U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

94–340 PDF 2015

S. HRG. 113–633 

REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF A 

NUCLEAR DEAL WITH IRAN 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JUNE 12, 2014 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

DANIEL E. O’BRIEN, Staff Director

LESTER E. MUNSON III, Republican Staff Director

(II)

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator from Tennessee, opening statement ................. 3 

Kagan, Dr. Frederick W., Christopher DeMuth Chair and director, Critical 

Threats Project, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC .................. 16 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 18 

Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator from New Jersey, opening statement .... 1 

Modell, Scott, senior associate, Burke Chair in Strategy, Center for Strategic 

and International Studies, Washington, DC ...................................................... 9 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 12 

Ross, Hon. Dennis, William Davidson Distinguised Fellow, counselor, The 

Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, DC .......................... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 7 

(III)

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

(1) 

REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF A 

NUCLEAR DEAL WITH IRAN 

THURSDAY, JUNE 12, 2014 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room SD– 

419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert Menendez (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Menendez, Cardin, Coons, Murphy, Kaine, 

Corker, Risch, Rubio, Johnson, Flake, Barrasso, and Paul. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY 

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee will come to order. 

Let me thank our panelists who I know will provide some 

thoughtful insights into the regional implications of a nuclear deal 

with Iran. 

International attention is feverishly focused on the question of 

‘‘if’’ the P5+1 and Iran will be able to agree and on what. I have 

strong views on what I think that agreement should look like and 

if we reach an agreement how we ensure Iranian compliance. 

It is my view that any deal with Iran must demand significant 

dismantling of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, including eliminating 

the vast majority of Iran’s centrifuge cascades and LEU’s, which 

cannot mean leaving large stockpiles of LEU in oxide form that can 

easily be reconverted; terminating Iran’s R&D efforts to create 

more advanced centrifuges; and fundamentally altering the internal infrastructure of the Arak facility, not just powering it down to 

a lower megawatt facility. Together, these elements must move the 

timeline for detectable breakout by Iran beyond a year. 

Second, Iran must come clean and provide information about the 

military dimensions of its nuclear program and allow access to 

facilities where these activities have been taking place. 

And third, the agreement must include a long-term robust 

inspections and verification regime, hopefully in the 20-year range, 

in other words, at least as long as Iran has been lying to the world 

about its program. 

Fourth, any suspension of sanctions will require Iran to meet a 

series of clear benchmarks. There must be clear demarcations of 

what constitutes a breach, including implications for both nominal 

failure to comply and significant material breaches. Repercussions 

for a breach by Iran will be snapback provisions for sanctions. At 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

2 

the end of the day, the specifics of the agreement will not be worth 

the paper they are written on if Iran believes it can cheat without 

significant repercussions. 

Now, less attention is focused on perhaps the more critical, strategically relevant question: What happens after a deal? What are 

the strategic implications for the United States, for our allies and 

partners? What are the strategic implications of a politically and 

economically resurgent Iran, and what are the goals of its leaders 

in the aftermath of such a deal? I personally doubt that the nuclear 

deal is part of broader Iranian aspiration for a rapprochement with 

the United States. 

This hearing will focus on what we should expect, how we should 

be preparing, and options we should be considering, if there is a 

deal. In other words, we must plan for a potential success. And in 

my view, success will not be defined exclusively by whether or not 

we get a good deal with Iran. The illicit nuclear program is only 

one pillar of much broader and equally troubling Iranian actions. 

Iranian support for terrorism goes back decades, and as we speak, 

Iran is actively cultivating terrorist networks and violent proxies 

across the region in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Bahrain, Yemen, the Palestinian territories, and beyond. 

Our gulf partners are very concerned about Iran-sponsored terrorism. I heard this very clearly from Saudi and Emirati officials 

during my recent visit to the gulf. It is imperative that if we 

achieve a nuclear deal with Iran, our partners and allies are reassured that the United States remains committed to their security 

and is not naive about the nature of the Iranian threat and its hegemonic ambitions. 

It is clear to me that our partners across the region are adopting 

hedging strategies toward Iran because United States commitment 

to the region is being actively questioned in light of our engagement with Iran and our hesitancy in Syria. This is evidenced by 

the string of Iranian official meetings and visits that has evolved 

from a trickle to a deluge. My concern is what will happen to gulf 

relationships with Iran after a deal is reached? 

Finally, on sanctions, it is my view that the international sanctions regime has been the single most influential determinant in 

keeping the Iranians at the negotiating table. I look forward to 

hearing from our panelists on what the regional implications of 

sanctions relief would be. How will the Iranian Government use 

this potential economic windfall? Can we control access to those 

assets to ensure that they are not increasing their investment in 

regional destabilization? 

At the end of the day, we must remain cognizant of Iranian motivations in pursuing a deal. Is it merely about sanctions relief for 

the leadership in Tehran, or is this about a broader realignment 

that could have serious strategic implications for the multidimensional chess game being played across the Middle East? 

With that, let me recognize the distinguished ranking member of 

the committee, Senator Corker. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

3 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE 

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having the hearing, and I want to thank our witnesses who always enlighten us. 

I know we have three very distinguished witnesses today. 

I think, as the chairman mentioned, there is no question that 

there is a pretty major geopolitical shift that is occurring right now 

in the Middle East. The United States is facilitating that by the 

policies that we have not pursued or pursued, if you will, in Syria, 

by Iraq being weakened as it is, and Iran certainly playing a big 

role there. And our friends on the peninsula. I, too, was there 

recently and it is pretty amazing the shift in their attitude and the 

hedging that is beginning to take place there and the possibility, 

I might say, of tremendous amounts of proliferation should this 

arrangement, as it appears today, continue on. 

I think all of us want to see a diplomatic solution. I do not think 

there is anybody on this dais that wants to see anything different 

from that. I think all of us have been pretty stunned, on the other 

hand, at the terms of the interim agreement and find it difficult 

for us to get to a good end state. 

Candidly, some of the conversations we have privately with those 

involved in negotiations—some comments come out from time to 

time like, well, we really want to get them hooked on cash. In other 

words, we want them to see how well they can do with sanctions 

being undone and their economy growing and want relief even 

more so as to see this through. 

So, look, again, I know we are at a critical period. I know there 

was a hastily called bilateral meeting that just took place. I have 

not had any readout as to whether it was successful or not. But 

there is no question that United States actions over the course of 

the last half a year, 9 months, have greatly strengthened Iran’s 

role in the world. You know, even if we get a good deal, which I 

hope we do—that is the most important element, is to make sure 

that their program is dismantled, not mothballed. As they say, they 

can crank right back up in 30 days and be right back in business 

based on what they have been discussing with us today. I know all 

of us want to see a dismantlement so that that cannot occur. 

But I want to emphasize again what the chairman has mentioned. Even if we make it through this successfully, which I hope 

with every cell of my body we do, they are still going to be a major 

state sponsor of terrorism. They are still going to be supporting a 

brutal dictator in Syria, and they are going to still be tremendous 

human rights violators. 

So I thank you all for being here. I thank you for the wisdom you 

share. I look forward to your comments and our opportunity to follow up with questions. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Corker. 

Today we have a single panel of well-regarded experts. We are 

pleased to welcome Ambassador Dennis Ross, counselor and 

William Davidson Distinguished Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Scott Modell, senior associate and holder 

of the Burke Chair in Strategy at The Center for Strategic and 

International Studies; and Dr. Frederick Kagan, the Christopher 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

4 

DeMuth chair and director of the Critical Threats Project at the 

American Enterprise Institute. Thank you all for being here. 

Let me remind you that your full statements will be included for 

the record, without objection. I would ask you to try to summarize 

your statements in about 5 minutes or so, so that we can enter into 

a dialogue with you. 

And with that, Ambassador Ross, we will start with you. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DENNIS ROSS, WILLIAM DAVIDSON DISTINGUISHED FELLOW, COUNSELOR, THE WASHINGTON 

INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ambassador ROSS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to 

be back here again before the committee. 

I will summarize what I submitted to the committee. 

I do want to start by saying I agree with your basic points on 

the essence of what a deal should be, and I do want to talk for a 

second about the deal not because I want to get into it but because 

I do not think right now the odds of reaching a deal are very high. 

It does not mean that it will never be achieved, but in the near 

term, I think it is not very likely. 

I think what could make it likely is the Iranians seeing that the 

price is very high. Right now, the Iranian perception is that they 

do not have to roll back their program either because they do not 

believe they have to or because they are not prepared to. If we 

want to change that because they do, in fact, seek a rollback of 

sanctions, if we want to change their calculus, they have got to see 

that the failure of diplomacy is much worse for them than it is for 

us. They have got to see that the costs will go up dramatically for 

them not only economically, but even the huge investment they 

have made in their nuclear infrastructure could be lost if there is 

no diplomacy because there could well be military action. 

The irony is the more we convey that kind of resolve, we make 

a deal more likely, but also the irony is the more we reassure our 

regional partners. The essence of this hearing is supposed to be 

about the implications of a deal, and the fact is today, if there were 

a deal, it would cause great concern among both our regional partners, meaning Arab partners but also Israel, but for different 

reasons. 

The Saudis, in particular—the Emiratis you mentioned you have 

just seen them. They look at themselves as being engaged in an 

existential struggle right now with Iran not because of the nuclear 

issue. They view the nuclear issue as being an instrument in what 

is an Iranian effort to gain regional dominance. 

From a Saudi perspective, what do they see in the region right 

now? They see troubles in their eastern province. They see Bahrain. They see Iraq. They see Syria. They see Lebanon. They see 

Yemen. Everywhere they see an Iranian hand. And that they view 

as an existential struggle. So if, in fact, there were a deal, from 

their standpoint right now, the deal would either provide a kind of 

license to the Iranians to do much more, but would also provide 

them the wherewithal to do much more. They would be out from 

under severe economic sanctions. They would be freed of that. They 

view the deal itself as being a function of our desire, an American 

desire, whether their perception is right or not—and I think their 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

5 

perception, by the way, is exaggerated, but their perception exists. 

And that perception is basically our concern with the nuclear issue 

trumps everything else. 

Now, that is a view that is also shared by the Israelis, but their 

point of departure is different. They view the Iranian behavior in 

the region as a problem but one they can deal with. They view the 

nuclear issue as an existential threat. A deal from the Israeli 

standpoint would be fine if it does not leave the Iranians as a 

threshold nuclear state where, at a time of their own choosing, they 

could end up breaking out. 

So how to deal with these collective set of concerns that exist 

about Iran but are not entirely motivated by the same factors. I am 

going to suggest to you a few things that we could be doing that 

would be appropriate for both sets of concerns, on the one hand, 

but I will also offer a few tailored ideas on the other. 

What is the most important factor for us? We need to demonstrate unmistakably that we are prepared to compete with the Iranians. And I would identify two things we could do that would have 

an impact on both our key Arab friends and the Israelis. Syria. You 

mentioned Syria. The more we are seen as being prepared to compete there, meaning we are prepared to raise the price to the Iranians of what they are doing in Syria. We are prepared to change 

the balance of power on the ground, meaning not only between 

those in the opposition vis-a-vis ISIS, who is obviously a source of 

concern, given what is going on in Iraq now, but also vis-a-vis the 

regime in Syria, Bashar al-Assad regime, where the Iranians are 

all in with them. 

Now, what does that mean in practical terms? It does not mean 

boots on the ground. It does mean the United States being prepared to quarterback the effort to provide meaningful assistance, 

including lethal assistance, designed to affect the balance of power 

on the ground. It means having the United States work with everybody else who is providing assistance, making sure that it is coordinated, it is complementary, it is additive, and in fact, it goes and 

addresses the purpose that we seek. That is one thing that we 

could do. 

A second thing we could do is we could actively interdict the Iranian and clandestine arms shipments around the region. When the 

Israelis interdicted the Klos C shipment that was going from Iran 

taking Iranian arms to Gaza, had we done that, the impact on the 

region and the impact on the Iranians would have been big. For 

those who feel that, gee, that might threaten what we are doing 

with Iran, Iran does not seem to have a problem negotiating with 

us on the nuclear issue and being very active throughout the region 

at the same time. There is absolutely no reason that we cannot do 

the same thing with them. 

And by the way, if what you are trying to do is to enhance 

Rouhani’s position, you do not enhance Rouhani’s position by showing that Qasem Soleimani is able to do things that do not cost the 

Iranians. It is the IRGC al-Quds Brigade that is active throughout 

the region, and we need to show that there is a cost to the Iranians 

for doing this, not only showing them that there is a cost to do 

something else, it would also have the benefit of reassuring our 

friends in the region that we mean what we say. We have resolve. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

6 

We are not turning a blind eye to what the Iranians are doing in 

the region to change the regional balance of power. We are prepared to compete with them. 

I know my time is about up. So let me cite a few other things 

we could be doing that is tailored more specifically to each side, to 

what the Saudi concerns could be, as an example, what the Israelis’ 

concerns could be for an example. 

I will give you just one example on the Saudis. There is a series 

of things that we could do with the Saudis, the Emiratis, and others, but just one thing that would make a big difference with the 

Saudis and the Emiratis. How about doing contingency planning? 

How about sitting down with them and saying let us look at the 

array of threats that we see throughout the region that are coming 

from the Iranians. We are not just going to do an assessment of 

them. Let us do contingency planning with you so that we could 

actually counter them, be prepared for them, deal with them. The 

signal that would send to each of them would be, I think, quite 

remarkable at this point. 

And again, one of the reasons you want to do this is it gets at 

what both the chairman and Mr. Corker were saying. We do not 

want them going off on their own and in a sense either engaging 

in hedging strategies or doing other things where the Saudis go 

ahead and they parade Chinese missiles. They are doing that for 

a reason, and it is sending a message to us and to others in the 

region. We want them to be more reassured about us. So contingency planning with the Saudis and the Emiratis I think would go 

a long way toward addressing concerns that they have. 

With the Israelis, I will give you two examples of things that we 

could do. 

If the big Israeli fear is that you have a deal that could allow 

the Iranians to break out or to creep out, then one of the things 

you have to do with the Israelis is to give them a high level of 

assurance that we are very well focused on how the Iranians could 

cheat, and more importantly, we are very well focused on making 

sure there is a severe consequence for cheating. We should be talking to the Israelis about identifying where they could break out, 

where the Iranians could break out or creep out if there is an 

agreement. We should be focused on what the cheating could look 

like. We should talk with the Israelis about what we are prepared 

to do, realizing that if we can do it collectively, it is one thing internationally, but being prepared to do things on our own if that is 

not the case. And that is not just economically. It might also have 

to involve the use of force under certain circumstances. 

The second thing we could do with the Israelis, because they 

might still fear that for whatever reasons we might constrain ourselves in the event of a violation, which after all, if you look at the 

history of arms control agreements, it is not exactly unusual for 

there to be violations of arms control agreements—one of the 

things we could do with the Israelis is make it clear to them that 

we would support what they would do. We could have conversations with them, identify categories of different kinds of violations 

of the agreement, and the more extreme the violations, we could 

be prepared to support what the Israelis’ actions would be, and 

that could even involve us providing the Israelis, in the event of an 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

7 

agreement, certain forms of compensation that could include the 

provision of capabilities that the Israelis themselves do not have 

today that could be useful for them if they had to act militarily. 

Sending that message not only to the Israelis but others in the 

region, including the Iranians, I think again ironically would reinforce the larger purpose of reaching an agreement in the first place, 

but if we do reach that agreement, then dealing with some of the 

concerns that you raised in your opening statement. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Ross follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR DENNIS ROSS

America’s readiness to negotiate a deal with the Islamic Republic on its nuclear 

program is a source of deep concern among our traditional friends in the Middle 

East. For the Arabs, the fear is that the deal will come at their expense, with the 

United States increasingly seeing Iran as a partner. For the Israelis, the worry is 

that we will conclude a deal that leaves the Iranians as a threshold nuclear state— 

capable of breaking out to nuclear weapons at a time when we might be distracted 

by another international crisis. 

