The Newport Papers 

Twelfth in the Series 

What Color Helmet? 

Myron H. NordQuist 

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND 

Naval War College 

Newport, Rhode Island 

Center for Naval Warfare Studies 

Newport Paper Number Twelve 

August 1997 

The Newport Papers are extended research projects that the editor, the Dean of 

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interest to policy makers, scholars, and analysts and judge worthy of extensive, selective 

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auspices of the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies. 

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948. E-mail: press@usnwc.edu 

President, Naval War College 

Rear Admiral J.R. Stark, 

U.S. Navy 

Dean of Naval Warfare Studies 

Professor Robert S. Wood 

Naval War College Press 

Editor: Professor Thomas B. Grassey 

Managing Editor: Pelham G. Boyer 

Associated Editor: Patricia A. Goodrich 

Production 

Publication: Gina Vieira 

Cover: Joan Y. Mikosh-Johnson 

Patricia A. Goodrich, associate editor of the Naval War College Press, performed the 

principal editing and proofreading of Newport Paper Number Twelve. 

§ 

Printed in the United States of America 
Reforming Security Council Peacekeeping Mandates 

Myron H. Nordquist 
Second printing January 1999 
Contents 

Foreword .... 

Acknowledgments 

Introduction . . . 

l UN Charter and North Atlantic Treaty 

Birth of Peacekeeping . . . . . . . 

North Atlantic Treaty . . .. . . . 

UN Secretariat and Military Staff Committee 

Uniting for Peace Resolution 

][][ Peacekeeping Practice. . . . . . 

][][K Context for Reforming Peacekeeping Mandates 

Traditional Peacekeeping Operations . . . . 

T he UN and the Evolving European Security Structure . 

Peacekeeping Terminology .. 

Nato Peacekeeping Mandates. 

Principles ... . . . . 

Operating Requirements 

][V Several Mixed Peacekeeping Scenarios 

V Reforming Security Council Peacekeeping Mandates 

Vi Conclusion 

Notes 

Glossary 

About the Author . 

Index of Newport Papers 

vii 

viii 

ix 

1 

6 

9 

11 

13 

15 

35 

35 

37 

42 

46 

46 

47 

51 

65 

69 

71 

73 

75 

77 
Foreword 

I am delighted to introduce this important and timely paper written by a 

scholar with distinguished credentials and strong connections to the military 

and the Naval War College. Dr. Nordquist holds a doctorate in juridical science 

from the University of Virginia and earned a diploma in international law at 

Cambridge, where he attended Grey's Inn of Court. After active duty in the 

us. Marines, including service in Vietnam, he joined the State Department as 

an attorney and legislative counsel. Leaving government service for several years 

of private practice, he later returned to become Deputy General Counsel of 

the US. Air Force, serving as Acting General Counsel for six months in 1993. 

Since August of that year he has been a professor oflaw at the US. Air Force 

Academy. In 1995-96 he was the Charles H. Stockton Professor ofInternational 

Law at the Naval War College. It was in that academic year that he produced 

this Newport Paper. 

Dr. Nordquist's study reviews past peacekeeping operations and the aspects 

of the Charter of the United Nations that govern the use of force. He proposes 

that. given the end of the Cold War, distinctions in the UN Charter framework 

between traditional peacekeeping and enforcement actions can and ought to be 

reflected in future Security Co uncil peacekeeping mandates. He also offers 

realistic peace-enforcement scenarios illustrating how updated mandates might 

operate. 

This overview of the Charter and the challenges of modern peace operations 

provides a better understanding of the legal and inst itutional nature of the 

Security Council. of why existing peacekeeping mandates now lack consistency, 

and of the importance of dealing with these issues. 

Dr. Nordquist's work exemplifies the purposes of our Newport Papers 

senes-it is current, insightful and relevant . I commend it to those policy makers 

who wil shape the peace operations of the future as well as the milit ary 

commanders and their staffs who will carry them out . 

Rear Admiral, US. Navy 

President, Naval War College 
Acknowledgments 

The United States Air Force Institute for National Security Studies provided 

the grant for most of the original research that supported this study, and it is 

with appreciation that I acknowledge that contribution. The writing was largely 

accomplished while the author was in residence at the Naval War College, where 

he held the Charles H. Stockton Chair of International Law during the 

1995-1996 term. 
Introduction 

This study is divided into five chapters. The first focuses on the legal 

framework for peacekeeping and enforcement operations under the United 

Nations Charter and the North Atlantic Treaty. The general approach here is 

an article-by-article review of the pertinent texts, without delving into nuances 

of meaning or legislative history. An occasional prescriptive comment will be 

made in relevant context, but by and large the fundamental idea is that an 

overview of the Charter's principles and rules will facilitate a better understanding of the legal and institutional framework in which the Security Council 

issues peacekeeping mandates. As will be shown, much of the confusion over 

current peacekeeping practice lies in inadequately considered departures from 

what States actually agreed to do in the United Nations and Nato. Chapter II 

is a brief summary of the forty peacekeeping operations in which the United 

Nations engaged from June 1948 through the end of 1995. Again, to foster a 

reform-minded policy outlook, only a skeletal description of the mandate for 

each UN peacekeeping operation is given. Marshaling such an outline of 

peacekeeping operations is instructive in that even the bare recitation of this 

fifty years of practice reveals a remarkable range of exper iences. It is easy to 

discern why Security Council mandates on peacekeeping lack consistency. 

Chapter III of this study contains an analysis of UN peacekeeping practice and 

of key points that ought to be dealt with in reformulating traditional peacekeeping and enforcement actions under Security Council mandates. In Chapter IV, 

several scenarios are presented to illustrate how properly mandated peacekeeping and enforcement operations might work in the post-Cold War era. To 

emphasize the critical distinctions between different use of force mandates and 

the cor responding legal status of the individuals involved, the illustrations refer 

to white, blue, and green helmet participants. Chapter V of this study proposes 

a few suggestions to improve Security Council mandates for "mixed" traditional 

peacekeeping and enforcement actions. 

A threshold comment is needed for clarification about the use of the term 

"peacekeeping" in this study W hen the term appears alone, it refers to the great 

variety of activities that have been mandated and therefore formally designated 

as "peacekeeping" operations. As will be explained, peacekeeping is a generic 

label that, inter alia, obscures an important legal distinction between traditional 

peacekeeping and enforcement actions. Fuzzy definitions can be useful for 

shorthand communication, but they can also contribute to fuzzy thinking. From 
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a legal perspective, it is important to know what is meant by the term 

"peacekeeping." However, efforts to use more precise words with better defined 

meanings may also pose problems. For instance, the term "peace enforcement" 

is now heard and often seen in the literature. While this is an understandable 

effort to distinguish operations based on consent from those that are not, the 

term is not taken from the Charter, is ill-defmed in actual practice, and is logically 

inconsistent as a phrase. The approach prefer red in this study is to use words 

taken from the text of the Charter or with an agreed meaning in State practice. 

However, bowing to overwhelming usage, an exception to this preference for 

precise language is made in the case of the term "peacekeeping." Accordingly, 

the term is used in this study generically to cover the entire spectrum of activities 

ranging from traditional peacekeeping to enforcement actions. Finally, a cut-off 

date is necessary for publication purposes. Unless otherwise indicated, the date 

used for this study is 31 December 1 995 . 
I 

UN Charter and North Atlantic Treaty 

�HE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS entered into force on 24 

Jl October 1945. Amendments to Articles 23 and 27 of the Charter were 

adopted by the General Assembly and came into force on 31 August 1965. The 

only other Charter amendments-to Article 61 (enlarging the Economic and 

Social Council) and to Article 109 (relating to a review of the Charter)-are 

not germane to this study 

The amendment to Article 23 enlarges the membership of the Security 

Council from eleven to fifteen. The amended Article 27 provides that decisions 

of the Security Council on procedural matters shal be made by an affirmative 

vote of nine Members (formerly seven). Decisions of the Security Council on 

al other matters require an afErmative vote of nine Members, including the 

concurring votes (which may be abstentions) of the five Permanent Members. 

Chapter I of the Charter consists of two articles outlining the purposes of 

the United Nations. Article 1 (1) reads: "To maintain international peace and 

security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention 

and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression 

or other breaches of the peace .... " Paragraph 21ists developing friendly relations 

among nations based on, inter alia, self-determination of peoples, while paragraph 4 identifies the United Nations as a center for harmonizing the actions 

of nations in the attainment of these ends. 

A threshold point is that the United Nations is a compact between sovereign 

States that agree to take collective action to attain international peace and 

security. There is no residual clause that places unallocated power in the hands 

of "the people" as does Amendment X of the U.S. Constitution. Agreement 
The Newport Papers 

between sovereign States is the legal glue of the UN Charter. That is all there 

is; and absent agreement, there is no legal basis for action. It follows that the 

rules regarding what States mayor may not do ultimately must be found within 

the text of the UN Charter that embodies their agreement. Subsequent practice 

that is consistent with the rights and obligations expressed in the Charter may 

be accepted by States as part of the Charter legal regime. But if binding legal 

obligations are inferred from State practice, such acts of acceptance must be 

unmistakable. Implied legal obligations are not lightly imposed on sovereign 

States. Their agreement to be bound must be real, and this is usually clearer 

where expressed in writing, e.g., in treaties rather than inferred from State 

practice, e.g., customary law. 

Article 2 reflects the fundamental premise that sovereign States are the 

building blocks of the UN Charter by providing that the Organization is "based 

on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members." The heart of the 

Charter is found in Article 2(4) that requires Members to refrain from the threat 

or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 

State. Paragraph 7 of Article 2 is especially germane for peacekeeping operations 

in that it prohibits the United Nations from inter vening in "matters which 

are essentially within the domestic jur isdiction of any state .... " The fact 

that the Secur ity Council declares a particular situation, as it did in the 1993 

peacekeeping intervention in Haiti, to be a "threat to inter national peace and 

security" mayor may not satisfY all Charter legal requirements. This issue is of 

importance to future Security Council mandates regarding peacekeeping and 

will be discussed later in this study. At this stage, note that a Security Council 

mandate may meet the procedural, but not the substantive, requirements of the 

Charter. Article 2(7) finishes by providing that "this pr inciple shall not prejudice 

the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII." 

The distinction between traditional peacekeeping and enforcement actions is a 

critical part of this study. Traditional peacekeeping activities are based on consent. 

Enforcement measures, including enforcement actions, by contrast, are the opposite; 

that is, they are nonconsensual or coercive in nature. The Secretariat of the United 

Nations as an institution is not well-constituted, either legally or practically, to 

engage in the coercive use of military force. This is evidenced by the fact that the 

Secretary-General and his staf are international civil servants, not military professionals. It is recognized in Article 2(7) of the Charter that it may be necessary to 

intervene in the domestic afairs of a State to carry out enforcement measures 

authorized by the Security Council. Such intervention is an agreed upon role for 

sovereign States, acting collectively, to undertake as provided in the Charter. 

However, as we shal see, peacekeeping practice evolved to fil a gap left in the 

2 
What Color Helmet? 

Charter between peaceful resolution of disputes and collective enforcement 

measures. It was practice, not Charter mandate, that revealed the need for UN 

forces to play a neutral, third-party military role. Indeed, this role for the 

Secretariat was not anticipated at all in the Charter. 

The principal problem with the way the Charter was written with respect 

to security and use of force issues was that the Permanent Members of the 

Security Council did not cooperate as fully as expected due to the Cold War. 

With the breakup of the Soviet bloc, the question now is whether the United 

Nations can function, more or less, as originally expected. The thesis developed 

in this study is that, while perfection is impossible, the letter and spirit of the 

UN Charter now can, and should, be followed more faithfully in peacekeeping 

activities. The Secretary-General ought to remain in charge of traditional 

peacekeeping operations. At the same time, the Secretary-General should not 

have "command and control" of operations to implement military enforcement 

measures. The Security Council should, instead, mandate enforcement action 

leadership either to an appropriate Chapter VIIJ regional collective security 

organization or to a Chapter VII coalition command constituted for the purpose 

by contributing Members. In mixed "war-peace" peacekeeping operations, 

whatever enforcement entity is mandated must, as a practical matter , cooperate 

closely with the Secretary-General, who is the leader of traditional peacekeeping 

efforts. But enforcement entities should report directly to the Security Council 

and future Security Council mandates should be crystal clear on this point. 

Equally, the Secretary-General and his staff should never be mandated to engage 

in enforcement. His proper and legal role is to "keep peace," not to "wage war." 

In Chapter II of the Charter, Members are defined as "states," and Article 5 

provides for the suspension of membership for States against whom preventive 

or enforcement action has been authorized by the Security Council. Chapter 

1II establishes, inter alia, the General Assembly, Security Council, and Secretariat 

as principal organs of the United Nations. This chapter also authorizes the 

establishment of necessary UN subsidiary organs. 

Chapter IV describes the functions and powers of the General Assembly. Any 

matter may be discussed in the General Assembly, including international peace 

and security. Except as provided in Article 12, it may make recommendations 

to Members or to the Security Council. But questions on what action is 

necessary must be referred to the Security Council. Article 12 provides that, 

while the Security Council is exercising its functions with regard to any dispute 

or situation, the General Assembly shall make no recommendation with regard 

to that dispute or situation unless requested by the Security Council. Otherwise, 

the General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment 

3 
The Newport Papers 

of any situation. This chapter also empowers the General Assembly to apportion 

the expenses to be borne by Members. 

Article 18 grants each Member of the General Assembly one vote. Decisions 

on "important" questions are to be made by a two-thirds majority. Such 

questions include recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security. 

Chapter V lays out the composition, powers, and functions of the Security 

Council. China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States are 

the five Permanent Members. The General Assembly elects ten other members 

for two-year terms. Under Article 24, the Security Council is given the 

"primary" responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and secur ity. 

Members specifically agree that the Security Council acts on their behalf in 

carrying out its duties. Moreover, Members expressly agree, in Article 25, to 

accept and carry out Security Council decisions. This latter undertaking is a 

binding legal duty by all Members to obey properly rendered decisions of the 

Security Council. 

Each Member of the Security Council has one vote. Decisions on procedural 

matters require an affirmative vote of nine Members. Al other matters, i.e., 

substantive matters, require an affirmative vote of nine Members, including the 

concurring votes of the Permanent Members. In this regard, the long-standing 

practice of the United Nations is that an abstention by a Permanent Member 

does not constitute a veto. The Security Council may invite Members (or even 

non-Members) who are not on the Security Council to participate, without 

voting, in discussions of their disputes or where their interests are specially 

affected. 

Chapter VI is titled "Pacific Settlement of Disputes." So-called Article 33 

disputes are those "likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace 

and security." Parties to these disputes are first to resort to peaceful means of 

their own choice. The Security Council may investigate to determine whether 

the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance 

of international peace and secur ity. Article 35 empowers any Member to bring 

any such dispute or situation to the attention of the Security Council or the 

General Assembly. Article 36 provides that the Secur ity Council may recommend appropr iate procedures or methods to the parties whereby peaceful 

settlement of Article 33 disputes may be achieved. The thrust of Chapter VI is 

for voluntary resolution of disputes by the parties. The parties are obligated, in 

the event that the hoped-for peaceful means are unsuccessful, to refer the dispute 

to the Security Council. The Security Council may recommend actual terms 

of settlement in such cases, especialy when requested by the parties. 

4 
What Color Helmet? 

If the Security Council determines the existence of any threat to the peace, 

hreach of the peace, or act of aggression, it may take actions in accordance with 

Chapter VII to maintain or restore international peace and secur ity. To prevent 

aggravation of the situation, Article 40 empowers the Security Council to cal 

upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it 

deems necessary or desirable. The Security Council may next decide, under 

Article 41, on measures by Members that do not involve the use of armed force. 

These may include interruption of economic relations and means of communication or the severance of diplomatic relations. If the Security Council fmds 

Article 41 measures inadequate, it may authorize an escalation, pursuant to 

Article 42, to such "action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to 

maintain or restore international peace and security." Article 42 actions may 

include blockade and other military operations by Members' forces. Note here 

that the Charter mentions only "Members' forces" in connection with Chapter 

VII enforcement measures. There is no runt here or, for that matter, any where in 

the Charter of standby military forces to serve under the command of the 

Secretary-General. Instead, Article 43 imposes an affirmative obligation on 

Members to contribute armed forces, assistance, and facilities at the call of the 

Security Council. According to the Charter text, these contributions were 

supposed to be made available in accordance with special agreements entered 

into for this purpose. The agreements were to cover the number and type of 

forces, readiness, and location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance. The 

agreements between the Secur ity Council and Members, or groups of Members, 

were to be subject to ratification by the signatory States in accordance with 

their respective constitutional processes. As of this wr iting, no such agreements 

have been concluded as envisioned in the Charter. 

Article 45 contemplates Members holding "immediately available national 

air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action." Plans to use 

armed force under UN authorization were to be made with the assistance of the 

Military Staff Committee. Pursuant to Article 47, the Military Staff Committee is 

made up exclusively of representatives from the five Permanent Members. Its stated 

purpose in the Charter is "to advise and assist the Security Council on al questions 

relating to the Security Council's military requirements .... " In that capacity, the 

Military Staf Committee is supposed to be responsible for the strategic direction 

of any armed forces acting under the Security Council. In fact, the Military Staff 

Committee has never functioned as intended. Permanent Five representatives to 

the Committee do meet regularly at UN Headquarters, but meetings are 

perfunctory and substantively meaningless. 

5 
The Newport Papers 

Article 48 specifically requires all Members to carry out the actions decided 

by the Security Council under Chapter VII. These actions may be done directly 

or, going beyond the more general obligations contained in Article 25, through 

international agencies of which they are members. The obligatory nature of 

Article 48 with respect to enforcement actions makes this provision one of the 

most legally significant provisions in the Charter. For example, Member States 

are obligated to pursue policies in the World Bank that are consistent with 

Security Council decisions with respect to States against whom Security 

Council enforcement actions are underway. 

But the most important principle pertaining to the use of force in the UN 

Charter is found in Article 51, the last article in Chapter VII. The first sentence 

of Article 51 reads: 

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual 

or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of 

the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. 

Members are still obliged to inform the Security Council immediately of 

the measures they exercise in their self-defense. And, the use of Article 51 

self-defense measures do es not relieve the Security Council of its obligations 

to take necessary actions to maintain or restore international peace and secur ity. 

Experts debate whether Article 51 creates an independent right of self-defense 

or simply recognizes that such a right exists under customary law. Perhaps it 

does both, although each legal theory carries different legal nuances. The text 

in the Charter imposes a condition precedent of an "armed attack" (at least in 

the English translation) and a condition subsequent of "until" the Security 

Council acts, presumably in an effective manner. These specific limitations do not 

exist in pre-Charter customary international law. In fact, the view that customary law rights (and duties) of self-defense coexist with Article 51 gives expanded 

scope to use of force by States. W hile the temptation is great to delve more into 

the debate about what is the true meaning of self-defense, this urge must be 

resisted due to the scope of this study. The reader is referred, instead, to other 

sources that are fo cused solely on the topic of self-defense and Article 51.1 

Birth of Peacekeeping 

The ChapterVII enforcement measures provided in Articles 41 and 42 are 

the backbone of the Charter's collective security system. The underlying premise 

6 
What Color Helmet? 

in this system is that the five Permanent Members in the Security Council can 

agree sufficiently on the use of armed force that none consistently vetoes 

required actions. A correlative premise is that the Security Council may not 

mandate enforcement actions affirmatively opposed by any one of the Permanent Five. Frequently, on peacekeeping votes, a Permanent Member expresses 

neutrality in the form of an abstention. As noted above, the time-honored 

practice of the Security Council is that an abstention is not a veto. Nevertheless, 

consistent lack of enthusiasm, as has been the case with China, should not be 

dismissed as an insignificant political attitude. Any Member of the Permanent 

Five is capable of cr ippling the Security Council's effectiveness. That is the 

safeguard that Member States wanted, and therefore so provided in the Charter, 

prior to the United Nation's taking affirmative action on international peace 

and security matters. This hard-core political reality provides the central legal 

and institutional framework within which peacekeeping mandates must be 

formulated. At the same time, while the Chiefs of Staff of the Permanent Five 

also make up the Military Staff Committee that was to plan Security Council 

military activities under the Charter, there is no indication that peacekeeping 

planning will be entrusted to that committee. And, of course, there is no legal 

obligation on the part of the Security Council to use the Military Staff 

Committee as originally planned. 

