IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Jay Larry Moyer, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 882 C.D. 2016

: SUBMITTED: November 23, 2016

Public Utility Commission, :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

SENIOR JUDGE LEADBETTER FILED: March 13, 2017

This case involves a long ongoing dispute between petitioner, Jay 

Larry Moyer, and his electric supplier, PPL Electric Utilities Corporation (PPL),

and the Public Utility Commission (PUC). Before us for disposition is Moyer’s 

pro se petition for review of the final order of the PUC ruling on two consolidated 

complaints (2011 and 2014 complaints) that he filed against PPL (intervenor here). 

Moyer challenged PPL’s billing under a virtual net meter aggregation program for 

accounts associated with solar panels that he installed on a hillside approximately 

600 yards from his farmhouse in Klingerstown, PA.

In its brief, PPL explains the concepts involved as follows:

Net metering enables customer-generators to use the 

electricity produced from their eligible alternative

energy sources, such as solar panels, to offset all or a

portion of their electric usage. The crediting is done
2

on a one-to-one basis: for every kilowatt-hour

("kWh") of electricity generated, one kWh of

electricity is credited to the account up to the total

amount of electricity used in the monthly billing

period. See 52 Pa. Code § 75.13(c).

 ***

Under traditional net metering, such as a solar panel

mounted on the roof of the customer's residence, the

alternative energy system is wired directly with the

customer's home or business. [T]he customergenerator has a single bidirectional meter that measures

and records the flow of electricity in both directions, 

meaning that it runs forward when electricity is used and 

runs backward when electricity is generated to

produce a single "net" meter read each month.

***

In contrast, meter aggregation enables a customergenerator to aggregate multiple locations for the

purposes of net metering. (PPL St. No. 1, p. 7) These

properties must be within two miles of the customergenerator's property and located within the electric

utility's service territory. Two types of meter

aggregation exist: (1) physical meter aggregation; and

(2) virtual meter aggregation.

Under physical meter aggregation, the customergenerator connects the alternative energy source

directly to the single meter at the customer's home or 

business. (PPL St. No. 1, p. 7) For example, solar

facilities located in a field could be directly connected

to the meter at a nearby residence by extending an

electrical conductor/conduit between the solar facility 

and the residence. Physical meter aggregation functions

like traditional net metering because the facilities are

physically connected to a single bidirectional

meter....

***

On the other hand, virtual meter aggregation

"virtually" aggregates separate meters that are not

physically connected. (PPL St. No. 1, p. 7) For

example, the meter at a residence can be "virtually"
3

aggregated with the meter for a solar facility located 'in

a nearby field without a physical connection to the

residence. (PPL St. No. 1, p. 7) To accomplish this

result, the electric utility measures the electricity used

and generated at the meter for the generating facilities

(such as Mr. Moyer's solar array) and aggregates that

with the customer-generator's usage from the meter at

his or her other property (such as Mr. Moyer's

residence). Under this scenario, there are two different

meters with two entirely different points of

interconnection with the electric system: (1) a

bidirectional meter at the generating facilities (referred

to as the host account) to measure usage and

generation of electricity; and (2) a standard meter at

the other property (referred to as the satellite account)

that measures the customer's electric usage....

Consequently, PPL Electric must [manually] virtually 

aggregate the generation and usage measured from the

meter for the generating facilities with the usage

measured from the meter for the customer's home or

business.

(Brief for PPL at 9-12) (Record citations deleted).

The relevant procedural history of this case is as follows. In 

November 2011, Moyer filed a complaint against PPL alleging that he contacted it 

regarding the installation of solar panels on his property and that a representative 

inspected and approved them in March 2009.1 He further alleged that for the 

period of April 2009 to February 2010, PPL failed to credit him for the electricity 

that was generated by those solar panels and delivered to PPL and that the checks 

that he had received since April 2010 lacked any accounting for the credits. 

Further, alleging that PPL failed to properly aggregate his accounts in accordance 

with the virtual-net metering provisions in its Net Metering for Renewable 

 

1 At that time, Moyer was represented by counsel. Since counsel’s March 2012 notice of 

withdrawal, however, Moyer has been proceeding pro se.
4

Customer-Generators Rider, Moyer averred that PPL failed to credit him for all of 

the electricity generated by his solar panels since March 2009. Accordingly, 

Moyer requested that the PUC order PPL to apply virtual net meter aggregation to 

his two accounts, disclose all credits and/or payments that PPL made to him and, if 

necessary, fully reimburse him for the electricity generated.