Both sets of fears presume that there will be a deal. While the committee has 

asked us to discuss the regional implications of such a deal, I should note at the 

outset that I still believe the prospects of an agreement are probably less than the 

50-percent figure President Obama cited late last year. Basic conceptual gaps 

remain, with the Iranians still believing that their limited offers of transparency 

should be sufficient to satisfy our concerns about the peaceful character of their 

nuclear program. Will the Supreme Leader, who has talked about not dismantling 

their program, accept a serious reduction in the numbers of their centrifuges? We 

will see, but at this point, Ali Khamenei either is not prepared to roll back Iran’s 

nuclear program or doesn’t believe he will have to do so in order to produce a serious rollback in the sanctions regime. He does not appear to understand that there 

can be no rollback in sanctions without a rollback and deep reduction in the Iranian 

nuclear program—meaning Iranian centrifuges must be dramatically reduced in 

number; much of the accumulated enriched uranium must be shipped out of the 

country; Fordow must be shut down or completely disabled; and the Arak heavy 

water plant must be converted so it cannot produce plutonium. 

The Iranian negotiators at this point have given no indication of being able to 

accept such a rollback. And yet, if we are to concede limited enrichment for the 

Iranians, rollback of this sort plus transparency both beyond the Additional Protocol 

and about the possible military dimensions of their program will be required. Even 

if President Rouhani and Mohammad Javad Zarif, his foreign minister, are ready 

to accept such a deal—and it is not clear that they are—can they sell this to the 

Supreme Leader? Maybe, but I suspect that still remains a long shot. 

To be sure, if there is to be a deal, the Supreme Leader must see the very high 

costs to the Islamic Republic of diplomacy failing. He must be convinced that such 

failure will mean enduring, severe economic pain for Iran as well as the high probability that force will be used to destroy the huge investment the Islamic Republic 

has made in its nuclear facilities. Ironically, that posture—which may make a deal 

more likely—would also be useful for assuaging the deep concerns our regional 

friends have about any possible P5+1 nuclear accord with the Iranians. 

Both the Israelis and our key Arab friends believe that we are anxious for a 

nuclear deal, and they are not taking seriously the administration’s declarations 

that no deal would be better than a bad deal. They see active Iranian efforts to 

change the balance of power in the region and, fairly or not, little sign that we are 

prepared to compete with the Iranians as they do so. That has led to a perception 

among our regional friends that we attach such importance to a deal on the Iranian 

nuclear program that we turn a blind eye to Iranian behavior in the region. 

The administration argument that it is simply separating the nuclear issue from 

the other Iranian challenges in the area has not altered the impression of many in 

the region that our concerns about the Iranian nuclear program trump everything 

else. Here, it is worth highlighting that the Israeli and Arab concerns are different 

when it comes to Iran. 

For the Israelis, their priority is the Iranian nuclear program. That constitutes 

an existential threat. Iran and its proxies like Hezbollah constitute a threat, but, 

in Israeli eyes, that is manageable. Iran possessing nuclear weapons is not manageable or containable. For the Saudis, Iran already represents an existential threat 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

8 

even without nuclear weapons. The Saudis, Emiratis, and others see an aggressive 

Iranian pursuit of regional hegemony. From a Saudi standpoint, the Iranians are 

encircling them—seeking to gain dominance in, and the ability to threaten them 

overtly and covertly from, Bahrain, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. The Iranian 

nuclear program would add to the threat—perhaps making the Iranians less risk 

averse—but it is not the source of the problem they see. 

Talk of a possible reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Iran is likely to mean 

little. They are competitors in every sense of the word. It is not just Arab versus 

Persian, Sunni versus Shiite, or even traditional balance of power concerns related 

to regional dominance. It is all of these things, and it goes to the source of legitimacy for each. The Islamic Republic challenges the legitimacy of any monarchy and 

has pretensions to lead Muslims internationally. The Saudis see a fundamental 

threat to their role in leading Sunnis and feel that Iran challenges it religiously. 

For the Saudis, an Iran with nuclear weapons requires a countervailing response; 

such weapons would certainly add to the dangers. But in the near term, the Saudis 

may fear even more an Iran that is no longer being damaged by severe economic 

sanctions, no longer isolated internationally, increasingly able to develop economically, and with more means for troublemaking. As such, the Saudis, in particular, 

may fear that a deal on the nuclear program will not only signal a new American 

openness to Iran, but, even more, give the Iranians license to be more aggressive 

in the region, and with the economic wherewithal to do so. Words alone will not reassure the Saudis in the aftermath of a deal. They will look for signs that a nuclear 

deal is not going to transform our relationship with Iran—and that we will be vigilant in countering Iran’s threats in the area. 

Unlike the Saudis, the measure for the Israelis is what kind of deal is reached. 

The Saudis will be suspicious of any nuclear deal; for the Israelis, it depends on 

the deal. A deal that precludes the Iranians from being able to turn a civil nuclear 

program into a nuclear weapons capability would be welcomed. Such a deal would 

remove an existential threat to Israel. The problem for the Israelis is that the deal 

that would make them most comfortable is probably not attainable in the P5+1 

negotiations; Israelis feel that Iran must be denied an ongoing enrichment capability. While that would be for the best from a strictly nonproliferation standpoint, 

it is probably not attainable—at least that is the consensus of those members of the 

P5+1 negotiating with the Iranians. The question for the Israelis becomes whether 

they can be reassured enough about the scope of the rollback of the Iranian program, the transparency measures designed to prevent cheating on the rollback, and 

the credible consequences that would be imposed on the Iranians if they cheated 

anyway. 

What implications does this have for our approach toward our regional friends if 

there is a deal? Since the Saudi and Israeli concerns are different, our approaches 

to them should also differ in some respects. That said, anything which suggests that 

the United States will actively compete with the Iranians would be reassuring to 

both. All of our friends want to see that we will not permit Iran to become stronger 

in the region at their expense, that we will be there for our friends if they face 

threats, and that we don’t so fear conflict with Iran that we will acquiesce to any 

of its behaviors. 

In this regard, there are two steps we could take that would be reassuring to 

Arabs and Israelis alike: 

• Demonstrate in Syria that our concern is about both the growth of the jihadist 

presence in the country and the prospects of Assad cementing his hold on 

power. The former threatens all of us; the latter would signal a victory for Iran 

and the demonstration that it succeeds when it uses its power to alter the landscape in the region. We need to show that we will not acquiesce to that outcome. This means not just increasing lethal assistance to the pragmatic Syrian 

opposition, but doing so with an eye toward changing the balance of power on 

the ground, including between the opposition and the regime. This means taking control of the collective effort to support the opposition—through training, 

material assistance, arming, etc.—in order to make sure that everything that 

is being done to support the acceptable opposition is coordinated and complementary. 

• Show that we will not allow the Iranians to ship arms clandestinely around the 

region. This means interdicting clandestine Iranian arms shipments. The 

Israelis interdicted the Klos C ship carrying Iranian arms to Gaza, but we 

should have done it. We don’t have to announce what we are doing or even take 

public credit for it; we just need to do it. The Iranians and our friends will see 

it and understand that we are competing and that the Iranians will pay a price 

for what they are doing. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

9 

As for additional steps geared toward the specific concerns of Arabs and Israelis, 

we might launch contingency planning with the Saudis and Emiratis on how we 

would deal with particular Iranian threats. This would show our seriousness and 

also put us in a position to act when needed; if this meant different kinds of exercises with each, the Iranians would also get the message. 

With the Israelis, if there is a nuclear deal, we could discuss the specific steps 

we would take if the Iranians cheat on a deal and how we would impose consequences—even anticipating that there might be reluctance on the part of others 

to hesitate in the face of violations of the agreement. We might also compensate the 

Israelis if there is a deal by providing more bunker-buster bombs and more tankers 

to make them more capable of militarily acting on their own against the Iranians 

in the face of cheating. This would reassure the Israelis that even if we felt constrained to act militarily in the face of Iranian violations of an agreement that made 

a breakout possible, Israel would not be left without options. 

CONCLUSIONS

Our traditional friends in the Middle East are very suspicious about Iran’s aims 

in the region. Although the Obama administration has tried to reassure the Saudis, 

Emiratis, and Israelis about our commitments and our understanding of Iranian 

behavior, there are deep-seated doubts about what we are actually prepared to do. 

While our hesitancy on Syria may reflect understandable concerns about avoiding 

a quagmire, the Iranians show no such hesitancy and have invested heavily in 

ensuring the survival of the Assad regime. In a region where an Iranian win is seen 

as a loss for our friends, the worries about us have increased. It is through that 

lens that many of our regional friends view a possible nuclear deal with Iran. The 

Israeli and Saudi fears are different, but if we want to reassure our friends about 

such a deal, we need to understand the source of their worries and take steps that 

address them. That does not mean accepting fears that we think are misplaced, but 

it does mean taking steps that can make us more secure and also signal to the 

Iranians they will pay a price for behaviors outside the nuclear area that we find 

unacceptable. Ironically, that may make a deal itself more likely. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Modell. 

STATEMENT OF SCOTT MODELL, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, BURKE 

CHAIR IN STRATEGY, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. MODELL. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, 

thank you for the opportunity. 

I would like to talk a little bit about my background before I get 

into my comments because it sort of colors what observations I 

want to make today. 

Prior to joining CSIS, I was in the Central Intelligence Agency, 

the Director of Operations, did five tours overseas. On my last tour, 

I oversaw Iranian operations there, Iranian internal operations, 

and oversaw a lot of the global external operations against the Iran 

threat network. So much of what I am going to say today has to 

do with observations on the basis of that experience that go into 

my thoughts on how the Iran threat network has evolved over the 

last 5 years, and in the aftermath of the nuclear deal, good or bad, 

how that Iran threat network is going to continue to be a problem 

for us. 

I would like to start with 2009 and the Green Movement. In 

2009, as the Green Movement began to coalesce and the Supreme 

Leader finally came around to understanding that it was a problem—it was an existential threat for the Iranian Government— 

they realized they had to dismantle it piece by piece, and they 

cleared out Evin Prison and they decided that they did not want 

to make the same mistake that the Shah had made in the late 

1970s. And it is exactly what they did. They went and they 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

10 

dismantled it, and it had a profound effect on the Iran threat network. The internal security apparatus got better. The MOIS, the 

IRGC, the law enforcement forces, the Basij, everybody came together in ways that they had not come together before. 

Fast forward to a year or so later when they were faced with 

attacks on their nuclear facilities. The presence of Stuxnet led to 

some unintended consequences, led to strengthening of their 

nuclear facilities, their industrial security, their cyber security, 

their ability to detect personnel that were not deemed sufficiently 

wedded to the revolution, and it sort of strengthened the internal 

security apparatus, as well as their apparatus overseas, the Iran 

threat network. 

Fast forward to 2012 and 2013. The sanctions regime that was 

put into place against Iran—when the United States and the European Union initially went through with an oil embargo, the Iranian 

Supreme Leader had come to the conclusion that the price of oil 

was going to increase from about $100 a barrel to $200 barrel and 

thought that it would be unsustainable for the world. When that 

did not happen, he realized that they had to come to the table and 

negotiate. So I agree with the comments made by the chairman initially that the only reason that they are negotiating right now is 

because there was a collapse of the economy and that economic 

recovery was a must for them. 

I think the fundamental strategic calculus of the Supreme 

Leader remains the same. It is preservation of the regime at home. 

And they have broader regional goals that they are going to continue to push. 

Now, as far as a nuclear deal, I think there is going to be a 

nuclear deal. I do not think it is going to be a good deal. I think 

it is going to go on. I think there are going to be several phases 

to it. I think that it is going to be presented as a fait accompli to 

the international community. It is something we are going to have 

to accept and for several years try to figure out what it is going 

to look like and how to implement it. And I think, like Mr. Ross 

said, as it frees up money for the Iranian Government, it is only 

going to embolden the Iran threat network even further. 

As far as solutions, one of the things I have seen in the way that 

the U.S. Government is postured toward dealing with the Iran 

threat network—I think there are a number of things that we have 

already done that we can take advantage of particularly on the law 

enforcement side. I think in the presence of sanctions that are 

eased and the presence of credible war options being taken off the 

table, I think there needs to be more of a focus on law enforcement. 

I think that the Department of the Treasury needs to start looking 

closer at overseas financial operations. I think we need to start 

looking at counterthreat facilitation which would be going after the 

criminal networks that the Iran threat network has built up over 

the last couple of years in order to evade sanctions. I think that 

network is going to go on in the aftermath of a nuclear agreement. 

And I think having a better understanding about how Iran evades 

sanctions, their transportation networks, their intelligence networks, the way they move men, money, and material around 

the world, that feeds right into the necessity of coming up with a 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

11 

comprehensive compliance and verification mechanism, which I 

think will be extremely difficult. 

Like the chairman mentioned, we need at least two decades of 

figuring out if Iran is going to be an honest nuclear broker. For us 

to figure out just the military dimensions of that program, it is 

going to take quite a bit of time. I think figuring out how to use 

our law enforcement overseas to detect cheating is something critical that we will have to continue to focus on. 

In the case of Treasury, for instance, the Department of the 

Treasury has done a fantastic job over the years of collecting information on individuals, groups, and entities that are involved in the 

proliferation of sanctioned materials. We need to do a better job of 

working with foreign liaison partners to actually take advantage of 

that. There are a number of things we could be doing governmentwide to take advantage of the information we have, and working 

with our allies to do more against the Iran threat network. 

As far as regional implications, as far as the GCC goes, I tend 

to agree I think they are shocked at what has transpired. And they 

are looking for answers and they are looking for reassurance. But 

I would also say that I tend to think that the bilateral security 

relationships between the United States and our gulf allies is 

strong. It is very strong. I think that they are beginning to contemplate things they had not contemplated in the past. But, 

nevertheless, I think the lack of alternatives for them, in terms of 

greater security arrangements, is going to force them to continue 

to rely on the United States. 

I think we should be very cautious when we hear statements 

from Saudi leaders and other gulf countries talking about the formation of joint military commands and GCC-specific entities that 

are trying to enhance interoperability and jointness. They have 

been talking about that for a long time. I think they are starting 

to talk about it again on the basis of perceived weakness on our 

part. But I think there is enough reassurance and I think there is 

enough long-standing faith in the bilateral relationships we have in 

terms of security to keep those relationships going. 

I would argue that what is going on in Iraq is going to be particularly troubling. Soleimani I think is going to see that as an 

opportunity to actually do what he has not been able to do over the 

last couple of years due to budgetary constraints. New units are 

going come online. New proxies are going to be more deeply funded, 

and I think you are going to see a much more active Quds Force 

inside of Iraq. 

I think the same thing with Syria. As well as they have done in 

Syria in creating basically a nationwide Basij force for the Syrians, 

I think that is going to go on. They are going to look to make that 

permanent in Syria. I think the idea of the Shia crescent—there is 

truth to that, and they are going to continue to find ways to build 

on that. 

As far as regional implications of sort of an embolden Iran, I 

think when you look at their efforts further out in places like Latin 

America and Africa, I would give it a mixed review in terms of success. They have had a very difficult time establishing a foothold in 

places like Latin America. They have had to downsize recently 

because of budgetary constraints, but nevertheless, they are 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

12 

pushing intel officers and military attache ́s and new embassies into 

the region. They are doing what they can. But again, there is not 

as much receptivity in that part of the world as they would like. 

So I think they are going to continue to focus on their part of the 

world. 

So the regional implications of a nuclear deal and the influx of 

cash will be, I think, a near-term sort of up-tick in their operations 

within the Iran threat network. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Modell follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SCOTT MODELL

June 12, 2014 Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, members of the 

committee, good afternoon and thank you for this opportunity to testify on the 

regional implications of a nuclear agreement with Iran. I will briefly describe the 

mind-set of Iran’s Supreme Leader and the Iran Threat Network, list some of the 

regional implications of a nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1 countries, and 

offer recommendations for the administration and Congress on future efforts to 

counter one of our most pressing national security challenges. 