The cooperation of the Permanent Five after World War II, which permitted 

the founding of the United Nations, dissipated shortly after the Charter entered 

into force. The Cold War ensued with the Soviet Union and its Eastern Bloc 

alies on one side and with the United States, France, and Great Br itain and 

their allies on the other. The Republic of China government soon no longer 

exercised sovereignty over the ter ritory of mainland China, and China's seat on 

the Security Council was eventually taken in the mid-1970s by a communist 

regime. This further handicapped cooperation among the Permanent Five and 

effective functioning of their Military Staff. The result was to cripple the 

collective security arrangements envisioned in the Charter. 

At the same time, new conflicts arose that commanded the attention of the 

United Nations. In particular, the process of decolonization unleashed ethnic 

strife and destabilized various regions. W here armed crises developed, Members 

of the United Nations felt pressured into finding ways to contain hostilities and 

to control conflicts outside the legal parameters expressly provided within the 

four corners of the Charter text. 

As peacekeeping operations were not anticipated by the Charter draftsmen, 

no descr iption of the practices is given in Charter text. At first, the Security 

Council formulated mandates tailored to the particular circumstances of each 

7 
The Newport Papers 

crisis, and peacekeeping practice "just grew," case by case, over a period of 

time. The characteristics of a peacekeeping doctrine therefore emerged 

gradually as the United Nations responded to various conflict situations in 

which the international community expected it to act in the interests of 

world peace. Most frequently, a peacekeeping activity was a UN operation 

using military personnel, not in a fighting or enforcement role but rather in 

an observer or "buffer" role. The peacekeeping forces der ived their legitimacy from the fact that the contending State parties wanted them in their 

sovereign territory and expressly agreed to their presence. They did not 

expect to fight in the first instance. 

Since the peacekeeper s were in the host State with the consent of the 

contending parties, including the host government recognized by the United 

Nations, the host Member nation was expected to cooperate with the 

peacekeeping efforts. The peacekeeper s were, accordingly, lightly armed and, in 

principle, were to engage only in their individual or unit self-defense. Use of 

force was clearly a last resort. Most importantly, these UN "blue helmets" were 

neutrals with orders to act impartially. The core idea was that the traditional 

peacekeepers were invited guests of the recognized government and were 

expected to achieve peacekeeping objectives more by moral authority than by 

force of arms. It was understood by al that UN forces would act in self-defense, 

in the personal protection sense, when resort to the use of armed force was 

truly unavoidable. But the real role of the traditional peacekeeper was keeping 

peace between consenting nations, not taking enforcement actions against 

unwilling parties. 

The term "peacekeeping" initially may have come into general use around 

1956 when the United Nations created a "Special Committee on Peace-keeping 

Operations." Typically, these peacekeeping operations involved supervision and 

maintenance of cease-fires, assistance in troop withdrawals, and provision of 

bufer zones between opposing forces. The legal mandate was always to maintain 

or restore international peace and security. The operations were also conducted 

in a political climate where the primary responsibility for success or failure lay 

with civilian personnel. 

A point to note at this stage is that the traditional peacekeeping doctrine that 

evolved through ad hoc practice was less peaceful than was envisioned in Chapter 

VI and less forceful than the doctrine that was contemplated in Chapter VII of 

the Charter. This led to the oft-cited observation of the late Secretary-General 

Dag Hammarskjold that these kinds of traditional peacekeeping activities were 

authorized under a nonexistent Chapter "six and one-half" of the UN Charter. 

8 
U'hat Color Helmet? 

North Atlantic Treaty 

The important role to be played by regional organizations in the maintenance 

of international peace and security is primarily recognized in Chapter VIII of 

the Charter. Article 52 provides that regional arrangements may deal with peace 

and secur ity issues "consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United 

Nations." Indeed, paragraph 2 of Article 52 requires Members in such agencies 

to "make every effort to achieve peaceful settlement oflocal disputes through 

such regional arrangements ... before referring them to the Security Council." 

In turn, the Security Council is to encourage pacific settlement of local disputes 

through such regional arrangements. In essence, the secur ity sy stem in the 

Charter is predicated upon action by a regional organization prior to the stage 

when the United Nations, as a global entity, must become involved. 

Article 53 provides that the Security Council may utilize regional arrangements for enforcement action taken under its authority. At the same time, this 

Chapter VIII article is quite specific in prohibiting enforcement acti on by 

regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council. A collateral 

note here is that there is no Charter prohibition to preclude Nato as a legal 

entity from being itself a party to a Charter VIII collective security arrangement. 

Indeed, this possibility could be a key for a new collective security alliance in 

Europe. Lastly, Article 54 requires that the Security Council be kept fully 

informed about the international peace and security activities of regional 

agencIes. 

The North Atlantic Treaty that charters Nato entered into force on 24 August 

1949. The parties to this agreement are: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, 

Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 

Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 

The North Atlantic Treaty text begins with a: reaffirmation of the UN Charter. 

The Parties express a resolve to "unite their efforts for collective defense and 

for the preservation of peace and security." In Article 1, the Parties pledge 

themselves to the peaceful settl ement of disputes and to refrain "from the threat 

or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United 

Nations." Article 2 dea ls with economic collaborati on and stability. Article 3 

provides that the Parties "wil maintain and develop their individual and 

collective capacity to resist armed attack." By Article 4, the Parties agree to 

consult when the "territor ial integrity, political independence or security of 

any of the Parties is threatened." Article 5, the heart of the commitment in the 

Nato alliance, reads in its entirety as follows: 

9 
The Newport Papers 

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in 

Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; 

and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of 

them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense 

recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist 

the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in 

concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including 

the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North 

Atlantic area. 

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof are to be 

immediately reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be 

terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary 

to restore and maintain international peace and security. 

Article 6 defines an Article 5 armed attack to include an armed attack on 

the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America or on the vessels 

or aircraft in this area . 

Article 7 provides that the Treaty does not affect the Members' rights and 

obligations under the UN Charter or the primary responsibility of the Security 

Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. Article 9 

establishes the Nato Council, and the remainder of the articles are largely 

procedural. 

T he collective response contemplated in the North Atlantic Treaty is predicated on an armed attack against a Party 's territory in Europe or North America. 

But, as noted at the beginning of this heading, enforcement through the regional 

arrangement scheme provided in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter is subordinate 

to the Security Council where any Permanent Five Member can veto action. 

Clearly, however, the Western Powers that formed Nato did not want to be 

under the control of an organ in which the Soviet Union held a decisive veto. 

The purpose of Nato was to defend against the Soviet bloc, and the North 

Atlantic Treaty understandably makes no mention of any relationship to the 

Security Council as a "regional arrangement" under Chapter VIII. Nato is set 

up to use armed force without Security Council author ization, and there is no 

requirement that the alliance take military enforcement action only after 

receiving authorization from the Security Council. Instead, the North Atlantic 

Treaty is expressly founded on the "collective self-defense" theory in Article 

51 of the UN Charter. Consistent with that, the Treaty simply requires 

immediate reporting to the Security Council of" al measures taken" in response 

to an armed attack. 

10 
What Color Helmet? 

No defmition of "regional ar rangement" is given in the UN Charter, and 

experts have not always agreed on Nato's status in this regard. Nothing in the 

UN Charter itself precludes Nato from assisting the Security Council in 

enforcement actions. At the same time, such a role for Nato was not envisioned 

in the North Atlantic Treaty. 

As a matter of international law, a fundamental diference exists bet ween a 

regional organization founded on the pr inciple of self-defense in Article 

51 and one founded on the collective security principles in Article 53. The latter 

entity is expressly prohibited from taking enforcement actions "without the 

authorization of the Security CounciL ... "From a US. domestic law standpoint, 

the difference is also legally significant. The US. Senate did not give its "advice 

and consent," as required by the US. Constitution, to a North Atlantic Treaty 

whereby Nato was to perform collective security duties under Security Council 

direction. Nato was to defend against armed attacks against the Parties' territory, 

aircraft, or vessels in North America or Europe. This agreement was approved 

by the US. Senate as an Article 51 self-defense organization under Chapter VII, 

not as an Article 53 collective security organization under Chapter VIII. 

UN Secretariat and Military Staff Committee 

Article 97 creates the UN Secretariat consisting of the Secretary-General and 

such staff as the Organization may require. The Security Council recommends 

a candidate for Secretary-General who is then appointed by the General 

Assembly. The Secretary-General is expressly denoted in Article 97 as the chief 

administrative officer of the United Nations. Among other powers, the Secretary-General may bring matter s which threaten peace and secur ity to the 

attention of the Security Council. Other articles emphasize that the first loyalty 

of Secretariat employees is to the United Nations and layout other details. 

As the Chief Administrative Officer of the United Nations, the SecretaryGeneral has considerable latitude in determining the size of the staff needed to 

fulfill the functions of the Secretariat. One possible reading of the lack of 

limitations in Article 97 is that the Security Council, or even the General 

Assembly, could authorize permanent UN Forces, a "standing army," to serve 

under the command of the Secretary-General . An argument can be made, for 

example, that he already recruits secur ity forces to guard UN Headquarters. The 

forces could be expanded to help "police the world." However, the power to 

create and control the staff required by the Organization for its internal security 

is far different from the power to command troops for enforcement actions in 

11 
The Newport Papers 

the name of the United Nations. This idea of a UN Guard was carefully 

considered and the concept rejected.2 

An objective reading of the Charter reveals virtually no support for the notion 

that a leading role for the Secretary-General was planned regarding the use of 

force. In truth, in Article 47, a large role for the Military Staf Committee was 

contemplated in advising the Security Council on the use of UN armed forces. 

The Committee was to consist of the Chiefs of Staf of the Permanent Members 

of the Security Council or their representatives. As such, the Military Staf 

Committee was expected to be competent to give "strategic direction" to the 

armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. In addition, to 

obtain such forces, the Security Council was to conclude agreements to make 

forces available upon its call. 

An early effort was undertaken to have the Military Staf Committee provide 

the strategic direction and other services outlined above, as provided in the 

Charter. But once again, the lack of political consensus among the Permanent 

Five Members caused these efforts to be abandoned in August 1948.3Themost 

insurmountable problem was an inability to agree on the total size of the forces 

and on the relative sizes of the contributions of the Permanent Five. A second 

basic disagreement arose over the location of the forces pending their use by 

the Security Council. The third disagreement concerned provision of assistance 

and facilities, including rights of passage, for armed forces. Essentially, this 

question revolved around the extent to which a Member would commit in 

advance for the use of its ter ritory by the armed forces operating under the 

Security Council. The fourth major disagreement was over the obligation in 

Article 29 to provide full logistical support for the forces contributed. At their 

core, al the disagreements arose from political distrust related to the East-West 

rivalry. 

The lack of support to make use of the Military Staf Committee, as provided 

in the Charter, does not inevitably lead to the conclusion that the SecretaryGeneral must, or even should, step in to play that role. Granted, the Security 

Council needs more professional advice on military matters than it has at the 

present. The creation of the Department of Peace-keeping Operations and the 

subsequent establishment of the Peace-keeping Situation Centre in April 1993 

were constructive steps in this regard. The Centre will improve the monitoring 

and information exchange between UN Headquarters and peacekeeping 

missions in the field. This should enhance the effectiveness of the United 

Nations in traditional peacekeeping operations. But there are definite limits to 

what to expect from UN officials as military planners in the enforcement arena. 

For example, no major power is yet ready to entrust sensitive intelligence 

12 
U'hat Color Helmet? 

information either to UN civil servants or to the Military Staf Committee 

composed of all Members of the Permanent Five. And, as establishment of the 

Situation Centre illustrates, real-time information is indispensable to effective 

military planning and operations. The point is that military planners assigned 

to UN Headquarters, who must gear up for intense enforcement actions, face 

not only formidable legal and institutional barriers but also inherent operational 

constraints. 

Uniting for Peace Resolution 

On 25 June 1950, the United States informed the Secretary-General that 

North Korean forces had invaded the territory of the Republic of Korea and 

requested an immediate convening of the Security Council to consider the 

situation. By coincidence, the Soviet Union was boycotting Security Council 

meetings to protest the presence of the Republic of China in the permanent 

seat designated for the representative of China. Nevertheless, the Council met 

and the Secretary-General characterized the Korean situation as a "threat to 

international peace.,,4 On 27 June, the Council adopted a resolution with a 

determination that the North Korean armed attack constituted a breach of the 

peace. The Council recommended that Members furnish assistance, under 

Article 43, to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and 

security. Subsequently, sixteen Members provided military assistance and, pursuant to another resolution adopted on 7 July 1950, authorized a unified 

command structure under United States leadership. 

The Soviet representative ended his boycott of the Security Council in 

August. By resuming his seat on the Council and regaining his nation's veto 

power, further authorization for enforcement action by the Security Council 

on the Korean issue was stopped. The General Assembly, faced with an obvious 

threat to international peace and security caused by a classic unwarranted act 

of aggression, stepped in to pass, on 3 November 1950, the "Resolution on 

Uniting for Peace . .. 5 The General Assembly noted the failure of the Security 

Council to discharge its duties, citing overuse of the veto and the non-implementation of its Article 43 calJ to arms. Section A of the Resolution provided 

"that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent 

Members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of 

international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat 

to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly 

shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate 

recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of 

13 
The Newport Papers 

a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, 

to maintain or restore international peace and security." 

The implicit legal rationale for the Uniting for Peace Resolution was that 

the General Assembly may do by recommendation under Chapter IV what the 

Security Council may do by decision under Chapter VII. This is a fundamentally 

flawed legal rationale. It is true that the Security Council is given "primary" 

and not "exclusive" responsibility in matters affecting international peace and 

secur ity. It is equally true that the General Assembly has a proper advisory role 

on such matters as outlined in the Charter. But nowhere is it contemplated in 

the Charter that the General Assembly may authorize enforcement actions on 

behalf of the United Nations. As its very name implies, that role was entrusted 

to the Security Council under the express language of the Charter. The General 

Assembly may offer opinions on such matters, and may even urge Members 

with recommendations; the Charter does not, however, constitute it as an action 

body for dealing with international peace and security. Moreover, considering 

that the Security Council did initially authorize a collective response to North 

Korea's aggression, the Korean War case provides a weak precedent for claiming 

expansive enforcement action powers being exercised by the General Assembly. 

A large role for the General Assembly in traditional peacekeeping is, of course, 

an entirely different matter. W hen done properly, they are under taken with the 

consent of the sovereign States impacted. Suffice to note here that, hopefully, 

the General Assembly will never again have to ftIl a void caused by the 

unwillingness of the Security Council to meet its enforcement action responsibilities under the Char ter. 

14 
II 

Peacekee ping Practice 

As NOTED AT THE OUTSET of this study, the term "peacekeeping" does 

not appear in the UN Charter, and there is no universal agreement about 

the precise content of its doctrine. However, over time, certain characteristics 

of UN peacekeeping operations emerged in practice. The most notable aspect 

is that traditional peaceke eping operations were conducted with the agreement 

or consent of the parties to the conflict. This was true whether the peacekeepers 

were deployed under the direct command and control of the UN SecretaryGeneral or under Member States operating with delegated authority from the 

Security Council. Military operations undertaken by UN-authorized forces in 

either case might have been, for example, to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach 

a political settlement. In such an instance, the consent of the disputants is 

important not only for the safety of the peacekeepers but also as positive 

evidence that the contending parties are sincere about concluding a lasting 

peace. The contending parties typically must agree upon many details of the 

deployment, including the nationality of the troops in the peacekeeping military 

forces. 

Another key characteristic, in addition to host State agreement or warring 

factions' consent, is that the traditional peacekeeper was to maintain strict 

impartiality. A fundamental Charter principle, clearly expressed in Article 2(7), 

is the rule of nonintervention in the domestic affairs of any State. Absent 

consent by the legitimate governme nt, UN traditional peacekeeping operations are not legally empowered to interfere in the internal affairs of Member 

States. The traditional peacekeepers' mandate is suspect if the mission cannot 
The Newport Papers 

be executed on the basis of the good faith consent and reliable cooperation of 

the contenders in the conflict. To stay within the terms of the Charter, traditional 

UN peacekeepers are not to use armed force against one domestic faction in 

favor of another. The neutrality of the UN forces is lost when they take sides. 

An additional consequence of taking sides is the loss of moral authority, an 

aspect critical to the maintenance of the lon g-term credibility and effectiveness 

of UN forces. 

A third important element is that a traditional peacekeeper is not to resort to 

the use oj force except in strictly construed instances of individual or unit 

self-defense. Armed conflict is to be avoided in the deployment strategy and in 

the mind-set of the UN peacekeepers. The troops are not encouraged to engage 

in armed conflict, because they thereby become swept up in the conflict. Use 

of force by UN peac ekeepers only adds fuel to the fIre they are trying to help 

extinguish. But when peacekeepers do use force affirmatively, they must expect 

to be judged by the customary laws of armed conflict. Military troops who 

voluntarily engage in combat cannot have it both ways. UN traditional 

peacekeepers deserve special immunity and treatment as neutrals or "experts 

on mission" only when they protect themselves or noncombatants entrusted to 

their protection .

6 But if they resort to the non-self-defense use of force, i.e. , 

engage in enforcement actions, they must r ightly expect to be treated as 

combatants by their adversaries, against whom they may be employing deadly 

force. Combatant activities are inextricably linked to combatant legal status for 

the individual military participant, including treatment as a prisoner of war if 

captured. To avoid this, i. e., to be entitled to be treated as, e.g. , "experts on 

mission" as distinguished from " combatants," enforcement action mandates 

should not be given to traditional peacekeeping operations. Likewise , 

peacekeeping labels should not be attached to enforcement action operations. 

Enforcement actions should carry enforcement legal consequences, even if 

labeled " peace enforcement" or "peace implementation," to broaden public 

app eal. 

Throughout history, responsible nations have made commendable efforts to 

gain universal acceptance of conventional and customary rules for armed 

conflict that foster clarity between friend and fo e. I ndividual soldiers, who se 

lives are on the line, cannot be left in doubt about either their own status or 

the status of their enemy. Political leaders, whether at the United Nations or in 

Member States, should avoid policies or decisions that leave deliberate doubt 

in an armed conflict on the critical question of whether individual troops are 

noncombatants, combatants , or neutrals. 

16 
What Color Helmet? 

Part of this study is directed toward reducing confusion over mandates in 

UN or Nato-led peacekeeping operations. Perfect clarity in military operations 

is a goal that is seldom achieved, even in the classic warfare settings such as were 

the norm in World War II. However, it is painfully evident that vague rules of 

engagement are being applied in mixed "war-peace" settings, all grouped under 

the broad-brush rubric of peacekeeping. The lines between traditional 

peacekeeping and genuine enforcement actions are being blurred, both consciously and unconsciously. Whatever the reasons for this development, a 

pressing need exists for a clearer consensus among UN Members on a military 

doctr ine for peacekeeping operations and on the Security Council's confer ring 

mandates consisten t with such doctr ine. The place to start is in reforming 

Security Council peacekeeping mandates by drawing bright lines between 

traditional peacekeeping operations and enforc ement actions. This app roach is, 

in fact, what was envisioned in the UN Charter. O nce that pr inciple is 

understood and accepted, it can be demonstrated how "mixed" operations ought 

to be conducted. A modest effort to illustrate this idea is given in several scenarios 

in Chapter IV of this study. 

