[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 20-11215

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ANTHONY MOORE, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 8:07-cr-00090-JDW-TGW-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 20-11215, 20-11216

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No. 20-11216

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ANTHONY MOORE, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 8:07-cr-00090-JDW-TGW-1

____________________

Before NEWSOM, BRANCH, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.

BRANCH, Circuit Judge:

Upon the third revocation of his supervised release, Anthony Moore was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment and an 

additional 18 months’ supervised release. During the revocation 

proceedings, he was also sentenced to a consecutive term of 6 

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20-11215, 20-11216 Opinion of the Court 3

months’ imprisonment for criminal contempt. On appeal, Moore 

raises five challenges to his contempt conviction and his revocation 

and contempt sentences. First, he argues that the district court 

plainly erred in imposing an additional term of supervised release 

because it failed to account for the terms of imprisonment that 

were imposed upon the prior revocations of his supervised release. 

Second, he argues that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)—the statute under 

which he was sentenced upon revocation—is unconstitutional because it allows the district court to extend Moore’s sentence beyond the authorized statutory maximum for his offense of conviction based solely on “judge-found facts” in violation of the Fifth and 

Sixth Amendments as set forth in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 

466 (2000), and Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013).1 Third, 

he argues that his revocation sentence is substantively unreasonable. Fourth, he argues that the district court plainly erred in convicting him of criminal contempt without giving him an opportunity to allocute. Fifth, he argues that we should exercise our “inherent supervisory authority” to modify the contempt sentence.

Although the district court plainly erred in imposing an 

18-month term of supervised release for Moore’s third revocation, 

§ 3583(e)(3) is not unconstitutional as applied to Moore, and the 

1 In the alternative, Moore argues that any constitutional concerns can be 

avoided by reading the text of § 3583(e)(3) as imposing an aggregate limitation 

on post-revocation imprisonment that caps the total sentence a defendant may 

serve for revocations and his original sentence at the statutory maximum term 

authorized for the underlying offense. 

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4 Opinion of the Court 20-11215, 20-11216

district court did not impose a substantively unreasonable sentence. As to Moore’s contempt sentence, the district court did not 

plainly err in convicting Moore of criminal contempt without giving him an opportunity to allocute, and we decline his request for 

us to modify the contempt sentence. Accordingly, with the benefit 

of oral argument, we affirm in part and vacate in part Moore’s contempt conviction and sentences.

I. Background 

In 2007, Moore was convicted of possession of several unregistered destructive devices in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841, 

5861(d), and 5871. He was sentenced to the statutory maximum 

for his offense—120 months’ imprisonment to be followed by 36 

months’ supervised release. He completed his term of imprisonment in 2016 and began serving the term of supervised release. 

Since then, his supervised release has been revoked three times.

In October 2017, after finding Moore guilty of two violations 

of the terms of his supervised release, the district court revoked 

Moore’s supervised release and sentenced him to 6 months’ imprisonment and 24 months’ supervised release.2 In December 2018, 

the district court revoked Moore’s supervised release again due to 

a new violation and sentenced him to 18 months’ imprisonment 

and 18 months’ supervised release. Finally, in March 2020, the district court revoked Moore’s supervised release a third time due to 

2 Moore appealed the first revocation, and we affirmed the revocation and his 

sentence. See United States v. Moore, 716 F. App’x 934 (11th Cir. 2018). 

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several new violations, and sentenced him to 18 months’ imprisonment and 18 months’ supervised release. The district court also 

sentenced him to a consecutive six-month term of imprisonment 

for criminal contempt for his conduct during the third revocation 

hearing. The facts underlying the third revocation are as follows.

In early 2020, Moore was charged with eight violations of 

the terms of his supervised release, most of which related to drug 

or alcohol use. The third of the eight violations charged was for 

failure to notify probation within 72 hours of being questioned by 

the police. On January 7, 2020, Moore had been questioned by the 

Tampa Police Department about excessive use of alcohol. According to the police report, Moore was drinking with his work crew 

supervisor Steven Stearns and another individual on Stearns’s boat. 

Moore drank excessively and later fell asleep on the couch in 

Stearns’s living room. The next morning, Stearns’s 5-year-old 

daughter told Stearns that Moore had “lifted her skirt and attempted to touch her inappropriately.” Stearns went into his living 

room, punched Moore in the face twice, and called the police. 

When the police arrived, they found Moore lying on the ground 

intoxicated. The officers interviewed Stearns’s daughter, who confirmed the details of the incident. The police declined to arrest 

Moore at that time. 

At the revocation hearing, Moore admitted to all the alleged 

violations of the terms of his supervised release except the third 

violation—the failure to notify probation within 72 hours of being 

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questioned by the police. Moore explained that he did not remember seeing the police or being questioned but stated that he was 

willing to admit to it. The government called Stearns as a witness 

to testify about whether Moore was questioned by law enforcement. The district court asked Stearns whether the police tried to 

question Moore and Stearns responded that “they tried to,” but 

Moore “scream[ed] out that he ain’t talking to them.” After the 

district court confirmed with Moore’s probation officer that Moore 

had failed to notify probation within 72 hours of the incident, it 

found Moore guilty of all eight violations and revoked his supervised release. 

The district court then turned to the question of Moore’s 

sentence. The maximum sentence the district court could impose 

was 24 months’ imprisonment, under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e),3 and the 

district court calculated Moore’s guidelines range to be an “8- to 

3 Moore’s offense of conviction was punishable by up to ten years’ imprisonment, making it a Class C felony. See 26 U.S.C. § 5871; 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(3). 

Under § 3583(e), upon a finding of a violation of the conditions of supervised 

release, a district court “may revoke a term of supervised release, and require 

the defendant to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release 

authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in such term of supervised 

release without credit for time previously served on postrelease supervision.” 

18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). However, the statute further provides that “a defendant whose term is revoked under this paragraph may not be required to serve 

on any such revocation . . . more than 2 years in prison” for a Class C felony. 

Id. Accordingly, the maximum term of imprisonment that the district court 

could have imposed for the revocation of Moore’s supervised release was 24 

months’ imprisonment. 

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14-month term [of imprisonment] and an additional term of supervised release of 36 months, less any jail time.” After hearing from 

Moore, the district court invited Stearns to make a victim impact 

statement as the father of the victim. Stearns described how his 

daughter was traumatized by Moore’s actions and testified that he 

believed Moore needed additional supervision. During Stearns’s 

testimony, Moore repeatedly interrupted, accusing Stearns of lying 

and denying that he did anything to Stearns’s daughter. 

The government requested an upward variance from the 

guidelines range, as well as “some term of supervision.” After 

speaking with Moore’s probation officer about treatment options, 

the district court sentenced Moore: 

The Court: All right. The factors under 3553(a) of Title 18, to the extent applicable in a revocation hearing, 

are considered as I determine the appropriate sanction.

It’s—it’s difficult, Mr. Moore, to determine what is a 

fair sanction for someone like yourself who has alcohol and drug-abuse addiction. But you’ve now, because of those addictions, crossed that line that results 

in you being hospitalized. You may not remember 

what happened, and it may be something that you 

can’t even conceive ever happened, but—

Moore: Yes, sir.

The Court: If you interrupt me, sir—

Moore: Oh, I’m sorry.

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The Court: —you’re going to spend a lot more time 

in prison than what you think.

Moore: Yes, sir. I’m sorry.

The Court: Because I can sentence you to contempt 

consecutive to the sentence. So it’s just time to be 

quiet and listen.

Moore: I’m sorry.

The Court: The public needs to be protected. Somebody who gets that drunk, that under the influence, 

and does something, the public needs to be protected. 

You need to get help, sir, but you got to want help. 

Probation has done everything they can do for you, 

and you’ve just basically thumbed your nose at it. I 

doubt anything I do here today is going to change 

you. The only thing I can hope for is that somehow 

it gets your attention, and that you are willing to get 

the help that you need. I don’t think you are. Somehow that happens with people.

I do find that a sentence within the advisory range is 

not sufficient. This is not just a matter of somebody 

who’s suffering from addiction. This is someone 

who’s abused drugs, abused alcohol regularly and 

continuously, who’s been before the Court a number 

of times for violating supervised release, and now 

there’s an indication in evidence that he committed 

a—or engaged in conduct which is very serious. May 

not have constituted a crime, but it was dangerously 

close. You traumatized a six-year-old.

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Having said all that and having considered all of these 

circumstances, it is the judgment of the Court [that] 

the defendant be committed to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons for a term of 18 months. I varied upward f[rom] the Guidelines for the reasons I articulated. You will then be placed on supervision for 18 

months, subject to the standard terms and conditions 

adopted by this Court.

Moore: He’s full of shit. He shouldn’t have done that 

to me, though. I didn’t do nothing to nobody.

The Court: Mr. Moore, I now find you in contempt, 

direct contempt of the Court.

Moore: Your Honor, I didn’t touch nobody. Your 

Honor, all I’m guilty of is being a drug addict. I’m 

just—

The Court: Would you like to be bound and gagged? 

