2021 IL App (4th) 200335-U 

NO. 4-20-0335 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

ALONZO FRANKLIN,

 Petitioner-Appellant, 

 v. 

JOHN R. BALDWIN, in his Official Capacity as Director 

of Corrections; MICHAEL P. MELVIN, in His Official 

Capacity as the Warden of Pontiac Correctional Center; 

and ANDREW J. BUFFORD, TROY E. DAVIS,

KENDRA R. WOLF, SHARON SIMPSON, MELISSA 

PHOENIX, and ALLISON LOVRANT, in Their Official 

Capacities as Employees of the Department of 

Corrections, 

 Respondents 

(John R. Baldwin, Michael P. Melvin, Andrew J. Buford, 

Kendra R. Wolf, Sharon Simpson, and Allison Lovrant, 

Respondents-Appellees).

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of

Livingston County 

No. 18MR185 

Honorable 

Jennifer H. Bauknecht, 

Judge Presiding.

 

 JUSTICE TURNER delivered the judgment of the court.

 Presiding Justice Knecht and Justice Steigmann concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The circuit court’s dismissal of petitioner’s petition for a writ of certiorari was

 proper for all but one of petitioner’s due process claims. 

¶ 2 In December 2018, petitioner, Alonzo Franklin, filed a pro se petition for a writ of 

certiorari against respondents, John R. Baldwin, in his official capacity as Director of 

Corrections; Michael P. Melvin, in his official capacity as the warden of the Pontiac Correctional 

Center; and Andrew J. Bufford, Troy E. Davis, Kendra R. Wolf, Sharon Simpson, Melissa

Phoenix, and Allison Lovrant, in their official capacities as employees of the Department of 

Corrections (Department). In his petition, petitioner alleged his due process rights were violated 

NOTICE

This Order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1). 

FILED

April 22, 2021

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL
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because of respondents’ actions during disciplinary proceedings related to petitioner’s November 

1, 2016, disciplinary report. The Livingston County circuit court dismissed respondents Davis 

and Phoenix because they were not served. In May 2019, respondents Wolf, Bufford, Simpson, 

Lovrant, and Melvin filed a motion to dismiss under section 2-619 of the Code of Civil 

Procedure (Procedure Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2018)). In March 2020, respondent 

Baldwin also filed a section 2-619 motion to dismiss. After a July 2020 hearing, the court 

granted the motions to dismiss petitioner’s petition for a writ of certiorari. 

¶ 3 Petitioner appeals, asserting the circuit court erred by dismissing his petition for a 

writ of certiorari. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the cause with directions. 

¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 5 On November 1, 2016, a disciplinary report was issued against petitioner, 

asserting he violated Department regulation 205, “Security Threat Group or Unauthorized 

Organizational Activity,” and regulation 310, “Abuse of Privileges.” See 20 Ill. Adm. Code 

504.Appendix A (Nos. 205, 310) (2016). The disciplinary report noted the investigation of 

petitioner took place between January 1, 2016, and November 2, 2016. The reporting employee 

was respondent Bufford and respondent Lovrant signed the disciplinary report as the hearing 

investigator. The disciplinary report asserted two confidential informants provided information 

petitioner was a highly respected leader/“board member” of the Gangster Disciples. The names 

of the informants were deliberately withheld for their safety. Information obtained from both 

audio and “correspondence surveillance on no less than 23 different occasions” confirmed 

petitioner’s active participation in the Gangster Disciples. The disciplinary report explained 

petitioner used family members to contact high ranking street-level Gangster Disciples via a 

three-way telephone conference. The report stated, “All source documentation will remain 
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on-file with the Pontiac C.C. Intelligence Unit and may only be reviewed following proper chain 

of command requests and procedures.” The disciplinary report was served on petitioner on 

November 4, 2016. After a November 8, 2016, hearing, the adjustment committee found 

petitioner guilty of both charges and imposed the following discipline: (1) one year of C grade, 

(2) one year of segregation, (3) one year of revocation of good conduct credit, and (4) six months 

of contact visits restriction. The final summary report was signed by respondents Davis, Wolf, 

and Melvin.