REVOLUTION, RESISTANCE, AND THE SUPREME LEADER

After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran set out to radically change its posture 

toward all nations, especially the United States. For the last 35 years it has kept 

its word, sponsoring terrorism, deceiving the international community about its 

nuclear program, supporting violent proxies against U.S. interests around the world, 

and above all, building a multifaceted global apparatus—political, ideological, religious, and criminal—to pursue a revolutionary agenda that envisions a new balance 

of power in the world. 

The Supreme Leader has consistently referred to ‘‘resistance’’ when describing 

Iran’s struggle with the West, similar to the way Americans speak of freedom—as 

a nonnegotiable value and source of national pride. The concept of resistance is critical for understanding why the Supreme Leader continues to champion Iran’s role 

as the leader of an ‘‘Axis of Resistance’’ and openly condemn U.S. values, character, 

and foreign policy. It lies at the core of his strategic calculus and drives the pursuit 

of two fundamental goals: preserving the regime at home and promoting the revolution abroad. 

Khamenei begrudgingly supports the P5+1 nuclear talks, skeptical that the 

United States will follow through on the terms of any deal. He recognizes, however, 

that a deal is necessary to ease the pressure of economic sanctions and revive Iran’s 

economy, but will not allow a deal to become the gateway to U.S.-Iran rapprochement. As Foreign Minister Zarif has stated, ‘‘Iran is looking for common ground, not 

friendship.’’ 

The Supreme Leader’s closest advisors, such as Deputy Chief of Staff Asghar MirHejazi, former IRGC commander and military advisor Yahya Rahim Safavi, and 

Supreme Council for National Security Chairman Ali Shamkhani have explained 

that severe budget cuts have had negative impact on the ability of Iran to conduct 

overseas operations. This has taken a particularly heavy toll on the IRGC Quds 

Force, which has the largest role in Iran’s external resistance mission. 

THE IRAN THREAT NETWORK

The Iran Threat Network is the global apparatus that Iran has used for more 

than three decades to promote the goals of the Islamic Revolution. It consists of a 

network of government and nongovernmental organizations that are involved in 

crafting and implementing the covert elements of Iran’s foreign policy agenda, from 

terrorism, political, economic, and social subversion; to illicit finance and weapons 

trafficking; and nuclear procurement and proliferation. Iran relies primarily on 

three organizations to coordinate and oversee the activities of the Iran Threat 

Network: 

• The Quds Force, an elite branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, 

responsible for irregular warfare and asymmetric operations, including a wide 

range of subversive activities from nonviolent cultural and business fronts to 

direct support to political resistance organizations and violent opposition 

groups. 

• The Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) is Iran’s primary civilian 

intelligence agency. It has the lead role in foreign intelligence collection and 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

13 

several covert action programs, both at home and abroad. It works closely with 

all of Iran’s closest proxies in the region and second only to the Quds Force in 

Iran’s global efforts to export the Islamic Revolution. • Lebanese Hezbollah has been Iran’s strongest nonstate ally since its inception 

in 1982. While Hezbollah’s role in projecting Iranian power has traditionally 

been tied to the goals of fighting Israel and protecting Lebanon, it remains a 

key element in fighting on the front lines in Syria, alongside Quds Force advisors and trainers and Syrian army units. 

The Iran Threat Network is Iran’s ‘‘whole-of-government’’ approach to preserving 

the regime at home and coordinating and promoting the revolution internationally. 

Its actions encompass a remarkable array of covert action, including covert influence 

operations, sanctions evasion, terrorism, training and equipping Islamic militants, 

and other so-called ‘‘resistance activities.’’ 

THE REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF A NUCLEAR DEAL

Weak or strong, comprehensive or limited, any deal will take several years if not 

decades to implement. In many countries of the region, the status quo will make 

way for a nuclear Iran. No countries, rhetoric aside, supports preemptive strikes 

against Iranian nuclear sites unless there is overwhelming evidence of further 

Iranian deception. Iran will be under tremendous pressure to comply with a comprehensive agreement, but has no apparent intention of slowing down its drive to 

achieve broader regional goals, which often conflicts with U.S. and allied security 

interests. If a deal is reached, there are several implications to keep in mind: 

• First, an agreement will give a much-needed boost to the Iranian economy. By 

most accounts, Iran stands to gain access to nearly $100 billion frozen in foreign 

banks, as well as billions more as oil export restrictions are lifted. At the same 

time, several EU countries appear poised to return to Iranian markets, adding 

billions of dollars more in potential foreign direct investment and trade. All of 

this will provide the leaders of the Iran Threat Network with the resources they 

need to gradually return to previous levels of operational activity. It means 

funding proxies that were either cut off or cut back due to sanctions; reassessing the ongoing closure or downsizing of Iranian embassies in nontraditional areas such as Latin America; expanding joint military training and security programs in Africa; and increasing funding for HAMAS, PIJ, and the new 

Palestinian coalition government. 

• Second, several countries in the gulf should expect to see a resumption of covert 

activity, including training, weapons, and nonlethal support to local proxies, 

especially in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, where Iran has a history of 

supporting Shia opposition movements. The GCC countries will also have to 

confront the growing threats posed by Iran in the area of Computer Network 

Exploitation operations. Iranian hackers employed primarily by the MOIS target the computer systems of U.S. and gulf personnel, companies, and government facilities. Iran has treated past Stuxnet attacks on centrifuges at Natanz 

as a declaration of cyber war, and is now responding in kind. 

• Third, IRGC Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani will find ways of 

increasing military support to the Assad regime. Keeping Assad in power will 

remain a strategic priority, mainly because it strengthens Iran’s relationship 

with its most important partner in the region, Lebanese Hezbollah, but also because in Iran’s eyes there is no alternative. Soleimani will also be focused on 

countering the growth of Sunni extremism in Iraq, which has reached levels of 

violence unseen since 2007. He will probably offer to increase current initiatives 

that arm, train, and fund new and existing pro-Iranian Shia militants in Iraq. 

Soleimani has more say over what Iran does in Syria and Iraq than President 

Rouhani, enjoying the full support of the Supreme Leader. His number one priority will remain building an arc of influence and power across the Levant, 

often referred to as Iran’s ‘‘Shia crescent.’’ 

• Fourth, there are few signs that a nuclear Iran will increase the chances of a 

near-term nuclear arms race in the Middle East. U.S.–GCC bilateral security 

relationships have evolved for more than 25 years. Any strategic shift away 

from the United States would take years given the depth of the commitments 

involved. GCC countries are rightfully more concerned about Iran’s attempts to 

exploit the very real issues of religious extremism, demographic pressures, and 

other internal sources of instability that each Gulf State is trying to address 

on its own. 

• Fifth, Iran has gone to considerable lengths to create a global shadow apparatus 

designed to evade sanctions. It enables the Iranian Government to support 

Islamic movements and pro-Iran militants around the world and spread the 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

14 

value of the ‘‘resistance’’ via cultural, social, economic, political, and business 

entities and organizations. That apparatus goes hand in hand with the asymmetrical nature of almost everything it does. The international community 

needs to develop a better understanding of this apparatus for several reasons, 

but largely because it is directly linked to some of Iran’s most destabilizing 

activities. • Sixth, as long as a nuclear deal does not address Iran’s ballistic missile program, which appears to be the case given outright rejection of the idea by the 

Supreme Leader, Iran will continue to develop long-range ballistic missiles that 

can strike any target in the GCC and add further to its arsenal of short-range 

artillery rockets that can strike coastal areas across the gulf. Iran will attempt 

to improve the accuracy of its missiles and rockets, and pursue the indigenous 

production of UCAVs, cruise missiles, and possibly even nuclear warheads. 

THE WAY FORWARD

Even if sanctions and diplomacy lead to a nuclear agreement with Iran, the activities of the Iran Threat Network will continue to pose significant obstacles to Iran’s 

diplomatic outreach to the gulf and the West. In some cases, lethal support to Shia 

opposition groups across the region also threatens both U.S. and international 

security. To address these threats, policymakers should consider the following 

recommendations: 

• Coordinate U.S. Efforts Against Networks. U.S. policymakers should call for an 

interagency and international task force for developing and deploying a comprehensive and global campaign against the operational and strategic depth of 

the Iran Threat Network. Such a task force would target the illicit networks 

and operatives associated with the Iran Threat Network, including its financial, 

business, and logistical support networks. The goal should be a counter network 

disruption campaign, modeled where appropriate, on previous successful U.S. 

whole-of-government initiatives against defiant state actors that combine overt 

and covert action, law enforcement, sanctions, and containment. 

• Refine and Expand Soft War Initiatives. The Supreme Leader repeatedly refers 

to the U.S.-led ‘‘soft war’’ as the single biggest threat to the existence of the 

Islamic Republic. An effective soft war should expose and neutralize the state 

and nonstate actors involved in subversive activities that are instrumental in 

marketing the Islamic Revolution overseas. At the very least, this should include Quds Force, MOIS, and Hezbollah operations and criminal activities. Of 

equal importance are Iran’s nonofficial cover organizations—religious, cultural, 

and charitable—as well as businesses that effectively blur the lines between 

overt and covert activity. 

• Focus Efforts on Transnational Organized Crime. In addition to being one of the 

world’s most formidable terrorist and paramilitary organizations, Hezbollah has 

become involved in a global criminal enterprise involving money laundering, 

racketeering, and drug trafficking. Indicting Hezbollah as a transnational criminal organization would dispel its image as an elite and ‘‘pure’’ resistance organization. We should approach and counter Hezbollah from the vantage point of 

strategic law enforcement, financial sanctions, and even the International Court 

of Criminal Justice (for its long record of global terrorism, for its involvement 

in the assassination of a democratically elected head of state, and possibly even 

for war crimes being perpetrated in Syria). 

• Developing Nonmilitary Policy Options. At any given time, dozens of U.S. Government agencies are pursuing the same elements of the Iran Threat Network. 

To improve the way multiple agencies work against the Iran Threat Network, 

the government has to be better organized. In relatively new and developing 

areas such as Counter Threat Finance, it would go a long way to work from 

an agreed-upon ‘‘financial order of battle’’ that maps key networks on a transnational scale (e.g., banks, exchange houses, front companies, trade-based 

money laundering, shipping companies, etc.). In doing so, U.S. Government 

agencies should draw assiduously on partner country liaison services as part of 

a global effort to build a coalition of like-minded states. An order of battle would 

generate a series of nonmilitary or military-enabled policy options that could 

serve as the basis of a strategic intelligence and law enforcement campaign— 

not just a series of strikes. 

• Focus on Counter Threat Facilitation. As long as Iran has an agenda of creating 

new centers of power in the world and doing so at the expense of the United 

States, it behooves us to consider a law enforcement-led ‘‘Counter Threat Facilitation’’ initiative. Such an initiative should emphasize strategically planned law 

enforcement operations to expose illicit networks, arrest their perpetrators, 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

15 

freeze assets and attack the Iran Threat Network’s crime-terror pipelines 

though the international trade and banking system. It could go a long way in 

weakening the illicit financial networks around the world that buttress Iran’s 

strategic foundations, revolutionary resolve, domestic staying power, and power 

projection capabilities. 

• Create Offices of Irregular Warfare. As sanctions are eased, the U.S. Government will need to find other ways of identifying and disrupting Iran’s involvement in nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and other threats to international security. If sanctions and military options make way for other policy options, the 

U.S. will have a much more difficult time identifying and countering many of 

the Iran Threat Network’s illicit activities, which tend to be irregular or asymmetric in nature. Creating offices of irregular warfare in various government 

agencies would go a long way toward exposing and damaging the criminal foundations of the Iran Threat Network. While irregular warfare is usually the domain of the military, several operationally robust and aggressive nonkinetic initiatives should be considered. In the area of Information Operations, for example, covert influence authorities ‘‘with teeth’’ are necessary to more effectively 

bolster Iranian moderates in Iran and to undermine Iran’s message to audiences in Africa, Central Asia, and across the Middle East. In the still developing 

area of Counter Threat Finance, the Treasury Department should be put on a 

financial and economic warfare footing, or better integrated with interagency 

partners who possess the needed level of financial operational authorities and 

capabilities. Treasury needs to be more involved in financial operations, particularly overseas, where there are significant gaps of understanding in the areas 

of international banking and finance. Finally, the U.S. cannot do it alone. The 

Iran Threat Network has grown increasingly transnational, making it critical 

to have the support of foreign liaison partners who have the ability to hit Iran’s 

threat facilitation networks (transport, shipping agents, freight forwarders, 

warehouses, pilots, airlines, etc.). Properly incentivizing our partners to conduct 

higher impact operations against the Iran Threat Network depends on creativity, money, and persistence. The Rewards for Justice Program, or a version 

thereof, should offer payouts to exceptional foreign government officials or units 

who successfully assist U.S. Government initiatives. 

CONCLUSION

A nuclear deal with Iran will bring in hundreds of billions of dollars as Iran 

recoups frozen assets, exports more oil, takes in foreign direct investment, enters 

into trade agreements, and starts to shrug off its pariah status. Yet, the strategic 

calculus of the Supreme Leader and much of the ruling conservative establishment 

is the same today as it was when the Islamic Revolution began: preserving the 

regime at home and deterring threats from abroad, while externalizing the revolution and resistance. The Iran Threat Network, free of budgetary constraints and 

emboldened as a newly minted nuclear power, is the engine of the regime and will 

resume Iran’s pursuit of broader goals in the region. Look for a return to past levels 

of activity by elements of the Iran Threat Network, including units of the Quds 

Force, whose budgets have been cut back as a result of Iran’s economic downturn. 

This means more operations in Syria, where Iran will continue to work closely with 

the Assad regime and Iran-trained, equipped, and guided militant networks; further 

attempts to support Shia activism in Bahrain, where Iran has attempted several 

times to create the conditions for regime change; continued use of Iraq as a transit 

point for illicit commerce coming from the gulf, and the movement of men, money, 

and illicit materiel across the Levant; deeper support to Hezbollah and the newly 

formed Palestinian coalition government; and likely increases in training, weapons, 

and funding to the Houthi rebels in Yemen and pariah states such as the Sudan. 

GCC countries will continue to harbor deep suspicion, distrust, and enmity toward 

Iran, well aware of Iran’s unrelenting efforts to create internal dissent and destabilization through support to local Shia opposition movements. Still, they will refrain 

from pursuing their own nuclear programs (other than the UAE) and continue to 

rely instead on strong bilateral security partnerships with the United States. For 

its part, Iran will push Hezbollah to do some of its more complicated bidding in 

Arab countries, which Hezbollah sometimes agrees to, other times not. Finally, the 

peaceful intentions of a nuclear Iran will take decades to validate. Until that 

happens, expect more denial, deception, and dissimulation from the Iran Threat 

Network. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Dr. Kagan. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

16 

STATEMENT OF DR. FREDERICK W. KAGAN, CHRISTOPHER 

DEMUTH CHAIR AND DIRECTOR, CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Dr. KAGAN. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member 

Corker, I have rarely felt more superfluous as a witness since I 

agree with virtually everything that the two previous witnesses 

have said. I will do my best to try to add a little bit to that, but 

I am afraid this is not going to be a very confrontational hearing, 

at least in terms of the witnesses. 

As I wrote this testimony, I was watching Iraq die. I was reading 

the reports of the fall of Mosul to the Islamic State of Iraq and 

al-Sham, to the collapse of the Iraqi Security Forces in the north, 

to the really complete collapse of the Iraqi Security Forces not only 

in Ninewah province but also in Kirkuk and wondering whether 

and where they may be able to stop the ISIS advance, which is not 

at all clear at this point. 

I note that ISIS has been simultaneously conducting operations 

against its rival al-Qaeda affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra, in Syria where 

it continues to expand and to control large amounts of territory. 

Sectarian conflict in the region is continuing to expand and deepen, 

along with al-Qaeda safe havens and capabilities. 

