1

Africa Security Brief

Africa’s Militaries: A Missing Link in 

Democratic Transitions

By Mathurin C. Houngnikpo

A Public ation of the Afric a C enter for Str ategic Studie s

◆ Military acceptance of civilian authority remains a missing piece of Africa’s democratic transition puzzle.

◆ While often perceived as an unwanted restriction on the purview of the security sector, the doctrine 

of democratic civilian control of the military boosts the legitimacy, capabilities, and performance of the 

armed forces.

◆ The practical realization of this doctrine requires Africa’s parliaments to assert and exercise more robust 

control and oversight of the security sector.

Hig h lig h t s

No. 17 / J a n u a ry 2012

politics remains widespread across the continent. 

This is prominently in view in Egypt where, in 

the midst of political transition, the military is 

attempting to maintain a privileged role for itself despite the widespread demands for genuine 

democratic reform.

A spate of military coups from 2008 to 2010 

in Mauritania, Guinea, Niger, and Madagascar 

raised the specter of a return to military rule in 

Africa. While the subsequent resumption of civilian government in Guinea and Niger has reduced 

these concerns, evidence of military influence in 

War is too important to be left to the generals.

—Georges Clemenceau, former prime minister of France

It is a difficult period for everybody, but we believe that it is a political thing. We are not politicians. We 

are military professionals and we are determined to remain so. Nobody, no matter what, no matter the effort, will 

drag us into it.

—Nigerian Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Abdulrahman Dambazzau in May 2010 shortly 

after the office and authorities of the Nigerian presidency were transferred to Vice President 

Goodluck Jonathan by the National Assembly following the death of President Umaru Yar’Adua
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In Côte d’Ivoire, Togo, Guinea Bissau, Ethiopia, 

the Central African Republic, Chad, Sudan, Angola, 

Rwanda, and many other African states, democratization or the consolidation of political reforms has 

been severely inhibited by armed forces that regularly intervene in political and economic matters. In 

Uganda, for instance, the military is permitted to select 10 officers to serve as members of parliament. In 

some cases, the armed forces operate autonomously 

and even maintain commercial interests outside the 

military budget. In Rwanda, the military grows, buys, 

processes, and exports commercial crops through a 

military-owned company.1

 Military officers in Angola participate in contract negotiations with foreign 

companies, sit on corporate boards, and are majority 

shareholders in telecommunications firms.2

Such practices are not only counterproductive 

to democratic governance, but also undermine stability, economic development, and even the interests of 

the militaries themselves. In cases where militaries 

have assumed total control over government, the results have usually been disastrous. Annual economic 

growth rates in Nigeria and Mali, for example, have 

been on average a full 3 percentage points lower during periods of military versus civilian rule. While 

lauded for their discipline and quick decisionmaking, militaries have little background in job creation, 

macroeconomic policy, public health, or the many 

other complex challenges of governing. More generally, military decisionmaking is rigidly hierarchical 

and beyond appeal, whereas in the public domain, 

policy implementation tends to be more effective 

when built through a consultative, transparent, and 

deliberative process.

Beyond the blunt military putsch, increasingly 

prevalent and sinister developments in Africa are the 

emergence of “democratic” and “creeping” coups. In 

the former, a military coup is staged, followed by a 

tactical withdrawal to hold elections that are “won” 

by a recently retired military officer—to the accolades of both regional and international organizations. Such was the case following the 2008 coup in 

Mauritania by General Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz. 

In creeping coups, civilian leaders will slowly erode 

the powers and authorities of legislatures, judiciaries, 

civil society groups, and other potential sources of 

opposition. This was the pattern followed by the now 

deposed President Mamadou Tandja in Niger and is, 

arguably, the process under way currently in Djibouti 

and Malawi, among other places. Co-opting security 

leaders or counterbalancing the military with special 

presidential security units is key to the success of such 

extra-constitutional exercises of authority.

The level of such co-optation is extensive in 

some countries. The use of force against peaceful 

demonstrations in recent years by security units in 

the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, 

Uganda, Malawi, and Cameroon, among others, is 

case in point. The shooting of unarmed civilians 

clearly indicates that some security sector leaders 

in Africa continue to see their role as defending 

the regime in power rather than the constitution—

contravening even basic codes of military conduct 

and emerging democratic norms on the continent. 