Fifty years after the founding of the United Nations, the fundamental legal 

and institutional arrangements in the Charter for dealing with international 

peace and secur ity issues are still workable. The political premise is still valid 

that the United Nations ought not to venture into the realm of armed conflict 

in the face of affirmative opposition from any of the five powerful nations that 

sit permanently on the Security Council. Despite the economic strength of 

nations such as Germany and Japan , the rationale in the Charter for entrusting 

the Security Council, as presently constituted, with UN multilateral use-of-force 

decisions, remains basically valid. In the ser ious realm of UN use of force, it is 

prudent to try to make better that which is known to work than to experiment 

with unknowns. This is not to suggest that wealthy States cannot play a leading 

role in p eacekeeping. Military ventures are expensive operations, as the United 

Nations has come to recognize. If wealthy nations want to pay disproportionately for peacekeeping o perations, creative means should be found to permit 

them to have political clout on peacekeeping issues that are commensurate with 

their additional financial contr ibutions. Absent such an unantiCipated infusion 

of funds, the United Nations cannot afford to maintain peaceke eping activities 

at the level it has in the past. It cannot afford to do so not only because its legal 

basis to do so is questionable, but also because it will exhaust its funds for other 

purposes if it does. 

Ambitious p eacekeeping experience since the end of the Cold War has 

provided UN Members with poignant lessons about the high cost of military 

1 7 
The Newport Papers 

operations. The Security Council has the clear legal duty under the Charter to 

monitor peace-threatening situations and to authorize collective intervention 

by armed force as a last resort. But, absent disproportionate financial commitments such as the United State s made to the Secur ity Council for Haiti, 

Members volunteer military personnel for peacekeeping operations and the 

General Assembly authorizes payment for them. This latter action is based on 

the assumption that the United Nations can raise th e money to pay for very 

expensive UN peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping decisions by the General 

Assembly must take into account its finite resources and the fact that the United 

Nations does some things better than other things. Money devoted to expensive 

military ventures that it does not do particularly well may take away resources 

from activities that it does do well. Moreover, unlike military operations, the 

diminished activities may well be ones that the United Nations itself was set up 

to do. When the United Nations takes on tasks that it is legally and institutional

y 

il-equipped to do, it is also more likely to sufer failures. Failures do not promote 

lasting peace and hurt the overall credibility of the United Nations. Thus, there 

are major drawbacks to consider when the United Nations faces what may 

superficially appear to be laudable tasks in the pursuit of peacekeeping, unless 

there is genuine political wil and dedicated financial means to achieve the 

mandate. Nations will not continue to send their citizens in harm's way unless 

the contributing governments know what to expect, both operationally and 

financially. In recent years, the Security Council has not always gotten it right. 

Sometimes the mandate provides too much guidance and sometimes too little 

with respect to UN sanctions or the use of force. 

Improvement in Security Council mandates and in General Assembly 

finances is essential for the United Nations to remain effective in both traditional 

peacekeeping and enfo rcement action operations. To o much responsibility for 

military planning has recently b een sought by, delegated to, and accepted by the 

Secretary-General with re spect to peacekeeping mandates. In sorting out proper 

mandates, it cannot be overemphasized that the Secur ity Council alone retains 

not only the primary but also the residual power and duty to deal with 

international peace and security issues under the UN Charter. The enforcement 

job was never intended for the Secretary-General and his staf of professional 

international civil servants. Traditional peacekeeping, based on the consent of 

the warring factions, is in principle entirely diferent. The main idea is that the 

Secur ity Council cannot claim authority without taking responsibility and 

accountability for global peace and security. The Charter has it about right; and 

UN quasi-successes and failures in the realm of peacekeeping have come largely 

18 
What Color Helmet? 

from not following the Charter's fundamental distinctions with respect to 

defensive and offensive use of force, as intended and as written. 

The mandates for the forty "peacekeeping" operations author ized by the 

Security Council since the founding of the United Nations through the end 

of 1 995 are highlighted in the following review. This survey provides a factual 

context for assessing how to reform peacekeeping mandates, particularly by 

emphasizing the distin ction between traditional peaceke eping and enforcement 

actions. Peacekeeping operations still underway at the end of 1 995 are identified 

with an asterisk. 

1. * UNTSO. The UN Truce Supervision Organization was the first 

peacekeeping mission. It was authorized in May 1 948 by Security Council 

Resolution (SCR) 50. The Security Council called for a halt to the first 

Arab-Israeli war and placed military observers in the region near Palestine 

to monitor cease-fires, to supervise armistice agreements, to deter incidents, and to assist in late r peacekeeping operations, especially by providin g 

Military Observers to UNIFIL and UNDOF. UNTSO had 1 94 Military 

Observers in 1 995, who cost the United Nations an estimated annual 

amount of $28.6 million. UNTSO has incurred 38 fatalities over 47 years 

of operation. 

2. * UNMOGIP. The UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan 

was autho rized by the Security Council in SCR 47 and e st ablished in 

January 1949. The mandate for UNMOGIP, provided in SCR 9 1 , is to 

monito r the 1 949 Karachi Agreement ce ase-fire between India and 

Pakistan and to discourage further fighting over the disputed state of 

Jamu and Kashmir. UNMOGIP's operations cost an estimated annual 

$7 .2 million to the United Nations during 1 995. This pays for about 44 

Military Observers who have sustained 9 fatalities over 47 years. 

3. UNEF I. The first UN Emergency Force served between November 

1 956 and June 1 967, after Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal . France, the 

United Kingdom, and I srael had intervened with armed forces. The 

involvement of two of the Permanent Five nations with veto powers 

prevented the Security Council from responding to what was an obvious 

threat to international peace and security. An emergency General Assembly 

session resulted in General Assembly Resolution 1 000 (adopted without 

a negative vote cast) more or less authorizing the first armed UN 

peacekeeping force. UNEF I troops supervised the withdrawal of the 

outside forces and acted as a buffer between the disputants. UNEF I left 

19 
The Newport Papers 

after Egypt withdrew consent for it to be on Egyptian territo ry. One 

month later, the June 1 967 "six-day war" erupted. 

4. uNOGIL. The peacekeeping mandate for the UN Observation Group 

in Leb anon arose out ofSCR 1 28 and lasted fromJune 1 958 to December 

1 958. Lebanon had charged Syria with interference in its internal afairs. 

UNOGIL observers ensured that personn el, arms, and materials were not 

inftltrated across Lebanese borders. The mission was terminated, and 

UNOGIL withdrew when tensions eased. 

5. ONUC. The Operation des Nations Unies au Congo was a large-scale 

operation in the Congo that technicaly lasted from July 1 960 to June 

1 964. SCR 143 authorized the Se cretary-General to take the "ne cessary 

steps" for military assistance and related activities to assist a newly 

independent government restore order. ONUC went well beyond tradi ­

tional peacekeeping. Congolese troops had mutinied and Belgian forces 

had intervened. The Security Council authorized the establishment of a 

UN operation that eventualy required some 1 9,000 armed troops. For a 

while, the United Nations even assumed responsibility for the territorial 

integrity and political indepen dence of the Congo. After four years, the 

Congolese government did not ask to extend ONUC, and the SecretaryGeneral ordered its withdrawal . 

6. UNTEA/UNSF. The UN S ecurity Force in West Irian served as a 

Temporary Executive Authority and security force. The General Assembly 

(with no negative votes cast) authorized the Secretary-General in General 

Assembly Re solution 1 752 to carry out certain agreed upon tasks with 

respect to the hostilities between the Netherlands and Indonesia over West 

Irian. A cease-fire arrangement gave the United Nations administrative 

responsibility for the terr ito ry pending its transfer to Indonesia. This 

mission, largely devoted to uph olding the author ity of UNTEA, lasted 

from October 1 962 to Apr il 1 963. 

7. UNYOM. The Yemen Observation Mission arose out of a report by 

Secretary-General U Thant and a subsequent SCR 1 79, duringJune 1 963 , 

that the support by Egypt and S audi Arabia for competing factions in 

Yemen's civil war threatened a wider conflict that endangered international peace and security. The Secretary's peace initiative led to an 

agreement on disengagement , and the Security Council established UNYOM, which oversaw implementation of the agreement from July 1 963 

to September 1 964 . 

20 
What Color Helmet? 

8. * UNFICYP. The UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus was established 

in March 1 964 by SCR 1 86, with a mandate to serve on Cyprus to help 

prevent violence between Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities. The mandat e has been renewed at six-month intervals ever since. 

Since 1 974, UNFICYP has also been deployed along a bufer zone between 

the Greek Cypriot National Guard and Turkish military forces. The civilian 

police numbered 35 in 1 995, while the troop strength was 1 , 1 66. UNFICYP sustained 1 67 fatalities over 32 years of operation. 

9. D OMREP. The Dominican Republic Representative peacekeeping 

mission involved the dispatch, p ursuant to SCR 203 , of a Spec ial 

Repre sentative of the Secretary-General to the D ominican Republic 

in May 1 965 . The Organization of the American States sent a p eace 

forc e and the United N ations sent military observers to monitor a 

cease -fire be tween r ival government forces. T his was the first time a 

UN p eacekeeping mission dealt with the same matters at the same time 

as a re gional o rganization. After a n ew government was installed, the 

Dominican R epublic requested the withdrawal of the UN Mission , 

which was acco mplished by 22 O ctober 1 9 66. 

10. UNIPOM. The UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission also involved 

India and Pakistan's continuing dispute over the territory of Kashmir. The 

Secur ity Council established the UNIPOM, pursuant to S CR 21 1, during 

September 1 965 to consolidate a cease-fire along the in ternational 

bo rder and to sup e rvise the withdrawal of the contending States' 

respective forces. UNIPOM worked closely with the already existent 

UNMOGIP. UNIPOM was disbanded, and UNMOGIP reverted to its 

original monitoring role after UNIPOM's mission was accomplished in 

March 1 966. 

11. UNEF II. The Second UN Emergency Force was creat ed by the 

Security Council in SCR 340 during October 1 973 . Egypt and I srael were 

at war in the Suez Canal and Sinai regions. With the consent of the 

belligerents, UNEF II was interposed in the Suez Canal sector between 

the opposing forces. After the belligerents agreed to withdraw, UNEF II 

was disbanded in July 1 979. 

1 2.* UNDOF. The UN D isengagement Observer Force began operations 

inJune 1 974, pursuant to SCR 350. In May 1974,an uneasy truce between 

Israel and Syr ia was brokered by the United States for the Go lan Heights. 

The Secur ity Council mandate established UND OF to maintain a cease21 
The Newport Papers 

fire to supervise the agreement on areas of separation and to ensure that 

other limitations were observed by both sides. The estimated annual cost 

to the United Nations for UNDOF is $32.2 million at the 1 995 force level 

of approximately 1 ,200 personnel. UNDOF sustained 36 casualties over a 

21 -year span. UNDOF's mandate continued throughout 1 996. 

1 3. * UNIFIL. The UN Inter im Force in Le banon was established by 

the S ecur ity Council in S CR 425 during March 1 978. Israel ret aliated 

against a PLO c ommando raid by attacking PLO bases in southern 

Lebanon. UNIFI L's mandate was to confirm I sraeli withdrawal from 

Lebanon and to assist the Lebanese government in rest or ing its effective 

control in the area. The Interim Force was un able to deploy fully, as 

instructed, b ecause I srael insisted on maintaining a "secur ity zone" 

north of the Lebanese border and h anded over part of the area to 

Lebanese de facto forces. The Interim Forc e remained to dampen 

violence, to promote stability, and to provide h umanitarian assistance 

to the local populace. The estimated annual cost to the Un ited Nations 

for UNIFIL in 1 995 was $1 42.3 million. This sum supports approximately 4 ,700 troops who have sustained 207 fatalities over 17 years. 

The mandate for UNIFlL was streamlined in 1 9 95 and the operation 

was continued throughout 1 9 96. 

14. UNGOMAP. This peacekeepin g activity involved the provis ion of 

a UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The invasion 

of Afghanistan by the Sovi et Union in late 1 979 predictably resulted 

in a deadlocked debat e in the S ecur ity Council. The matter was 

referred, un der the " Uniting for Peace" procedure , to an emergency 

session of the General Assembly, which strongly c ondemned the Soviet 

armed intervention. In early 1 981, the S ecre tary-General sent his 

personal representative to the region to help nego tiate a re solution of 

the conflict. On 8 April 1 988, Gen eva Accords were finalized between 

the Soviet Union, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the United Stat es, providing for the S oviet withdrawal and for noninterference by Afghanistan 

and Pakistan . The Security Council, in SCR 622, confirmed the 

arrangements in the Geneva Accords. UN monitors were dispatched, 

Soviet forces left, and UNGOMAP 's mandate was terminated 15 March 

1 990. 

15. UNIIMOG. The UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group's mandate 

was set out in S CR 598, dur ing July 1 987, when the Security Council 

22 
Uiha t Color Helmet? 

authorized dire ct talks under the auspices of the Secretary-General. Iran 

and Iraq finally agreed in mid-1 988, after eight years of bloo dy fighting, 

to a cease -fire and the placement of UN observers in a classic buffer role. 

UNIIMOG itself thus actually functioned from August 1988 to February 

1 99 1 . UNIIMOG forces were disbanded after confirming the withdrawal 

from the territories respectively occupied by the forces of both Iran and 

Iraq. 

1 6. UNAVEM 1. The UN Angola Verification Mission was established by 

SCR 626 in December 1 988, pursuant to a request from the governments 

of Angola and Cuba. A 1 978 Security Council resolution, SCR 435, dealt 

with the independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of Cuban troops 

from Angola. Intensive mediation by the United States led to agreement 

between Angola, Cuba, and South Africa for a phased withdrawal of Cuban 

troops from Angola. The role of the UN peacekeepers was to verify their 

withdrawal, as agreed. UNAVEM I deployed from January 1 989 to the 

successful fulftllment of its mandate in June 1991 . 

1 7. UNTAG. The UN Transition Assistance Group's peacekeeping mission in N amibia laste d from Apr il 1 9 89 t o M arch 1 9 90. The 

Se curity Council adopted SCR 435 during September 1 978 , which 

contained a detailed plan for Namibia's transition to independence 

through free and fair elections. South Africa resisted this effort for ten 

years, but the UNTAG operation, with many unique elements, was finally 

launched in 1 989. The S ecurity Council gave the Secretary-General a 

far-reaching mandate which involved the United N ations deeply in the 

political process of Namibia's transition from an occupied territ ory to a 

sovereign and independent State. Eventually, some 8 ,000 military and 

civilian personnel from 1 20 nations participated in UN TAG . The UN's 

efforts resulted in Namibia's joining the United N ations in April 1990, 

after holding successful democratic elections. 

1 8 . ONUCA. The UN Observer Group in Central America peacekeeping 

operation, approved by SCR 644 , ran from November 1989 to January 

1 992. The Observer Group was part of extensive UN involvement in 

assisting five Central American governments to keep their se cur ity commitments. The Security Council established ONUCA to assist in ver ifying 

that the governments in the region were no longer providing arms and 

other aid to irregular forces. ONUCA forces later supported the voluntary 

demobilization of over 20,000 members of the Nicaraguan Resistance. 

23 
The Newport Papers 

19.* UNIKOM. The UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission was authorized in SCR 689,following the suspension of hostilities after the U.S. and 

Saudi Arabian-led multinational coalition had restored peace and security 

in the region by expelling Iraq from Kuwait. UNIKOM began in April 

1 991 with a mandate to monitor the Khor Abd Allah waterway and the 

demilitar ized zone along the border between Iraq and Kuwait. The 

mandate was expanded in January 1 993 by SCR 806 with the addition of 

an infantry battalion. The estimated annual cost to the United Nations in 

1 995 for the UNIKOM peacekeeping operation was $63. 1 million to 

provide a force level of about 1,100, which has sustained three fatalities. 

20 . UNAVEM II. The UN Angola Verification Mission II, authorized by 

SCR 696 and established in June 1 99 1 , continues through UNAVEM III. 

When UNAVEM I finished, Angola requested assistance from the United 

Nations in implementing cease-fire agreements between its government 

and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) . 

UNI TA resisted acceptance of the re sults of democratic elections held 

on 30 September 1 992. UNAVEM II , which lasted until 8 February 

1 995, helped to end a 1 6-year c ivil war by providing military personnel 

to observe a cease-fire and by supporting implementation of the "Acordos de Paz. " 

21 . ONUSAL. The UN Observer Mission in El Salvador was authorized 

by the Security Council in May 1991 by SCR 693. SCR 99 1 , passed in 

April 1 995, terminated ONUSAL's mandate. ONUSAL was a combined 

military and civilian operation that monitored agreements between the 

Salvadoran government and the FMLN (Frente Farabundo Marti Para la 

Liberacion Nacional) to end more than a decade of civil war. Civilians 

from ONUSAL began work before the declaration of a cease-fire and 

military personnel were sent by the Security Council to help implement 

the agreements. The mandate for ONUSAL was terminated following the 

signing of a program of work to complete the Peace Accord. 

22. * MINURSO. The UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, 

authorized in April 1 991 by SCR 690, became operational in September 

1 991 . In August 1 988, the government of Morocco and the Polisario Front 

(Frente Popular Para la Liberacion de Saguia el Hamra y de Rio de Oro) 

agreed to a settlement plan in the disputed terr itory of Western Sahara to 

determine its political future. MINURSO's mandate is to complete the 

process of identifYing registered voters and to verifY the cessation of 

24 
What Color Helmet? 

ho stilities. The Security Council extended MINURSO's mandate throughout 1 996. MINURSO's 1 995 force level of 379 personnel co st the United 

Nations an estimated $40.5 million. The MINURSO operation had 

sustained seven fatalities by the end of 1 995 . 

23 . UNAMIC. The UN Advance Mission in Cambodia was launched in 

October 1991 by SCR 717 and terminated in February 1 992 by SCR 745 . 

This advance mission of military observers paved the way for the UN 

Transitional Authority (UNTAC) operation in Cambodia that immediately 

followed. 

24. * UNPROFOR. The UN Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia was 

established in February 1 992 by SCR 743, primarily with a humanitarian 

assistance mandate. Approximately four years later, UNPROFOR's greatly 

expanded mandate was terminated upon the transfer of its authority to 

IFOR (Implementation Force) . The mandate for IFOR was authorized by 

the Security Council in SCR 1 031 on 15 Dec ember 1 995 , one day after 

the signing in Paris of the Dayton General Framework Agreement for 

Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. IFOR is a multinational military force 

under unified control that is composed ofbo th Nato and non-Nato units. 