Because that’s what’s coming next.

Moore: No, sir.

The Court: Then be quiet.

Moore: But, I mean, fair is fair. I’m just no different 

than any other drug addict.

The Court: You get six more months for contempt of 

Court, sir, consecutive to the sanction I’ve just imposed. Do you have any other questions?

Moore: No, sir. I don’t want no trouble. I’m just trying to explain to you I’m just a regular drug addict.

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The court then asked Moore’s counsel if she had “anything [she 

would] like to say on behalf of Mr. Moore.” Moore’s counsel consulted with Moore and then Moore addressed the court:

Moore: I didn’t mess with nobody when I was out 

there. I just did drugs. I worked every day. I worked 

six days a week. My apartment was paid for when I 

left. I never did nothing to nobody. We went to party 

at this guy’s house. I mean, come on. Fair is fair. I 

mean, damn.

The district court then pronounced its judgment:

The Court: This is a case of direct criminal contempt. 

Mr. Moore used a profanity when the Court was announcing the sanction. It may have been directed to 

Mr. Stearns. It may have been directed to the Court. 

But, nonetheless, it obstructed the Court’s proceeding, and I find that a six-month sanction for direct 

criminal contempt is appropriate consecutive to the 

sanction that I’ve announced on the revocation.

The district court then asked Moore’s counsel whether she had 

“any objections to the sanctions imposed in the manner in which it 

has been pronounced,” and Moore’s counsel stated that she did 

not. 

In its judgment imposing the sentence for contempt, the district court explained that Moore “obstruct[ed] the proceedings by 

interrupting the court as it was announcing the sanction for violating the terms and conditions of supervised release, using profanity, 

and disregarding direct orders of the court.” Moore subsequently 

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appealed from both the revocation sentence and the contempt sentence. 

II. Discussion 

A. Revocation Term of Supervised Release

Moore argues that the district court plainly erred in imposing a term of supervised release because it failed to account for the 

terms of imprisonment he had already served for prior revocations. 

The government agrees and concedes that the district court plainly 

erred.4 

We review the district court’s imposition of a term of supervised release for plain error because Moore failed to object to it below. See United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 

2005). “The plain-error test has four prongs: there must be (1) an 

error (2) that is plain and (3) that has affected the defendant’s substantial rights; and if the first three prongs are met, then a court 

may exercise its discretion to correct the error if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 

proceedings.” United States v. Madden, 733 F.3d 1314, 1320 (11th 

Cir. 2013) (alteration adopted) (quotation omitted); see Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 52(b). Moore has demonstrated all four prerequisites 

4 Although we are not required to accept the government’s concession, see 

United States v. Linville, 228 F.3d 1330, 1331 n.2 (11th Cir. 2000), we agree 

with Moore and the government that the district court plainly erred in imposing a term of supervised release here.

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here, and, therefore, the error warrants exercise of our discretion 

to correct it.

Section 3583(h) provides:

When a term of supervised release is revoked and the 

defendant is required to serve a term of imprisonment, the court may include a requirement that the 

defendant be placed on a term of supervised release 

after imprisonment. The length of such a term of supervised release shall not exceed the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that 

resulted in the original term of supervised release, less 

any term of imprisonment that was imposed upon 

revocation of supervised release.

18 U.S.C. § 3583(h) (emphasis added). In United States v. Mazarky, 

499 F.3d 1246, 1250 (11th Cir. 2007), we held that, under § 3583(h),

“the maximum allowable supervised release following multiple 

revocations must be reduced by the aggregate length of any terms 

of imprisonment that have been imposed upon revocation.”

Moore’s maximum term of supervised release upon his original conviction was 36 months. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(2), 26 

U.S.C. § 5871. And he was sentenced to a total of 42 months’ imprisonment for his prior revocations. Thus, under § 3583(h), because he had already served a term of imprisonment for prior revocations in excess of the statutory maximum amount of supervised 

release, the district court was not authorized to impose any additional supervised release and it was error for the district court to do 

so.

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This error was plain in light of § 3583(h) and Mazarky; it affected Moore’s substantial rights because it exposed him to an unauthorized term of supervised release (18 months), and it “undermines the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings,” because it resulted in an “unnecessary deprivation of liberty,” Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897, 1908 (2018). 

Accordingly, we vacate the supervised release portion of Moore’s 

sentence.

B. Revocation Term of Imprisonment

Moore also argues that § 3583(e) violates the Fifth and Sixth 

Amendments as applied to him because it allows the district court 

to extend Moore’s sentence beyond the authorized statutory maximum for his offense of conviction based solely on “judge-found 

facts,” in violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), 

and Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013).5 Moore does not 

5 Specifically, Moore argues that when his sentence is viewed in the aggregate—meaning his original sentence combined with the sentence imposed 

upon each revocation of supervised release—it totals 13.5 years which exceeds 

the authorized statutory maximum of 13 years (based on combining the statutory maximum term of imprisonment and the statutory maximum term of 

supervised release). Thus, he argues that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) is unconstitutional, as applied to him, because it allows the district court to extend his sentence beyond the authorized statutory maximum for his offense of conviction 

based solely on “judge-found facts,” in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments as set forth in Apprendi and Alleyne.

Alternatively, he argues that the constitutional concerns he has identified can 

be avoided if we interpret § 3583(e)(3) as imposing an aggregate limitation on 

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dispute that he did not raise this argument in the district court; 

therefore, we review for plain error. 

Once again, “[t]he plain-error test has four prongs: there 

must be (1) an error (2) that is plain and (3) that has affected the 

defendant’s substantial rights; and if the first three prongs are met, 

then a court may exercise its discretion to correct the error if (4) the 

error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of 

judicial proceedings.” Madden, 733 F.3d at 1320 (alteration 

adopted) (quotation omitted). For an error to be plain:

[T]he legal rule [must be] clearly established at the 

time the case is reviewed on direct appeal. Where the 

explicit language of a statute or rule does not specifically resolve an issue, there can be no plain error 

where there is no precedent from the Supreme Court 

or this Court directly resolving it. Such error must be 

so clearly established and obvious that it should not 

have been permitted by the trial court even absent the 

defendant’s timely assistance in detecting it.

United States v. Hesser, 800 F.3d 1310, 1325 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotations and internal citations omitted). For the reasons that follow, 

Moore’s claim fails because he cannot establish that there was an 

error, or that, even assuming that an error occurred, it was plain. 

revocation sentences that caps the total sentence a defendant may serve at the 

statutory maximum for the underlying offense. 

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As always, our starting point is the statutory text. Section 

3583(e)(3) provides, in relevant part:

The court may . . . revoke a term of supervised release, and require the defendant to serve in prison all 

or part of the term of supervised release authorized 

by statute for the offense that resulted in such term of 

supervised release without credit for time previously 

served on post­release supervision, if the court, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure applicable to revocation of probation or supervised release, finds by a preponderance of the evidence that 

the defendant violated a condition of supervised release, except that a defendant whose term is revoked 

under this paragraph may not be required to serve on 

any such revocation . . . more than 2 years in prison if 

such offense is a class C or D felony . . . .

Nothing in the text of § 3583(e) provides that the full panoply of 

rights provided for in the Fifth or Sixth Amendments apply to 

§ 3583(e) revocation proceedings. And nothing in the text provides 

that the total time a defendant may serve for his original conviction 

and revocations of supervised release cannot exceed the combined 

statutory maximum terms of imprisonment and supervised release 

for the original offense of conviction. Thus, the statutory text does 

not establish that a plain error occurred in this case. Accordingly, 

we must determine whether there is a Supreme Court case or a 

case from this Court directly resolving the issue. 

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In Morrissey v. Brewer, the Supreme Court held that “the 

revocation of parole is not part of a criminal prosecution and thus 

the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding does 

not apply.” 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972). The Court then went on to 

hold that only minimal due process rights apply in revocation of 

parole proceedings, such as notice, a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, and an opportunity for the defendant to be heard. Id.

at 487–88. Thereafter, the Supreme Court held in Johnson v. 

United States, 529 U.S. 694, 700 (2000), that the Sixth Amendment 

right to a jury trial is not applicable during revocation proceedings 

because revocation of supervised release is treated “as part of the 

penalty for the initial offense” and that “the violative conduct need 

not be criminal and need only be found by a judge under a preponderance of the evidence standard.” 