Upcoming elections in Zimbabwe, Senegal, Burkina 

Faso, and Kenya may pose similar dilemmas for these 

countries’ military and police leadership.

Even where legitimate civilian rule predominates, civil-military relations remain strained in 

much of Africa. Given its unique institutional dynamics, responsibilities, and standard procedures, 

the military can find it challenging to interact with 

parliament, civil society organizations, or other civilian entities. Likewise, most African civilian officials lack a deep understanding of security issues 

and institutions. Productive engagement, cooperation, and mutual respect are elusive and frustration 

is common.

In Nigeria, for example, the President of 

the Senate explained in a 2008 speech to fellow 

Dr. Mathurin C. Houngnikpo is the Academic Chair of 

Civil-Military Relations in the Africa Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University.

“for democracy to sink deep 

roots on the continent, the 

security sector needs to be a 

willing partner in the process of 

democratic consolidation”
3

legislators that one of the country’s greatest national 

security threats was a lack of familiarity between civilian and military agencies that demanded a “consistent and coherent process of engagement with a 

view to strengthening the security agencies’ work 

vis-à-vis the legislature, particularly in the areas 

of appropriation, constitutional reforms, oversight 

functions, foreign policy, and national security.”3

Put simply, Africa’s civilian and military leaders 

barely know one another.

Despite noteworthy progress toward democracy 

since the end of the Cold War, the influence of the 

security services in Africa continues to overshadow 

democratic development on the continent. Complications resulting from military overreach are not only 

limited to Africa’s fragile or autocratic countries but 

also continue to be a challenge in the continent’s 

better governed states. Military acceptance of civilian authority—the doctrine of civilian control—remains a missing piece of Africa’s democratic transition puzzle. For democracy to sink deep roots on the 

continent, the security sector needs to be a willing 

partner in the process of democratic consolidation.

Inculcating a Doctrine of Civilian , 

Democratic Authority

The legitimacy of the security sector is ultimately derived from the authority vested in it by democratically elected civilian leaders under the rule of 

law. This, in turn, helps ensure that the use of force, 

the most authoritative demonstration of national 

power, is seen as justified and therefore supported 

by the general population. Recognizing the power of 

this legitimacy is the basis of the doctrine of civilian 

control of the military.

However, this doctrine is typically poorly understood or respected in Africa.4

 This is a consequence of many complex factors, including colonial 

legacies, weak oversight, and corruption. Colonial 

administrations typically structured and mandated 

African security forces to protect executive offices 

and strategic resources as well as to control and suppress Africans perceived as threats to the status quo. 

Remnants of these structures and outlooks still linger 

in Africa. Persistent weak governance has also meant 

that checks and balances to constrain public sector 

agencies to their official remit are easily breeched. 

Since they tend to be comparatively well funded and 

are often one of the biggest sectors of government in 

Africa, the armed forces often overstep their bounds 

with little opposition.

To be clear, it is not always leaders of the armed 

forces who attempt to seize power. Many civilian 

authoritarians have intentionally used the security 

services to weaken political opposition and protect 

their authority and patronage networks.

Strengthening the doctrine of civilian control 

of the military, then, requires institutional adjustments on the part of both military and civilian authorities. Such adjustments commence by aligning 

the distinct but complementary core strengths of 

civilian authorities and the armed forces. By constructively applying force or the threat of force, disciplined security forces are able to influence, manage, or control events, the principal purpose being 

to protect national security. Yet such actions only 

have credibility to the extent that they are seen as 

supporting a democratic leadership.

By contrast, a civilian government derives its 

powers directly from the governed. This generates 

a political authority that can more effectively manage and sustain security, as well as economic and 

social development. Legitimate governments are 

inherently more stable because they have relatively 

greater societal support to address internal problems, adapt to change, and navigate conflict that 

affects individual and collective well-being.5 Likewise, coercion can be applied more credibly when 

decisions to use force are made by democratically 

elected civilians. Thus, the armed forces and their 

actions are deemed legitimate indirectly through 

their deference to legitimate civilian authorities 

and civilian governing structures.

