IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Jay Larry Moyer, : Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 882 C.D. 2016

: SUBMITTED: November 23, 2016 Public Utility Commission, : Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
SENIOR JUDGE LEADBETTER FILED: March 13, 2017

This case involves a long ongoing dispute between petitioner, Jay

Larry Moyer, and his electric supplier, PPL Electric Utilities Corporation (PPL)

, and the Public Utility Commission (PUC)

. Before us for disposition is Moyer’s

pro se petition for review of the final order of the PUC ruling on two consolidated

complaints (2011 and 2014 complaints) that he filed against PPL (intervenor here)

. Moyer challenged PPL’s billing under a virtual net meter aggregation program for

accounts associated with solar panels that he installed on a hillside approximately

600 yards from his farmhouse in Klingerstown, PA

.

In its brief, PPL explains the concepts involved as follows:

Net metering enables customer

- generators to use the electricity produced from their eligible alternative

energy sources, such as solar panels, to offset all or a portion of their electric usage. The crediting is done2 on a one

- to

- one basis: for every kilowatt

- hour ("kWh") of electricity generated, one kWh of electricity is credited to the account up to the total

amount of electricity used in the monthly billing period. See 52 Pa. Code § 75.13(c).

***

Under traditional net metering, such as a solar panel mounted on the roof of the customer's residence, the alternative energy system is wired directly with the customer's home or business. [T] he customer

generator has a single bidirectional meter that measures and records the flow of electricity in both directions, meaning that it runs forward when electricity is used and runs backward when electricity is generated to produce a single "net" meter read each month.

***

In contrast, meter aggregation enables a customer

generator to aggregate multiple locations for the

purposes of net metering. (PPL St. No. 1, p. 7) These properties must be within two miles of the customer

generator's property and located within the electric utility's service territory. Two types of meter aggregation exist: (1) physical meter aggregation; and (2) virtual meter aggregation.

Under physical meter aggregation, the customer

generator connects the alternative energy source directly to the single meter at the customer's home or business

. (PPL St. No. 1, p. 7) For example, solar facilities located in a field could be directly connected

to the meter at a nearby residence by extending an electrical conductor/conduit between the solar facility and the residence. Physical meter aggregation functions like traditional net metering because the fac i lities are physically connected to a single bidirectional

meter

.... ***

On the other hand, virtual meter aggregation "virtually" aggregates separate meters that are not physically connected. (PPL St. No. 1, p. 7) For example, the meter at a residence can be "virtually"3 aggregated with the meter for a solar facility located 'in

a nearby field without a physical connection to the residence. (PPL St. No. 1, p. 7) To accomplish this result, the electric utility measures the electricity used and generated at the meter for the generating facilities (such as Mr. Moyer's solar array) and aggregates that with the customer

- generator's usage from the meter at his or her other property (such as Mr. Moyer's residence). Under this scenario, there are two different

meters with two entirely different points of interconnection with the electric system: (1) a bidirectional meter at the generating fac i lities (referred

to as the host account) to measure usage and generation of electricity; and (2) a standard meter at the other property (referred to as the sa tellite account) that measures the customer's electric usage

.... Consequently, PPL Electric must [manually] virtually aggregate the generation and usage measured from the

meter for the generating facilities with the usage measured from the meter for the customer's home or business.

(Brief for PPL at 9

- 12 ) (Record citations deleted).

The relevant procedural history of this case is as follows. In

November 2011, Moyer filed a complaint against PPL alleging that he contacted it

regarding the installation of solar panels on his property and that a representative

inspected and approved them i n March 2009. 1 He further alleged that for the

period of April 2009 to February 2010, PPL failed to credit him for the electricity

that was generated by those solar panels and delivered to PPL and that the checks

that he had received since April 2010 lacked any accounting for the credits.

Further, alleging that PPL failed to properly aggregate his accounts in accordance

with the virtual

- net metering provisions in its Net Metering for Renewable

1 At that time, Moyer was represented by counsel. Since counsel’s March 2012 notice of withdrawal, however, Moyer has been proceeding pro se

.4

Customer

- Generators Rider, Moyer averred that PPL failed to credit him for all of

the electricity generated by his solar panels since March 2009. Accordingly,

Moyer requested that the PUC order PPL to apply virtual net meter aggregation to

his two accounts, disclose all credits and/or p ayments that PPL made to him and, if

necessary, fully reimburse him for the electricity generated.