Following Johnson, however, in the context of initial criminal proceedings, the Supreme Court held that, under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial 

guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, “[o]ther than the fact of a 

prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a 

jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. 

at 490. Subsequently, in Alleyne, the Supreme Court extended Apprendi and held that any facts that increase a mandatory minimum 

sentence must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 570 U.S. at 116. Thus, Moore argues that § 3583(e) 

plainly violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments as applied to him 

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because the district court imposed a sentence beyond the statutory 

maximum based solely on judge-found facts in violation of Apprendi and Alleyne.6 But neither Apprendi nor Alleyne dealt with 

revocation proceedings, and, therefore, those decisions do not directly resolve the issue presented in this case for purposes of establishing plain error. Furthermore, Moore concedes that, in United 

States v. R. Scott Cunningham, we joined several of our sister circuits in holding that Apprendi does not apply to revocation proceedings under § 3583(e)(3), and that “§ 3583(e)(3) is constitutional 

under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.” 607 F.3d 1264, 1265, 1268 

(11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). Specifically, after examining pre- and 

post-Apprendi precedent from the Supreme Court and other circuits, we held that “3583(e)(3) does not violate the Fifth or Sixth 

Amendments because the violation of supervised release need only 

be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, and there is no right 

to trial by jury in a supervised release revocation hearing.” Id. Under our prior-precedent rule, Cunningham binds us unless it is 

overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by this Court 

sitting en banc or by the Supreme Court. See United States v. 

Brown, 342 F.3d 1245, 1246 (11th Cir. 2003).

6 Section 3583(e)(3) does not present any Alleyne problem because it does not 

impose any mandatory minimum term of imprisonment based on judicial factfinding. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3); see also United States v. Haymond, 139 S. 

Ct. 2369, 2383–84 (2019) (“Section § 3583(e), which governs supervised release 

revocation proceedings generally, does not contain any similar mandatory 

minimum triggered by judge-found facts.”). Thus, although Moore cites both 

Apprendi and Alleyne, his argument revolves solely around Apprendi. 

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Notwithstanding Cunningham’s holding that Apprendi does 

not apply to § 3583(e)(3) proceedings and that § 3583(e)(3) does not 

violate the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, Moore argues that the Supreme Court’s more recent, fractured decision in United States v. 

Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019) (plurality opinion), establishes 

that a § 3583(e)(3) revocation sentence that results in a total sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum is plainly unconstitutional under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Moore’s argument 

fails, as Haymond addressed a different subsection of § 3583, and, 

therefore, does not directly resolve the issue at hand for purposes 

of plain error review.

Specifically, in Haymond, the Supreme Court struck down 

18 U.S.C. § 3583(k), which required a district court to impose a 

minimum term of incarceration upon a finding of certain violations 

of supervised release. 139 S. Ct. at 2374. However, the plurality 

clarified that its “decision [was] limited to § 3583(k) . . . and the Alleyne problem raised by [§ 3583(k)’s] 5-year mandatory minimum 

term of imprisonment.” Id. at 2383. Haymond did not address 

whether § 3583(k), much less § 3583(e), was consistent with Apprendi. Id. at 2382 n.7 (“[W]e have no occasion to decide whether 

§ 3583(k) implicates Apprendi . . . [and] we do not pass judgment 

one way or the other on § 3583(e)’s consistency with Apprendi.”). 

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Thus, Haymond has no direct application to the issue before us 

which involves § 3583(e).7

And perhaps more importantly, while the Haymond plurality relied on Alleyne—an Apprendi progeny case—to conclude that 

§ 3583(k) was unconstitutional, Justice Breyer’s concurrence in 

Haymond, which is the controlling opinion, did not.8 Id. at 2385–

86 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Haymond is narrower than the plurality opinion because he does not 

“transplant the Apprendi line of cases to the supervised-release context”—therefore, it is the controlling opinion. Id. Thus, Haymond 

does not establish that plain error occurred in Moore’s case.9 

7 The concurrence agrees that Haymond does not implicate § 3583(e), and, 

therefore, cannot establish plain error in this case for purposes of Moore’s Apprendi claim. 

8 See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When a fragmented 

Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the 

assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as the position 

taken by those Members who concurred in the judgment[] on the narrowest 

grounds.”); see also Haymond, 139 S. Ct. at 2386 (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating 

that Justice Breyer’s concurrence contains “today’s holding”); United States v. 

Watters, 947 F.3d 493, 497 (8th Cir. 2020) (“Justice Breyer’s opinion is the narrower opinion[ ] and therefore controls.”).

9 Despite the dissent’s arguments that there was an Apprendi violation here, if 

the Supreme Court itself did not see fit to “transplant” the entire body of Apprendi jurisprudence to the supervised release criminal scheme in Haymond, 

we do not see how we could do so under these circumstances given our Cunningham decision and that we are on plain error review.

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20 Opinion of the Court 20-11215, 20-11216

The concurrence and dissent argue that Cunningham does 

not “control” here because the Apprendi argument before the Cunningham panel was different and it did not have the opportunity to 

consider the argument Moore presents—whether Apprendi and its 

progeny apply to § 3583(e)(3) proceedings where the revocation of 

supervised release and imposition of a new term of imprisonment 

results in a combined sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum for the original offense. 

As we explained previously, however, Cunningham announced a broad ruling that “3583(e)(3) does not violate the Fifth 

or Sixth Amendments because the violation of supervised release 

need only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, and there 

is no right to trial by jury in a supervised release revocation hearing.” 607 F.3d at 1268. Thus, we rejected the application of Apprendi in the context of § 3583(e)(3) proceedings. To be sure, the 

dissent is correct that the Cunningham court did not have the benefit of the particular Apprendi argument raised here, but that 

makes no difference under the prior-panel-precedent rule. See In 

re Lambrix, 776 F.3d 789, 794 (11th Cir. 2015) (“We have held that 

a prior panel precedent cannot be circumvented or ignored on the 

basis of arguments not made to or considered by the prior 

panel. . . . In short, we have categorically rejected an overlooked 

reason or argument exception to the prior-panel-precedent rule.” 

(quotations and internal citations omitted)); Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc., 204 F.3d 1069, 1076 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Unless and until the 

holding of a prior decision is overruled by the Supreme Court or 

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by the en banc court, that holding is the law of this Circuit regardless of what might have happened had other arguments been made 

to the panel that decided the issue first.”). 

Regardless, even if the concurrence and dissent are correct 

that Cunningham did not address Moore’s precise claim, neither 

did Apprendi or Haymond. And Moore has not presented us with 

any authority—much less controlling authority—directly resolving 

the issue in this case. It is this absence of controlling authority that 

is fatal to Moore’s claim because an error cannot be plain if there is 

“no precedent from the Supreme Court or this Court directly resolving [the issue].” Hesser, 800 F.3d at 1325.

Accordingly, for all of these reasons, Moore’s claim fails on 

plain error review.10 

C. Reasonableness of the Revocation Sentence

Next, Moore argues that his revocation sentence was substantively unreasonable. We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release 

for abuse of discretion, based on the totality of circumstances. 

10 Alternatively, Moore also argues that § 3583(e) should be construed to impose an aggregate limit on post-revocation imprisonment—meaning that a defendant’s aggregate post-revocation sentence is capped at the statutory maximum term for the underlying offense. But as discussed above, nothing in the 

text of § 3583(e) expressly imposes an aggregate limit on post-revocation imprisonment, and once again Moore fails to cite to any controlling authority 

from the Supreme Court or this Court that resolves this issue. Thus, he has 

failed to demonstrate plain error.

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22 Opinion of the Court 20-11215, 20-11216

United States v. Trailer, 827 F.3d 933, 935–36 (11th Cir. 2016) (per 

curiam). “A district court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to 

afford consideration to relevant factors that were due significant 

weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering the 

proper factors.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th 

Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quotation omitted). We will vacate a sentence 

“if, but only if, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that 

the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing 

the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the 

range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” Id. 

at 1190 (quotation omitted). A district court may vary upward 

from the guidelines range “when the court determines that a guidelines sentence will not adequately further the purposes reflected in 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v. Hall, 965 F.3d 1281, 1295 

(11th Cir. 2020); see United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230, 1240 

(11th Cir. 2009).

The guidelines range for Moore’s offenses was 8 to 14 

months’ imprisonment and the district court sentenced him to 18 

months’ imprisonment—a 4-month upward variance. But we cannot say that Moore’s revocation sentence was an abuse of discretion. As the district court noted, Moore had “abused drugs, abused 

alcohol regularly and continuously” and had “been before the 

Court a number of times for violating supervised release.” He had 

committed eight violations of supervised release within a few 

months of starting his third term of supervised release. And the 

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20-11215, 20-11216 Opinion of the Court 23

district court noted that there was “an indication in evidence that 

he committed a—or engaged in conduct which is very serious. 

May not have constituted a crime, but it was dangerously close. 

[Moore] traumatized a six-year-old.” In other words, he continued 

to re-offend after already having served 6- and 18-month terms of 

imprisonment for prior revocations. The district court was within 

its discretion to determine that a 4-month upward variance was 

necessary to deter Moore and to protect the public. See United 

States v. Hunt, 941 F.3d 1259, 1264 (11th Cir. 2019); United States 

v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1256–57 (11th Cir. 2015).

Moore argues that the district court erred by giving “dispositive weight” to Stearns’s testimony. But the sentencing transcript 

reveals that the district court considered the other § 3553(a) factors 

and did not give Stearns’s testimony dispositive weight.11 Nor has 

Moore demonstrated that the district court committed a clear error 

of judgment in considering the § 3553(a) factors. Accordingly, 

Moore’s sentence was not substantively unreasonable.

