor 1965. 88 Cong, 2 Sess, 1964.

____. Foreign Operations Appropriationsfor 1962. 87 Cong, 1 Sess, 1961.

____,. Foreign Operations Appropriationsfor 1963.87 Cong, 2 Sess, 1962.

____. Foreign Operations Appropriationsfor 1964. 88 Cong, 1 Sess, 1963.

____. Foreign Operations Appropriationsfor 1965.88 Cong, 2 Sess, 1964.

Committee on Armed Services. AuthorizingAppropriationsfor Aircraft, Missiles, and Naval Vessels for

the Armed Forces. 87 Cong, 1 Sess, 1961.

____. Military Posture Briefings. 87 Cong, 1 Sess, 1961.

___. Military Posture and H.R. 9751. 87 Cong, 2 Sess, 1962.

____. Military Posture and H.R. 2440. 88 Cong, 1 Sess, 1963.
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___. Military Posture and HR. 9637. 88 Cong, 2 Sess, 1964.

___. Military Posture and HR. 4016. 89 Cong, 1 Sess, 1965.

____. House Joint Resolution 505, to Authorize the President to Order Units and Members in the

Ready Reserve to Active Duryfir Not More Than 12 Months andfir Other Purposes; and HR. 8353,

to Authorize AdditionalAppropriationsfir Aircraft, Missiles, and Naval Vessels fir the Armed Forces,

andfir Other Purposes. 87 Cong, 1 Sess, 1961.

____. Subcommittee No.3. Military Reserve Posture. 87 Cong, 2 Sess, 1962.

____. Special Subcommittee on Defense Agencies. Hearings. 87 Cong, 2 Sess, 1962.

Committee on Foreign Affairs. To Establish a United States Arms Control Agency. 87 Cong, 1 Sess,

1961.

____. The International Development and Security Act. 87 Cong, 1 Sess, 1961.

____. Foreign Assistance Act of1962. 87 Cong, 1 Sess, 1961.

____. Foreign Assistance Act of1963. 87 Cong, 2 Sess, 1962.

____. Foreign Assistance Act of1964.88 Cong, 1Sess, 1963.

____. Foreign Assistance Act of1965. 88 Cong, 2 Sess, 1964.

Committee on Government Operations. Subcommittee. Civil Deftnse-1961. 87 Cong, 1 Sess,

1961.

___. Deftnse Supply Agency. 87 Cong, 2 Sess, 1962.

____. Subcommittee on Military Operations. Systems Development and Management. 87 Cong,

2 Sess, 1962.

Committee on Science and Astronautics. Deftnse Space Interests. 87 Cong, 1 Sess, 1961.

____. Research and Developmentfir Deftnse. 87 Cong, 1 Sess, 1961.

U.S. CONGRESS: HOUSE DOCUMENTS AND REpORTS

Amendments to the Budget Involving Increases fir the National Aeronautics and Space Administration,

the Small Business Administration, the u.s. Infirmation Agency, the Department ofCommerce, and

the Department ofDeftnse, Military. 87 Cong, 1 Sess, 1961. H. Doc 179.

Amendments to the Budget fOr the Military Functions ofthe Department ofDeftnse Redistributing the

Funds RequestedfOr the Army Reserve Forces. 87 Cong, 1 Sess, 1962. H. Doc. 377.

Committee on Appropriations. Department ofDeftnse Appropriation Bill, 1962, 87 Cong, 1 Sess,

1961. H. Rpt. 574.

___. Department ofDeftnse Appropriation Bill, 1963. 87 Cong, 2 Sess, 1962. H. Rpt. 1607.

___. DepartmentofDeftnseAppropriation Bill, 1964.88 Cong, 1 Sess, 1963. H. Rpt. 439.

___. DepartmentofDeftnseAppropriation Bill, 1964.88 Cong, 1 Sess, 1963. H. Rpt. 812.

____. Department ofDeftnse Appropriation Bill, 1965. 88 Cong, 2 Sess, 1964. H. Rpt. 1329.

____. Department ofDeftnse Appropriation Bill, 1965. 88 Cong, 2 Sess, 1964. H. Rpt. 1642.

____. Department ofDeftnseAppropriationsfOr 1963: Conftrence Report to Accompany HR 11289.

87 Cong, 2 Sess, 1962. H. Rpt. 2036.

____. Foreign Assistance Actof1961. 87 Cong, I Sess, 1961. H. Rpt. 1088.

____. Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, 1962. 87 Cong, 1 Sess, 1961.

H. Rpt. 1107.

____. Foreign Assistance Act of1963. 88 Cong, 1 Sess, 1963. H. Rpt. 1006.

____. Foreign Aid and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, 1964. 88 Cong, 1 Sess, 1963. H.

Rpt. 1040.

___. Foreign Assistance Act of1964. 88 Cong, 2 Sess, 1964. H. Rpt. 1925.

Committee on Armed Services. Report ofSpecial Subcommittee on Deftnse Agencies. 87 Cong, 2 Sess,

1962.

____. AuthorizingAppropriationsfir Aircraft, Missiles, and Naval Vessels. 87 Cong, 1 Sess, 1961.

H. Rpt. 380.

- . AuthorizingAppropriationsfOr Aircraft, Missiles, andNaval Vtossels. 87 Cong, 1 Sess, 1961.

H. Rpt. 817.

____. Authorization fOr Aircraft, Missiles, and Naval VtosseLr, Fiscal Year 1962. 87 Cong, 1 Sess,

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Library of Congress, Legislative Reference Service. United States Deftnse Policies in 1961. 87 Cong,

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U.S. CONGRESS: SENATE HEARINGS

Committee on Appropriations. Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriationsfor 1962. 87

Cong, 1 Sess, 1961.

____. Subcommittee. Department ofDefense Appropriationsfor 1962. 87 Cong, 1 Sess, 1961.

________. Department ofDefense Appropriationsfor 1963. 87 Cong, 2 Sess, 1962.

________. Department ofDefense Appropriationsfor 1964.88 Cong, 1 Sess, 1963.

Committee on Armed Services. Nomination ofRobert S. McNamara. 87 Cong, 1 Sess, 1961.

___--,. Nominations Hearing on Paul H. Nitze, Charles j. Hitch, Cyrus R. Vance, Arthur Sylvester,

and Thomas D. Morris. 87 Cong, 1 Sess, 1961.

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____. Status ofU.S. Strategic Power. 90 Cong, 2 Sess, 1968.

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1961.

____. Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation. TFX Contract Negotiations. 88 Cong, 1 Sess,

1963-64.

________. TFX Contract Investigations (Second Series). 91 Cong, 2 Sess, 1970.

____,. Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations. Planning-Programming-Budgeting. 90 Cong, 2 Sess, 1968.
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Index

Acheson, Dean, 2, 6, 314, 381; and Berlin, 147-

49, 151-53, 155, 161, 164, 170; and Cuban

missile crisis, 206, 214; and MLF, 389, 391,

393,398; and NATO, 303-04, 359, 361, 362,

363,389,391

Acheson-Lilienthal report, 324

Adenauer, Konrad, 146, 156,210,359,361,373,

392, 404n, 410-12

Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft (AMSA),

486,490

Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), 337

Agency for International Development, 36-37,

252,256,424-25,429,431-33,436-37,439,

444-46,453,506,511-12,533

Aiken, Sen. George, 351,426

Ailes, Stephen B., 34, 108-10

Air America, 256

Air Force, U.S., 7-8,16-18,21-25,28,35,38-40,

50,72-74,539,541; and balance of payments,

450, 452; and base closures, 464-65; and Bay

of Pigs, 176; and Berlin, 154, 161; and cosr

reduction program, 455, 461; and counterinsurgency, 38-40; and flexible response, 295,

301-02, 309, 311-12, 316-17, 319-20; and

FY 1962 budget, 53-55, 59-63, 67, 70; and

FY 1963 budget, 82-83, 85-87, 90, 93, 95,

100, 103, 106, 115-16; and FY 1964 budget,

120, 122-23, 125-28, 137; and FY 1965 budget, 476, 478, 482; and FY 1966 budget, 490,

493-94, 496; and multilateral force, 404; and

Skybolt, 376-77; and space development, 44-

47, 49; and TFX, 466-69, 471-72, 540; and

Vietnam, 531

aircraft carriers, 85, 467, 478, 487, 490, 491-92

airlift, 12, 68, 70, 80, 83, 85, 92, 129, 368, 495,

496

Albert, Rep. Carl, 441

Algeria, 363, 367

Alliance for Progress, 195, 199,227,427, 441n

Alsop, Joseph, 152,400

Alsop, Stewart, 12

Amery, Julian, 378

Anderson, Admiral George W, Jr., 47-48,86,91,

102, 125, 128-29, 132, 203, 212, 352, 407,

468

Anderson, Robert, 449

Anderson, Maj. Rudolph, 222

Ann Arbor address, 295, 308-09, 313, 315, 373,

384,396,398

anti-ballistic missile (ABM), 34, 35, 60, 61, 69,

123-25, 128, 309, 315, 320, 321, 348, 493,

544

Ap Bac, batrle of, 281-82

Apollo,477n

Arends, Rep. Leslie c., 115, 133

Argentina, 211

Armed Services Procurement Regulation, 454,

459

arms control and disarmament, 2,18,323-56. See

also limited nuclear test ban treaty

Arms Control and DisarmamentAgency (ACDA),

325-26,336,338,342-45,348,356

Army, U.S., 7-8, 16-18, 21-25, 28, 33-35, 44-

46,73-74,539,547; and balance of payments,

450-51; and base closures, 464-65; and Bay of

Pigs, 173, 182; and Berlin, 143, 151, 153-54,

161; and cost reduction program, 456; and Cuban missile crisis, 224; and counterinsurgency,