In response, PPL acknowledged that for a discreet period it failed to

aggregate the excess generation produced by the solar panels generated with the

usage at Moyer’s residence. It maintained, however, that it made payments to him

for that excess generation and applied credits to his residential account. In any

event, following failed mediation, Administrative Law Judge Cynthia Williams

Fordham (ALJ) conduc ted an August 2012 evidentiary hearing at which time

Moyer testified, presented two witnesses, and introduced twenty exhibits into the

record, ten of which were admitted. PPL presented two witnesses and introduced

ten exhibits, nine of which were admitted . In February 2013, the ALJ issued her

initial decision dismissing the 2011 complaint.

In January 2014, the PUC vacated the ALJ’s initial decision to the

extent that she found that PPL properly credited Moyer for his solar generation.

C oncluding that th e record was insufficient to make such a determination, the PUC

remanded the case to the ALJ for further development of the record. In so doing,

the PUC granted Moyer’s petition to reopen the record to include the following

additional information: (1) PP L to provide Moyer’s actual data for the period of

April 2009 to May 2013; and (2) Moyer to provide all of his monthly bills and

statements for the period of April 2009 to January 9, 2014. Further, the PUC

encouraged the parties to meet and attempt to res olve Moyer’s concerns and5

advised him that, if informal discussions with PPL did not result in a resolution, he

could request further hearings.

In September 2014, before a second hearing could be held, Moyer

filed a new complaint raising issues concerning the accuracy and content of PPL’s

billing processes for his virtual

- net metering accounts and requesting that the PUC

order PPL to de velop and implement new billing procedures and processes for

such accounts using a single bill for both accounts being vir tually aggregated. In

January 2015, the ALJ consolidated the 2011 and 2014 complaints.

At an April 2015 hearing, Moy er submitted his direct and surr ebuttal

testimony and proffered 267 additional exhibits, 179 of which were admitted into

the record. PPL submitted rebuttal testimony and five additional exhibits, all of

which were admitted into the record. In October 2015, the ALJ issued her initial

decision on remand in which she (1) dismissed the 2014 complaint in its entirety;

and (2) sustained the 2011 complaint to the extent that PPL was to compensate

Moyer for credits earned for the electricity generated from his solar panels between

May and December 2010

, and that PPL permit Moyer to participate in its virtual

meter aggregation program, as earlier du ring the litigation it had agreed to do,

subject to changes in PPL’s tariffs or the applicable law, but dismissed the 2011

complaint in all other respects.

O n May 19, 2016, the PUC entered its final opinion and order

, adopting the ALJ’s decision on remand

, finding that PPL correctly billed and

credited Mr. Moyer’s accounts but modified that decision to require PPL to pay

additional interest through the date of its order

. Further

, although the PUC opined

that the accounts did not qualify for virtual

- meter aggregation under the terms of

PPL’s tariff because he failed to show the existence of an independent, non

-6

generational load 2 at his generation facility, the PUC reiterated the o rder that

Moyer be allowed to virtually aggregate his two accounts because PPL had agreed

to a waiver of th e load requirement in an effort to resolve the issues. See PUC’s

May 19, 2016, Opinion at 30 n.10, 38

- 39, 43

, and 48.

In addition to Moyer’s petition for review , we have the following

three applications before us for disposition with the merits: (1) the PUC’s

November 1, 2016, application to strike the amicus curiae brief filed by Sunrise

Energy, LLC, (Sunrise) via its principal and majority shareholder David N.

Hommrich; (2) Moyer’s October 20, 2016, application for relief, asserting, inter

alia , that this Court’s decision in Sunrise Energy , LLC, v. FirstEnergy

Corporation

, 148 A.3d 894 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) ( en banc )

, 3 has immediate

2 The regulation defining “virtual meter aggregation” provides:

The combination of readings and billing for all meters regardless of rate class on properties owned or leased and operated by a

customer

- generator by means of the EDC’s [electric distribution

c ompany] billing process, rather than through physical rewiring of

the customer

- generator’s property for a physical, single point of contact. Virtual meter aggregation on properties owned or leased and operated by a customer

- generator and located within 2 miles of

the boundaries of the customer

- generator’s property and within a single electric distribution company’s service territory shall be eligible for net metering.