In a similar manner, the doctrine of civilian 

control recognizes that the military, as a specialized 

“the armed forces and their 

actions are deemed legitimate 

indirectly through their deference 

to legitimate civilian authorities 

and civilian governing structures”
4

government agency with defined roles and responsibilities, is supposed to implement rather than formulate security policy. The military is but one instrument with which to enhance security. Diplomacy, 

socioeconomic policies, and various mediation tools 

all affect the drivers of tensions and disputes. Moreover, broad strategic matters, such as the decision 

to declare war, end conflict, and procure advanced 

armaments, have significant impacts on all citizens. 

Legitimate civilian leaders and institutions are in a 

better position to balance the application of these 

various instruments and considerations than counterparts in the armed forces.

Benefits of Civilian Rule an d 

Dangers of Politicization

This distinction between policymaking and 

policy implementation yields practical benefits for 

the security services. Excessive interference free 

from checks and balances has tended to erode capacity and professionalism in the security sector as 

well as the caliber of its leadership. For instance, 

lack of legitimacy often compels authoritarians to 

rely on ethnically or geographically biased recruitment to maintain allegiance. This tends to weaken 

readiness and effectiveness. The security forces are 

also more likely to be used as an employer of last 

resort, resulting in large but poorly educated and 

ill-trained military services. In Guinea Bissau, for 

example, the ratio of troops to total population 

is more than twice the average in West Africa. 

Meanwhile, its swollen ranks are undisciplined, 

its equipment dated and unusable, and interservice 

strife acute.

Côte d’Ivoire’s security sector experienced a 

similar dilution of professionalism over the last decade. Personnel tripled in size as former President 

Laurent Gbagbo continually doled out state resources to purchase the support of key constituencies. The gradual growth and politicization of the 

security services was a major contributor to instability in the country, which culminated in a deadly 

standoff following Gbagbo’s loss in the November 

2010 presidential elections. The national defense 

forces disregarded their obligations to uphold the 

constitution and instead sided with Gbagbo in his 

effort to overturn the electoral results. Thousands 

died before Gbagbo was captured. Having discredited themselves and their uniform, military leaders 

were no longer able to command the respect of the 

population or fulfill their role in society. The country’s new military leaders now face the daunting 

task of reforming and realigning security services 

that were once a highly respected force in Africa. 

Such setbacks can be avoided if African militaries 

adapt to and uphold expanding democratic reforms 

on the continent.

Military and authoritarian governments will also 

attempt to buy the loyalty of one component of the 

armed forces at the expense of others to secure the 

regime’s continued rule. Such considerations may 

lead to swings in budgetary support, favoring a specific branch of the armed forces at the expense of 

another, only to swing back in the other direction 

some time later.

The presidential guard in Togo, for example, 

is favored over other branches of the military and 

staffed predominantly by the ruling party’s ethnic 

kin, skewing promotions and training that limit the 

military’s capabilities. The resentment generated 

has contributed to multiple instances of mutiny in 

the armed forces since the early 1990s. Meanwhile, 

the military remains deficient in its rapid reaction 

capability, the small navy and air force have been 

sidelined, and general doctrine, strategy, and defense 

structures are unclear.6

A study of the budgeting process in Ethiopia determined that the centralization of spending decisions 

has led to higher levels of interservice rivalry and suboptimal resource allocation.7

 In Kenya, Uganda, and 

South Africa, evidence suggests that procurements 

of faulty or overpriced military equipment may have 

concealed diversions of funds to political campaigns.8

Frequent shifts, promotions, and demotions in 

Rwanda’s security leadership have bred uncertainty 

and instability in the officer corps. For instance, President Paul Kagame suddenly announced the removal 

of the head of national intelligence in July 2011. His 

replacement was an army general who had been under house arrest for most of 2010. Such manipulation 

undercuts military professionalism. The lack of continuity also severely constrains the security services’ 
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“studies of military expenditures 

and corruption have found that 

improvements in oversight should 

increase resources available to 

the military”

ability to modernize, make strategic arms procurements, and plan for the future.