¶ 6 Petitioner’s pro se petition for a writ of certiorari raised numerous due process 

violations in the proceedings on the November 1, 2016, disciplinary report. Specifically, 

petitioner asserted (1) respondent Bufford failed to comply with section 504.30 of Title 20 of the 

Illinois Administrative Code (20 Ill. Adm. Code 504.30 (2016)), (2) the notice of the charges 

against him was insufficient and prevented him from preparing an adequate defense, (3) the final 

summary report does not explain the basis for the adjustment committee’s decision, (4) the final 

summary report violated section 504.80 of Title 20 of the Illinois Administrative Code (20 Ill. 

Adm. Code 504.80 (2016)), (5) the adjustment committee failed to call the requested witnesses 

and review the audio and corresponding surveillance video, and (6) the prison review board also 

denied him due process by failing to recognize the adjustment committee’s violation of his due 

process rights. Petitioner attached the following documents to his petition: (1) the November 1, 

2016, disciplinary report; (2) petitioner’s November 7, 2016, letter to the adjustment committee; 

(3) petitioner’s December 11, 2016, grievance; (4) the adjustment committee’s final summary 

report; (5) the May 20, 2017, grievance officer’s report by respondent Simpson; (6) the June 12, 

2017, order by the administrative review board that reduced the revocation of petitioner’s good 

conduct credits to two months and was signed by respondents Phoenix and Baldwin; 
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(7) petitioner’s undated letter to the administrative review board; and (8) the September 20, 

1981, memorandum from the adjustment committee to the administrative review board.

¶ 7 In May 2019, respondents Wolf, Bufford, Simpson, Lovrant, and Melvin filed 

their section 2-619 motion to dismiss, contending petitioner’s petition should be dismissed with 

prejudice because petitioner received all of the procedural protections required by Wolff v. 

McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). Petitioner filed a response.

¶ 8 At a July 2019 status hearing, the circuit court dismissed respondents Davis and 

Phoenix because they had not been served and more than six months had lapsed. In February 

2020, counsel for respondents Wolf, Bufford, Simpson, Lovrant, and Melvin entered her 

appearance on behalf of respondent Baldwin and filed a section 2-619 motion to dismiss on his 

behalf. Respondent Baldwin’s motion to dismiss also asserted petitioner had been afforded the 

procedural protections provided by Wolff. Petitioner also filed a response to respondent 

Baldwin’s motion to dismiss. Hereafter, “respondents” collectively refers to respondents Wolf, 

Bufford, Simpson, Lovrant, Melvin, and Baldwin.

¶ 9 On July 8, 2020, the circuit court held a hearing on the two motions to dismiss. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court dismissed petitioner’s petition for a writ of certiorari, 

finding petitioner had received all of the due process rights afforded to him under Wolff. 

¶ 10 On July 23, 2020, petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal from the circuit court’s 

July 8, 2020, order in sufficient compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303 (eff. July 1, 

2017). Thus, this court has jurisdiction of petitioner’s appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 

301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994).

¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 12 In this case, petitioner appeals from the circuit court’s dismissal of his petition for 
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a writ of certiorari. The petition alleged petitioner’s due process rights were violated based on 

respondents’ actions during the disciplinary proceeding related to a disciplinary ticket issued on 

November 1, 2016. On appeal, respondents suggest their motion should have been brought 

under section 2-615 of the Procedure Code (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2018)). 

¶ 13 Regardless of whether the circuit court’s considered respondents’ motions to 

dismiss were brought under section 2-615 or 2-619, this court’s standard of review is the same. 

Jane Doe-3 ex rel. Julie Doe-3 v. White, 409 Ill. App. 3d 1087, 1092, 951 N.E.2d 216, 223 

(2011). We review de novo the circuit court’s dismissal. White, 409 Ill. App. 3d at 1092, 951 

N.E.2d at 223. “In doing so, we will accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations.” White, 

409 Ill. App. 3d at 1092, 951 N.E.2d at 223. We can affirm the circuit court’s dismissal for any 

reason found in the record. Akemann v. Quinn, 2014 IL App (4th) 130867, ¶ 21, 17 N.E.3d 223. 