In response, PPL acknowledged that for a discreet period it failed to 

aggregate the excess generation produced by the solar panels generated with the 

usage at Moyer’s residence. It maintained, however, that it made payments to him 

for that excess generation and applied credits to his residential account. In any 

event, following failed mediation, Administrative Law Judge Cynthia Williams 

Fordham (ALJ) conducted an August 2012 evidentiary hearing at which time 

Moyer testified, presented two witnesses, and introduced twenty exhibits into the 

record, ten of which were admitted. PPL presented two witnesses and introduced 

ten exhibits, nine of which were admitted. In February 2013, the ALJ issued her 

initial decision dismissing the 2011 complaint.

In January 2014, the PUC vacated the ALJ’s initial decision to the 

extent that she found that PPL properly credited Moyer for his solar generation. 

Concluding that the record was insufficient to make such a determination, the PUC 

remanded the case to the ALJ for further development of the record. In so doing, 

the PUC granted Moyer’s petition to reopen the record to include the following 

additional information: (1) PPL to provide Moyer’s actual data for the period of 

April 2009 to May 2013; and (2) Moyer to provide all of his monthly bills and 

statements for the period of April 2009 to January 9, 2014. Further, the PUC 

encouraged the parties to meet and attempt to resolve Moyer’s concerns and 
5

advised him that, if informal discussions with PPL did not result in a resolution, he 

could request further hearings.

In September 2014, before a second hearing could be held, Moyer 

filed a new complaint raising issues concerning the accuracy and content of PPL’s 

billing processes for his virtual-net metering accounts and requesting that the PUC 

order PPL to develop and implement new billing procedures and processes for 

such accounts using a single bill for both accounts being virtually aggregated. In 

January 2015, the ALJ consolidated the 2011 and 2014 complaints.

At an April 2015 hearing, Moyer submitted his direct and surrebuttal 

testimony and proffered 267 additional exhibits, 179 of which were admitted into 

the record. PPL submitted rebuttal testimony and five additional exhibits, all of 

which were admitted into the record. In October 2015, the ALJ issued her initial 

decision on remand in which she (1) dismissed the 2014 complaint in its entirety; 

and (2) sustained the 2011 complaint to the extent that PPL was to compensate 

Moyer for credits earned for the electricity generated from his solar panels between 

May and December 2010, and that PPL permit Moyer to participate in its virtualmeter aggregation program, as earlier during the litigation it had agreed to do, 

subject to changes in PPL’s tariffs or the applicable law, but dismissed the 2011 

complaint in all other respects.

On May 19, 2016, the PUC entered its final opinion and order,

adopting the ALJ’s decision on remand, finding that PPL correctly billed and

credited Mr. Moyer’s accounts but modified that decision to require PPL to pay

additional interest through the date of its order. Further, although the PUC opined

that the accounts did not qualify for virtual-meter aggregation under the terms of 

PPL’s tariff because he failed to show the existence of an independent, non-
6

generational load2at his generation facility, the PUC reiterated the order that 

Moyer be allowed to virtually aggregate his two accounts because PPL had agreed 

to a waiver of the load requirement in an effort to resolve the issues. See PUC’s 

May 19, 2016, Opinion at 30 n.10, 38-39, 43, and 48.

In addition to Moyer’s petition for review, we have the following 

three applications before us for disposition with the merits: (1) the PUC’s 

November 1, 2016, application to strike the amicus curiae brief filed by Sunrise 

Energy, LLC, (Sunrise) via its principal and majority shareholder David N.