Civilian authority, then, should also be subject 

to checks and balances, with the legislative branch 

having a critical role in approving military budgets 

and security policies. Without such accountability, 

decisions are more liable to be based on political, institutional, or personal interest as opposed to the real 

needs of the security services to protect the nation.

Studies of military expenditures and corruption 

have found that improvements in oversight should 

increase resources available to the military.9 Additionally, effective oversight creates opportunities for 

citizens and civil society to have a voice in security 

policy and provision. Trusted, legitimate security 

services, in turn, are able to more easily cooperate, 

inform, and interact with civilians.

In short, tangible benefits accrue under the doctrine of civilian control. When decisions are made 

and resources allocated through a process of accountable and democratic governance, the outcomes are 

more likely to serve the national interest.

Balance Th r o u g h 

Parliamentary Oversight

Many African parliaments have recently become 

more open and responsive to their electorates and 

increasingly active in developing and approving legislation. However, most have yet to fully incorporate 

oversight as a core activity.

Even where parliamentarians have demonstrated legislative aptitude and capacity, oversight 

has not been prioritized. In Ghana, for example, 

roughly 70 percent of Ghanaian members of parliament rate as poor the body’s performance on oversight. Among parliamentary committees, defense 

and security portfolios are not very active. In Benin, 

Kenya, Nigeria, and Uganda, members of parliament 

rarely focus primarily on matters of national security.10 Not a single bill was proposed in Ghana’s Defense and Interior Parliamentary Committee from 

2007 through 2009.11

Auditing of the executive, the military budget, 

and the security sector more generally is also weak. 

The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, Angola, Senegal, Niger, Chad, Malawi, and several other 

African countries all rank near the bottom of indices 

of defense budget transparency in part due to infrequent, incomplete, or nonexistent audits.12 When 

released, many audits contain no information on military procurements, which are deemed confidential.13

However, studies have shown that actual expenditures exceed defense budgets by approximately 20 

percent annually in Mali, Ghana, Ethiopia, Kenya, 

and Nigeria.14 Even when parliament actively reviews 

and approves military budgets, audits of subsequent 

spending, delivery of procurements, and performance 

are still essential.

Public Accounts Committees (PACs) are another particularly important oversight institution. Typically chaired by an opposition member of parliament 

to ensure integrity, PACs are a common venue in 

parliamentary systems for reviewing audits, assessing 

government expenditures, holding hearings on policy 

implementation, and identifying corrective measures 

as necessary.15

In Ghana, the PAC has actively exercised its 

investigative powers, holding many public meetings—some are even televised—and has uncovered 

misappropriation and fraud.16 The Public Accounts 

Committee of Uganda’s Parliament has also been a 

vital backstop to the Defence and Internal Affairs 

Committee. Though their effectiveness remains 

impeded by excessive classification of documents 

and manipulation by the executive branch, misappropriation of funds has been exposed and officials 

have been penalized and imprisoned following reports from Uganda’s Auditor General and hearings 

by the PAC.17

As the ears and eyes of citizens, parliamentarians must ensure that principles of good governance 

and the rule of law apply to the defense and security 

forces. Active parliamentary involvement makes the 

difference between civilian oversight and democratic 

oversight. A state without parliamentary oversight of 
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its security sector should at best be deemed an unfinished democracy.

The Way Fo rwar d

Democratic civilian control of the security sector 

in Africa has been uneven during the past 20 years 

of democratization experience. Still, Africa’s institutions of accountability have been gaining traction.18

To make further progress, Africa will need to build 

on this momentum.

As a starting point, parliamentary committees 

should more thoroughly scrutinize security sector 

leadership appointments put forth by the executive 

branch. In those countries where parliament remains 

excluded from such approval processes, institutionalizing it should be a priority. Without checks and balances, appointments are vulnerable to politicization. 

Among those parliaments that are legally empowered to oversee such appointments, many lack 

fully capable and available legislative staff that normally perform such analysis. Addressing this is a 

priority. Civil society actors and independent media 

should also be encouraged to conduct and openly 

share evidence-based assessments of the integrity and 

merits of candidates. 