¶ 14 Our supreme court has held the proper analysis of an inmate’s allegations of 

violations of Department regulations begins with a determination of whether the Department 

regulations at issue create judicially enforceable rights for inmates. Fillmore v. Taylor, 2019 IL 

122626, ¶ 38, 137 N.E.3d 779. “It is only if those regulations create judicially enforceable rights 

for inmates that we consider whether plaintiff was entitled to mandamus or writ of certiorari 

based upon defendants’ alleged failure to comply with those regulations.” Fillmore, 2019 IL 

122626, ¶ 38. Ultimately, the Fillmore court determined that, “in the context of prison 

disciplinary proceedings, a prisoner is entitled to due process protections, such as the procedural 

protections set forth in Wolff, 418 U.S. 539, only when the penalty faced by the prisoner 

implicates a liberty interest because it affects the nature or duration of his confinement.” 

Fillmore, 2019 IL 122626, ¶ 48. Our supreme court further found, “ ‘[a]s a general rule, only 

sanctions which result in loss of good conduct time credits for inmates who are eligible for 
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release on mandatory supervision or which otherwise directly and adversely affect release on 

mandatory supervision will impose upon a liberty interest.’ ” Fillmore, 2019 IL 122626, ¶ 56 

(quoting Spicer v. Collins, 9 F. Supp. 2d 673, 685 (E.D. Tex. 1998)). Here, petitioner had two 

months of good conduct credits revoked, and thus we will address petitioner’s due process 

claims. 

¶ 15 Under Wolff, when a prison disciplinary hearing may result in the loss of a 

prisoner’s good conduct credits, the inmate must receive (1) advance written notice of the 

disciplinary charges, (2) an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and 

correctional goals, to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense, and (3) a 

written statement by the fact finder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary 

action. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-67. Additionally, the prison disciplinary board’s findings must be 

supported by some evidence in the record. Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional 

Institution, Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985). 

¶ 16 On appeal, petitioner asserts his petition was sufficient to raise a due process 

claim based on (1) the insufficiency of the notice of the charges against him which prevented 

him from preparing a defense and (2) the adjustment committee’s failure to have the informants 

called, interviewed, and considered as part of his defense and to review all audio and 

corresponding surveillance. Respondents assert (1) petitioner has forfeited any challenge to the 

denial of his other due process claims and (2) the notice of the charges against him was adequate

and thus did not state a due process claim. However, the respondents agree with petitioner he 

stated a due process claim based on the failure to call his requested witness and provide him with 

transcripts and recordings. 

¶ 17 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) provides arguments not 
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raised in the opening brief are forfeited. In re Marriage of Kasprzyk, 2019 IL App (4th) 170838, 

¶ 40, 128 N.E.3d 1105. Thus, petitioner forfeited all of the other due process claims raised in his 

petition for a writ of certiorari besides the two he argued in his appellant brief.

¶ 18 On appeal, petitioner asserted he stated a claim of a due process violation based 

on the insufficiency of the notice of the charges in this case. The Fillmore court found the notice 

of the charges in that case did not constitute a due process violation. Fillmore, 2019 IL 122626, 

¶ 58. There, the petitioner was served with an inmate disciplinary report on December 15, 2014, 

and the adjustment committee hearing took place on December 19, 2014. Fillmore, 2019 IL 

122626, ¶ 58. The inmate disciplinary report consisted of five pages and set forth the charges 

and evidence against the petitioner. Fillmore, 2019 IL 122626, ¶ 58. The supreme court 

concluded the petitioner did receive advanced written notice of the charges against him in 

compliance with the first due process requirement set forth in Wolff. Fillmore, 2019 IL 122626, 

¶ 58. 