IFOR's legal successor will be a multinational stabilization force (SFOR), also 

under unified command. In SCR 7 1 3 of25 September 1 99 1 , the Security 

Council decided, under Chapter VII, to "immediately implement a general 

and complete embargo on al deliveries of weapons and military equipment 

to Yugoslavia .... " During 1 995 , the complex situation in the former 

Yugoslavia was the subj ect of more than 50 of the 1 29 resolutions adopted 

and presidential statements issued by the Security Council. Active involve ­

ment by the Security Council , begun after UN mediation, with European 

support, produced a cease-fire between the Yugoslav National Army and 

ethnic militias. Warring factions next requested a UN peacekeeping 

operation to end months of bitter fighting. The operational mandate of 

UNPROFOR was extended to five republics of the former Yugoslavia-Croatia, 

Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia--d liaison to a 

sixth, Slovenia. In Croatia, the UN Protection Force was to separate Croatian 

and Krajina Seth forces, maintain cease-fir es, defend four protected areas 

(UNPAs) and assist refugees. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, UNPROFOR (with 

Nato air support) was to provide huma.nitarian escort operations, monitor 

"no fly" zones and six "safe area" zones, and facilitate negotiations between 

the Bosnian government and Bosnian Serbs. The goal of the negotiations 

is to foster peaceful development of a Bosnian State consisting of two 

25 
The Newport Papers 

entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika 

Srpska. In the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, UNPROFOR's 

mandate was for a preventive deployment to keep the conflict from 

spreading into that country. In SCR 757, passed in May 1 992, the Security 

Council acted un der Chapter VII to impose an economic and air boycott 

as well as an embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 

Montenegro). In SCR 787 , sanctions were expanded to include a shipping 

embargo. SCR 820 authorized the impoundment and forfeiture of "al 

vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock and aircraft belonging to the Federal 

Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) found violating Security 

Council resolutions. " UNPROFOR police monitors were deployed to 

Macedonia at the request of the government in the fo rmer Yugoslav 

Republic of Macedonia, by SCR 795. In March 1 995 , by SCR 982, 

UNCRO in Croatia was separated from UNPROFOR and, by SCR 983, 

UNPREDEP in Macedonia was likewise split off. This restructuring of 

UNPROFOR left three separate peacekeeping missions under a single 

command (UNPF). UNPF consists of the UN Confidence Restoration 

Operations in Croatia (UNCRO) , the UN Preventive D eployment Force 

(UNPREDEP) within the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and 

UNMIBH in Bo snia and Herzegovina. In SCR 1 035, passed on 21 

December 1 995, the Security Council established an International Police 

Task Fo rce (IPTF), a UN-run civilian police operation called for under 

the Dayton Agreement. Also following the D ayton Agreement, the Coun ­

cil lifted the arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia and suspended the 

sanctions imposed in 1 992 on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia 

and Montenegro) . The approximate cost to the United Nations for 

UNPROFOR in 1 995 was about $ 1 .6 billion, or about half of the entire 

UN peacekeeping budget. The level of the UNPROFOR forces reached 

some 40,000 personnel in 1 995, while 1 92 fatalities have occurred since 

March 1 992. 

25 . UNTAC. The UN Transition al Author ity in Cambo dia deployment 

was authorized in March 1 992 by SCR 74 5, and its work was l argely 

completed by the end of1 993. U NTAC was established by the Security 

Council to implement the Paris Agreements signed on 23 O ctober 

1 991 by the four warring factions in Cambo dia. UNTAC's mandate was 

to consolidate the cease-fire, to help administer the country, and to 

br ing about free and fair elections. The Par ty of D emo cratic Kampuchea (PDK) fac tion consist ently failed to meet its obligations under 

26 
"What Colo, Helmet? 

the Agreements and did not participate in the electoral process. UNTAC 

ultimately grew to a combined civilian/military deployment of some 

22,000 personnel. UN certified elections were held from 23-28 May 

1 993. S CR 880 noted the adoption of a c onstitution and the termination ofUNTAC's mandate after the establishment of a n ew government 

on 24 September 1 993. 

26. UNOSOM 1. The first UN Operation in Somalia was author ized in 

April 1 992 by SCR 75 1. The mandate was initially set up by the Security 

Council to monitor a cease-fire between r ival factions and to provide 

security for the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies. A weapons 

embargo impo sed by SCR 733 had proved ineffectual, and the humanitarian situation steadily deteriorated. SCR 794, passed in December 1 992, 

author ized Member States to "use al necessary means" to pro tect relief 

operations. A Unified Task Force led by the United States operated with 

a peak strength of 37,000 troops until UNOSOM I was terminated in 

March 1 993 by the creation of UN OS OM II, in S CR 814 . 

27. UNOMSA. The UN Observer Mission in South Africa was established 

in August 1 992 by SCR 772 to monitor implementation of the National 

Peace Accord. Upon submission of the {mal report of the Secretary-General that a "united, non-racial and democratic South Africa" existed, 

UNOMSA was terminated in June 1 994 by SCR 930. 

28. ONUMOZ. The UN Operation in Mozambique was established by 

the Security Council in December 1 992 by SCR 797 to mo nitor and 

guarantee the implementation of a general peace agreement between the 

government of Mozambique and the Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana 

(RENAMO) that ended 14 years of civil war. The agreement included a 

cease-fire, the holding of presidential and legislative elections, and a force 

demobilization. Considerable delay in implementation of the agreement 

occurred, particularly with respect to disarmament of irregular troops. In 

SCR 898, the Security Council authorized the deployment of 1 , 1 44 UN 

police observers. SCR 957 set 15 December 1994 to terminate O NUMOZ's mandate as satisfactory elections took place on 27 and 28 October 

1 994 . ONUMOZ's peacekeeping operations actually finished in January 

1 995. 

29. UNOSOM II. The original UN Operation in Somalia was expanded 

from the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) and UNOSOM I through the 

establishment of UNOSOM II in S CR 814, passed in March 1 993 . 

2 7 
The Newport Papers 

UNOSOM II's broad mandate was to provide humanitarian assistance, to 

help in the repatr iation of refugees, to assist in the reestablishment of 

infrastructure, to cooperate in the removal of mines, and to aid in political 

reconciliation. Acting under Chapter VII, the Security Council asked the 

Secretary-General to support the arms embargo using UNOSOM II's 

forces and to provide security for repatriation of refugees. The Security 

Council requested the Secretary-General to direct the Force Commander 

of UNOSOM II to assume responsibility for a phased transition from 

UNITAF to UNOSOM II . On 6 June 1 993, in SCR 837, the Security 

Council strongly condemned armed attacks by the United Somali Congress forces against UNOSOM II troops contributed from Pakistan. The 

Security Council reaffirmed that the Secretary-General was authorized 

to take "all necessary measures" against those responsible for the armed 

attacks. The Security Council also encouraged Member States to contrib ­

ute military support to meet the full requirement of a force of 28,000 

personnel. On 22 September 1 993, in SCR 865, the Security Council 

called upon the Secretary-General to prepare a detailed plan covering 

UNOSOM's humanitarian, political, and security strategy for S omalia. The 

Secretary-General was asked to assist in rebuilding Somali political institutions and in reestablishing its police, judicial, and penal systems. In SCR 

897, passed in February 1 994, the Security Council noted "that the people 

of Somalia bear the ultimate responsibility for setting up viable national 

political institutions and for reconstructing their country. " The Council 

also authorized the reduction of the UNOSOM II force level to 22,000. 

SCR 923 , passed on 31 May 1 9 94, contained an acknowledgment of 

"the absence of a government in Somalia .... " In March 1 994, the leaders 

of major Somali factions signed a D eclaration of National Reconciliation. S CR 954 terminated UNOSOM's mandate on 31 March 1 995 after 

UNOSOM II forces completed their withdrawal. 

30. UNOMUR. The UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda was established by SCR 846 in June 1 993 in response to a request from the two 

governments for the deployment of UN observers along their common 

border. UNOMUR was deployed entirely in Uganda to verify that no 

military assistance reached Rwanda where fighting raged between the 

government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) . The 

Secretary-General also supported the peace efforts of the Organization of 

Mrican Unity (OAU) by providing military experts to assist its Neutral 

Military Observer Group. In May 1 994 , the Security Council extended 

28 
What Color Helmet? 

UNOMUR's observation and monitor ing activities to the entire 

Uganda/Rwanda border. In SCR 928, passed in June 1 9 94, a phased 

withdrawal was authorized and UNOMUR's mandate was terminated in 

September 1 994. 

31 .* UNOMI G. The UN Observer Mission in Georgia was established in 

August 1 9 93 by SCR 858 as a prelude to the possible estab lishment 

of a peacekeeping mission to Abkhazia. A cease-fire agreement signed on 

27 July 1 993 between the Republic of Georgia and forces in Abkhazia 

was followed by a Memorandum of Understanding signed on 1 December 

1 993. The dispute centers around the future political status of Abkhazia, 

where local authorities tried to separate from the Republic of Georgia. 

On 14 May 1 994, the same parties also signed an Agreement on a 

Cease-fire and Separation of Forces. To monitor compliance with the 

cease-fire, a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) peacekeeping 

force was deployed, as requested by the leaders of Georgia and Abkhazia. 

The Secur ity Council, in SCR 937, increased the strength of UNO MIG's 

military observer force and exp anded its mandate to monitor the CIS 

peacekeeping operation. The mandate ofUNOMI G extended throughout 

1 996, in part to deal with mounting concerns over human rights. The 

approximate annual cost to the United Nations for UNO MIG's force of 

1 32 personnel in 1 995 was $ 1 0.9 million. 

32.* UNOMIL. The UN Observer Mission in Lib eria was established by 

SCR 866 in September 1 993 after an embargo on munitions deliver ies to 

Liberia was imposed by the Security Coun cil, under Chapter VI I, late in 

1 992. The Cotonou Peace Agreement, signed by three warr ing factions 

on 25 July 1 993, assigned to the Economic Community of West African 

States Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) the primary responsibility to supervise implementation of military provisions directed at 

restoring peace, security, and stability in Liberia. The Security Council 

established UNOMIL with a mandate to monitor and verify this process 

and extended its mandate throughout 1 996. The approximate annual cost 

to the United Nations for UNOMIL's deployment in 1 995 of 91 military 

observers was $1 .1 million. 

33. * UNMIH. The UN Mission in Haiti was authorized in September 

1 993 by SCR 867. From the outset, the Security Council charact erized 

the circumstances in Haiti as "unique and exceptional." In an agreement 

signed on Governors Island in New York City, both Haiti's previously 

29 
The Newport Papers 

exiled president,jean-B ertrand Ar istide, and its then commander-in-chief 

of the armed forces, Raoul Cedras, requested UN assistance in creating a 

new police force for Haiti and in modernizing its armed forces. In response , 

the Security Council dispatched 567 UN police monitors and a 700-person military construction unit to assist Haiti. However, "armed forces" 

there prevented the UNMIH personnel from starting their work. In SCR 

873 , passed in October 1 993, the Security Council determined that the 

failure of the military authorities in Haiti to fulflll their obligations under 

the " Governors Island Agreement " and to comply with relevant Secur ity 

Council resolutions constituted a " threat to peace and security in the 

region. " Accordingly, the Security Council reimposed a strict embargo on 

arms and petroleum products that was to remain in effect until democratically elected President Ar istide was reinstated and Haiti was in ful

 

compliance with Security Council resolutions. In May 1 994, the Security 

Council imposed further economic sanctions that were not to be lifted 

until senior police and military leaders in Haiti stepped down. At the end 

of july 1 994, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, Member States 

were authorized to form a multinational force under unified command 

and control. Within that framework, the force was authorized to use "al 

necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military 

leadership, consistent with the Governors Island Agreement, the prompt 

return of the legitimately elected President and the restoration of the 

legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti, and to establish and 

maintain a secure and stable environment that will permit implementation 

of the Governors Island Agreement, on the understanding that the cost 

of implementing this temporary operation will be borne by the participating Member States. " As a practical matter, this meant that the multinational force that landed on 19 September 1 994 was provided and funded 

almost entirely by the United States. It was determined in SCR 975, passed 

in late january 1 995, that Haiti was secure and stable, and plans were 

launched to pass ful responsibility from the multinational force to UNMIH 

by 31 March 1995. Presidential elections were held on 17 December 1 995 

and a new president inaugurated shortly thereafter. The situation generally 

stabilized while the Security Council extended UNMIH's mandate 

throughout 1 99 6. The approximate cost to the United Nations for 

UNMIH in 1 995 was $1.1 milion for an authorized level of personnel of 

6,567. UNMIH had suffered six fatalities through 1 9 95. 

30 
"What Color Helmet? 

34. UNAMIR. The UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda was established 

by SCR 872 in October 1 993 to assist in implementing the Arusha Peace 

Agreement between the Hutu-dominat ed government of Rwanda and 

the Tutsi Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) . UNAMIR was integrated 

administratively with UNOMUR. On 6 April 1 9 94, however, the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi were killed in an airplane crash, triggering 

large-scale tribal genocide in Rwanda. In mid-May 1 994 , by SCR 918, 

the Security Council expanded the mandate of UN AMIR to include the 

creation of secure humanitarian areas and the provision of security for the 

distribution of relief supplies. The Council expressly recognized that 

UNAMIR personnel might be required to take action in their self-defense 

and authorized a force of up to 5 ,500 troops. An arms embargo was also 

imposed under Chapter VII. The Security Council deplored the displacement of some 1 .5 million Rwandan refugees. In SCR 929 in June 1 9 94, 

the Council stressed "the strictly humanitarian character of this operation 

which shall be conducted in an impartial and neutral fashion, and shall 

not constitute an interposition force between the parties. " The Council 

also determined that the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis constituted 

a threat to peace and security in the region. The Security Council also 

approved France 's offer to undertake a multinational operation under its 

command and control. This latter operation, whose cost was borne by the 

Member States participating, was authorized to use "all necessary means 

to achieve the humanitarian objectives .... " UNAM IR's mandate was 

extended by SCR 1 029 in December 1 995, providing for the withdrawal 

of UNAMIR's forces, starting on 8 March 1 996. The approximate cost to 

the United Nations for UNAMIR in 1 995 was $193.5 millio n at a strength 

level of 5,522 personnel. However, in view of the reservations about the 

UN presence expressed by the government of Rwanda in 1 995 , the 

mandate was adjusted to further reduce force levels. UNAMI R had 

sustained 26 fatalities through 1 995. 

35 . UNASOG.The UN Aouzou Strip Observer Group was established by 

the Security Council in May 1 994 by S CR 915. The mandate was to 

observe the implementation of the Surt Agreement signed by Chad and 

Libya on 4 April 1 994 and to carry out the judgment of the International 

Court of Justice relating to their disputed territories around the Aouzou 

Strip. UNASOG's mission was successfully completed, and its mandate 

accordingly terminated by SCR 926 in June 1 994 . 

31 
The Newport Papers 

36.* UNMOT. The UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan \.Vas authorized 

in December 1 994 by SCR 968. UNMOT's mandate was regularly extended and UNMOT's activities continued through 1 996. UNMOT is to 

assist the Tajik government, as well as its opposition, in monitoring 

implementation of a cease-fIre and in facilitating political discussions. A 

Commonwe alth of Independent States peacekeeping force, largely composed of Russian troops, has been deployed along the Tajikistan border 

with Afghanistan since 1 993. The estimated annual cost to the United 

Nations for the 44 military observers was Sl .1 million in 1 995. UNMOT 

had suffered one fatality as of the end of 1 995. 

37.* UNAVEM III. The UN Angola Ver ification Mission provided for in 

SCR 976 was established in February 1 995. A new mandate for the 

peacekeeping operation in Angola \.Vas given, based on the Secretary-General's recommendation that more than 7,000 peacekeepers help rebuild 

the country. UNAVEM Ill's mandate is to supervise implementation of the 

"Acordos de paz" and the Lusaka Protocol between the Angolan government and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola 

(UNITA) . The Secretary-General deployed peacekeepers in May and 

August 1 995 , and UNAVEM III's mandate was extended through 1 996. 

38. * UNMIBH. The UN Mission in B osnia and Herzegovina was 

established by S CR 1 035 in December 1 995. The International Police 

Task Force (IPTF) , a part of UNMIBH, continued its mission through 

1 996, carrying out the tasks set out in Annex II of the Dayton Peace 

Agreement. In particular, IPTF will assist in the restructur ing of law 

enforcement agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

39.* UNCRO. The UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia \.Vas 

established in SCR 981 , passed in March 1 995. UNCRO \.Vas separated 

from UNPROFOR. whose mandate was to ensure the demilitar ization of 

the UN Protected Areas (UNPAs) through the withdrawal or disbandment 

of all armed forces and to protect personnel in the UNPAs. The deployment 

of UNCRO military observers was authorized in April 1 995 by SCR 9 90. 

with the mandate to control. monitor. and report on the borders between 

Croatia and its neighbors. In particular. emphasis \.Vas placed on normalizing relations between Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 

concerning the disputed issues pertaining to the Prevlaka peninsula. At 

the end of 1 995 , of UNCRO's 1 ,5 00 personnel. 16 had suffered fatalities. 

32 
"What Color Helmet? 

40.* UNPREDEP. The UN Preventive D eployment Force for the former 

Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which arose out ofSCR 983, and passed 

in March 1 995, changed UNPROFOR in Macedonia to UNPREDEP.The 

mandate of UNPREDEP remain s largely as originally set in SCR 795, 

passed in December 1 992. UNPREDEP is to keep armed conflict from 

spreading to the former Yugoslavia Republic of M acedonia from either 

of its neighbors, Albania or the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 

Montenegro). The expectation is that there will be a peaceful demarcation 

of the border between the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and 

the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. UNPREDEP's mandate was extended 

through 1 996 to maintain stability. UNPREDEP consists of 1 , 1 50 military 

personnel and 23 civilian policemen. UNPREDEP forces had sustained 

four fatalities by the end of 1 995 . 

4 1 . UN TAE S . The UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, 

B aranj a, and Western Sirmium was e stablished in S CR 1 037 , p assed in 

January 1 99 6. A "B asic Agreement" on the region was signed in 

November 1 995 by the government of the Republic of Croatia and 

the local Serb community to facilitat e the peaceful return of the 

territories to Croatia. UNTAES' peacekeeping mandate is to promot e 

confidence amo ng all ethnic groups , monitor demilitar ization and 

refugees, and promote peaceful integration dur ing the transition. The 

man dat e of UNTAES extended through 1 996. 

42. MINUGUA. The UN Mission for the Verification of H uman Rights 

and of Compliance with the Comprehensive Agreement on Human 

Rights in Guatemala was established in S CR 1094 passed 20 January 1 997. 

The mandate of MINUGUA is to verify observance of the peace accords 

between the government of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria 

Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) that started in early 1 994. SCR 1 094 

authorized 1 55 military observers and requisite medical personnel to 

verify a cease-fire and demobilize URNG forces. 

N.B. UNTAES andMINUGUA were mandated by the Se cur ity Council after the general 

cutoff date in this study of 1 995. 

33 

III 

Context for Reforming Peacekeeping Mandates 

Traditional Peacekeeping Operations 

If N CHAPTER II, attention was drawn to the "peacekeeping" label that has 

been placed on a wide variety of missions, some of which were c arried out 

concurrently with humanitarian and enforcement action operations. In tradi ­

tional peacekeeping deployments, at least four types of o perations can be 

distilled from UN practice. 

Observation operations, as the name implies, are to observe, monitor, verify and 

report. This has been the most frequently used peacekeeping activity. UN observers 

are customarily unarmed, but there are circumstances where limited personal 

self-defense capabilities are necessary. Observer groups typically consist of military 

offic ers and equivalent civilians. The size of the force may range from a few to 

several hundred personnel . Missions may in clude observing cease-fire and 

demarcation lines, confirming withdrawal of foreign forces, monitoring for war 

preparations, reporting human rights abuses, verifying election processes, and 

inspecting for agreement compliance.An effective observer operation requires close 

liaison with the involved p arties to maintain trust and to minimize incidents. 

Regular patrolling and the manning of observation posts further di;;courages armed 

conflict. 
The Newport Papers 

Interpositional operations try to keep opposing forces separated. This 

operation is often deployed immediately after the termination or suspension 

of hostilities. The pe acekeepers. who are typically lightly arme d, are po sitioned between the b elligerents to create a buffer zone. The absence of dire ct 

contact between ho stile forces is intended to h elp the parties negotiate a 

l onger term peace settlement. A gain, the size of the force varies with the 

location and the number of comb atan ts. Interpo sition forces may h ave to 

move in quickly, especially to o ccupy key terrain . Operations involve 

patrolling actively, establishing che ckpo ints, and reacting promptly. If tensions decre ase sufficiently, interpo sitional operations may revert to more 

passive observer functio ns. 