You might ask what does this have to do with the topic of today’s 

hearing, and I would say that this has everything to do with the 

topic of today’s hearing. Iran is a belligerent in this regional sectarian war, and its regional activities will be shaped to a considerable degree by the approach it adopts in this conflict. We can only 

reflect on the implications of a possible nuclear weapons deal for 

the region in the context of how the Iranians are going about, and 

will go about, pursuing what they perceive to be their interests in 

the region. 

The nuclear issue is at the core of America’s thinking about Iran 

with the exception of this committee, for which I am very grateful. 

But it is at the periphery of Iran’s strategic calculus in many ways. 

The purpose of pursuing a nuclear weapons program for Iran is to 

enable other activities in the region. And so from the standpoint of 

what the Iranians will do in the region, with or without a deal, we 

have to understand that the nuclear program was never the central 

objective. It was a means to an end. 

I think the point that Ambassador Ross made about whether a 

deal would constitute a fundamental change in the attitudes of 

Iran toward the United States and the West is an important one. 

I think we should reflect on the atmosphere of United States-Soviet 

relationships during and after the SALT talks. We had a brief 

period of detente during which the Soviets stopped none of the 

activities that they had been engaged in against the United States 

and its allies and around the world, and indeed, the period of 

detente ended with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 

There is no reason—in fact, there is ample reason from the history of arms control agreements to believe that arms control agreements do not generally lead to peace and brotherhood and 

kumbaya moments. They can occur in the midst of extremely tense 

engagements as one side or both sides decide that it is not in their 

interest to pursue a particular weapons path at this time and prefer to take that problem off the table. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

17 

But even if we could imagine a total change in the attitudes of 

the Islamic Republic toward us, which in my opinion would require 

the death of Ayatollah Khamenei who is absolutely never going to 

change his views on us, and his replacement by someone who has 

fundamentally different views, we would still have a problem. That 

would not actually bring Iran into alignment with our interests in 

the region. And I think we really have to understand this point. 

I began this testimony talking about Iraq because Iran’s strategy 

in Iraq and Syria and Lebanon and Bahrain and Yemen and 

throughout the region has shown the enormous damage the Islamic 

Republic does by the methods that it uses to pursue its aims. Iran 

does not fill vacuums. Iran creates vacuums on the whole. Iran 

does not strengthen regional states. Iran undermines regional 

states because its preferred methods are through nonstate or substate proxies. 

And it is interesting—not surprising, but interesting—to see the 

way as Lebanese Hezbollah has come into the Lebanese Government, it has, nevertheless, remained an independent force that the 

Lebanese Government does not control, and the Iranians have 

assisted it to do so. And in fact, it has engaged in a unilateral invasion of Syria at Iranian behest, which the Lebanese Government 

certainly did not approve of. 

We have seen this in Iraq as well. Iranian efforts in Iraq have 

consistently undermined efforts to form coherent governance in 

Iraq even when you have had an Iraqi Shia Prime Minister, 

although I have never been in the camp of thinking that Malaki 

was an Iranian stooge. 

They are pursuing a similar approach in Yemen. They have coopted to a considerable extent the quasi-Shia al-Houthis movement 

in northwest Yemen. And some years ago, we began to see for the 

first time al-Houthis running around chanting ‘‘death to America’’ 

and repeating Iranian slogans. And the al-Houthis have now established a de facto state independent of the government of Sana’a 

and are, in fact, working to extend that state. But the Iranians did 

not support only the al-Houthis. They are also supporting the 

Southern Mobility Movement, the secessionist movement that is a 

Sunni movement in southern Yemen. In other words, the Iranian 

strategy in Yemen, which is, I would submit, in some respects more 

well thought through than ours, is a strategy that is fundamentally 

aimed at dismembering the Yemeni state. 

All of this would seem odd because we imagine the Iranians to 

be the enemies of al-Qaeda and threatened by al-Qaeda. And they 

certainly are threatened by al-Qaeda. But it is interesting that Iranian operatives in Syria have made no effort that we can see to go 

after the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham. And on the contrary, 

Assad’s forces have been largely cooperating with ISIS because 

ISIS has been taking the fight to the Kurds and the Assad regime 

finds that of utility. 

So the point is that it is not simply that the Iranians do not like 

us. It is not simply that they are opposed to our interests. We can 

discuss whether the regime is evil or not, whether it matters or 

not, whether it is evil. What matters is that this regime is entirely 

committed to a set of strategies that revolve around a certain set 

of tools and approaches that are absolutely destabilizing to the 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

18 

region and absolutely fueling the sectarian regional war that is 

actually the most important American national security threat that 

we are facing because that regional sectarian war not only destroys 

any prospect of stability in a critically important region, but it is 

also the principal recruiting force for a global jihadi movement that 

is now regularly drawing recruits from the United States itself into 

these conflicts and most likely cycling them back. 

So anything that we do with Iran, deal or no deal, we must 

develop a strategy, as Ambassador Ross suggested, to compete with 

the Iranian means and methods and approaches in the Middle East 

because we must be prepared to contest with Iran not for control 

of the Middle East, not for Middle East hegemony, not for ideology, 

but for stability. It is very important to us that we have a peaceful 

and stable Middle East, and because the word ‘‘stability’’ is misused here very frequently, let me say I do not believe that stability 

flows from the gun of a dictator. I believe that we actually have to 

have some kind of representative state, some kind of inclusive government, some kind of support from the population. But that is not 

what the Iranians seek. So if we have any prospect of achieving our 

core national security objectives in the region, whether we have a 

nuclear deal or not, we must develop and execute a comprehensive 

strategy to press our interests in stability and contest the Iranian 

drive for instability in the region. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Kagan follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. FREDERICK W. KAGAN

Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, members of the committee, thank 

you for this opportunity to appear before you today. As I write this testimony, I am 

reading reports of the fall of Mosul to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) 

and the military maneuver of ISIS forces toward Baghdad. The Iraqi Security 

Forces in Ninewah have collapsed, and it is not clear where—or if—they will be able 

to stop the ISIS advance. ISIS is simultaneously conducting offensive operations 

against the rival al-Qaeda affiliate in eastern Syria, where it continues to control 

and govern significant territory. Sectarian conflict in the region continues to expand 

and deepen, along with al-Qaeda safe havens and capabilities. 

What does this have to do with the topic of today’s hearing, you might be wondering. The answer is: everything. Iran is a belligerent in this regional sectarian 

war and its regional activities will be shaped to a considerable degree by the 

approach it adopts to this conflict. We can only reflect on the implications of a possible nuclear weapons deal for the region in this context. 

The national security policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is designed to prevail 

in the war Tehran believes the United States and Israel are waging against it. 

Supreme Leader Khamenei declared in March that international sanctions on Iran 

became ‘‘an all-out war’’ against Iran in 2011. He denied that sanctions have anything to do with Iran’s nuclear program: ‘‘One day, their excuse is the nuclear issue 

and another day, it is the issue of the enrichment. One day, it is human rights and 

another day, it is other such issues. Sanctions existed against us before the nuclear 

issue was brought up and they will continue to exist . . . even if the nuclear issue 

and these negotiations are resolved.’’ He sees American enmity in everything: ‘‘From 

the beginning the enemy has made extensive efforts, and the more we advance, the 

clearer their work becomes. They use thousands of TV networks, radio programs, 

and the Internet to curse the Islamic Republic.’’ He even blames us for al-Qaeda: 

‘‘Today Takfiri groups are working against Islam and Shias in certain regions and 

carrying out evil acts, but they are not the main enemies. The main enemy is the 

one who provokes them and provides them with money.’’ Even the supposedly 

reformist Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani declared in 2010: ‘‘Radical Islamic groups 

such as al-Qaeda and the Taliban are the creatures of the espionage service of the 

United States and the West.’’ 

These are not isolated statements. The Iranian national security leadership regularly repeats and expands on them. Tehran has evolved a national security strategy 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

19 

around the concept of ‘‘soft war’’ that seeks to defeat the supposedly subtle and complex efforts of the U.S. and Israel to destroy Iran with everything from smart missiles to Internet pornography. This strategy sees any American influence in the Middle East as anathema and a mortal threat, and its goal is the complete expulsion 

of the U.S., the destruction of Israel, and the creation of a Persian hegemony. The 

Islamic Republic sees itself as the revolutionary vanguard that will overturn the 

current immoral, unjust, and infidel world-order in favor of its preferred religiousideological vision. 

Iran seeks to be not merely a great-power rival to the U.S., but a force to destroy 

the U.S.-dominated (from Tehran’s perspective) world system. 

The nuclear issue is at the core of America’s current policy concern with Iran, but 

it is at the periphery of Iran’s strategic calculus. The rational explanation for Iran’s 

pursuit of nuclear weapons capability is the desire to be able to deter an American 

or Israeli attack on Iran once and for all. That is a defensive objective whose primary aim is to enable other operations to achieve Iran’s goals throughout the 

region. Iran’s nuclear program is meant to be a strategic enabler, not a strategy 

unto itself. 

What would happen, then, if Iran actually abandoned that program? The international sanctions regime would be unwound, large amounts of money and human 

capital would flow into Iran, the regime would be able to stabilize itself internally 

and would have enormously greater resources with which to pursue its regional 

goals. A nuclear agreement would advance the regional interests of the U.S. only 

if it led to a fundamental change in the nature of Iran’s attitudes toward and relationship with the U.S. and its allies. 

Such a shift seems most unlikely, however. The entire ideological foundation of 

the current Iranian regime rests as much on anti-Americanism as it does on antiZionism (without much distinction between the two). One could imagine a nuclear 

deal in which Iran yields almost all of its enrichment capability in exchange for full 

sanctions relief, but the tone of the agreement would be like the tone of U.S.- 

Russian relations after the signing of the SALT treaty in 1972. There might well 

follow a period of detente, but there is no reason to imagine a wholesale change in 

the fundamental thinking, strategy, and approach of the Islamic Republic. The history of arms treaties amply demonstrates the degree to which the spirit of cooperation in which they are negotiated can be separated from an overall atmosphere of 

hostility. 

But even a total reversal of Tehran’s attitudes toward the U.S. would not be 

enough to bring Iran into alignment with U.S. interests in the region. I began this 

testimony speaking about Iraq because Iran’s strategy there and in Syria, Lebanon, 

Bahrain, Yemen, and throughout the region has shown the enormous damage the 

Islamic Republic does to regional stability through the methods by which it pursues 

its aims. Iran relies mainly on substate Shia militant groups combined with overt 

bribes to individuals and regimes to shape the strategies and policies of its neighbors. 

Lebanese Hezbollah, its primary regional proxy, participates in the Lebanese Government but maintains its own large armed force—which it sent into Syria at 

Tehran’s behest in support of Assad. Iranian strategy in Lebanon has consistently 

sought to prevent the Lebanese Government from gaining control over Hezbollah— 

and thereby over much of southern Lebanon—even after Hezbollah became part of 

the government. 

Iranian strategy in Iraq has turned heavily on supporting and sustaining multiple 

competing Shia militia groups, political factions, and suborned individuals. This 

strategy has consistently hindered efforts to form a coherent Iraqi state. The militias themselves became a major driver of sectarian conflict from shortly after the 

U.S. invasion, in fact, and are responsible in no small way for the regional sectarian 

war we now face. 

Tehran has pursued a similar approach in Yemen, coopting the quasi-Shia alHouthis in the northwest, training, arming, and funding them as they have established a de facto independent ministate between Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Iran 

simultaneously has been providing assistance to Sunni separatists in southern 

Yemen, contributing to the collapse of that state. 

And Iranian strategy in Syria has been to back Assad in the conduct of a sectarian bloodletting of remarkable viciousness. That viciousness has powerfully 

fueled the regional sectarian war and become a magnet, rallying cry, and now training and logistical base for Sunni extremists from around the world. 

It is not just that the Islamic Republic is anti-American. The Islamic Republic is 

a polarizing sectarian force whose main methods of pursuing its goals destroy order, 

stability, and politics. It will seek to manage the escalating crisis through these 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

20 

methods and will instead make it worse. A nuclear deal will only give Tehran more 

resources with which to pursue its mistaken and misshapen strategy. 

A nuclear agreement that verifiably eliminated Iran’s ability to acquire nuclear 

weapons capability would of course be desirable, although I do not believe that it 

is achievable. Certainly Tehran has not put anything on the table thus far that 

comes even close to meeting this standard. The Iranian penchant for pursuing secret 

nuclear and weaponization programs and admitting to them only after the U.S. 

finds them does not bode well for full transparency, particularly considering the Iranian conviction that the International Atomic Energy Agency is an espionage network for the West. There is also the question of how to ensure continued Iranian 

adherence to any agreement in the absence of sanctions. Sanctions have been absolutely essential in bringing the Supreme Leader to the negotiating table at all. Once 

lifted, they will not be easily or quickly restored. Without the credible threat of the 

rapid restoration of crippling sanctions, pressure on Tehran to abide by any agreement will be considerably less than the pressure that has been required to bring 

Iran to the table. Even a deal could only work, then, if the Iranians really undergo 

a fundamental change of heart on the nuclear issue—something for which there is 

no evidence whatever to suggest. 

Any deal comes with the risk of miscalculation and betrayal—the risk that Iran 

might after all retain the ability to field a nuclear arsenal. We are all focused on 

that risk. But a deal would also come with another risk—the risk that the U.S. 

would persuade itself that solving one problem solves all. In this case, on the contrary, solving one problem may very well make others a lot worse. But deal or no 

deal, the U.S. can only hope to advance (or defend) its interests in the Middle East 

through our own active engagement. Perhaps we must now speak of reengagement 

after the determined retreats of the past 5 years. 

This is not a brief for military regime change in Iran, for reinvading Iraq, or for 

any specific policy. It is certainly not an argument for pursuing purely military 

responses to regional problems and the Iranian threat. We must instead use the 

moment of reflection afforded by this hearing to consider how to develop a strategy 

that competes with Iran while fighting al-Qaeda—all the while avoiding the trap of 

imagining that the one can be an effective ally against the other. 

The basic outlines of such a strategy are clear. The urgency of the situations in 

Iraq and Syria demands active American involvement in those conflicts, not necessarily through the deployment of U.S. combat troops, but certainly through the 

deployment of advisers, support elements, enablers (including air power), and intelligence to assist the majorities in both countries who seek to reject both al-Qaeda 

and Iranian domination. Hezbollah’s invasion of Syria has exacerbated rifts within 

Lebanon and opened the possibility of driving a wedge between Hezbollah and other 

parts of Lebanese society. Aggressive diplomacy and well-targeted assistance could 

help weaken Hezbollah’s control over its vital base, forcing it to refocus on Lebanon 

and away from supporting Assad. The U.S. must also work seriously—and not 

through speeches—to regain the confidence of our Arab allies, particularly Saudi 

Arabia and Turkey. America’s retreat from the region has increased the costs of implementing such a strategy, but we must keep in mind that things are not going 

terribly well for Iran either, despite the current euphoria in Tehran. A strategy that 

combines continued sanctions with meaningful efforts to displace and disrupt Iran’s 

proxies and Iran’s strategies in the region is essential to creating any prospect of 

long-term change in Tehran’s attitudes and of regional stability. 

I thank the committee for raising this important issue and for the opportunity to 

present my views. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you all. 

A lot to cover here. Let me say I see the GCC and others increasingly warming up to Iran. Last month, Saudi Arabia extended an 

invitation to Foreign Minister Zarif. Last week, the Emir of Kuwait 

made an official visit to Iran. It seems that President Rouhani may 

have been invited to the Egyptian President’s inauguration ceremony. These are just a few examples, but it seems that Iran’s 

international and regional isolation may be quickly melting away 

as the anticipation of a deal accelerates. 

What is motivating the culf leaders to engage Iran, especially 

after listening to your description, Ambassador Ross, about their 

concerns, which while the nuclear deal is something that is really 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

21 

a concern about their regional designs, in terms of engaging the 

Iranians? Is this hedging? And if so, what does that stem from? 

Ambassador ROSS. First, I think we probably have to distinguish 

between some of the different actors in the region on the Arab side. 