Hommrich; (2) Moyer’s October 20, 2016, application for relief, asserting, inter 

alia, that this Court’s decision in Sunrise Energy, LLC, v. FirstEnergy 

Corporation, 148 A.3d 894 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (en banc),

3

has immediate 

 

2

The regulation defining “virtual meter aggregation” provides:

The combination of readings and billing for all meters regardless 

of rate class on properties owned or leased and operated by a 

customer-generator by means of the EDC’s [electric distribution 

company] billing process, rather than through physical rewiring of 

the customer-generator’s property for a physical, single point of 

contact. Virtual meter aggregation on properties owned or leased 

and operated by a customer-generator and located within 2 miles of 

the boundaries of the customer-generator’s property and within a 

single electric distribution company’s service territory shall be 

eligible for net metering.

52 Pa. Code § 75.12. An additional regulation then in effect, which the PUC asserts implicitly

required an independent, non-generational load, provides that electric distribution companies 

shall offer net metering to customer-generators that generate electricity on the customergenerator’s side of the meter. 52 Pa. Code § 75.13(a). The PUC asserts that its proposed 

rulemaking at Commission Docket L-2014-2404361, which has now been made part of its 

regulations at 52 Pa. Code § 75.13, makes explicit what was previously implied.

3 On December 12, 2016, we denied the application of FirstEnergy Corporation and West 

Penn Power Company for reargument/reconsideration en banc of the Sunrise decision. On 

January 12, 2017, they filed a petition for allowance of appeal to our Supreme Court at No. 25 

WAL Docket 2017.
7

implications for his case and that, pursuant thereto, the PUC’s adjudication in his 

case is rendered null and void;4and (3) Moyer’s November 23, 2016, application 

for relief asserting, inter alia, that the PUC’s final proposed rulemaking on 

November 19, 2016, makes the issue of the independent-load requirement for 

virtual-meter aggregation ripe for review. For the reasons that follow, we grant the 

PUC’s application to strike the purported amicus curiae brief, deny both of 

Moyer’s applications for relief, and affirm the PUC’s final order on the merits.

In considering the PUC’s application to strike the purported amicus 

curiae brief filed by Mr. Hommrich on behalf of Sunrise, as joined by PPL, we 

note that, in addition to the untimeliness of the brief,5it does not appear as though 

Mr. Hommrich is an attorney licensed to practice law in the Commonwealth. In 

that regard, in Moyer v. Public Utility Commission, (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 336 C.D. 

2016, filed July 26, 2016), wherein this Court granted the PUC’s motion to quash 

Moyer’s petition for review of a PUC final rulemaking order, we dismissed Sunrise 

as an intervenor due to Mr. Hommrich’s failure to file a copy of the certificate of 

organization and docketing statement on file for Sunrise with the Department of

State, Bureau of Corporations and Charitable Organizations, or to have a member 

of the Pennsylvania Bar enter an appearance on Sunrise’s behalf. In light of 

 

4

This Court ruled that, “to the extent that the application raises the applicability of this 

court’s recent decision in [Sunrise Energy, LLC], the application and the answer thereto will be 

treated as supplemental briefs.” In addition, we ordered that, “[t]o the extent [Moyer] seeks any 

additional relief in his application, the application is denied.” November 1, 2016, 

Commonwealth Court Order at 1.

5

In an August 30, 2016, order rejecting Sunrise’s initial August 23, 2016, brief for 

noncompliance with the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, this Court directed that, 

unless a conforming brief was filed on or before September 29, 2016, Sunrise would be 

precluded from filing a brief. Our docket entries indicate that Sunrise’s brief was filed on 

September 30, 2016.
8

Sunrise’s recent inability and/or failure to comply with this Court’s directive and 

the fact that Mr. Hommrich represents only that he is principal and majority 

shareholder of the company, which is not represented by counsel, we grant the 

PUC’s application to quash Sunrise’s brief. See 20 West’s Pa. Prac., Pa. Appellate 

Practice § 102.11 at 281 (2015) (providing that a corporation must be represented 

by counsel and that the failure to have such counsel may result in dismissal). We 

turn now to Moyer’s October 20, 2016, application for relief and the effect of this 

Court’s decision in Sunrise Energy, LLC.