Transition assistance operations can help a nation move to a stable p olitical 

condition and a more peaceful existence after a struggle for independence or 

civil strife. The peacekeeping force may consist of police elements to contain 

violence and foster a return to normal life. The warfare may h ave lett the country 

impoverished, and assistance may be expected from the peacekeepers in 

restoring infrastructure. Tasks may include civil administration, control of armed 

militia, colle ctio n and confiscation of weapons, disarmament of military forces, 

supervision of elections, maintenance of cease-fire zones, humanitarian aid and 

refugee assistance. Transition assistance operations typically require a large force 

with diverse capabilities. Personnel may or may not carry arms, depending on 

the danger involved, and UN activities may be under either military or civilian 

control. Effective co ordination with o ther elements of the peacekeeping 

operation as well as with the local leaders in the host State is essential. As the 

situation stabilizes, civilian leaders should increasingly assume control from 

military commanders. 

Preventive deployment normally occurs when the government or governments 

in whose territory the operation is to be conducted request the deployment of 

peacekeeping forces there to head off armed conflict. The peacekeepers may 

take up positions on both sides of a border, or even one side of a border, to 

discourage hostilities. Preventive deployment may include ground troops on 

the border or air and maritime forces patrolling far from specific conflict areas. 

Part of the mandate may be to demonstrate a " show offorce," featuring military 

resolve, to discourage unwanted deployment of armed forces or to encourage 

negotiations on a political settlement. Operations may include patrolling and 

high visibility military training activities. 

36 
What Color Helmet? 

The UN and the Evolvi ng European Security Structure 

As outlined in Chapter I of this study, the legal and institutional structure for 

decision making in the UN Charter sets parameters for the conduct of both 

traditional peacekeeping and genuine enforcement actions. In the most basic 

sense, the Charter entrusts the Security Council with the primary responsibility 

to maintain international peace and security. The Se curity Council alone is 

expressly granted the power to authorize collective responses by UN Members, 

by passing resolutions that mandate enforcement actions, including the use of 

military force. As previously noted, the term "peacekeeping" is not mentioned 

anywhere in the UN Charter. A definition of these operations, therefore, must 

be discerned from what the United Nations has done and what its Member 

States have supported over the past 50 years. The legitimacy of the operations 

depends, however, not only on what is done and is tolerated, but also upon 

whether the activities comport with the purposes and allocations of power 

provided in the Charter itself. The point is that the legal standards in the UN 

Charter must be met. The Charter remains the constitution for UN activities. 

It is no t legally sufficient merely to note: "It's alright because the United Nations 

did it and nobody complained. " The core idea about the rule oflaw in this area 

is that the Charter must be respected by UN Members just as the United States 

Constitution must be resp ected by U S. citizens. In the United N ations, 

legitimacy der ives from the agreement made by the Member Stat es, just as in 

the United States legitimacy comes from the consent of the governed citizens 

whose pact is expressed in the US. Constitution. It is not enough that 

government officials, temporarily in power, want to do something or even have 

done something without significant objection. Respect for the rule of law 

requires a thoughtful examination of the purposes and the allocations of power 

within the constituting document, viewed as a whole. Only after an assessment 

of the Charter text and whether the practice in question is consistent with it, 

can a determination be properly made whether past and future "peacekeeping" 

operations actually comport with the agreements made by the sovereign State 

Members. Unlike the US. domestic judicial review of constitutional issues, there 

is no review provided in the Charter for S ecurity Council substantive decisions 

if the Security Council acts in accordance with its procedures. For example, the 

Security Council determined that the circumstances in Haiti constituted a threat 

to international peace and security. In one sense, this determination is all that 

is legally required. The procedures in the Charter are met. But another view is 

that substantive standards in the Charter still must be met, even if the procedures 

available for substantive review are not particularly effective. The idea is that 

3 7 
The Newport Papers 

respect for the rule oflaw dictates that Security Council actions that are properly 

done as a matter of procedure are still op en to substantive challenge. The 

principle that ought not to be lost in the rush of any crisis is that all nations, 

persons, and institutions must follow both the procedures and substantive 

standards of the rule oflaw, especially in the realm of UN peacekeeping in which 

use of force may be involved. The notion is straightforward: if it is the law, al 

must obey it. If the law is bad, change it. But to ignore law is to negate the force 

of the rule oflaw. And without the rule of law, the commitments in the Charter 

are meaningless. Nations either follow law, or they do not. In principle, there is 

no "pick and choose" option to suit political convenience. 

The 40 UN peacekeeping operations officially designated as such through 

the end of 1 995 are outlined in Chapter II of this study. The wide variety of 

activities revealed in this survey reinfo rces the conclusion that there are few 

universally followed rules governing either traditional peacekeeping or UN 

enforc ement ac tions. Lack of doctr inal clarity does not, however, deter the 

Security Council from regularly adopting resolutions mandating peacekeeping 

operations . Unfortunately, the Security Council often does not clearly distin ­

guish between consensual operations and enforcement actions. 

Article 97 of the UN Chart er specifically labels the Secretary-General as the 

"Chief Administrative Officer" of the United Nations. In the realm of 

peacekeeping practice, however, the Se cretary-General has also assumed responsibility for the organization, conduct, and direc tion of military operations. When 

these duties entail ext ensive use of armed force, they can hardly be deemed 

purely " administrative" in any ordinary sense. Rather, these responsibilities are 

akin to those of the Commander-in-Chief under the Constitution of the United 

St ates. If this seems odd, recal that a leading role for the Military Staff 

Committee in planning for the Security Council's use of armed force was 

envisioned in th e UN Charter. As we have seen , this proved politically impractical to implement. Although it is obvious that these duries ought to be 

p erformed by military professionals, and the Military Staff Committee has the 

p otential to provide that service, there is no "hue and cry" to breathe life into 

the Committee, at least not to the extent the Charter provides. An alternative 

appro ach, to take advantage of the renewed cooperation among the Permanent 

Five on security matters, is for the United Nations to channel more enforcement 

actions into Chapter VIII "regional organizations." Member States, after al, do 

have professional military personnel who can be made available to deal with 

UN use of force problems under Secur ity Council direction. The most influential Chapter VIII regional alliances pertain to Europe. And, while not a 

Chapter VIII entity, th e most formidable military organization in the world, 

38 
U'hat Color Helmet? 

Nato, is lo cated there. Th e Security Council understandably has turned to Nato 

for help on the UN's most pressing security problem, the situation in the former 

Yugoslavia. As we previously no ted, however, using Nato as a Chapter VIII 

enforcement entity is a legal problem, since Nato was not set up to serve under 

the Security Council as a colle ctive security organization. 

By contrast, the "Helsinki Summit Declaration" of 1 0 July 1 992 made it clear 

that the Council of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

(CSCE) was willing to undertake peacekeeping operations un der Chapter VIII 

in cases of conflict within or among participating States. Th e Council is the 

central decision-making and governing body of the Conference, and it meets 

annually at either the Heads of Government or Foreign Minister level. B etween 

Council me etings, the Committee of Senior Officials or its Permanent Committee in Vienna is responsible for management and decision making. In 

principle, decisions are made by consensus. The CSCE , which was created in 

1 975 , was expanded to include not only the United S tates, Canada, and almo st 

all European States but also all of the newly independent States of the former 

Soviet Unio n. In 1 995 , the CSCE was renamed the " Organization for Security 

and Co operation in Europe," and its acronym changed to OSCE. 

The 52 Members of the oseE quality, in their collective capacity, as a 

"Regional Arrangement" under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. As such, the 

UN Charter provide s that the Security Council may delegate authority to the 

OSCE to take enforcement action on behalf of the United Nations. Nato, in 

turn, has offered to provide military support for OSCE peacekeeping operations. 

From an international law point of view, there is nothing to preclude Nato from 

serving as a contributing entity to an OSCE peacekeeping operation. U. S. 

domestic law is another matter. The OSCE organization itself can play a direct 

role in conflict prevention activities such as fact-fmding, mediation, and cooperation with other security organizations. Given its long experience, expertise, 

and available resources to support large-scale military operations, Nato is 

uniquely qualified, in a practical sense, to carry out peacekeeping assignments 

that require the use of any significant military force. To repeat, however, Nato was 

not set up to operate under the Security Council, as is required by Chapter VIII. 

In De cember 1 99 1 , at the European Community summit in Maastricht, a 

dual role for the Western European Union (WEU) was announced. The WEU 

i s t o embody the European defense entity and to function as the European pillar 

within Nato. The ten-nation defense wing ofWEU forces (out of the 1 5 -nation 

European Union) are to be multinational, including the EUROCORPS (FrenchGerman), EUROFOR (French, Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese forces for rapid 

reaction in the southern region) , and EUROMARFOR (all-Member maritime 

39 
The Newport Papers 

force} . These formations will be subordinate to Nato when they operate under 

it. However, it is likely to be only a matter of time until Nato assets wil be used 

for peacekeeping and o ther military operations under the auspices of the WEU. 

The WEU de termined that WEU Members may not invoke the automatic 

military assistance provisions between WEU Members against a Nato Member 

nor may Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty be invoked against a WEU 

Member. Se tting aside the vexing question of who has binding authority to 

interpret conflicts between WEU and Nato mandates, there is, without doubt, 

an overlap between the respective security roles now given to the EU and Nato. 

Any resulting confusion may be attributed to the fact that there is, as yet, no 

agreed upon policy among all the Member nations on the respective security 

and defense roles to be played by each organization. For that matter, there is no 

agreed upon strategy for international security in the North Atlantic region. 

The United States, for its part, has made it clear that Nato is the avenue through 

which security consultations are to be made and major issues determined. It 

remains to be seen how long this U.S. policy can be sustained. Partisan political 

controversy is likely to emerge in the United States over Nato 's role, especially 

as the real financial costs in Bosnia surface. It is possible that a coalition of 

like-minded States may form between European Powers to assume (and pay 

for) a greater role in European security. A conservative U.S. Congress may even 

be happy to have them do so. 

Another potential Chapter VIII regional organization in Europe is the North 

Atlantic Co operation Council (NACC), whose genesis was in the Declaration 

on Peace and Cooperation issued at the Nato Summit Meeting in November 

1 991 . NACC's primary role is to serve as the vehicle for western European 

support for reform occurring in the countries of central and eastern Europe. 

Nato Members were in favor of the steps being taken toward democratic reform 

and invited the nations concerned to participate in appropriate forums. The 

States of the former Soviet Union and post-Co mmunist Europe joined the 

NACC, enlarging its membership to thirty-eight. This opened another new, 

post-Cold War venue for contact and consultation with countries, such as 

Russia, about military matters, including peacekeeping. NACC has the potential 

to be a Chapter VIII regional organization , but as a matter of stated policy, NACC 

itself currently has no operational role in peacekeeping. In fact, Nato leaders 

decided in 1 992 to operate out of the region only under UN or OSCE mandate. 

For example, the Nato-led operation in Bosnia, which clearly is not in the 

territory of any Nato Members, is under UN mandate . 

In Chapter I of this study, it was no ted that Article 5 of the North Atlantic 

Treaty provides that an armed attack against any Party's territory in Europe or 

40 
"What Color Helmet? 

North America shall be considered an attack against all Nato Parties. Nato was 

created to provide a collective secur ity bulwark against aggression by Warsaw 

Pact Members, esp ecially the Soviet Union. However, when the Warsaw Pact 

disintegrated, the collective self-defense rationale , upon which Nato was 

founded under Article 51 of the Charter, came into question. The original 

reasons for a Nato military organization to protect against an armed attack from 

the Soviet Union no longer existed . There are, of course, new threats, and few 

suggest that Nato be immediately disbanded. At the same time, Nato is under 

scrutiny; it inevitably must be reformed to respond to the new European secur ity 

environment. The Cold War Nato, constituted under the North Atlantic Treaty 

as an Article 51 self-defense organization, is at the threshold of a period of 

adjustment. 

In recognition of this reality, the Nato summit in January 1 994 endorsed the 

concept of Combined Joint Task Forces and launched the Partnership for Peace 

initiative. The Combined Joint Task Force concept envisions a military operation 

using elements of the alliance's command structure but drawing forces only 

from Members willing to contribute. Twenty-two non-Nato countries, with 

diverse languages and cultures, have started to cooperate along these lines with 

Nato in various ways. Their first joint exercise, "Co-operative Bridge," was held 

in September 1 994. Th e Nato Partnership for Peace/ Combined Joint Task Force 

Program was expected to provide the princ ipal means to integrate non-Nato 

troops into UN peacekeeping operations. With this in mind, Nato's SecretaryGeneral released a study in mid-1 995 on the question of Nato's enlargement 

eastward. The Partnership for Peace initiative had grown to 26 Members, 

including all 15 of the former Soviet republics. Although no decision on the 

admission of new parties to the North Atlantic Treaty is expected until 1 997 , 

or later, the importance of Nato's future membership raises critical security 

questions. Should former enemies of Nato become parties to the North Atlantic 

Treaty without completely rethinking Nato? What security threats does the 

Treaty now guard against? What type of collective security organization, if any, 

is needed for the new Europe? Would Russia ever agree to an expanded Nato? 

How about a less threatening N ato or Nato plus partners? Would Russia put 

its troops directly under Nato command? Likewise, would the United States 

put its troops under the operational command of Russians in some form of an 

expanded Nato? What are the costs and time-frames to integrat e applicant States' 

personnel, equipment, and doctrine into a revised Nato? What will be the 

financial cost to the West for expanding Nato membership eastward? Would 

current Nato nations be willing to commit to take action in ethnic strife 

41 
The Newport Papers 

between States or groups located in the former Warsaw Pact nations? In the 

final analysis, would expansion of Nato stabilize or destabilize Europe? 

From a domestic U.S. perspective, would Congress approve new Nato 

Members from the former Communist East? What would be the financial or 

other costs to secure the votes of all 15 other Members of Nato who must agree 

to new Members as required by the North Atlantic Treaty? 

The Nato aliance has enormous political, economic, and military significance, 

not only for Europe but also for the world. Nato nations rightly ought to proceed 

cautiously on expansion to avoid creating unrealistic expectations. Political rhetoric 

is important and symbolic generalizations to garner public support have their place. 

But Nato is in the business of life or death on a vast scale. Serious issues such as 

this merit open debate at the highest policy levels between the nations concerned 

and between the Clinton administration and the U.S. Congress. It is not clear that 

this debate has been encouraged. In any case, political acceptance as well as 

integration will be a slow process. Greater relative responsibility for Europeans in 

providing for their own defense may be one emerging trend. In the meantime, 

Nato has offered to play the role of executive agent for both the United Nations 

and, as noted above, for the OSCE, either in traditional peacekeeping or in Charter 

enforcement operations. 

One practical response by Nato to the new security environment in Europe 

was to adopt the concept of the Rapid Response Corps. First, Allied Mobile 

Forces are to meet the need for smal, immediate intervention operations. The 

next larger group is the Atlantic Alliance's Rapid Response Corps (ARRC) , 

consisting of units from thirteen countries as of 1 995 . The ARRC is to be ready 

for action within one to two weeks after notice. The third level is Nato's principal 

defense forces in the nations of the sixteen Parties. The final military force is 

composed of reinforcements resulting from mobilization in individual Nato 

States. The ARRC is thus the main peacekeeping force available for crisis 

management planning in N ato. Plans are for the ARRC to have ten divisions 

amounting to 400,000 troops? Some units wil be genuinely multinational, 

while others will be formed principally, or entirely, from one country. 

Peacekeeping Terminology 

An important element in formulating mandates for peacekeeping operations 

that may be commanded by the United Nations or by Nato nations is agreed 

upon terms and defmitions pertaining to the use offo rce. The starting point for 

analysis on this topic is the outlook at the United Nations that is provided in 

UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's discussion of peace support 

42 
What Color Helmet? 

operations in "An Agenda for Peace. ,,8 This pamphlet, which was published in 

July 1 992, defmes four types of operations: 

Preventive diplomacy is action to prevent disputes from ar ising betwe en parties, 

to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts, and to limit the spread 

of conflicts when they occur. 

Peacemaking is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through 

such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the UN Charter. 

Peacekeeping is the deployment of a UN presence in the fleld, hitherto with 

the consent of all the parties c oncerned. normally involving UN military 

and/or police personnel and fre quently civilians as well. 

Peacebuilding is action to identify and support structures which will tend to 

strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. 

In a supplement to "An Agenda for Peace, " dated 3 January 1995 , the 

Secretary-General identifies six "Instruments for Peace and Security." These 

are: preventive diplomacy and peacemaking, peacekeeping, post-conflict peacebuilding, disarmament, sanctions, and enforcement action.

9 With respect to 

peacekeeping, the Secretary-General states: " [C] ertain basic pr inciples of peacekeeping are essential to its success. Three particularly important pr inciples are 

the consent of the parties, impartiality, and the non-use of force except in 

self-defense. Analysis of recent successes and failures shows that in al the 

successes those principles were respected and in most of the less successful 

. h h f h ,,10 

operations one or t e ot er 0 t em was not. 

The Secretary-General went on to observe that "the logic of peace-keeping 

flows from political and military premises that are quite distinct from those of 

enforcement .... To blur the distinction between the two can undermine the 

viability of the peace-keeping operation and endanger its personnel. " 11 The 

Secretary-General and his Secretariat obviously learned important lessons from 

UN peacekeeping experiences dur ing the period from 1 992, when "An Agenda 

for Peace" was published, and 1995, when the "Supplement " was issued. More 

realistic attitudes by the Secretary-General on peacekeeping operations are, 

indeed, welcome. Now the trick will be to persuade Security Council Members, 

particularly the United States, to be more disciplined in formulating and issuing 

peacekeeping mandates. 

In the 1 995 Supplement, the Secretary-General highlights the difference 

between traditional peacekeeping and enforcement actions by listing the latter 

43 
The Newport Papers 

last in his new hierarchy of instruments for peace and secur ity. Peacekeeping 

and enfo rcement action are not simply lumped together under a peacekeeping 

heading; three other listings are deliberately placed in between. Interestingly, 

the word "hitherto " (see above) is omitted in the more recent reference to the 

co nsent requirement in peacekeeping. This is not a mere drafting point but a 

signal of significance. One may conclude that the Secretary-General is expressing a renewed appreciation of the necessity for consent in peacekeeping 

operations that he supervises. However, the Secretary-General still clings to the 

hope that the United Nations, as such , "in the long run" will develop the 

capacity to "deploy, direct, command and control" enforcement operations.

12 

Given no mention of a time frame , such theoretical musing is probably harmless, 

but it is still misguided. The Secretary-General is not set up, politically, 

institutionally, legally, financially, or in any other way, to provide command and 

control for enforcement action operations. On the one hand, the SecretaryGeneral appears to recognize this point; on the other hand, he keeps the flame 

flickering to accept enforcement assignments from the Security Council. 

The thinking of the North Atlantic Military Committee of the NACC on 

combined peacekeeping operations is discussed in a March 1 994 paper entitled 

" Cooperation in Planning." 13 This document may n ow be overtaken by events, 

but it still contains useful insights for the purposes of this study. The goal of this 

unclassified paper was to provide a common NACC basis for peacekeeping 

planning. These Planning Guidelines were based on the principles, cr iter ia, and 

defmitions in the NACC Ad Hoc Group (NACC-AHG) Report endorsed by 

the Ministers in Athens, Greece, on 11 June 1993. This is a helpful guide to 

discuss issues that must be considered in formulating Secur ity Council mandates 

for combined multinational "peacekeeping" operations. 

The first problem encountered by the " Cooperation in Peacekeeping Planning Working Group " was a need for agreement between the United N ations 

and the OSCE on terminology and defmitions about use of forc e terms in 

peacekeeping. Consideration was given to using the UN Secretary-General's 

term "peace support operations " as a general cover-term to describe all 

operations in support of the United N ations, e.g. , conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, humanitar ian aid, peace enforcement, and peace-building. Proponents urged that the generic term covered al

 types of operatio ns, 

emphasized the importance of peacekeeping expansion, recognized the difficulty in separating the range of operations, and met the demand for options 

beyond traditional peacekeeping. 