The Saudi willingness to at least invite Zarif to come—by the 

way, he has not come yet. I would read that through a very careful 

lens. They may be prepared to talk to him, but I do not see any 

sign that the Saudis are about to somehow change their behavior 

toward the Iranians. Having a conversation with Zarif might be 

designed to sort of, A, impose a set of principles that if the Iranians 

want to see any improvement with the Saudis, this is what the 

Saudis require. And there is a lot of indication that is kind of what 

the message has been. Or, B, it could just be to see if there is any 

information they can acquire out of this kind of an exchange. But 

I do not see the Saudis at this point, certainly not with this King 

who is very clear on his view of the Iranians—I do not see a change 

there. 

In the case of Kuwait, historically the Kuwaitis had a different 

kind of relationship with the Iranians. They tried to be somewhat 

more in between, and they view the Iranians as a potential threat. 

They lined up more with the Saudis and the Emiratis in terms of 

their attitudes in the past year when they uncovered what was a 

plot within Kuwait. But I suspect right now the more traditional 

instinct to at least hedge bets or at least try to minimize—give the 

Iranians a reason to reduce reasons for hostility—I think that probably accounts for it. 

In the case of Egypt, look, Egypt’s focus is much more internal 

than anything else. They are not going to do anything with Iran 

that would upset the Saudis. The Saudis are their principal bankers right now. That is their main focus. I think inviting the Iranians to the inauguration is more a sign of trying to demonstrate 

a broad participation with regard to that event. 

If you are talking about Oman, Oman has always had a different 

relationship with Iran. 

Qatar also has always tried to hedge its bets. 

The CHAIRMAN. You do not see a hedging of bets? 

Ambassador ROSS. Not right now, not by the Saudis. 

The CHAIRMAN. So in this context, there are voices that I consistently hear, some in the Congress, others from beyond the Congress, 

who suggest that striking the nuclear deal with Iran is opening the 

doors to a much wider set of possibilities. As I listened to your collective testimony, it seems to me it does not open the door to a 

much wider set of possibilities of engaging Iran in a way in which 

they will change, particularly the asymmetric effort that they have 

within the region and beyond but will actually fuel the possibility 

for them to pursue a course of action that they already determined 

is in their interest. Is that a fair statement? 

Ambassador ROSS. Certainly the way I read it. What I was trying 

to get at was it may well be that Rouhani and Zarif represent a 

constituency within Iran that would like to end Iran’s isolation, 

would like to normalize relations, see that the best way to support 

the future of the Islamic Republic is, in fact, to have a greater normalization. Now, obviously, the Supreme Leader I think operates 

on a different premise. Somehow he was persuaded to give Rouhani 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

22 

a license to negotiate because the costs of isolation, the costs of the 

sanctions was seen as potentially threatening the Islamic Republic 

itself. 

But for him, he views us through a lens of hostility. He allows 

the IRGC al-Quds Forces to be their action arm throughout the 

rest of the region. There is no indication that Rouhani or Zarif have 

any impact on what the Iranians are doing throughout the rest of 

the region. And that was what I was trying to suggest. If you want 

to try to see a constituency that seems more pragmatic to have 

greater authority and somehow greater empowerment, the way to 

do that is to show the high costs of the behaviors that are unacceptable throughout the rest of the region. 

And I would also say, also the only way he is going to be able 

to sell the Supreme Leader on the kind of deal that is required, by 

the way, outlines of which I completely agree with what you presented—that is what is required for us to have a deal. The reason 

I say I do not think a deal is likely—Scott thinks a deal may happen. Here I would say I am more dubious. I am not saying it will 

not happen, but it is not going to happen unless there is an understanding that they get no relief on sanctions. They get no economic 

benefit unless, in fact, they roll back their program. Their approach 

to the negotiations right now is we will do some semblance of 

transparency and we should be able to add to the rest of the program. I do not believe there will be a deal under those circumstances. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you all this, and I would like to have 

your opinion. Former CIA Director General David Petraeus said in 

an op-ed published in the Washington Post—and I quote—‘‘rather 

than freeing Washington to reduce the U.S. footprint in the Middle 

East and focus elsewhere, a nuclear agreement with Tehran is 

likely to compel us to deepen our military, diplomatic, and intelligence presence in the region in order to help partners there balance against increasing Iranian power. A variety of steps should be 

pursued to this end: approval of additional military capability 

sought by Arab partners and Israel, a renewed initiative to integrate the Gulf Cooperation Council countries’ air and ballistic missile defenses, maritime and air exercises to demonstrate U.S. and 

partner capabilities in the region, and sustaining, if not augmenting, existing infrastructure and force posture there.’’ 

That is a pretty significant universe of things. How do you all 

feel about that? Dr. Kagan, let us start with you. 

Dr. KAGAN. I am in violent agreement with that. A nuclear deal 

that lifts sanctions to any considerable extent will result in a flood 

of money resources, intellectual property, human capital, and other 

things into Iran. There are companies and countries around the 

world champing at the bit to get into a potentially massive and 

extremely lucrative market. That will flood the coffers of the state. 

We know that it will also flood the coffers of the IRGC. 

It has been interesting to observe the behavior of the IRGC leaders and their statements as these negotiations have proceeded. Initially they were very cold, very cautious, very suspicious, and very 

hostile. Now they are very supportive. They are constantly underlining their support for Rouhani and for what he is doing, and they 

are very clearly on board. And it is the behavior more of people 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

23 

who believe that they are really going to get something out of this 

than people who have been simply told by the Supreme Leader to 

get in line. 

So I think the assessment that the Iranian threat in the region 

will grow enormously is absolutely spot-on because I think Ambassador Ross has really hit it. I am not as sure that in strengthening 

Rouhani per se is going to achieve our interests. I am very confident that until and unless the strategy that Qasem Soleimani has 

been pursuing is shown to be bad for Iran and bad for the Supreme 

Leader in some way, the Iranians will continue to double down on 

that strategy. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Modell, do you have any views? 

Mr. MODELL. I would tend to agree. I think that with the influx 

of cash that comes as a result of a deal—and first of all, I would 

like to clarify that. I think the world will be presented with a deal. 

I do not know how good the deal is going to be because every indication I have is that Iran does not have any true intentions of actually honoring its obligation—that has been very clear since the 

November agreement—to actually come clean on the military 

dimensions of its program which, as far as we know, in the latest 

IAEA Board of Governors report, at the present time they are not 

actually implementing the additional protocol and they have not 

answered a lot of the fundamental questions about the military 

dimensions of the program, the most troubling aspects of the program. So whatever that deal is, we have a very, very long way to 

go before we can actually call it a comprehensive deal. 

But to the extent that Petraeus pointed out that there is going 

to be an enhanced focus on the Middle East, I could not agree more 

because the necessity of coming up with a comprehensive verification and compliance regime is going to demand even greater focus 

on all of the things that Iran does to evade sanctions. And a lot 

of those mechanisms are in the region. A lot of the ways in which 

they would potentially cheat on any type of a nuclear deal, which 

I believe is very likely—they basically obligate us to actually sort 

of double up our resources in figuring out what they are doing. 

As far as going back to the GCC issue, I want to make one comment. I very much agree. I think behind the charm offensive, I 

think when you talk to the Saudis and you talk to the Kuwaitis 

and others, I think they see through it. I think there is too much 

scar tissue over the last 30 years for them to simply embrace Iran. 

I think the existence of Hezbollah of the Hejaz years ago, which 

was used by Iran to attack targets in Saudi, other Hezbollah entities that were backed by Iran that are well known in the gulf left 

them with a very permanent, lasting impression that Iran has 

broader regional roles that are contrary to their own. And they are 

going to continue to focus on their internal security, and they will 

keep Iran at bay, to the extent they can. So I agree with the idea 

that there is going to have to be a greater focus on the Middle 

East, and there is going to be no pivot away from it. 

Ambassador ROSS. I support what Petraeus was suggesting. The 

only difference I would have is I would not wait until after the 

deal. I would do it now. I would try to do each of those things now. 

And I think, again, it makes a deal more likely. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Corker. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

24 

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I do want to say to the witnesses a great compliment as the 

chairman let each of you go over about 3 minutes in your testimony. And that just speaks to the importance we place on each of 

you. So thank you so much for being here. 

Mr. Ross, I know you have read the quote recently from the 

Supreme Leader of Iran saying today launching a military attack 

is not a priority from the viewpoint of Americans. They understand 

that they suffered a loss on the issue of Iraq and Afghanistan 

where they launched military attacks. There it can be said that 

they have changed their mind about launching a military attack. 

I am just curious as to how important that statement, that thinking process is relative to the negotiations that are underway. 

Ambassador ROSS. I think it is fundamental. I think the 

Supreme Leader has got to believe that the price of the failure of 

diplomacy is simply unacceptable from his standpoint, and I think 

the extent to which he believes that when we say all options are 

on the table, he believes that they are not—that is what his statement means—I think it makes the prospect of diplomacy succeeding less than it would be otherwise. 

Senator CORKER. And does anybody dissent? 

Dr. KAGAN. No. I would go even further than that and say that 

what we are seeing, as we observe the statements of the Iranian 

military command, is a sense of triumphalism in Tehran that is 

remarkable. They really do appear to believe that they have defeated us in a very fundamental way, and that the nuclear deal 

will cement that defeat. So very far from feeling as if they are in 

a position of weakness and must concede things. I think the talks 

are most likely to fail in many respects because the Iranians think 

that they do not have to give us anything because they think they 

have already won. 

Senator CORKER. While you have got the mike, your comment 

about the strategy that Iran is displaying in the region of dismembering, of destabilizing—one of the things I did not pick up in that 

discussion was toward what end. In other words, the role they are 

playing is very evident, but from their perspective, that is toward 

what end in the region? 

Dr. KAGAN. It is toward the larger objective of Iranian regional 

hegemony and the establishment of a Shia crescent and the overthrow of states and peoples that they think have been unjustly ruling in areas of concern to themselves and to the establishment of 

solid proxies for themselves. And since they have not historically 

been able to make states proxies for a variety of reasons, they have 

become accustomed to working through certain kinds of proxies, in 

addition to which I would say that I think although the Iranians 

have a general destination in mind, a general vision of what they 

would like the region to look like, I am not persuaded that they 

have a very specific vision. And I am not persuaded that they are 

driving toward very particular end states in any of the countries 

that they are actually supporting. They are driving in a direction, 

and the direction is greater Iranian influence, driving the United 

States out of the region, isolating Israel, and empowering people 

who will pursue the ideology of the Islamic Republic and, more 

importantly, the interests of the Islamic Republic. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

25 

Senator CORKER. So, therefore, controlling the region but not 

necessarily through statehood but just through proxies and gaining 

strength in that way. 

Dr. KAGAN. I think, obviously, they preferred the situation when 

Assad was governing Syria. The situation that they now have in 

Syria is much worse for them than it was before. But it does not 

seem to be that much of a priority for them, honestly, to build up 

the capacity of states as long as they can maintain the effective 

capacity of nonstate proxies. 

Senator CORKER. Does anybody disagree with that thesis? 

[No response.] 

Mr. MODELL. If you would not mind, I would like to make a comment just on the mind-set of the Supreme Leader very quickly. 

One of the things that has been mentioned here is that there is 

doubt as to whether or not the Supreme Leader thinks that any 

nuclear deal, good or bad, is going to lead to a greater rapprochement with the United States and the West. Based on everything 

that I have been reading lately on the Iranian side in the Iranian 

press, including the comments that were just mentioned, I think 

one of his redlines, if you had to actually define it, is exactly that. 

He does not believe that any type of agreement—it may lead to the 

revival of the Iranian economy, but the resumption of diplomatic 

relations with the United States at this point is definitely a redline. And I do not think that he would go there. 

There has been mention of Soleimani and his influence particularly with the Supreme Leader. When you look at the way that 

Iran has carried out its foreign policy in the Levant and Iraq, 

Soleimani has had a great deal of control. And Rouhani came into 

office knowing that to actually come in and try to take away influence from Soleimani in the area of foreign policy in the immediate 

region—I think he realized that was unrealistic. And I think to 

date you are seeing Soleimani still really calling the shots when it 

comes to what Iran does and what Iran is planning to do in that 

part of the world. And I do not think you are going to see a change 

on that. 

Ambassador ROSS. I will just comment briefly on what Dr. Kagan 

said. I generally agree with him. When the Supreme Leader now 

takes a look at what is happening in Iraq, that is not a good thing. 

Their preoccupation with Iraq is something that is understandable. 

They fought a war for 81⁄2 years. And with ISIS establishing itself 

and moving toward Baghdad, this is a challenge. This is a threat. 

So dismembering of states is a lever they have. It is a tool they 

have. I agree with what you said, that having someone like Assad 

in control of Syria where you are not consuming lots of resources, 

where you are not having to expend a lot of these proxies that you 

develop, they were using Hezbollah, Qutb Hezbollah, within Syria. 

Now they are going to have to mobilize all these Shia groups again 

and militias back in Iraq. So that is not a great scenario for them. 

Senator CORKER. So let me flip it around. So you have laid out 

what you think Iran’s thesis is, what their strategy is, what their 

objective is. If you look at U.S. policy, what is its objective? I mean, 

if you look at what happened in Syria, we basically have purposely 

strengthened Assad by focusing on chemical weapons. I have said 

this many times. The wisest thing he did for his own sustainability 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

26 

was to kill 1,200 people with chemical weapons, and that is all the 

administration now talks about is that. And yet, he has just been 

reelected, quote, quote, quote, to another term. 

In Iraq, you see what is happening. There is a guy named George 

Friedman who wrote a book that was the rage for a while talking 

about the next decade and how the United States really should 

cozy up with Iran. Is that really where we should be? I mean, if 

you look at the administration’s policies—I mean, one, two, three, 

four—it would seem that that is the direction they are taking. 

Do you think that is something that is purposeful? Do you think 

this is by accident? What is the United States policy today relative 

to Iran? 

Ambassador ROSS. Well, the way I would read the administration’s policy is to focus on the nuclear issue first, to prevent the 

Iranians from being in a position where having civil nuclear power 

can be converted into a nuclear weapon. I think that is a genuine 

objective. I think that is what the administration is pursuing 

through negotiations. 

I think it is prepared to work with our friends in the region to 

counter what the Iranians are doing throughout the rest of the 

region. Obviously, at this point, the way the regional actors see it 

is that they do not have a high level of confidence that we are prepared to be active enough to counter the Iranians because they 

believe that our priority of the nuclear objective is so great that 

everything else is secondary. That is one of the reasons I said I 

would like to see us—some of the things I even suggested that we 

should be doing in the aftermath of an agreement I am actually 

suggesting we should be doing now because, A, it sends a message 

to our friends we are not prepared to sit back and acquiesce in seeing the landscape and the region change fundamentally against the 

interests of our friends shifting in favor of the Iranians. I think 

that would do wonders for our friends. But I think, as I said before, 

it would actually do wonders to actually reach an agreement. 

I do think the Supreme Leader makes a calculus about whether 

something is a threat to the well-being of the Islamic Republic. I 

do not think it is an accident that Rouhani was allowed to win the 

election. I use the words ‘‘allowed to win the election’’ quite deliberately. The Supreme Leader decided that the costs were too high 

of staying on the path they were on. So if you want to reach an 

agreement, it has to be clear that the costs are very high if you do 

not reach an agreement. And I think the more the administration 

can communicate that, they will do better not only in terms of their 

objective on the nuclear issue, but they will do better on their 

objective in the rest of the region as well. 

Senator CORKER. If you could briefly respond, Dr. Kagan, I would 

appreciate it. I know my time is way up. 

Dr. KAGAN. Senator, what I would say is that what the administration is actually doing in the region has had the effect generally 

of putting us on the side of Iran in the region rather than on the 

side of other potential partners. I have no idea whether that is 

deliberate, and I am reluctant to think that it is. I think it is a corollary of policies that are really focused on not being involved in 

the region and on seeing al-Qaeda as the principal threat in the 

region, which it is, and on seeing Iranian proxies as, in many 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

27 

respects, our best bet for containing the al-Qaeda threat without 

United States involvement, which I believe is a very bad miscalculation. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Cardin. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I do thank all three of our witnesses. I have found this discussion 

to be very, very helpful. 