52 Pa. Code § 75.12. An additional regulation then in effect

, which the PUC asserts impl icitly required an independent, non

- generational load

, provides that electric distribution companies shall offer net metering to customer

- generators that generate electricity on the customer

generator’s side of the meter. 52 Pa. Code § 75.13(a). The PUC asserts that its proposed rulemaking at Commission Docket L

- 2014

- 2404361 , which has now been made part of its

re gulations at 52 Pa. Code § 75.13

, makes explicit what was previously implied.

3 On December 12, 2016, we denied the application of FirstEnergy C orporation and West Penn Power Company for reargument/reconsideration en banc of the Sunrise decision. On January 12, 2017, they filed a petition for allowance of appeal to our Supreme Court at No. 25
WAL Docket 2017

.7

implications for his case and t hat, pursuant thereto, the PUC’s adjudication in his

case is rendered null and void; 4 and (3) Moyer’s November 23, 2016, application

for relief asserting, inter alia , that the PUC’s final proposed rulemaking on

November 19, 2016, makes the issue of the ind ependent

- load requirement for

virtual

- meter aggregation ripe for review. For the reasons that follow, we grant the

PUC’s application to strike the purported amicus curiae brief, deny both of

Moyer’s applications for relief , and affirm the PUC’s final orde r on the merits

. In considering the PUC’s application to strike the purported amicus

cur i ae brief filed by Mr. Hommrich on behalf of Sunrise, as joined by PPL, we

note that, in addition to the untimeliness of the brief, 5 it does not appear as though

Mr. Hommrich is an attorney licensed to practice law in the Commonwealth. In

that regard, in Moyer v. Public Utility Commission

, ( Pa. Cmwlth. No. 336 C.D.

2016, filed July 26, 2016) , wherein this Court granted the PUC’s motio n to quash

Moyer’s petition for review of a PUC final rulemaking order , we dismissed Sunrise

as an intervenor due to Mr. Hommrich’ s failure to file a copy of the certificate of

organization and docketing statement on file for Sunrise with the Department of

State, Bureau of Corporations and Charitable Organizations

, or to have a member

of the Pennsylvania Bar enter an appearance on Sunrise’ s behalf. In light of

4 This Court ruled that, “to the exten t that the application raises the applicability of this court’s recent decision in [ Sunrise Energy, LLC ], the application and the answer thereto will be treated as supplemental briefs.” In addition, we ordered that, “[t]o the extent [Moyer] seeks any additional relief in his application, the application is denied.” November 1, 2016,

Commonwealth Court Order at 1.

5 In an August 30, 2016, order rejecting Sunrise’s initial August 23, 2016, brief for noncompliance with the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, this Court directed that, unless a conforming brief was filed on or before September 29, 2016, Sunrise would be precluded from filing a brief. Our docket entries indicate that Sunrise’s brief was filed on September 30, 2016.8

Sunrise’s recent inability and/or failure to comply with this Court’s directive and

the fact that Mr. Hommrich represents only that he is principal and majority

shareholder of the company, which is not represented by counsel, we grant the

PUC’s application to quash Sunrise’s brief. See 20 West’s Pa. Prac., Pa. Appellate

Practice § 102.11 at 281 (2015) (providing that a corporation must be represented

by counsel and that the failure to have such counsel may result in dismissal). We

turn now to Moyer’s October 20, 2016, application for relief and the effect of this

Court’s decision in Sunri se Energy, LLC

.