38-41; and flexible response, 293-95, 316; and

FY 1962 budget, 54-55, 60-63, 65-66, 68; and

FY 1963 budget, 81-82, 86-89, 91, 93, 107-

09,112-14; and FY 1964 budget, 120, 122-26,

128, 137; and FY 1965 budget, 476-77; and

FY 1966 budget, 490, 494, 496; and NATO,

368; and Vietnam, 506, 512, 515, 529-30

650
assured destruction, 34, 295, 319-22

Athens address, 295, 305-09, 313, 315, 373, 384,

396-99

Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF), 414-16, 418

Atlantic, Supreme Allied Commander (SACLANT),

211,366,391, 393

Atlantic Command, Commandet in Chief (CINC~T), 186, 193,200,202,211,213

Atlas, 53, 54, 59, 335, 493

Atomic Energy Act, 1958 Amendments to, 372,

375

Atomic Energy Commission, 32, 62, 138, 328-

29,331,335,345

Ausland, John, 168

Australia, 251, 434

B-26, 173, 175, 179, 183,237

B-47,60, 62, 348,404,496

B-52, 54, 60, 63, 64, 66, 68, 69, 83, 104, 213,

376,496,526,530

B-58, 54,60,63, 64,66,68,69,496

B-59 (Soviet submarine), 212

B-70, 15,59-60,62,63,64,69,70, 71, 85, 86,

90,104,312,454,539,541

Badger (Soviet bomber), 348

balance of payments (BOP), 142,368,370,422,

429,434,436,447-53,473

Ball, George W, 1,437; and Cuban missile crisis,

206, 206n, 216; and MLF, 385, 388-89, 400,

401n, 405-06, 408, 413, 416, 418; and NATO,

382; and Vietnam, 286, 498, 504, 523

Baruch Plan, 324

base closures, 447, 453, 462-66, 540

Basic National Security Policy (BNSP), 295-98,

313

Bates, Rep. William H., 99-100, 459

Baudet, Philippe, 370

Bay ofpigs invasion. See Cuba

Belgium, 360, 363, 365, 367, 414

Bell, David E., 317, 379; and FY 1962 budget,

56-58,60; and FY 1963 budget, 75, 78-79, 87-

89,91; and FY 1964 budget, 119-20, 127; and

military assistance, 422, 429, 431-32, 436-37,

438, 442, 444-45

Berle, AdolfA., 178, 182

Berlin, 15, 30, 32-33, 121, 143-71, 232, 250,

270, 294, 353, 388, 449; and Cuban missile

crisis, 203, 207, 208, 218-20; and FY 1962

budget, 64, 67-70; and FY 1963 budget, 82,

84,86-87,88,91,99

Berlin Task Force, 147, 160, 162, 164

Bethe, Hans, 334, 442

Bien Hoa, 526-27

Bissell, Richard M., Jt., 36n, 173-74, 178-79,

180-81, 184, 188, 196,301

Index 651

Black, Col. E. E, 329

Blackburn, A. W, 470-71

Blandford, John, 548

Blomeyer-Bartenstein, Horst, 374

Blue Streak, 376, 378

Boeing, 468-69

Bohlen, Charles, 399

Boston Navy Yard, 465

Boun Oum, Ptince, 229, 245, 247-48, 253

Bowie, Robert, 385, 387, 389, 398n, 400, 405

Bowie Report, 387

Bowles, Chestet, 180

Boyle, Btig. Gen. Andrew J., 252

Brandt, Willy, 146, 156, 158

Brazil, 211, 227, 444

Bridges, Sen. Styles, 19

Brooklyn Navy Yard, 465

Brown, Harold, 7-8, 483, 485, 491, 547; and

FY 1964 budget, 131-33, 137, 139; and MLF,

400; and Nike-Zeus, 124; and nuclear testing,

330, 333, 343, 353; and Skybolt, 379; and

TFX, 468, 471

Brown, Winthrop G., 247-48

Bucharest, 211

Buchan, Alastair, 419-20

budget, 12, 13-14,296,317,540; FY 1961, 47,

53, 56, 57, 75; FY 1962, 14, 30-31, 38, 46,

52-71,75,82,97,143,145,153-54,170,308,

376,421-27; FY 1963, 31-32, 33, 47, 72-95,

96-117,308,377, 424, 428-31, 435; FY 1964,

33,47, 115, 116, 118-42, 379, 432-38, 440,

442,456,475; FY 1965, 34, 436-37, 439-43,

457,478,480-89,540; FY 1966, 34, 443-45,

489; FY 1967, 492

Budget, Bureau of the, 56-62,73, 75, 78-79, 82,

85, 87, 89, 119-21, 127, 317, 379, 422, 428-

29,431,437,439-40,444,477,480-83,492

Bundy, McGeorge, 6, 58, 87, 493,547; and Bay

of Pigs, 178, 180, 185; and Berlin Wall, 152,

160; and counterinsurgency, 36-37; and Cuban missile crisis, 198, 202, 204, 206, 209,

219, 222-23; and Laos, 238; and militaty assistance, 427, 437, 441; and MLF, 399-400,

402,404,406, 411-15, 416-20; and NATO,

363, 379-82; and nuclear test ban, 323, 325,

331, 335, 338-39; and Vietnam, 275, 291,

498,501,503,511,514-15,517-18,521,527,

529,530-31

Bundy, William P., 180, 220; and Bay ofPigs, 182,

200; and Laos, 252; and military assistance,

422,428,432,436,440-41; and NATO, 363,

370; and Vietnam, 265, 269-70, 274, 283-84,

288,506-07,513,515,517,527

Burchinal, Maj. Gen. DavidA., 312

Burke, Admiral Arleigh, 10-11, 61, 76, 78, 80,

173,177-78,183,186-87,189-90,242
652 Index

Burlatsky, Fedot, 220

Burma, 37,236,240,440

Byrd, Sen. Harry E, 480, 483

C-5,492,494

C-130, 58, 129

C-141, 58,492

Cabell, General Charles P., 184,302

Cambodia, 37, 228n, 229, 231, 236, 240, 255,

283,508,509,515

Cameroon, 37

Canada, 240,360,365,409,434,448,449

Cannon, Rep. Clarence, 31, 131,442

Capehart, Sen. Horner E., 204

Caribbean, Commander in Chief (CINCCARIB),427

Carroll, George, 244-45, 248-49

Carroll, Lt. Gen. Joseph E, 23

Carter, Lr. Gen. Marshall, 199

Case, Sen. Francis, 190

Castro, Fidel, 3, 13, 172-75, 183-84, 193-200,

202-03,215-19,223-27,427

Central Intelligence Agency: and Bay ofPigs, 172-

92; and Berlin, 67; and counterinsurgency, 36-

37; and Cuban missile crisis, 196, 198-99,202,

210,225-26; and Defense Intelligence Agency,

24; and Laos, 232, 236-37, 241-42, 253, 256-

57; and limited nuclear test ban treaty, 331,

346, 348; and missile gap, 300-02; and Vietnam, 266-67, 282-83, 286-87, 289, 498,501-

02,506,514-16,522n,527

Charyk, Joseph v., 8, 106,301, 467, 469-70

Chavez, Sen. Dennis, 62

Chiang Kai-shek, 508

Chile, 199

China, Communist, 145, 515; and Laos, 241,

242,243,244, 246, 250-51; and nuclear test

ban treaty, 328, 329, 342, 343, 347, 349, 350;

and Vietnam, 272, 506, 513, 526, 531, 533.

See also Taiwan

Christmas Island, 333, 334, 335

civil defense, 18,29-35, 51, 65, 69, 70, 85, 92,

96n, 125, 130,320,321,477,481,543,544

Civil Guard, 262-63, 266, 273-74, 276-77

civil rights legislation, 138, 481, 488, 491, 546

Clarke, General Bruce, 165

Clay, General Lucius, 158-59, 165-68, 170,432-

33,435

Clay Committee, 431-33, 435

Cleveland, Harlan, 418

Clifford, Clark, 4, 17n

Colby, William E., 225, 257, 282, 289, 291

Colombia, 37, 38

Committee of Principals, 325-26, 329, 336, 344-

45,348

Committee on the Defense Establishment. See

Symington Committee

comptroller, assistant secretary of defense, 8, 13,

538-39; and cost reduction program, 457; and

flexible response, 308, 310; and FY 1962 budget, 63; and FY 1963 budget, 74-77, 81, 85,

89, 95; and FY 1964 budget, 119, 122, 132;

and FY 1965 budget, 476; and FY 1966 budget, 489-92; and military assistance, 426; and

Skybolt, 377, 379; and TFX, 471

Conference on Cessation of Nuclear Weapons

Tests, 327. See also limited nuclear test ban

treaty

Congo, 38, 193, 442n

Connally, John B., Jr., 8-9, 86, 93

Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD),

449

continental defense, 14, 18,53,74,92,477,495

contracts, awarding of, 454-59, 466-73

controlled response, 295, 310, 311, 314, 317,

322. See also flexible response

conventional forces, 3, 12,52,65,87, 129, 143,

146,149,152-53,161-62,170-71,304,305,

308, 314, 324, 359, 369, 396, 429, 543. SIT

also limited warfare

Cooper, Chester, 529n

Cooper, Sen. John Sherman, 523

cost reduction, 98, 140,453-62,475,494,540

Cottrell, SterlingJ., 224

Council ofEconomic Advisers, 82, 121, 480

counter-cities, 294, 295, 320

counterforce, 294, 295, 306, 309, 310, 312, 313,

319,320,321

counterinsurgency, 35-43, 52, 62, 129,233,248,

262-67, 271, 272, 275-80, 281, 291, 292,

294

Cousins, Norman, 346

Craig, U.S.S., 519

Craig, Brig. Gen. William H., 251-52

Cuba: Bay of Pigs invasion, 1, 13, 15,20,22,24,

30, 36, 172-94, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 224,

227,239,241,242,243,257,267,269,301,

426, 475; exiles, 196-97 (see also Bay of Pigs

invasion); missile crisis, 48, 1I5, 121, 128,

135, 168-69, 195-227, 340, 356, 374, 401,

475,487,544; and Operation Mongoose, 194,

198-99,225

Cuban Revolutionary Council, 196

Cuba Study Group, 36, 186-88, 192, 194

Cuban Task Force, 225

Daley, Richard, 464

DaNang, 532

Dean, Arthur H., 2, 332, 338, 341
Decker, General George H., 61, 87, 89, 91, 162,