11 Moore also argues that the district court erred in admitting Stearns’s testimony without finding that it was reliable or providing him an opportunity to 

cross-examine Stearns under United States v. Frazier, 26 F.3d 110, 114 (11th 

Cir. 1994). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a) provides that a harmless 

error—an “error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights”—“must be disregarded.” Regardless of whether the district court’s 

decision to admit Stearns’s testimony was error, we conclude that any such 

error was harmless because “the properly considered evidence overwhelmingly demonstrated that [Moore] breached the terms of his supervised release.” Frazier, 26 F.3d at 114.

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24 Opinion of the Court 20-11215, 20-11216

D. Contempt Conviction

Next, Moore contends that the district court plainly erred in 

convicting him for criminal contempt because it failed to give him 

an opportunity to allocute before it sentenced him. Because Moore 

failed to object below, we review the district court’s decision for 

plain error. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1298.

The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that a district court may punish criminal contempt committed in its presence “summarily”—that is, “without delaying to provide for formal charges or a formal trial,” United States v. Browne, 318 F.3d

261, 265 (1st Cir. 2003)—if the court “saw or heard the contemptuous conduct and so certifies,” see Fed. R. Crim. P. 42(b); see also 18 

U.S.C. § 401(1) (“A court of the United States shall have the power 

to punish by fine or imprisonment, or both, at its discretion, such 

contempt of its authority, and none other, as . . . [m]isbehavior of 

any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice.”). In Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 307–14 

(1888), the Supreme Court held that a court may hold a defendant 

in summary contempt without notice or a prior opportunity to be 

heard. 

Moore argues that United States v. Brannon, 546 F.2d 1242 

(5th Cir. 1977), and Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974), establish 

that the district court was required to provide him an opportunity 

to allocute before it sentenced him. In Brannon, we wrote that 

“notice and at least a brief opportunity to be heard should be afforded as a matter of course” in criminal contempt proceedings. 

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20-11215, 20-11216 Opinion of the Court 25

546 F.2d at 1249; see id. (“[E]ven if the trial judge here had not 

waited as long as he did but had proceeded immediately to find the 

appellant in contempt, he should have first explicitly warned the 

appellant of the consequences of his continued refusals and should 

have afforded him the right of allocution.”). And in Taylor, the 

Supreme Court wrote that:

[R]easonable notice of a charge and an opportunity to 

be heard in defense before punishment is imposed are 

basic in our system of jurisprudence. Even where 

summary punishment for contempt is imposed during trial, the contemnor has normally been given an 

opportunity to speak in his own behalf in the nature 

of a right of allocution.

418 U.S. at 498 (quotations and internal citation omitted).

But Brannon and Taylor speak of norms, not absolute rules. 

See Brannon, 546 F.2d at 1249 (stating “notice and at least a brief 

opportunity to be heard should be afforded as a matter of course” 

(emphasis added)); see also Taylor, 418 U.S. at 498 (“Even where 

summary punishment for contempt is imposed during trial, the 

contemnor has normally been given an opportunity to speak in his 

own behalf in the nature of a right of allocution.” (emphasis added) 

(quotations and internal citations omitted)). Because no precedent 

from the Supreme Court or this Court directly establishes that 

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26 Opinion of the Court 20-11215, 20-11216

Moore had the right to allocute before being held in summary contempt, he has failed to demonstrate plain error. See Hesser, 800 

F.3d at 1325.12

E. Moore’s Contempt Sentence

Finally, Moore argues that we should exercise our “inherent 

supervisory authority” to reduce his contempt sentence.13 Moore 

contends that a sentence of six months’ imprisonment—the maximum punishment that the district court could impose without a 

jury trial, see Cheff v. Shnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 380 (1966)—was 

unreasonable because he had “accepted responsibility for his violations, had been respectful before the court in the past, and had apologized for his minor interruption.” 

 But the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a six-month sentence. Moore admits that he interrupted the 

proceedings to interject: “He’s full of shit. He shouldn’t have done 

12 The government contends that the district court gave Moore an opportunity 

to speak on his own behalf before imposing punishment. Because we conclude that Moore failed to demonstrate plain error, we do not address this argument.

13 See Cheff v. Shnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 380 (1966) (describing “the peculiar 

power of federal courts to revise sentences in contempt cases”). The government maintains that Moore must still demonstrate plain error irrespective of 

this “peculiar power.” We need not resolve whether plain error review applies 

here because, even under the lower abuse-of-discretion standard, the district 

court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the contempt sentence.

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20-11215, 20-11216 Opinion of the Court 27

that to me, though. I didn’t do nothing to nobody.” And his disruptions were not as he asserts limited to a “single isolated use of 

street vernacular.” Rather, he had already interrupted the court 

several times, and persisted in arguing with the district court even 

after he had been convicted of criminal contempt. The district 

court was in the best position to evaluate the disruptive effect of 

Moore’s conduct, cf. Messer v. Kemp, 760 F.2d 1080, 1087 (11th 

Cir. 1985), and the Supreme Court has affirmed longer sentences 

for contempt (albeit, following a jury trial), see Green v. United 

States, 356 U.S. 165, 188–89 (1958) (three-year sentence). Because 

Moore has failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its 

discretion in imposing a six-month sentence for contempt, we decline his request for us to modify that sentence.

III. Conclusion 

For these reasons, we affirm Moore’s 18-month revocation 

sentence and six-month contempt sentence but vacate the term of 

post-revocation supervised release.

AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART. 

 

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20-11215, 20-11216 LAGOA, J., Concurring in part and in result 1

LAGOA, Circuit Judge, Concurring in part and in the result:

I concur in full in Parts II.A., II.C., II.D., and II.E. of the majority opinion. However, I concur in result only as to Part II.B. of 

the majority opinion, which affirms the district court’s decision to 

sentence Moore to 18 months’ imprisonment for the third revocation of his supervised release, resulting in a cumulative total of 162 

months’ imprisonment for both the underlying offense and the 

three revocations of supervised release. That holding raises two 

issues: (1) whether district courts can impose a term of imprisonment for the revocation of supervised release that, together with 

the term of imprisonment already served for the underlying crime, 

exceeds the statutory maximum sentence the defendant faced at 

the time of sentencing—i.e., the statutory maximum term of imprisonment for the underlying offense (in this case, 120 months) 

plus the statutory maximum period of supervised release (in this 

case, 36 months); and (2) whether the district court plainly erred in 

sentencing Moore to such 18 months’ imprisonment. 

Moore’s counsel did not preserve these issues for appeal, and 

both the majority and the dissent therefore agree that the district 

court’s sentence is reviewed for plain error. I agree that this is the 

proper standard of review. And, as explained below, I believe that 

the standard of review makes the difference in this case. While the 

majority opinion also concludes that the district court did not 

plainly err, I write separately because, unlike the majority opinion, 

I believe that the issues Moore has raised are issues of first impression without controlling precedent from this Court. 

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2 LAGOA, J., Concurring in part and in result 20-11215, 20-11216

As noted in Andrews v. Warden, a ‘“sentence,’ refers to all 

sanctions imposed for a crime, and a sentence can have multiple 

components, including imprisonment, supervised release, and 

fines.” 958 F.3d 1072, 1080 (11th Cir. 2020). Thus, when we talk 

about a statutory maximum sentence, we must consider the maximum potential sentence a defendant faced when taking into consideration the various components of the sentence. As relevant 

here, it is the term of imprisonment and the term of supervised release. 

In 2007, Moore was convicted of possession of several unregistered destructive devices in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841, 

5861(d), and 5871. Pursuant to these violations, Moore faced, and 

was sentenced to, the statutory maximum sentence consisting of a 

120-month term of imprisonment followed by a 36-month term of 

supervised release—in other words, a maximum sentence of 156 

months. Moore completed his term of imprisonment in 2016 and 

then began serving the 36 months’ term of supervised release. 

In October 2017, the district court revoked Moore’s supervised release and sentenced him to 6 months’ imprisonment. In 

December 2018, the district court again revoked Moore’s supervised release and sentenced Moore to 18 months’ imprisonment. 

And in March 2020, the district court revoked Moore’s supervised 

release for a third time and sentenced him to 18 months’ imprisonment. Thus, as a result of this most recent revocation, Moore now 

faced a total of 162 months in prison—his initial 120-month term 

of imprisonment plus a total of 48 months’ imprisonment arising 

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20-11215, 20-11216 LAGOA, J., Concurring in part and in result 3

from the three separate revocations. That exceeds by 6 months the 

statutory maximum sentence Moore faced for the underlying offense.

I. Do Prior Precedents Address Whether District Courts Can Impose a Cumulative Sentence of Imprisonment that Exceeds the 

Statutory Maximum Sentence the Defendant Faced at the 

Time of Sentencing? 