The term was not adopted by the Working Group, however, because it is not 

in common use and acceptance. The belief was that even when it was used, it 

44 
Mat Color Helmet? 

was used inconsistently. Moreover, the t erm "peace support operations" glossed 

over the fact that conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace-building, and humanitarian aid in the first instance, peacekeeping in the second instance, and 

enforcement measures in the third instance, while inter-related, are very 

diferent. Moreover, and this was important for the Working Group, as "peace 

support operations" included "peace enforcement," the term exceeded the 

accepted scope of the NACC's policy mandate. This po int might well be noted 

by the UN Secretary-General as well. The Group's main substantive concern, 

however, was about blurring the distinction between "peacekeeping" and 

"peace enforcement," and with the ambiguity and vagueness that results. The 

NACC-AHG stressed that the main diference between "peacekeeping" and 

"peace enforcement " was the consent of the parties and impartiality in the first 

case and the application of warfighting or coercive techniques in the second 

case. The chairman of the AHG emphasized that another important distinction 

was not the level of violence, but rather the change in the status of the 

combatants that occurs when enforcement troops take a side in the conflict. 

Again, the UN Secretary-General as well as the IFOR commanders ought to 

pay close attention to this point. 

The difficulties with the expression "peace enforcement" have already been 

stressed throughout this study. Despite its widespread popularity, the t erm is a 

misnomer whose meaning obfuscates rather than clarifies thinking. While the 

look and sound of the phrase may appeal to the public at large, it is rife with 

mischief from misunderstanding. This is immediately evident by noting the 

contradiction between the words "peace " and "enforcement." If there is peace, 

what is there to enforce? If enforcement is required, how can peace be said to 

exist? It is easier to understand the concept of a peace to be kept than one that 

must be enforced or "implemented. " Use of misleading terminology just to 

keep the term "peace " in the label should be discouraged, for it blurs the essential 

legal distinction under the Charter between traditional peacekeeping practices 

and genuine Chapter VII or VI II enforcement actions. Not surprisingly, the UN 

Charter is not the source of the phrase "peace enforcement." Rather, the UN 

Charter term that refers to general Chapter VII authorizations is "enforcement 

measures. " The specific term, embodied in Article 42, to connote even great er 

use of armed force against a non-consenting party is "enforcement action. " 

These Charter terms are used correctly in this study wherever possible. The 

term "enforcement measures," taken from Article 41 , refers to coercive means 

such as econo mic sanctions, interruption of communications, and diplomatic 

pressures. It is also broad enough to include more direct use of military force . 

For this latter idea, however, the term "enforcement action," taken from Article 

45 
The Newport Papers 

42, is even more accurate and is used in this study when the narrOwer meaning 

is intended. 

Nato Peacekeeping Mand ates 

Principles . As we have seen, part of the reason that the term "peaceke eping" 

sufers trom imprecision is that the concept derived from UN and State practice, 

not from express terms in the Charter. The advantage of the loose, ordinary 

sen se in which it is commonly employed by the press and the general public is 

that the term conveys an idea that people perceive they understand. It is for that 

reason that the expression "peacekeeping operation" is used in this study to 

encompass both traditional peacekeeping and enforcement operations. It is 

stressed, however, that these two phrases refer to markedly different concepts 

under the UN Charter-the former to be run by the Secretariat and the latter 

by the Security Council. The most important result is that a traditional 

peacekeeping mandate implies, in principle, no need for the use of armed force 

while an enforcement action mandate authorizes, in pr inciple, the use of armed 

force. Looked at in another way, traditional peacekeepers operate at the behest 

of all the parties to the conflict or dispute. Enforcement troops, by contrast, are 

tasked to enforce the will of the Security Council on the non-consenting 

factions or States. 

When Nato leaders decided in 1 992 that Nato would undertake peacekeeping operations out of the region only under UN or OSeE mandate, this decision 

was consistent with Nato's status as an Article 51 (Chapter VII) self-defense 

organization as distinguished trom an Article 53 (Chapter VIII) collective 

security organization. But the door was left open for Nato to undertake 

peacekeeping operations within the region either as it was or as an expanded 

Nato, or as a regional organization composed of both Nato members and new 

"partners" from the former Soviet bloc. We now see IFOR operating outside 

the Nato treaty region in Bosnia and there is also discussion about using Nato 

forces clearly outside the Parties' territories in Nato's southern flank. Whatever 

form multilateral peacekeeping operations take within the Nato environment, 

development of a common doctrine for the use of armed force must be a 

priority. Joint exerci�es with diverse nation participation are highly desirable 

prior to an actual military deployment. Moreover, at the moment, they seem 

to play well politically. This encourages even greater efforts at coordination 

among the prospective nations, and that is al

 to the good. However, war games 

are not the same as actual engagement in armed conflict. An expanded Nato 

has a long way to go before new members will o perate smoothly in truly hostile 

46 
"What Color Helmet? 

situations without creating unacceptable dangers. A ccordingly, careful attention 

ought to be given to the framing of Security Council mandates and the essential 

operating requirements to impl ement them well before the time arrives to 

deploy such Nato forces in combat. 

Based on the foregoing review of the UN Charter and subsequent peacekeeping practice, the author concludes that a Security Council mandate for any 

combined multinational peacekeeping operation that might involve traditional 

peacekeeping as well as enfo rcement measures, possibly including expanded 

Nato military forces , ought to include th e following pr inciples: 

1. Peacekeeping operatio ns will be carried out only at the request and under 

the authority of either the UN Security Council under Chapter VII or the 

oseE under Chapter VIII. 

2. The UN Security Council or the OSCE will consult with contributing 

States on a case-by-case basis to determine command and control arrangements 

tailored to each peacekeeping operation. 

3. Peac ekeeping operations will be undertaken only to support the achievement of clearly defined and agreed upon political objectives as determined by 

the UN S ecurity Council or OSCE mandating authority. 

4. Peacekeeping operatio ns will have clearly established conditions for withdrawal, termination, or escalation. 

5. Firm financial commitments to pay for the peac ekeeping operations will 

be agreed upon before military forces deploy. 

Operating Requirements. The distinction between peacekeeping and 

enfo rcement action is fundamentally important for yet another reason. The 

status of individuals under international law is directly linked to their use or 

nonuse of armed force. Consistent with that l ine of reasoning, traditional 

peac ekeeping forc es o ught to enj oy the status of n eutral s, while multinational 

forces engaged in UN enforcement action ought to be treated as combatants . 

Despite the obvious need for clarity on this matter, Nato as well as other 

Member State forces may be tasked to perform operations broadly labeled as 

"peacekeeping" which, in fact, consist of a mixture of activities ranging from 

humanitarian assistance to full-fledged enforcement action. In this setting, 

Daniel and Hayes have identified a spe ctrum of operations with three benchmarks: traditional peacekeeping, inducement, and enfo rcement.

14 They propose 

thoughtful recommendations to deal, in particular, with what they refer to as 

inducement operations in the "middle gro und." 

47 
The Newport Papers 

The mixed "war-peace " setting is, indeed, the central pro blem that must be 

addressed in developing rational mandates to guide multinational military fo rce!1-

engaged in peacekeeping operatiom. The problem i!1- mO!1-t acute in !1-ituatiom 

where a wide range of UN-sanctioned activities i!1- underway in the same area 

at the same time. The methodology chosen in thi!1- study, to stimulate discU!1.!1-io n 

on how multinational forces ought to o perate in "middle ground" settings, fint 

distinguishes three groups by the colon of their helmet!1-. For discussion 

purpose!1-, "White Helmets" are declared to be noncombatant!1-. "Blue Helmets" 

are the traditional, neutral UN peacekeepers. " Green H elmet!1-" are the normal 

military combatants maintained by Member S tates. 

The foremost requirement for any peacekeeping mis!1-ion is a clearly defined 

objective. If the mandate i!1- not easily understo od, or if the guidance from 

political author ities keeps changing, or if the military goals are ambiguous or 

contradictory, peacekeeping forces will be confused. In ad dition, the troops of 

contending factions may become confused. Confused troops are prone to make 

deadly mistakes. Accordingly, the designated collective secur ity command and 

its contr ibuting M embers must comult early and often to ensure that the 

mandate for the p eacekeeping operation is fully understood at all levels. From 

the out!1-et, the operational commander must know what is expected to ensure 

that suitable forces are !1-elected for the specifIC nilssion. Once underway, " nils!1-ion 

creep" should occur o nly by deliberate political decision. The temptation to be 

helpful will sometimes be overwhelming for commander!1- on the !1-cene, but it 

must be resisted if the proposed activity does not contribute directly to 

accompli!1-hment of the mi!1-sion. 

A second requirement, which applies only in the traditional peacekeeping 

operation, is that the Blue H elmet!1- must remain m ictly neutral and impartial. 

The credibility of UN forces as unbiased repre!1-entatives o f all nations preserving 

peace rests on conduct by its individual commanders and their troops that is , 

and i!1- perceived by the disputant!1- to be, even-handed. The Blue Helmets must 

not favor one faction or protect one contending group with greater vigor than 

another. Moreover, the protection or immunity that attaches to either White 

Helmet noncombatants or Blue Helmet neutrah is jeopardized wherever they 

and Green Helmet combatants are unnecessar ily commingled physically. Blue 

Helmets cannot initiate the use of offensive military force and expect immunity 

from those they attack. Equally, Green Helmet combatants cannot hide behind 

a Blue shield when their rules of engagement allow offensive use of nllitary 

weapons. 

A third requirement is that warring parties to the conflict truly consent, in 

good faith, to the presence and planned operatiom of the Blue H elmets. From 

48 
What Color Helmet? 

an international law standpoint, one of the consenting parties that must agree 

to the presence of the UN-sanctioned peacekeeping forces is the legally 

recognized government of the host nation. The Security Council must not 

expect the Secretary-General to take on the role of an invading commander. 

For his part, when host nation consent is uncertain or unreliable, the SecretaryGeneral must insist that the peacekeeping operations include appropriate 

war-fight ers under national command who are authorized by the Security 

Council to engage in the affirmative use of armed force. Ifhost nation c onsent 

is withdrawn, the UN Blue Helmets must leave the sovereign territory of the 

State where they are no longer welcome. 

A fourth requirement is that peacekeepers must have the means to implement 

the respective mandates they are given. UN forces must not be seen as "paper 

tigers. " The institutional effectiveness of the United Nations to promote peace 

in the long term is seriously harmed when Blue Helmets are assigned missions 

they cannot actually perform. The Security Council ought to include Green 

Helmets in its mandates where enforcement activities may arise. If the S ecre ­

tary-General does not have the personnel, e quipment, and other support 

necessary to fulflll the Security Council mandate, he must refuse to accept the 

peacekeeping mission. The Secretary-General has a solemn duty not to accept 

"mission impossible" mandates; he must insist upon an achievable mission, 

adequate resources and, if necessary, back-up forces supplied by Member States 

that are prepared for offensive military operations. Part of this point is that the 

United States and the o ther nations who are in the same category must pay 

their UN bills on time. Members in serious financial arrears ought to be 

restrained about requesting additional UN peacekeeping services . However, the 

essential concept is that the United Nations, as an institution, must be genuinely 

prepared not only with the political wil to "stay the course" but also with the 

financial resources to ensure that the required military personnel and equipment 

will be available to fulfil the mandate. The United Nations and Member States 

such as the United States must not take on peacekeeping missions when the 

resources needed to achieve the mandate are in doubt. Concisely expressed, it 

is better no t to go at al than to go and do badly. A related notion is that the 

United N ations simply cannot do all it wants to do any more than a national 

government can. 

A fifth requirement for a multin ational peacekeeping operation destined for 

a mixed setting is clear command and control over the respective groups 

deployed. The relationships between the White, Blue, and Green Helmets will 

be illustrated in the next section. To begin, written documents that provide for 

close coordination between those in charge of the humanitarian, traditional 

49 
The Newport Papers 

peacekeeping and enforcement personnel must be in place in advance of 

deployment. One UN commander wearing a Blue Helmet must be in charge 

of al national military contingents dedicated to a particular traditional 

peacekeeping operation. An agreed upon representative in the theater of 

operations for all of the nongovernmental organizations involved in humanitarian assistance must be asked to sign on to the UN plan. If a White Helmet 

group is unwilling to sign such an agreement, the United Nations and its 

Member States should deny it any support whatsoever. Green Helmets , such as 

the regular military units in Nato, will undoubtedly have a single military officer 

commander who is empowered to act as commander for the combatants. The 

point is that authority, responsibility, and accountability for each helmet color 

must be cl early established at the o utset of any UN operation potentially 

involving the use of force. 

50 
IV 

Several M ixed Peacekeeping Scenarios 

UN PEACEKEEPING PRACTICE has evolved over many years without 

articulation of a consistent and well-thought-out doctrine on the all-important issue of the use of force. Since peacekeeping operations were launched 

as practical responses by the United Nations to m eet urgent demands that the 

organization play a constructive role in defusing international conflicts , the 

practice fo r multinational operations under UN auspices developed case by case. 

A central thesis in this study is that, with clarifications, the framework in the 

UN Charter provides an acceptable and workable basis for multinational 

peacekeeping operations. The point of view is that deficiencies in UN perfo rmance are not due to a fundamentally flawed Charter but rather are due to a 

misapplication of pr inciples implicit in it. The most common error with respect 

to issuing peacekeeping mandates has b een the failure of the Secur ity Council 

to distinguish clearly between consensual and coercive activities. From a legal 

point of view, the Charter is founded on consent from sovereign States. And 

consent is a crucial legal pr incipl e in its own right in al legal systems. In the 

cr iminal law, for instance, the absence of consent can be the difference between 

lawful assisted suicide and unlawful murder. As a practical matter, the Security 

Council ough t to pursue a more rational and co nsistent approach for peacekeeping activities within the existing framework, since amendment of the Charter is 

not only not imminent but also unnecessary. S everal hypo thetical scenarios 

follow that are intended to illustrate how peacekeeping practice might be 

conducted to comp ort better with the UN Charter as it is wr itten. Part of the 

assumptions in the scenarios is that peacekeeping operations o ccur in a mixed 

setting between peace and war and that Nato's military capacity has been 
The Newport Papers 

expanded in some way to include Russia and other former Soviet Union 

nations. 

Traditional peacekeeping operations are frequently referred to as "Blue 

Helmet " operations, bec ause peacekeepers normally wear a blue covering on 

their heads to identify their affiliation with the United Nations. The operational 

commander of Blue Helmet forces is a regular military officer of a Member 

State who is temporar ily detailed to service under the UN Secretary-General. 

The Clinton administration's policy on "Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations," issued in May 1 994, places lead management and funding responsibility 

for u.s. partic�ation in Blue H elmet operations in the hands of the U.S. State 

Department. 1 This policy decision is consistent with the view advanced in this 

study that UN forces should be strictly confined to consensual operations. 

Moreover, the author's view is that U.S. ground troops ought no t to be deployed 

as peacekeepers wearing Blue Helmets . Prior to the breakup of the S oviet 

Union, none of the Permanent Members of the Security Council served as 

traditional peacekeepers. This practice has many advantages , not the least of 

which is the strong desire in the U. S. Congress that Amer ican forces not serve 

un der foreign commanders save for an unexpanded Nato. 

The characterization "Green Helmets" is used in the scenarios that follow 

to refer to the conventional air, ground, and sea military forces that are 

maintained by most Member nations. The color green was selected because that 

is the typical color of the helmet worn by ground combat troops. " Green 

Helmet" is simply a shorthand fIgure of speech selected to denote the conventional military combatant forces of Member States whose actions are governed 

by the customary laws of armed c onflict. The premise in this study is that Green 

Helmets are presumptively combat forces who do not perform traditional 

peacekeeping tasks . The traditional peacekeeping role would be played by Blue 

Helmets who serve concurrently in the same "mixed" consensual and c oercive 

conflict area with Green H elmets. In the UN peacekeeping c ontext advanced 

in this study, Green Helmet forces participating in a mixed multinational 

peacekeeping operation would report directly to the professional military 

officers in their chain of command. The Green Helmets would not report to a 

UN commander. Green H elmet commanders would be nationals of a Member 

State that is either part of a Unified Command operation mandated by the 

Security Council under Chapter VII or a regional organization functioning in 

a c ollective security capacity, e.g., OSeE/Nato revised under Chapter VIII. The 

Unified Command or regional organization would establish its respective chain 

of command as directed by the contributing nations. 

52 
J¥hat Color Helmet? 

The main idea is that for enforcement actions that would be conducted only 

by Green Helmets, a single chain of command would be set up by the nations 

themselves. This chain would be clearly designated on an agreed upon basis 

with policy guidance set at political levels, e.g., North Atlantic Council or oseE. 

Formal reports from the military command in the theater of operation would 

flow through the designated chain of command for interface with the United 

Nations elements first at political levels. One or more accredited representatives 

from major contributing nations to a mixed operation wo uld report directly to 

the Security Council on the Green Helmet enforcement activities. As the 

mandate to enforce comes from the UN Charter, the contributing Members 

would have neither more nor less authority than that which the Security 

Council rightfully bestowed for the particular enforcement operations. To 

repeat, Green Helmets would not report formally to the Secretary-General or 

to any of his appointed military commanders. By contrast, the Secretary-General 

would continue to report to the Security Council on all Blue Helmet 

peacekeeping activities as he has traditionally done. A clear, political chain of 

command is absolutely necessary to facilitate complete co operation between 

Blue and Green Helmet military commanders in the area of potential hostilities. 

Likewise, there must be extensive coordination between Green and Blue units 

at the operational level in a mixed "war-peace" s.etting. The working assumption 

must be that there is agreement on the mission mandate and the respective roles 

to be played by the Blue and the Green Helmets. In the United States, the 

Defense Department has the lead responsibility for oversight, management, and 

financial support of all U.S. participation in Green Helmet operations.

16 Again, 

this policy decision by the Clinton administration is consistent with the legal 

theory that Green Helmets are combatants who ought to be led by experienced 

military professionals. 

The term "White Helmets," as used in this study, refers to an eclectic 

assortment of civilians or other noncombatant groups who may be affiliated 

with UN peacekeeping operations in a mixed setting. The United Nations itself 

has numerous specialized agencies, such as the World Health Organization, that 

are often heavily engaged in humanitarian activities in combat zones. These 

organizations often work side-by-side in the field with nongovernmental entities, e.g., the International Committee of the Red Cross. Customary law of war 

principles confer a protected status on civilians, including media personnel , 

civilian contractors, and other noncombatants indirectly associated with combat 

operations. Civilians who refrain from war-like activities are legally entitled to 

protected-person treatment that is consistent with their non-warlike activities. 

White Helmets will almost always be civilians, but could be military medical 

53 
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doctors or nurses, for instance , providing humanitarian assistance. When Blue 

or Green H elmets are temporarily tasked to directly support humanitarian 

activities, temporary rules pertaining to their status for the purposes of the 

p articular missio n should apply, as discussed below. 

Keeping in mind three categories-no ncombatants, neutrals, and c ombatants 

that generally correspond to White, Blue, and Green H elmets-imagine the 

following scenar io. A European Member of the United Nations has been 

subjected to protracted civil strife with rival ethnic groups pitted against one 

ano ther. The armed conflict sometimes spills over to neighboring countries. 

The UN Secretary-General, with the support of several European regional 

organizations, brokers an uneasy truce. The contending forces, including the 

legally recognized representatives of the host State that is a Member of the 

United Nations, sign a peace accord. The accord, inter alia, invites UN p eacekeep ­

ers into that country's sovereign territory to help with a deter iorating humanitarian situatio n and to enforce the peace settlement as provided in the accord. 