In Sunrise Energy, LLC

, solar power generator Sunrise initiated its

complaint in the court of common pleas against one public utility /electric

distribution company (West Penn Power Company) and one non

- public utility

(FirstEnergy Corporati on) , alleging a breach of contract and seeking declaratory

relief arising from a contract dispute over West Penn Power Company’s purchase

of excess energy from Sunrise. The defendants filed preliminary objections based

on primary jurisdiction, seeking dis missal and/or transfer of certain counts to the

PUC. After common pleas dismissed the preliminary objections and permitted an

interlocutory appeal, which this Court granted, we affirmed the court’s order,

ruling that neither the doctrine of exclusive nor that of primary jurisdiction

require d it to transfer certain issues to the PUC. Specifically, we held that

common pleas had jurisdiction to decide eligibility for net metering pursuant to the

Alternative Energy Portfolio Standards Act (AEPS), Act of Novem ber 30, 2004,

P.L. 1672, as amended , 73 P.S. §§ 1648.1

- 1648.8, and that it did not err in refusing

to cede jurisdiction to the PUC. Contrary to Moyer’s position here in, Sunrise

Energy, LLC

, does not affect the jurisdictional validity of the PUC’s order in this

case.9 In the present case , Moyer through his then counsel

, filed a complaint

with the PUC c hallenging PPL’s bill ing procedures and its practices for virtual

meter aggregation and PPL’s assignment , based on its tariff, of its commercial GS

1 rate to Moyer’s host (solar panel) account. Before the PUC entered its final

order, the issue of Moyer’s eligibility for virtual meter aggregation became moot

when PPL agreed to allow Moyer to participate in the program. At a minimum, the

remaining issues were within the PUC’s jurisdiction. See Section 70 1 of the Public

Utility Code, 66 Pa. C. S . § 701 ( providing , in pertinent part, that “any person . . .

may complain in writing, setting forth any act or thing done or omitted to be done

by any public utility in violation, or claimed violation, of any law which the

commission has jurisdiction to administer, or of any regulation or order of the

commission” ) and PPL Elect. Util. Corp. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n , 912 A.2d 386,

400 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) (holding that the P UC is responsible for regulating utility

rates and evaluating tariffs over which it has the particular expertise)

. Sunrise

Energy, LLC

, therefore, is distinguishable from the present case and the PUC had

jurisdiction to decide the issues before it. Accordingly, we deny Moyer’s October

20, 2016, application for relief.

Finally, i n his November 23, 2016, application for relief , Moyer

asserted

, inter alia , that the PUC’s final proposed rulemaking on November 19,

2016 ( see supra n.2 ) , makes his challeng e to the independent

- load requirement for

virtual

- meter aggregation ripe for review. H owever, as noted above, the PUC

ordered that Moyer continue to be allowed to participate in net metering because of

PPL’s waiver of the independent

- load requirement in M oyer’s case. Thus, the

instant appeal does not encompass the issue of whether Moyer is subject to the

independent

- load requirement , nor is the final rulemaking (which occurred more10

than a year after the record closed in this case) at issue here

. 6 At any rate , a final

rulemaking order is not an appealable order. Moyer v. Pub . Util. Comm ’ n , (Pa.

Cmwlth. No. 336 C.D. 2016, filed July 26, 2016) [citing Popowsky v. Pub. Util.

Comm’n , 701 A.2d 277, 2 78

- 79 (Pa. 1997) and Pub. Advocate v. Brunwasser , 22

A.3d 261, 269 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) ]

. Accordingly, we will not consider it here.

T urn ing to the merits of Moyer’s petition for review, the cognizable

issues are follows : 7 (1) whether the PUC erred in determining that PPL ’s manual

billing procedures for its virt ual

- meter aggregation customers were sufficient ; (2)

6 Mindful that it directed PPL in a January 2014 order to continue permitting Moyer to participat e in PPL’s virtual

- meter aggregation program de spite the fact that there is no independent, non

- generational load at his solar facility

, the PUC observed as follows regarding

Mo yer’s waiver:

[W]hile future changes in the law or in PPL’s tariff may alter the waiver PPL has agreed to, our AEPS [Alternative Energy Portfolio Standards] Final Rulemaking Order proposed additional clarifying language to reinforce the already existing pr ovisions of our AEPS Regulations which requires a customer

- generator to have independent, non

- generational load to be eligible to participate in net metering. Therefore, our issuance of the AEPS Final Rulemaking Order does not disturb our prior direction that PPL permit [Moyer] to participate in its virtual meter aggregation program, which we reinforce here.