Moore asserts that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) is unconstitutional to 

the extent that it allowed the district court to extend his “cumulative sentence of imprisonment”—i.e., imprisonment for the underlying offense plus the cumulative imprisonment for all revocations 

of supervised release—beyond the statutory maximum sentence of 

156 months, based solely on “judge found facts.” The relevant provision is 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), which states that: 

The court may . . . revoke a term of supervised release, and require the defendant to serve in prison all 

or part of the term of supervised release authorized 

by statute for the offense that resulted in such term of 

supervised release without credit for time previously 

served on postrelease supervision, if the court, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure applicable to revocation of probation or supervised release, finds by a preponderance of the evidence that 

the defendant violated a condition of supervised release, except that a defendant whose term is revoked 

under this paragraph may not be required to serve on 

any such revocation more than 5 years in prison if the 

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4 LAGOA, J., Concurring in part and in result 20-11215, 20-11216

offense that resulted in the term of supervised release 

is a class A felony, more than 3 years in prison if such 

offense is a class B felony, more than 2 years in prison 

if such offense is a class C or D felony, or more than 

one year in any other case . . . .

The majority opinion suggests that this Court’s decision in 

United States v. R. Scott Cunningham, 607 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 

2010) forecloses Moore’s argument. Maj. Op. at 17. I agree with 

the dissent that this Court’s decision in R. Scott Cunningham does 

not address the issue Moore raises and therefore is not grounds for 

affirming the 18-month sentence at issue. Diss. Op. at 8–10. In R. 

Scott Cunningham, the defendant contended that § 3583(e)(3) is 

unconstitutional because “there is no principled basis to exempt 

§ 3583(e)(3) from Apprendi’s mandates because the revocation of 

supervised release commonly results in substantial terms of incarceration unsupported by a jury’s findings.” 607 F.3d at 1267. This

Court noted that the pre-Apprendi1 revocation of parole was “not 

part of a criminal prosecution” implicating “the full panoply of 

rights” and that the Supreme Court has held that revocation proceedings do not implicate the Sixth Amendment “because revocation of supervised release is treated ‘as part of the penalty for the 

initial offense.’” Id. (first quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 

471, 480 (1972); then quoting Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 

694, 700 (2000)). This Court concluded, consistent with other cir1 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).

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20-11215, 20-11216 LAGOA, J., Concurring in part and in result 5

cuits, that because the defendant was “already convicted of the underlying offense . . . and was granted only conditional liberty, the 

existence of which depend[ed] on [the defendant’s] observation of 

the limits of his supervised release” imprisonment for the revocation of supervised release pursuant to § 3583(e)(3) “does not violate 

the Fifth or Sixth Amendments.” Id. at 1268. 

But that is not the issue addressed here. Moore does not 

contend that he was entitled to full due process and a jury trial because the court revoked his supervised release and sentenced him 

to additional imprisonment. Instead, Moore challenges the district 

court’s ability to impose a cumulative sentence, for multiple violations of supervised release and the underlying offense, that exceeds 

the statutory maximum sentence he faced for the underlying offense. This Court did not address that issue in R. Scott Cunningham, and I therefore believe that the majority opinion’s reliance on 

R. Scott Cunningham is misplaced. 

Post-R. Scott Cunningham, this Court has stated that courts 

have the “power under [§] 3583(e)(3) to impose an additional term 

of imprisonment even though [the defendant] had already served 

the maximum statutory sentence for his offense.” United States v. 

Sharpe, No. 20-13808, 2021 WL 4452532, at *2–3 (11th Cir. Sept. 29, 

2021). But in Sharpe, like in R. Scott Cunningham, this Court was 

not faced with a revocation sentence that resulted in a cumulative 

sentence of imprisonment that exceeded the statutory maximum 

sentence—which is different from the maximum statutory sentence for the underlying offense because the maximum potential 

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6 LAGOA, J., Concurring in part and in result 20-11215, 20-11216

sentence is inclusive of both the maximum statutory sentence and 

the maximum term of supervised release. In Sharpe, the defendant 

faced a statutory maximum sentence consisting of a 10-year term 

of imprisonment plus a lifetime term of supervised release—i.e., a 

potential lifetime statutory maximum sentence. Id. at *1. And, 

upon revocation of his supervised release, the defendant was sentenced to 24 months’ imprisonment. Id.

Nor do other post-R. Scott Cunningham cases from this 

Court resolve the issue. For example, in United States v. John A. 

Cunningham,2 this Court interpreted § 3583(e)(3)—specifically the 

phrase “on any such revocation”—to mean “that upon each revocation of supervised release a defendant may be sentenced to the 

felony class limits contained within § 3583(e)(3) without regard to 

imprisonment previously served for revocation of supervised release.”3 800 F.3d 1290, 1293 (11th Cir. 2015). The defendant in 

John A. Cunningham faced a statutory maximum sentence of 156 

months—a maximum term of imprisonment of 120 months and a 

maximum term of supervised release of 36 months. 800 F.3d at 

2 References to this case use the defendant’s full name to distinguish this case 

from the R. Scott Cunningham case.

3 While one could argue that the phrase “serve . . . all or part of the term of 

supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in such 

term of supervised release” creates an upper limit, see § 3583(e)(3) (emphasis 

added), whereby the maximum imprisonment for all violations of supervised 

release is the maximum supervised release authorized by statute for the underlying offense, the facts and conclusion reached in John A. Cunningham are 

contrary to that interpretation. 

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20-11215, 20-11216 LAGOA, J., Concurring in part and in result 7

1290–91; see 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). The defendant was sentenced to 

a term of imprisonment of 30 months, but, as a result of three violations of his supervised release, he received revocation sentences 

totaling 46 months’ imprisonment. Although the revocation sentences cumulatively exceeded the statutory maximum term of supervised release for the underlying sentence,4 id. at 1291, the defendant’s cumulative sentence of imprisonment (76 months) was 

less than the statutory maximum sentence (156 months). Id. at 

1291. Therefore, this Court did not reach the issue presented here: 

whether the cumulative sentence of imprisonment—inclusive of 

all sentences for revocation of supervised release—can exceed the 

statutory maximum sentence.

A few additional cases touch upon the issue raised here, but 

none conclusively address the issue. For example, in Andrews v. 

Warden, this Court explained that: 

18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)[] allows the reimprisonment of defendants who violate conditions of supervised release 

4 Moreover, in rejecting the defendant’s argument that § 3583(e)(3) implicitly 

contains an aggregation limitation, this Court held that “§ 3583(h) places an 

indirect constraint upon the total amount of revocation imprisonment a defendant may receive . . . by limiting post-imprisonment supervision.” 800 F.3d

at 1293. In other words, the majority opinion’s holding in II.A. that “the district court was not authorized to impose any additional supervised release”

because Moore “already served a term of imprisonment for prior revocations

in excess of the statutory maximum amount” is the cap that “ensures that a 

defendant is not at risk for an unlimited cycle of imprisonment and supervised 

release.” John A. Cunningham, 800 F.3d at 1292. 

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8 LAGOA, J., Concurring in part and in result 20-11215, 20-11216

even when they were initially sentenced to the statutory maximum term. For example, a defendant 

might initially be sentenced to the statutory maximum term of 15 years of imprisonment and to a term 

of two years of supervised release. Upon completing 

his 15-year term of imprisonment, the defendant 

might then commit another crime a year into serving 

his supervised release. A district court would be well 

within its power to order that defendant to serve the 

remainder of his supervised release in prison, which 

would be a term of imprisonment that is part of his 

original sentence but not his original term of imprisonment. That defendant would then serve 16 years 

in prison despite that the statutory maximum for his 

underlying crime allowed for only 15 years of imprisonment. The terms of imprisonment are distinct 

components of his sentence.

958 F.3d at 1080 (citations omitted). This statement endorses the 

dissent’s assertion that “pursuant to a single conviction” a court can 

impose both a term of imprisonment and a term of supervised release and later convert “all or part of the defendant’s supervisedrelease term into a prison term.” See Diss. Op. at 4. But it does not 

go a step further and explicitly stand for the proposition that the 

initial term of supervised release plus the prison term for the underlying offense act as a ceiling for the defendant’s total period of 

confinement. 

Next, in United States v. Cameron, the defendant argued 

that a post-revocation sentence of 24 months was unconstitutional 

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20-11215, 20-11216 LAGOA, J., Concurring in part and in result 9

because, together with the 108 months imprisonment he served for 

the underlying offense, he would serve 132 months’ imprisonment 

for an underlying offense that carried a statutory maximum of 120 

months’ imprisonment. 808 F. App’x 1020, 1020–21 (11th Cir. 

2020). This Court found that the defendant invited the alleged error by specifically requesting a term of imprisonment (18 months)

that resulted in a sentence exceeding the statutory maximum for 

the underlying offense. Id. This Court also held that: (1) the defendant could not prevail because in R. Scott Cunningham the 

Court found that § 3583(e)(3) is constitutional; and (2) the Supreme 

Court’s ruling in United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019),

was limited to § 3583(k). Id. This Court was not asked, and therefore did not address, whether a sentence could exceed the statutory 

maximum sentence. 