The Secur ity Council passes a resolution on the situation with three distinct 

mandates. The fir st is that the Secretary-General is urged to facilitate humanitarian assistance efforts and to support those who are engaged in UN-ap proved 

relief activities. The second is that the Secretary-General is asked to prepare a 

Blue Helmet operation for the host nation that will be funded through the 

General Assembly. The Blue Helmets' mission includes providing civilian 

policemen to assist in re-establishing domestic law and order and military 

observers to monitor neutral zones designated in the peace accord to separate 

the warring factions. As traditional peacekeepers, the Blue Helmets are lightly 

armed and are authorized to use deadly force only as a last resort for p ersonal 

or UI1lt self-defense. The third portion of the Security Council mandate accepts 

an offer from a European regional organization to lead and to fund a Unified 

Coalition of Member States who will provide the Green Helmets for the 

operation in this mixed "war-peace" setting. The missio n of the Green Helmets, 

who will be drawn from a Nato plus other nations coalition, is to enforce the 

peace accord that was signed by warring faction leaders. The Green Helmets 

may also respond to requests from the Blue H elmet commander to employ 

levels of force beyond the Blue Helmet's capabilities. 

Assume further that White, Blue, and Green H elmets are now on the ground 

in the host State's terr itory as mandated by Security Council resolutions. Prior 

to the in-country deployment of either the Blue or Green Helmets, several 

agreements were executed. An aide memoire between the UN Secretariat and 

the tro op-contributing countries laid out the guidelines for assigning personnel 

and equipment for Blue Helmet service. None of the Blue Helmets are from 

54 
What Color Helmet? 

a nation with permanent membership on the Security Council. A status of 

forces agreement (SOFA) between the United Nations and the host nation 

representatives is reached that defmes the legal relationships between the Blue 

Helmets and the host nation. In this case, a model S OFA on file with the 

Secretary-General had been incorporated by reference in the Peace Accord and 

declared provisionally applicable. It is stipulated that the Peace Accord was 

properly executed by appropriate political representatives in the host nation, 

including the government recognized by the States involved. The Peace Accord 

provides that Blue Helmet personnel will be entitled to the pr ivileges and 

immunities accorded " experts on mission," i.e., the status enjoyed by UN agents 

while engaged in offic ial duties. Supplementary administrative and operating 

regulations tailored to this particular operation will be issued as circumstances 

require and time permits. The Blue and Green Helmet military commanders 

have jointly prepared and issued a combined strategic operations plan that, inter 

alia, spells out compatible but clearly separate rules of engagement geared to 

their respective military roles. One important agreed upon rule is that the Green 

Helmets may only initiate offensive operations against forces deemed hostile to 

the Blue Helmets when asked to do so by the Blue Helmet command. Once 

engaged in hostilities initiated at the request of the Blue Helmets, the Green 

Helmets will disengage either when the requested mission is accomplished, 

consistent with the safety of Green Helmets, or when the Blue Helmet 

command asks them to cease operations. The Green H elmets have no obligation 

to cease operations in a way that is inconsistent with their customary law rights 

of self-defense. In fact, an important pr inciple expressed in the combined 

operations plan is that neither Blue nor Green Helmet forces ever relinquish 

their inherent right and duty of individual or unit self-defense. Lastly, a UN 

advance team had concluded memoranda of under standing (MOUs) with the 

International Committee of the Red Cross and several o ther humanitarian 

groups active in the ho st nation. These MOUs were directed primarily at 

practical ways to maintain the distinction betwe en the purely humanitarian 

activities of the White Helmets, the UN traditional peacekeeping operations of 

the Blue Helmets, and the UN enforcement actions of the Green Helmets. The 

MOUs also establish effective communication networks to ensure that there are 

practical means for close consultation on humanitarian activities between the 

White and Blue Helmets on the one hand and close coordination on operational 

use of force matter s between the Blue Helmets and the Green Helmets on the 

other. 

A condition for UN support for the White Helmets is that they be present 

in the area of potential hostilities at the request of all contending factions in the 

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host nation. The White Helmets are likely to become engaged in activities such 

as in distr ibuting food and providing medical assistance throughout the host 

nation. In these activities, the White H elmets may be assisted from time to time 

by either Blue or Green Helmet military units. For example, the u.s. Army 

Corps of Engineers units serving as Green Helmets may make available to the 

White Helmets the personnel and material needed to build water purification 

facilities. The u.s. Air Force may also provide C-17 aircraft to ferry supplies 

into the host nation to support the White H elmet humanitarian assistance 

efforts. 

The White Helmets consist of numerous organizations with various nationals 

from around the world. In this scenario, the Blue H elmet forces are drawn from 

the Netherlands, Norway, and Poland and are led by a Dutch br igadier general . 

The expanded Nato-led Green Helmet combatants are drawn from seven 

contributing nations, including Russia and the United States. The commander 

in the host nation of these expanded Nato-led forces is a national of France; his 

deputy is a national of Russia. The Green H elmet air units are under the 

comb ined command of a United States Air Force officer. 

What is the status of the respective individuals participating in this mixed 

UN peacekeeping operation? What rules govern their use or nonuse of force? 

The White Helmet civilians are noncombatants who are entitled to the 

protections afforded in the Fourth 1 949 Geneva Convention Relative to the 

Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. The White Helmets are not 

obligated to wear a uniform, but it is desirable that they take care to distinguish 

themselves from indigenous factions who may be lawful hostile fire targets. The 

White Helmets should, in pr inciple, not carry arms or engage directly in 

combatant activities. Their legal right to carry arms is the same as that of an 

ordinary citizen in the host nation who might car ry small arms strictly for 

personal self-defense. To avoid j eopardizing their protected per son status under 

international law, they should confme their activities to humanitarian work and 

not wilingly become directly engaged in hostilities. Legally, the White H elmets 

are not to be captured or treated as combatants. Killing them deliberately is the 

crime of murder under the laws of the host nation and may be a grave breach 

of the laws of war under international law. 

The Blue Helmet troops that assist the White Helmets incur no change in 

legal status by render ing humanitarian assistance. They wear uniforms and c arry 

small arms openly. The main duty of all UN Blue Helmet peac ekeepers is to 

help all humanity in an impartial manner. Therefore, it is important that the 

Blue Helmets make every effort to treat all host nation groups impartially. After 

all, the Blue Helmets are representatives of the United Nations as a whole. The 

56 
What Color Helmet? 

UN Blue Helmet troops' arms are appropriate for the polic e-like functions and 

related neutral duties they undertake to perform with the prior consent of the 

host nation. Likewise, the SOFA rules conferring privileges and immunities for 

UN "experts on mission" apply to the Blue Helmets. Blue Helmets are not to 

be captured by hostile forces or treated as prisoners of war. If detained or taken 

into custody by hostile forces, they are entitled to immediate release. 

Green Helmet forces, such as military engineers or cargo aircraft crews 

directly assisting White Helmets, also ought to have the same neutral status as 

Blue Helmet forces have, so long as these Green Helme ts are directly engaged 

solely in humanitarian activities. To be legally entitled to the privileges and 

immunities granted to Blue Helmets, however, the Green Helmets must assume 

the burdens that go with the benefits of that status. The SOFA must expressly 

confer Blue Helmet neutral status on Green Helmets while they are under 

orders to directly support humanitarian activities. During that time, the Green 

Helmets should wear distinctive insignia on their helmets and uniforms to 

identify their temporary Blue Helmet status. If they comply, but are, nevertheless , 

captured, they are legally entitl ed to "expert on mission" status and are not to 

be treated as prisoners of war. Consistent with their status as neutrals, the arms 

that Green Helmet forces may c arry while rendering direct assistance to White 

Helmets must be comparable to what the Blue Helmets would car ry insofar as 

practicable. To remain entitled to Blue Helmet status , the Green Helmet 's 

vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and other equipment should be clearly marked to 

indicate that they are temporarily engaged in noncombatant activities. Absent 

clear indications to the contrary, Green Helmets will be correctly presumed by 

hostile forces to be combatants. There is, of course, no obligation on the part 

of Green Helmets to claim the status of Blue Helmets. They may elect to remain 

as combatants even while helping the White Helmets. In such a case, there is 

no issue about the extent of the military hardware carried. But, as such, they 

remain combatants and are prisoners of war if captured by hostile forces. White 

Helmets, however, may prefer that Green Helmet forces actually claim the status 

of (and wear the insignia of) Blue Helmets during humanitarian assistance 

activities, since Green Helmets may draw fire as legitimate targets by hostile 

forces even though directly engaged in humanitarian activities. The most 

important law of war principle to bear in mind throughout all the above 

circumstances is that the reason to maintain a clear distinction between 

combatants, neutrals and noncombatants is to protect noncombatants from 

hostile use of force. 

Next, assume that a White Helmet motor transport convoy carrying food 

and medicine under the direction of a medical doctor from the UN World 

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Health Organization is en rou te to a geographic center from which humanitarian supplies are distributed to anyone in need. However, the center is located 

in a region of the host nation that is predominately inhabited by one of the 

warring ethnic groups. As a practical matter, this me ans that almost all of the 

humanitar ian assistance activitie s at the center inure to the benefit of one 

particular ethnic group. The convoy is stopped by a rogue band made up of 

paramilitary forces from another ethnic group that is embittered by what they 

consider to be the human rights violations committed by individuals who are 

of the same ethnic group as the inhabitants near the distribution center. 

Providing supplies to the distribution center is seen by the rogues as a belligerent 

act that directly aids their enemies. The convoy is protected by Blue Helmets 

under the command of a Norwegian major, who rides at the front of the convoy 

in his white radio jeep that is prominently flying a UN flag. The drivers and the 

trucks transporting the supplies are from a Green Helmet unit on temporary 

detail from a Turkish military detachment. As authorized in the SOFA for this 

type of situation, the Turkish troops wear blue plastic covers stretched over their 

green helmets and have plastic UN banners clearly displayed on their vehicles. 

The leader of the rogue band that surrounds the convoy demands that all the 

cargo and supplies be relinquished to his forces. 

For dealing with potential hostilities, it was agreed by MOU in advance that 

the UN 's Norwegian Blue Helmet officer would assume command and control 

of the humanitarian convoy operation. The United Nations is responsible for 

the safe passage of the White Helmets and for their shipment of humanitarian 

supplies. We may assume that the Turkish troops, who are openly assisting the 

White Helmets, have complied with the legal requirements detailed in the SOFA 

and MOUs. Accordingly, they are temporarily entitled to Blue Helmet noncombatant status while performing this humanitarian assistance role. Of course, 

the Turkish forces must continue to act like Blue Helmets to be entitle d to be 

treated like Blue Helmets. 

This situation illustrates why it is absolutely essential that Green Helmet 

troops, who are highly trained for immediate reaction in combat situations, 

clearly understand their status and the applic able rules of engagement prior to 

the time that hostile inc idents arise. Assume in this c ase that the Norwegian 

major has an opportunity to negotiate with the leader of the rogue band. In 

addition to explaining carefully the noncombatant or neutral status of all the 

individuals for whom he is responsible, the major points out that he is in radio 

communication with Green Helmets whose F-16 tactical support aircraft are 

circling overhead. He also informs the rogue commander that the route was 

planned in advance and, therefore, has pre-plotted targets. Part of the contin58 
What Color Helmet? 

gency planning for the convoy operation was that the Green Helmets programmed naval gunfire and heavy artillery on likely ambush sites such as this. 

While the rogue band firepower may be superior to that of the Blue Helmet 

protection force, the Green Helmets are on stand-by to render rapid strike 

assistance if requested. The major explains that , unlike the Blue Helmets, the 

Green Helmets are ready and willing to engage, consistent with the laws of 

armed conflict, in all-out warfare against the rogue band. 

In the above scenario, the Blue Helmet major may or may not talk his way 

out of hostilities with the rogue band. But certainly his chances of avoiding 

conflict seem better by having ready recourse to the Green Helmet's war-making capability. If hostilities ensue, in spite of the UN officer's effortS to avoid 

them, the Green Helmets are militar ily equipped to enforce the UN mandate 

by deadly use of force actions. This capability should help maintain respect for 

the overall UN peacekeeping efforts. Moreover, the hands of the Blue Helmet 

are kept morally "cleaner" than if the major were threatening to use force with 

his own Blue Helmets. Future contacts b etween the rogue 's ethnic allies and 

the Blue Helmets should not be as confrontational as would be the case if the 

Blue Helmets were forced into either backing down or themselves engaging in 

direct armed conflict. At the same time, the Green Helmets are, righ tly, more 

interested in rogue fear than friendship. The Green Helmet mind-set and mission 

remain clear. If called into combat, they are not confused about their mandate: 

their mission is to find and destroy the enemy. 

Assume another scenario. The Blue Helmets' mission is to provide security 

for a UN-designated "safe haven" where refugees may gather away from armed 

hostilities to receive medical care, food, and related humanitar ian assistance. At 

an earlier stage in the strife, the principal leaders of the contending forces agreed 

to the establishment of this safe haven site. However, the Blue Helmet commander now has reliable intelligence that armed forces composed of one ethnic 

group turned "rogue " are planning to launch an attack on the safe haven. The 

camp is filled with refugees from an ethnic group who are mortal enemies of 

the armed forces expected to attack. In better times, UN political leaders had 

widely broadcast that the safe haven would be a sanctuary under UN protection 

for all refugees who fled there. The Blue Helmet commander lacks the troops 

and weapons to repel the attack. What can he do? 

Assume that the political will exists in the Security Council and on the part 

of the Secretary-General to protect the refugee safe haven and that the Green 

Helmets have received an appropriate urgent authorization to provide "all 

necessary means" of assistance to the Blue H elmet commander. The Dutch Blue 

Helmet commander makes direct contact with the French Green Helmet 

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The Newport Papers 

commander to request military assistance from the Gre en Helmets to defend 

the safe haven refuge e site. At the stage when "all necessary means" use offorce 

assistance is requested from the Green Helmets, the Blue Helmets are obligated 

by MOUs to provide all their available intelligence about hostile forces and the 

military situation pertaining to the camp. 

The Blue H elmet commander may tell the Green Helmet commander what 

the military force assistance mission is, but not how the Green Helmets are to 

accomplish it. Maintenance of a viable symbiotic relationship between the Blue 

and Green Helmets in mixed "war-peace" settings is dependent upon close and 

continuous coordination between the two forces. But the Green H elmet 

commander is under no obligation to risk his troops on mission requests 

encumbered with unacceptable terms and conditions imp osed by the Blue 

Helmet commander. Likewise, the Blue H elmet commander should no t request 

assistance ifhe judges that the rogue group's likely reaction to the Green H elmet 

intervention outweighs the benefit of requesting combatant assistance. The 

nature of the agreed relationship is that the Blue Helmet commander requests 

the mission and the Green Helmet commander may accept it or reject it. Ifhe 

accepts it, the Green Helmet commander executes it as he sees fit until the 

mission is over. The point is that military necessity dictates that the ultimate 

selection of the means to accomplish a combatant mission is dec ided by the 

Green Helmet commander. 

Assume in this case that the mission portrayed by the Blue Helmet commander is for the Green Helmets to protect th e safe haven refugee c amp from 

an anticipated attack by a rogue ethnic band. This mission assignment is accepted 

by the Green Helmet commander. 

The Green H elmet commander tasks a reinforced battalion of U.S. Marines 

located on an offshore assault ship to undertake an urgent, initial deployment 

to commence accomplishment of the mission. Assume that this unit is forward 

deployed expressly to support UN operations as part of a Nato amphibious task 

force that is on station in the Mediterranean Sea. Within a few hours of receiving 

the mission request, contingent operations plans are appropr iat ely adapted, and 

the Marines are helicoptered to the safe haven site area in the host nation. Within 

another few hours , the Marine s establish an outer defensive p er imeter around 

the Blue Helmet's inner security ring around the refugee camp. Additional 

equipment and personnel continue to arr ive, including a British psychological 

operations unit that erects a large radio broadcast tower. This unit will concentrate on informin g the populace in the host nation of the reasons for the 

UN -sponsored military activities that are being undertaken with the consent of 

the legitimate government. Six pieces of Russian h eavy artillery are brought in 

60 
Mat Color Helmet? 

by U.S. Air Force C-1 7 aircraft , which are able to l and on the makeshift former 

commercial landing strip now secured within the Marines' defensive per imeter. 

The Russian combat troops are under the command of a Russian artillery 

captain who reports through the single Green Helmet chain of command for 

al expanded Nato forces engaged in enforcement action in the host nation. 

Prior to deployment, Russian political representatives h ad agreed to the 

contribution of the Russian troops and equipment for this operation. U.S. N avy 

and Marine close air support aircraft have been flying overhead since accompanying the initial helicopter assault forces into the combat area. In short, all of 

the usual warfighting activities neces sary for a successful military operation are 

put into motion by the military professionals in the expanded Nato. One unusual 

command and control aspect is that the French Green Helmet commander, in 

addition to his deputy from Russia, has at least one senior officer on his personal 

staff, either from each of the nations contributing forces or their designated 

proxy. These officers are empowered to make recommendations, at any stage, 

to their respective national military commands regarding the conduct of the 

comb at operations being conducted by expanded Nato forces. Such recommendations could include termination of that nation 's voluntary suppo rt of any 

UN enforcement action, including this one, which is to pro tect the safe haven 

refugee camp. Part of the advance agreement b etween the contributing Member 

States is that such withdrawal will not be implemented in a way that unduly 

jeopardizes the lives of other Nato forces continuing in the engagement . 

The Green Helmets will provide protection for the safe haven until asked to 

leave by the Blue Helmet commander o r by the lawful government of the host 

natio n. The Green Helmets would of course also leave when ordered to do so 

by the Green H elmet operational commander. 

The Blue Helmet commander may decide that it is too risky to ask for Green 

Helmet assistance, and the Blue Helmets are under no obligation to request 

assistance. But it should be obvious that the Blue Helmets cannot accomplish 

their mission as mandated by the Security Council without the genuine 

cooperation of the armed factions in the h ost nation. When faced with hostilities, 

the Blue Helmets retain the discretion to decide whether to stay in command 

and control . They may not want to pass operational command and control to 

the Green Helmets. But once passed, forces hostile to the UN troo ps must 

understand that wh en the Green Helmets decide to use a particular type or 

amount of armed force against an enemy. th at is a matter between the Green 

Helmets and the enemy. The Blue Helmets are out of the decision lo op. Even 

without a Blue Helmet request, the Green Helmets are under no obligation to 

stand by helplessly and watch a slaughter of civilians or other innocents. 

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The Newport Papers 

including Blue Helmets. Green Helmet political lead ers may decide on their 

own to take hostile action against rogues, or any other enemy. But such use of 

force in the peacekeeping area of operations must be lawful either under the 

UN Charter, pursuant to Security Council mandate, or by agreement with the 

host State. To keep their status as a legitimate enforcement agent for the S ecurity 

Council, for example, the Green Helmets would be required to act within the 

legal parameters of the resolutions authorizing their involvement. If th e UN 

mandate were too restrictive, the political leaders controlling an expanded 

Nato's military forces should refuse to take the mission. They should also refuse 

missions where the mandate from the Security Council is ambiguous. 

In the above scenarios, the Blue and Green H elmets' use of armed force is 

consist ent with the UN Charter as well as with accepted conventional and 

customary international law. The troops know their status-if in doubt, they 

can check the color of their helmets. Blue Helmets are not neutrals one moment 

and combatants the next. Likewise, Green H elmets are combatants unless they 

carefully comply with previously agreed upon ar rangements negotiated with 

the host nation whereby they may temporarily enjoy "expert on mission" status. 

Equally important, all others, including potential hostile forces, should be able 

to readily identify the status of individuals and their equipment. If rogue forces 

kill a White or Blue Helmet, this is the domestic crime of murder with only 

the defenses and mitigation permitted under the judicial system of the host 

nation. The ac t may also be a war crime within the jurisdictional competence 

of an international criminal court. If rogue forces kill a Green Helmet in combat , 

it is not murder anymore than it is murder if one of the rogue forces is kil

ed 

by the Green Helmets. Both are full-fledged combatants whose conduct is 

governed by the laws of armed conflict. The principle is that establishing a clear 

status for different categories of troops in mixed hostilities is indispensable 

consider ing the legal consequences that follow from that status. 