Obviously, the best outcome would be for an agreement to be 

reached that accomplishes what the chairman spelled out—an 

agreement that eliminates a breakout capacity for Iran in a short 

period of time and that ensures it will not be a nuclear weapons 

state. Listening to your testimonies, none of the three of you 

believe that that is likely to occur within the timeframe set out for 

this agreement. 

And it seems to me that the United States can influence one of 

two outcomes at the end of July. One could be that we have not 

achieved the objective of preventing Iran from breaking out to a 

nuclear capacity, and we certainly do not have the transparency 

that was needed. And therefore, we should work with our international partners to continue and to expand the sanctions that are 

imposed against Iran because of their violations of their international commitments. We must try to keep those sanctions as 

strong as possible, looking for a new day and a new opportunity to 

advance our objectives of preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear 

weapons state. 

Or the second option could be, well, we have a framework. Let 

us build on it. Let us make sure that we have transparency to prevent Iran from continuing its nuclear program. Let us try to make 

incremental progress in getting them to weaken their capacity as 

a nuclear weapons state, and let us try to keep the sanctions as 

tight as we can during that period of time, recognizing there may 

be some concessions that have to be made as progress is made. 

It seems to me they are the two paths that we could go down. 

And it does seem to me that the United States is the driver as to 

which of those two courses we take since we are the dominant 

player in these negotiations. 

I think I know your answers, but I would like to get on the 

record what you think is in the best interest of the United States. 

Which of those two courses would be in our best interest? 

Dr. KAGAN. Well, let us go from junior to senior. 

I think what Ambassador Ross has outlined is the right course 

of action, which is we should yield as little as possible in advance 

of the continuation of the negotiations and throughout the negotiations. We need to make it very clear that there is an enormous 

amount of pain for Iran if it does not come through with an agreement of the sort that is required and we all agree on what that is 

here. 

Senator CARDIN. I hear you. I understand that, and I agree with 

that. 

My point is we are going to reach a point where we will either 

do, as Mr. Modell suggested, announce that there is some interim 

agreement—it will not be a complete agreement, as Mr. Modell is 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

28 

expressing. But the United States could influence a judgment to 

say that is not adequate and therefore we should go back to where 

we were prior to the beginning of this year and get the international coalition, again recognizing that Iran is not serious about it. 

What course do you think is in the best interest for the United 

States? To continue along the path of holding Iran—I think we are 

able to do this—to not advancing with transparency and negotiating the process. But the cost of that would be to give in on 

some of the sanctions. Or are we better off saying no, this is not 

working? 

Dr. KAGAN. Okay. Senator, I will give you the direct answer to 

that. I apologize. Anyone who has purchased a rug in a Middle 

Eastern or, as I have, in an Afghan market knows that you have 

to be prepared to walk away from the table. You have to be prepared to walk out of the shop if the deal is not going toward what 

you need it to go to. And the worst thing that we can do is make 

it clear to the Iranians that we want a deal so badly that we will 

continue to dole out concessions, even as they are not meeting our 

terms, in the hopes that they will ultimately come to where we 

want them to be. So I would say at a certain point, if it is clear 

that they are not going to get there now, we should walk away, and 

walking away means bringing back as harsh a sanctions regime as 

we can. 

Mr. MODELL. Senator, I would tend to agree. I think even though 

we are going to be presented with some sort of a deal that is going 

to take years to verify and confirm if it is real, I would say in the 

runup to that, we ought to give very serious consideration about 

making sure that—I agree with what Fred says. We should be willing to say no because I think there are simply too many indications—— 

Senator CARDIN. Do you disagree with me that the United States 

is sort of in the driver’s seat here from the point of view of whether 

we are presented with some sort of a deal or saying we have not 

made enough progress, we are back in square one? 

Mr. MODELL. The perception on the Iranian side is that we are 

not in the driver’s seat. If you take at face value everything that 

they Iranian leaders are saying—and we are talking about the conservative hardliners—they are saying that the Obama administration is more desperate for a deal than Iran is. So I think that they 

are hoping for an easing of sanctions, and I think they are looking 

to enter into, quite frankly, a 10- or 20-year process that will allow 

them to replenish their funds and get the Iran threat network back 

and get their economy going. And if they do truly have intentions 

of cheating, they will have plenty of time to do it. So, again, I think 

there are simply too many unresolved concerns for us to go forward. 

Senator CARDIN. I certainly have questions. I am going to give 

Ambassador Ross a chance. 

I think the administration has been clear, though, what an 

agreement must look like. We have had several discussions about 

that. So I am not sure I want to identify myself with your view 

that the administration has already made that judgment. I am not 

sure they have. And I think that the United States can direct what 

path we take at the end of July. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

29 

Mr. MODELL. No, I agree. I just think there is a difference in perceptions right now. 

Senator CARDIN. That is an important point. 

Mr. MODELL. There is wishful thinking on the Iranian side that 

they can actually get to a point where they will have a little bit 

more flexibility. 

Senator CARDIN. Ambassador Ross. 

Ambassador ROSS. I do agree with that. I think the Iranians 

right now think they can get what they want without having to do 

what is necessary, and I think they are dead wrong. They will not. 

I do not think the administration is prepared to accept anything. 

I do think we are not going to get a deal by July 20. 

The real question you are asking is do we say, all right, stop it 

now and go back to the way it was prior to the joint plan of action 

or do we do what is built already into the joint plan of action, 

which is by mutual agreement, you can extend it another 6 

months. It is clear that the other members of the 5+1 will say let 

us extend it for the remaining 6 months. I think it will be difficult 

for the administration under those circumstances to say we are 

going to cut it off and walk away when the other members want 

to proceed and when our greatest effectiveness, at least with the 

sanctions, is when everyone is prepared to continue to implement 

those sanctions. 

Having said that, it is not going to be a given. This will not be 

a simple negotiation simply to extend because we will say to the 

Iranians, all right, look. You had to roll back your 20 percent and 

you have done that. We need to see some other rollback. For example, we need to see some rollback of your 3.5 percent. And the Iranians will say, well, we are not going to do that unless we get 

something. So it is not a given that you are going to be able to 

extend this because this itself is going to involve a negotiation. 

Right now, our focus is not on that plan B. Our focus is on trying 

to get a deal by July 20. I just think where the Iranians are is so 

far from where they need to be, unless this is just purely posturing, 

unless they are holding out until the last second and suddenly they 

are going to concede, but I doubt that. That is not the way I think 

they operate. So I think it is not going to be so simple to produce 

even the alternative that you are talking about, extending it for 

another 6 months. 

We are going to come to a point if there is no deal by the end 

of the year, then what do we do. And then I would say we do have 

to be prepared to walk away. I think we have to show the Iranians 

we are not so anxious for a deal. The deal we are prepared to 

accept is one that already involves a major concession to them. The 

major concession is that they will be allowed to enrich in a limited 

way. That is a big concession to them. And the price for that has 

to be that they go along with a very substantial rollback of the 

numbers of centrifuges, a ship-out of almost all of the enriched uranium material they have in country, a shutdown of Fordow, and 

Arak being converted into a light water reactor with then answers 

to the possible military dimensions of their program not because 

we are seeking to punish them but because how are we going to 

have a high level of confidence about what is going to happen in 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

30 

the future if they are not prepared to reveal what happened in the 

past. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, I agree with that. And, of course, this 

morning’s report is not very encouraging on those issues. Thank 

you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask a quick question in response to something you said to Senator Cardin. There is a third option in terms 

of July 20, and that is you extend but exactly under the same 

terms and conditions. 

Ambassador ROSS. That may be. That could be a fallback in the 

event. But I think going in, if there is—— 

The CHAIRMAN. I am not an advocate of that, but I am just saying it is a possibility. 

Ambassador ROSS. I think in the end, if you get a rollover, it will 

be a rollover with them being required to roll something further 

back and us also easing some additional sanctions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Risch. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As I listen to what you say, am I correct in getting out of this 

that all of you think that the administration is not going to wind 

up with a deal here, that the Iranians are not going to be willing 

to go far enough that the administration will cut a deal? Briefly. 

Is that what I am getting out of your testimony? 

Ambassador ROSS. By July 20, I think that is right. I am not saying that if we do not find a way to increase the leverage on the Iranians that we could not get a comprehensive deal. But right now, 

that is not where the Iranians are, and I do not think they think 

they need to be. And I think they are wrong. 

Senator RISCH. Mr. Modell. 

Mr. MODELL. I was going to say I think the world is going to be 

presented with some sort of a deal that is going to have to be 

worked out over time. I do not know what that deal is going to look 

like, but the more you look at the Iranians’ insistence, just as they 

did from 2003 to 2005, in having 50,000 centrifuges or 100,000 centrifuges eventually as part of a nationwide civilian nuclear program, I think eventually a deal is bound to come undone. 

Senator RISCH. Mr. Kagan. 

Dr. KAGAN. Senator, I am not prepared to say what this administration might or might not accept or might or might not announce. 

So I do not know. 

On the Iranian side, I think the likelihood that the Iranians will 

agree to a deal such as Ambassador Ross has identified and which 

we all agree is the minimum necessary is zero unless things change 

very dramatically, and the change is not going to come through 

diplomacy and negotiations. 

Senator RISCH. Well, I guess my fear is that we will wind up 

with a deal and it is not going to be the deal that needs to be done. 

I got to tell you after watching negotiations, as this administration 

has proceeded, I have got a really deep-seated fear in that regard. 

Anybody want to try to change that for me? 

Ambassador ROSS. Yes. 

Senator RISCH. Okay, have at it. [Laughter.] 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

31 

Ambassador ROSS. I believe that the administration understands 

that on this issue if you produce an outcome that leaves the Iranians in a position where they are a threshold nuclear state, where 

there are not very clear prohibitions that would make it difficult 

for them to then turn that into having a nuclear weapons capability, that that is not a sustainable deal. It is not good from the 

administration’s standpoint. It is not good from the national interest standpoint. It is not going to gain support within the Congress. 

It is certainly not going to get support from key regional friends. 

And I do not think the administration is negotiating with the 

Iranians in a way at this point that suggests that they are prepared to cave and not meet a certain basic threshold, which I think 

in fact is close to what the chairman outlined in his opening 

statement. 

Senator RISCH. Mr. Modell, do you share that optimism? 

Mr. MODELL. I do not. I have to disagree on that. I think over 

the last 4 or 5 years, you have given the Supreme Leader numerous reasons for him to think that the United States will back down, 

that this President is committed to multilateralism and not confronting the Iranian regime, with the exception of the sanctions 

regime which we are now actually negotiating right now. But I 

think there is ample evidence to suggest that we are looking for a 

deal desperately, and that is what they believe. 

Senator RISCH. Mr. Kagan. 

Dr. KAGAN. I think the administration is going to be faced at a 

certain point with a very sharp dilemma as my colleagues on the 

panel have outlined. I do not feel like I can predict in advance how 

exactly it will react to that. My concern is that the administration 

seems to be seeking desperately for some sort of foreign policy success and this is it. And that is a mind-set that can be very dangerous when you are in a negotiation. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you. 

Mr. Ross, I hope you are right and that Mr. Modell and I are 

wrong. But in any event, I guess time will tell. 

Very quickly. Let us assume we walk out of the rug market. How 

do we get the genie back in the bottle on the sanctions? We need 

some partners on this, and I use that word ‘‘partners’’ advisedly. 

One of those partners is Russia. It has been in all the papers. Our 

relationship has not been the best lately. How do we get the genie 

back in the bottle? 

Ambassador ROSS. Let me just say one thing. When I was asked 

at the time after the events in Crimea unfolded, was I worried that 

we would have an immediate problem with the Russians on the 

Iranian issue, my answer was ‘‘No,’’ not immediately because they 

are not in the 5+1 negotiations as a favor to us. They do not have 

an interest in the Iranians having a nuclear weapon. So it is not 

to say if they decided this was the most important thing to us and 

it trumped everything else and they realized that they could use 

it as a lever on us on other issues, that they would not do that. 

They would. But they have their own interests here. 

And it is interesting that in the negotiations that have been 

going on so far—and one of the reasons I think that you have this 

high-level bilateral discussion that took place this week with the 

Iranians was precisely because the 5+1 has actually held together 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

32 

in terms of saying that where the Iranians are is not going to make 

a deal possible. 

Now, can I say that will hold forever? I am not so sure. If the 

Iranians were to suddenly come in and change their position and 

adopt a position where they offered concessions that fell well short 

of where we want to be, maybe they would be able to play upon 

the differences in the 5+1. But that has not been the Iranian 

behavior so far. And partly—here I agree with my colleagues—it is 

because the Iranians think they do not have to do it. Well, unless 

we correct that impression, there is not going to be a deal. 

Senator RISCH. I think the thing that has troubled all of us here 

is we have all watched the media reports about this flood of business people that are going in there and getting ready to do business, as if the sanctions are done and over with. And that really 

troubles me about trying to put that back in the box. It seems to 

me it is going to be very difficult. 

Mr. Modell, my time is almost up. Do you want to take a run at 

this real quick? 

Mr. MODELL. I was just going to say I agree with Mr. Ross on 

those comments with regard to the Russian mind-set and the P5+1, 

but I would also be very careful about disregarding entirely the 

possibility of a new strategic partnership between Iran and Russia 

on some level, particularly if we get into a long phased process for 

5 or 10 or 20 years where we have to continuously reaffirm that 

they are following the additional protocol. But it is a tense process. 

Meanwhile, I think there is a good indication you are going to see 

growing signs of partnership between Russia and Iran behind the 

scenes. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you. 

Mr. Kagan, do you want to close this out for me? 

Dr. KAGAN. Yes. I agree what the Russians can do in the P5+1 

and so forth may be limited. But I also agree that we are already 

seeing indications of an Iranian-Russian entente of a much deeper 

level than we have seen before. And what we have to recognize is 

that Russia is not a partner anymore. Sadalov Dimeter sees the 

United States as his enemy and sees himself at war with us. This 

is extremely clear from his statements and actions. And he sees our 

enemies as his potential allies. So I think we need to understand 

that core pillar, that Russian partnership as a core pillar of American strategy toward Iran and Syria—that pillar has collapsed. And 

we need to contemplate what we are going to do in the aftermath. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Coons. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, for chairing 

this hearing, and I want to thank our witnesses for appearing 

today as we consider the very difficult potential implications of a 

nuclear agreement with Iran regionally and globally. 

I do share the administration’s ultimate goal, stated goal, of 

reaching an agreement that denies Iran the ability to acquire 

nuclear weapons capability, and I do continue to hope that a final 

deal could be reached that would include the most comprehensive 

inspections and verification regime possible so that we may irrefutably prevent Iran from acquiring a pathway to a bomb. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

33 

However, I share the skepticism and concerns expressed by this 

panel. We should have no illusions about these negotiations. The 

Iranians have given us no reason to trust their intentions, and any 

final agreement in my view must dismantle Iran’s enrichment infrastructure and address the military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear 

program including particularly its ICBM capability. 

So we also have to consider the regional implications and the 

legitimate and shared security concerns of our vital and trusted 

allies, principally Israel, and many others in the region. 

As the chair of the Africa Subcommittee, I am also increasingly 

concerned about Iran’s not just charm offensive, but active engagement across the continent to find diplomatic and potential military 

or economic allies as they continue to spread their influence 

and seek ways to break out from our efforts to impose meaningful 

sanctions. 

Ambassador, as you suggested in your written testimony, there 

is no deal. There is no pathway to a deal unless the Supreme 

Leader is convinced that if diplomacy fails, they will be enduring 

severe economic pain and the high probability that force will be 

used to destroy the investment that they have made in the nuclear 

program. 