Strengthening scrutiny of appointments achieves 

multiple goals. Most importantly, it improves security by identifying the most qualified appointees. It 

also sends a signal to all in the military that capable 

professionals will be rewarded. Security sector leaders who are appointed through a more accountable 

process will likewise have more credibility and will 

reduce the armed forces’ vulnerability to manipulation by political actors. Parliamentary review of senior military appointments can also help balance the 

prevailing dominance of the executive branch over 

national security.

Parliamentarians should also move to curtail the 

excessive use of opaque budgeting to fund the security sector and clarify the standards of information 

classification, which are often abused to shield security sector activity from scrutiny. National security is 

a priority for any state and merits adequate support. 

Legislators should not be reticent in justifying these 

outlays. At the same time, many African states need 

to recalibrate their force structures to meet contemporary security challenges. This includes scrutiny of 

the role and cost of presidential guards.

To do so, parliamentarians must cultivate their 

expertise in security sector issues. Civilian leaders 

that are versed in the nuances and complexities of 

military strategy, policing, intelligence, threat assessment, and similar facets of national security will 

gain the trust and respect of military leaders, as well 

as more ably judge the qualities of policy options. A 

growing number of African research institutes and 

civil society organizations specialize in security issues. 

Africa’s parliaments should engage more with such 

organizations and sponsor members’ participation in 

their programs and exchanges.

Legislative agendas must also devote more attention to national security matters. Members of 

defense and security committees should hold more 

public hearings with security experts and officials on 

emerging threats, civil-military relations, deployments and operations, and the nation’s long-term 

goals for military modernization, among many other 

topics. Promising initiatives and reforms emerging 

from these hearings should then inform new bills 

to be considered by these committees. Ombudsmen, PACs, and special commissions have proven 

to be critical elements of parliamentary oversight 

and therefore should be provided stronger mandates 

and funding.

Africa’s Regional Economic Communities can 

also play vital roles in improving democratic oversight of the armed forces. Various security-oriented 

bodies—such as the Economic Community of West 

African States Committee of Chiefs of Defence, 

Staff Council of Elders, the Defense and Security 

Commission, and similar entities at other Regional 

Economic Communities—offer valuable venues to 

identify practical ways to institutionalize democratic 

“international partners must 

broaden their engagement 

beyond narrow ‘train and equip’ 

paradigms of devising security 

assistance to meet operational 

needs and focus more on overall 

governance and accountability”
7

practices in the security sector. For instance, to better manage former military officers’ roles in politics, 

these committees and councils could devise guidelines for enhanced asset disclosures of military leaders and moratoriums on running for office once they 

have retired from active duty.

These and other criteria could even provide the 

basis for a security sector peer review along the lines 

of the African Peer Review Mechanism, a now 10-

year old initiative that publicizes multiple in-depth 

assessments of a range of governance indicators in 

African states. 

More generally, African states also need to 

ratify the AU Charter on Democracy. Once ratified by 15 members—10 have done so thus far—

this will strengthen the legal framework to prevent 

unconstitutional actions and creeping coups on 

the continent.

International partners must broaden their engagement beyond narrow “train and equip” paradigms of devising security assistance to meet operational needs and focus more on overall governance 

and accountability. Specifically, security partnerships should favor those countries that are more 

democratic and therefore more likely to contribute 

to regional stability. Directing security assistance to 

countries with more effective oversight mechanisms 

will, likewise, better ensure that funds and transfers 

are used responsibly.

In the end, consolidating democracy requires 

positive and productive civil-military relations. 

Contrary to most assumptions, such changes can be 

achieved to the mutual benefit of civilian and military communities. Democratic oversight of the security services is difficult to realize, but the benefits to 

regional, national, and human security that accrue 

from it are substantial and long lasting.

Notes

1

 James Karuhanga, “RDF Expects Over 15,000 Tonnes of 

Cassava Harvest,” New Times (Rwanda), March 29, 2011.

2

 Rafael Marques de Morais, “Angola: The Presidency—the 

Epicentre of Corruption,” Pambazuka News, August 5, 2010.

3

 Stanley Nkwazema and Sufuyan Ojeifo, “Mark Lists 

Challenges of National Security,” This Day (Nigeria), August 

20, 2008.