From the point of view of command and control, Blue Helmets are ultimately 

responsible to the Secretary-General who, in turn, on traditional peacekeeping 

missions, reports to the Secur ity Council. The Secretary-General is also accountable to the General Assembly, who must pay the bills for the peacekeeping 

operations he supervises. By contrast, the Green Helmet chain of command 

flows through a Unified or Coalition commander, probably designated by Nato, 

perhaps under a regional organization such as the OSCE. The OSCE qualifies 

as a regional collective secur ity organization that is entitled, under Article 53 

in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, to assist the Security Council in carrying 

out Chapter VII enforcement actions. Nato does not presently so qualify, but 

the North Atlantic Treaty could be re-negotiated to allow this legal possibility. 

62 
What Color Helmet? 

An interesting variation is that Nato could serve as one entity contributing 

forces to a newly created Chapter VIII collective security arrangement for the 

North Atlantic region. The other contributing entities could be expanded Nato 

member States participating in their individual, as distinguished from their 

collective, capacity. From a domestic perspective, this would entail obtaining 

the advice and consent of the United States Senate. To elaborate: it is not 

unlawful from the perspective of international law for Nato to be used as a 

Chapter VIII regional enforcement organization so long as the activities are 

approved by the Nato heads of State or their agents. At the same time, it is not 

lawful under the domestic Constitutional processes in the United States to use 

Nato as a Chapter VIII collective security organization without obtaining the 

advice and consent of the U.S. Senate. As is evident from the text of its Article 

5, the Senate only approved the North Atlantic Treaty as an Article 5 1 , Chapter 

VII self-defense organization. 

The legal rules governing peacekeeping operations in mixed "war-peace " 

settings are not easy to unravel, but they can be sorted out with clear thinking 

and mental discipline on the part of political leaders. The S ecretary-General 

can serve as an even-handed representative of all sovereign Me mbers, and 

traditional peacekeeping that has been successful when done properly can 

continue un der the UN Charter as written . There is little that is unusual about 

the combined-color Helmet operations described in this study except the 

no tion that the Blue Helmet commander has the author ity to withdraw his 

request for Green Helmet assistance on missions undertaken at Blue Helmet 

request. 

As no ted earlier, in the United States, the Department of D efense, pursuant 

to the May 1 994 presidential decision, has lead management and funding 

responsibility for U.S. participation in Green H elmet operations, whether they 

occur under traditional peacekeeping or enforcement action mandates from the 

Security Council. Significantly, the approach suggested in this study does not 

co ntemplate UN funding for Green Helmets, whose actions are focused almost 

exclusively on enforcement. The costs of Green Helmets are to be paid by the 

contributing Members who must also pay their UN-determined share to other 

nations who provide troops for traditional UN peacekeeping Blue H elmet 

operations. It is exp ected that the approach outlined in this study will discourage 

the United Nations from overreaching into risky and expensive ventures with 

traditional peacekeepers, as the policy of the Security Council will be to leave 

enforcement to Member State forces who do not repo rt to the Security Council 

through the Secretary-General . 

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The Newport Papers 

One downside to this approach is that the United S caces and o cher States 

with the ability to influence Security Council mandates paid by the United 

Nations would have to pay for the enforcement actions they support out of 

their national budgets. In addition, the lives laid on the line for UN enforcement 

operations would be those of nationals from the Member States whose military 

services would be doing the enforcing. The perceived advantage of cost-sharing 

for enforcement operations from Germany, japan, and other UN Members in 

general would be lost. Still, the net effect of the approach is that the United 

Nations as such would be kept away from enforcement operations it cannot 

afford and should not be involved in anyway. An additional result under this 

approach is that the United States and other nations contributing Green 

Helmets would be discouraged from entering into enforcement operations. 

Certainly, the U.S. Congress would h ave more input into Green Helmet 

decisions than it does n ow when there is confusion about whether the 

comm.itment is for a Blue or Green Helmet operation. From the perspective 

of the United States, any Administration is less likely to commit U.S. military 

forces to Green Helmet operations without consultation with Congress. The 

mere fact that such consultation will occur is likely to act as a brake on the 

comm.itment of forces overseas. 

64 
v 

Reforming Security Council Peacekeeping Mandates 

�HE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD return to the basic principles in the 

Jl UN Charter and apply its provisions regarding use of force clearly and 

consistently with resp ect to al peacekeeping operations. In doctr ine and 

application, personnel should have no confusion about their roles: White 

Helmets are unarmed noncombatants; Blue Helmets are lightly armed neutrals; 

and Green Helmets are fully armed combatants. Civilians may command White 

Helmets; the Secretary-General's military commander may command Blue 

Helmets; and a UN-approved Member-State coalition or regional colle ctive 

security organization 's military commander may command Green Helmets. 

The structure of the UN Charter provides for a gradual escalation from 

low-key preventive diplomacy by the Secretary-General to full-scale offensive 

military action (when authorized by the Security Council) by Member States 

to maintain international peace and se curity. The Security Council is o bligated 

to exhaust Chapter VI me asures before invoking " Chapter VI and a half' 

traditional peacekeeping actions. Chapter VII enforcement measures are to be 

led by collective security alliances consisting of Member S tates, not by the 

Secretary-General. The North Atlantic Treaty needs to be ren egotiated before 

Nato is legally empowered under U.S. law to act o ther than as an Article 51 

self-defense force in the current p arties' terr itories. In any event, the role of the 

Secretary-General is consistent with the UN Charter when limited to traditional 

peacekeeping. The Security Council has a responsibility to provide sufficiently 

clear guidance so that agreed upon rules of engagement detail the exact 

circumstances under which military armed force is authorized in all UN 

operations. The need for consistent UN use of fo rce doctrine has never been 
The Newport Papers 

greater, given th e current trend to lace together diverse coalitions with both 

police and combatant functions that are expected to be performed in mixed 

"war-pe ace " settings. Moreover, to cope with the greater number of regional 

conflicts since the end of the Cold War, the United N ations is likely to make 

greater use of Chapter VI II regional peacekeepers. Truly combined multinational forces, with rapid response capabilities, are emerging to meet that need 

in the Nato context. Proper Secur ity Council mandates should draw a br ight 

line between UN command and control for traditional self-defense peacekeeping and national command and control for offensive enforcement actions. 

Fifty years after its founding, the United Nations has reached ano ther 

threshold. UN credibility with respect to international peace and security is 

being challenged at a time when the opportunity to fulftll the commitments in 

the UN Charter are the best since the end of World War II. There is also a 

pressing need for greater selectivity in undertaking UN peacekeeping missions. 

The UN's financial cr isis is ser ious and will simply worsen when the United 

States reduces its share of funding to a more realistic 25 percent contr ibution. 

A major problem in peacekeeping is that both the Secretary-General and the 

Security Counc il must learn to "just say no." Each must restrict itself to roles 

and missions that are consistent with the legal requirements in the UN Charter. 

The United Nations must face its limitations realistically, and Member States, 

particularly the United States, must disc ipline themselves to seek only achievable 

goals. 

Prominently, the UN Charter expressly prohibits intervention in the domestic 

affairs of sovereign States. The Clinton administration conceptually came to 

grips with the problem of when to support a peacekeeping operation in its May 

1 994 policy announcement. After listing a collection of factors such as national 

interest, threat to the peace, clear objectives and the like, the Administration 

stated that it would apply even str icter standards for U.S. participation in what 

amounted to an enforcement action operation, i.e.,risking combat. This is sound 

policy, but it needs to be implemented in deeds as well as in words. The Secur ity 

Council cannot afford to take enforcement action in every nation where there 

are significant human r ights violations or a defective form of democratic 

government. In fact, these defects have always existed in a majority of the 

Member States in the United Nations. The organization r ightfully lacks the 

political will and the resources to deal with these matters on a co nsistent basis 

throughout the globe. 

The Secur ity Council must institute a more selective review pro cess for both 

the operational activities and financial aspects of its peacekeeping mandates. Far 

to o often the Secur ity Council has too readily, almost automatically, extended 

66 
Wha t Color Helmet? 

or expanded peacekeeping mandates. The Security Council should terminate 

peacekeeping missions outright when domestic factions lack the political will 

to live in peace without UN peacekeepers. The notion ought to be accepted 

that domestic armed conflicts h ave a cycle that must be run until the hostile 

forces want to stop fighting. Premature involvement by the United Nations may 

yield short-term gains but is highly unlikely to be successful in the long run . 

In some instances, the United Nations has assumed virtualy a permanent 

presence in host nations akin to that of an occupying power, even when 

individual Members can be easily identified as sponsors of one or another 

warring faction. Let the State sponsors of the conflict pay for the UN presence 

or pull the peacekeepers out. If necessary, the Se curity Council can utilize its 

mandatory powers to impose p olitical and financial accountability on individual 

Members that support threats to international peace and security. While this 

tough-minded approach may lead to the extraction of UN forces from places 

such as Cyprus, it wil also, for example, place responsibility for that crisis 

squarely on the nations responsible : Turkey and Greece. The Security Council 

and Nato have the political and military means to deal with whatever may arise 

as a result of closing down the UN o ccupation there. As it is, the world 

community is foo ting the bill for a bilateral problem which neither offending 

state has any incentive to settle, and the problem j ust continues to fester. 

67 

VJI 

Concl usion 

T

HE UN CHARTER IS FAR FROM PERFECT, but it is the most important 

agreement that the world has ever concluded to constrain aggressive war. 

With the thaw in the Cold War, a fleeting window of opportunity has opened 

to follow the Charter on se curity issues almost as originally int ended fifty years 

ago. Unfortunately, overreaching by the Secretary-General, lack of discipline by 

political leaders in the United States and elsewhere, as well as other factors, have 

caused the essential legal distinction between consensual and coercive measures 

to be blurred. The post-Cold War reality is that UN-sponsored forc es are likely 

to be placed in mixed "war-peace" settings involving ethnic strife where several 

categories of peacekeep ers must deal simultaneously with a spectrum of 

activities ranging from humanitarian assistance to enforcement action. The 

author's view is that Blue Helmets should always restrict themselves to tradi ­

tional peacekeeping and that conventional war-fighters from Member States 

should presumptively retain their status as full combatants. Only when circumstances in the field require Green Helmets to serve in a support capacity under 

Blue Helmet command should the Green H elmets become legally entitled to 

temporary st atus as UN "experts on mission." The principal conclusion advanced is that the all-important distinction laid out in the UN Charter between 

self-defense and enforcement use of force categories can, and should, be 

maintained. Finally, while the UN Charter sufces as written as a legal basis for 

generic peacekeeping activitie s (once properly distinguished) , the North Atlantic Treaty has clearly been overtaken by post-Cold War events. A new North 

American-European collective security scheme should reconstitute Nato to 

alow it to function, as in the past, as an Article 51 self-defense organization 
TIl

 Newport Papen 

under Chapter VII, but also as a contributor entity itself to a Chapter VIII 

collective security agency mandated by the Secur ity Council. 

70 
Notes 

1. The best is SelfDifense in International Law by D. w. Bowett (New York: Praeger, 1958). 

2. See Report of Secretary-General on a United Nations Guard, UN Doc. A/656, p. 7. 

3. Off. Rec. S.c., 2nd yr., Spec. Supp. No. 2 (s/336), pp. 1-32. 

4. Off. Rec. S.c., 5th Sess., No. 1 5, 473rd mtg., p. 3. 

5. G.A. Res. 377A (V), Nov. 3, 1950. 

6. See Article 1 of Convention on the Safety of United Natio ns and Associated Personnel. 

Off. Rec. G.A., A 49/49 (Vol. 1), 9 December 1 994. Article 2 of Appendix B to Annex l -A 

(Military Aspects) of the Dayton Peace Accord apparently confers "experts on mission" privileges 

on combat troops who are following "robust" rules of engagement. This ilustrates the confusion 

that arises by not clearly distinguishing between traditional peacekeeping and enforcement 

actions. The troops on the ground are placed in unrealistic circumstances when they are asked 

to act as combatants against hostile forces and yet be treated as noncombatants when captured 

by the same hostile forces. For example, is it realistic to expect "prompt release" and "no 

interrogation" of IFOR forces who are captured while using deadly force against their captors? 

7. FBIS-WEU, 94-195, 7 October 1 994, p. 1. 

8. UN Doc. A/471277-S/241 11, 31 January 1 992. "An Agenda for Peace : Position Paper of 

the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations ." 

9. Off. Rec. G.A. , A/50/60 and S/1 995/1, 3 January 1 995. Supplement to "An Agenda for 

Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of 

the United Nations." 

10. Id., para. 33. 

11. Id., para. 35. 

12. Id., para. 77. 

13. NACC Planning Principles and Guidelines for Combined Peacekeeping Operations, 17 

March 1 994, p. 5. 

14. D. Daniel and B. Hayes, "Securing Observance of UN Mandates through the Employment 

of Military Forces," Strategic Research Department Research Report 3-95 , Occasional Paper of 

the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College. 

1 5 . "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations," 

Dept. of State Pub. 10161 , May 1 994, pp. 1 2-1 3. 

16. Id., p. 1 3. 

ARRC 

CIS 

CSCE 

DOMREP 

ECOMOG 

EU 

EUROCORPS 

EUROFOR 

EUROMARFOR 

FMLN 

IF OR 

IPTF 

MINUGUA 

MINURSO 

MOU 

NACC 

NACC-AHG 

OAU 

ONUC 

ONUCA 

ONUMOZ 

ONUSAL 

oseE 

PDK 

Polisario Front 

RENAMO 

RPF 

SCR 

SFOR 

UNAMIC 

UNAMIR 

UNASOG 

UNAVEM I 

UNAVEM II 

UNAVEM III 

UNCRO 

Glossary 

Atlantic Alliance's Rapid Response Corps 

Commonwealth of Independent States 

Council on the Conference on Security and Cooperation 

in Europe (renamed OSCE) 

Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General on 

the Dominican Republic 

Economic Community of West African States Cease-fire 

Monitoring Group 

European Union 

French-German WEU forces 

French, Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese WEU forces 

All-Member Maritime Force (WEU) 

Frente Farabundo Marti Para la Liberacion Nacional 

Implementation Force 

International Police Task Force 

UN Mission for the Verification of Human Rights and of 

Compliance with the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights in Guatemala 

UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara 

Memorandum of Understanding 

North Atlantic Cooperation Council 

North Atlantic Cooperation Council Ad Hoc Group 

Organization of African Unity 

Operation des Nations Unies au Congo 

UN Observer Group in Central America 

UN Operation in Mozambique 

UN Observer Mission in El Salvador 

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (formerly CSCE) 

Party of Democratic Kampuchea 

Frente Popular Para la Liberacion de Saguia el Hamra y de 

Rio de Oro 

Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana 

Rwandese Patriotic Front 

Security Council Resolution 

Stabilization Force (successor to IFOR) 

UN Advance Mission in Cambodia 

UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda 

UN Aouzou Strip Observer Group 

UN Angola Verification Mission I 

UN Angola Verification Mission II 

UN Angola Verification Mission III 

UN Confidence Restoration Operation (in Croatia) 
The Newport Papers 

UNDOF 

UNEF I 

UNEF II 

UNFICYP 

UNGOMAP 

UNIFIL 

UNIIMOG 

UNIKOM 

UNIPOM 

UNITA 

UNITAF 

UNMIBH 

UNMIH 

UNMOGIP 

UNMOT 

UNOGIL 

UNOMIG 

UNOMIL 

UNOMSA 

UNOMUR 

UNOSOM I 

UNOSOM II 

UNPA 

UNPF 

UNPREDEP 

UNPRO FOR 

UNTAC 

UNTAES 

UN TAG 

UNTEA/UNSF 

UNTSO 

UNYOM 

URNG 

WEU 

UN Disengagement Observer Force 

UN Emergency Force I (1 956-1 967) 

UN Emergency Force II (1 973- 1 979) 

UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus 

UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan 

UN Interim Force in Lebanon 

UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group 

UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission 

UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission 

National Union for the Total Independence of Angola 

Unified Task Force 

UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina 

UN Mission in Haiti 

UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan 

UN Mission of Observers in Taj ikistan 

UN Observation Group in Lebanon 

UN Observer Mission in Georgia 

UN Observer Mission in Liberia 

UN Observer Mission in South Africa 

UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda 

UN Operation in Somalia 1 (1 992-1 993) 

UN Operation in Somalia II (1 993- 1 995) 

UN Protected Area 

UN Confidence Restoration Operations in Croatia (UNCRO) ; UN Preventive Deployment force (UNPREDEP) 

within the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; and 

UNMIBH in Bosnia and Herzegovina 

UN Preventive Deployment Force 

UN Protection Force 

UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia 

UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, 

Baranja, and Western Sirmium 

UN Transition Assistance Group 

UN Security Force serving as a Temporary Executive 

Authority (and security force) 

UN Truce Supervision Organization 

UN Yemen Observation Mission 

Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca 

Western European Union 

74 
About the Author 

Dr. Nordquist holds a doctorate in jur idical science from the University of 

Virginia, a diploma in int ernational law from Cambridge (where he attended 

Grey's Inn of Cour t) , a certificate from The Hague Academy of International 

Law, and a juris do ctorate from California Western University. After attending 

law school following active duty in the U S. Marine Corps with service in 

Vietnam, Dr. Nordquist was an attorney and legislative counsel in the D epartment of State. He then continued his practice as a partner in a pr ivate law firm 

in Washington, nc., for twelve years. In 1 990 Dr. Nordquist became Deputy 

General Counsel of the US. Air Force, and for six months in 1 993 served as 

Acting General Counsel. Since August 1 993 he has been a pro fessor of law at 

the U S. Air Force Academy. 

This paper was written while Dr. Nordquist was the Stockton Professor of 

International Law at the Naval War College dur ing the 1 996 Academic Year. 

Much of the original research for this study was made possible by a grant from 

the Institute for National Security Studies at the US. Air Force Ac ademy. 
THE NEWPORT PAPERS 

Index 

1 99 1 -1997 

1. "Are l# Beasts ?" Churchill and the Moral Question of Wo rld War II ({Area 

Bombing" by Christopher C. Harmon (December 1 991). 

2. Toward a Pax Universalis : A His toriwl Critique of the National Military Strategy 

by Lieutenant Colonel Gary W Anderson, US. Marine Corps (April 1 992) . 

3. The "New" LAw of the Sea and the LAw of A rmed Conflict at Sea by Horace 

B. Robertson, Jr. (October 1 992) . 

4. Global War Game: The First Five Years by Bud Hay and Bob Gile Gune 

1 993) . 

5. Beyond Mahan: A Proposal for a u.s. Naval Strategy in the Twenty-First 

Century by Colonel Gary W Anderson, US. Marine Corps (August 1 993). 

6. The Burden of Trtifalgar: Decisive Battle and Naval Strategic Expectations on the 

Eve of the First World War by Jan S. Breemer (October 1 993). 

7. Mission in the Eas t: The Building of an A rmy in a Democracy in the New 

German States by Colonel Mark E. Victorson, US. Army Gune 1 994). 

8. Physics and Metaphysics of Deterrence: The British Approach by Myron A. 

Greenberg (December 1 994) . 

9. A Doctrine Reader: The Navies of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, 

and Sp ain by James J. Tritten and Vice Admiral Luigi Donolo, Italian Navy 

(Retired) , (December 1 995). 

10. Chaos Theory: The Essentials for Military Applications by Majo r Glenn E. 

James, US. Air Force (October 1 996). 

11. The International Legal Ramifications of United Sta tes Counter-Proliferation 

Strategy: Problems and Prospects by Frank Gibson Goldman (April 1 997) .