In Sunrise Energy, LLC, solar power generator Sunrise initiated its 

complaint in the court of common pleas against one public utility/electric 

distribution company (West Penn Power Company) and one non-public utility 

(FirstEnergy Corporation), alleging a breach of contract and seeking declaratory 

relief arising from a contract dispute over West Penn Power Company’s purchase 

of excess energy from Sunrise. The defendants filed preliminary objections based 

on primary jurisdiction, seeking dismissal and/or transfer of certain counts to the 

PUC. After common pleas dismissed the preliminary objections and permitted an 

interlocutory appeal, which this Court granted, we affirmed the court’s order, 

ruling that neither the doctrine of exclusive nor that of primary jurisdiction 

required it to transfer certain issues to the PUC. Specifically, we held that 

common pleas had jurisdiction to decide eligibility for net metering pursuant to the 

Alternative Energy Portfolio Standards Act (AEPS), Act of November 30, 2004, 

P.L. 1672, as amended, 73 P.S. §§ 1648.1-1648.8, and that it did not err in refusing 

to cede jurisdiction to the PUC. Contrary to Moyer’s position herein, Sunrise 

Energy, LLC, does not affect the jurisdictional validity of the PUC’s order in this 

case.
9

In the present case, Moyer through his then counsel, filed a complaint

with the PUC challenging PPL’s billing procedures and its practices for virtualmeter aggregation and PPL’s assignment, based on its tariff, of its commercial GS1 rate to Moyer’s host (solar panel) account. Before the PUC entered its final 

order, the issue of Moyer’s eligibility for virtual meter aggregation became moot 

when PPL agreed to allow Moyer to participate in the program. At a minimum, the 

remaining issues were within the PUC’s jurisdiction. See Section 701 of the Public 

Utility Code, 66 Pa. C.S. § 701 (providing, in pertinent part, that “any person . . . 

may complain in writing, setting forth any act or thing done or omitted to be done 

by any public utility in violation, or claimed violation, of any law which the 

commission has jurisdiction to administer, or of any regulation or order of the 

commission”) and PPL Elect. Util. Corp. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 912 A.2d 386, 

400 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) (holding that the PUC is responsible for regulating utility

rates and evaluating tariffs over which it has the particular expertise). Sunrise 

Energy, LLC, therefore, is distinguishable from the present case and the PUC had 

jurisdiction to decide the issues before it. Accordingly, we deny Moyer’s October

20, 2016, application for relief.

Finally, in his November 23, 2016, application for relief, Moyer 

asserted, inter alia, that the PUC’s final proposed rulemaking on November 19, 

2016 (see supra n.2), makes his challenge to the independent-load requirement for 

virtual-meter aggregation ripe for review. However, as noted above, the PUC 

ordered that Moyer continue to be allowed to participate in net metering because of 

PPL’s waiver of the independent-load requirement in Moyer’s case. Thus, the 

instant appeal does not encompass the issue of whether Moyer is subject to the 

independent-load requirement, nor is the final rulemaking (which occurred more 
10

than a year after the record closed in this case) at issue here.

6

 At any rate, a final 

rulemaking order is not an appealable order. Moyer v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, (Pa. 

Cmwlth. No. 336 C.D. 2016, filed July 26, 2016) [citing Popowsky v. Pub. Util. 

Comm’n, 701 A.2d 277, 278-79 (Pa. 1997) and Pub. Advocate v. Brunwasser, 22 

A.3d 261, 269 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011)]. Accordingly, we will not consider it here.

Turning to the merits of Moyer’s petition for review, the cognizable 

issues are follows:

7

 (1) whether the PUC erred in determining that PPL’s manual 

billing procedures for its virtual-meter aggregation customers were sufficient; (2) 

 

6 Mindful that it directed PPL in a January 2014 order to continue permitting Moyer to 

participate in PPL’s virtual-meter aggregation program despite the fact that there is no 

independent, non-generational load at his solar facility, the PUC observed as follows regarding 

Moyer’s waiver:

[W]hile future changes in the law or in PPL’s tariff may alter the 

waiver PPL has agreed to, our AEPS [Alternative Energy Portfolio 

Standards] Final Rulemaking Order proposed additional clarifying 

language to reinforce the already existing provisions of our AEPS 

Regulations which requires a customer-generator to have 

independent, non-generational load to be eligible to participate in 

net metering. Therefore, our issuance of the AEPS Final 

Rulemaking Order does not disturb our prior direction that PPL 

permit [Moyer] to participate in its virtual meter aggregation 

program, which we reinforce here.