And, in United States v. Horne, the defendant similarly argued that a 21-month sentence for violating supervised release, together with the time served for the underlying offense, exceeded 

the statutory maximum sentence. 789 F. App’x 139, 142 (11th Cir. 

2019). This Court rejected this argument, again holding that there 

is “no violation of [the defendant’s] Fifth and Sixth Amendment 

rights when the district court imposed a new term of imprisonment 

that exceeded the statutory maximum sentence available for his 

original crime of conviction without conducting a jury trial.” Id. at 

143. In Horne, the defendant was initially sentenced to 180 

months’ imprisonment and 60 months’ supervised release. Id. at 

140. After serving 132 months, he successfully sought to vacate his 

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10 LAGOA, J., Concurring in part and in result 20-11215, 20-11216

remaining sentence because the Supreme Court invalidated the 

Armed Career Criminal Act’s (“ACCA”) residual clause, and his 

sentence was reduced to time served and 36 months’ supervised 

release. Id. Upon violating supervised release, the defendant was 

sentenced to 21 months’ imprisonment, resulting in a cumulative 

total imprisonment of 153 months. Id. at 140–41. Assuming that, 

without the ACCA’s enhancement, the statutory maximum sentence for the underlying offense was 156 months—a 120 month

term of imprisonment and a 36 month term of supervised release—

defendant’s cumulative sentence was still below the statutory maximum sentence. 

As these cases indicate, it is well settled that: (1) a court may 

impose a sentence of imprisonment for violating supervised release, that together with the term of imprisonment initially imposed for the underlying offense, exceeds the statutory maximum 

term of imprisonment for the underlying offense; and (2) upon 

each revocation of supervised release a defendant may be sentenced to the felony class limits specific to the underlying offense. 

But these cases do not address whether the cumulative sentence of 

imprisonment—inclusive of all sentences for revocation of supervised release and for the underlying offense—can exceed the statutory maximum sentence consisting of both the maximum term of 

imprisonment plus the maximum term of supervised release. 

The dissent raises two arguments based on Supreme Court 

decisions as to why we should find plain error here: (1) that subjecting Moore to a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum 

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20-11215, 20-11216 LAGOA, J., Concurring in part and in result 11

sentence “violated foundational American law, embodied (most recently, but hardly exclusively) in Apprendi and its progeny,” see 

Diss. Op. at 8; and (2) that the three Haymond opinions (plurality, 

concurrence, and dissent) all agree “that a judge can’t impose a total prison term exceeding the maximum prison term plus the maximum supervised-release term,” see Diss. Op. at 5–7.

The question presented in Apprendi was “whether the Due 

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a factual determination authorizing an increase in the maximum prison 

sentence for an offense from 10 to 20 years be made by a jury on 

the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. at 469. The 

Supreme Court explained that:

“under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the 

Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime 

must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a 

jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt[,]” [and] 

[t]he Fourteenth Amendment commands the same 

answer.” 

Id. at 476 (citation omitted) (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 

U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999)). The Supreme Court further noted that 

the statutory scheme at issue was problematic because it “expose[d] the criminal defendant to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive if punished according to the facts reflected 

in the jury verdict alone.” Id. at 482–83. The Supreme Court also 

identified the following guiding principle: “practice must at least 

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12 LAGOA, J., Concurring in part and in result 20-11215, 20-11216

adhere to the basic principles undergirding the requirements of trying to a jury all facts necessary to constitute a statutory offense, and 

proving those facts beyond reasonable doubt.” Id. at 483–84. But 

Apprendi did not address whether a defendant is entitled to a trial 

by jury for imprisonment imposed due to a violation of supervised 

release.5 

This Court has repeatedly held that Apprendi and its progeny do not implicate additional post-revocation safeguards because 

“a defendant in a supervised-release revocation proceeding ‘stands 

already convicted’ of the underlying criminal offense and ‘was 

granted only conditional liberty’ dependent upon the defendant's 

compliance with the conditions of supervised release.” E.g., 

Sharpe, 2021 WL 4452532, at *3 (quoting R. Scott Cunningham, 

607 F.3d at 1268). Under these cases, Apprendi does not apply to 

5 After Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he decision to impose sentences consecutively is not within the jury function.” Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 

160, 168 (2009). In so holding, the Supreme Court explained that “Apprendi’s 

core concern [is] a legislative attempt to ‘remove from the [province of the] 

jury’ the determination of facts that warrant punishment for a specific statutory offense” and that legislative reforms regarding the imposition of multiple 

sentences do not implicate that core concern because “[t]here [was] no encroachment here by the judge upon facts historically found by the jury, nor 

any threat to the jury’s domain as a bulwark at trial between the State and the 

accused.” Id. at 169–70 (second alteration in original) (quoting Apprendi, 530 

U.S. at 490. The Supreme Court also identified “the length of supervised release” as an example of where trial judges “find facts about the nature of the 

offense or the character of the defendant.” Id. at 171–72. But that statement 

neither supports, nor weighs against, the majority opinion.

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20-11215, 20-11216 LAGOA, J., Concurring in part and in result 13

post-revocation proceedings because guilt for the underlying offense has already been established and supervised release is a component of the penalty for that offense. That view is supported by 

the plurality opinion in Haymond, in which the plurality 

“acknowledge[d] that an accused’s final sentence includes any supervised release sentence he may receive” and noted that the Court 

had “already recognized that supervised release punishments arise 

from and are ‘treat[ed] . . .as part of the penalty for the initial offense.’” Haymond, 139 S. Ct. at 2379–80 (plurality opinion) (quoting Johnson, 529 U.S. at 700). 

The question that remains is whether cumulative sentences 

for violating supervised release, that result in a term of imprisonment that exceeds the statutory maximum sentence, constitute a 

“penalty exceeding the maximum [the defendant] would receive if 

punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone.” 

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 482–83. But Apprendi does not directly resolve this question, which is what is required for us to find plain 

error. 

As this Court has already found in other cases, the plurality 

opinion in Haymond was “‘limited to § 3583(k) . . . and the Alleyne

[v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013),] problem raised by its 5-year 

mandatory minimum term of imprisonment,’ and declined expressly to address the constitutionality of section 3583(e).” See, 

e.g., Sharpe, 2021 WL 445232, at *3 (quoting Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 

at 2383 (plurality opinion)); Cameron, 808 F. App’x at 1021 (“[I]n 

Haymond, the Supreme Court invalidated only § 3583(k).”); 

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14 LAGOA, J., Concurring in part and in result 20-11215, 20-11216

Horne, 789 F. App’x at 143 (“Haymond explicitly reserved the 

question whether § 3583(e)(3) violates Apprendi.”). And as the majority opinion correctly notes, see Maj. Op. at 19, Justice Breyer’s 

concurrence which, together with the plurality, forms the majority 

opinion in Haymond on that issue, is “specific [to the § 3583(k) provision] of the supervised-release statute” and specifically states that 

it does not “transplant the Apprendi line of cases to the supervisedrelease context.” 138 S. Ct. 2385–86 (Breyer, J., concurring). 

Therefore, it cannot be said that Haymond limits sentences imposed under § 3583(e)(3) to the statutory maximum sentence. 

The issue raised here appears to be a question of first impression and the precedents cited to by both the majority opinion and 

the dissent are unavailing regarding how this Court should rule. As 

noted, the panel all agree that the proper standard of review in this 

case is plain error. I will therefore address whether the district 

court plainly erred by sentencing Moore to 18 months’ imprisonment for his third violation of supervised release. 

II. Did the District Court Plainly Err by Sentencing Moore to 18 

Months’ Imprisonment for His Third Violation of Supervised 

Release? 

As this Court has explained:

“To find plain error, there must be: (1) error, (2) that 

is plain, and (3) that has affected the defendant's substantial rights.” If we find that these conditions are 

met, we may exercise our discretion to recognize a 

forfeited error, but only if the error “seriously affect[s] 

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20-11215, 20-11216 LAGOA, J., Concurring in part and in result 15

the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 

proceedings.” . . . “Plain” error means that the legal 

rule is clearly established at the time the case is reviewed on direct appeal. “[W]here the explicit language of a statute or rule does not specifically resolve 

an issue, there can be no plain error where there is no 

precedent from the Supreme Court or this Court directly resolving it.’” 

United States v. Hesser, 800 F.3d 1310, 1324–25 (11th Cir. 2015)

(first quoting United States v. Khan, 794 F.3d 1288, 1300 (11th Cir. 

2015); then quoting United States v. Moriarty, 429 F.3d 1012, 1019 

(11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam); and then quoting United States v. 

Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam)).

Therefore, pursuant to this standard, there is no plain error 

if: (1) the explicit language of the statute does not specifically resolve the issue; (2) no precedent from the Supreme Court directly 

resolves the issue; and (3) no precedent from this Court directly 

resolves the issue. And reviewing the relevant statutory language 

as well as precedent from the Supreme Court and this Court, I conclude that there is no plain error established in this case.