4

 Mathurin C. Houngnikpo, Guarding the Guardians:CivilMilitary Relations and Democratic Governance in Africa (Burlington, 

VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2010).

5

 Bruce M. Russett and John R. O’Neal, Triangulating Peace: 

Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations (New 

York: Norton, 2001).

6

 “Togo: Armed Forces,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Review—West 

Africa, IHS Global Insight, November 11, 2011.

7

 “Ethiopia Defence Spending Irrational,” South African 

Press Agency, May 1, 2005.

8

 Ben Magahy, Dominic Scott, and Mark Pyman, Defence 

Corruption Risk In Sub-Saharan Africa: An Analysis of Data Relating Corruption in Defence Establishments to Development Outcomes 

(London: Transparency International, 2009), 32.

9

 Ibid., 28.

10 Joel D. Barkan, “Legislative Power in Emerging African 

Democracies,” in Legislative Power in Emerging African Democracies, ed. Joel D. Barkan (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2009), 

242.

11 Sarah Brierley, “Ghana Country Report,” Centre for Social 

Science Research, University of Cape Town, 2010, 4, available at 

<www.africanlegislaturesproject.org/sites/africanlegislaturesproject.

org/files/Ghana%20Country%20Report%20final.pdf>.

12 Mariya Gorbanova and Leah Wawro, The Tranparency of 

National Defence Budgets (London: Transparency International, 

2011).

13 Wuyi Omitoogun, “A Synthesis of Case Studies,” in Budgeting for the Military Sector in Africa: The Processes and Mechanisms 

of Control, ed. Wuyi Omitoogun and Eboe Hutchful (London: Oxford University Press, 2006), 250–251.

14 Magahy, Scott, and Pyman, 21.

15 Nthabiseng Ngozwana, “Good Practice Guide for Public 

Accounts Committees in SADC,” Southern Africa Development 

Community Organisation of Public Accounts Committees, August 

2009, available at <www.sadcopac.org/modules/documents/index.

php%3Faction%3Ddownloadfile%26filename%3DSADCOPAC%

2520GOOD%2520PRACTICE%2520GUIDE.pdf>.

16 Staffan I. Lindberg with Yongmei Zhou, “Co-optation Despite Democratization in Ghana,” in Legislative Power in Emerging 

African Democracies, 158.

17 “Country Report—Uganda,” Countries at the Crossroads 

2006 (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2006). 

18 Joseph Siegle et al., Africa and the Arab Spring: A New 

Era of Democratic Expectations, Africa Center for Strategic Studies 

(ACSS) Special Report No. 1 (Washington, DC: ACSS, November 2011).
8

Africa Center for 

Strategic Studies

Director: Ambassador William 

M. Bellamy (Ret.)

National Defense University

300 Fifth Avenue, Building 21

Fort Lesley J. McNair

Washington, DC 20319-5066

Phone: + 1 202-685-7300

Web site: www.africacenter.org

Africa Center 

Regional Office 

in Dakar

Deputy Regional Manager: 

Claude Toze 

Phone: 221 33 869 61 60

Email: TozeC@ndu.edu

Africa Center 

Regional Office 

in Addis Ababa

Regional Manager:

Brad Anderson 

Phone: 251 11 517 4000 

Email: AndersonBG@state.gov

Africa Security Briefs

Editor: Joseph Siegle, Ph.D.

Phone: + 1 202-685-6808

Email: Sieglej@ndu.edu

The Africa Security Briefs series presents research and analysis 

by ACSS experts and outside scholars with the aim of advancing 

understanding of African security issues. The opinions, conclusions, 

and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of 

the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 

U.S. Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal 

Government. For more information on ACSS, visit the Web site at 

http://www.africacenter.org.

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) supports the 

development of U.S. strategic policy toward Africa by providing highquality academic programs, undertaking policy-relevant research and 

analysis, and fostering awareness of and open dialogue on U.S. strategic 

priorities and African security issues. Toward these aims, the ACSS 

is committed to building networks of African, American, European, 

and international military and civilian leaders and articulating African 

perspectives to U.S. policymakers.

AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

http://www.africacenter.org

ISSN 2164-4047

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