May 19, 2016, PUC’s Opinion at 43 n.14. Accordingly, because the independent-load 

requirement at 52 Pa. Code § 75.13 is not being applied to Moyer’s facility, its validity is not 

properly before this Court, and we must decline Moyer’s request that we issue an advisory 

opinion. In that regard, “an actual case or controversy must be extant at all stages of review. . . .” 

Pap’s A.M. v. City of Erie, 812 A.2d 591, 600 (Pa. 2002).

7

It is well established that an appellate court may only consider a question on appeal that 

was previously raised before the PUC. Section 703(a) of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa. 

C.S. § 703(a); Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 778 A.2d 785, 794 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2001). All other issues are waived. Accordingly, to the extent that Moyer has raised 

issues that were not raised before the PUC, we decline to consider them on appeal. Moreover, to 

the extent that Moyer attempts to raise issues concerning the independent-load requirement, we 

also decline to consider them on appeal. See supra n. 6.
11

whether there is substantial evidence to support the PUC’s finding that PPL’s 

records for Moyer’s accounts do not contain inconsistencies and irregularities or 

reflect that there are omissions; and (3) whether the PUC erred in determining that 

PPL followed the law and its tariff in assigning the host (solar panel) account 

PPL’s commercial GS-1 rate.8 We turn first to the PUC’s determination regarding 

PPL’s manual billing procedures.

In determining that PPL could use manual billing and was not 

required to implement an automated billing process for its virtual-meter 

aggregation program, the PUC construed the Public Utility Code and its 

regulations as well as the AEPS, and determined that nothing mandated that PPL 

implement an automated billing process and nothing prohibited PPL from using a 

manual billing system. In addition, the PUC took into consideration the evidence 

that PPL presented regarding the relatively small number of customers enrolled in 

virtual-meter aggregation, ninety eight, and the cost for upgrading PPL’s billing 

system. The PUC concluded, therefore, that manual billing was sufficient and that 

there was nothing requiring PPL to implement automated billing.

9

 PUC’s May 19, 

2016, Opinion at 22-24. We conclude that the PUC did not err in rendering that 

determination. See City of Phila. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 829 A.2d 1241, 1243

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (holding that the PUC’s interpretation of a utility law and 

 

8

Pertinent here, we are limited on appeal to determining whether an error of law occurred 

and whether necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Popowsky v. Pa. 

Pub. Util. Comm’n, 910 A.2d 38, 48 (Pa. 2006). Substantial evidence means more than a mere 

trace of evidence or suspicion of the existence of a fact sought to be established. Norfolk & W. 

Ry. Co. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 413 A.2d 1037, 1047 (Pa. 1980).

9

In this regard, we note the PUC’s acknowledgment of PPL’s efforts to provide its 

customers enrolled in virtual-meter aggregation with the tools to better understand their bills. 

PUC’s May 19, 2016, Opinion at 28.
12

regulations is to be given great deference). We turn now to addressing whether 

there is substantial evidence for the PUC’s determination regarding the accuracy 

and adequacy of PPL’s records for Moyer’s accounts.

In addressing the sufficiency of PPL’s records for Moyer’s accounts, 

the PUC’s relied on PPL’s Exhibit APC-5. In reviewing that exhibit, the PUC 

noted that PPL provided a description for each of the columns and an explanation 

as to how it calculated and applied credits for Moyer’s excess generation. PUC’s 

May 19, 2016, Opinion at 29. In addition, the PUC noted that it also considered 

Moyer’s Exhibits JLM 101-170 (solar/host account bills) and 202-267 

(satellite/residential account bills) and concluded that they “corroborate[d] PPL’s 

assertion that it demonstrated how its tabulation of [Moyer’s] actual data for the 

two accounts since 2009 reconciles with [his] bills, and that it explained any 

alleged inconsistencies in [his] bills.” Id. The PUC stated that, “[t]his affirms the 

ALJ’s conclusion that [Moyer] was appropriately billed for his usage and credit for 

his generation.” Id.