173,189,242

Defense Atomic Support Agency, 20

Defense Communications Agency, 17, 20, 455

Defense Intelligence Agency, 15, 17, 19,22-24,

49,202,215,226,516,521

Defense Reorganization Act of 1958,5,8, 16, 17,

24,25,28-29, 536

defense research and engineering, director of

(DDR&E), 7, 8, 15,44,61, 81, 86,131,309,

318, 330, 343, 353, 378-79, 400, 466-68,

470-72,491,548

Defense Special Missile and Astronautic Center,

24

Defense Supply Agency, 20, 24-29, 454-56

defoliation program, 276, 291

de Gaulle, Charles, 150, 156, 2lO, 314, 350, 453;

andMLF, 400, 403, 404n, 406, 409, 414, 417;

and NATO, 368, 370-74; and Vietnam, 288,

502,515

Denmark, 367

Dennison, Admiral Robert, 176, 193, 206

dependents abroad, 448-50

DeSoto patrols, 519, 521, 523, 525

Development Loan Fund (DLF), 423, 425

Dillon, C. Douglas, 121, 206n, 207, 389, 448,

452-53,481

directives, DoD, 22, 23, 44, 45, 46, 458

Dirksen, Sen. Everett M., 130, 354, 530

Disarmament Administration, 327. See also Arms

Control and Disarmament Agency

Dixon, John W, 76

Dobrynin, Anaroly; 201-02, 217, 222-23

Dodd, Sen. ThomasJ., 342

Dominic, Operation, 335, 337

Dominican Republic, 226

domino principle, 288

Douglas, James, 10,76

Douglas, Sen. Paul H., 457

Douglas-Home, Alec, 351, 414, 415

Dowling, Walter c., 159, 165-66

Draft Presidential Memorandums (DPMs), 83-

85, 86, 116, 121, 122, 123, 295, 478, 479,

481,490

Drucker, Peter, 548

Dulles, Allen W, 36, 67,173-76,178,180,182,

186,188,196,198,242,266,331

Dulles, John Foster, 144

Duong Van Minh, General, 271, 498, 502, 504,

505,510,512-13,524

Durbrow, Elbridge, 263-65

Dworshak, Sen. Henry, 276

Dynasoar, 69,104,477,479,481

Index 653

East Germany. See German Democratic Republic

Ecuador, 37, 38

Edwards, U.S.S., 525

Egypt, 202

Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee

(ENDC), 334, 335, 336, 337, 339, 340-41

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 52, 67, 73, 145, 189,

260, 293, 296, 359, 377, 480, 546; and balance of payments, 448-49; and Castro regime,

172-75; and Defense Reorganization Act of

1958,16; and FY 1962 budget, 53-54; and FY

1964 budget, 135; and Laos, 228-29, 231; and

missile gap, 299; and nuclear test ban, 324-26,

327n, 331, 342; and SlOP, 316; and Vietnam,

263,267,531-32

elections: 1960,2-3, 9, 13, 144, 175,293,298-

99,357,377; 1964, 121,476,484,489,524,

526

Ellender, Sen. Allen J., 253

Ellsberg, Daniel, 308

Engle, Sen. Clair, 63

Enthoven, Alain c., 8, 14,76, 84, 136, 308, 317,

538-39; and assured destruction, 319, 321; and

counterforce strategy, 309-lO, 312-13; and FY

1966 budget, 489-90, 492

Erhard, Ludwig, 414, 416, 419

Europe, Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR),

155, 164, 190, 222, 304, 358-60, 363, 369,

375, 386-88, 391, 393-95, 397, 401, 404,

407

Europe, U.S. Commander in Chief (USCINCEUR), 146, 155, 161,363

Executive Committee (ExCom), 204-10, 213-17,

219-21

Export-Import Bank, 423n, 434

F-5,438

F-8,516

F-lOO,516

F-101,284

F-102,85

F-104G,223

F-106,85

F-111, 469, 471-73, 492, 541

Fanfani, Amintore, 4lO

Farm Gate, 39, 272

Federal Civil Defense Administration, 30

Felt, Admiral Harry, 262, 282-83, 290, 507, 513-

14,519

Finletter, Thomas K., 17n, 150, 304, 362, 392-

94,396-98,413,418-19

Fisk, James B., 325

Fitzgerald, Desmond, 225

Five-Year Force Structure and Financial Program

(FYFS&FP), 119, 120,476-77
654 Index

flexible response, 13,52, 143, 170-71,293-322,

358,360,369,543,549

Flood, Rep. Daniel]., 66

Foertsch, General Friedrich, 373

Food for Peace program, 138

Ford, Rep. Gerald R., 108-09, 136, 430, 436,

487, 530

Ford, Harold P., 283, 527n

Ford, Henry, II, 4

foreign aid, 422, 424-25, 430, 431, 436, 437,

442,445-46

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 424, 433, 439,

444-45

Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, 430

Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, 434

Forrestal, Michael, 37, 281, 286, 502-04, 506,

513-14, 519, 525

Fort Chaffee, Ark., 464

Foster, John S., 330, 352

Foster, William c., 326, 336, 341, 348

France, 304, 307, 309, 314, 357, 362, 373, 384;

base closures in, 462n; and Berlin, 146, 150,

155, 156; force de frappe, 314, 370-73; and

Indochina, 228-29, 231, 502; and MLF, 385,

389, 391, 403, 404n, 406, 408, 414, 417;

military assistance and sales to, 421, 434; and

NATO requirements, 360, 365-70; and nuclear test ban, 342, 349-50; and u.s. balance of

payments, 448, 451, 453

Frankel, Rear Adm. Samuel B., 23

Freeman, General Paul, 169

Fubini, Eugene, 547

Fulbright, Sen. J. William, 130, 180, 351, 354,

440,523

Gaither panel, 30

Garcia, Reuben de Leon, 196

Gates, Thomas S., 5,10-11,17,35,76,392,449,

536; and creation of DCA, 20; and Laos, 231;

and McNamara, 489; and missile gap, 300; and

MLF, 387-88; and SlOp, 316; and Skybolr,

376; and TFX, 466; and Vietnam, 262

Gavin, James, 372

Gemini, 477n, 481-82

general counsel, DoD, 7,19,28

General Dynamics, 468-73

Geneva Accords (1954), 228-29, 235, 246, 260,

268

Geneva Conference on Laos (1961), 243-47

Geneva Conference on Laos (1962), 254-56, 268

Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference (1959),

144,324-25

German Democratic Republic (GDR), 143, 144,

145, 149, 150-51, 154, 156-57, 163-64, 168,

169-70,360

Germany, Federal Republic of (FRG), 38, 42,

357, 358, 434; and Berlin crisis, 143-71; and

flexible response, 304, 314-15, 384; and MLF,

385,386,389,390,391,392,394,396,403,

408,410,412,414,416,418,419,420; and

NATO requirements, 360-61, 362-70; and

nuclear aspirations, 373-75 (see afro MLF); and

u.S. balance of payments, 448, 449, 450, 451,

452

Geyelin, Philip, 413

Gilpatric, Roswell, L., 7,10,14, 17n, 19,48,61,

76-77, 81, 86-87, 89-90, 106, 110, 120, 129,

136, 326, 450-51, 456, 482, 492; and B-70,

59; and Bay of Pigs, 180-81; and Berlin Wall,

67, 150-51; and centralization of power in

OSD, 49; and civil defense program, 32; and

counterinsurgency, 37, 41; and Cuban missile

crisis, 197-98,201, 206n, 208, 210, 212; and

FY 1964 budget, 139-40; and Laos, 242, 244,

251; and Lansdale, 267-68; and McNamara,

535, 541-42, 548; and military assistance,

423n, 427; and NATO, 363, 375-76; and National Reconnaissance Office, 302; and nuclear

testing, 333-34; and nuclear weapons policy,

162, 296-97, 299; and Skybolr, 378-79, 383-

84; and space research, 45-46; and TFX, 468-

71; and Vietnam, 264, 286

Glass, Henry E., 76-77, 80, 88-89, 94, 97, 99,

132,136,541

Goldberg, ArthurJ., 9

Goldwater, Sen. Barry, 68, 352, 354, 476, 484-

86,489,524

Goodpaster, Lt. Gen. Andrew]., 374, 529n, 531

Goodwin, Richard, 178, 180

Gordon, Kermit, 444, 477, 480-83, 491, 493

Gore, Sen. Albert, 190

Goulart, Joao, 227n

Gray, Brig. Gen. David W, 176-77

Gray report, 176

Great Britain, 357, 362, 421, 434; base closures

in, 462n; and Berlin, 146, 148, 155, 156, 163-

64; and flexible response, 314; and Geneva

Conference, 231, 238, 240, 243, 246-47; and

MLF, 386, 392, 402-05, 406, 409, 410-11,

412, 414-15, 416-18; and NATO requirements, 360-61, 362-70; and nuclear tesr ban,