I am cautiously encouraged that the sanctions regime has not 

come unraveled, that the negotiations have gone this far, and yet 

sanctions have largely remained effectively in place. And I agree 

with the dynamics you point to that suggests that the Russians 

may remain engaged with this at least for the moment. 

What do you see as the greatest risk? I agree with Dr. Kagan. 

Having negotiated in a number of souks around the world, you 

have to not just be willing to walk away. You have to walk away 

for there to be a deal. 

So what is the most important weak point of our ability to sustain a meaningful, a punishing sanctions regime given that we may 

well have to walk away? 

Ambassador ROSS. Well, the weakest point would be if some of 

the countries that, prior to the joint plan of action, were actually 

cutting back on their oil purchases stopped doing that. I guess the 

question is what is the best way to ensure that they do not do that. 

There are two different mind-sets there. 

One is, again, you continue to highlight, look, you do that and 

you pay this terrible price with us. Now, obviously, that imposes 

a price on us as well. 

The other is to be able to use what is the Iranian nonresponsiveness. Again, when we say walk away, we should be prepared to 

walk away. But one of the values of having demonstrated a readiness to negotiate genuinely and in good faith is that you expose the 

Iranians. I said before our readiness to be prepared to allow an outcome where they are allowed to have limited enrichment is a big 

concession. So if they are allowed to have limited enrichment but 

they are not prepared to do a deal, one of the things we are doing 

is we are exposing that. The fact of the matter is they do not want 

civil nuclear power. They want the option of being able to have a 

nuclear weapon, and they are not prepared to give it up. Now, the 

more you can expose that, the more you are going to be able to susFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

34 

tain I think the collective enforcement of sanctions that we have 

right now. 

Senator COONS. Well, Ambassador Ross and Dr. Kagan both, if 

Iran is allowed to retain some element of a domestic enrichment 

program, what do you think are the consequences of that? The 

UAE in a civil nuclear agreement with the United States gave up 

its enrichment capability, and I think if we get presented with a 

deal where there is anything other than the most preliminary or 

basic civil enrichment capability remaining within Iran, I think it 

has very negative consequences regionally and globally. But I 

would be interested in what you think. 

Ambassador ROSS. Look, there is no question that from a strictly 

nonproliferation standpoint, the best outcome is no enrichment. 

But that is probably not something that can be achieved. The question is, what do you say to a country like the UAE? I think what 

you say to them is look at what is being imposed on them. The 

kind of verification regime we need is the equivalent of what we 

had in Iraq. Do you want to have the kind of intrusion? If you want 

to go ahead with enrichment, that is what is going to be required. 

You do not have the same kind of sovereignty that you have today. 

So I would say you can show, yes, you did something that was the 

right path, but the agreement here that they are adopting is one 

that imposes limits on them that you would not want to have to 

face yourself. 

Senator COONS. Is it credibly possible for us to sustain an inspection regime over the long term that will actually provide the 

needed transparency and reassurance to Israel and to the United 

States? 

Ambassador ROSS. Well, it better be. Look, we should not be prepared to agree to an outcome where they have an enrichment capability even if it is limited because we know from their past behavior—you know, the old saying—Ronald Reagan’s saying was trust 

but verify. Well, my approach with the Iranians is distrust and 

verify. So it better be. 

Dr. KAGAN. Senator, if I could take a shot at that, I have got a 

very direct answer, which is ‘‘No.’’ I cannot imagine any verification 

regime that could actually provide the kind of guarantees that 

Israel or other allies would require partly because there never has 

been such an inspection regime. 

The Iraq inspection regime, we should remember, failed and it 

failed in the most interesting possible way. It completely failed to 

identify the fact that Saddam actually did not have the nuclear 

program. And as a result, it led everyone in the region to believe 

that he did, and it led us to believe that he did. 

It is hard for me to imagine that it will more effective in a country the size and shape of Iran with the terrain of Iran and with 

the degree of investment in digging that the Iranians have done. 

But I would just like to make one other point very quickly, which 

is that we are in the process of down-scaling our own intelligence 

capabilities at a dramatic rate, along with our military footprint 

and our military capabilities. And you cannot divorce the question 

of the verifiability of any deal from the question of what our intelligence capabilities are going to be down the road. 

Senator COONS. I agree. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

35 

Ambassador ROSS. It is a reason, by the way, that you do have 

to have a very thought-out and preplanned approach to dealing 

with the consequences of violations. 

Senator COONS. If I might ask a last question, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador, following up on that exact point, there are some 

publicly expressed concerns by the Israelis about their ability to 

rely on our security guarantees, and there are some repeatedly 

expressed concerns by Congress about our level of engagement with 

oversight for a potential deal and then its execution. 

What advice might you have for the administration and for us 

about reassuring the Israelis and engagement by Congress—by the 

engagement by the administration with Congress in the advance of 

our being presented with some deal? 

Ambassador ROSS. Well, it is two points that I was making in the 

testimony. One, we should have a systematic conversation with the 

Israelis about what cheating could look like, how best to deal with 

it, and specifically what the actions would be in the event of certain 

kinds of cheating, including not just sanctions but even the use of 

force. And we should be prepared to provide the Israelis some additional capabilities, with a clear understanding that if there was 

cheating and we did not act, we would support their acting and 

they would have the means to do so. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Ambassador. Thank you to our panel 

and your testimony. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for being here. Fascinating testimony. 

I did not want to miss this opportunity. Today is the fifth anniversary of the fraudulent election that brought Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to power and the protests that followed it. And I highlight 

this fact because I think that 5 years ago the administration 

missed an opportunity to stand up for human rights and for the 

aspirations of the Iranian people in those weeks following that 

fraudulent election. And I think that has had repercussions since. 

In that vein, the general matrix that has been outlined, as we 

have discussed this issue, has been that these sanctions are in 

place to deter, punish, and hopefully to encourage Iran to stop 

enriching and reprocessing because that gives them that basic 

capability. 

And then the second area argument has always been that if in 

fact they ever break out and go toward a weapon, the word that 

is always used is all options are on the table. But what that really 

means is a military option. And yet, I now believe—and I wanted 

to get your opinion—that more than ever before in recent memory 

there is a solid opinion now on behalf of the leadership of Iran, 

especially the Supreme Leader, that the United States is not willing to use military force. I think that he believes that we will use 

economic sanctions. I think he believes we will use soft power and 

all sorts of other things, but I do not believe that at any time in 

recent memory have they believed more strongly than they do now 

that the United States is not willing and/or capable of using any 

sort of military force against them potentially no matter what they 

do. And the implications that that is having on these negotiations 

I believe are important. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

36 

And I wanted to get your sense of whether you believe that that 

is true, and more importantly, was there ever a time in recent 

memory where they had perhaps a different opinion or where they 

perhaps had concerns that the United States, in fact, would engage 

in some sort of military action? Anyone can go first. If you agree 

with me, go first, please. [Laughter.] 

Mr. MODELL. One of the things I mentioned in my opening comments was exactly that. In 2009, I think the United States missed 

a major opportunity, probably the first real opportunity in the 30 

years at that point to actually effect some sort of a permanent 

change in the foundation of the regime. We failed to capitalize on 

that. In 2009, when the movement against the fraudulent elections 

coalesced into the Green Movement, the people in the Green Movement were wondering what kind of support they should expect 

from the United States, and that ended up to be no support at all. 

It was never designed to be a militant move to violently overthrow 

the regime, but at the same time, it sent a real strong message to 

the reformist movement in the country that we were not really 

willing to do anything and that instead, the President was elected 

on the idea that he was going to engage with anybody, be that 

Hugo Chavez in Venezuela or the Supreme Leader in Iran, that it 

was all about engagement. So that started the sort of second track 

of engagement. But again, it was a very clear message to the 

Supreme Leader of weakness on his part, and I think that that has 

been verified over and over and over again. 

I think when you look at where we are now, I firmly believe that 

he thinks that we are here negotiating out of desperation for a 

deal. And I am not convinced that he thinks we are going to walk 

away. When he repeatedly makes comments, as the chairman mentioned, that the United States is unwilling to take military action, 

I think he honestly believes that. 

Dr. KAGAN. I think I will pick up the hint that you I think were 

throwing out there, which is, yes, in 2003 I believe that the Iranian 

regime and the Supreme Leader thought that Iran could quite possibly be next and really did seriously—much more seriously than 

the Bush White House—consider the possibility that we would finish in Iraq and pivot to the east and take out the next country in 

the Axis of Evil. 

Senator RUBIO. What did they do as a result of that? 

Dr. KAGAN. They suspended the nuclear program and took a variety of steps to conceal it and to try to reach out to us in a variety 

of ways. More or less, the sincerity of those outreaches is open to 

question. But, yes, that is clearly what happened. 

I would like to parse what you said about their belief in our capability a little bit more finely, though. I do not think the Supreme 

Leader believes that we do not have the capability to remove him 

from power if we chose to do so. I think he believes that we do have 

that capability. 

Senator RUBIO. And just to clarify, I did not mean the technical 

capability. I meant the political capability. 

Dr. KAGAN. Exactly. 

Senator RUBIO. The political will. 

Dr. KAGAN. This is entirely about will. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

37 

Ambassador ROSS. I agree that in 2003 they feared that they 

were next, and they put a proposal on the table. It was just suspension. They actually put a proposal on the table through the Swiss 

that would have been far-reaching. There was some question was 

it genuine or not, but it was never really tested. 

By 2005, 2006, they had walked away from the suspension without any consequence to them. At a point in 2006, 2007, when we 

were really tied down in Iraq, they no longer had the same kind 

of fear. 

The Supreme Leader’s statement now that we will not use force 

is something he has not said before. So clearly, they have the perception that we will not. And it is very important for us to change 

that perception. If we want to have a deal, we have to change that 

perception. 

Senator RUBIO. I would highlight, as you—I think maybe someone mentioned this earlier on the June 4 speech. It was underneath 

a banner that said America cannot do a damn thing. They have 

used that slogan before. I do not think it has meant more to them 

than it does today. And we recently saw as well their generals 

bragging that one of our bases is now within reach. 

With the minute I have remaining, I wanted to pivot briefly to 

Iraq because I think it is related to Iran, and it is an interesting 

dynamic. Obviously, the situation in Syria—not that they were not 

close already, but the situation in Syria has brought that regime 

closer and under more of the influence of Iran than ever before, 

quite frankly dependent on Iran and Russia for their survival. And 

now we are seeing something similar potentially play out in Iraq 

where increasingly because of ISIL’s gains over the last 72 to 96 

hours, we have to assume that the Iranians are all in with regard 

to pushing back against that. And we know that there was the 

presence of these Shia militias, many of whom have been equipped 

and trained, if not all of them, by Iranian forces. 

From a regional perspective—and of course, the interesting 

dynamic is that in many respects we actually share an enemy in 

ISIL even though our interests may not coincide in terms of the 

long term. In fact, they do not coincide in terms of the long-term 

future for that area. 

But I wanted your take on what is happening now with regard 

to Iraq and Malaki and that government’s increasing dependence 

and/or reliance on Iran for potentially its very survival. 

Dr. KAGAN. A couple of quick points about Iraq. One is the Iranians, I do not believe, have the capability to help Malaki regain 

control of his country any more than they have been able to enable 

Assad to regain control of his country. We continue to have a theoretical opportunity in Iraq because we can offer the Iraqis something that the Iranians cannot. We have both the capability 

and the desire to help the Iraqis reconquer all of their territory 

from ISIS, which I believe that we could with the rapid use of 

military force, which is certainly not going to happen under this 

administration. 

So we are in a situation, as we always have been in Iraq, which 

is that the Iraqis will take Iranian assistance, especially when 

there is nothing else on offer, but they would prefer our assistance 

because we can offer them things that the Iranians cannot. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

38 

Another thing that we have to be very clear about, in a certain 

sense we have been having a fictional conversation here about 

sanctions. In the real world, unless we are prepared to sanction 

Iraq, the sanctions regime is unraveling anyway. The Iranians 

have been working aggressively to expand their ability to export oil 

and many other things through Iraq. We have turned a blind eye 

to it. I understand that in the current context. I do not see how 

we could sanction Malaki while we are trying to help him fight for 

his life. But what that means is that there is an oil spigot in the 

Persian Gulf for Iranian oil that we will not be able to control. And 

as we talk about sanctions, we need to keep that in mind as well. 

Ambassador ROSS. Can I make two quick points? 

First, I think we should be prepared to help in Iraq, given the 

stakes, but there should be conditions for Malaki. One of the reasons we are where we are is precisely because the way Malaki has 

governed, which is to say he has governed in a completely noninclusive fashion. He has basically alienated the Sunnis in a way 

that was not required. And if we help, there has to be some change 

in his behavior in order to do this. 

The second point is if we help, it cannot look in the region like— 

yes, ISIS is a threat to us and to our regional friends, but it cannot 

look like we are prepared there to help to counter them, but we are 

not prepared to go against what the Iranians are doing in Syria 

because then it looks like all we are doing is helping to shift the 

regional balance more in Iran’s favor. 

Dr. KAGAN. And I agree with both of those comments. 

Mr. MODELL. The only other thing I would add, Senator Rubio, 

is when you look at the U.S. Government forces that are involved 

in monitoring the Iran threat network around the world, there are 

things that we could potentially do to address some of the issues 

you are talking about, particularly Iran’s potential movement to a 

greater extent into Iraq. I will give you an example. 

The Department of the Treasury has done a fantastic job in some 

senses, but in others, it just does not have the resources to do what 

it needs to do. So OFAC designations. When you look at the thousands of Iranian entities or individuals and groups who have been 

designated over the years as violators of sanctions, what has happened as a result of that? They simply close this door and open up 

another one. There needs to be a comprehensive look at what 

Treasury’s OFAC designations—what the impact of that has been 

and what gaps we need to address because if you are looking at 

ways—in the context of the greater nuclear issue, are we going to 

have a comprehensive long-term verification mechanism that really 

works? Well, a lot of the cheating that has gone on over the years 

could have been prevented if we had better overseas capability, 

quite frankly, not on our own but with liaison partners to actually 

verify the designations are being honored. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Flake. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you. I appreciate the testimony. 

Ambassador Ross, we are coming up right now at the end of our 

negotiating period and determining whether we want to extend or 

not. What concerns are there that if we do not continue, that our 

allies might leave us behind, figure nothing will ever be good 

enough for the Americans, we will cut our own deal? Is there a 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

39 

concern about that? Should we be concerned about that? And is 

that something that motivates us to stay at the table? 

Ambassador ROSS. I think the answer is ‘‘yes’’ because I think 

the other members of the 5+1—precisely because the joint plan of 

action built into it a renewable 6 months for a total of 1 year by 

mutual agreement, I am quite certain that all the other members 

are going to say, look, rather than walking away, let us take the 

other 6 months and let us see if we can, in fact, reach a comprehensive agreement. 

I think beyond, at the end of the next 6 months, we may be in 

a different place. But a lot depends upon the Iranians. Are they 

nonresponsive? Do they stay in the position they are right now, 

which signals they are not close to understanding or recognizing 

what is being required? They are talking right now about wanting 

thousands, 30,000, 100,000 centrifuges, not rolling back their 

program. 

Senator FLAKE. Any comment on that, Mr. Kagan? Just to back 

up a bit, I think we all can see that Iran is at the table because 

of these sanctions, and it is because that we have had cooperation 

from our, in particular, European allies on this. And we need them 

to stay at the table. We need this to be Iran versus the West rather 

than Iran versus the United States in terms of sanctions. So how 

much of a motivating factor is that for the United States to stay 

at the table because we need our allies with us? 

Dr. KAGAN. I think Ambassador Ross made a very excellent 

point, which is that deciding that you want to stay at the table is 

one thing. Actually getting an agreement to stay at the table and 

extend is another thing. That technical discussion about what the 

extension would look like is probably going to be more determinative of whether we can do this than anything else. 

I am a little bit less worried at the prospect that if we walk away 

from the table, the European states will decide the heck with us 

and do a unilateral deal with Iran. There are a lot of other issues 

in play. As always, we talk about this in isolation. There is tremendous nervousness about Russia and the threat to NATO in general. 