Moreover, beyond generally asserting that PPL’s tabulation reflecting 

specific actual information on a monthly basis did not correspond to the actual bills 

mailed to him, Moyer has failed to identify any evidence in the record indicating 

that PPL’s records were inconsistent or irregular, or reflect that there may have 

been omissions. In that regard, the party seeking affirmative relief from the PUC 

bears the burden of proving its claims by competent evidence. Milkie v. Pa. Pub. 

Util. Comm’n, 768 A.2d 1217, 1220 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001). Further, even where it 

exists, evidence that supports a different result than that reached by the PUC is 

irrelevant as long as the record contains substantial evidence to support its

decision. Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 778 A.2d 785, 
13

794-95 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001). Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence that the 

PUC relied upon constituted substantial evidence to support its determination.

Finally, in rejecting Moyer’s argument that the host account should be 

assigned PPL’s residential RS rate, the PUC acknowledged that there was no 

evidence indicating that he was using his solar facility to engage in commercial 

activity and that there was nothing in the AEPS or PUC regulations explicitly

mandating that a residential customer-generator electing virtual-meter aggregation 

receive service under a commercial rate schedule for his host account. PUC’s May 

19, 2016, Opinion at 35. Nonetheless, the PUC determined that, “the current terms 

of PPL’s Commission-approved tariff simply do not permit [Moyer’s] solar facility 

to be billed under PPL’s Rate Schedule RS nor does the construct of [his] virtual 

net metering impose the same burdens on or uses of PPL’s infrastructure as do 

physical meter aggregation customers.” Id.

Specifically, in support of its determination that Moyer did not meet 

PPL’s tariff specifications for its residential RS rate applicable to single-phase 

electric service, the PUC reviewed the relevant criteria:

(a) A single family dwelling and detached buildings 

when the detached buildings are served at the customer’s 

expense through the same meter as the single family 

dwelling;

(b) A separate dwelling unit in an apartment house;

(c) A single farm dwelling and general farm uses when 

general farm uses are served at the customer’s expense 

through the same meter as the single farm dwelling;

(d) A building previously wired for single meter service 

which is converted to not more than 8 separate dwelling 

units served through one meter.

Id. at 36. In concluding that Moyer’s solar facility did not meet the above criteria, 

the PUC observed that Moyer’s solar facility was “simply an array of mounted 
14

solar panels located several hundred yards away from [his] residence[,]” that he 

“did not use it for shelter, dining, sleeping, or cooking[,]” and that it was served by 

a separate meter from the one located at his residence. Id.

Moreover, in determining that Moyer was properly subject to PPL’s 

commercial rate, the PUC reviewed PPL’s tariff for rate schedule GS-1, which 

provides, in relevant part, that it is applicable to “single phase non-residential 

service at secondary voltage and other applications outside the scope of the 

Residential Rate Schedule.” Id. at 37 (emphasis in original). In support of its 

determination, the PUC noted that Moyer offered no evidence to refute PPL’s 

evidence that, in order to provide service to his solar facility, PPL had to perform 

one standard transformation to step down the distribution line’s voltage from 240 

volts to 120 volts at the point of delivery. Id. Accordingly, mindful that a public 

utility’s tariff has the force and effect of law and is binding on both the customer 

and the utility,10 we conclude that the PUC did not err in determining that PPL 

properly assigned a commercial rate to Moyer’s host account. See PPL Elec. Util. 

Corp., 912 A.2d at 400 (holding that the PUC is responsible for regulating utility 

rates and evaluating tariffs over which it has the particular expertise).

For the above reasons, therefore, we grant the PUC’s application to 

strike the purported amicus curiae brief, deny both of Moyer’s applications for 

relief, and affirm the PUC’s final order on the merits.

_____________________________________

BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,

Senior Judge

 

10 PECO Energy Co. v. Twp. of Upper Dublin, 922 A.2d 996, 1004 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Jay Larry Moyer, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 882 C.D. 2016

:

Public Utility Commission, :

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 13th day of March, 2017, the order of the Public 

Utility Commission is hereby AFFIRMED. Further, Respondent’s application to 

strike the purported amicus curiae brief filed by Sunrise Energy, LLC, is hereby 

GRANTED. Finally, both Petitioner’s applications for relief, filed October 20, 

2016, and November 23, 2016, are hereby DENIED.

_____________________________________

BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,

Senior Judge