332, 339-40, 349-51; and Skybolt, 375-84,

402-03; and u.S. balance of payments, 448,

451

Great Society, 462, 476, 483, 497

Greece, 252, 367, 398, 425, 428, 432, 438, 442

Greene, General Wallace M., 490, 509, 512, 516,

525-26

Gromyko, Andrei, 164, 167,206,218,348,350-

51,492

Grozny,214
Guantanamo, 173, 177,203,206,207,210,213,

215,449

Guatamala, 37,173,174,175,178

Hailsham, Viscount Quinton, 349

Halberstam, David, 281, 291

Hamilton, Fowler, 17n, 37, 429, 431

Hardy, Rep. Porter, Jr., 27, 459

Hare, Raymond, 221

Harkins, General Paul D., 274-75, 277, 279-80,

282-84,286,289,291,500,503-05,511-13

Harriman, W Averell, 2, 37, 278, 289; and Berlin

Wall, 145, 152; and Laos, 239, 241, 243-44,

246-48, 252-53, 256, 516; and NATO, 361;

and nuclear test ban, 344, 347-50, 352-53; and

Vietnam, 275, 286, 290

Harrison, Maj. Gen. William H., Jr., III

Hartel, Brig. Gen. Frederick 0., 182

Hawk, 530

Hayward, Vice Adm. John T., 46

health and medical, assistant secretary of defense

for, 20

Hebert, Rep. E Edward, 96, 103, 106, 110, 114,

132-33,459,463,542

Heller, Walter, W, 121,480

Helms, Richard, 181, 198

Herter, Christian A., Jr., 144n, 228, 387, 389

Hickenlooper, Sen. Bourke B., 351

Hickey, Lt. Gen. Thomas F., 316-18

Hickey reports, 295, 316-18

Hilsman, Roger: and assessment ofMcNamara, 4;

and Bay of Pigs, 185; and Laos, 256-58, 515;

and nuclear test ban treaty, 355; and Vietnam,

275, 278, 280-81, 284, 286, 288-90, 292,

504

Hitch, Charles]., 8,13,89,95,136,310,538-39;

and FY 1962 budget, 63; and FY 1964 budget,

119-22, 131; and FY 1965 budget, 476-77;

and FY 1966 budget, 490-91; and military assistance, 426; and PPBS, 74-75, 77, 79-81, 92;

and SlOp, 317-18; and Skybolt, 377, 379

Ho Chi Minh, 228, 244

Ho Chi Minh Trail, 244, 249, 256, 257, 260,

509

Hoelscher, Leonard W, 65n

Honest John, 371

Hoover Commission (1955), 24n

Hoover, Joseph S., 85,457

Hornig, Donald E, 492-93

hot line, 346

Hound Dog, 127,381,383

House Appropriations Committee, 30-31, 56-57,

62-63,66,74,96-97, 103-04, 107, 109-10,

130-31, 136-37, 414, 424-25, 430, 435-37,

440,442,457,487-88

Index 655

House Armed Services Committee, 10, 12, 13,

29,47,55,62-64,68,97-106,110,114,131-

35,321,427,459,463-64,484-86,537,548

House Foreign Affairs Committee, 424, 435-36,

441-42,445,522,533

House Government Operations Committee, 26-

29

House Science and Astronautics Committee, 44-

45

Humphrey, Sen. Hubert H., 331, 351

Hyannis Port, Mass., 88, 116, 125, 156, 381,

479

IL-28, 207, 215-18

India, 238, 240, 436, 444

Indonesia, 202, 251

installations and logistics (I&L), assistant secretary of defense for, 20, 453-55, 457-58, 461n,

462-63

intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 53,

61, 63, 299, 300, 301, 302, 312, 368, 373,

394, 398, 415, 494, 496, 543, 545. See also

Minuteman

Interdepartmental Committee on Cuba, 224

intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs),

202,207,218,220,401

International Control Commission (ICC), 238-

40,243,245,248-49,255-56,284,523

International Cooperation Administration, 232n,

252,266,421-23,425

international security affairs (ISA), assistant secretary of defense for, 7, 548; and Bay of Pigs,

180, 182, 192; and Berlin, 143, 146, 148; and

Cuban missile crisis, 200, 219-20; and flexible

response, 296-97, 308; and FY 1964 budget,

124; and Laos, 234, 236, 238-40, 244, 248-49,

251-52; and militaty assistance, 422-23, 426,

428, 431, 434, 439-40, 443-44; and multilateral force, 388-89, 393, 398n, 400, 405, 414;

and NATO, 360-61, 363, 365, 368, 370, 379,

381; and Vietnam, 284,513

Iran, 37,38,425,428, 438

Iraq, 202

Italy, 220n, 221, 363, 368, 398, 402, 411, 434,

451,462n

Jackson, Sen. Henry M., 6, 68, 103, 342, 352,

469

Japan, 147,434,448,451,452

Johnson, General Harold K., 494

Johnson, Vice President and President Lyndon B.,

9,38,92,142,158-59, 176,208,226,227,

268-69,277,287,367,448,452-53,471,479,

489, 535, 543; and cost reduction, 459, 461-
656 Index

62,465,473,475,476; and FY 1965 budget,

480,481-83,486; and FY 1966 budget, 493-

97; and Gulf ofTonkin incident, 519-24, 532;

and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan QSCP65),320; and military assistance, 437, 439-40,

442,445; and multilateral force, 412-13, 414-

19; and NSAMs, 415, 417-18, 437, 499,510,

515, 525; and OPLAN 34A, 501, 519, 523,

525; and Vietnam, 268-69, 277, 287, 498-

99,502,504,507-10,513-14,516,517,525,

526-31,532,533

Johnson, U. Alexis, 37, 198,200,250,252,255,

518

Johnston Island, 207, 335

Joint Atomic Energy Committee, 333, 415

Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S., 5-7, 9-10,14,17-18,

21-22,35,50,535,537-38,548; and balance

of payments, 449; and Bay of Pigs, 173-80,

183-85, 187-90, 192-93; and Berlin, 148-53,

155, 158, 163, 166-67, 170; and counterinsurgency, 37-38, 41-42; and Cuban missile crisis,

195-96,200-03,206-07,209,211,214,218,

221, 223-25; and Defense Intelligence Agency,

22-24; and Defense Supply Agency, 26-28; and

flexible response, 295-98, 304, 310-13, 315-18,

320; and FY 1962 budget, 56-58, 67-68; and

FY 1963 budget, 73, 76, 80, 82-87, 90, 92, 94,

98,102-03,115-16; and FY 1964 budget, 120,

122-23, 125-26, 128-29, 132, 134, 136, 139;

and FY 1965 budget, 476, 479-80, 482; and

FY 1966 budget, 490-91, 493; and Laos, 231,

233-35, 237, 239-43, 248, 250-55, 258; and

limited nuclear test ban treaty, 323, 325-27,

342-43, 345, 347, 352-56; and military assistance, 421, 423, 427-30, 434-36, 440-45; and

multilatetal fotce, 387-88, 393-95, 397, 401-

02,404,407,414; and NATO, 360-65, 367,

369, 374, 380-81; and Skybolt, 380-81; and

space development, 45-46; and Vietnam, 262,

264,266-68,272-76,279,281-84,289,292,

499,501-02,504-10,512,515-16,519,521,

523, 525-26, 528, 530, 532-33

Joint Economic Committee, 470

Joint Straregic Objectives Plan: JSOP-67, 120,

317; JSOP-68, 476; JSOP-69, 490

Joinr Strategic Target Planning Staff, 17, 316

Joint Study Group on Foreign Intelligence Activities, 22

Jones, Col. David c., 100

Jungle Jim (4400th Combat Crew Training

Squadron),39,272

Jupiter, 213-14, 220-23, 386, 394, 404n

Kattenburg, Paul, 287, 291-92

Kaufmann, William W., 159,305,308,310

Kaysen, Carl, 90, 123, 152,347,355,393,431,

479

Keating, Sen. Kenneth B., 204

Keenan, Joseph, 9-10

Keeny, Spurgeon, 478, 492-93

Kelleher, Philip W., 104-05

Kennan, George E, 8, 249

Kennedy, PresidentJohn E, 1-2,4-5,6,9,17-19,

40,47,48,191-92,197,317,404n,413,418,

469, 473, 481, 535, 547; and Acheson, 147,

151-52, 153, 164, 303, 359, 389; assassination, 290, 479-80, 498; and balance of payments, 422, 429, 434, 449-52; and base closures, 462-65; and Bay of Pigs, 173-80, 183-

86, 188-91, 241, 243, 269; and Berlin crisis,

64,68, 145-47, 150, 152-64, 218, 219, 249;

and civil defense, 30, 32-34; and cost reduction program, 453-55; and counrerinsurgency,

35-42, 52, 224-25, 263-64, 268, 294; and Cuban missile crisis, 201, 204-10, 213, 215-18,

220-22; and FY 1962 budget, 52, 58-60, 61,

62-65,68,69, 145; and FY 1963 budget, 78,

82, 84, 88, 89-91, 96; and FY 1964 budget,

119, 120-21, 125-29, 135; and FY 1965 budget, 477, 479; guidance to McNamara, 12-13,

36,38, 57, 75,454-55,462; and Joint Chiefs

of Staff, 38, 90-91,128-29,176-77,189,196,

203, 206, 221, 233, 250, 335, 353-54, 407,

429-30; and Khrushchev, 144-45, 150-51,

160, 209, 213-14, 216-18, 222, 246, 249,

328, 330-32, 341, 346-47, 349-50, 355; and

Laos, 228, 231, 232-33, 235, 236-38, 241-43,

246, 248-50, 258-59, 269; and limited nuclear test ban rreaty, 323, 325, 328-36, 338-42,

346-47, 353-55, 543; and military assistance,

422-25, 428-32, 437, 439, 445; and multilateral force, 390-91, 395, 397-99, 401, 405-08,

410-15; and NATO, 303-04, 359, 362, 364,

367, 372, 376-78, 381, 383-84, 389-91, 403-

04; and NSAMs, 42, 201, 269, 273, 395, 431,

434, 452; and nuclear strategy, 293, 296-97,

305-06, 322; and overthrow ofCastro, 192-95,

198,200,203,224-25; and Reserve forces, 65-

66,89, 109, 112, 151; and strategic weapons,

94-95, 119,299; and Vietnam, 39, 260, 262-

63,267-73,282,286,288-89,499-500,511

Kennedy, Robert E, 4-5, 241-42, 479; and Bay

of Pigs, 175, 186; and civil defense, 32; and

counterinsurgency, 37; and Cuba, 196, 198,

201; and Cuban missile crisis, 206, 207-08,

214,217,222-24

Kent, Brig. Gen. Glenn A., 321

Khrushchev, Nikita, 13, 64, 164, 195,298, 492;

and Berlin, 143-44, 150-51, 153-54, 165-69,

218-20; and Berlin Wall, 156, 158, 160, 162;

and Cuban missile crisis, 201-02, 208-09, 213-
17, 227; and Laos, 234, 246, 249; and nuclear

test ban, 328, 330-32, 341-42, 344, 346-47,

349-50,353; and U.S. missiles in Turkey, 221-

23; and wars of national liberation, 35, 145,

421

Killian, James R., 22

Kirkpatrick, Lyman B., Jr., 191

Kissinger, Henry A., 398

Kitchen, Jeffrey c., 406n, 428

Kitchen Group report, 427-29

Klein, David, 416

Kohler, Foy, D., 147, 161, 407

Komer, Robert W, 275

Konev, Marshal Ivan, 159n, 165, 167

Kong Le, 252, 257-58

Korea. See South Korea

Korean War, 96, 118, 128, 168,233

Korth, Fred H., 48, 98, 468, 471, 478

Kosygin, Alexei, 492-93

Krulak, Lt. Gen. Victor H., 40-41, 286-88, 499,

501

Kuznetsov, Vasily, 216, 340-41

Laird, Rep. Melvin R., 440, 459, 487

Landon, Kenneth P., 236

Lange, Halvard, 389

Lansdale, Brig. Gen. Edward G., 35-36, 180,

196, 198-99, 233, 262-65, 267-68, 270-71,

279,291-92

Laos, 37, 38, 52, 143, 173,228-59,260, 267,

268,269,270,275,294,501,504,505,515-

17, 533; MAP assistance to, 437, 443, 445

Lawrence Livermore Radiation Laboratory, 6, 8,

330,342,352

Leddy, John M., 419

Lee, Rear Adm. John M., 388-89, 400-02, 405

Legere, Col. Lawrence, 397, 400

legislative affairs, assistant to the secretary of defense for, 97-98,131,484,487,541

leMay, General Curtis E., 47-48, 67, 100, 127-

28, 139, 384, 476, 537; and assured destruction, 320; and counterinsurgency, 39; and Cuban missile crisis, 203; and FY 1963 budget,

83,86,90,101-03; and FY 1965 budget, 478,

482,485; and FY 1966 budget, 490, 493; and

Laos, 242; and Nike-Zeus, 125, 539; and nuclear test ban, 345, 352, 354; and RS-70, 106,

115; and SlOP, 311; a~d Vietnam, 501, 509,

512,525-26

Lemnitzer, General Lyman L., 6-7, 10, 14, 17,

45, 56, 83, 85, 93, 98, 115, 120, 254, 313,

326,334n, 393n, 394-95,401,427,430; and

Bay ofPigs, 36, 173, 175-76, 185, 187-90; and

Berlin, 67, 155, 158-59, 169; and counterinsurgency, 37; and Cuba, 198; and Laos, 233,

Index 657

236-37, 240-41, 243, 250; and McNamara,

11, 537~38; and missile gap, 299; and NATO,

303-04,311,361-62,407; and Nike-Zeus, 61;

and nuclear test ban, 330, 333, 335-36, 339;

and SlOp, 316; and Vietnam, 279, 292

Leva, Marx, 17n

Lightner, E. Allan, Jr., 165

limited nuclear test ban treaty, 139, 141,323-56,

475, 543

limited warfare, 62, 68, 74, 233, 304, 310, 429

Lincoln Laboratories, 27

Lippmann, Walter, 221, 328

LIVE OAK, 146, 160

Lodge, Henry Cabot, 285-90, 498-500, 503-07,

510-14,518

logistics, 18,27,123,451,455

Logistics Management Institute, 27, 457

Lovett, Robert A., 3-4, 206

Luce, Henry, 191

Luxembourg, 409

Mace, 370

Macmillan, Harold, 148, 156, 167, 238, 314,

414; and MLF, 409, 412; and nuclear test ban,

330,332,334,339-40,342,346,349-50,355;

and Skybolt, 376, 380, 383, 403-04

Maddox, U.S.S., 519, 521, 522

Mahon, Rep. George H., 31, 56, 63, 66, 74,104,

107, 109, 112-13, 136-37, 414, 442, 457,

487

Malinovsky, Marshal Rodion, 220

Manning, RobertJ., 515

manpower, assistant secretary ofdefense for, 9, 20,

110

Mansfield, Sen. Mike, 491, 500, 529n, 530

Mao Tse-tung, 145, 263

Marine Corps, U.S.: and Bay of Pigs, 177; and

cost reduction program, 456; and counterinsurgency, 38, 40; and FY 1962 budget, 55,

65,68; and FY 1963 budget, 91; and FY 1964

budget, 125, 128-29; and FY 1965 budget,

477; and FY 1966 budget, 490-91, 494, 496;

and Laos, 237; and Vietnam, 509, 515, 518,

529-30,532

Marshall, Charles Burton, 423, 427

Marshall, George c., 6, 548

massive retaliation, 3, 13,52,84, 155,295,304,

309,315,317,358

May, Ernest R., 213

McClellan, Sen. John L., 141,470-71

McCloy, JohnJ., 2,154,204,217,325-27,329,

347

McCone, John A., 37, 198, 201, 206n, 207, 283,

286,348,498-99,501-02,508,514,528

McCormack, Rep. John W, 104,441, 529n, 530
658 Index

McCullough, Hugh, 76

McDonald, Admiral David L., 478, 490, 494,

509-10,512

McElroy, Neil H., 60, 299

McGarr, Lt. Gen. Lionel C, 264-67, 272, 275,

278-79

McGhee, George C, 265

McGiffert, David, 131-33, 138-39,484-88

McGovern, Sen. George, 138-41,486

McGowan, Maj. Gen. Donald w., 109-10

McNamara, Lt. Gen. AndrewT., 26-27

McNamara, Robert S., 13, 19,25,47-48,78-80,

95, 97-98, 119-20, 126, 135, 197,226, 258,

294,297,320,476-77,546-47; and Anderson,

Admiral George w., Jr., 47-48, 102, 125, 128,

212; Ann Arbor speech, 308-09, 313-15, 373,

384, 396, 398, 544; appointment as secretary

of defense, 1, 4-6, 10-11; Athens speech, 305-

09, 313-15, 373, 384, 396-99, 544; and base

closures, 462-66, 473; and Bay of Pigs, 175-

80, 183-84, 188-90; and Berlin crisis, 67, 84,

91,99, 147-49, 152-53, 155, 158-62, 164-65,

168, 170, 219, 250, 305; and Bureau of the

Budget, 79, 119-20, 481, 492; and civil defense, 30-34, 320, 544; congressional relations,

27,96,99, 101, 103-04, 114, 116-17, 131,

133, 137, 141, 433, 436, 439-40, 459, 464-

66, 469-71, 473, 484-85, 491-92, 537, 540-

42; congressional testimony, 11-12, 28-29,

31,56,62-64,66,97-100, 103, 107, 131-33,

136, 209, 218, 223, 249, 320-21, 353, 424,

426-27, 430, 435-36, 440-42, 445, 456, 459,

470,485-87,500,503,519, 522-23,533;and

cost effectiveness, 140,361,447,449-50,452,

467, 536; cost reduction program, 453-62,

473, 475, 540; and counterinsurgency, 35-36,

38,41-42,224, 275, 291-92; and critics, lOll, 17,27,28,93, 136, 190,314,365,382,

459,469-70,489,516,518,536-37,541,545,

548; and Cuban missile crisis, 115, 132, 135,

168,201, 204,205n,206-13, 218-19, 222-23,

319,379,487,544; and DoD reorganization,

2-4,5,8, 10,14-16, 18-30,49-50, 57-58, 65n,

536-37,539,547-48; and flexible response, 13,

155,170,214,227,293,295-98,303,305-07,

314-16, 322, 543-44; and FY 1962 budget, 52,

56-64,66-70; and FY 1963 budget, 75, 77, 79,

81-82,85-87,89-91,94,96-100,102-03,107;

and FY 1964 budget, 118-22, 125-29, 131-34,

136-39; and FY 1965 budget, 476-84, 485-

89, 497; and FY 1966 budget, 490-91, 493-

94; and Gulf ofTonkin incident, 519-23; and

Harkins, General Paul D., 275, 284, 289, 500,

503-04, 511, 513; and influence ofThomas S.

Gates, Jr., 5, 10, 17, 20, 536; and Joint Chiefs

ofStaff QCS), 7-8,10-11,115; and Laos, 231-

32, 235-40, 242-43, 248-50, 253-55, 259,

515-16; and leMay, General Curtis E., 47, 67,

102-03,106,125,127-28,345,354,476,482,

490,493-94, 509, 537; and limited nuclear test

ban treaty, 323, 325, 329-30, 332-39, 343-45,

348,353-56; management philosophy, 49, 63,

74, 78, 119,447,453,455-56,458-61,471-

72, 474, 535-37, 547; and military assistance,

422-23, 426-45, 446; and missile gap, 3, 12-

13, 299-301, 545-46; and multilateral force,

388-89, 391-92, 393, 395-402, 404, 406-07,

410-20; and NATO, 305-08, 315, 322, 359,

361, 363-69, 374-75, 380-81, 391-92, 396,

398, 543-44; and nuclear straregy, 20, 297,

305-21; 542-43; and overseas meetings, 274,

277,281,284,288-89,305-08,369,375,381,

383,396,402,418,499-500, 502, 507, 513,

514, 517; and overthrow of Castro, 192-93,

195, 198, 200, 203, 224-25; personality, 1-5,

7, 11, 46, 48, 94, 141, 291, 382, 470, 535,

540-42,547-48; and personnel selection, 6-10,

19, 74-75; and planning-programming-budgeting system (PPBS), 72, 77-78, 92-93, 95,

476, 539-40; and posture statement, 97-98,

132, 297, 457, 485; and reorganization of

Reserves and National Guard, 88-89, 107-08,

110-14, 116, 161, 540; and RS-70, 102-06,

110-11,115-16, 119n, 132, 136-37; and Rusk,

Secretary of State Dean, 6, 273, 287, 290-91,

325, 339, 345, 374, 380-82, 395, 400-01,

404, 406n, 408,413,422-23,436,498, 505,

511-12, 542;andSkybolt, 118, 120, 123, 136,

314,376-84,402,404; and space program, 22,

43-44, 46-47, 481-82; and strategic nuclear

weapons, 13, 59-61, 69, 94-95, 123-25, 127,

149,161-62,164,168,209,227,293,301-02,

318-21, 348, 356, 368,478-79,482,490; and

tactical fighter experimental (TFX), 141, 447,

466-74, 540-41; and Vietnam, 1, 242, 263-68,

270-77,279,281,283-92,430-31,437,439,

487,498-514,517-20,526,528-34,545; and

Whiz Kids, 4, 7-8, 76,116,291,516,538

McNaughton, John T., 216, 347, 349-50, 407-

08, 410n, 411, 414, 418, 443-45, 469n, 513,

523, 527n, 529n

McNeil, Wilfred]., 74-75, 77, 538

Meany, George, 9

medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs): III

Cuba, 201, 202, 204, 205, 207; and NATO,

297,306,357,360,361,363,366,374,381,

387,390-91,393-403,408

Melman, Seymour, 136, 138-39

Mendenhall, Joseph, 288

Menshikov, Mikhail, 145,234

Merchant, Livingston, 405, 407-11

Mercury, 43
Meredirh, James H., 547

Michaelis, Rear Adm. Frederick, 400

MIGs, 167,202,207

Mikoyan, Anastas I., 215

military assistance, 51, 54, 80, 83, 85, 92,119-20,

125, 129-30, 241, 252, 253, 277, 281, 283,

291,421-46,448,449,477,481,482,501

Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG):

and balance of payments, 449; and counterinsurgency, 38-39, 41; and Laos, 237, 240-

41, 252-53, 256; and military sales, 434; and

NATO, 371; and Vietnam, 264-66, 268, 270,

274,278-79,290,503,511

MilitaryAssistance Command, Vietnam (MACV),

274-76, 281-82, 286, 290-91, 500-01, 511,

513,518-19

Military Assistance Program (MAP), 235, 241,

281, 284, 421-46. See also military assistance

Military Revolutionary Council, 502, 524

Millpond, 237

Minuteman, 15,83,300,312,317,377,381,

415,416,496,546; and FY 1962 budget, 53,

54, 59, 60, 62, 63; and FY 1963 budget, 87,

90; and FY 1964 budget, 121-28, 134; and FY

1965 budget, 476, 478-79, 481, 482; and FY

1966 budget, 490, 493

Miro Cardona, Jose, 196-97

missile gap, 3,12-13,127,295,298-99,545

Missileer, 466

mobile medium-range ballistic missiles, 121, 139,

140

Mollenhoff, Clark, 7

Mongoose, Operation, 194, 198-99,225

Monnet, Jean, 386

Morgan, Rep. Thomas E., 435-36, 440-42

Morocco, 462n

Morris, Thomas, 453, 456-58, 462-64

Morse, Richard S., 45

Morse, Sen. Wayne, 436, 522, 533

Morton, U.S.S., 525

multilateral force (MLF), 297, 306, 308, 377,

381,382,383,384,385-420

Murphy, Charles]. v., 185, 190-91,517

Murrow, Edward R., 182,332

Mustin, Vice Adm. Lloyd M., 527n

Mutual Security Program (MSP), 422, 424

Nassau Conference, 372, 383-84, 402, 403, 404,

405,406,409,416

National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, 43

National Aeronautics and Space Administration,

43,45-47

National Guard, 18, 51, 65-66, 70, 78, 83, 88-

89, 96, 99, 107-14, 116, 130-31, 143, 151,

161,170,495,540,546-47

Index 659

National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), 124, 181,

283

National Liberation Front (NLF), 262

National Military Command Center, 521

National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), 302

National Security Agency, 20, 22-23, 522n

National Security Council (NSC): and Bay of

Pigs, 173, 192-94; and Berlin, 152-54, 163-

64; and counterinsurgency, 36-37; and Cuban

missile crisis, 196, 200-01, 204; and Defense

Intelligence Agency, 22; and flexible response,

296-97,317; and FY 1962 budget, 57; and FY

1963 budget, 75; and FY 1965 budget, 478-

79; and FY 1966 budget, 492-93; and Laos,

242; and limited nuclear test ban treaty, 326,

331; and military assistance, 429, 432; and

multilateral force, 391; and NATO, 372; and

Vietnam, 273, 281, 502, 510, 514-15, 521-22,

529-30

Navy, U.S., 7-9, 16-18, 21-25, 28, 35, 44, 46,

48, 50,73-74, 539; and base closures, 464-65;

and Bay ofPigs, 173; and Berlin, 161; and cost

reduction program, 455, 458, 461; and counterinsurgency, 38, 40; and Cuban missile crisis,

200,203,206,211-15; and flexible response,

293, 295, 316; and FY 1962 budget, 53-55;

and FY 1963 budget, 81-82, 85-86, 91, 93, 98,

102; and FY 1964 budget, 120, 122-23, 125-

26,128,131,137; and FY 1965 budget, 476-

78; and FY 1966 budget, 490-91, 454, 496;

and multilatetal force, 391, 400, 407, 412; and

TFX, 466-69, 471-72, 540-41; and Vietnam,

519-22,532

Nehru, Jawaharlal, 238

Nelson, Sen. Gaylord, 138

Nes, David G., 511-12

Net Evaluation Subcommittee (NESC), 298,

316

Netherlands, 360, 365, 414

Neustadt, Richard, 296, 398n, 403, 406n, 412,

416

Nevada underground testing, 341-42

New Frontier, 1-2,413

New Orleans Naval Station, 463

New Zealand, 9

Ngo Dinh Diem, 244, 257, 260, 262-66, 268-

71, 273, 277-80, 282, 285-86, 288-90, 292,

498-99,503

Ngo Dinh Nhu, 280, 285-88

Nguyen Dinh Thuan, 286

Nguyen Khanh, Maj. Gen., 502-05, 507-08,

510-14,517,519,523-25,528

Nhu, Madame, 285

Nike-Ajax,496

Nike-Hercules, 371, 496

Nike-X, 124,320,321,477,493
660 Index

Nike-Zeus, 31, 45, 60, 61, 62, 63, 70, 71, 85, 87,

90, 121, 122, 124, 125, 127, 128, 134, 141,

320,539

Nitze, Paul H., 7-8, 149, 221, 296, 312, 371,

398,428,471, 491; and ACDA, 325-26; and

Acheson report, 303-04; and Bay of Pigs, 178,

180, 192-93; and Berlin, 146-47, 161-63;

and Cuban missile crisis, 206, 208-09, 211,

214,216-17,219; and Laos, 228, 240, 244,

246, 248; and MLF, 388, 392, 406, 414; and

NATO, 361-62, 380-81, 383; and Nike-Zeus,

124; and nuclear test ban, 333, 339, 342; and

Vietnam, 276, 291

Nixon, Richard M., 175

no-cities doctrine, 295, 310, 319, 322

Nolting, Frederick, 265, 268, 274, 279-80, 283,

285,287,290,511

Norsrad, General Lauris, 221, 304, 388-89, 397-

98, 403; and Berlin, 146-47, 149, 155, 160-

61, 163-64, 169-70; and MLF, 394-95, 400-

01; and NATO, 358-62, 371-72, 375, 386,

391,393

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 2,

234,357-84,535,542-44,546; and balance of

payments, 452; and Berlin, 144, 146-50, 155,

160-64, 166-67, 171, 219; and flexible response, 3,294,297,303-10,313-15,322; and

Jupiter missiles in Turkey, 221-23; and limited

nuclear test ban treaty, 324, 342, 347-48; and

military assistance, 432, 435, 439; and multilateral force, 395-420

North Vietnam. See Vietnam, Democratic Republic of

Norway, 363

NSAM65,269

NSAM 109, 163

NSAM 111, 273-74

NSAM 147,395

NSAM 159,431

NSAM 181,201

NSAM 182,42

NSAM 242, 434

NSAM 270, 452

NSAM 273, 499, 501

NSAM 276, 437

NSAM 288, 510, 515

NSAM 314, 525

NSAM 318, 415-16

NSAM 322, 417-19

NSC 5096/1, 297

NSC Counter-Guerrilla Warfare Task Force, 36

nuclear-powered aircraft, 62

nuclear proliferation, 306, 328, 342, 344, 355,

373,420

nuclear sharing, 392, 408, 414, 419. See also multilateral force (MLF)

nuclear warfare, 3, 13, 14, 15,34, 155, 168, 170-

71, 209, 243, 259, 293, 294, 305-22, 340,

355,357,361-62,374,544

nuclear weapons, 303, 306-08, 331-34; stockpiles, 138, 155, 162,324,329,353,386; testing, 324-25, 327-35, 341-44

O'Brien, Lawrence E, 102, 104, 106

Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, 30-31,

96n

Office of Defense Mobilization, 30

Office ofEmergency Planning, 30

Office of Organizational and Management Planning. See Vance Task Force

Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), 14,

17-18,20-23, 28, 31, 44-45, 47, 49,51, 536-

42, 547-49; and base closures, 462; and Bay of

Pigs, 180, 182; and Berlin, 146, 148-49, 158,

162-64, 170; and cost reduction program, 454,

457-62; and Cuban missile crisis, 198, 224,

247; and flexible response, 295, 302-03, 310,

312,315,317,319,322; and FY 1962 budget,

70; and FY 1963 budget, 89, 93-95, 100, 107,

110,112,116; and FY 1964 budget, 119, 121-

23,131, 136-38; and FY 1965 budget, 476-79,

485; and FY 1966 budget, 489-92; and Laos,

233, 237, 252, 254; and limited nuclear test

ban treaty, 326, 337; and military assistance,

429-31,433,435-39,441-46; and multilateral

force, 388, 393-94; and NATO, 367-68, 371,

376,378; and Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS), 74-77, 80, 84-85, 93, 95;

and TFX, 469-71; and Vietnam, 274, 513

offset payments, 451, 452, 473

O'Hara, Rep. James G., 326-27

Okinawa, 38, 449

on-site inspection, 334, 337-40, 344, 347, 351

OPLAN 34A, 501, 519, 521, 523, 525

OPLAN 312-62, 200, 201

OPLAN 314-61, 200

Organization of American States (OAS), 182,

193,195, 199,209-10,227

Ormsby Gore, David, 380, 382, 384

Owen, Henry D., 385, 389-90,400,406,418

Pacific Command, United States (PACOM), 274,

282

Pacific, Commander in Chief (CINCPAC), 36,

233, 235, 239, 247, 256, 262-63, 265, 274,

279,282-84,290,519,521-22,548

Pakistan, 231, 425, 428, 438

Panama, 38,39,40,226,444,449

Panofsky, Wolfgang K. H., 330-31

Partridge, General Earle E., 20, 318
Partridge Committee report, 20, 295, 318

Passman, Rep. Otto E., 424-25, 430-31, 433,

435-37,439,441

Pastore, Sen. John 0., 351

Pathet Lao, 229-59, 515-17

Paul, Norman S., 97-98,103,541

Pershing, 370, 371, 375, 389, 415, 416

Peurifoy, John E., 252

Philadelphia Navy Yard, 464, 465

Philippines, 234

Phoumi Nosovan, General, 229, 233-37, 239-40,

243,247-48,252-53,255,517

"Pierce Arrow," 522

Pittman, Steuart L., 31-34

Planning-Programming-BudgetingSystem(PPBS),

3,14,72-95,476,539,540,548-49

Pleiku,529

Poland, 240, 360

Polaris, 12, 83, 300, 312, 317, 335, 494, 496,

546; and FY 1962 budget, 54, 57, 58, 59, 60,

62; and FY 1964 budget, 124, 125, 127, 134;

and NATO use, 308, 361, 363, 366, 372, 377,

380,381,382-84,386-89,392,393,394,403,

404

Portsmouth (N.H.) Navy Yard, 465

Portugal, 48, 409

posture statement, 76, 97, 98, 457, 485

Power, General Thomas S., 211, 312, 317

Presque Isle Air Force Base, Maine, 463

Procurement of Equipment and Munitions for

the Army (PEMA), 126

program change proposals (PCPs), 119, 121, 122,

476-78,490,491

Programs Evaluation Office, 229, 236-37, 240-

41

Proxmire, Sen. William, 68, 140

public affairs, assistant secretary of defense for,

103,470

Quinn, Maj. Gen. William w., 23

Ramsey, Henry C, 36n

RAND Corporation, 6, 8, 10, 13,27,72,76-77,

309

Randolph, Sen. Jennings, 140

Raritan (N.J.) Arsenal, 463

Reedy, George, 493

research and development, 14, 38, 44, 57, 80, 83,

92, 130, 139,457,484,485,486, 495. SeeaMo

Advanced Research Projects Agency; defense

research and engineeting, director of

Reserve forces, 18,51,65-66,70,78,83,88-89,

92, 96, 107-14, 116, 130-31, 143, 151, 161,

170,270,495,540

Index 661

Reston, James, 400, 418

RF-8,516

Richardson, John, 289

Ricketts, Admiral Claude V, 400, 410, 411,

413n

Rickover, Admiral Hyman, 400, 407

Riley, Rep. John J., 66

Rivers, Rep. L. Mendel, 484

Roa, Raul, 183

Robertson, Sen. A. Willis, 68, 96,101, 109, 110-

13, 135

Rockefeller, Nelson D., 30, 342, 465

Rockefeller report, 7

Rogers, Jack A., 529n

roles and missions, 42, 45-47, 74, 78, 81, 468,

537

Rolling Thunder, 531

Rosson, Maj. Gen. William B., 41

Rostow, Walt w., 1, 36n, 152, 193, 236, 248,

258,270-71,280,290,297-98,385,389,398,

400,413,418

Rowan, Carl T., 511, 514

Rowen, Henry S., 143, 296-97, 305, 308, 310,

360,371,398

Rowny, Brig. Gen. Edward L., 364

Rowny report, 364

RS-70,47, 70,96,100-03,105-07,110-11,113,

115-16, 119, 121, 122, 131-32, 134, 136-37,

141

Rubel, John H., 378, 381, 383, 548-49

Ruffner, General Clark, 304

Runge, Carlisle P., 110

Rusk, Dean, 5-6, 36, 97, 146, 180, 187, 198,

201, 413, 436, 452, 492; and Bay of Pigs,

175-78,184-85; and Berlin, 152-53, 157, 160,

164, 167; and BNSp, 297-98; and counterinsurgency, 42; and Cuban missile crisis, 206;

and Laos, 232, 237, 239, 243, 245-46, 248;

and McNamara, 325, 542; and military assistance, 422-23, 434; and MLF, 388, 395, 398,

400-02, 404, 406n, 408-09, 412, 416, 419;

and NATO, 303, 363, 365, 372, 374; and

Nike-Zeus, 124-25; and nuclear test ban, 338-

39,345-47,351-53; and Skybolr, 380-83; and

Vietnam, 266, 273, 286-87, 289-91, 498, 501,

503,505-06,511-15,519,521,526,528-29,

532

Russell, Sen. Richard B., 10,98-99, 103, 133-34,

137-41, 342, 352, 440, 459, 484, 486, 488,

493,541

Ryan, Rep. William F., 136

Saltonstall, Sen. Leverett, 11, 29, 63, 99, 109,

113,140,351,459,491

SAMOS, 301, 310
662 Index

San Francisco Navy Yard, 464

San Marcos, U.S.s., 176

Sarit Thanarat, 255

Schamel, Robert J., 389, 400, 406

Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., 2, 5, 34, 152, 177,

181-82,191,323,347

Schriever, General Bernard A., 44-45

SEABEEs (construction battalions), U.S. Navy,

40

Seaborg, Glenn T., 330-32, 335, 339, 344-45,

350, 355,413n

seali&, 12,68,70,80,83,85,92,129,495,496

SEALs (Sea-Air-Land teams), U.S. Navy, 40

Self Defense Corps (SDC), 273-74, 276-79

Senate Appropriations Committee, 23, 29, 41,

56-57, 62-63, 67-68, 96, 101, 107, 109-11,

135, 137-39, 141,425,442, 446n, 486, 488,

495n

Senate Armed Services Committee, 6, 10, 11, 33,

55,62,68,97-99, 103, 105-06, 133-35, 141,

167, 190, 352-54, 440, 458, 463, 484, 486,

495n,503,522

Senate Finance Committee, 480, 483

Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 130, 167,

180,249,352-54,424,436,442,522-23

Senate Government Operations Committee, 470,

473

Senate Government Operations Committee,

Qackson) Subcommittee on National Policy

Machinery, 6, 11

Senate Preparedness Committee, 69,141

Senior Interdepartmental Group, 38

Sergeant, 371

Sharp, Admiral Ulysses S., Jr., 519, 521-22, 528,

548

Sheehan, Neil, 281, 282

Shoup, General David M., 40, 91,128,177-78,

456,490

Shriver, Robert Sargent, Jr., 4

Sihanouk, Prince Norodom, 231, 255, 515

Sikes, Rep. Robert L. E, 107, 457, 459

Single Integrated Operational Plan (SlOP), 20,

297,311,316,317,319,321

single manager system, 25-27

Skybolt, 59, 83, 118, 119, 121, 123, 125, 131,

132,136,314,375-84,402,403,404

Smathers, Sen. George A., 198

Smith, Maj. Gen. Dale, 345

Smith, General Frederic H., Jr., 90, 100

Smith, Gerard, 385, 389, 400-02, 405, 408, 413,

418

Smith, Rear Adm. Harry, 428

Smith, Sen. Margaret Chase, 9, 97-98,133,541

Smith, Col. William Y., 297

Sorensen, Theodore, 6, 65, 87, 104, 121, 152,

174,201-02, 206n, 208, 232, 241, 331, 372,

390

Souphanouvong, Prince, 229, 247, 255

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO),

228-29, 231-34, 236, 238, 241-44, 247-48,

250-51,254,256,275,522

South Korea, 147,425,428,431, 438, 439,440,

442,443,452

South Vietnam. See Vietnam, Republic of

Souvanna Phouma, Prince, 229, 231, 234-35,

239,244-45,247-51, 253, 255-57, 515-17

Soviet Union, 35, 172, 421; anti-ballistic missile

defense, 124, 125, 134; and Berlin, 143-71,

218-23; and Cuban missile crisis, 194, 195,

201-23; and Laos, 232-49 passim; military

budget, 492-93; and missile gap, 3, 298-302;

and NATO, 358-62, 364, 365; and nuclear

test ban, 323-56; and space competition, 3, 43,

47; and U.S. strategic planning, 293, 294, 305,

307, 308, 310, 311, 315, 321, 322; and Vietnam,236,531

Spaak, Paul-Henri, 361-62, 365, 388-89, 391

space development, 43-47, 65, 121,477

Sparkman, Sen. John, 323

Special Air Warfare Center, 39

Special Forces, 38-40, 42, 268, 506, 512, 529. See

also counterinsurgency

Special Group (Augmented), 187, 194, 198,201

Special Group (Counterinsurgency), 37-38, 40,

275

Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIEs),

202,219

special operations, assistant to the secretary of defense for, 22

Special Warfare Center, 38, 39, 41

Springfield (Mass.) Armory, 465

Sputnik,3,43,298,358,369,370,386,477n

Staats, Elmer B., 120

Stahr, Elvis J., Jr., 8, 16,28,46,86-87,93

Staley, Eugene, 269

Stans, Maurice H., 135

State, Department of, 5, 8; and Bay of Pigs, 173,

180-82, 185, 187, 192; and Berlin, 146-49,

152, 158, 162, 165, 167, 170; and counterinsurgency, 35-37,42; and Cuban missile crisis,