First, the language of § 3583(e)(3) does not indicate that the 

total amount of time a defendant spends in prison for the underlying offense and subsequent violations of supervised release is limited to the statutory maximum sentence. Indeed, in John A. Cunningham, this Court interpreted § 3583(e)(3) to mean “that upon 

each revocation of supervised release a defendant may be senUSCA11 Case: 20-11215 Date Filed: 01/13/2022 Page: 43 of 57
16 LAGOA, J., Concurring in part and in result 20-11215, 20-11216

tenced to the felony class limits contained within § 3583(e)(3) without regard to imprisonment previously served for revocation of supervised release.” 800 F.3d at 1293. And the only limitations the 

Court found with respect to subsequent sentences for violating supervised release were: (1) the limits provided for the specific felony 

classes; and (2) that “§ 3583(h) places an indirect constraint upon 

the total amount of revocation imprisonment a defendant may receive . . . by limiting post-imprisonment supervision,” such that 

there is not a “risk for an unlimited cycle of imprisonment and supervised release.” Id. at 1292–93. 

Both the majority opinion and dissent agree that the district 

court’s sentence of additional supervised release after the third 

post-revocation imprisonment violates this latter limitation. But 

the plain language of the statute does not impose any further relevant limitations, including that the total amount of time a defendant spends in prison cannot exceed the statutory maximum sentence. 

Second, as explained above, neither the Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi nor the plurality decision in Haymond directly 

resolves this issue. The dissent argues that, based on Haymond, it 

is common ground that the justices of the Supreme Court would 

not uphold a sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum sentence. But the plurality and concurring decisions in Haymond 

were expressly limited to § 3583(k), and therefore Haymond does 

not create any binding precedent regarding the constitutionality of 

a sentence of imprisonment imposed under § 3583(e). See Marks 

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20-11215, 20-11216 LAGOA, J., Concurring in part and in result 17

v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When a fragmented 

Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result 

enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be 

viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in 

the judgments on the narrowest ground.” (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976))). And the fact that the justices 

indicated how they may vote on the issue raised here is not precedent “directly resolving [the issue].” Hesser, 800 F.3d at 1325 (quoting Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d at 1291). 

Third, as summarized above, there is no Eleventh Circuit 

precedent that directly addresses whether the cumulative sentence 

of imprisonment—inclusive of all sentences for revocation of supervised release and for the underlying offense—can exceed the 

statutory maximum sentence. Because no such case exists, I conclude that the district court could not have plainly erred because 

“the explicit language of [the] statute . . . does not specifically resolve [the] issue” and “there is no precedent from the Supreme 

Court or this Court directly resolving it.” Id. (quoting LejardeRada, 319 F.3d at 1291). I therefore concur in result only as to Part 

II.B. of the majority opinion, which affirms the district court’s decision to sentence Moore to 18 months’ imprisonment for the third 

revocation of his supervised release, resulting in a cumulative total 

of 162 months’ imprisonment for both the underlying offense and 

the three revocations of supervised release. And I concur in full as 

to Parts II.A., II.C., II.D., and II.E. of the majority’s opinion. 

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20-11215, 20-11216 NEWSOM, J., dissenting in part 1

NEWSOM, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part:

The defendant here was convicted of a federal crime that 

carried a statutory maximum penalty of 10 years in prison plus 

three years of supervised release. Because any supervised release 

time can (upon the occurrence of certain conditions) be converted 

into prison time, the defendant’s total statutory maximum penalty 

was 13 years in prison. Without convicting him of any new crimes, 

the district court sentenced the defendant to a total of 13 and a half

years in prison. Because that sentence plainly violated the Fifth and 

Sixth Amendments inasmuch as it exceeded the statutory maximum of 13 years, I respectfully dissent from Part II.B. of the Court’s 

opinion.1

I 

After Anthony Moore made pipe bombs for an undercover 

agent, the federal government charged and convicted him under 

26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). By statute, the district court was authorized to 

impose a maximum prison term of 10 years plus a maximum supervised-release term of three years. See 26 U.S.C. § 5871; 18 

U.S.C. §§ 3559(a)(3), 3583(b)(2). The district court imposed the 

maximum terms. After serving his 10-year prison sentence, Moore 

violated his conditions of supervised release, and the district court 

1 For the balance of my dissent, I will use the term “principal opinion” to refer 

to Part II.B. Because Judge Lagoa concurs “in result only” with respect to Part 

II.B., see Lagoa Op. at 1, the discussion there represents only Judge Branch’s 

view.

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2 NEWSOM, J., dissenting in part 20-11215, 20-11216

imposed a six-month revocation sentence. After serving that sixmonth sentence, Moore violated his conditions again, and the district court imposed a second revocation sentence of 18 months. 

Moore then violated his conditions yet again, and the district court 

imposed a third revocation sentence of another 18 months. All 

told, then—10 years plus six months, plus 18 months, plus 18 

months—the district court sentenced Moore to a total of 13 and a 

half years in prison, all pursuant to his original conviction. On appeal, Moore challenges (among other issues) the constitutionality 

of the final revocation sentence. 

II 

A 

It is bedrock American law that a defendant may be “constitutionally deprived of his liberty” as punishment for a crime only 

insofar as authorized by a “valid conviction.” Meachum v. Fano, 

427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976). In order to secure such a valid conviction, 

the government must first afford the defendant due process of law 

and provide him the right to a jury trial. See U.S. Const. amends. 

V, VI; see also, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). And 

once the government secures a valid conviction, a court can imprison the defendant only to the extent authorized by law. So if (as 

here) the government convicts a defendant of a crime carrying a 

statutory maximum sentence of 13 years, then a court can imprison 

him for no longer than 13 years. 

Although the parties and my colleagues discuss this principle 

by reference to the Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New 

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20-11215, 20-11216 NEWSOM, J., dissenting in part 3

Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and its progeny—and not erroneously 

so—we should be clear that the principle itself dates back much 

further. As the Supreme Court put it 40 years ago, a defendant has 

a “constitutional right to be deprived of liberty as punishment for 

criminal conduct only to the extent authorized by Congress.” 

Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 690 (1980). It is “axiomatic,” 

we said about a decade later, that a court may not impose a prison 

term “beyond that which is authorized by statute.” United States 

v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1350 n.18 (11th Cir. 1993); see also United 

States v. Masters, 978 F.2d 281, 286 (7th Cir. 1992) (explaining that 

“[c]onviction at trial” constitutionally authorizes “depriving the defendant of liberty for any term up to the maximum prescribed by 

statute”). Ultimately, this foundational rule derives from the Fifth 

and Sixth Amendments and the common-law history out of which 

they arose. See U.S. Const. amends. V, VI; see also Magna Carta 

ch. 29 (1215); Thomas Cooley, The General Principles of Constitutional Law in the United States of America 224 (1880). 

In Apprendi, the Supreme Court applied this principle in a 

new context and gave it fuller meaning. Apprendi concerned a legislative scheme that explicitly authorized a judge—as opposed to a 

jury—to increase a defendant’s maximum sentence upon making 

additional findings by a mere preponderance of the evidence—as 

opposed to beyond a reasonable doubt. 530 U.S. at 468–69. The 

Court held that even that scheme was unconstitutional. Id. at 497. 

Nothing but a conviction supported by a finding of guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt or a valid plea, the Court held, can “increase[] the 

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4 NEWSOM, J., dissenting in part 20-11215, 20-11216

penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum.” 

Id. at 490. Importantly, the Court later clarified that for constitutional purposes the “statutory maximum” that a judge can’t exceed, even with express legislative sanction, is “the maximum sentence [he] may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in 

the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.” Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004) (emphasis in original). Thus, even 

when authorized by the legislature, a judge alone cannot effect any 

increase in the defendant’s maximum penalty. Once the conviction 

is in, the maximum penalty is fixed, and nothing but a new, valid 

conviction can extend it.

B 

In the federal system, a court may, pursuant to a single conviction, impose a two-part sentence: (1) a prison term, followed by 

(2) a term of supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a); Mont v. 

United States, 139 S. Ct. 1826, 1834 (2019). If, during the supervised-release term, a defendant violates his conditions of release, 

the court can, through an abbreviated procedure, “revoke” the release and “require the defendant to serve in prison all or part of the 

term of supervised release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Such a “revocation sentence” converts all or part of the defendant’s supervisedrelease term into a prison term. 

The constitutionality of revocation sentences has recently 

generated a split at the Supreme Court. One side holds that revocation sentences can be—and routinely are—unconstitutional, 

even when imposed within the bounds authorized by Congress. 

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20-11215, 20-11216 NEWSOM, J., dissenting in part 5

Under this view, represented by Justice Gorsuch’s four-Justice plurality opinion in United States v. Haymond, a valid conviction can 

support the defendant’s incarceration for the maximum original 

prison term, but no longer. See 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2378 (2019) (plurality op.). On this account, any revocation sentence beyond that 

maximum original prison term—again, even one within the terms 

authorized by Congress for the original conviction—constitutes a 

“new punishment” requiring full due-process and jury-trial rights. 

Id. So, to use the particulars of this case as an example, if a federal 

statute authorizes a maximum prison term of 10 years plus a maximum supervised-release term of three years, the maximum total 

constitutional prison term is 10 years, not 13. See id.

The other side of the split holds that revocation sentences 

are generally constitutional, so long as they don’t cause the total 

sentence to exceed the maximum prison term plus the maximum 

supervised-release term. On this view—which, I’ll say, seems right 

to me—although a revocation of supervised release may look like 

a new punishment, it was actually already baked into the original 

sentence. See Mont, 139 S. Ct. at 1834 (“Supervised release is a 

form of punishment that Congress prescribes along with a term of 

imprisonment as part of the same sentence.”); see also Johnson v. 

United States, 529 U.S. 694, 701 (2000). As Justice Alito put it in 

Haymond, “[w]hen a jury finds a federal defendant guilty of violating a particular criminal statute, the maximum period of confinement authorized is the maximum term of imprisonment plus the 

maximum term of supervised release.” 139 S. Ct. at 2391 (Alito, J., 

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6 NEWSOM, J., dissenting in part 20-11215, 20-11216

dissenting) (emphasis added). Thus, he explained, “a defendant 

sentenced to x years of imprisonment followed by y years of supervised release is really sentenced to a maximum punishment of x + 

y years of confinement, with the proviso that any time beyond x 

will be excused if the defendants abides by the terms of supervised 

release.” Id. at 2390. So, to carry the example forward, under a 

federal statute that authorizes a maximum prison term of 10 years 

and a maximum supervised-release term of three years, the defendant’s total maximum prison term is 13 years, not 10. Notably, although Justice Alito wrote in Haymond on behalf of four dissenters, 

Justice Breyer’s separate concurring opinion expressed agreement 

with Justice Alito’s assessment of how total sentence maximums 

should be computed. See id. at 2385 (Breyer, J., concurring). 

Although I read Justice Breyer’s opinion to mean that Justice 

Alito’s analysis of revocation sentences represented a majority 

view, we don’t have to resolve the disagreement to decide this case. 

It is common ground—at least at the Supreme Court—that a judge 

can’t impose a total prison term exceeding the maximum prison 

term plus the maximum supervised-release term. See Haymond,

139 S. Ct. at 2378 (plurality op.), 2390 (Alito, J., dissenting). Some 

of the Justices would have further curtailed a court’s sentencing 

power, but all seemed to agree that a sentence cannot exceed the 

combined terms of imprisonment and supervised release. 

C 

The Court here defies this common ground—and, in so doing, carries us beyond where any Justice appears prepared to go. 

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20-11215, 20-11216 NEWSOM, J., dissenting in part 7

The government lawfully convicted Anthony Moore under 26 

U.S.C. § 5861(d). As the principal opinion acknowledges, that statute authorized a maximum prison term of 10 years plus a maximum supervised-release term of three years. See Branch Op. at 4; 

26 U.S.C. § 5871; 18 U.S.C. §§ 3559(a)(3), 3583(b)(2). Accordingly, 

setting aside the dispute that divided the Justices in Haymond, 

Moore’s maximum total prison term was, at the very most, 13 

years. Indeed, even the government conceded at oral argument in 

this case that “the statutory maximum for [Moore’s] underlying 

firearm offense” was 13 years. See Oral Arg. at 21:30–55.

And yet, pursuant to a single § 5681(d) conviction, the district court sentenced Moore to 13 and a half years in prison. It did 

so by imposing the following four consecutive sentences: (1) 10 

years on his original sentence; (2) six months for his first violation 

of supervised release; (3) 18 months for his second violation of supervised release; and (4) 18 months for his third violation of supervised release. Those four sentences totaled 13 and a half years—six 

months beyond the highest possible aggregate term of total imprisonment. The district court didn’t afford Moore due process or the 

right to a jury trial before imposing the fourth sentence, nor did the 

government secure a new conviction. Therefore, to the extent that 

it caused Moore’s total term of imprisonment to exceed 13 years, 

the fourth sentence was unconstitutional. It imposed a penalty beyond “the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the 

basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the 

defendant,” Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303, and therefore violated 

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8 NEWSOM, J., dissenting in part 20-11215, 20-11216

Moore’s “constitutional right to be deprived of liberty as punishment for criminal conduct only to the extent authorized by Congress,” Whalen, 445 U.S. at 690.

To be sure, we review here only for plain error. See Branch 

Op. at 13–14; Lagoa Op. at 1. But just as surely, the district court’s 

error was “plain” inasmuch as it violated foundational American 

law, embodied (most recently, but hardly exclusively) in Apprendi

and its progeny. The district court’s error also affected Moore’s 

substantial rights by subjecting him to an additional six months in 

prison, and it undermined the “fairness, integrity, or public reputation” of judicial proceedings by causing an “unnecessary deprivation of liberty.” Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897, 

1908 (2018); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(b). 

D 

The principal opinion rejects this analysis and upholds 

Moore’s six-months-too-long sentence because it says that we held 

in a past case that “Apprendi does not apply to revocation proceedings.” See Branch Op. at 17. But in the case on which the principal 

opinion relies, United States v. R. Scott Cunningham, 607 F.3d 1264 

(11th Cir. 2010), we had no reason to contemplate, let alone decide, 

the question before us today: whether a revocation sentence can 

be used to extend a prisoner’s total imprisonment beyond his combined statutory maximums. The government in Cunningham secured a conviction authorizing—as here—a maximum prison term 

of 10 years plus a maximum supervised-release term of three years. 

See id. at 1265–66; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1957, 3559(a)(3), 3583(b)(2). 

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20-11215, 20-11216 NEWSOM, J., dissenting in part 9

Pursuant to that conviction, the district court sentenced the defendant to two years in prison plus three years of supervised release. Cunningham, 607 F.3d. at 1266. After the defendant violated 

the conditions of his supervised release, the court imposed a fourmonth revocation sentence, bringing his total prison term to two 

years and four months, well within the combined statutory maximum of 13 years. Id. The defendant challenged his revocation sentence on a theory that outflanked even Justice Gorsuch’s Haymond 

plurality. Any sentence based on the revocation of supervised release, the defendant argued, constituted new punishment requiring 

full due-process and jury-trial rights. Id. at 1266. We (sensibly) rejected that sweeping argument and adhered to the conventional 

view of supervised release that Justice Alito would later embrace in 

Haymond. See id. at 1268. 

But again, Moore doesn’t ask us to hold that all revocation 

sentences are unconstitutional. Rather, he accepts the conventional, less defendant-friendly view that revocation sentences are 

generally constitutional, and argues only that they can’t cause a defendant’s total prison time to exceed the combined maximum 

terms of imprisonment and supervised release. The Cunningham

panel never even adverted to (or seemingly even imagined) the 

possibility of extending a defendant’s total sentence beyond the 

combined statutory maximums, and so its decision doesn’t control 

here. See, e.g., Crocker v. Beatty, 995 F.3d 1232, 1255 (11th Cir. 

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10 NEWSOM, J., dissenting in part 20-11215, 20-11216

2021) (Newsom, J., concurring) (“[A] decision doesn’t answer questions that aren’t asked.”).2

Tellingly, when asked point blank at oral argument for examples of other cases in which courts had blessed sentences exceeding the combined maximum terms of imprisonment and supervised release, the government could muster only one—an unpublished, two-paragraph, out-of-circuit case that was decided 

based on an Anders brief and over a dissent. See United States v. 

Two Crow, 781 F. App’x 562 (8th Cir. 2019). For its part, the principal opinion cites exactly none. And with good reason: Overwhelmingly—and to their great credit—district court judges have 

known not to impose revocation sentences that cause a defendant’s 

2 The principal opinion doubles down on Cunningham by invoking the unremarkable proposition that one three-judge panel can’t overrule another’s decision just because the parties before it make new arguments. See Branch Op. 

at 20–21. But the principal opinion misses the point. As I hope I’ve made clear, 

I’m not out to overrule Cunningham, which I think was rightly decided. I’m 

just saying that today’s case presents an altogether new and different question—one that wasn’t, and couldn’t have been, presented in Cunningham: 

whether a revocation sentence can be used to extend a prisoner’s total imprisonment beyond his combined statutory maximums. Had the Cunningham

panel reached out beyond the four corners of its case to answer the question

presented in this one—by (oddly) proclaiming that the district court there 

could have sentenced the defendant not only to two years and four months, 

but also to more than 13 years—its proclamation would have constituted the 

most aggressive form of non-binding dicta. See Lebron v. Sec’y of Fla. Dep’t 

of Child. & Fams., 772 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2014). 

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20-11215, 20-11216 NEWSOM, J., dissenting in part 11

total prison time to exceed the aggregate maximum prison and supervised-release terms. Moore’s sentence in this case was aberrant 

in the extreme—and unlawful. 

III 

The district court deprived Anthony Moore of his liberty for 

longer than was authorized by his combined maximum terms of 

imprisonment and supervised release. Because that was lawless, I 

would have vacated the final six months of Moore’s sentence. I 

respectfully dissent from the Court’s refusal to do so.

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