¶ 19 Here, petitioner received his disciplinary report on November 4, 2016, and the 

adjustment committee hearing took place on November 8, 2016. The report set forth two 

charges, gang or unauthorized organization activity and abuse of privileges. It further set forth 

the nature of the two charged offenses on two pages. The charges noted the identity of the 

confidential informants and when and where the confidential informants provided the 

information had been withheld for safety. It also noted all source documentation was on file 

with the Pontiac Correctional Center Intelligence Unit and could only be reviewed following 

proper chain-of-command requests and procedures. Given the disciplinary report explained why 

more specific information could not be provided, we find the disciplinary report in this case was 

sufficient to comply with Wolff’s first due process requirement.
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¶ 20 Petitioner also asserts he stated a due process claim based on the adjustment 

committee’s failure to have the informants called, interviewed, and considered as part of his 

defense and to review all audio and corresponding surveillance. He further notes prison officials 

denied his witness and document request without cause or a reason. Petitioner attached

numerous documents to his petition. One was his November 7, 2016, letter to the adjustment 

committee showing his witness and evidentiary requests. Petitioner also alleged in his petition 

he made a verbal request at the hearing for review of the audio recordings and corresponding 

surveillance. Moreover, petitioner attached the adjustment committee’s final summary report, 

which stated “no witnesses requested” and did not provide a reason as to why petitioner’s 

requested witnesses and evidence were not presented. The May 2017 grievance officer’s report 

did state calling the confidential informants/sources would jeopardize their safety and disrupt the 

security of the facility. The May 2017 report did not address the adjustment committee’s failure 

to review recordings and transcripts.

¶ 21 In Fillmore, 2019 IL 122626, ¶ 60, the supreme court found the petitioner 

sufficiently pled respondent’s denial of the petitioner’s witnesses and documentary evidence 

without an explanation violated petitioner’s due process rights. The petitioner’s complaint 

alleged he timely and properly submitted a witness request slip to the adjustment committee, in 

which he requested witnesses and exculpatory evidence. Fillmore, 2019 IL 122626, ¶ 60. He 

also gave a duplicate of the witness request form to a correctional counselor to give to the 

adjustment committee. Fillmore, 2019 IL 122626, ¶ 60. Additionally, at the disciplinary 

hearing, the petitioner asked (1) to see the notes described in the inmate disciplinary report and 

(2) the committee to review the notes, review the inmate telephone logs in question and listen to 

the telephone recordings, and call his witnesses. Fillmore, 2019 IL 122626, ¶ 60. The 
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petitioner’s complaint alleged one of the respondents noted the prison official who wrote the 

inmate disciplinary report directed the committee not to call any of the petitioner’s witnesses. 

Fillmore, 2019 IL 122626, ¶ 60. The adjustment committee’s final summary report made no 

reference to the petitioner’s request to review documents and stated no witness was requested. 

Fillmore, 2019 IL 122626, ¶ 61. In finding the aforementioned allegations were sufficient to

state a due process claim, the supreme court noted the respondents did not give reasons for 

denying the petitioner’s witnesses and evidence during the disciplinary proceeding and did not 

“explain that decision ‘later.’ ” Fillmore, 2019 IL 122626, ¶ 64. 

¶ 22 In this case, the grievance officer did explain why petitioner’s witnesses were 

denied but did not address petitioner’s request for the adjustment committee to review the 

recordings and transcripts mentioned in the disciplinary report. Since the reason for failing to 

call petitioner’s witnesses was later explained, petitioner’s petition did not state a due process 

claim based on the adjustment committee’s failure to call petitioner’s witnesses at the hearing. 

However, as in Fillmore, the record does not contain any explanation in the final summary report 

or “later” for the adjustment committee’s failure to review the evidence that petitioner requested 

to be reviewed. Thus, we agree with petitioner and respondents the petition for a writ of 

certiorari did set forth a due process claim based on the adjustment committee’s refusal to 

review at the hearing the recordings and transcripts of the telephone calls referred to in the 

disciplinary report.

¶ 23 Accordingly, we find the circuit court’s dismissal of petitioner’s petition for a writ 

of certiorari was proper as to all of the due process claims except for the one based on the 

adjustment committee’s refusal to review at the hearing the recordings and transcripts of the 

telephone calls referred to in the disciplinary report. As such, further proceedings on that claim 
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only are warranted.

¶ 24 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 25 For the reasons stated, we affirm in part and reverse in part the Livingston County 

circuit court’s judgment and remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with this order. 

¶ 26 Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

¶ 27 Cause remanded with directions.