196, 199-201, 211, 224-26; and flexible response, 296-97, 313; and FY 1962 budget, 58;

and Laos, 231-32, 235, 237, 240, 244-45, 247,

249-50, 252, 254-56; and limited nuclear test

ban treaty, 325-26, 328, 341, 349; and militaryassistance, 421-23, 427-28, 431, 439, 444,

446; and multilateral force, 387-90, 392-95,

397, 400-02, 405, 406n, 410, 412-13, 418,

420; and NATO, 359-63, 370, 373-75, 377,

379-84; and Planning-Programming-Budget-
664 Index

Van Fleet, Lt. Gen. James, 252

Van Zandt, Rep. James E., 210

Vance, Cyrus R., 7,19,25,46,112,114,224-26,

488,491,521

Vance Committee, 25-26

Vance Task Force, 19-20, 22

Vandiver, Ernest S., 10

Vanguard, 73

Vann, Lt. Col. John Paul, 281-82

VAX, 467

V-bomber, 376, 377, 381, 404

VELA, 337-39, 343

Venezuela, 37, 199,211,452

Vienna Summit Conference (1961), 150-51, 246,

328,331,341

Viet Cong, 262-73, 276-77, 280-81, 283-85,

287-88,498, 500, 502-03, 505-07, 509, 513-

15,517-18,524-33

Vietnam, 1, 52, 191, 228, 229, 244, 294, 353,

450,453,487,494,495,540,543,544-45

Vietnam, Democratic Republic of (North Vietnam), 229; and Laos, 232, 237, 241, 242, 244,

245,249,251,253,254,255,256,257,258;

and South Vietnam, 260, 262, 263, 264, 265,

266,272,276,278,290,498-534 passim; and

Tonkin Gulf incident, 519-24; U.S. air strikes

against, 525-33

Vietnam, Republic of (South Vietnam), 229; and

Buddhist rebellion, 283, 285-86; counterinsurgency activities in, 35-36, 37, 38-40; and crisis

in Laos, 231, 232, 233, 236, 242, 243, 244,

245,249,250,251,254,255,256,257,259;

and defoliation program, 276, 291; deployment ofU.S. Marines to, 532; and Diem assassination, 290; during Johnson administration,

498-534; during Kennedy administration, 260-

92; Gilpatric task force on, 267-68; and Khanh

coup, 502-04; military assistance to, 425, 426,

430,431,432,436,437,438,439,440,441,

442, 443, 444, 445, 446; Staley report on,

269; and strategic hamlet program, 277-80,

281,283; visits to by U.S. officials (McGeorge

Bundy) 529-30, (Vice PresidentJohnson) 268-

69, (Lansdale) 262-63, (McNamara) 288-89,

499-501, 507-08, 513-14, (Taylor-Rostow

mission) 270-74

Vietnam Task Force, 267-68, 275, 278

Vinson, Rep. Carl, 10, 12, 29, 459, 465; and FY

1962 budget, 56, 63-64; and FY 1963 budget,

96,98-99, 101-06; and FY 1964 budget, 131-

34, 141; and FY 1965 authorization bill, 484-

86; and McNamara, 537, 542; and military

assistance, 441

Vo Nguyen Giap, General, 244

von Braun, Werner, 45

von Brentano, Heinrich, 146

von Hassel, Kai-Uwe, 415

Ward, Rear Adm. N. G., 411

Warren, Maj. Gen. Frederick M., 109-10

Warsaw Pact, 199,201,214,313,324,347,360,

364

Washington Ambassadorial Steering Group, 156,

160

Watertown (Mass.) Arsenal, 464

Watkinson, Harold, 378-79, 392

Watson, Maj. Gen. Albert, III, 165

Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG),

321

Webb, James E., 47

Weiss, Seymour, 162, 400

West Germany. See Germany, Federal Republic

of

Westmoreland, General William c., 445, 503-04,

513-14,518,523,528-29,532

Wheeler, General Earl G., 132, 139, 224, 519;

and Bay of Pigs, 177; and counterinsurgency,

42; and FY 1964 budget, 126, 128; and FY

1966 budget, 490, 493; and McNamara, 537-

38; and military assistance, 442; and Vietnam,

282-83,512,521,525,531

White, General Thomas D., 44, 61,176,243

Whiz Kids, 4, 7-8, 76,116,190,291,538

Wiesner, Jerome B., 46, 123-27, 152,330, 355,

378

Wilson, Charles E., 8, 11

Wilson, Harold, 415-19

Wilson, Col. Jasper, 503

Wolfe, Col. Thomas, 239

Wood, General Robert J., 435-36, 439, 443

World War II, 2, 3, 4, 74, 174, 179, 294, 358,

421,425,465,487,538

Yarmolinsky, Adam, 31, 308

York, Herbert F., 8,15,61,337,466-67

Yoshpe, Harry, 34

Yugoslavia, 249

Zapata, Operation, 179, 181, 187, 188, 198

Zelikow, Philip D., 213

Zorthian, Barry, 515, 524

Zuckerman, Solly, 349

Zuckert, Eugene M., 8, 14, 67, 86, 93-94, 100,

106, 115,468-71,478,536

G;l}" u.s. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 2006--325-762
ing System (PPBS), 92; and posture statements,

97,542; and Vietnam, 264-67, 274, 278, 281,

286-88,290, 501, 506, 512-13, 515-16, 518,

527

Stead Air Force Base, Nev., 464

Steinbruner, John, 411, 419-20

Stennis, Sen. John, 99, 352,541

Stern, Marvin, 309-10

Stevenson, Adlai, 185,210

Stikker, Dirk, 160, 167,304,362-63,365,391-

94,397-98

Strategic Air Command, Commander in Chief

(CINCSAC), 211n, 213, 310, 312, 316-18

Strategic Army Corps (STRAC), 233

"strategic hamlet" program, 277-80, 281, 283

Strauss, Franz Josef, 155-56, 162,304,361, 373,

392-93,451

Sudan,425

Sullivan, William H., 518-19

Sweden, 333

Switzerland, 434

Sylvester, Arthur, 103,470

Symington, Sen. W Stuart, 17-18, 68, 98-99,

342

Symington Committee, 7,17-19,30,49

systems analysis, 61, 72, 77, 536, 549. See also

Planning-Prograrnming-Budgeting System (PPBS)

T-6,237

T-28,516

T-33,284

T-34,225

Tactical Air Command (TAC), 213

Taiwan (Republic ofChina), 425, 428, 431, 438,

442,443,444

Tartar, 370

tax reduction, 120-21, 127,475,480,481,483,

485

Taylor, General Maxwell D., 6, 22, 73, 88, 115-

16,129,190-92,198,293,295,297,320,322,

331,477,479,490,493; and Bay of Pigs, 174,

178, 182, 186-87, 194; and Berlin, 152, 163;

and counterinsurgency, 37, 42; and Cuban

missile crisis, 196,206,207-08,221-22; and

flexible response, 311-12; and FY 1964 budget, 136, 139; and Laos, 250; and McNamara,

537-38,548; and military assistance, 429, 441;

and MLF, 400, 402, 407, 411; and NATO,

362, 372. 395, 397-98; and Nike-Zeus, 124-

25; and nuclear test ban, 323, 345, 348, 353-

54; and Skybolt, 123,381; and Taylor-Rostow

mission, 270-74; and Vietnam, 275-76, 279,

282,286-89,291-92,499, 504, 506-07, 509,

510,512-14,518,525-29,532-33

Teller, Edward, 342, 352-53

Index 663

Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament, 324,

334

TFX, 48,141,447,466-74,540-41

Thailand, 37, 275; and Laos, 231, 232, 233, 234,

236,237,241,242,243,245,249,250,253,

254,255,256,257; military assistance to, 425,

430-31,438,442-43; and Vietnam, 530

Thant, U, 217

Third World, 13

Thomas, Rep. Albert, 30

Thompson, Llewellyn, 166, 206n, 220, 234, 238,

346

Thompson, Robert, 275, 277-78

Thor, 223, 386, 394

Thorneycroft, Peter, 379-84, 409

Thornton, Charles (Tex), 4

Thresher, U.S.S., 134

Thurmond, Sen. Strom, 62, 134,352

Ticonderoga, U.S.S., 519

Titan, 15,53,54,59,62,83,454,493,496

Tonkin Gulf incident, 519-24, 525, 532

Tonkin Gulf Resolution, 517-18, 522-24, 525

Tran Thien Khiem, Lt. Gen., 524

Tran Van Huong, 528

Trapnell, Lt. Gen. Thomas,]., 240, 264

Treasury, Department of, 4, 36, 82, 121, 140,

481

Trinidad, Operation, 174-75, 179, 181, 187

Trudeau, Lt. Gen. Arthur G., 45-46

Truman, Harry 5.,109,546

Turkey: and Cuban missile crisis, 195,207,208,

210,213-14,218,220-23,402; military assistance to, 367, 425, 428, 431, 432, 438, 439,

442,443

Turnerjoy, U.S.S., 519, 522

Twining, General Nathan E, 387, 393n

Tyler, William R., 406n, 410

U-2, 174,201,202,204,211,213,215,222,

226,301,324

Ulbricht, Walter, 151, 156-57, 165

Unger, Leonard, 529n

United Nations, 183-85,204,209-10,215,217,

333

United Nations Disarmament Commission, 324-

26,332

United States Information Agency (USIA), 36,

182,224,237,267,325n,332,408,510

United States Intelligence Board, 23

U.S. Seventh Army, 161, 164

U.S. Sixth Fleet, 161,412

University of Mississippi, integration of, 547