May 19, 2016, PUC’s Opinion at 43 n.14. Accordingly, because the independent

- load requirement at 52 Pa. Code § 75.13 is not being applied to Moyer’s facility, its validity is not properly before this Court , and we must decline Moyer’s request that we issue an advisory opinion. In that regard, “an actual case or controversy must be extant at all stages of review. . . .” Pap’s A.M. v. City of Erie , 812 A.2d 591, 600 (Pa. 2002).

7 It is well established that an appellate court may only consider a question on appeal that was previously raised before the PUC. Section 703(a) of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S. § 703(a); Wheeling & Lake Erie R y. C o . v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n , 778 A.2d 785, 794 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001). All other issues are waived. Accordingly, to the extent that Moyer has raised issues that were not raised before the PUC, we decline to consider them on appeal. M oreover, to
the extent th at Moyer attempts to raise issues concerning the independent

- load requirement, we also decline to consider them on appeal. See supra n

. 6

.11

whether there is substantial evidence to support the PUC’s finding that PPL’s

records for Moyer’s accounts d o not contain inconsistencies and ir r egula rities or

reflect that there are omissions ; and (3) w hether the PUC erred in determining that

PPL followed the law and its tariff in assigning the host (solar panel) account

PPL’s commercial GS

- 1 rate. 8 We turn first to the PUC’s determination regarding

PPL’s manual billing procedures.

In determining that PPL could use manual billing and was not

required to implement an automated billing process for its virtual

- meter

aggregation program , the PUC construed the Public Utility Code and its

regulations as well as the AEPS, and determined tha t nothing mandated that PPL

implement an automated billing process and nothing prohibited PPL from using a

manual billing system

. In addition, the PUC took into consideration the evidence

that PPL presented regarding the relatively small number of custome rs enrolled in

virtual

- meter aggregation, ninety eight, and the cost for upgrading PPL’s billing

system. The PUC concluded , therefore, that manual billing was sufficient and that

there was nothing requiring PPL to implement automated billing

. 9 PUC’s May 19,

2016, Opinion at 22

- 2 4

. We conclude that the PUC did not err in rendering that

determination. See City of Phila

. v. P a. Pub. Util. Comm’n , 829 A.2d 1241 , 1243

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (holding that the PUC’s interpretation of a utility law and

8 Pertinent here, we are limited on appeal to determining whether an error of law occurred and whether necessary fin dings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Popowsky v. Pa.
Pub. Util. Comm’n , 910 A.2d 38, 48 (Pa. 2006). Substantial evidence means more than a mere trace of evidence or suspicion of the existence of a fact sought to be established. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm ’n, 413 A.2d 1037, 1047 (Pa. 1980).

9 In this regard, we note the PUC’s acknowledgment of PPL’s efforts to provide its

customers enrolled in virtual

- meter aggregation with the tools to better understand their bills.
PUC’s May 19, 2016, Opinion at 28.12

regulations is to be given great deference). We turn now to addressing whether

there is substantial evidence for the PUC’s determination regarding the accuracy

and adequacy of PPL’s records for Moyer’s accounts.

In addressing the sufficiency of PPL’s records for Moy er’s accounts,

the PUC ’ s reli ed on PPL’s Exhibit APC

- 5. In reviewing that exhibit, the PUC

noted that PPL provided a description for each of the columns and an explanation

as to how it calculated and applied credits for Moyer’s excess generation. PUC’s

May 19, 2016, Opinion at 29. In addition, the PUC noted that it also considered

Moyer’s Exhibits JLM 101

- 170 (solar/host account bills) and 202

- 267

(satellite/residential account bills) and concluded that they “corroborate[d] PPL’s

assertion that it demonstrated how its tabulation of [Moyer’s] actual data for the

t wo accounts since 2009 reconciles with [his] bills, and that it explained any

alleged inconsistencies in [his] bills.” Id . The PUC stated that, “[t]his affirms the

ALJ’s conclusion that [Moyer] was appropriately billed for his usage and credit for

his ge neration.” Id

.

Moreover, beyond generally asserting that PPL’s tabulation reflecting

specific actual information on a monthly basis d id not correspond to the actual bills

mailed to him, Moyer has failed to identify any evidence in the record indicating

t hat PPL’s records we re inconsistent or irregular , or reflect that there may have

be en omissions

. In that regard, the party seeking affirmative relief from the PUC

bears the burden of proving its claims by competent evidence. Milkie v. Pa. Pub.

Util. Comm ’n , 768 A.2d 1217, 1220 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001). Further, even where it

exists, evidence that supports a different result than that reached by the PUC is

irrelevant as long as the record contains substantial evidence to support its

decision. Wheeling & Lake E rie R y. C o. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n , 778 A.2d 785,13

794

- 95 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001). Accordingly, w e conclude that t he evidence that the

PUC relied upon constituted substantial evidence to support its determination.

Finally, i n rejecting Moyer’s argument that the host account should be

assigned PPL’s residential RS rate

, the PUC acknowledged that there was no

evidence indicating that he was using his solar facility to engage in commercial

activity and that there was nothing in the AEPS or PUC regulations explic itly

mandating that a residential customer

- generator electing virtual

- meter aggregation

receive service under a commercial rate schedule for his host account. PUC’s May

19, 2016, Opinion at 35. Noneth eless, the PUC determined that, “the current terms

of PPL’s Commission

- approved tariff simply do not permit [Moyer’s] solar facility

to be billed under PPL’s Rate Schedule RS no r does the construct of [his] virtual

net metering impose the same burdens on or uses of PPL’s infrastructure as do

physical meter ag gregation customers.” Id

.

Specifically, i n support of its determination that Moyer did not meet

PPL’s tariff specifi cations for its residential RS rate applicable to single

- phase

electric service , the PUC reviewed the relevant criteria :

(a) A single fami ly dwelling and detached buildings when the detached buildings are served at the customer’s expense through the same meter as the si n gle family dwelling ; (b) A separate dwelling unit i n an apartment house;
(c) A single farm dwelling and general farm uses when general farm uses are served at the customer’s expense through the same meter as the single farm dwelling;
(d) A building previously wired for single meter service which is converted to not more than 8 separate dwelling units s erved through one meter.

Id . at 36. In concluding that Moyer’s solar facility did not meet the above criteria,

the PUC observed that Moyer’s solar facility was “simply an array of mounted14

solar panels located several hundred yards away from [his] residence[,]” that he

“did not u se it for shelter, dining, sleeping, or cooking[,]” and that it was served by

a separate meter from the one located at his residence. Id

.

Moreover, in determining that Moyer was properly subject to PPL’s

commercial rate, the PUC reviewed PPL’s tariff for rate schedule GS

- 1 , which

provides , in relevant part, that it is applicable to “single phase non

- residential

service at secondary voltage and other applications outside the scope of the

Residential Rate Schedule .” Id . at 37 (emphasis in original)

. In su pport of its

determination, the PUC noted that Moyer offered no evidence to refute PPL ’ s
evidence that, in order to provide service to his solar facility, PPL had to perform

one standard transformation to step down the distribution line’s voltage from 240

volts to 120 volts at the point of delivery. Id

. Accordingly, m indful that a public

utility’s tariff has the force and effect of law and is binding on both the customer

and the utility, 10 we conclude that the PUC did not err in determining that PPL

proper ly assigned a commercial rate to Moyer’s host account. See PPL Elec. Util.

Corp

. , 912 A.2d at 400 (holding that the PUC is responsible for regulating utility

rates and evaluating tariffs over which it has the particular expertise).

For the above reasons, therefore, we grant the PUC’s application to

strike the purported amicus curiae brief, deny both of Moyer’s applications for

relief, and affirm the PUC’s final order on the merits.

_____________________________________ BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior J udge

10 PECO Energy Co. v. Twp. of Upper Dublin , 922 A.2d 996, 1004 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Jay Larry Moyer, : Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 882 C.D. 2016

: Public Utility Commission, : Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 13 th day of March

, 201 7

, the order of the Public

Utility Com m ission is hereby AFFIRMED. Further, Respondent’s application to

strike the purported amicus curiae brief filed by Sunrise Energy, LLC, is hereby

GRANTED . Finally, both Petitioner’s application s for relief, filed October 20,

2016, and November 23, 2016, are hereby DENIED.

_____________________________________ BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior J udge