There is a tremendous concern about alienating the United States 

even more to the point where we withdraw entirely at a moment 

when people seem to need us a great deal. And so I think a lot of 

calculations would be made regarding whether we actually are 

going to see European partners just torpedo us entirely. So I am 

a little less pessimistic about that even though I would be surprised if we ended up walking away. 

Senator FLAKE. The concern about extension and going for a full 

year, obviously, is if Iran is gaming the system now in a way that 

puts them closer to being a threshold state. Is it your opinion, Mr. 

Modell or Mr. Ross, that this time period does allow them to get 

closer? Or are they truly rolling back in a way that benefits us in 

terms of a final deal? 

Mr. MODELL. I would say I think they are already a nuclear 

threshold state. They have the ability. If they wanted to cross that 

threshold and to make that move to actually break out, they could 

do that. I do not necessarily think that they are trying to delay for 

another 6 or 12 months. I think they honestly want to see if they 

can actually work their way into a deal that will allow them to purFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

40 

sue an agenda that may not be totally transparent to us right now, 

particularly on the military dimensions of their program. But they 

need time to do that. So I do not think it is just simply a matter 

of buying time. 

But I would make a comment too. On the United States corporate side, we have talked to a number of companies, particularly 

in the energy field, who are like everybody wondering at what 

point it would be prudent to start taking a serious look about reentering the Iranian market. There is a great deal of reluctance on 

their part. Really. And it is not only in terms of the sanctions 

and the political risk involved, but it is simply there are a lot of 

fundamentals in terms of the deals that will be struck on production-sharing agreements and other forms with the fundamental 

agreements they would need to have in place rather than to even 

consider going back in. 

Senator FLAKE. Well, I think from what we hear, Iran thought 

that they might get more out of this interim deal than they actually are in terms of sanctions relief. It has been more difficult just 

because of the interlocking nature of these sanctions and the reluctance of people to get involved. So that is, frankly, a good sign. 

Ambassador ROSS. I do not think, in answer to your question, 

they are not able to game the system very much, given the nature 

of this agreement. The one area where they have the potential to 

game is that they can do R&D on the existing centrifuges that they 

have. So they cannot deploy any new centrifuges except one of 

those that break down. But it means that the R&D that they are 

doing on the existing centrifuges—and they have several generations—means at the end of this, they would be in a better position 

to move quickly. But the fact is during this time, that is the only 

area where they are able to do anything that potentially advance 

them. And the 20 percent they have dismantled. So from that 

standpoint, they are a little bit farther removed from where their 

breakout capability might have been prior to the time of the deal. 

Dr. KAGAN. I have to disagree with Ambassador Ross on one important point. There is a realm in which they can advance because 

this agreement has done virtually nothing to improve our ability to 

detect their pursuit of weaponization technology. And I have long 

believed that that is actually the long pole in the tent. They clearly 

have the capability under any scenario to process enough uranium 

to produce enriched uranium. We are just talking about timelines 

there. 

The challenges that they have been facing have been developing 

a working nuclear device small enough and reliable enough to put 

on a reentry vehicle and so forth. There is absolutely nothing in 

this deal in my opinion that has harmed their ability to continue 

to pursue that effort in any meaningful way. 

Senator FLAKE. Mr. Kagan, I was interested in your contention 

at the beginning that Iran’s nuclear ambitions are secondary to 

their regional ambitions in other areas. If we were to strike a deal 

and get a deal that we are comfortable with and comfortable 

enough to move ahead, what would be our next step—the United 

States that is—in terms of trying to influence Iran in terms of its 

regional activities? Would we be in a much better position to have 

influence on them or not in your view? 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

41 

Dr. KAGAN. I think it depends on whether or not the administration does what Ambassador Ross is telling them to do. If we were 

to right now design and implement and execute a strategy to combat Iranian influence around the region, put pressure on the Iranian regime and so forth in pursuit of a good deal, then we could 

emerge, theoretically, at the end of those negotiations in a better 

position. If we do not do that and if we do not work to strip away 

from them the capabilities that they are using to operate in the 

way that they are throughout the region, then a deal will simply 

open the flood gates and we will be in a much worse position. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Paul. 

Senator PAUL. Thanks to the panel for coming today. 

Since we have had some lessening of the sanctions with the 

interim agreement with Iran, people talk about them being easily 

reversible. I am not really so concerned about the technical aspect 

of being easily reversible, but I am concerned about whether or not 

the reconstitution of an international coalition, which I think the 

sanctions, I think everyone would agree, are not as successful if it 

is just us—I am interested in the panel’s opinion on whether or not 

we have gone beyond getting everybody back together. Is there 

going to be the ability, if there is no deal or if there is the sense 

that Iran is evading even the interim deal, to reconstitute an international coalition to make sanctions effective? Where do you think 

we are in that spectrum of being able to reconstitute that? 

Ambassador ROSS. I think the ability to sustain this is much 

greater when you can point to Iran’s bad behaviors. So if in the 

end, they are not responsive and there has been clearly a serious 

effort to try to offer them something and they are not responsive, 

it becomes much easier to sustain this with the kind of collective 

enforcement that we are seeing. 

Mr. MODELL. Senator, I would just add to that. When you look 

at the task before us and trying to figure out, is bad behavior going 

to occur in terms of illegal proliferation—illegal actions on the part 

of the threat network that they have got in the region—one of the 

things that we have not done a good enough job of, I think, in the 

U.S. Government, is actually defining what a comprehensive verification and compliance regime needs to look like. It is not that easy 

simply to say that we are going to crack down on Iran. There are 

a lot of things that we do not do very well. There are a lot of risks 

that we are unwilling to take. There is a lot of liaison relationships 

out there with allied countries, by the way, that do not have the 

resources they need, that do not have the support they need, and 

do not have the transparency from us, including Israel I would say. 

Ambassador Ross made a comment earlier about the need for us 

to have actually a common understanding with regard to Israel as 

to what is it going to look like when we jointly try to pursue efforts 

to figure out if the Iranians are cheating or not. Half the time, we 

do not know what the Israelis are doing. They do not know what 

we are doing. There has to be better dialogue and transparency on 

sensitive regional and global issues if you are going to be serious 

about trying to figure out if they are cheating or not. 

Dr. KAGAN. Senator, if the question is can we reconstitute the 

regime exactly as it was and continue to strengthen it in the way 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

42 

that we had been doing it; I am not sure. We certainly have the 

problems with Russia that we have. We have problems with China 

that we have. So I am not sure we are going to be able to continue 

to do that. 

However, I think that Scott has pointed out quite rightly that as 

long as we can keep the current resolutions in place and the current agreements in force—and I think that is a perfectly feasible 

undertaking—we have the ability to improve our own prosecution 

of the sanctions in a way that can bring additional pain on Iran. 

Senator PAUL. One quick followup. All of you who feel like 

nobody is evading beyond or lessening the sanctions beyond what 

we sort of agreed to lessen them to—Russia and China and others—they are still adhering to the previous set of sanctions that 

supposedly are in place? 

Dr. KAGAN. No. 

Senator PAUL. But you do think they are. 

Dr. KAGAN. Absolutely, yes. I am certain that they are and the 

Iranians are evading the sanctions in a variety of ways, including 

through Iraq, as I said. 

Senator PAUL. And then the only other point I would like to 

make—and I think this is an important one because I try to think 

about these as if—you know, what a soldier thinks about our soldier unit that you might send back into Iraq, which I am not very 

excited about. 

We released three Moroccans from Gitmo a while back under the 

previous administration. They went home for a while and then they 

decided to go fight in Syria. They are fighting on the same side as 

we are in Syria. So people who hate America are on our side, which 

concerns me a bit and confuses me a bit. 

We are supporting a Sunni sort of movement. It has people we 

say we are not going to give weapons to, but we did give some to 

a military council that said recently that said they are going for the 

Golan Heights when they are done with Assad. That is confusing 

to me to be on the same side as people who are going to try to 

reclaim the Golan Heights. 

It is a Sunni resistance. It also has parts of ISIS in it. But now 

we are sort of supportive of ISIS. Not really, but we are on the 

same side as ISIS in one battle. 

So you tell a GI who is going to carry a gun and put his life 

down—and I know a guy from my neighboring town lost both legs 

and an arm, and he fought for freedom. He fought for our Bill of 

Rights. He fought for our Constitution. But you can see how it 

might be confusing when you send a soldier back in there that you 

say, well, Iran supports Hezbollah and the Allawites and the Shiites, but Iran also likes Malaki and the Shiites in there. So you can 

see how it is very confusing. We are on both sides of two different 

wars. 

To be at war and to kill people and to fight and to lay down your 

life—it is hard for me to be certain that I am excited to go. I mean, 

I hate that Mosul is falling and I hate that those are falling, but 

I also think for 10 years we have supplied the Iraqis. They cannot 

stand up and do anything to defend their country and it is all up 

to us? It is hard for me. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

43 

And I think it is easy from a geopolitical point of view. All the 

things you say are rational and logical, but I see this also emotionally from a GI who has to go over there and potentially lose his 

life, an American. And I am concerned that it is confusing. Which 

side are we on? We are for the Sunnis in one war, and we are 

against the same set of Sunnis in another war in a neighboring 

place. It is all destabilizing. 

But you could even go back 10 years and say, you know, what? 

It might have been a little more stable when we had that awful 

guy Hussein who hated the Iranians. So I am not saying I am for 

having Hussein there. I am just saying that geopolitically you had 

people somewhat at a standstill over there, and now you have a 

really confusing mess that makes it hard for me or for a GI to 

understand who he is shooting at and why and he is shooting at 

one person in one war and a different person in another war, 

neighboring war. 

Ambassador ROSS. Can I make just one quick response to that? 

Look, what you are saying is, obviously, a reality. But I think 

one way to think about it is that there are radical Shia militias 

who are armed, trained, funded by the Iranians. There is ISIS. 

These are extremist radical Sunnis. Both are our enemies. Both 

hate us. Both threaten us. So the key is to identify who are our 

natural partners who are contending with both, and how do we 

support them? We have to be able to discriminate enough and then 

we have to be able to figure out how to do that. 

Senator PAUL. But would you agree it is hard to sort of decide 

who are our friends and who are not? We have given antitank 

weapons to a group in Syria that 2 weeks ago said that they will 

attack Israel. And we have already given them weapons. We let 

three people go from Gitmo who are fighting on the same side of 

the war. It is confusing. And there are radical elements, but they 

have hated each other for thousands of years, and they are probably going to hate each other for another thousand years and fight 

each other. 

I am not really saying do not be involved. I am saying try to help 

in some way, but really think seriously before we say, oh, it is real 

easy. We have the might. We do. We could go in and we could do 

it. But are you willing to let 4,000 more soldiers die in Iraq, Americans, to bring back Mosul? I think it is terrible what is happening, 

but the Iraqis need to step up and defend their country. And I just 

do not know if I am ready to send 4,000 soldiers in. 

I am also disturbed that we still have it on the books that the 

President, while you say he is unlikely, which I agree—it is still 

on the books that he could—we could go to war tomorrow with no 

vote of Congress. This is very, very tragic. And at the very least, 

even if everybody else disagrees with me and they want to go war 

in Iraq again, we should vote on it. For goodness sakes, we should 

not have permanent war that you can just go to war anytime you 

want. That is the way it exists right now. I am very troubled by 

that. 

And this is not really clear-cut exactly who we are for or who we 

are against, who we are shooting, and we are shooting different 

people in different wars. It is quite confusing I think. And for someFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

44 

one who is going to lay down their life, it needs to be much more, 

I think, clear-cut who is our enemy. 

Dr. KAGAN. May I respond to that, please? 

Senator, I do not know anyone who is excited about going back 

to Iraq. I do not know anyone who thinks it will be easy. And I 

do not know anyone who is advocating it with a light heart or in 

a way that does not imagine that this is going to be incredibly 

painful. 

Senator PAUL. You are in favor of sending troops back into Iraq 

now? 

Dr. KAGAN. Sir, I am in favor of being prepared to do that rather 

than allowing an al-Qaeda franchise to establish a full-up state 

with an army with vehicles stretching from—— 

Senator PAUL. And I do not question your motives. I mean, I 

think you are sincere. You are all trying to think this through. We 

are all Americans. We are always trying to do the right things. So 

I do not question your motives. But let us be clear. You are for 

sending troops into Iraq—— 

Dr. KAGAN. Yes, sir. I am very clear about that. 

Senator PAUL. But to do that, you have to be prepared to also 

say—are you prepared to lose 4,000 lives if it takes it to get Mosul 

back? And that is a real question. Are you prepared to have 4,000 

soldiers more die to take back Iraq again and try for another 10 

years? Then what happens in 10 years? Do we have to stay 20, 30, 

50? The war has been going on a thousand years. 

Ambassador ROSS. Can I just say one thing? 

I am not sure the choice is either you have to send troops back 

in or you do nothing. And I do not think we want to put ourselves 

in a position where our choice is you have to send troops in or you 

do nothing. There are options short of that, and we have to think 

through those because if, in fact, ISIS is able to establish a strong 

foothold in northern Iraq, we will end up finding that they do not 

just attack others within the area. It will become a base to attack 

us. 

Senator PAUL. And we will go in as allies of Iran. And I myself 

am concerned about Iran. I am for the sanctions. I voted for all the 

sanctions. But if we go to war again in Iraq, we will go to war as 

allies of Iran. So it is a little bit confusing to tell a soldier you are 

going over there. We must do everything possible, including war, 

to keep Iran from having nuclear weapons, and yet we will be 

allied with Iran in a war in Iraq. It is confusing. It is not clearcut. 

Dr. KAGAN. Senator, I am very confident that our soldiers will be 

able to understand who the enemy is largely because there will be 

the enemy that is shooting at them, and they have shown in the 

past that they can do that. The soldiers we are talking about and 

officers are my friends. These are the people that I have also 

served with overseas. I understand the costs of this war, as well 

as you do, sir. And I understand the risks of sending troops into 

this conflict, as well as you do. 

I would not send American boots on the ground into this conflict 

in the first instance. I agree with Ambassador Ross. There are 

things to do short of that. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

45 

But I agree with the point that you are making fundamentally, 

Senator, which is a very important one, that we should not imagine 

that there is an easy course of action here that is a limited action 

that is either guaranteed success or that we can do it and then say, 

well, it did not work and we are done with it. I am saying that if 

we are going to involve ourselves in this, we should be prepared 

to—— 

The CHAIRMAN. I have allowed this to go on for a while, and I 

know everybody is passionate about their views and I appreciate 

that. There is a vote that is shortly going to be coming up. So I 

am sure the debate will continue. 

I will say one point about Iraq. It is not the focus of this hearing 

but elements of it have seeped in. As someone who voted against 

the war in Iraq, I can tell you that the biggest beneficiary of President Bush’s engagement in Iraq has been Iran. And we are facing 

the flow of consequences from that. And it is not neat and it is not 

nice. 

I do believe after so many lives and national treasure that to do 

nothing is probably unacceptable in our national interests and our 

national security. But what that is I think there can be targeted, 

limited, but significant assistance to the Iraqis but only—and this 

is where I agree with Ambassador Ross—but only if Malaki is willing to make public statements with reference to a nonsectarian 

agenda and an Iraqi unity regardless of sector ethnicity, and uses 

the opportunity to unify his country because we can train all you 

want. 

But when I was in Iraq and I asked are these soldiers really 

ready to fight for their country or is this a job—Americans when 

they sign up, especially in a volunteer army, are fighting for their 

country. They are fighting for a set of principles and beliefs. If it 

is just a job, there is a whole different set of circumstances. And 

so unless there is a sense of national unity and purpose, this will 

never be a successful set of circumstances. 

I appreciate this panel’s insights. It has been very helpful. There 

is a lot more work to be done on the Iran question and many 

dimensions to it. And I am sure we will be engaging with you in 

the days ahead. 

With the appreciation of the committee, this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

Æ 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER